On the Nature of the Gods

CICERO
106–43 BC

On the Nature of the Gods

De natura deorum

Translated from the Latin with AI (Claude) and edited

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On the Nature of the Gods · Cicero (106–43 BC)

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CONTENTS

Introduction vii

Book I 1

At Cotta's house 6
Velleius attacks Plato and the Stoics 7
A history of errors 10
Velleius: Epicurus' gods 16
Cotta replies 21
Against atoms 23
Quasi-body and quasi-blood 25
Against human-shaped gods 27
Idle gods 37
Epicurus abolishes religion 41

Book II 47

Balbus agrees to speak 47
That gods exist 48
The world is divine 55
What the gods are like 62
Gods of benefit and myth 67
Providence rules the world 72
Nature, the craftsman 75
The beauty of the world 81
The constellations 83
Plants and animals 89
The making of man 94
Care for humankind 102

Book III 107

Cotta replies to Balbus 107
Do the gods exist? 109
Is the world a god? 114
Can a god be eternal? 117
Where does deification stop? 120
The theologians' many gods 125
Providence and the gift of reason 130
The good suffer, the wicked thrive 136
Ending 142

INTRODUCTION

Do the gods exist, what are they like, and do they care about us? In 45 BC, grieving his daughter Tullia and shut out of politics by Caesar's dictatorship, Cicero set out to bring the whole of Greek philosophy into Latin. *On the Nature of the Gods* is his account of the great question of religion, dedicated to Marcus Brutus, who would help kill Caesar a few months later.

The book stages a conversation at the house of Gaius Cotta in Rome, with Cicero as a young listener. Velleius speaks for Epicurus: the gods are blessed, eternal, shaped like humans, and wholly unconcerned with the world. Cotta, an Academic skeptic who is also one of Rome's high priests, demolishes him. Balbus then gives the Stoic case at length: a divine reason runs through the world, whose order and beauty—the stars, the seasons, the design of the human body—prove that it was made by gods and for gods and humans. In Book III Cotta takes that apart too, ending on the problem of evil: why do the good suffer and the wicked thrive?

Cicero leaves the verdict open, saying only that Balbus' view seemed to him closer to the truth. The dialogue preserves much of what we know about ancient theology and was read eagerly by early Christian writers, Renaissance humanists, and Enlightenment skeptics such as Hume.

Book I

The Epicurean case and its refutation
Velleius sets out Epicurus' untroubled gods; Cotta, the Academic, takes them apart.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.1	**CICERO** Cum multae res in philosophia nequaquam satis adhuc explicatae sint, tum perdifficilis, Brute, quod tu minime ignoras, et perobscura quaestio est de natura deorum, quae et ad cognitionem animi pulcherrima est et ad moderandam religionem necessaria. De qua cum tam variae sint doctissimorum hominum tamque discrepantes sententiae, magno argumento esse debeat ea causa, principium philosophiae ad h … scientiam, prudenterque Academici a rebus incertis adsensionem cohibuisse. quid est enim temeritate turpius aut quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ulla dubitatione defendere?	**CICERO** Many questions in philosophy have by no means been adequately cleared up so far. But the inquiry into the nature of the gods is, as you know very well, Brutus, especially difficult and obscure. It is both a most noble subject for the mind's understanding and necessary for regulating religion. The views of the most learned men on it are so varied and so much at odds that this fact alone ought to be strong evidence that the starting point of philosophy … knowledge, and that the Academics were wise to withhold assent from uncertain matters. For what is more disgraceful than rashness? And what is so rash, and so unworthy of a wise man's seriousness and consistency, as either to hold a false opinion or to defend without the least hesitation what has not been thoroughly grasped and understood?[1]
1.2	Velut in hac quaestione plerique, quod maxime veri simile est et quo omnes †sese duce natura venimus, deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. Qui vero deos esse dixerunt tanta sunt in varietate et dissensione, ut eorum infinitum sit enumerare sententias.	Take this very question. Most people have said that gods exist, which is the most probable view and the one to which nature leads us all. Protagoras said he was in doubt, and Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene thought there were no gods at all. But those who have said that gods exist are so varied and so divided that it would be an endless task to list their views.[2]
	nam et de figuris deorum et de locis atque sedibus et de actione vitae multa dicuntur, deque is summa philosophorum dissensione certatur; quod vero maxime rem causamque continet, utrum nihil agant nihil moliantur omni curatione et administratione rerum vacent, an contra ab iis et a principio omnia facta et constituta sint et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur, in primis [quae] magna dissensio est, eaque nisi diiudicatur in summo errore necesse est homines atque in maximarum rerum ignoratione versari.	For much is said about the forms of the gods, about their locations and dwelling places, and about their way of life, and the philosophers fight over these points with the greatest disagreement. But the issue that most of all holds the heart of the matter is this: do the gods do nothing, undertake nothing, and stay free of all care and management of things? Or, on the contrary, were all things made and established by them from the beginning, and are they ruled and moved by them for

1 Marcus Junius Brutus, the future assassin of Caesar, is the dedicatee of the work. The manuscripts are damaged here; the usual restoration makes ignorance the starting point of philosophy.
2 Protagoras of Abdera (5th century BC) was a famous sophist; Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene were notorious atheists.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		infinite time? It is here above all [that] there is great disagreement, and unless it is settled, human beings must remain in the deepest error and in ignorance of the most important matters.[3]
1.3	Sunt enim philosophi et fuerunt qui omnino nullam habere censerent rerum humanarum procurationem deos. quorum si vera sententia est, quae potest esse pietas quae sanctitas quae religio? haec enim omnia pure atque caste tribuenda deorum numini ita sunt, si animadvertuntur ab is et si est aliquid a deis inmortalibus hominum generi tributum; sin autem dei neque possunt nos iuvare nec volunt nec omnino curant nec quid agamus animadvertunt nec est quod ab is ad hominum vitam permanare possit, quid est quod ullos deis inmortalibus cultus honores preces adhibeamus? in specie autem fictae simulationis sicut reliquae virtutes item pietas inesse non potest; cum qua simul sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse est, quibus sublatis perturbatio vitae sequitur et magna confusio;	For there are, and have been, philosophers who held that the gods take no care whatever of human affairs. If their view is true, what piety can there be, what holiness, what religion? All these must be offered purely and chastely to the divine power of the gods only on condition that the gods take notice of them, and that the immortal gods have granted something to the human race. But if the gods are neither able nor willing to help us, if they do not care at all and pay no attention to what we do, if nothing can flow from them into human life, what reason is there for us to offer the immortal gods any worship, honors or prayers? Piety, like the other virtues, cannot exist in the mere show of pretense; and with piety, holiness and religion must also be done away with. Once they are gone, disorder in life follows, and great confusion;
1.4	atque haut scio an pietate adversus deos sublata fides etiam et societas generis humani et una excellentissuma virtus iustitia tollatur. Sunt autem alii philosophi, et hi quidem magni atque nobiles, qui deorum mente atque ratione omnem mundum administrari et regi censeant, neque vero id solum, sed etiam ab isdem hominum vitae consuli et provideri; nam et fruges et reliqua quae terra pariat et tempestates ac temporum varietates caelique mutationes, quibus omnia quae terra gignat maturata pubescant, a dis inmortalibus tribui generi humano putant, multaque quae dicentur in his libris colligunt, quae talia sunt ut ea ipsa dei inmortales ad usum hominum fabricati paene videantur. Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem.	and I am not sure that, once piety toward the gods is abolished, trust and the fellowship of the human race, and justice, the single most excellent virtue, are not abolished as well. But there are other philosophers, and great and distinguished ones, who hold that the whole world is managed and ruled by the mind and reason of the gods. And not only that: they hold that the same gods take thought and make provision for human life. For they think that crops and everything else the earth produces, and the weather, the changes of the seasons and the shifts in the sky, through which all that the earth brings forth ripens and matures, are granted to the human race by the immortal gods. They collect many such things, which will be discussed in these books, and which are of a kind that makes it seem almost as if the immortal gods had fashioned them expressly for human use. Against these philosophers Carneades argued at such length that he roused people who were not sluggish to a desire to search out the truth.[4]
1.5	res enim nulla est de qua tantopere non solum indocti sed etiam docti dissentiant; quorum opiniones cum tam	For there is no subject on which not only the unlearned but even the learned disagree so much.

3 Square brackets mark words that the editor, Plasberg, thought were later additions to the text.
4 Carneades (2nd century BC), head of the skeptical Academy, was famous for arguing both sides of every question.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	variae sint tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest ut earum nulla, alterum certe non potest ut plus una vera sit.	Since their opinions are so varied and so much at odds with one another, one thing is certainly possible: that none of them is true. Another is certainly impossible: that more than one is.
	Qua quidem in causa et benivolos obiurgatores placare et invidos vituperatores confutare possumus, ut alteros reprehendisse paeniteat, alteri didicisse se gaudeant; nam qui admonent amice docendi sunt, qui inimice insectantur repellendi.	On this subject I can both placate well-meaning critics and refute envious detractors, so that the one group will regret having found fault and the other will be glad to have learned something. For those who advise us as friends should be instructed; those who attack us as enemies should be driven off.
1.6	Multum autem fluxisse video de libris nostris, quos compluris brevi tempore edidimus, variumque sermonem partim admirantium unde hoc philosophandi nobis subito studium extitisset, partim quid quaque de re certi haberemus scire cupientium; multis etiam sensi mirabile videri eam nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, quae lucem eriperet et quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet, desertaeque disciplinae et iam pridem relictae patrocinium necopinatum a nobis esse susceptum. Nos autem nec subito coepimus philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore aetatis in eo studio operam curamque consumpsimus, et cum minime videbamur tum maxime philosophabamur; quod et orationes declarant refertae philosophorum sententiis et doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus semper domus nostra floruit, et principes illi Diodotus Philo Antiochus Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus.	I see that my books, several of which I have published in a short time, have caused a great deal of talk, and of various kinds. Some people wonder where this sudden enthusiasm of mine for philosophy came from; others want to know what I hold as certain on each subject. I have also noticed that many find it strange that I should have chosen to approve, of all philosophies, the one that snatches away the light and pours a kind of night over things, and that I should unexpectedly have taken up the defense of a school deserted and long since abandoned. But I did not take up philosophy suddenly. From my earliest youth I have spent no small effort and care on its study, and when I seemed least to be doing philosophy, I was doing it most. My speeches show this, packed as they are with the maxims of philosophers; so do my friendships with the most learned men, who have always graced my house; and so do those eminent teachers who trained me, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius.[5]
1.7	et si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse quae ratio et doctrina praescripserit. Sin autem quis requirit quae causa nos inpulerit ut haec tam sero litteris mandaremus, nihil est quod expedire tam facile possimus. Nam cum otio langueremus et is esset rei publicae status ut eam unius consilio atque cura gubernari necesse esset, primum ipsius rei publicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi, magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis res tam gravis tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri.	And if all the precepts of philosophy bear on how we live, I believe that in both public and private affairs I have put into practice what reason and learning prescribed. But if anyone asks what led me to commit these things to writing so late, there is nothing I can explain more easily. When I was languishing in idleness, and the state of the commonwealth was such that it had to be governed by the counsel and care of one man, I thought, first of all, that philosophy ought to be expounded to our countrymen for the sake of the commonwealth itself. I judged it very important for the honor and glory of our city that subjects so weighty and so

5 Diodotus was a Stoic who lived in Cicero's house; Philo of Larissa headed the skeptical Academy, Antiochus of Ascalon broke from it to found his "Old Academy," and Posidonius of Rhodes was a leading Stoic.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		splendid should be available in Latin literature as well.[6]
1.8	eoque me minus instituti mei paenitet, quod facile sentio quam multorum non modo discendi sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim. complures enim Graecis institutionibus eruditi ea quae didicerant cum civibus suis communicare non poterant, quod illa quae a Graecis accepissent Latine dici posse diffiderent; quo in genere tantum profecisse videmur, ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur.	And I regret my undertaking all the less because I can easily see how many people I have stirred to the pursuit not only of learning but also of writing. Many who had been educated in Greek teachings were unable to share what they had learned with their fellow citizens, because they doubted that what they had received from the Greeks could be expressed in Latin. In this area I think we have made such progress that not even in richness of vocabulary are we outdone by the Greeks.
1.9	Hortata etiam est ut me ad haec conferrem animi aegritudo fortunae magna et gravi commota iniuria; cuius si maiorem aliquam levationem reperire potuissem, non ad hanc potissimum confugissem. ea vero ipsa nulla ratione melius frui potui quam si me non modo ad legendos libros sed etiam ad totam philosophiam pertractandam dedissem. omnes autem eius partes atque omnia membra tum facillume noscuntur, cum totae quaestiones scribendo explicantur; est enim admirabilis quaedam continuatio seriesque rerum, ut alia ex alia nexa et omnes inter se aptae conligataeque videantur.	I was also driven to turn to these studies by grief of mind, brought on by a great and heavy blow of fortune. Had I been able to find any greater relief for it, I would not have taken refuge in this one above all. And I could have made no better use of philosophy itself than by devoting myself not only to reading books but to treating the whole of philosophy. All its parts and all its members are most easily understood when entire questions are worked out in writing. For there is a remarkable continuity and sequence of subjects, so that each seems linked to the next and all seem fitted and bound together.[7]
1.10	Qui autem requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est; non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. quin etiam obest plerumque iis qui discere volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere, id habent ratum quod ab eo quem probant iudicatum vident. nec vero probare soleo id quod de Pythagoreis accepimus, quos ferunt, si quid adfirmarent in disputando, cum ex iis quaereretur quare ita esset, respondere solitos "ipse dixit"; ipse autem erat Pythagoras: tantum opinio praeiudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas.	As for those who ask what I myself think on each question, they are more curious than they need be. In argument we should look for the weight of reasoning rather than of authority. In fact, the authority of those who profess to teach often stands in the way of those who want to learn: they stop applying their own judgment and take as settled whatever they see decided by the teacher they approve of. Nor do I usually approve of what we are told about the Pythagoreans. When they asserted something in debate and were asked why it was so, they are said to have replied, "He himself said so"—and "he himself" was Pythagoras. So powerful was a judgment formed in advance that authority prevailed even without reasoning.[8]
1.11	Qui autem admirantur nos hanc potissimum disciplinam secutos, his quattuor Academicis libris satis responsum videtur. Nec vero desertarum relictarumque rerum patrocinium suscepimus; non enim hominum interitu	Those who are surprised that I have followed this school above all have, I think, been answered sufficiently in my four books of *Academics*. Nor have I

6 The one man is Julius Caesar, dictator at the time.
7 Cicero's daughter Tullia died in February 45 BC.
8 Pythagoras of Samos (6th century BC) founded a philosophical and religious community in southern Italy.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	sententiae quoque occidunt, sed lucem auctoris fortasse desiderant. ut haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte iudicandi profecta a Socrate repetita ab Arcesila confirmata a Carneade usque ad nostram viguit aetatem; quam nunc prope modum orbam esse in ipsa Graecia intellego. quod non Academiae vitio sed tarditate hominum arbitror contigisse. nam si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto maius omnis; quod facere is necesse est quibus propositum est veri reperiendi causa et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere.	taken up the defense of a deserted and abandoned cause. Views do not die when the people who held them die, though they may miss the light their author shed on them. Take this method in philosophy of arguing against everything and openly passing judgment on nothing: it began with Socrates, was revived by Arcesilaus, was strengthened by Carneades, and has flourished right down to our own time—though I understand that in Greece itself it is now all but orphaned. I think this has happened not through any fault of the Academy but through the dullness of men. For if it is a great thing to master each school separately, how much greater to master them all! Yet that is what must be done by those whose aim is to speak both against and for all the philosophers in order to find the truth.[9]
1.12	cuius rei tantae tamque difficilis facultatem consecutum esse me non profiteor, secutum esse prae me fero. Nec tamen fieri potest ut qui hac ratione philosophentur hi nihil habeant quod sequantur. dictum est omnino de hac re alio loco diligentius, sed quia nimis indociles quidam tardique sunt admonendi videntur saepius. non enim sumus i quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed i qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta esse dicamus tanta similitudine ut in is nulla insit certa iudicandi et adsentiendi nota. ex quo exsistit et illud, multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et inlustrem, his sapientis vita regeretur.	I do not claim to have attained the ability for so great and difficult a task; I do declare that I have pursued it. Yet it cannot be that those who philosophize in this way have nothing to follow. I have discussed this point more carefully elsewhere, but because some people are so slow and hard to teach, it seems they need reminding more often. We are not people to whom nothing seems true. We are people who say that certain false things are attached to all true ones, with so close a resemblance that they contain no sure mark for judging and assenting. From this arises the further view that many things are probable: although they are not firmly grasped, still, because they present a distinctive and clear appearance, the wise man's life can be guided by them.
1.13	Sed iam, ut omni me invidia liberem, ponam in medio sententias philosophorum de natura deorum. quo quidem loco convocandi omnes videntur, qui quae sit earum vera iudicent; tum demum mihi procax Academia videbitur, si aut consenserint omnes aut erit inventus aliquis qui quid verum sit invenerit. itaque mihi libet exclamare ut in Synephebis: pro deum, popularium omnium, omnium adulescentium / clamo postulo obsecro oro ploro atque inploro fidem non levissuma de re, ut queritur ille in civitate fieri facinora capitalia: "ab amico amante argentum accipere meretrix non vult",	But now, to free myself from all ill will, I will set out the views of the philosophers on the nature of the gods. At this point it seems that everyone should be summoned to judge which of them is true. I will think the Academy presumptuous only if they all agree, or if someone is found who has discovered what is true. So I feel like crying out, as in *The Young Comrades*: "Gods, all my countrymen, all you young men— / I cry, I demand, I beseech, I beg, I weep and I implore your protection!"—and not over some utterly trivial matter, like that character who complains that capital crimes are being

9 The *Academics* (Academica) is Cicero's work on the theory of knowledge, written earlier in 45 BC. Arcesilaus (3rd century BC) turned Plato's Academy toward skepticism.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		committed in the city: "A courtesan refuses to take money from a loving friend!"—[10]
1.14	sed ut adsint cognoscant animadvertant, quid de religione pietate sanctitate caerimoniis fide iure iurando, quid de templis delubris sacrificiisque sollemnibus, quid de ipsis auspiciis, quibus nos praesumus, existimandum sit (haec enim omnia ad hanc de dis inmortalibus quaestionem referenda sunt): profecto eos ipsos, qui se aliquid certi habere arbitrantur, addubitare coget doctissimorum hominum de maxuma re tanta dissensio.	but so that they may come, learn and consider what we ought to think about religion, piety, holiness, rites, good faith and oaths; about temples, shrines and solemn sacrifices; and about the very auspices over which I preside (for all these things bear on this question about the immortal gods). Surely so great a disagreement among the most learned men on the greatest of subjects will force even those who think they hold something certain to begin to doubt.[11]

AT COTTA'S HOUSE

Cicero joins Cotta, Velleius and Balbus during the Latin Festival; Velleius is asked to begin.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.15	**CICERO** Quod cum saepe alias tum maxime animadverti cum apud C. Cottam familiarem meum accurate sane et diligenter de dis inmortalibus disputatumst. nam cum feriis Latinis ad eum ipsius rogatu arcessituque venissem, offendi eum sedentem in exedra et cum C. Velleio senatore disputantem, ad quem tum Epicurei primas ex nostris hominibus deferebant. aderat etiam Q. Lucilius Balbus, qui tantos progressus habebat in Stoicis, ut cum excellentibus in eo genere Graecis compararetur.	**CICERO** I have noticed this on many other occasions, but most of all when the immortal gods were discussed very thoroughly and carefully at the house of my friend Gaius Cotta. I had come to see him during the Latin Festival at his own request and invitation, and found him sitting in an alcove, debating with the senator Gaius Velleius, whom the Epicureans at that time ranked first among our countrymen. Quintus Lucilius Balbus was there too, who had made such progress in Stoicism that he was compared with the leading Greeks of that school.[12]
	COTTA Tum ut me Cotta vidit "Peroportune" inquit "venis; oritur enim mihi magna de re altercatio cum Velleio, cui pro tuo studio non est alienum te interesse."	**COTTA** As soon as Cotta saw me, he said, "You've come at just the right moment. A heated argument on a great subject is starting up between me and Velleius, and given your interests it is quite fitting that you join in."
1.16	**CICERO** "Atqui mihi quoque videor" inquam "venisse, ut dicis, oportune. tres enim trium disciplinarum principes convenistis. M. enim Piso si adesset, nullius philosophiae, earum quidem quae in honore sunt, vacaret locus."	**CICERO** "Well, I think so too," I said, "that I have come, as you say, at the right moment. For here you are, three leaders of three schools, gathered together. If Marcus Piso were here, no philosophy —none, at least, of those held in honor—would be without its place."[13]
	COTTA Tum Cotta "Si" inquit "liber Antiochi nostri, qui ab eo nuper ad hunc Balbum missus est, vera loquitur,	**COTTA** Then Cotta said, "If the book that our friend Antiochus recently sent to Balbus here is

10 *The Young Comrades* (Synephebi) was a comedy by Caecilius Statius (2nd century BC), adapted from a Greek play by Menander.
11 Cicero had been a member of the college of augurs since 53 BC.
12 Gaius Aurelius Cotta (consul 75 BC) was a pontiff and an Academic. The Latin Festival was an annual holiday of the Latin peoples celebrated on the Alban Mount.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	nihil est quod Pisonem familiarem tuum desideres; Antiocho enim Stoici cum Peripateticis re concinere videntur verbis discrepare; quo de libro Balbe velim scire quid sentias."	telling the truth, you have no reason to miss your friend Piso. For Antiochus holds that the Stoics agree with the Peripatetics in substance and differ from them in words. I would like to know what you think of that book, Balbus."
	BALBUS "Egone" inquit ille, "miror Antiochum hominem in primis acutum non vidisse interesse plurimum inter Stoicos, qui honesta a commodis non nomine sed genere toto diiungerent, et Peripateticos, qui honesta commiscerent cum commodis, ut ea inter se magnitudine et quasi gradibus non genere differrent. haec enim est non verborum parva sed rerum permagna dissensio. verum hoc alias; nunc quod coepimus, si videtur".	**BALBUS** "Me?" he said. "I am amazed that Antiochus, a man exceptionally sharp, did not see the vast difference between the Stoics, who separate the honorable from the advantageous not in name but in their whole kind, and the Peripatetics, who mix the honorable with the advantageous, so that the two differ from each other in magnitude and, as it were, by degrees, not in kind. This is no small disagreement about words but a very great one about things. But more on this another time. Now, if you agree, let us go on with what we began."
1.17	COTTA "Mihi vero" inquit Cotta "videtur. sed ut hic qui intervenit" me intuens "ne ignoret quae res agatur, de natura agebamus deorum, quae cum mihi videretur perobscura, ut semper videri solet, Epicuri ex Velleio sciscitabar sententiam. quam ob rem" inquit "Vellei, nisi molestum est, repete quae coeperas."	**COTTA** "I do agree," said Cotta. "But so that our new arrival"—looking at me—"does not miss what is going on: we were discussing the nature of the gods. Since it seemed to me very obscure, as it always does, I was asking Velleius for Epicurus' view. So, Velleius," he said, "if you don't mind, go back over what you had begun."
	VELLEIUS "Repetam vero, quamquam non mihi sed tibi hic venit adiutor; ambo enim" inquit adridens "ab eodem Philone nihil scire didicistis."	**VELLEIUS** "I will, though he has come here as an ally not for me but for you. For you both," he said with a smile, "learned from the same Philo to know nothing."
	CICERO Tum ego: "Quid didicerimus Cotta viderit, tu autem nolo existimes me adiutorem huic venisse sed auditorem, et quidem aecum, libero iudicio, nulla eius modi adstrictum necessitate, ut mihi velim nolim sit certa quaedam tuenda sententia."	**CICERO** Then I said: "What we learned is Cotta's business. But I don't want you to think that I have come as his ally. I have come as a listener—and an impartial one, free in my judgment, bound by no constraint that would oblige me to defend some fixed view whether I like it or not."

VELLEIUS ATTACKS PLATO AND THE STOICS

Plato's craftsman god, the Stoics' Providence and a round, spinning world-god are ridiculed as dreams.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.18	VELLEIUS Tum Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset, "Audite" inquit "non futtilis commenticiasque sententias, non opificem aedificatoremque mundi Platonis de Timaeo deum, nec anum fatidicam Stoicorum Pronoeam, quam Latine licet	**VELLEIUS** Then Velleius, with great confidence, as is the way with those people, fearing nothing so much as seeming to be in doubt about anything, as if he had just come down from the council of the gods and from Epicurus' spaces between the worlds, said: "Listen—not to worthless, made-up views; not to the craftsman and builder of the

13 Marcus Pupius Piso (consul 61 BC) was a follower of the Peripatetic school.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Providentiam dicere, neque vero mundum ipsum animo et sensibus praeditum rutundum ardentem volubilem deum, portenta et miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed somniantium."	world, the god of Plato's *Timaeus*; not to the Stoics' fortune-telling old woman Pronoia, whom in Latin we may call Providence; nor yet to the world itself as a god endowed with mind and senses, round, fiery and revolving. These are the monstrosities and marvels of philosophers who are not reasoning but dreaming."[14]
1.19	Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a deo atque aedificari mundum facit; quae molitio quae ferramenta qui vectes quae machinae qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt; quem ad modum autem oboedire et parere voluntati architecti aer ignis aqua terra potuerunt; unde vero ortae illae quinque formae, ex quibus reliqua formantur, apte cadentes ad animum afficiendum pariendosque sensus? longum est ad omnia, quae talia sunt ut optata magis quam inventa videantur;	With what eyes of the mind could your Plato have seen that great workshop in which he has the world assembled and built by god? What engineering was there, what tools, what levers, what machines, what workmen for so vast a task? How could air, fire, water and earth obey and submit to the will of the architect? And where did those five shapes come from, out of which everything else is formed, so neatly suited to affecting the mind and producing sensations? It would take too long to go through all of it—things such that they seem to have been wished for rather than discovered;
1.20	sed illa palmaris, quod, qui non modo natum mundum introduxerit sed etiam manu paene factum, is eum dixerit fore sempiternum. hunc censes primis ut dicitur labris gustasse physiologiam id est naturae rationem, qui quicquam quod ortum sit putet aeternum esse posse? quae est enim coagmentatio non dissolubilis, aut quid est cuius principium aliquod sit nihil sit extremum? Pronoea vero si vestra est Lucili eadem, requiro quae paulo ante, ministros machinas omnem totius operis dissignationem atque apparatum; sin alia est, cur mortalem fecerit mundum, non, quem ad modum Platonicus deus, sempiternum.	but this one takes the prize: that a man who presented the world not only as born but as practically handmade should have said it will be eternal. Do you think this man had even tasted, as they say, with the tip of his lips *physiologia*—that is, the science of nature—when he believes that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What joining together cannot be taken apart? Or what is there that has a beginning and no end? As for your Pronoia, Balbus: if she is the same one, I ask what I asked a moment ago about the workmen, the machines, the whole design and equipment of the entire work. If she is a different one, why did she make the world mortal, and not eternal as Plato's god did?
1.21	Ab utroque autem sciscitor cur mundi aedificatores repente exstiterint, innumerabilia saecla dormierint; non enim si mundus nullus erat saecla non erant (saecla nunc dico non ea quae dierum noctiumque numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fateor ea sine mundi conversione effici non potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aeternitas, quam nulla circumscriptio temporum metiebatur, spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit intellegi potest, quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit ut fuerit	I ask you both why the builders of the world suddenly appeared after sleeping through countless ages. For if there was no world, that does not mean there were no ages. (By "ages" I do not now mean those made up of numbers of days and nights in yearly courses; I admit those could not have been produced without the revolution of the world. But there was a kind of eternity stretching from infinite time, which no marking off of periods measured; yet in terms of extent we can understand

14 Epicurus placed his gods in the intermundia, the spaces between the worlds. Pronoia is Greek for "providence"; Plato's craftsman god appears in his dialogue *Timaeus*.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		what it was like, since it cannot even be conceived that there was ever
1.22	tempus aliquod nullum cum tempus esset)—isto igitur tam inmenso spatio quaero Balbe cur Pronoea vestra cessaverit. laboremne fugiebat? at iste nec attingit deum nec erat ullus, cum omnes naturae numini divino, caelum ignes terrae maria, parerent. Quid autem erat quod concupisceret deus mundum signis et luminibus tamquam aedilis ornare? si ut deus ipse melius habitaret, antea videlicet tempore infinito in tenebris tamquam in gurgustio habitaverat. post autem: varietatene eum delectari putamus, qua caelum et terras exornatas videmus? quae ista potest esse oblectatio deo? quae si esset, non ea tam diu carere potuisset.	a time when there was no time.) In that vast stretch, then, Balbus, I ask why your Pronoia sat idle. Was she avoiding work? But work does not touch a god, and there was none to do, since all natures—sky, fires, lands, seas—obeyed the divine power. And what made god want to decorate the world with constellations and lights, like an aedile? If it was so that god himself might live better, then evidently he had lived for an infinite time before in darkness, as if in a hovel. And then: are we to think he delights in the variety with which we see the sky and the earth adorned? What delight can that be to a god? And if it were one, he could not have done without it for so long.[15]
1.23	an haec, ut fere dicitis, hominum causa a deo constituta sunt? sapientiumne? propter paucos igitur tanta est rerum facta molitio. an stultorum? at primum causa non fuit cur de inprobis bene mereretur; deinde quid est adsecutus, cum omnes stulti sint sine dubio miserrimi, maxime quod stulti sunt (miserius enim stultitia quid possumus dicere), deinde quod ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut ea sapientes commodorum conpensatione leniant, stulti nec vitare venientia possint nec ferre praesentia. Qui vero mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi natura intellegentis in quam figuram cadere posset. de quo dicam equidem paulo post, nunc autem hactenus:	Or were these things, as you usually say, set up by god for the sake of human beings? For the wise? Then so vast a construction was made for a handful. For fools? But first, there was no reason for god to do favors for the wicked. Second, what did he achieve, since all fools are beyond doubt utterly miserable—above all because they are fools (for what can we call more miserable than folly?), and then because life holds so many hardships that the wise soften them by setting advantages against them, while fools can neither avoid them as they come nor bear them when they are present? As for those who said that the world itself is a living and wise being, they utterly failed to see into what shape the nature of an intelligent mind could fit. I will speak of this a little later; for now, just this much:
1.24	admirabor eorum tarditatem qui animantem inmortalem et eundem beatum rutundum esse velint, quod ea forma neget ullam esse pulchriorem Plato: at mihi vel cylindri vel quadrati vel coni vel pyramidis videtur esse formosior. Quae vero vita tribuitur isti rutundo deo? nempe ut ea celeritate contorqueatur cui par nulla ne cogitari quidem possit; in qua non video ubinam mens constans et vita beata possit insistere. Quodque in nostro corpore si minima ex parte significetur molestum sit, cur hoc idem non habeatur molestum in deo?	I will marvel at the dullness of those who want an immortal and blessed living being to be round, because Plato says there is no shape more beautiful. Yet to me a cylinder, a cube, a cone or a pyramid seems more beautiful. And what life is assigned to that round god? Why, to be whirled around at a speed so great that nothing equal to it can even be imagined. I do not see where in that a steady mind and a blessed life can find a footing. And what would be distressing in our own bodies if we felt even the slightest trace of it, why should the same not be considered distressing in a god?

15 Aediles were Roman magistrates who decorated the city with statues and lamps for public festivals; Latin *signa* means both "statues" and "constellations."

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	terra enim profecto, quoniam mundi pars est, pars est etiam dei; atqui terrae maxumas regiones inhabitabilis atque incultas videmus, quod pars earum adpulsu solis exarserit, pars obriguerit nive pruinaque longinquo solis abscessu; quae, si mundus est deus, quoniam mundi partes sunt, dei membra partim ardentia partim refrigerata ducenda sunt.	For the earth, since it is part of the world, is surely also part of the god. Yet we see that vast regions of the earth are uninhabitable and uncultivated, some scorched by the sun's nearness, others frozen with snow and frost because the sun is far away. If the world is a god, then these regions, since they are parts of the world, must be counted as limbs of the god, some of them burning, some of them frozen.

A HISTORY OF ERRORS

Velleius reviews what every philosopher from Thales to Chrysippus has said about the gods.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.25	**VELLEIUS** Atque haec quidem vestra Lucili; qualia vero ... est, ab ultimo repetam superiorum. Thales enim Milesius, qui primus de talibus rebus quaesivit, aquam dixit esse initium rerum, deum autem eam mentem quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret: si dei possunt esse sine sensu; et mentem cur aquae adiunxit, si ipsa mens constare potest vacans corpore? Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervallis orientis occidentisque, eosque innumerabilis esse mundos. sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intellegere qui possumus?	**VELLEIUS** So much for your views, Balbus. But as to what sort ... is, I will go back to the earliest of their predecessors. Thales of Miletus, who was the first to inquire into such matters, said that water is the origin of things, and that god is the mind that shaped everything out of water—fine, if gods can exist without sensation. And why did he join mind to water, if mind itself can exist without a body? Anaximander's view, on the other hand, is that the gods are born, rising and setting at long intervals, and that they are countless worlds. But how can we conceive of a god who is not eternal?[16]
1.26	Post Anaximenes aera deum statuit, eumque gigni esseque inmensum et infinitum et semper in motu: quasi aut aer sine ulla forma deus esse possit, cum praesertim deum non modo aliqua sed pulcherrima specie deceat esse, aut non omne quod ortum sit mortalitas consequatur. Inde Anaxagoras, qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus omnium rerum discriptionem et modum mentis infinitae vi ac ratione dissignari et confici voluit. in quo non vidit neque motum sensu iunctum et [in] continentem infinito ullum esse posse, neque sensum omnino quo non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret. deinde si mentem istam quasi animal aliquod voluit esse, erit aliquid interius ex quo illud animal nominetur; quid autem interius mente: cingatur igitur corpore externo;	Next, Anaximenes declared that air is god, and that it comes into being and is immeasurable, infinite and always in motion. As if formless air could be god, especially when a god ought to have not just some form but the most beautiful one! Or as if everything that has come into being were not bound to die! Then Anaxagoras, who was taught by Anaximenes, was the first to hold that the ordering and measure of all things were designed and brought about by the power and reason of an infinite mind. In this he failed to see that there can be no motion that is joined to sensation and also [in] continuous union with the infinite, nor any sensation at all in which the whole being is not itself struck and feels the blow. Further, if he meant that mind to be some kind of living creature, there will have to be something inside it from which the creature gets its name. But what is more inward than mind? So let it be surrounded by an outer body;[17]

16 Thales and Anaximander, both of Miletus (6th century BC), were the earliest Greek natural philosophers.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.27	quod quoniam non placet, aperta simplexque mens nulla re adiuncta, quae sentire possit, fugere intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur. Crotoniates autem Alcmaeo, qui soli et lunae reliquisque sideribus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus inmortalitatem dare. Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi et lacerari deum, et cum miseri animi essent, quod plerisque contingeret, tum dei partem esse miseram, quod fieri non potest.	and since he does not accept that, a mind bare and simple, joined to nothing through which it could feel, seems to escape the reach and grasp of our understanding. Alcmaeon of Croton, who granted divinity to the sun, the moon and the other stars, and to the mind besides, did not realize that he was giving immortality to mortal things. Pythagoras, for his part, held that mind extends through and pervades the whole of nature, and that our own minds are plucked from it. He did not see that god would be torn apart and mangled by the separation of human minds, and that whenever those minds were miserable, as happens to most of them, a part of god would be miserable—which cannot be.[18]
1.28	cur autem quicquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset deus? quo modo porro deus iste, si nihil esset nisi animus, aut infixus aut infusus esset in mundo? Tum Xenophanes, qui mente adiuncta omne praeterea, quod esset infinitum, deum voluit esse, de ipsa mente item reprehendetur ut ceteri, de infinitate autem vehementius, in qua nihil neque sentiens neque coniunctum potest esse. Nam Parmenides quidem commenticium quiddam: coronae similem efficit (στεφάνην appellat) continentem ardorum lucis orbem, qui cingit caelum, quem appellat deum; in quo neque figuram divinam neque sensum quisquam suspicari potest.	And why would the human mind be ignorant of anything, if it were god? Further, if that god of his were nothing but mind, how could he be either fixed into the world or poured through it? Next Xenophanes, who held that the universe as a whole, being infinite, with mind added to it, was god, will be criticized like the others over mind itself, and more severely over infinity, in which nothing can either have sensation or be joined to anything. As for Parmenides, he invents something fanciful: a crown-like thing (he calls it στεφάνην [crown]), a continuous ring of glowing light that encircles the heavens, and this he calls god. In it no one can imagine either a divine shape or sensation.[19]
	multaque eiusdem monstra, quippe qui bellum qui discordiam qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis eiusdem ad deum revocet, quae vel morbo vel somno vel oblivione vel vetustate delentur; eademque de sideribus, quae reprehensa in alio iam in hoc omittantur.	He has many other monstrosities too. He refers war, discord, desire and other things of that kind to god, though these are wiped out by disease, or sleep, or forgetfulness, or the passage of time. He says the same about the stars, but since I have already criticized that in another, I may pass over it in his case.
1.29	Empedocles autem multa alia peccans in deorum opinione turpissume labitur. quattuor enim naturas, ex quibus omnia constare censet, divinas esse vult; quas et nasci et extingui perspicuum est et sensu omni carere. Nec vero Protagoras, qui sese negat omnino de deis	Empedocles, who goes wrong in many other ways, slips most disgracefully in his view of the gods. He holds that the four substances from which he thinks everything is composed are divine, yet it is plain that they come into being and are extin-

17 Anaximenes of Miletus (6th century BC) made air the first principle; Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (5th century BC) taught that mind ordered the universe.
18 Alcmaeon of Croton (early 5th century BC) was a physician and natural philosopher associated with the Pythagoreans.
19 Xenophanes of Colophon (6th century BC) was a poet-philosopher who attacked human-shaped gods. Parmenides of Elea (early 5th century BC) set out his philosophy in a poem.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	habere quod liqueat, sint non sint qualesve sint, quicquam videtur de natura deorum suspicari. Quid Democritus, qui tum imagines eorumque circumitus in deorum numero refert, tum illam naturam quae imagines fundat ac mittat, tum sententiam intellegentiamque nostram, nonne in maximo errore versatur? cum idem omnino, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne deum omnino ita tollit, ut nullam opinionem eius reliquam faciat? Quid aer, quo Diogenes Apolloniates utitur deo, quem sensum habere potest aut quam formam dei?	guished, and that they lack all sensation. Nor does Protagoras, who says he has nothing at all clear to say about the gods—whether they exist or not, or what they are like—seem to have any inkling of the nature of the gods. What about Democritus? He counts among the gods now the images and their revolutions, now the nature that pours out and emits the images, now our own thought and understanding. Is he not caught in the greatest error? And since he also denies that anything at all is eternal, because nothing remains permanently in its own state, does he not abolish god so completely as to leave no notion of him whatever? And the air that Diogenes of Apollonia treats as god—what sensation can it have, or what form of a god? [20]
1.30	Iam de Platonis inconstantia longum est dicere, qui in Timaeo patrem huius mundi nominari neget posse, in Legum autem libris quid sit omnino deus anquiri oportere non censeat. quod vero sine corpore ullo deum vult esse (ut Graeci dicunt ἀσώματον), id quale esse possit intellegi non potest: careat enim sensu necesse est, careat etiam prudentia, careat voluptate; quae omnia una cum deorum notione conprehendimus. idem et in Timaeo dicit et in Legibus et mundum deum esse et caelum et astra et terram et animos et eos quos maiorum institutis accepimus. quae et per se sunt falsa perspicue et inter se vehementer repugnantia.	As for Plato's inconsistency, it would take a long time to describe. In the *Timaeus* he says that the father of this world cannot be named; in the books of the *Laws* he thinks one should not inquire at all into what god is. And his wish that god be wholly without body (what the Greeks call ἀσώματον [bodiless])—what that could be like is beyond understanding. Such a god must lack sensation, must lack practical wisdom too, must lack pleasure, and all of these we include in our notion of the gods. He also says, both in the *Timaeus* and in the *Laws*, that the world is god, and the heavens, and the stars, and the earth, and minds, and the gods we have received from the institutions of our ancestors. These claims are plainly false in themselves and sharply inconsistent with one another.
1.31	Atque etiam Xenophon paucioribus verbis eadem fere peccat; facit enim in his quae a Socrate dicta rettulit Socratem disputantem formam dei quaeri non oportere, eundemque et solem et animum deum dicere, et modo unum tum autem plures deos; quae sunt isdem in erratis fere quibus ea quae de Platone dicimus.	Xenophon, too, makes nearly the same mistakes in fewer words. In his record of what Socrates said, he has Socrates argue that one ought not to ask about the form of god; and he has the same Socrates call both the sun and the mind god, and speak now of one god, now of several. These are almost the same errors as those we are pointing out in Plato.[21]
1.32	Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo libro qui physicus inscribitur popularis deos multos naturalem unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam deorum. Nec multo secus Speusippus Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim	Antisthenes too, in the book entitled *On Nature*, says that the gods of popular belief are many but the god of nature is one, and so abolishes the power and nature of the gods. Speusippus does

20 Empedocles of Acragas, Protagoras of Abdera and Democritus of Abdera were 5th-century BC thinkers; Democritus' atomism was the basis of Epicurus' physics. Diogenes of Apollonia (5th century BC) made air the first principle of all things.
21 Xenophon's record of Socrates' conversations is the *Memorabilia* (Memoirs of Socrates).

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evellere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum.	much the same. Following his uncle Plato, he speaks of a certain force by which all things are governed, and that a living one, and so tries to root the knowledge of the gods out of our minds.[22]
1.33	Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone dissentiens; modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partis tribuit ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur, tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse designarit deum. quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot dii, si numeramus etiam caelum deum? cum autem sine corpore idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. quo porro modo mundus moveri carens corpore aut quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest?	Aristotle, in the third book of his *On Philosophy*, creates great confusion by disagreeing with his teacher Plato. Now he attributes all divinity to mind; now he says that the world itself is god; now he sets some other being over the world and assigns it the role of directing and maintaining the world's motion by a kind of reverse rotation; then he says that the fiery heat of the heavens is god, not realizing that the heavens are part of the world, which he himself has elsewhere designated as god. But how can that divine sensation of the heavens be preserved amid such great speed? And where, then, are all those many gods, if we count the heavens too as god? And when the same man wants god to be without body, he robs him of all sensation, and of practical wisdom too. Besides, how can the world move if it lacks a body? Or how, if it is always moving itself, can it be at rest and blessed?[23]
1.34	Nec vero eius condiscipulus Xenocrates in hoc genere prudentior est, cuius in libris qui sunt de natura deorum nulla species divina describitur; deos enim octo esse dicit, quinque eos qui in stellis vagis nominantur, unum qui ex omnibus sideribus quae infixa caelo sint ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus deus, septimum solem adiungit octavamque lunam; qui quo sensu beati esse possint intellegi non potest. Ex eadem Platonis schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refersit libros, et tamen modo mundum tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit sensuque deum privat et eius formam mutabilem esse vult, eodemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos.	Nor is his fellow pupil Xenocrates any wiser in this area. In his books *On the Nature of the Gods* no divine form is described. He says there are eight gods: the five that go by the names of the wandering stars; one composed of all the stars fixed in the heavens, as if of scattered limbs, which must be regarded as a single god; as the seventh he adds the sun, and as the eighth the moon. In what sense these could be blessed is impossible to understand. From the same school of Plato came Heraclides of Pontus, who stuffed his books with childish stories. Even so, he thinks now the world, now mind, is divine; he also attributes divinity to the wandering stars; he deprives god of sensation and wants his form to be changeable; and in the same book he again counts the earth and the heavens among the gods.[24]
1.35	Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus. Nec	Nor can we tolerate the inconsistency of Theophrastus. Now he assigns divine rule to mind, now

22 Antisthenes was a follower of Socrates and a forerunner of the Cynics. Speusippus, Plato's nephew, succeeded him as head of the Academy.
23 *On Philosophy* was an early dialogue of Aristotle's, now lost.
24 Xenocrates succeeded Speusippus as head of the Academy; Heraclides of Pontus was another pupil of Plato. The "wandering stars" are the five planets known in antiquity.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	audiendus eius auditor Strato is qui physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quae causas gignendi augendi minuendi habeat sed careat omni et sensu et figura.	to the heavens, and then to the constellations and stars of the heavens. Nor should we listen to his pupil Strato, the one called "the Natural Philosopher," who holds that all divine power resides in nature, which contains the causes of birth, growth and decay but lacks all sensation and shape.[25]
1.36	Zeno autem, ut iam ad vestros Balbe veniam, naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. quam legem quo modo efficiat animantem intellegere non possumus; deum autem animantem certe volumus esse. atque hic idem alio loco aethera deum dicit: si intellegi potest nihil sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus neque in optatis neque in votis. aliis autem libris rationem quandam per omnium naturam rerum pertinentem vi divina esse adfectam putat. idem astris hoc idem tribuit, tum annis mensibus annorumque mutationibus.	Zeno—to come now to your own school, Balbus—thinks that the law of nature is divine, and that it has the power of commanding what is right and forbidding the opposite. How he makes this law a living being we cannot understand; and we certainly want god to be a living being. In another place the same man says that the ether is god—if a god without sensation can be understood at all, one who never presents himself to us in our prayers, or our wishes, or our vows. In other books he thinks that a certain reason pervading the whole of nature is endowed with divine power. He attributes the same divinity to the stars, and then to the years, the months and the seasons.[26]
	cum vero Hesiodi Theogoniam id est originem deorum interpretatur, tollit omnino usitatas perceptasque cognitiones deorum; neque enim Iovem neque Iunonem neque Vestam neque quemquam qui ita appelletur in deorum habet numero, sed rebus inanimis atque mutis per quandam significationem haec docet tributa nomina.	And when he interprets Hesiod's *Theogony*, that is, *The Origin of the Gods*, he does away entirely with the customary and accepted notions of the gods. He counts neither Jupiter nor Juno nor Vesta nor anyone so named among the gods, but teaches that these names were given, by a kind of symbolism, to lifeless and mute things.[27]
1.37	Cuius discipuli Aristonis non minus magno in errore sententiast, qui neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat neque in dis sensum esse dicat dubitetque omnino deus animans necne sit. Cleanthes autem, qui Zenonem audivit una cum eo quem proxime nominavi, tum ipsum mundum deum dicit esse, tum totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen, tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum et extremum omnia cingentem atque conplexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum iudicat; idemque quasi delirans in his libris quos scripsit contra voluptatem tum fingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, tum divinitatem omnem tribuit astris, tum nihil ratione censet esse divinius. ita fit ut deus ille, quem mente noscimus atque in animi notione tamquam in vestigio volumus reponere, nusquam prorsus appareat.	His pupil Aristo holds a view in no less serious error: he thinks that the form of god cannot be understood, says that there is no sensation in the gods, and is altogether in doubt whether god is a living being or not. Cleanthes, who studied under Zeno together with the man I have just named, says now that the world itself is god; now he gives this name to the mind and soul of all nature; now he judges that the surest god is that remotest and highest heat, spread out on every side, outermost, encircling and embracing all things, which is called ether. And in the books he wrote against pleasure, as if raving, the same man now invents a certain form and appearance for the gods, now assigns all divinity to the stars, now thinks that nothing is more divine than reason. So it turns out that the god we know with the mind, and want to

25 Theophrastus succeeded Aristotle as head of the Peripatetic school; Strato of Lampsacus succeeded Theophrastus.
26 Zeno of Citium (c. 334–262 BC) founded the Stoic school; he is not the Epicurean Zeno whom Cotta mentions at 1.59.
27 Hesiod (c. 700 BC) was a Greek poet; his *Theogony* tells of the birth and genealogy of the gods.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		lodge in the mind's conception as in an imprint, appears absolutely nowhere.[28]
	At Persaeus eiusdem Zenonis auditor eos esse habitos deos a quibus aliqua magna utilitas ad vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas, ut ne hoc quidem diceret, illa inventa esse deorum, sed ipsa divina;	Persaeus, another pupil of the same Zeno, says that those men were regarded as gods who had discovered something of great benefit for civilized life, and that useful and healthful things themselves were called by the names of gods. So he did not even say that these were discoveries of the gods, but that they were themselves divine;[29]
1.38	quo quid absurdius quam aut res sordidas atque deformis deorum honore adficere aut homines iam morte deletos reponere in deos, quorum omnis cultus esset futurus in luctu.	and what could be more absurd than either to give the honor due to gods to things that are base and ugly, or to place among the gods men already wiped out by death, whose whole worship would consist in mourning?
1.39	Iam vero Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum somniorum vaferrumus habetur interpres, magnam turbam congregat ignotorum deorum, atque ita ignotorum ut eos ne coniectura quidem informare possimus, cum mens nostra quidvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere. ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse et eius animi fusionem universam, tum eius ipsius principatum qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam universam atque omnia continentem, tum fatalem †umbram et necessitatem rerum futurarum, ignem praeterea et eum quem ante dixi aethera, tum ea quae natura fluerent atque manarent, ut et aquam et terram et aera, solem lunam sidera universitatemque rerum qua omnia continerentur, atque etiam homines eos qui inmortalitatem essent consecuti.	Then there is Chrysippus, who is regarded as the craftiest interpreter of the Stoics' dreams. He gathers a great crowd of unknown gods—so unknown that we cannot form any picture of them even by guesswork, though our mind seems able to paint anything at all in thought. He says that divine power resides in reason and in the soul and mind of universal nature. He says that the world itself is god, and the universal outpouring of its soul; then the world's own ruling part, which operates in mind and reason; and the common nature of things, universal and containing everything; then the power of fate and the necessity of future events; besides these, fire and the ether I mentioned before; then the things that by nature flow and pass into one another, such as water, earth and air; the sun, the moon, the stars, and the totality of things in which all is contained; and even those human beings who have attained immortality.[30]
1.40	idemque disputat aethera esse eum quem homines Iovem appellarent, quique aer per maria manaret eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum. idemque etiam legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae et magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse, eandemque fatalem necessitatem appellat sempiternam rerum futurarum veritatem; quorum nihil tale est ut in eo vis divina inesse videatur.	He also argues that the ether is the one people call Jupiter; that the air which pervades the seas is Neptune; and that the earth is the one called Ceres; and he works through the names of the other gods in a similar way. He also says that the force of the everlasting and eternal law, which is a kind of guide of life and teacher of duties, is Jupiter; and he calls the same thing the necessity of fate and the eternal truth of future events. None of this is such that divine power seems to reside in it.

28 Aristo of Chios was a pupil of Zeno. Cleanthes (c. 331–232 BC) succeeded Zeno as head of the Stoic school.
29 Persaeus of Citium was a pupil and housemate of Zeno.
30 Chrysippus (c. 280–207 BC), the third head of the Stoic school, was its chief systematizer.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.41	et haec quidem in primo libro de natura deorum; in secundo autem volt Orphei Musaei Hesiodi Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea quae ipse primo libro de deis inmortalibus dixerit, ut etiam veterrimi poetae, qui haec ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videantur. Quem Diogenes Babylonius consequens in eo libro qui inscribitur de Minerva partum Iovis ortumque virginis ad physiologiam traducens deiungit a fabula.	and all this is in the first book of his *On the Nature of the Gods*. In the second he tries to adapt the tales of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer to what he himself had said about the immortal gods in the first book, so that even the most ancient poets, who never had the slightest inkling of these ideas, would seem to have been Stoics. Diogenes of Babylon follows him in the book entitled *On Minerva*: he detaches Jupiter's giving birth and the virgin's origin from myth by turning them into natural science.[31]
1.42	Exposui fere non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia. Nec enim multo absurdiora sunt ea quae poetarum vocibus fusa ipsa suavitate nocuerunt, qui et ira inflammatos et libidine furentis induxerunt deos feceruntque ut eorum bella proelia pugnas vulnera videremus, odia praeterea discidia discordias, ortus interitus, querellas lamentationes, effusas in omni intemperantia libidines, adulteria vincula, cum humano genere concubitus mortalisque ex inmortali procreatos.	What I have set out are, for the most part, not the judgments of philosophers but the dreams of madmen. Indeed, they are not much more absurd than the things poured out by the voices of the poets, which have done harm by their very charm. The poets have presented gods inflamed with anger and raging with lust, and have made us see their wars, battles, fights and wounds; their hatreds, too, their quarrels and feuds, their births and deaths, their complaints and laments, their passions let loose in every kind of excess, their adulteries and chains, their couplings with the human race, and mortals born of an immortal.
1.43	Cum poetarum autem errore coniungere licet portenta magorum Aegyptiorumque in eodem genere dementiam, tum etiam vulgi opiniones, quae in maxima inconstantia veritatis ignoratione versantur.	With the poets' error we may couple the monstrous tales of the Magi and the madness of the Egyptians, which is of the same kind, and also the opinions of the common people, which, through ignorance of the truth, are full of the greatest inconsistency.[32]

VELLEIUS: EPICURUS' GODS

Every people has a preconception of gods; they are blessed, eternal, human in form, and untroubled by any work.

LATIN	ENGLISH
VELLEIUS Ea qui consideret quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero de quibus haec quaestio est habere debeat. Solus enim vidit primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem inpressisset ipsa natura. quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat πρόλημψιν Epicurus id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intellegi	**VELLEIUS** Anyone who considers how thoughtlessly and rashly all this is said ought to revere Epicurus and count him among the very beings this inquiry is about. For he alone saw, first, that the gods exist, because nature itself had imprinted the notion of them on the minds of all. What nation or race of human beings is there that does not have, without being taught, some preconception of the gods? Epicurus calls it πρόλημψιν [precon-

31 Orpheus and Musaeus were legendary early poets to whom religious poems were ascribed. Diogenes of Babylon (2nd century BC) headed the Stoic school; in myth Minerva was born from Jupiter's head.
32 The Magi were the priestly caste of the Persians.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. quoius rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de regula et iudicio volumine accepimus.	ception], that is, a kind of outline of a thing grasped in advance by the mind, without which nothing can be understood, investigated or discussed. We learned the force and usefulness of this reasoning from that heavenly volume of Epicurus, *On the Rule and the Criterion*.[33]
1.44	quod igitur fundamentum huius quaestionis est, id praeclare iactum videtis. cum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intellegi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est; esse igitur deos confitendum est. Quod quoniam fere constat inter omnis non philosophos solum sed etiam indoctos, fatemur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praenotionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse πρόληψιν appellavit,	So you see that the foundation of this inquiry has been splendidly laid. For since this belief was not established by any institution, custom or law, and the agreement of everyone without exception remains firm, it must be understood that gods exist, because we have implanted, or rather innate, notions of them. And what the nature of all people agrees on must be true. So it must be admitted that gods exist. Since this is accepted by nearly everyone—not only by philosophers but also by the uneducated—we admit that this too is accepted: that we have this "preconception" of the gods, as I called it before, or "prenotion" (for new things must be given new names, just as Epicurus himself called it πρόληψιν [preconception],
1.45	quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat)—hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et inmortales putemus. quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, eadem insculpsit in mentibus ut eos aeternos et beatos haberemus. Quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, quod beatum aeternumque sit id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod quae talia essent inbecilla essent omnia.	a word no one had used for it before)—this, then, we have, so that we think the gods blessed and immortal. For the same nature that gave us an outline of the gods themselves has engraved on our minds that we should hold them eternal and blessed. If that is so, Epicurus rightly stated the principle that what is blessed and eternal neither has any trouble itself nor causes trouble for another, and so is subject neither to anger nor to favor, since everything of that kind is a mark of weakness.
	Si nihil aliud quaereremus nisi ut deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum; nam et praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et aeterna esset et beatissima (habet enim venerationem iustam quicquid excellit), et metus omnis a vi atque ira deorum pulsus esset; intellegitur enim a beata inmortalique natura et iram et gratiam segregari; quibus remotis nullos a superis inpendere metus. sed ad hanc confirmandam opinionem anquirit animus et formam et vitam et actionem mentis atque agitationem in deo.	If we were seeking nothing else than to worship the gods with piety and to be freed from superstition, enough would have been said. For the exalted nature of the gods would be worshiped by human piety, since it is both eternal and supremely blessed (for whatever excels deserves rightful veneration); and all fear of the power and anger of the gods would have been driven out, since it is understood that both anger and favor are excluded from a blessed and immortal nature, and once these are removed, no fears threaten us from the gods above. But to confirm this belief, the mind inquires into the form of god, his life, and the activity and working of his mind.[34]

33 Epicurus' lost work known as the *Canon* ("Rule") dealt with the criteria of truth.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.46	Ac de forma quidem partim natura nos admonet partim ratio docet. Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum; quae enim forma alia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? Sed ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones, ratio hoc idem ipsa declarat.	As for form, nature partly prompts us and reason partly teaches us. From nature, all of us, of all nations, have no other image of the gods than a human one; for what other form has ever appeared to anyone, awake or asleep? But so that not everything is referred back to primary notions, reason itself declares the same thing.
1.47	nam cum praestantissumam naturam, vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur eandem esse pulcherrimam, quae conpositio membrorum, quae conformatio liniamentorum, quae figura, quae species humana potest esse pulchrior? Vos quidem Lucili soletis (nam Cotta meus modo hoc modo illud), cum artificium effingitis fabricamque divinam, quam sint omnia in hominis figura non modo ad usum verum etiam ad venustatem apta describere;	for since it seems fitting that the most excellent nature, either because it is blessed or because it is eternal, should also be the most beautiful, what arrangement of limbs, what shaping of features, what figure, what appearance can be more beautiful than the human? You Stoics, Balbus (for my friend Cotta says one thing one moment and another the next), usually describe, when you portray the craftsmanship and workmanship of the gods, how everything in the human figure is suited not only for use but also for beauty;
1.48	quod si omnium animantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem animans est, ea figura profecto est quae pulcherrimast omnium. quoniamque deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse specie deos confitendum est.	and if the human figure surpasses the form of all living beings, and god is a living being, then god certainly has the figure that is the most beautiful of all. And since it is agreed that the gods are supremely blessed, and no one can be blessed without virtue, nor can virtue exist without reason, nor reason be found anywhere except in human form, it must be admitted that the gods have human appearance.
1.49	Nec tamen ea species corpus est sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem sed quasi sanguinem. Haec quamquam et inventa sunt acutius et dicta subtilius ab Epicuro quam ut quivis ea possit agnoscere, tamen fretus intellegentia vestra dissero brevius quam causa desiderat. Epicurus autem, qui res occultas et penitus abditas non modo videat animo sed etiam sic tractet ut manu, docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur, nec soliditate quadam nec ad numerum, ut ea quae ille propter firmitatem στερέμνια appellat, sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis, cum infinita simillumarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad deos adfluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intellegentiam capere quae sit et beata natura et aeterna.	Yet that appearance is not a body but a quasi-body; it has no blood, but quasi-blood. These points were discovered more acutely and expressed more subtly by Epicurus than just anyone could grasp; still, relying on your intelligence, I am discussing them more briefly than the subject demands. Epicurus, who not only sees hidden and deeply buried things with his mind but handles them as if with his hand, teaches that the power and nature of the gods is such that, first, it is discerned not by the senses but by the mind. It does not have solidity or numerical identity, like the things he calls στερέμνια [solids] because of their firmness; rather, it is perceived through images, by their likeness and their succession. Since an endless series of closely similar images arises from countless atoms and flows toward the gods, our mind, fixed intently upon those images with the greatest

34 Superstition (*superstitio*) is fearful, excessive religiosity; Balbus distinguishes it from religion at 2.72.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		pleasure, grasps what a blessed and eternal nature is.
1.50	Summa vero vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima est. in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant; hanc ἰσονομίαν appellat Epicurus id est aequabilem tributionem. ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse inmortalium non minorem, et si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere.	The supreme power of infinity, moreover, is most worthy of great and careful contemplation. In it we must understand that nature is such that all things correspond equally to their equals. Epicurus calls this ἰσονομίαν [equilibrium], that is, an even distribution. From this, then, it follows that if there is so great a multitude of mortals, there is no smaller number of immortals; and if the things that destroy are countless, the things that preserve must also be infinite.
	Et quaerere a nobis Balbe soletis quae vita deorum sit quaeque ab is degatur aetas.	And you Stoics, Balbus, are in the habit of asking us what the life of the gods is like, and how they spend their days.
1.51	ea videlicet qua nihil beatius nihil omnibus bonis affluentius cogitari potest. nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est inplicatus, nulla opera molitur, sua sapientia et virtute gaudet, habet exploratum fore se semper cum in maximis tum in aeternis voluptatibus.	it is, clearly, a life than which nothing more blessed, nothing more abounding in every good, can be imagined. For god does nothing, is entangled in no occupations, undertakes no labors. He rejoices in his own wisdom and virtue, and knows for certain that he will always be in pleasures that are both the greatest and eternal.
1.52	Hunc deum rite beatum dixerimus, vestrum vero laboriosissimum. sive enim ipse mundus deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso versari circum axem caeli admirabili celeritate: nisi quietum autem nihil beatum est; sive in ipso mundo deus inest aliquis, qui regat qui gubernet qui cursus astrorum mutationes temporum rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservet, terras et maria contemplans hominum commoda vitasque tueatur, ne ille est inplicatus molestis negotiis et operosis.	This god we may rightly call blessed; yours, on the other hand, is the most overworked of all. For if the world itself is god, what can be less restful than to revolve around the axis of the heavens at astonishing speed without a moment's pause? Yet nothing is blessed unless it is at rest. Or if there is some god within the world who rules and steers it, who maintains the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons, and the alternations and orderly sequences of things, and who, surveying lands and seas, protects the interests and lives of human beings—then surely he is entangled in troublesome and laborious business.
1.53	nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus. docuit enim nos idem qui cetera, natura effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica, tamque eam rem esse facilem, quam vos effici negetis sine divina posse sollertia, ut innumerabiles natura mundos effectura sit efficiat effecerit. quod quia quem ad modum natura efficere sine aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut tragici poetae cum explicare argumenti exitum non potestis confugitis ad deum.	We, by contrast, place the blessed life in tranquility of mind and freedom from all duties. For the same man who taught us everything else taught us that the world was made by nature; that there was no need of any construction; and that the thing you say cannot be done without divine skill is so easy that nature will make, is making and has made countless worlds. Because you do not see how nature could do this without some mind, you behave like tragic poets: when you cannot work

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		out the ending of your plot, you take refuge in a god.[35]
1.54	cuius operam profecto non desideraretis, si inmensam et interminatam in omnis partis magnitudinem regionum videretis, in quam se iniciens animus et intendens ita late longeque peregrinatur, ut nullam tamen oram ultimi videat in qua possit insistere. in hac igitur inmensitate latitudinum longitudinum altitudinum infinita vis innumerabilium volitat atomorum, quae interiecto inani cohaerescunt tamen inter se et aliae alias adprehendentes continuantur; ex quo efficiuntur eae rerum formae et figurae, quas vos effici posse sine follibus et incudibus non putatis. itaque inposuistis in cervicibus nostris sempiternum dominum, quem dies et noctes timeremus. quis enim non timeat omnia providentem et cogitantem et animadvertentem et omnia ad se pertinere putantem curiosum et plenum negotii deum?	You would certainly not need his help if you could see the vast extent of space, immense and unbounded in every direction. The mind throws itself into it and strains forward, traveling so far and wide that it never sees any final shore on which to come to rest. In this immensity of breadth, length and height there flies about an infinite quantity of countless atoms. Though separated by the void, they nevertheless cling together and, catching hold of one another, form continuous masses. From this arise those forms and shapes of things that you think cannot be produced without bellows and anvils. And so you have set over our necks an eternal master, for us to fear by day and by night. For who would not fear a god who foresees, considers and notices everything, who thinks everything is his concern—a meddlesome god, full of business?
1.55	Hinc vobis extitit primum illa fatalis necessitas, quam εἱμαρμένην dicitis, ut quicquid accidat id ex aeterna veritate causarumque continuatione fluxisse dicatis. quanti autem haec philosophia aestimandast, cui tamquam aniculis, et his quidem indoctis, fato fieri videantur omnia. sequitur μαντικὴ vestra, quae Latine divinatio dicitur, qua tanta inbueremur superstitione si vos audire vellemus, ut haruspices augures harioli vates coniectores nobis essent colendi.	From this came, first, that fated necessity of yours, which you call εἱμαρμένην [destiny], so that you say whatever happens has flowed from eternal truth and an unbroken chain of causes. But what value should be placed on a philosophy to which, as to old women—and uneducated ones at that—everything seems to happen by fate? Next comes your μαντικὴ [mantic art], which in Latin is called divination. If we were willing to listen to you, we would be steeped in so much superstition that we would have to revere soothsayers, augurs, fortune-tellers, prophets and interpreters of dreams.[36]
1.56	His terroribus ab Epicuro soluti et in libertatem vindicati nec metuimus eos quos intellegimus nec sibi fingere ullam molestiam nec alteri quaerere, et pie sancteque colimus naturam excellentem atque praestantem.	Released from these terrors by Epicurus and set free, we do not fear beings who, as we understand, neither create any trouble for themselves nor seek to cause it for another; and we worship with piety and holiness a nature that is excellent and supreme.
	Sed elatus studio vereor ne longior fuerim. erat autem difficile rem tantam tamque praeclaram inchoatam relinquere; quamquam non tam dicendi ratio mihi habenda fuit quam audiendi.	But I am afraid that, carried away by enthusiasm, I have gone on too long. Yet it was hard to leave so great and splendid a subject half-finished—though I ought to have been thinking less about speaking than about listening.

35 The allusion is to the "god from the machine" who resolves the plot at the end of some Greek tragedies.
36 Soothsayers (*haruspices*) foretold the future by reading the entrails of sacrificed animals.

COTTA REPLIES

Easier to say what is false than what is true; is the universal belief in gods any proof?

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.57	**COTTA** Tum Cotta comiter ut solebat "Atqui" inquit "Vellei nisi tu aliquid dixisses, nihil sane ex me quidem audire potuisses. mihi enim non tam facile in mentem venire solet quare verum sit aliquid quam quare falsum; idque cum saepe tum cum te audirem paulo ante contigit. roges me qualem naturam deorum esse dicam: nihil fortasse respondeam; quaeras putemne talem esse qualis modo a te sit exposita: nihil dicam mihi videri minus."	**COTTA** Then Cotta, in his usual friendly way, said: "Well, Velleius, if you had not said something, you certainly could not have heard anything from me. For I usually find it much easier to see why a thing is false than why it is true; that has often happened to me, and it happened again just now as I was listening to you. If you asked me what I say the nature of the gods is, I might perhaps give no answer at all. If you asked whether I think it is such as you have just set out, I would say that nothing seems to me less likely."
	Sed ante quam adgrediar ad ea quae a te disputata sunt de te ipso dicam quid sentiam.	But before I tackle the arguments you have made, I will tell you what I think of you yourself.
1.58	Saepe enim de L. Crasso illo familiari tuo videor audisse, cum te togatis omnibus sine dubio anteferret, paucos tecum Epicureos e Graecia compararet, sed, quod ab eo te mirifice diligi intellegebam, arbitrabar illum propter benivolentiam uberius id dicere. ego autem, etsi vereor laudare praesentem, iudico tamen de re obscura atque difficili a te dictum esse dilucide, neque sententiis solum copiose sed verbis etiam ornatius quam solent vestri.	I often seem to have heard your close friend Lucius Crassus rank you, without hesitation, above every Roman, and say that only a few Epicureans from Greece could be compared with you. But since I knew he was extraordinarily fond of you, I thought his goodwill made him say it rather too generously. For my part, though I hesitate to praise a man to his face, I judge that you have spoken lucidly on an obscure and difficult subject, rich not only in ideas but also in language more elegant than your school usually uses.[37]
1.59	Zenonem, quem Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat, cum Athenis essem audiebam frequenter, et quidem ipso auctore Philone, credo ut facilius iudicarem quam illa bene refellerentur, cum a principe Epicureorum accepissem quem ad modum dicerentur. non igitur ille ut plerique, sed isto modo ut tu, distincte graviter ornate. Sed quod in illo mihi usu saepe venit, idem modo cum te audirem accidebat, ut moleste ferrem tantum ingenium (bona venia me audies) in tam leves ne dicam in tam ineptas sententias incidisse.	When I was in Athens I often went to hear Zeno, whom our Philo used to call the "coryphaeus" [chorus leader] of the Epicureans. I did so on Philo's own advice, I believe so that once I had learned from the leader of the Epicureans how those doctrines were stated, I could more easily judge how well they were refuted. He did not speak like most of them, then, but in your manner: clearly, weightily, elegantly. But what often happened to me with him happened again just now as I listened to you. I was vexed that so great a talent (you will pardon me for saying so) should have fallen into such trivial—not to say such foolish—opinions.[38]
1.60	Nec ego nunc ipse aliquid adferam melius. ut enim modo dixi, omnibus fere in rebus sed maxime in physicis quid	Nor will I myself now offer anything better. For as I said a moment ago, in almost every subject, but most of all in natural philosophy, I could sooner

37 Lucius Licinius Crassus (140–91 BC), the leading Roman orator of his generation.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	non sit citius quam quid sit dixerim. roges me quid aut quale sit deus: auctore utar Simonide, de quo cum quaesivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi sibi unum diem postulavit; cum idem ex eo postridie quaereret, biduum petivit; cum saepius duplicaret numerum dierum admiransque Hiero requireret cur ita faceret, "quia quanto diutius considero" inquit "tanto mihi spes videtur obscurior". Sed Simoniden arbitror (non enim poeta solum suavis verum etiam ceteroqui doctus sapiensque traditur), quia multa venirent in mentem acuta atque subtilia, dubitantem quid eorum esset verissimum desperasse omnem veritatem.	say what is not the case than what is. Ask me what god is, or what god is like, and I shall take Simonides as my authority. When the tyrant Hiero asked him this same question, he asked for one day to think it over. When Hiero asked him again the next day, he asked for two days. He kept doubling the number of days, and when Hiero in astonishment asked why he was doing this, he said, "Because the longer I consider it, the more obscure it seems to me." But I believe that Simonides—for tradition says he was not only a charming poet but also learned and wise in other respects—had so many clever and subtle ideas come into his mind that, unable to decide which of them was truest, he despaired of truth altogether.[39]
1.61	Epicurus vero tuus (nam cum illo malo disserere quam tecum) quid dicit quod non modo philosophia dignum esset sed mediocri prudentia?	But your Epicurus (for I would rather argue with him than with you)—what does he say that would be worthy, I will not say of philosophy, but even of ordinary good sense?
	Quaeritur primum in ea quaestione quae est de natura deorum, sintne dei necne sint. "Difficile est negare." Credo si in contione quaeratur, sed in huius modi sermone et in consessu familiari facillimum. itaque ego ipse pontifex, qui caerimonias religionesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitror, is hoc quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi mihi non opinione solum sed etiam ad veritatem plane velim. multa enim occurrunt quae conturbent, ut interdum nulli esse videantur.	The first question in the inquiry into the nature of the gods is whether the gods exist or not. "It is hard to deny it." I suppose so, if the question is put in a public assembly; but in a conversation of this kind, among friends gathered together, it is very easy. So I myself, a pontiff, who believe that the public rites and religious observances must be maintained with the utmost reverence—I would like to be persuaded of this first point, that the gods exist, not merely as a matter of opinion but as plain truth. For many things occur to me that are so disturbing that at times there seem to be no gods at all.[40]
1.62	Sed vide quam tecum agam liberaliter: quae communia sunt vobis cum ceteris philosophis non attingam, ut hoc ipsum; placet enim omnibus fere mihique ipsi in primis deos esse. itaque non pugno; rationem tamen eam quae a te adfertur non satis firmam puto. Quod enim omnium gentium generumque hominibus ita videretur, id satis magnum argumentum esse dixisti cur esse deos confiteremur. quod cum leve per se tum etiam falsum est. Primum enim unde tibi notae sunt opiniones nationum? equidem arbitror multas esse gentes sic inmanitate efferatas, ut apud eas nulla suspicio deorum sit.	But see how generously I am dealing with you: I will not touch on the points your school shares with the other philosophers, such as this very one. For almost all of them, and I myself above all, hold that the gods exist. So I do not dispute it; but I do not think the argument you offer is sound enough. You said that the fact that people of all nations and races believe it is a strong enough reason for us to admit that the gods exist. That argument is not only weak in itself but false as well. First, how do you know the beliefs of the nations? For my part, I

38 Zeno of Sidon (c. 150–75 BC), a leading Epicurean in Athens, not the founder of Stoicism. Philo of Larissa was head of the Academy and teacher of both Cotta and Cicero.
39 Simonides of Ceos (c. 556–468 BC), lyric poet, spent his last years at the court of Hiero I, tyrant of Syracuse (478–467 BC).
40 Cotta belonged to the college of pontiffs, the body of priests that oversaw Rome's state religion.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		think there are many peoples so brutalized by savagery that they have no notion of gods at all.
1.63	Quid Diagoras, Atheos qui dictus est, posteaque Theodorus nonne aperte deorum naturam sustulerunt? nam Abderites quidem Protagoras, cuius a te modo mentio facta est, sophistes temporibus illis vel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisset "de divis neque ut sint neque ut non sint habeo dicere", Atheniensium iussu urbe atque agro est exterminatus librique eius in contione combusti; ex quo equidem existimo tardioris ad hanc sententiam profitendam multos esse factos, quippe cum poenam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuisset. Quid de sacrilegis, quid de impiis periurisque dicemus? Tubulus si Lucius umquam, / si Lupus aut Carbo aut Neptuni filius, ut ait Lucilius, putasset esse deos, tam periurus aut tam inpurus fuisset?	What about Diagoras, who was called *Atheos* [the Atheist], and later Theodorus—did they not openly abolish the nature of the gods? As for Protagoras of Abdera, whom you mentioned just now, perhaps the greatest sophist of those times: he opened his book with the words "About the gods I cannot say either that they exist or that they do not exist," and for this he was banished by order of the Athenians from their city and its territory, and his books were burned in the assembly. That, I believe, has made many people slower to profess this view, since not even doubt had managed to escape punishment. What shall we say of temple-robbers, of the impious and of perjurers? "If ever Lucius Tubulus, / if Lupus or Carbo or Neptune's son," as Lucilius says, had believed that gods exist, would he have been such a perjurer, or so vile?[41]
1.64	Non est igitur tam explorata ista ratio ad id quod vultis confirmandum quam videtur. sed quia commune hoc est argumentum aliorum etiam philosophorum, omittam hoc tempore; ad vestra propria venire malo.	So that argument of yours is not as well established a proof of what you want to show as it seems. But since it is an argument shared with other philosophers too, I will leave it aside for now; I prefer to turn to your school's own doctrines.

AGAINST ATOMS

Cotta attacks the atoms, the void and the infinite worlds of Democritus and Epicurus.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.65	**COTTA** Concedo esse deos; doce me igitur unde sint ubi sint quales sint corpore animo vita; haec enim scire desidero. Abuteris ad omnia atomorum regno et licentia; hinc quodcumque in solum venit, ut dicitur, effingis atque efficis. Quae primum nullae sunt. nihil est enim … quod vacet corpore, corporibus autem omnis obsidetur locus; ita nullum inane, nihil esse individuum potest.	**COTTA** I grant that the gods exist. Then teach me where they come from, where they are, and what they are like in body, mind and life; for that is what I want to know. For everything you exploit the reign and lawlessness of the atoms; out of them you mold and produce whatever turns up, as the saying goes. First of all, there are no such things. For there is nothing … that is empty of body, and every place is filled with bodies; so there can be no void and nothing indivisible.
1.66	Haec ego nunc physicorum oracla fundo, vera an falsa nescio, sed veri [simile] tamen similiora quam vestra. ista enim flagitia Democriti sive etiam ante Leucippi, esse corpuscula quaedam levia alia aspera, rutunda alia, partim autem angulata et hamata, curvata quaedam et	I am now pouring forth these oracles of the natural philosophers. Whether they are true or false I do not know, but they are nevertheless [probable and] closer to the truth than yours. Consider those outrageous notions of Democritus—or, even before

41 Lucilius (c. 180–103 BC) was the Roman satirist; Lucius Hostilius Tubulus, a praetor, was notorious for taking bribes as a judge.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quasi adunca, ex iis effectum esse caelum atque terram nulla cogente natura sed concursu quodam fortuito—hanc tu opinionem C. Vellei usque ad hanc aetatem perduxisti, priusque te quis de omni vitae statu quam de ista auctoritate deiecerit; ante enim iudicasti Epicureum te esse oportere quam ista cognovisti: ita necesse fuit aut haec flagitia concipere animo aut susceptae philosophiae nomen amittere.	him, of Leucippus: that there are certain tiny particles, some smooth, some rough, some round, some angular and hooked, some curved and, as it were, bent; and that from them the heavens and the earth were made, with no nature compelling it, but by a kind of chance collision. This view, Gaius Velleius, you have carried with you to your present time of life, and one could dislodge you from your whole way of life sooner than from that authority. For you decided you must be an Epicurean before you learned these doctrines. So you had no choice: either take these outrages into your mind or give up the name of the philosophy you had embraced.
1.67	quid enim mereas, ut Epicureus esse desinas? "Nihil equidem" inquis "ut rationem vitae beatae veritatemque deseram". Ista igitur est veritas? nam de vita beata nihil repugno, quam tu ne in deo quidem esse censes nisi plane otio langueat. sed ubi est veritas? in mundis credo innumerabilibus omnibus minimis temporum punctis aliis nascentibus aliis cadentibus; an in individuis corpusculis tam praeclara opera nulla moderante natura nulla ratione fingentibus? Sed oblitus liberalitatis meae, qua tecum paulo ante uti coeperam, plura complector. Concedam igitur ex individuis constare omnia; quid ad rem?	for what would you take to stop being an Epicurean? "Nothing at all," you say, "would make me abandon the way to a blessed life, and the truth." Is that the truth, then? About the blessed life I raise no objection—though you think it does not exist even in a god unless he languishes in utter idleness. But where is the truth? In innumerable worlds, I suppose, some being born and others perishing at every tiniest moment of time? Or in indivisible particles producing such splendid works with no nature guiding them and no reason? But I am forgetting the generosity I had begun to show you a little while ago, and taking in too much. So I will concede that everything consists of indivisible particles; what has that to do with the point?
1.68	deorum enim natura quaeritur. sint sane ex atomis; non igitur aeterni. †quia enim ex atomis, id natum aliquandost; si natum, nulli dei ante quam nati; et si ortus est deorum, interitus sit necesse est, ut tu paulo ante de Platonis mundo disputabas. ubi igitur illud vestrum beatum et aeternum, quibus duobus verbis significatis deum? Quod cum efficere vultis, in dumeta conrepitis. ita enim dicebas, non corpus esse in deo sed quasi corpus, nec sanguinem sed tamquam sanguinem.	for it is the nature of the gods that is under inquiry. Suppose they are made of atoms; then they are not eternal. For whatever is made of atoms came into being at some time; if the gods came into being, there were no gods before they came into being; and if the gods had a beginning, they must also have an end, as you argued a little while ago about Plato's world. Where, then, is that "blessed and eternal" of yours, the two words by which you denote a god? When you try to make this out, you crawl into a thicket. For this is what you said: that a god has not a body but a quasi-body, not blood but quasi-blood.
1.69	Hoc persaepe facitis, ut, cum aliquid non veri simile dicatis et effugere reprehensionem velitis, adferatis aliquid quod omnino ne fieri quidem possit, ut satius fuerit illud ipsum de quo ambigebatur concedere quam tam inpudenter resistere. Velut Epicurus cum videret, si	You Epicureans do this very often. When you say something implausible and want to escape criticism, you put forward something utterly impossible, so that it would have been better to concede the very point in dispute than to resist so

LATIN	ENGLISH
atomi ferrentur in locum inferiorem suopte pondere, nihil fore in nostra potestate, quod esset earum motus certus et necessarius, invenit quo modo necessitatem effugeret, quod videlicet Democritum fugerat: ait atomum, cum pondere et gravitate directo deorsus feratur, declinare paululum.	shamelessly. For example, Epicurus saw that if atoms were carried downward by their own weight, nothing would be in our power, since their motion would be fixed and necessary. So he discovered a way to escape necessity—something that had evidently escaped Democritus. He says that an atom, while it is carried straight down by its weight and heaviness, swerves very slightly.
1.70 hoc dicere turpius est quam illud quod vult non posse defendere. Idem facit contra dialecticos; a quibus cum traditum sit in omnibus diiunctionibus, in quibus "aut etiam aut non" poneretur, alterum utrum esse verum, pertimuit ne, si concessum esset huius modi aliquid "aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus", alterutrum fieret necessarium: totum hoc "aut etiam aut non" negavit esse necessarium; quo quid dici potuit obtusius? Urguebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret quae sensibus viderentur, Zenon autem non nulla visa esse falsa non omnia; timuit Epicurus ne, si unum visum esset falsum, nullum esset verum: omnes sensus veri nuntios dixit esse. Nihil horum nisi †valde; graviorem enim plagam accipiebat ut leviorem repelleret.	to say this is more shameful than to be unable to defend what he wants. He does the same against the logicians. They teach that in every disjunction of the form "either yes or no," one of the two alternatives is true. He was terrified that if something like "Either Epicurus will be alive tomorrow or he will not" were granted, one or the other would become necessary; so he denied that the whole "either yes or no" is necessary. What could be more obtuse? Arcesilaus was pressing Zeno: he himself said that everything perceived by the senses was false, while Zeno said that some impressions were false, but not all. Epicurus feared that if a single impression were false, none would be true, so he declared that all the senses are messengers of truth. In none of this did he act other than very clumsily; for he took a heavier blow to ward off a lighter one.[42]

QUASI-BODY AND QUASI-BLOOD

Epicurus' evasions: the swerve, gods with quasi-bodies, and a founder who boasted he had no teacher.

LATIN	ENGLISH
1.71 COTTA Idem facit in natura deorum: dum individuorum corporum concretionem fugit ne interitus et dissipatio consequatur, negat esse corpus deorum sed tamquam corpus, nec sanguinem sed tamquam sanguinem. Mirabile videtur quod non rideat haruspex cum haruspicem viderit; hoc mirabilius quam ut vos inter vos risum tenere possitis? "non est corpus sed quasi corpus": hoc intellegerem quale esset, si in cereis fingeretur aut fictilibus figuris; in deo quid sit quasi corpus aut quid sit quasi sanguis intellegere non possum. ne tu quidem Vellei, sed non vis fateri.	COTTA He does the same regarding the nature of the gods. While he avoids making them a compound of indivisible bodies, for fear that destruction and dispersal would follow, he says that the gods do not have a body but a quasi-body, not blood but quasi-blood. It seems remarkable that one soothsayer does not laugh when he sees another; is it not more remarkable still that you Epicureans can keep a straight face among yourselves? "It is not a body but a quasi-body": I could understand what this meant if it were said of figures made of wax or clay; but what a quasi-body or quasi-blood is in a god, I cannot understand. Nor can you, Velleius, but you do not want to admit it.[43]

42 Arcesilaus (316–241 BC), who turned the Academy toward skepticism, debated Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism.
43 The quip goes back to Cato the Elder.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.72	Ista enim a vobis quasi dictata redduntur, quae Epicurus oscitans halucinatus est, cum quidem gloriaretur, ut videmus in scriptis, se magistrum habuisse nullum. quod et non praedicanti tamen facile equidem crederem, sicut mali aedificii domino glorianti se architectum non habuisse; nihil enim olet ex Academia, nihil [ne] ex Lycio, nihil ne e puerilibus quidem disciplinis. Xenocraten audire potuit (quem virum, dii inmortales), et sunt qui putent audisse; ipse non vult: credo, plus nemini. Pamphilum quendam Platonis auditorem ait a se Sami auditum (ibi enim adulescens habitabat cum patre et fratribus, quod in eam pater eius Neocles agripeta venerat, sed cum agellus eum non satis aleret ut opinor, ludi magister fuit);	For you all recite, as if from dictation, the fantasies Epicurus dreamed up while yawning—though he boasted, as we see in his writings, that he had never had a teacher. I would easily have believed that even if he had not proclaimed it, just as I would believe the owner of a badly built house who boasted that he had not employed an architect. For there is no whiff of the Academy about him, none [even] of the Lyceum, not even of a schoolboy's education. He could have heard Xenocrates—what a man, by the immortal gods!—and some people think he did; he himself denies it, and I believe him more than anyone. He says he heard a certain Pamphilus, a pupil of Plato, at Samos (he lived there as a young man with his father and brothers, because his father Neocles had gone there as a settler in search of land; but since his little plot did not feed him well enough, I suppose, he became a schoolmaster);[44]
1.73	sed hunc Platonicum mirifice contemnit Epicurus: ita metuit ne quid umquam didicisse videatur. In Nausiphane Democriteo tenetur; quem cum a se non neget auditum vexat tamen omnibus contumeliis. atqui si haec Democritea non audisset, quid audierat, quid est in physicis Epicuri non a Democrito? nam etsi quaedam commutavit, ut quod paulo ante de inclinatione atomorum dixi, tamen pleraque dicit eadem, atomos inane, imagines infinitatem locorum innumerabilitatemque mundorum, eorum ortus interitus, omnia fere quibus naturae ratio continetur.	but Epicurus has an extraordinary contempt for this Platonist: so afraid is he of seeming ever to have learned anything. He is caught out in the case of Nausiphanes the Democritean: though he does not deny that he heard him, he still assails him with every kind of insult. And yet if he had not heard these Democritean doctrines, what had he heard? What is there in Epicurus' natural philosophy that does not come from Democritus? For though he changed some things—such as the swerve of the atoms I mentioned a moment ago—most of what he says is the same: atoms, the void, images, the infinity of space and the countless number of worlds, their births and deaths—almost everything that makes up the account of nature.[45]
	Nunc istuc quasi corpus et quasi sanguinem quid intellegis?	Now, what do you understand by that quasi-body and quasi-blood?
1.74	ego enim te scire ista melius quam me non fateor solum sed etiam facile patior; cum quidem semel dicta sunt, quid est quod Velleius intellegere possit Cotta non possit? itaque corpus quid sit sanguis quid sit intellego, quasi corpus et quasi sanguis quid sit nullo prorsus modo intellego. neque tu me celas ut Pythagoras solebat alienos, nec consulto dicis occulte tamquam Heraclitus, sed, quod inter nos liceat, ne tu quidem intellegis.	for I not only admit that you know these things better than I do, I am quite happy to accept it; but once they have been put into words, what is there that Velleius could understand and Cotta could not? So I understand what a body is and what blood is; what a quasi-body and quasi-blood are, I cannot understand in any way at all. And you are not concealing it from me, as Pythagoras used to

44 Xenocrates headed Plato's Academy from 339 to 314 BC; the Lyceum was Aristotle's school.
45 Nausiphanes of Teos (4th century BC), a follower of Democritus.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		with outsiders, nor are you deliberately speaking obscurely, like Heraclitus; but—just between ourselves—you do not understand it either.[46]
1.75	Illud video pugnare te, species ut quaedam sit deorum, quae nihil concreti habeat nihil solidi nihil expressi nihil eminentis, sitque pura levis perlucida. dicemus igitur idem quod in Venere Coa: corpus illud non est sed simile corporis, nec ille fusus et candore mixtus rubor sanguis est sed quaedam sanguinis similitudo; sic in Epicureo deo non rem sed similitudines esse rerum.	I see that what you contend is this: that there is a kind of appearance of the gods that has nothing compact, nothing solid, nothing sharply defined, nothing in relief, and is pure, light and translucent. So we shall say the same as of the Venus of Cos: that is not a body but the likeness of a body, and that blush, spread over her and mingled with whiteness, is not blood but a certain likeness of blood. In the same way, in the Epicurean god there is no reality, only likenesses of realities.[47]
	Fac id quod ne intellegi quidem potest mihi esse persuasum; cedo mihi istorum adumbratorum deorum liniamenta atque formas.	Suppose I have been persuaded of something that cannot even be understood: show me the outlines and shapes of those shadowy gods of yours.

AGAINST HUMAN-SHAPED GODS

Cotta rejects the arguments for human form and asks what use limbs and organs would be to a god.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.76	COTTA Non deest hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis humanas esse formas deorum; primum quod ita sit informatum anticipatumque mentibus nostris, ut homini, cum de deo cogitet, forma occurrat humana; deinde cum, quoniam rebus omnibus excellat natura divina, forma quoque esse pulcherrima debeat, nec esse humana ullam pulchriorem; tertiam rationem adfertis, quod nulla in alia figura domicilium mentis esse possit.	COTTA There is no lack of arguments here with which you try to show that the gods have human form. First, that our minds are so shaped and preconceived that when a human being thinks of a god, a human form comes to mind. Second, that since the divine nature surpasses all things, its form too must be the most beautiful, and no form is more beautiful than the human. As a third argument you put forward that the mind can have its home in no other shape.
1.77	primum igitur quidque considera quale sit; arripere enim mihi videmini quasi vestro iure rem nullo modo probabilem.	so consider each of these in turn and what it is worth; for you seem to me to seize, as if by your own right, a proposition that is in no way plausible.
	Primum omnium quis tam caecus in contemplandis rebus umquam fuit, ut non videret species istas hominum conlatas in deos aut consilio quodam sapientium, quo facilius animos imperitorum ad deorum cultum a vitae pravitate converterent, aut superstitione, ut essent simulacra quae venerantes deos ipsos se adire crederent. auxerunt autem haec eadem poetae pictores opifices; erat enim non facile agentis aliquid et molientes deos in aliarum formarum imitatione servare.	First of all, who has ever been so blind in contemplating things as not to see that these human forms were attributed to the gods either by some design of wise men, so that they might more easily turn the minds of the ignorant from a depraved life to the worship of the gods, or by superstition, so that there might be images which people could venerate in the belief that they were approaching the gods themselves? Poets, painters and crafts-

46 Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 500 BC) was nicknamed "the Obscure" for his riddling style.
47 The Venus of Cos was a celebrated painting by Apelles (4th century BC).

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		men then reinforced these same notions; for it was not easy to portray gods doing things and undertaking great works while keeping to the likeness of other shapes.
	Accessit etiam ista opinio fortasse, quod homini homine pulchrius nihil videatur. Sed tu hoc physice non vides, quam blanda conciliatrix et quasi sui sit lena natura? an putas ullam esse terra marique beluam quae non sui generis belua maxime delectetur? quod ni ita esset, cur non gestiret taurus equae contrectatione, equus vaccae? an tu aquilam aut leonem aut delphinum ullam anteferre censes figuram suae? quid igitur mirum si hoc eodem modo homini natura praescripsit, ut nihil pulchrius quam hominem putaret? … eam esse causam cur deos hominum similis putaremus: quid censes, si ratio esset in beluis, non suo quasque generi plurimum tributuras fuisse?	Perhaps there was also the belief that nothing seems more beautiful to a human being than a human being. But do you, a natural philosopher, not see what a seductive matchmaker nature is—a procuress, as it were, on her own behalf? Or do you think there is any beast on land or sea that is not most delighted by a beast of its own kind? If that were not so, why would a bull not be aroused by contact with a mare, or a stallion with a cow? Or do you think an eagle or a lion or a dolphin prefers any shape to its own? What wonder is it, then, if nature has in the same way prescribed to human beings that they should think nothing more beautiful than a human being? … that this was the reason we thought the gods were like human beings. What do you think—if beasts had reason, would each of them not have given first place to its own kind?
1.78	At mehercule ego (dicam enim ut sentio) quamvis amem ipse me tamen non audeo dicere pulchriorem esse me quam ille fuerit taurus qui vexit Europam; non enim hoc loco de ingeniis aut de orationibus nostris sed de specie figuraque quaeritur. quod si fingere nobis et iungere formas velimus, qualis ille maritimus Triton pingitur, natantibus invehens beluis adiunctis humano corpori, nolis esse. Difficili in loco versor; est enim vis tanta naturae, ut homo nemo velit nisi hominis similis esse— et quidem formica formicae.	But by Hercules—I will say what I think—however much I love myself, I do not dare say that I am more beautiful than that bull that carried off Europa; for the question here is not about our intellects or our speeches but about appearance and shape. And if we chose to invent and combine forms for ourselves, you would not want to look like the sea-god Triton as he is painted, borne along on swimming beasts joined to his human body. I am on difficult ground here; for the power of nature is so great that no human being wants to resemble anything but a human being—and indeed an ant wants to resemble an ant.
1.79	Sed tamen cuius hominis? quotus enim quisque formonsus est: Athenis cum essem, e gregibus epheborum vix singuli reperiebantur —video quid adriseris, sed ita tamen se res habet. Deinde nobis, qui concedentibus philosophis antiquis adulescentulis delectamur, etiam vitia saepe iucunda sunt. naevos in articulo pueri delectat Alcaeum; at est corporis macula naevos; illi tamen hoc lumen videbatur. Q. Catulus, huius collegae et familiaris nostri pater, dilexit municipem tuum Roscium, in quem etiam illud est eius: constiteram exorientem Auroram forte salutans, cum subito a laeva Roscius exoritur. pace mihi liceat caelestes dicere vestra:	And yet—like which human being? How few are handsome! When I was in Athens, out of whole throngs of young men there was scarcely one here and there to be found—I see why you are smiling, but that is how things are. Besides, for those of us who, with the approval of the ancient philosophers, take pleasure in youths, even blemishes are often charming. Alcaeus was delighted by a mole on a boy's knuckle; yet a mole is a blemish on the body, but to him it seemed a beauty. Quintus Catulus, father of our colleague and friend here, loved your fellow townsman Roscius, and even wrote this poem about him: "I had stopped by chance to

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	mortalis visus pulchrior esse deo. huic deo pulchrior; at erat, sicuti hodie est, perversissimis oculis: quid refert, si hoc ipsum salsum illi et venustum videbatur?	greet the rising Dawn, when suddenly on my left Roscius rises. Heavenly gods, by your leave let me say it: a mortal seemed more beautiful than a god." To him, Roscius was more beautiful than a god; yet he had then, as he still has today, a terrible squint. What does it matter, if this very feature seemed witty and charming to him?[48]
1.80	Redeo ad deos. ecquos si non tam strabones at paetulos esse arbitramur, ecquos naevum habere, ecquos silos flaccos frontones capitones, quae sunt in nobis, an omnia emendata in illis? Detur id vobis; num etiam una est omnium facies? nam si plures, aliam esse alia pulchriorem necesse est, igitur aliquis non pulcherrimus deus; si una omnium facies est, florere in caelo Academiam necesse est: si enim nihil inter deum et deum differt, nulla est apud deos cognitio, nulla perceptio.	I return to the gods. Do we think some of them are, if not quite cross-eyed, at least slightly squint-eyed? Do some have a mole? Are some snub-nosed, flap-eared, beetle-browed or big-headed—features found among us—or is everything corrected in them? Grant you that; do they all have one and the same face? For if there are several faces, one must be more beautiful than another, and so some god is not supremely beautiful. If they all have one face, the Academy must be flourishing in heaven: for if there is no difference between one god and another, there is no recognition among the gods, no perception.[49]
1.81	Quid si etiam Vellei falsum illud omnino est, nullam aliam nobis de deo cogitantibus speciem nisi hominis occurrere: tamenne ista tam absurda defendes? Nobis fortasse sic occurrit ut dicis; a parvis enim Iovem Iunonem Minervam Neptunum Vulcanum Apollinem reliquos deos ea facie novimus qua pictores fictoresque voluerunt, neque solum facie sed etiam ornatu aetate vestitu. at non Aegyptii nec Syri nec fere cuncta barbaria; firmiores enim videas apud eos opiniones esse de bestiis quibusdam quam apud nos de sanctissimis templis et simulacris deorum.	And what if, Velleius, it is entirely false that no other appearance comes to mind when we think of a god than that of a human being—will you still defend such absurdities? For us, perhaps, it does come to mind as you say; for from childhood we have known Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan, Apollo and the other gods with the faces that painters and sculptors chose to give them—and not only the faces but their attributes, age and dress. But that is not so for the Egyptians or the Syrians, or for almost the entire foreign world. For you would find that their beliefs about certain animals are firmer than ours about our most sacred temples and images of the gods.
1.82	etenim fana multa spoliata et simulacra deorum de locis sanctissimis ablata videmus a nostris, at vero ne fando quidem auditumst crocodilum aut ibin aut faelem violatum ab Aegyptio. quid igitur censes Apim illum sanctum Aegyptiorum bovem nonne deum videri Aegyptiis? tam hercle quam tibi illam vestram Sospitam. Quam tu numquam ne in somnis quidem vides nisi cum pelle caprina cum hasta cum scutulo cum calceolis repandis. at non est talis Argia nec Romana Iuno. ergo	For we see many shrines plundered and images of the gods carried off from the most sacred places by our own people; but no one has ever so much as heard tell of a crocodile or an ibis or a cat being harmed by an Egyptian. What, then, do you think: does not Apis, that sacred bull of the Egyptians, seem a god to the Egyptians? As much, by Hercules, as that Sospita of yours seems to you. You never see her, even in your dreams, except with

48 Quintus Lutatius Catulus (consul 102 BC) was the father of Cotta's fellow pontiff. Roscius, the famous comic actor, came from Lanuvium, like Velleius; Alcaeus was a Greek lyric poet of about 600 BC.
49 A joke on the Academic doctrine that nothing can be perceived with certainty.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	alia species Iunonis Argivis alia Lanuinis. et quidem alia nobis Capitolini alia Afris Hammonis Iovis.	her goatskin, her spear, her little shield and her turned-up shoes. But that is not what the Argive Juno looks like, nor the Roman one. So the Argives have one form of Juno, the people of Lanuvium another. And indeed we have one form of Capitoline Jupiter, the Africans another of Jupiter Hammon.[50]
1.83	Non pudet igitur physicum id est speculatorem venatoremque naturae ab animis consuetudine inbutis petere testimonium veritatis? isto enim modo dicere licebit Iovem semper barbatum, Apollinem semper inberbem, caesios oculos Minervae, caeruleos esse Neptuni. et quidem laudamus esse Athenis Volcanum eum quem fecit Alcamenes, in quo stante atque vestito leviter apparet claudicatio non deformis: claudum igitur habebimus deum, quoniam de Volcano sic accepimus. Age et his vocabulis esse deos facimus quibus a nobis nominantur?	Is it not shameful, then, for a natural philosopher —that is, an observer and hunter of nature—to seek evidence of the truth from minds steeped in habit? On those terms it will be permissible to say that Jupiter is always bearded and Apollo always beardless, that Minerva has gray eyes and Neptune sea-blue ones. And indeed we admire the Vulcan at Athens made by Alcamenes: he is standing and clothed, and a slight limp shows through, not an unsightly one. So we shall have a lame god, since that is what we have been told about Vulcan. Come now—do we also hold that the gods have the very names by which we call them?[51]
1.84	at primum quot hominum linguae tot nomina deorum; non enim ut tu Velleius quocumque veneris sic idem in Italia Volcanus idem in Africa idem in Hispania. deinde nominum non magnus numerus ne in pontificiis quidem nostris, deorum autem innumerabilis. an sine nominibus sunt? istud quidem ita vobis dicere necesse est; quid enim attinet, cum una facies sit, plura esse nomina? Quam bellum erat Vellei confiteri potius nescire quod nescires quam ista effutientem nauseare atque ipsum sibi displicere. An tu mei similem putas esse aut tui deum? profecto non putas.	But first, there are as many names for the gods as there are human languages. You are Velleius wherever you go, but Vulcan is not Vulcan alike in Italy, in Africa and in Spain. Next, there is no great number of names even in our pontifical books, but the number of gods is countless. Or are they without names? You at least are bound to say so; for what is the point of several names when there is a single face? How much better it would have been, Velleius, to admit that you do not know what you do not know, rather than babble all this until you feel queasy and are disgusted with yourself. Do you think a god looks like me, or like you? Surely you do not.
	"Quid ergo, solem dicam aut lunam aut caelum deum? ergo etiam beatum: quibus fruentem voluptatibus? et sapientem: qui potest esse in eius modi trunco sapientia?"	"What then? Shall I say that the sun or the moon or the heavens is a god? Then it is also blessed—but enjoying what pleasures? And wise—but how can there be wisdom in a lump like that?"
1.85	haec vestra sunt. Si igitur nec humano ..., quod docui, nec tali aliquo, quod tibi ita persuasum est, quid dubitas negare deos esse? non audes. sapienter id quidem, etsi hoc loco non populum metuis sed ipsos deos. novi ego Epicureos omnia sigilla venerantes. Quamquam video non nullis videri Epicurum, ne in offensionem Atheniensium caderet, verbis reliquisse deos re	these are your school's words. So if the gods are neither in human form ..., as I have shown, nor in some such form as that, as you are convinced, why do you hesitate to deny that the gods exist? You do not dare. That is wise of you—though in this case it is not the people you fear but the gods themselves.

50 Juno Sospita ("the Savior") was the patron goddess of Lanuvium, Velleius' hometown. Jupiter Hammon had a famous oracle at the oasis of Siwa in Libya.
51 Alcamenes, an Athenian sculptor of the later 5th century BC, was a pupil of Phidias.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	sustulisse. itaque in illis selectis eius brevibusque sententiis, quas appellatis κυρίας δόξας, haec ut opinor prima sententia est: "quod beatum et inmortale est id nec habet nec exhibet cuiquam negotium"; in hac ita exposita sententia sunt qui existiment, quod ille inscitia plane loquendi fecerit, fecisse consulto:	I have known Epicureans who revere every little statuette. Yet I see that some people think Epicurus, to avoid offending the Athenians, kept the gods in words but abolished them in fact. And so in those selected brief maxims of his which you call κυρίας δόξας [principal doctrines], this, I think, is the first: "What is blessed and immortal neither has trouble itself nor causes trouble to anyone." Some people think that in phrasing this maxim as he did, he acted deliberately, when in fact it came from sheer inability to express himself:[52]
1.86	de homine minime vafro male existimant. dubium est enim utrum dicat aliquid esse beatum et inmortale an si quod sit id esse tale. non animadvertunt hic eum ambigue locutum esse, sed multis aliis locis et illum et Metrodorum tam aperte quam paulo ante te. Ille vero deos esse putat, nec quemquam vidi qui magis ea quae timenda esse negaret timeret, mortem dico et deos: quibus mediocres homines non ita valde moventur, his ille clamat omnium mortalium mentes esse perterritas; tot milia latrocinantur morte proposita, alii omnia quae possunt fana conpilant: credo aut illos mortis timor terret aut hos religionis.	they misjudge a man who was anything but crafty. For it is unclear whether he means that something blessed and immortal exists, or that if anything of that kind exists, this is what it is like. They fail to notice that his language is ambiguous here, but in many other places both he and Metrodorus speak as plainly as you did a little while ago. He really does believe that gods exist, and I have never seen anyone more afraid of the very things he said were not to be feared—I mean death and the gods. Ordinary people are not much troubled by them, yet he cries out that they have terrified the minds of all mortals. So many thousands turn to highway robbery although the penalty is death, and others plunder every shrine they can. No doubt fear of death terrifies the robbers, and fear of religion the plunderers![53]
	Sed quoniam non audes (iam enim cum ipso Epicuro loquar) negare esse deos, quid est quod te inpediat aut solem aut mundum aut mentem aliquam sempiternam in deorum numero ponere?	But since you do not dare (for now I will address Epicurus himself) to deny that the gods exist, what is to stop you from counting the sun, or the world, or some eternal mind among the gods?
1.87	"Numquam vidi" inquit "animam rationis consilique participem in ulla alia nisi humana figura". Quid solis numquidnam aut lunae aut quinque errantium siderum simile vidisti? sol duabus unius orbis ultimis partibus definiens motum cursus annuos conficit; huius hanc lustrationem eiusdem incensa radiis menstruo spatio luna complet; quinque autem stellae eundem orbem tenentes, aliae propius a terris aliae remotius, ab isdem principiis disparibus temporibus eadem spatia conficiunt. num quid tale Epicure vidisti?	"I have never seen," he says, "a soul that shares in reason and judgment in any shape except the human one." Well, have you ever seen anything like the sun, or the moon, or the five wandering stars? The sun bounds its motion by the two outermost limits of a single orbit and completes its yearly courses. The moon, kindled by the sun's rays, completes this same circuit of the sun's in the space of a month. And the five stars keep to the same orbit, some nearer the earth and some farther away, and from the same starting points they cover the same distances in different times. Have you ever seen anything like that, Epicurus?

52 The *Principal Doctrines* are a collection of forty short maxims summarizing Epicurus' teaching.
53 Metrodorus of Lampsacus (c. 331–278 BC) was Epicurus' closest friend and disciple.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.88	ne sit igitur sol ne luna ne stellae, quoniam nihil esse potest nisi quod attigimus aut vidimus. Quid deum ipsum numne vidisti? cur igitur credis esse? Omnia tollamus ergo quae aut historia nobis aut ratio nova adfert. ita fit ut mediterranei mare esse non credant. quae sunt tantae animi angustiae ut, si Seriphi natus esses nec umquam egressus ex insula, in qua lepusculos vulpeculasque saepe vidisses, non crederes leones et pantheras esse, cum tibi quales essent dicerentur, si vero de elephanto quis diceret, etiam rideri te putares.	Then let there be no sun, no moon, no stars, since nothing can exist except what we have touched or seen! Well, have you ever seen god himself? Then why do you believe he exists? So let us do away with everything new that history or reason brings us. That is how people who live inland come not to believe in the sea. This is narrowness of mind on such a scale that if you had been born on Seriphos and never left the island, where you had often seen little hares and little foxes, you would not believe that lions and panthers existed when someone described them to you; and if anyone told you about an elephant, you would even think you were being laughed at.[54]
1.89	Et tu quidem Vellei non vestro more sed dialecticorum, quae funditus gens vestra non novit, angustia argumenti sententiam conclusisti. Beatos esse deos sumpsisti: concedimus. beatum autem esse sine virtute neminem posse: id quoque damus, et libenter quidem. virtutem autem sine ratione constare non posse: conveniat id quoque necesse est. Adiungis nec rationem esse nisi in hominis figura. quem tibi hoc daturum putas? si enim ita esset, quid opus erat te gradatim istuc pervenire? sumpsisses tuo iure. quod autem est istuc gradatim? nam a beatis ad virtutem, a virtute ad rationem video te venisse gradibus; a ratione ad humanam figuram quo modo accedis? praecipitare istuc quidem est, non descendere.	And you, Velleius, compressed your view into a tight chain of argument, not in your school's manner but in that of the logicians—a tribe your people know nothing about. You assumed that the gods are blessed: we grant it. Next, that no one can be blessed without virtue: we grant that too, and gladly. Next, that virtue cannot exist without reason: that too must be agreed. Then you add that reason exists only in human shape. Who do you think will grant you that? For if it were so, why did you need to arrive at it step by step? You could simply have assumed it, as was your right. And what are these steps of yours? I see that you came from the blessed to virtue and from virtue to reason by steps; but how do you get from reason to human shape? That is not stepping down, it is falling headlong.
1.90	Nec vero intellego cur maluerit Epicurus deos hominum similes dicere quam homines deorum. quaeres quid intersit; si enim hoc illi simile sit, esse illud huic. video, sed hoc dico, non ab hominibus formae figuram venisse ad deos; di enim semper fuerunt, nati numquam sunt, si quidem aeterni sunt futuri; at homines nati; ante igitur humana forma quam homines, eaque erant forma dii inmortales: non ergo illorum humana forma sed nostra divina dicenda est.	Nor do I understand why Epicurus preferred to say that gods resemble humans rather than that humans resemble gods. You will ask what the difference is, since if this is like that, then that is like this. I see that; but my point is that the outline of the form did not pass from humans to gods. For the gods have always existed and were never born —if, that is, they are to be eternal—whereas humans were born. So human form existed before humans, and the immortal gods had that form. Therefore we should not call their form human, but ours divine.
	Verum hoc quidem ut voletis; illud quaero, quae fuerit tanta fortuna (nihil enim ratione in rerum natura	

54 Seriphos, a small rocky island in the Cyclades, was proverbial for its insignificance.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		But have it as you like. What I want to know is this: what great stroke of luck was it (for you hold that nothing in the natural world
1.91	factum esse vultis)—sed tamen quis iste tantus casus, unde tam felix concursus atomorum, ut repente homines deorum forma nascerentur? Seminane deorum decidisse de caelo putamus in terras et sic homines patrum similes extitisse? vellem diceretis; deorum cognationem agnoscerem non invitus. nihil tale dicitis, sed casu esse factum ut essemus similes deorum. Et nunc argumenta quaerenda sunt quibus hoc refellatur. utinam tam facile vera invenire possim quam falsa convincere.	was made by reason)—but still, what was this great chance, where did so fortunate a collision of atoms come from, that humans were suddenly born in the form of gods? Are we to suppose that seeds of the gods fell from heaven to earth, and that this is how humans came into being resembling their fathers? I wish you would say so; I would gladly acknowledge my kinship with the gods. You say nothing of the kind, only that it happened by chance that we are like the gods. And now arguments have to be found to refute this! I wish I could discover the truth as easily as I can expose falsehood.
	Etenim enumerasti memoriter et copiose, ut mihi quidem admirari luberet in homine esse Romano tantam scientiam, usque a Thale Milesio de deorum natura philosophorum sententias.	Indeed, you listed from memory and at length—so that I was quite moved to admire such learning in a Roman—the opinions of the philosophers on the nature of the gods, starting all the way back with Thales of Miletus.
1.92	omnesne tibi illi delirare visi sunt qui sine manibus et pedibus constare deum posse decreverint?	Did all of them seem mad to you, those who decided that a god could exist without hands and feet?
	Ne hoc quidem vos movet considerantis, quae sit utilitas quaeque oportunitas in homine membrorum, ut iudicetis membris humanis deos non egere? quid enim pedibus opus est sine ingressu, quid manibus si nihil conprehendendum est, quid reliqua discriptione omnium corporis partium, in qua nihil inane nihil sine causa nihil supervacuaneum est, itaque nulla ars imitari sollertiam naturae potest. habebit igitur linguam deus et non loquetur, dentes palatum fauces nullum ad usum, quaeque procreationis causa natura corpori adfinxit ea frustra habebit deus; nec externa magis quam interiora, cor pulmones iecur cetera— quae detracta utilitate quid habent venustatis (quando quidem haec esse in deo propter pulchritudinem voltis)?	Are you not moved even by this—when you consider what use and what advantage the limbs have in a human being—to conclude that the gods have no need of human limbs? What need is there for feet without walking, or for hands if there is nothing to grasp, or for the whole arrangement of the body's parts, in which nothing is empty, nothing without purpose, nothing superfluous, so that no art can imitate nature's skill? So a god will have a tongue and not speak; he will have teeth, palate, and throat for no use; and the parts that nature attached to the body for procreation a god will have to no purpose. And this applies not only to the outer parts but to the inner ones too—heart, lungs, liver, and the rest. Take away their usefulness, and what beauty do they have (since you want these things to be in a god for the sake of beauty)?
1.93	Istisne fidentes somniis non modo Epicurus et Metrodorus et Hermarchus contra Pythagoram Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt, sed meretricula etiam Leontium contra Theophrastum scribere ausast —scito illa quidem sermone et Attico, sed tamen: tantum Epicuri	Was it trusting in dreams like these that not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus argued against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, but even that little courtesan Leontium dared to write against Theophrastus? Her style, to be sure, is

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	hortus habuit licentiae. Et soletis queri; Zeno quidem etiam litigabat; quid dicam Albucium; nam Phaedro nihil elegantius nihil humanius, sed stomachabatur senex si quid asperius dixeram, cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phaedoni Socratico turpissime male dixerit, Metrodori sodalis sui fratrem Timocraten, quia nescio quid in philosophia dissentiret, totis voluminibus conciderit, in Democritum ipsum quem secutus est fuerit ingratus, Nausiphanem magistrum suum, a quo non nihil didicerat, tam male acceperit.	clever and good Attic Greek, but still—such was the license of Epicurus' Garden. And yet you people are always complaining. Zeno even used to pick quarrels. Why mention Albucius? As for Phaedrus, no one was more refined or more courteous, but the old man would grow irritated if I said anything too harsh—and this when Epicurus attacked Aristotle with the utmost insolence, abused Phaedo the Socratic most shamefully, and tore apart in whole volumes Timocrates, the brother of his companion Metrodorus, because he disagreed with him on some point of philosophy or other; when he was ungrateful to Democritus himself, whom he followed, and treated his own teacher Nausiphanes, from whom he had learned a good deal, so badly.[55]
	Zeno quidem non eos solum qui tum erant, Apollodorum Sillim ceteros, figebat maledictis, sed Socraten ipsum parentem philosophiae Latino verbo utens scurram Atticum fuisse dicebat, Chrysippum numquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat.	Zeno, for his part, not only pelted his contemporaries—Apollodorus, Silus, and the rest—with abuse, but said that Socrates himself, the father of philosophy, had been an Attic buffoon (he used the Latin word *scurra*), and he never called Chrysippus anything but Chrysippa.[56]
1.94	tu ipse paulo ante cum tamquam senatum philosophorum recitares, summos viros desipere delirare dementis esse dicebas. quorum si nemo verum vidit de natura deorum, verendum est ne nulla sit omnino.	You yourself, a little while ago, when you were reading out what amounted to the roll of a senate of philosophers, said that the greatest men were deluded, deranged, demented. If none of them saw the truth about the nature of the gods, there is a danger that there is no such nature at all.[57]
	Nam ista quae vos dicitis sunt tota commenticia, vix digna lucubratione anicularum. non enim sentitis quam multa vobis suscipienda sint si inpetraritis ut concedamus eandem hominum esse et deorum figuram. omnis cultus et curatio corporis erit eadem adhibenda deo quae adhibetur homini, ingressus cursus accubitio inclinatio sessio conprehensio, ad extremum etiam sermo et oratio.	For what you people say is pure fiction, hardly worthy of old women at their work by lamplight. You do not realize how much you would have to take on if you got us to concede that humans and gods have the same shape. All the care and attention given to a human body will have to be given to a god as well: walking, running, reclining, leaning, sitting, grasping, and finally even conversation and speech.
1.95	nam quod et maris deos et feminas esse dicitis, quid sequatur videtis. equidem mirari satis non possum unde ad istas opiniones vester ille princeps venerit.	As for your saying that there are both male and female gods, you see what follows. For my part, I cannot wonder enough how that founder of yours arrived at such opinions.
	Sed clamare non desinitis retinendum hoc esse, deus ut beatus inmortalisque sit. quid autem obstat quo minus sit	But you never stop shouting that we must hold fast to this: that a god is blessed and immortal. Yet

55 Leontium belonged to Epicurus' circle; Theophrastus succeeded Aristotle as head of the Peripatetic school. Zeno of Sidon and Phaedrus were Epicurean teachers whom Cicero had heard in Athens.
56 "Chrysippa" turns the name of the Stoic Chrysippus into a woman's name.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	beatus si non sit bipes, aut ista sive beatitas sive beatitudo dicendast (utrumque omnino durum, sed usu mollienda nobis verba sunt)—verum ea quaecumque est cur aut in solem illum aut in hunc mundum aut in aliquam mentem aeternam figura membrisque corporis vacuam cadere non potest?	what prevents him from being blessed if he is not two-legged? Or this "blessedness"—whether we should call it *beatitas* or *beatitudo* (both are certainly harsh, but words have to be softened by use)—whatever it is, why can it not apply to that sun there, or to this world, or to some eternal mind free of shape and bodily limbs?[58]
1.96	nihil aliud dicis nisi "Numquam vidi solem aut mundum beatum". Quid mundum praeter hunc umquamne vidisti? negabis. cur igitur non sescenta milia esse mundorum sed innumerabilia ausus es dicere? "Ratio docuit." Ergo hoc te ratio non docebit, cum praestantissima natura quaeratur eaque beata et aeterna, quae sola divina naturast, ut inmortalitate vincamur ab ea natura sic animi praestantia vinci, atque ut animi item corporis? cur igitur, cum ceteris rebus inferiores simus, forma pares sumus; ad similitudinem enim deorum propius accedebat humana virtus quam figura.	All you say is: "I have never seen a blessed sun or a blessed world." Well, have you ever seen any world besides this one? You will say no. Then why did you dare to say that there are not six hundred thousand worlds but innumerable ones? "Reason taught me." Then will reason not teach you this as well? When we look for the most excellent nature, one that is blessed and eternal—and this alone is divine nature—then just as that nature surpasses us in immortality, so it surpasses us in excellence of mind, and as in mind, so in body. Why then, when we are inferior in everything else, are we its equals in form? Human virtue would come closer to resembling the gods than human shape does.
1.97	An quicquam tam puerile dici potest (ut eundem locum diutius urgeam) quam si ea genera beluarum, quae in rubro mari Indiave gignantur, nulla esse dicamus? atqui ne curiosissimi quidem homines exquirendo audire tam multa possunt quam sunt multa quae terra mari paludibus fluminibus existunt; quae negemus esse, quia numquam vidimus?	Can anything so childish be said (to press the same point a little longer) as if we were to claim that the kinds of beasts born in the Red Sea or in India do not exist? Yet not even the most inquisitive people, however much they ask around, can hear of as many things as actually live on land, in the sea, in marshes, and in rivers. Are we to deny that these exist because we have never seen them?
	Ipsa vero quam nihil ad rem pertinet, quae vos delectat maxime, similitudo. quid canis nonne similis lupo (atque, ut Ennius, "simia quam similis turpissuma bestia nobis"); at mores in utroque dispares. elephanto beluarum nulla prudentior;	And how utterly irrelevant is that resemblance which delights you so much! Isn't a dog like a wolf (and, as Ennius says, "how similar to us the simian, that ugliest of beasts")? Yet the two differ in character. No beast is wiser than the elephant;[59]
1.98	ad figuram quae vastior? de bestiis loquor; quid inter ipsos homines nonne et simillimis formis dispares mores et moribus paribus figura dissimilis?	which is more ungainly in shape? I am speaking of animals. But among humans themselves, do we not find very similar forms with different characters, and the same character in dissimilar shapes?
	Etenim si semel Vellei suscipimus genus hoc argumenti, attende quo serpat. tu enim sumebas nisi in hominis figura rationem inesse non posse; sumet alius nisi in terrestri, nisi in eo qui natus sit, nisi in eo qui adoleverit, nisi in eo qui didicerit, nisi in eo qui ex animo constet et	Indeed, Velleius, once we accept this kind of argument, see where it creeps. You assumed that reason can exist only in human shape. Someone else will assume: only in a creature that lives on land; only in one that was born; only in one that has

57 The image is of the censors' public reading of the senate roll, at which unworthy members were struck off.
58 Cicero coins these abstract nouns from *beatus*, "blessed"; *beatitudo* survived and gave English "beatitude."
59 Ennius (239–169 BC), the early Roman poet; his line puns on *simia*, "ape," and *similis*, "like."

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	corpore caduco et infirmo, postremo nisi in homine atque mortali. quod si in omnibus his rebus obsistis, quid est quod te forma una conturbet? his enim omnibus quae proposui adiunctis in homine rationem esse et mentem videbas; quibus detractis deum tamen nosse te dicis, modo liniamenta maneant. hoc est non considerare sed quasi sortiri quid loquare.	grown up; only in one that has been taught; only in one composed of a mind and a perishable, frail body; and finally only in a human and mortal being. If you resist on all these points, why does form alone trouble you? You saw reason and mind in a human being together with all the attributes I have listed; take those away, and yet you say you recognize a god, so long as the outlines remain. That is not thinking things through; it is more like drawing lots for what to say.
1.99	Nisi forte ne hoc quidem adtendis, non modo in homine sed etiam in arbore quicquid supervacuaneum sit aut usum non habeat obstare. quam molestum est uno digito plus habere; quid ita? quia nec speciem nec usum alium quinque desiderant. tuus autem deus non digito uno redundat sed capite collo cervicibus lateribus alvo tergo poplitibus manibus pedibus feminibus cruribus. si ut inmortalis sit, quid haec ad vitam membra pertinent, quid ipsa facies? magis illa, cerebrum cor pulmones iecur: haec enim sunt domicilia vitae; oris quidem habitus ad vitae firmitatem nihil pertinet.	Unless perhaps you have not even noticed that, not only in a human being but even in a tree, anything superfluous or useless is a hindrance. How awkward it is to have one finger too many! Why so? Because five fingers need nothing more, either for appearance or for use. But your god has more than an extra finger: he has a superfluous head, neck, nape, sides, belly, back, knees, hands, feet, thighs, and legs. If these are there to make him immortal, what do these limbs have to do with life—what does the face itself? Those other parts matter more—brain, heart, lungs, liver—for these are the dwelling places of life; the look of the face contributes nothing to keeping life secure.
1.100	Et eos vituperabas, qui ex operibus magnificis atque praeclaris, cum ipsum mundum, cum eius membra caelum terras maria, cumque horum insignia solem lunam stellasque vidissent, cumque temporum maturitates mutationes vicissitudinesque cognovissent, suspicati essent aliquam excellentem esse praestantemque naturam, quae haec effecisset moveret regeret gubernaret. qui etiam si aberrant a coniectura, video tamen quid sequantur: tu quod opus tandem magnum et egregium habes quod effectum divina mente videatur, ex quo esse deos suspicere? "Habebam" inquis "in animo insitam informationem quandam dei". Et barbati quidem Iovis, galeatae Minervae: num igitur esse talis putas?	And you found fault with those who looked at magnificent and splendid works—the world itself, its parts the heavens, lands, and seas, and their adornments the sun, moon, and stars—and who came to know the ripenings, changes, and alternations of the seasons, and so surmised that there was some excellent and superior nature that had made these things and set them in motion, that ruled and steered them. Even if they go astray in their guess, I still see what they are after. But you—what great and remarkable work can you point to that seems to have been made by a divine mind, from which you might surmise that gods exist? "I had," you say, "a certain idea of god imprinted in my mind." Yes, and of a bearded Jupiter and a helmeted Minerva. Do you then think they are like that?
1.101	Quanto melius haec vulgus imperitorum, qui non membra solum hominis deo tribuant sed usum etiam membrorum; dant enim arcum sagittas hastam clipeum fuscinam fulmen, et si actiones quae sint deorum non vident, nihil agentem tamen deum non queunt cogitare. ipsi qui inridentur Aegyptii nullam beluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem quam ex ea caperent consecraverunt;	How much better the ignorant crowd does here! They attribute to a god not only human limbs but also the use of those limbs. They give the gods bows, arrows, spears, shields, tridents, thunderbolts; and even if they do not see what the gods' actions are, they still cannot conceive of a god doing nothing. Even the Egyptians, whom people

LATIN	ENGLISH
velut ibes maximam vim serpentium conficiunt, cum sint aves excelsae cruribus rigidis corneo proceroque rostro; avertunt pestem ab Aegypto, cum volucris anguis ex vastitate Libyae vento Africo invectas interficiunt atque consumunt, ex quo fit ut illae nec morsu vivae noceant nec odore mortuae. possum de ichneumonum utilitate de crocodilorum de faelium dicere, sed nolo esse longus.	laugh at, deified no beast except for some benefit they derived from it. Ibises, for instance, destroy vast numbers of snakes, being tall birds with stiff legs and a long horny beak. They ward off plague from Egypt by killing and eating the flying serpents carried in from the Libyan desert by the southwest wind, so that these do no harm either by their bite while alive or by their stench when dead. I could speak of the usefulness of ichneumons, of crocodiles, of cats, but I do not want to go on too long.[60]
ita concludam, tamen beluas a barbaris propter beneficium consecratas, vestrorum deorum non modo beneficium nullum extare, sed ne factum quidem omnino.	So I will conclude: foreigners at least deified beasts because of the benefits they brought, whereas from your gods not only does no benefit appear, but no deed of any kind.
1.102 "Nihil habet" inquit "negotii". Profecto Epicurus quasi pueri delicati nihil cessatione melius existimat. at ipsi tamen pueri etiam cum cessant exercitatione aliqua ludicra delectantur: deum sic feriatum volumus cessatione torpere, ut, si se commoverit, vereamur ne beatus esse non possit? haec oratio non modo deos spoliat motu et actione divina, sed etiam homines inertis efficit, si quidem agens aliquid ne deus quidem esse beatus potest.	"He has nothing to occupy him," he says. Evidently Epicurus, like spoiled children, thinks nothing better than idleness. Yet even children, when they are idle, enjoy some playful activity. Do we want a god to be so sluggish in his holiday idleness that, if he stirs, we fear he cannot be blessed? This argument not only robs the gods of divine motion and activity; it also makes humans lazy, if indeed not even a god can be blessed while doing something.

IDLE GODS

Where do Epicurus' gods live and what do they do? A god who does nothing cannot be happy or worshiped.

LATIN	ENGLISH
1.103 COTTA Verum sit sane, ut vultis, deus effigies hominis et imago: quod eius est domicilium quae sedes qui locus, quae deinde actio vitae, quibus rebus, id quod vultis, beatus est? utatur enim suis bonis oportet et fruatur qui beatus futurus est. nam locus quidem his etiam naturis, quae sine animis sunt, suus est cuique proprius, ut terra infimum teneat, hanc inundet aqua, superior aeri, aetheriis ignibus altissima ora reddatur; bestiarum autem terrenae sunt aliae, partim aquatiles, aliae quasi ancipites in utraque sede viventes, sunt quaedam etiam quae igne nasci putentur appareantque in ardentibus fornacibus saepe volitantes.	COTTA But let it be granted, as you wish, that a god is the likeness and image of a human being. What is his home, his dwelling, his place? And then what is his activity in life? By what means is he blessed, as you claim? For whoever is to be blessed must use and enjoy his own good things. Even natures without souls each have a place of their own: earth holds the lowest, water floods over it, the region above is assigned to air, and the highest region to the fires of the ether. Of animals, some live on land and some in water, and some are double, as it were, living in both habitats; there are even some that are thought to be born from fire, and they are often seen fluttering about in blazing furnaces.
1.104 Quaero igitur vester deus primum ubi habitet, deinde quae causa eum loco moveat, si modo movetur aliquando,	

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	post, cum hoc proprium sit animantium ut aliquid adpetant quod sit naturae accommodatum, deus quid appetat, ad quam denique rem motu mentis ac rationis utatur, postremo quo modo beatus sit quo modo aeternus. quicquid enim horum attigeris ulcus est: ita male instituta ratio exitum reperire non potest.	So I ask, first, where your god lives. Next, what moves him from his place, if he ever moves at all. Then, since it is characteristic of living creatures to seek something suited to their nature, what a god seeks. Further, for what purpose he uses the motion of his mind and reason. Finally, how he is blessed and how he is eternal. Whichever of these points you touch, you touch a sore: an argument so badly founded can find no way out.
1.105	Sic enim dicebas, speciem dei percipi cogitatione non sensu, nec esse in ea ullam soliditatem, neque eandem ad numerum permanere, eamque esse eius visionem ut similitudine et transitione cernatur neque deficiat umquam ex infinitis corporibus similium accessio, ex eoque fieri ut in haec intenta mens nostra beatam illam naturam et sempiternam putet. hoc, per ipsos deos de quibus loquimur, quale tandem est? nam si tantum modo ad cogitationem valent nec habent ullam soliditatem nec eminentiam, quid interest utrum de hippocentauro an de deo cogitemus; omnem enim talem conformationem animi ceteri philosophi motum inanem vocant, vos autem adventum in animos et introitum imaginum dicitis.	For this is what you were saying. The appearance of a god is grasped by thought, not by the senses. It has no solidity and does not remain numerically the same. The vision of it is such that it is perceived through likeness and succession, and a fresh supply of similar images never fails, drawn from the infinite number of atoms. As a result our mind, intent on these images, believes that nature to be blessed and eternal. In the name of the very gods we are talking about, what sort of thing is this? If they act only on thought and have no solidity or depth, what difference does it make whether we think of a hippocentaur or of a god? Every other philosopher calls any such mental picture an empty movement of the mind; you call it the arrival and entry of images into our minds.
1.106	ut igitur, Ti. Gracchum cum videor contionantem in Capitolio videre de M. Octavio deferentem sitellam, tum eum motum animi dico esse inanem, tu autem et Gracchi et Octavi imagines remanere, quae in Capitolium cum pervenerint tum ad animum meum referantur—hoc idem fieri in deo, cuius crebra facie pellantur animi, ex quo esse beati atque aeterni intellegantur.	So when I seem to see Tiberius Gracchus addressing the people on the Capitol and bringing out the voting urn for the motion against Marcus Octavius, I say that this is an empty movement of the mind. You say that the images of both Gracchus and Octavius persist, and that when they have reached the Capitol they are carried to my mind—and that the same thing happens with a god, whose repeated appearance strikes our minds, so that from it the gods are understood to be blessed and eternal.[61]
1.107	Fac imagines esse quibus pulsentur animi: species dumtaxat obicitur quaedam; num etiam cur ea beata sit cur aeterna?	Grant that there are images that strike our minds: all that is presented is an appearance of some kind. Does it also show why that being is blessed, why it is eternal?
	Quae autem istae imagines vestrae aut unde? a Democrito omnino haec licentia; sed et ille reprehensus a multis est, nec vos exitum reperitis, totaque res vacillat et claudicat. nam quid est quod minus probari possit, omnium in me	But what are these images of yours, and where do they come from? This whole license comes from Democritus. Yet he too has been criticized by

60 The ichneumon is the Egyptian mongoose, prized for killing snakes and destroying crocodile eggs.
61 In 133 BC the tribune Tiberius Gracchus had the people vote his fellow tribune Marcus Octavius out of office; the urn was used to draw lots for the order of voting.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	incidere imagines, Homeri Archilochi Romuli Numae Pythagorae Platonis—nec ea forma qua illi fuerunt: quo modo illi ergo? et quorum imagines: Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles numquam fuisse, et hoc Orphicum carmen Pythagorei ferunt cuiusdam fuisse Cerconis; at Orpheus, id est imago eius ut vos vultis, in animum meum saepe incurrit.	many, and you cannot find a way out: the whole thing totters and limps. For what could be less convincing than that the images of everyone come drifting into me—Homer, Archilochus, Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras, Plato—and not even in the form those men actually had? How then are they those men? And whose images are they? Aristotle teaches that the poet Orpheus never existed, and the Pythagoreans say that this Orphic poem was the work of a certain Cercops. Yet Orpheus—that is, his image, as you would have it—often comes running into my mind.[62]
1.108	Quid quod eiusdem hominis in meum aliae aliae in tuum; quid quod earum rerum quae numquam omnino fuerunt neque esse potuerunt, ut Scyllae ut Chimaerae; quid quod hominum locorum urbium earum quas numquam vidimus; quid quod simul ac mihi collibitum est praesto est imago; quid quod etiam ad dormientem veniunt invocatae. tota res Vellei nugatoria est. Vos autem non modo oculis imagines sed etiam animis inculcatis: tanta est inpunitas garriendi. At quam licenter.	What about the fact that different images of the same man come into my mind and into yours? What about images of things that never existed at all and never could, like Scylla or the Chimaera? What about images of people, places, and cities we have never seen? What about the image being there the moment I take a fancy to it? What about images coming even to a sleeper, unbidden? The whole thing, Velleius, is nonsense. And you force images not only on our eyes but on our minds as well—so complete is your freedom to chatter unpunished. And with what license!
1.109	"Fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur." Puderet me dicere non intellegere, si vos ipsi intellegeretis qui ista defenditis. quo modo enim probas continenter imagines ferri, aut si continenter, quo modo aeterne? "Innumerabilitas" inquit "suppeditat atomorum". Num eadem ergo ista faciet ut sint omnia sempiterna? Confugis ad aequilibritatem (sic enim ἰσονομίαν si placet appellemus) et ais, quoniam sit natura mortalis, inmortalem etiam esse oportere. isto modo, quoniam homines mortales sunt, sint aliqui inmortales, et quoniam nascuntur in terra, nascantur in aqua. "Et quia sunt quae interimant, sint quae conservent." Sint sane, sed ea conservent quae sunt; deos istos esse non sentio.	"There is a frequent succession of flowing visions, so that out of many, one is seen." I would be ashamed to say I don't understand this, if you who defend it understood it yourselves. How do you prove that the images move in an unbroken stream—or, if unbroken, how they do so eternally? "The countless number of atoms," he says, "supplies them." Will that same countlessness, then, make everything eternal? You take refuge in "equilibrium" (for that, if you like, is what we may call ἰσονομία [isonomia, "equal distribution"]), and you say that, since there is a mortal nature, there must also be an immortal one. On that reasoning, since human beings are mortal, let there be some who are immortal; and since they are born on land, let some be born in water. "And because there are things that destroy, there must be things that preserve." By all means let there be—but let them preserve things that exist; I am not aware that those gods of yours exist.[63]

62 Cercops was an early Pythagorean poet to whom some ascribed the poems circulating under Orpheus' name; Aristotle's remark survives only here.
63 Isonomia is the Epicurean principle that, in an infinite universe, opposing kinds of things balance one another out.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.110	Omnis tamen ista rerum effigies ex individuis quo modo corporibus oritur? quae etiam si essent, quae nulla sunt, pellere sepse et agitari inter se concursu fortasse possent, formare figurare colorare animare non possent. Nullo igitur modo inmortalem deum efficitis.	And how, in any case, does this whole likeness of things arise from atoms? Even if atoms existed—and they do not—they might perhaps push one another and be jostled about by collision; they could not give things form, shape, color, and life. So in no way do you make your god immortal.
	Videamus nunc de beato. Sine virtute certe nullo modo; virtus autem actuosa; et deus vester nihil agens; expers virtutis igitur;	Now let us look at blessedness. Without virtue there can certainly be none; but virtue is active; and your god does nothing; so he has no share in virtue;
1.111	ita ne beatus quidem. Quae ergo vita? "Suppeditatio" inquis "bonorum nullo malorum interventu". Quorum tandem bonorum? voluptatum credo, nempe ad corpus pertinentium; nullam enim novistis nisi profectam a corpore et redeuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem. non arbitror te velle similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum, quos pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum, quibus ille testatur se ne intellegere quidem ullum bonum quod sit seiunctum a delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus; quas quidem non erubescens persequitur omnis nominatim.	and so he is not blessed either. What sort of life does he have, then? "An abundance of good things," you say, "with no admixture of bad." What good things, pray? Pleasures, I suppose—and bodily ones, of course; for you recognize no pleasure of the mind except one that starts from the body and returns to the body. I don't suppose you want to be like the other Epicureans, who are ashamed of certain sayings of Epicurus. In them he declares that he cannot even conceive of any good apart from voluptuous and indecent pleasures—and without a blush he goes through them all, one by one, by name.
1.112	quem cibum igitur aut quas potiones aut quas vocum aut florum varietates aut quos tactus quos odores adhibebis ad deos, ut eos perfundas voluptatibus? ac poetae quidem nectar ambrosiam epulas conparant et aut Iuventatem aut Ganymedem pocula ministrantem, tu autem Epicure quid facies? neque enim unde habeat ista deus tuus video nec quo modo utatur. locupletior igitur hominum natura ad beate vivendum est quam deorum, quod pluribus generibus fruitur voluptatum.	So what food, what drink, what variety of sounds or flowers, what touches, what scents will you offer the gods, to steep them in pleasures? The poets, at least, lay on nectar, ambrosia, and banquets, with Juventas or Ganymede to serve the cups. But you, Epicurus, what will you do? I see neither where your god is to get such things nor how he is to use them. Human nature, then, is better equipped for a blessed life than the nature of the gods, since it enjoys more kinds of pleasure.[64]
1.113	At has levioris ducis voluptates, quibus quasi titillatio (Epicuri enim hoc verbum est) adhibetur sensibus. quo usque ludis? nam etiam Philo noster ferre non poterat aspernari Epicureos mollis et delicatas voluptates. summa enim memoria pronuntiabat plurimas Epicuri sententias is ipsis verbis quibus erant scriptae. Metrodori vero, qui est Epicuri collega sapientiae, multa inpudentiora recitabat; accusat enim Timocratem fratrem suum Metrodorus, quod dubitet omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertineant ventre metiri, neque id semel dicit sed saepius. adnuere te video, nota enim tibi sunt;	But you consider these pleasures rather trivial—the ones by which the senses are, so to speak, "tickled" (the word is Epicurus' own). How long will you keep up this game? Even our friend Philo could not bear to hear the Epicureans disown soft and luxurious pleasures. With his excellent memory he used to recite many of Epicurus' sayings in the very words in which they were written. And he would read out many still more shameless sayings of Metrodorus, Epicurus' colleague in wisdom. Metrodorus reproaches his brother Timo-

64 Juventas, the Roman goddess of youth (the Greek Hebe), and Ganymede, the Trojan boy carried off by Jupiter, were cupbearers of the gods.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	proferrem libros si negares. Neque nunc reprehendo quod ad voluptatem omnia referantur (alia est ea quaestio), sed doceo deos vestros esse voluptatis expertes, ita vestro iudicio ne beatos quidem. "At dolore vacant."	crates for hesitating to measure everything that belongs to the blessed life by the belly—and he says it not once but repeatedly. I see you nodding, for you know these passages; I would produce the books if you denied it. I am not now criticizing the idea that everything is to be referred to pleasure (that is another question). I am showing that your gods have no share in pleasure, and so, by your own judgment, are not blessed either. "But they are free from pain."[65]
1.114	Satin est id ad illam abundantem bonis vitam beatissimam? "Cogitat" inquiunt "adsidue beatum esse se; habet enim nihil aliud quod agitet in mente". Conprehende igitur animo et propone ante oculos deum nihil aliud in omni aeternitate nisi "mihi pulchre est" et "ego beatus sum" cogitantem. Nec tamen video quo modo non vereatur iste deus beatus ne intereat, cum sine ulla intermissione pulsetur agiteturque atomorum incursione sempiterna, cumque ex ipso imagines semper afluant. Ita nec beatus est vester deus nec aeternus.	Is that enough for that supremely blessed life overflowing with good things? "He thinks constantly," they say, "that he is blessed; for he has nothing else to occupy his mind." Then picture it in your mind and set it before your eyes: a god thinking, through all eternity, of nothing but "Things are splendid for me" and "I am blessed." And yet I do not see how this blessed god of yours can help fearing that he will perish, since he is battered and shaken without any respite by an everlasting onslaught of atoms, and since images are constantly streaming off him. So your god is neither blessed nor eternal.

EPICURUS ABOLISHES RELIGION

Without care for us there is no piety; Epicurus left the name of gods but took away the gods.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1.115	COTTA "At etiam de sanctitate de pietate adversus deos libros scripsit Epicurus." At quo modo in his loquitur: ut Ti. Coruncanium aut P. Scaevolam pontifices maximos te audire dicas, non eum qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem nec manibus ut Xerses sed rationibus deorum inmortalium templa et aras everterit. quid est enim cur deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum dei non modo homines non colant sed omnino nihil curent nihil agant?	COTTA "But Epicurus also wrote books on holiness and on piety toward the gods." Yes, but how does he speak in them? You would think you were listening to Tiberius Coruncanius or Publius Scaevola, chief pontiffs—not to the man who did away with all religion root and branch, and overturned the temples and altars of the immortal gods not with his hands, like Xerxes, but with his arguments. For what reason is there to say that the gods should be worshiped by human beings, when the gods not only pay no heed to human beings but care for nothing and do nothing at all?[66]
1.116	"At est eorum eximia quaedam praestansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam elicere sapientem." An quicquam eximium potest esse in ea natura, quae sua voluptate laetans nihil nec actura sit umquam neque agat	"But their nature is so outstanding and supreme that by its very excellence it ought to draw the wise man to worship it." Can there be anything outstanding in a nature that, delighting in its own

65 Metrodorus of Lampsacus was Epicurus' closest disciple; his brother Timocrates broke with the school and attacked it.
66 Tiberius Coruncanius (chief pontiff from 254 BC) and Publius Mucius Scaevola (from 130 BC) were famous holders of Rome's highest priesthood; Xerxes, king of Persia, burned the temples of Athens in 480 BC.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	neque egerit? Quae porro pietas ei debetur a quo nihil acceperis, aut quid omnino cuius nullum meritum sit ei deberi potest? est enim pietas iustitia adversum deos; cum quibus quid potest nobis esse iuris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit communitas? Sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum; qui quam ob rem colendi sint non intellego nullo nec accepto ab his nec sperato bono.	pleasure, never will do anything, does nothing now, and never has done anything? Further, what piety is owed to one from whom you have received nothing? Or what can be owed at all to one who has done nothing to deserve it? For piety is justice toward the gods; and what bond of justice can there be between us and them, when a human being has nothing in common with a god? Holiness, again, is the knowledge of how the gods are to be worshiped; and I do not understand why they are to be worshiped at all, when we have neither received nor hope to receive any good from them.
1.117	Quid est autem quod deos veneremur propter admirationem eius naturae in qua egregium nihil videmus?	And what reason is there to revere the gods out of admiration for a nature in which we see nothing remarkable?
	Nam superstitione, quod gloriari soletis, facile est liberare, cum sustuleris omnem vim deorum. Nisi forte Diagoram aut Theodorum, qui omnino deos esse negabant, censes superstitiosos esse potuisse; ego ne Protagoram quidem, cui neutrum licuerit, nec esse deos nec non esse. horum enim sententiae omnium non modo superstitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis deorum, sed etiam religionem, quae deorum cultu pio continetur.	As for freeing people from superstition, which you so often boast about, that is easy once you have abolished all the power of the gods. Unless perhaps you think that Diagoras or Theodorus, who denied outright that gods exist, could have been superstitious. I don't think even Protagoras could have been, who allowed himself neither view—that gods exist or that they do not. The views of all these men abolish not only superstition, which involves an empty fear of the gods, but also religion, which consists in the pious worship of the gods.
1.118	Quid i qui dixerunt totam de dis inmortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut quos ratio non posset eos ad officium religio duceret, nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt? Quid Prodicus Cius, qui ea quae prodessent hominum vitae deorum in numero habita esse dixit, quam tandem religionem reliquit?	What about those who said that the whole belief in the immortal gods was invented by wise men for the good of the state, so that religion might lead to their duty those whom reason could not? Did they not abolish all religion root and branch? And Prodicus of Ceos, who said that things beneficial to human life had been counted among the gods—what religion, pray, did he leave?[67]
1.119	Quid qui aut fortis aut claros aut potentis viros tradunt post mortem ad deos pervenisse, eosque esse ipsos quos nos colere precari venerarique soleamus, nonne expertes sunt religionum omnium? quae ratio maxime tractata ab Euhemero est, quem noster et interpretatus est et secutus praeter ceteros Ennius; ab Euhemero autem et mortes et sepulturae demonstrantur deorum; utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem an penitus totam sustulisse? Omitto Eleusinem sanctam illam et augustam, "ubi initiantur gentes orarum ultimae", praetereo Samothraciam eaque quae Lemni "nocturno	And what of those who teach that brave, famous, or powerful men joined the gods after death, and that these are the very gods we customarily worship, pray to, and revere—are they not wholly without religion? This theory was worked out most fully by Euhemerus, whom our own Ennius, more than anyone, translated and followed. Euhemerus even points out the deaths and burials of gods. Does he seem, then, to have strengthened religion, or to have done away with it utterly and completely? I say nothing of holy and august

67 Prodicus of Ceos was a fifth-century BC sophist, a contemporary of Socrates.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	aditu occulta coluntur silvestribus saepibus densa"; quibus explicatis ad rationemque revocatis rerum magis natura cognoscitur quam deorum.	Eleusis, "where the farthest peoples of the earth are initiated"; I pass over Samothrace, and those rites on Lemnos "worshiped in secret, approached by night, thick with woodland hedges." When these are explained and reduced to reason, it is the nature of things, rather than that of the gods, that comes to be understood.[68]
1.120	Mihi quidem etiam Democritus vir magnus in primis, cuius fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos inrigavit, nutare videtur in natura deorum. tum enim censet imagines divinitate praeditas inesse in universitate rerum, tum principia mentis quae sunt in eodem universo deos esse dicit, tum animantes imagines quae vel prodesse nobis solent vel nocere, tum ingentes quasdam imagines tantasque ut universum mundum conplectantur extrinsecus. quae quidem omnia sunt patria Democriti quam Democrito digniora;	Even Democritus, a truly great man, from whose springs Epicurus watered his little gardens, seems to me to waver about the nature of the gods. At one moment he holds that there are images endowed with divinity within the universe; at another he says that the elements of mind in that same universe are gods; at another, that living images, which are apt to help or harm us, are gods; at yet another, certain huge images, so vast that they embrace the whole world from outside. All of this is more worthy of Democritus' native city than of Democritus himself;[69]
1.121	quis enim istas imagines conprehendere animo potest, quis admirari, quis aut cultu aut religione dignas iudicare?	for who can grasp such images in his mind, who can admire them, who can judge them worthy of worship or reverence?
	Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus religionem, cum dis inmortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit. cum enim optimam et praestantissumam naturam dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in deo gratiam: tollit id quod maxime proprium est optimae praestantissimaeque naturae. quid enim melius aut quid praestantius bonitate et beneficentia; qua cum carere deum vultis, neminem deo nec deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari neminem diligi vultis: ita fit ut non modo homines a deis sed ipsi dei inter se ab aliis alii neglegantur. Quanto Stoici melius, qui a vobis reprehenduntur: censent autem sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos; nihil est enim virtute amabilius, quam qui adeptus erit ubicumque erit gentium a nobis diligetur.	Epicurus, for his part, tore religion out of human minds by the roots when he took from the immortal gods both their power to help and their goodwill. For while he says that the nature of a god is supremely good and excellent, he also denies that a god has any goodwill—and so removes what is most characteristic of a supremely good and excellent nature. What is better or more excellent than kindness and beneficence? When you insist that a god lacks it, you are insisting that no one, god or human, is dear to a god, that no one is loved or cherished by him. And so it follows that not only are humans neglected by the gods, but the gods themselves are neglected by one another. How much better the Stoics, whom you criticize! They hold that wise men are friends to wise men even when they do not know one another; for nothing is more lovable than virtue, and whoever has attained it will be loved by us wherever in the world he may be.
1.122	Vos autem quid mali datis, cum in inbecillitate gratificationem et benivolentiam ponitis. ut enim	But what harm you do when you locate kindness and goodwill in weakness! Leaving aside the

68 Euhemerus of Messene (about 300 BC) argued that the gods were deified mortals, and Ennius translated his *Sacred History* into Latin; Eleusis, Samothrace, and Lemnos were famous centers of mystery cults.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	omittam vim et naturam deorum, ne homines quidem censetis, nisi inbecilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos fuisse? nulla est caritas naturalis inter bonos? carum ipsum verbum est amoris, ex quo amicitiae nomen est ductum; quam si ad fructum nostrum referemus, non ad illius commoda quem diligemus, non erit ista amicitia sed mercatura quaedam utilitatum suarum. prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo, quod fructus ex is capiuntur, hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est; quanto igitur magis deorum, qui nulla re egentes et inter se diligunt et hominibus consulunt.	power and nature of the gods, do you really think that not even human beings would have been beneficent and kind if they were not weak? Is there no natural affection between good people? "Dear" is itself a word of love, and from love (*amor*) the name of friendship (*amicitia*) is derived. If we make friendship serve our own profit, not the advantage of the one we love, it will not be friendship but a kind of trade in one's own interests. Meadows and fields and herds of cattle are valued in that way, because we draw profit from them; but human affection and friendship are freely given. How much more, then, is this true of the gods, who lack nothing, yet love one another and look after human beings.
	Quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur quid precamur deos, cur sacris pontifices cur auspiciis augures praesunt, quid optamus a deis inmortalibus quid vovemus? "At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate."	If that were not so, why do we revere the gods and pray to them? Why do pontiffs preside over sacred rites and augurs over the auspices? Why do we ask for things from the immortal gods, why do we make vows to them? "But Epicurus has even written a book on holiness."
1.123	Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. quae enim potest esse sanctitas si dii humana non curant, quae autem animans natura nihil curans? Verius est igitur nimirum illud quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius disseruit in libro quinto de natura deorum, nullos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de deis inmortalibus dixerit invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse; neque enim tam desipiens fuisset ut homunculi similem deum fingeret, liniamentis dumtaxat extremis non habitu solido, membris hominis praeditum omnibus usu membrorum ne minimo quidem, exilem quendam atque perlucidum, nihil cuiquam tribuentem nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem nihil agentem. quae natura primum nulla esse potest, idque videns Epicurus re tollit oratione relinquit deos;	He is making fools of us—a man not so much witty as free with the liberties he takes in writing. For what holiness can there be if the gods take no interest in human affairs? And what kind of living nature is it that cares for nothing? So no doubt the truer view is the one our common friend Posidonius set out in the fifth book of his *On the Nature of the Gods*: that Epicurus does not believe in gods at all, and that what he said about the immortal gods he said to ward off hostility. For he would not have been so foolish as to imagine a god resembling a little man—a mere outline with no solid substance, equipped with all a man's limbs but without the slightest use for them, a thin, transparent sort of being who grants nothing to anyone, does no one a kindness, and cares for nothing and does nothing at all. In the first place, such a nature cannot exist; and Epicurus, seeing this, keeps the gods in words and abolishes them in fact;
1.124	deinde si maxime talis est deus ut nulla gratia nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat—quid enim dicam "propitius sit"; esse enim propitius potest nemini, quoniam ut dicitis omnis in inbecillitate est et gratia et caritas.	and in the second place, even granting that a god is precisely the kind of being bound by no goodwill and no affection for human beings, then goodbye to him—for why should I say "may he be gracious"? He cannot be gracious to anyone, since, as

69 Epicurus' school was known as the Garden; Democritus' birthplace, Abdera in Thrace, was proverbial for the dullness of its people.

LATIN	ENGLISH
	you say, all goodwill and affection spring from weakness.

Book II

The Stoic case

Balbus argues that gods exist, what they are, that they govern the world, and that they care for humankind.

BALBUS AGREES TO SPEAK

Velleius and Cotta urge Balbus to set out the Stoic case.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2.1	**VELLEIUS** Quae cum Cotta dixisset, tum Velleius "Ne ego" inquit "incautus, qui cum Academico et eodem rhetore congredi conatus sim. nam neque indisertum Academicum pertimuissem nec sine ista philosophia rhetorem quamvis eloquentem; neque enim flumine conturbor inanium verborum nec subtilitate sententiarum si orationis est siccitas. tu autem Cotta utraque re valuisti; corona tibi et iudices defuerunt. Sed ad ista alias, nunc Lucilium, si ipsi commodum est, audiamus."	**VELLEIUS** When Cotta had said this, Velleius replied: "How reckless I was to take on an Academic who is also a trained orator! I would not have been afraid of an Academic with no gift for speaking, nor of an orator without that philosophy of yours, however eloquent he was. A flood of empty words does not throw me, and neither does subtle thinking when the delivery is dry. But you, Cotta, were strong in both. All you lacked was a ring of spectators and a jury. But more of that another time. Now let us hear Balbus, if it suits him."
2.2	**BALBUS** Tum Balbus: "Eundem equidem mallem audire Cottam, dum qua eloquentia falsos deos sustulit eadem veros inducat. est enim et philosophi et pontificis et Cottae de dis inmortalibus habere non errantem et vagam ut Academici sed ut nostri stabilem certamque sententiam. nam contra Epicurum satis superque dictum est; sed aveo audire tu ipse Cotta quid sentias."	**BALBUS** Then Balbus said: "For my part I would rather hear Cotta again, provided he uses the same eloquence to bring in the true gods that he used to do away with the false ones. A philosopher, a pontiff, and a Cotta ought to hold a view of the immortal gods that is not wandering and unsettled, like the Academics', but firm and definite, like ours. Enough has been said against Epicurus, and more than enough. But I am eager to hear, Cotta, what you yourself think."
	COTTA "An" inquit "oblitus es quid initio dixerim, facilius me, talibus praesertim de rebus, quid non sentirem quam quid sentirem posse dicere? quod si haberem aliquid quod liqueret, tamen te vicissim audire vellem, cum ipse tam multa dixissem."	**COTTA** "Have you forgotten," he said, "what I said at the start? I said that I could more easily say what I did not think than what I did, especially on subjects like these. And even if I had reached some clear conclusion, I would still want to hear you in turn, since I have already said so much myself."
2.3	**BALBUS** Tum Balbus: "Geram tibi morem et agam quam brevissume potero; etenim convictis Epicuri erroribus longa de mea disputatione detracta oratio est. Omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis inmortalibus quaestionem in partis quattuor. primum docent esse deos, deinde quales sint, tum mundum ab his administrari, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis. nos autem hoc sermone quae priora duo sunt sumamus;	**BALBUS** Then Balbus said: "I will do as you wish and be as brief as I can. Now that Epicurus' errors have been refuted, much of the length of my discussion has been cut away. In general, our school divides the whole question of the immortal gods into four parts. First they show that the gods exist; next, what they are like; then, that the world is

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	tertium et quartum, quia maiora sunt, puto esse in aliud tempus differenda."	governed by them; and finally, that they take thought for human affairs. In this conversation let us take up the first two. The third and fourth are larger, and I think they should be put off to another time."
	COTTA "Minime vero" inquit Cotta; "nam et otiosi sumus et his de rebus agimus, quae sunt etiam negotiis anteponenda."	**COTTA** "Not at all," said Cotta. "We have time to spare, and the subject we are discussing deserves to come before even our business."

THAT GODS EXIST

The sky itself, the consent of all peoples, appearances of the gods, divination and the order of nature.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2.4	**BALBUS** Tum Lucilius "Ne egere quidem videtur" inquit "oratione prima pars. Quid enim potest esse tam apertum tamque perspicuum, cum caelum suspeximus caelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis quo haec regantur? quod ni ita esset, qui potuisset adsensu omnium dicere Ennius 'aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Iovem'—illum vero et Iovem et dominatorem rerum et omnia motu regentem et, ut idem Ennius, 'patrem divumque hominumque' et praesentem ac praepotentem deum? quod qui dubitet, haud sane intellego cur non idem sol sit an nullus sit dubitare possit;"	**BALBUS** Then Balbus said: "The first part hardly seems to need discussion at all. When we have looked up at the sky and contemplated the heavenly bodies, what can be so plain and obvious as that there is some divine power of surpassing intelligence by which all this is ruled? If it were not so, how could Ennius have said, with everyone's agreement, 'Behold this lofty, gleaming vault, which all invoke as Jupiter'? Jupiter indeed: lord of the universe, ruling all things by his motion, and, as the same Ennius says, 'father of gods and men,' a god present and all-powerful. If anyone doubts this, I really do not see why he could not equally doubt whether the sun exists or not;"[1]
2.5	qui enim est hoc illo evidentius? Quod nisi cognitum conprehensumque animis haberemus, non tam stabilis opinio permaneret nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis nec una cum saeclis aetatibusque hominum inveterare potuisset. etenim videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse. quis enim hippocentaurum fuisse aut Chimaeram putat, quaeve anus tam excors inveniri potest quae illa quae quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta extimescat? opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat.	for how is the sun any more evident than this? Unless we held this knowledge firmly grasped in our minds, the belief would not remain so stable. It would not be strengthened by the passage of time, nor could it have taken deeper root along with the centuries and generations of humankind. Indeed, we see that other beliefs, invented and empty, have withered away with time. Who thinks that the hippocentaur or the Chimaera ever existed? What old woman can be found so witless as to dread those monsters of the underworld that people once believed in? Time wipes out the fictions of opinion, but it confirms the judgments of nature.
2.6	Itaque et in nostro populo et in ceteris deorum cultus religionumque sanctitates existunt in dies maiores atque meliores; idque evenit non temere nec casu, sed quod et praesentes saepe di vim suam declarant, ut et apud	And so, among our own people and among others, the worship of the gods and the holiness of religious observance grow greater and better day by

1 The Latin narration calls Balbus by his family name, Lucilius, here and often elsewhere; this translation calls him Balbus throughout.

LATIN

Regillum bello Latinorum, cum A. Postumius dictator cum Octavio Mamillio Tusculano proelio dimicaret, in nostra acie Castor et Pollux ex equis pugnare visi sunt, et recentiore memoria idem Tyndaridae Persem victum nuntiaverunt. P. enim Vatinius avus huius adulescentis, cum e praefectura Reatina Romam venienti noctu duo iuvenes cum equis albis dixissent regem Persem illo die captum, cum senatui nuntiavisset, primo quasi temere de re publica locutus in carcerem coniectus est, post a Paulo litteris allatis cum idem dies constitisset, et agro a senatu et vacatione donatus est.

ENGLISH

day. This happens not at random or by chance, but because the gods often show their power in person. At Lake Regillus, in the war with the Latins, the dictator Aulus Postumius was fighting a battle against Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, and Castor and Pollux were seen fighting on horseback in our battle line. Within more recent memory, the same sons of Tyndareus announced the defeat of Perseus. Publius Vatinius, the grandfather of the young Vatinius of today, was coming to Rome by night from the prefecture of Reate when two young men on white horses told him that King Perseus had been captured that day. When he reported this to the senate, he was at first thrown into prison for speaking rashly about affairs of state. Later a letter arrived from Paullus, and the date was confirmed. The senate then rewarded him with a grant of land and exemption from military service.[2]

atque etiam cum ad fluvium Sagram Crotoniatas Locri maximo proelio devicissent, eo ipso die auditam esse eam pugnam ludis Olympiae memoriae proditum est. saepe Faunorum voces exauditae, saepe visae formae deorum quemvis aut non hebetem aut impium deos praesentes esse confiteri coegerunt.

and again, when the Locrians defeated the people of Croton in a great battle at the river Sagra, it is recorded that news of the battle was heard at the Olympic Games on that very day. Often the voices of Fauns have been heard, and often the forms of gods have been seen. These have compelled anyone who is not dull-witted or impious to admit that the gods are present among us.[3]

2.7 Praedictiones vero et praesensiones rerum futurarum quid aliud declarant nisi hominibus ea quae sint ostendi monstrari portendi praedici, ex quo illa ostenta monstra portenta prodigia dicuntur. Quod si ea ficta credimus licentia fabularum, Mopsum Tiresiam Amphiaraum Calchantem Helenum (quos tamen augures ne ipsae quidem fabulae adscivissent, si res omnino repudiarent), ne domesticis quidem exemplis docti numen deorum conprobabimus? Nihil nos P. Clodi bello Punico primo temeritas movebit, qui etiam per iocum deos inridens, cum cavea liberati pulli non pascerentur, mergi eos in aquam iussit, ut biberent, quoniam esse nollent? qui risus classe devicta multas ipsi lacrimas, magnam populo Romano cladem attulit. quid collega eius L. Iunius eodem bello nonne tempestate classem amisit, cum auspiciis non paruisset?

As for predictions and forebodings of future events, what do they show except that what is to come is shown, pointed out, portended, and foretold to human beings? That is why we call them omens, signs, portents, and prodigies. Suppose we believe that Mopsus, Tiresias, Amphiaraus, Calchas, and Helenus were inventions of poetic license. Even the myths would not have adopted them as augurs if they rejected the thing altogether. But even so, shall we not be taught by examples from our own history to acknowledge the divine power of the gods? Will we be unmoved by the recklessness of Publius Clodius in the First Punic War? He mocked the gods, even in jest. When the sacred chickens were let out of their coop and would not eat, he ordered them thrown into the water to drink, since they refused to eat. After his fleet was defeated, that laugh brought many tears

2 The battle of Lake Regillus (traditionally 496 BC) secured Rome against the Latins. Perseus, the last king of Macedon, was defeated by Lucius Aemilius Paullus at Pydna in 168 BC.
3 Locri and Croton were Greek cities in southern Italy; the battle took place in the sixth century BC.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		to himself and a great disaster to the Roman people. And what of his colleague Lucius Junius in the same war? Did he not lose his fleet in a storm after disobeying the auspices?[4]
	itaque Clodius a populo condemnatus est, Iunius necem sibi ipse conscivit.	and so Clodius was condemned by the people, and Junius took his own life.
2.8	C. Flaminium Coelius religione neglecta cecidisse apud Transumenum scribit cum magno rei publicae vulnere. quorum exitio intellegi potest eorum imperiis rem publicam amplificatam qui religionibus paruissent. et si conferre volumus nostra cum externis, ceteris rebus aut pares aut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione id est cultu deorum multo superiores.	Coelius writes that Gaius Flaminius neglected religion and fell at Trasimene, dealing a great wound to the state. The ruin of these men shows that the state grew great under the command of those who obeyed religion. And if we choose to compare ourselves with foreign peoples, we shall find that we are equal or even inferior to them in other respects. In religion, however, that is, in the worship of the gods, we are far superior.[5]
2.9	An Atti Navi lituus ille, quo ad investigandum suem regiones vineae terminavit, contemnendus est? crederem, nisi eius augurio rex Hostilius maxima bella gessisset. Sed neglegentia nobilitatis augurii disciplina omissa veritas auspiciorum spreta est, species tantum retenta; itaque maximae rei publicae partes, in is bella quibus rei publicae salus continetur, nullis auspiciis administrantur, nulla peremnia servantur, nulla ex acuminibus, nulli viri vocantur ex quo in procinctu testamenta perierunt; tum enim bella gerere nostri duces incipiunt, cum auspicia posuerunt.	Or is the famous augur's staff of Attus Navius to be scorned, with which he marked out the regions of a vineyard to find his pig? I would think so, had not King Hostilius waged his greatest wars under his augury. But the nobility has been negligent, and the discipline of augury has been abandoned. The truth of the auspices is scorned, and only the outward show is kept. So the most important affairs of state, including wars, on which the safety of the state depends, are conducted without any auspices. No auspices are observed at river crossings, none from the points of weapons, and no men are called. As a result, wills made in battle order have died out. For our generals begin to wage war only once they have laid the auspices aside.[6]
2.10	at vero apud maiores tanta religionis vis fuit, ut quidam imperatores etiam se ipsos dis inmortalibus capite velato verbis certis pro re publica devoverent. Multa ex Sibyllinis vaticinationibus, multa ex haruspicum responsis commemorare possum quibus ea confirmentur quae dubia nemini debent esse. Atqui et nostrorum augurum et Etruscorum haruspicum disciplinam P. Scipione C. Figulo consulibus res ipsa probavit. quos cum Ti. Gracchus consul iterum crearet, primus rogator, ut eos rettulit, ibidem est repente mortuus. Gracchus cum comitia nihilo minus peregisset remque illam in religionem populo venisse sentiret, ad senatum rettulit.	But among our ancestors the force of religion was so great that some commanders even devoted themselves to the immortal gods on behalf of the state, with veiled heads and in fixed words. I could recall many things from the Sibylline prophecies, and many from the responses of the soothsayers, that confirm what ought to be doubtful to no one. And indeed, in the consulship of Publius Scipio and Gaius Figulus, events themselves proved the discipline of both our augurs and the Etruscan soothsayers. Tiberius Gracchus, consul for the

4 The Latin nouns ostenta, monstra, portenta, prodigia are derived, as Cicero takes it, from the verbs just before them. Publius Claudius Pulcher (Cicero writes Clodius) was defeated at sea off Drepana in Sicily in 249 BC.
5 Lucius Coelius Antipater was a Roman historian of the war with Hannibal. Hannibal defeated Flaminius at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC.
6 Attus Navius was a legendary augur who divided a vineyard with his curved staff to find a lost pig. A will "in battle order" was declared orally before the army as it stood ready to fight.

LATIN	ENGLISH
senatus quos ad soleret referendum censuit. haruspices introducti responderunt non fuisse iustum comitiorum rogatorem. tum Gracchus, ut e patre audiebam, incensus ira:	second time, was holding the election for them. Just as the first vote-teller was reporting their names, he dropped dead on the spot. Gracchus nonetheless completed the election. But he sensed that the incident had become a matter of religious scruple for the people, so he referred it to the senate. The senate decided that it should be referred to those who usually dealt with such matters. The soothsayers were brought in and answered that the man who had put the question to the assembly had not been properly qualified. Then Gracchus, as I used to hear from my father, flared up in anger:[7]
2.11 "itane vero, ego non iustus, qui et consul rogavi et augur et auspicato? an vos Tusci ac barbari auspiciorum populi Romani ius tenetis et interpretes esse comitiorum potestis?" itaque tum illos exire iussit. post autem e provincia litteras ad collegium misit, se cum legeret libros recordatum esse vitio sibi tabernaculum captum fuisse hortos Scipionis, quod, cum pomerium postea intrasset habendi senatus causa, in redeundo cum idem pomerium transiret auspicari esset oblitus; itaque vitio creatos consules esse. augures rem ad senatum; senatus ut abdicarent consules; abdicaverunt. quae quaerimus exempla maiora: vir sapientissimus atque haud sciam an omnium praestantissimus peccatum suum, quod celari posset, confiteri maluit quam haerere in re publica religionem, consules summum imperium statim deponere quam id tenere punctum temporis contra religionem.	"Is that so? Am I not properly qualified, I who put the question as consul, as augur, and after taking the auspices? Do you Etruscans and foreigners hold the law of the auspices of the Roman people? Can you act as interpreters of our elections?" And so he ordered them out. Later, however, he sent a letter from his province to the college of augurs. He wrote that while reading the books he had remembered a ritual flaw in the site he had taken for his augural tent, the gardens of Scipio. He had afterward crossed the city's sacred boundary to hold a meeting of the senate, and on his way back, when he crossed the same boundary again, he had forgotten to take the auspices. And so the consuls had been improperly elected. The augurs referred the matter to the senate; the senate ruled that the consuls should resign; they resigned. What greater examples are we looking for? A man of the greatest wisdom, perhaps the most outstanding of all, preferred to confess his own error, which could have been concealed, rather than let a religious taint cling to the state. And the consuls preferred to lay down supreme power at once rather than hold it for a moment against religion.
2.12 magna augurum auctoritas; quid haruspicum ars nonne divina? Haec et innumerabilia ex eodem genere qui videat nonne cogatur confiteri deos esse? quorum enim interpretes sunt, eos ipsos esse certe necesse est; deorum autem interpretes sunt; deos igitur esse fateamur. At fortasse non omnia eveniunt quae praedicta sunt. ne aegri quidem quia non omnes convalescunt idcirco ars nulla medicina est. signa ostenduntur a dis rerum	great is the authority of the augurs. And is not the soothsayers' art divine? Anyone who sees these and countless other things of the same kind must surely be compelled to admit that the gods exist. If there are interpreters of certain beings, those beings themselves must certainly exist. But there are interpreters of the gods. Therefore let us admit that the gods exist. But perhaps not everything

7 In the ritual of devotio a commander offered his own life to the gods in exchange for victory. The election took place in 163 BC; Gracchus was the father of the reformers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	futurarum; in his si qui erraverunt, non deorum natura sed hominum coniectura peccavit.	that is predicted comes to pass. Nor does it follow that medicine is no art because not all the sick recover. The gods show signs of future events. If some people have gone wrong in reading them, it is not the nature of the gods that erred but human guesswork.
	Itaque inter omnis omnium gentium summa constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse deos. quales sint varium est, esse nemo negat.	And so all people of all nations agree on the main point. It is inborn in everyone, and engraved, as it were, on the mind, that gods exist. What they are like is disputed; that they exist no one denies.
2.13	Cleanthes quidem noster quattuor de causis dixit in animis hominum informatas deorum esse notiones. primam posuit eam de qua modo dixi, quae orta esset ex praesensione rerum futurarum; alteram quam ceperimus ex magnitudine commodorum, quae percipiuntur caeli temperatione fecunditate terrarum aliarumque commoditatum complurium copia;	Our own Cleanthes said that notions of the gods were formed in human minds for four reasons. The first he gave was the one I have just mentioned, which arises from foreknowledge of future events. The second is the one we have derived from the greatness of the benefits we enjoy: a temperate climate, a fertile earth, and an abundance of many other good things;
2.14	tertiam quae terreret animos fulminibus tempestatibus nimbis nivibus grandinibus vastitate pestilentia terrae motibus et saepe fremitibus lapideisque imbribus et guttis imbrium quasi cruentis, tum labibus aut repentinis terrarum hiatibus tum praeter naturam hominum pecudumque portentis, tum facibus visis caelestibus tum stellis is quas Graeci κομήτας nostri cincinnatas vocant, quae nuper bello Octaviano magnarum fuerunt calamitatum praenuntiae, tum sole geminato, quod ut e patre audivi Tuditano et Aquilio consulibus evenerat, quo quidem anno P. Africanus sol alter extinctus est, quibus exterriti homines vim quandam esse caelestem et divinam suspicati sunt;	the third is the one that terrified people's minds. Lightning, storms, rain clouds, snow, hail, devastation, plague, earthquakes and frequent rumblings, showers of stones and raindrops that seemed to be blood; then landslides and sudden chasms in the earth; then monstrous births of humans and animals contrary to nature; then torches seen in the sky; then the stars that the Greeks call κομήτας [comets, "long-haired ones"] and we call "curly-haired," which recently, in the Octavian war, heralded great disasters; then the double sun, which, as I heard from my father, appeared in the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius, the very year in which Publius Africanus, a second sun, was extinguished. Terrified by these things, people suspected that there was some heavenly and divine power;[8]
2.15	quartam causam esse eamque vel maximam aequabilitatem motus constantissimamque conversionem caeli, solis lunae siderumque omnium distinctionem utilitatem pulchritudinem ordinem, quarum rerum aspectus ipse satis indicaret non esse ea fortuita: ut, si quis in domum aliquam aut in gymnasium aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem modum disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri iudicare, sed esse aliquem intellegat qui praesit et cui pareatur, multo magis in tantis motionibus tantisque	the fourth reason, and the most important, is the regularity of motion and the perfectly constant revolution of the heavens, together with the distinctness, usefulness, beauty, and order of the sun, the moon, and all the stars. The very sight of these things, he said, shows clearly enough that they are not the work of chance. Suppose someone enters a house, or a gymnasium, or a forum, and sees the method, measure, and discipline of everything.

8 The Octavian war was the civil conflict of 87 BC between the consuls Gnaeus Octavius and Cinna. Tuditanus and Aquilius were consuls in 129 BC, the year Scipio Africanus the Younger died.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	vicissitudinibus, tam multarum rerum atque tantarum ordinibus, in quibus nihil umquam inmensa et infinita vetustas mentita sit, statuat necesse est ab aliqua mente tantos naturae motus gubernari.	He cannot judge that all this happens without a cause, but understands that someone is in charge and is obeyed. All the more, then, amid such great motions and changes, amid the ordered courses of so many vast things, in which boundless and infinite ages have never once played false, he must conclude that these great motions of nature are governed by some mind.
2.16	Chrysippus quidem, quamquam est acerrimo ingenio, tamen ea dicit ut ab ipsa natura didicisse, non ut ipse repperisse videatur. "Si enim" inquit "est aliquid in rerum natura quod hominis mens quod ratio quod vis quod potestas humana efficere non possit, est certe id quod illud efficit homine melius; atqui res caelestes omnesque eae quarum est ordo sempiternus ab homine confici non possunt; est igitur id quo illa conficiuntur homine melius. id autem quid potius dixeris quam deum? Etenim si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius; in eo enim solo est ratio, qua nihil potest esse praestantius; esse autem hominem qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet desipientis adrogantiae est; ergo est aliquid melius. est igitur profecto deus."	Chrysippus, for all the sharpness of his intellect, says things that seem to have been learned from nature herself rather than discovered by him. "If there is anything in nature," he says, "that the human mind, human reason, human strength or power cannot produce, then what produces it is certainly better than a human being. But the heavenly bodies, and all those things whose order is eternal, cannot be made by a human being. Therefore that by which they are made is better than a human being. And what would you call that rather than a god? Indeed, if there are no gods, what in nature can be better than a human being? Reason is found in humans alone, and nothing can be more excellent than reason. But for a human being to think that there is nothing in the whole world better than himself is senseless arrogance. Therefore there is something better. Therefore there certainly is a god."
2.17	An vero, si domum magnam pulchramque videris, non possis adduci ut, etiam si dominum non videas, muribus illam et mustelis aedificatam putes—: tantum ergo ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum caelestium, tantam vim et magnitudinem maris atque terrarum si tuum ac non deorum inmortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere videare? An ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse meliora, terram autem esse infimam, quam crassissimus circumfundat aer: ut ob eam ipsam causam, quod etiam quibusdam regionibus atque urbibus contingere videmus, hebetiora ut sint hominum ingenia propter caeli pleniorem naturam, hoc idem generi humano evenerit, quod in terra hoc est in crassissima regione mundi conlocati sint.	If you saw a large and beautiful house, could anyone persuade you that it had been built by mice and weasels, even if you could not see its master? Then if you thought that the world in all its splendor, the heavenly bodies in all their variety and beauty, and the sea and land in all their force and extent were your dwelling rather than that of the immortal gods, would you not plainly seem to be out of your mind? Or do we not even understand that everything above is better, while the earth is lowest, wrapped round by the thickest air? We see that in certain regions and cities people's minds are duller because the air is denser. For the same reason, the same thing has happened to the human race, because it has been placed on the earth, that is, in the densest region of the world.
2.18	Et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam mentem et eam quidem acriorem et divinam existimare debemus. unde enim hanc homo "arripuit", ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates. quin et umorem et calorem, qui est fusus in corpore, et terrenam ipsam viscerum	And yet human ingenuity itself should lead us to conclude that there is some mind, and a sharper and divine one at that. For where did man "pick up" his mind, as Socrates asks in Xenophon? If anyone asks where we get the moisture and heat

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	soliditatem, animum denique illum spirabilem si quis quaerat unde habeamus, apparet; quorum aliud a terra sumpsimus aliud ab umore aliud ab igni aliud ab aere eo quem spiritum dicimus. illud autem quod vincit haec omnia, rationem dico et, si placet pluribus verbis, mentem consilium cogitationem prudentiam, ubi invenimus unde sustulimus? An cetera mundus habebit omnia, hoc unum quod plurimi est non habebit?	spread through the body, the earthy solidity of our flesh, and finally the breathing soul within us, the answer is obvious. We took one from earth, another from water, another from fire, and another from the air that we call breath. But that which surpasses all these—I mean reason, or, if you want more words for it, mind, judgment, thought, wisdom—where did we find it? Where did we take it from? Will the world have everything else and lack this one thing, which is worth the most?[9]
	atqui certe nihil omnium rerum melius est mundo nihil praestabilius nihil pulchrius, nec solum nihil est sed ne cogitari quidem quicquam melius potest. et si ratione et sapientia nihil est melius, necesse est haec inesse in eo quod optimum esse concedimus.	yet surely nothing in all existence is better than the world, nothing more excellent, nothing more beautiful. Not only is there nothing better, but nothing better can even be imagined. And if nothing is better than reason and wisdom, these must be present in what we grant to be the best.
2.19	Quid vero tanta rerum consentiens conspirans, continuata cognatio quem non coget ea quae dicuntur a me conprobare? possetne uno tempore florere, dein vicissim horrere terra, aut tot rebus ipsis se inmutantibus solis accessus discessusque solstitiis brumisque cognosci, aut aestus maritimi fretorumque angustiae ortu aut obitu lunae commoveri, aut una totius caeli conversione cursus astrorum dispares conservari? haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur.	Then again, whom will this vast kinship of things, harmonious, breathing together, and continuous, not compel to accept what I am saying? Could the earth flower at one time and then lie stiff with cold in turn? Could the sun's approach and retreat at the summer and winter solstices be recognized by the changes in things themselves? Could the tides of the sea and the currents in narrow straits be moved by the rising or setting of the moon? Could the unequal courses of the stars be preserved within the single revolution of the whole heavens? With all the parts of the world in harmony with one another, these things surely could not happen unless they were held together by a single divine and continuous breath.
2.20	Atque haec cum uberius disputantur et fusius, ut mihi est in animo facere, facilius effugiunt Academicorum calumniam; cum autem, ut Zeno solebat, brevius angustiusque concluduntur, tum apertiora sunt ad reprendendum. nam ut profluens amnis aut vix aut nullo modo, conclusa autem aqua facile conrumpitur, sic orationis flumine reprensoris convicia diluuntur, angustia autem conclusae rationis non facile se ipsa tutatur. Haec enim quae dilatantur a nobis Zeno sic premebat:	When these arguments are set out more fully and expansively, as I intend to do, they escape the cavils of the Academics more easily. But when they are compressed into short, tight syllogisms, as Zeno used to do, they lie more open to attack. A flowing river is hardly polluted, or not at all, while enclosed water is easily spoiled. In the same way, a critic's abuse is washed away by the stream of speech, whereas a compressed argument, in its narrow confines, cannot easily defend itself. Zeno pressed home the points I am expanding like this:
2.21	"Quod ratione utitur id melius est quam id quod ratione non utitur; nihil autem mundo melius; ratione igitur mundus utitur". similiter effici potest sapientem esse mundum, similiter beatum, similiter aeternum; omnia	"That which uses reason is better than that which does not. But nothing is better than the world. Therefore the world uses reason." In the same way

9 Socrates asks this in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (1.4.8).

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	enim haec meliora sunt quam ea quae sunt his carentia, nec mundo quicquam melius. ex quo efficietur esse mundum deum.	it can be proved that the world is wise, likewise that it is blessed, likewise that it is eternal. All these qualities are better than their absence, and nothing is better than the world. From this it will follow that the world is a god.
2.22	Idemque hoc modo: "Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens; mundi autem partes sentientes sunt; non igitur caret sensu mundus". Pergit idem et urguet angustius: "Nihil" inquit "quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantem compotemque rationis; mundus autem generat animantis compotesque rationis; animans est igitur mundus composque rationis". Idemque similitudine, ut saepe solet, rationem conclusit hoc modo: "Si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiae nascerentur, num dubitares quin inesset in oliva tibicini quaedam scientia? quid si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes: idem scilicet censeres in platanis inesse musicam. cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque iudicetur, cum ex se procreet animantis atque sapientis?"	He also argued as follows: "No part of something that lacks sensation can be sentient. But parts of the world are sentient. Therefore the world does not lack sensation." He goes on and presses the point more tightly: "Nothing that lacks mind and reason can produce from itself a living being that possesses reason. But the world produces living beings that possess reason. Therefore the world is a living being possessing reason." And, as he often does, he completed the argument with a comparison: "If flutes playing in tune grew on an olive tree, would you doubt that the olive had some knowledge of flute playing? What if plane trees bore lyres that played in rhythm? You would of course think that there was music in plane trees too. Why then should the world not be judged living and wise, when it produces from itself beings that are living and wise?"

THE WORLD IS DIVINE

Heat sustains all life; the world, which holds all things, must have reason and so be a god.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2.23	**BALBUS** Sed quoniam coepi secus agere atque initio dixeram (negaram enim hanc primam partem egere oratione, quod esset omnibus perspicuum deos esse), tamen id ipsum rationibus physicis id est naturalibus confirmari volo. Sic enim res se habet, ut omnia quae alantur et quae crescant contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent nec crescere. nam omne quod est calidum et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo; quod autem alitur et crescit motu quodam utitur certo et aequabili; qui quam diu remanet in nobis tam diu sensus et vita remanet, refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et extinguimur.	**BALBUS** Although I have begun to proceed differently from what I said at the outset (I said that this first part needed no discussion, since it was plain to all that the gods exist), I still want to confirm this very point with physical, that is, natural, arguments. The fact is that everything that is nourished and grows contains within it a force of heat, without which it could neither be nourished nor grow. Everything hot and fiery is stirred and set going by its own motion, and what is nourished and grows makes use of a certain regular and even motion. As long as this motion remains in us, sensation and life remain. But when the heat has cooled and gone out, we ourselves die and are extinguished.
2.24	Quod quidem Cleanthes his etiam argumentis docet, quanta vis insit caloris in omni corpore: negat enim esse ullum cibum tam gravem quin is nocte et die concoquatur; cuius etiam in reliquiis inest calor iis quas natura respuerit. iam vero venae et arteriae micare non	Cleanthes also uses the following arguments to show how great a force of heat is present in every body. He says that no food is so heavy that it is not digested within a night and a day, and that heat is present even in the remains that nature has rejec-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	desinunt quasi quodam igneo motu, animadversumque saepe est cum cor animantis alicuius evolsum ita mobiliter palpitaret ut imitaretur igneam celeritatem. Omne igitur quod vivit, sive animal sive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem. ex quo intellegi debet eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem.	ted. Moreover, the veins and arteries never stop throbbing, as if with a kind of fiery motion. It has often been observed that when the heart of some animal is torn out, it throbs so rapidly that it imitates the swiftness of fire. Everything that lives, therefore, whether animal or plant, lives because of the heat enclosed within it. From this we should understand that the nature of heat has in itself a vital force that extends through the whole world.
2.25	Atque id facilius cernemus toto genere hoc igneo quod tranat omnia subtilius explicato. Omnes igitur partes mundi (tangam autem maximas) calore fultae sustinentur. Quod primum in terrena natura perspici potest. nam et lapidum conflictu atque tritu elici ignem videmus et recenti fossione terram fumare calentem, atque etiam ex puteis iugibus aquam calidam trahi, et id maxime fieri temporibus hibernis, quod magna vis terrae cavernis contineatur caloris eaque hieme sit densior ob eamque causam calorem insitum in terris contineat artius.	We shall see this more easily once we have explained more precisely this whole fiery element that permeates everything. All the parts of the world, then (I will touch only on the largest), are supported and sustained by heat. This can be seen first in the element of earth. We see that fire is struck from stones by collision and rubbing. We see that freshly dug earth steams with warmth, and that warm water is drawn from ever-flowing wells, especially in winter. This is because a great force of heat is held in the caverns of the earth, and in winter the earth is denser and so holds its innate heat in more tightly.
2.26	longa est oratio multaeque rationes, quibus doceri possit omnia quae terra concipiat semina quaeque ipsa ex se generata stirpibus infixa contineat ea temperatione caloris et oriri et augescere. Atque aquae etiam admixtum esse calorem primum ipse liquor aquae declarat et fusio, quae neque conglaciaret frigoribus neque nive pruinaque concresceret, nisi eadem se admixto calore liquefacta et dilapsa diffunderet; itaque et aquilonibus reliquisque frigoribus adiectis durescit umor, et idem vicissim mollitur tepefactus et tabescit calore. atque etiam maria agitata ventis ita tepescunt ut intellegi facile possit in tantis illis umoribus esse inclusum calorem; nec enim ille externus et adventicius habendus est tepor, sed ex intumis maris partibus agitatione excitatus, quod nostris quoque corporibus contingit cum motu atque exercitatione recalescunt.	it would take a long discourse and many arguments to show that this tempering of heat is what makes all things arise and grow: every seed the earth conceives, and everything it has generated from itself and holds rooted within it. That heat is mixed with water too is shown, first of all, by the very fluidity of water and its flowing. Water would not freeze in the cold or harden into snow and frost unless it were the admixture of heat that made it liquid and let it spread and flow. So under north winds and other cold, water hardens, and in turn it softens when warmed and melts with heat. The seas, too, grow warm when stirred by the winds, so that one can easily see that heat is enclosed in those great masses of water. That warmth must not be thought to come from outside. It is stirred up by agitation from the innermost parts of the sea, just as our bodies grow warm again through movement and exercise.
	Ipse vero aer, qui natura est maxime frigidus, minime est expers caloris;	Air itself, which is by nature extremely cold, is by no means without heat;
2.27	ille vero et multo quidem calore admixtus est: ipse enim oritur ex respiratione aquarum; earum enim quasi vapor quidam aer habendus est, is autem existit motu eius caloris qui aquis continetur, quam similitudinem cernere	in fact it is mixed with a great deal of heat. Air arises from the exhalation of waters; it should be regarded as a sort of vapor from them, and this vapor is produced by the motion of the heat con-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	possumus in his aquis quae effervescunt subiectis ignibus. Iam vero reliqua quarta pars mundi: ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est et ceteris naturis omnibus salutarem inpertit et vitalem calorem.	tained in the waters. We can see something similar in water that boils when fire is put under it. Now there remains the fourth part of the world. It is entirely fiery by nature, and it imparts healthy and life-giving heat to all the other elements.
2.28	Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique natura in tanta diuturnitate servari, eoque magis quod intellegi debet calidum illud atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis et causa gignendi, a quo et animantia omnia et ea quorum stirpes terra continentur et nasci sit necesse et augescere.	From this it follows that, since all the parts of the world are sustained by heat, the world itself is also preserved through so long a span by a like and equal nature. This is all the more so because we must understand that this hot and fiery element is diffused through all nature in such a way that it holds within it the power of procreation and the cause of generation. From it all living creatures, and all things whose roots are held in the earth, must be born and grow.
2.29	Natura est igitur quae contineat mundum omnem eumque tueatur, et ea quidem non sine sensu atque ratione. Omnem enim naturam necesse est, quae non solitaria sit neque simplex sed cum alio iuncta atque conexa, habere aliquem in se principatum, ut in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis unde oriantur rerum adpetitus; in arborum autem et earum rerum quae gignuntur e terra radicibus inesse principatus putatur. principatum autem id dico quod Graeci ἡγεμονικὸν vocant, quo nihil in quoque genere nec potest nec debet esse praestantius. ita necesse est illud etiam in quo sit totius naturae principatus esse omnium optumum omniumque rerum potestate dominatuque dignissimum.	It is nature, then, that holds the whole world together and protects it, and a nature that is not without sensation and reason. For every nature that is not solitary or simple, but joined and connected with something else, must have some ruling part within it. In a human being this is the mind. In a beast it is something like a mind, from which its appetites for things arise. In trees and the things that grow from the earth, the ruling part is thought to lie in the roots. By "ruling part" I mean what the Greeks call ἡγεμονικόν [the governing part], and nothing in any kind of thing can or should be more excellent than it. So the thing in which the ruling part of all nature resides must also be the best of all things, and the most worthy of power and dominion over all.[10]
2.30	videmus autem in partibus mundi (nihil est enim in omni mundo quod non pars universi sit) inesse sensum atque rationem. in ea parte igitur, in qua mundi inest principatus, haec inesse necessest, et acriora quidem atque maiora. quocirca sapientem esse mundum necesse est, naturamque eam quae res omnes conplexa teneat perfectione rationis excellere, eoque deum esse mundum omnemque vim mundi natura divina contineri.	Now we see that sensation and reason are present in the parts of the world (for there is nothing in the whole world that is not part of the universe). They must therefore be present in that part in which the world's ruling part resides, and present in a keener and greater degree. Therefore the world must be wise, and the nature that holds all things in its embrace must excel in the perfection of reason. And so the world is a god, and all the world's power is held together by divine nature.
	Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo haec quae nota nobis sunt retinentur et vigent.	Moreover, the world's fiery glow is far purer, more translucent and more mobile than this heat of ours, by which the things familiar to us are sus-

10 The Stoic *hēgemonikon* was the command center of a living being, the seat of perception, impulse and thought.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		tained and kept vigorous. For those reasons it is far better suited to stirring sensation.
2.31	absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiaeque hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse sine sensu, qui integro et libero et puro eodemque acerrimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur, praesertim cum is ardor qui est mundi non agitatus ab alio neque externo pulsu sed per se ipse ac sua sponte moveatur; nam quid potest esse mundo valentius, quod pellat atque moveat calorem eum quo ille teneatur.	It is absurd, then, to say that the world is without sensation. Humans and beasts are sustained by this heat of ours, and that is why they move and perceive. The world is sustained by a fire that is whole, free and pure, and also supremely keen and mobile. This is especially true because the world's fire is not driven by something else or by an external impulse, but moves of itself and of its own accord. For what could be stronger than the world, to push and move the heat by which the world is sustained?
2.32	Audiamus enim Platonem quasi quendam deum philosophorum; cui duo placet esse motus, unum suum alterum externum, esse autem divinius quod ipsum ex se sua sponte moveatur quam quod pulsu agitetur alieno. hunc autem motum in solis animis esse ponit, ab isque principium motus esse ductum putat. quapropter quoniam ex mundi ardore motus omnis oritur, is autem ardor non alieno inpulsu sed sua sponte movetur, animus sit necesse est; ex quo efficitur animantem esse mundum.	Let us listen to Plato, who is a kind of god among philosophers. He holds that there are two kinds of motion, one self-caused and the other external. What moves of itself, of its own accord, is more divine than what is driven by an impulse from elsewhere. This self-motion he places in minds alone, and he thinks the origin of all motion derives from them. All motion arises from the world's fire, and that fire moves not by an impulse from elsewhere but of its own accord. It must therefore be a mind, and from this it follows that the world is a living being.
	Atque ex hoc quoque intellegi poterit in eo inesse intellegentiam, quod certe est mundus melior quam ulla natura. ut enim nulla pars est corporis nostri quae non minoris sit quam nosmet ipsi sumus, sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem aliquam universi. quod si ita est, sapiens sit mundus necesse est. nam ni ita esset, hominem qui esset mundi pars, quoniam rationis esset particeps, pluris esse quam mundum omnem oporteret.	There is a further reason to understand that there is intelligence in the world: the world is certainly better than any other nature. There is no part of our body that is not of less worth than we ourselves are. In the same way, the universe as a whole must be of more worth than any part of the universe. If that is so, the world must be wise. If it were not, then a human being, who is part of the world, would have to be of more worth than the whole world, since a human being shares in reason.
2.33	Atque etiam si a primis incohatisque naturis ad ultimas perfectasque volumus procedere, ad deorum naturam perveniamus necesse est. Prima enim animadvertimus a natura sustineri ea quae gignantur e terra, quibus natura nihil tribuit amplius quam ut ea alendo atque augendo tueretur.	Again, if we want to proceed from the first, rudimentary natures to the last and perfect ones, we must arrive at the nature of the gods. First, we observe that the things that grow from the earth are sustained by nature. Nature has given them nothing more than this: it preserves them by nourishing them and making them grow.
2.34	bestiis autem sensum et motum dedit et cum quodam adpetitu accessum ad res salutares a pestiferis recessum. hoc homini amplius, quod addidit rationem, qua	To beasts, however, nature gave sensation and movement, and also a kind of appetite by which they approach what is wholesome and withdraw

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	regerentur animi adpetitus, qui tum remitterentur tum continerentur. quartus autem est gradus et altissimus eorum qui natura boni sapientesque gignuntur, quibus a principio innascitur ratio recta constansque, quae supra hominem putanda est deoque tribuenda id est mundo, in quo necesse est perfectam illam atque absolutam inesse rationem.	from what is harmful. To human beings it gave more, for it added reason. By reason the mind's appetites are governed, now given rein, now held in check. The fourth and highest level belongs to beings born good and wise by nature. Right and steadfast reason is innate in them from the beginning. This reason must be considered above humanity and attributed to god, that is, to the world, in which that perfect and complete reason must reside.
2.35	Neque enim dici potest in ulla rerum institutione non esse aliquid extremum atque perfectum. ut enim in vite ut in pecude, nisi quae vis obstitit, videmus naturam suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenire, atque ut pictura et fabrica ceteraeque artes habent quendam absoluti operis effectum, sic in omni natura ac multo etiam magis necesse est absolvi aliquid ac perfici. etenim ceteris naturis multa externa quo minus perficiantur possunt obsistere, universam autem naturam nulla res potest impedire propterea quod omnis naturas ipsa cohibet et continet. Quocirca necesse est esse quartum illum et altissimum gradum quo nulla vis possit accedere.	For it cannot be said that any ordered system of things lacks some final and perfect stage. We see in a vine or in a farm animal that nature follows its own path to completion, unless some force obstructs it. Painting, building and the other arts likewise achieve a finished work. In the same way, and much more so, something in nature as a whole must be brought to completion and perfection. Other natures can be kept from reaching perfection by many external obstacles. Nothing, however, can hinder nature as a whole, because nature itself holds together and contains all natures. Therefore that fourth and highest level must exist, which no force can reach.
2.36	is autem est gradus in quo rerum omnium natura ponitur; quae quoniam talis est ut et praesit omnibus et eam nulla res possit inpedire, necesse est intellegentem esse mundum et quidem etiam sapientem.	and that is the level at which the nature of all things is placed. This nature is over all things, and nothing can hinder it. The world must therefore be intelligent, and indeed wise.
	Quid autem est inscitius quam eam naturam quae omnis res sit conplexa non optumam dici, aut, cum sit optuma, non primum animantem esse, deinde rationis et consilii compotem, postremo sapientem. qui enim potest aliter esse optima? neque enim si stirpium similis sit aut etiam bestiarum, optuma putanda sit potius quam deterruma. Nec vero, si rationis particeps sit nec sit tamen a principio sapiens, non sit deterior mundi potius quam humana condicio. homo enim sapiens fieri potest, mundus autem, si in aeterno praeteriti temporis spatio fuit insipiens, numquam profecto sapientiam consequetur; ita erit homine deterior. quod quoniam absurdum est, et sapiens a principio mundus et deus habendus est.	What could be more ignorant than to say that the nature that embraces all things is not the best? Or, granting that it is the best, to deny that it is, first, a living being, next, possessed of reason and judgment, and finally wise? How else could it be the best? If it were like plants, or even like beasts, it would have to be thought the worst rather than the best. Nor, if it shared in reason but was not wise from the beginning, would the world's condition be anything but worse than humanity's. For a human being can become wise. But if the world was unwise through the eternal span of past time, it will surely never attain wisdom, and so it will be worse than a human being. Since that is absurd, the world must be regarded as wise from the beginning, and as a god.
2.37	Neque enim est quicquam aliud praeter mundum quoi nihil absit quodque undique aptum atque perfectum expletumque sit omnibus suis numeris et partibus. Scite	For there is nothing besides the world that lacks nothing and is fitted and perfect in every respect, complete in all its measures and parts. Chrysippus

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	enim Chrysippus, ut clipei causa involucrum vaginam autem gladii, sic praeter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges atque fructus quos terra gignit animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut ecum vehendi causa arandi bovem venandi et custodiendi canem; ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum—nullo modo perfectus sed est quaedam particula perfecti.	put it cleverly. A cover is made for the sake of a shield and a sheath for the sake of a sword. In the same way, everything except the world was made for the sake of other things. The crops and fruits that the earth produces exist for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of humans: the horse for riding, the ox for plowing, the dog for hunting and guarding. Humankind itself was born to contemplate and imitate the world. It is by no means perfect, but it is a small particle of what is perfect.
2.38	sed mundus quoniam omnia conplexus est neque est quicquam quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est; qui igitur potest ei desse id quod est optimum? nihil autem est mente et ratione melius; ergo haec mundo deesse non possunt. Bene igitur idem Chrysippus, qui similitudines adiungens omnia in perfectis et maturis docet esse meliora, ut in equo quam in eculeo in cane quam in catulo in viro quam in puero; item quod in omni mundo optimum sit id in perfecto aliquo atque absoluto esse debere;	But the world embraces everything, and there is nothing that is not in it, so it is perfect in every respect. How, then, can it lack what is best? Nothing is better than mind and reason, so the world cannot lack them. Chrysippus again puts it well. Using comparisons, he shows that everything is better in what is fully grown and mature: in a horse than in a foal, in a dog than in a puppy, in a man than in a boy. Likewise, he argues, what is best in the whole world must reside in something perfect and complete;
2.39	est autem nihil mundo perfectius nihil virtute melius; igitur mundi est propria virtus. Nec vero hominis natura perfecta est, et efficitur tamen in homine virtus; quanto igitur in mundo facilius; est ergo in eo virtus. sapiens est igitur et propterea deus.	but nothing is more perfect than the world, and nothing better than virtue. Therefore virtue belongs properly to the world. Human nature is not perfect, and yet virtue is achieved in a human being. How much more easily, then, in the world! So there is virtue in it. The world is therefore wise, and therefore a god.
	Atque hac mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem divinitas; quae ex mobilissima purissimaque aetheris parte gignuntur neque ulla praeterea sunt admixta natura totaque sunt calida atque perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime et animantia esse et sentire atque intellegere dicantur.	Once we have perceived the divinity of the world, we must attribute the same divinity to the stars. They are born from the most mobile and purest part of the ether, are mixed with no other nature, and are entirely hot and translucent. So they too are quite rightly said to be living beings, and to perceive and understand.
2.40	Atque ea quidem tota esse ignea duorum sensuum testimonio confirmari Cleanthes putat, tactus et oculorum. nam solis calor et candor inlustrior est quam ullius ignis, quippe qui inmenso mundo tam longe lateque conluceat, et is eius tactus est, non ut tepefaciat solum sed etiam saepe comburat, quorum neutrum faceret nisi esset igneus. “ergo” inquit “cum sol igneus sit Oceanique alatur umoribus” (quia nullus ignis sine pastu aliquo possit permanere) “necesse est aut ei similis sit igni quem adhibemus ad usum atque victum, aut ei qui corporibus animantium continetur.”	Cleanthes thinks that the stars are shown to be entirely fiery by the testimony of two senses, touch and sight. The sun’s heat and brightness are more brilliant than those of any fire, since it shines so far and wide across the immense world. Its touch not only warms but often even burns, and it would do neither unless it were fiery. “Therefore,” he says, “since the sun is fiery and is fed by the moisture of Ocean” (because no fire can last without some fuel), “it must resemble either the fire we use for practical purposes and for preparing food,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		or the fire contained in the bodies of living creatures."
2.41	"atqui hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et consumptor omnium idemque quocumque invasit cuncta disturbat ac dissipat; contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia conservat alit auget sustinet sensuque adficit." negat ergo esse dubium horum ignium sol utri similis sit, cum is quoque efficiat ut omnia floreant et in suo quaeque genere pubescant. quare cum solis ignis similis eorum ignium sit qui sunt in corporibus animantium, solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra quae oriantur in ardore caelesti qui aether vel caelum nominatur.	"But this fire of ours, which the needs of life require, destroys and consumes everything, and wherever it spreads it throws all into disorder and scatters it. The fire in our bodies, on the other hand, which gives life and health, preserves, nourishes, increases and sustains all things and endows them with sensation." So he says there is no doubt which of these fires the sun resembles, since the sun too makes all things flourish and brings each to maturity after its kind. Since the sun's fire is like the fires in the bodies of living creatures, the sun too must be a living being. So must the other stars that arise in the heavenly blaze called the ether or the heavens.
2.42	Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit aliorum in aqua in aere aliorum, absurdum esse Aristoteli videtur in ea parte quae sit ad gignenda animantia aptissima animal gigni nullum putare. sidera autem aetherium locum optinent; qui quoniam tenuissimus est et semper agitatur et viget, necesse est quod animal in eo gignatur id et sensu acerrumo et mobilitate celerrima esse. quare cum in aethere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in his sensum inesse et intellegentiam, ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda. Etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia et ad intellegendum aptiora eorum qui terras incolant eas in quibus aer sit purus ac tenuis quam illorum qui utantur crasso caelo atque concreto.	Some living creatures originate on land, some in water, some in air. Aristotle therefore thinks it absurd to suppose that no living creature is born in the region best suited for generating living creatures. The stars occupy the region of the ether. That region is very fine and is always in motion and full of vigor, so any creature born in it must have the keenest perception and the swiftest motion. Therefore, since the stars are born in the ether, it is reasonable that there is perception and intelligence in them. From this it follows that the stars must be counted among the gods. Indeed, one can see that people who live in lands where the air is pure and thin have sharper wits and greater understanding than those who live in a thick and heavy atmosphere.[11]
2.43	quin etiam cibo quo utare interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant. probabile est igitur praestantem intellegentiam in sideribus esse, quae et aetheriam partem mundi incolant et marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis alantur. Sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxume declarat ordo eorum atque constantia (nihil est enim quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio), in quo nihil est temerarium nihil varium nihil fortuitum. ordo autem siderum et in omni aeternitate constantia neque naturam significat (est enim plena rationis) neque fortunam, quae amica varietati constantiam respuit. sequitur ergo ut ipsa sua sponte suo sensu ac divinitate moveantur.	It is even thought that the food one eats makes some difference to the sharpness of the mind. It is probable, then, that there is surpassing intelligence in the stars. They inhabit the ethereal region of the world, and they are nourished by the moisture of sea and land, refined by its long passage. But the stars' perception and intelligence are shown most clearly by their order and regularity, in which there is nothing random, nothing variable, nothing accidental (for nothing can move by reason and measure without planning). The order of the stars and their regularity through all eternity point neither to nature, for that order is full of

11 The argument probably comes from Aristotle's lost dialogue *On Philosophy*, which presented a more theological picture than his surviving works.

LATIN

ENGLISH

reason, nor to fortune, which loves variety and spurns regularity. It follows, then, that the stars move of their own accord, by their own perception and divinity.

2.44 Nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus in eo quod omnia quae moventur aut natura moveri censuit aut vi aut voluntate; moveri autem solem et lunam et sidera omnia; quae autem natura moverentur, haec aut pondere deorsum aut levitate in sublime ferri, quorum neutrum astris contingeret propterea quod eorum motus in orbem circumque ferretur; nec vero dici potest vi quadam maiore fieri ut contra naturam astra moveantur (quae enim potest maior esse?); restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius.

Aristotle, too, deserves praise for holding that everything that moves does so by nature, by force or by will. The sun, the moon and all the stars move. Things that move by nature are carried either downward by their weight or upward by their lightness. Neither applies to the stars, because their motion is circular, revolving around. Nor can it be said that some greater force makes the stars move against nature, for what force could be greater? It remains, then, that the motion of the stars is voluntary.

Quae qui videat non indocte solum verum etiam impie faciat si deos esse neget. nec sane multum interest utrum id neget an eos omni procuratione atque actione privet; mihi enim qui nihil agit esse omnino non videtur. esse igitur deos ita perspicuum est, ut id qui neget vix eum sanae mentis existimem.

Anyone who sees this would act not only ignorantly but impiously if he denied that the gods exist. And it makes little difference whether he denies it or strips them of all care and activity, for to me whatever does nothing seems not to exist at all. That the gods exist, then, is so evident that I would scarcely consider anyone who denies it to be of sound mind.

WHAT THE GODS ARE LIKE

The world is a sphere, and the sun, moon and planets are gods moving by their own will.

LATIN

ENGLISH

2.45 **BALBUS** Restat ut qualis eorum natura sit consideremus; in quo nihil est difficilius quam a consuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere ea difficultas induxit et vulgo imperitos et similes philosophos imperitorum, ut nisi figuris hominum constitutis nihil possent de dis inmortalibus cogitare; cuius opinionis levitas confutata a Cotta non desiderat orationem meam. Sed cum talem esse deum certa notione animi praesentiamus, primum ut sit animans, deinde ut in omni natura nihil eo sit praestantius, ad hanc praesensionem notionemque nostram nihil video quod potius accommodem quam ut primum hunc ipsum mundum, quo nihil excellentius fieri potest, animantem esse et deum iudicem.

BALBUS It remains to consider what their nature is like. Here nothing is harder than to draw the mind's eye away from the habits of the eyes. This difficulty has led both the ignorant masses and philosophers who resemble the ignorant to think of the immortal gods only in fixed human shapes. Cotta has refuted the shallowness of that opinion, and it needs no speech of mine. We have a definite mental notion anticipating what a god is like: first, that it is a living being; next, that nothing in all nature is more excellent. I see nothing that fits this preconception and notion of ours better than to judge, first, that this very world is a living being and a god, since nothing more excellent than the world can exist.

2.46 Hic quam volet Epicurus iocetur, homo non aptissimus ad iocandum minimeque resipiens patriam, et dicat se non posse intellegere qualis sit volubilis et rutundus deus, tamen ex hoc, quod etiam ipse probat, numquam me

Here Epicurus may joke as much as he likes, though he is a man not at all suited to joking and has little of the flavor of his native land. Let him say that he cannot understand what a rotating,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	movebit. Placet enim illi esse deos, quia necesse sit praestantem esse aliquam naturam qua nihil sit melius. mundo autem certe nihil est melius; nec dubium quin quod animans sit habeatque sensum et rationem et mentem id sit melius quam id quod is careat.	spherical god would be like. He will still never move me from this point, which even he accepts. He holds that the gods exist because there must be some surpassing nature than which nothing is better. But certainly nothing is better than the world. And there is no doubt that what is alive and has sensation, reason and mind is better than what lacks them.[12]
2.47	ita efficitur animantem, sensus mentis rationis mundum esse compotem; qua ratione deum esse mundum concluditur. Sed haec paulo post facilius cognoscentur ex is rebus ipsis quas mundus efficit. interea Vellei noli quaeso prae te ferre vos plane expertes esse doctrinae. conum tibi ais et cylindrum et pyramidem pulchriorem quam sphaeram videri. novum etiam oculorum iudicium habetis.	So it follows that the world is a living being possessed of sensation, mind and reason. By this argument we conclude that the world is a god. But these points will be understood more easily a little later, from the very things the world brings about. Meanwhile, Velleius, please do not parade the fact that your school is entirely without learning. You say that a cone, a cylinder and a pyramid seem to you more beautiful than a sphere. You people even have a new sense of sight.
	sed sint ista pulchriora dumtaxat aspectu—quod mihi tamen ipsum non videtur; quid enim pulchrius ea figura quae sola omnis alias figuras complexa continet, quaeque nihil asperitatis habere nihil offensionis potest, nihil incisum angulis nihil anfractibus, nihil eminens nihil lacunosum; cumque duae formae praestantissimae sint, ex solidis globus (sic enim σφαῖραν interpretari placet), ex planis autem circulus aut orbis, qui κύκλος Graece dicitur, his duabus formis contingit solis ut omnes earum partes sint inter se simillumae a medioque tantum absit extremum,	But suppose those shapes are more beautiful, at least to look at—though I do not think even that. For what is more beautiful than the shape that alone encloses and contains all other shapes? It can have nothing rough and nothing jarring, nothing cut by angles or broken by bends, nothing jutting out and nothing hollowed in. There are two outstanding forms: among solids, the globe (for so I choose to render σφαῖραν [sphere]), and among plane figures, the circle or orb, called κύκλος [circle] in Greek. These two forms alone have the property that all their parts are exactly alike and that the edge is equally distant from the center at every point,
2.48	quo nihil fieri potest aptius—sed si haec non videtis, quia numquam eruditum illum pulverem attigistis, ne hoc quidem physici intellegere potuistis, hanc aequabilitatem motus constantiamque ordinum in alia figura non potuisse servari? Itaque nihil potest indoctius quam quod a vobis adfirmari solet. nec enim hunc ipsum mundum pro certo rutundum esse dicitis, nam posse fieri ut sit alia figura, innumerabilesque mundos alios aliarum esse formarum.	and nothing could be more fitting than that. But if you do not see this, because you have never touched that learned dust, could you not, as natural philosophers, at least understand that this uniformity of motion and regularity of order could not have been preserved in any other shape? So nothing could be more ignorant than what you Epicureans usually assert. You do not even say for certain that this very world is round. You say it may have some other shape, and that there are countless other worlds of other forms.[13]
2.49		If Epicurus had learned what two times two makes, he would certainly not say these things.

12 Epicurus was an Athenian citizen, and Athenians were proverbial for their wit. The Latin *resipiens* ("tasting of") is a gibe at his lack of it.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quae si bis bina quot essent didicisset Epicurus certe non diceret; sed dum palato quid sit optimum iudicat, "caeli palatum", ut ait Ennius, non suspexit.	But while he was judging with his palate what is best, he never looked up at the "palate of the heavens," as Ennius calls it.[14]
	Nam cum duo sint genera siderum, quorum alterum spatiis inmutabilibus ab ortu ad occasum commeans nullum umquam cursus sui vestigium inflectat, alterum autem continuas conversiones duas isdem spatiis cursibusque conficiat, ex utraque re et mundi volubilitas, quae nisi in globosa forma esse non posset, et stellarum rutundi ambitus cognoscuntur.	For there are two kinds of stars. One kind travels from east to west on unchanging paths and never deviates at all from its course. The other completes two continuous revolutions on the same paths and courses. From both facts we learn two things: that the world revolves, which it could not do unless it were spherical, and that the stars move in circular orbits.
	Primusque sol, qui astrorum tenet principatum, ita movetur ut, cum terras larga luce compleverit, easdem modo his modo illis ex partibus opacet; ipsa enim umbra terrae soli officiens noctem efficit. nocturnorum autem spatiorum eadem est aequabilitas quae diurnorum. eiusdemque solis tum accessus modici tum recessus et frigoris et caloris modum temperant. circumitus enim solis orbium quinque et sexaginta et trecentorum quarta fere diei parte addita conversionem conficiunt annuam; inflectens autem sol cursum tum ad septem triones tum ad meridiem aestates et hiemes efficit et ea duo tempora quorum alterum hiemi senescenti adiunctum est alterum aestati: ita ex quattuor temporum mutationibus omnium quae terra marique gignuntur initia causaeque ducuntur.	First, the sun, which holds first place among the stars, moves in such a way that after filling the lands with abundant light it darkens them, now in these parts, now in those. For it is the earth's own shadow, blocking the sun, that produces night. The nights have the same regularity as the days. And the same sun, by its measured approaches and withdrawals, regulates the extremes of cold and heat. The sun's circuits of three hundred and sixty-five days, with about a quarter of a day added, complete its yearly revolution. By bending its course now toward the north, now toward the south, it produces summers and winters. It also produces the two seasons that are joined, the one to aging winter, the other to summer. So from the changes of the four seasons come the beginnings and causes of all that is produced on land and sea.
2.50	Iam solis annuos cursus spatiis menstruis luna consequitur, cuius tenuissimum lumen facit proximus accessus ad solem, digressus autem longissimus quisque plenissimum. neque solum eius species ac forma mutatur tum crescendo tum defectibus in initia recurrendo, sed etiam regio; quae cum est aquilonia aut australis, in lunae quoque cursu est et brumae quaedam et solstitii similitudo, multaque ab ea manant et fluunt quibus et animantes alantur augescantque et pubescant maturitatemque adsequantur quae oriuntur e terra.	Next, the moon covers in monthly spans the course the sun takes a year to run. Its light is faintest when it comes closest to the sun, and fullest each time it is farthest away. Not only do its appearance and shape change, as it now waxes and now wanes back to its starting point, but its position changes as well. When it lies in the north or the south, there is in the moon's course too something like a winter and a summer solstice. And many influences flow and stream from it. By them animals are nourished and grow, and the things that spring from the earth come to their prime and reach maturity.
2.51	Maxume vero sunt admirabiles motus earum quinque stellarum quae falso vocantur errantes; nihil enim errat	But most wonderful of all are the movements of the five stars that are falsely called "wandering."

13 Geometers drew their figures in fine dust spread on a board or on the ground.
14 Latin *palatum* means both "palate" and "vault." Ennius used it of the dome of the sky, and Cicero turns it against Epicurus' supposed devotion to the pleasures of taste.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quod in omni aeternitate conservat progressus et regressus reliquosque motus constantis et ratos. quod eo est admirabilius in is stellis quas dicimus, quia tum occultantur tum rursus aperiuntur, tum adeunt tum recedunt, tum antecedunt tum autem subsecuntur, tum celerius moventur tum tardius, tum omnino ne moventur quidem sed ad quoddam tempus insistunt. quarum ex disparibus motionibus magnum annum mathematici nominaverunt, qui tum efficitur cum solis et lunae et quinque errantium ad eandem inter se comparationem confectis omnium spatiis est facta conversio;	For nothing wanders that maintains its forward and backward motions and all its other movements constant and fixed through all eternity. This is all the more remarkable in these stars because now they are hidden, now they reappear; now they approach, now they recede; now they go ahead, now they follow behind; now they move faster, now slower; and now they do not move at all, but stand still for a time. From their unequal motions the astronomers have named the "Great Year." It is completed when the sun, the moon and the five wandering stars have all finished their courses and returned to the same positions relative to one another;[15]
2.52	quae quam longa sit magna quaestio est, esse vero certam et definitam necesse est. Nam ea quae Saturni stella dicitur Φαίνωνque a Graecis nominatur, quae a terra abest plurimum, XXX fere annis cursum suum conficit, in quo cursu multa mirabiliter efficiens tum antecedendo tum retardando, tum vespertinis temporibus delitiscendo tum matutinis rursum se aperiendo nihil inmutat sempiternis saeclorum aetatibus quin eadem isdem temporibus efficiat. Infra autem hanc propius a terra Iovis stella fertur, quae Φαέθων dicitur, eaque eundem duodecim signorum orbem annis duodecim conficit easdemque quas Saturni stella efficit in cursu varietates.	how long that takes is a great question, but it must be fixed and definite. The star called Saturn's, which the Greeks name Φαίνων [the Shining One], is farthest from the earth and completes its course in about thirty years. In that course it does many wonderful things. Now it goes ahead and now it falls behind; now it disappears at evening and now it reappears at dawn. Yet through endless ages it changes nothing, but does the same things at the same times. Below it, nearer to the earth, moves Jupiter's star, called Φαέθων [the Radiant]. It completes the same circle of the twelve signs in twelve years and shows the same variations in its course as Saturn's star.
2.53	Huic autem proximum inferiorem orbem tenet Πυρόεις, quae stella Martis appellatur, eaque quattuor et viginti mensibus sex ut opinor diebus minus eundem lustrat orbem quem duae superiores. Infra hanc autem stella Mercuri est (ea Στίλβων appellatur a Graecis), quae anno fere vertenti signiferum lustrat orbem neque a sole longius umquam unius signi intervallo discedit tum antevertens tum subsequens. Infima est quinque errantium terraeque proxuma stella Veneris, quae Φωσφόρος Graece Lucifer Latine dicitur cum antegreditur solem, cum subsequitur autem Ἕσπερος; ea cursum anno conficit et latitudinem lustrans signiferi orbis et longitudinem, quod idem faciunt stellae superiores, neque umquam ab sole duorum signorum intervallo longius discedit tum antecedens tum subsequens.	The next circle below belongs to Πυρόεις [the Fiery], which is called the star of Mars. It travels the same circle as the two above it in twenty-four months, less six days, I think. Below this is the star of Mercury, which the Greeks call Στίλβων [the Twinkler]. It travels the circle of the zodiac in about a year and never moves more than one sign's distance from the sun, now going ahead of it, now following. Lowest of the five wandering stars and nearest the earth is the star of Venus. When it goes before the sun it is called Φωσφόρος [Light-bringer] in Greek and Lucifer in Latin, and when it follows the sun it is called Ἕσπερος [Evening Star]. It completes its course in a year, traveling both the width and the length of the zodiac, as the higher stars also do. It never moves more than two signs' distance from the sun, now going ahead, now following.

15 The Greek word for the planets, *planētes*, means "wanderers." Ancient estimates of the length of the Great Year varied widely.

LATIN	ENGLISH
2.54 Hanc igitur in stellis constantiam, hanc tantam tam variis cursibus in omni aeternitate convenientiam temporum non possum intellegere sine mente ratione consilio. quae cum in sideribus inesse videamus, non possumus ea ipsa non in deorum numero reponere.	This regularity in the stars, then, this great harmony of timing kept through all eternity in such varied courses, I cannot understand without mind, reason and planning. And since we see these qualities in the heavenly bodies, we cannot fail to count them among the gods.
Nec vero eae stellae quae inerrantes vocantur non significant eandem mentem atque prudentiam. quarum est cotidiana conveniens constansque conversio, nec habent aetherios cursus neque caelo inhaerentes, ut plerique dicunt physicae rationis ignari; non est enim aetheris ea natura ut vi sua stellas conplexa contorqueat, nam tenuis ac perlucens et aequabili calore suffusus aether non satis aptus ad stellas continendas videtur;	The stars called fixed also show the same mind and wisdom. Their daily revolution is harmonious and constant. They do not travel along with the ether, nor are they fastened to the sky, as most people ignorant of natural science claim. The ether is not of such a nature that it could embrace the stars and whirl them round by its own force: being thin, transparent and suffused with uniform heat, the ether does not seem well suited to holding the stars;
2.55 habent igitur suam sphaeram stellae inerrantes ab aetheria coniunctione secretam et liberam. earum autem perennes cursus atque perpetui cum admirabili incredibilique constantia declarant in his vim et mentem esse divinam, ut haec ipsa qui non sentiat deorum vim habere is nihil omnino sensurus esse videatur.	so the fixed stars have their own sphere, separate from the ether and free of any attachment to it. Their everlasting, unbroken courses, with their wonderful and incredible regularity, declare that there is divine power and mind in them. Anyone who does not perceive that these very stars possess the power of gods would seem incapable of perceiving anything at all.
2.56 Nulla igitur in caelo nec fortuna nec temeritas nec erratio nec vanitas inest contraque omnis ordo veritas ratio constantia, quaeque his vacant ementita et falsa plenaque erroris, ea circum terras infra lunam, quae omnium ultima est, in terrisque versantur. caelestem ergo admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua conservatio et salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat is ipse mentis expers habendus est.	In the heavens, then, there is no chance, no randomness, no wandering, no emptiness. On the contrary, there is complete order, truth, reason and constancy. The things that lack these—things counterfeit and false and full of error—are found around the earth, below the moon, which is the last of all the heavenly bodies, and on the earth itself. So anyone who thinks that the wonderful order and incredible constancy of the heavens, from which arises all the preservation and safety of all things, is devoid of mind must himself be considered devoid of mind.
2.57 Haut ergo ut opinor erravero, si a principe investigandae veritatis huius disputationis principium duxero. Zeno igitur naturam ita definit ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via. censet enim artis maxume proprium esse creare et gignere, quodque in operibus nostrarum artium manus efficiat id multo artificiosius naturam efficere, id est ut dixi ignem artificiosum magistrum artium reliquarum. Atque hac quidem ratione omnis natura artificiosa est, quod habet quasi viam quandam et sectam quam sequatur.	I shall not go wrong, I think, if I take the first principle of this discussion from the first among those who investigated the truth. Zeno, then, defines nature as a craftsmanlike fire proceeding methodically to generation. He holds that creating and generating is what is most characteristic of a craft, and that what the hand achieves in the works of our crafts, nature achieves with far greater craft. Nature, that is, is, as I said, a craftsmanlike fire, the teacher of all the other crafts. On this account

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		every nature is craftsmanlike, because it has, so to speak, a certain path and method to follow;
2.58	ipsius vero mundi, qui omnia conplexu suo coercet et continet, natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum oportunitatumque omnium. atque ut ceterae naturae suis seminibus quaeque gignuntur augescunt continentur, sic natura mundi omnis motus habet voluntarios, conatusque et adpetitiones, quas ὁρμὰς Graeci vocant, et is consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi qui animis movemur et sensibus. Talis igitur mens mundi cum sit ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel providentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim πρόνοια dicitur), haec potissimum providet et in is maxime est occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptissimus sit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxume autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo sit atque omnis ornatus.	but the nature of the world itself, which holds and contains all things in its embrace, is said by the same Zeno to be not only craftsmanlike but an actual craftsman, planning and providing for every benefit and advantage. All other natures are each generated, grow and are sustained by their own seeds; in the same way the nature of the world has all its motions voluntary, and has endeavors and desires (which the Greeks call ὁρμὰς [impulses]), and performs actions in harmony with them, just as we ourselves do, who are moved by minds and senses. Such, then, is the mind of the world, and for that reason it can rightly be called prudence or providence (in Greek it is called πρόνοια [forethought]). It provides above all for these things and is most occupied with them: first, that the world be as fit as possible to endure; next, that it lack nothing; and most of all, that there be in it surpassing beauty and every adornment.
2.59	Dictum est de universo mundo, dictum etiam est de sideribus, ut iam prope modum appareat multitudo nec cessantium deorum nec ea quae agant molientium cum labore operoso ac molesto. non enim venis et nervis et ossibus continentur nec his escis aut potionibus vescuntur, ut aut nimis acres aut nimis concretos umores colligant, nec is corporibus sunt ut casus aut ictus extimescant aut morbos metuant ex defetigatione membrorum, quae verens Epicurus monogrammos deos et nihil agentes commentus est.	I have spoken of the world as a whole, and also of the heavenly bodies. So it is now almost evident that there is a multitude of gods who are neither idle nor perform their tasks with laborious and troublesome toil. They are not held together by veins, sinews and bones. They do not eat food and drink of a kind that makes them collect humors either too sharp or too thick. Nor do they have bodies of a kind that would make them dread falls or blows, or fear diseases brought on by exhaustion of the limbs. It was fear of these things that led Epicurus to invent gods who are mere sketches and do nothing;
2.60	illi autem pulcherruma forma praediti purissimaque in regione caeli collocati ita feruntur moderanturque cursus, ut ad omnia conservanda et tuenda consensisse videantur.	but these gods, endowed with the most beautiful form and set in the purest region of the sky, move and guide their courses in such a way that they seem to have agreed together to preserve and protect all things.

GODS OF BENEFIT AND MYTH

Gods named for their gifts, deified benefactors, and the natural meaning hidden in the myths.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	BALBUS Multae autem aliae naturae deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum non sine causa et a Graeciae sapientissimis et a maioribus nostris constitutae	**BALBUS** Many other divine natures too have been established and named—not without reason—both by the wisest of the Greeks and by our ancestors,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	nominataeque sunt. quicquid enim magnam utilitatem generi adferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur. itaque tum illud quod erat a deo natum nomine ipsius dei nuncupabant, ut cum fruges Cererem appellamus vinum autem Liberum, ex quo illud Terenti	on account of the great benefits they confer. For whatever brought great advantage to the human race, they believed, could not come about without divine goodness toward humankind. And so sometimes they called what a god had produced by the name of the god himself, as when we call grain Ceres and wine Liber. Hence that line of Terence:[16]
2.61	"sine Cerere et Libero friget Venus", tum autem res ipsa, in qua vis inest maior aliqua, sic appellatur ut ea ipsa vis nominetur deus, ut Fides ut Mens, quas in Capitolio dedicatas videmus proxume a M. Aemilio Scauro, ante autem ab A. Atilio Calatino erat Fides consecrata. vides Virtutis templum vides Honoris a M. Marcello renovatum, quod multis ante annis erat bello Ligustico a Q. Maxumo dedicatum. quid Opis quid Salutis quid Concordiae Libertatis Victoriae; quarum omnium rerum quia vis erat tanta ut sine deo regi non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen optinuit. quo ex genere Cupidinis et Voluptatis et Lubentinae Veneris vocabula consecrata sunt, vitiosarum rerum neque naturalium—quamquam Velleius aliter existimat, sed tamen ea ipsa vitia naturam vehementius saepe pulsant.	"Without Ceres and Liber, Venus grows cold." At other times the thing itself in which some greater power resides is named in such a way that this very power is called a god, as with Faith and Mind, which we see dedicated on the Capitol, most recently by Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, though Faith had been consecrated earlier by Aulus Atilius Calatinus. You see the temple of Virtue, and the temple of Honor restored by Marcus Marcellus, which had been dedicated many years before by Quintus Maximus during the Ligurian war. What of Wealth, Safety, Concord, Liberty, Victory? Because the power of all these things was so great that it could not be governed without a god, the thing itself acquired the name of a god. To this class belong the consecrated names of Cupid, Pleasure and Venus Lubentina—things that are vicious and not natural (though Velleius thinks otherwise); but even so, these very vices often strike hard at our nature.[17]
2.62	Utilitatum igitur magnitudine constituti sunt ei di qui utilitates quasque gignebant, atque is quidem nominibus quae paulo ante dicta sunt quae vis sit in quoque declaratur deo. Suscepit autem vita hominum consuetudoque communis ut beneficiis excellentis viros in caelum fama ac voluntate tollerent. hinc Hercules hinc Castor et Pollux hinc Aesculapius hinc Liber etiam (hunc dico Liberum Semela natum, non eum quem nostri maiores auguste sancteque Liberum cum Cerere et Libera consecraverunt, quod quale sit ex mysteriis intellegi potest; sed quod ex nobis natos liberos appellamus, idcirco Cerere nati nominati sunt Liber et Libera, quod in Libera servant, in Libero non item)—hinc etiam Romulum, quem quidam eundem esse Quirinum putant. quorum cum remanerent animi atque aeternitate fruerentur, rite di sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et aeterni.	So the gods who produced particular benefits were established because of the greatness of those benefits, and the names I have just mentioned declare what power resides in each god. Human life and common custom have also adopted the practice of raising to heaven, in reputation and affection, men outstanding for their benefactions. Hence Hercules, hence Castor and Pollux, hence Aesculapius, hence Liber too. I mean Liber the son of Semele, not the Liber whom our ancestors solemnly and devoutly consecrated together with Ceres and Libera; what that signifies can be understood from the mysteries. But because we call our offspring *liberi*, the children of Ceres were named Liber and Libera—a meaning still kept in Libera's case but not in Liber's. Hence also Romulus, whom some think to be the same as Quirinus.

16 Terence (died 159 BC), Roman comic playwright; the line comes from his *Eunuch*.
17 Venus Lubentina was Venus as goddess of sensual delight. Scaurus was consul in 115 BC and Calatinus in 258 BC; Quintus Fabius Maximus and Marcus Marcellus were leading generals of the late third century BC.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		Since their minds lived on and enjoyed eternity, they were rightly considered gods, being both the best of beings and eternal.[18]
2.63	Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica magna fluxit multitudo deorum, qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt, hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt. atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo pluribus verbis explicatus est. Nam vetus haec opinio Graeciam opplevit, esse exsectum Caelum a filio Saturno, vinctum autem Saturnum ipsum a filio Iove:	Another great multitude of gods has flowed from another line of reasoning, a scientific one. Clothed in human form, these gods have supplied the poets with stories and filled human life with every kind of superstition. This topic was treated by Zeno and later set out at greater length by Cleanthes and Chrysippus. An old belief filled all Greece: that Caelus was castrated by his son Saturn, and that Saturn himself was put in chains by his son Jupiter.[19]
2.64	physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impias fabulas. caelestem enim altissimam aetheriamque naturam id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis quae coniunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum. Saturnum autem eum esse voluerunt qui cursum et conversionem spatiorum ac temporum contineret. qui deus Graece id ipsum nomen habet: Κρόνος enim dicitur, qui est idem χρόνος id est spatium temporis. Saturnus autem est appellatus quod saturaretur annis; ex se enim natos comesse fingitur solitus, quia consumit aetas temporum spatia annisque praeteritis insaturabiliter expletur. vinctus autem a Iove, ne inmoderatos cursus haberet, atque ut eum siderum vinclis alligaret.	In these impious tales lies enclosed a scientific idea that is not without elegance. They meant that the celestial nature—the highest, the ethereal, that is, the fiery—which generates all things by itself, lacks the bodily part that needs union with another in order to procreate. And they meant Saturn to be the one who maintains the course and revolution of periods and seasons. This god's Greek name says exactly that: he is called Κρόνος [Kronos], which is the same as χρόνος [chronos], that is, a span of time. He was called Saturn because he was sated (*saturaretur*) with years. He is imagined to have been in the habit of eating his own children, because time devours the spans of the seasons and is insatiably filled with the years that are past. He was put in chains by Jupiter so that his courses would not be unrestrained, and so that Jupiter might bind him with the bonds of the stars;
	sed ipse Iuppiter, id est iuvans pater, quem conversis casibus appellamus a iuvando Iovem, a poetis "pater divomque hominumque" dicitur, a maioribus autem nostris optumus maxumus, et quidem ante optimus id est beneficentissimus quam maximus, quia maius est certeque gratius prodesse omnibus quam opes magnas	but Jupiter himself—that is, *iuvans pater*, "helping father," whom, changing the case-forms, we call Jove from *iuvare*, "to help"—is called by the poets "father of gods and men," and by our ancestors "Best and Greatest." Indeed "Best," that is, most beneficent, comes before "Greatest," because it is a greater thing, and certainly a more welcome one, to benefit everyone than to possess great
2.65	habere—hunc igitur Ennius, ut supra dixi, nuncupat ita dicens "aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Iovem" planius quam alio loco idem "cui quod in me est exsecrabor hoc quod lucet quicquid est"; hunc etiam augures nostri cum dicunt "Iove fulgente tonante": dicunt enim "caelo fulgente et tonante". Euripides autem	wealth. It is this god, then, whom Ennius, as I said above, names in these words: "Behold this lofty, gleaming vault, which all invoke as Jupiter." He does so more plainly than in another passage: "To this shining thing, whatever it may be, I will call down curses with all my strength." Our augurs,

18 Liber and Libera were old Italian deities worshipped with Ceres at Rome; Liber was later identified with Bacchus, son of Semele.
19 Caelus ("Sky") is the Latin counterpart of the Greek Ouranos.

LATIN	ENGLISH
ut multa praeclare sic hoc breviter: vides sublime fusum immoderatum aethera, qui terram tenero circumiectu amplectitur: hunc summum habeto divum, hunc perhibeto Iovem.	too, mean him when they say "when Jupiter lightens and thunders," for what they mean is "when the sky lightens and thunders." Euripides, who said many things splendidly, said this briefly: "You see this boundless ether spread on high, which holds the earth in its soft embrace: count this the highest of the gods, call this Jupiter."[20]
2.66 Aer autem, ut Stoici disputant, interiectus inter mare et caelum Iunonis nomine consecratur, quae est soror et coniux Iovis, quod ei et similitudo est aetheris et cum eo summa coniunctio. effeminarunt autem eum Iunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo mollius. sed Iunonem a iuvando credo nominatam. Aqua restabat et terra, ut essent ex fabulis tria regna divisa. datum est igitur Neptuno alterum, Iovis ut volumus fratri, maritimum omne regnum, nomenque productum ut Portunus a porta sic Neptunus a nando, paulum primis litteris immutatis. Terrena autem vis omnis atque natura Diti patri dedicata est, qui dives ut apud Graecos Πλούτων, quia et recidunt omnia in terras et oriuntur e terris.	Air, as the Stoics argue, lying between the sea and the sky, is deified under the name of Juno, the sister and wife of Jupiter, because it resembles the ether and is very closely joined with it. They made air female and assigned it to Juno because nothing is softer. But I believe Juno is named from *iuvare*, "to help." Water and earth remained, so that, as in the stories, there would be three kingdoms divided up. So the second kingdom, the whole realm of the sea, was given to Neptune, Jupiter's brother as we have it. His name was lengthened: just as Portunus comes from *porta*, "gate," so Neptunus comes from *nare*, "to swim," with the first letters slightly altered. All the power and nature of the earth was dedicated to Father Dis, who is "rich" (*dives*), just as among the Greeks he is Πλούτων [Pluto, "the Wealthy One"], because all things fall back into the earth and arise from the earth.
†Cui Proserpinam (quod Graecorum nomen est, ea enim est quae Περσεφόνη Graece nominatur)—quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a matre fingunt.	To him they give Proserpina as wife (this is a Greek name, for she is the one called Περσεφόνη [Persephone] in Greek). They take her to be the seed of the crops, and imagine that she was hidden away and sought by her mother.
2.67 Mater autem est a gerendis frugibus Ceres tamquam geres, casuque prima littera itidem immutata ut a Graecis; nam ab illis quoque Δημήτηρ quasi γῆ μήτηρ nominata est. Iam qui magna verteret Mavors, Minerva autem quae vel minueret vel minaretur. Cumque in omnibus rebus vim haberent maxumam prima et extrema, principem in sacrificando Ianum esse voluerunt, quod ab eundo nomen est ductum, ex quo transitiones perviae iani foresque in liminibus profanarum aedium ianuae nominantur. Nam Vestae nomen a Graecis (ea est enim quae ab illis Ἑστία dicitur); vis autem eius ad aras et focos pertinet, itaque in ea dea, quod est rerum custos intumarum, omnis et precatio et sacrificatio extrema est.	Her mother is Ceres, named from bearing (*gerere*) crops, as if "Geres," the first letter having been changed by chance, just as among the Greeks: they too named her Δημήτηρ [Demeter] as if γῆ μήτηρ [earth mother]. Again, the one who overturns great things (*magna verteret*) is Mavors, while Minerva is the one who either diminishes (*minueret*) or threatens (*minaretur*). Since in all things the first and the last have the greatest force, they made Janus first in sacrifice; his name is derived from *ire*, "to go," and hence open passageways are called *iani*, and the doors at the thresholds of ordinary buildings are called *ianuae*. The name of Vesta comes from the Greeks, for she is the one they call Ἑστία [Hestia]. Her power extends to al-

20 The lines come from a lost play of Euripides, rendered by Cicero into Latin verse.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		tars and hearths, and so, since she is the guardian of all that is innermost, every prayer and every sacrifice ends with this goddess.
2.68	Nec longe absunt ab hac vi di Penates, sive a penu ducto nomine (est enim omne quo vescuntur homines penus) sive ab eo quod penitus insident; ex quo etiam penetrales a poetis vocantur. Iam Apollinis nomen est Graecum. quem solem esse volunt, Dianam autem et lunam eandem esse putant, cum sol dictus sit vel quia solus ex omnibus sideribus est tantus vel quia cum est exortus obscuratis omnibus solus apparet, luna a lucendo nominata sit; eadem est enim Lucina, itaque ut apud Graecos Dianam eamque Luciferam sic apud nostros Iunonem Lucinam in pariendo invocant. quae eadem Diana Omnivaga dicitur non a venando sed quod in septem numeratur tamquam vagantibus;	Not far removed from her power are the Penates. Their name comes either from *penus*, for *penus* is everything people eat, or from the fact that they dwell deep within (*penitus*); hence the poets also call them *penetrales*, "gods of the inner chambers." Apollo's name, again, is Greek. They take him to be the sun, and they consider Diana to be the same as the moon. The sun (*sol*) is so called either because it alone (*solus*) of all the heavenly bodies is so great, or because when it has risen, all the rest are obscured and it alone appears; the moon (*luna*) is named from shining (*lucere*). She is the same as Lucina, and so, just as among the Greeks women in childbirth call on Diana as Light-bringer, so among our people they call on Juno Lucina. This same Diana is called Wide-wandering, not from her hunting but because she is counted among the seven "wandering" stars, as they are called;
2.69	Diana dicta quia noctu quasi diem efficeret. adhibetur autem ad partus, quod i maturescunt aut septem non numquam aut ut plerumque novem lunae cursibus, qui quia mensa spatia conficiunt menses nominantur; concinneque ut multa Timaeus, qui cum in historia dixisset qua nocte natus Alexander esset eadem Dianae Ephesiae templum deflagravisse, adiunxit minime id esse mirandum, quod Diana quom in partu Olympiadis adesse voluisset afuisset domo. Quae autem dea ad res omnes veniret Venerem nostri nominaverunt, atque ex ea potius venustas quam Venus ex venustate.	she is called Diana because at night she makes a kind of day (*dies*). She is called upon at childbirth because babies come to term sometimes in seven, generally in nine, courses of the moon; these are called months (*menses*) because they complete measured (*mensa*) spaces. Timaeus put it neatly, as he did many things. In his history he said that on the very night Alexander was born the temple of Diana at Ephesus burned down, and added that this was not at all surprising: Diana, wanting to attend Olympias in labor, had been away from home. The goddess who comes (*veniret*) to all things our people named Venus; and charm (*venustas*) comes from her, rather than Venus from charm.[21]
2.70	Videtisne igitur ut a physicis rebus bene atque utiliter inventis tracta ratio sit ad commenticios et fictos deos. Quae res genuit falsas opiniones erroresque turbulentos et superstitiones paene aniles. et formae enim nobis deorum et aetates et vestitus ornatusque noti sunt, genera praeterea coniugia cognationes, omniaque traducta ad similitudinem inbecillitatis humanae. nam et perturbatis animis inducuntur: accepimus enim deorum cupiditates aegritudines iracundias; nec vero, ut fabulae ferunt, bellis proeliisque caruerunt, nec solum ut apud	Do you see, then, how reasoning was drawn away from discoveries about nature, made well and usefully, to gods that are invented and fictitious? This produced false beliefs, confused errors and superstitions worthy of old wives. We know the gods' looks and ages, their clothing and adornments, and also their families, marriages and kinships, and everything about them has been fashioned in the likeness of human weakness. They are even represented with troubled minds: we hear of the

21 Timaeus of Tauromenium (about 350–260 BC), Greek historian of Sicily; Olympias was the mother of Alexander the Great.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Homerum cum duo exercitus contrarios alii dei ex alia parte defenderent, sed etiam ut cum Titanis ut cum Gigantibus sua propria bella gesserunt. haec et dicuntur et creduntur stultissime et plena sunt futtilitatis summaeque levitatis.	gods' lusts, griefs and fits of anger. Nor, according to the stories, have they been free of wars and battles—not only, as in Homer, when two armies faced each other and different gods defended each side, but also when they waged wars of their own, as against the Titans and the Giants. These things are said and believed most foolishly, and are full of nonsense and the utmost frivolity.
2.71	Sed tamen is fabulis spretis ac repudiatis deus pertinens per naturam cuiusque rei, per terras Ceres per maria Neptunus alii per alia, poterunt intellegi qui qualesque sint quoque eos nomine consuetudo nuncupaverit. Quos deos et venerari et colere debemus. cultus autem deorum est optumus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur. non enim philosophi solum verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separaverunt.	Yet if we reject and repudiate these stories, we will be able to understand the god who pervades the nature of each thing—Ceres through the lands, Neptune through the seas, others through other parts—and who and what kind of gods they are, and by what name custom has called each of them. These gods we ought to revere and worship. The best worship of the gods, and also the most chaste, the holiest and the fullest of piety, is to revere them always with a mind and a voice that are pure, whole and uncorrupted. Not only philosophers but our ancestors too distinguished superstition from religion;
2.72	nam qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant, ut sibi sui liberi superstites essent, superstitiosi sunt appellati, quod nomen patuit postea latius; qui autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent diligenter retractarent et tamquam relegerent, i sunt dicti religiosi ex relegendo, tamquam elegantes ex eligendo, [tamquam] ex diligendo diligentes, ex intellegendo intellegentes; his enim in verbis omnibus inest vis legendi eadem quae in religioso. ita factum est in superstitioso et religioso alterum vitii nomen alterum laudis. Ac mihi videor satis et esse deos et quales essent ostendisse.	for those who spent whole days praying and sacrificing so that their children might survive them (*superstites*) were called superstitious (*superstitiosi*), a word that later acquired a wider meaning. But those who carefully went back over everything pertaining to the worship of the gods, and so to speak "re-read" it (*relegerent*), were called religious (*religiosi*) from *relegere*—just as "elegant" comes from *eligere*, "to choose," [just as] "diligent" comes from *diligere*, "to value," and "intelligent" from *intellegere*, "to understand"; for in all these words there is the same force of *legere*, "to gather" or "to read," as in "religious." So it came about that of "superstitious" and "religious" the one became a term of reproach, the other of praise. And now I think I have shown sufficiently both that the gods exist and what they are like.[22]

PROVIDENCE RULES THE WORLD

Nothing is greater than the gods, so the world is governed by their providence.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2.73	**BALBUS** Proximum est ut doceam deorum providentia mundum administrari. magnus sane locus est et a vestris	**BALBUS** Next I must show that the world is governed by the providence of the gods. This is cer-

22 Cicero's etymologies (both disputed) mark his distinction between religion, careful and proper worship, and superstition, anxious and excessive devotion.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Cotta vexatus, ac nimirum vobiscum omne certamen est. Nam vobis Vellei minus notum est quem ad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis. velut a te ipso hesterno die dictumst anum fatidicam Pronoean a Stoicis induci id est Providentiam. quod eo errore dixisti, quia existumas ab is providentiam fingi quasi quandam deam singularem, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat.	tainly a large topic, and one your school, Cotta, has attacked; and naturally the whole contest is with you. You Epicureans, Velleius, have little idea how each thing is meant. You read only your own books and love only your own, and you condemn everyone else without a hearing. For instance, you yourself said yesterday that the Stoics bring on stage a fortune-telling old woman, Pronoia, that is, Providence. You said this out of a mistake: you think they imagine providence as a kind of goddess in her own right, who steers and rules the whole world.
2.74	sed id praecise dicitur: ut, si quis dicat Atheniensium rem publicam consilio regi, desit illud "Arii pagi", sic, cum dicimus providentia mundum administrari, deesse arbitrato "deorum", plene autem et perfecte sic dici existumato, providentia deorum mundum administrari. Ita salem istum, quo caret vestra natio, in inridendis nobis nolitote consumere, et mercule si me audiatis ne experiamini quidem; non decet non datum est non potestis. nec vero hoc in te unum convenit moribus domesticis ac nostrorum hominum urbanitate limatum, sed cum in reliquos vestros tum in eum maxime qui ista peperit, hominem sine arte sine litteris, insultantem in omnes, sine acumine ullo sine auctoritate sine lepore.	But this is a shortened expression. If someone said that the Athenian state is governed by its council, the words "of the Areopagus" would be missing. In the same way, when we say that the world is governed by providence, you should take the words "of the gods" to be missing, and understand that the full and complete expression is this: the world is governed by the providence of the gods. So do not waste on mocking us that wit of yours, which your tribe lacks; and, by Hercules, if you take my advice, do not even try. It does not suit you, it has not been granted to you, you cannot do it. This does not apply to you alone, polished as you are by the manners of your family and the urbanity of our fellow Romans, but to the rest of your school, and above all to the man who gave birth to these ideas—a man without art, without letters, abusive toward everyone, without any acuteness, without authority, without charm.[23]
2.75	Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes et initio constitutas esse et omni tempore administrari. Eamque disputationem tris in partes nostri fere dividunt. quarum prima pars est quae ducitur ab ea ratione quae docet esse deos; quo concesso confitendum est eorum consilio mundum administrari. secunda est autem quae docet omnes res subiectas esse naturae sentienti ab eaque omnia pulcherrume geri; quo constituto sequitur ab animantibus principiis eam esse generatam. tertius est locus qui ducitur ex admiratione rerum caelestium atque terrestrium.	I say, then, that the world and all its parts were set in order at the beginning and are governed at every moment by the providence of the gods. Our school generally divides this argument into three parts. The first is drawn from the reasoning that shows the gods exist; once that is granted, it must be admitted that the world is governed by their planning. The second shows that all things are subject to a sentient nature, and that by it everything is carried on most beautifully; once this is established, it follows that nature was generated from living first principles. The third topic is drawn from wonder at things in the heavens and on earth.
2.76		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Primum igitur aut negandum est esse deos, quod et Democritus simulacra et Epicurus imagines inducens quodam pacto negat, aut qui deos esse concedant is fatendum est eos aliquid agere idque praeclarum; nihil est autem praeclarius mundi administratione; deorum igitur consilio administratur. Quod si aliter est, aliquid profecto sit necesse est melius et maiore vi praeditum quam deus, quale id cumque est, sive inanima natura sive necessitas vi magna incitata haec pulcherrima opera efficiens quae videmus;	First, then: either one must deny that the gods exist—as, in a sense, Democritus with his images and Epicurus with his do—or those who grant that the gods exist must admit that they do something, and something splendid. But nothing is more splendid than the governance of the world; therefore it is governed by the planning of the gods. If it is otherwise, there must surely be something better than a god and endowed with greater power, whatever it may be—whether inanimate nature or necessity driven by great force—that produces these most beautiful works we see;
2.77	non est igitur natura deorum praepotens neque excellens, si quidem ea subiecta est ei vel necessitati vel naturae, qua caelum maria terrae regantur. nihil est autem praestantius deo; ab eo igitur mundum necesse est regi; nulli igitur est naturae oboediens aut subiectus deus; omnem ergo regit ipse naturam. Etenim si concedimus intellegentes esse deos, concedimus etiam providentes et rerum quidem maxumarum. ergo utrum ignorant quae res maxumae sint quoque eae modo tractandae et tuendae, an vim non habent qua tantas res sustineant et gerant? at et ignoratio rerum aliena naturae deorum est, et sustinendi muneris propter inbecillitatem difficultas minime cadit in maiestatem deorum. ex quo efficitur id quod volumus, deorum providentia mundum administrari.	in that case the nature of the gods is neither supremely powerful nor preeminent, since it is subject to that necessity or nature by which the sky, the seas and the lands are governed. But nothing is more excellent than a god; therefore the world must be governed by a god; therefore a god is obedient or subject to no nature; therefore he himself governs all nature. Indeed, if we grant that the gods have intelligence, we grant also that they exercise foresight, and over the greatest matters. Are we to say, then, that they do not know which matters are greatest and how these are to be handled and protected, or that they lack the power to sustain and manage such great things? But ignorance is alien to the nature of the gods, and difficulty in sustaining a task through weakness is wholly incompatible with the majesty of the gods. From this follows what we want to prove: that the world is governed by the providence of the gods.
2.78	Atqui necesse est cum sint di (si modo sunt, ut profecto sunt) animantis esse, nec solum animantes sed etiam rationis compotes inter seque quasi civili conciliatione et societate coniunctos, unum mundum ut communem rem publicam atque urbem aliquam regentis.	Moreover, since the gods exist (if indeed they exist, as they certainly do), they must be living beings—and not only living beings but possessed of reason, and bound together in a kind of civic fellowship and community, governing the one world as their shared commonwealth and city;
2.79	sequitur ut eadem sit in is quae humano in genere ratio, eadem veritas utrobique sit eademque lex, quae est recti praeceptio pravique depulsio. ex quo intellegitur prudentiam quoque et mentem a deis ad homines pervenisse (ob eamque causam maiorum institutis Mens Fides Virtus Concordia consecratae et publice dedicatae sunt; quae qui convenit penes deos esse negare, cum eorum augusta et sancta simulacra veneremur: quod si inest in hominum genere mens fides virtus concordia,	it follows that the same reason exists in them as in the human race, that the same truth is found in both, and the same law, which commands what is right and repels what is wrong. From this we understand that wisdom and mind, too, have come to humans from the gods. (For this reason, by the institutions of our ancestors, Mind, Faith, Virtue and Concord have been consecrated and publicly dedicated. How can it be consistent to deny that these

23 The Areopagus ("Hill of Ares") was the ancient council of Athens.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	unde haec in terram nisi ab superis defluere potuerunt?), cumque sint in nobis consilium ratio prudentia, necesse est deos haec ipsa habere maiora, nec habere solum sed etiam his uti in maxumis et optumis rebus.	exist among the gods, when we worship their majestic and holy images? And if mind, faith, virtue and concord are present in the human race, from where could they have flowed down to earth except from the gods above?) And since there are in us planning, reason and wisdom, the gods must possess these same qualities in greater measure, and not only possess them but use them in the greatest and best of matters;
2.80	nihil autem nec maius nec melius mundo; necesse est ergo eum deorum consilio et providentia administrari. Postremo cum satis docuerimus hos esse deos, quorum insignem vim et inlustrem faciem videremus, solem dico et lunam et vagas stellas et inerrantes et caelum et mundum ipsum et earum rerum vim quae inessent in omni mundo cum magno usu et commoditate generis humani, efficitur omnia regi divina mente atque prudentia. Ac de prima quidem parte satis dictum est.	but nothing is greater or better than the world; therefore it must be governed by the planning and providence of the gods. Finally, we have sufficiently shown that those are gods whose remarkable power and brilliant appearance we see—I mean the sun and moon, the wandering stars and the fixed stars, the sky, the world itself, and the power of those things present throughout the world to the great use and benefit of the human race. It follows that all things are governed by divine mind and wisdom. And that is enough about the first part.

NATURE, THE CRAFTSMAN

A reasoning nature holds the world together; the sundial and the planetary sphere show design.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2.81	**BALBUS** Sequitur ut doceam omnia subiecta esse naturae, eaque ab ea pulcherrime geri. Sed quid sit ipsa natura explicandum est ante breviter, quo facilius id quod docere volumus intellegi possit. namque alii naturam esse censent vim quandam sine ratione cientem motus in corporibus necessarios, alii autem vim participem rationis atque ordinis tamquam via progredientem declarantemque quid cuiusque rei causa efficiat quid sequatur, cuius sollertiam nulla ars nulla manus nemo opifex consequi possit imitando; seminis enim vim esse tantam, ut id, quamquam sit perexiguum, tamen, si inciderit in concipientem conprendentemque naturam nanctumque sit materiam qua ali augerique possit, ita fingat et efficiat in suo quidque genere, partim ut tantum modo per stirpes alantur suas, partim ut moveri etiam et sentire et appetere possint et ex sese similia sui gignere.	**BALBUS** Next I must show that all things are subject to nature and that by it everything is carried on most beautifully. But first I must briefly explain what nature itself is, so that what I want to teach can be more easily understood. Some think that nature is a kind of force without reason that stirs necessary motions in bodies. Others think it is a force that shares in reason and order, proceeding methodically, so to speak, and making clear what it brings about for the sake of each thing and what it aims at—a skill that no art, no hand, no craftsman could match by imitation. For the power of a seed, they say, is so great that, tiny as it is, if it falls into a nature that conceives and takes hold of it, and finds material by which it can be nourished and grow, it shapes and produces each thing after its kind: some so that they are nourished only through their roots, others so that they can also move, perceive and desire, and generate offspring like themselves.
2.82	Sunt autem qui omnia naturae nomine appellent, ut Epicurus qui ita dividit, omnium quae sint naturam esse	Some people, however, apply the name “nature” to everything. Epicurus, for instance, divides things

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	corpora et inane quaeque is accidant. Sed nos cum dicimus natura constare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus ut glaebam aut fragmentum lapidis aut aliquid eius modi nulla cohaerendi natura, sed ut arborem ut animal, in quibus nulla temeritas sed ordo apparet et artis quaedam similitudo.	this way: the nature of all that exists consists of bodies, the void and whatever happens to them. But when we say that the world is held together and governed by nature, we do not mean it in the sense one might use of a clod of earth, a chip of stone or something of that kind, which has no nature that holds it together. We mean it as one would of a tree or an animal, in which there is no haphazardness but order, and a kind of likeness to art.
2.83	Quod si ea quae a terra stirpibus continentur arte naturae vivunt et vigent, profecto ipsa terra eadem vi continetur arte naturae, quippe quae gravidata seminibus omnia pariat et fundat ex sese, stirpes amplexa alat et augeat ipsaque alatur vicissim a superis externisque naturis; eiusdemque exspirationibus et aer alitur et aether et omnia supera. Ita si terra natura tenetur et viget, eadem ratio in reliquo mundo est; stirpes enim terrae inhaerent, animantes autem adspiratione aeris sustinentur; ipseque aer nobiscum videt nobiscum audit nobiscum sonat, nihil enim eorum sine eo fieri potest; quin etiam movetur nobiscum, quacumque enim imus qua movemur videtur quasi locum dare et cedere.	And if the things that are held to the earth by their roots live and flourish by nature's art, then surely the earth itself is held together by the same power, by nature's art. Pregnant with seeds, it gives birth to everything and pours it out from itself. It embraces the roots, nourishes them and makes them grow, and it is nourished in turn by the natures above and outside it. Its exhalations nourish the air, the ether and everything above. So if the earth is sustained and flourishes by nature, the same reasoning holds for the rest of the world. Plants cling to the earth, and animals are kept alive by breathing the air. The air itself sees with us, hears with us and makes sounds with us, since none of these things can happen without it. It even moves with us: wherever we go and wherever we move, it seems to make way for us and give place.
2.84	quaeque in medium locum mundi, qui est infimus, et quae a medio in superum quaeque conversione rutunda circum medium feruntur, ea continentem mundi efficiunt unamque naturam. Et cum quattuor genera sint corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata natura est. nam ex terra aqua ex aqua oritur aer ex aere aether, deinde retrorsum vicissim ex aethere aer inde aqua ex aqua terra infima. sic naturis is ex quibus omnia constant sursus deorsus ultro citro commeantibus mundi partium coniunctio continetur.	and the things that are carried toward the center of the world, which is its lowest point, those carried from the center upward, and those that travel around the center in a circular revolution, together make the world continuous and a single nature. And since there are four kinds of bodies, the nature of the world is kept continuous by their passing into one another. From earth comes water, from water air, from air ether. Then, in reverse, from ether comes air, from air water, and from water earth, the lowest. So as these elements, of which all things are composed, travel up and down and back and forth, the connection between the world's parts is held together.
2.85	Quae aut sempiterna sit necessest hoc eodem ornatu quem videmus, aut certe perdiuturna, permanens ad longinquum et inmensum paene tempus. quorum utrumvis ut sit, sequitur natura mundum administrari. Quae enim classium navigatio aut quae instructio exercitus aut, rursus ut ea quae natura efficit conferamus, quae procreatio vitis aut arboris, quae porro	This connection must either be eternal, in the same ordered beauty that we see, or at the very least extremely long-lasting, enduring for a vast and almost immeasurable span of time. Whichever of the two is true, it follows that the world is governed by nature. What voyage of a fleet, what marshaling of an army, or again, to

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	animantis figura conformatioque membrorum tantam naturae sollertiam significat quantam ipse mundus? aut igitur nihil est quod sentiente natura regatur, aut mundum regi confitendum est.	compare the works of nature, what growth of a vine or a tree, what shape and structure of an animal's limbs reveals such skill on nature's part as the world itself? So either nothing is governed by a nature that perceives, or we must admit that the world is so governed.
2.86	Etenim qui reliquas naturas omnes earumque semina contineat, qui potest ipse non natura administrari; ut, si qui dentes et pubertatem natura dicat existere, ipsum autem hominem cui ea existant non constare natura, non intellegat ea quae ecferant aliquid ex sese perfectiores habere naturas quam ea quae ex his efferantur. omnium autem rerum quae natura administrantur seminator et sator et parens ut ita dicam atque educator et altor est mundus omniaque sicut membra et partes suas nutricatur et continet. quod si mundi partes natura administrantur, necesse est mundum ipsum natura administrari. Cuius quidem administratio nihil habet in se quod reprehendi possit; ex his enim naturis quae erant quod effici optimum potuit effectum est.	Indeed, how can the world, which contains all other natures and their seeds, not itself be governed by nature? Anyone who said that teeth and puberty come about by nature, but that the human being in whom they come about is not constituted by nature, would fail to understand that things which produce something from themselves have more perfect natures than the things produced from them. Now the world is the sower and planter and, so to speak, the parent, rearer and nourisher of all the things that are governed by nature. It nourishes and holds together everything as its own limbs and parts. If the parts of the world are governed by nature, then the world itself must be governed by nature. And its governance has nothing in it that could be faulted. Out of the natures that existed, the best that could be made has been made.
2.87	doceat ergo aliquis potuisse melius; sed nemo umquam docebit, et si quis corrigere aliquid volet aut deterius faciet aut id quod fieri non potuerit desiderabit.	so let someone show that it could have been done better. But no one ever will. Anyone who wants to correct something will either make it worse or be wishing for something that could not have been done.
	Quod si omnes mundi partes ita constitutae sunt ut neque ad usum meliores potuerint esse neque ad speciem pulchriores, videamus utrum ea fortuitane sint an eo statu quo cohaerere nullo modo potuerint nisi sensu moderante divinaque providentia. Si igitur meliora sunt ea quae natura quam illa quae arte perfecta sunt nec ars efficit quicquam sine ratione, ne natura quidem rationis expers est habenda. Qui igitur convenit, signum aut tabulam pictam cum aspexeris, scire adhibitam esse artem, cumque procul cursum navigii videris, non dubitare quin id ratione atque arte moveatur, aut cum solarium vel descriptum vel ex aqua contemplere, intellegere declarari horas arte non casu, mundum autem, qui et has ipsas artes et earum artifices et cuncta conplectatur, consilii et rationis esse expertem putare.	Now, if all the parts of the world are so arranged that they could be neither better for use nor more beautiful to look at, let us consider whether they are the product of chance, or whether they are in a condition in which they could not possibly hold together without the guidance of a perceiving mind and divine providence. If, then, the things nature has perfected are better than those art has perfected, and art makes nothing without reason, then nature too must not be considered devoid of reason. When you look at a statue or a painting, you know that art has been applied. When you see the course of a ship in the distance, you do not doubt that it is moved by reason and art. When you study a sundial, or a water clock, you understand that it tells the hours by art and not by chance. How can it make sense, then, to think that the world, which embraces these very arts, their

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		makers and everything else, lacks purpose and reason?
2.88	quod si in Scythiam aut in Brittanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae conversiones idem efficiunt in sole et in luna et in quinque stellis errantibus quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus, quis in illa barbaria dubitet quin ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione; hi autem dubitant de mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia, casune ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliqua an ratione ac mente divina, et Archimedem arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis sphaerae conversionibus quam naturam in efficiendis; praesertim cum multis partibus sint illa perfecta quam haec simulata sollertius.	Suppose someone were to carry to Scythia or to Britain the sphere recently made by our friend Posidonius, each revolution of which produces in the sun, the moon and the five wandering stars the same movements that take place in the sky each day and night. Who in that barbarous land would doubt that the sphere was the product of reason? Yet these people are unsure whether the world, from which all things arise and come into being, was itself produced by chance, by some necessity, or by reason and a divine mind. They think Archimedes showed more power in imitating the revolutions of the sphere than nature did in producing them, and this when the originals are made with many times more skill than the imitations.[24]
2.89	utque ille apud Accium pastor, qui navem numquam ante vidisset, ut procul divinum et novum vehiculum Argonautarum e monte conspexit, primo admirans et perterritus hoc modo loquitur: tanta moles labitur fremibunda ex alto ingenti sonitu et spiritu: prae se undas volvit, vertices vi suscitat, ruit prolapsa, pelagus respergit reflat; ita dum interruptum credas nimbum volvier, dum quod sublime ventis expulsum rapi saxum aut procellis, vel globosos turbines existere ictos undis concursantibus— nisi quas terrestres pontus strages conciet aut forte Triton fuscina evertens specus subter radices penitus undanti in freto molem ex profundo saxeam ad caelum eruit: dubitat primo quae sit ea natura quam cernit ignotam; idemque iuvenibus visis auditoque nautico cantu: sicut †inciti atque alacres rostris perfremunt delphini —item alia multa— Silvani melo consimilem ad aures cantum et auditum refert —	Think of the shepherd in Accius who had never seen a ship before. When from a mountain he caught sight, far off, of the strange and divine vessel of the Argonauts, at first, in wonder and terror, he speaks like this: “So huge a mass glides on, roaring from the deep with mighty noise and blast; it rolls the waves before it, stirs up eddies with its force, rushes headlong, spatters and blows back the sea; so that now you might think a torn storm cloud was rolling on, now that a rock, flung aloft by the winds, was being swept up or by the gales, or that round whirlwinds were rising, struck by clashing waves— unless the sea is stirring up some havoc on the land, or Triton perhaps, overturning caves with his trident deep beneath their roots in the surging strait, is heaving a rocky mass from the depths up to the sky.” At first he is unsure what this unknown thing he sees can be. Then, when he sees the young men and hears the sailors’ song, he says: “Like dolphins, swift and eager, they roar with their snouts”—and much else besides—“it brings to my

24 Posidonius of Apamea (c. 135–51 BC), Stoic philosopher at Rhodes and Cicero’s teacher. Archimedes of Syracuse (3rd century BC) built a celebrated planetary sphere, brought to Rome after Syracuse fell in 212 BC.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		ears a song just like the melody of Silvanus"—[25]
2.90	ergo ut hic primo aspectu inanimum quiddam sensuque vacuum se putat cernere, post autem signis certioribus quale sit id de quo dubitaverat incipit suspicari, sic philosophi debuerunt, si forte eos primus aspectus mundi conturbaverat, postea cum vidissent motus eius finitos et aequabiles omniaque ratis ordinibus moderata inmutabilique constantia, intellegere inesse aliquem non solum habitatorem in hac caelesti ac divina domo sed etiam rectorem et moderatorem et tamquam architectum tanti operis tantique muneris.	well, just as this man at first sight thinks he is looking at something lifeless and without sensation, but later, from clearer signs, begins to suspect what the thing he was unsure of really is, so too the philosophers ought to have done. If the first sight of the world perhaps confused them, they should afterward have seen its movements, defined and regular, and everything governed in fixed order and with unchanging constancy. Then they should have understood that in this heavenly and divine house there is not only an inhabitant but also a ruler and director, an architect, as it were, of so great a work and so great a creation.
	Nunc autem mihi videntur ne suspicari quidem quanta sit admirabilitas caelestium rerum atque terrestrium.	As it is, though, they seem to me not even to suspect how wonderful the things of heaven and earth are.
2.91	Principio enim terra sita in media parte mundi circumfusa undique est hac animali spirabilique natura cui nomen est aer—Graecum illud quidem sed perceptum iam tamen usu a nostris; tritum est enim pro Latino. hunc rursus amplectitur inmensus aether, qui constat ex altissimis ignibus (mutuemur hoc quoque verbum, dicaturque tam aether Latine quam dicitur aer, etsi interpretatur Pacuvius: "hoc, quod memoro, nostri caelum Grai perhibent aethera"—quasi vero non Graius hoc dicat. "at Latine loquitur." si quidem nos non quasi Graece loquentem audiamus; docet idem alio loco:	To begin with, the earth, set in the central part of the world, is surrounded on every side by that living, breathable nature whose name is air. The word is Greek, admittedly, but our people have now taken it over through use; it is as well worn as a Latin word. The air in turn is embraced by the immeasurable ether, which consists of the highest fires. (Let us borrow this word too, and let *aether* be said in Latin just as *aer* is—although Pacuvius translates it: "This thing I speak of, our people call *caelum*, the Greeks *aethera*"—as if the speaker were not a Greek! "But he is speaking Latin." Yes, provided we do not hear him as if he were speaking Greek; and the same poet tells us elsewhere:[26]
2.92	"Graiugena: de isto aperit ipsa oratio")—sed ad maiora redeamus. ex aethere igitur innumerabiles flammae siderum existunt, quorum est princeps sol omnia clarissima luce conlustrans, multis partibus maior atque amplior quam terra universa, deinde reliqua sidera magnitudinibus inmensis. atque hi tanti ignes tamque multi non modo nihil nocent terris rebusque terrestribus, sed ita prosunt ut si mota loco sint conflagrare terras necesse sit a tantis ardoribus moderatione et temperatione sublata.	"Greek-born: my speech itself reveals it")—but let us return to greater matters. From the ether, then, arise the countless flames of the stars. Chief among them is the sun, which lights up everything with its brilliant light and is many times greater and larger than the whole earth; then come the other stars, of immense size. These fires, so great and so many, not only do no harm to the earth and earthly things but are so beneficial that, if they were moved from their place, the earth would inevitably be consumed by such great

25 Lucius Accius (170–c. 86 BC), Roman tragic poet; the lines come from a lost tragedy, probably his *Medea*, in which a shepherd sees the Argo, the first ship.
26 Marcus Pacuvius (c. 220–130 BC), Roman tragic poet.

LATIN	ENGLISH
	heat, once its moderation and balance were removed.
2.93 Hic ego non mirer esse quemquam qui sibi persuadeat corpora quaedam solida atque individua vi et gravitate ferri mundumque effici ornatissimum et pulcherrimum ex eorum corporum concursione fortuita? hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intellego cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formae litterarum vel aureae vel qualeslibet aliquo coiciantur, posse ex is in terram excussis annales Enni ut deinceps legi possint effici; quod nescio an ne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna.	Should I not be amazed, at this point, that anyone can persuade himself that certain solid and indivisible bodies are carried along by their own force and weight, and that a world of the greatest order and beauty is produced by the chance collision of those bodies? Anyone who thinks this could have happened might as well think that if countless copies of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet, in gold or any material you like, were thrown together somewhere and shaken out onto the ground, they could form the *Annals* of Ennius, ready to be read straight through. I doubt whether chance could manage this even in a single line.[27]
2.94 isti autem quem ad modum adseverant ex corpusculis non colore non qualitate aliqua (quam ποιότητα Graeci vocant) non sensu praeditis sed concurrentibus temere atque casu mundum esse perfectum, vel innumerabiles potius in omni puncto temporis alios nasci alios interire: quod si mundum efficere potest concursus atomorum, cur porticum cur templum cur domum cur urbem non potest, quae sunt minus operosa; et multa quidem faciliora. certe ita temere de mundo effuttiunt, ut mihi quidem numquam hunc admirabilem caeli ornatum (qui locus est proxumus) suspexisse videantur.	and these people, for their part, insist that the world was made out of tiny bodies endowed with no color, no quality of any kind (what the Greeks call ποιότητα [quality]) and no sensation, but colliding at random and by chance. Or rather they say that countless worlds come into being, some born and others perishing at every moment of time. Well, if a collision of atoms can make a world, why can it not make a colonnade, a temple, a house or a city, things that take less labor and are indeed much easier? Certainly they babble so recklessly about the world that they seem to me never to have looked up at this wonderful ordered beauty of the sky, which is my next topic.
2.95 Praeclare ergo Aristoteles "Si essent" inquit "qui sub terra semper habitavissent bonis et inlustribus domiciliis, quae essent ornata signis atque picturis instructaque rebus his omnibus quibus abundant i qui beati putantur, nec tamen exissent umquam supra terram, accepissent autem fama et auditione esse quoddam numen et vim deorum, deinde aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadere in haec loca quae nos incolimus atque exire potuissent: cum repente terram et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem ventorumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magnitudinem pulchritudinemque tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent, quod is diem efficeret toto caelo luce diffusa, cum autem terras nox opacasset tum caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque luminum varietatem tum crescentis tum senescentis, eorumque omnium ortus	So Aristotle puts it brilliantly: "Suppose there were people who had always lived underground, in good and splendid dwellings adorned with statues and paintings and furnished with everything that those reckoned blessed possess in abundance, but who had never come up above the earth. Suppose they had learned by report and hearsay that there exists a divine power, a might of gods. Then, at some point, the jaws of the earth opened and they were able to escape from those hidden abodes and come out into these regions where we live. Suddenly they would see the earth, the seas and the sky. They would learn the size of the clouds and the force of the winds. They would look at the sun and come to know not only its size and beauty but also its power, how it makes the day by spreading its light over the whole sky. And

27 The *Annals* of Ennius (239–169 BC) was the great Latin epic of Roman history; the Latin alphabet then had twenty-one letters.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	et occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos inmutabilesque cursus—quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum esse arbitrarentur".	when night had darkened the earth, they would see the whole sky studded and adorned with stars, the varying light of the moon, now waxing, now waning, and the risings and settings of all these bodies, and their courses, fixed and unchanging for all eternity. When they saw all this, they would surely believe both that the gods exist and that these great works are the works of the gods."[28]
2.96	atque haec quidem ille; nos autem tenebras cogitemus tantas quantae quondam eruptione Aetnaeorum ignium finitimas regiones obscuravisse dicuntur, ut per biduum nemo hominem homo agnosceret, cum autem tertio die sol inluxisset tum ut revixisse sibi viderentur: quod si hoc idem ex aeternis tenebris contingeret ut subito lucem aspiceremus, quaenam species caeli videretur? sed adsiduitate cotidiana et consuetudine oculorum adsuescunt animi, neque admirantur neque requirunt rationes earum rerum quas semper vident, proinde quasi novitas nos magis quam magnitudo rerum debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare.	that, then, is what he says. But let us imagine a darkness as great as the one which, they say, once covered the neighboring regions during an eruption of Etna's fires. For two days no one could recognize anyone else, and when on the third day the sun shone again, people felt they had come back to life. If the same thing happened to us after an eternal darkness, so that we suddenly saw the light, how would the sky appear to us? But our minds grow used to things through daily repetition and the habit of our eyes. They neither wonder at nor ask the reasons for the things they always see, as though it were novelty, rather than the greatness of things, that ought to rouse us to seek out causes.
2.97	Quis enim hunc hominem dixerit, qui, cum tam certos caeli motus tam ratos astrorum ordines tamque inter se omnia conexa et apta viderit, neget in his ullam inesse rationem eaque casu fieri dicat, quae quanto consilio gerantur nullo consilio adsequi possumus. an, cum machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut sphaeram ut horas ut alia permulta, non dubitamus quin illa opera sint rationis, cum autem impetum caeli cum admirabili celeritate moveri vertique videamus constantissime conficientem vicissitudines anniversarias cum summa salute et conservatione rerum omnium, dubitamus quin ea non solum ratione fiant sed etiam excellenti divinaque ratione?	Who would call a man human if, having seen such certain movements in the sky, such fixed orders of the stars, and everything so connected and fitted together, he denied that there is any reason in them and said they happen by chance? These things are managed with such design that no design of ours can grasp how great it is. When we see something moved by a mechanism, like a sphere, a clock or many other things, we do not doubt that they are works of reason. Yet when we see the sweep of the heavens moving and turning with wonderful speed, completing the yearly changes of the seasons with perfect constancy, for the safety and preservation of all things, do we doubt that this is done not only by reason but by an outstanding and divine reason?

THE BEAUTY OF THE WORLD

Earth, sea, air and sky, and the sun, moon and planets in their courses.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2.98		**BALBUS** For we may now set aside subtle argument and gaze, as it were, with our own eyes at the

28 Probably from Aristotle's lost dialogue *On Philosophy*.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	BALBUS Licet enim iam remota subtilitate disputandi oculis quodam modo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum earum quas divina providentia dicimus constitutas.	beauty of the things that we say were established by divine providence.
	Ac principio terra universa cernatur, locata in media sede mundi, solida et globosa et undique ipsa in sese nutibus suis conglobata, vestita floribus herbis arboribus frugibus, quorum omnium incredibilis multitudo insatiabili varietate distinguitur. adde huc fontum gelidas perennitates, liquores perlucidos amnium, riparum vestitus viridissimos, speluncarum concavas altitudines, saxorum asperitates, inpendentium montium altitudines inmensitatesque camporum; adde etiam reconditas auri argentique venas infinitamque vim marmoris.	First let us look at the whole earth. It is placed in the central seat of the world, solid and round, drawn together into a globe on every side by its own tendency toward the center, and clothed with flowers, grasses, trees and crops, all of them in incredible abundance and set off by an inexhaustible variety. Add to this the cool, never-failing springs, the clear waters of the rivers, the vivid green clothing of their banks, the hollow depths of caves, the ruggedness of rocks, the heights of overhanging mountains and the immensity of the plains. Add, too, the hidden veins of gold and silver and the boundless quantity of marble.
2.99	quae vero et quam varia genera bestiarum vel cicurum vel ferarum, qui volucrium lapsus atque cantus, qui pecudum pastus, quae vita silvestrium. quid iam de hominum genere dicam, qui quasi cultores terrae constituti non patiuntur eam nec inmanitate beluarum efferari nec stirpium asperitate vastari, quorumque operibus agri insulae litoraque collucent distincta tectis et urbibus. quae si ut animis sic oculis videre possemus, nemo cunctam intuens terram de divina ratione dubitaret.	and then what kinds of animals there are, and how varied, both tame and wild! What flights and songs of birds, what grazing herds, what life in the woods! And what am I to say of the human race? Appointed, as it were, to cultivate the earth, humans do not allow it to grow savage with monstrous beasts or be laid waste by rough, wild growth; and through their works the fields, islands and shores shine, studded with houses and cities. If we could see these things with our eyes as we can with our minds, no one who surveyed the whole earth would doubt the existence of divine reason.
2.100	At vero quanta maris est pulchritudo, quae species universi, quae multitudo et varietas insularum, quae amoenitates orarum ac litorum, quot genera quamque disparia partim submersarum partim fluitantium et innantium beluarum partim ad saxa nativis testis inhaerentium. ipsum autem mare sic terram appetens litoribus eludit, ut una ex duabus naturis conflata videatur.	And how great is the beauty of the sea! What a sight its whole expanse is, what a number and variety of islands, what charm in its coasts and shores! How many kinds of creatures, and how different: some living beneath the surface, some floating and swimming, some clinging to the rocks by their natural shells! The sea itself, reaching for the land, plays so along the shores that the two natures seem to be fused into one.
2.101	Exin mari finitumus aer die et nocte distinguitur, isque tum fusus et extenuatus sublime fertur, tum autem concretus in nubes cogitur umoremque colligens terram auget imbribus, tum effluens huc et illuc ventos efficit. idem annuas frigorum et calorum facit varietates, idemque et volatus alitum sustinet et spiritu ductus alit et sustentat animantes.	Next to the sea comes the air, divided into day and night. At times it is diffused and thinned and rises aloft. At other times it condenses and gathers into clouds, and, collecting moisture, enriches the earth with rain. At still other times it flows this way and that and produces winds. It also brings about the yearly variations of cold and heat. It supports the flight of birds, and, drawn in as breath, it nourishes and sustains living creatures.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Restat ultimus et a domiciliis nostris altissimus omnia cingens et coercens caeli complexus, qui idem aether vocatur, extrema ora et determinatio mundi, in quo cum admirabilitate maxima igneae formae cursus ordinatos definiunt.	Last remains the embrace of the heavens, the outermost and highest from our dwellings, encircling and enclosing everything. It is also called the ether, the farthest border and boundary of the world, and in it fiery shapes, to our greatest wonder, trace out their ordered courses.
2.102	E quibus sol, cuius magnitudine multis partibus terra superatur, circum eam ipsam volvitur, isque oriens et occidens diem noctemque conficit et modo accedens tum autem recedens binas in singulis annis reversiones ab extremo contrarias facit, quarum in intervallo tum quasi tristitia quadam contrahit terram tum vicissim laetificat ut cum caelo hilarata videatur.	Among these the sun, which exceeds the earth in size many times over, revolves around the earth itself. By rising and setting it makes day and night. Now approaching, now withdrawing, it makes two turnings each year in opposite directions from its farthest points. In the interval between them it at one time makes the earth contract, as if in a kind of sadness, and at another, in turn, gladdens it, so that the earth seems to rejoice along with the sky.
2.103	Luna autem, quae est, ut ostendunt mathematici, maior quam dimidia pars terrae, isdem spatiis vagatur quibus sol, sed tum congrediens cum sole tum degrediens et eam lucem quam a sole accepit mittit in terras et varias ipsa lucis mutationes habet, atque etiam tum subiecta atque opposita soli radios eius et lumen obscurat, tum ipsa incidens in umbram terrae, cum est e regione solis, interpositu interiectuque terrae repente deficit. Isdemque spatiis eae stellae quas vagas dicimus circum terram feruntur eodemque modo oriuntur et occidunt, quarum motus tum incitantur tum retardantur,	The moon, which is more than half the size of the earth, as the mathematicians show, wanders along the same paths as the sun. Now converging with the sun, now moving away from it, it sends to the earth the light it has received from the sun and itself undergoes various changes of light. Sometimes, too, when it passes beneath the sun and in front of it, it obscures the sun's rays and light. At other times it falls into the shadow of the earth, when it is directly opposite the sun, and with the earth placed in between, it is suddenly eclipsed. Along the same paths the stars we call wandering travel around the earth, and they rise and set in the same way. Their movements now speed up, now slow down,
2.104	saepe etiam insistunt, quo spectaculo nihil potest admirabilius esse nihil pulchrius. Sequitur stellarum inerrantium maxima multitudo, quarum ita descripta distinctio est, ut ex notarum figurarum similitudine nomina invenerint.	and often they even stand still—and nothing could be a more wonderful or beautiful sight. Next comes the vast multitude of the fixed stars. Their arrangement has been so mapped out that they have been given names from their resemblance to familiar figures.

THE CONSTELLATIONS

Balbus tours the night sky in the verses of Aratus that Cicero translated as a young man.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	BALBUS Atque hoc loco me intuens "Utar" inquit "carminibus Arateis, quae a te admodum adulescentulo conversa ita me delectant quia Latina sunt, ut multa ex is memoria teneam. Ergo, ut oculis adsidue videmus, sine ulla mutatione aut varietate cetera labuntur celeri	BALBUS At this point he looked at me and said: "I will use the verses of Aratus. You translated them when you were quite a young man, and because they are in Latin they delight me so much that I know many of them by heart. Well, as we see constantly with our own eyes, without any change or

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	caelestia motu / cum caeloque simul noctesque diesque feruntur,"	variation, 'the other heavenly bodies glide on with swift motion / and are carried night and day along with the sky,'"[29]
2.105	quorum contemplatione nullius expleri potest animus naturae constantiam videre cupientis. extremusque adeo duplici de cardine vertex dicitur esse polus. Hunc circum Arctoe duae feruntur numquam occidentes. ex is altera apud Graios Cynosura vocatur, altera dicitur esse Helice, cuius quidem clarissimas stellas totis noctibus cernimus, quas nostri Septem soliti vocitare Triones;	and no mind that longs to see the constancy of nature can ever have its fill of contemplating them. "And the topmost end of the axis, at either hinge, is called the pole." Around it the two Bears move, never setting. Of these, "one is called Cynosura among the Greeks, the other is said to be Helice." Her very bright stars we see all night long, the ones "our people are used to calling the Seven Plow-Oxen";[30]
2.106	paribusque stellis similiter distinctis eundem caeli verticem lustrat parva Cynosura. hac fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto. sed prior illa magis stellis distincta refulget et late prima confestim a nocte videtur. haec vero parva est, sed nautis usus in hac est; nam cursu interiore brevi convertitur orbe. Et quo sit earum stellarum admirabilior aspectus, has inter veluti rapido cum gurgite flumen torvus Draco serpit supter supraque revolvens sese conficiensque sinus e corpore flexos.	and little Cynosura, with an equal number of stars arranged in the same way, circles the same top of the sky. "Trusting her guidance, the Phoenicians sail the deep by night. But the other, picked out more richly with stars, shines brighter and is seen far and wide as soon as night begins; this one is small, but sailors find her useful, for she turns on an inner course in a narrow circle." And to make the sight of these stars more wonderful, "between them, like a river with a rushing current, the fierce Dragon creeps, writhing below and above, and twisting his body into winding coils."
2.107	eius cum totius est praeclara species tum in primis aspicienda est figura capitis atque ardor oculorum: huic non una modo caput ornans stella relucet, verum tempora sunt duplici fulgore notata e trucibusque oculis duo fervida lumina flagrant atque uno mentum radianti sidere lucet; opstipum caput, at tereti cervice reflexum optutum in cauda maioris figere dicas.	and while the whole of him is a splendid sight, the shape of his head and the blaze of his eyes are especially worth seeing: "here not just one star shines, adorning his head, but his temples are marked with a double gleam, and from his fierce eyes two burning lights blaze, and his chin glows with a single radiant star; his head is bent, and with his rounded neck turned back you would say he fixes his gaze on the tail of the Greater Bear."
2.108	et relicum quidem corpus Draconis totis noctibus cernimus, hoc caput hic paulum sese subitoque recondit, ortus ubi atque obitus parti admiscetur in una. Id autem caput attingens defessa velut maerentis imago	and while we see the rest of the Dragon's body all night long, "here this head dips briefly and suddenly out of sight, where its rising and its setting merge in a single

29 Aratus of Soli (3rd century BC) described the constellations in his poem *Phaenomena*; Cicero's youthful Latin version, the *Aratea*, is quoted in what follows.
30 Cynosura is the Little Bear and Helice the Great Bear; the Romans called the seven bright stars of the Great Bear the Septentriones, "seven plow-oxen."

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	vertitur, quam quidem Graeci Engonasin vocitant, genibus quia nixa feratur. hic illa eximio posita est fulgore Corona. Atque haec quidem a tergo, propter caput autem Anguitenens, quem claro perhibent Ophiuchum nomine Graii.	point." Touching this head, "the figure of a weary man, as if in mourning, turns; the Greeks call him Engonasin, because he travels on bended knee. Here is placed the Crown, with its outstanding brilliance." These lie behind him; near his head is "the Serpent-Holder, whom the Greeks call by the famous name of Ophiuchus."[31]
2.109	hic pressu duplici palmarum continet Anguem, atque eius ipse manet religatus corpore torto; namque virum medium Serpens sub pectora cingit. ille tamen nitens graviter vestigia ponit atque oculos urget pedibus pectusque Nepai. Septentriones autem sequitur Arctophylax, vulgo qui dicitur esse Bootes, quod quasi temone adiunctam prae se quatit Arctum. Dein quae sequuntur:	"He grips the Serpent in the double pressure of his palms, and is himself held fast, bound by its twisted body; for the Serpent girds the man around the middle, beneath his chest. Yet he, straining hard, plants his feet firmly and presses down with them on the Scorpion's eyes and chest." After the Plow-Oxen comes "Arctophylax [Bear-Guard], commonly called Boötes, because he drives the Bear before him as if it were yoked to a pole." Then come the lines that follow:
2.110	"huic" enim Booti subter praecordia fixa videtur stella micans radiis, Arcturus nomine claro; cuius pedibus subiecta fertur Spicum inlustre tenens splendenti corpore Virgo. Atque ita demetata signa sunt, ut in tantis descriptionibus divina sollertia appareat: et Natos Geminos invisses sub caput Arcti; subiectus mediaest Cancer, pedibusque tenetur magnus Leo tremulam quatiens e corpore flammam. Auriga sub laeva Geminorum obductus parte feretur. adversum caput huic Helicae truculenta tuetur. at Capra laeum umerum clara obtinet. Tum quae secuntur: verum haec est magno atque inlustri praedita signo, contra Haedi exiguum iaciunt mortalibus ignem. Cuius sub pedibus corniger est valido conixus corpore Taurus. eius caput stellis conspersum est frequentibus;	"for beneath his"—Boötes', that is—"chest there seems to be fixed a star flashing with rays, Arcturus by its famous name"; and beneath his feet moves "the Virgin, holding the bright Ear of Grain, her body shining." The constellations are so measured out that divine skill is evident in such vast designs: "and you would see the Twins beneath the Bear's head; below her middle is the Crab, and beneath her feet the great Lion, shaking a quivering flame from his body." "The Charioteer will be carried along, hidden beneath the left side of the Twins; facing him, the fierce head of Helice gazes. But the bright Goat holds his left shoulder." Then come these lines: "but she is endowed with a great and splendid star, while the Kids cast only a faint fire for mortals." Beneath his feet is "the horned Bull, straining with his mighty body." His head is thickly sprinkled with stars;
2.111	has Graeci stellas Hyadas vocitare suerunt a pluendo (ὕειν enim est pluere), nostri imperite Suculas, quasi a subus essent non ab imbribus nominatae. Minorem autem Septentrionem Cepheus passis palmis post terga subsequitur; namque ipsum ad tergum Cynosurae	the Greeks have long called these stars the Hyades, from raining (the Greek ὕειν [hyein] means "to rain"), while our people ignorantly call them Suculae [Piglets], as if they were named after pigs and not after showers. Behind the Lesser Bear fol-

31 Engonasin, Greek for "the Kneeler," is the constellation later called Hercules.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	vertitur Arcti. Hunc antecedit obscura specie stellarum Cassiepia. Hanc autem inlustri versatur corpore propter Andromeda aufugiens aspectu maesta parentis. Huic Equos ille iubam quatiens fulgore micanti summum contingit caput alvo, stellaque iungens una tenet duplices communi lumine formas aeternum ex astris cupiens conectere nodum. exin contortis Aries cum cornibus haeret. quem propter Pisces, quorum alter paulum praelabitur ante et magis horriferis aquilonis tangitur auris.	lows Cepheus with outspread hands, "for he turns right behind the back of Cynosura, the Bear." Ahead of him goes "Cassiepia, with her dim-looking stars. Near her turns Andromeda, with her shining body, fleeing, sorrowful, from the sight of her mother. Then the Horse, shaking his mane with flashing brightness, touches the top of her head with his belly, and a single star, joining them, holds the double figures with a shared light, eager to tie an eternal knot out of the stars. Next the Ram clings on, with his twisted horns." Near him are "the Fishes, one of which glides a little ahead of the other and is touched more by the shuddering blasts of the north wind."
2.112	Ad pedes Andromedae Perseus describitur, quem summa a regione aquilonis flamina pulsant. cuius propter laeum genum Vergilias tenui cum luce videbis. inde Fides leviter posita et convexa videtur. inde est ales Avis lato sub tegmine caeli. Capiti autem Equi proxima est Aquari dextra totusque deinceps Aquarius. Tum gelidum valido de pectore frigus anhelans corpore semifero magno Capricornus in orbe; quem cum perpetuo vestivit lumine Titan, brumali flectens contorquet tempore currum.	At Andromeda's feet Perseus is drawn, "buffeted by the blasts of the north wind from its topmost region." "Near his left knee you will see the Pleiades with their faint light. Then the Lyre is seen, lightly set and curved." "Then there is the winged Bird beneath the broad canopy of the sky." Next to the Horse's head is the right hand of Aquarius, and then the whole of Aquarius in turn. "Then, breathing icy cold from his powerful chest, Capricorn, half a beast in body, in the great circle; and when the Titan Sun has clothed him in his unceasing light, he turns and wheels his chariot around at the season of midwinter."
2.113	Hic autem aspicitur sese ostendens emergit Scorpios alte posteriore trahens flexum vi corporis Arcum. quem propter nitens pinnis convolvitur Ales. at propter se Aquila ardenti cum corpore portat. Deinde Delphinus. exinde Orion obliquo corpore nitens.	Here, too, "showing itself to view, the Scorpion rises on high, dragging the curved Bow behind it with the force of its body." "Near it the Bird wheels, shining on its wings; and near it the Eagle bears itself along with burning body." Then the Dolphin. Next "Orion, shining with slanting body."
2.114	quem subsequens fervidus ille Canis stellarum luce refulget. post Lepus subsequitur curriculum numquam defesso corpore sedans at Canis ad caudam serpens prolabitur Argo. hanc Aries tegit et squamoso corpore Pisces Fluminis inlustri tangentem corpore ripas. quem longe "serpentem" et manantem aspicies proceraque Vincla	Following him, "the famous blazing Dog shines out with the light of its stars." Behind comes the Hare, "never resting from its course, its body never tired; and at the Dog's tail the Argo glides along, creeping. It is covered by the Ram and by the Fishes with

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	videbis, quae retinent Pisces caudarum a parte locata Inde Nepae cernes propter fulgentis acumen Aram, quam flatu permulcet spiritus austri. Propter quae Centaurus cedit Equi partis properans subiungere Chelis. hic dextram porgens, quadrupes qua vasta tenetur, tendit et inlustrem truculentus cedit ad Aram. Hic sese infernis e partibus erigit Hydra, cuius longe corpus est fusum, in medioque sinu fulgens Cretera relucet.	their scaly bodies, as it touches with its bright body the banks of the River." You will see the River far off, "snaking" and flowing, and "you will see the long Bonds that hold the Fishes, set at the end of their tails. Then you will make out, near the sting of the shining Scorpion, the Altar, which the breath of the south wind gently caresses." Near these "the Centaur moves on, hurrying to bring his horse parts up beneath the Claws. Stretching out his right hand, where the huge four-footed Beast is held, he reaches out and, fierce, moves on toward the bright Altar. Here the Hydra rises from the lower regions"; its body is stretched out far, "and in the middle of its coil the shining Bowl gleams
	/ extremam nitens plumato corpore Corvus rostro tundit, et hic Geminis est ille sub ipsis Ante Canem, Procyon Graio qui nomine fertur.	/ the Raven, shining with feathered body, pecks at its far end with its beak; and here, just beneath the Twins themselves, is 'Before the Dog,' which goes by the Greek name Procyon."
2.115	Haec omnis descriptio siderum atque hic tantus caeli ornatus ex corporibus huc et illuc casu et temere cursantibus potuisse effici cuiquam sano videri potest, aut vero alia quae natura mentis et rationis expers haec efficere potuit quae non modo ut fierent ratione eguerunt sed intellegi qualia sint sine summa ratione non possunt?	Can anyone in his right mind believe that this whole arrangement of the stars and this vast adornment of the heavens could have been produced by bodies rushing this way and that, by chance and at random? Or could any other nature, lacking mind and reason, have produced these things—things that not only required reason in order to come into being, but cannot even be understood for what they are without the highest reason?
	Nec vero haec solum admirabilia, sed nihil maius quam quod ita stabilis est mundus atque ita cohaeret, ad permanendum ut nihil ne excogitari quidem possit aptius. omnes enim partes eius undique medium locum capessentes nituntur aequaliter. maxime autem corpora inter se iuncta permanent cum quasi quodam vinculo circumdato colligantur; quod facit ea natura quae per omnem mundum omnia mente et ratione conficiens funditur et ad medium rapit et convertit extrema.	Nor are these the only wonders. Nothing is greater than the fact that the world is so stable and holds together so well that nothing better suited to lasting can even be imagined. For all its parts, seeking the center from every side, press toward it equally. And bodies joined together endure best when they are bound by something like a chain wrapped around them. This is the work of that nature which, accomplishing all things by mind and reason, is diffused through the whole world, draws its outermost parts toward the center and turns them inward.
2.116	Quocirca si mundus globosus est ob eamque causam omnes eius partes undique aequabiles ipsae per se atque	Therefore, if the world is spherical, and for that reason all its parts, evenly balanced on every side,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	inter se continentur, contingere idem terrae necesse est, ut omnibus eius partibus in medium vergentibus (id autem medium infimum in sphaera est) nihil interrumpat quo labefactari possit tanta contentio gravitatis et ponderum. Eademque ratione mare, cum supra terram sit, medium tamen terrae locum expetens conglobatur undique aequabiliter, neque redundat umquam neque effunditur.	are held together by themselves and with one another, the same must hold for the earth. Since all its parts tend toward the center (and in a sphere the center is the lowest point), nothing interrupts so great a tension of gravity and weight in a way that could make it totter. By the same principle the sea, though it lies above the earth, still seeks the earth's center, and so is rounded evenly on every side; it never overflows or spills out.
2.117	Huic autem continens aer fertur ille quidem levitate sublimi, sed tamen in omnes partes se ipse fundit; itaque et mari continuatus et iunctus est et natura fertur ad caelum, cuius tenuitate et calore temperatus vitalem et salutarem spiritum praebet animantibus. Quem complexa summa pars caeli, quae aetheria dicitur, et suum retinet ardorem tenuem et nulla admixtione concretum et cum aeris extremitate coniungitur. In aethere autem astra volvuntur, quae se et nisu suo conglobata continent et forma ipsa figuraque sua momenta sustentant; sunt enim rutunda, quibus formis, ut ante dixisse videor, minime noceri potest.	Adjoining the sea is the air, which is carried upward by its lightness and yet spreads itself in every direction. So it is both continuous and joined with the sea and borne by its nature toward the heavens; and tempered by their thinness and heat, it provides living creatures with breath that gives life and health. The air is embraced by the highest part of the heavens, called the ethereal region, which both keeps its own fine heat, thickened by no admixture, and is joined to the outer edge of the air. In the ether the stars revolve. They hold themselves together, rounded into balls by their own pressure, and sustain their motions by their very shape and form. For they are round, and round shapes, as I believe I said earlier, are the least liable to harm.
2.118	Sunt autem stellae natura flammeae; quocirca terrae maris aquarumque reliquarum vaporibus aluntur is qui a sole ex agris tepefactis et ex aquis excitantur; quibus altae renovataeque stellae atque omnis aether effundunt eadem et rursum trahunt indidem, nihil ut fere intereat aut admodum paululum, quod astrorum ignis et aetheris flamma consumat. ex quo eventurum nostri putant id de quo Panaetium addubitare dicebant, ut ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret, cum umore consumpto neque terra ali posset nec remearet aer, cuius ortus aqua omni exhausta esse non posset: ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem, a quo rursum animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret atque idem ornatus oreretur.	The stars are fiery by nature. For this reason they are nourished by the vapors of the earth, the sea and the other waters, which the sun raises from fields it has warmed and from waters. Fed and renewed by these, the stars and the whole ether pour them out again and draw them back again from the same source, so that almost nothing is lost, or only very little, to be consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the ether. From this our school believes there will follow the event about which, they used to say, Panaetius had his doubts: that in the end the whole world would burst into flame, when the moisture was used up and the earth could no longer be nourished, nor the air return, since air cannot arise once all water is exhausted. So nothing would be left but fire; and from this fire, a living being and a god, the renewal of the world would come about again, and the same ordered beauty would arise.[32]
2.119	Nolo in stellarum ratione multus vobis videri, maximeque earum quae errare dicuntur; quarum tantus	I do not want to seem long-winded to you about the system of the stars, especially those said to

32 Panaetius of Rhodes (c. 185–109 BC), head of the Stoic school, who doubted the doctrine of the world's periodic conflagration.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	est concentus ex dissimillimis motibus, ut, cum summa Saturni refrigeret, media Martis incendat, is interiecta Iovis inlustret et temperet, infraque Martem duae soli oboediant, ipse sol mundum omnem sua luce compleat, ab eoque luna inluminata graviditates et partus adferat maturitatesque gignendi. Quae copulatio rerum et quasi consentiens ad mundi incolumitatem coagmentatio naturae quem non movet, hunc horum nihil umquam reputavisse certo scio.	wander. Their harmony, arising from the most dissimilar motions, is such that while the highest, Saturn's star, cools, the middle one, Mars', heats, and the one placed between them, Jupiter's, gives light and tempers; below Mars two obey the sun; the sun itself fills the whole world with its light; and the moon, lit by it, brings pregnancies and births and the ripening for birth. Whoever is not moved by this linking of things, by this joining-together of nature in a kind of concord for the world's safety, has never, I know for certain, given a thought to any of these matters.

PLANTS AND ANIMALS

Plants and beasts are equipped to feed, defend and preserve themselves and their kind.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2.120	**BALBUS** Age ut a caelestibus rebus ad terrestres veniamus, quid est in his in quo non naturae ratio intellegentis appareat. Principio eorum quae gignuntur e terra stirpes et stabilitatem dant is quae sustinentur, et e terra sucum trahunt quo alantur ea quae radicibus continentur; obducunturque libro aut cortice trunci, quo sint a frigoribus et caloribus tutiores. iam vero vites sic claviculis adminicula tamquam manibus adprehendunt atque ita se erigunt ut animantes; quin etiam a caulibus brassicae, si propter sati sint, ut a pestiferis et nocentibus refugere dicuntur nec eos ulla ex parte contingere.	**BALBUS** Come, then—to pass from the things of the heavens to those of the earth—what is there among these in which the reason of an intelligent nature does not appear? To begin with the things that grow from the earth: their stems give stability to what they support, and draw from the earth the sap that nourishes what the roots hold; and the trunks are covered with bark or rind, to make them safer against cold and heat. Then again, vines grasp their props with their tendrils as if with hands, and so raise themselves up like living creatures. Indeed, it is said that if they are planted near cabbages they shrink away from them as from something harmful and poisonous, and will not touch them at any point.
2.121	Animantium vero quanta varietas est, quanta ad eam rem vis ut in suo quaeque genere permaneat. Quarum aliae coriis tectae sunt aliae villis vestitae aliae spinis hirsutae; pluma alias alias squama videmus obductas, alias esse cornibus armatas, alias habere effugia pinnarum. Pastum autem animantibus large et copiose natura eum qui cuique aptus erat comparavit. Enumerare possum ad eum pastum capessendum conficiendumque quae sit in figuris animantium et quam sollers subtilisque descriptio partium quamque admirabilis fabrica membrorum. omnia enim, quae quidem intus inclusa sunt, ita nata atque ita locata sunt, ut nihil eorum supervacuaneum sit, nihil ad vitam retinendam non necessarium.	And what variety there is among animals, and what power to ensure that each remains in its own kind! Some are covered with hides, some clothed in shaggy hair, some bristling with spines; some we see covered with feathers, others with scales, some armed with horns, some with wings to escape on. For animals nature has provided food abundantly and plentifully—the food that suited each. I could list how skillful and precise is the arrangement of parts in the shapes of animals for seizing and digesting that food, and how wonderful the construction of their limbs. For all of them —at least the parts enclosed within—are so formed and so placed that none is superfluous, none unnecessary for sustaining life.
2.122		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Dedit autem eadem natura beluis et sensum et appetitum, ut altero conatum haberent ad naturales pastus capessendos, altero secernerent pestifera a salutaribus. Iam vero alia animalia gradiendo alia serpendo ad pastum accedunt, alia volando alia nando, cibumque partim oris hiatu et dentibus ipsis capessunt, partim unguium tenacitate arripiunt partim aduncitate rostrorum, alia sugunt alia carpunt alia vorant alia mandunt. atque etiam aliorum east humilitas ut cibum terrestrem rostris facile contingant, quae autem altiora sunt, ut anseres ut cygni ut grues ut camelli, adiuvantur proceritate collorum;	The same nature has given beasts both sensation and appetite: the one so that they would strive to seize their natural food, the other so that they could tell what is harmful from what is wholesome. Again, some animals approach their food by walking, some by creeping, some by flying, some by swimming. Some seize their food with gaping mouth and the teeth themselves, others snatch it with the grip of their claws, others with their hooked beaks; some suck, some nibble, some gulp, some chew. Then again, some are so low to the ground that they easily reach food on the earth with their beaks; while the taller ones, such as geese, swans, cranes and camels, are helped by the length of their necks;
2.123	manus etiam data elephantost, quia propter magnitudinem corporis difficiles aditus habebat ad pastum. at quibus bestiis erat is cibus ut †aliis generis escis vescerentur, aut vires natura dedit aut celeritatem. data est quibusdam etiam machinatio quaedam atque sollertia, ut in araneolis aliae quasi rete texunt, ut si quid inhaeserit conficiant, aliae autem ut … ex inopinato observant et si quid incidit arripiunt idque consumunt. pina vero (sic enim Graece dicitur) duabus grandibus patula conchis cum parva squilla quasi societatem coit comparandi cibi; itaque cum pisciculi parvi in concham hiantem innataverunt, tum admonita a squilla pina morsu comprimit conchas: sic dissimillimis bestiolis communiter cibus quaeritur;	the elephant, too, was given a hand, because the size of its body made it hard for it to get at its food. To those beasts whose diet was to feed on creatures of other kinds, nature gave either strength or speed. Some have even been given a kind of ingenuity and cunning. Among little spiders, for example, some weave a sort of net, so as to finish off anything that gets caught in it, while others … keep watch, ready to strike without warning, and if anything falls in, they seize and devour it. The pina (for that is its Greek name), opening wide its two large shells, forms a sort of partnership with a little shrimp for getting food. So when little fish have swum into the gaping shell, the pina, alerted by the shrimp, snaps its shells shut. In this way creatures utterly unlike each other seek their food in common;[33]
2.124	in quo admirandum est, congressune aliquo inter se an iam inde ab ortu natura ipsa congregatae sint. Est etiam admiratio non nulla in bestiis aquatilibus is quae gignuntur in terra; veluti crocodili fluviatilesque testudines quaedamque serpentes ortae extra aquam simul ac primum niti possunt aquam persequuntur. quin etiam anitum ova gallinis saepe supponimus; e quibus pulli orti primo aluntur ab his ut a matribus, a quibus exclusi fotique sunt, deinde eas relinquunt et effugiunt sequentes, cum primum aquam quasi naturalem domum videre potuerunt: tantam ingenuit animantibus conservandi sui natura custodiam.	and here one may wonder whether they came together through some meeting, or were joined by nature itself right from birth. There is also something wonderful in those water creatures that are born on land. Crocodiles, for instance, and river turtles and certain snakes, born out of the water, make for the water as soon as they are first able to move. Indeed, we often set ducks' eggs under hens. The chicks hatched from them are at first reared by the hens as by mothers, since the hens hatched and warmed them; then, as soon as they first catch sight of water, as if it were their natural home, they abandon the hens and flee from them when they try to follow. So great is the instinct for

33 The pina is the fan mussel, a large Mediterranean shellfish.

LATIN	ENGLISH
	self-preservation that nature has implanted in living creatures.
Legi etiam scriptum, esse avem quandam quae platalea nominaretur; eam sibi cibum quaerere advolantem ad eas avis quae se in mari mergerent, quae cum emersissent piscemque cepissent usque eo premere earum capita mordicus, dum illae captum amitterent, in quod ipsa invaderet. eademque haec avis scribitur conchis se solere complere, eas cum stomachi calore concoxerit evomere, atque ita eligere ex his quae sunt esculenta.	I have also read that there is a bird called the platalea, which gets its food by flying at birds that dive into the sea: when these have come up with a fish they have caught, it presses their heads with its bill until they let go of their catch, which it then pounces on. It is also written that this same bird usually fills itself with shellfish, and when it has digested them with the heat of its stomach, it vomits them up and so picks out from them the parts that are edible.[34]
2.125 Ranae autem marinae dicuntur obruere sese harena solere et moveri prope aquam, ad quas quasi ad escam pisces cum accesserint confici a ranis atque consumi. Miluo est quoddam bellum quasi naturale cum corvo; ergo alter alterius ubicumque nanctus est ova frangit.	Sea frogs are said to bury themselves in the sand and stir near the water; when fish come up to them as if to bait, they are killed and devoured by the frogs. Between the kite and the raven there is a sort of natural war; so each breaks the other's eggs wherever it finds them.
Illud vero (ab Aristotele animadversum, a quo pleraque) quis potest non mirari: grues cum loca calidiora petentes maria transmittant trianguli efficere formam; eius autem summo angulo aer ab is adversus pellitur, deinde sensim ab utroque latere tamquam remis ita pinnis cursus avium levatur; basis autem trianguli, quam efficiunt grues, ea tamquam a puppi ventis adiuvatur; eaeque in tergo praevolantium colla et capita reponunt; quod quia ipse dux facere non potest, quia non habet ubi nitatur, revolat ut ipse quoque quiescat, in eius locum succedit ex his quae adquierunt, eaque vicissitudo in omni cursu conservatur.	And who can fail to marvel at this (observed by Aristotle, from whom most of these examples come): when cranes cross the seas in search of warmer places, they form the shape of a triangle. With its apex they push aside the air in front of them; then gradually, on either side, the birds' course is eased by their wings as if by oars; and the base of the triangle that the cranes form is helped along by the winds, as if from the stern. They rest their necks and heads on the backs of those flying ahead; and since the leader cannot do this, having nothing to lean on, he flies back so that he too may rest, and one of those that have rested takes his place. This alternation is kept up throughout the whole journey.
2.126 Multa eius modi proferre possum, sed genus ipsum videtis. Iam vero illa etiam notiora, quanto se opere custodiant bestiae, ut in pastu circumspectent, ut in cubilibus delitiscant. Atque illa mirabilia, quod —ea quae nuper id est paucis ante saeclis medicorum ingeniis reperta sunt—vomitione canes, purgando autem alvo se ibes Aegyptiae curant. auditum est pantheras, quae in barbaria venenata carne caperentur, remedium quoddam habere, quo cum essent usae non morerentur, capras autem in Creta feras, cum essent confixae venenatis sagittis, herbam quaerere quae dictamnus vocaretur, quam cum gustavissent sagittas excidere dicunt e corpore;	I could cite many examples of this kind, but you see the general pattern. Better known still is how carefully beasts guard themselves: how they look around while feeding, how they hide in their lairs. And this too is wonderful: dogs treat themselves by vomiting, and Egyptian ibises by purging their bowels—remedies discovered by the ingenuity of physicians only recently, that is, a few centuries ago. It has been reported that panthers, which in foreign lands are caught with poisoned meat, have a certain remedy that keeps them from dying once they have used it; and that the wild goats of Crete, when they have been pierced by poisoned arrows,

34 Probably the spoonbill.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		look for an herb called dittany, and when they have tasted it, the arrows, they say, drop out of their bodies;
2.127	cervaeque paulo ante partum perpurgant se quadam herbula quae seselis dicitur. Iam illa cernimus, ut contra vim et metum suis se armis quaeque defendat: cornibus tauri, apri dentibus, cursu leones, aliae fuga se aliae occultatione tutantur, atramenti effusione saepiae torpore torpedines, multae etiam insectantes odoris intolerabili foeditate depellunt.	and does, shortly before giving birth, purge themselves thoroughly with a little herb called seselis. Then we see how each creature defends itself against violence and fear with its own weapons: bulls with horns, boars with tusks, lions with their charge; some protect themselves by flight, some by hiding, cuttlefish by squirting ink, numbfish by numbing; and many even drive off their pursuers with the unbearable foulness of their smell.
	Ut vero perpetuus mundi esset ornatus, magna adhibita cura est a providentia deorum, ut semper essent et bestiarum genera et arborum omniumque rerum quae a terra stirpibus continerentur; quae quidem omnia eam vim seminis habent in se ut ex uno plura generentur. Idque semen inclusum est in intuma parte earum bacarum quae ex quaque stirpe funduntur, isdemque seminibus et homines adfatim vescuntur et terrae eiusdem generis stirpium renovatione conplentur.	So that the world's ordered beauty might last forever, the providence of the gods has taken great care that there should always be kinds of beasts and of trees and of all things held to the earth by roots. All of these have in them such power of seed that from one many are generated. That seed is enclosed in the innermost part of the fruits that each plant puts forth; and on these same seeds human beings feed abundantly, while the earth is filled anew with plants of the same kind.
2.128	Quid loquar quanta ratio in bestiis ad perpetuam conservationem earum generis appareat? nam primum aliae mares aliae feminae sunt, quod perpetuitatis causa machinata natura est, deinde partes corporis et ad procreandum et ad concipiendum aptissimae, et in mari et in femina commiscendorum corporum mirae libidines, cum autem in locis semen insedit rapit omnem fere cibum ad sese eoque saeptum fingit animal; quod cum ex utero elapsum excidit, in is animantibus quae lacte aluntur omnis fere cibus matrum lactescere incipit, eaque quae paulo ante nata sunt sine magistro duce natura mammas adpetunt earumque ubertate saturantur.	Need I say how much rational design appears in beasts for the perpetual preservation of their kind? First, some are male and some female, which nature contrived for the sake of perpetuity. Then there are the parts of the body perfectly suited both to begetting and to conceiving, and in male and female a wonderful desire for the union of bodies. When the seed has settled in its place, it draws almost all the food to itself and, enclosed there, shapes a living creature. When this has slipped out of the womb and been born, in those animals that are nourished by milk almost all the mothers' food begins to turn to milk; and the newborns, with no teacher but nature as their guide, seek the teats and are filled by their abundance.
	atque ut intellegamus nihil horum esse fortuitum et haec omnia esse opera providae sollertisque naturae, quae multiplices fetus procreant, ut sues ut canes, is mammarum data est multitudo, quas easdem paucas habent eae bestiae quae pauca gignunt.	and so that we may understand that none of this is accidental, and that all of it is the work of a provident and skillful nature, those that produce many young, such as pigs and dogs, have been given many teats, while beasts that bear few young have few.
2.129	Quid dicam quantus amor bestiarum sit in educandis custodiendisque is quae procreaverunt, usque ad eum finem dum possint se ipsa defendere. etsi pisces, ut aiunt, ova cum genuerunt relinquunt, facile enim illa aqua et	Need I tell how great is the love of beasts in rearing and guarding their offspring, right up to the point when these can defend themselves? Fish, it is true, as they say, abandon their eggs once they

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	sustinentur et fetum fundunt; testudines autem et crocodilos dicunt, cum in terra partum ediderint, obruere ova, deinde discedere: ita et nascuntur et educantur ipsa per sese. iam gallinae avesque reliquae et quietum requirunt ad pariendum locum et cubilia sibi nidosque construunt eosque quam possunt mollissume substernunt, ut quam facillume ova serventur; e quibus pullos cum excuderunt ita tuentur ut et pinnis foveant ne frigore laedantur et si est calor a sole se opponant; cum autem pulli pinnulis uti possunt, tum volatus eorum matres prosequuntur, reliqua cura liberantur.	have laid them, for these are easily supported by the water and hatch their young there. Turtles and crocodiles, they say, when they have laid their eggs on land, bury them and then go away; so the young are both born and reared on their own. Hens and other birds, on the other hand, look for a quiet place to lay, build themselves beds and nests and line them as softly as they can, so that the eggs may be kept as easily as possible. When they have hatched their chicks, they protect them by warming them with their wings so that the cold does not harm them, and by shielding them if there is heat from the sun. When the chicks can use their little wings, the mothers accompany their flights, and are then freed from any further care.
2.130	Accedit etiam ad non nullorum animantium et earum rerum quas terra gignit conservationem et salutem hominum etiam sollertia et diligentia. nam multae et pecudes et stirpes sunt quae sine procuratione hominum salvae esse non possunt.	Besides, the skill and diligence of human beings also contribute to the preservation and safety of certain animals and of the things the earth produces. For there are many domestic animals and many plants that cannot survive without human care.
	Magnae etiam oportunitates ad cultum hominum atque abundantiam aliae aliis in locis reperiuntur. Aegyptum Nilus inrigat, et cum tota aestate obrutam oppletamque tenuit tum recedit mollitosque et oblimatos agros ad serendum relinquit. Mesopotamiam fertilem efficit Euphrates, in quam quotannis quasi novos agros invehit. Indus vero, qui est omnium fluminum maximus, non aqua solum agros laetificat et mitigat, sed eos etiam conserit; magnam enim vim seminum secum frumenti similium dicitur deportare.	Great resources for human livelihood and plenty are also found, different ones in different places. The Nile irrigates Egypt; and when it has kept the land buried and flooded all summer, it recedes and leaves the fields softened and covered with silt for sowing. The Euphrates makes Mesopotamia fertile, bringing into it new fields, as it were, every year. And the Indus, the greatest of all rivers, not only gladdens and softens the fields with its water but even sows them; for it is said to carry along with it a great quantity of seeds resembling grain.
2.131	multaque alia in aliis locis commemorabilia proferre possum, multos fertiles agros alios aliorum fructuum. Sed illa quanta benignitas naturae, quod tam multa ad vescendum tam varie tam iucunda gignit, neque ea uno tempore anni, ut semper et novitate delectemur et copia. Quam tempestivos autem dedit quam salutares non modo hominum sed etiam pecudum generi, is denique omnibus quae oriuntur e terra, ventos etesias; quorum flatu nimii temperantur calores, ab isdem etiam maritimi cursus celeres et certi diriguntur. Multa praetereunda sunt et tamen multa dicuntur.	

LATIN

ENGLISH

I could cite many other remarkable things in other places, many fields fertile in various crops. But how great is nature's kindness in producing so many things to eat, so varied and so pleasant, and not at one season of the year only, so that we may always delight in both novelty and abundance! And how timely, how healthful—not only for the human race but for herds as well, and indeed for everything that grows from the earth—are the Etesian winds she has given! Their breath tempers excessive heat, and by them, too, swift and sure voyages at sea are steered. Much must be passed over, and yet much is being said.[35]

2.132 enumerari enim non possunt fluminum oportunitates, aestus maritimi †multum accedentes et recedentes, montes vestiti atque silvestres, salinae ab ora maritima remotissimae, medicamentorum salutarium plenissumae terrae, artes denique innumerabiles ad victum et ad vitam necessariae. Iam diei noctisque vicissitudo conservat animantes tribuens aliud agendi tempus aliud quiescendi.

for it is impossible to list the advantages of rivers, the tides of the sea flowing in and out, the mountains clothed in forest, the salt deposits far from the seacoast, the lands full of healing drugs, and finally the countless arts needed for livelihood and for life. Then the alternation of day and night preserves living creatures, giving them one time for activity and another for rest.

Sic undique omni ratione concluditur mente consilioque divino omnia in hoc mundo ad salutem omnium conservationemque admirabiliter administrari.

So from every side and by every argument the conclusion is reached that all things in this world are wonderfully governed by divine mind and plan for the safety and preservation of all.

THE MAKING OF MAN

The body's design, the senses, the hand, reason and speech: the world was made for gods and humans.

LATIN

ENGLISH

2.133 **BALBUS** Sin quaeret quispiam cuiusnam causa tantarum rerum molitio facta sit—arborumne et herbarum, quae quamquam sine sensu sunt tamen a natura sustinentur: at id quidem absurdum est; an bestiarum: nihilo probabilius deos mutarum et nihil intellegentium causa tantum laborasse. quorum igitur causa quis dixerit effectum esse mundum? eorum scilicet animantium quae ratione utuntur; hi sunt di et homines; quibus profecto nihil est melius, ratio est enim quae praestet omnibus ita fit credibile deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum quaeque in eo mundo sint omnia.

BALBUS But suppose someone asks for whose sake this vast work was undertaken. For the trees and plants, which, though without sensation, are sustained by nature? That is absurd. For the beasts? It is no more plausible that the gods went to so much trouble for mute creatures that understand nothing. For whose sake, then, would anyone say the world was made? Surely for those living beings that use reason—that is, gods and humans. Nothing, certainly, is better than they, for it is reason that surpasses all things. So it becomes credible that the world, and everything in that world, was made for the sake of gods and humans.

And it will be easier to understand that the immortal gods have provided for human beings if we

35 The Etesian winds are the steady northerly winds that blow over the eastern Mediterranean in summer.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Faciliusque intellegetur a dis inmortalibus hominibus esse provisum, si erit tota hominis fabricatio perspecta omnisque humanae naturae figura atque perfectio.	examine the whole construction of the human being and the entire form and perfection of human nature.
2.134	Nam cum tribus rebus animantium vita teneatur, cibo potione spiritu, ad haec omnia percipienda os est aptissimum quod adiunctis naribus spiritu augetur, dentibus autem in ore constructis mandatur atque ab is extenuatur et mollitur cibus. eorum adversi acuti morsu dividunt escas, intimi autem conficiunt qui genuini vocantur; quae confectio etiam a lingua adiuvari videtur.	Since the life of living creatures depends on three things—food, drink and breath—the mouth is perfectly suited to taking in all of them. With the nostrils joined to it, it is supplied with more breath, while the food is chewed by the teeth set in the mouth and is broken down and softened by them. The front teeth, which are sharp, bite and divide the food; the back teeth, called molars, grind it up; and this grinding seems to be helped by the tongue as well.
2.135	linguam autem ad radices eius haerens excipit stomachus, quo primum inlabuntur ea quae accepta sunt ore. is utraque ex parte tosillas attingens palato extremo atque intimo terminatur atque is agitatione et motibus linguae cum depulsum et quasi detrusum cibum accepit depellit. ipsius autem partes eae quae sunt infra quam id quod devoratur dilatantur, quae autem supra contrahuntur.	the tongue, at its root, is met by the gullet, into which whatever has been taken into the mouth first slides. Touching the tonsils on either side, the gullet ends at the farthest, innermost part of the palate; and when it has received the food driven and, as it were, thrust down by the agitation and movements of the tongue, it pushes it on. The parts of the gullet below what is being swallowed widen, while those above contract.
2.136	Sed cum aspera arteria (sic enim a medicis appellatur) ostium habeat adiunctum linguae radicibus paulo supra quam ad linguam stomachus adnectitur, eaque ad pulmones usque pertineat excipiatque animam eam quae ductast spiritu eandemque a pulmonibus respiret et reddat, tegitur quodam quasi operculo, quod ob eam causam datum est, ne si quid in eam cibi forte incidisset spiritus impediretur.	But the windpipe (the "rough artery," as physicians call it) has its opening joined to the root of the tongue, a little above the point where the gullet is attached to the tongue; it extends all the way to the lungs, receiving the air drawn in by breathing and breathing it out again from the lungs and returning it. So it is covered by a kind of lid, given for this reason: so that if any food happened to fall into it, the breathing would not be obstructed.
	Sed cum alvi natura subiecta stomacho cibi et potionis sit receptaculum, pulmones autem et cor extrinsecus spiritum ducant, in alvo multa sunt mirabiliter effecta, quae constant fere e nervis; est autem multiplex et tortuosa arcetque et continet sive illud aridum est sive umidum quod recepit, ut id mutari et concoqui possit, eaque tum adstringitur tum relaxatur, atque omne quod accepit cogit et confundit, ut facile et calore, quem multum habet, et terendo cibo et praeterea spiritu omnia cocta atque confecta in reliquum corpus dividantur. in pulmonibus autem inest raritas quaedam et adsimilis spongiis mollitudo ad hauriendum spiritum aptissima, qui tum se contrahunt adspirantes tum †inre spiritu dilatantur, ut frequenter ducatur cibus animalis, quo maxime aluntur animantes.	Since the stomach, set beneath the gullet, is the receptacle for food and drink, while the lungs and heart draw in breath from outside, many wonderful things have been accomplished in the stomach, which consists mostly of sinews. It is manifold and winding, and it confines and holds whatever it has received, dry or moist, so that it can be transformed and digested. It now tightens, now relaxes, and compresses and mixes everything it has received, so that by its heat, of which it has a great deal, by the grinding of the food, and also by breath, everything is digested and worked up and then distributed to the rest of the body. In the lungs there is a certain porousness and a sponge-like softness perfectly suited to drawing in breath. They contract as they breathe

LATIN	ENGLISH
	out and expand when breath comes in, so that the food of the breath, by which living creatures are chiefly nourished, is drawn in again and again.
2.137 Ex intestinis autem †alvo secretus a reliquo cibo sucus is quo alimur permanat ad iecur per quasdam a medio intestino usque ad portas iecoris (sic enim appellantur) ductas et directas vias, quae pertinent ad iecur eique adhaerent; atque inde aliae … pertinentes sunt, per quas cadit cibus a iecore dilapsus. ab eo cibo cum est secreta bilis eique umores qui e renibus profunduntur, reliqua se in sanguinem vertunt ad easdemque portas iecoris confluunt ad quas omnes eius viae pertinent; per quas lapsus cibus in hoc ipso loco in eam venam quae cava appellatur confunditur perque eam ad cor confectus iam coctusque perlabitur; a corde autem in totum corpus distribuitur per venas admodum multas in omnes partes corporis pertinentes.	From the intestines and the stomach, the juice by which we are nourished, once it has been separated from the rest of the food, seeps through to the liver along certain passages that run straight from the middle of the intestine to the gates of the liver (as they are called), reaching the liver and attached to it. From there other passages … extend, through which the food flows down after it has passed through the liver. When the bile and the fluids discharged from the kidneys have been separated from this food, the rest turns into blood and flows to those same gates of the liver to which all its passages lead. Through these the food glides, and at this very place pours into the vein called the vena cava, the "hollow vein"; through it, now worked up and digested, it flows down to the heart; and from the heart it is distributed through the whole body by a great many veins reaching every part of the body.
2.138 Quem ad modum autem reliquiae cibi depellantur tum astringentibus se intestinis tum relaxantibus, haud sane difficile dictu est, sed tamen praetereundum est, ne quid habeat iniucunditatis oratio. Illa potius explicetur incredibilis fabrica naturae: nam quae spiritu in pulmones anima ducitur, ea calescit primum ipso ab spiritu, deinde contagione pulmonum, ex eaque pars redditur respirando, pars concipitur cordis parte quadam quam ventriculum cordis appellant, cui similis alter adiunctus est, in quem sanguis a iecore per venam illam cavam influit. eoque modo ex is partibus et sanguis per venas in omne corpus diffunditur et spiritus per arterias; utraeque autem crebrae multaeque toto corpore intextae vim quandam incredibilem artificiosi operis divinique testantur.	How the remains of food are expelled, as the intestines now contract and now relax, would not be hard to describe. But I must pass over it, so that my speech has nothing unpleasant in it. Let me explain instead this incredible piece of nature's workmanship. The air drawn into the lungs by breathing is warmed first by the breathing itself and then by contact with the lungs. Part of it is given back as we breathe out. Part is taken in by a certain part of the heart which they call the ventricle of the heart. Joined to it is a second, similar one, into which the blood flows from the liver through that vena cava. In this way, from these parts, the blood is spread through the veins into the whole body, and the breath through the arteries. Both are numerous and closely woven through the whole body, and they bear witness to an incredible power of craftsmanlike and divine work.
2.139 Quid dicam de ossibus; quae subiecta corpori mirabiles commissuras habent et ad stabilitatem aptas et ad artus finiendos adcommodatas et ad motum et ad omnem corporis actionem. Huc adde nervos, a quibus artus continentur, eorumque inplicationem corpore toto pertinentem, qui sicut venae et arteriae a corde tractae et profectae in corpus omne ducuntur.	What should I say of the bones? Set beneath the body as its framework, they have marvelous joints, suited for stability, adapted to marking off the limbs, and fit for movement and for every action of the body. Add to these the sinews, which hold the limbs together, and their interweaving, which extends through the whole body. Like the

LATIN

ENGLISH

veins and arteries, they start out from the heart and are drawn into the whole body.

2.140 Ad hanc providentiam naturae tam diligentem tamque sollertem adiungi multa possunt, e quibus intellegatur quantae res hominibus a dis quamque eximiae tributae sint. Qui primum eos humo excitatos celsos et erectos constituit, ut deorum cognitionem caelum intuentes capere possent. sunt enim ex terra homines non ut incolae atque habitatores sed quasi spectatores superarum rerum atque caelestium, quarum spectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet. Sensus autem interpretes ac nuntii rerum in capite tamquam in arce mirifice ad usus necessarios et facti et conlocati sunt. nam oculi tamquam speculatores altissimum locum optinent, ex quo plurima conspicientes fungantur suo munere;

To this providence of nature, so careful and so skillful, many things can be added. From them one may understand how great and how outstanding are the gifts the gods have bestowed on human beings. First, humans were raised from the ground and made tall and upright, so that by gazing at the heavens they could gain knowledge of the gods. For human beings are on earth not as its inhabitants and residents but as spectators, so to speak, of the things above and in the heavens—a spectacle that concerns no other kind of living creature. The senses, the interpreters and messengers of things, have been made and placed in the head, as in a citadel, in a wonderful way for the uses they must serve. The eyes, like lookouts, occupy the highest place, from which they can see the most and so perform their task;

2.141 et aures, cum sonum percipere debeant qui natura in sublime fertur, recte in altis corporum partibus collocatae sunt; itemque nares et, quod omnis odor ad supera fertur, recte sursum sunt et, quod cibi et potionis iudicium magnum earum est, non sine causa vicinitatem oris secutae sunt. iam gustatus, qui sentire eorum quibus vescimur genera deberet, habitat in ea parte oris qua esculentis et posculentis iter natura patefecit. tactus autem toto corpore aequabiliter fusus est, ut omnes ictus omnesque nimios et frigoris et caloris adpulsus sentire possimus. atque ut in aedificiis architecti avertunt ab oculis naribusque dominorum ea quae profluentia necessario taetri essent aliquid habitura, sic natura res similis procul amandavit a sensibus.

and the ears, since they must catch sound, which by nature travels upward, are rightly placed in the high parts of the body. Likewise the nostrils: since every smell travels upward, they rightly point up, and since they play a large part in judging food and drink, it is not without reason that they have sought the neighborhood of the mouth. Taste, which was to perceive the kinds of things we eat, lives in that part of the mouth where nature has opened a passage for food and drink. Touch is spread evenly over the whole body, so that we can feel every blow and every excessive onset of cold and heat. And just as architects in buildings keep away from the eyes and noses of the owners whatever must drain off and would inevitably be somewhat foul, so nature has banished similar things far from the senses.

2.142 Quis vero opifex praeter naturam, qua nihil potest esse callidius, tantam sollertiam persequi potuisset in sensibus? Quae primum oculos membranis tenuissimis vestivit et saepsit; quas primum perlucidas fecit ut per eas cerni posset, firmas autem ut continerentur. sed lubricos oculos fecit et mobiles, ut et declinarent si quid noceret et aspectum quo vellent facile converterent; aciesque ipsa qua cernimus, quae pupula vocatur, ita parva est ut ea quae nocere possint facile vitet; palpebraeque, quae sunt tegmenta oculorum, mollissimae tactu ne laederent aciem, aptissime factae et ad claudendas pupulas ne quid incideret et ad

What craftsman other than nature, than which nothing can be more ingenious, could have achieved such skill in the senses? First, she clothed and fenced the eyes with very thin membranes. She made these transparent, so that one could see through them, but firm, so that the eyes would be held in place. She made the eyes slippery and mobile, so that they could turn away from anything harmful and easily direct their gaze wherever they wished. The very point of sight with which we see, called the pupil, is so small that it easily avoids things that could harm it. The

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	aperiendas, idque providit ut identidem fieri posset cum maxima celeritate.	eyelids, which are the coverings of the eyes, are very soft to the touch so as not to hurt the pupil. They are perfectly made both for closing the pupils, so that nothing falls in, and for opening them; and nature has provided that this can happen again and again with the greatest speed.
2.143	munitaeque sunt palpebrae tamquam vallo pilorum, quibus et apertis oculis si quid incideret repelleretur et somno coniventibus, cum oculis ad cernendum non egeremus, ut qui tamquam involuti quiescerent. latent praeterea utiliter et excelsis undique partibus saepiuntur. primum enim superiora superciliis obducta sudorem a capite et fronte defluentem repellunt; genae deinde ab inferiore parte tutantur subiectae leviterque eminentes; nasusque ita locatus est ut quasi murus oculis interiectus esse videatur.	The eyelids are fortified with a palisade, as it were, of hairs. When the eyes are open, these drive off anything that falls in. When the eyes close in sleep and we do not need them for seeing, the hairs let them rest as if wrapped up. Besides, the eyes are usefully recessed and fenced in by raised parts on every side. First, the parts above, covered by the eyebrows, ward off the sweat running down from the head and forehead. Then the cheeks, set below and projecting slightly, protect them from beneath. And the nose is placed so that it seems like a wall set between the eyes.
2.144	Auditus autem semper patet, eius enim sensu etiam dormientes egemus, a quo cum sonus est acceptus etiam e somno excitamur. flexuosum iter habet, ne quid intrare possit si simplex et directum pateret; provisum etiam ut si qua minima bestiola conaretur inrumpere in sordibus aurium tamquam in visco inhaeresceret. extra autem eminent quae appellantur aures, et tegendi causa factae tutandique sensus, et ne adiectae voces laberentur atque errarent prius quam sensus ab his pulsus esset. sed duros et quasi corneolos habent introitus multisque cum flexibus, quod his naturis relatus amplificatur sonus; quocirca et in fidibus testudine resonatur aut cornu, et ex tortuosis locis et inclusis referuntur ampliores.	Hearing, however, is always open, for we need this sense even when asleep: when it has received a sound, we are roused even from sleep. It has a winding passage, so that nothing can get in, as it could if the passage were simple and straight. Provision has also been made that if some tiny creature tries to break in, it gets stuck in the earwax as if in birdlime. On the outside project what are called the ears. They were made both to cover and protect the sense and to keep the voices that reach them from slipping away and wandering off before the sense has been struck by them. Their entrances are hard and almost horny, with many windings, because in materials of this kind sound is reflected and amplified. That is why in stringed instruments the resonance comes from tortoiseshell or horn, and why sounds come back louder from winding and enclosed places.
2.145	Similiter nares, quae semper propter necessarias utilitates patent, contractiores habent introitus, ne quid in eas quod noceat possit pervadere; umoremque semper habent ad pulverem multaque alia depellenda non inutilem. Gustatus praeclare saeptus est; ore enim continetur et ad usum apte et ad incolumitatis custodiam.	Similarly the nostrils, which are always open because of their necessary functions, have narrower entrances, so that nothing harmful can get into them. They always contain a moisture that is quite useful for keeping out dust and much else. Taste is splendidly fenced in: it is enclosed in the mouth, an arrangement well suited both to its use and to keeping it safe.
	Omnesque sensus hominum multo antecellunt sensibus bestiarum. Primum enim oculi in his artibus, quarum iudicium est oculorum, in pictis fictis caelatisque formis,	And all the senses of human beings far surpass those of animals. First, in the arts that the eyes judge—painted, modeled, and engraved forms—

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	in corporum etiam motione atque gestu multa cernunt subtilius, colorum etiam et figurarum †tum venustatem atque ordinem et ut ita dicam decentiam oculi iudicant, atque etiam alia maiora: nam et virtutes et vitia cognoscunt, iratum propitium, laetantem dolentem, fortem ignavum, audacem timidumque cognoscunt.	and in the movement and gesture of bodies too, our eyes discern many things more finely. The eyes also judge the beauty, order, and, if I may call it so, the propriety of colors and shapes. They judge greater things besides, for they recognize virtues and vices: they recognize the angry and the kindly, the glad and the grieving, the brave and the cowardly, the bold and the timid.
2.146	Auriumque item est admirabile quoddam artificiosumque iudicium, quo iudicatur et in vocis et in tibiarum nervorumque cantibus varietas sonorum intervalla distinctio, et vocis genera permulta, canorum fuscum, leve asperum, grave acutum, flexibile durum, quae hominum solum auribus iudicantur. Nariumque item et gustandi et †parte tangendi magna iudicia sunt. ad quos sensus capiendos et perfruendos plures etiam quam vellem artes repertae sunt; perspicuum est enim quo conpositiones unguentorum, quo ciborum conditiones, quo corporum lenocinia processerint.	The ears, likewise, have a wonderful and skilled power of judgment. In the voice and in the music of pipes and strings, they judge the variety of sounds, the intervals, and the distinctions. They also judge very many kinds of voice—resonant and dull, smooth and rough, deep and high, flexible and hard—and only human ears can judge these. Smell, taste, and to some extent touch also have great powers of judgment. To capture and enjoy these senses, even more arts have been invented than I would like; for it is obvious how far the blending of perfumes, the seasoning of foods, and the allurements of the body have gone.
2.147	Iam vero animum ipsum mentemque hominis rationem consilium prudentiam qui non divina cura perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere. De quo dum disputarem tuam mihi dari vellem Cotta eloquentiam. quo enim tu illa modo diceres, quanta primum intellegentia deinde consequentium rerum cum primis coniunctio et conprehensio esset in nobis; ex quo videlicet iudicamus quid ex quibusque rebus efficiatur, idque ratione concludimus, singulasque res definimus circumscripteque conplectimur; ex quo scientia intellegitur quam vim habeat qualisque sit, qua ne in deo quidem est res ulla praestantior. quanta vero illa sunt, quae vos Academici infirmatis et tollitis, quod et sensibus et animo ea quae extra sunt percipimus atque conprendimus;	And as for the mind and intellect of a human being, with its reason, judgment, and good sense: anyone who does not see that they were perfected by divine care seems to me to lack these very things. While discussing this, I wish I were given your eloquence, Cotta. How you would describe, first, how great our understanding is, and then our capacity to link consequences with their premises and grasp them together! By this, of course, we judge what follows from each thing and draw conclusions by reasoning. We define individual things and grasp them in precise outline. From this we understand what power knowledge has and what it is like—and not even in a god is there anything more excellent. And how great are those things that you Academics weaken and abolish: that we perceive and grasp external things both with the senses and with the mind;
2.148	ex quibus conlatis inter se et conparatis artes quoque efficimus partim ad usum vitae partim ad oblectationem necessarias. Iam vero domina rerum, ut vos soletis dicere, eloquendi vis quam est praeclara quamque divina. quae primum efficit ut et ea quae ignoramus discere et ea quae scimus alios docere possimus; deinde hac cohortamur hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes conprimimus hac cupiditates iracundiasque	and from these, gathered and compared with one another, we also create arts, needed partly for the practical uses of life and partly for enjoyment. And then the power of speech, the "queen of all things," as you like to call it—how splendid it is, and how divine! First, it enables us to learn what we do not know and to teach others what we do know. Then, with it we exhort, with it we persuade; with it we console the afflicted, with it we

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	restinguimus, haec nos iuris legum urbium societate devinxit, haec a vita inmani et fera segregavit.	lead the terrified away from fear; with it we restrain the overexcited, with it we quench desires and fits of anger. It is speech that has bound us together in a community of justice, laws, and cities. It is speech that has separated us from a savage and brutish life.
2.149	Ad usum autem orationis incredibile est, nisi diligenter attenderis, quanta opera machinata natura sit. primum enim a pulmonibus arteria usque ad os intimum pertinet, per quam vox principium a mente ducens percipitur et funditur. deinde in ore sita lingua est finita dentibus; ea vocem inmoderate profusam fingit et terminat atque sonos vocis distinctos et pressos efficit, cum et dentes et alias partes pellit oris; itaque plectri similem linguam nostri solent dicere, chordarum dentes, nares cornibus is quae ad nervos resonant in cantibus.	It is incredible, unless you look closely, how much work nature has contrived for the use of speech. First, the windpipe runs from the lungs right up to the back of the mouth. Through it the voice, which takes its origin from the mind, is caught and poured out. Next, the tongue is set in the mouth, bounded by the teeth. It shapes and limits the voice, which would otherwise pour out without measure, and produces distinct and clipped vocal sounds when it strikes the teeth and other parts of the mouth. That is why our people say the tongue is like the plectrum, the teeth like the strings, and the nostrils like the horns that resonate to the strings in music.
2.150	Quam vero aptas quamque multarum artium ministras manus natura homini dedit. Digitorum enim contractio facilis facilisque porrectio propter molles commissuras et artus nullo in motu laborat. itaque ad pingendum fingendum, ad scalpendum, ad nervorum eliciendos sonos ad tibiarum apta manus est admotione digitorum. Atque haec oblectationis, illa necessitatis, cultus dico agrorum extructionesque tectorum, tegumenta corporum vel texta vel suta omnemque fabricam aeris et ferri; ex quo intellegitur ad inventa animo percepta sensibus adhibitis opificum manibus omnia nos consecutos, ut tecti ut vestiti ut salvi esse possemus, urbes muros domicilia delubra haberemus.	And how well adapted are the hands nature has given to humans, and how serviceable to many arts! Thanks to the supple joints and limbs, the fingers bend easily and straighten easily, with no strain in any movement. So the hand, by the movement of the fingers, is fit for painting, for modeling, for carving, and for drawing sounds from strings and from pipes. These things are for enjoyment. The others are for necessity—I mean the tilling of fields, the building of houses, clothing for the body, whether woven or sewn, and all work in bronze and iron. From this we understand that we have obtained everything by applying the hands of craftsmen to what the mind invented and the senses perceived. In this way we could have shelter, clothing, and safety, and could possess cities, walls, homes, and temples.
2.151	Iam vero operibus hominum id est manibus cibi etiam varietas invenitur et copia. nam et agri multa efferunt manu quaesita, quae vel statim consumantur vel mandentur condita vetustati, et praeterea vescimur bestiis et terrenis et aquatilibus et volantibus partim capiendo partim alendo. Efficimus etiam domitu nostro quadripedum vectiones, quorum celeritas atque vis nobis ipsis adfert vim et celeritatem. nos onera quibusdam bestiis nos iuga inponimus; nos elephantorum acutissumis sensibus nos sagacitate canum ad utilitatem nostram abutimur; nos e terrae cavernis ferrum elicimus	Moreover, by human work, that is, by our hands, we also obtain variety and abundance of food. The fields yield many things won by hand, to be eaten at once or stored and preserved for later. Besides, we feed on animals of the land, the water, and the air, partly by catching them and partly by raising them. By taming four-footed beasts we also gain the means of riding, and their speed and strength give us strength and speed. We put loads on some animals, yokes on others. We exploit the keen senses of elephants and the sharp noses of dogs

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	rem ad colendos agros necessariam, nos aeris argenti auri venas penitus abditas invenimus et ad usum aptas et ad ornatum decoras.	for our own benefit. We draw iron, a thing necessary for tilling the fields, from the caverns of the earth. We find deeply hidden veins of copper, silver, and gold, suitable for use and beautiful as ornament.
	Arborum autem confectione omnique materia et culta et silvestri partim ad calficiendum corpus igni adhibito et ad mitigandum cibum utimur, partim ad aedificandum, ut tectis saepti frigora caloresque pellamus;	We use the felling of trees and all timber, both cultivated and wild, partly to warm our bodies and soften our food by applying fire, and partly to build, so that, sheltered by roofs, we may keep off cold and heat;
2.152	magnos vero usus adfert ad navigia facienda, quorum cursibus suppeditantur omnes undique ad vitam copiae; quasque res violentissimas natura genuit earum moderationem nos soli habemus, maris atque ventorum, propter nauticarum rerum scientiam, plurimisque maritimis rebus fruimur atque utimur. Terrenorum item commodorum omnis est in homine dominatus: nos campis nos montibus fruimur, nostri sunt amnes nostri lacus, nos fruges serimus nos arbores; nos aquarum inductionibus terris fecunditatem damus, nos flumina arcemus derigimus avertimus; nostris denique manibus in rerum natura quasi alteram naturam efficere conamur.	but timber is also of great use in building ships, whose voyages bring supplies for life from every quarter. Over the most violent things nature has produced, the sea and the winds, we alone have control, thanks to our knowledge of seamanship; and we enjoy and use a great many products of the sea. Likewise, all mastery over the benefits of the land lies with humans. We enjoy the plains, we enjoy the mountains; the rivers are ours, the lakes are ours; we sow grain, we plant trees; we make the land fertile by irrigation; we dam rivers, straighten them, divert them. In short, with our hands we try to create, as it were, a second nature within the natural world.
2.153	Quid vero hominum ratio non in caelum usque penetravit? soli enim ex animantibus nos astrorum ortus obitus cursusque cognovimus, ab hominum genere finitus est dies mensis annus, defectiones solis et lunae cognitae praedictaeque in omne posterum tempus, quae quantae quando futurae sint. Quae contuens animus accedit ad cognitionem deorum, e qua oritur pietas, cui coniuncta iustitia est reliquaeque virtutes, e quibus vita beata existit par et similis deorum, nulla alia re nisi immortalitate, quae nihil ad bene vivendum pertinet, cedens caelestibus.	And where has human reason not penetrated, even into the heavens? We alone of living creatures have learned the risings, settings, and courses of the stars. The human race has defined the day, the month, and the year. Eclipses of the sun and moon have been understood and predicted for all future time: what kind they will be, how great, and when they will occur. Contemplating these things, the mind arrives at knowledge of the gods, and from this piety arises. Joined to piety are justice and the other virtues, and from them arises a blessed life, equal and similar to that of the gods. It yields to the heavenly beings in nothing except immortality, which has nothing to do with living well.
	Quibus rebus expositis satis docuisse videor hominis natura quanto omnis anteiret animantes. ex quo debet intellegi nec figuram situmque membrorum nec ingenii mentisque vim talem effici potuisse fortuna.	Having set out these points, I think I have shown well enough how far human nature surpasses all living creatures. From this it should be understood that neither the shape and arrangement of our limbs nor such power of intellect and mind could have been produced by chance.

CARE FOR HUMANKIND

Everything in the world serves us, and the gods care for nations and for individuals.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2.154	**BALBUS** Restat ut doceam atque aliquando perorem, omnia quae sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata.	**BALBUS** It remains for me to show—and then at last to conclude—that everything in this world that human beings use was made and provided for the sake of human beings.
	Principio ipse mundus deorum hominumque causa factus est, quaeque in eo sunt ea parata ad fructum hominum et inventa sunt. Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque; soli enim ratione utentes iure ac lege vivunt. ut igitur Athenas et Lacedaemonem Atheniensium Lacedaemoniorumque causa putandum est conditas esse, omniaque quae sint in his urbibus eorum populorum recte esse dicuntur, sic quaecumque sunt in omni mundo deorum atque hominum putanda sunt.	First, the world itself was made for the sake of gods and humans, and the things in it were provided and devised for human use. For the world is, as it were, a common home of gods and humans, or a city belonging to both; for they alone use reason and live by justice and law. We must suppose that Athens and Sparta were founded for the sake of the Athenians and the Spartans, and everything in those cities is rightly said to belong to those peoples. In the same way, whatever is in the whole world must be regarded as belonging to gods and humans.
2.155	Iam vero circumitus solis et lunae reliquorumque siderum, quamquam etiam ad mundi cohaerentiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus praebent; nulla est enim insatiabilior species, nulla pulchrior et ad rationem sollertiamque praestantior; eorum enim cursus dimetati maturitates temporum et varietates mutationesque cognovimus. quae si hominibus solis nota sunt, hominum facta esse causa iudicandum est.	The circuits of the sun, the moon, and the other stars also serve the cohesion of the world, but they nevertheless provide a spectacle for human beings. For no sight is more inexhaustible, none more beautiful, none more conducive to reason and skill. By measuring their courses we have come to know the ripening of the seasons and their variations and changes. And if these things are known to humans alone, we must judge that they were made for the sake of humans.
2.156	Terra vero feta frugibus et vario leguminum genere, quae cum maxuma largitate fundit, ea ferarumne an hominum causa gignere videtur? quid de vitibus olivetisque dicam, quarum uberrumi laetissumique fructus nihil omnino ad bestias pertinent; neque enim serendi neque colendi nec tempestive demetendi percipiendique fructus neque condendi ac reponendi ulla pecudum scientia est, earumque omnium rerum hominum est et usus et cura.	As for the earth, teeming with grain and every kind of legume, which she pours out in the greatest abundance—does she seem to bring these forth for the sake of wild beasts or of humans? What should I say of vines and olive groves, whose rich and abundant fruits have nothing whatever to do with animals? For no beast has any knowledge of sowing or tending, or of reaping and gathering the harvest in season, or of storing and laying it up. The use and care of all these things belong to humans.
2.157	ut fides igitur et tibias eorum causa factas dicendum est qui illis uti possent, sic ea quae dixi is solis confitendum est esse parata qui utuntur, nec, si quae bestiae furantur aliquid ex is aut rapiunt, illarum quoque causa ea nata esse dicemus. neque enim homines murum aut formicarum causa frumentum condunt sed coniugum et	So, just as we must say that lyres and pipes were made for the sake of those who could use them, we must admit that the things I have mentioned were provided only for those who use them. If some animals steal or snatch some of them, we shall not say that these things were produced for the anim-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	liberorum et familiarum suarum; itaque bestiae furtim ut dixi fruuntur, domini palam et libere;	als' sake too. People do not store grain for the sake of mice or ants, but for their wives, their children, and their households. So the animals, as I said, enjoy these things by stealth, while the owners enjoy them openly and freely;
2.158	hominum igitur causa eas rerum copias comparatas fatendum est. nisi forte tanta ubertas varietasque pomorum eorumque iucundus non gustatus solum sed odoratus etiam et aspectus dubitationem adfert quin hominibus solis ea natura donaverit. Tantumque abest ut haec bestiarum etiam causa parata sint, ut ipsas bestias hominum gratia generatas esse videamus. quid enim oves aliud adferunt nisi ut earum villis confectis atque contextis homines vestiantur; quae quidem neque ali neque sustentari neque ullum fructum edere ex se sine cultu hominum et curatione potuissent. canum vero tam fida custodia tamque amans dominorum adulatio tantumque odium in externos et tam incredibilis ad investigandum sagacitas narium tanta alacritas in venando quid significat aliud nisi se ad hominum commoditates esse generatos.	we must therefore admit that this abundance of things was provided for the sake of humans. Unless perhaps such richness and variety of fruits, delightful not only to taste but also to smell and to look at, leaves any doubt that nature has bestowed them on humans alone. These things are so far from having been provided for animals as well that we see the animals themselves were created for the sake of humans. For what do sheep offer, except that their wool, dressed and woven, clothes human beings? Indeed, without human care and tending they could not have been fed or kept alive or yielded any product. And dogs—their faithful watchfulness, their loving fawning on their masters, their hatred of strangers, the incredible keenness of their noses in tracking, their eagerness in hunting—what does all this signify except that they were created for human convenience?
2.159	quid de bubus loquar; quorum ipsa terga declarant non esse se ad onus accipiendum figurata, cervices autem natae ad iugum, tum vires umerorum et latitudines ad aratra †extrahenda. quibus cum terrae subigerentur fissione glebarum ab illo aureo genere, ut poetae loquuntur, vis nulla umquam adferebatur: ferrea tum vero proles exorta repentest ausaque funestum primast fabricarier ensem et gustare manu iunctum domitumque iuvencum: tanta putabatur utilitas percipi e bubus, ut eorum visceribus vesci scelus haberetur. longum est mulorum persequi utilitates et asinorum, quae certe ad hominum usum paratae sunt.	What should I say of oxen? Their very backs show that they were not shaped to carry loads, but their necks were born for the yoke, and the strength and breadth of their shoulders for drawing the plow. Since it was with their help that the earth was broken up by splitting the clods, that golden race, as the poets put it, never did them any violence: "But then the iron brood sprang up all at once, and first dared to forge the deadly sword and to taste the bullock yoked and tamed by hand." So great was the benefit thought to be gained from oxen that to eat their flesh was considered a crime. It would take too long to go through the uses of mules and donkeys, which were certainly provided for human service.[36]
2.160	sus vero quid habet praeter escam; cui quidem ne putesceret animam ipsam pro sale datam dicit esse Chrysippus; qua pecude, quod erat ad vescendum hominibus apta, nihil genuit natura fecundius. quid multitudinem suavitatemque piscium dicam, quid avium; ex quibus tanta percipitur voluptas, ut interdum Pronoea nostra Epicurea fuisse videatur, atque eae ne caperentur	And what does the pig have to offer except food? Chrysippus even says that its soul was given to it in place of salt, to keep it from going rotten. Since this animal was fit for humans to eat, nature made none more prolific. What should I say of the multitude and delicacy of fish, or of birds? So much pleasure is gained from them that our Pronoia

36 The lines come from Cicero's own verse translation of Aratus' *Phaenomena*, describing the end of the golden age.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quidem nisi hominum ratione atque sollertia; quamquam avis quasdam, et alites et oscines, ut nostri augures appellant, rerum augurandarum causa esse natas putamus.	sometimes seems to have been an Epicurean. And even these could not be caught except by human reason and skill. Yet we think some birds, the "flyers" and the "singers," as our augurs call them, were born for the purpose of taking auguries.[37]
2.161	iam vero immanes et feras beluas nanciscimur venando, ut et vescamur is et exerceamur in venando ad similitudinem bellicae disciplinae et utamur domitis et condocefactis, ut elephantis, multaque ex earum corporibus remedia morbis et vulneribus eligamus, sicut ex quibusdam stirpibus et herbis, quarum utilitates longinqui temporis usu et periclitatione percepimus. Totam licet animis tamquam oculis lustrare terram mariaque omnia: cernes iam spatia frugifera atque inmensa camporum vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum pastus, tum incredibili cursus maritimos celeritate.	Then there are the huge and savage beasts, which we obtain by hunting. We hunt them to eat them, to train ourselves in a way that resembles military discipline, and to use them once they are tamed and trained, as with elephants. From their bodies we also select many remedies for diseases and wounds, as we do from certain roots and herbs whose benefits we have learned through long use and testing. You may survey the whole earth and all the seas with the mind, as if with the eyes. You will see vast, fruitful stretches of plain, mountains densely clothed with forest, pastures for cattle, and ships making their voyages across the sea with incredible speed.
2.162	Nec vero supra terram sed etiam in intumis eius tenebris plurimarum rerum latet utilitas, quae ad usum hominum orta ab hominibus solis invenitur.	And not only on the earth's surface but also in its innermost darkness lies hidden the usefulness of many things. These came into being for human use, and humans alone discover them.
	Illud vero, quod uterque vestrum arripiet fortasse ad reprendendum, Cotta quia Carneades lubenter in Stoicos invehebatur, Velleius quia nihil tam inridet Epicurus quam praedictionem rerum futurarum, mihi videtur vel maxume confirmare deorum prudentia consuli rebus humanis. est enim profecto divinatio, quae multis locis rebus temporibus apparet cum in privatis tum maxume publicis:	There is one point that each of you will perhaps seize on to criticize. Cotta will, because Carneades loved attacking the Stoics; Velleius will, because Epicurus mocks nothing so much as the prediction of the future. Yet to me it seems to confirm more strongly than anything that the providence of the gods looks after human affairs. For divination certainly exists. It appears in many places, matters, and times, both in private affairs and, above all, in public ones:
2.163	multa cernunt haruspices multa augures provident, multa oraclis declarantur multa vaticinationibus multa somniis multa portentis; quibus cognitis multae saepe res ex hominum sententia atque utilitate partae, multa etiam pericula depulsa sunt. haec igitur sive vis sive ars sive natura ad scientiam rerum futurarum homini profecto est nec ali cuiquam a dis inmortalibus data.	soothsayers see many things, augurs foresee many, many are revealed by oracles, many by prophecies, many by dreams, many by portents. When these are understood, many things have often turned out as people wished and to their advantage, and many dangers have been averted. This power, then, or art, or natural gift for knowing the future has certainly been given by the immortal gods to humans and to no one else.
	Quae si singula vos forte non movent, universa certe tamen inter se conexa atque coniuncta movere debebant.	Even if these arguments taken one by one perhaps do not move you, taken all together, connected

37 Balbus turns Velleius' mocking name for providence (1.18) on his own school, since pleasure is the Epicurean good.

LATIN	ENGLISH
	and joined with one another, they surely ought to have moved you.
2.164 Nec vero universo generi hominum solum sed etiam singulis a dis inmortalibus consuli et provideri solet. Licet enim contrahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradatim ad pauciores postremo deducere ad singulos. nam si omnibus hominibus, qui ubique sunt quacumque in ora ac parte terrarum ab huiusce terrae quam nos incolimus continuatione distantium, deos consulere censemus ob has causas quas ante diximus, his quoque hominibus consulunt qui has nobiscum terras ab oriente ad occidentem colunt.	And the immortal gods regularly look after and provide not only for the human race as a whole but also for individuals. For we may narrow down the totality of the human race and bring it down step by step to smaller groups, and finally to individuals. We believe, for the reasons given earlier, that the gods take care of all human beings everywhere, on whatever coast or in whatever region of the earth they live, even those separated from the continuous land we inhabit. If so, they also take care of those who share with us these lands from east to west.
2.165 sin autem consulunt qui quasi magnam quandam insulam incolunt quam nos orbem terrae vocamus, etiam illis consulunt qui partes eius insulae tenent, Europam Asiam Africam. ergo et earum partes diligunt, ut Romam Athenas Spartam Rhodum, et earum urbium separatim ab universis singulos diligunt, ut Pyrrhi bello Curium Fabricium Coruncanium, primo Punico Calatinum Duellium Metellum Lutatium, secundo Maxumum Marcellum Africanum, post hos Paulum Gracchum Catonem, patrumve memoria Scipionem Laelium; multosque praeterea et nostra civitas et Graecia tulit singulares viros, quorum neminem nisi iuvante deo talem fuisse credendum est.	And if they take care of those who inhabit what we call the circle of the earth, a kind of great island, then they also take care of those who occupy the parts of that island: Europe, Asia, and Africa. Therefore they also love the parts of these, such as Rome, Athens, Sparta, and Rhodes. And within these cities they love individual men, apart from the whole community: in the war with Pyrrhus, Curius, Fabricius, and Coruncanius; in the First Punic War, Calatinus, Duilius, Metellus, and Lutatius; in the Second, Maximus, Marcellus, and Africanus; after them, Paullus, Gracchus, and Cato; or, in our fathers' time, Scipio and Laelius. Besides these, both our own state and Greece have produced many outstanding men, none of whom, we must believe, became what he was without the help of a god.[38]
2.166 quae ratio poetas maxumeque Homerum inpulit ut principibus heroum Ulixi Diomedi Agamemnoni Achilli certos deos discriminum et periculorum comites adiungeret. praeterea ipsorum deorum saepe praesentiae, quales supra commemoravi, declarant ab is et [in] civitatibus et singulis hominibus consuli quod quidem intellegitur etiam significationibus rerum futurarum, quae tum dormientibus tum vigilantibus portenduntur; multa praeterea ostentis, multa in extis admonemur multisque rebus aliis, quas diuturnus usus ita notavit ut artem divinationis efficeret.	It was this reasoning that led the poets, and Homer above all, to give the chief heroes—Ulysses, Diomedes, Agamemnon, Achilles—particular gods as companions in their trials and dangers. Moreover, the frequent appearances of the gods themselves, such as I mentioned earlier, show that they care for [those in] cities and for individual people. This is also understood from the signs of future events that are shown to us sometimes while we sleep, sometimes while we are awake. We are also warned by many portents, by many signs in the entrails, and by many other things, which long experience has observed so carefully that it has created an art of divination.

38 Roman leaders of the third and second centuries BC, from the war against Pyrrhus (280–275 BC) to Scipio Aemilianus and his friend Gaius Laelius.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2.167	nemo igitur vir magnus sine aliquo adflatu divino umquam fuit. Nec vero ita refellendum est ut, si segetibus aut vinetis cuiuspiam tempestas nocuerit, aut si quid e vitae commodis casus abstulerit, eum cui quid horum acciderit aut invisum deo aut neglectum a deo iudicemus. magna di curant, parva neglegunt. magnis autem viris prosperae semper omnes res, si quidem satis a nostris et a principe philosophiae Socrate dictum est de ubertatibus virtutis et copiis.	So no great man ever existed without some divine inspiration. But this is not to be refuted by the argument that, if a storm has damaged someone's crops or vineyards, or if some accident has taken away one of life's comforts, we should judge that the person it happened to is hated or neglected by a god. The gods care for great things; they neglect small ones. For great men, however, all things always go well—if, that is, enough has been said by our school and by Socrates, the prince of philosophy, about the riches and abundance of virtue.
2.168	Haec mihi fere in mentem veniebant quae dicenda putarem de natura deorum. tu autem Cotta si me audias eandem causam agas teque et principem civem et pontificem esse cogites et, quoniam in utramque partem vobis licet disputare, hanc potius sumas eamque facultatem disserendi, quam tibi a rhetoricis exercitationibus acceptam amplificavit Academia, potius huc conferas. mala enim et impia consuetudo est contra deos disputandi, sive ex animo id fit sive simulate.	These, roughly, are the things that occurred to me as worth saying about the nature of the gods. As for you, Cotta, if you would listen to me, you would plead the same cause and remember that you are both a leading citizen and a pontiff. You Academics are allowed to argue on either side, so you would choose this side instead. You would devote to it the skill in argument that you gained from rhetorical exercises and that the Academy has enlarged. For it is an evil and impious habit to argue against the gods, whether one does it sincerely or as a pretense.

Book III

The Academic reply
Cotta, a priest who keeps the ancestral religion, shows that the Stoics have proved none of it.

COTTA REPLIES TO BALBUS

A priest who keeps the ancestral rites asks the philosopher for his reasons.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3.1	COTTA Quae cum Balbus dixisset, tum adridens Cotta "Sero" inquit "mihi Balbe praecipis quid defendam. ego enim te disputante quid contra dicerem mecum ipse meditabar, neque tam refellendi tui causa quam ea quae minus intellegebam requirendi. cum autem suo cuique iudicio sit utendum, difficile factu est me id sentire quod tu velis."	COTTA When Balbus had finished, Cotta smiled and said, "You are too late, Balbus, in telling me what to defend. While you were speaking I was turning over in my mind what I might say against you, not so much to refute you as to ask about the points I did not quite understand. And since each of us must use his own judgment, it is hard for me to think what you would like me to think."
3.2	VELLEIUS Hic Velleius "Nescis" inquit "quanta cum expectatione Cotta sim te auditurus. iucundus enim Balbo nostro sermo tuus contra Epicurum fuit; praebebo igitur ego me tibi vicissim attentum contra Stoicos auditorem. spero enim te ut soles bene paratum venire."	VELLEIUS Here Velleius said, "You have no idea, Cotta, how eagerly I am waiting to hear you. Your speech against Epicurus gave our friend Balbus pleasure, so now it is my turn to be your attentive listener against the Stoics. I hope you come well prepared, as you usually do."
3.3	COTTA Tum Cotta "Sic mehercule" inquit "Vellei; neque enim mihi par ratio cum Lucilio est ac tecum fuit."	COTTA Then Cotta said, "I do indeed, by Hercules, Velleius. My task with Balbus is not the same as it was with you."
	VELLEIUS "Qui tandem" inquit ille.	VELLEIUS "How so, may I ask?" he said.
	COTTA "Quia mihi videtur Epicurus vester de dis immortalibus non magnopere pugnare: tantum modo negare deos esse non audet, ne quid invidiae subeat aut criminis; cum vero deos nihil agere nihil curare confirmat membrisque humanis esse praeditos sed eorum membrorum usum nullum habere, ludere videtur satisque putare si dixerit esse quandam beatam naturam et aeternam."	COTTA "Because it seems to me that your Epicurus does not put up much of a fight about the immortal gods. He merely lacks the nerve to deny that the gods exist, so as not to incur any odium or accusation. But when he asserts that the gods do nothing and care for nothing, and that they are equipped with human limbs but have no use for those limbs, he seems to be joking, and to think it enough to have said that there is some blessed and eternal nature."
3.4	A Balbo autem animadvertisti credo quam multa dicta sint quamque etiam si minus vera tamen apta inter se et cohaerentia. itaque cogito ut dixi non tam refellere eius orationem quam ea quae minus intellexi requirere. quare Balbe tibi permitto, responderene mihi malis de singulis	But you noticed, I think, how much Balbus said, and how consistent and coherent it was, even if not quite true. So, as I said, I intend not so much to refute his speech as to ask about the points I did not fully understand. Therefore, Balbus, I leave the choice to you: would you rather answer me

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	rebus quaerenti ex te ea quae parum accepi an universam audire orationem meam.	point by point as I ask you about what I have not properly grasped, or hear my whole speech straight through?
	BALBUS Tum Balbus: "Ego vero, si quid explanari tibi voles, respondere malo, sin me interrogare non tam intellegendi causa quam refellendi, utrum voles faciam, vel ad singula quae requires statim respondebo vel cum peroraris ad omnia."	BALBUS Then Balbus said: "For my part, if you want something explained to you, I would rather answer. But if you are questioning me not so much to understand as to refute, I will do whichever you like: either I will answer each point you raise at once, or I will answer them all when you have finished."
3.5	COTTA Tum Cotta "Optime" inquit; "quam ob rem sic agamus ut nos ipsa ducit oratio. Sed ante quam de re, pauca de me. non enim mediocriter moveor auctoritate tua Balbe orationeque ea quae me in perorando cohortabatur ut meminissem me et Cottam esse et pontificem; quod eo credo valebat, ut opiniones, quas a maioribus accepimus de dis immortalibus, sacra caerimonias religionesque defenderem. ego vero eas defendam semper semperque defendi, nec me ex ea opinione, quam a maioribus accepi de cultu deorum inmortalium, ullius umquam oratio aut docti aut indocti movebit. sed cum de religione agitur, Ti. Coruncanium P. Scipionem P. Scaevolam pontifices maximos, non Zenonem aut Cleanthen aut Chrysippum sequor, habeoque C.	COTTA Then Cotta said, "Excellent. So let us proceed as the argument itself leads us. But before I speak of the subject, a few words about myself. I am more than a little moved by your authority, Balbus, and by the close of your speech, which urged me to remember that I am both Cotta and a pontiff. That, I suppose, was meant to make me defend the beliefs about the immortal gods that we have received from our ancestors—the sacred observances, the rites, the religious duties. I will indeed defend them always, and I always have; and no one's speech, learned or unlearned, will ever move me from the belief about the worship of the immortal gods that I received from our ancestors. But when religion is in question, I follow the chief pontiffs Tiberius Coruncanius, Publius Scipio, and Publius Scaevola, not Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius[1]
	Laelium augurem eundemque sapientem quem potius audiam dicentem de religione in illa oratione nobili quam quemquam principem Stoicorum. cumque omnis populi Romani religio in sacra et in auspicia divisa sit, tertium adiunctum sit si quid praedictionis causa ex portentis et monstris Sibyllae interpretes haruspicesve monuerunt, harum ego religionum nullam umquam contemnendam putavi mihique ita persuasi, Romulum auspiciis Numam sacris constitutis fundamenta iecisse nostrae civitatis, quae numquam profecto sine summa placatione deorum inmortalium tanta esse potuisset."	Laelius, an augur and also a wise man, whom I would rather hear speaking about religion in that famous speech of his than any of the leading Stoics. The whole religion of the Roman people is divided into sacred rites and auspices, with a third part added: whatever warnings the interpreters of the Sibyl or the soothsayers have given, for the sake of prediction, on the basis of portents and prodigies. I have never thought that any of these religious observances should be despised. I have convinced myself that Romulus, by establishing the auspices, and Numa, by establishing the rites, laid the foundations of our state—which surely could never have become so great if the immortal gods had not been appeased to the utmost."[2]
3.6	Habes Balbe quid Cotta quid pontifex sentiat; fac nunc ego intellegam tu quid sentias; a te enim philosopho	There you have it, Balbus: what Cotta thinks, and what the pontiff thinks. Now let me understand

1 Like Coruncanius and Scaevola (see 1.115), Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica was a chief pontiff and an authority on sacred law.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	rationem accipere debeo religionis, maioribus autem nostris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere.	what you think. From you, a philosopher, I ought to receive a reasoned account of religion; but our ancestors I ought to believe even when no reason is given.
	BALBUS Tum Balbus "Quam igitur a me rationem" inquit "Cotta desideras?"	BALBUS Then Balbus said, "What account, then, Cotta, do you want from me?"
	COTTA Et ille "Quadripertita" inquit "fuit divisio tua, primum ut velles docere deos esse, deinde quales essent, tum ab is mundum regi, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis. haec, si recte memini, partitio fuit."	COTTA And he said, "Your division had four parts: first, you meant to show that the gods exist; next, what they are like; then, that the world is governed by them; and finally, that they take care of human affairs. That, if I remember rightly, was your outline."
	BALBUS "Rectissume" inquit Balbus; "sed expecto quid requiras."	BALBUS "Quite right," said Balbus, "but I am waiting to hear what you want to ask."

DO THE GODS EXIST?

Cotta believes it on his ancestors' authority; Balbus' proofs only make it doubtful.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3.7	COTTA Tum Cotta "Primum quidque videamus" inquit "et si id est primum, quod inter omnis nisi admodum impios convenit, mihi quidem ex animo exuri non potest, esse deos, id tamen ipsum, quod mihi persuasum est auctoritate maiorum, cur ita sit nihil tu me doces."	COTTA Then Cotta said, "Let us take each point in turn. The first point is one on which everyone agrees except the utterly impious, and for my part it cannot be burned out of my mind: that the gods exist. Yet about this very thing, of which the authority of our ancestors has persuaded me, you teach me nothing as to why it is so."
	BALBUS "Quid est" inquit Balbus, "si tibi persuasum est, cur a me velis discere?"	BALBUS "But if you are persuaded," said Balbus, "why do you want to learn it from me?"
	COTTA Tum Cotta "Quia sic adgredior" inquit "ad hanc disputationem, quasi nihil umquam audierim de dis immortalibus nihil cogitaverim; rudem me et integrum discipulum accipe et ea quae requiro doce."	COTTA Then Cotta said, "Because I am approaching this discussion as if I had never heard anything about the immortal gods, never given them a thought. Take me as a raw, untouched pupil, and teach me what I ask."
3.8	BALBUS "Dic igitur" inquit "quid requiras".	BALBUS "Tell me, then," he said, "what you are asking."
	COTTA "Egone, primum illud, cur, quom [perspicuum in] istam partem ne egere quidem oratione dixisses, quod esset perspicuum et inter omnis constaret deos esse, de eo ipso tam multa dixeris."	COTTA "Me? First this: why, when you had said that this part [, being obvious,] did not even need discussion—since it was obvious and agreed by everyone that the gods exist—did you say so much about that very point?"
	BALBUS "Quia te quoque" inquit "animadverti Cotta saepe cum in foro diceres quam plurimis posses	BALBUS "Because," he said, "I have noticed that you too, Cotta, when speaking in the Forum, often load the judge with as many arguments as you

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	argumentis onerare iudicem, si modo eam facultatem tibi daret causa. atque hoc idem et philosophi faciunt et ego ut potui feci. tu autem quod quaeris similiter facis ac si me roges cur te duobus contuear oculis et non altero coniveam, cum idem uno adsequi possim."	can, provided the case gives you the opportunity. Philosophers do the same, and I have done it as well as I could. But in asking this you are behaving just as if you asked me why I look at you with both eyes instead of closing one, since I could see the same with one."
3.9	COTTA Tum Cotta "Quam simile istud sit" inquit "tu videris. nam ego neque in causis, si quid est evidens de quo inter omnis conveniat, argumentari soleo (perspicuitas enim argumentatione elevatur) nec si id facerem in causis forensibus idem facerem in hac suptilitate sermonis. cur coniveres autem altero oculo causa non esset, cum idem obtutus esset amborum et cum rerum natura, quam tu sapientem esse vis, duo lumina ab animo ad oculos perforata nos habere voluisset. sed quia non confidebas tam esse id perspicuum quam tu velis, propterea multis argumentis deos esse docere voluisti. mihi enim unum sat erat, ita nobis maioris nostros tradidisse. sed tu auctoritates contemnis, ratione pugnas;"	COTTA Then Cotta said, "How apt that comparison is, you must judge. In lawsuits, if something is evident and agreed on by everyone, I do not usually argue for it, for clarity is only diminished by argument; and even if I did so in cases in the Forum, I would not do the same in a discussion as subtle as this. As for closing one eye, there would be no reason for it, since both have the same view, and since nature, which you claim is wise, wanted us to have two lights pierced through from the mind to the eyes. But because you were not as confident that the point was obvious as you would like it to be, you wanted to prove with many arguments that the gods exist. For me a single argument was enough: that our ancestors handed it down to us. But you despise authorities and fight with reason;"
3.10	patere igitur rationem meam cum tua ratione contendere.	so allow my reasoning to contend with yours.
	Adfers haec omnia argumenta cur dii sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam argumentando dubiam facis; mandavi enim memoriae non numerum solum sed etiam ordinem argumentorum tuorum. Primum fuit, cum caelum suspexissemus statim nos intellegere esse aliquod numen quo haec regantur. ex hoc illud etiam "aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Iovem":	You bring all these arguments for the existence of the gods, and by arguing you make doubtful a matter that in my view is not doubtful at all. I have committed to memory not only the number of your arguments but also their order. The first was that as soon as we look up at the sky we understand that there is some divine power by which all this is governed. From this came that line too: "Behold this lofty, gleaming vault, which all invoke as Jupiter":
3.11	quasi vero quisquam nostrum istum potius quam Capitolinum Iovem appellet, aut hoc perspicuum sit constetque inter omnes, eos esse deos quos tibi Velleius multique praeterea ne animantis quidem esse concedant. Grave etiam argumentum tibi videbatur, quod opinio de dis inmortalibus et omnium esset et cottidie cresceret: placet igitur tantas res opinione stultorum iudicari, vobis praesertim qui illos insanos esse dicatis? "At enim praesentis videmus deos, ut apud Regillum Postumius, in Salaria Vatinius"—nescio quid etiam de Locrorum apud	as if any of us would call that Jupiter rather than Jupiter of the Capitol, or as if it were obvious and agreed by everyone that those things are gods which Velleius, and many others besides, would not even grant you are living beings! You also thought it a weighty argument that belief in the immortal gods is shared by all and grows every day. Do you think, then, that questions of such importance should be decided by the opinion of fools

2 Gaius Laelius, called "the Wise," friend of Scipio Aemilianus, spoke in 145 BC against a bill to make priesthoods elective. The interpreters of the Sibyl were the priestly board that consulted the Sibylline Books.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Sagram proelio. quos igitur tu Tyndaridas appellabas id est homines homine natos, et quos Homerus, qui recens ab illorum aetate fuit, sepultos esse dicit Lacedaemone, eos tu cum cantheriis albis nullis calonibus obviam Vatinio venisse existimas et victoriam populi Romani Vatinio potius homini rustico quam M.	—especially you Stoics, who say that fools are mad? "But we see gods present in person, as Postumius did at Lake Regillus, and Vatinius on the Via Salaria"—and something too about the battle of the Locrians at the Sagra. So those whom you called the Tyndaridae—that is, men born of a man —and whom Homer, who lived not long after their time, says were buried in Lacedaemon: do you think they came to meet Vatinius on white nags, without any grooms, and announced the Roman people's victory to Vatinius, a country fellow, rather than to Marcus[3]
	Catoni qui tum erat princeps nuntiavisse? ergo et illud in silice quod hodie apparet apud Regillum tamquam vestigium ungulae Castoris equi credis esse?	Cato, who was then the leading man of the state? Do you also believe, then, that the mark in the rock at Regillus, which can still be seen today and looks like a hoofprint, was made by Castor's horse?
3.12	nonne mavis illud credere, quod probari potest, animos praeclarorum hominum, quales isti Tyndaridae fuerunt, divinos esse et aeternos, quam eos qui semel cremati essent equitare et in acie pugnare potuisse; aut si hoc fieri potuisse dicis, doceas oportet quo modo, nec fabellas aniles proferas.	Would you not rather believe what can be proved —that the souls of outstanding men, such as those Tyndaridae were, are divine and eternal—than that men who had once been cremated could ride horses and fight in battle? Or, if you say this could happen, you must show how, and not trot out old wives' tales.
3.13	BALBUS Tum Lucilius "An tibi" inquit "fabellae videntur? nonne ab A. Postumio aedem Castori et Polluci in foro dedicatam, nonne senatus consultum de Vatinio vides? nam de Sagra Graecorum etiam est volgare proverbium, qui quae adfirmant certiora esse dicunt quam illa quae apud Sagram. his igitur auctoribus nonne debes moveri?"	BALBUS Then Balbus said, "Do you think they are tales? Do you not see the temple of Castor and Pollux in the Forum, dedicated by Aulus Postumius? Do you not see the senate's decree about Vatinius? As for the Sagra, there is even a common saying among the Greeks: when they assert something, they say it is more certain than what happened at the Sagra. Should such authorities not move you?"
	COTTA Tum Cotta "Rumoribus" inquit "mecum pugnas Balbe, ego autem a te rationes requiro … secuntur quae futura sunt;"	COTTA Then Cotta said, "You fight me with rumors, Balbus, whereas I ask you for reasons … what is to come follows its course;"
3.14	effugere enim nemo id potest quod futurum est. saepe autem ne utile quidem est scire quid futurum sit; miserum est enim nihil proficientem angi nec habere ne spei quidem extremum et tamen commune solacium; praesertim cum vos idem fato fieri dicatis omnia, quod autem semper ex omni aeternitate verum fuerit id esse fatum: quid igitur iuvat aut quid adfert ad cavendum scire aliquid futurum, cum id certe futurum sit? Unde porro ista divinatio, quis invenit fissum iecoris, quis cornicis cantum notavit quis sortis? quibus ego credo,	for no one can escape what is to come. And often it is not even useful to know what is to come. It is wretched to be tormented to no purpose, and to be without even the last comfort, which yet all share —hope. This is especially so since you Stoics also say that everything happens by fate, and that fate is whatever has always been true from all eternity. So what is the good of knowing that something will happen, or how does it help us guard against it, when it is certainly going to happen? Then

3 Homer says the sons of Tyndareus lie buried in Lacedaemon (*Iliad* 3.243).

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	nec possum Atti Navi quem commemorabas lituum contemnere, sed qui ista intellecta sint a philosophis debeo discere, praesertim cum plurimis de rebus divini isti mentiantur.	again, where does this divination of yours come from? Who discovered the cleft in the liver? Who first took note of the crow's cry, or of lots? I believe in them, and I cannot despise the augur's staff of Attus Navius, whom you mentioned; but I ought to learn from philosophers how these things came to be understood, especially since those diviners of yours lie about a great many things.
3.15	"At medici quoque" (ita enim dicebas) "saepe falluntur". Quid simile medicina, cuius ego rationem video, et divinatio, quae unde oriatur non intellego? Tu autem etiam Deciorum devotionibus placatos deos esse censes. quae fuit eorum tanta iniquitas, ut placari populo Romano non possent nisi viri tales occidissent? consilium illud imperatorium fuit, quod Graeci στρατήγημα appellant, sed eorum imperatorum qui patriae consulerent vitae non parcerent; rebantur enim fore ut exercitus imperatorem equo incitato se in hostem inmittentem persequeretur, id quod evenit. Nam Fauni vocem equidem numquam audivi; tibi, si audivisse te dicis, credam, etsi Faunus omnino quid sit nescio. Non igitur adhuc, quantum quidem in te est Balbe, intellego deos esse; quos equidem credo esse, sed nil docent Stoici.	"But doctors too," you said, "are often mistaken." What resemblance is there between medicine, whose rational basis I can see, and divination, whose origin I do not understand? You even think that the gods were appeased by the self-sacrifice of the Decii. How could the gods be so unjust that they could not be reconciled to the Roman people unless such men had died? That was a commander's plan—what the Greeks call στρατήγημα [a stratagem]—but the plan of commanders who cared for their country and did not spare their own lives. They reckoned that the army would follow its commander as he spurred his horse and hurled himself at the enemy—and that is what happened. As for the voice of Faunus, I for my part have never heard it; if you say you have heard it, I will believe you, though I have no idea at all what Faunus is. So far, then, Balbus, as far as it depends on you, I do not understand that the gods exist. I do believe that they exist, but the Stoics teach me nothing.[4]
3.16	Nam Cleanthes ut dicebas quattuor modis informatas in animis hominum putat deorum esse notiones. unus is modus est de quo satis dixi, qui est susceptus ex praesensione rerum futurarum; alter ex perturbationibus tempestatum et reliquis motibus; tertius ex commoditate rerum quas percipimus et copia; quartus ex astrorum ordine caelique constantia. De praesensione diximus. De perturbationibus caelestibus et maritimis et terrenis non possumus dicere cum ea fiant non esse multos qui illa metuant et a dis inmortalibus fieri existument;	Cleanthes, as you said, thinks that our notions of the gods have been formed in human minds in four ways. The first is the one I have said enough about, which arises from foreknowledge of future events; the second from disturbances of the weather and other upheavals; the third from the usefulness and abundance of the things we receive; the fourth from the order of the stars and the regularity of the heavens. We have spoken about foreknowledge. As for disturbances in the sky, the sea, and the earth, we cannot deny that when they occur there are many who fear them and think they are caused by the immortal gods;
3.17	sed non id quaeritur, sintne aliqui qui deos esse putent: di utrum sint necne sint quaeritur. Nam reliquae causae	but the question is not whether there are some who think that gods exist; the question is whether

4 Publius Decius Mus and his son of the same name each "devoted" himself to the gods of the underworld and charged to his death in battle (340 and 295 BC) to win victory for Rome. Faunus was an Italian woodland god whose voice was said to be heard before battles.

LATIN	ENGLISH
quas Cleanthes adfert, quarum una est de commodorum quae capimus copia, altera de temporum ordine caelique constantia, tum tractabuntur a nobis, cum disputabimus de providentia deorum, de qua plurima a te Balbe dicta sunt;	gods exist or not. The other causes that Cleanthes puts forward—one concerning the abundance of benefits we enjoy, the other concerning the order of the seasons and the regularity of the heavens—will be dealt with when we discuss the providence of the gods, on which you, Balbus, said a great deal;
3.18 eodemque illa etiam differemus, quod Chrysippum dicere aiebas, quoniam esset aliquid in rerum natura quod ab homine effici non posset, esse aliquid homine melius, quaeque in domo pulchra cum pulchritudine mundi comparabas, et cum totius mundi convenientiam consensumque adferebas; Zenonisque brevis et acutulas conclusiones in eam partem sermonis quam modo dixi differemus; eodemque tempore illa omnia quae a te physice dicta sunt de vi ignea deque eo calore ex quo omnia generari dicebas loco suo quaerentur; omniaque quae a te nudius tertius dicta sunt, cum docere velles deos esse, quare et mundus universus et sol et luna et stellae sensum ac mentem haberent, in idem tempus reservabo.	and to the same point we will also postpone what you said Chrysippus argued: that since there is something in nature that a human being cannot produce, there is something better than a human being. The same goes for your comparison of the things in a beautiful house with the beauty of the world, and for your appeal to the harmony and concord of the whole world. Zeno's short and rather clever syllogisms we will put off to the part of the discussion I have just mentioned. At the same time, everything you said as a natural philosopher about the fiery force, and about the heat from which you said all things are generated, will be examined in its proper place. And everything you said the day before yesterday, when you wanted to show that the gods exist—why the whole world, and the sun, moon, and stars, have sensation and mind—I will reserve for the same occasion.
3.19 A te autem idem illud etiam atque etiam quaeram, quibus rationibus tibi persuadeas deos esse.	But I will ask you the same thing again and again: by what reasoning do you convince yourself that the gods exist?
BALBUS Tum Balbus: "Equidem attulisse rationes mihi videor, sed eas tu ita refellis, ut, cum me interrogaturus esse videare et ego me ad respondendum compararim, repente avertas orationem nec des respondendi locum. itaque maximae res tacitae praeterierunt, de divinatione de fato, quibus de quaestionibus tu quidem strictim nostri autem multa solent dicere, sed ab hac ea quaestione quae nunc in manibus est separantur; quare si videtur noli agere confuse, ut hoc explicemus, hac disputatione quod quaeritur."	BALBUS Then Balbus said: "I think I have produced my reasons. But you refute them in such a way that, just when you seem about to question me and I have got ready to answer, you suddenly turn the discussion aside and give me no chance to reply. And so the most important subjects have passed by in silence—divination and fate. You yourself touch on these questions only briefly, while our school usually says a great deal about them; but they are separate from the question we now have in hand. So, if you agree, do not proceed in a confused way, so that in this discussion we may clear up the question before us."

IS THE WORLD A GOD?

Zeno's syllogisms, the heat of nature and the reason of the world, rejected one by one.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3.20	**COTTA** "Optime" inquit Cotta. "Itaque quoniam quattuor in partes totam quaestionem divisisti de primaque diximus, consideremus secundam; quae mihi talis videtur fuisse, ut, cum ostendere velles quales di essent, ostenderes nullos esse. A consuetudine oculorum animum abducere difficillimum dicebas, sed, cum deo nihil praestantius esset, non dubitabas quin mundus esset deus, quo nihil in rerum natura melius esset: modo possemus eum animantem cogitare vel potius ut cetera oculis sic animo hoc cernere."	**COTTA** "Excellent," said Cotta. "So, since you divided the whole question into four parts and we have spoken about the first, let us consider the second. It seems to me to have turned out like this: in trying to show what the gods are like, you showed that there are none. You said that it was very difficult to draw the mind away from what the eyes are used to; but since nothing is more excellent than god, you had no doubt that the world is a god, since there is nothing in nature better than it—if only we could conceive of it as a living being, or rather see this with the mind as we see other things with the eyes."
3.21	Sed cum mundo negas quicquam esse melius, quid dicis melius? si pulchrius, adsentior; si aptius ad utilitates nostras, id quoque adsentior; sin autem id dicis, nihil esse mundo sapientius, nullo modo prorsus adsentior, non quod difficile sit mentem ab oculis sevocare, sed quo magis sevoco eo minus id quod tu vis possum mente comprendere. "Nihil est mundo melius in rerum natura." Ne in terris quidem urbe nostra; num igitur idcirco in urbe esse rationem cogitationem mentem putas, aut, quoniam non sit, num idcirco existimas formicam anteponendam esse huic pulcherrumae urbi, quod in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus sed etiam mens ratio memoria? videre oportet Balbe quid tibi concedatur, non te ipsum quod velis sumere.	But when you say that nothing is better than the world, what do you mean by "better"? If you mean more beautiful, I agree; if better suited to our needs, I agree to that too. But if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, I do not agree at all. This is not because it is hard to withdraw the mind from the eyes; rather, the more I withdraw it, the less I can grasp with my mind what you want. "There is nothing in nature better than the world." Nor is there anything on earth better than our city; do you therefore think that our city has reason, thought, and mind? Or, since it does not, do you think that an ant should be ranked above this most beautiful city, because a city has no sensation at all, while an ant has not only sensation but also mind, reason, and memory? You must see, Balbus, what is granted to you, and not simply assume whatever you like.
3.22	Istum enim locum totum illa vetus Zenonis brevis et ut tibi videbatur acuta conclusio dilatavit .... Zeno enim ita concludit: "Quod ratione utitur id melius est quam id quod ratione non utitur; nihil autem mundo melius; ratione igitur mundus utitur".	For it was that old syllogism of Zeno's, short and—as you thought—sharp, that opened up this whole topic .... Zeno argues as follows: "What uses reason is better than what does not use reason; but nothing is better than the world; therefore the world uses reason."
3.23	Hoc si placet, iam efficies ut mundus optime librum legere videatur; Zenonis enim vestigiis hoc modo rationem poteris concludere: "quod litteratum est id est melius quam quod non est litteratum; nihil autem mundo melius; litteratus igitur est mundus"—isto modo etiam disertus et quidem mathematicus musicus, omni denique	If you accept this, you will soon prove that the world is an excellent reader of books. Following in Zeno's footsteps, you will be able to frame the argument this way: "What is literate is better than what is not literate; but nothing is better than the world; therefore the world is literate." In the same

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	doctrina eruditus, postremo philosophus. Saepe dixisti nihil fieri sine deo, nec ullam vim esse naturae ut sui dissimilia posset effingere: concedam non modo animantem et sapientem esse mundum sed fidicinem etiam et tubicinem, quoniam earum quoque artium homines ex eo procreantur? Nihil igitur adfert pater iste Stoicorum quare mundum ratione uti putemus, ne cur animantem quidem esse.	way it will also be eloquent—indeed a mathematician, a musician, learned in every branch of knowledge, and finally a philosopher. You have often said that nothing comes about without god, and that nature has no power to produce things unlike itself. Shall I grant, then, that the world is not only a living and wise being but also a lyre player and a trumpeter, since people skilled in those arts too are produced from it? So that father of the Stoics offers no reason for us to think that the world uses reason, nor even that it is a living being.
	non est igitur mundus deus; et tamen nihil est eo melius: nihil est enim eo pulchrius nihil salutarius nobis, nihil ornatius aspectu motuque constantius.	The world, then, is not a god. And yet nothing is better than it: for nothing is more beautiful, nothing more beneficial to us, nothing more splendid to look at or more regular in its motion.
	Quod si mundus universus non est deus, ne stellae quidem, quas tu innumerabilis in deorum numero reponebas. quarum te cursus aequabiles aeternique delectabant, nec mehercule iniuria, sunt enim admirabili incredibilique constantia.	And if the world as a whole is not a god, neither are the stars, countless as they are, which you counted among the gods. You were delighted by their even and eternal courses—and not without reason, by Hercules, for they move with an admirable and incredible regularity.
3.24	sed non omnia Balbe quae cursus certos et constantis habent ea deo potius tribuenda sunt quam naturae. quid Chalcidico Euripo in motu identidem reciprocando putas fieri posse constantius, quid freto Siciliensi, quid Oceani fervore illis in locis, "Europam Libyamque rapax ubi dividit unda"? quid aestus maritimi vel Hispanienses vel Brittannici eorumque certis temporibus vel accessus vel recessus sine deo fieri nonne possunt? vide quaeso, si omnis motus omniaque quae certis temporibus ordinem suum conservant divina dicimus, ne tertianas quoque febres et quartanas divinas esse dicendum sit, quarum reversione et motu quid potest esse constantius. sed omnium talium rerum ratio reddenda est;	But not everything, Balbus, that has fixed and regular courses should be attributed to a god rather than to nature. What do you think could be more regular than the Euripus at Chalcis, with its constant ebb and flow, or the Strait of Sicily, or the surging of the Ocean in those parts "where the rushing wave divides Europe from Libya"? What of the tides on the coasts of Spain or Britain, flowing in and ebbing out at fixed times—can they not happen without a god? Consider, please: if we call divine every motion and everything that keeps its order at fixed times, we may have to call tertian and quartan fevers divine as well, for what could be more regular than their recurrence and movement? But a rational account must be given of all such things;[5]
3.25	quod vos cum facere non potestis, tamquam in aram confugitis ad deum.	and since you Stoics cannot give one, you take refuge in a god, as if at an altar.
	Et Chrysippus tibi acute dicere videbatur, homo sine dubio versutus et callidus (versutos eos appello quorum celeriter mens versatur, callidos autem quorum tamquam manus opere sic animus usu concalluit); is igitur "Si	And Chrysippus seemed to you to argue sharply—undoubtedly a versatile and crafty man (I call *versatile* those whose minds turn quickly, and *crafty* those whose minds have grown hardened by prac-

5 The Euripus, the narrow strait between Euboea and the Greek mainland at Chalcis, was famous for its frequently reversing currents.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	aliquid est" inquit "quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est homine; homo autem haec quae in mundo sunt efficere non potest; qui potuit igitur is praestat homini; homini autem praestare quis possit nisi deus; est igitur deus". Haec omnia in eodem quo illa Zenonis errore versantur.	tice, as hands do by work). He, then, says: "If there is something that a human being cannot produce, whoever produces it is better than a human being; but a human being cannot produce the things that are in the world; therefore whoever could produce them is superior to a human being; and who could be superior to a human being except a god? Therefore a god exists." All this involves the same error as those arguments of Zeno.[6]
3.26	quid enim sit melius quid praestabilius, quid inter naturam et rationem intersit, non distinguitur. Idemque, si dei non sint, negat esse in omni natura quicquam homine melius; id autem putare quemquam hominem, nihil homine esse melius, summae adrogantiae censet esse. Sit sane adrogantis pluris se putare quam mundum; at illud non modo non adrogantis sed potius prudentis, intellegere se habere sensum et rationem, haec eadem Orionem et Caniculam non habere. Et "Si domus pulchra sit, intellegamus eam dominis" inquit "aedificatam esse non muribus; sic igitur mundum deorum domum existimare debemus". Ita prorsus existimarem, si illum aedificatum, non quem ad modum docebo a natura conformatum putarem.	For he does not distinguish what is better from what is more excellent, or nature from reason. He also says that, if there are no gods, there is nothing in all nature better than a human being; and he holds that for any human being to think that nothing is better than a human being is the height of arrogance. Granted, it may be arrogant to value oneself above the world; but it is not arrogant—rather it is wise—to understand that one has sensation and reason, and that Orion and the Dog Star do not. And he says, "If a house is beautiful, we would understand that it was built for its owners, not for mice; in the same way, then, we ought to regard the world as the home of the gods." I would certainly think so, if I thought the world had been built, and not—as I shall show—shaped by nature.
3.27	At enim quaerit apud Xenophontem Socrates unde animum arripuerimus si nullus fuerit in mundo. Et ego quaero unde orationem unde numeros unde cantus; nisi vero loqui solem cum luna putamus cum propius accesserit, aut ad harmoniam canere mundum ut Pythagoras existimat. Naturae ista sunt Balbe, naturae non artificiose ambulantis ut ait Zeno, quod quidem quale sit iam videbimus, sed omnia cientis et agitantis motibus et mutationibus suis.	But, you say, Socrates in Xenophon asks where we got our mind from if there was none in the world. And I ask where we got speech, where numbers, where song—unless we think that the sun converses with the moon when it comes closer to it, or that the world sings in harmony, as Pythagoras believes. These are the works of nature, Balbus—not of nature proceeding in craftsmanlike fashion, as Zeno says (we will soon see what that amounts to), but of nature setting everything in motion and stirring it by its own movements and changes.[7]
3.28	Itaque illa mihi placebat oratio de convenientia consensuque naturae, quam quasi cognatione continuatam conspirare dicebas, illud non probabam, quod negabas id accidere potuisse nisi ea uno divino spiritu contineretur. illa vero cohaeret et permanet naturae viribus non deorum, estque in ea iste quasi consensus, quam συνπάθειαν Graeci vocant; sed ea quo sua sponte maior est eo minus divina ratione fieri existimanda est.	So I liked what you said about the harmony and concord of nature, which you said breathes together as one, held continuous as if by kinship. What I did not accept was your claim that this could not have happened unless nature were held together by a single divine breath. In fact, nature holds together and endures by its own powers, not by those of the gods; and there is in it that quasi-concord which the Greeks call συνπάθειαν [sym-

6 Cicero derives *versutus* ("versatile") from *versari*, "to turn," and *callidus* ("crafty") from *callum*, "callus" or hardened skin.
7 Pythagoras taught that the heavenly bodies produce a harmony as they move.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		pathy]. But the greater it is of its own accord, the less we should think that it comes about by divine reason.

CAN A GOD BE ETERNAL?

Every living body can suffer and perish; virtue and pleasure would make a god mortal.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3.29	**COTTA** Illa autem, quae Carneades adferebat, quem ad modum dissolvitis: si nullum corpus inmortale sit, nullum esse corpus sempiternum: corpus autem inmortale nullum esse, ne individuum quidem nec quod dirimi distrahive non possit; cumque omne animal patibilem naturam habeat, nullum est eorum quod effugiat accipiendi aliquid extrinsecus id est quasi ferendi et patiendi necessitatem, et si omne animal tale est inmortale nullum est. Ergo itidem, si omne animal secari ac dividi potest, nullum est eorum individuum nullum aeternum; atqui omne animal ad accipiendam vim externam et ferundam paratum est; mortale igitur omne animal et dissolubile et dividuum sit necesse est.	**COTTA** But how do you Stoics answer the arguments Carneades used to put forward? If no body is immortal, no body is eternal; but there is no immortal body, not even one that is indivisible or cannot be split or pulled apart. And since every living creature has a nature that can be acted upon, none of them escapes the necessity of receiving something from outside—that is, so to speak, of bearing and suffering it; and if every living creature is of that kind, none is immortal. Likewise, then, if every living creature can be cut and divided, none of them is indivisible, none eternal. But every living creature is liable to receive and bear force from outside; therefore every living creature must be mortal, dissoluble, and divisible.
3.30	Ut enim, si omnis cera commutabilis esset, nihil esset cereum quod commutari non posset, item nihil argenteum nihil aeneum, si commutabilis esset, natura argenti et aeris—similiter igitur, si omnia quae sunt … e quibus cuncta constant mutabilia sunt, nullum corpus esse potest non mutabile; mutabilia autem sunt illa ex quibus omnia constant, ut vobis videtur; omne igitur corpus mutabile est. at si esset corpus aliquod immortale, non esset omne mutabile; ita efficitur ut omne corpus mortale sit. Etenim omne corpus aut aqua aut aer aut ignis aut terra est aut id quod est concretum ex is aut ex aliqua parte eorum.	Take wax. If all wax were changeable, nothing made of wax could be unchangeable. Likewise nothing made of silver or bronze could be unchangeable, if the nature of silver and bronze were changeable. In the same way, then, if all the things that exist … the things of which everything is made are changeable, no body can be unchangeable. And the things of which everything is made are changeable, as you yourselves hold. Therefore every body is changeable. Yet if some body were immortal, not every body would be changeable. So it follows that every body is mortal. For every body is either water or air or fire or earth, or something compounded of these or of some part of them.
3.31	horum autem nihil est quin intereat; nam et terrenum omne dividitur, et umor ita mollis est ut facile premi conlidique possit; ignis vero et aer omni pulsu facillime pellitur naturaque cedens est maxime et dissupabilis. praetereaque omnia haec tum intereunt cum in naturam aliam convertuntur, quod fit cum terra in aquam se vertit et cum ex aqua oritur aer ex aere aether, cumque eadem vicissim retro commeant. quod si ita est, ut ea intereant e	but none of these is exempt from perishing. Everything earthy can be divided. Moisture is so soft that it is easily pressed and crushed. Fire and air are driven very easily by every impulse, and by nature they are extremely yielding and easily scattered. Moreover, all these perish when they are converted into another nature. This happens when earth turns into water, when air arises from water and ether from air, and when the same

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quibus constet omne animal, nullum est animal sempiternum.	things travel back again in turn. And if the things of which every living being is composed perish in this way, no living being is eternal.
3.32	Et ut haec omittamus, tamen animal nullum inveniri potest quod neque natum umquam sit et semper sit futurum. omne enim animal sensus habet; sentit igitur et calida et frigida et dulcia et amara nec potest ullo sensu iucunda accipere non accipere contraria; si igitur voluptatis sensum capit, doloris etiam capit; quod autem dolorem accipit id accipiat etiam interitum necesse est; omne igitur animal confitendum est esse mortale. Praeterea, si quid est quod nec voluptatem sentiat nec dolorem, id animal esse non potest;	But leave all that aside: still, no living being can be found that was never born and will exist forever. Every living being has senses. It therefore perceives hot and cold, sweet and bitter, and it cannot take in what is pleasant through any sense without also taking in its opposite. If, then, it is capable of feeling pleasure, it is capable of feeling pain too; and whatever is open to pain must also be open to death. So we must admit that every living being is mortal. Further, if there is something that feels neither pleasure nor pain, it cannot be a living being;
3.33	sin autem quod animal est, id illa necesse est sentiat, et quod ea sentiat non potest esse aeternum; et omne animal sentit; nullum igitur animal aeternum est. Praeterea nullum potest esse animal in quo non et adpetitio sit et declinatio naturalis. adpetuntur autem quae secundum naturam sunt, declinantur contraria; et omne animal adpetit quaedam et fugit a quibusdam, quod autem refugit id contra naturam est, et quod est contra naturam id habet vim interemendi. omne ergo animal intereat necesse est.	but if whatever is a living being must necessarily feel these things, and what feels them cannot be eternal, and every living being feels, then no living being is eternal. Further, there can be no living being without a natural impulse to seek some things and avoid others. What accords with nature is sought, and its opposite avoided. Every living being seeks certain things and flees from others; what it flees from is contrary to nature, and what is contrary to nature has the power to destroy. Therefore every living being must perish.
3.34	Innumerabilia sunt ex quibus effici cogique possit nihil esse quod sensum habeat quin id intereat; etenim ea ipsa quae sentiuntur, ut frigus ut calor ut voluptas ut dolor ut cetera, cum amplificata sunt interimunt; nec ullum animal est sine sensu; nullum igitur animal aeternum est. Etenim aut simplex est natura animantis, ut vel terrena sit vel ignea vel animalis vel umida, quod quale sit ne intellegi quidem potest, aut concretum ex pluribus naturis, quarum suum quaeque locum habeat quo naturae vi feratur, alia infimum alia summum alia medium. haec ad quoddam tempus cohaerere possunt, semper autem nullo modo possunt; necesse est enim in suum quaeque locum natura rapiatur. nullum igitur animal est sempiternum.	There are countless arguments from which it can be inferred and proved that nothing with sensation escapes perishing. The very things that are perceived—cold, heat, pleasure, pain and the rest—destroy when they are intensified. And there is no living being without sensation. Therefore no living being is eternal. Again, the nature of a living being is either simple or compound. If simple, it is earth alone, or fire, or air, or moisture—something whose nature cannot even be conceived. If compound, it is made of several natures, each of which has its own place to which it is carried by the force of nature: one to the lowest place, another to the highest, another to the middle. These can hold together for a certain time, but they cannot possibly do so forever, for each must be swept by nature to its own place. Therefore no living being is eternal.
3.35	Sed omnia vestri Balbe solent ad igneam vim referre Heraclitum ut opinor sequentes, quem ipsum non omnes interpretantur uno modo, †quoniam quid diceret quod intellegi noluit† omittamus; vos autem ita dicitis, omnem	But your people, Balbus, usually trace everything back to the force of fire, following Heraclitus, I think. Not everyone interprets him in the same way, but since he did not want to be understood,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	vim esse ignem, itaque et animantis cum calor defecerit tum interire, et in omni natura rerum id vivere id vigere quod caleat. Ego autem non intellego quo modo calore extincto corpora intereant, non intereant umore aut spiritu amisso, praesertim cum intereant etiam nimio calore.	let us leave aside what he meant. You Stoics, at any rate, put it like this: all power is fire. That is why living beings die when their heat fails, and why throughout the whole of nature whatever is warm is what lives and thrives. But I do not understand why bodies should perish when their heat is extinguished, yet not perish when they lose moisture or breath—especially since they also perish from too much heat.
3.36	quam ob rem id quidem commune est de calido; verum tamen videamus exitum. ita voltis opinor, nihil esse animal extrinsecus in natura atque mundo praeter ignem: qui magis quam praeter animam, unde animantium quoque constet animus, ex quo animal dicitur? quo modo autem hoc quasi concedatur sumitis, nihil esse animum nisi ignem; probabilius enim videtur tale quiddam esse animum, ut sit ex igni atque anima temperatum. "Quod si ignis ex sese ipse animal est nulla se alia admiscente natura, quoniam is, cum inest in corporibus nostris, efficit ut sentiamus, non potest ipse esse sine sensu." Rursus eadem dici possunt: quidquid est enim quod sensum habeat, id necesse est sentiat et voluptatem et dolorem, ad quem autem dolor veniat ad eundem etiam interitum venire.	So what you say about heat applies to the other elements as well; but let us see where your argument leads. You hold, I think, that in nature and the world outside us there is no living being except fire. Why fire rather than air (*anima*), of which the minds (*animus*) of living creatures are also made, and from which a creature is called an "animal"? And how do you take it as though it were granted that the mind is nothing but fire? It seems more plausible that the mind is a blend of fire and air. "But if fire is a living being in its own right, with no other nature mixed in, then since, when it is present in our bodies, it makes us feel, it cannot itself be without sensation." Again, the same arguments apply: whatever has sensation must feel both pleasure and pain, and whatever pain reaches, death reaches too.
	ita fit ut ne ignem quidem efficere possitis aeternum.	and so it turns out that you cannot prove even fire to be eternal.
3.37	Quid enim, non eisdem vobis placet omnem ignem pastus indigere nec permanere ullo modo posse nisi alatur, ali autem solem lunam reliqua astra aquis, alia dulcibus alia marinis; eamque causam Cleanthes adfert cur se sol referat nec longius progrediatur solstitiali orbi itemque brumali, ne longius discedat a cibo. Hoc totum quale sit mox; nunc autem concludatur illud: quod interire possit id aeternum non esse natura; ignem autem interiturum esse nisi alatur; non esse igitur natura ignem sempiternum.	Well then, do you Stoics not also hold that all fire needs fuel and cannot last at all unless it is fed? And that the sun, moon and other stars are fed by waters, some by fresh, some by salt? Cleanthes even gives this as the reason why the sun turns back and goes no farther than the summer tropic or the winter one: so as not to stray too far from its food. What all this amounts to, we shall see shortly. For now let us draw this conclusion: what can perish is not eternal by nature; fire will perish unless it is fed; therefore fire is not eternal by nature.
3.38	Qualem autem deum intellegere nos possumus nulla virtute praeditum? Quid enim, prudentiamne deo tribuemus, quae constat ex scientia rerum bonarum et malarum et nec bonarum nec malarum? cui mali nihil est nec esse potest, quid huic opus est dilectu bonorum et malorum, quid autem ratione quid intellegentia: quibus utimur ad eam rem ut apertis obscura adsequamur; at opscurum deo nihil potest esse. Nam iustitia, quae suum	And what sort of god can we conceive of who has no virtue at all? Shall we attribute prudence to a god? It consists in knowing what is good, what is bad, and what is neither. For a being to whom nothing bad happens or can happen, what need is there to choose between good and bad? What need of reason or intelligence, which we use to reach

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	cuique distribuit, quid pertinet ad deos; hominum enim societas et communitas, ut vos dicitis, iustitiam procreavit. Temperantia autem constat ex praetermittendis voluptatibus corporis: cui si locus in caelo est, est etiam voluptatibus. Nam fortis deus intellegi qui potest, in dolore an in labore an in periculo:	the obscure from the evident? But nothing can be obscure to a god. Justice, which gives each his due —what has that to do with the gods? Human society and community, as you yourselves say, gave birth to justice. Self-control consists in forgoing bodily pleasures; if there is room for it in heaven, there is room for pleasures too. And how can a god be conceived of as brave? In pain? In toil? In danger?
3.39	quorum deum nihil attingit. Nec ratione igitur utentem nec virtute ulla praeditum deum intellegere qui possumus?	none of which touches a god. How, then, can we conceive of a god who neither uses reason nor has any virtue?

WHERE DOES DEIFICATION STOP?

If the stars and deified humans are gods, so are Nymphs, clouds, rivers and every abstraction.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	COTTA Nec vero volgi atque imperitorum inscitiam despicere possum, cum ea considero quae dicuntur a Stoicis. sunt enim illa imperitorum: piscem Syri venerantur, omne fere genus bestiarum Aegyptii consecraverunt; iam vero in Graecia multos habent ex hominibus deos, Alabandum Alabandis, Tenedi Tenen, Leucotheam quae fuit Ino et eius Palaemonem filium cuncta Graecia— Herculem Aesculapium Tyndaridas Romulum nostrum aliosque compluris, quos quasi novos et adscripticios cives in caelum receptos putant.	COTTA Indeed, when I consider what the Stoics say, I cannot look down on the ignorance of the common people and the uneducated. For these are the beliefs of the uneducated: the Syrians worship a fish; the Egyptians have deified almost every kind of beast; and in Greece, again, they have many gods who were once human—Alabandus at Alabanda, Tenes on Tenedos, Leucothea, who was once Ino, and her son Palaemon throughout Greece—and Hercules, Aesculapius, the sons of Tyndareus, our own Romulus and many others, who they think have been received into heaven like new citizens added to the rolls.[8]
3.40	Haec igitur indocti; quid vos philosophi, qui meliora? Omitto illa, sunt enim praeclara: sit sane deus ipse mundus. hoc credo illud esse "sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Iovem". Quare igitur pluris adiungimus deos? quanta autem est eorum multitudo: mihi quidem sane multi videntur; singulas enim stellas numeras deos eosque aut beluarum nomine appellas, ut Capram ut Nepam ut Taurum ut Leonem, aut rerum inanimarum, ut Argo ut Aram ut Coronam.	So much for the uneducated. What about you philosophers, who claim to know better? I pass over your doctrines—they are splendid indeed. By all means let the world itself be a god. This, I suppose, is "that lofty, gleaming vault which all invoke as Jupiter." Why, then, do we add more gods? And how great their number is! To me, at least, they seem very many. You count individual stars as gods, and you call them either by the names of beasts—the She-Goat, the Scorpion, the Bull, the Lion—or by the names of lifeless things—the Argo, the Altar, the Crown.
3.41	Sed ut haec concedantur, reliqua qui tandem non modo concedi sed omnino intellegi possunt? Cum fruges Cererem vinum Liberum dicimus, genere nos quidem	But even if these are granted, how on earth can the rest be granted, or even understood at all? When

8 Alabandus was the legendary founder of Alabanda in Caria, and Tenes the eponymous hero of the island of Tenedos; the sons of Tyndareus are Castor and Pollux.

LATIN

sermonis utimur usitato, sed ecquem tam amentem esse putas qui illud quo vescatur deum credat esse? Nam quos ab hominibus pervenisse dicis ad deos, tu reddes rationem quem ad modum id fieri potuerit aut cur fieri desierit, et ego discam libenter; quo modo nunc quidem est, non video quo pacto ille, cui "in monte Oetaeo inlatae lampades" fuerint ut ait Accius, "in domum aeternam patris" ex illo ardore pervenerit; quem tamen Homerus apud inferos conveniri facit ab Ulixe sicut ceteros qui excesserant vita.

3.42 Quamquam quem potissimum Herculem colamus scire sane velim; pluris enim tradunt nobis i qui interiores scrutantur et reconditas litteras, antiquissimum Iove natum—sed item Iove antiquissimo, nam Ioves quoque pluris in priscis Graecorum litteris invenimus: ex eo igitur et Lysithoe est is Hercules quem concertavisse cum Apolline de tripode accepimus. alter traditur Nilo natus Aegyptius, quem aiunt Phrygias litteras conscripsisse. tertius est ex Idaeis Digitis, cui inferias adferunt †cui. quartus Iovis est et Asteriae Latonae sororis, qui Tyri maxime colitur, cuius Carthaginem filiam ferunt, quintus in India qui Belus dicitur, sextus hic ex Alcmena quem Iuppiter genuit, sed tertius Iuppiter, quoniam ut iam docebo pluris Ioves etiam accepimus.

3.43 Quando enim me in hunc locum deduxit oratio, docebo meliora me didicisse de colendis diis inmortalibus iure pontificio et more maiorum capedunculis his, quas Numa nobis reliquit, de quibus in illa aureola oratiuncula dicit Laelius, quam rationibus Stoicorum. Si enim vos sequar, dic quid ei respondeam qui me sic roget: "Si di sunt ..., suntne etiam Nymphae deae? si Nymphae, Panisci etiam et Satyri; hi autem non sunt; ne Nymphae [deae] quidem igitur. at earum templa sunt publice vota et dedicata. ne ceteri quidem ergo di, quorum templa sunt dedicata. Age porro: Iovem et Neptunum deum numeras; ergo etiam Orcus frater eorum deus, et illi qui fluere apud inferos dicuntur, Acheron Cocytus Pyriphlegethon, tum Charon tum Cerberus di putandi."

ENGLISH

we call grain Ceres and wine Liber, we are using a familiar figure of speech. But do you think anyone is so mad as to believe that what he eats is a god? As for those who you say passed from being human to being gods, you will explain how that could have happened, or why it has stopped happening, and I shall gladly learn. As things stand, I do not see how the man for whom, as Accius says, "torches were set to the pyre on Mount Oeta" passed from that blaze "into his father's eternal home." And yet Homer has Ulysses meet him in the underworld, like the others who had departed this life.[9]

And yet I should very much like to know which Hercules we ought to worship above all, for those who search out esoteric and recondite writings tell us of several. The oldest is a son of Jupiter—but again of the oldest Jupiter, for in the ancient writings of the Greeks we find several Jupiters as well. That Jupiter and Lysithoe, then, were the parents of the Hercules who, we are told, fought with Apollo over the tripod. A second, an Egyptian, is said to be the son of the Nile; they say he wrote down the Phrygian writings. The third is one of the Idaean Dactyls, to whom they bring offerings for the dead. The fourth is the son of Jupiter and Asteria, sister of Latona; he is worshiped chiefly at Tyre, and they say Carthage was his daughter. The fifth, in India, is called Belus. The sixth is our own, the son of Alcmena, fathered by Jupiter—but by the third Jupiter, since, as I shall presently show, we have records of several Jupiters too.[10]

Since my argument has brought me to this topic, I shall show that I have learned more about the worship of the immortal gods from pontifical law, from ancestral custom, and from those little sacrificial bowls that Numa left us—of which Laelius speaks in that little golden speech of his—than from the reasonings of the Stoics. For if I follow you, tell me how I should answer someone who questions me like this: "If there are gods ..., are the Nymphs goddesses too? If the Nymphs are, then so are the little Pans and the Satyrs. But they are not; so the Nymphs are not [goddesses] either. Yet temples to them have been vowed and dedicated

9 Hercules burned himself on a pyre on Mount Oeta; Ulysses meets his shade in the underworld in *Odyssey* 11.
10 The Idaean Dactyls ("Fingers") were mythical smiths and wonder-workers of Mount Ida.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		by the state. So neither are the other gods to whom temples have been dedicated. Go on: you count Jupiter and Neptune as gods; then their brother Orcus is a god too, and the rivers said to flow in the underworld—Acheron, Cocytus, Pyriphlegethon—and then Charon and Cerberus must be considered gods."[11]
3.44	"at id quidem repudiandum; ne Orcus quidem igitur; quid dicitis ergo de fratribus?" Haec Carneades aiebat, non ut deos tolleret (quid enim philosopho minus conveniens), sed ut Stoicos nihil de dis explicare convinceret; itaque insequebatur: "Quid enim" aiebat, "si hi fratres sunt in numero deorum, num de patre eorum Saturno negari potest, quem volgo maxime colunt ad occidentem? qui si est deus, patrem quoque eius Caelum esse deum confitendum est. quod si ita est, Caeli quoque parentes dii habendi sunt Aether et Dies eorumque fratres et sorores, qui a genealogis antiquis sic nominantur, Amor Dolus †modus Labor Invidentia Fatum Senectus Mors Tenebrae Miseria Querella Gratia Fraus Pertinacia Parcae Hesperides Somnia; quos omnis Erebo et Nocte natos ferunt.	"But that must be rejected; so Orcus is not a god either. Then what do you say about his brothers?" This was how Carneades used to argue—not to abolish the gods (what could be less fitting for a philosopher?), but to prove that the Stoics could explain nothing about them. And so he would press on: "Well then," he would say, "if these brothers are counted among the gods, can it be denied of their father Saturn, who is worshiped most widely in the West? And if he is a god, we must admit that his father Caelus is a god too. If so, the parents of Caelus must be considered gods—Ether and Day—and their brothers and sisters, whom the ancient genealogists name as follows: Love, Guile, Fear, Toil, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, Misery, Lament, Favor, Fraud, Obstinacy, the Fates, the Hesperides, Dreams—all of whom, they say, were born of Erebus and Night.
	aut igitur haec monstra probanda sunt aut prima illa tollenda."	so either these monstrosities must be accepted, or those first gods must be abolished."
3.45	Quid Apollinem Volcanum Mercurium ceteros deos esse dices, de Hercule Aesculapio Libero Castore Polluce dubitabis? at hi quidem coluntur aeque atque illi, apud quosdam etiam multo magis. ergo hi dei sunt habendi mortalibus nati matribus. Quid Aristaeus qui olivae dicitur inventor Apollinis filius, Theseus qui Neptuni, reliqui quorum patres di, non erunt in deorum numero? quid quorum matres? opinor etiam magis; ut enim [in] iure civili qui est matre libera liber est, item iure naturae qui dea matre est deus sit necesse est. itaque Achillem Astypalenses insulani sanctissume colunt; qui si deus est, et Orpheus et Rhesus di sunt Musa matre nati; nisi forte maritumae nuptiae terrenis anteponuntur. si hi di non sunt, quia nusquam coluntur, quo modo illi sunt?	What? Will you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury and the rest are gods, and have doubts about Hercules, Aesculapius, Liber, Castor and Pollux? But these are worshiped just as much as those, and in some places much more. So they must be considered gods, though born of mortal mothers. What about Aristaeus, son of Apollo, who is said to have discovered the olive, or Theseus, son of Neptune, and the rest whose fathers were gods—will they not be counted among the gods? And what about those whose mothers were goddesses? Even more so, I think. Just as [in] civil law the child of a free mother is free, so by the law of nature the child of a goddess must be a god. And so the islanders of Astypalaea worship Achilles with the greatest devotion. If he is a god, then Orpheus and Rhesus are gods, being born of a Muse—unless perhaps marriages at sea rank above marriages on

11 Numa, Rome's second king, was credited with founding its rites; for Laelius' speech see 3.5.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		land. If these are not gods, because they are worshiped nowhere, how can those be?[12]
3.46	vide igitur ne virtutibus hominum isti honores habeantur non immortalitatibus; quod tu quoque Balbe visus es dicere. Quo modo autem potes, si Latonam deam putas, Hecatam non putare, quae matre Asteria est sorore Latonae? an haec quoque dea est; vidimus enim eius aras delubraque in Graecia. sin haec dea est, cur non Eumenides? quae si deae sunt, quarum et Athenis fanumst et apud nos ut ego interpretor lucus Furinae, Furiae deae sunt, speculatrices credo et vindices facinorum et sceleris.	so consider whether these honors are paid to human virtues rather than to immortality—which you too, Balbus, seemed to say. And if you think Latona a goddess, how can you not think Hecate one, whose mother Asteria is Latona's sister? Or is she a goddess too? For we have seen her altars and shrines in Greece. But if she is a goddess, why not the Eumenides? And if they are goddesses—they have a temple at Athens, and here at Rome, if I interpret it correctly, the grove of Furina—then the Furies are goddesses, presumably as watchers over crime and wickedness and avengers of it.[13]
3.47	Quod si tales dei sunt ut rebus humanis intersint, Natio quoque dea putanda est, cui cum fana circumimus in agro Ardeati rem divinam facere solemus; quae quia partus matronarum tueatur a nascentibus Natio nominata est. ea si dea est, di omnes illi qui commemorabantur a te, Honos Fides Mens Concordia, ergo etiam Spes Moneta omniaque quae cogitatione nobismet ipsis possumus fingere. quod si veri simile non est, ne illud quidem est haec unde fluxerunt. Quid autem dicis, si di sunt illi quos colimus et accepimus, cur non eodem in genere Serapim Isimque numeremus? quod si facimus, cur barbarorum deos repudiemus? boves igitur et equos, ibis accipitres, aspidas crocodilos pisces, canes lupos faelis, multas praeterea beluas in deorum numerum reponemus.	And if the gods are such as to take part in human affairs, then Natio too must be considered a goddess. We customarily sacrifice to her when we make the round of the shrines in the territory of Ardea; she is named Natio from *nascentes* ("those being born"), because she watches over married women in childbirth. If she is a goddess, then so are all those you mentioned—Honor, Faith, Mind, Concord—and so also Hope, Moneta and everything we can invent in our own imaginations. If that is not plausible, neither is the source from which these flowed. And what do you say to this: if the gods we worship and have inherited are gods, why should we not count Serapis and Isis in the same class? And if we do, why should we reject the gods of foreigners? Then we shall add to the number of the gods oxen and horses, ibises and hawks, asps, crocodiles and fish, dogs, wolves and cats, and many other beasts besides.[14]
	quae si reiciamus, illa quoque unde haec nata sunt reiciemus.	and if we reject these, we shall also reject the things from which they sprang.
3.48	Quid deinde, Ino dea ducetur et Λευκοθέα a Graecis a nobis Matuta dicetur, cum sit Cadmi filia, Circe autem et Pasiphae et Aeeta e Perseide Oceani filia natae patre Sole in deorum numero non habebuntur? quamquam Circen quoque coloni nostri Cercienses religiose colunt. ergo hanc deam ducis: quid Medeae respondebis, quae duobus dis avis Sole et Oceano Aeeta patre matre Idyia procreata est, quid huius Absyrtio fratri (qui est apud Pacuvium Aegialeus, sed illud nomen veterum litteris usitatius)? qui	Next, will Ino be regarded as a goddess, called Λευκοθέα [Leucothea, "the White Goddess"] by the Greeks and Matuta by us, though she is Cadmus' daughter, while Circe, Pasiphae and Aeetes, born of Perseis, daughter of Oceanus, with the Sun as their father, are not counted among the gods? And yet our colonists at Circeii worship Circe devoutly too. So you regard her as a goddess. What, then, will you answer Medea, whose two grandfathers

12 Achilles' mother was the sea goddess Thetis; Orpheus and Rhesus were sons of Muses.
13 Furina was an obscure old Roman goddess with a grove across the Tiber; Cotta connects her name with the Furies.
14 Natio was a Latin birth goddess worshiped at Ardea, south of Rome.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	si di non sunt, vereor quid agat Ino; haec enim omnia ex eodem fonte fluxerunt.	were gods, the Sun and Oceanus, and whose father was Aeetes and mother Idyia? What will you answer her brother Absyrtus (in Pacuvius he is Aegialeus, but the other name is more common in the old writers)? If they are not gods, I fear for Ino, for all these flowed from the same source.
3.49	An Amphiaraus erit deus et Trophonius? nostri quidem publicani, cum essent agri in Boeotia deorum inmortalium excepti lege censoria, negabant immortalis esse ullos qui aliquando homines fuissent. sed si sunt i di, est certe Erectheus, cuius Athenis et delubrum vidimus et sacerdotem. quem si deum facimus, quid aut de Codro dubitare possumus aut de ceteris qui pugnantes pro patriae libertate ceciderunt? quod si probabile non est, ne illa quidem superiora unde haec manant probanda sunt.	Or will Amphiaraus be a god, and Trophonius? Our tax collectors, at any rate, when lands in Boeotia belonging to the immortal gods were exempted under the censors' contract, denied that anyone who had once been human was immortal. But if those two are gods, then Erechtheus certainly is; we have seen both his shrine and his priest at Athens. And if we make him a god, how can we doubt about Codrus, or the others who fell fighting for their country's freedom? If that is not plausible, neither should those earlier claims from which these flow be accepted.[15]
3.50	Atque in plerisque civitatibus intellegi potest augendae virtutis gratia, quo libentius rei publicae causa periculum adiret optimus quisque, virorum fortium memoriam honore deorum immortalium consecratam. ob eam enim ipsam causam Erectheus Athenis filiaeque eius in numero deorum sunt, itemque Leonaticum est delubrum Athenis quod Λεωκόριον nominatur. Alabandenses quidem sanctius Alabandum colunt, a quo est urbs illa condita, quam quemquam nobilium deorum; apud quos non inurbane Stratonicus ut multa, cum quidam ei molestus Alabandum deum esse confirmaret Herculem negaret, "ergo"	In most states, one can see, the memory of brave men has been hallowed with the honors of the immortal gods in order to encourage virtue, so that the best men would face danger more willingly for the commonwealth. For this very reason Erechtheus and his daughters are numbered among the gods at Athens, and there is likewise at Athens the shrine of the daughters of Leos, called the Λεωκόριον [Leocorion]. The people of Alabanda, indeed, worship Alabandus, the founder of their city, more devoutly than any of the famous gods. It was there that Stratonicus—wittily, as so often—was pestered by someone insisting that Alabandus was a god and Hercules was not. "Very well,"[16]
3.51	inquit "mihi Alabandus tibi Hercules sit iratus". Illa autem Balbe, quae tu a caelo astrisque ducebas, quam longe serpant non vides: solem deum esse lunamque, quorum alterum Apollinem Graeci alteram Dianam putant. quod si luna dea est, ergo etiam Lucifer ceteraeque errantes numerum deorum optinebunt; igitur etiam inerrantes. cur autem arqui species non in deorum numero reponatur; est enim pulcher (et ob eam speciem, quia causam habeat admirabilem, Thaumante dicitur esse nata). cuius si divina natura est, quid facies nubibus; arcus enim ipse e nubibus efficitur quodam modo coloratis; quarum una etiam Centauros peperisse dicitur.	he said, "then let Alabandus be angry with me, and Hercules with you." And as for the arguments you drew from the heavens and the stars, Balbus, do you not see how far they creep? You say the sun and moon are gods; the Greeks take the one for Apollo, the other for Diana. But if the moon is a goddess, then the Morning Star and the other wandering stars will also hold a place among the gods —and so will the stars that do not wander. And why should the rainbow not be placed among the gods? It is beautiful, and because of that beauty,

15 Amphiaraus and Trophonius were legendary heroes with oracle shrines in Boeotia, whose lands the tax collectors wished to tax. Codrus was the legendary king of Athens who gave his life to save the city.
16 The Leocorion honored the daughters of Leos, said to have been sacrificed to save Athens. Stratonicus was an Athenian musician of the fourth century BC, famous for his wit.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quod si nubes rettuleris in deos, referendae certe erunt tempestates, quae populi Romani ritibus consecratae sunt.	since its cause is a wonder, it is said to be the daughter of Thaumas. If it has a divine nature, what will you do with the clouds? For the rainbow itself is formed from clouds colored in a certain way, and one of them is even said to have given birth to the Centaurs. And if you count the clouds among the gods, you will certainly have to count the storms too, which have been consecrated in the rites of the Roman people.[17]
	ergo imbres nimbi procellae turbines dei putandi; nostri quidem duces mare ingredientes inmolare hostiam fluctibus consuerunt.	so rain showers, storm clouds, gales and whirlwinds must be thought gods; and our generals, at any rate, when putting to sea, have been accustomed to sacrifice a victim to the waves.
3.52	Iam si est Ceres a gerendo (ita enim dicebas), terra ipsa dea est (et ita habetur; quae est enim alia Tellus); sin terra, mare etiam, quem Neptunum esse dicebas; ergo et flumina et fontes. itaque et Fontis delubrum Masso ex Corsica dedicavit, et in augurum precatione Tiberinum Spinonem Anemonem Nodinum alia propinquorum fluminum nomina videmus. Ergo hoc aut in inmensum serpet, aut nihil horum recipiemus; nec illa infinita ratio superstitionis probabitur; nihil ergo horum probandum est.	Again, if Ceres comes from *gerere* ("to bear"), as you said, then the earth itself is a goddess (and so it is regarded—for what else is Tellus?). And if the earth is, so is the sea, which you said was Neptune; and therefore rivers and springs too. So it was that Maso dedicated a shrine to Fons after his Corsican campaign, and in the augurs' prayer we find Tiberinus, Spino, Anemo, Nodinus and the names of other nearby rivers. So either this will creep on endlessly, or we shall accept none of it. Nor will that boundless system of superstition be approved. Therefore none of it should be approved.[18]

THE THEOLOGIANS' MANY GODS

Three Jupiters, five Suns, four Vulcans, five Mercuries: the genealogies multiply every god.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3.53	**COTTA** Dicamus igitur Balbe oportet contra illos etiam, qui hos deos ex hominum genere in caelum translatos non re sed opinione esse dicunt, quos auguste omnes sancteque veneramur. Principio Ioves tres numerant i qui theologi nominantur, ex quibus primum et secundum natos in Arcadia, alterum patre Aethere, ex quo etiam Proserpinam natam ferunt et Liberum, alterum patre Caelo, qui genuisse Minervam dicitur, quam principem et inventricem belli ferunt, tertium Cretensem Saturni filium, cuius in illa insula sepulcrum ostenditur. Dioscoroe etiam apud Graios multis modis nominantur: primi tres, qui appellantur Anactes Athenis, ex rege Iove antiquissimo et Proserpina nati Tritopatreus Eubuleus Dionysus, secundi Iove tertio nati et Leda Castor et Pollux; tertii dicuntur a non nullis Alco et Melampus †euiolus, Atrei filii, qui Pelope natus fuit.	**COTTA** We ought also, then, Balbus, to answer those who say that these gods, carried up from the human race into heaven—gods whom we all worship with reverence and devotion—exist not in reality but in belief. To begin with, those called theologians count three Jupiters. Of these the first and second were born in Arcadia: one had Ether as his father, and Proserpina and Liber are said to be his children; the other had Caelus as his father and is said to have begotten Minerva, whom they call the originator and inventor of war. The third is the Cretan, son of Saturn, whose tomb is shown on that island. The Dioscuri, too, are named in many ways among the Greeks. The first three, who are called the Anactes ("Lords") at Athens, were sons

17 The name Thaumas suggests Greek *thauma*, "wonder."
18 Gaius Papirius Maso, consul in 231 BC, won a victory in Corsica; Fons was the Roman god of springs.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		of the most ancient king Jupiter and Proserpina: Tritopatreus, Eubuleus and Dionysus. The second were sons of the third Jupiter and Leda: Castor and Pollux. The third are said by some to be Alco, Melampus and Eumolus, sons of Atreus, the son of Pelops.[19]
3.54	Iam Musae primae quattuor [natae] Iove altero †nata et Thelxinoe† Aoede Arche Melete, secundae Iove tertio et Mnemosyne procreatae novem, tertiae [Iove tertio] Piero natae et Antiopa, quas Pieridas et Pierias solent poetae appellare, isdem nominibus et eodem numero quo proxumae superiores. Cumque tu solem quia solus esset appellatum esse dicas, Soles ipsi quam multi a theologis proferuntur. unus eorum Iove natus nepos Aetheris, alter Hyperione, tertius Volcano Nili filio, cuius urbem Aegyptii volunt esse eam quae Heliopolis appellatur, quartus is quem heroicis temporibus Acantho Rhodi peperisse dicitur, pater Ialysi Camiri Lindi, unde Rhodii, quintus qui Colchis fertur Aeetam et Circam procreavisse. Volcani item complures:	Next, the first Muses are four, [born] of the second Jupiter: Thelxinoe, Aoede, Arche and Melete. The second, nine in number, were born of the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne. The third were born of [the third Jupiter] Pierus and Antiopa; the poets usually call them Pierides and Pierians, and they have the same names and the same number as the ones just mentioned. And though you say the sun (*sol*) got its name because it is alone (*solus*), how many Suns the theologians bring forward! One of them is the son of Jupiter and grandson of Ether; another, the son of Hyperion; the third, the son of Vulcan, son of the Nile—the Egyptians claim that his city is the one called Heliopolis; the fourth is the one whom Acantho is said to have borne at Rhodes in the heroic age, father of Ialysus, Camirus and Lindus, from whom the Rhodians descend; the fifth is the one said to have fathered Aeetes and Circe at Colchis. There are likewise several Vulcans:
3.55	primus Caelo natus, ex quo et Minerva Apollinem eum cuius in tutela Athenas antiqui historici esse voluerunt, secundus [in] Nilo natus Opas ut Aegyptii appellant, quem custodem esse Aegypti volunt, tertius ex tertio Iove et Iunone, qui Lemni fabricae traditur praefuisse, quartus Maemalio natus, qui tenuit insulas propter Siciliam quae Volcaniae nominabantur.	the first, son of Caelus, who by Minerva was father of the Apollo whom the ancient historians declared to be the guardian of Athens; the second, born [in] the Nile, whom the Egyptians call Opas and regard as the protector of Egypt; the third, son of the third Jupiter and Juno, who is said to have been master of the forges on Lemnos; the fourth, son of Maemalius, who ruled the islands near Sicily that used to be called the Vulcanian Islands.[20]
3.56	Mercurius unus Caelo patre Die matre natus, cuius obscenius excitata natura traditur quod aspectu Proserpinae commotus sit, alter Valentis et Phoronidis filius is qui sub terris habetur idem Trophonius, tertius Iove tertio natus et Maia, ex quo et Penelopa Pana natum ferunt, quartus Nilo patre, quem Aegyptii nefas habent nominare, quintus quem colunt Pheneatae, qui Argum dicitur interemisse ob eamque causam Aegyptum profugisse atque Aegyptiis leges et litteras tradidisse:	One Mercury is the son of Caelus and Dies. The story goes that his nature was roused rather indecently because he was stirred by the sight of Proserpina. The second, son of Valens and Phoronis, is the one believed to dwell beneath the earth, and he is the same as Trophonius. The third, son of the third Jupiter and Maia, is the one by whom, they say, Penelope bore Pan. The fourth had the Nile as his father; the Egyptians consider it sacrilege to speak his name. The fifth, worshiped

19 The "theologians" were Greek writers who compiled genealogies of the gods.
20 Opas is probably Ptah, the Egyptian craftsman god.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	hunc Aegyptii Theyt appellant, eodemque nomine anni primus mensis apud eos vocatur.	by the people of Pheneus, is said to have killed Argus, to have fled to Egypt for that reason, and to have given the Egyptians their laws and their letters. The Egyptians call him Theyt, and the first month of their year goes by the same name.[21]
3.57	Aesculapiorum primus Apollinis, quem Arcades colunt, qui specillum invenisse primusque volnus dicitur obligavisse, secundus secundi Mercuri frater: is fulmine percussus dicitur humatus esse Cynosuris; tertius Arsippi et Arsinoae, qui primus purgationem alvi dentisque evolsionem ut ferunt invenit, cuius in Arcadia non longe a Lusio flumine sepulcrum et lucus ostenditur. Apollinum antiquissimus is quem paulo antea e Volcano natum esse dixi custodem Athenarum, alter Corybantis filius natus in Creta, cuius de illa insula cum Iove ipso certamen fuisse traditur, tertius Iove tertio natus et Latona, quem ex Hyperboreis Delphos ferunt advenisse, quartus in Arcadia, quem Arcades Nomionem appellant quod ab eo se leges ferunt accepisse.	Of the Aesculapiuses, the first is the son of Apollo and is worshiped by the Arcadians. He is said to have invented the surgical probe and to have been the first to bandage a wound. The second is the brother of the second Mercury; he is said to have been struck by lightning and buried at Cynosura. The third, son of Arsippus and Arsinoe, was the first, they say, to devise purging of the bowels and the pulling of teeth. His tomb and grove are shown in Arcadia, not far from the river Lusius. Of the Apollos, the oldest is the one I mentioned a little earlier as the son of Vulcan and the guardian of Athens. The second, son of Corybas, was born in Crete; he is said to have fought Jupiter himself for that island. The third, son of the third Jupiter and Latona, is said to have come to Delphi from the Hyperboreans. The fourth is in Arcadia; the Arcadians call him Nomios, because they say they received their laws from him.[22]
3.58	Dianae item plures, prima Iovis et Proserpinae, quae pinnatum Cupidinem genuisse dicitur, secunda notior quam Iove tertio et Latona natam accepimus; tertiae pater Upis traditur Glauce mater: eam saepe Graeci Upim paterno nomine appellant. Dionysos multos habemus, primum Iove et Proserpina natum, secundum Nilo, qui Nysam dicitur interemisse, tertium Cabiro patre, eumque regem Asiae praefuisse dicunt, cui Sabazia sunt instituta, quartum Iove et Luna, cui sacra Orphica putantur confici, quintum Nyso natum et Thyone, a quo trieterides constitutae putantur.	There are likewise several Dianas. The first, daughter of Jupiter and Proserpina, is said to have given birth to the winged Cupid. The second, better known, is by tradition the daughter of the third Jupiter and Latona. The third is said to have had Upis as her father and Glauce as her mother; the Greeks often call her Upis, after her father's name. We have many Dionysuses. The first is the son of Jupiter and Proserpina. The second is the son of the Nile and is said to have killed Nysa. The third had Cabirus as his father; they say he ruled as king of Asia, and the Sabazian rites were founded in his honor. The fourth is the son of Jupiter and the Moon; the Orphic rites are thought to be performed for him. The fifth, son of Nysus and Thyone, is thought to have established the biennial festivals.[23]
3.59	Venus prima Caelo et Die nata, cuius Eli delubrum vidimus, altera spuma procreata, ex qua et Mercurio	The first Venus is the daughter of Caelus and Dies; I have seen her shrine at Elis. The second was

21 Theyt is Thoth, the Egyptian god credited with inventing writing.
22 The Greek name *Nomios* suggests *nomos*, "law" (it can also mean "of the pastures").
23 The biennial festivals (*trieterides*, "every third year" by Greek inclusive counting) were Dionysiac celebrations held every other year.

LATIN	ENGLISH
Cupidinem secundum natum accepimus, tertia Iove nata et Diona, quae nupsit Volcano, sed ex ea et Marte natus Anteros dicitur, quarta Syria Cyproque concepta, quae Astarte vocatur, quam Adonidi nupsisse proditum est. Minerva prima quam Apollinis matrem supra diximus, secunda orta Nilo, quam Aegyptii Saietae colunt, tertia illa quam a Iove generatam supra diximus, quarta Iove nata et Coryphe Oceani filia, quam Arcades Κορίαν nominant et quadrigarum inventricem ferunt, quinta Pallantis, quae patrem dicitur interemisse virginitatem suam violare conantem, cui pinnarum talaria adfigunt.	born from the sea foam; by tradition she bore the second Cupid to Mercury. The third, daughter of Jupiter and Dione, married Vulcan, but Anteros is said to be her son by Mars. The fourth was conceived in Syria and Cyprus; she is called Astarte, and she is recorded to have married Adonis. The first Minerva is the one I said above was the mother of Apollo. The second sprang from the Nile; the Egyptians worship her at Sais. The third is the one I said above was begotten by Jupiter. The fourth, daughter of Jupiter and Coryphe, the daughter of Oceanus, is called Κορίαν [Koria] by the Arcadians, and they say she invented the four-horse chariot. The fifth is the daughter of Pallas; she is said to have killed her father when he tried to violate her chastity. She is shown with winged sandals fastened to her ankles.
3.60 Cupido primus Mercurio et Diana prima natus dicitur, secundus Mercurio et Venere secunda, tertius qui idem est Anteros Marte et Venere tertia. Atque haec quidem et alia eius modi ex vetere Graeciae fama collecta sunt. quibus intellegis resistendum esse, ne perturbentur religiones; vestri autem non modo haec non refellunt verum etiam confirmant interpretando quorsum quidque pertineat.	The first Cupid is said to be the son of Mercury and the first Diana; the second, of Mercury and the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of Mars and the third Venus. These and other tales of the kind have been gathered from the ancient lore of Greece. You understand that they must be resisted, so that religion is not thrown into confusion. Your school, however, not only fails to refute them but actually confirms them, by interpreting what each one refers to.
Sed eo iam unde huc digressi sumus revertamur. Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad haec refellenda?	But let us now go back to the point from which we digressed. Do you really think a subtler argument is needed to refute these things?
3.61 Nam mentem fidem spem virtutem honorem victoriam salutem concordiam ceteraque huius modi rerum vim habere videmus non deorum. aut enim in nobismet insunt ipsis, ut mens ut spes ut fides ut virtus ut concordia, aut optandae nobis sunt, ut honos ut salus ut victoria; quarum rerum utilitatem video, video etiam consecrata simulacra; quare autem in is vis deorum insit tum intellegam cum cognovero. quo in genere vel maxime est fortuna numeranda, quam nemo ab inconstantia et temeritate seiunget, quae digna certe non sunt deo.	For we see that mind, good faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, safety, concord and the rest of this kind have the force of things, not of gods. Either they are within us—mind, hope, good faith, virtue, concord—or they are things we must wish for—honor, safety, victory. I see the usefulness of these things; I also see the statues consecrated to them. But why the power of gods resides in them I will understand when I have found out. In this class Fortune above all must be counted, and no one will separate her from inconstancy and rashness—qualities certainly unworthy of a god.
3.62 Iam vero quid vos illa delectat explicatio fabularum et enodatio nominum? exsectum a filio Caelum, vinctum itidem a filio Saturnum, haec et alia generis eiusdem ita defenditis, ut i qui ista finxerunt non modo non insani sed etiam fuisse sapientes videantur. in enodandis autem	Then again, why do you take such delight in explaining myths and untangling names? Caelus castrated by his son, Saturn likewise put in chains by his son—these and other stories of the same kind you defend in such a way that the people who

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis: "Saturnus quia se saturat annis, Mavors quia magna vertit, Minerva quia minuit aut quia minatur, Venus quia venit ad omnia, Ceres a gerendo". quam periculosa consuetudo. in multis enim nominibus haerebitis: quid Veiovi facies quid Volcano? quamquam, quoniam Neptunum a nando appellatum putas, nullum erit nomen quod non possis una littera explicare unde ductum sit; in quo quidem magis tu mihi natare visus es quam ipse Neptunus.	made them up seem not only not to have been mad but even to have been wise. And in untangling names you go to pitiable lengths: "Saturn, because he is sated (*saturat*) with years; Mavors, because he overturns great things (*magna vertit*); Minerva, because she diminishes (*minuit*) or because she threatens (*minatur*); Venus, because she comes (*venit*) to all things; Ceres, from bearing (*gerendo*)." What a dangerous habit! You will get stuck on a great many names. What will you do with Vejovis? What with Vulcan? Though since you think Neptune is named from swimming (*nando*), there will be no name whose origin you cannot explain by a single letter. In this, at any rate, you seemed to me to be swimming about more than Neptune himself.[24]
3.63	Magnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno post Cleanthes deinde Chrysippus, commenticiarum fabularum reddere rationem, vocabulorum cur quidque ita appellatum sit causas explicare. quod cum facitis illud profecto confitemini, longe aliter se rem habere atque hominum opinio sit; eos enim qui di appellantur rerum naturas esse non figuras deorum. Qui tantus error fuit, ut perniciosis etiam rebus non nomen deorum tribueretur sed etiam sacra constituerentur. Febris enim fanum in Palatio et Orbonae ad aedem Larum et aram Malae Fortunae Exquiliis consecratam videmus.	Zeno first, then Cleanthes, and after him Chrysippus took on a great and wholly unnecessary burden: to give an account of invented myths and to explain the reasons behind names—why each thing is called what it is. When you do this, you are surely admitting that the truth is far different from what people believe: that those who are called gods are the natures of things, not the figures of gods. This error went so far that even harmful things were not only given the name of gods but even had rites established for them. For we see a shrine of Fever on the Palatine, a shrine of Orbona near the temple of the Lares, and an altar consecrated to Bad Fortune on the Esquiline.[25]
3.64	Omnis igitur talis a philosophia pellatur error, ut, cum de dis inmortalibus disputemus, dicamus digna dis inmortalibus. de quibus habeo ipse quid sentiam, non habeo autem quid tibi adsentiar. Neptunum esse dicis animum cum intellegentia per mare pertinentem, idem de Cerere; istam autem intellegentiam aut maris aut terrae non modo comprehendere animo sed ne suspicione quidem possum attingere. itaque aliunde mihi quaerendum est et ut esse deos et quales sint dii discere possim, qualis tu eos esse vis	So let all such error be driven out of philosophy, so that when we discuss the immortal gods we say things worthy of the immortal gods. On that subject I have my own view; what I do not have is anything on which to agree with you. You say Neptune is a mind endowed with intelligence that pervades the sea, and you say the same of Ceres. But this intelligence of the sea or of the earth I cannot grasp with my mind, nor can I even touch it with a guess. So I must look elsewhere in order to learn both that the gods exist and what kind of beings they are; the kind you would have them be ...

24 Vejovis was an obscure, ancient Roman god with a temple on the Capitol.
25 Orbona was the goddess of bereavement, invoked by parents who had lost children.

PROVIDENCE AND THE GIFT OF REASON

After a gap in the text: reason serves crime as often as good, so it proves no divine care.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3.65	**COTTA** ... videamus ea quae secuntur, primum deorumne prudentia mundus regatur, deinde consulantne di rebus humanis. haec enim mihi ex tua partitione restant duo; de quibus si vobis videtur accuratius disserendum puto.	**COTTA** ... let us look at what follows: first, whether the world is governed by the foresight of the gods; then, whether the gods take care of human affairs. These are the two points that remain for me from your division of the subject. If you both agree, I think they need to be discussed with special care.
	VELLEIUS "Mihi vero" inquit Velleius "valde videtur; nam et maiora exspecto et is quae dicta sunt vehementer adsentior."	**VELLEIUS** "I certainly agree," said Velleius, "and heartily. For I am expecting weightier matters still, and I strongly agree with what has been said so far."
	BALBUS Tum Balbus "Interpellare te" inquit "Cotta nolo, sed sumemus tempus aliud; efficiam profecto ut fateare. sed ..."	**BALBUS** Then Balbus said, "I do not want to interrupt you, Cotta, but we will choose another time; I will certainly bring you to admit it. But ..."
	COTTA ... Primum igitur non est probabile eam materiam rerum unde omnia orta sunt esse divina providentia effectam, sed et habere et habuisse vim et naturam suam. ut igitur faber cum quid aedificaturus est non ipse facit materiam sed utitur ea quae sit parata, fictorque item cera, sic isti providentiae divinae materiam praesto esse oportuit non quam ipse faceret sed quam haberet paratam. quod si materia non est a deo facta, ne terra quidem et aqua et aer et ignis a deo factus est. ...	**COTTA** ... First, then, it is not plausible that the matter of things, from which everything arose, was created by divine providence. Rather, it has, and always has had, a force and nature of its own. A builder, when he is about to put something up, does not make his materials himself but uses what is ready to hand; a modeler likewise uses wax. In the same way, your divine providence must have had matter available—not matter it had made itself, but matter it found ready. And if matter was not made by a god, then neither were earth, water, air and fire made by a god. ...[26]
	nequaquam istuc istac ibit; magna inest certatio. nam ut ego illi supplicarem tanta blandiloquentia, ni ob rem:	"That will not go the way you think; there is a great struggle in it. For why would I have pleaded with him in such flattering words, unless to some purpose"—[27]
3.66	parumne ratiocinari videtur et sibi ipsa nefariam pestem machinari? illud vero quam callida ratione: qui volt quod volt, ita dat se res ut operam dabit, qui est versus omnium seminator malorum. ille traversa mente mihi hodie tradidit repagula, quibus ego iram omnem recludam atque illi perniciem dabo, mihi maerores illi luctum, exitium illi exilium mihi. hanc videlicet rationem, quam vos divino beneficio homini solum tributam dicitis, bestiae non habent;	does she seem to be short of reasoning, as she contrives a monstrous disaster on her own account? And this—with what cunning reasoning: "Whoever wants what he wants, things will turn out as he works for them"—a line that sows every evil. "He, with his mind gone astray, has today handed me the bolts with which I shall unlock all my anger and bring ruin on him—

26 A long section of Cotta's argument is lost here; this passage survives only as a quotation in the Christian writer Lactantius.
27 From Ennius' tragedy *Medea*: Medea explains why she begged King Creon for one more day before her exile.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		grief for me, mourning for him; death for him, exile for me." This reason, of course, which you say was granted to man alone by divine favor, the beasts do not possess;
3.67	videsne igitur quanto munere deorum simus adfecti? Atque eadem Medea patrem patriamque fugiens, postquam pater adpropinquat iamque paene ut conprehendatur parat, puerum interea obtruncat membraque articulatim dividit perque agros passim dispergit corpus: id ea gratia ut, dum nati dissipatos artus captaret parens, ipsa interea effugeret, illum ut maeror tardaret sequi, sibi salutem ut familiari pareret parricidio.	so do you see what a great gift the gods have bestowed on us? And the same Medea, fleeing her father and her fatherland: "when her father draws near and is now almost ready to seize her, she meanwhile butchers the boy, cuts him apart limb by limb, and scatters the body far and wide across the fields—all to this end: that while the parent gathered up his son's scattered limbs, she meanwhile might escape, that grief might slow his pursuit, that she might win safety for herself by murdering her own kin."[28]
3.68	huic ut scelus sic ne ratio quidem defuit. Quid ille funestas epulas fratri conparans nonne versat huc et illuc cogitatione rationem: maior mihi moles, maius miscendumst malum, qui illius acerbum cor contundam et conprimam. Nec tamen ille ipse est praetereundus, qui non sat habuit coniugem inlexe in stuprum, de quo recte et verissume loquitur Atreus: quod re in summa summum esse arbitror periclum, matres coinquinari regias, contaminari stirpem, admisceri genus. at id ipsum quam callide, qui regnum adulterio quaereret: "addo" inquit "huc, quod mihi portento caelestum pater" "prodigium misit, regni stabilimen mei," "agnum inter pecudes aurea clarum coma" "quondam Thyestem clepere ausum esse e regia," "[a] qua in re adiutricem coniugem cepit sibi."	she lacked reason no more than she lacked crime. And what of the man preparing a deadly feast for his brother? Does he not turn his reasoning this way and that in his thoughts: "A greater effort is needed, a greater evil must be brewed, to crush and quell that bitter heart of his." Nor should we pass over that man himself, who was not content to lure his brother's wife into adultery, and of whom Atreus speaks rightly and most truly: "What I consider, in matters of the highest state, the highest danger: that royal mothers be defiled, the stock polluted, the bloodline mixed." And how cunningly he went about that very thing, seeking the throne through adultery! "I add this," says Atreus, "that the father of the heavenly gods sent me as a portent" "a prodigy, the mainstay of my reign—" "a lamb among the flocks, bright with golden fleece—" "and that Thyestes once dared to steal it from the palace," "taking my wife to help him in the deed."[29]
3.69	videturne summa inprobitate usus non sine summa esse ratione? Nec vero scaena solum referta est his sceleribus sed multo vita communis paene maioribus. sentit domus	does he not seem, while practicing the utmost wickedness, to have used the utmost reason as well? And it is not only the stage that is crammed

28 Lines from Accius' tragedy *Medea*: the boy is her young brother Absyrtus, killed to delay their father Aeetes.
29 From Accius' tragedy *Atreus*: Atreus served his brother Thyestes his own sons at a banquet, in revenge for Thyestes' seduction of his wife.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	unius cuiusque sentit forum, sentit curia campus socii provinciae, ut quem ad modum ratione recte fiat sic ratione peccetur, alterumque et a paucis et raro, alterum et semper et a plurimis, ut satius fuerit nullam omnino nobis a dis immortalibus datam esse rationem quam tanta cum pernicie datam.	with these crimes; ordinary life is crammed with crimes almost far greater. Every household feels it, the Forum feels it; the senate house, the Campus, the allies, the provinces feel it—so that just as right actions are done by reason, so are wrongs: the one by few and rarely, the other always and by very many. It would have been better, then, for the immortal gods to have given us no reason at all than to have given it with such ruinous results.
	ut vinum aegrotis, quia prodest raro nocet saepissime, melius est non adhibere omnino quam spe dubiae salutis in apertam perniciem incurrere, sic haud scio an melius fuerit humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis acumen sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera sit multis admodum paucis salutaris, non dari omnino quam tam munifice et tam large dari.	just as with wine for the sick: since it rarely helps and very often harms, it is better not to give it at all than to rush into obvious ruin in the hope of an uncertain recovery. In the same way, I rather think it would have been better for the human race not to have been given at all that quick movement of thought, that sharpness, that ingenuity which we call reason—since it is deadly to many and beneficial to very few—than to have been given it so generously and so lavishly.
3.70	Quam ob rem si mens voluntasque divina idcirco consuluit hominibus quod is est largita rationem, is solis consuluit quos bona ratione donavit, quos videmus si modo ulli sint esse perpaucos. non placet autem paucis a diis inmortalibus esse consultum; sequitur ergo ut nemini consultum sit.	Therefore, if the divine mind and will took care of human beings by bestowing reason on them, it took care only of those it endowed with good reason—and these, we see, are very few, if there are any at all. But you do not accept that the immortal gods took care of only a few. It follows, then, that they took care of no one.
	Huic loco sic soletis occurrere: non idcirco non optume nobis a dis esse provisum, quod multi eorum beneficio perverse uterentur; etiam patrimoniis multos male uti, nec ob eam causam eos beneficium a patribus nullum habere. Quisquam istuc negat, aut quae est in collatione ista similitudo? nec enim Herculi nocere Deianira voluit cum ei tunicam sanguine Centauri tinctam dedit, nec prodesse Pheraeo Iasoni is qui gladio vomicam eius aperuit, quam sanare medici non potuerant. multi enim et cum obesse vellent profuerunt et cum prodesse offuerunt; ita non fit ex eo quod datur ut voluntas eius qui dederit appareat, nec si is qui accepit bene utitur idcirco is qui dedit amice dedit.	You usually meet this point as follows: the gods have provided for us no less than excellently just because many people misuse their gift; many misuse their inheritances too, yet that does not mean they have received no benefit from their fathers. Does anyone deny that? But what likeness is there in that comparison? Deianira did not mean to harm Hercules when she gave him the tunic dipped in the Centaur's blood. Nor did the man who opened Jason of Pherae's abscess with a sword—an abscess the doctors had been unable to cure—mean to help him. Many people have done good when they meant to do harm, and harm when they meant to do good. So the gift itself does not reveal the intention of the giver; nor, if the recipient uses it well, does it follow that the giver gave it in friendship.[30]
3.71	Quae enim libido quae avaritia quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto aut sine animi motu et cogitatione di est ratione perficitur; nam omnis opinio	For what lust, what greed, what crime is either undertaken without a plan being formed, or carried

30 Jason was tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly in the 4th century BC; an assassin's sword reportedly lanced his abscess and cured him.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	ratio est, et quidem bona ratio si vera, mala autem si falsa est opinio. sed a deo tantum rationem habemus, si modo habemus, bonam autem rationem aut non bonam a nobis. Non enim ut patrimonium relinquitur sic ratio est homini beneficio deorum data; quid enim potius hominibus dii dedissent si is nocere voluissent, iniustitiae autem intemperantiae timiditatis quae semina essent si is vitiis ratio non subesset?	out without the mind's activity and thought—that is, without reason? For every belief is a form of reason: good reason if the belief is true, bad reason if it is false. But from god we have only reason itself, if indeed we have it; whether it is good reason or bad comes from ourselves. For reason was not given to man by the favor of the gods the way an inheritance is bequeathed. What could the gods have given humans in preference to it if they had wanted to harm them? And what seeds would there be of injustice, intemperance and cowardice, if reason did not underlie these vices?
	Medea modo et Atreus commemorabatur a nobis, heroicae personae inita subductaque ratione nefaria scelera meditantes.	I mentioned Medea and Atreus a moment ago—heroic figures plotting unspeakable crimes after working out and totting up their reckoning.
3.72	quid levitates comicae parumne semper in ratione versantur? parumne subtiliter disputat ille in Eunucho: quid igitur faciam? exclusit, revocat; redeam? non si me obsecret. ille vero in Synephebis Academicorum more contra communem opinionem non dubitat pugnare ratione, qui "in amore summo summaque inopia suave" esse dicit parentem habere avarum inlepidum in liberos difficilem, qui te nec amet nec studeat tui,	what about the frivolities of comedy—are they not forever busy with reasoning? Does not that fellow in *The Eunuch* argue subtly enough: "What shall I do, then? She shut me out, she calls me back; shall I go back? Not if she begs me." And the young man in *The Young Comrades* does not hesitate, in the manner of the Academics, to fight against common opinion with reason, when he says that "in the height of love and the depth of poverty" it is "pleasant" to have "a father who is stingy, ungracious to his children, and difficult, who neither loves you nor takes any interest in you,"[31]
3.73	atque huic incredibili sententiae ratiunculas suggerit: aut tu illum fructu fallas aut per litteras avertas aliquod nomen aut per servolum percutias pavidum; postremo a parco patre quod sumas, quanto dissipes libentius; idemque facilem et liberalem patrem incommodum esse amanti filio disputat: quem neque quo pacto fallam nec quid inde auferam nec quem dolum ad eum aut machinam commoliar scio quicquam: ita omnes meos dolos fallacias praestrigias praestrinxit commoditas patris. quid ergo isti doli, quid machinae, quid fallaciae praestrigiaeque num sine ratione esse potuerunt? o praeclarum munus deorum; ut Phormio possit dicere: cedo senem; iam instructa sunt mihi in corde consilia omnia.	and he supplies some petty reasons for this incredible view: "Either you can cheat him of his income, or by a forged document divert some debt, or through a slave boy give the timid man a fright; and finally, from a stingy father, what you take, how much more gladly you squander it!" And the same man argues that an easygoing, generous father is a nuisance to a son in love: "I have no idea how to cheat him, or what to get out of him, or what trick or device to work up against him—none at all: so completely have all my tricks, my deceits, my sleights of hand been foiled by my father's good nature." Well then, these tricks, these devices, these deceits and sleights of hand—could

31 *The Eunuch* is a comedy by Terence; *The Young Comrades* (*Synephebi*) a comedy by Caecilius Statius.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		they have existed without reason? What a splendid gift of the gods—so that Phormio can say: "Bring me the old man; all my plans are now drawn up in my mind."[32]
3.74	Sed exeamus e theatro, veniamus in forum. sessum it praetor. quid ut iudicetur? qui tabularium incenderit. quod facinus occultius: at se Q. Sosius splendidus eques Romanus ex agro Piceno fecisse confessus est. qui transscripserit tabulas publicas: id quoque L. Alenus fecit, cum chirographum sex primorum imitatus est; quid hoc homine sollertius? cognosce alias quaestiones, auri Tolossani coniurationis Iugurthinae; repete superiora: Tubuli de pecunia capta ob rem iudicandam; posteriora: de incestu rogatione Peducaea; tum haec cotidiana: sicae venena peculatus, testamentorum etiam lege nova quaestiones.	But let us leave the theater and come to the Forum. The praetor goes to take his seat. To try what? Who set fire to the Record Office. What crime could be more secret? Yet Quintus Sosius, a distinguished Roman knight from the Picene district, confessed that he had done it. Who falsified the public records? Lucius Alenus did that too, when he forged the handwriting of the six chief clerks. What could be more ingenious than that man? Consider other inquiries: into the gold of Toulouse, into the Jugurthine conspiracy. Go back to earlier ones: that of Tubulus, for taking money to give a verdict. Later ones: the inquiry into unchastity under the Peducaean bill. Then these everyday ones: daggers, poisons, embezzlement, and also the inquiries into wills under the new law.[33]
	inde illa actio "ope consilioque tuo furtum aio factum esse", inde tot iudicia de fide mala, tutelae mandati pro socio fiduciae, reliqua quae ex empto aut vendito aut conducto aut locato contra fidem fiunt, inde iudicium publicum rei privatae lege Laetoria, inde everriculum malitiarum omnium iudicium de dolo malo, quod C. Aquillius familiaris noster protulit, quem dolum idem Aquillius tum teneri putat cum aliud sit simulatum aliud actum.	hence that legal formula: "I declare that a theft was committed with your help and counsel"; hence all the trials for bad faith—in guardianship, commissions, partnerships and trusts—and the other breaches of faith in buying or selling, in hiring or letting; hence the public trial of a private matter under the Laetorian law; hence that dragnet for every kind of malice, the action for fraud, which our friend Gaius Aquillius introduced. And this same Aquillius holds that fraud has taken place when one thing is pretended and another done.[34]
3.75	Hanc igitur tantam a dis inmortalibus arbitramur malorum sementim esse factam? si enim rationem hominibus di dederunt, malitiam dederunt; est enim malitia versuta et fallax ratio nocendi; idem etiam di fraudem dederunt facinus ceteraque quorum nihil nec suscipi sine ratione nec effici potest. Utinam igitur, ut illa anus optat ne in nemore Pelio securibus / caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes sic istam calliditatem hominibus di ne dedissent, qua perpauci bene utuntur, qui tamen ipsi saepe a male utentibus	Are we to think, then, that this vast sowing of evils was done by the immortal gods? For if the gods gave humans reason, they gave them malice, since malice is a crafty and deceitful reasoning aimed at doing harm. The same gods also gave fraud, crime and all the rest, none of which can be either undertaken or carried out without reason. If only, then—as that old woman wishes "that in the grove of Pelion, by axes / felled, the fir-wood timbers had never crashed to the ground"—so the gods had

32 Phormio is the scheming parasite in Terence's comedy of that name.
33 Notorious trials: the temple gold looted at Toulouse in 106 BC, Jugurtha of Numidia's bribery of Roman officials, the corrupt praetor Lucius Hostilius Tubulus (142 BC), and the Vestal Virgins tried in 113 BC under Sextus Peducaeus' bill.
34 The Laetorian law (about 200 BC) protected young people under twenty-five against being defrauded. Gaius Aquillius Gallus was an eminent jurist, later Cicero's colleague as praetor in 66 BC.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	opprimuntur, innumerabiles autem improbe utuntur, ut donum hoc divinum rationis et consilii ad fraudem hominibus non ad bonitatem impertitum esse videatur.	never given humans that cunning of yours! Very few use it well, and even they are often crushed by those who use it badly, while countless people use it wickedly. So this divine gift of reason and deliberation seems to have been bestowed on humans for fraud, not for goodness.[35]
3.76	Sed urgetis identidem hominum esse istam culpam non deorum. Ut si medicus gravitatem morbi, gubernator vim tempestatis accuset; etsi hi quidem homunculi, sed tamen ridiculi: "quis enim te adhibuisset" dixerit quispiam "si ista non essent". contra deum licet disputare liberius: "in hominum vitiis ais esse culpam: eam dedisses hominibus rationem quae vitia culpamque excluderet". Ubi igitur locus fuit errori deorum? nam patrimonia spe bene tradendi relinquimus, qua possumus falli; deus falli qui potuit? an ut Sol in currum quom Phaethontem filium sustulit, aut Neptunus cum Theseus Hippolytum perdidit, cum ter optandi a Neptuno patre habuisset potestatem:	But you insist again and again that the fault lies with humans, not with the gods. That is as if a doctor were to blame the severity of the disease, or a helmsman the force of the storm. They are only poor mortals, yet even they would be ridiculous: "Who would have called you in," someone might say, "if those things did not exist?" Against a god one may argue more freely: "You say the fault lies in human vices. You should have given humans a reason that would rule out vice and fault." Where, then, was there room for the gods to make a mistake? We leave our estates in the hope of handing them on well, and in that hope we can be deceived; but how could a god be deceived? Or was it the way the Sun was deceived when he lifted his son Phaethon into his chariot, or Neptune when Theseus destroyed Hippolytus, after receiving from his father Neptune the power to make three wishes:
3.77	poetarum ista sunt, nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum auctores non fabularum. atque hi tamen ipsi di poetici, si scissent perniciosa fore illa filiis, peccasse in beneficio putarentur. Et si verum est quod Aristo Chius dicere solebat, nocere audientibus philosophos is qui bene dicta male interpretarentur (posse enim asotos ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis schola exire)—prorsus, si qui audierunt vitiosi essent discessuri, quod perverse philosophorum disputationem interpretarentur, tacere praestaret philosophis quam iis qui se audissent nocere;	these are the poets' stories, but we want to be philosophers, dealing in facts, not in fables. And yet even these gods of poetry, had they known that their gifts would be ruinous to their sons, would be thought to have erred in their kindness. Aristo of Chios used to say that philosophers do harm to those of their hearers who misinterpret what was well said—for profligates could come out of Aristippus' school, and harsh men out of Zeno's. If that is true, then surely, if their hearers were going to leave corrupted because they misinterpreted the philosophers' teaching, it would be better for philosophers to keep silent than to harm those who had listened to them;[36]
3.78	sic, si homines rationem bono consilio a dis immortalibus datam in fraudem malitiamque convertunt, non dari illam quam dari humano generi melius fuit. Ut si medicus sciat eum aegrotum, qui iussus sit vinum sumere, meracius sumpturum statimque periturum, magna sit in	so too, if people turn reason, which the immortal gods gave with good intent, into fraud and malice, it would have been better for it not to be given to the human race than to be given. A doctor who knew that a patient told to take wine would take it

35 The old woman is Medea's nurse in the opening lines of Ennius' *Medea,* wishing the timber for the ship Argo had never been cut.
36 Aristo of Chios was a pupil of Zeno, founder of Stoicism; Aristippus founded the Cyrenaic school, which made pleasure the highest good.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	culpa, sic vestra ista Providentia reprendenda, quae rationem dederit is quos scierit ea perverse et inprobe ussuros. Nisi forte dicitis eam nescisse. Utinam quidem; sed non audebitis, non enim ignoro quanti eius nomen putetis.	too undiluted and die at once would be much to blame. In the same way, that Providence of yours deserves blame for giving reason to those it knew would use it perversely and wickedly. Unless perhaps you say she did not know. I wish you would! But you will not dare, for I am well aware how highly you value her name.

THE GOOD SUFFER, THE WICKED THRIVE

Regulus tortured, Dionysius untouched: the gods do not reward the good or punish the wicked.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3.79	**COTTA** Sed hic quidem locus concludi iam potest. nam si stultitia consensu omnium philosophorum maius est malum quam si omnia mala et fortunae et corporis ex altera parte ponantur, sapientiam autem nemo adsequitur, in summis malis omnes sumus, quibus vos optume consultum a dis inmortalibus dicitis. nam ut nihil interest utrum nemo valeat an nemo possit valere, sic non intellego quid intersit utrum nemo sit sapiens an nemo esse possit.	**COTTA** But this topic can now be brought to a close. By the agreement of all philosophers, folly is a greater evil than all the evils of fortune and of the body placed together on the other side of the scale. If that is so, and no one attains wisdom, then we are all in the depths of misery—we for whom, you say, the immortal gods have provided excellently. For just as it makes no difference whether no one is healthy or no one can be healthy, so I do not see what difference it makes whether no one is wise or no one can be wise.
	Ac nos quidem nimis multa de re apertissuma; Telamo autem uno versu totum locum conficit cur di homines neglegant: nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis; quod nunc abest. debebant illi quidem omnis bonos efficere, si quidem hominum generi consulebant;	And I have said far too much on a perfectly obvious matter. Telamon, though, settles the whole question of why the gods neglect humans in a single line: "for if they cared, it would go well for the good and badly for the bad"—which is not the case now. They ought, of course, to have made everyone good, if they really cared for the human race;[37]
3.80	sin id minus, bonis quidem certe consulere debebant. Cur igitur duo Scipiones fortissimos et optimos viros in Hispania Poenus oppressit, cur Maximus extulit filium consularem, cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, cur Paulum Cannae sustulerunt, cur Poenorum crudelitati Reguli corpus est praebitum, cur Africanum domestici parietes non texerunt? Sed haec vetera et alia permulta; propiora videamus. cur avunculus meus vir innocentissumus idemque doctissumus P. Rutilius in exilio est, cur sodalis meus interfectus domi suae Drusus, cur temperantiae prudentiaeque specimen ante simulacrum Vestae pontifex maximus est Q. Scaevola trucidatus, cur ante etiam tot civitatis principes a Cinna interempti, cur omnium perfidiosissimus C. Marius Q.	or failing that, they certainly ought to have cared for the good. Why, then, did the Carthaginian crush the two Scipios, men of the greatest courage and virtue, in Spain? Why did Maximus have to bury his son, a former consul? Why did Hannibal kill Marcellus? Why did Cannae carry off Paulus? Why was Regulus' body handed over to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why did the walls of his own home fail to protect Africanus? But these are old cases, and there are a great many others; let us look at more recent ones. Why is my uncle Publius Rutilius, a man of perfect integrity and great learning, in exile? Why was my friend Drusus murdered in his own house? Why was the chief pontiff Quintus Scaevola, the very model of self-

37 Telamon, father of Ajax, speaks this line in a tragedy by Ennius.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Catulum praestantissuma dignitate virum mori potuit iubere?	control and good judgment, butchered before the statue of Vesta? Why, even before that, were so many leading citizens killed by Cinna? Why was Gaius Marius, the most treacherous of all men, able to order the death of Quintus Catulus, a man of the highest standing?[38]
3.81	Dies deficiat si velim numerare quibus bonis male evenerit, nec minus si commemorem quibus improbis optime. Cur enim Marius tam feliciter septimum consul domi suae senex est mortuus, cur omnium crudelissimus tam diu Cinna regnavit? "At dedit poenas." Prohiberi melius fuit impedirique ne tot summos viros interficeret quam ipsum aliquando poenas dare. Summo cruciatu supplicioque Q. Varius homo importunissumus periit; si quia Drusum ferro Metellum veneno sustulerat, illos conservari melius fuit quam poenas sceleris Varium pendere. Duodequadraginta Dionysius tyrannus annos fuit opulentissumae et beatissumae civitatis;	The day would run out if I tried to list the good people who fared badly, and no less if I recounted the wicked who fared extremely well. Why did Marius die so happily, an old man in his own home, consul for the seventh time? Why did Cinna, the cruelest of all men, rule for so long? "But he paid the penalty." It would have been better for him to be stopped and prevented from killing so many great men than to pay the penalty himself in the end. Quintus Varius, a thoroughly ruthless man, died in extreme torment and punishment. If that was because he had killed Drusus with the sword and Metellus with poison, it would have been better for them to be saved than for Varius to pay for his crime. Dionysius was tyrant of a very rich and prosperous city for thirty-eight years;[39]
3.82	quam multos ante hunc in ipso Graeciae flore Pisistratus. "At Phalaris, at Apollodorus poenas sustulit." Multis quidem ante cruciatis et necatis. Et praedones multi saepe poenas dant, nec tamen possumus dicere non pluris captivos acerbe quam praedones necatos. Anaxarchum Democriteum a Cyprio tyranno excarnificatum accepimus, Zenonem Eleatem in tormentis necatum; quid dicam de Socrate, cuius morti inlacrimare soleo Platonem legens? Videsne igitur deorum iudicio, si vident res humanas, discrimen esse sublatum?	and how many years before him, in the very flower of Greece, did Pisistratus rule! "But Phalaris and Apollodorus paid the penalty." Yes—after torturing and killing many people first. Pirates, too, are often punished, yet we cannot say that more captives have not died cruel deaths than pirates. We are told that Anaxarchus, the follower of Democritus, was butchered by the tyrant of Cyprus, and that Zeno of Elea was put to death under torture. And what am I to say of Socrates, whose death I cannot read about in Plato without tears? Do you see, then, that the judgment of the gods, if they do observe human affairs, has done away with any distinction between good and bad?[40]
3.83	Diogenes quidem Cynicus dicere solebat Harpalum, qui temporibus illis praedo felix habebatur, contra deos testimonium dicere, quod in illa fortuna tam diu viveret. Dionysius, de quo ante dixi, cum fanum Proserpinae	Diogenes the Cynic used to say that Harpalus, who in those days was considered a lucky robber, was a standing witness against the gods, because he lived so long in such good fortune. Dionysius,

38 Africanus here is Scipio Aemilianus, found mysteriously dead at home in 129 BC. Rutilius Rufus was unjustly exiled in 92 BC; the tribune Marcus Livius Drusus was assassinated in 91 BC; Catulus was driven to suicide in 87 BC and Scaevola killed in 82 BC.
39 Dionysius I ruled Syracuse from 405 to 367 BC. Quintus Varius, tribune in 90 BC, set up a court that prosecuted Roman leaders and was later condemned under his own law.
40 Pisistratus was tyrant of Athens in the 6th century BC; Phalaris (of Acragas) and Apollodorus (of Cassandreia) were tyrants proverbial for cruelty.

LATIN	ENGLISH
Locris expilavisset, navigabat Syracusas; isque cum secundissumo vento cursum teneret, ridens "videtisne" inquit "amici quam bona a dis inmortalibus navigatio sacrilegis detur". atque homo acutus cum bene planeque percepisset, in eadem sententia perseverabat. qui quom ad Peloponnesum classem appulisset et in fanum venisset Iovis Olympii, aureum ei detraxit amiculum grandi pondere, quo Iovem ornarat e manubiis Carthaginiensium tyrannus Gelo, atque in eo etiam cavillatus est aestate grave esse aureum amiculum hieme frigidum, eique laneum pallium iniecit, cum id esse ad omne anni tempus diceret.	whom I mentioned before, had plundered the temple of Proserpina at Locri and was sailing back to Syracuse. As he held his course with a perfectly favorable wind, he laughed and said: "Do you see, my friends, what a fine voyage the immortal gods grant to the sacrilegious?" And the shrewd fellow, having grasped this point clearly and well, persisted in the same view. When he had brought his fleet to the Peloponnese and entered the temple of Olympian Jupiter, he stripped from the god a golden cloak of great weight, with which the tyrant Gelo had adorned Jupiter out of the spoils taken from the Carthaginians. He even joked about it, saying that a golden cloak was heavy in summer and cold in winter, and he threw a woolen cloak over the statue, saying that this suited every season of the year.[41]
idemque Aesculapi Epidauri barbam auream demi iussit; neque enim convenire barbatum esse filium, cum in omnibus fanis pater imberbis esset.	He also ordered the golden beard of Aesculapius at Epidaurus to be removed, saying it was not fitting for the son to wear a beard when his father was beardless in every temple.[42]
3.84 iam mensas argenteas de omnibus delubris iussit auferri, in quibus quod more veteris Graeciae inscriptum esset "bonorum deorum", uti se eorum bonitate velle dicebat. idem Victoriolas aureas et pateras coronasque, quae simulacrorum porrectis manibus sustinebantur, sine dubitatione tollebat eaque se accipere non auferre dicebat; esse enim stultitiam a quibus bona precaremur ab is porrigentibus et dantibus nolle sumere. eundemque ferunt haec quae dixi sublata de fanis in forum protulisse et per praeconem vendidisse exactaque pecunia edixisse ut quod quisque a sacris haberet id ante diem certam in suum quicque fanum referret: ita ad impietatem in deos in homines adiunxit iniuriam.	Next he ordered the silver tables to be carried off from all the shrines. Since these bore the inscription "Property of the good gods," in the custom of ancient Greece, he said he wished to make use of their goodness. He also took away without hesitation the little golden Victories, the bowls and the crowns that the statues held in their outstretched hands, and he said he was not taking them but accepting them: it was folly, he said, to refuse to take good things from those to whom we pray for them, when they hold them out and offer them. They say, too, that he brought these things he had removed from the temples into the marketplace and had them sold by auction; then, once he had collected the money, he issued an edict that whatever anyone had from the sacred places must be returned to its own temple before a fixed day. So to impiety toward the gods he added injustice toward human beings.
Hunc igitur nec Olympius Iuppiter fulmine percussit nec Aesculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabescentem interemit, atque in suo lectulo mortuus in †tyrannidis rogum inlatus est, eamque potestatem, quam ipse per scelus erat nanctus, quasi iustam et legitimam hereditatis loco filio tradidit.	Well, this man was neither struck by the thunderbolt of Olympian Jupiter, nor did Aesculapius make him waste away and die of some wretched, lingering disease. He died in his own bed, was carried to his pyre with a tyrant's honors, and handed

41 Harpalus, Alexander the Great's treasurer, absconded with a vast sum of the royal funds.
42 Aesculapius was the son of Apollo, who was always represented as a beardless youth.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		on to his son, as an inheritance, the power he had gained by crime, as though it were just and lawful.
3.85	Invita in hoc loco versatur oratio, videtur enim auctoritatem adferre peccandi; recte videretur, nisi et virtutis et vitiorum sine ulla divina ratione grave ipsius conscientiae pondus esset, qua sublata iacent omnia. ut enim nec domus nec res publica ratione quadam et disciplina dissignata videatur, si in ea nec recte factis praemia extent ulla nec supplicia peccatis, sic mundi divina in homines moderatio profecto nulla est, si in ea discrimen nullum est bonorum et malorum.	My argument dwells on this topic reluctantly, for it seems to lend authority to wrongdoing. And so it rightly would, were it not that conscience itself, even without any divine government, carries great weight in matters of virtue and vice; take conscience away, and everything collapses. For just as neither a household nor a state would seem to be organized on any rational system and discipline if it offered no rewards for right actions and no punishments for wrongdoing, so surely there is no divine government of the world over human beings if it makes no distinction between the good and the wicked.
3.86	"At enim minora di neglegunt, neque agellos singulorum nec viticulas persequuntur, nec, si uredo aut grando cuipiam nocuit, id Iovi animadvertendum fuit; ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant": sic enim dicitis. Quasi ego paulo ante de fundo Formiano P. Rutili sim questus non de amissa salute. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent, externas commoditates, vineta segetes oliveta, ubertatem frugum et fructuum, omnem denique commoditatem prosperitatemque vitae a dis se habere; virtutem autem nemo umquam acceptam deo rettulit.	"But the gods neglect smaller matters. They do not attend to the little fields and little vines of individuals, and if blight or hail has harmed someone, that is not something Jupiter was obliged to notice. Not even in kingdoms do kings look after every smallest thing"—for that is what you say. As if a little while ago I had been complaining about Publius Rutilius' estate at Formiae, and not about the loss of his civic existence! And indeed all mortals take this view: that their external advantages—vineyards, cornfields, olive groves, abundant crops and fruits, in short every comfort and prosperity of life—come to them from the gods. But no one has ever credited a god with his virtue.
3.87	nimirum recte; propter virtutem enim iure laudamur et in virtute recte gloriamur; quod non contingeret, si id donum a deo non a nobis haberemus. at vero aut honoribus aucti aut re familiari, aut si aliud quippiam nacti sumus fortuiti boni aut depulimus mali, tum dis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostrae laudi adsumptum arbitramur. num quis quod bonus vir esset gratias dis egit umquam? at quod dives quod honoratus quod incolumis, Iovemque optimum et maximum ob eas res appellant, non quod nos iustos temperantes sapientes efficiat, sed quod salvos incolumis opulentos copiosos;	And no doubt rightly so; for it is on account of virtue that we are justly praised, and in virtue that we rightly take pride, which would not be the case if we had it as a gift from a god and not from ourselves. But when we have been advanced in office or in wealth, or have come by some other chance good or warded off some evil, then we thank the gods, and then we think nothing has been added to our own credit. Has anyone ever thanked the gods for being a good man? No—but for being rich, honored, safe, yes. And people call Jupiter "Best and Greatest" for these reasons—not because he makes us just, temperate and wise, but because he makes us safe, secure, wealthy and well supplied;
3.88	neque Herculi quisquam decumam vovit umquam, si sapiens factus esset—quamquam Pythagoras, cum in geometria quiddam novi invenisset, Musis bovem	and no one has ever vowed a tenth to Hercules in return for becoming wise. True, Pythagoras is said to have sacrificed an ox to the Muses when he had

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	immolavisse dicitur; sed id quidem non credo, quoniam ille ne Apollini quidem Deli hostiam immolare voluit, ne aram sanguine aspergeret. ad rem autem ut redeam, iudicium hoc omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam. quamvis licet Menti delubra et Virtuti et Fidei consecremus, tamen haec in nobis ipsis sita videmus; spei salutis opis victoriae facultas a dis expetenda est.	discovered something new in geometry; but I do not believe it, since he would not sacrifice a victim even to Apollo at Delos, for fear of spattering the altar with blood. But to return to the point: this is the judgment of all mortals, that fortune must be sought from a god, but wisdom must be acquired by oneself. We may dedicate shrines to Mind, to Virtue and to Good Faith, but we still see that these reside within ourselves; it is the gift of hope, safety, help and victory that must be sought from the gods.[43]
	Inproborum igitur prosperitates secundaeque res redarguunt, ut Diogenes dicebat, vim omnem deorum ac potestatem.	The prosperity and success of the wicked, then, as Diogenes used to say, refute all the force and power of the gods.
3.89	"At non numquam bonos exitus habent boni." Eos quidem arripimus adtribuimusque sine ulla ratione dis inmortalibus. at Diagoras cum Samothracam venisset Atheus ille qui dicitur, atque ei quidam amicus "tu, qui deos putas humana neglegere, nonne animadvertis ex tot tabulis pictis, quam multi votis vim tempestatis effugerint in portumque salvi pervenerint", "ita fit" inquit, "illi enim nusquam picti sunt qui naufragia fecerunt in marique perierunt". idemque, cum ei naviganti vectores adversa tempestate timidi et perterriti dicerent non iniuria sibi illud accidere qui illum in eandem navem recepissent, ostendit eis in eodem cursu multas alias laborantis quaesivitque num etiam in is navibus Diagoram vehi crederent. Sic enim res se habet, ut ad prosperam adversamve fortunam qualis sis aut quem ad modum vixeris nihil intersit.	"But sometimes good people come to a good end." Yes, and we seize on those cases and, without any reason, attribute them to the immortal gods. But when Diagoras—the one they call "the Atheist"—came to Samothrace, a friend said to him: "You who think the gods neglect human affairs, don't you notice from all these painted tablets how many people have escaped the violence of a storm by their vows and reached harbor safely?" "That is because," he replied, "there are no paintings anywhere of those who were shipwrecked and drowned at sea." On another occasion, when he was on a voyage and the passengers, frightened and terrified by a storm, said they deserved what was happening to them for having taken him on board the same ship, he pointed out many other ships on the same course in difficulties and asked whether they thought Diagoras was aboard those ships too. That is how things are: what sort of person you are, or how you have lived, makes no difference to your good or bad fortune.[44]
3.90	"Non animadvertunt" inquit "omnia di, ne reges quidem". Quid est simile; reges enim si scientes praetermittunt, magna culpa est; at deo ne excusatio quidem est inscientiae. Quem vos praeclare defenditis, cum dicitis eam vim deorum esse, ut etiam si quis morte poenas sceleris effugerit expetantur eae poenae a liberis a nepotibus a posteris. O miram aequitatem deorum: ferretne civitas ulla latorem istius modi legis, ut condemnaretur filius aut nepos, si pater aut avus	"The gods do not notice everything," he says, "and neither do kings." What comparison is there? If kings knowingly pass things over, that is a serious fault; but a god does not even have the excuse of ignorance. And you defend him splendidly when you say that the power of the gods is such that, even if someone has escaped the penalty for his crime by dying, that penalty is exacted from his children, his grandchildren, his descendants.

43 Romans commonly vowed a tenth of their gains to Hercules.
44 The sanctuary of the Great Gods on Samothrace was famed for protecting sailors, who dedicated painted tablets there after escaping shipwreck.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	deliquisset? quinam Tantalidarum internecioni modus paretur, aut quaenam umquam ob mortem Myrtili poenis luendis dabitur satias supplici?	What marvelous fairness on the part of the gods! Would any state tolerate the proposer of a law like that—that a son or grandson should be condemned if his father or grandfather had done wrong? "What end shall be devised for the slaughter of Tantalus' line, or when, for the death of Myrtilus, will enough punishment ever be paid?"[45]
3.91	Utrum poetae Stoicos depravarint an Stoici poetis dederint auctoritatem non facile dixerim; portenta enim ab utrisque et flagitia dicuntur. neque enim quem Hipponactis iambus laeserat aut qui erat Archilochi versu volneratus a deo immissum dolorem non conceptum a se ipso continebat, nec cum Aegisthi libidinem aut cum Paridis videmus a deo causam requirimus, cum culpae paene vocem audiamus, nec ego multorum aegrorum salutem non ab Hippocrate potius quam ab Aesculapio datam iudico, nec Lacedaemoniorum disciplinam dicam umquam ab Apolline potius Spartae quam a Lycurgo datam. Critolaus inquam evertit Corinthum, Carthaginem Asdrubal; hi duo illos oculos orae maritumae effoderunt, non iratus aliqui, quem omnino irasci posse negatis, deus.	Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics or the Stoics have lent authority to the poets, I could not easily say; for both tell monstrous and shameful tales. The man stung by Hipponax's iambics or wounded by a verse of Archilochus was not nursing a pain sent by a god; he had conceived it himself. Nor, when we see the lust of Aegisthus or of Paris, do we look for its cause in a god, since we can almost hear the voice of their guilt. Nor do I judge that the recovery of many sick people was granted by Aesculapius rather than by Hippocrates; nor will I ever say that the Spartan system of discipline was given to Sparta by Apollo rather than by Lycurgus. It was Critolaus, I say, who overthrew Corinth, and Hasdrubal who overthrew Carthage. These two men gouged out those two eyes of the coastline—not some angry god, who, you say, cannot be angry at all.[46]
3.92	At subvenire certe potuit et conservare urbis tantas atque talis; vos enim ipsi dicere soletis nihil esse quod deus efficere non possit, et quidem sine labore ullo; ut enim hominum membra nulla contentione mente ipsa ac voluntate moveantur, sic numine deorum omnia fingi moveri mutarique posse. neque id dicitis superstitiose atque aniliter sed physica constantique ratione; materiam enim rerum, ex qua et in qua omnia sint, totam esse flexibilem et commutabilem, ut nihil sit quod non ex ea quamvis subito fingi convertique possit, eius autem universae fictricem et moderatricem divinam esse providentiam; haec igitur quocumque se moveat, efficere posse quicquid velit. Itaque aut nescit quid possit, aut neglegit res humanas, aut quid sit optimum non potest iudicare.	But surely he could have come to the rescue and preserved cities so great and so splendid. For you yourselves regularly say that there is nothing a god cannot accomplish, and without any effort at all. Just as human limbs are moved without strain by the mind and will alone, so, you say, everything can be shaped, moved and changed by the divine power of the gods. And you say this not in a superstitious, old-womanish way, but on a consistent scientific account. For the matter of things, from which and in which everything exists, is entirely pliable and changeable, so that there is nothing that cannot be shaped and transformed out of it, however suddenly; and the shaper and governor of all this matter is divine providence. So providence, wherever it moves, can accomplish whatever it wishes. Therefore either it does not know what it can do, or it neg-

45 Pelops, son of Tantalus, killed his charioteer Myrtilus, whose dying curse fell on the whole house of Tantalus.
46 Hipponax and Archilochus were Greek iambic poets notorious for invective. Critolaus led the Achaean League and Hasdrubal commanded Carthage in the wars that ended with both cities destroyed by Rome in 146 BC.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		lects human affairs, or it cannot judge what is best.
3.93	"Non curat singulos homines." Non mirum: ne civitates quidem; non eas: ne nationes quidem et gentis. quod si has etiam contemnet, quid mirum est omne ab ea genus humanum esse contemptum?	"It does not care for individual human beings." No wonder—it does not care for cities either. Not for cities? Not even for nations and peoples. And if it is going to despise even these, what wonder is it that the whole human race has been despised by it?
	Sed quo modo idem dicitis non omnia deos persequi, idem voltis a diis inmortalibus hominibus dispertiri ac dividi somnia (idcirco haec tecum, quia vestra est de somniorum veritate sententia), atque idem etiam vota suscipi dicitis oportere? Nempe singuli vovent, audit igitur mens divina etiam de singulis; videtis ergo non esse eam tam occupatam quam putabatis. Fac esse distentam, caelum versantem terram tuentem maria moderantem: cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur, cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos praeficit, qui a te Balbe innumerabiles explicati sunt?	But how can you say that the gods do not attend to everything, and at the same time hold that the immortal gods distribute and allot dreams to human beings—I put this to you, Balbus, because it is your school that believes dreams come true—and also say that vows ought to be made? Of course, it is individuals who make vows, so the divine mind hears even about individuals; you see, then, that it is not as busy as you thought. Suppose it is fully occupied—turning the heavens, watching over the earth, governing the seas. Why does it allow so many gods to do nothing and sit idle? Why does it not put some of these idle gods in charge of human affairs—the countless gods you set out for us, Balbus?
	Haec fere dicere habui de natura deorum, non ut eam tollerem sed ut intellegeretis quam esset obscura et quam difficiles explicatus haberet.	This is roughly what I had to say about the nature of the gods—not in order to abolish it, but so that you might understand how obscure it is and how hard to explain.

ENDING

Balbus will reply another day; Velleius and Cicero give their verdicts.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3.94	**BALBUS** Quae cum dixisset, Cotta finem. Lucilius autem "Vehementius" inquit "Cotta tu quidem invectus es in eam Stoicorum rationem quae de providentia deorum ab illis sanctissume et prudentissume constituta est. sed quoniam advesperascit, dabis nobis diem aliquem ut contra ista dicamus. est enim mihi tecum pro aris et focis certamen et pro deorum templis atque delubris proque urbis muris, quos vos pontifices sanctos esse dicitis diligentiusque urbem religione quam ipsis moenibus cingitis; quae deseri a me, dum quidem spirare potero, nefas iudico."	**BALBUS** With these words Cotta finished. But Balbus said: "You have attacked rather vehemently, Cotta, the Stoic account of the providence of the gods, which they have established most reverently and most wisely. But since evening is coming on, you will grant us another day to answer what you have said. For my fight with you is for altars and hearths, for the temples and shrines of the gods, and for the walls of the city—walls that you pontiffs declare sacred, and you gird the city more carefully with religion than with the walls themselves. To abandon these, as long as I have breath in me, I hold to be an impiety."
3.95		**COTTA** Then Cotta said: "For my part, Balbus, I actually wish to be refuted. I preferred to discuss the

LATIN	ENGLISH
COTTA Tum Cotta: "Ego vero et opto redargui me Balbe, et ea quae disputavi disserere malui quam iudicare, et facile me a te vinci posse certo scio."	points I raised rather than to pass judgment on them, and I am quite sure you can easily defeat me."
VELLEIUS "Quippe" inquit Velleius "qui etiam somnia putet ad nos mitti ab Iove, quae ipsa tamen tam levia non sunt quam est Stoicorum de natura deorum oratio."	VELLEIUS "Naturally," said Velleius, "since he is a man who thinks that even dreams are sent to us by Jupiter—though dreams themselves are not as flimsy as the Stoics' discourse on the nature of the gods."
CICERO Haec cum essent dicta, ita discessimus, ut Velleio Cottae disputatio verior, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior.	CICERO When this had been said, we parted. Velleius thought Cotta's argument the truer; to me, Balbus' seemed to come closer to the likeness of truth.[47]

47 "Likeness of truth" (veritatis similitudo) echoes the Academic standard of the probable, which stops short of claiming certainty.