Categories

ARISTOTLE
384–322 BC

Categories

Κατηγορίαι

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited



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Categories · Aristotle (384–322 BC)

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INTRODUCTION

The *Categories* is a short treatise on the most basic kinds of things there are, and on how we speak about them. It has stood at the head of Aristotle's works on logic since antiquity, and for two thousand years it was the first book of philosophy that students read.

Aristotle sorts everything that is said "without combination" into ten highest kinds: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, having, acting and being acted on. His favorite examples are homely ones—a particular man, a particular horse, "white", "in the Lyceum", "yesterday". At the base of it all stands substance, and above all the individual thing, "this man" or "this horse", which is neither said of anything else nor present in anything else; everything else is either said of such things or present in them.

The last chapters, on opposites, priority, simultaneity, change and the senses of "having", were long read as an appendix, and some scholars have doubted they belong to the work. The vocabulary coined here—substance and accident, genus and species, the categories themselves—became the common language of medieval and modern philosophy.

Categories

Aristotle sorts what there is into ten kinds, with individual substance at the foundation.

CHAPTER 1

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1a	ὉΜΩΝΥΜΑ λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον. Τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος· ἂν γάρ τις ἀποδιδῷ τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει. Συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς. Ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς κοινῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται ζῷον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὸν ἑκατέρου λόγον, τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει.	Things are called homonymous when only the name is common to them, but the definition (account) of the being that corresponds to the name is different. For example, both a man and a picture are "animals." These have only the name in common, while the definition of the being that corresponds to the name is different. If someone is to say what being an animal is for each of them, he will give a distinctive definition for each. Things are called synonymous when both the name is common to them and the definition of the being that corresponds to the name is the same. For example, both a man and an ox are animals. A man and an ox are each called by a common name, "animal," and the definition of the being is also the same. If someone gives the definition of each, saying what being an animal is for each of them, he will give the same definition.[1]
	Παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπό τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοὔνομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.	Things are called paronymous when they get their name from something else, with a difference in ending. For example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, and the courageous man from courage.[2]

THINGS SAID AND THINGS THAT ARE

Aristotle separates expressions in combination from those without, and sorts beings by being said of or in a subject.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.	Of things that are said, some are said in combination, others without combination. Those in combination are like "man runs" and "man wins"; those without combination are like "man," "ox," "runs," "wins."
Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ'	Of the things there are, some are said of a subject but are not in any subject. For example, man is

1 The Greek *zōon* means both "animal" and "picture" (a painted figure), hence the example. Homonymous and synonymous things are what the later tradition calls things named "equivocally" and "univocally."

GREEK	ENGLISH
ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστι· τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω, ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν), οἷον ἡ τὶς γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δ' οὐδενὸς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν τῷ σώματί ἐστιν (ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι), καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται· τὰ δὲ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τε [1b] λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται τῆς γραμματικῆς· τὰ δὲ οὔτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ τὶς ἵππος· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται.	said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By "in a subject" I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) For example, the individual grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all color is in a body), but is not said of any subject. Some are both said of a subject [1b] and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is said of a subject, grammar. Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example the individual man or the individual horse. Nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject.
1b Ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ κατ' οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι· ἡ γάρ τις γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται.	Things that are individual and one in number are, without exception, not said of any subject. But nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject: the individual grammar is one of the things in a subject, yet it is not said of any subject.

PREDICATION AND DIFFERENTIAE

What is said of a predicate is said of its subject; genera not ranked together have different differentiae.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ' ἑτέρου κατηγορῆται ὡς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται, οἷον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ ζῷον· ὁ γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῷον.	When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, everything said of what is predicated will also be said of the subject. For example, man is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man. So animal will also be predicated of the individual man, since the individual man is both a man and an animal.
Τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί, οἷον ζῴου καὶ ἐπιστήμης· ζῴου μὲν γὰρ διαφοραὶ τό τε πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον, ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων· οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης τῷ δίπους εἶναι. Τῶν δέ γε ὑπ' ἄλληλα γενῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς διαφορὰς εἶναι· τὰ γὰρ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ γενῶν κατηγορεῖται, ὥστε ὅσαι τοῦ κατηγορουμένου διαφοραί εἰσι, τοσαῦται καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἔσονται.	Where genera are different and not ranked one under the other, their differentiae are also different in species. Take animal and knowledge. Footed, two-footed, winged and aquatic are differentiae of animal, but none of these is a differentia of knowledge: one knowledge does not differ from another by being two-footed. But where genera are ranked one under the other, nothing prevents their differentiae from being the same. The higher genera are predicated of those under them, so that all the differentiae of what is predicated will be differentiae of the subject as well.

2 Paronymous things are those traditionally said to be named "derivatively."

THE TEN CATEGORIES

Everything said without combination signifies substance, quantity, quality, relative, where, when, position, having, acting or being acted on.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν· πρός τι δὲ [2a] οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον· ποῦ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, ἐν ἀγορᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ οἷον ἐχθές, πέρυσιν· κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται, κάθηται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεται, καίεται. Ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει λέγεται ἢ ἀποφάσει, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις γίνεται.	Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or quality or a relative or where or when or being in a position or having or acting or being acted on. To give a rough idea: substance is, for example, man, horse; quantity, for example, two cubits long, three cubits long; quality, for example, white, grammatical; a relative, [2a] for example, double, half, greater; where, for example, in the Lyceum, in the marketplace; when, for example, yesterday, last year; being in a position, for example, is lying down, is sitting; having, for example, has shoes on, is armed; acting, for example, cuts, burns; being acted on, for example, is cut, is burned. None of the things mentioned is said, itself by itself, in any affirmation or denial. It is by the combination of these with one another that an affirmation or denial comes about.[3]
2a	Ἅπασα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἤτοι ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι· τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ	For every affirmation and denial, it seems, is either true or false, whereas none of the things said without any combination is either true or false: for example, "man," "white," "runs," "wins."

SUBSTANCE

Primary substance is the individual; species and genera are secondary substances, and everything else depends on primary substances.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος. Δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον· δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσίαι, οἷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον. Φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ κατηγορεῖταί γε τοὔνομα· τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις.	Substance, in the most proper, primary and fullest sense of the word, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, for example the individual man or the individual horse. Secondary substances are the species in which the things primarily called substances belong, and also the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and the genus of the species is animal. So these are called secondary substances, for example man and animal. It is clear from what has been said that, for things said of a subject, both the name and the definition must be predicated of the subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, and

3 The Lyceum was a gymnasium just outside Athens, where Aristotle taught.

GREEK	ENGLISH
	the name is indeed predicated: you will predicate man of the individual man.
Καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται· ὁ γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῷον. Ὥστε καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου κατηγορηθήσεται. Τῶν δ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων οὔτε τοὔνομα οὔθ' ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τοὔνομα μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαί ποτε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὂν τῷ σώματι κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται), ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ σώματος κατηγορηθήσεται. Τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν.	The definition of man will also be predicated of the individual man, since the individual man is both a man and an animal. So both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject. But with things that are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition is predicated of the subject. In some cases nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated of the subject, but the definition cannot be. For example, white, which is in a subject, the body, is predicated of the subject (a body is called white), but the definition of white will never be predicated of a body. All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or are in them as subjects.
Τοῦτο δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων, οἷον τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται· οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ ζῷον· εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδενὸς [2b] τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως. Πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως. Ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. Μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.	This is clear from particular cases taken up one by one. For example, animal is predicated of man, so it will also be predicated of the individual man; for if it were predicated of none [2b] of the individual men, it would not be predicated of man at all. Again, color is in body, so it is also in an individual body; for if it were not in some one of the particular bodies, it would not be in body at all. So all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or are in them as subjects. Therefore, if the primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.
2b Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους· ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν. Ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος ἀποδιδοὺς ἢπερ τὸ γένος, οἷον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἂν ἀποδοίη ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ κοινότερον. Καὶ τὸ τὶ δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἀποδώσει δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ φυτόν. Ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι λέγονται.	Of the secondary substances, the species is more a substance than the genus, since it is nearer to the primary substance. If someone is to say what the primary substance is, he will give a more informative and more appropriate answer by giving the species than by giving the genus. For example, in saying what the individual man is, he would be more informative in saying "man" than in saying "animal," since the first is more distinctive of the individual man and the second more general. And in saying what the individual tree is, he will be more informative in saying "tree" than in saying "plant." Further, the primary substances are called substances most of all because they underlie all the other things, and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them.
Ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος ἔχει· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ	And just as the primary substances stand to all the other things, so the species stands to the genus.

GREEK

εἶδος τῷ γένει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ εἴδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει. Ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσία. Αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι γένη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσεις κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἵππου τὸν ἵππον. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐσία ἢ ὁ τὶς βοῦς.

Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται· μόνα γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων. Τὸν γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδοὺς οἰκείως ἀποδώσει καὶ γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὅ τι ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις, ἀλλοτρίως ἔσται ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ τρέχει ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς. Ὥστε εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτα μόνα οὐσίαι λέγονται. Ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κυριώτατα οὐσίαι [3a] λέγονται. Ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται.

3a Τὸν γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς γραμματικόν· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῷον γραμματικὸν ἐρεῖς. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη οὐσία οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται· τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φανερὸν μὲν καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. Ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῷον καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ. Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων τὸ μὲν ὄνομα οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαί ποτε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον.

ENGLISH

The species underlies the genus: the genera are predicated of the species, but the species do not reciprocate by being predicated of the genera. So on these grounds too the species is more a substance than the genus. But among species themselves, the ones that are not genera, no one is more a substance than another. You will not give a more appropriate answer about the individual man by saying "man" than about the individual horse by saying "horse." In the same way, among the primary substances no one is more a substance than another: the individual man is no more a substance than the individual ox.

It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, the species and genera alone of all the other things should be called secondary substances, since of all the things predicated they alone reveal the primary substance. If someone is to say what the individual man is, he will answer appropriately by giving the species or the genus, and he will make it more informative by giving "man" than "animal." But whatever else he gives, his answer will be foreign to the question, for example if he says "white" or "runs" or anything else of that kind. So it is reasonable that these alone of the other things should be called substances. Further, it is because the primary substances underlie all the other things that they are called substances [3a] in the most proper sense. And just as the primary substances stand to all the other things, so the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest, for all the rest are predicated of them.

You will call the individual man grammatical, and so you will also call both man and animal grammatical. And it is the same with the other cases.

It is common to every substance not to be in a subject. The primary substance is neither in a subject nor said of a subject. As for the secondary substances, it is obvious in the following way too that they are not in a subject. Man is said of the individual man as subject, but is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man. Likewise animal is said of the individual man as subject, but animal is not in the individual man. Further, with things that are in a subject, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated of the subject, but the definition cannot be.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν κατηγορεῖται καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τοὔνομα· τὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις, καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῴου ὡσαύτως. Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. Οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τοῦτο τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. Τὸ γὰρ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ δίπουν ἢ τὸ πεζόν. Καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ κατηγορεῖται ὁ τῆς διαφορᾶς, καθ' οὗ ἂν λέγηται ἡ διαφορά, οἷον εἰ τὸ πεζὸν κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ πεζοῦ κατηγορηθήσεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· πεζὸν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.	But with the secondary substances, both the definition and the name are predicated of the subject: you will predicate the definition of man of the individual man, and likewise the definition of animal. So substance could not be one of the things in a subject. This is not distinctive of substance, however; the differentia too is one of the things not in a subject. Footed and two-footed are said of man as subject but are not in a subject: two-footed or footed is not in man. And the definition of the differentia is predicated of whatever the differentia is said of. For example, if footed is said of man, the definition of footed will also be predicated of man, since man is footed.
	Μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένοις ὄντα τοῖς ὅλοις, μή ποτε ἀναγκασθῶμεν οὐκ οὐσίας αὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐλέγετο τὰ ὡς μέρη ὑπάρχοντα ἔν τινι.	We need not be troubled by the parts of substances, as though they were in their wholes as subjects, and worry that we might be forced to say that they are not substances. When we spoke of things in a subject, we did not mean things that belong to something as parts.
	Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὸ πάντα συνωνύμως ἀπ' αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι. Πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κατηγορίαι ἤτοι κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται ἢ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν. Ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας οὐδεμία ἐστὶ κατηγορία· κατ' οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται· τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου. [3b] Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται. Καὶ τὸν λόγον δὲ ἐπιδέχονται αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν τῶν γενῶν, καὶ τὸ εἶδος δὲ τὸν τοῦ γένους· ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν διαφορῶν λόγον ἐπιδέχεται τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ ἄτομα.	It is a feature of substances and of differentiae that everything called after them is called synonymously. All the predications from them are predicated either of the individuals or of the species. From the primary substance there is no predication, since it is said of no subject. Of the secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, and the genus both of the species and of the individual. [3b] Likewise the differentiae are predicated both of the species and of the individuals. And the primary substances admit the definition of their species and of their genera, and the species admits the definition of its genus; for everything said of what is predicated will also be said of the subject. Likewise the species and the individuals admit the definition of the differentiae.[4]
3b	Συνώνυμα δέ γε ἦν ὧν καὶ τοὔνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν συνωνύμως λέγεται.	Synonymous things, as we said, were those that have both the name in common and the same definition. So everything called after substances and after differentiae is called synonymously.
	Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει· ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι	Every substance seems to signify a "this." With the primary substances it is indisputable and true that they signify a "this," since what they reveal is individual and one in number. With the secondary substances, when someone says "man" or "anim-

4 "Predication" translates *katēgoria,* the word that gives the *Categories* its name; as a technical term it is rendered "category."

GREEK

σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ ἔν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον. Οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ ποιόν τι σημαίνει, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν. Τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορίζει· ποιὰν γάρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει.

Ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τῷ γένει ἢ τῷ εἴδει τὸν ἀφορισμὸν ποιεῖται· ὁ γὰρ ζῷον εἰπὼν ἐπὶ πλεῖον περιλαμβάνει ἢ ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

ENGLISH

al," it looks from the shape of the name as though they signify a "this" in the same way. But that is not true. Rather, each signifies something qualified, since the subject is not one, as the primary substance is: man and animal are said of many things. Yet it does not simply signify something qualified, as white does. White signifies nothing but something qualified, whereas the species and the genus mark off the qualified with regard to substance: they signify a substance qualified in a certain way.[5]

But the genus marks off more widely than the species: someone who says "animal" takes in more than someone who says "man."

THE MARKS OF SUBSTANCE

Substance has no contrary and admits no more and less, but one and the same substance can receive contraries.

GREEK

Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. Τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ οὐσίᾳ τί ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ τινὶ ζῴῳ; οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον. Οὐδέ γε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ ζῴῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον. Οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τοῦτο τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ· τῷ γὰρ διπήχει ἢ τριπήχει οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οὐδέ γε τοῖς δέκα, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, εἰ μή τις τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη ἐναντίον εἶναι ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ. Τῶν δὲ ἀφωρισμένων ποσῶν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον ἐστίν.

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. Λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐσία οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον οὐσία καὶ ἧττον οὐσία (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἔστιν), ἀλλ' ὅτι ἑκάστη οὐσία τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστίν, οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Οἷον εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἕτερος ἑτέρου· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ τὸ [4a] λευκὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλόν ἐστι καὶ ἧττον λευκόν, καὶ καλὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον καλὸν καὶ ἧττον λέγεται. Καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, οἷον τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν ὂν μᾶλλον λευκὸν εἶναι λέγεται νῦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ θερμὸν ὂν μᾶλλον θερμὸν καὶ ἧττον λέγεται.

4a Ἡ δέ γε οὐσία οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον νῦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ πρότερον λέγεται,

ENGLISH

It also belongs to substances that nothing is contrary to them. What would be contrary to a primary substance, for example to the individual man or the individual animal? Nothing is contrary to it. Nor is anything contrary to man or to animal. This is not distinctive of substance, however; it holds of many other things too, for example of quantity. Nothing is contrary to two cubits long or three cubits long, nor to ten, nor to anything of that kind, unless someone were to say that much is contrary to little, or large to small. But of definite quantities none is contrary to any other.

Substance seems not to admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance, or less a substance, than another (we have said that it is), but that no substance is called more or less just what it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more or less a man, either than itself or than another man. One man is not more a man than another, in the way that [4a] one white thing is more or less white than another, and one beautiful thing is called more or less beautiful than another. A thing is also called more or less than itself: for example, a body that is white is said to be whiter now than before, and one that is hot is called more or less hot.

But substance is not called more or less. A man is not called more a man now than before, nor is any

GREEK

οὐδέ γε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν, ὅσα ἐστὶν οὐσίαι. Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.

Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν, οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις τὸ τοιοῦτο προενεγκεῖν, ὅσα μή εἰσιν οὐσίαι, ὃ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα, ὅ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, οὐκ ἔσται λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, οὐδὲ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ οὐκ ἔσται φαύλη καὶ σπουδαία· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα μή εἰσιν οὐσίαι. Ἡ δέ γε οὐσία ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέλας γίνεται, καὶ θερμὸς καὶ ψυχρός, καὶ φαῦλος καὶ σπουδαῖος.

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ μή τις ἐνίσταιτο τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φάσκων τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικά. Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἀληθὴς εἴη ὁ λόγος τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος λόγος ψευδὴς ἔσται. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης· εἰ γάρ τις ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ψευδῶς δοξάσει, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχων περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαν. Εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο παραδέχοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τρόπῳ διαφέρει. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστί· ψυχρὸν γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ γενόμενον μετέβαλεν (ἠλλοίωται γάρ) καὶ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ σπουδαῖον ἐκ φαύλου. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μεταβολὴν δεχόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν.

Ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκίνητα πάντῃ πάντως διαμένει, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος κινουμένου τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ αὐτὰ γίνεται· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος διαμένει ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, τοῦ δὲ [4b] πράγματος κινηθέντος ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὴς ὁτὲ δὲ ψευδὴς λέγεται. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης. Ὥστε τῷ τρόπῳ γε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς μεταβολὴν δεκτικὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι. Εἰ δέ τις καὶ ταῦτα παραδέχοιτο, τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς τοῦτο. Ὁ γὰρ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ δέχεσθαί τι τῶν

ENGLISH

of the other things that are substances. So substance would not admit of a more and a less.

What seems most distinctive of substance is that, while remaining one and the same in number, it is able to receive contraries. Among the other things, the ones that are not substances, no one could produce anything that, being one in number, is able to receive contraries: for example, a color that is one and the same in number will not be white and black, nor will one and the same action, one in number, be base and worthy; and it is the same with the other things that are not substances. But substance, while remaining one and the same in number, is able to receive contraries. For example, the individual man, being one and the same, becomes pale at one time and dark at another, hot and cold, base and worthy.

With none of the other things does this appear to be so, unless someone were to object by saying that a statement and a belief are able to receive contraries. For the same statement seems to be both true and false. If, for example, the statement that someone is sitting is true, then once he has stood up this same statement will be false. It is the same with belief: if someone truly believes that someone is sitting, then once that person has stood up he will believe falsely, while holding the same belief about him. But even if one were to accept this, there is still a difference in the way it happens. In the case of substances, the things are able to receive contraries by changing themselves. What has become cold from hot has changed (it has been altered), and so has what has become black from white, or worthy from base. Likewise with the others: each of them is able to receive contraries by itself undergoing change.

But the statement and the belief themselves remain entirely unchanged in every way; it is because the actual thing changes that the contrary comes to hold of them. The statement that someone is sitting remains the same, but when the [4b] actual thing has changed, the statement is called true at one time and false at another. It is the same with belief. So, in the way it happens at least, it would be distinctive of substance to be able to receive contraries by a change in itself. Yet even if

5 A "this" is a definite individual, something that can be pointed out.

GREEK

ENGLISH

ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὰ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ περὶ ἕτερόν τι τὸ πάθος γεγενῆσθαι.

someone were to accept this too, that a statement and a belief are able to receive contraries, it is not true. For a statement and a belief are said to be able to receive contraries not because they themselves receive anything, but because the affection has come about in something else.

4b Τῷ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, τούτῳ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι λέγεται, οὐ τῷ αὐτὸς δεκτικὸς εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐθὲν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε ὁ λόγος κινεῖται οὔτε ἡ δόξα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς γινομένου πάθους. Ἡ δέ γε οὐσία τῷ αὐτὴ τὰ ἐναντία δέχεσθαι, τούτῳ δεκτικὴ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι λέγεται· νόσον γὰρ καὶ ὑγίειαν δέχεται, καὶ λευκότητα καὶ μελανίαν· καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αὐτὴ δεχομένη τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὴ λέγεται. Ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν οὐσίας εἴη τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς μεταβολήν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν οὐσίας τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

It is because the actual thing is so or is not so that the statement is said to be true or false, not because the statement itself is able to receive contraries. For, quite simply, neither a statement nor a belief is itself changed in any way by anything. So they would not be able to receive contraries, since no affection comes about in them. Substance, on the other hand, is said to be able to receive contraries because it itself receives the contraries: it receives sickness and health, whiteness and blackness, and it is by itself receiving each such thing that it is said to be able to receive contraries. So it would be distinctive of substance that, while being one and the same in number, it is able to receive contraries by a change in itself. So much, then, for substance.

QUANTITY

Quantities are discrete or continuous, and their parts either have position relative to one another or do not.

GREEK

ENGLISH

Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν. Ἔστι δὲ διωρισμένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχὲς δὲ οἷον γραμμή, ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μορίων οὐδείς ἐστι κοινὸς ὅρος, πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, οἷον τὰ πέντε εἰ ἔστι τῶν δέκα μόριον, πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει τὰ πέντε καὶ τὰ πέντε, ἀλλὰ διώρισται· καὶ τὰ τρία γε καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει· οὐδ' ὅλως ἂν ἔχοις ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ κοινὸν ὅρον λαβεῖν τῶν μορίων, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ διώρισται· ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν.

Of quantity, some is discrete and some continuous. Some consists of parts that have position in relation to one another, and some of parts that do not have position. Discrete quantities are, for example, number and speech; continuous ones are line, surface, body, and besides these, time and place. The parts of a number have no common boundary at which they join. For example, if five is a part of ten, the two fives do not join at any common boundary but are separate; nor do three and seven join at any common boundary. In general, you could not find a common boundary between the parts of a number: they are always separate. So number is one of the discrete quantities.

Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ποσόν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, φανερόν· καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῇ βραχείᾳ καὶ μακρᾷ. Λέγω δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν μετὰ φωνῆς λόγον γιγνόμενον. Πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι κοινὸς ὅρος πρὸς ὃν αἱ συλλαβαὶ συνάπτουσιν, ἀλλ' ἑκάστη διώρισται αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν. 5a Ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχής ἐστιν· ἔστι γὰρ

Likewise speech is one of the discrete quantities. That speech is a quantity is obvious, since it is measured in short and long syllables. I mean speech that is spoken aloud. Its parts do not join at any common boundary: there is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate, itself by itself. 5a A line, on the other

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λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον πρὸς ὃν τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς συνάπτει, στιγμήν, καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας γραμμήν· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχοις ἂν λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον, γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν, πρὸς ἃ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια συνάπτει.

5a Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ τόπος τῶν τοιούτων· ὁ γὰρ νῦν χρόνος συνάπτει πρὸς τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα. Πάλιν ὁ τόπος τῶν συνεχῶν ἐστί· τόπον γάρ τινα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια κατέχει, ἃ πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει· οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου μόρια, ἃ κατέχει ἕκαστον τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων, πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον συνάπτει πρὸς ὃν καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια. Ὥστε συνεχὴς ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ τόπος· πρὸς γὰρ ἕνα κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει.

Ἔτι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν, οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν κεῖταί που, καὶ ἔχοις ἂν διαλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι ὅπου ἕκαστον κεῖται ἐν τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ πρὸς ποῖον μόριον τῶν λοιπῶν συνάπτει. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια θέσιν ἔχει τινά· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἀποδοθείη ἕκαστον οὗ κεῖται, καὶ ποῖα συνάπτει πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ τὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου. Ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ θέσιν τινὰ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ κεῖταί που, ἢ ποῖά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα συνάπτει τῶν μορίων.

Οὐδὲ τὰ τοῦ χρόνου· ὑπομένει γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ χρόνου μορίων· ὃ δὲ μή ἐστιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου τὸ δ' ὕστερον. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως τῷ τὸ ἓν πρότερον ἀριθμεῖσθαι τῶν δύο καὶ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν· καὶ οὕτω τάξιν τινὰ ἂν ἔχοι, θέσιν δὲ οὐ πάνυ λάβοις ἄν. Καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὡσαύτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑπομένει τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' εἴρηταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦτο λαβεῖν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη θέσις τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ, εἴγε μηδὲν ὑπομένει. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων τῶν μορίων συνέστηκε, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν.

Κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα μόνα λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ 5b ἀποβλέποντες καὶ τἆλλα ποσὰ λέγομεν, οἷον πολὺ τὸ

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hand, is continuous. You can find a common boundary at which its parts join, namely a point; and for a surface, a line, since the parts of a plane join at some common boundary. Likewise in the case of a body you could find a common boundary, a line or a surface, at which the parts of the body join.

Time and place are also of this kind. Present time joins with past and future. Place, again, is one of the continuous quantities. The parts of a body occupy some place, and they join at some common boundary. So the parts of the place that each of the parts of the body occupies also join at the same boundary as the parts of the body do. So place too would be continuous, since its parts join at one common boundary.

Further, some quantities consist of parts that have position in relation to one another, and others of parts that do not have position. For example, the parts of a line have position in relation to one another: each of them lies somewhere, and you could distinguish and state where each lies in the plane and which of the other parts it joins. Likewise the parts of a plane have some position, since one could state in the same way where each lies and which parts join one another. The same goes for the parts of a solid and the parts of a place. But in the case of a number, one could not show that its parts have any position in relation to one another, or lie somewhere, or which of its parts join one another.

Nor can one do so with the parts of time. None of the parts of time endures, and how could what does not endure have any position? You would rather say that they have a certain order, in that one part of time is prior and another posterior. It is the same with number, in that one is counted prior to two, and two prior to three. In this way number would have a certain order, but you would scarcely find position in it. Speech is the same: none of its parts endures, but once a part has been said it can no longer be caught, so its parts would have no position, given that none of them endures. So some quantities consist of parts that have position, and others of parts that do not.

Only the things mentioned are called quantities in the proper sense; all the others are so called accidentally. It is with an eye 5b to these that we call

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λευκὸν λέγεται τῷ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν πολλὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις μακρὰ τῷ γε τὸν χρόνον πολὺν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ κίνησις πολλή. Οὐ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον τούτων ποσὸν λέγεται. Οἷον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις πόση τις ἡ πρᾶξίς ἐστι, τῷ χρόνῳ ὁριεῖ, ἐνιαυσιαίαν ἢ οὕτω πως ἀποδιδούς. Καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ποσόν τι ἀποδιδοὺς τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ὁριεῖ· ὅση γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια ᾖ, τοσοῦτον καὶ τὸ λευκὸν φήσειεν ἂν εἶναι. Ὥστε μόνα κυρίως καὶ καθ' αὑτὰ ποσὰ λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

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the others quantities too. For example, there is said to be much white because the surface is large, an action is called long because the time taken is long, and a change, too, is called long. None of these is called a quantity in its own right. For example, if someone is to say how long an action is, he will define it by the time, saying that it lasts a year or something of the sort. And in saying how much white there is, he will define it by the surface: however large the surface is, that is how much he would say the white is. So only the things mentioned are called quantities properly and in their own right. None of the others is a quantity in its own right, but, if at all, accidentally.

5b

Ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον. Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀφωρισμένων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ διπήχει ἢ τριπήχει ἢ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τινί· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ. Τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεσθαι, οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τῶν ὁμογενῶν. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἡ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ εἴγε καθ' αὑτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὸ μὲν ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη.

Further, nothing is contrary to a quantity. In the case of definite quantities it is obvious that nothing is contrary, for example to two cubits long or three cubits long, or to a surface, or to anything of that kind. Nothing is contrary to them, unless someone were to say that much is contrary to little, or large to small. But none of these is a quantity; they are relatives. Nothing is called large or small itself by itself, but only by being referred to something else. For example, a mountain is called small and a millet seed large, because the seed is larger than others of its kind and the mountain smaller than others of its kind. So the reference is to something else; for if a thing were called small or large itself by itself, a mountain would never be called small or a millet seed large.

Πάλιν ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ φαμὲν πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγους πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ πολλούς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους πολλῷ πλείους ὄντας. Ἔτι τὸ μὲν δίπηχυ καὶ τρίπηχυ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ποσὸν σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν οὐ σημαίνει ποσὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρός τι· πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον θεωρεῖται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν. Ἔτι ἐάν τε τιθῇ τις ταῦτα ποσὰ εἶναι ἐάν τε μὴ τιθῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον οὐδέν· ὃ γὰρ μή ἐστιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται, πῶς ἂν φαίη τις τούτῳ τι ἐναντίον;

Again, we say that there are many people in the village but few in Athens, though there are many times as many there; and that there are many in the house but few in the theater, though there are far more there. Further, two cubits long, three cubits long and everything of that kind signify a quantity, while large or small does not signify a quantity but rather a relative, since large and small are viewed in relation to something else. So it is obvious that these are relatives. Further, whether one counts them as quantities or not, nothing is contrary to them. How could anyone say that something is contrary to what cannot be taken itself by itself, but is referred to something else?

ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἔσται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἐναντία, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι καὶ αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία. Συμβαίνει γάρ ποτε ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ μέγα τε

Further, if large and small are to be contraries, it will turn out that the same thing admits contraries simultaneously, and that things are contrary to

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καὶ μικρὸν εἶναι· ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο μικρόν, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο μέγα. Ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι συμβαίνει· ὥστε ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δοκεῖ 6a ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας· δεκτικὴ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὔτι γε ἅμα νοσεῖ καὶ ὑγιαίνει. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν ἐστὶν ἅμα. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεται. Καὶ αὐτὰ δ' ἑαυτοῖς συμβαίνει ἐναντία εἶναι.

6a Εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἅμα μέγα καὶ μικρόν, αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ εἴη ἂν ἐναντίον. Ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ. Ὥστε εἰ καὶ μὴ τῶν πρός τι ταῦτά τις ἐρεῖ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ, οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ἕξει.

Μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τόπον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν. Τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον τιθέασι, τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι. Ἐοίκασι δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων ὁρισμὸν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπιφέρειν· τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται.

Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οἷον τὸ δίπηχυ· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον δίπηχυ. Οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον τὰ τρία τῶν πέντε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὰ τρία, οὐδὲ τὰ πέντε τῶν τριῶν. Οὐδὲ χρόνος ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον χρόνος εἶναι λέγεται. Οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅλως οὐδενὸς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον λέγεται. Ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.

Ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι. Ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ποσῶν ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, οἷον σῶμα καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, καὶ χρόνος καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ῥηθέντων ἕκαστον ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται. Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι ποσά, οὐ πάνυ ἂν δόξαι ἴσα τε καὶ ἄνισα λέγεσθαι, οἷον ἡ διάθεσις οὐ πάνυ ἴση τε καὶ ἄνισος λέγεται, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον οὐ πάνυ, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον. Ὥστε

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themselves. For it sometimes turns out that the same thing is simultaneously both large and small: it is small in relation to this thing, but this same thing is large in relation to another. So it turns out that the same thing is both large and small at the same time, and so admits contraries simultaneously. But nothing seems 6a to admit contraries simultaneously. Take substance: it seems to be able to receive contraries, yet no one is sick and healthy at the same time. Nor is anything white and black at the same time. Nor is there anything else that admits contraries simultaneously. And it also turns out that things are contrary to themselves.

For if large is contrary to small, and the same thing is simultaneously large and small, it would be contrary to itself. But it is impossible for anything to be contrary to itself. So large is not contrary to small, nor much to little. So even if someone says that these are not relatives but quantities, they will have no contrary.

But it is in the case of place that there seems most of all to be a contrariety of quantity. For people treat up as contrary to down, calling the region toward the center "down," because the distance from the center to the limits of the world is greatest. And they seem to derive their definition of the other contraries from these as well, for they define as contraries the things within the same genus that are farthest apart from one another.

Quantity does not seem to admit of a more and a less. Take two cubits long: one thing is not more two cubits long than another. Nor with number: three is no more three than five is five, nor is five more five than three is three. Nor is one time called more a time than another. In general, none of the things mentioned is called more or less. So quantity does not admit of a more and a less either.

What is most distinctive of quantity is that it is called equal and unequal. Each of the quantities mentioned is called both equal and unequal. For example, a body is called both equal and unequal, and a time both equal and unequal. It is the same with each of the other things mentioned. But the remaining things, the ones that are not quantities, would hardly seem to be called equal and un-

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τοῦ ποσοῦ μάλιστα ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.	equal. For example, a condition is hardly called equal or unequal, but rather similar; and white is hardly equal or unequal, but similar. So it would be most distinctive of quantity to be called equal and unequal.

RELATIVES

Relatives are things said to be what they are of something else, like double and half or slave and master.

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Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ λέγεται μεῖζον· καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται· 6b τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον λέγεται. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διάθεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις. Πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι· ἡ γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ θέσις τινὸς θέσις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως.	We call relatives all things that are said to be just what they are of other things, or in some other way in relation to something else. For example, the greater is said to be just what it is of something else, since it is called greater than something; and the double is said to be just what it is of something else, 6b since it is called double of something. It is the same with all other such things. The following are also relatives: state, condition, perception, knowledge, position. All of these are said to be just what they are of other things, and not something else: a state is called a state of something, knowledge knowledge of something, a position the position of something, and so on with the rest.
6b Πρός τι οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον ὄρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον· πρός τι γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος· καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρός τι λέγεται. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάκλισις καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ καθέδρα θέσεις τινές, ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν πρός τι. Τὸ δὲ ἀνακεῖσθαι ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις, παρωνύμως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων θέσεων λέγεται.	Relatives, then, are those things that are said to be just what they are of other things, or in some other way in relation to something else. For example, a mountain is called large in relation to something else, since the mountain is called large relative to something. The similar is called similar to something, and the other things of this kind are called relative in the same way. Further, lying, standing and sitting are particular positions, and position is a relative. But to be lying, to be standing or to be sitting are not themselves positions; they are called paronymously from the positions just mentioned.
Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον, ἑκάτερον ὂν τῶν πρός τι, καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοίᾳ. Οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρός τι ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐναντίον· τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τῷ τριπλασίῳ, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί.	There is also contrariety among relatives. For example, excellence is contrary to vice, each of them being a relative, and knowledge to ignorance. But not every relative has a contrary: nothing is contrary to double, nor to triple, nor to anything of that kind.
Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρός τι· ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόμοιον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν· τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τινὶ ἀνόμοιον. Οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι	Relatives also seem to admit of a more and a less. Similar and dissimilar are called more and less, and equal and unequal are called more and less, each of them being a relative, since the similar is called similar to something and the dissimilar dis-

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ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διπλάσιον, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.	similar to something. But not all relatives admit of a more and a less: double is not called more or less double, nor is anything of that kind.

CORRELATIVES THAT RECIPROCATE

Every relative reciprocates with its correlative, provided the correlative is named properly, even if a new name must be coined.

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Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέγεται καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μείζονος ἔλαττον. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν, ἐὰν μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ, ἀλλὰ διαμάρτῃ ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ.	All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate. For example, the slave is called slave of a master, and the master master of a slave; the double double of a half, and the half half of a double; the greater greater than a less, and the less less than a greater. It is the same with the others, except that the wording will sometimes differ in grammatical case. For example, knowledge is called knowledge of the knowable, and the knowable knowable by knowledge; perception perception of the perceptible, and the perceptible perceptible by perception. Sometimes, though, they will not seem to reciprocate, when what they are spoken of in relation to is not given appropriately and the person giving it makes a mistake. For example, if a wing is given as a wing of a bird, it does not reciprocate: a bird is not a bird of a wing.
Οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ [7a] πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ τὸ πτερὸν αὐτοῦ λέγεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ πτερωτόν ἐστι· πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων πτερά ἐστιν, ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες. Ὥστε ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτόν. Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνοματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ οἰκείως ἂν ἀποδοθείη, οἷον τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πλοίου ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ, οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πλοῖον, ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ τὸ πηδάλιον λέγεται· ἔστι γὰρ πλοῖα ὧν οὐκ ἔστι πηδάλια. Διὸ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· τὸ γὰρ πλοῖον οὐ λέγεται πηδαλίου πλοῖον. Ἀλλ' ἴσως οἰκειοτέρα ἂν ἡ ἀπόδοσις εἴη, εἰ οὕτω πως ἀποδοθείη, τὸ πηδάλιον πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδάλιον, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως· ὄνομα γὰρ οὐ κεῖται.	That is because it was not given appropriately in the [7a] first place, as wing of a bird. It is not insofar as it is a bird that the wing is said to be its wing, but insofar as it is winged, since many other things that are not birds have wings too. So if it is given appropriately, it does reciprocate: the wing is wing of the winged, and the winged is winged by a wing. Sometimes it may even be necessary to coin a name, if there is no established name in relation to which it could be given appropriately. For example, if a rudder is given as rudder of a boat, the way it is given is not appropriate. It is not insofar as it is a boat that the rudder is said to be its rudder, since there are boats that have no rudders. That is why it does not reciprocate: the boat is not called boat of a rudder. But perhaps it would be given more appropriately if it were put something like this: the rudder is rudder of the ruddered, or in some other such way, since there is no established name.
7a Καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, ἐὰν οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ· τὸ γὰρ πηδαλιωτὸν πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ οἰκειοτέρως ἂν ἀποδοθείη κεφαλωτοῦ ἢ ζῴου ἀποδιδομένη· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ζῷον, κεφαλὴν	And it does reciprocate if given appropriately: the ruddered is ruddered by a rudder. It is the same in other cases. For example, a head would be more appropriately given as head of the headed than as

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ἔχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζῴων κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔχει. Οὕτω δὲ ῥᾷστα ἂν ἴσως τις λάβοι οἷς μὴ κεῖται ὀνόματα, εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπὸ τοῦ πτεροῦ τὸ πτερωτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πηδαλίου τὸ πηδαλιωτόν. Πάντα οὖν τὰ πρός τι, ἐάν περ οἰκείως ἀποδιδῶται, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει.

head of an animal, since it is not insofar as it is an animal that a thing has a head: many animals have no head. This is perhaps the easiest way to find names where none are established: derive names from the original terms and apply them to the correlatives that reciprocate with them, as in the examples above, "winged" from "wing" and "ruddered" from "rudder." All relatives, then, provided they are given appropriately, are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate. If they are given in relation to some chance thing, and not to the very thing they are spoken of in relation to, they do not reciprocate.

Λέγω δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγομένων, καὶ ὀνομάτων αὐτοῖς κειμένων, οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέφει, ἐὰν πρός τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου ἢ δίποδος ἢ ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσίς ἐστιν.

I mean that even among things admitted to be spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, and for which names are established, none reciprocates if it is given in relation to something accidental and not to the very thing it is spoken of in relation to. For example, if a slave is given as slave not of a master but of a man, or of a two-footed thing, or of anything of that kind, it does not reciprocate, since it has not been given appropriately.

Ἔτι δ' ἐὰν μέν τι οἰκείως ἀποδεδομένον ᾖ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστί, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τούτου πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη οἰκείως, ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος ἐὰν πρὸς δεσπότην λέγηται, περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ, οἷον τὸ δίποδι εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῷ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος [7b] λέγεται. Ἐὰν δέ γε μὴ οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ πρὸς ὅ ποτε λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη, οὐ ῥηθήσεται πρὸς αὐτό.

Further, if something has been given appropriately in relation to what it is spoken of in relation to, then when everything else that is accidental is stripped away and only the thing it was appropriately given in relation to is left, it will always be spoken of in relation to that. For example, if a slave is spoken of in relation to a master, then when everything accidental to the master is stripped away, such as being two-footed, being able to receive knowledge and being a man, and only being a master is left, the slave will always be spoken of in relation to it, since the slave is called slave of a master. [7b] But if it is not given appropriately in relation to whatever it is spoken of in relation to, then when the other things are stripped away and only the thing it was given in relation to is left, it will not be spoken of in relation to that.

7b Ἀποδεδόσθω γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ πτερὸν ὄρνιθος, καὶ περιῃρήσθω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δεσπότην αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ῥηθήσεται· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος δεσπότου οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν. Ὡσαύτως καὶ τοῦ ὄρνιθος περιῃρήσθω τὸ πτερωτῷ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ πτερὸν τῶν πρός τι· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος πτερωτοῦ οὐδὲ πτερὸν ἔσται τινός. Ὥστε δεῖ μὲν ἀποδιδόναι πρὸς ὅ ποτε οἰκείως λέγεται. Κἂν μὲν ὄνομα ᾖ κείμενον, ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίνεται· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ὀνοματοποιεῖν. Οὕτω δὲ ἀποδιδομένων

Let a slave be given as slave of a man, and a wing as wing of a bird, and let being a master be stripped away from the man. The slave will no longer be spoken of in relation to a man, for if there is no master, there is no slave either. In the same way, let being winged be stripped away from the bird. The wing will no longer be a relative, for if there is nothing winged, the wing will not be the wing of anything either. So one must give each thing in relation to whatever it is appropriately

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φανερὸν ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται.

Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστιν. Ἅμα γὰρ διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστι· καὶ δεσπότου ὄντος δοῦλός ἐστι, καὶ δούλου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Καὶ συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστι διπλάσιον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα. Οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν πρός τι ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ τὸ ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν πρότερον ἂν δόξειε τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι. Ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προϋπαρχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν· ἐπ' ὀλίγων γὰρ ἂν ἢ ἐπ' οὐδενὸς ἴδοι τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γινομένην.

Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ· ἐπιστητοῦ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη), ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι, οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸς εἴγε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδέπω, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιστητόν ἐστιν. Ἔτι ζῴου μὲν ἀναιρεθέντος οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη, τῶν δ' ἐπιστητῶν πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔχει. Τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πρότερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως δοκεῖ εἶναι. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ.

Αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις περὶ σῶμα καὶ ἐν σώματί εἰσιν, αἰσθητοῦ δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος ἀναιρεῖται [8a] καὶ τὸ σῶμα (τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν τὸ σῶμα), σώματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὥστε συναναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν. Ἡ δέ γε αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ· ζῴου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος αἴσθησις μὲν ἀναιρεῖται, αἰσθητὸν δὲ ἔσται, οἷον σῶμα, θερμόν, γλυκύ, πικρόν, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν αἰσθητά. Ἔτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητικῷ γίνεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ζῴῳ γίνεται καὶ αἴσθησις· τὸ δέ γε αἰσθητόν ἐστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ἢ αἴσθησιν εἶναι· πῦρ γὰρ

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spoken of in relation to. If a name is established, this is easy; if not, it may be necessary to coin one. When they are given in this way, it is obvious that all relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate.

Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature, and in most cases this is true. Double and half are simultaneous: when there is a half there is a double, when there is a master there is a slave, and when there is a slave there is a master; and the other cases are similar to these. These also do away with each other: if there is no double there is no half, and if there is no half there is no double; and it is the same with the other such cases. But it does not seem true of all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature. The knowable would seem to be prior to knowledge, since for the most part we acquire knowledge of things that already exist. In few cases, if any, would one see knowledge coming into being simultaneously with the knowable.

Further, the knowable, when done away with, does away with knowledge along with it, but knowledge does not do away with the knowable along with it. If there is no knowable, there is no knowledge (there will be nothing for it to be knowledge of), but if there is no knowledge, nothing prevents there being a knowable. For example, the squaring of the circle, if indeed it is knowable: there is as yet no knowledge of it, but it is itself knowable. Further, if animal is done away with, there will be no knowledge, but many of the knowables may still exist. The case of perception is similar to these, since the perceptible seems to be prior to perception. The perceptible, when done away with, does away with perception along with it, but perception does not do away with the perceptible along with it.[6]

Perceptions are concerned with body and are in body. If the perceptible is done away with, body [8a] is done away with too (since body is one of the perceptibles), and if there is no body, perception is done away with too. So the perceptible does away with perception along with it. But perception does not do away with the perceptible along with it. If animal is done away with, perception is done away with, but there will still be perceptibles,

6 Squaring the circle means constructing a square equal in area to a given circle, a famous unsolved problem of Greek geometry.

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	καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ ζῷον συνίσταται, ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ὅλως εἶναι ἢ αἴσθησιν, ὥστε πρότερον ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι δόξειεν.	such as body, hot, sweet, bitter and all the other things that are perceptible. Further, perception comes into being simultaneously with what is able to perceive, since perception comes into being simultaneously with the animal. But the perceptible exists even before there is an animal or perception: fire and water and the like, from which the animal itself is composed, exist even before there is any animal at all, or perception. So the perceptible would seem to be prior to perception.

CAN A SUBSTANCE BE RELATIVE?

Aristotle asks whether heads and hands are relatives, and sharpens the definition so that no substance is.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
8a	Ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν πότερον οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, ἢ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατά τινας τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν. Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀληθές ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ μέρη πρός τι λέγεται. Ὁ γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινός τις ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ τὶς βοῦς τινός τις βοῦς. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη· ἡ γάρ τις χεὶρ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις χεὶρ ἀλλά τινος χείρ, καὶ ἡ τὶς κεφαλὴ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις κεφαλὴ ἀλλά τινος κεφαλή. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, ἐπί γε τῶν πλείστων, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ βοῦς τινὸς βοῦς, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον τινὸς ξύλον, ἀλλά τινος κτῆμα λέγεται.	There is a problem as to whether no substance is spoken of as a relative, as is commonly thought, or whether this is possible with some secondary substances. With primary substances it is true, for neither wholes nor parts are spoken of in relation to something. The individual man is not called some individual man of something, nor is the individual ox called some individual ox of something. The same goes for parts. An individual hand is not called some individual hand of something but someone's hand, and an individual head is not called some individual head of something but someone's head. The same holds for secondary substances, at least for most of them. Man, for example, is not called man of something, nor ox ox of something, nor timber timber of something. It is called something's property.
	Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρός τι· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν, οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ τινὸς λέγεται κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τινὸς λέγεται χεὶρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρός τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἢ τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ δεῖξαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, ἴσως ἂν ῥηθείη τι πρὸς αὐτά. Ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμὸς παρακολουθεῖ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πρός τι, οὐ μὴν ταὐτόν γέ ἐστι τῷ πρός τι αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι.	With things like these, then, it is evident that they are not relatives. With some secondary substances, though, there is room for dispute. For example, a head is called someone's head, a hand someone's hand, and so with each thing of this kind, so that these would seem to be relatives. If the definition of relatives has been adequately given, it is either very difficult or impossible to show that no substance is spoken of as a relative. But if it has not been adequately given, and relatives are those things for which being is the same as being somehow related to something, then perhaps something could be said in reply. The earlier definition does apply to all relatives, but for them being relative is not the same as being said to be just what they are of other things.

GREEK

Ἐκ δὲ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἴσεται. Φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐστίν. Εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε τι ὅτι ἔστι τῶν πρός τι, ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πρός τι ταὐτὸν τῷ 8b πρός τί πως ἔχειν, κἀκεῖνο οἶδε πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅλως πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει, οὐδ' εἰ πρός τί πως ἔχει εἴσεται. Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ δῆλον τὸ τοιοῦτον, οἷον τόδε τι εἰ οἶδε ἀφωρισμένως ὅτι ἔστι διπλάσιον, καὶ ὅτου διπλάσιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως οἶδεν· εἰ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀφωρισμένων οἶδεν αὐτὸ διπλάσιον, οὐδ' εἰ διπλάσιόν ἐστιν ὅλως οἶδεν.

ENGLISH

From this it is clear that if someone knows any relative definitely, he will also know definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of. This is evident from the cases themselves too. For if someone knows of this particular thing that it is a relative, and being, for relatives, is the same as 8b being somehow related to something, he also knows that to which it is somehow related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is somehow related, he will not know whether it is somehow related to something either. The point is clear in particular cases as well. For example, if someone knows definitely of this particular thing that it is double, he also knows at once, definitely, what it is double of. For if he knows it to be double of nothing definite, he does not know whether it is double at all.

8b Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτου κάλλιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι διὰ ταῦτα. Οὐκ ἀορίστως δὲ εἴσεται ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι χείρονος κάλλιον· ὑπόληψις γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο γίνεται, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀκριβῶς εἴσεται ὅτι ἐστὶ χείρονος κάλλιον. Εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, οὐδέν ἐστι χεῖρον αὐτοῦ. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὃ ἂν εἰδῇ τις τῶν πρός τι ἀφωρισμένως, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀφωρισμένως εἰδέναι. Τὴν δέ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ἃ εἰσιν οὐσίαι, αὐτὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένως ἔστιν εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. Τίνος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἡ χείρ, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδέναι ὡρισμένως. Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι.

Likewise, if he knows of this particular thing that it is more beautiful, it follows from this that he must also know at once, definitely, what it is more beautiful than. He will not know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something worse, for that sort of thing is supposition, not knowledge. He will no longer know exactly that it is more beautiful than something worse, because, as it may turn out, there is nothing worse than it. So it is evident that if someone knows any relative definitely, he must also know definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of. But the head and the hand and each thing of that kind, which are substances, can be known definitely as to just what they are, while that in relation to which they are spoken of need not be. For whose this head is, or whose the hand, cannot be known definitely. So these would not be relatives.

Εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν. Ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπεσκεμμένον· τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ' ἑκάστου αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν.

And if these are not relatives, it would be true to say that no substance is a relative. It is perhaps hard to make confident pronouncements on such matters without having examined them many times. Still, to have gone through the difficulties about each of them is not useless.

QUALITY

Quality has several kinds: states and conditions, natural capacities, affective qualities and affections, and shape.

GREEK

Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες εἶναι λέγονται. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων. Ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. Διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολὺ χρονιώτερον εἶναι

ENGLISH

By a quality I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehow. Quality is one of the things spoken of in several ways. Let us call

GREEK

καὶ μονιμώτερον. Τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ, ἐάν περ μὴ μεγάλη μεταβολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ' εὐμετάβολον.

Διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἃ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· διάκειται μὲν γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γενόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ [9a] νοσεῖν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύοι. Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἕξεις λέγειν, ἃ ἐστι πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ δυσκινητότερα· τοὺς γὰρ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντας ἀλλ' εὐκινήτους ὄντας οὔ φασιν ἕξιν ἔχειν, καίτοι διάκεινταί γέ πως κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον.

9a Ὥστε διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιωτέραν τε καὶ δυσκινητοτέραν. Εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διάκεινταί γέ πως κατ' αὐτάς, οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν.

Ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ' ὃ πυκτικοὺς ἢ δρομικοὺς ἢ ὑγιεινοὺς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται. Οὐ γὰρ τῷ διακεῖσθαί γέ πως ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ποιὸν λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν, οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως λέγονται ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως, ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ῥᾳδίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων. Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν λέγεται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ

ENGLISH

one species of quality, then, states and conditions. A state differs from a condition in being much more lasting and more stable. Such are the branches of knowledge and the excellences. Knowledge seems to be one of the things that are lasting and hard to shift, even if someone has acquired it only moderately, unless some great change comes about through illness or something else of the kind. So too excellence, such as justice or moderation or anything of the kind, does not seem easy to shift or easy to change.

Conditions, on the other hand, are what we call things that are easily shifted and change quickly, for example heat and chill, illness and health, and so on. A man is in a certain condition with respect to these, but he changes quickly, becoming cold instead of hot and passing from being healthy to [9a] being ill. The same holds for the others, unless one of these very conditions should happen, through length of time, to have already become part of a man's nature and incurable, or very hard to shift. Then one might perhaps call it a state by now. It is evident that people mean by states those things that are more lasting and harder to shift. For those who have no firm hold on their branches of knowledge, but are easily shifted, are not said to have a state, though they are in a certain condition, worse or better, with respect to knowledge.

So a state differs from a condition in that a condition is easily shifted, while a state is more lasting and harder to shift. States are also conditions, but conditions are not necessarily states. Those who have states are also in a certain condition in virtue of them, but those who are in a certain condition do not in every case have a state as well.

Another genus of quality is that in virtue of which we call people boxers or runners, healthy or sickly. In general, it covers whatever is spoken of in virtue of a natural capacity or incapacity. Each of these is called qualified not by being in a certain condition, but by having a natural capacity or incapacity to do something easily or to be unaffected. For example, people are called boxers or runners not by being in a certain condition, but by having a natural capacity to do something easily. They are called healthy by having a natural capacity not to be easily affected by whatever befalls them, and sickly by having a natural incapacity

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ῥᾳδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου.

not to be easily affected by whatever befalls them. The hard and the soft are similar. The hard is so called by having a capacity not to be easily divided, the soft by having an incapacity for this same thing.

Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη. Ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιάδε οἷον γλυκύτης τε καὶ πικρότης καὶ στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, ἔτι δὲ θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗται ποιότητές εἰσι, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα αὐτὰ ποιὰ λέγεται κατ' αὐτάς, οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέχθαι γλυκὺ λέγεται καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα δεδέχθαι· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. Παθητικαὶ δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς [9b] ποιότητας πεπονθέναι τι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.

A third genus of quality is affective qualities and affections. Such are, for example, sweetness, bitterness and sourness and everything akin to them, as well as heat and coldness, whiteness and blackness. That these are qualities is evident, because the things that have received them are called qualified in virtue of them. Honey, for example, is called sweet by having received sweetness, and a body white by having received whiteness, and it is the same with the others. They are called affective qualities not because the things that have received the [9b] qualities have themselves been affected in some way. Honey is not called sweet because it has been affected in some way, and the same is true of everything else of that kind.

9b Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα πεπονθέναι τι, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται· ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι. Λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χροιαὶ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους γεγονέναι.

Heat and coldness are similar. They are called affective qualities not because the things that have received them have been affected in some way. Each of the qualities mentioned is called an affective quality because it produces an affection in the senses. Sweetness produces an affection in taste, and heat in touch, and the others do likewise. Whiteness and blackness and the other colors, however, are not called affective qualities in the same way as those just mentioned. They are so called because they themselves have come about from an affection.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίνονται διὰ πάθος πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆλον· αἰσχυνθεὶς γάρ τις ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεὶς ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις φύσει τῶν τοιούτων τι παθῶν πέπονθεν ἔκ τινων φυσικῶν συμπτωμάτων, τὴν ὁμοίαν χροιὰν εἰκός ἐστιν ἔχειν αὐτόν· ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ αἰσχυνθῆναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ' ἄν, ὥστε φύσει καὶ τὴν χροιὰν ὁμοίαν γίγνεσθαι. Ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων συμπτωμάτων ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε, παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται.

That many changes of color come about through an affection is plain. Someone who is ashamed turns red, someone who is frightened turns pale, and so on. So if someone is by nature subject to some such affection, arising from certain natural occurrences, it is to be expected that he will have the same color. For the very condition of the body that comes about now, in being ashamed, might also come about through one's natural constitution, so that the color too would be similar by nature. Such occurrences, then, as have taken their origin from certain affections that are hard to shift and lasting are called affective qualities.

Εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία γεγένηται, ποιότητες λέγονται (ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα), εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα τὸ αὐτὸ

Pallor or darkness may have come about in one's natural constitution, and then it is called a quality, since we are called qualified in virtue of it. Or this

GREEK

τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκαθίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ αὐταὶ λέγονται· ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα. Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί τινες κατὰ ταύτας. Οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβηθῆναι ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι. Ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ. Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέγεται.

ENGLISH

same pallor or darkness may have resulted from a long illness or from scorching heat, and not easily go away, or even last for life. Then these too are called qualities, since we are likewise called qualified in virtue of them. But what comes about from things that are easily dissolved and quickly go away is called an affection, not a quality, because people are not called qualified in virtue of these. Someone who blushes because he is ashamed is not called ruddy, nor is someone who turns pale because he is frightened called pallid. Rather, he is said to have been affected in some way. So such things are called affections, not qualities. In a similar way, there are said to be affective qualities and affections in the case of the soul as well.

Ὅσα γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων γεγένηται, ποιότητες λέγονται, οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ [10a] ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι ἐκστάσεις μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ' ἀπό τινων ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων γεγένηνται δυσαπάλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιότητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται. Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, οἷον εἰ λυπούμενός τις ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι. Ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δ' οὔ.

Whatever has come about right from birth from certain affections that are hard to shift is called a quality. Examples are the derangement of madness [10a] and anger and the like, for people are called qualified in virtue of these, being called irascible and mad. So too with derangements that are not natural but have come about from certain other occurrences, and are hard to get rid of or even cannot be shifted at all. Such things too are qualities, for people are called qualified in virtue of them. But what comes about from things that quickly go away is called an affection. An example is someone who is more irascible when he is distressed. Someone who is more irascible while in such an affection is not called irascible. Rather, he is said to have been affected in some way. So such things are called affections, not qualities.

10a Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης καὶ καμπυλότης, καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιόν ἐστιν. Καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ποιόν τι λέγεται· τὸ γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον εἶναι ποιόν τι λέγεται, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον. Καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν δὲ ἕκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται. Τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε μὲν ἂν ποιόν τι σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως· θέσιν γὰρ μᾶλλόν τινα φαίνεται τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον δηλοῦν.

A fourth genus of quality is shape and the form that belongs to each thing, together with straightness and curvedness and anything similar to these. In virtue of each of these a thing is called qualified somehow. A thing is called qualified somehow by being triangular or square, and by being straight or curved. And each thing is called qualified somehow in virtue of its form too. The rare and the dense, the rough and the smooth, might seem to signify a way of being qualified. But such things seem to be foreign to the division of quality, since each of them appears rather to indicate a certain position of the parts.

Πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μανὸν δὲ τῷ διεστάναι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· καὶ λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ'

A thing is dense because its parts are close to one another, and rare because they stand apart from one another. It is smooth because its parts lie in

GREEK	ENGLISH
εὐθείας πως τὰ μόρια κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν.	some sort of straight line, and rough because some parts stick up and others fall short.
Ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν τις φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος, ἀλλ' οἵ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν οὗτοί εἰσιν.	Perhaps some other mode of quality might come to light as well, but the ones most commonly spoken of are roughly these.
Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ' αὐτῶν. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρωνύμως λέγεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος λευκὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παρωνύμως ἀπ' αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι οἷον δρομικὸς ἢ πυκτικὸς ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος [10b] παρωνύμως λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι καθ' ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται, ὥσπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καθ' ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ κατὰ διάθεσιν λέγονται· πυκτικὴ γὰρ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δ' ἀπὸ τούτων παρωνύμως οἱ διακείμενοι λέγονται.	These, then, are qualities. Qualified things are those called paronymously after them, or in some other way from them. In most cases, practically all, they are called paronymously. From whiteness, for example, a thing is called white, from grammar grammatical, from justice just, and likewise with the others. In some cases, though, no names are established for the qualities, and so things cannot be called paronymously after them. For example, the runner or the boxer, so called in virtue of a natural capacity, is not called paronymously after any quality. [10b] No names are established for the capacities in virtue of which these people are called qualified. It is otherwise with the branches of knowledge in virtue of which people are called boxers or wrestlers by condition. Boxing and wrestling are spoken of as branches of knowledge, and those in that condition are called qualified paronymously after them.
10b Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνόματος κειμένου οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν ποιὸν λεγόμενον, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος· τῷ γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ' οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς. Οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. Ποιὰ τοίνυν λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ' αὐτῶν.	Sometimes, even when a name is established, what is called qualified in virtue of the quality is not called paronymously. An example is the worthy man, so called from excellence. He is called worthy by having excellence, but not paronymously from excellence. This does not happen in many cases, though. Qualified things, then, are those called paronymously after the qualities mentioned, or in some other way from them.

FEATURES OF QUALITY

Qualities admit contraries and a more and a less; what is distinctive of quality is likeness and unlikeness.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανίᾳ καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ κατ' αὐτὰς ποιὰ λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ ἄδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. Οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ πυῤῥῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύταις χροιαῖς οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν. Ἔτι δέ, ἐὰν τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ᾖ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον προχειριζομένῳ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀδικία·	There is contrariety in the case of quality too. Justice, for example, is contrary to injustice, whiteness to blackness, and so on. The things called qualified in virtue of them are contrary as well, the unjust to the just, and the white to the black. But this is not so in every case. Nothing is contrary to tawny or pale or such colors, though they are qualified. Further, if one of two contraries is qualified, the other will be qualified too. This is clear if one runs through the other categories. For

GREEK

οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἐφαρμόσει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ποσὸν οὔτε τὸ πρός τι οὔτε ποῦ οὔθ' ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν.

Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναντίων.

Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά. Λευκὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ δίκαιον ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. Καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει· λευκὸν γὰρ ὂν ἔτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι. Οὐ πάντα δέ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα. Δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης εἰ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων. Ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ φασὶ δεῖν λέγεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας, ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειαν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἕτερον [11a] ἑτέρου, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γραμματικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας διαθέσεις.

11a Ἀλλ' οὖν τά γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον· γραμματικώτερος γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ ὑγιεινότερος καὶ δικαιότερος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. Τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων σχημάτων οὐδέν. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τριγώνου λόγον ἢ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ' ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ κύκλοι εἰσί, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου ῥηθήσεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον τοῦ ἑτερομήκους κύκλος ἐστίν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου λόγον. Ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. Οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιὰ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.

Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἴδιον ποιότητος, ὅμοια δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ καθ' ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν. Ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον λέγεσθαι κατ' αὐτήν.

Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι, μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν πρός

ENGLISH

example, if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is a quality, then injustice is a quality too. None of the other categories will fit injustice, whether quantity or relative or where or anything of that sort at all. Only quality fits it.

And the same holds for the other contraries in the case of quality.

Qualified things also admit of a more and a less. One thing is called more white or less white than another, and one thing more just than another. And the thing itself can increase in this respect, since something that is white can become whiter still. Not all do, however, but most. One might raise the question whether one justice is called more or less justice than another, and similarly with the other conditions. Some people dispute about such cases. They say that justice should not at all be called more or less justice than justice, nor health than health. But they say that one person has less health than another, and one person less justice than [11a] another, and likewise with grammar and the other conditions.

At any rate, the things called qualified in virtue of these indisputably admit of a more and a less. One person is called more grammatical than another, healthier, more just, and the same holds for the rest. But triangle and square do not seem to admit of the more, nor does any other shape. Things that admit the definition of the triangle or of the circle are all equally triangles or circles. Of things that do not admit it, none will be called more so than another. A square is no more a circle than an oblong is, since neither admits the definition of the circle. In short, unless both admit the definition of what is under discussion, one will not be called more so than the other. So not all qualified things admit of a more and a less.

None of the features mentioned, then, is distinctive of quality. But things are called like and unlike in virtue of qualities alone. One thing is not like another in virtue of anything except that in virtue of which it is qualified. So it would be distinctive of quality that things are called like and unlike in virtue of it.

We should not be troubled if someone says that, having set out to discuss quality, we are counting many relatives along with it, since we said that

GREEK	ENGLISH
τι εἶναι ἐλέγομεν. Σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδέν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, γένος οὖσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται (τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται), τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς γραμματικὴ οὐδ' ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται τῶν πρός τι λέγονται, οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματική, καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη λέγεται, οὐ τινὸς μουσική. Ὥστε αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.	states and conditions are relatives. In practically all such cases the genera are spoken of in relation to something, but none of the particular ones is. Knowledge, which is a genus, is said to be just what it is of something else, since it is called knowledge of something. But none of the particular ones is said to be just what it is of something else. Grammar, for example, is not called grammar of something, nor music music of something. If at all, these too are spoken of as relatives in virtue of their genus. Grammar is called knowledge of something, not grammar of something, and music is called knowledge of something, not music of something. So the particular ones are not relatives.
Λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ ταῖς καθ' ἕκαστα· ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν· ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά. Ὥστε αὗται ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν, αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα, καθ' ἃς ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα· αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι. Ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνοι τὸ αὐτὸ πρός τι καὶ ποιὸν ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι.	It is by the particular ones that we are called qualified, since these are the ones we have. We are called knowledgeable by having one of the particular branches of knowledge. So these would be qualities too, the particular ones in virtue of which we are sometimes called qualified, and these are not relatives. Further, if the same thing should happen to be both a relative and qualified, there is nothing absurd in counting it in both genera.

ACTING, BEING ACTED ON, AND THE REST

Acting and being acted on admit contraries and degrees; the remaining categories need no further discussion.

GREEK	ENGLISH
11b Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἐναντιότητα καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνειν τῷ ψύχειν ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι τῷ ψύχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῷ λυπεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἐπιδέχεται ἐναντιότητα. Καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἧττον· θερμαίνειν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔστι, καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Ἐπιδέχεται οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν.	Acting and being acted on also admit of contrariety and of a more and a less. Heating is contrary to cooling, being heated to being cooled, and being pleased to being pained, so they admit of contrariety. They also admit of a more and a less, for one can heat more and less, and be heated more and less. So acting and being acted on admit of a more and a less.
Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα λέγεται· εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, ὅτι παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν θέσεων λέγεται. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, τοῦ τε ποτὲ καὶ τοῦ ποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλο λέγεται ἢ ὅσα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐρρέθη, ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν μὲν σημαίνει τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι, τὸ ὡπλίσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποῦ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐρρέθη.	This much, then, is said about these. Being in a position was also discussed in the section on relatives, where it was said to be spoken of paronymously from positions. The rest, when, where and having, are obvious, so nothing more is said about them than what was said at the beginning. There we said that having signifies having shoes on or being armed, and that where signifies, for example, "in the Lyceum." The other things said about them there also stand.

FOUR KINDS OF OPPOSITES

Things are opposed as relatives, as contraries, as privation and possession, or as affirmation and denial.

GREEK

Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθεν ἀντικεῖσθαι, ῥητέον. Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις. Ἀντίκειται δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν ὡς μὲν τὰ πρός τι, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τῷ ἡμίσει, ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὡς δὲ τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον τυφλότης καὶ ὄψις, ὡς δὲ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, οἷον κάθηται — οὐ κάθηται.

ENGLISH

About the genera that were proposed, what has been said is enough. We must now speak about opposites, and about the number of ways in which things are customarily opposed. One thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways: as relatives, as contraries, as privation and possession, or as affirmation and denial. To put it in outline, each of these is opposed as follows. As relatives, for example, the double is opposed to the half. As contraries, the bad is opposed to the good. As privation and possession, blindness is opposed to sight. As affirmation and denial, "he is sitting" is opposed to "he is not sitting."

Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτά, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἑτέρου διπλάσιον λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον. Καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ λέγεταί γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ. Καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀντικείμενον λέγεται, τὴν ἐπιστήμην· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τινὶ λέγεται ἐπιστητόν, τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

Things opposed as relatives are said to be just what they are of their opposites, or are related to them in some other way. The double, for example, is said to be just what it is, double, of something else, for it is double of something. Knowledge too is opposed to the knowable as relatives are, and knowledge is said to be just what it is of the knowable. The knowable too is said to be just what it is in relation to its opposite, knowledge, for the knowable is said to be knowable by something, namely by knowledge.

Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι, αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται. Τὰ δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται, ἐναντία μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἐναντίον, οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος λευκόν, ἀλλ' ἐναντίον. Ὥστε διαφέρουσιν αὗται αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἀλλήλων. Ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν [12a] ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον. Ὧν δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον πάντως, οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ ζῴου σώματι, ἢ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν.

Things opposed as relatives, then, are said to be just what they are of other things, or are in some way or other spoken of in relation to one another. Things opposed as contraries, however, are in no way said to be just what they are in relation to one another, though they are called contraries of one another. The good is not called good of the bad, but its contrary. Nor is the white called white of the black, but its contrary. So these oppositions differ from one another. Some contraries are such [12a] that one or the other of them must belong to the things in which they naturally occur, or of which they are predicated, and these have nothing in between. But with those of which it is not necessary that one or the other belong, there is always something in between. For example, illness and health naturally occur in an animal's body, and one or the other must belong to an animal's body, either illness or health.

12a

GREEK

Καὶ περιττὸν δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον. Καὶ οὐκ ἔστι γε τούτων οὐδὲν ἀνὰ μέσον, οὔτε νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου. Ὧν δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἤτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν. Καὶ φαῦλον δὲ καὶ σπουδαῖον κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατὰ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν ἂν κατηγορῆται· οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἤτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπουδαῖά ἐστιν.

Καὶ ἔστι γέ τι τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ τὸ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα χρώματα, τοῦ δὲ φαύλου καὶ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε φαῦλον οὔτε σπουδαῖον. Ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ τὸ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα χρώματα· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ ὀνόματι μὲν οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται, οἷον τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον.

ENGLISH

Odd and even too are predicated of number, and one or the other must belong to a number, either odd or even. And there is nothing in between either pair, whether illness and health or odd and even. But with those of which it is not necessary that one or the other belong, there is something in between. Black and white, for example, naturally occur in body, but it is not necessary that one or the other of them belong to body, since not every body is either white or black. Base and worthy too are predicated both of man and of many other things, but it is not necessary that one or the other of them belong to the things they are predicated of. Not all things are either base or worthy.

And there is something in between these. Between white and black there are, for example, gray and pale and all the other colors. Between base and worthy there is what is neither base nor worthy. In some cases names are established for the intermediates, as with gray and pale and all the other colors between white and black. In others it is not easy to supply a name for the intermediate, and so it is defined by the denial of each of the extremes. Examples are "neither good nor bad" and "neither just nor unjust."

PRIVATION AND POSSESSION

Blindness and sight are neither relatives nor contraries, and change runs only from possession to privation.

GREEK

Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν· καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἕξις πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν. Ἐστερῆσθαι δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ἕξεως δεκτικῶν, ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ. Νωδόν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν· τινὰ γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχει οὔτε ὀδόντας, ἀλλ' οὐ λέγεται οὔτε νωδὰ οὔτε τυφλά. Τὸ δὲ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν οὐκ ἔστι στέρησις καὶ ἕξις.

Ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, στέρησις δὲ ἡ τυφλότης· τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι

ENGLISH

Privation and possession are spoken of in connection with the same thing. Sight and blindness, for example, are spoken of in connection with the eye. To put it universally, each of them is spoken of in connection with that in which the possession naturally occurs. Something capable of receiving a possession is said to be deprived of it when the possession is in no way present in that in which it naturally belongs, at the time when it is natural for the thing to have it. We do not call something toothless just because it has no teeth, or blind just because it has no sight. We use those words for what does not have them when it is natural for it to have them. Some things have neither sight nor teeth from birth, yet they are not called toothless or blind. Being deprived and having the possession are not privation and possession.

Sight is a possession, and blindness a privation. But having sight is not sight, nor is being blind

GREEK

τυφλότης. Στέρησις γάρ τίς ἡ τυφλότης ἐστὶν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν εἶναι ἐστερῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησίς ἐστιν. Ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ τυφλότης ταὐτὸν τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι, κατηγορεῖτο ἂν ἀμφότερα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης [12b] δὲ οὐδαμῶς λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν, ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις· ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυφλότης τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται.

12b Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατάφασις λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατικός, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι λόγος. Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός. Ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθηται τῷ οὐ κάθηται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὑφ' ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι τῷ μὴ καθῆσθαι.

Ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου. Ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ' ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται. Ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τυφλότης λέγοιτ' ἂν τυφλότης ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μὲν ὄψεως ἡ τυφλότης λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ λέγεται. Ἔτι τὰ πρός τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τυφλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρός τι, ἀντέστρεφεν ἂν κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις τυφλότητος ὄψις.

Ὅτι δὲ οὐδ' ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν λεγόμενα, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἀεί· τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου. Ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ ὑπάρχειν θάτερον· οὔτε γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε ψυχρόν· τούτων γὰρ ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν.

ENGLISH

blindness. Blindness is a certain privation, whereas being blind is being deprived, not a privation. Further, if blindness were the same as being blind, both would be predicated of the same thing. But a man is called blind, while a man is in no way called [12b] blindness. Yet these too, being deprived and having the possession, seem to be opposed as privation and possession, since the mode of opposition is the same. As blindness is opposed to sight, so being blind is opposed to having sight.

Nor is what underlies an affirmation and a denial itself an affirmation and a denial. An affirmation is an affirmative statement and a denial a negative statement, whereas none of the things underlying affirmation and denial is a statement. Yet these too are said to be opposed to one another as affirmation and denial, since with them too the mode of opposition is the same. An affirmation is opposed to a denial, as "he is sitting" is opposed to "he is not sitting." In just the same way the thing underlying each is opposed to the other, his sitting to his not sitting.

That privation and possession are not opposed as relatives is evident, since neither is said to be just what it is of its opposite. Sight is not sight of blindness, nor is it spoken of in relation to blindness in any other way. Likewise, blindness would not be called blindness of sight. It is called privation of sight, but it is not called blindness of sight. Further, all relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate. So if blindness were a relative, that in relation to which it is spoken of would reciprocate with it. But it does not reciprocate, since sight is not called sight of blindness.

That things spoken of as privation and possession are not opposed as contraries either is clear from the following. With contraries that have nothing in between, one or the other must always belong to that in which they naturally occur, or of which they are predicated. For there was nothing in between in those cases where one or the other had to belong to what can receive them, as with illness and health, and odd and even. But where there is something in between, it is never necessary that one or the other belong to everything. It is not necessary that everything that can receive them be white or black, or hot or cold, because nothing prevents something in between from belonging.

GREEK

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν ἦν τῷ δεκτικῷ, εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ. Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν. Ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη [13a] τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν.

13a Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχον λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον. Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον· ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ποτε παντὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· ὅταν γὰρ ἤδη πεφυκὸς ᾖ ὄψιν ἔχειν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν ἔχον ῥηθήσεται, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως θάτερον, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τισί, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἕν.

Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κατ' οὐδέτερον τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα.

Ἔτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ δεκτικοῦ, δυνατὸν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γίνεσθαι, εἰ μή τινι φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον δυνατὸν νοσῆσαι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν μέλαν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμόν, καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ ἐκ φαύλου σπουδαῖον δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. Ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος εἰς βελτίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν μικρόν γέ τι ἐπιδοίη εἰς τὸ βελτίων εἶναι. Ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαξ κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν λάβῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ τελέως ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν λάβοι· ἀεὶ γὰρ εὐκινητότερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίνεται, κἂν ἡντινοῦν ἐπίδοσιν εἰληφὼς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾖ, ὥστε καὶ πλείω εἰκὸς ἐπίδοσιν αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γινόμενον

ENGLISH

Further, as we saw, there was something in between in those cases where it was not necessary for one or the other to belong to what can receive them. The exception was things to which one of the pair belongs by nature, as being hot belongs to fire and being white to snow. In these cases one of the two must belong definitely, and not whichever it happens to be, since fire cannot be cold, nor snow black. So it is not necessary for one of them to belong to everything [13a] that can receive them. It belongs only to those things to which one of the pair belongs by nature, and to these it is definitely one, and not whichever it happens to be.

With privation and possession, neither of these accounts is true. It is not always necessary that one or the other belong to what can receive them. Something that is not yet at the point where it is natural for it to have sight is called neither blind nor having sight. So these would not be contraries of the kind that have nothing in between. But neither are they of the kind that have something in between, since at some point one or the other of them must belong to everything that can receive them. Once a thing has reached the point where it is natural for it to have sight, it will be called either blind or having sight. And it is not definitely one of these, but whichever it happens to be. It is not necessary for it to be blind, or for it to have sight, but it is whichever it happens to be. With contraries that have something in between, however, it was never necessary that one or the other belong to everything. It belonged only to some things, and to these definitely one of the pair.

So it is clear that things opposed as privation and possession are not opposed as contraries in either of the two ways.

Further, with contraries, a change of each into the other is possible while the thing that receives them persists, unless one of the pair belongs to something by nature, as being hot belongs to fire. What is healthy can become ill, what is white black, and what is cold hot. It is also possible to become base from worthy and worthy from base. A base man who is led into better ways of spending his time and better discussions would make at least some small progress toward being better. And once he makes even a little progress, it is evident that he would either change completely or

GREEK	ENGLISH
τελείως εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἀποκαθίστησιν, ἐάν περ μὴ χρόνῳ ἐξείργηται.	make a very great deal of progress. He keeps becoming more easily moved toward excellence, even if he made only the slightest progress at first, so that it is likely he will make still more progress. When this keeps happening, it brings him over completely to the contrary state, unless he is prevented by lack of time.
Ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως ἀδύνατον εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι. Ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον. Οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός τις πάλιν ἀνέβλεψεν, οὔτε φαλακρὸς ὢν πάλιν κομήτης ἐγένετο, οὔτε νωδὸς ὢν ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν.	With possession and privation, however, a change of each into the other is impossible. Change occurs from possession to privation, but from privation to possession it is impossible. No one who has gone blind has ever seen again. No one who is bald has ever grown a full head of hair again, and no one who is toothless has ever grown teeth.

AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL

Only in affirmation and denial must one side always be true and the other false.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Ὅσα δὲ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται, 13b φανερὸν ὅτι κατ' οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ἀντίκειται· ἐπὶ γὰρ μόνων τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι. Οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως. Οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἡ νόσος ἐναντία, καὶ οὐδέτερόν γε οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν οὐδέτερον οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος. Οὐδέ γε τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης. Ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν· πάντα δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται.	As for things opposed as affirmation and denial, 13b it is evident that they are not opposed in any of the ways mentioned. With these alone it is always necessary that one of them be true and the other false. With contraries it is not always necessary that one be true and the other false. The same is true of relatives, and of possession and privation. For example, health and illness are contraries, and neither of them is either true or false. Likewise the double and the half are opposed as relatives, and neither of them is either true or false. Nor is either of the things spoken of as privation and possession, such as sight and blindness. In general, nothing spoken of without any combination is either true or false, and all the things mentioned are spoken of without combination.
13b Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειε τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναντίων λεγομένων· τὸ γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτην τῷ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην ἐναντίον ἐστίν. Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος εἶναι. Ὄντος μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτους ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην οὔτε τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους.	Still, this would seem most likely to happen with contraries spoken of in combination. "Socrates is healthy," for instance, is contrary to "Socrates is ill." But not even with these is it always necessary that one be true and the other false. If Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false. But if he does not, both will be false, since neither "Socrates is ill" nor "Socrates is healthy" is true if Socrates himself does not exist at all.[7]
Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως μὴ ὄντος τε ὅλως οὐδέτερον ἀληθές, ὄντος τε οὐκ ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθὲς θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ ὄψιν ἔχειν Σωκράτην τῷ	With privation and possession, if he does not exist at all, neither is true. And if he does exist, it is not

7 Socrates (469–399 BC), the Athenian philosopher, serves here simply as a stock example of an individual.

GREEK	ENGLISH
τυφλὸν εἶναι Σωκράτην ἀντίκειται ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, καὶ ὄντος τε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος (ὅτε γὰρ μήπω πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ), μὴ ὄντος τε ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους, καὶ οὕτω ψευδῆ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ ὄψιν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. Ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς καταφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἀεί, ἐάν τε ᾖ ἐάν τε μὴ ᾖ, τὸ ἕτερον ἔσται ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθές.	always the case that one is true and the other false. "Socrates has sight" is opposed to "Socrates is blind" as possession to privation. If he exists, it is not necessary that one of them be true and the other false, since both are false when he is not yet at the point where it is natural for him to have sight. And if Socrates does not exist at all, then too both are false, both that he has sight and that he is blind. But with affirmation and denial, one will always be false and the other true, whether he exists or not.
Τὸ γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην, ὄντος τε αὐτοῦ φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, καὶ μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ ὄντος ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀληθές. Ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀεὶ θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται.	Take "Socrates is ill" and "Socrates is not ill." If he exists, it is evident that one of them is true and the other false, and likewise if he does not exist. If he does not exist, "he is ill" is false and "he is not ill" is true. So it would be distinctive of these alone, the things opposed as affirmation and denial, that one of them is always true and the other false.

MORE ON CONTRARIES

Aristotle discusses the contraries of good and bad, and the genera to which contraries belong.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθῷ μὲν κακόν· τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ 14a ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Κακῷ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν· τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ, οὖσα ἀγαθόν. Ἐπ' ὀλίγων δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν.	The contrary of a good is necessarily a bad. This is clear by induction from particular cases. Illness is contrary to health, 14a cowardice to courage, and similarly with the others. But the contrary of a bad is sometimes a good and sometimes a bad. Deficiency, which is a bad, has as its contrary excess, which is itself a bad. Likewise the mean, which is a good, is contrary to each of them. One would see this in few cases, though. In most, the contrary of a bad is always a good.
14a Ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν θάτερον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι. Ὑγιαινόντων μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ὑγίεια μὲν ἔσται, νόσος δὲ οὔ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λευκῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων λευκότης μὲν ἔσται, μελανία δὲ οὔ. Ἔτι εἰ τὸ Σωκράτην ὑγιαίνειν τῷ Σωκράτην νοσεῖν ἐναντίον ἐστί, μὴ ἐνδέχεται δὲ ἅμα ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν ἐναντίων ὄντος καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι· ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ Σωκράτην ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην.	Further, with contraries it is not necessary, if one exists, that the other exist too. If everyone is healthy, there will be health but not illness. Likewise, if everything is white, there will be whiteness but not blackness. Further, suppose that Socrates' being healthy is contrary to Socrates' being ill, and that both cannot belong to the same thing at the same time. Then it would not be possible for the other contrary to exist when one of them exists. If Socrates' being healthy exists, Socrates' being ill would not.
Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταὐτὸν ἢ εἶδει ἢ γένει πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία. Νόσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία ἁπλῶς ἐν σώματι, δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν ψυχῇ ἀνθρώπου.	It is also clear that contraries naturally occur in connection with the same thing, either in species or in genus. Illness and health naturally occur in an animal's body, whiteness and blackness in body

GREEK	ENGLISH
	without qualification, and justice and injustice in a man's soul.
Ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι. Λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ γένος), δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος)· ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινῶν ὄντα.	All contraries must either be in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or be genera themselves. White and black are in the same genus, since color is their genus. Justice and injustice are in contrary genera, since the genus of the one is excellence and that of the other is vice. Good and bad, however, are not in a genus, but are themselves genera of certain things.

PRIOR

One thing is called prior to another in time, in implication of being, in order, in value, or as cause.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Πρότερον ἑτέρου ἕτερον λέγεται τετραχῶς, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα κατὰ χρόνον, καθ' ὃ πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω εἶναι καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται. Δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον· δυοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ἀκολούθησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν. Πρότερον δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ μὴ ἀντιστρέφει ἡ τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησις.	One thing is called prior to another in four ways. The first and most strict is in time. In this sense one thing is called older and more ancient than another, since it is called both older and more ancient because its time is greater. Second, a thing is prior when the implication of being does not reciprocate. One, for example, is prior to two. If there are two, it follows at once that there is one, but if there is one, it is not necessary that there be two. So from one the implication that the other exists does not reciprocate. And what seems to be prior is that from which the implication of being does not reciprocate.
Τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν τὸ πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων. Ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ τάξει (τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν [14b] διαγραμμάτων τῇ τάξει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραμματικῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν συλλαβῶν), ἐπί τε τῶν λόγων ὁμοίως· τὸ γὰρ προοίμιον τῆς διηγήσεως πρότερον τῇ τάξει ἐστίν.	Third, a thing is called prior with respect to a certain order, as with branches of knowledge and speeches. In the demonstrative branches of knowledge there is a prior and posterior in order. The elements are prior in order to the [14b] diagrams, and in grammar the letters are prior to the syllables. The same holds for speeches, for the introduction is prior in order to the narration.[8]
14b Ἔτι παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον πρότερον εἶναι τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ. Εἰώθασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντιμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν προτέρους φάσκειν παρ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι. Ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀλλοτριώτατος τῶν τρόπων οὗτος.	Further, besides those mentioned, what is better and more valued seems to be prior by nature. Most people are in the habit of saying that those they hold in greater honor and love more are "first" with them. This is, though, pretty much the most remote of the ways.
Οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τρόποι τοῦ προτέρου σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ	These, then, are roughly the ways in which prior is spoken of. But there might seem to be another way

8 In geometry the "elements" are the basic propositions and the "diagrams" the proofs built on them. The same Greek word for "elements" also means the letters of the alphabet.

GREEK

ἕτερος εἶναι προτέρου τρόπος· τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότερον εἰκότως τῇ φύσει λέγοιτ' ἄν. Ὅτι δ' ἔστι τινὰ τοιαῦτα, δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον. Εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε· εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.

Ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς λόγος οὐδαμῶς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μέντοι πρᾶγμα φαίνεταί πως αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται. Ὥστε κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται.

ENGLISH

of being prior besides those mentioned. Some things reciprocate as to implication of being, and the one that is in some way the cause of the other's being might reasonably be called prior by nature. That there are some such cases is clear. There being a man reciprocates as to implication of being with the true statement about it. If there is a man, the statement by which we say that there is a man is true. And it does reciprocate, for if the statement by which we say that there is a man is true, there is a man.

The true statement, however, is in no way the cause of the thing's being. But the thing does seem in some way to be the cause of the statement's being true, since it is because the thing is or is not that the statement is called true or false. So one thing is called prior to another in five ways.

SIMULTANEOUS

Things are simultaneous in time, or by nature when they reciprocate without either causing the other.

GREEK

Ἅμα δὲ λέγεται ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα, ὧν ἡ γένεσίς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ· οὐδέτερον γὰρ πρότερον οὐδὲ ὕστερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν. Ἅμα δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ταῦτα λέγεται. Φύσει δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος· ἀντιστρέφει μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα (διπλασίου γὰρ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἥμισυ καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν), οὐδέτερον δὲ οὐδετέρῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν.

Καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις ἅμα τῇ φύσει λέγεται. Ἀντιδιῃρῆσθαι δὲ λέγεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν, οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντιδιῄρηται ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα, εἵς τε τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον, καὶ οὐδέν γε τούτων πρότερον ἢ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ [15a] τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ εἶναι. Διαιρεθείη δ' ἂν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων εἰς εἴδη πάλιν, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον. Ἔσται οὖν κἀκεῖνα ἅμα τῇ φύσει, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσίν ἐστιν.

ENGLISH

Things are called simultaneous, without qualification and most strictly, when their coming to be is at the same time, since neither of them is prior or posterior. These are called simultaneous in time. Things are simultaneous by nature when they reciprocate as to implication of being but neither is in any way the cause of the other's being. The double and the half are an example. These reciprocate, since if there is a double there is a half, and if there is a half there is a double. But neither is the cause of the other's being.

Things divided against one another from the same genus are also called simultaneous by nature. Things are said to be divided against one another when they come from the same division, as winged is divided against footed and aquatic. These are divided against one another from the same genus, since animal is divided into these, into winged, footed and aquatic. None of them is prior or posterior. Rather, such things [15a] seem to be simultaneous by nature. Each of these, footed, winged and aquatic, might in turn be divided into species. The species that come from the same genus by the same division will then also be simultaneous by nature.

15a

GREEK	ENGLISH
Τὰ δὲ γένη τῶν εἰδῶν ἀεὶ πρότερα· οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον ἐνύδρου μὲν ὄντος ἔστι ζῷον, ζῴου δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔνυδρον εἶναι.	Genera, however, are always prior to species, since they do not reciprocate as to implication of being. If there is an aquatic creature, there is an animal, but if there is an animal, it is not necessary that there be an aquatic one.
Ἅμα οὖν τῇ φύσει λέγεται, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστι, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις· ἁπλῶς δὲ ἅμα, ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.	So things are called simultaneous by nature when they reciprocate as to implication of being but neither is in any way the cause of the other's being. Things divided against one another from the same genus are also simultaneous by nature. Things are simultaneous without qualification when their coming to be is at the same time.

CHANGE

There are six kinds of change; alteration is distinct from the others, and each kind has its contrary.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἴδη ἕξ, γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή.	There are six species of change: coming to be, perishing, increase, decrease, alteration, and change of place.
Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κινήσεις φανερὸν ὅτι ἕτεραι ἀλλήλων εἰσίν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις φθορὰ οὐδέ γε ἡ αὔξησις μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν, μή ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον κατά τινα τῶν λοιπῶν κινήσεων ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστι· σχεδὸν γὰρ κατὰ πάντα τὰ πάθη ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἡμῖν οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων κοινωνοῦσιν· οὔτε γὰρ αὔξεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κατὰ πάθος κινούμενον οὔτε μειοῦσθαι, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσθ' ἑτέρα ἂν εἴη παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κινήσεις ἡ ἀλλοίωσις· εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ αὐτή, ἔδει τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον εὐθὺς καὶ αὔξεσθαι ἢ μειοῦσθαι ἢ τινα τῶν ἄλλων ἀκολουθεῖν κινήσεων· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη.	Now it is evident that the other changes are different from one another. Coming to be is not perishing, and increase is neither decrease nor change of place, and likewise with the others. With alteration, however, there is a problem: perhaps whatever is altered must be altered by one of the other changes. But this is not true. We are altered with respect to practically all affections, or most of them, without sharing in any of the other changes. What is changed in respect of an affection need not increase or decrease, and the same holds for the rest. So alteration would be different from the other changes. If it were the same, what is altered would have to increase or decrease at once, or go through one of the other changes. But it need not.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐξανόμενον ἤ τινα ἄλλην κίνησιν κινούμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἔδει· ἀλλ' ἔστι τινὰ αὐξανόμενα ἃ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται, οἷον τὸ τετράγωνον γνώμονος περιτεθέντος ηὔξηται μέν, ἀλλοιότερον δὲ οὐδὲν γεγένηται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. Ὥσθ' ἕτεραι ἂν εἴησαν αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλων.	Likewise, what increases, or goes through some other change, would have to be altered. But there are some things that increase without being altered. When a gnomon is placed around a square, for example, the square has increased but has not been altered at all. The same holds for other such cases. So the changes would be different from one another.[9]
15b Ἔστι δὲ ἁπλῶς μὲν κινήσει ἠρεμία ἐναντία, ταῖς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα, γενέσει μὲν φθορά, αὐξήσει δὲ	Change without qualification has rest as its contrary, and the particular changes have the particu-

GREEK	ENGLISH
μείωσις, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῇ ἡ κατὰ τόπον ἠρεμία. Μάλιστα δ' ἔοικεν ἀντικεῖσθαι ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολή, οἷον τῇ κάτωθεν ἡ ἄνω, τῇ δὲ ἄνωθεν ἡ κάτω. Τῇ δὲ λοιπῇ τῶν ἀποδοθεισῶν κινήσεων οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐναντίον, ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτῇ ἐναντίον, εἰ μή τις καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τὴν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρεμίαν ἀντιτιθείη ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολήν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς τὴν κατὰ τόπον ἠρεμίαν ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸν ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολήν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν.	lar contraries. Coming to be has perishing, increase has decrease, and change of place has rest in place. But change toward the contrary place seems most of all to be opposed to change of place, for example upward change to downward, and downward change to upward. With the remaining one of the changes listed, it is not easy to say what its contrary is. It seems that nothing is contrary to it, unless here too one were to oppose rest in quality, or change to the contrary of the quality. That would be just as, with change of place, one opposes rest in place or change to the contrary place. For alteration is change in quality.
Ὥστε ἀντικείσεται τῇ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κινήσει ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρεμία ἢ ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν γίνεσθαι τῷ μέλαν γίνεσθαι· ἀλλοιοῦται γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολῆς γινομένης.	So change in quality will be opposed by rest in quality or by change to the contrary of the quality. Becoming white, for example, will be opposed by becoming black. For a thing is altered when a change of quality into contraries takes place.

HAVING

Having is said in many ways, from having knowledge or a size to having a house or a wife.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Τὸ δὲ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείονας τρόπους λέγεται. Ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα· λεγόμεθα γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν. Ἢ ὡς ποσόν, οἷον ὃ τυγχάνει τις ἔχων μέγεθος· λέγεται γὰρ τρίπηχυ μέγεθος ἔχειν ἢ τετράπηχυ. Ἢ ὡς τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, οἷον ἱμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα. Ἢ ὡς ἐν μορίῳ, οἷον ἐν χειρὶ δακτύλιον. Ἢ ὡς μέρος, οἷον χεῖρα ἢ πόδα. Ἢ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ, οἷον ὁ μέδιμνος τοὺς πυροὺς ἢ τὸ κεράμιον τὸν οἶνον· οἶνον γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ κεράμιον λέγεται, καὶ ὁ μέδιμνος πυρούς· ταῦτ' οὖν πάντα ἔχειν λέγεται ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ. Ἢ ὡς κτῆμα· ἔχειν γὰρ οἰκίαν ἢ ἀγρὸν λεγόμεθα.	Having is spoken of in several ways. It may be having as a state and condition, or some other quality, since we are said to have some knowledge, or excellence. It may be having as a quantity, such as the size someone happens to have, for he is said to have a size of three cubits or of four. It may be having as with things on the body, such as a cloak or tunic, or as with something on a part, such as a ring on a hand. It may be having as a part, such as a hand or foot. It may be having as in a vessel, as the bushel has the wheat or the jar the wine. The jar is said to have wine, and the bushel wheat, so all these are said to have as in a vessel. Or it may be having as a possession, for we are said to have a house or a field.
Λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα ἔχειν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἄνδρα· ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλοτριώτατος ὁ νῦν ῥηθεὶς τρόπος τοῦ ἔχειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τῷ ἔχει γυναῖκα σημαίνομεν ἢ ὅτι συνοικεῖ.	We are also said to have a wife, and a wife to have a husband. But the way of having just mentioned seems the most remote, since by "has a wife" we signify nothing other than that he lives with her.
Ἴσως δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς φανείησαν τοῦ ἔχειν τρόποι· οἱ δὲ εἰωθότες λέγεσθαι σχεδὸν ἅπαντες κατηρίθμηνται.	Perhaps some other ways of having might come to light too, but the ones customarily spoken of have practically all been enumerated.

9 A gnomon is an L-shaped figure; fitted around two sides of a square, it produces a larger square.