Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. HEGEL
1770–1831

Phenomenology of Spirit

Phänomenologie des Geistes

Translated from the German with AI (Claude) and edited



FORAGE
forage.com

Phenomenology of Spirit · G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831)

Translated from the German with AI (Claude) and edited. Reading edition, Forage, September 2026. forage.com/hegel/phenomenology-of-spirit

German text: the first edition (Bamberg and Würzburg, 1807) as transcribed by the Deutsches Textarchiv (www.deutschestextarchiv.de/book/show/hegel_phaenomenologie_1807) (CC BY-SA 4.0). English: translated from the German with AI (Claude), then edited for accuracy and consistency. Not reviewed by a human specialist. Free to reuse under CC BY-SA 4.0. The small numbers set in the text are the standard paragraph numbers (¶1–808) of A. V. Miller's translation, also used by Pinkard; where one of these begins inside a paragraph of the 1807 text, the number appears at that point.

The original text is in the public domain. This translation is free to share and adapt under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA 4.0): creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0

Set in Source Serif 4.

CONTENTS

Introduction xi

Preface 1
Vorrede. 1
Philosophy as science 4
A time of birth 7
The night of the absolute 10
Substance as subject 11
The path to science 18
The power of the negative 20
True and false 25
Method and the lifeless schema 31
The speculative proposition 40

Introduction 51
Erster Theil. Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewußtseyns. . . 51
Fear of error as fear of truth 52
The path of despair 55
Consciousness tests itself 58

Consciousness 65
I. Die sinnliche Gewißheit; oder das Diese und das Meynen. . . 65
Perception: the thing and deception 74
Perception corrects itself 79
The sophistry of common sense 86
Force and the understanding 87
The play of forces 93
Appearance and the supersensible beyond 95
The tranquil realm of laws 100
Explanation 104
The inverted world 107
Infinity 110

Behind the curtain 114

Self-Consciousness 117
IV. Die Wahrheit der Gewißheit seiner selbst. 117
Self-consciousness as desire 118
Satisfaction in another self-consciousness 123
Lordship and bondage 125
The life-and-death struggle 127
Lord and bondsman 129
Fear, service and work 132
Stoicism 134
Skepticism 138
The unhappy consciousness 142
Desire, work and thanksgiving 149
The mediator and sacrifice 153

Reason: Observing Reason 157
V. Gewißheit und Wahrheit der Vernunft. 157
A. Observing reason 164
a. Observation of nature 166
The search for laws 170
The organic 174
The outer as expression of the inner 180
b. Observing self-consciousness: logical and psychological laws 201
Psychology and the individual 204
c. Physiognomy and phrenology 207
Face, hand and deed 209
The skull 218
The result of observing reason 232

Reason: The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness 237
B. Reason actualizing itself 237
The realm of ethical life 238
a. Pleasure and necessity 244
b. The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit 248
c. Virtue and the way of the world 256

Reason: Individuality Real in and for Itself 265
C. Individuality real in and for itself 265
a. The spiritual animal kingdom and deception, or the matter itself 267
The matter itself 276
Honesty and deception 280
b. Reason as lawgiver 283
Truthfulness and neighborly love 285
c. Reason as tester of laws 288
The unwritten law 292

Spirit: True Spirit, Ethical Life 295
VI. Der Geist. 295
A. True spirit: ethical life 298
a. The ethical world: human and divine law, man and woman 299
The family and the dead 301
Government and war 305
Brother and sister 306
The harmony of the ethical world 309
b. Ethical action: human and divine knowing, guilt and fate . 312
Guilt and the hidden power 317
Two brothers and a burial 320
Womankind and war 322
c. The condition of right 325
The lord of the world 327

Spirit: Self-Alienated Spirit, Culture 331
B. Self-alienated spirit: culture 331
I. The world of self-alienated spirit 334
a. Culture and its realm of actuality 335
State power and wealth 339
Noble and base consciousness 342
From service to flattery 344
Language as alienation 347
Wealth and its client 351
The language of disruption 355

b. Faith and pure insight 361
The world of faith 365
Pure insight 367
II. The Enlightenment 369
a. The struggle of the Enlightenment with superstition 370
The silent infection 372
How faith experiences the Enlightenment 378
The positive truths of the Enlightenment 382
The right of the Enlightenment 386
b. The truth of the Enlightenment 393
Utility 396
III. Absolute freedom and terror 400
The fury of disappearing 404
From terror to morality 406

Spirit: Spirit Certain of Itself, Morality 411
C. Spirit certain of itself: morality 411
a. The moral world-view 412
The postulates 415
b. Dissemblance 422
Happiness, envy and the holy lawgiver 427
c. Conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness . . . 433
The freedom of conscience 439
The language of conviction 446
The beautiful soul 449
Evil and hypocrisy 451
The judging consciousness 454
Confession and the hard heart 456
Forgiveness 458

Religion 463
VII. Die Religion. 463
Religion and the moments of spirit 466
Three forms of religion 470
A. Natural religion 471
a. The luminous essence 473

b. Plant and animal 475
c. The artificer 476
B. The religion of art 479
a. The abstract work of art 483
The cult 489
b. The living work of art 492
c. The spiritual work of art 496
Tragedy 501
Comedy 508
C. The revealed religion 511
The death of the gods 514
God become human 518
Spirit in its community 523
The first element: pure thought 525
The second element: creation and fall 527
Incarnation, death and reconciliation 530
The third element: the community 534

Absolute Knowing 541
VIII. Das absolute Wissen. 541
Recollecting the shapes of consciousness 543
The final reconciliation 545
Absolute knowing and science 548
Science, time and history 549
From science back to nature and history 554

INTRODUCTION

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) was Hegel's first major book, finished in Jena as Napoleon's army approached the town. It was meant as the introduction to his system of philosophy: the path by which ordinary consciousness can rise, step by step, to "absolute knowing."

Hegel follows consciousness through a series of shapes, each of which fails by its own standard and passes into the next: from sense-certainty and perception to self-consciousness, with its famous struggle between lord and bondsman; to reason; to spirit, the life of whole communities from the Greek city to the French Revolution; to religion; and finally to a knowing that comprehends the whole journey.

It is one of the most difficult and influential books in philosophy, a source for Marx, existentialism and much of modern thought. The Preface, on the true as "the whole" and substance as subject, is often read on its own.

Preface

Vorrede
On scientific knowledge: the true is the whole, and substance must be grasped as subject.

VORREDE.

[1] A preface customarily places at the front of a book an explanation of the aim the author has set himself in it, of the occasions that prompted it, and of how he believes it stands in relation to other treatments of the same subject, earlier or contemporary. In a philosophical work such an explanation seems not only superfluous but, given the nature of the matter, even inappropriate and at odds with its purpose. For whatever it might be fitting to say about philosophy in a preface, and however it might be said, it cannot count as the way in which philosophical truth is to be presented. Such a preface might offer a historical *account* of the tendency and standpoint, of the general content and the results, or a string of assertions and assurances about the true that go back and forth.— [2] And because philosophy exists essentially in the element of universality, which contains the particular within itself, it is more exposed than other sciences to a certain semblance. It can look as if the matter itself, even in its complete essence, were expressed in the aim or the final results, and as if the working-out were, by comparison, the really inessential part. Take, by contrast, the general representation of what anatomy is: say, knowledge of the parts of the body considered in their lifeless existence. Here we are convinced that we do not yet possess the matter itself, the content of this science, and that we must also take pains over the particulars.—

Further, with an aggregate of information of this kind, which does not rightly bear the name of science, a conversation about its aim and similar generalities is no different from the historical, unconceptual way in which the content itself is talked about: these nerves, muscles and so on. In philosophy, on the other hand, an incongruity would arise. Such a way of proceeding would be used, and yet philosophy itself would show it to be incapable of grasping the truth.

In the same way, determining the relation that a philosophical work believes it has to other efforts on the same subject drags in an extraneous interest and obscures what matters in the cognition of truth. The more firmly opinion fixes the opposition of the true and the false, the more it tends to expect either agreement with or contradiction of a given philosophical system, and to see in any statement about such a system only the one or the other. It does not grasp the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive development of truth. It sees in that diversity only contradiction. The bud disappears as the blossom bursts forth, and one could say that the bud is refuted by the blossom. In the same way the fruit declares the blossom to be a false existence of the plant, and the fruit steps into the blossom's place as its truth. These forms are not only distinct from one another; they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. But their fluid nature at the same time makes them moments of the organic unity. In that unity they not only do not conflict: each is as necessary as the other, and it is this equal necessity that first constitutes the life of the whole. But contradiction of a philosophical system usually does not grasp itself in this way. And the consciousness that apprehends the contradiction usually does not know how to free it from its one-sidedness, or keep it free. Nor does it know how to recognize, in what takes the shape of conflict and apparent opposition, moments that are mutually necessary.

[3] The demand for explanations of this kind, and the satisfying of that demand, may perhaps seem to be concerned with what is essential. Where could the inner core of a philosophical work be

more fully expressed than in its aims and results? And how could these be known more definitely than by their difference from what the age otherwise produces in the same sphere? But suppose such activity is meant to count as more than the beginning of cognition, as actual cognition. Then it must in fact be reckoned among the devices for evading the matter itself. It combines two things: the appearance of seriousness and effort about the matter, and the actual sparing of that effort. — For the matter is not exhausted in its *aim* but in its *working-out*. Nor is the *result* the *actual* whole; the whole is the result together with its becoming. The aim, taken for itself, is the lifeless universal, just as the tendency is a mere drive that still lacks its actuality; and the bare result is the corpse that has left the tendency behind.—Likewise, *difference* is rather the *limit* of the matter. It is where the matter stops, or it is what the matter is not. Such labors over aims or results, and over the differences between one system and another and the judgments passed on each, are therefore easier work than they might seem. For instead of engaging with the matter, such activity is always already beyond it. Instead of dwelling in the matter and forgetting itself there, such knowing always reaches for something else; it stays with itself rather than being with the matter and surrendering to it.—The easiest thing is to pass judgment on what has content and solidity. Harder is to grasp it. Hardest of all is to combine the two and produce its presentation.

[4] The beginning of culture, of working one's way out of the immediacy of substantial life, will always have to be made by acquiring knowledge of general principles and points of view. One must first work one's way up to the thought of the matter in general. No less, one must learn to support it with reasons or refute it, to apprehend its concrete and rich fullness in its determinatenesses, and to know how to give a well-ordered account of it and a serious judgment on it. But this beginning of culture will first give way to the seriousness of fulfilled life, which leads into the experience of the matter itself. And when the seriousness of the Concept is added and descends into the

matter's depths, such knowledge and judgment will keep their proper place in conversation.[1]

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE

Truth exists only as a scientific system, and the time has come to raise philosophy to science.

[5] The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of truth. What I have set myself to do is to help bring philosophy closer to the form of science—to the goal where it can lay aside its name of *love* of *knowing* and be *actual knowing*. The inner necessity that knowing be science lies in its nature, and the only satisfactory explanation of this is the presentation of philosophy itself. External necessity, however, grasped in a universal way, setting aside the contingency of the person and of individual occasions, is the same as inner necessity, only in the shape in which time presents the existence of its moments. To show that the time has come for philosophy to be raised to science would therefore be the only true justification of attempts that have this aim. For it would demonstrate that the aim is necessary—indeed, it would at the same time carry the aim out.

[6] I place the true shape of truth in its being scientific; or, what is the same thing, I claim that truth has the element of its existence in the *Concept* alone. I know that this seems to contradict a certain view, together with its consequences—a view whose presumption is as great as its spread in the convictions of our age. An explanation concerning this contradiction therefore seems not superfluous, even if here it can be nothing more than an assurance, just like the view it opposes. On this view, the true exists only in, or rather only as, what is called now intuition, now immediate knowing of the absolute, religion, being—not being at the center of divine love, but the being of that center

1 Bildung, rendered "culture" throughout, means formation, education and cultivation at once. "Concept" is capitalized where Hegel means the speculative Concept (Begriff).

itself. From this standpoint, what is demanded for the presentation of philosophy is the very opposite of the form of the Concept. The absolute is not to be grasped conceptually but felt and intuited. Not its Concept but the feeling and intuition of it are to have the say and be given voice.[2]

7 Take the appearance of such a demand in its broader context, and look at the stage at which self-conscious spirit now stands. Spirit has gone beyond the substantial life it once led in the element of thought. It has gone beyond this immediacy of its faith, beyond the satisfaction and security of the certainty that consciousness had of its reconciliation with the essence and of the essence's universal presence, inner and outer. Spirit has not only passed beyond this into the other extreme, its insubstantial reflection into itself; it has passed beyond that too. Not only is its essential life lost to it; it is also conscious of this loss, and of the finitude that is its content. Turning away from the husks, confessing that it lies in wickedness and railing at it, spirit now demands of philosophy not so much the *knowing* of what it *is* as help in first regaining, through philosophy, the restoration of that substantiality and of the solidity of being. To meet this need, philosophy is not so much to unlock the closedness of substance and raise substance to self-consciousness. Nor is it so much to bring its chaotic consciousness back to thought-out order and to the simplicity of the Concept. It is rather to jumble together the distinctions of thought, suppress the differentiating Concept and restore the feeling of the essence. It is to provide not so much *insight* as *edification*.[3] The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion and love are the bait required to arouse the appetite to bite. Not the Concept but ecstasy, not the cold, advancing necessity of the matter but fermenting enthusiasm, is supposed to be what sustains the wealth of substance and carries its expansion onward.

2 Hegel is targeting Jacobi's "immediate knowing," the religion of feeling, and the Romantic and Schellingian intuition of the absolute.

3 The "husks" recall the prodigal son (Luke 15:16); "lies in wickedness" echoes 1 John 5:19.

[8] This demand is matched by a strenuous, almost zealous and irritable effort to tear people out of their immersion in the sensuous, the commonplace and the singular, and to raise their eyes to the stars. It is as if, wholly forgetful of the divine, they were on the point of contenting themselves with dust and water, like the worm. Once, they had a heaven furnished with an ample wealth of thoughts and images. The meaning of everything that is lay in the thread of light by which it was tied to heaven. Along that thread, instead of dwelling in *this* present, the gaze glided beyond it, up to the divine essence—to a present, if one may put it so, that lies in the beyond. The eye of spirit had to be turned to earthly things by force and held fast there. It took a long time to work that clarity, which only the supraterrestrial possessed, into the dullness and confusion in which the meaning of this world lay, and to make attention to the present as such—what was called *experience*—interesting and valid.—Now the opposite need seems to exist. Our sense is so firmly rooted in the earthly that it takes an equal force to raise it above this. Spirit shows itself so poor that, like a wanderer in the desert longing for a simple drink of water, it seems to crave for its refreshment only the meager feeling of the divine in general. By what spirit is content with, we can measure the extent of its loss.

[9] This contentment in receiving, or stinginess in giving, does not befit science, however. Whoever seeks only edification, whoever longs to wrap the earthly multiplicity of his existence and his thought in fog and to have the indeterminate enjoyment of this indeterminate divinity, may look for where he can find it. He will easily find the means to work himself into a rapture and puff himself up with it. But philosophy must beware of wishing to be edifying.

[10] Still less must this contentment, which renounces science, claim that such enthusiasm and murkiness is something higher than science. This prophetic talk supposes that it stays right at the center and in the depths. It looks down with contempt on determinateness (the *horos* [boundary, definition]) and deliberately keeps its distance from the Concept and from necessity, as

from a reflection that dwells only in finitude. But just as there is an empty breadth, there is also an empty depth. Just as there is an extension of substance that pours out into finite multiplicity without the force to hold it together, so this is an intensity without content. Holding itself as pure force without expansion, it is the same thing as superficiality. The force of spirit is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in unfolding itself.—At the same time, this unconceptual, substantial knowing claims to have sunk the particularity of the self in the essence and to philosophize truly and in holiness. In doing so it hides from itself the fact that, instead of being devoted to God, it disdains measure and determination and so merely gives free rein now to the contingency of the content within itself, now to its own arbitrariness within the content. — Surrendering themselves to the unbridled fermentation of substance, they suppose that by veiling self-consciousness and giving up the understanding they are *His own*, to whom God gives wisdom in sleep. And so what they in fact receive and bring forth in their sleep is, accordingly, dreams.[4]

A TIME OF BIRTH

A new world of spirit is dawning, but at first it exists only as a bare concept.

[11] It is not hard to see, besides, that our time is a time of birth and of transition to a new period. Spirit has broken with the world of its existence and representation up to now. It is on the point of sinking that world into the past, and it is at work on its own transformation. Spirit, to be sure, is never at rest; it is always caught up in ever-progressing movement. But consider a child: after long, quiet nourishment, its first breath breaks off the gradualness of merely cumulative growth—a qualitative leap —and now the child is born. In the same way, spirit in forming itself matures slowly and quietly toward the new shape, dissolv-

4 Echoes Psalm 127:2 as rendered by Luther: "for he gives it to his own in sleep."

ing one small piece of the structure of its previous *world* after another. That world's tottering is indicated only by isolated symptoms. The frivolity and the boredom that spread through the established order, and the vague presentiment of something unknown, are harbingers that something other is on the way. This gradual crumbling, which did not alter the physiognomy of the whole, is interrupted by the sunrise, which, like a flash of lightning, sets up at a single stroke the structure of the new world.

[12] Yet this new thing has no more complete actuality than the newborn child has, and it is essential not to overlook this. Its first appearance is only its immediacy, or its concept. A building is not finished when its foundation has been laid; just as little is the concept of the whole, once attained, the whole itself. When we want to see an oak in the strength of its trunk, the spread of its branches and the masses of its foliage, we are not satisfied if we are shown an acorn instead. In the same way science, the crown of a world of spirit, is not complete at its beginning. The beginning of the new spirit is the product of a far-reaching upheaval of manifold forms of culture, the prize of a winding and tangled path and of just as much strenuous effort. It is the whole that has returned into itself out of succession and out of its extension: the *simple concept* of the whole, which has come to be. But the actuality of this simple whole consists in this: the shapes that have become its moments develop again and take on shape afresh, but now in their new element, in the sense that has come to be.

[13] On the one hand, the first appearance of the new world is only the whole veiled in its *simplicity*, or its universal ground. On the other hand, the wealth of the previous existence is still present to consciousness in memory. In the newly appearing shape, consciousness misses the spread and particularization of content. It misses still more the elaboration of form by which differences are determined with certainty and ordered into their fixed relations. Without this elaboration science lacks universal *intelligibility* and has the look of being the esoteric possession of

a few individuals. It is an esoteric possession because it is present only in its concept, or only its inner side is present. It belongs to a few individuals because its unexpanded appearance makes its existence something individual. Only what is completely determined is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and becoming the property of all. The form of science that belongs to the understanding is the path to science that is offered to all and made equal for all. To reach rational knowing by way of the understanding is the just demand of consciousness as it approaches science. For the understanding is thinking, the pure I as such; and what belongs to the understanding is what is already known, what science and unscientific consciousness have in common. Through it, unscientific consciousness can immediately enter science.

[14] Science that is only just beginning, and has therefore attained neither completeness of detail nor perfection of form, is open to criticism on that score. But if such criticism is meant to strike at its essence, it would be just as unjust as it is inadmissible to refuse to recognize the demand for that elaboration. This opposition seems to be the main knot at which scientific culture is currently wearing itself out, and about which it does not yet properly understand itself. One side insists on the wealth of material and on intelligibility. The other at least disdains intelligibility and insists on immediate rationality and divinity. The first side may have been reduced to silence, whether by the force of truth alone or by the impetuousness of the other side, and it may have felt overpowered as regards the ground of the matter. It is not on that account satisfied as regards those demands, for they are just, but unmet. Its silence is due only half to victory. The other half is owed to the boredom and indifference that usually follow from expectations constantly aroused and promises never fulfilled.

THE NIGHT OF THE ABSOLUTE

A monotonous formalism applies one formula to everything and dissolves all differences in the absolute.

[15] As regards content, the other side sometimes makes it easy enough for itself to cover a great extent. They drag a mass of material onto their territory, namely what is already known and ordered. Because they busy themselves mainly with oddities and curiosities, they seem all the more to possess the rest, with which knowing had already finished in its own way. They seem at the same time to master what is still unregulated, and so to subject everything to the absolute idea, which thus seems to be known in everything and to have matured into a fully expanded science. But looked at more closely, this expansion turns out not to have come about through one and the same thing shaping itself in different ways. It is rather the shapeless repetition of one and the same thing, merely applied externally to diverse material, which thereby acquires a tedious semblance of diversity. The idea, true enough for itself, in fact always stays stuck at its beginning if its development consists in nothing but such repetition of the same formula. The one unmoving form is carried around by the knowing subject over whatever is at hand, and the material is dipped from outside into this static element. That is no more the fulfillment of what is demanded than arbitrary notions about the content are. What is demanded is the wealth that springs from itself, the self-determining difference of shapes. This is rather a monochrome formalism, which arrives at differences in its material only because that material is already prepared and familiar.

[16] At the same time, this formalism asserts that its monotony and abstract universality are the absolute. It assures us that dissatisfaction with them is an inability to master the absolute standpoint and hold fast to it. Formerly, the empty possibility of representing something in another way was enough to refute a representation, and this same bare possibility, the general

thought, also had the whole positive value of actual cognition. Here, likewise, we see all value ascribed to the universal idea in this form of non-actuality. And the dissolution of what is differentiated and determinate—or rather its being hurled into the abyss of the void, a move that is not developed further and does not justify itself in its own terms—is passed off as the speculative way of considering things. To consider any existence as it is in the *absolute* here consists in nothing more than saying of it that, although it has just been spoken of as a something, in the absolute, in A = A, there is no such thing at all: there, everything is one. To set this one knowing, that in the absolute everything is the same, against cognition that makes distinctions and is fulfilled, or that seeks and demands fulfillment—or to pass off one's *absolute* as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black—is the naivety of emptiness in cognition.[5] — Recent philosophy has denounced and reviled formalism, and formalism has arisen again within that very philosophy. Even though its inadequacy is known and felt, it will not vanish from science until the cognition of absolute actuality has become fully clear about its nature.—A general picture, placed before an attempt to carry it out, makes that attempt easier to grasp. With this in mind, it is useful to sketch its rough outline here, taking the opportunity at the same time to set aside some forms whose habitual use is an obstacle to philosophical cognition.

SUBSTANCE AS SUBJECT

The true must be grasped as subject, a self-moving whole that is actual only as the result of its development.

17 In my view—a view that must justify itself through the presentation of the system itself—everything turns on grasping and expressing the true not only as *substance* but equally as *subject*. At the same time, it should be noted that substantiality includes within itself the universal, or the *immediacy of knowing*,

5 Generally read as a jab at Schelling's philosophy of identity, in which the absolute is the indifference of all differences.

just as much as that immediacy which is *being*, or immediacy *for* knowing.[6] — Conceiving God as the one substance outraged the age in which this determination was first expressed. The reason lay partly in the instinct that in it self-consciousness is only submerged, not preserved. But partly the opposite position, which holds fast to thinking as thinking—*universality*—is the same simplicity, the same undifferentiated, unmoving substantiality. And third, if thinking unites the being of substance with itself and grasps immediacy, or intuiting, as thinking, it still remains to be seen whether this intellectual intuiting does not again fall back into inert simplicity and present actuality itself in a non-actual way.[7]

[18] Further, living substance is the being that is in truth *subject* —or, what amounts to the same thing, that is in truth actual— only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or the mediation of its becoming-other with itself. As subject it is pure *simple negativity*, and precisely thereby the splitting of the simple in two, the doubling that sets its terms in opposition. This doubling in turn is the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its opposition. Only this *self-restoring* sameness, or reflection into itself in otherness—not an *original* unity as such, or an *immediate* one as such—is the true. It is the becoming of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its purpose and has it as its beginning, and that is actual only through being carried out and through its end.

[19] The life of God and divine cognition may well be expressed, then, as love playing with itself. But this idea sinks into edification and even into insipidity if it lacks the seriousness, the pain, the patience and the labor of the negative. *In itself*, that life is indeed untroubled sameness and unity with itself, for which otherness and alienation, and the overcoming of this alienation, are no serious matter. But this *in-itself* is abstract universality,

6 The 1807 text reads literally "not as substance, but equally as subject"; "equally" carries the sense of "not only."

7 The one substance is Spinoza's doctrine; "intellectual intuition" was a key term of Schelling's.

which leaves out of account the nature of that life, which is *to be for itself*, and with it the self-movement of form altogether. When form is declared to be the same as essence, it is for that very reason a misunderstanding to suppose that cognition can be content with the in-itself, or the essence, and spare itself the form. It is equally a misunderstanding to suppose that the absolute first principle or the absolute intuition makes the working-out of the former or the development of the latter unnecessary. Precisely because form is as essential to essence as essence is to itself, essence is not to be grasped and expressed merely as essence—that is, as immediate substance or as the pure self-intuition of the divine. It must be grasped and expressed equally as *form*, and in the whole wealth of developed form. Only thus is it grasped and expressed as something actual.

[20] The true is the whole. But the whole is only the essence completing itself through its development. Of the absolute it must be said that it is essentially *result*, that only at the *end* is it what it is in truth; and precisely in this consists its nature, which is to be something actual, subject, self-becoming. However contradictory it may seem that the absolute is to be comprehended essentially as result, a little reflection sets this semblance of contradiction right. The beginning, the principle, or the absolute as it is first and immediately expressed, is only the universal. When I say "*all* animals," these words cannot count as a zoology; in the same way it is plain that the words "divine," "absolute," "eternal" and so on do not express what is contained in them;—and only such words do in fact express intuition as the immediate. Whatever is more than such a word, even the transition to a mere proposition, is a *becoming-other* that has to be taken back; it is a mediation. But mediation is precisely what is regarded with horror. It is as if absolute cognition were given up the moment one makes more of mediation than simply that it is nothing absolute and has no place at all in the absolute.

[21] But this horror in fact stems from unfamiliarity with the nature of mediation and of absolute cognition itself. For mediation is nothing but self-sameness in motion. It is reflection into

itself, the moment of the I that is for itself, pure negativity or *simple becoming*. The I, or becoming in general—this mediating—is, precisely because of its simplicity, immediacy in the process of becoming, and the immediate itself.—It is therefore a misconception of reason to exclude reflection from the true and fail to grasp it as a positive moment of the absolute. It is reflection that makes the true a result, but reflection equally sublates this opposition to its becoming. For this becoming is just as simple, and therefore not different from the form of the true, which is to show itself as *simple* in the result; it is rather precisely this having-returned into simplicity.—The embryo is indeed a human being *in itself*, but it is not one *for itself*. It is one for itself only as cultivated reason, which has *made* itself into what it is *in itself*. Only this is reason's actuality.[8] But this result is itself simple immediacy. For it is self-conscious freedom, which rests in itself and has not pushed the opposition aside and left it lying there, but is reconciled with it.

[22] What has been said can also be put this way: reason is *purposive activity*. The exaltation of a supposed nature over a misunderstood thinking, and in the first place the banishment of external purposiveness, has brought the form of *purpose* in general into discredit. But as Aristotle, too, defines nature as purposive activity, purpose is the immediate, what is at rest, which is itself moving, or is subject. Its abstract force of moving is *being-for-self*, or pure negativity. The result is the same as the beginning only because the beginning is purpose;—or, the actual is the same as its concept only because the immediate, as purpose, has within itself the self, or pure actuality.[9] The purpose carried out, or the actual as existing, is movement and unfolded becoming; but precisely this unrest is the self. And it is the same as that immediacy and simplicity of the beginning because it is the result, what has returned into itself—and what

8 "Sublate" renders aufheben, which means at once to cancel, to preserve and to raise up.

9 Aristotle argues in *Physics* II that nature acts for the sake of an end.

has returned into itself is precisely the self, and the self is sameness and simplicity relating itself to itself.

[23] The need to represent the absolute as *subject* has made use of propositions such as: *God* is the eternal, or the moral world order, or love, and so on. In such propositions the true is simply posited straight off as subject; it is not presented as the movement of reflecting itself into itself. A proposition of this kind begins with the word "*God*." Taken for itself, this is a senseless sound, a mere name. Only the predicate says *what he is*; it is the word's filling and meaning, and the empty beginning becomes actual knowing only in this end. To this extent it is hard to see why one should not speak only of the eternal, the moral world order and so on, or, as the ancients did, of pure concepts, being, the one and so on —[10] of what carries the meaning, without adding the senseless sound as well. But the word signifies precisely that what is posited is not a being, an essence or a universal in general, but something reflected into itself, a subject. Yet at the same time this is only anticipated. The subject is assumed as a fixed point to which the predicates are attached as to their support. They are attached by a movement that belongs to the one who knows about the subject, and that is not regarded as belonging to the point itself; yet only through such a movement would the content be presented as subject. Given the way this movement is constituted, it cannot belong to the subject. But once that point is presupposed, the movement cannot be constituted otherwise; it can only be external. That anticipation, that the absolute is subject, is therefore not only not the actuality of this concept; it even makes that actuality impossible. For the anticipation posits the concept as a point at rest, whereas actuality is self-movement.

[24] Among the various consequences that follow from what has been said, one can be singled out: that knowing is actual, and can be presented, only as science or as *system*. A further consequence is that a so-called first principle of philosophy, if it is

10 "The moral world order" alludes to Fichte, whose identification of God with it sparked the Atheism Controversy of 1799.

true, is for that very reason also false, simply because it is a first principle.—It is therefore easy to refute it. The refutation consists in pointing out its deficiency; and it is deficient because it is only the universal, or principle, the beginning. If the refutation is thorough, it is drawn from the principle itself and developed out of it, not accomplished by contrary assurances and notions brought in from outside. The refutation would thus really be the principle's development, and so the remedying of its deficiency, were it not mistaken about itself. It errs in attending only to its *negative* side and in failing to become aware of its progress and result on their *positive* side too.—Conversely, the properly *positive* working-out of the beginning is at the same time just as much a negative relation to it, namely to its one-sided form of being at first only *immediate*, or *purpose*. It can therefore just as well be taken as the refutation of what constitutes the *ground* of the system. It is better taken, though, as a demonstration that the *ground* or principle of the system is in fact only its *beginning*.

[25] That the true is actual only as system, or that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the representation that speaks of the absolute as *spirit*. This is the most sublime concept, and the one that belongs to the modern age and its religion. The spiritual alone is the *actual*. It is the essence, or what is *in itself*. It is what *relates itself* and is determinate, *otherness* and *being-for-self*. And it is what remains within itself in this determinateness, or in its being-outside-itself;—in other words, it is *in and for itself*.—But it is this being-in-and-for-itself at first only for us, or *in itself*: it is spiritual *substance*. It must also be this *for itself*: it must be the knowing of the spiritual and the knowing of itself as spirit. That is, it must be an *object* to itself, but just as immediately a *mediated*, that is, sublated object, reflected into itself. Spirit is *for itself* only for us, insofar as its spiritual content is generated by spirit itself. But insofar as it is for itself also for its own self, this self-generating, the pure Concept, is at the same time for spirit the objective element in which it has its existence. In this way, in its existence, spirit is for itself an

object reflected into itself.—Spirit that knows itself as spirit in this way is *science*. Science is spirit's actuality, and the realm that spirit builds for itself in its own element.

[26] *Pure* self-cognition in absolute otherness, this ether *as such*, is the ground and soil of science, or *knowing in general*. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or demands that consciousness be in this element. But this element attains its completion and transparency only through the movement of its becoming. It is pure spirituality, or the universal that has the mode of simple immediacy. Because it is the immediacy of spirit, because substance in general is spirit, substance is *transfigured essentiality*: reflection that is itself simple, or is immediacy; being that is reflection into itself. Science, for its part, requires of self-consciousness that it have raised itself into this ether, so that it can live with science and in science, and does so. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science at least hand it the ladder to this standpoint. This right is grounded in the individual's absolute independence, which it knows it possesses in every shape of its knowing. For in every such shape, whether recognized by science or not, and whatever its content, the individual is at the same time the absolute form; it has the *immediate certainty* of itself, and so, if this expression is preferred, unconditioned *being*. The standpoint of consciousness is to know objective things in opposition to itself, and itself in opposition to them. For science this standpoint counts as the *other*: what consciousness takes as its being at home with itself counts for science rather as the loss of spirit. For consciousness, conversely, the element of science is a remote beyond in which it no longer possesses itself. Each of these two sides seems to the other to be the inversion of truth. When natural consciousness entrusts itself directly to science, it is making an attempt, drawn it knows not by what, to walk on its head for once. The compulsion to adopt this unaccustomed posture and move about in it is a violence it is expected to do to itself, one as unprepared as it seems unnecessary.—Let science be in its own self what it will: in relation to immediate self-consciousness it presents itself as

something inverted. Or again, immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality; since that self-consciousness exists for itself outside science, science bears the form of non-actuality. Science therefore has to unite that element with itself, or rather to show that it belongs to science, and how. Lacking actuality, science is only the *in-itself*, the *purpose*, which is at first still something *inner*: not yet spirit, only spiritual substance. It has to externalize itself and become for itself. This means nothing other than that it has to posit self-consciousness as one with itself.

THE PATH TO SCIENCE

The Phenomenology presents knowing's long path, on which the individual retraces the culture of the world spirit.

[27] It is this becoming of *science in general*, or of *knowing*, that this *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents, as the first part of the system of science. Knowing as it is at first, or *immediate spirit*, is what is devoid of spirit: it is *sensuous consciousness*. To become knowing proper, or to generate the element of science, which is science's pure Concept, spirit has to work its way along a long path. — This becoming, as set out in its content and in the shapes that appear within it, will seem to be something other than a guide leading unscientific consciousness to science. It will also seem to be something other than a grounding of science. And it is certainly something other than the enthusiasm that begins straight off with absolute knowing, like a shot from a pistol, and has already disposed of other standpoints by declaring that it takes no notice of them.

[28] The task of leading the individual from its uncultured standpoint to knowing had to be taken in its universal sense: the universal individual, the world spirit, had to be considered in its culture.—As to the relation between the two: in the universal individual each moment shows itself as it acquires concrete form and a shape of its own. The particular individual, however, is incomplete spirit, a concrete shape whose entire existence

falls to one determinateness, while the others are present only in blurred outline. In spirit that stands higher than another, the lower concrete existence has sunk to an inconspicuous moment. What was previously the matter itself is now only a trace; its shape is veiled and has become a simple shading. The individual whose substance is spirit at a higher stage runs through this past in the way that someone taking up a higher science goes over the preparatory knowledge he has long possessed, in order to make its content present to himself. He calls it back to memory without taking any interest in it or lingering over it. In the same way each individual also runs through the stages of culture of universal spirit, but as shapes that spirit has already cast off, as stages of a path that has been worked out and leveled. So, as regards knowledge, we see that what occupied the mature spirit of grown men in earlier ages has sunk to the level of the knowledge, exercises and even games of boyhood. And in the progress of education we will recognize the history of the world's culture traced as if in silhouette. This past existence is already the acquired property of universal spirit, which constitutes the substance of the individual, or its inorganic nature.—In this respect the culture of the individual, viewed from the individual's side, consists in acquiring what is thus at hand, consuming its inorganic nature within itself and taking possession of it for itself. But this is equally nothing other than universal spirit, or substance, giving itself its self-consciousness, or its becoming and its reflection into itself.

[29] Science presents this formative movement both in its full detail and necessity and, in its configuration, as what has already sunk to a moment and property of spirit. The goal is spirit's insight into what knowing is. Impatience demands the impossible: to reach the goal without the means. On the one hand, the *length* of this path must be endured, for every moment is necessary. On the other hand, one must *linger* over each moment, for each is itself an individual, whole shape. And each is regarded absolutely only insofar as its determinateness is regarded as a whole or concrete, or the whole is regarded in the

peculiarity of this determination. — The substance of the individual, the world spirit, has had the patience to pass through these forms over the long stretch of time and to take on the immense labor of world history. It could not reach consciousness of itself by any lesser labor. For that reason the individual, too, cannot comprehend its substance with any less. At the same time, though, the individual has less trouble, because this has already been accomplished *in itself*: the content is already actuality reduced to possibility, immediacy subdued. Already something *thought*, the content is the property of individuality. It is no longer a matter of turning *existence* into *being-in-itself*, but only of turning the *in-itself* into the form of being-*for-self*, and the manner of this must now be determined more precisely.

[30] What the individual is spared in this movement is the sublating of *existence*. What still remains is the *representation* of the forms and *familiarity* with them. Existence, taken back into substance, has through that first negation been transposed into the element of the self only *immediately*. It therefore still has the same character of uncomprehended immediacy, or unmoved indifference, as existence itself; in other words, it has merely passed over into *representation*.—At the same time, it is thereby something *familiar*, something spirit has finished with, and in which spirit's activity, and so its interest, no longer lies. The activity that finishes with existence is immediate, or existent, mediation, and thus the movement only of the particular spirit that does not comprehend itself. Knowing, by contrast, is directed against the representation that has come about in this way, against this being-familiar. Knowing is the doing of the universal self and the interest of thinking.

THE POWER OF THE NEGATIVE

The familiar is not truly known; understanding divides, and spirit lives by enduring the negative.

[31] What is familiar in general is not cognized precisely because it is *familiar*. The commonest way of deceiving oneself, as well as

others, is to presuppose something as familiar in cognition and simply to put up with it. For all its talk back and forth, such knowing gets nowhere, without knowing what is happening to it. Subject and object, and so on, God, nature, the understanding, sensibility, and so on, are laid down unexamined as familiar and valid, and they form fixed points both of departure and of return. The movement goes back and forth between them while they remain unmoved, and so it proceeds only on their surface. Accordingly, apprehending and testing, too, consist in seeing whether each person also finds what is said about these points in their own representation, whether it seems so to them and is familiar to them or not.

[32] The *analysis* of a representation, as it used to be carried on, was already nothing other than the sublating of the form of its familiarity. To take a representation apart into its original elements is to go back to its moments. These moments at least do not have the form of the representation as it was found, but constitute the immediate property of the self. This analysis, to be sure, arrives only at *thoughts*, which are themselves familiar, fixed, and static determinations. But this *separated*, non-actual element is itself an essential moment. For only because the concrete divides itself and makes itself into something non-actual is it what moves itself. The activity of dividing is the power and labor of the *understanding*, the most astonishing and greatest of powers, or rather the absolute power. The circle that rests enclosed within itself and, as substance, holds its moments together is the immediate relation, and therefore not an astonishing one. But the accidental as such, separated from its surroundings, what is bound and actual only in its connection with other things, gains an existence of its own and a separate freedom: this is the tremendous power of the negative. It is the energy of thought, of the pure I. Death, if we want to call that non-actuality by that name, is the most dreadful thing of all, and to hold fast to what is dead is what requires the greatest strength. Powerless beauty hates the understanding, because the understanding asks of it what it cannot do. But the life of

spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation. It is the life that endures death and maintains itself in it. Spirit wins its truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment. Spirit is not this power as the positive that looks away from the negative, as when we say of something that it is nothing or false and then, having done with it, turn away from it to something else. Rather, spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and lingering with it. This lingering is the magical power that converts the negative into being. — This magical power is the same as what was called the subject above. By giving existence to determinateness in its own element, the subject sublates abstract immediacy, that is, immediacy that merely *is* in general. It is thereby the genuine substance: being, or immediacy, that does not have mediation outside itself but is this mediation itself.

[33] That what is represented becomes the property of pure self-consciousness, this elevation to universality in general, is only one side. It is not yet culture in its completed form.—The ancient way of study differs from the modern in that it was the genuine, thorough cultivation of natural consciousness. Testing itself specifically on every part of its existence and philosophizing about everything that came its way, natural consciousness made itself into a universality active through and through. In modern times, by contrast, the individual finds the abstract form ready-made. The effort to grasp it and make it one's own is more the unmediated driving-forth of the inner and a truncated generation of the universal than the universal's emergence from the concrete and from the manifold variety of existence. Nowadays, therefore, the task consists not so much in purifying the individual of the immediate, sensuous mode and making it into thought and thinking substance. It consists rather in the opposite: in actualizing the universal and infusing it with spirit by sublating fixed, determinate thoughts. But it is far harder to bring fixed thoughts into fluidity than sensuous existence. The reason is the one given above. Those determinations have the I, the power of the negative, or pure actuality, as their substance

and the element of their existence. Sensuous determinations, on the other hand, have only powerless, abstract immediacy, or being as such. Thoughts become fluid when pure thinking, this inner *immediacy*, recognizes itself as a moment, or when the pure certainty of itself abstracts from itself. It does not leave itself out or set itself aside, but gives up the *fixity* of its self-positing. It gives up both the fixity of the pure concrete, which is the I itself in opposition to differentiated content, and the fixity of differentiated items that, posited in the element of pure thinking, share in that unconditionedness of the I. Through this movement pure thoughts become *concepts*, and only then are they what they are in truth: self-movements, circles, what their substance is, spiritual essentialities.

[34] This movement of pure essentialities constitutes the nature of scientific character in general. Regarded as the connectedness of its content, this movement is the necessity of that content and its unfolding into an organic whole. Through it, the path by which the concept of knowing is reached likewise becomes a necessary and complete becoming. This preparation thus ceases to be a haphazard philosophizing that fastens onto this or that object, relation, or thought of imperfect consciousness as chance may bring. Nor does it seek to ground the true by argumentation going back and forth, by inferring and drawing conclusions from determinate thoughts. Instead, through the movement of the Concept, this path will encompass the complete worldliness of consciousness in its necessity.

[35] Such a presentation, moreover, constitutes the *first* part of science because the existence of spirit, as what comes first, is nothing but the immediate, or the beginning. The beginning, however, is not yet its return into itself. The *element of immediate existence* is therefore the determinateness by which this part of science is distinguished from the others.—Stating this difference leads to a discussion of some fixed thoughts that usually come up here.

[36] The immediate existence of spirit, *consciousness*, has two moments: knowing, and the objectivity negative to knowing. As

spirit develops in this element and lays out its moments, this opposition belongs to them, and they all appear as shapes of consciousness. The science of this path is the science of the *experience* that consciousness undergoes. Substance is considered as it, together with its movement, is the object of consciousness. Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing except what is in its experience. For what is in experience is only spiritual substance, and indeed as *object* of its own self. But spirit becomes an object because it is this movement: of becoming an *other* to *itself*, that is, an *object of its own self*, and of sublating this otherness. And experience is the name for precisely this movement in which the immediate, the unexperienced, that is, the abstract, whether of sensuous being or of the merely thought simple, alienates itself and then returns to itself from this alienation. Only then is it presented in its actuality and truth, and only then is it also the property of consciousness.

[37] The inequality that obtains in consciousness between the I and the substance that is its object is their difference, the *negative* in general. It can be regarded as the *defect* of both, but it is their soul, or what moves them. That is why some of the ancients conceived the *void* as what moves: they grasped what moves as the *negative*, to be sure, but did not yet grasp the negative as the self.—Now, if this negative first appears as the inequality of the I to its object, it is just as much the inequality of substance to itself. What seems to happen outside substance, to be an activity directed against it, is its own doing, and substance shows itself to be essentially subject.[11] When substance has shown this completely, spirit has made its existence equal to its essence. It is an object to itself just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of knowing from truth, has been overcome. Being is absolutely mediated;—it is substantial content that is just as immediately the property of the I, of the nature of the self, or the Concept. With this, the phenomenology of spirit concludes. What spirit prepares for itself

11 The ancient atomists, Leucippus and Democritus (5th century BC), held that atoms and the void are the principles of things, the void making motion possible.

in it is the element of knowing. In this element the moments of spirit now spread themselves out in the *form of simplicity* that knows its object as itself. They no longer fall apart into the opposition of being and knowing, but remain in the simplicity of knowing. They are the true in the form of the true, and their diversity is only diversity of content. Their movement, which organizes itself into a whole in this element, is *logic*, or *speculative philosophy*.

TRUE AND FALSE

Truth is no minted coin; the false is not a separate thing that can simply be thrown away.

[38] Now, that system of the experience of spirit comprises only the *appearance* of spirit. For that reason the progression from it to the science of the *true*, which is in the *shape* of the *true*, seems to be merely negative. One might want to be spared the negative as the *false* and demand to be led straight to the truth: why bother with what is false?—The demand mentioned above, that one should begin with science straightaway, must be answered here with regard to the status of the negative as the *false* in general. The representations people have about this are what chiefly obstruct entry into truth. This will give occasion to speak of mathematical cognition. Non-philosophical knowing regards it as the ideal that philosophy ought to strive to attain, but has so far striven for in vain.

[39] The *true* and the *false* belong to those determinate thoughts that are held, motionless, to be independent beings, one standing over there, the other over here, each fixed and isolated with no community with the other. Against this it must be maintained that truth is not a minted coin that can be handed over ready-made and pocketed as it is. Nor *is there* such a thing as the false, any more than there is such a thing as evil. Evil and the false are, to be sure, not as bad as the devil, for as the devil they are even made into a particular *subject*. As the false and evil they are only *universals*, yet they still have their own essentiality over

against each other.—The false (for only the false is at issue here) would be the other, the negative, of substance, which as the content of knowing is the true. But substance is itself essentially the negative: partly as the differentiation and determination of the content, and partly as a *simple* differentiating, that is, as self and knowing in general. One can certainly know falsely. That something is known falsely means that knowing is in inequality with its substance. But precisely this inequality is differentiating in general, which is an essential moment. Out of this differentiation their equality does indeed come about, and this equality that has come about is truth. But it is not truth in the sense that the inequality has been thrown away, like dross from pure metal, nor even in the way the tool remains apart from the finished vessel. Rather, the inequality, as the negative, as the self, is itself still immediately present in the true as such. It cannot, however, be said on that account that the *false* forms a moment, let alone a component, of the true. In the saying "there is something true in everything false," the two count like oil and water, which do not mix and are joined only externally. Precisely because these terms mean to designate the moment of *complete otherness*, they must no longer be used where their otherness has been sublated. Consider the expression *unity* of subject and object, of finite and infinite, of being and thinking, and so on. It has the awkwardness that object and subject, and so on, signify what they are *outside their unity*, and so within the unity they are not meant as what their expression says. In just the same way, the false is no longer a moment of truth as the false.

[40] *Dogmatism* as a way of thinking, in knowing and in the study of philosophy, is nothing but the opinion that the true consists in a proposition that is a fixed result, or else one that is known immediately. To such questions as when Caesar was born, how many toises there were in a stadium (and in which stadium), and so on, a *neat* answer is supposed to be given, just as it is definitely true that the square of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares of the other two sides of a right-angled

triangle. But the nature of such a so-called truth differs from the nature of philosophical truths.[12]

41 As for *historical* truths, to mention them briefly, insofar as their purely historical aspect is considered: it will readily be granted that they concern individual existence, a content in its aspect of contingency and arbitrariness, determinations of it that are not necessary.—Yet even such bare truths as the one cited as an example are not without the movement of self-consciousness. To know one of them, a great deal must be compared, books must be consulted, or inquiry made in some way or other. Even in the case of an immediate intuition, only the knowledge of it together with its grounds is held to have true value, although really the bare result is supposed to be all that matters.

42 As for *mathematical* truths, someone who knew Euclid's theorems *by heart* without their proofs, without knowing them, as one might put it by contrast, *inwardly*, would still less be considered a geometer. Likewise, knowledge acquired by measuring many right-angled triangles, that their sides stand in the familiar ratio to one another, would be considered unsatisfactory. Yet even in mathematical cognition the *essentiality* of the proof does not yet have the significance and nature of being a moment of the result itself. Rather, in the result the proof is over and gone. As a result, to be sure, the theorem is *something seen to be true*.[13] But this added circumstance does not concern the theorem's content, only its relation to the subject. The movement of mathematical proof does not belong to what is the object; it is a doing *external* to the matter at hand. Thus the nature of the right-angled triangle does not itself break down in the way it is exhibited in the construction required for proving the proposition that expresses its relation. The whole production of the result is a procedure and a means of cognition.—In philosophical

12 The toise was an old French unit of length (about 1.95 m); the ancient stadium varied from place to place, hence "which one."

13 Hegel puns on *auswendig* ("by heart," literally "outwardly") and *inwendig* ("inwardly").

cognition, too, the becoming of *existence* as existence is different from the becoming of *essence*, or of the inner nature of the matter. But, first, philosophical cognition contains both, whereas mathematical cognition presents only the becoming of *existence*, that is, of the *being* of the nature of the matter in *cognition* as such. Second, philosophical cognition also unites these two particular movements. Inner coming-to-be, or the becoming of substance, is an undivided passing over into the outer, into existence, being for another; and conversely, the becoming of existence is its taking itself back into essence. The movement is thus the twofold process and becoming of the whole, such that each at the same time posits the other, and each therefore also has both within it as two aspects. Together they make up the whole by dissolving themselves and making themselves into its moments.

[43] In mathematical cognition, insight is a doing external to the matter; it follows that the true matter is thereby altered. The means, construction and proof, therefore does contain true propositions; but it must equally be said that the content is false. In the example above, the triangle is torn apart and its parts are consigned to other figures that the construction causes to arise on it. Only at the end is the triangle restored, the triangle that really matters. It was lost sight of along the way and appeared only in pieces belonging to other wholes. — Here, then, we also see the negativity of the content coming in. It would have to be called the content's falsity just as much as the disappearance of thoughts supposed to be fixed would be in the movement of the Concept.

[44] The real defectiveness of this cognition, however, concerns both the cognition itself and its material in general.—As regards the cognition, first of all the necessity of the construction is not seen. It does not arise from the concept of the theorem but is prescribed. One must blindly obey this instruction to draw precisely these lines, when infinitely many others could be drawn, knowing nothing more than having good faith that this will serve to conduct the proof. Afterward this purposiveness does

indeed show itself, but it is merely external, precisely because it shows itself only afterward, in the proof.—In the same way, the proof follows a path that begins somewhere, one does not yet know in what relation to the result that is supposed to come out. Its progression takes up *these* determinations and relations and leaves others aside, without one's seeing immediately by what necessity; an external purpose governs this movement.

[45] The *self-evidence* of this defective cognition, of which mathematics is proud and which it also flaunts against philosophy, rests solely on the poverty of its *purpose* and the defectiveness of its *material*. It is therefore of a kind that philosophy must spurn. —The *purpose* or concept of mathematics is *magnitude*. This is precisely the inessential, conceptless relation. The movement of knowing therefore proceeds on the surface. It does not touch the matter itself, not the essence or the concept, and is therefore no comprehending.—The *material* about which mathematics offers its gratifying treasury of truths is *space* and the *one*. Space is the existence in which the Concept inscribes its differences as in an empty, dead element, in which they are equally unmoving and lifeless. The *actual* is not something spatial in the way mathematics considers it. Neither concrete sensuous intuition nor philosophy concerns itself with such non-actuality as the things of mathematics are. In such a non-actual element there is, accordingly, only non-actual truth, that is, fixed, dead propositions. One can stop at any one of them. The next begins anew on its own, without the first moving itself on to the other, and without a necessary connection arising in this way through the nature of the matter itself. — Moreover, because of that principle and element—and this is what the formal character of mathematical self-evidence consists in—knowing runs along the line of *equality*. For what is dead, since it does not move itself, does not arrive at differences of essence, at essential opposition or inequality. So it does not arrive at the passage of opposite into opposite, at qualitative, immanent movement, at self-movement. For it is magnitude, inessential difference, that mathematics alone considers. Mathematics abstracts from the fact that it

is the Concept which divides space into its dimensions and determines the connections between and within them. It does not consider, for example, the relation of line to surface. And where it compares the diameter of a circle with its circumference, it runs up against their incommensurability, that is, a relation of the Concept, an infinite that escapes its determination.

[46] Immanent, so-called pure mathematics also does not set *time* as time over against space as the second material of its consideration. Applied mathematics does deal with time, as it does with motion and with other actual things. But it takes its synthetic propositions, that is, propositions about the relations of these things, which are determined by their concept, from experience, and merely applies its formulas to these presuppositions. The so-called proofs of such propositions, such as that of the equilibrium of the lever, or of the relation of space and time in the motion of falling, and so on, which applied mathematics frequently gives, are given and accepted as proofs. That fact itself only proves how great cognition's need for proof is: where it has nothing more, it respects even the empty semblance of proof and finds satisfaction in it. A critique of those proofs would be as remarkable as it would be instructive. It would cleanse mathematics of this false finery, and it would show the limits of mathematics and thereby the necessity of another kind of knowing.—As for *time*, which one would suppose would form, as the counterpart to space, the material of the other part of pure mathematics, time is the existent Concept itself. The principle of *magnitude*, of conceptless difference, and the principle of *equality*, of abstract, lifeless unity, cannot deal with that pure unrest of life and absolute differentiation. This negativity therefore becomes the second material of this cognition only in paralyzed form, namely as the *one*. This cognition, an external doing, degrades what moves itself into material, so as to have in it an indifferent, external, lifeless content.

[47] Philosophy, by contrast, does not consider *inessential* determination, but determination insofar as it is essential. Its element and content is not the abstract or non-actual but the

actual, what posits itself and lives within itself, existence in its concept. It is the process that generates its own moments and runs through them, and this whole movement constitutes the positive and its truth. This truth therefore includes within it just as much the negative, what would be called the false if it could be regarded as something to be abstracted from. The disappearing must rather itself be regarded as essential, not in the determination of something fixed, to be cut off from the true and left lying outside it, who knows where. Nor, likewise, is the true to be regarded as the dead positive lying inert on the other side. Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is in itself, and constitutes the actuality and movement of the life of truth. The true is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; and because each member, as soon as it separates itself off, just as immediately dissolves,—the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. Before the tribunal of that movement, the individual shapes of spirit, like determinate thoughts, do not endure. But they are just as much positive, necessary moments as they are negative and disappearing.—In the *whole* of the movement, grasped as repose, what differentiates itself within it and gives itself particular existence is preserved as something that *recollects* itself, whose existence is knowing of itself, just as this knowing is equally immediately existence.[14]

METHOD AND THE LIFELESS SCHEMA

Philosophical method is not the mathematical style, nor a triadic schema pasted onto everything.

[48] It might seem necessary to say more at the outset about the *method* of this movement, that is, of science. But its concept already lies in what has been said, and its proper presentation belongs to logic, or rather is logic itself. For the method is nothing but the structure of the whole set out in its pure essentiality.

14 *Sich erinnern*, "to recollect," literally suggests "going into oneself"; Hegel uses it for a remembering that inwardizes and preserves.

Regarding what has been current on this subject until now, however, we must be aware that the system of representations concerning what philosophical method is also belongs to a culture that has passed away. — If this should sound boastful or revolutionary, a tone I know I am far from, it should be borne in mind that the scientific pomp lent by mathematics—definitions, divisions, axioms, series of theorems, their proofs, principles, and the inferring and concluding from them—is already, at least in general opinion, *outdated*. Even if its unfitness is not clearly seen, little or no use is made of it any longer; and even if it is not disapproved of in itself, it is not loved. And we must hold this presumption in favor of what is excellent: that it will come into use and make itself loved. It is not hard to see, however, that the manner of putting forward a proposition, adducing grounds for it, and likewise refuting the opposite proposition by grounds, is not the form in which truth can appear. Truth is its own movement within itself, whereas that method is a cognition external to its material. That is why this method is peculiar to mathematics and must be left to it. As noted, mathematics has the conceptless relation of magnitude as its principle, and dead space, as well as the equally dead one, as its material. The method may also remain, in a freer manner, that is, more mixed with arbitrariness and contingency, in ordinary life, in conversation, or in historical instruction that serves curiosity more than cognition —which is roughly what a preface is, too. In ordinary life, consciousness has as its content items of knowledge, experiences, sensuous concretions, and also thoughts and principles: in general, content that counts as something on hand, or as a fixed, static being or essence. Consciousness partly runs along this content, partly interrupts its connection by freely disposing of it at will, and relates to it as an external determining and handling of it. It traces the content back to something certain, even if only the feeling of the moment, and conviction is satisfied once it has reached a resting point familiar to it.

[49] But while the necessity of the Concept banishes the looser gait of argumentative conversation as well as the stiffer gait of

scientific pomp, it was already pointed out above that its place is not to be taken by the non-method of presentiment and enthusiasm and the arbitrariness of prophetic speech. Such speech despises not only that kind of scientific rigor but scientific rigor altogether.

[50] The Kantian *triplicity*, rediscovered only by instinct, still dead, still uncomprehended, has now been raised to its absolute significance. The true form has thereby been set up in its true content at the same time, and the concept of science has emerged. Just as little, then, should we regard as scientific that use of this form by which we see it reduced to a lifeless schema, a veritable phantom, and see scientific organization reduced to a table.[15] — This formalism, of which we have already spoken in general above and whose manner we now want to describe more precisely, thinks it has comprehended and expressed the nature and life of a shape when it has predicated of it some determination of the schema—be it subjectivity or objectivity, or else magnetism, electricity, and so forth, contraction or expansion, east or west, and the like. This can be multiplied endlessly, because in this way each determination or shape can in turn be used, with respect to another, as a form or moment of the schema, and each can gratefully perform the same service for the other;—a circle of reciprocity in which one does not learn what the matter itself is, nor what either the one or the other is. In the process, sensuous determinations are partly taken up from ordinary intuition, and they are, of course, supposed to *mean* something other than what they say. Partly, what is significant in itself, the pure determinations of thought, such as subject, object, substance, cause, the universal, and so on, is used just as unexamined and uncritically as in ordinary life, and in the same way as strengthening and weakening, expansion and contraction. So this metaphysics is as unscientific as those sensuous representations.

[51] Instead of the inner life and self-movement of its existence, such a simple determinateness is now pronounced about a

shape on the basis of intuition, which here means sensuous knowing, according to a superficial analogy. And this external and empty application of the formula is called *construction*.—Such formalism is in the same case as any other. How dull would a head have to be not to learn in a quarter of an hour the theory that there are asthenic, sthenic, and indirectly asthenic diseases and as many plans of treatment? And since until recently such instruction was enough for this, how dull would it have to be not to be transformed, in so short a time, from a routine practitioner into a theoretical physician?[16] Suppose the formalism of the philosophy of nature teaches, say, that the understanding is electricity, or that the animal is nitrogen, or is *equal* to south or north, and so forth, or represents it, whether stated as baldly as here or brewed up with more terminology. Such a force grabs together things that seem far apart, and the static sensuous suffers violence through this combination. This violence lends it the semblance of a concept but spares it the main thing, which is to express the concept itself, or the meaning of the sensuous representation.—At all this, inexperience may fall into admiring astonishment and revere a profound genius in it. It may likewise delight in the cheerfulness of such determinations, since they replace the abstract concept with something intuitive and make it more pleasing. And it may congratulate itself on the kinship of soul it senses with such glorious doings.[17] The trick of such wisdom is as quickly learned as it is easy to practice. Once it is known, its repetition becomes as unbearable as the repetition of a conjuring trick one has seen through. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is no harder to handle than a painter's palette with only two colors on it, say red and green: the one for coloring a surface when a history painting is wanted, the other

15 Kant arranged his categories in groups of three; Fichte and Schelling made this triadic form central. Hegel puns on *Schema* and *Schemen* ("phantom").

16 The medical theory of the Scottish physician John Brown (1735–1788), which classed diseases by excess or deficiency of "excitability," was much in vogue in Germany around 1800.

17 Hegel targets the followers of Schelling's philosophy of nature (such as Lorenz Oken), who equated natural and mental phenomena by analogy.

when a landscape is.—It would be hard to decide which is greater here: the complacency with which everything in heaven, on earth, and under the earth is daubed over with such a soup of color, or the conceit about the excellence of this universal remedy. The one supports the other.[18] This method sticks the couple of determinations of the universal schema onto everything heavenly and earthly, onto all natural and spiritual shapes, and in this way files everything away. What it produces is nothing less than a crystal-clear report on the organism of the universe: namely, a table. The table resembles a skeleton with little labels stuck on it, or the rows of closed boxes with their labels pinned on in a spice shop. It is as clear as either of these. There, the flesh and blood have been stripped from the bones; here, the matter, which is no more alive, is hidden in the boxes. In the same way, the table has left out or hidden the living essence of the matter. — It has already been noted above that this manner at the same time perfects itself into a monochrome absolute painting. Ashamed of the differences of the schema, it sinks them too, as belonging to reflection, into the emptiness of the absolute, so that pure identity, the formless white, may be restored. That uniform coloring of the schema and its lifeless determinations, this absolute identity, and the passing over from one to the other: the one is as much dead understanding as the other, and as much external cognition.

[52] The excellent, however, not only cannot escape the fate of being drained of life and spirit in this way, and of seeing its flayed skin worn by lifeless knowing and its vanity. Rather, in this very fate one must still recognize the power the excellent exercises over hearts, if not over spirits. One must also recognize in it the development into universality and determinateness of form in which its completion consists, and which alone makes it possible for this universality to be put to superficial use.

[53] Science may organize itself only through the Concept's own life. In science, the determinateness that the schema sticks onto

18 "In heaven, on earth, and under the earth" echoes Philippians 2:10.

existence from outside is the self-moving soul of the fulfilled content. The movement of what is consists, on the one hand, in becoming an other to itself and so becoming its own immanent content. On the other hand, it takes this unfolding, this existence of its own, back into itself; that is, it makes itself into a *moment* and simplifies itself into determinateness. In the former movement, *negativity* is the differentiating and the positing of *existence*; in this return into itself, it is the becoming of *determinate simplicity*. It is in this way that the content shows that it does not receive its determinateness from something else, with the determinateness pinned onto it. Rather, it gives its determinateness to itself and of its own accord assigns itself the rank of a moment and a place in the whole. The tabulating understanding keeps for itself the necessity and concept of the content, what constitutes the concrete, the actuality and living movement of the matter it arranges. Or rather, it does not keep this for itself, but does not know it; for if it had this insight, it would surely show it. It does not even know that there is a need for it; otherwise it would give up its schematizing, or at least think no more of it than of a table of contents. It gives only the table of contents; the content itself it does not deliver. — Even when the determinateness is one that is concrete or actual in itself, magnetism for example, it has nevertheless sunk to something dead. For it is merely predicated of another existence and is not known as the immanent life of that existence, or as having in that existence its native and peculiar self-generation and presentation. The formal understanding leaves it to others to add this main point.—Instead of entering into the immanent content of the matter, it always surveys the whole and stands above the individual existence it is talking about; that is, it does not see it at all. Scientific cognition, however, demands rather that one surrender to the life of the object, or, what is the same thing, that one have its inner necessity before one and express it. Absorbing itself in its object in this way, scientific cognition forgets that survey, which is only the reflection of knowing out of the content into itself. But, immersed in the material and

advancing in the material's movement, cognition comes back into itself. It does so, however, only when the filling, or content, takes itself back into itself, simplifies itself into determinateness, reduces itself to one aspect of an existence, and passes over into its higher truth. Through this, the simple whole that surveys itself emerges from the wealth in which its reflection seemed lost.

[54] In general, because, as was put above, substance is in its own self subject, all content is its own reflection into itself. The subsisting, or the substance, of an existence is self-equality; for its inequality with itself would be its dissolution. Self-equality, however, is pure abstraction, and pure abstraction is *thinking*. When I say *quality*, I say simple determinateness. By its quality one existence is distinguished from another, or is an existence at all. It is for itself, or it subsists through this simplicity with itself. But thereby it is essentially *thought*.—This is how we comprehend that being is thinking. And here lies the insight that is usually missing from the ordinary, conceptless talk of the identity of thinking and being. — Now, because the subsisting of existence is self-equality, or pure abstraction, it is the abstraction of itself from itself. In other words, it is itself its own inequality with itself and its dissolution,—its own inwardness and withdrawal into itself,—its becoming. — Because of this nature of what is, and insofar as what is has this nature for knowing, knowing is not the activity that handles the content as something alien, not reflection into itself out of the content. Science is not that idealism which took the place of *asserting* dogmatism as an *assuring dogmatism*, or the *dogmatism* of *self-certainty*. Rather, since knowing sees the content return into its own inwardness, the activity of knowing is both absorbed in the content, for it is the immanent self of the content, and at the same time returned into itself, for it is pure self-equality in otherness. So it is the cunning that, while seeming to refrain from activity, looks on as determinateness and its concrete life, precisely in supposing that it is pursuing its own self-preservation

and particular interest, turn out to be the reverse: a doing that dissolves itself and makes itself into a moment of the whole.

[55] Earlier the meaning of the *understanding* was given with respect to the self-consciousness of substance. What has been said here makes clear its meaning with respect to substance's determination as something that is.—Existence is quality: self-identical determinateness, or determinate simplicity, determinate thought. This is the understanding of existence. Through this, existence is *nous,* which is what Anaxagoras first recognized the essence to be. Those who came after him grasped the nature of existence more determinately as *eidos* or *idea*, that is, as *determinate universality*, *species*. The word *species* may seem rather too common and too slight for the ideas, for the beautiful and the holy and the eternal, which are all the rage these days. But in fact *idea* expresses neither more nor less than *species*.[19] Nowadays, however, we often see an expression that designates a concept precisely being scorned, and another preferred instead. The preferred one, even if only because it belongs to a foreign language, wraps the concept in fog and therefore sounds more edifying.—It is precisely in being determined as species that existence is simple thought. *Nous,* simplicity, is substance. Because of its simplicity or self-identity, substance appears fixed and permanent. But this self-identity is equally negativity, and through it that fixed existence passes over into its dissolution. At first determinateness seems to be what it is only by relating itself to an *other,* and its movement seems to be imposed on it by an alien power. But that it has its otherness within itself and is self-movement is contained precisely in that *simplicity* of thinking itself. For this simplicity is thought that moves and differentiates itself; it is its own inwardness, the pure *Concept*. Thus the *character of understanding* is a becoming, and as this becoming it is *rationality*.

[56] It is in this nature of what is, namely to be its concept in its being, that *logical necessity* in general consists. This necessity

alone is the rational and the rhythm of the organic whole. It is just as much *knowing* of the content as the content is concept and essence; or, it alone is the *speculative*.—The concrete shape, moving itself, makes itself into simple determinateness. In doing so it raises itself to logical form and is in its essentiality. Its concrete existence is only this movement, and is immediately logical existence. It is therefore unnecessary to impose formalism on the concrete content from outside. The content is in itself the passing over into formalism. But this formalism ceases to be external, because the form is the native becoming of the concrete content itself.

[57] This nature of scientific method is, on the one hand, to be inseparable from the content and, on the other, to determine its rhythm through itself. As already mentioned, it has its proper exposition in speculative philosophy.—What has been said here does express the concept, but it cannot count as more than an assurance given in advance. Its truth does not lie in this partly narrative exposition. For that very reason it is just as little refuted when someone assures us to the contrary that this is not so, that things stand thus and so. Nor is it refuted when habitual representations are recalled and recited as established and well-known truths, or when something new is served up and assured to us from the shrine of inner divine intuition. — [58] Such a reception tends to be the first reaction of a knowing to which something was unfamiliar. It reacts this way to rescue its freedom and its own insight, its own authority, against the alien authority, for that is the shape in which what is now first encountered appears. It also reacts this way to remove the appearance, and the kind of disgrace supposedly involved, of having learned something. In the same way, when the unfamiliar is accepted with applause, the reaction of the same kind consists in what, in another sphere, was ultrarevolutionary talk and action.[20]

19 Anaxagoras (c. 500–428 BC) taught that *nous* (mind, intellect) orders all things. "Those after him" are Plato and Aristotle, for whom *eidos* or *idea* is the form or kind of a thing.

20 Probably an allusion to the radical factions of the French Revolution who sought to outbid the Revolution itself.

THE SPECULATIVE PROPOSITION

In philosophical propositions the subject passes into the predicate, which checks ordinary thinking and demands rereading.

What matters in the *study* of *science*, therefore, is to take on the strenuous effort of the Concept. This effort demands attention to the Concept as such, and to its simple determinations, for example those of *being-in-itself*, *being-for-self*, *self-identity*, and so on. For these are pure self-movements of the kind one might call souls, if their Concept did not designate something higher than souls. For the habit of running along in representations, being interrupted by the Concept is just as irksome as it is for formal thinking, which argues back and forth in thoughts that are not actual. That habit should be called material thinking. It is a contingent consciousness, merely immersed in its material, and so it finds it hard at the same time to lift its self cleanly out of the matter and to be with itself. The other kind of thinking, argumentation, is by contrast freedom from the content and vanity about it. What is asked of it is the effort to give up this freedom. Instead of being the arbitrarily moving principle of the content, it is to sink this freedom into the content, to let the content move by its own nature, that is, by the self as the content's own self, and to contemplate this movement. To refrain from interjecting one's own bright ideas into the immanent rhythm of concepts, and not to interfere in it through caprice or through wisdom acquired elsewhere: this restraint is itself an essential moment of attention to the Concept.

[59] In argumentative conduct, two sides deserve to be brought into sharper view, in respect of which comprehending thinking is opposed to it.—First, argumentation relates negatively to the content it has taken up; it knows how to refute it and reduce it to nothing. This insight, that things are not so, is merely *negative*. It is the end of the line and does not itself go beyond itself to a new content. To have a content again, something *other* must be taken up from somewhere. It is reflection into the empty I, the vanity

of its knowing.—But this vanity expresses not only that this content is vain but also that this insight itself is vain. For it is the negative that does not glimpse the positive within itself. Because this reflection does not gain its own negativity as its content, it is not in the matter at all, but always beyond it. That is why it fancies that by asserting emptiness it is always further along than an insight rich in content. By contrast, as shown earlier, in comprehending thinking the negative belongs to the content itself. It is the *positive*, both as the content's *immanent* movement and determination and as the *whole* of these. Taken as a result, it is what comes out of this movement: the *determinate* negative, and hence equally a positive content.

[60] But such thinking has a content, whether of representations or of thoughts or of a mixture of both, and in this respect it has another side that makes comprehension difficult for it. The remarkable nature of this side is closely connected with the essence of the idea itself as stated above. Or rather, it expresses the idea as it appears in the movement that is thinking apprehension.—In its negative conduct, just discussed, argumentative thinking is itself the self into which the content returns. In its positive cognition, by contrast, the self is a represented *subject*, to which the content is related as accident and predicate. This subject forms the basis to which the content is attached and on which the movement runs back and forth. Things are different in comprehending thinking. Here the Concept is the object's own self, which presents itself as *its becoming*. It is therefore not a resting subject that bears its accidents unmoved, but the Concept that moves itself and takes its determinations back into itself. In this movement that resting subject itself perishes. It enters into the differences and the content, and instead of remaining opposed to the determinateness it constitutes it, that is, it constitutes the differentiated content and its movement. The firm ground that argumentation has in the resting subject therefore begins to sway, and only this movement itself becomes the object. The subject that fills its content ceases to go beyond it and cannot have still other predicates or accidents.

Conversely, the scattered content is thereby bound under the self; it is not the universal that, free of the subject, could belong to several things. The content is thus in fact no longer the predicate of the subject; it is the substance, the essence and the concept of what is under discussion. It is the nature of representational thinking to run along the accidents or predicates and, rightly, since they are no more than predicates and accidents, to go beyond them. But because what has the form of a predicate in the proposition is the substance itself, representational thinking is checked in its course. It suffers, to put it pictorially, a counterthrust. It starts from the subject as though the subject remained the underlying ground. But since the predicate is rather the substance, it finds that the subject has passed over into the predicate and has thereby been sublated. And since what seems to be the predicate has thus become the whole, independent mass, thinking cannot wander about freely but is held back by this weight.—Ordinarily, the subject is first laid down as the *objective*, fixed self. From here the necessary movement proceeds to the manifold of determinations or predicates. At this point the knowing I itself takes the place of that subject: it is what connects the predicates and the subject that holds them. But since that first subject enters into the determinations themselves and is their soul, the second subject, namely the knowing one, still finds the first in the predicate. It wanted to be done with the first subject and to go beyond it and return into itself. Instead of being able to be the agent in the movement of the predicate, as argumentation deciding whether this or that predicate should be attributed to the subject, it still has to deal with the self of the content. It is supposed to be not for itself but together with this self.

[61] Formally, what has been said can be expressed as follows. The nature of the judgment or proposition in general, which includes the distinction of subject and predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition; and the identical proposition into which the former turns contains the counterthrust to that relation.—This conflict between the form of a proposition in general

and the unity of the Concept that destroys it resembles the conflict that occurs in rhythm between meter and accent. Rhythm results from the hovering middle between the two and their union. So too in the philosophical proposition the identity of subject and predicate is not meant to annihilate their difference, which the form of the proposition expresses. Rather, their unity is meant to emerge as a harmony. The form of the proposition is the appearance of the determinate sense, or the accent that distinguishes its fulfillment. But that the predicate expresses the substance, and that the subject itself falls into the universal, is the *unity* in which that accent dies away.

[62] To illustrate what has been said by examples: in the proposition *God is being*, the predicate is *being*. It has a substantial meaning in which the subject dissolves. Being is here meant to be not a predicate but the essence. As a result God seems to cease being what he is by virtue of his position in the proposition, namely the fixed subject. — Instead of getting further in the transition from subject to predicate, thinking feels checked, since the subject is lost; missing the subject, it is thrown back to the thought of it. Or, since the predicate itself has been expressed as a subject, as *being*, as the *essence* that exhausts the nature of the subject, thinking finds the subject immediately in the predicate too. And now, instead of having gone into itself in the predicate and gained the free position of argumentation, it is still absorbed in the content, or at least there is the demand that it be absorbed in it.—So too when it is said that the *actual* is the *universal*: the actual, as subject, vanishes in its predicate. The universal is meant to have not only the meaning of the predicate, so that the proposition would state that the actual is universal. Rather, the universal is meant to express the essence of the actual.—Thinking therefore loses the firm objective ground it had in the subject just as much as it is thrown back upon the subject in the predicate; and in the predicate it returns not into itself but into the subject of the content.

[63] The complaints about the unintelligibility of philosophical writings rest largely on this unaccustomed checking, provided

the individual otherwise meets the conditions of culture needed to understand them. In what has been said we see the reason for the quite specific reproach often made against such writings: that much in them has to be read several times before it can be understood. This reproach is supposed to contain something outrageous and final, so that, if it is well founded, it permits no further rebuttal.—It is clear from the above what the situation is. The philosophical proposition, because it is a proposition, calls up the opinion that the ordinary relation of subject and predicate holds, and with it the usual procedure of knowing. This procedure, and the opinion that goes with it, are destroyed by the proposition's philosophical content. Opinion discovers that what is meant is other than it meant, and this correction of its opinion forces knowing to come back to the proposition and now grasp it differently.

[64] One difficulty that ought to be avoided is the mixing of the speculative and the argumentative modes: when at one moment what is said of the subject has the meaning of its concept, and at another only the meaning of its predicate or accident.—The one mode disturbs the other. Only a philosophical exposition that strictly excluded the ordinary kind of relation among the parts of a proposition would succeed in being plastic.

[65] In fact non-speculative thinking also has its right, which is valid but is disregarded in the manner of the speculative proposition. The sublation of the form of the proposition must not happen only in an *immediate* way, merely through the content of the proposition. Rather, this opposite movement must be expressed: not only that inner checking, but this return of the Concept into itself must be *presented*. This movement, which constitutes what proof was otherwise supposed to accomplish, is the dialectical movement of the proposition itself. It alone is the *actual* speculative, and only the expression of it is speculative presentation. As a proposition, the speculative is only the *inner* checking, the *non-existent* return of the essence into itself. We therefore often find philosophical expositions referring us to this *inner* intuition, and thereby sparing us the presentation of the dialectical

movement of the proposition that we demanded.—The *proposition* is supposed to express *what* the true is; but essentially the true is subject. As subject it is only the dialectical movement, this course that generates itself, leads itself onward and returns into itself.—In other kinds of cognition, proof constitutes this side of expressed inwardness. But since dialectic was separated from proof, the concept of philosophical proving has in fact been lost.

[66] It may be pointed out here that the dialectical movement likewise has propositions for its parts or elements. The difficulty indicated therefore seems to keep coming back, and to be a difficulty in the matter itself.—This resembles what happens in ordinary proof, where the grounds it uses themselves need grounding in turn, and so on to infinity. But this form of grounding and conditioning belongs to the kind of proving from which the dialectical movement differs, and hence to external cognition. As for the dialectical movement itself, its element is the pure Concept; it therefore has a content that is through and through subject in itself. So no content occurs that would behave as an underlying subject and to which its meaning would belong as a predicate. The proposition is immediately a merely empty form.—Apart from the self that is sensuously intuited or represented, it is above all the name as name that designates the pure subject, the empty, conceptless One. For this reason it can be useful, for example, to avoid the name *God*, because this word is not immediately a concept as well, but the proper name, the fixed repose of the underlying subject. By contrast, being, for example, or the One, singularity, the subject and so on, themselves also immediately indicate concepts. — Even when speculative truths are stated about that subject, their content lacks the immanent Concept, because it is present only as a resting subject; and owing to this circumstance they easily take on the form of mere edification.—From this side, then, the obstacle that lies in the habit of taking the speculative predicate according to the form of the proposition, rather than as concept and essence, can be increased through the fault of philosophical

exposition itself, and can also be reduced by it. The presentation, faithful to its insight into the nature of the speculative, must keep the dialectical form and admit nothing except insofar as it is comprehended and is the Concept.

[67] As much a hindrance to the study of philosophy as argumentative conduct is the non-argumentative conceit about established truths. Their owner thinks he has no need to return to them; he takes them as his basis and believes he can simply pronounce them, and pass judgment and condemnation by means of them. From this side it is especially necessary that philosophizing be made serious business again. For all sciences, arts, skills and crafts, the conviction holds that possessing them requires a great deal of effort in learning and practice. With philosophy, by contrast, a prejudice now seems to prevail. Everyone has eyes and fingers, and yet on being given leather and tools is not thereby in a position to make shoes; but everyone supposedly knows immediately how to philosophize and how to judge philosophy, because he possesses the standard for it in his natural reason—as if he did not equally possess the standard for a shoe in his foot.—It seems that possession of philosophy is located precisely in the lack of knowledge and study, and that philosophy stops where knowledge and study begin. Philosophy is frequently taken for a formal knowing, empty of content. There is a great lack of insight that whatever is truth in any branch of knowledge or science, including its content, can deserve this name only when it has been produced by philosophy; and that the other sciences, however much they try with argumentation and without philosophy, cannot have life, spirit or truth in them without it.

[68] As for philosophy proper, we see the immediate revelation of the divine, and common sense, which has neither troubled itself with nor been cultivated by any other knowing or by philosophizing proper, regarding themselves as a perfect equivalent for the long path of culture, for that movement, as rich as it is deep, through which spirit arrives at knowing. They consider themselves just as good a substitute as chicory is praised

as being for coffee. It is not pleasant to observe that ignorance, and a crudeness without form or taste, itself incapable of holding its thinking to a single abstract proposition, still less to the connection of several, claims to be now the freedom and tolerance of thought, now genius. Genius, as is well known, once ran rampant in poetry just as it now does in philosophy. But instead of poetry, whenever the productions of this genius had any sense, they amounted to trivial prose, or, when they went beyond prose, to crazed talk. So now a natural philosophizing that thinks itself too good for the Concept, and through the lack of it takes itself for intuitive and poetic thinking, brings to market the arbitrary combinations of an imagination merely disorganized by thought—creations that are neither fish nor fowl, neither poetry nor philosophy.[21]

69 Flowing instead along the calmer bed of common sense, natural philosophizing treats us to a rhetoric of trivial truths. If their insignificance is held up to it, it assures us in reply that their meaning and fulfillment are present in its heart and must be present in the hearts of others too. For it thinks that with the innocence of the heart, the purity of conscience and the like, it has said the last word, against which there can be no objection and beyond which nothing further can be demanded. But the point was that the best should not remain inside, but be brought up out of this mineshaft into the light of day. The trouble of producing last truths of that sort could have been spared long ago, for they have long been found in the catechism, in popular proverbs, and so on.—It is not hard to catch such truths in their indeterminacy or distortion, and often to point out to their consciousness the very opposite truth within that consciousness itself. In trying to extricate itself from the confusion stirred up in it, this consciousness will fall into new confusion, and may well burst out with the claim that it is settled that things are *so* and *so*, and that the rest is *sophistry*. This is a catchword of common sense against cultivated reason, just as ignorance of philo-

21 The earlier cult of genius in poetry refers to the *Sturm und Drang* ("Storm and Stress") movement of the 1770s.

sophy has memorized the word *daydreams* to use against philosophy once and for all. — Since common sense appeals to feeling, its inner oracle, it is finished with anyone who does not agree. It has to declare that it has nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same in himself. In other words, it tramples the root of humanity underfoot. For the nature of humanity is to press toward agreement with others, and its existence lies only in the achieved community of consciousnesses. What is contrary to humanity, the merely animal, consists in remaining at the level of feeling and being able to communicate only through feeling.

70 If one were to ask for a royal road to science, none more comfortable could be named than this: rely on common sense, and, to keep up with the times and with philosophy as well, read reviews of philosophical works, or perhaps even just their prefaces and first paragraphs. For the prefaces give the general principles on which everything turns, and the reviews, besides the historical information, give the assessment, which, precisely because it is an assessment, is above what it assesses. This common road can be walked in a dressing gown. But the lofty feeling of the eternal, the holy, the infinite strides along in high-priestly vestments—along a road that is rather itself already immediate being at the center, the genius of profound original ideas and lofty flashes of thought.[22] Yet just as such depth does not yet reveal the source of essence, so these rockets are not yet the empyrean. True thoughts and scientific insight can be won only through the labor of the Concept. The Concept alone can produce the universality of knowing. This universality is neither the common indeterminacy and poverty of common sense, but cultivated and complete cognition; nor is it the uncommon universality of a gift for reason that ruins itself through indolence and the conceit of genius, but truth that has ripened to its native

22 "No royal road": the reply attributed to Euclid when King Ptolemy I asked for an easier way to learn geometry.

form, truth capable of being the property of all self-conscious reason.[23]

71 I place what makes science exist in the self-movement of the Concept. Yet the aspects of our time's representations of the nature and shape of truth that I have mentioned, and still other external aspects, deviate from this, indeed are wholly opposed to it. This observation seems to promise no favorable reception for an attempt to present the system of science in that determination. Meanwhile, I can reflect that if, for example, the excellence of Plato's philosophy is sometimes placed in his scientifically worthless myths, there have also been times, even called times of enthusiasm, in which Aristotle's philosophy was esteemed for its speculative depth. In those times Plato's *Parmenides*, surely the greatest work of art of ancient *dialectic*, was taken to be the true disclosure and the *positive expression of the divine life*; and, despite much murkiness in what *ecstasy* produced, this misunderstood ecstasy was in fact supposed to be nothing other than *the pure Concept*. I can reflect, further, that what is excellent in the philosophy of our time places its value in scientific character itself, and, even if others take it otherwise, in fact makes itself count only through that scientific character.[24] So I can also hope that this attempt to vindicate science for the Concept, and to present science in this, its proper element, will manage to gain acceptance through the inner truth of the matter. We must be convinced that the true has the nature of breaking through when its time has come; that it appears only when its time has come, and therefore never appears too early nor finds a public unready for it. We must also be convinced that the individual needs this effect in order to have what is still his solitary concern confirmed by it, and to experience as something universal the conviction that as yet belongs only to particularity. Here, however, the public must often be distinguished

23 The empyrean was the highest heaven, the realm of pure fire or light, in ancient and medieval cosmology.

24 The Neoplatonists of late antiquity, notably Proclus (AD 412–485), read Plato's dialogue *Parmenides* as a revelation of the divine.

from those who behave as its representatives and spokesmen. The public behaves in many respects differently from them, indeed in the opposite way. The public good-naturedly tends to take the blame on itself when a philosophical work does not appeal to it; these others, by contrast, sure of their competence, shift all the blame onto the author. The effect in the public is quieter than the doings of these dead when they bury their dead.[25] Today general insight is on the whole more cultivated, its curiosity more alert and its judgment more quickly made, so that the feet of those who will carry you out are already at the door. Yet one must often distinguish from this the slower effect, which corrects both the attention extorted by imposing assurances and dismissive censure. This slower effect gives some works a contemporary audience only after some time, while others, after that time, have no posterity left.[26]

72 Besides, we live in a time when the universality of spirit has grown so strong and singularity, as is fitting, has become correspondingly more indifferent, and when universality holds to its full range and cultivated wealth and demands it. In such a time the share of the total work of spirit that falls to the activity of the individual can only be small. The individual must therefore, as the nature of science already entails, forget itself all the more. It must indeed become and do what it can; but just as less must be demanded of it, so it may expect less of itself and demand less for itself.

25 Alludes to Matthew 8:22: "Let the dead bury their own dead."
26 Alludes to Acts 5:9, where Peter tells Sapphira that the feet of those who buried her husband are at the door and will carry her out.

Introduction

Einleitung
The method of the book: consciousness tests itself against its own standard, on a path of doubt and despair.

ERSTER THEIL. WISSENSCHAFT DER ERFAHRUNG DES BEWUSSTSEYNS.

[73] It is natural to suppose that, before getting to the matter itself in philosophy, namely to the actual cognition of what truly is, one must first come to an understanding about cognition. Cognition is regarded as the instrument by which one takes possession of the absolute, or as the medium through which one catches sight of it. The worry seems justified, on the one hand, that there may be different kinds of cognition, one of which might be better suited than another to attain this final purpose, so that we might go wrong by choosing badly among them. On the other hand, since cognition is a faculty of a determinate kind and scope, it seems a justified worry that without a more precise determination of its nature and limits we may seize clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth. This worry must surely even turn into the conviction that the whole undertaking of acquiring for consciousness, through cognition, what is in itself is absurd in its very concept, and that a boundary falls between cognition and the absolute that separates them absolutely. For if cognition is the instrument for taking possession of the absolute essence, it is immediately obvious that applying an instrument to a thing does not leave the thing as it is for itself, but shapes and alters it. Or if cognition is not an instrument of our activity but, as it were, a passive medium through which the

light of truth reaches us, then here too we receive the truth not as it is in itself but as it is through and in this medium. In both cases we use a means that immediately produces the opposite of its purpose; or rather, what is absurd is that we make use of a means at all. It seems, admittedly, that this drawback could be remedied by knowing how the *instrument* works. That knowledge would make it possible to subtract, in the result, the part of the representation of the absolute we receive through the instrument that belongs to the instrument, and so to obtain the true in its purity. But this improvement would in fact only bring us back to where we were before. If we remove from a shaped thing what the instrument has done to it, then the thing—here the absolute—is for us exactly what it was before this effort, which was therefore superfluous. Suppose the absolute were only to be brought nearer to us in general by the instrument, without anything in it being changed, as a bird is brought near by a lime-twig. Then, if the absolute were not already in and for itself with us and did not want to be, it would surely mock this ruse. For in this case cognition would be a ruse, since through its manifold efforts it gives itself the air of doing something quite other than merely producing the immediate and therefore effortless relation. Or suppose that examining cognition, which we represent to ourselves as a *medium*, teaches us the law of its refraction. Then it is equally useless to subtract this refraction in the result. For it is not the refraction of the ray but the ray itself, through which the truth touches us, that is cognition; and with the ray subtracted, all that would be indicated to us is the pure direction or the empty place.

FEAR OF ERROR AS FEAR OF TRUTH

Distrust of cognition as an instrument or medium already presupposes a great deal that is untested.

[74] Meanwhile, if the worry about falling into error sets up a mistrust of science, which gets to work without any such scruples and actually cognizes, it is hard to see why one should not, con-

versely, set up a mistrust of this mistrust, and worry that this fear of erring is already the error itself. In fact this fear presupposes something as truth, indeed a good deal, and bases its scruples and conclusions on it; and whether this is truth must itself first be examined. It presupposes, namely, *representations* of *cognition* as an *instrument* and a *medium*, and also a *distinction between ourselves and this cognition*. Above all it presupposes that the absolute stands *on one side*, and that *cognition, on the other side*, for itself and separated from the absolute, is nevertheless something real. In other words, it presupposes that cognition, which, being outside the absolute, is surely also outside the truth, is nevertheless true. Through this assumption, what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of the truth.

[75] This consequence follows from the fact that the absolute alone is true, or the true alone is absolute. It may be rejected by drawing a distinction: a cognition that does not cognize the absolute, as science wants to, may still be true; and cognition in general, though incapable of grasping the absolute, may be capable of other truth. But we gradually come to see that such talk back and forth comes down to a murky distinction between an absolute truth and some other kind of truth, and that the absolute, cognition and so on are words that presuppose a meaning, when obtaining that meaning is precisely what is at issue.

[76] We need not trouble ourselves with such useless representations and turns of phrase about cognition as an instrument for getting hold of the absolute, or as a medium through which we catch sight of the truth, and so on—relations to which all these representations of a cognition separated from the absolute, and of an absolute separated from cognition, surely come down. Nor need we trouble ourselves with the excuses that incapacity for science draws from presupposing such relations, so as at once to free itself from the labor of science and to give itself the air of serious and zealous effort; nor with answers to all this. Instead of all that, we could reject these representations outright as contingent and arbitrary. The use of words bound up with them, such as the absolute, cognition, also the objective and the sub-

jective, and countless others whose meaning is presupposed as generally known, could even be regarded as a deception. For the pretense that their meaning is generally known, and also that one has their concept oneself, seems rather meant only to spare us the main thing, namely giving this concept. With more justification, by contrast, one could spare oneself the trouble of taking any notice at all of such representations and turns of phrase, which are supposed to ward off science itself. For they make up only an empty appearance of knowing, which vanishes immediately when science comes on the scene. But science, in coming on the scene, is itself an appearance; its coming on the scene is not yet science carried out and unfolded in its truth. In this regard it makes no difference whether one thinks of *science* as the appearance because it comes on the scene *alongside something else*, or calls that other, untrue knowing its appearing. Science must, however, free itself from this semblance, and it can do so only by turning against it. For science can neither simply reject a knowing that is not true as a common view of things, assuring us that it itself is an entirely different cognition and that that knowing is nothing at all to it; nor can it appeal to the intimation of something better within that knowing. By such an *assurance* it would declare its *being* to be its force. But untrue knowing likewise appeals to the fact that *it is*, and *assures* us that science is nothing to it. *One* bare assurance, however, counts for exactly as much as another. Still less can science appeal to the better intimation that is supposed to be present in untrue cognition and to point, within that cognition, toward science. For on the one hand it would again be appealing to a being. On the other hand it would be appealing to itself as it exists in untrue cognition, that is, to a poor mode of its being, and to its appearance rather than to what it is in and for itself. For this reason the presentation of appearing knowing is to be undertaken here.

THE PATH OF DESPAIR

The presentation of appearing knowing is a thoroughgoing skepticism that ends in determinate negation.

[77] Now because this presentation has only appearing knowing for its object, it seems not itself to be free science moving in its own proper shape. From this standpoint it can instead be taken as the path of natural consciousness pressing forward to true knowing. Or it can be taken as the path of the soul, which journeys through the series of its shapes as stations laid out for it by its nature, so that it may purify itself into spirit by arriving, through the complete experience of itself, at knowledge of what it is in itself.

[78] Natural consciousness will prove to be only the concept of knowing, or not real knowing. But because it immediately takes itself to be real knowing, this path has a negative meaning for it: what is the realization of the concept counts for it rather as the loss of itself, for on this path it loses its truth. The path can therefore be regarded as the path of *doubt*, or more properly as the path of despair. For what happens on it is not what is usually understood by doubting: a shaking of this or that supposed truth, followed by a due disappearance of the doubt and a return to that truth, so that in the end the matter is taken as it was before.[1] Rather, the path is the conscious insight into the untruth of appearing knowing, for which what is most real is what is in truth only the unrealized concept. This self-completing skepticism is therefore also not what earnest zeal for truth and science perhaps fancies it has prepared and equipped itself with for them. That is, it is not the *resolve* not to surrender, in science, to the thoughts of others on their authority, but to examine everything oneself and follow only one's own conviction—or better still, to produce everything oneself and hold only one's own act to be the true. [79] The series of shapes that consciousness

1 In German the words for "doubt" (*Zweifel*) and "despair" (*Verzweiflung*) share a root, a play the English cannot reproduce.

goes through on this path is rather the detailed history of the *culture* of consciousness itself up to science. That resolve represents culture, in the simple manner of a resolve, as immediately done and over with; this path, by contrast, is the actual carrying out, set against this untruth. To follow one's own conviction is certainly more than to surrender to authority. But when holding something true on authority is converted into holding it true from one's own conviction, its content has not necessarily changed, nor has truth necessarily taken the place of error. Being stuck in the system of opinion and prejudice on the authority of others, and being stuck in it from one's own conviction, differ from each other only by the vanity inherent in the latter. Skepticism directed at the whole range of appearing consciousness, by contrast, first makes spirit capable of examining what truth is. It does so by bringing about a despair of so-called natural representations, thoughts and opinions, whether one calls them one's own or others'—it makes no difference. Consciousness that sets about examining *straight away* is still filled and burdened with these, and is thereby in fact incapable of what it means to undertake.

The *completeness* of the forms of unreal consciousness will result from the necessity of the progression and interconnection itself. To make this comprehensible, it may be remarked in general beforehand that the presentation of untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely *negative* movement. Natural consciousness generally has such a one-sided view of it. And a knowing that makes this one-sidedness its essence is one of the shapes of incomplete consciousness; it belongs to the course of the path itself and will present itself there. It is, namely, the skepticism that always sees in the result only *pure nothing*, and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinately the nothing *of that from which it results*. But nothing is in fact the true result only when taken as the nothing of that from which it comes; it is thereby itself a *determinate* nothing and has a *content*. The skepticism that ends with the abstraction of nothing or emptiness cannot go any further from there. It must wait to

see whether, and what, something new might present itself to it, so that it can throw this into the same empty abyss. When, by contrast, the result is grasped as it is in truth, as *determinate* negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition has been made through which the progression through the complete series of shapes comes about of itself.

[80] But the *goal* is set for knowing just as necessarily as the sequence of the progression. It lies where knowing no longer needs to go beyond itself, where it finds itself, and where the concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept. The progress toward this goal is therefore also relentless, and no satisfaction is to be found at any earlier station. What is confined to a natural life cannot go beyond its immediate existence by its own means. But it is driven beyond it by something else, and this being torn out of itself is its death. Consciousness, however, is for itself its own *concept*. It is therefore immediately the going beyond what is limited, and, since this limited thing belongs to it, the going beyond itself. With the singular, the beyond is at the same time posited for consciousness, even if only, as in spatial intuition, *next to* what is limited. Consciousness therefore suffers this violence at its own hands: it spoils its own limited satisfaction. When it feels this violence, its dread of the truth may well shrink back and strive to hold on to what it is in danger of losing. But this anxiety can find no rest. It may want to stand still in thoughtless inertia—but thought troubles thoughtlessness, and its unrest disturbs the inertia. Or it may entrench itself as a sentimentality that assures us it finds everything *good of its kind*—but this assurance suffers the same violence from reason, which finds something not good precisely insofar as it is a kind. Or the fear of truth may hide itself, from itself and from others, behind the pretense that it is precisely its burning zeal for truth itself that makes it so hard, indeed impossible, to find any truth other than the single truth of vanity: always being cleverer still than any thoughts one has, whether from oneself or from others. This vanity knows how to render every truth

vain and to return from it into itself. It revels in this understanding of its own, which always knows how to dissolve all thoughts and to find, in place of all content, only the barren I. It is a satisfaction that must be left to itself, for it flees the universal and seeks only being-for-self.

CONSCIOUSNESS TESTS ITSELF

Consciousness supplies its own standard, so we need only look on as it compares its knowing with its object.

81 Having said this, provisionally and in general, about the manner and necessity of the progression, it may be useful to add something about *the method of carrying it out*. This presentation, conceived as a *relation* of *science* to *appearing* knowing, and as an *investigation* and *examination of the reality of cognition*, seems unable to take place without some presupposition laid down at the outset as a *standard*. For an examination consists in applying an accepted standard, and in deciding whether what is examined is correct or incorrect according to whether it turns out to be equal or unequal to that standard. And the standard in general—and likewise science, if it were the standard—is thereby taken to be the *essence* or *the in-itself*. But here, where science is only just making its appearance, neither science itself nor anything else has justified itself as the essence or the in-itself; and without something of that kind, it seems that no examination can take place.

82 This contradiction and its removal will emerge more definitely if we first recall the abstract determinations of knowing and of truth as they occur in consciousness. Consciousness, namely, *distinguishes* from itself something to which it at the same time *relates* itself; or, as this is also put, something is *for it*. The determinate aspect of this *relating*, or of the *being* of something *for a consciousness*, is *knowing*. From this being for another, however, we distinguish *being-in-itself*. What is related to knowing is equally distinguished from it and posited as something that *is* outside this relation too; the aspect of this in-itself is

called *truth*. What these determinations really amount to is of no further concern to us here. Since appearing knowing is our object, its determinations too are taken up, to begin with, just as they immediately present themselves; and they surely do present themselves in the way they have been grasped here.

[83] If we now investigate the truth of knowing, it seems that we are investigating what knowing is *in itself*. But in this investigation knowing is *our* object; it is *for us*. The *in-itself* of knowing that would result would therefore rather be its being *for us*. What we asserted as its essence would be not its truth but only our knowing of it. The essence, or the standard, would lie in us, and what was supposed to be compared with it, and decided upon by this comparison, would not necessarily have to recognize it.

[84] But the nature of the object we are investigating spares us this separation, or this semblance of separation and presupposition. Consciousness provides its own standard in itself, and the investigation will therefore be a comparison of consciousness with itself; for the distinction just made falls within it. In consciousness there is one thing *for* another; or, in general, consciousness has in itself the determinateness of the moment of knowing. At the same time, this other is for consciousness not only *for it* but also outside this relation, or *in itself*: the moment of truth. In what consciousness declares within itself to be the *in-itself* or the *true*, then, we have the standard that consciousness itself sets up by which to measure its knowing. If we call *knowing* the *concept*, and call the essence or the *true* that which is, or the *object*, then the examination consists in seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object. But if we call *the essence* or the in-itself *of the object the concept*, and understand by the *object*, on the other hand, the object as *object*—namely as it is *for another*—then the examination consists in our seeing whether the object corresponds to its concept. Clearly the two are the same. But what is essential is to keep this firmly in mind throughout the whole investigation: these two moments, *concept and object*, *being for another* and being *in itself*, fall within the

very knowing we are investigating. We therefore have no need to bring standards with us, or to apply *our* own notions and thoughts in the investigation. By leaving these aside, we manage to consider the matter as it is *in* and *for itself*.

[85] But it is not only in this respect—that concept and object, the standard and what is to be examined, are present in consciousness itself—that any addition on our part becomes superfluous. We are also spared the trouble of comparing the two and of actually carrying out the *examination*, so that, since consciousness examines itself, all that is left to us in this respect too is simply to look on. For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object and, on the other, consciousness of itself: consciousness of what is the true for it, and consciousness of its knowing of that. Since both are *for it*, consciousness is itself their comparison; it becomes a matter *for consciousness itself* whether or not its knowing of the object corresponds to the object. Admittedly, the object seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it. Consciousness seems unable, as it were, to get behind the object to what it is, *not for consciousness*, but *in itself*, and hence also unable to test its knowing against the object. But precisely in the fact that consciousness knows of an object at all, the distinction is already present that *for it* something is the *in-itself*, while another moment is knowing, or the being of the object *for* consciousness. The examination rests on this distinction, which is present. If, in this comparison, the two do not correspond, it seems that consciousness must alter its knowing to make it conform to the object. But in the alteration of the knowing, the object itself in fact alters for consciousness as well. For the knowing that was present was essentially a knowing of the object; with the knowing, the object too becomes something else, since it belonged essentially to this knowing. It thus becomes clear to consciousness that what was previously the *in-itself* for it is not in itself, or that it was *in itself only for it*. So when consciousness finds, in its object, that its knowing does not correspond to that object, the object itself does not hold out either. In other words, the standard of the

examination changes when what it was supposed to be the standard of does not survive the examination; and the examination is an examination not only of knowing but also of its standard.

[86] This *dialectical* movement, which consciousness performs on itself—on its knowing as well as on its object—*insofar as the new, true object arises for it* out of this movement, is really what is called *experience*. In this connection, one moment in the process just described should be brought out more precisely; it will cast new light on the scientific side of the presentation that follows. Consciousness knows *something*; this object is the essence or the *in-itself*. But it is also the *in-itself* for consciousness, and with this the ambiguity of this truth enters. We see that consciousness now has two objects: the first, the *in-itself*; the second, *the being-for-it of this in-itself*. The second seems at first to be merely consciousness's reflection into itself: a representing, not of an object, but only of its knowing of the first object. But, as was shown earlier, the first object changes for consciousness in the process. It ceases to be the in-itself and becomes for consciousness an object that is *the in-itself only for it*. And so this—*the being-for-it of this in-itself*—is then the true; which means that this is the *essence*, or consciousness's *object*. This new object contains the nullity of the first; it is the experience that has been made about the first.

[87] In this presentation of the course of experience there is one moment by which it seems not to agree with what is ordinarily understood by experience. The transition from the first object and the knowing of it to the other object—the one *on which* the experience is said to have been made—was described in such a way that the knowing of the first object, or the being-*for*-consciousness of the first in-itself, is supposed to become the second object itself. Ordinarily, by contrast, it seems that we have the experience of the untruth of our first concept *on some other* object, one we happen upon by chance and from outside, so that all that falls to us is the pure *apprehending* of what is in and for itself. From the viewpoint set out above, however, the

new object shows itself to have come about through a *reversal of consciousness* itself. This way of looking at the matter is our contribution. Through it the series of consciousness's experiences is raised to a scientific progression, and it is not there for the consciousness we are observing. But this is in fact the same circumstance that was discussed above regarding the relation of this presentation to skepticism: namely, that the result that emerges in each case from an untrue knowing must not collapse into an empty nothing, but must necessarily be grasped as the nothing *of that of which it is the result*—a result that contains what was true in the preceding knowing. Here this presents itself as follows. What first appeared as the object sinks, for consciousness, to a knowing of it, and the *in-itself* becomes a *being-for-consciousness of the in-itself*. This is the new object, and with it a new shape of consciousness also emerges, for which the essence is something different from what it was for the preceding shape. It is this circumstance that guides the entire succession of the shapes of consciousness in its necessity. Only this necessity itself—or the *emergence* of the new object, which presents itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing how this happens to it—is what goes on, for us, as it were behind consciousness's back. Through this, a moment of *being-in-itself*, or of *being-for-us*, enters into the movement of consciousness—a moment that does not present itself to the consciousness caught up in the experience itself. The *content*, however, of what arises for us is *for consciousness*; we grasp only its formal aspect, or its pure arising. *For consciousness*, what has arisen is only an object; *for us*, it is at the same time movement and becoming.

[88] Because of this necessity, this path to science is itself already *science*, and, in terms of its content, it is therefore the science of the *experience of consciousness*.[2]

[89] The experience that consciousness makes about itself can, by its concept, comprise nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, or the entire realm of the truth of spirit. It does

2 "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" was the title Hegel originally planned for the book; it appears on a half-title in some copies of the 1807 edition.

so in such a way that the moments of this truth present themselves in their own peculiar determinateness: not as abstract, pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears in its relation to them. Through this, the moments of the whole are *shapes of consciousness*. In driving itself forward to its true existence, consciousness will reach a point at which it sheds the semblance of being burdened with something alien, something that is only for it and as an other. That is, it will reach a point where appearance becomes equal to essence, so that its presentation coincides, at just this point, with the science of spirit proper. And finally, when consciousness itself grasps this essence of its own, it will signify the nature of absolute knowing itself.

Consciousness

I–III. Die sinnliche Gewißheit; Die Wahrnehmung; Krafft und Verstand
Sense-certainty, perception, and force and the understanding.

I. DIE SINNLICHE GEWISSHEIT; ODER DAS DIESE UND DAS MEYNEN.

90 The knowing that is our object at first, or immediately, can be none other than the knowing that is itself immediate: *knowing* of the *immediate*, or of *what is*. We, for our part, must behave just as *immediately*, or *receptively*. We must therefore alter nothing in this knowing as it presents itself, and keep comprehension out of our apprehension.

91 The concrete content of *sense-certainty* makes it appear immediately as the *richest* kind of knowledge—indeed, as a knowledge of infinite wealth, for which no limit can be found, whether we go *out* into space and time, in which it spreads itself, or take a piece of this abundance and go *into* it by dividing it. It also appears to be the *truest* knowledge; for it has not yet left anything out of the object, but has the object before it in its entire completeness. In fact, however, this *certainty* turns out, by its own account, to be the most abstract and poorest *truth*. Of what it knows, it says only this: it *is*; and its truth contains nothing but the *being* of the thing. Consciousness, for its part, is present in this certainty only as a pure *I*; or *I* am in it only as a pure *this one*, and the object likewise only as a pure *this*. I, *this one*, am *certain* of *this* thing not because *I*, as consciousness, have developed myself in the process and set thought moving in manifold ways. Nor is it because *the thing* of which I am certain

is, in virtue of a host of distinct properties, a rich relation within itself or a manifold relation to other things. Neither of these has anything to do with the truth of sense-certainty. Neither the I nor the thing has the significance here of a manifold mediation: the I does not signify a manifold representing or thinking, nor does the thing signify manifold properties. Rather, the thing *is*; and it *is* merely because it *is*. It *is*—this is what is essential for sensuous knowing, and this pure *being*, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its *truth*. Likewise, the certainty, as *relation*, is an *immediate*, pure relation. Consciousness is *I*, nothing more, a pure *this one*; the *singular* one knows a pure this, or *the singular*.

[92] But if we look closely, a great deal else is in play alongside the *pure being* that constitutes the essence of this certainty, and which it declares to be its truth. An actual sense-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy but an *instance* of it. Among the countless differences that turn up here, we find in every case the principal distinction: that in sense-certainty the two *Thises* already mentioned immediately fall out of pure being—a *this one* as *I* and a *this as object*. If *we* reflect on this distinction, it turns out that neither the one nor the other is merely *immediate* in sense-certainty; each is at the same time *mediated*. I have the certainty *through* something else, namely the thing; and the thing is likewise in the certainty *through* something else, namely through the I.

[93] This distinction between essence and instance, between immediacy and mediation, is not made only by us; we find it in sense-certainty itself. And it is to be taken up in the form in which it is present there, not as we have just determined it. In sense-certainty, one term is posited as what simply and immediately is, or as the essence: *the object*. The other is posited as the inessential and mediated, which is in sense-certainty not *in itself* but through something else: the I, a *knowing* that knows the object only because *the object* is, and that can either be or not be. The object, however, *is*: it is the true and the essence. It *is*, indifferent to whether it is known or not; it remains even if it is not known. But the knowing is not, if the object is not.

[94] The object, then, must be examined to see whether, in sense-certainty itself, it is in fact the kind of essence that sense-certainty makes it out to be—whether this concept of the object, that it is the essence, corresponds to the way it is present in sense-certainty. To this end, we must not reflect on it and ponder what it might be in truth, but only consider it as sense-certainty has it.

[95] *Sense-certainty* itself, then, must be asked: *What is the This?* If we take the This in the twofold shape of its being, as the *Now* and as the *Here*, the dialectic that it has in it will take on a form as intelligible as the This itself. To the question *What is the Now?* we answer, then, for example: *The Now is night*. To test the truth of this sense-certainty, a simple experiment will suffice. We write this truth down; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, any more than by our preserving it. If we look at the written truth again *now, this noon*, we will have to say that it has gone stale.

[96] The Now that is night is *preserved*: that is, it is treated as what it is claimed to be, as something that *is*. But it proves rather to be something that is not. The *Now* itself does indeed maintain itself, but as a Now that is not night. Likewise, in relation to the day, which it now is, it maintains itself as a Now that is also not day—or as something *negative* in general. This self-maintaining Now is therefore not immediate but mediated; for it is determined as something enduring and self-maintaining *by the fact that* something else—namely day and night—is not. At the same time it is still just as simple as before—*Now*—and in this simplicity it is indifferent to what is still in play alongside it. Just as little as night and day are its being, it is just as much day and night; it is not affected in the least by this otherness of its own. Something simple of this kind, which is by way of negation, which is neither this nor that, a *not-this*, and is equally indifferent to being this or that, we call a *universal*. The universal, then, is in fact the truth of sense-certainty.

[97] It is also as a universal that we *utter* what is sensuous. What we say is: *This*, that is, the *universal This*; or: *it is*, that is, *being in*

general. Of course, in doing so we do not *represent to ourselves* the universal This or being in general; but we *utter* the universal. In other words, we simply do not speak in the way we *mean* it in this sense-certainty. But language, as we see, is the truer. In it we ourselves immediately refute our *meaning*; and since the universal is the truth of sense-certainty, and language expresses only this truth, it is not possible at all for us ever to say a sensuous being that we *mean*.

98 The same will be the case with the other form of the This, with *the Here*. *The Here* is, for example, *the tree*. I turn around, and this truth has vanished and turned into its opposite: *The Here is not a tree*, but rather *a house*. The *Here* itself does not vanish; *it is* and endures in the vanishing of the house, the tree, and so on, and it is indifferent to being house or tree. The *This* thus shows itself once again to be a *mediated simplicity*, or *universality*.

99 Since sense-certainty demonstrates in itself that the universal is the truth of its object, *pure being* remains its essence—not, however, as immediate, but as a being to which negation and mediation are essential. It remains, then, not as what we *mean* by *being*, but as *being* with the *determination* that it is abstraction, or the purely universal. And all that is left over is *our meaning*, for which the truth of sense-certainty is not the universal, standing over against this empty or indifferent Now and Here.

100 If we compare the relation in which *knowing* and the *object* first appeared with the relation in which they come to stand in this result, it has been reversed. The object, which was supposed to be the essential, is now the inessential element of sense-certainty. For the universal that the object has become is no longer the kind of thing it was supposed to be as essential for sense-certainty. Instead, sense-certainty is now present in the opposite, namely in the knowing, which was previously the inessential. Its truth lies in the object as *my* object, or in *meaning*: the object is because *I* know of it.[1] Sense-certainty has thus been driven out of the object, but it has not yet been sublated by this; it has

1 Hegel puns on meinen ("to mean," "to intend," "to opine") and mein ("my"): what I merely "mean" is what is mine, private and unsayable.

only been pushed back into the I. We must see what experience shows us about this reality of sense-certainty.

101 The force of its truth now lies, then, in the *I*, in the immediacy of my *seeing, hearing*, and so on. The vanishing of the singular Now and Here that we mean is prevented by the fact that *I* hold on to them. *The Now is day*, because I see it; *the Here is a tree*, for the same reason. But in this relation sense-certainty experiences in itself the same dialectic as in the previous one. *I, this one*, see the tree and *assert the tree as the Here*; but *another I* sees the house and asserts that the Here is not a tree but a house. Both truths have the same authentication, namely the immediacy of seeing, and the security and assurance of each about its knowing; but the one vanishes in the other.

102 What does not vanish in this is the *I* as *universal*. Its seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house but a simple seeing, which, though mediated by the negation of this house and so on, remains in this just as simple and indifferent to what is still in play alongside it—to the house, the tree. The I is only a universal, like *Now, Here*, or *This* in general. I do indeed mean a *singular I*; but I can no more say what I mean by "I" than what I mean by "Now" and "Here." When I say *this Here, Now*, or a *singular*, I am saying *all these, all Heres, Nows, singulars*. Likewise, when I say *I, this singular I*, I say in general *all* "I"s; each is what I say: *I, this singular I*. Suppose science is presented with this demand as its touchstone—one it supposedly could not withstand at all: to deduce, to construct, to find a priori, or however one wants to put it, a so-called *this thing* or *this particular human being*. Then it is only fair that the demand should *say* which *this* thing or which *this* I it means. But to say this is impossible.[2]

103 Sense-certainty thus experiences that its essence lies neither in the object nor in the I, and that its immediacy is an immediacy neither of the one nor of the other. For in both, what I mean is rather something inessential; and the object and the I are universals, in which the Now and Here and I that I mean

2 An allusion to Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770–1842), who challenged idealist philosophers to deduce his writing pen from their systems.

does not persist, or *is* not. We thereby reach the point of positing the *whole* of sense-certainty itself as its *essence*, and no longer just one of its moments, as happened in the two cases where first the object opposed to the I, and then the I, was supposed to be its reality. Thus it is only the *whole* of sense-certainty itself that holds fast to itself as *immediacy*, and thereby excludes from itself all the opposition that occurred in the previous cases.

[104] This pure immediacy, then, is no longer concerned with the otherness of the Here as tree, which passes over into a Here that is not-tree; nor with the otherness of the Now as day, which passes over into a Now that is night; nor with another I for which something else is the object. Its truth maintains itself as a relation that remains equal to itself and makes no distinction of essentiality and inessentiality between the I and the object—a relation, therefore, into which no distinction whatever can penetrate. I, this one, therefore assert the Here as tree, and do not turn around, so that the Here would become a not-tree for me. Nor do I take any notice of the fact that another I sees the Here as not-tree, or that I myself, at another time, take the Here as not-tree, the Now as not-day. Rather, I am pure intuiting. I, for my part, stick to this: the Now is day; or else to this: the Here is tree. Nor do I compare the Here and the Now themselves with each other; I hold fast to *one* immediate relation: the Now is day.

[105] Since, then, this certainty will no longer come forward when we draw its attention to a Now that is night, or to an I for whom it is night, we go up to it and have it point out to us the Now that is being asserted. We must have it *pointed out* to us, for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of *this* I, which confines itself to one *Now* or one *Here*. If we were to take up this truth *afterward*, or stand at a *distance* from it, it would have no meaning at all; for we would be sublating the immediacy that is essential to it. We must therefore enter the same point of time or of space, have it pointed out to us—that is, let ourselves be made into the same this I that is the one who knows with certainty. Let us see, then, what the immediate that is pointed out to us is like.

106 The *Now* is pointed out: *this Now*. *Now*—it has already ceased to be in the very act of being pointed out. The *Now* that *is* is a different one from the Now pointed out, and we see that the Now is precisely this: in being, already no longer to be. The Now, as it is pointed out to us, is something that *has been*; and that is its truth. It does not have the truth of being. It is nevertheless true that it has been. But what *has been* is in fact *no essence*; it *is* not—and our concern was with being.[3]

107 What we see in this pointing out, then, is only a movement with the following course. 1) I point out the Now, and it is asserted to be the true; but I point it out as something that has been, or as something sublated, and so I sublate the first truth. 2) Now I assert, as the second truth, that it *has been*, that it is sublated. 3) But what has been is not; I sublate the having-been or being-sublated, the second truth, thereby negate the negation of the Now, and so return to the first assertion: that the *Now* is. The Now, and the pointing out of the Now, are thus so constituted that neither the Now nor its pointing out is something immediate and simple; each is a movement that has various moments in it. *This* is posited; but rather *another* is posited, or the This is sublated; and this *otherness*, or sublation of the first, is itself *sublated in turn*, and so a return is made to the first. But this first, reflected into itself, is not exactly the same as what it was at first, namely something *immediate*. Rather, it is precisely *something reflected into itself*, or *simple*, which remains in otherness what it is: a Now that is absolutely many Nows. And this is the true Now: the Now as a simple day that has many Nows within it —hours. Such a Now, an hour, is likewise many minutes, and these Nows likewise many Nows, and so on.—The *pointing out* is thus itself the movement that expresses what the Now is in truth: namely a result, or a plurality of Nows taken together; and the pointing out is the experiencing that the Now is a *universal*.

108 The *Here pointed out*, which I hold fast, is likewise a *this* Here that is in fact *not this* Here, but a Front and Back, an Above

3 German gewesen ("has been") contains Wesen ("essence"); Hegel plays on the two words.

and Below, a Right and Left. The Above is itself likewise this manifold otherness in above, below, and so on. The Here that was supposed to be pointed out vanishes into other Heres, but these vanish likewise. What is pointed out, held fast, and enduring is a *negative This*, which only *is* in that the *Heres* are taken as they ought to be, but in being so taken sublate themselves. It is a simple complex of many Heres. The Here that is meant would be the point; but the point *is* not. Rather, when it is pointed out as being, the pointing out shows itself to be not immediate knowing but a movement: from the Here that is meant, through many Heres, into the universal Here—which, just as the day is a simple plurality of Nows, is a simple plurality of Heres.

[109] It is evident that the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing other than the simple history of its movement, or of its experience, and that sense-certainty itself is nothing other than just this history. That is why natural consciousness, too, always advances by itself to this result—to what the truth of sense-certainty is—and has the experience of it. But it always forgets it again just as often, and starts the movement over from the beginning. It is therefore astonishing when, in opposition to this experience, it is put forward as universal experience—and also as a philosophical claim, and even as the result of skepticism—that the reality or being of external things as *these*, or as sensuous things, has absolute truth for consciousness. Such a claim does not know what it is saying; it does not know that it says the opposite of what it wants to say. The truth of the sensuous *This* for consciousness is supposed to be universal experience; but it is rather the opposite that is universal experience. Every consciousness itself sublates such a truth as, for example, *The Here is a tree* or *The Now is noon*, and utters the opposite: the Here is *not* a tree *but* a house. And whatever, in this assertion that sublates the first, is again just such an assertion of a sensuous This, consciousness sublates in the same way, and so on. In all sense-certainty, what is in truth experienced is only what we have seen: the *This* as a *universal*—the opposite of what that claim assures us is universal experience. — In this appeal to universal experi-

ence, we may be permitted to anticipate a consideration of the practical sphere. In this respect, those who assert that truth and certainty of the reality of sensuous objects may be told that they should be sent back to the most elementary school of wisdom, namely to the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, and that they have yet to learn the secret of eating bread and drinking wine. For whoever is initiated into these mysteries not only comes to doubt the being of sensuous things but to despair of it; and in the mysteries he partly brings about the nullity of these things himself, and partly watches it being brought about.[4] Nor are animals excluded from this wisdom; on the contrary, they show themselves to be the most deeply initiated into it. For they do not stand still before sensuous things as though these were things that are in themselves. Despairing of this reality, and completely certain of the nullity of these things, they simply help themselves and devour them. And all of nature, like the animals, celebrates these open mysteries, which teach what the truth of sensuous things is.

110 But those who put forward such a claim also themselves, in keeping with the preceding remarks, immediately say the opposite of what they mean—a phenomenon that is perhaps best suited to prompt reflection on the nature of sense-certainty. They speak of the existence of *external* objects, which can be determined still more precisely as *actual*, absolutely *singular*, *wholly personal*, *individual* things, each of which has nothing absolutely like it; this existence, they say, has absolute certainty and truth. They mean *this* piece of paper on which I am writing *this*, or rather have written it; but what they mean, they do not say. If they really wanted to *say* this piece of paper that they mean—and they did want to *say* it—this is impossible, because the sensuous This that is meant is *unreachable* by language, which belongs to consciousness, to what is in itself universal. In the actual attempt to say it, it would therefore rot away. Those

4 The Eleusinian mysteries were secret initiation rites of ancient Greece honoring Demeter (Ceres); Dionysus (Bacchus) was also associated with them. Bread and wine were the gifts of these two gods.

who had begun describing it could not finish, but would have to leave the description to others, who would in the end themselves admit that they were speaking of a thing that *is* not. They do mean, then, *this* piece of paper, which here is quite a different one from the one above; but what they say is actual *things*, *external* or *sensuous objects*, *absolutely singular* beings, and so on. That is, they say of them only the *universal*. Hence what is called the ineffable is nothing other than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant.—If nothing more is said of something than that it is *an actual thing*, an *external object*, it is expressed only as the most universal of all; and what is expressed is thereby its *equality* with everything rather than its distinctness. If I say *a singular thing*, I rather say it as something entirely *universal*, for everything is a singular thing; and likewise *this* thing is anything one likes. If it is designated more precisely, as *this piece of paper*, then *each and every* piece of paper is *a this* piece of paper, and I have still only said the universal. But suppose I want to help out speech—which has the divine nature of immediately inverting what is meant, turning it into something else, and so never letting it get *a word in* at all—by *pointing out* this piece of paper. Then I have the experience of what the truth of sense-certainty in fact is. I point it out as a *Here* that is a Here of other Heres, or is in itself a *simple togetherness* of many *Heres*—that is, a universal. I thus take it up as it is in truth, and instead of knowing something immediate, I *perceive*.[5]

PERCEPTION: THE THING AND DECEPTION

Consciousness now takes its object as a universal: the thing with many properties.

111 Immediate certainty does not take hold of the true, for its truth is the universal, whereas it wants to take the *This*. Perception, on the other hand, takes what is, for it, as a universal. Just as universality is its principle in general, so too its moments,

5 German wahrnehmen ("to perceive") literally means "to take as true" (wahr nehmen); Hegel exploits this in the transition to perception.

which are immediately distinguished within it, are universal: the I a universal, and the object a universal. That principle has *arisen* for us, and our taking up of perception is therefore no longer a merely phenomenal taking up, as it was with sense-certainty, but a necessary one. In the arising of the principle, the two moments that merely *fall out* in its appearance have at the same time come to be: one of them the movement of pointing out, the other the same movement, but as something simple; the former is *perceiving*, the latter the *object*. The object is in essence the same as the movement: the movement is the unfolding and distinguishing of the moments, the object their being-gathered-together. For us, or in itself, the universal as principle is the *essence* of perception; and, over against this abstraction, the two terms that are distinguished—the perceiver and the perceived—are the *inessential*. But in fact, because both are themselves the universal, or the essence, both are essential. Since, however, they relate to each other as opposites, only one of them can be the essential in the relation; and the distinction between essential and inessential must be divided between them. The one determined as the simple—the object—is the essence, indifferent to whether it is perceived or not. Perceiving, however, as the movement, is the unstable, which can be or not be, and is the inessential.

[112] This object must now be determined more precisely, and this determination developed briefly from the result that has emerged; a more detailed development does not belong here. Since the object's principle, the universal, is in its simplicity something *mediated*, the object must express this in itself as its nature. It thereby shows itself to be *the thing with many properties*. The wealth of sensuous knowing belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, in which it was only what was in play alongside; for only perception has *negation*, difference, or manifoldness, in its essence.

[113] The This is thus posited as *not this*, or as *sublated*; and hence not as nothing, but as a determinate nothing, or *a nothing of a content*, namely of *the This*. The sensuous is thereby itself

still present, but not as it was supposed to be in immediate certainty, as the singular that is meant, but as a universal, or as what will be determined as a *property*. *Sublating* displays its true double meaning, which we have seen in the negative: it is a *negating* and a *preserving* at once. The nothing, as the *nothing of the This*, preserves immediacy and is itself sensuous, but it is a universal immediacy. — Being, however, is a universal by virtue of having mediation, or the negative, in it. When it *expresses* this in its immediacy, it is a *distinct, determinate* property. At the same time, *many* such properties are thereby posited, each the negative of the others. Since they are expressed in the *simplicity* of the universal, these *determinatenesses*—which are properly properties only through a further determination still to come—relate *to themselves*; they are *indifferent* to one another, each for itself, free of the others. But the simple, self-identical universality itself is in turn distinct from these determinatenesses of its own, and free. It is pure relating-to-itself, or the *medium* in which all these determinatenesses are, and in which, as in a *simple* unity, they therefore *interpenetrate*, but without *touching* one another; for it is precisely through their participation in this universality that they are indifferent, each for itself.—This abstract universal medium, which can be called *thinghood* in general or *pure essence*, is nothing other than the *Here* and *Now* as it has proved to be: namely a *simple togetherness* of many—though the many are themselves, *in their determinateness*, *simply universal*. This salt is a simple Here, and at the same time manifold: it is white, and *also* sharp-tasting, *also* cubical in shape, *also* of a specific weight, and so on. All these many properties are in one simple *Here*, in which they therefore interpenetrate. None has a different Here from the others; each is everywhere, in the same Here as the others. And at the same time, without being separated by different Heres, they do not affect one another in this interpenetration. The white does not affect or alter the cubical, neither of them affects the sharp taste, and so on. Rather, since each is itself a simple *relating-to-itself*, it leaves the others alone and relates to them only through the indifferent *Also*. This *Also* is

thus the pure universal itself, or the medium, the *thinghood* that holds them together in this way.

[114] In this relation, which has now emerged, only the character of positive universality has so far been observed and developed. But another side presents itself, and it too must be taken into account. If the many determinate properties were utterly indifferent and related themselves solely to themselves, they would not be *determinate* properties. They are determinate only insofar as they *distinguish* themselves from one another and *relate* themselves *to others* as opposed to them. Because of this opposition, however, they cannot be together in the simple unity of their medium, a unity that is just as essential to them as negation is. Their distinction, insofar as it is not indifferent but excludes and negates what is other, therefore falls outside this simple medium. Consequently the medium is not only an *Also*, an indifferent unity, but also a *One*, an *excluding unity*.—The One is the *moment of negation*, as negation relates itself to itself in a simple way and excludes what is other. It is that through which *thinghood* is determined as a *thing*. In the property, negation is present as *determinateness*. This determinateness is immediately one with the immediacy of being, and through this unity with negation that immediacy is universality. As the *One*, however, negation is present as freed from this unity with its opposite and as being in and for itself.

[115] Taken together in these moments, the thing, as the truth of perception, is complete, so far as it needs to be developed here. It is (*α*) the indifferent, passive universality, the *Also* of the many properties, or rather *matters*; (*β*) negation, likewise as simple, or the *One*, the excluding of opposite properties; and (*γ*) the many *properties* themselves, the relation of the first two moments. The properties are negation as it relates itself to the indifferent element and spreads itself out there as a multitude of differences—the point of singularity radiating out into multiplicity within the medium of subsistence. Insofar as these differences belong to the indifferent medium, they are themselves universal: they relate only to themselves and do not affect one another. Insofar

as they belong to the negative unity, however, they are at the same time excluding; but they necessarily have this opposed relation to properties that are removed from *their Also*. Sensuous universality, or the *immediate* unity of being and the negative, is a *property* only when the One and pure universality have been developed out of it and distinguished from each other, and when it joins them together. Only this relation of sensuous universality to the pure essential moments completes the *thing*.

116 This, then, is how the thing of perception is constituted; and consciousness is determined as perceiving insofar as this thing is its object. Consciousness has *only to take* the object and to conduct itself as pure apprehending; what results for it in this way is the true. If consciousness itself did anything in this taking, it would alter the truth by adding something or leaving something out. The object is the true and universal, what is equal to itself, while consciousness is, for itself, the changeable and inessential. So it can happen that consciousness apprehends the object incorrectly and deceives itself. The percipient is conscious of the possibility of deception. For in universality, which is its principle, *otherness* itself is immediately for it—but as what is *null*, as sublated. Its criterion of truth is therefore *self-equality*, and its conduct consists in apprehending the object as self-equal. Since at the same time what is diverse is also for it, this conduct is a relating of the different moments of its apprehending to one another. But if an inequality comes to light in this comparison, this is not an untruth of the object—for the object is what is self-equal—but an untruth of perceiving.

117 Let us now see what experience consciousness has in its actual perceiving. *For us*, this experience is already contained in the development just given of the object and of consciousness's conduct toward it; it will be nothing but the development of the contradictions present there.—The object I take up presents itself as *purely one*. I also become aware of the property in it, which is *universal* and thereby goes beyond singularity. The first being of the objective essence, as a one, was therefore not its true being. Since *the object* is the true, the untruth falls in me,

and my apprehending was not correct. On account of the *universality* of the property, I must rather take the objective essence as a *community* in general. Further, I now perceive the property as *determinate*, *opposed* to another and excluding it. So in fact I did not apprehend the objective essence correctly when I determined it as a *community* with others, or as continuity. Rather, on account of the *determinateness* of the property, I must break up the continuity and posit the objective essence as an excluding one. In the separated one I find many such properties, which do not affect one another but are indifferent to one another. So I did not perceive the object correctly when I apprehended it as *excluding*. Rather, just as before it was merely continuity in general, it is now a universal *common medium* in which many properties are present as sensuous *universals*, each for itself and each, as *determinate*, excluding the others. But then the simple and true that I perceive is also not a universal medium; it is the *single property* for itself. Taken this way, however, the property is neither a property nor a determinate being, for it is now neither in a one nor in relation to others. Yet it is a property only in a one, and determinate only in relation to others. As this pure relating of itself to itself, it remains merely *sensuous being* in general, since it no longer has the character of negativity in it. And the consciousness for which there is now a sensuous being is merely *meaning*; that is, it has gone entirely out of perceiving and back into itself. But sensuous being and meaning themselves pass over into perceiving. I am thrown back to the beginning and dragged once more into the same circuit, which sublates itself in each of its moments and as a whole.

PERCEPTION CORRECTS ITSELF

Consciousness blames itself for the thing's contradictions, then ascribes them to the thing instead.

118 Consciousness therefore necessarily runs through this circuit again, but at the same time not in the same way as the first time. For it has had the experience, regarding perceiving, that the res-

ult and the truth of perceiving is its dissolution, or reflection into itself out of the true. What has thereby become determinate for consciousness is how its perceiving is essentially constituted: not as simple, pure apprehending, but as being, *in its apprehending*, at the same time *reflected out* of the true *into itself*. This return of consciousness into itself *intrudes* immediately into pure apprehending—for it has shown itself to be essential to perceiving—and it alters the true. At the same time consciousness recognizes this side as its own and takes it upon itself; in this way it will keep the true object pure.—So now, as happened with sense-certainty, perceiving has a side in which consciousness is driven back into itself. But at first this is not in the sense it had there, as if the *truth* of perceiving fell into consciousness. Rather, consciousness recognizes that it is the *untruth* occurring in perceiving that falls into it. Through this recognition, however, it is also able to sublate this untruth. It distinguishes its apprehending of the true from the untruth of its perceiving and corrects the latter. And insofar as it undertakes this correction itself, the truth, as truth of *perceiving*, does indeed fall *within consciousness*. The conduct of consciousness now to be considered is therefore such that consciousness no longer merely perceives but is also conscious of its reflection into itself, and separates this reflection from simple apprehension itself.

[119] So I first become aware of the thing as a *One*, and I have to hold it fast in this true determination. If anything contradicting this comes up in the movement of perceiving, it is to be recognized as my reflection. Now in perception various properties also come up, which seem to be properties of the thing. But the thing is a One, and we are conscious that this diversity, through which it would cease to be a One, falls in us. So in fact this thing is white only to *our* eye, *also* sharp to *our* tongue, *also* cubical to *our* touch, and so on. We take the complete diversity of these sides not from the thing but from ourselves. They fall apart for us in this way because our eye is quite distinct from our tongue, and so on. We are thus the *universal medium* in which such moments separate from one another and are each for itself. By

regarding the determinateness of being a universal medium as our reflection, we therefore preserve the self-equality and truth of the thing: its being a One.

120 These *various sides* that consciousness takes upon itself, however, are each *determinate* when considered for itself as situated in the universal medium. White is white only in opposition to black, and so on; and the thing is a One precisely by opposing itself to others. But the thing does not exclude others from itself insofar as it is a One—for being a One is the universal relating of itself to itself, and by being a One the thing is rather like all others. It excludes them through its *determinateness*. The things themselves are therefore determinate *in and for themselves*; they have properties through which they distinguish themselves from others. Since the *property* is the *proper* property of the thing, or a determinateness in the thing itself, the thing has *several* properties. For, first, the thing is the true; it is *in itself*; and what is in it is in it as its own essence, not for the sake of others. So, second, the determinate properties are not only for the sake of other things and for other things, but in the thing itself. Yet they are determinate properties *in it* only insofar as they are several, distinguishing themselves from one another. And third, since they are in this way in thinghood, they are in and for themselves and indifferent to one another. In truth, then, it is the thing itself that is white, and *also* cubical, *also* sharp, and so on. In other words, the thing is the *Also*, the *universal medium* in which the many properties subsist outside one another without touching or sublating one another. Taken in this way, the thing is taken as the true.

121 In this perceiving, consciousness is at the same time conscious that it *also* reflects itself into itself, and that in perceiving the moment opposed to the *Also* comes up. This moment, however, is the *unity* of the thing with itself, a unity that excludes difference from itself. It is therefore this unity that consciousness has to take upon itself, for the thing itself is the *subsisting of the many different* and *independent properties*. So it is said of the thing: *it is* white, *also* cubical, and also sharp, and so on. But

insofar as it is white, it is not cubical; and *insofar as* it is cubical and also white, it is not sharp, and so on. The *putting into one* of these properties belongs only to consciousness, which therefore must not let them fall into one in the thing. To this end it brings in the *Insofar*, by which it keeps the properties apart and keeps the thing as the Also. Consciousness takes *oneness* upon itself in the full and proper sense only when what was called a property is represented as a *free matter*. In this way the thing is raised to a genuine *Also*: it becomes a collection of matters and, instead of being a One, a merely enclosing surface.

122 Let us look back at what consciousness previously took upon itself and now takes upon itself, at what it previously ascribed to the thing and now ascribes to it. It turns out that consciousness alternately makes both itself and the thing into each of two things: into the pure *One* without multiplicity, and into an *Also* dissolved into independent matters. Through this comparison, then, consciousness finds that it is not only *its* taking of the true that contains the *diversity of apprehending* and *of returning into itself*. Rather, the true itself, the thing, shows itself in this twofold way. Here, then, is the experience that the thing *presents itself* in a determinate way *for* the apprehending *consciousness*, but that *at the same time* it is *reflected out of* the way in which it offers itself and *into itself*—in other words, that it has in itself an opposed truth.

123 Consciousness has thus left behind this second way of conducting itself in perceiving as well—the way of taking the thing as the true, the self-equal, and itself as the unequal, as what returns out of equality into itself. The object is now for consciousness this whole movement, which was previously divided between the object and consciousness. The thing is a *One*, reflected into itself; it is *for itself*; but it is also *for an other*; and indeed it is *something other* for itself *than it is* for an other. Accordingly the thing is for itself and *also* for an other, a *twofold*, diverse being; but it is *also One*. Its being one, however, contradicts this diversity of its own. So consciousness would once more have to take this putting-into-one upon itself and keep it away from the

thing. It would thus have to say that the thing, *insofar as* it is for itself, is not for an other. But oneness also belongs to the thing itself, as consciousness has experienced: the thing is essentially reflected into itself. The *Also*, or indifferent difference, therefore does fall into the thing just as much as *oneness* does. But since the two are different, they fall not into the same thing but into *different* things. The contradiction present in the objective essence as such is distributed between two objects. So the thing is indeed in and for itself, equal to itself; but this unity with itself is disturbed by other things. In this way the unity of the thing is preserved, and at the same time otherness is preserved outside it, as well as outside consciousness.

[124] Now although the contradiction of the objective essence is in this way distributed among different things, difference will nevertheless reach the separated individual thing itself. The *different things* are thus posited *for themselves*, and the conflict falls into them reciprocally, so that each is different not from itself but only from the other. But each is thereby itself determined *as something different* and has its essential difference from the others *in itself*—though not in such a way that this would be an opposition within itself. Rather, each is for itself a *simple determinateness*, which constitutes its *essential* character, distinguishing it from others. In fact, since diversity is in the thing, this diversity is necessarily present in it as an *actual* difference of manifold characteristics. But since the determinateness constitutes the *essence* of the thing, through which it distinguishes itself from others and is for itself, this otherwise manifold constitution is the *inessential*. So the thing does have the *twofold Insofar* within its unity, but with *unequal value*. Because of this, its being opposed does not become an actual opposition of the thing itself. Rather, insofar as the thing comes into opposition through its *absolute difference*, it has this opposition over against another thing outside it. The rest of the manifoldness is, it is true, also necessarily in the thing, so that it cannot stay away from it; but it is *inessential* to the thing.

[125] This determinateness, which constitutes the essential character of the thing and distinguishes it from all others, is now so determined that through it the thing stands in opposition to others, yet is supposed to preserve itself for itself in this opposition. But the thing is a thing, or a One that is for itself, only insofar as it does not stand in this relation to others. For what is posited in this relation is rather connection with an other, and connection with an other is the end of being-for-self. It is precisely through its *absolute character* and its opposition that the thing *relates* itself to *others*, and it is essentially nothing but this relating. But the relation is the negation of its independence; and so the thing rather perishes through its essential property.

[126] The necessity of this experience for consciousness—that the thing perishes precisely through the determinateness that constitutes its essence and its being-for-self—can be briefly considered, in terms of the simple concept, as follows. The thing is posited as *being-for-self*, or as the absolute negation of all otherness; hence as absolute negation relating itself only to itself. But negation relating itself to itself is the sublating *of itself*, or having its essence in an other.

[127] In fact, the determination of the object as it has emerged contains nothing else. The object is supposed to have an essential property that constitutes its simple being-for-self, and yet, along with this simplicity, also to have diversity in itself—a diversity that is supposed to be *necessary* but not to constitute its *essential* determinateness. But this is a distinction that still lies only in words. The *inessential*, which is nevertheless supposed to be *necessary* at the same time, sublates itself; it is what was just now called the negation of itself.

[128] With this, the last *Insofar*, which separated being-for-self from being-for-an-other, falls away. Rather, the object is *in one and the same respect the opposite of itself: for itself insofar as it is for an other*, and *for an other insofar as it is for itself*. It is *for itself*, reflected into itself, One. But this being *for itself*, reflected into itself, One, is in a unity with its opposite, *being for an other*, and is therefore posited only as sublated. In other words, this *being-*

for-self is just as *inessential* as what alone was supposed to be the inessential, namely the relation to an other.

129 The object is thereby sublated in its pure determinatenesses, the determinatenesses that were supposed to constitute its essentiality, just as it was sublated in its sensuous being. From sensuous being it becomes a universal. But since this universal *comes from the sensuous*, it is essentially *conditioned* by the sensuous. It is therefore not a genuinely self-equal universality at all, but a universality *affected with an opposition*; and for that reason it splits into the extremes of singularity and universality, of the One of the properties and the Also of the free matters. These pure determinatenesses seem to express *essentiality* itself, but they are only a *being-for-self* burdened with *being for an other*. Since, however, the two are essentially *in a unity*, unconditioned absolute universality is now present, and here for the first time consciousness genuinely enters the realm of the understanding.

130 Sensuous singularity, then, does vanish in the dialectical movement of immediate certainty and becomes universality—but only *sensuous universality*. Meaning has vanished, and perceiving takes the object as *it is in itself*, or as a universal in general. Singularity therefore emerges in the object as true singularity, as the *being-in-itself* of the *One*, or as *being reflected into* itself. But it is still a *conditioned* being-for-self, *alongside which* another being-for-self appears: universality, which is opposed to singularity and conditioned by it. These two contradictory extremes, however, are not merely *alongside each other* but in a single unity. Or, what is the same thing, what they have in common, *being-for-self*, is burdened with opposition as such—that is, it is at the same time not a *being-for-self*. The sophistry of perception tries to save these moments from their contradiction and to hold them fast by distinguishing *respects*, by the *Also* and the *Insofar*, and finally to grasp the true by distinguishing the *inessential* from an *essence* opposed to it. But these expedients, instead of warding off deception in apprehending, prove rather to be null themselves. And the true that this logic of perception is supposed to win shows itself to be, in one and the same

respect, the opposite, and thus to have as its essence universality without distinction or determination.

THE SOPHISTRY OF COMMON SENSE

The perceiving understanding is driven back and forth between empty abstractions it takes for solid reality.

131 These empty abstractions—of *singularity* and of the *universality* opposed to it, of the *essence* that is linked with something inessential, and of an *inessential* that is nevertheless necessary—are the powers whose play is the perceiving understanding, often called sound common sense. This understanding, which takes itself to be solid, real consciousness, is in perceiving only the play of *these abstractions*. In general it is always poorest where it thinks itself richest. Driven about by these null essences, thrown from the arms of one into those of the other, it strives through its sophistry to hold fast and assert now one thing and then its exact opposite, and so resists the truth—and it thinks that philosophy deals only with *things of thought*. Philosophy does indeed deal with them too, and it recognizes them as the pure essences, the absolute elements and powers. But in doing so it also recognizes them *in their determinateness*, and is therefore master over them; whereas the perceiving understanding takes them for the true and is sent by them from one error into another. The understanding itself does not become conscious that it is such simple essentialities that hold sway in it. It always thinks it is dealing with thoroughly solid material and content—just as sense-certainty does not know that the empty abstraction of pure being is its essence. But in fact it is these essentialities along which the understanding runs, this way and that, through all its material and content. They are what holds that material together and governs it; they alone are what the sensuous is *as essence* for consciousness, what determines the relations of the sensuous to consciousness, and that in which the movement of perceiving and of its true runs its course. This course—a constantly alternating determining of the

true and sublating of that determining—really makes up the everyday, constant life and activity of perceiving consciousness, the consciousness that thinks it moves within the truth. In this course it advances relentlessly to the result in which all these essential essentialities or determinations are equally sublated. But in each single moment it is conscious only of this *one determinateness* as the true, and then again of the opposite one. It does indeed scent their lack of essence; and to save them from the threatening danger it resorts to sophistry, now asserting as true what it had itself just asserted to be untrue. What the nature of these untrue essences is really trying to drive this understanding toward is to *bring together* the *thoughts* of these non-essences —the thoughts of that *universality* and *singularity*, of the *Also* and the *One*, of that *essentiality* which is *necessarily* linked with an *inessentiality*, and of an *inessential* that is nevertheless necessary —and by doing so to sublate them. This the understanding resists by leaning on the props of the *Insofar* and the various *respects*, or by taking one thought upon itself in order to keep the other separate and as the true one. But the nature of these abstractions brings them together in and for themselves. Sound understanding is their prey; they drive it round and round in their whirling circle. The understanding tries to give them truth by now taking their untruth upon itself, now calling the deception a semblance belonging to the unreliable things, and by separating the essential from something that is necessary to them yet supposed to be inessential, holding the former fast as their truth against the latter. In doing so it does not preserve their truth for them; it only gives itself untruth.

FORCE AND THE UNDERSTANDING

Consciousness reaches the unconditioned universal and grasps it first as force.

132 In the dialectic of sense-certainty, consciousness has lost its hearing and seeing; and as perceiving it has arrived at thoughts, which, however, it first brings together in the unconditioned

universal. This unconditioned would itself, in turn, be nothing other than the *extreme* of *being-for-self* stepping off to one side, if it were taken as a simple essence at rest; for then the non-essence would confront it. But in relation to that non-essence it would itself be inessential, and consciousness would not have got out of the deception of perception. The unconditioned, however, has turned out to be something that has returned into itself out of such a conditioned being-for-self.[6] — This unconditioned universal, which is now the true object of consciousness, is still an *object* of consciousness; it has not yet grasped its *Concept* as *Concept*. The two must be essentially distinguished. For consciousness, the object has returned into itself out of its relation to an other and has thereby become the Concept *in itself*. But consciousness is not yet the Concept for itself, and therefore it does not recognize itself in that reflected object. *For us*, this object has come about through the movement of consciousness in such a way that consciousness is interwoven in the object's becoming, and the reflection on both sides is the same, or is only one reflection. But because in this movement consciousness had only the objective essence as its content, not consciousness as such, the result must be posited for it in an objective sense. Consciousness still steps back from what has come to be, so that this, as something objective, is for it the essence.

133 The understanding has thereby sublated its own untruth and the untruth of the object; and what has come to be for it through this is the concept of the true. It is the true as being *in itself*, which is not yet Concept, which lacks the *being-for-self* of consciousness, and which the understanding lets go its own way without knowing itself in it. This true pursues its essence for itself, so that consciousness has no share in its free realization but merely looks on and purely apprehends it. For the time being, therefore, *we* still have to step into its place and be the Concept that develops what is contained in the result. Only in this fully developed object, which presents itself to conscious-

6 Hegel takes literally the idiom *jemandem vergeht Hören und Sehen*, "to be stunned," literally "to lose one's hearing and seeing."

ness as something that is, does consciousness become comprehending consciousness.

134 The result was the unconditioned universal, at first in the negative and abstract sense that consciousness negated its one-sided concepts and abstracted from them—that is, gave them up. But in itself the result has the positive meaning that in it the unity of *being-for-self* and *being-for-an-other*, or absolute opposition, is immediately posited as one and the same essence. At first this seems to concern only the form of the moments in relation to one another. But being-for-self and being-for-an-other are just as much the *content* itself. For opposition in its truth can have no other nature than the one that emerged in the result: namely, that the content held to be true in perception in fact belongs only to the form and dissolves into its unity. This content is at the same time universal; there can be no other content that, through its particular constitution, would escape returning into this unconditioned universality. Such a content would be some determinate way of being for itself and of relating to an other. But *being for itself* and *relating to an other as such* constitute the *nature* and *essence* of such a content, and their truth is to be unconditionally universal; so the result is simply universal.

135 But because this unconditioned universal is an object for consciousness, the distinction of form and content emerges in it. In the shape of content, the moments have the appearance in which they first presented themselves: on the one hand, a universal medium of many subsisting matters; on the other, a One reflected into itself, in which their independence is obliterated. The former is the dissolution of the thing's independence, or the passivity that is a being for an other; the latter is being-for-self. We have to see how these moments present themselves in the unconditioned universality that is their essence. It is clear, first of all, that because they exist only in this universality, they no longer lie apart from each other at all. They are essentially sides that sublate themselves in themselves, and all that is posited is their passing over into each other.

136 The one moment thus appears as the essence that has stepped to one side, as universal medium, or as the subsisting of independent matters. But the *independence* of these matters is nothing other than this medium; or this *universal* is altogether the *multiplicity* of such different universals. That the universal is in itself in undivided unity with this multiplicity means that these matters are each where the other is: they interpenetrate one another—but without touching, because, conversely, the many distinct matters are just as independent. With this, their pure porosity, or their being sublated, is also posited. This being sublated, in turn, or the reduction of this diversity to pure *being-for-self*, is nothing other than the medium itself; and the medium is the *independence* of the differences. In other words, the matters posited as independent pass immediately over into their unity, their unity passes immediately over into unfolding, and the unfolding passes back again into reduction. This movement, however, is what is called *force*. One moment of it, force as the spreading out of the independent matters in their being, is its *expression*. Force as the having-vanished of those matters is force *driven back* into itself out of its expression, or *force proper*. But, first, force driven back into itself *must* express itself; and second, in its expression it is just as much force that is *within* itself as it is expression in this being-within-itself.[7] — 137 Since we thus keep both moments in their immediate unity, it is really the understanding, to which the concept of force belongs, that is *the concept* bearing the distinct moments as distinct; for *in force itself* they are not supposed to be distinct. The difference is therefore only in thought.—Or: in what has been said so far, only the concept of force has been posited, not its reality. In fact, however, force is the unconditioned universal, which is in itself just what it is *for an other*; or which has difference in itself—for difference is nothing other than being-for-*an-other*. For force to be in its truth, then, it must be left entirely free of thought and posited as the substance of these differences. That means, *first*, that

7 "Expression" renders Äußerung (literally an outward manifestation or utterance), a word related to Entäußerung, "externalization."

force, as this whole force, remains essentially *in and for itself*; and *second*, that its *differences* are *substantial*, moments subsisting for themselves. Force as such, or as driven back into itself, is thus for itself an *excluding* One, for which the unfolding of the matters is an *other subsisting essence*; and so two distinct, independent sides are posited. But force is also the whole, or it remains what it is according to its concept; that is, these *differences* remain pure forms, superficial *vanishing moments*. *The differences* between force proper, driven *back* into itself, and the *unfolding* of the independent matters would at the same time not exist at all if they had no *subsistence*; or force would not be if it did not *exist* in this opposed way. But "force exists in this opposed way" means nothing other than that both moments are themselves at the same time *independent*.—It is this movement, then, that must be considered: the two moments constantly making themselves independent and sublating themselves again.—It is clear in general that this movement is nothing other than the movement of perceiving. There the two sides, the perceiving and the perceived, are at once one and undistinguished as the *apprehending* of the true, while each side is just as much *reflected* into itself, or for itself. Here these two sides are moments of force. They are just as much in a unity as this unity—which appears as the middle over against the extremes that are for themselves—constantly splits apart into just these extremes, which exist only through this splitting.—The movement that earlier presented itself as the self-annihilation of contradictory concepts thus has an *objective* form here. It is the movement of force, and its result is the unconditioned universal emerging as something *non-objective*, as the *inner* of things.

138 Force, as it has been determined, when it is represented as *such*, or as *reflected into itself*, is one side of its concept—but as a substantialized extreme, specifically the one posited under the determinateness of the One. The *subsistence* of the unfolded matters is thereby excluded from force and is *something other* than it. Since it is necessary that force *itself* be this *subsistence*, or that it *express* itself, its expression is represented as *that other coming*

to it and soliciting it. But in fact, since force *necessarily* expresses itself, it has within itself what was posited as another essence.[8] We must retract the view that force was posited as *a One*, and its essence—to express itself—as an other coming to it from outside. Rather, force is itself this universal medium in which the moments subsist as matters; or *it has expressed itself*, and what was supposed to be the other that solicits it is rather force itself. So force now exists as the medium of the unfolded matters. But it has, just as essentially, the form of the sublatedness of the subsisting matters; it is essentially *One*. Since *force* is now posited as the medium of matters, this *being-One* is *now something other than force*, and force has this essence of its own outside itself. But since force must necessarily be what it is *not yet* posited as being, *this other comes to it* and solicits it to reflection into itself, or sublates its expression. In fact, however, *force itself* is this being-reflected-into-itself, this sublatedness of expression. The being-One vanishes *as* it appeared, namely as *an other*; *force is itself that oneness*; it is force driven back into itself.

What comes forward as an other and solicits force both to expression and to return into itself is, as is immediately evident, *itself force*. For the other shows itself just as much as universal medium as it does as One, and in such a way that each of these shapes appears at the same time only as a vanishing moment. So force, by there being an other for it and by its being for an other, has not yet stepped outside its concept at all. At the same time, however, two forces are present. The concept of both is indeed the same, but it has gone out of its unity into duality. Instead of the opposition remaining wholly and essentially only a moment, it seems, through this division into entirely *independent forces*, to have withdrawn from the rule of unity. What this independence really amounts to must be examined more closely. First, the second force comes forward as the soliciting force—and, as regards its content, as universal medium—over against the force determined as solicited. But since the second

8 "Solicit" renders sollicitieren, a term from the natural philosophy of the time for one force calling forth, or inciting, the expression of another.

force is essentially the alternation of these two moments and is itself force, it is in fact likewise universal medium *only when it is solicited to be so*; and likewise it is negative unity, or what solicits force to return into itself, only *through being solicited*. So this difference between the two—that the one was supposed to be the *soliciting* force and the other the *solicited*—is also transformed into the same exchange of determinatenesses with one another.

THE PLAY OF FORCES

Two forces solicit each other, and each turns into what the other was.

139 The play of the two forces therefore consists in this: their being determined in opposite ways, their being for each other in this determination, and the absolute, immediate interchange of the determinations—a transition through which alone there are these determinations in which the forces seem to come forward *independently*. The soliciting force, for example, is posited as universal medium, and the solicited, by contrast, as force driven back into itself. But the former is universal medium only because the other is force driven back into itself; or rather, the latter is what solicits the former and first makes it the medium. The former has its determinateness only through the other, and is soliciting only insofar as it is solicited by the other to be soliciting. And it loses this determinateness given to it just as immediately, for the determinateness passes over to the other, or rather has already passed over to it. The alien force that solicits the force comes forward as universal medium, but only because it has been solicited to do so by that force. This means, however, that *the force posits* it in this way and *is* rather *itself essentially* universal medium. It posits the soliciting force in this way because this other determination is essential to *it*—that is, because *it is rather that determination itself*.

140 To complete our insight into the concept of this movement, we may also point out that the differences themselves show themselves in a twofold difference. *Once* as differences *of content*, in that one extreme is force reflected into itself and the

other the medium of the matters; and *again* as differences of *form*, in that the one is soliciting and the other solicited, the former active and the latter passive. According to the difference of content they *are* distinct in general, or for us; but according to the difference of form they are independent, separating themselves from one another in their relation and opposed to each other. That the extremes, in both of these respects, are thus nothing *in themselves*, and that these respects, in which their distinct essence was supposed to consist, are only vanishing moments, an immediate passing of each into its opposite—this comes to be for consciousness in its perception of the movement of force. For us, however, as was pointed out above, there was also this: that in themselves the differences vanished as *differences of content and of form*. On the side of form, the *active*, *soliciting*, or *for-itself* was in essence the same as what, on the side of content, presented itself as force driven back into itself. And the passive, *solicited*, or for-an-other, on the side of form, was the same as what, on the side of content, presented itself as the universal medium of the many matters.

141 It follows from this that the concept of force becomes *actual* through its doubling into two forces, and it shows how it becomes so. These two forces exist as beings that are for themselves. But their existence is a movement of each against the other of such a kind that their *being* is instead a pure *being-posited by an other*; that is, their being has instead the pure significance of *vanishing*. They are not like extremes that keep something fixed for themselves and merely send an external property toward each other into the middle, where they touch. Rather, what they are, they are only in this middle and this contact. In this middle and contact, then, there is immediately present both force's being driven back into itself, its *being-for-self*, and its expression; both soliciting and being solicited. These moments are therefore not distributed between two independent extremes that merely offer each other opposite points. Their essence is simply this: each is only through the other, and in being what it thus is through the other, each immediately ceases

to be it. So in fact they have no substances of their own to support and preserve them. The *concept* of force instead preserves itself as *the essence* in its very *actuality*. *Force as actual* exists purely and simply in its *expression*, and this expression is at the same time nothing other than a sublating of itself. If this *actual* force is represented as free of its expression and as being for itself, it is force driven back into itself. But this determinateness, as has turned out, is in fact itself only a moment of *expression*. The truth of force thus remains only the *thought* of it. The moments of its actuality, their substances and their movement, collapse with nothing to hold them into an undifferentiated unity. This unity is not force driven back into itself, for that is itself only one such moment; rather, this unity is *its concept, as concept*. The realization of force is thus at the same time the loss of reality. In this realization force has instead become something quite other, namely this *universality*, which the understanding first, or immediately, recognizes as force's essence, and which also proves to be its essence in what was supposed to be its reality, in the actual substances.

142 If we regard *the first* universal as the *concept* of the understanding, in which force is not yet for itself, then the second is now force's *essence* as it presents itself *in* and *for itself*. Or, conversely, if we regard the first universal as the *immediate*, which was supposed to be an *actual* object for consciousness, then this second universal is determined as the *negative* of force as a sensuous object. It is force as it is in its true essence, only as *object of the understanding*. The first would be force driven back into itself, or force as substance; but this second is the *inner* of things *as inner*, which is the same as the concept as concept.

APPEARANCE AND THE SUPERSENSIBLE BEYOND

Through the play of forces the understanding looks into the inner of things, at first an empty beyond.

143 This true essence of things has now become determined in such a way that it is not immediately for consciousness. Instead,

consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner and, as understanding, *looks through this middle term, the play of forces, into the true background of things*. The middle term that joins the two extremes, the understanding and the inner, is the developed *being* of force, which for the understanding itself is now a *vanishing*. That is why it is called *appearance*; for we call *being* that is immediately, in itself, a *non-being* mere seeming. But it is not merely a seeming; it is appearance, a *whole* of seeming. This *whole* as whole or as *universal* is what constitutes the *inner*: the *play of forces* as the *reflection* of that play into itself.[9] In it the essences of perception are *posited* for consciousness, in an objective way, as they are in themselves: namely, as moments that turn immediately into their opposite, without rest or being —the One immediately into the universal, the essential immediately into the inessential, and vice versa. This play of forces is therefore the developed negative; but its truth is the positive, namely the *universal*, the object that is *in itself*. — The *being* of this object *for* consciousness is mediated through the movement of *appearance*. In this movement the *being of perception*, and the sensuously objective in general, have only negative significance. Consciousness therefore reflects itself out of them into itself as into the true. But, as consciousness, it again makes this true into an objective *inner*, and distinguishes this reflection of things from its own reflection into itself—just as the mediating movement is likewise still an objective one for it. This inner is therefore, for consciousness, an extreme set over against it. But it is the true for consciousness because in the inner, as in the *in-itself*, consciousness at the same time has the certainty of itself, or the moment of its being-for-self. Consciousness is not yet aware of this ground, however. For the *being-for-self* that the inner was supposed to have in itself would be nothing other than the negative movement; but for consciousness this movement is still the *objective*, vanishing appearance, not yet its *own* being-for-self. The inner is therefore indeed concept for con-

9 Hegel plays on Schein (seeming, show, semblance) and Erscheinung (appearance): appearance is seeming taken as a whole.

sciousness, but consciousness does not yet know the nature of the concept.

144 In this *inner truth*, as the *absolutely universal*, which has been purified of the *opposition* between universal and singular and has come to be *for the understanding*, there now opens up for the first time, above the *sensuous* world as the *world of appearance*, a *supersensible* world as the *true* world: above the vanishing *here-below*, the enduring *beyond*. This is an in-itself which is the first and therefore itself imperfect appearance of reason, or only the pure element in which the truth has its *essence*.

145 *Our object* is thus now the syllogism whose extremes are the inner of things and the understanding, and whose middle term is appearance. The movement of this syllogism, however, yields the further determination of what the understanding sees in the inner through the middle term, and the experience the understanding has of this relationship of being joined together.[10]

146 The inner is still a *pure beyond* for consciousness, because consciousness does not yet find itself in it. It is *empty*, for it is only the nothingness of appearance and, positively, the simple universal. This way of being of the inner immediately agrees with those who say that the inner of things cannot be known; but the reason for this would have to be conceived differently.[11] Of this inner as it immediately is here, there is certainly no knowledge. But this is not because reason is too short-sighted, or limited, or whatever else one wants to call it—about that nothing is known here yet, for we have not yet penetrated so deep. It is because of the simple nature of the matter itself: namely, because nothing is cognized in what is *empty*; or, put from the other side, because the inner is determined precisely as the *beyond* of consciousness. — The result is admittedly the same whether a blind person is placed amid the riches of the supersensible world—if it has any, whether they are its own peculiar content or consciousness itself is this content—or a

10 Schluß, "syllogism": for Hegel, any structure in which two extremes are joined through a middle term.

11 Hegel has in mind Kant's doctrine that things in themselves cannot be known.

sighted person is placed in pure darkness, or, if you like, in pure light, if that is all the supersensible world is. The sighted person sees as little in that pure light as in that pure darkness, and just as much as the blind person sees in the abundance of riches that might lie before them. If there were nothing more to the inner, and to being joined together with it through appearance, then nothing would be left but to cling to appearance—that is, to take as true something we know is not true. Or else there is the empty. It first came about as the emptiness of objective things, but *as emptiness in itself* it must also be taken as the emptiness of all spiritual relationships and of the differences of consciousness as consciousness. So that there might after all be something in this *utterly empty*, which is also called the *holy*, one would have to fill it with daydreams, *appearances* that consciousness generates for itself. The empty would have to put up with being treated so badly, for it would deserve nothing better, since even daydreams are better than its emptiness.

147 But the inner, or the supersensible beyond, has *come about*: it *comes* from appearance, and appearance is its mediation. In other words, *appearance is its essence*, and in fact its filling. The supersensible is the sensuous and perceived posited as it is in *truth*; but the *truth* of the *sensuous* and perceived is to be *appearance*. The supersensible is therefore *appearance* as *appearance*.—If this is taken to mean that the supersensible is *therefore* the sensuous world, or the world as it is *for immediate sense-certainty and perception*, that is to understand it the wrong way round. For appearance is, on the contrary, *not* the world of sensuous knowing and perceiving as a world that simply is; it is that world posited *as sublated*, or in truth *as inner*. It is often said that the supersensible is *not* appearance. But what is meant here by appearance is not appearance but rather the *sensuous* world taken as itself real actuality.

148 The understanding, which is our object, finds itself at exactly this point: the inner has only just come to be for it as the universal, still unfilled *in-itself*. For the understanding, the play of forces has only this negative significance of not being in itself,

and only this positive significance of being the *mediating* element, but one outside the understanding. Its relation to the inner through mediation, however, is its movement, through which the inner will fill itself for it.—What is *immediately* for the understanding is the play of forces; but *the true* for it is the simple inner. The movement of force is therefore likewise the true only as something *simple* in general. But we have seen that this play of forces has this character: the force that is *solicited* by another force is equally the *soliciting* force for that other, which itself becomes soliciting only through this. Here too, then, there is present only the immediate alternation, the absolute interchange, of the *determinateness* that makes up the sole *content* of what comes on the scene: to be either universal medium or negative unity. In its determinate coming on the scene, what comes on the scene immediately ceases to be what it comes on as. Through its determinate appearance it solicits the other side, which thereby *expresses* itself; that is, the other side is now immediately what the first was supposed to be. These two sides —the *relation* of soliciting and the *relation* of determinate, opposed content—are *each for itself* absolute inversion and interchange. But these two relations are themselves in turn the same. The difference of *form*, being the solicited and being the soliciting, is the same as the difference of *content*: the solicited as such, namely the passive medium, and the soliciting, on the other hand, the active, the negative unity or the One. As a result, all difference between the *particular forces* that were supposed to be present in this movement vanishes altogether; for they rested solely on those differences. And the difference of the forces likewise collapses, together with those two, into just one. Thus neither force, nor soliciting and being solicited, nor the determinateness of being a subsisting medium and a unity reflected into itself, is anything on its own, individually; nor are they different opposites. Rather, what there is in this absolute alternation is only *difference as universal*, that is, a difference into which the many opposites have been reduced. This *difference as univer-*

sal is therefore *what is simple in the play of force itself*, and its truth. It is the *law of force*.

THE TRANQUIL REALM OF LAWS

Law is the stable image of unstable appearance, and the many laws are unified into one.

149 The absolutely alternating appearance becomes *simple difference* through its relation to the simplicity of the inner, or of the understanding. The inner is at first only the universal in itself. But this *universal*, simple in itself, is essentially and just as absolutely the *universal difference*; for it is the result of the alternation itself, or the alternation is its essence. But it is the alternation as posited in the inner, as it is in truth, and hence taken up into the inner as an equally absolutely universal, stilled, self-identical difference. Or: negation is an essential moment of the universal, and negation, or mediation, in the universal is therefore *universal difference*. This difference is expressed in *law*, as the *stable* image of unstable appearance. The *supersensible* world is thus a *tranquil realm of laws*. It lies beyond the perceived world, for the perceived world presents law only through constant change; but it is equally *present* in that world, and is its immediate, still image.

150 This realm of laws is indeed the truth of the understanding, a truth that has its *content* in the difference that is in law. But at the same time it is only the understanding's *first truth*, and it does not fill out appearance. Law is present in appearance, but it is not its whole presence; under ever different circumstances it has an ever different actuality. Appearance thus retains *for itself* a side that is not in the inner; in other words, it is not yet in truth posited as *appearance*, as *sublated* being-for-self. This deficiency of law must equally come to light in law itself. What law seems to lack is this: it does have difference itself within it, but as universal, indeterminate difference. But insofar as it is not *the* law as such but *a* law, it has determinateness within it; and so there are indefinitely *many* laws. Yet this plurality is itself rather

a deficiency; for it contradicts the principle of the understanding, for which, as consciousness of the simple inner, the *unity* that is universal in itself is the true. The understanding must therefore instead let the many laws collapse into *one* law—as, for example, the law by which a stone falls and the law by which the heavenly spheres move have been grasped as *one* law.[12] With this collapse into one another, however, the laws lose their determinateness. The law becomes ever more superficial, and what has been found is in fact not the unity of *these determinate* laws but a law that leaves out their determinateness—just as the one law that unites within itself the laws of bodies falling on earth and of celestial motion does not in fact express either of them. The unification of all laws in *universal attraction* expresses no content beyond the *mere concept of law itself*, which is posited in it as *being*. Universal attraction says only this: that *everything has a constant difference* in relation to *other things*. The understanding supposes that in this it has found a universal law that expresses universal actuality *as such*. But in fact it has found only the *concept* of *law itself*—though in such a way that it thereby also declares that *all* actuality is lawful *in itself*. The expression *universal attraction* is therefore of great importance insofar as it is directed against thoughtless *representational thinking*, to which everything presents itself in the shape of contingency and for which determinateness has the form of sensuous independence.

151 Standing over against the determinate laws, then, is universal attraction, or the pure concept of law. Insofar as this pure concept is regarded as the essence, or as the true inner, the *determinateness* of the determinate law itself still belongs to appearance, or rather to sensuous being. But the pure *concept* of law goes beyond not only the law that, being itself *determinate*, stands over against *other determinate* laws; it also goes beyond *law* as such. The determinateness we were speaking of is really itself only a vanishing moment, which can no longer figure here as an essentiality; for only law is present as the true. But the

12 An allusion to Newton's theory of universal gravitation, which unified Galileo's laws of terrestrial fall with Kepler's laws of planetary motion.

concept of law is turned against *law* itself. For in law, difference itself is grasped *immediately* and taken up into the universal—but with that there is also a *subsisting* of the moments whose relation law expresses, as indifferent essentialities that are in themselves. These parts of the difference in law, however, are at the same time themselves determinate sides. The pure concept of law, as universal attraction, must be grasped in its true meaning in such a way that in it, as something absolutely *simple*, the *differences* present in law *as such* themselves *go back again into the inner as simple unity*. This unity is the inner *necessity* of law.

152 Law is thereby present in a twofold way. On the one hand it is present as law in which the differences are expressed as independent moments. On the other it is present in the form of *simple* having-gone-back-into-itself, which can again be called *force*—but in such a way that it is not force driven back into itself but force in general, or force as the concept of force: an abstraction that draws into itself the differences between what attracts and what is attracted. Thus, for example, *simple* electricity is *force*; but the expression of difference falls within *law*, and this difference is positive and negative electricity. In the motion of falling, *force* is the simple element, *gravity*, which has the *law* that the magnitudes of the distinct moments of the motion, the elapsed *time* and the traversed *space*, are related to each other as root and square. Electricity itself is not difference in itself; it is not in its essence the twofold essence of positive and negative electricity. That is why it is customary to say that it *has* the law of *being* in this way, or also that it *has the property* of expressing itself thus. This property is indeed the essential and sole property of this force; in other words, it is *necessary* to it. But necessity is here an empty word: the force *must* double itself in this way just *because* it *must*.[13] Of course, if *positive* electricity is posited, *negative* electricity is also necessary *in itself*; for the *positive* is only as relation to a *negative*, or the positive is *in itself* the difference from itself, just as the negative is. But that electricity as

13 Galileo's law of free fall: the distance a falling body covers is proportional to the square of the time elapsed.

such should divide itself in this way is not what is necessary in itself. As *simple force* it is indifferent to its law of *being* positive and negative. If we call the former its concept and the latter its being, then its concept is indifferent to its being. It merely *has* this property—which means precisely that the property is not necessary to it *in itself*. — This indifference takes on another shape when it is said that it belongs to the *definition* of electricity to be positive and negative, or that this is simply *its concept and essence*. Its being would then mean *its existence* in general. But that definition does not contain the *necessity of its existence*. Either electricity exists because one *finds* it—which is to say that it is not necessary at all—or its existence comes about through other forces—which is to say that its necessity is external. But when necessity is placed in the determinateness of *being through another*, we fall back into the *plurality* of determinate laws that we have just left in order to consider *law* as law. Only with law as law can its *concept* as concept, or its necessity, be compared; but in all these forms necessity has shown itself to be still only an empty word.

153 The indifference of law and force, or of concept and being, is present in yet another way than the one indicated. In the law of motion, for example, it is necessary that motion *divide* itself into time and space, or else into distance and velocity. Since motion is only the relation of those moments, motion, the universal, is here indeed divided *in itself*. But these parts—time and space, or distance and velocity—do not express in themselves this origin from one. They are indifferent to one another: space is represented as able to be without time, time without space, and distance at least without velocity—just as their magnitudes are indifferent to one another, since they do not relate to each other *as positive* and *negative*, and hence are not related to one another through *their essence*. The necessity of the *division* is thus present here, but not the necessity of the *parts* as such for one another. For this very reason, however, that first necessity is itself only a sham, a false necessity. For motion is not itself represented as something *simple* or as pure essence, but as *already*

divided. Time and space are its *independent* parts, or *essences in their own right*; or distance and velocity are modes of being or of representing, one of which can well be without the other. Motion is therefore only their *superficial* relation, not their essence. Represented as simple essence, or as force, motion is indeed *gravity*; but gravity does not contain these differences within it at all.

154 In both cases, then, the difference is not a *difference in itself*. Either the universal, force, is indifferent to the division that is in law, or the differences, the parts of law, are indifferent to one another. The understanding, however, *has* the concept of *this difference in itself*, precisely in the fact that law is, on the one hand, the inner, what is *in itself*, but is at the same time *differentiated within itself*. That this difference is thus an *inner* difference lies in the fact that law is *simple* force, or is as its *concept*—hence a *difference of the concept*. But this inner difference as yet falls only *within the understanding*; it is not yet *posited in the thing itself*.

EXPLANATION

The understanding explains by distinguishing force from law, then declares the difference to be none.

What the understanding declares, then, is only its *own* necessity. It makes a difference, but only in such a way that it at the same time expresses that the difference is not a *difference of the thing itself*. This necessity, which lies only in the word, is thus the recital of the moments that make up its circle. They are indeed distinguished; but their difference is at the same time expressed as not being a difference of the thing itself, and is therefore itself immediately sublated again. This movement is called *explaining*. A *law* is stated; from it, its universal in itself, or its ground, is distinguished as *force*; but of this difference it is said that it is none, and that the ground is rather constituted exactly like the law. The individual event of lightning, for example, is apprehended as a universal, and this universal is stated as the *law* of electricity. The explanation then gathers the *law* together into *force*,

as the essence of the law. This force is then *so constituted* that, when it expresses itself, opposite electricities appear which again vanish into each other; that is, *the force is constituted exactly like the law*. It is said that the two are not distinct at all. The differences are the pure universal expression, or the law, and the pure force; but both have *the same* content, *the same* constitution. The difference as a difference of content, that is, of the *thing*, is therefore also taken back again.

155 In this tautological movement, as it turns out, the understanding sticks to the tranquil unity of its object, and the movement falls only within the understanding itself, not within the object. It is an explaining that not only explains nothing but is so clear that, while it makes as if to say something different from what has already been said, it instead says nothing and merely repeats the same thing. In the thing itself nothing new arises through this movement; the movement comes into consideration as a movement of the understanding. In it, however, we now recognize precisely what was missing in law, namely absolute alternation itself; for this *movement*, if we look at it more closely, is immediately the opposite of itself. For it posits *a difference* which is not only *no difference* for us, but which the movement itself sublates as difference. This is the same alternation that presented itself as the play of forces. In that play there was the difference between the soliciting and the solicited, between force expressing itself and force driven back into itself; but these were differences that in truth were none, and that therefore also immediately sublated themselves again. What is present is not mere unity, such that *no difference would be posited*; rather it is this *movement: that* a difference is certainly made, but, *because it is none,* is sublated again. — With explaining, then, the flux and alternation that were formerly outside the inner, only in appearance, have penetrated into the supersensible itself. Our consciousness, however, has passed over from the inner as object to the other side, into the *understanding*, and it is there that it has the alternation.

156 This alternation is thus not yet an alternation of the thing itself. Rather, it presents itself as *pure alternation* precisely because the *content* of the moments of the alternation remains the same. But since the *concept*, as concept of the understanding, is the same as the *inner* of things, *this alternation becomes, for the understanding, the law of the inner*. The understanding thus *experiences* that it is the *law* of *appearance itself* that differences come about which are no differences; or that the *like-named repels* itself from itself; and likewise that the differences are only such as are in truth none and sublate themselves; or that the *unlike-named attracts* itself.[14] — This is a *second law*, whose content is opposed to what was previously called law, namely to difference that remains constantly self-identical; for this new law expresses rather the *becoming-unlike of the like* and the *becoming-like of the unlike*. The Concept demands of thoughtlessness that it bring the two laws together and become aware of their opposition.—The second is, of course, also a law, an inner self-identical being; but it is rather a self-identity of unlikeness, a constancy of inconstancy. — In the play of forces this law turned out to be precisely this absolute passing over, and pure alternation. The *like-named*, force, *decomposes* into an opposition which at first appears as an independent difference, but which in fact proves to be *none*. For it is the *like-named* that repels itself from itself, and what is thus repelled therefore essentially attracts itself, since it is *the same*; the difference that was made, being none, thus sublates itself again. It thereby presents itself as a difference *of the thing itself*, or as absolute difference; and this difference of the *thing* is therefore nothing other than the like-named that has repelled itself from itself and so posits only an opposition that is none.

14 Gleichnamig, "of the same name", is the term for like poles or charges, which repel; ungleichnamig, "unlike-named", is used of unlike ones, which attract.

THE INVERTED WORLD

A second supersensible world turns every law of the first into its opposite.

157 Through this principle, the first supersensible world—the tranquil realm of laws, the immediate image of the perceived world—is turned round into its opposite. Law was in general what *remains the same*, and so were its differences; but now it is posited that each of them is rather the opposite of itself. What is *like itself* rather repels itself from itself, and what is unlike itself rather posits itself as what is like itself. In fact, only with this determination is difference *inner* difference, or difference *in itself*, since the like is unlike itself and the unlike is like itself.—*This second supersensible world* is in this way the *inverted* world; and indeed, since one side of it is already present in the first supersensible world, it is the *inversion* of this *first* one.[15] The inner is thereby completed as appearance. For the first supersensible world was only the *immediate* elevation of the perceived world into the universal element. It had its necessary counterpart in the perceived world, which still retained *for itself the principle of alternation* and *change*. The first realm of laws lacked that principle, but obtains it as the inverted world.

158 According to the law of this inverted world, then, what is *like-named* in the first world is *unlike* itself, and what is *unlike* in it is likewise *unlike itself*, or becomes *like* itself. In determinate moments this will turn out as follows: what in the law of the first world is sweet is, in this inverted in-itself, sour; what in the first is black is, in this one, white. What in the law of the first is the north pole of a magnet is, in its other, supersensible in-itself (namely in the earth), the south pole; but what is the south pole there is the north pole here. Likewise, what in the first law of electricity is the oxygen pole becomes, in its other, supersens-

15 Die verkehrte Welt, "the inverted" or "topsy-turvy world", was a familiar satirical motif of a world turned upside down, and the title of a comedy by Ludwig Tieck (1798).

ible essence, the hydrogen pole; and conversely, what is the hydrogen pole there becomes the oxygen pole here.[16] In another sphere, according to the *immediate law*, revenge on an enemy is the highest satisfaction of injured individuality. *This law* bids me show myself as a being in my own right toward someone who does not treat me as a self, and indeed to sublate him as a being. But through the principle of the other world it is *inverted into its opposite*: restoring myself as a being by sublating the alien being turns into self-destruction. Now if this inversion, which is presented in the *punishment* of crime, is made into *law*, then it too is again only the law of the one world, which has an *inverted* supersensible world *standing over against* it—a world in which what is despised in the first comes to be honored, and what is honored in the first comes to be despised. Punishment, which according to the *law of the first world* disgraces and destroys a person, is transformed in its *inverted world* into the pardon that preserves his essence and restores him to honor.

159 Viewed superficially, this inverted world is the opposite of the first in such a way that it has the first outside itself and repels it from itself as an inverted *actuality*: *one* world is *appearance*, the *other* the *in-itself*; *one* is the world as it is *for an other*, the *other* as it is *for itself*. So, to use the previous examples, what tastes sweet would *really*, or *inwardly* in the thing, be sour; or what is the north pole in the actual magnet of appearance would be the south pole in its *inner or essential being*; what presents itself as the oxygen pole in electricity as it appears would be the hydrogen pole in electricity as it does not appear. Or an action that is a crime in *appearance* would be able to be really good *inwardly* (a bad action could have a good intention); punishment would be punishment only *in appearance*, but *in itself*, or in another world, a benefit to the criminal. But such oppositions of inner and outer, of appearance and the supersensible, as of two kinds of actuality, are no longer present here. The repelled differences are not distributed anew between two such substances,

16 The oxygen and hydrogen poles are the electrodes of a voltaic pile at which water, when decomposed by current, gives off oxygen and hydrogen respectively.

which would support them and lend them a separate subsistence; for then the understanding would fall out of the inner and back into its former position. One side or substance would again be the world of perception, in which one of the two laws would carry on its business; and over against it there would be an inner world, *just such a sensuous world* as the first, but in *representation*. It could not be exhibited as a sensuous world—could not be seen, heard, or tasted—and yet it would be represented as such a sensuous world. But in fact, if *what is posited on the one side* is something perceived, and its *in-itself*, as its inversion, is likewise something *represented through the senses*, then the sour that would be the in-itself of the sweet thing is as actual a thing as the sweet one—a *sour thing*. The black that would be the in-itself of the white is the actual black; the north pole that is the in-itself of the south pole is the north pole *present on the same magnet*; the oxygen pole that is the in-itself of the hydrogen pole is the *present* oxygen pole of the same pile. The *actual* crime, however, has *its inversion* and *its in-itself*, as *possibility*, in *the intention* as such, but not in a good intention; for the truth of the intention is only the deed itself. But crime, with regard to its content, has its reflection into itself, or its inversion, in *actual* punishment; this punishment is the reconciliation of the law with the actuality opposed to it in the crime. Finally, *actual* punishment has its *inverted* actuality within it in this way: it is a realization of the law through which the activity the law has as punishment *sublates itself*. From active law it becomes once more *tranquil* and valid law, and the movement of individuality against the law, and of the law against individuality, is extinguished.

160 From the representation of inversion, then, which constitutes the essence of one side of the supersensible world, we must remove the sensuous representation of the differences as fixed in a distinct element of subsistence. And this absolute concept of difference must be presented and grasped purely, as inner difference: the repelling of the like-named, as like-named, from itself, and the being-alike of the unlike as unlike. It is pure

alternation, or *opposition within itself, contradiction, that is to be thought*. For in a difference that is inner, the opposite is not merely *one of two*—otherwise it would be something that *simply is*, and not an opposite—but it is the opposite of an opposite; or the other is itself immediately present in it. I do, of course, put the opposite *here*, and *over there* the other of which it is the opposite—thus putting the *opposite* on one side, in and for itself, without the other. But precisely because I have *the opposite in and for itself* here, it is the opposite of itself; or it in fact has the other immediately within itself.—So the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time reached over the other world and has it within itself. It is for itself the inverted world, that is, the inversion of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only in this way is it difference as *inner* difference, or difference *in itself*; that is, only so is it as *infinity*.

INFINITY

Difference is grasped as inner difference: the self-repelling unity that is the simple essence of life.

161 Through infinity we see law completed into necessity within itself, and all the moments of appearance taken up into the inner. That the simple element of law is infinity means, according to what has emerged, *α*) that it is something *self-identical* which is, however, *difference* in itself; or it is the like-named that repels itself from itself, or divides itself in two. What was called *simple* force *doubles* itself, and through its infinity it is law. *β*) What is divided in two, which makes up the parts represented in *law*, presents itself as something subsisting. Considered without the concept of inner difference, these parts—space and time, or distance and velocity, which appear as moments of gravity—are indifferent to one another and without necessity for one another, as well as for gravity itself; just as this simple gravity is indifferent to them, or simple electricity to positive and negative. *γ*) But through the concept of inner difference, this unlike and indifferent element, space and time and so on, is a *difference*

that is no *difference*, or only a difference of the *like-named*, and its essence is unity. As positive and negative they are animated against each other, and their being is rather this: to posit themselves as non-being and to sublate themselves in the unity. Both distinct terms subsist; they are *in themselves*, they are *in themselves as opposites*, that is, each is the opposite of itself; they have their other within them and are only one unity.

162 This simple infinity, or the absolute Concept, may be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood. Omnipresent, it is neither dimmed nor interrupted by any difference; rather, it is itself all differences as well as their sublatedness. It therefore pulsates within itself without moving, trembles within itself without being restless. It is *self-identical*, for the differences are tautological: they are differences that are none. This self-identical essence therefore relates itself only to itself. But if it relates *to itself*, then this "itself" is an other toward which the relation is directed, and *relating to itself* is rather *dividing in two*; in other words, that very self-identity is inner difference. These *divided* terms are therefore *in and for themselves*, each an opposite—*of an other*; and so the *other* is already expressed together with it. Or it is not the opposite *of an other* but only *the pure opposite*; and so it is, in itself, the opposite of itself; or it is not an opposite at all but purely for itself, a pure self-identical essence that has no difference within it. In that case we need not ask *how* difference or otherness comes out of this pure essence, how it comes *out* of it—still less regard agonizing over such a question as philosophy, or even hold the question to be unanswerable for philosophy. For the division has already taken place: difference has been excluded from the self-identical and set beside it. What was supposed to be *the self-identical* is thus already one of the divided terms, rather than the absolute essence.[17] *The self-identical divides itself in two* therefore means just as much that it sublates itself as something already

17 Hegel is probably thinking of the philosophy of identity of his day, notably Schelling's, which faced the question of how difference arises from an undifferentiated absolute.

divided, that it sublates itself as otherness. The *unity* of which it is customarily said that difference cannot come out of it is in fact itself only one moment of the division. It is the abstraction of simplicity, which stands over against difference. But since it is the abstraction, only one of the opposites, it has already been said that it is the dividing. For if unity is a *negative*, an *opposite*, then it is posited precisely as that which has opposition within it. The differences of *dividing in two* and *becoming self-identical* are therefore likewise only *this movement of self-sublation*. For the self-identical, which is supposed first to divide itself or become its opposite, is an abstraction, or is *already itself* something divided; so its dividing is a sublation of what it is, and thus the sublation of its dividedness. *Becoming self-identical* is equally a dividing: what becomes *self-identical* thereby steps over against division; that is, it thereby itself takes a place *on one side*, or rather it *becomes* something *divided*.

163 Infinity, this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, means that whatever is determined in some way, for example as being, is rather the opposite of this determinateness. Infinity has indeed already been the soul of everything so far, but only in the *inner* has it itself come forth freely. Appearance, or the play of forces, already presents it, but it first comes forth freely as *explanation*. And since it is finally an object for consciousness *as what it is*, consciousness is *self-consciousness*. The understanding's *explaining* at first only describes what self-consciousness is. The understanding sublates the differences present in the law, differences that have already become pure but are still indifferent, and posits them in a single unity, force. This becoming-equal, however, is just as immediately a dividing in two. The understanding sublates the differences, and posits the oneness of force, only by making a new difference, between law and force, which at the same time is no difference. And to show that this difference is equally no difference, the understanding itself goes on to sublate it in turn, by letting force be constituted just as the law is.—But this movement, or necessity, is in this form still a necessity and movement of the understanding. In other

words, *as such* it is *not the understanding's object*. In it the understanding instead has as its objects positive and negative electricity, distance, velocity, force of attraction and a thousand other things, which make up the content of the moments of the movement. That is exactly why explaining brings so much self-satisfaction. In it consciousness is, so to speak, in immediate conversation with itself and enjoys only itself. It seems to be busy with something else, but in fact it is only busying itself with itself.

164 In the opposite law, as the inversion of the first law, or in inner difference, infinity itself does become the *object* of the understanding. But the understanding misses it as such once again. It distributes the difference in itself, the self-repulsion of the like-named and the attraction of the unlike, over two worlds or two substantial elements. The *movement*, as it is in experience, is for the understanding here a mere happening, and the like-named and the unlike are *predicates* whose essence is an existing substrate. What is an object for the understanding in a sensuous covering is an object for us in its essential shape, as pure concept. This grasping of difference as it is *in truth*, or the grasping of *infinity* as such, is *for us*, or *in itself*. The exposition of the concept of infinity belongs to science. But consciousness, as it has this concept *immediately*, appears once more as a form of its own, a new shape of consciousness. This new shape does not recognize its own essence in what preceded it but takes it for something quite different.—Since this concept of infinity is its object, consciousness is consciousness of difference as something just as much *immediately* sublated. It is *for itself*; it is the *distinguishing of what is undistinguished*, or *self-consciousness*. I *distinguish myself from myself*, and *in doing so it is immediately for me that what is distinguished is not distinguished*. I, the like-named, repel myself from myself. But what is thus distinguished, posited as unlike, is for me immediately, in being distinguished, no difference. Consciousness of an other, of an object in general, is indeed itself necessarily *self-consciousness*: being reflected into itself, consciousness of itself in its otherness. The previous shapes of consciousness took their truth to be a thing, some-

thing other than themselves. The *necessary progression* from them expresses precisely this: not only is consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness, but self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes. But this truth is present only for us, not yet for consciousness. Self-consciousness has only just become *for itself*, not yet *as a unity* with consciousness in general.

BEHIND THE CURTAIN

In the inner of things the understanding finds only itself, and consciousness becomes self-consciousness.

165 We see that in the inner of appearance the understanding in truth experiences nothing other than appearance itself. It does not experience appearance as the play of forces, however, but that play in its absolutely universal moments and their movement; and in fact it experiences only *itself*. Raised above perception, consciousness presents itself as joined together with the supersensible through the middle term of appearance, through which it gazes into this background. The two extremes, the pure inner on the one side and on the other the inner that gazes into this pure inner, have now collapsed together. And just as they have vanished as extremes, so too has the middle term, as something other than they. This curtain, then, has been drawn away from the inner, and what is present is the inner gazing into the inner. It is the gazing of the *undistinguished* like-named, which repels itself and posits itself as a *distinguished* inner, but *for which* the *undistinguishedness* of the two is just as immediately present: *self-consciousness*. It turns out that behind the so-called curtain, which is supposed to conceal the inner, there is nothing to be seen unless *we* ourselves go behind it—as much in order that there may be seeing as in order that there may be something behind it that can be seen. But at the same time it turns out that one cannot simply go straight behind it without further ado. For this knowing—the knowing of what the truth *of the representation* of appearance and its inner is—is itself only the result

of a roundabout movement, through which the modes of consciousness, meaning, perceiving and the understanding, vanish. And it will likewise turn out that the cognition of *what consciousness knows in knowing itself* requires still more ado. Setting this out is the task of what follows.

Self-Consciousness

IV. Die Wahrheit der Gewißheit seiner selbst
Desire and recognition, lordship and bondage, stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness.

IV. DIE WAHRHEIT DER GEWISSHEIT SEINER SELBST.

166 In the previous modes of certainty the true is, for consciousness, something other than itself. But the concept of this true vanishes in the experience of it. The object was immediately *in itself*: the existent of sense-certainty, the concrete thing of perception, the force of the understanding. Yet it proves not to be so in truth. Instead this *in-itself* turns out to be a way in which the object is only for an other. The concept of the object is sublated in the actual object; that is, the first immediate representation is sublated in experience, and certainty was lost in truth. Now, however, something has arisen that did not come about in these earlier relationships: a certainty that is equal to its truth. For the certainty is its own object, and consciousness is itself the true for itself. There is indeed an otherness in this too, for consciousness makes a distinction. But what it distinguishes is at the same time, for consciousness, something not distinguished. Let us call the movement of knowing the *concept*, and knowing as a tranquil unity, or as I, the *object*. Then we see that the object corresponds to the concept, not only for us but for knowing itself. — Or, to put it the other way: let us call the *concept* what the object is *in itself*, and call the object what it is as *object*, or *for an* other. Then it is clear that being-in-itself and being-for-an-other are the same. For the *in-itself* is consciousness, but consciousness is equally that *for which* an other (the *in-itself*) is. And it is for con-

sciousness that the in-itself of the object and the object's being for an other are the same. The I is the content of the relation and the relating itself. It is itself over against an other, and at the same time it reaches beyond this other, which for it is equally only itself.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AS DESIRE

Self-consciousness returns from otherness and first takes the form of desire, whose object is life.

167 With self-consciousness, then, we have now entered the native realm of truth. We must see how the shape of self-consciousness first appears. Let us consider this new shape of knowing, the knowing of oneself, in relation to what preceded it, the knowing of an other. That earlier knowing has indeed vanished, but its moments have at the same time been preserved. The loss consists in this: here they are present as they are in themselves. The *being* of meaning, the *singularity* of perception and the *universality* opposed to it, as well as *the empty inner* of the understanding, are no longer essences but moments of self-consciousness. That is, they are abstractions or differences which *for* consciousness itself are at the same time null, no differences at all, purely vanishing entities. So what seems to have been lost is only the principal moment itself, namely *simple independent subsistence* for consciousness. But in fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the sensuous and perceived world, and is essentially the return out of *otherness*. As self-consciousness it is movement. But since it distinguishes from itself *only itself as* itself, the difference is for it *immediately sublated* as an otherness. The difference *is* not, and *it*, self-consciousness, is only the motionless tautology "I am I." Insofar as the difference does not also have the shape of *being* for it, it is not self-consciousness. For self-consciousness, therefore, otherness is present *as a being*, or as a *distinguished moment*. But also present for it is the unity of itself with this difference, as a *second distinguished* moment. With that first moment, self-consciousness

exists as *consciousness*, and the whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it. At the same time, however, it is preserved only as related to the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself. The sensuous world is thus for self-consciousness something that subsists, but only as *appearance*, or as a difference that has no being *in itself*. This opposition between its appearance and its truth, however, has for its essence only the truth, namely the unity of self-consciousness with itself. This unity must become essential to self-consciousness; that is, self-consciousness is *desire* in general. As self-consciousness, consciousness now has a double object. The first is the immediate object, the object of sense-certainty and of perceiving, which, however, is marked *for it* with the *character of the negative*. The second is *itself*, which is the true *essence* and at first is present only in opposition to the first object. Self-consciousness presents itself here as the movement in which this opposition is sublated and its equality with itself comes to be for it.

168 The object that is the negative for self-consciousness has, however, for its part, *for us* or *in itself*, returned into itself, just as consciousness has on the other side. Through this reflection into itself the object has become *life*. What self-consciousness distinguishes from itself *as being* has in it, insofar as it is posited as being, not merely the mode of sense-certainty and of perception. It is being reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is a *living thing*. For the *in-itself*, or the *universal* result of the understanding's relation to the inner of things, is the distinguishing of what is not to be distinguished, or the unity of what is distinguished. But this unity is, as we have seen, just as much its repelling of itself from itself, and this concept *divides itself in two* into the opposition of self-consciousness and life. Self-consciousness is the unity *for which* the infinite unity of the differences is. Life, however, only *is* this unity itself, so that it is not at the same time *for itself*. As independent as consciousness is, then, just so independent *in itself* is its object. Self-consciousness is simply *for itself* and immediately marks its object with the character of the negative; that is, it is at first *desire*. It will there-

fore instead come to experience the independence of that object.

169 The determination of life, as it follows from the concept or the universal result with which we enter this sphere, is enough to characterize life without our having to develop its nature further. This determination completes its circle in the following moments. The *essence* is infinity as the *sublatedness* of all differences. It is the pure movement of rotating on its own axis, the rest of itself as absolutely restless infinity. It is *independence* itself, in which the differences of the movement are dissolved. It is the simple essence of time, which in this self-equality has the solid shape of space. In this *simple universal* medium, however, the *differences* are just as much present *as differences*. For this universal fluidity has its negative nature only insofar as it is a *sublating of them*, and it cannot sublate the differentiated unless they subsist. This very fluidity, as self-equal independence, is itself their *subsistence*, or *substance*, in which they therefore exist as distinct members and as parts *that are for themselves*. *Being* no longer means the *abstraction of being*, nor does their pure essentiality mean the *abstraction* of *universality*. Rather, their being is precisely that simple fluid substance of pure movement within itself. The *difference* of these members *from one another*, *as* difference, consists in no other *determinateness* at all than that of the moments of infinity, or of pure movement itself.

170 The independent members are *for themselves*. But this *being-for-self* is just as *immediately* their reflection into the unity as this unity is the division into the independent shapes. The unity is divided because it is absolutely negative, or infinite, unity; and because *it* is the *subsistence*, the difference too has independence only *in it*. This independence of the shape appears as something *determinate, for an other*, for it is something divided; and to that extent the *sublating* of the division takes place through an other. But this sublating is just as much in the shape itself. For that very fluidity is the substance of the independent shapes, and this substance is infinite. In its very subsistence, therefore, the shape is the division, or the sublating of its being-for-self.

171 If we distinguish the moments contained here more closely, we see that the *first* moment is the *subsistence of the independent* shapes. It is the suppression of what distinguishing is in itself, namely not to be in itself and to have no subsistence. The *second* moment, however, is the *subjection* of that subsistence to the infinity of difference. In the first moment there is the subsisting shape. As *being for itself*, or as substance infinite in its determinateness, it comes forward against the *universal* substance. It disowns this fluidity and its continuity with it, and asserts that it is not dissolved in this universal. It asserts instead that it preserves itself by separating itself from this inorganic nature of its own and by consuming it. Life in the universal fluid medium, a *tranquil* unfolding of shapes, thereby becomes the movement of those shapes, or life as *process*. The simple universal fluidity is the *in-itself*, and the difference of the shapes is the *other*. But through this difference the fluidity itself becomes *the other*. For it is now *for the difference*, which is in and for itself and is therefore the infinite movement by which that tranquil medium is consumed: life as a *living thing*. — This *inversion*, however, is therefore in turn *invertedness in itself*. What is consumed is the essence. The individuality preserves itself at the expense of the universal and gives itself the feeling of its unity with itself. In doing precisely this, it sublates *its opposition to the other, through which it is for itself*. The *unity* with itself that it gives itself is precisely the *fluidity* of the differences, or *universal dissolution*. But conversely, the sublating of individual subsistence is equally its production. The *essence* of the individual shape, universal life, and what is for itself are in themselves simple substance. So when this substance posits the *other* within itself, it sublates this *simplicity* of its own, or its essence; that is, it divides that simplicity in two, and this dividing of the undifferentiated fluidity is precisely the positing of individuality. The simple substance of life, then, is its own division into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these subsisting differences; and the dissolution of the division is just as much a dividing, an articulating into members. The two sides of the whole movement that were

distinguished thus collapse into each other: the shaping, tranquilly spread out in the universal medium of independence, and the process of life. The latter is just as much shaping as it is the sublating of shape; and the former, the shaping, is just as much a sublating as it is articulation. The fluid element is itself only the *abstraction* of the essence; in other words, it is *actual* only as shape. And its articulating itself into members is in turn a dividing of what has been articulated, a dissolving of it. This whole cycle constitutes life. Life is not what was first expressed, the immediate continuity and solidity of its essence. Nor is it the subsisting shape and the discrete that is for itself, nor the pure process of these, nor yet the simple gathering together of these moments. It is the whole that develops itself, dissolves its development, and in this movement simply preserves itself.

172 We set out from the first immediate unity, passed through the moments of shaping and of process to the unity of these two moments, and thus returned to the first simple substance. This *reflected unity*, however, is different from the first. As against that *immediate* unity, the one expressed as a *being*, this second unity is the *universal* one, which contains all these moments within itself as sublated. It is the *simple genus,* which in the movement of life itself does not *exist for itself as* this *simple* thing. Instead, in this *result* life points to something other than itself, namely to consciousness, for which life is as this unity, or as genus.

173 This other life, however, for which the *genus* as such is, and which is genus for itself, is self-consciousness. At first it is for itself only as this simple essence, and has itself as *pure I* for its object. In its experience, which we must now consider, this abstract object will grow richer for it and acquire the unfolding we have seen in life.

SATISFACTION IN ANOTHER SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Desire finds its object independent; self-consciousness is satisfied only in another self-consciousness.

[174] The simple I is this genus, or the simple universal for which the differences are no differences, only by being the *negative essence* of the shaped independent moments. Self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by sublating this other, which presents itself to it as independent life: self-consciousness is *desire*. Certain of the nullity of this other, it posits that nullity *for itself* as its truth. It annihilates the independent object and thereby gives itself certainty of itself as *true* certainty, as a certainty that has come to be for it in an *objective way*.

[175] In this satisfaction, however, self-consciousness experiences the independence of its object. Desire, and the certainty of itself attained in desire's satisfaction, are conditioned by the object. For that certainty exists through the sublating of this other, and for there to be this sublating, this other must be. Self-consciousness, therefore, cannot sublate the object through its negative relation to it; rather, it produces the object again, and the desire as well. In fact the essence of desire is something other than self-consciousness, and through this experience self-consciousness has itself come to see this truth. At the same time, however, self-consciousness is equally absolutely for itself, and it is so only by sublating the object; and it must obtain its satisfaction, for it is the truth. Because of the independence of the object, therefore, self-consciousness can attain satisfaction only if the object itself carries out the negation in itself. And the object must carry out this negation of itself in itself, for it is *in itself* the negative and must be for the other what it is. Since the object is negation in itself and is at the same time independent in this, it is consciousness. In life, which is the object of desire, *negation* is either *in an other*, namely in desire; or it is present as *determinateness* over against another, indifferent shape; or as life's *inorganic universal nature*. But this universal independent

nature, in which negation is present as absolute negation, is the genus as such, or the genus as *self-consciousness*. *Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness*.

[176] Only in these three moments is the concept of self-consciousness complete. a) Pure, undistinguished I is its first immediate object. b) But this immediacy is itself absolute mediation; it exists only as the sublating of the independent object; in other words, it is desire. The satisfaction of desire is indeed the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or certainty that has become truth. c) But the truth of this certainty is rather the double reflection, the doubling of self-consciousness. There is an object for consciousness that in itself posits its otherness, or the difference, as null, and is independent in doing so. The distinguished, merely *living* shape does indeed also sublate its independence in the process of life itself, but along with its difference it ceases to be what it is. The object of self-consciousness, however, remains just as independent in this negativity of itself. It is thus genus for itself, universal fluidity within the particularity of its separateness: it is living self-consciousness.

[177] It is a *self-consciousness for a self-consciousness*. Only in this way does it actually exist; for only here does the unity of itself in its otherness come to be for it. The *I* that is the object of its concept is in fact not an *object*. The object of desire, by contrast, is merely *independent*, for it is the universal, indestructible substance, the fluid, self-equal essence. When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just as much I as it is object.—With this, the concept of *spirit* is already present for us. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is. Spirit is this absolute substance which, in the complete freedom and independence of its opposition, namely of different self-consciousnesses each existing for itself, is their unity: *I* that is *We*, and *We* that is *I*. Only in self-consciousness, as the concept of spirit, does consciousness reach its turning point. There it steps out of the colorful show of the sensuous here-below and out of the empty night of the supersensible beyond, into the spiritual daylight of the present.

LORDSHIP AND BONDAGE

Self-consciousness exists only in being recognized; Hegel sets out the pure concept of recognition.

178 Self-consciousness is *in* and *for itself* in that, and by virtue of the fact that, it is in and for itself for an other; that is, it exists only as something recognized. The concept of this unity of self-consciousness in its doubling, of infinity realizing itself in self-consciousness, is a many-sided and equivocal interweaving. Its moments must in part be kept strictly apart. In part, within this very distinction, they must also be taken and known as not distinguished, or always in their opposite meaning. The double sense of what is distinguished lies in the essence of self-consciousness: to be infinite, or to be immediately the opposite of the determinateness in which it is posited. Setting out the concept of this spiritual unity in its doubling presents us with the movement of *recognition*.[1]

179 For self-consciousness there is another self-consciousness; it has come *out of itself*. This has a double meaning. *First*, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an *other* essence. *Second*, it has thereby sublated the other, for it does not see the other as essence either, but sees *itself* in the other.

180 It must sublate *its own otherness*. This is the sublating of the first double meaning and is therefore itself a second double meaning. *First*, it must set about sublating *the other* independent essence, in order thereby to become certain of *itself* as the essence. *Second*, it thereby sets about sublating *itself*, for this other is itself.

181 This twofold sublating of its twofold otherness is equally a twofold return *into itself*. *First*, through the sublating it gets itself back, since by sublating *its* otherness it becomes equal to itself again. *Second*, however, it equally gives the other self-consciousness back to itself. It was itself in the other; it sublates this being

1 *Anerkennung*, "recognition": the acknowledgment of another as a free, self-conscious being; it is the central idea of this section.

of its own in the other, and so releases the other again into freedom.

182 This movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has so far been represented as *the doing of the one*. But this doing of the one itself has the double meaning of being just as much *its own doing* as *the doing of the other*. For the other is equally independent and self-enclosed, and there is nothing in it that is not there through itself. The first self-consciousness does not have before it the object as it at first exists merely for desire. It has an object that is for itself and independent, over which it therefore has no power on its own unless the object does in itself what the first does to it. The movement, then, is simply the double movement of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees *the other* do the same as *it* does. Each itself does what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does *only* insofar as the other does the same. One-sided doing would be useless, because what is to happen can be brought about only by both.

183 The doing, therefore, has a double meaning. It is a doing directed just as much *against itself* as *against the other*; and it is, inseparably, just as much *the doing of the one* as *of the other*.

184 In this movement we see repeated the process that presented itself as the play of forces, but now in consciousness. What in that process was for us is here for the extremes themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness, which breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this exchange of its determinateness and absolute transition into the opposite. As consciousness, however, it does indeed come *out of itself*. Yet in its being-outside-itself it is at the same time held back within itself, *for itself*, and its outside-itself is *for it*. It is for it that it immediately *is* and *is not* another consciousness. And it is equally for it that this other is for itself only by sublating itself as something that is for itself, and is for itself only in the being-for-self of the other. Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself with itself and joins itself together with itself. And each is, to itself and to the other, an

immediate essence that is for itself, yet at the same time is thus for itself only through this mediation. They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing one another*.

185 We must now consider this pure concept of recognition, of the doubling of self-consciousness in its unity, as its process appears for self-consciousness. The process will first present the side of the *inequality* of the two, or the emergence of the middle term into the extremes. As extremes these are opposed to each other, the one being only recognized, the other only recognizing.

THE LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE

Each self-consciousness must stake its own life and seek the other's death to prove itself free.

186 Self-consciousness is at first simple being-for-self, equal to itself by excluding everything *other from itself*. Its essence and absolute object is, for it, *I*; and in this *immediacy*, or in this *being* of its being-for-self, it is *singular*. Whatever is other for it is an inessential object, marked with the character of the negative. But the other is also a self-consciousness: one individual comes on the scene facing another individual. Emerging in this *immediate* way, they are for each other like ordinary objects. They are *independent* shapes, consciousnesses sunk in the *being* of *life*—for here the object in its being has determined itself as life. They have not yet accomplished *for each other* the movement of absolute abstraction, which annihilates all immediate being and is only the purely negative being of self-equal consciousness. In other words, they have not yet presented themselves to each other as pure *being-for-self*, that is, as *self*-consciousness. Each is indeed certain of itself, but not of the other, and therefore its own certainty of itself still has no truth. For its truth would consist only in its own being-for-self having presented itself to it as an independent object. Or, what is the same thing, it would consist in the object having presented itself as this pure certainty of itself. According to the concept of recognition, however, this is

possible only if each accomplishes this pure abstraction of being-for-self in itself, the one for the other just as the other for it, through its own doing and, in turn, through the doing of the other.

187 Presenting itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness, however, consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode. It consists in showing that it is not bound to any determinate *existence*, not bound to the universal singularity of existence as such, not bound to life. This presentation is a *twofold* doing: doing of the other, and doing through itself. Insofar as it is doing *of the other*, each seeks the death of the other. But the second doing, *doing through itself*, is also present in this, for the first involves staking one's own life. The relation of the two self-consciousnesses is thus determined in such a way that they *prove* themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. — They must enter into this struggle, for each must raise its certainty of itself, of *being for itself*, to truth, both in the other and in itself. And it is only by staking one's life that freedom is proven. Only so is it proven that for self-consciousness the essence is not *being*, not the *immediate* way in which it makes its appearance, not its immersion in the expanse of life. It is proven instead that there is nothing present in self-consciousness that would not be, for it, a vanishing moment, and that it is only pure *being-for-self*. An individual who has not risked life may well be recognized as a *person*, but has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. Just as each stakes its own life, so each must seek the death of the other; for the other counts for it no more than it does itself. Its essence presents itself to it as an other; it is outside itself, and it must sublate its being-outside-itself. The other is consciousness entangled in manifold ways, consciousness that simply is. It must intuit its otherness as pure being-for-self, or as absolute negation.

188 This proving through death, however, sublates the very truth that was supposed to come out of it, and with it also the certainty of oneself altogether. For just as life is the *natural* posi-

tion of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the *natural* negation of consciousness, negation without independence. Death therefore remains without the significance that recognition requires. Through death, to be sure, it has become certain that both staked their lives and held life in contempt, in themselves and in the other. But this certainty is not for those who went through the struggle. They sublate their consciousness, which had its place in this alien essentiality, natural existence. That is, they sublate themselves, and as *extremes* seeking to be for themselves they are sublated. With this, however, the essential moment vanishes from the play of exchange: the moment of breaking up into extremes of opposed determinateness. The middle term collapses into a dead unity, which is broken up into dead extremes that merely are and are not opposed. The two do not give each other back and receive each other back through consciousness; they merely let each other go, indifferently, as things. Their deed is abstract negation, not the negation of consciousness. Consciousness *sublates* in such a way that it *preserves* and *maintains* what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated.

LORD AND BONDSMAN

The struggle yields an independent consciousness, the lord, and a dependent one, the bondsman.

189 In this experience self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. In immediate self-consciousness the simple I is the absolute object. For us, or in itself, however, this object is absolute mediation and has subsisting independence as its essential moment. The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience. Through it there are posited a pure self-consciousness and a consciousness that is not purely for itself but for an other, that is, *existing* consciousness, or consciousness in the shape of *thinghood*. Both moments are essential. At first they are unequal and opposed, and their reflection into unity has not yet come about; so they

exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness. The one is the independent consciousness, whose essence is being-for-self; the other is the dependent consciousness, whose essence is life, or being for an other. The former is the *lord*, the latter the *bondsman*.[2]

190 The lord is consciousness that is *for itself*, no longer merely the concept of such consciousness. He is consciousness existing for itself that is mediated with itself through an *other* consciousness, namely one whose essence includes being bound up with independent *being*, or with thinghood in general. The lord relates himself to both these moments: to a *thing* as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness for which thinghood is what is essential. a) As the concept of self-consciousness he is the immediate relation of *being-for-self*. b) But he is now at the same time mediation, a being-for-self that is for itself only through an other. Accordingly he relates himself a) immediately to both, and b) mediately to each through the other. The lord relates himself *to the bondsman mediately through independent being*; for it is precisely by this that the bondsman is held. It is his chain, from which he could not abstract in the struggle; and he therefore proved himself dependent, as having his independence in thinghood. The lord, however, is the power over this being, for he proved in the struggle that it counts for him only as something negative. Since he is the power over this being, and this being is the power over the other, in this syllogism he holds this other beneath him. Likewise, the lord relates himself *mediately through the bondsman to the thing*. The bondsman, as self-consciousness in general, also relates himself negatively to the thing and sublates it. But at the same time the thing is independent for him, and so through his negating he cannot have done with it to the point of annihilating it; he only *works on* it. For the lord, on the other hand, this mediation turns the *immediate* relation *into* the pure negation of the thing, or *enjoyment*. What desire failed to do, he succeeds in doing: having done with the

2 *Herr* and *Knecht*, often rendered "master" and "slave"; *Knecht* means a servant or bonded laborer, hence the traditional "Lordship and Bondage."

thing and satisfying himself in enjoyment. Desire failed in this because of the thing's independence. But the lord, who has inserted the bondsman between the thing and himself, thereby joins himself only with the thing's dependence and enjoys it purely. The side of its independence, however, he leaves to the bondsman, who works on it.

191 In these two moments the lord's being recognized by another consciousness comes about for him. For that other consciousness posits itself in them as inessential: once in working on the thing, and again in its dependence on a determinate existence. In neither case can it become master over being and attain absolute negation. Here, then, there is present the moment of recognition in which the other consciousness sublates itself as being-for-self and thereby itself does what the first does to it. Equally present is the other moment, that this doing of the second is the first's own doing. For what the bondsman does is really the lord's doing. For the lord only being-for-self is the essence. He is the pure negative power for which the thing is nothing, and thus the pure essential doing in this relationship; the bondsman, by contrast, is a doing that is not pure but inessential. For recognition proper, however, one moment is missing: that what the lord does to the other he also does to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he also does to the other. What has arisen, therefore, is a one-sided and unequal recognition.

192 In this relationship the inessential consciousness is, for the lord, the object that constitutes the *truth* of his certainty of himself. But it is clear that this object does not correspond to its concept. Precisely where the lord has fully achieved himself, something quite different from an independent consciousness has come to be for him. What is for him is not an independent consciousness but a dependent one. He is therefore not certain of *being-for-self* as the truth; rather, his truth is the inessential consciousness and its inessential doing.

FEAR, SERVICE AND WORK

Through the fear of death and through work, the bondsman comes to a mind of his own.

193 The *truth* of the independent consciousness is accordingly the *servile consciousness*. At first, to be sure, this consciousness appears *outside* itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness. But just as lordship showed that its essence is the reverse of what it wants to be, so bondage too will, in its fulfillment, rather become the opposite of what it immediately is. As consciousness *forced back* into itself, it will go into itself and be turned around into true independence.

194 We have seen only what bondage is in its relationship to lordship. But bondage is self-consciousness, and we must now consider what it accordingly is in and for itself. At first, for bondage the lord is the essence. So the *independent consciousness that is for itself* is *the truth* for it, a truth that *for it* is not yet *in it*. Yet bondage does have this truth of pure negativity and of *being-for-self in fact within itself*, for it has *experienced* this essence within itself. This consciousness was not anxious about this or that, nor for this or that moment, but about its entire being; for it has felt the fear of death, the absolute lord. In that fear it has been inwardly dissolved, has trembled through and through within itself, and everything fixed in it has quaked. This pure universal movement, this absolute becoming-fluid of all that subsists, is, however, the simple essence of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, *pure being-for-self*, which is thus *in* this consciousness. This moment of pure being-for-self is also *for it*, for in the lord it has this moment as its *object*. Moreover, this consciousness is not only this universal dissolution *in general*; in serving it *actually* carries the dissolution out. In serving it sublates its attachment to natural existence in every *single* moment and works that existence away.

195 The feeling of absolute power in general, however, and in the particulars of service, is only dissolution *in itself*. And

although the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom, in this fear consciousness is *for itself*, but it is not *being-for-self*. Through work, however, it comes to itself. In the moment that corresponds to desire in the lord's consciousness, the serving consciousness did seem to have been left the side of the inessential relation to the thing, since there the thing keeps its independence. Desire has reserved for itself the pure negating of the object and thereby the unalloyed feeling of self. But for that very reason this satisfaction is itself only a vanishing, for it lacks the *objective* side, or *subsistence*.[3] Work, on the other hand, is desire *held in check*, vanishing *held back*; in other words, work *forms*. The negative relation to the object becomes the object's *form* and something *permanent*, precisely because for the one who works the object has independence. This *negative* middle term, the forming *activity*, is at the same time *singularity*, or the pure being-for-self of consciousness. In work this being-for-self now steps out of consciousness into the element of permanence. Through this, then, the working consciousness comes to intuit independent being *as itself*.[4]

196 Forming, however, has not only this positive significance, that in it the serving consciousness, as pure *being-for-self*, becomes for itself *something that is*. It also has a negative significance with respect to its first moment, fear. For in fashioning the thing, its own negativity, its being-for-self, becomes an object for it only because it sublates the opposed *form* that exists. But this objective *negative* is precisely the alien being before which it trembled. Now, however, consciousness destroys this alien negative and posits *itself* as such a negative in the element of permanence. It thereby becomes, *for itself*, *something that is for itself*. In the lord, being-for-self is for it *an other*, or only *for it*. In fear, being-for-self is *within it itself*. In fashioning, being-for-self becomes *its own* for it, and it comes to be conscious that it itself is in and for itself. By being *put outside* it, the form does

3 Echoes Psalm 111:10 and Proverbs 9:10: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." The German *Herr* means both "lord" and "the Lord."

4 *Bilden*, "to form" or "fashion," is the verb behind *Bildung*, "culture."

not become for it something other than itself, for this very form is its pure being-for-self, which in the form becomes its truth. Through this rediscovery of itself by itself, then, it becomes *a mind of its own*, precisely in work, where it seemed to be only *someone else's mind*.—For this reflection both moments are necessary, fear and service in general as well as fashioning, and both at the same time in a universal way. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains merely formal and does not spread over the conscious actuality of existence. Without fashioning, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become for itself. If consciousness forms without the initial absolute fear, it is merely a vain mind of its own, for its form or negativity is not negativity *in itself*. Its forming therefore cannot give it the consciousness of itself as the essence. If it has not endured absolute fear but only some anxiety, then the negative being has remained something external to it, and its substance has not been infected by it through and through. Since not everything that filled its natural consciousness has been shaken, it still belongs *in itself* to determinate being. Its mind of its own is *self-will*, a freedom that still remains within bondage. Pure form cannot become the essence for it. By the same token, that form, regarded as extending over the individual, is not universal fashioning, not the absolute concept. It is a skill, which has power over some things but not over the universal power and the whole of objective being.[5]

STOICISM

The freedom of self-consciousness first appears as thought withdrawn from the world.

197 For the independent self-consciousness, on the one hand, only the pure abstraction of the *I* is its essence. On the other hand, as this abstraction develops and gives itself differences, this differentiating does not become for it an objective essence

5 Hegel plays on *eigner Sinn* ("a mind of its own," literally "own sense") and *Eigensinn* ("self-will," "stubbornness").

that is *in itself*. So this self-consciousness does not become an I that truly differentiates itself in its simplicity, or that remains equal to itself in this absolute differentiation. By contrast, the consciousness that has been forced back into itself becomes an object to itself in forming, as the form of the things fashioned, and in the lord it beholds being-for-self at the same time as consciousness. But for the serving consciousness as such, these two moments fall apart: the moment of *itself* as an independent object, and the moment of this object as a consciousness, and hence as its own essence. But *for us*, or *in itself*, *form* and *being-for-self* are the same, and in the concept of independent consciousness *being-in-itself* is consciousness. So the side of *being-in-itself* or *thinghood* that received form in work is no substance other than consciousness. A new shape of self-consciousness has thereby come about for us: a consciousness that is the essence to itself as infinity, or as the pure movement of consciousness; a consciousness that *thinks*, or is free self-consciousness. For to *think* means to be an object to oneself not as an *abstract I*, but as an I that at the same time has the significance of *being-in-itself*. Or it means to relate to the objective essence in such a way that this essence has the significance of the *being-for-self* of the consciousness for which it is. — For *thinking*, the object moves not in representations or shapes but in *concepts*. That is, it moves in a differentiated being-in-itself that, immediately for consciousness, is not differentiated from it. What is *represented*, *shaped*, *existent* as such has the form of being something other than consciousness. But a concept is at the same time something *existent*, and this difference, insofar as it lies in the concept itself, is its determinate content. Yet because this content is at the same time a conceived content, consciousness remains *immediately* conscious of its unity with this determinate and differentiated existent. It is not as with a representation, where consciousness still has to remind itself specifically that this is *its* representation. Rather, the concept is for me immediately *my* concept. In thinking I *am free*, because I am not in an other but remain simply with myself. The object that is the

essence for me is, in undivided unity, my being-for-myself, and my movement in concepts is a movement within myself.—But in this characterization of this shape of self-consciousness, it is essential to hold fast to one point: that it is *thinking* consciousness *in general*, or that its object is the *immediate* unity of *being-in-itself* and *being-for-self*. Consciousness that is like-named with itself, and that repels itself from itself, becomes for itself the *element that is in itself*. But as yet it is this element for itself only as universal essence in general, not as this objective essence in the development and movement of its manifold being.

198 This freedom of self-consciousness, as is well known, was called *Stoicism* when it appeared in the history of spirit as a phenomenon conscious of itself. Its principle is that consciousness is a thinking being, and that something has essentiality for consciousness, or is true and good for it, only insofar as consciousness conducts itself in it as a thinking being.[6]

199 The manifold expansion of life, differentiating itself within itself, its individuation and complexity, is the object on which desire and work act. This manifold activity has now contracted into the simple differentiation that lies in the pure movement of thought. What has essentiality now is no longer the difference that presents itself as a *determinate thing*, or as the *consciousness of a determinate natural existence*, as a feeling, or as *desire* and a *purpose for desire*, whether this difference is posited by one's *own* consciousness or by *an alien consciousness*. What alone has essentiality is the difference that is a *thought* difference, or that is immediately not distinguished from Me. This consciousness is therefore negative toward the relationship of lordship and bondage. Its activity is not to have its truth in the bondsman, as the lord does, nor, as bondsman, to have its truth in the lord's will and in its own serving. Its activity is to be free, whether on the throne or in chains, in every dependence of its individual existence. It is to preserve for itself the lifelessness that constantly withdraws from the movement of existence, from acting as from

6 Stoicism: the philosophical school founded by Zeno of Citium around 300 BC, later represented by Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.

suffering, *into the simple essentiality of thought*.[7] Self-will is the freedom that clings to something individual and stands *within* bondage. Stoicism, by contrast, is the freedom that always comes immediately out of bondage and back into the *pure universality* of thought. As a universal form of the world-spirit, it could appear only in a time of universal fear and bondage, but also of universal culture, a culture that had raised fashioning to the level of thinking.

200 For this self-consciousness the essence is neither an other than itself nor the pure abstraction of the I. It is the I that has otherness within it, but as a thought difference, so that in its otherness it has immediately returned into itself. Even so, this essence of its is at the same time only an *abstract* essence. The freedom of self-consciousness is *indifferent* toward natural existence, and has therefore *let natural existence go free as well*. The *reflection* is thus a *twofold* one. Freedom in thought has only *pure thought* as its truth, a truth without the filling of life. So it is also only the concept of freedom, not living freedom itself. For to this freedom, only *thinking* in general is as yet the essence: form as such, which has turned away from the independence of things and gone back into itself. But if individuality were to present itself as living in its acting, or, in its thinking, were to grasp the living world as a system of thought, then *thought itself* would have to contain a *content*: for the expansion of action, a content of what is good; for the expansion of thought, a content of what is true. Only then would there be *absolutely* no other ingredient in *what is for consciousness* than the concept that is the essence. But as the concept here separates itself, as *abstraction*, from the multiplicity of things, it has *no content in itself*, only *a given one*. Consciousness does indeed destroy the content as an alien *being* by thinking it. But the concept is a *determinate* concept, and this *determinateness* of it is the alien element it has in it. That is why Stoicism was at a loss when it was asked, as the phrase went, for the *criterion* of truth as such, which really

7 "On the throne or in chains" recalls the two most famous later Stoics: the emperor Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, who had been a slave.

meant: for a *content* of *thought itself*. To the question *what* is good and true, it again answered with *contentless* thinking itself: the true and the good are supposed to consist in rationality.[8] But this self-identity of thinking is again only pure form, in which nothing is determined. The general words about the true and the good, about wisdom and virtue, at which Stoicism has to stop, are no doubt uplifting in a general way. But since in fact they cannot arrive at any expansion of content, they soon begin to be boring.

201 This thinking consciousness, as it has determined itself, namely as abstract freedom, is thus only the incomplete negation of otherness. It has merely *withdrawn* from existence into itself, and so has not accomplished itself in existence as its absolute negation. The content counts for it only as thought, to be sure, but also as *determinate* thought, and so determinateness as such counts for it at the same time.

SKEPTICISM

Skeptical thought dissolves every determinate thing, and so contradicts itself.

202 *Skepticism* is the realization of what Stoicism was only the concept of, and the actual experience of what freedom of thought is. This freedom is *in itself* the negative, and must present itself as such. With the reflection of self-consciousness into the simple thought of itself, independent existence, or permanent determinateness, has in fact fallen outside infinity and stands over against that reflection. In skepticism, the complete inessentiality and dependence of this other now comes to be *for consciousness*. Thought becomes the complete thinking that annihilates the being of the *multiply determined* world, and the negativity of free self-consciousness becomes real negativity in rela-

8 The "criterion of truth" was the central issue in the Hellenistic debate between the Stoics and the skeptics of Plato's Academy.

tion to this manifold shaping of life.[9] — [203] It is evident that Stoicism corresponds to the *concept* of *independent* consciousness, which appeared as the relationship of lordship and bondage. In the same way, skepticism corresponds to the *realization* of that consciousness as the negative orientation toward otherness, that is, to desire and work. But desire and work could not carry out the negation for self-consciousness. This polemical orientation against the manifold independence of things, by contrast, will succeed. It turns against things as a free self-consciousness already complete in itself. More precisely, it has *thinking*, or infinity, within itself, and in this infinity the independent things, in their difference, are for it only vanishing magnitudes. The differences, which in the pure thinking of itself are only the abstraction of differences, here become *all* differences, and all differentiated being becomes a difference of self-consciousness.

This has determined the *activity* of *skepticism* in general, and its *manner*. Skepticism exhibits the *dialectical movement* that sense-certainty, perception and understanding are. It likewise exhibits the inessentiality of whatever counts as *determinate* in the relationship of ruling and serving, and for abstract thinking itself. That relationship at the same time includes a *determinate mode* in which ethical laws, too, are present as commands of lordship. The determinations in abstract thinking, on the other hand, are concepts of science. Into these, contentless thinking expands. It attaches the concept, in a way that is in fact merely external, to the being independent of it that makes up its content, and it holds only *determinate* concepts to be valid, even if these are also pure abstractions.

[204] The *dialectical*, as negative movement just as it immediately *is*, appears to consciousness at first as something it is at the mercy of, something that does not exist through consciousness itself. As *skepticism*, on the other hand, this movement is a moment of self-consciousness. Here it does not *happen* to self-

9 Skepticism: ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism, known chiefly through the writings of Sextus Empiricus (2nd–3rd century AD).

consciousness that what is true and real for it vanishes without its knowing how. Rather, in the certainty of its freedom, self-consciousness itself makes this other, which gives itself out as real, vanish. It makes vanish not only the objective as such, but its own relation to it, in which the objective counts and is made to count as objective. So it also makes vanish its *perceiving*, as well as its *shoring up* of what it is in danger of losing, namely *sophistry*, and the *self-determined* and *fixed truth* it has established. Through this self-conscious negation, it procures *the certainty of its freedom for itself*, produces the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it to *truth*. What vanishes is the determinate, or the difference that sets itself up as fixed and unchangeable, in whatever way and from whatever source. The difference has nothing permanent in it, and *must* vanish before thought, because what is differentiated is precisely this: not to be *in itself*, but to have its essentiality only in an other. Thinking, however, is insight into this nature of the differentiated. It is the negative essence as simple.

205 In the flux of everything that tries to establish itself for it, skeptical self-consciousness thus experiences its own freedom as given and preserved by itself. It is for itself this ataraxia of thinking itself, the unchangeable and *true certainty of itself*. This certainty does not arise as a result out of something alien that had collapsed its manifold development within itself, a result that would have its becoming behind it. Rather, consciousness itself is the *absolute dialectical unrest*, this medley of sensuous and thought representations whose differences coincide, and whose *equality* likewise dissolves again, since equality is itself *determinateness* as against the *unequal*.[10] But in precisely this, instead of being self-identical consciousness, this consciousness is in fact only a purely contingent confusion, the vertigo of a disorder that perpetually generates itself. *It is this for itself*, since it itself maintains and produces this self-moving confusion. So it also admits as much: it confesses to being an entirely *contingent*,

10 Ataraxia (Greek, "imperturbability"): the tranquility of mind that the ancient skeptics sought through suspending judgment.

individual consciousness, a consciousness that is *empirical*. It takes its direction from what has no reality for it, obeys what is no essence for it, and does and brings to actuality what has no truth for it. But just as it takes itself in this way to be *individual, contingent* and in fact animal life, and *lost* self-consciousness, it also, on the contrary, makes itself once more into *universal, self-identical* consciousness, for it is the negativity of all singularity and all difference. From this self-identity, or rather within it, it falls back again into that contingency and confusion, for this very self-moving negativity deals only with what is individual and knocks about among contingent things. This consciousness is thus this unconscious babble, going back and forth from the one extreme of self-identical self-consciousness to the other extreme of contingent, confused and confusing consciousness. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together. At *one* time it knows its freedom as an elevation above all the confusion and contingency of existence. At *another*, it likewise admits to falling back into *inessentiality* and knocking about in it. It makes the inessential content vanish in its thinking, but precisely in doing so it is the consciousness of something inessential. It pronounces absolute *vanishing*, but the *pronouncing is*, and this consciousness is the pronounced vanishing. It pronounces the nullity of seeing, hearing and so on, and it *itself sees, hears* and so on. It pronounces the nullity of ethical essentialities, and makes them the very powers that govern its action. Its deeds and its words always contradict each other. And it itself likewise has the doubled, contradictory consciousness of unchangeableness and equality, and of complete contingency and inequality with itself. But it keeps this contradiction of itself apart, and treats it just as it treats everything in its purely negative movement in general. If *equality* is pointed out to it, it points out *inequality*. And when this inequality, which it has just asserted, is now held up to it, it moves on to pointing out *equality*. Its talk is in fact the squabbling of self-willed boys, one of whom says A when the other says B, and then B when the other says A,

and who, by contradicting *themselves*, buy themselves the pleasure of remaining in contradiction *with each other*.

206 In skepticism, consciousness in truth experiences itself as a consciousness that contradicts itself within itself. From this experience a *new shape* emerges, which brings together the two thoughts that skepticism keeps apart. Skepticism's thoughtlessness about itself must vanish, because it is in fact *one* consciousness that has these two modes in it. This new shape is therefore one that is *for itself* the doubled consciousness of itself: of itself as self-liberating, unchangeable and self-identical, and of itself as absolutely self-confusing and self-inverting. And it is the consciousness of this contradiction of its own.

THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness knows itself as divided between a changeable self and an alien Unchangeable.

— In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself. In skepticism this freedom realizes itself and annihilates the other side, that of determinate existence, but in doing so it rather doubles *itself*, and is now twofold for itself. The duplication that was previously divided between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, has thereby come home into one. The duplication of self-consciousness within itself, which is essential in the concept of spirit, is thus present, but not yet its unity; and 207 *the unhappy consciousness* is the consciousness of itself as the doubled, merely contradictory being.[11]

208 This contradiction of its essence is, for itself, *one* consciousness. So this *unhappy consciousness, divided within itself*, must always have the other consciousness in the one as well. Hence it is immediately driven out of each one, just when it thinks it has arrived at the victory and rest of unity. Its true return into itself, however, or its reconciliation with itself, will

11 The unhappy consciousness: Hegel's name for consciousness divided against itself; the following pages draw on the imagery of Christian devotion and asceticism.

present the concept of spirit that has come alive and entered into existence. For it already has this in it: that, as one undivided consciousness, it is a doubled one. It itself *is* the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, and it itself *is* both, and the unity of both is also the essence for it. But *for itself* it is not yet this essence itself, not yet the unity of both.

At first it is only the *immediate unity* of the two, and for it they are not the same but opposed. So one of them, namely the simple Unchangeable, counts for it as the *essence*, while the other, the manifold changeable, counts as the *inessential*. *For it*, the two are beings alien to each other. Because it is the consciousness of this contradiction, it places itself on the side of the changeable consciousness and is the inessential to itself. But as the consciousness of unchangeableness, or of the simple essence, it must at the same time set about freeing itself from the inessential, that is, from itself. For although *for itself* it is only the changeable, and the Unchangeable is something alien to it, it *is itself* simple and hence unchangeable consciousness. It is therefore conscious of the Unchangeable as *its own* essence, yet in such a way that *it itself*, for itself, is again not this essence. The position it assigns to the two therefore cannot be one in which they are indifferent to each other, that is, it cannot be an indifference of itself toward the Unchangeable. Rather, it is immediately both itself, and *the relation of the two* is for it a relation of the essence to the non-essence, such that the latter is to be sublated. But since for it the two are equally essential and contradictory, it is only the contradictory movement in which the opposite does not come to rest in its opposite, but only produces itself anew in it as opposite.

[209] What we have, then, is a struggle against an enemy, where victory is rather defeat, and to have attained the one is rather to lose it in its opposite. Consciousness of life, of its existence and activity, is only pain over this existence and activity. For in it, consciousness has only the consciousness of its opposite as the essence, and of its own nothingness. From here it passes over into elevation to the Unchangeable. But this elevation is itself

this consciousness. It is therefore immediately the consciousness of the opposite, namely of itself as singularity. The Unchangeable that enters consciousness is, by that very fact, at the same time touched by singularity and present only together with it. Instead of singularity having been extinguished in the consciousness of the Unchangeable, it only ever emerges there anew.

[210] In this movement, however, consciousness experiences precisely this *emergence of singularity in the Unchangeable*, and *of the Unchangeable in singularity*. *For it*, singularity *in general* comes to be *in* the unchangeable essence, and at the same time *its own* singularity comes to be in it. For the truth of this movement is precisely the *oneness* of this doubled consciousness. *This unity comes to be for it*, but *at first* as a unity *in which the difference* of the two *still dominates*. Consciousness thereby has three ways in which singularity is linked with the Unchangeable. *First*, it emerges again as opposed to the unchangeable essence, and it is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle, which remains the element of the whole relationship. *Second*, the *Unchangeable* itself has *singularity in it* for consciousness, so that singularity is the shape of the Unchangeable, and the whole mode of existence thereby passes over into the Unchangeable. *Third*, consciousness finds *itself* as this individual in the Unchangeable. The *first* Unchangeable is for it only the *alien* essence that condemns singularity. Since the *second* is a *shape* of *singularity* like consciousness itself, consciousness *thirdly* becomes spirit, has the joy of finding itself in it, and becomes conscious that its singularity is reconciled with the universal.

[211] What presents itself here as the mode and relationship of the Unchangeable emerged as the *experience* that divided self-consciousness undergoes in its unhappiness. This experience is not, to be sure, *its own one-sided* movement. For it is itself unchangeable consciousness, and hence at the same time individual consciousness too, and the movement is just as much the movement of the unchangeable consciousness, which appears in it as much as the other does. For the movement runs through

these moments: first, the unchangeable opposed to the individual in general; then, itself individual, opposed to the other individual; and finally, one with it. But this consideration, insofar as it belongs to us, is premature here. For so far only unchangeableness as the unchangeableness of consciousness has come about for us, which is therefore not the true unchangeableness but one still burdened with an opposition, and not the Unchangeable *in and for itself*. We therefore do not know how the latter will behave. All that has emerged here is that these determinations just indicated appear in the Unchangeable to the consciousness that is our object here.

[212] For this reason the unchangeable *consciousness*, too, even in taking on shape, retains the character and basis of being divided and of being-for-self as against the individual consciousness. For the individual consciousness, then, it is in general something that *happens* that the Unchangeable receives the shape of singularity. In the same way, it merely *finds* itself opposed to the Unchangeable, and so has this relationship *by nature*. That it finally *finds itself* in the Unchangeable appears to it partly as brought about by itself, or as taking place because it is itself individual. But part of this unity appears to it as belonging to the Unchangeable, both in its origin and insofar as it exists; and the opposition remains within this unity itself. In fact, through the Unchangeable's *taking on shape*, the moment of the beyond has not only remained but has been further consolidated. On the one hand, the shape of individual actuality seems to have brought the Unchangeable closer to consciousness. On the other hand, it now stands over against consciousness as an opaque sensuous *one*, with all the unyielding hardness of something *actual*. The hope of becoming one with it must remain hope, that is, without fulfillment and presence. For between the hope and its fulfillment stands precisely the absolute contingency or immovable indifference that lies in the taking on of shape itself, which is what grounds the hope. Through the nature of the *existing one*, through the actuality it has put on, it necessarily comes

about that it has vanished in time, was far away in space, and remains utterly far away.

213 At first, the mere concept of divided consciousness determined itself so that it aimed at sublating itself as individual and at becoming unchangeable consciousness. Its striving now has this determination instead: to sublate its relationship to the pure *unshaped* Unchangeable, and to give itself only the relation to *the Unchangeable One who has taken shape*. For the *oneness* of the individual with the Unchangeable is now its *essence* and *object*, just as in the concept only the shapeless, abstract Unchangeable was the essential object. The relationship of this absolute dividedness of the concept is now what it has to turn away from. But its relation to the Unchangeable who has taken shape, a relation that is at first external, as to an alien actual being, it has to raise into absolute becoming-one.[12]

214 The movement in which the inessential consciousness strives to attain this oneness is itself *threefold*, corresponding to the threefold relationship it will have to its beyond that has taken shape: first, as *pure consciousness*; second, as an *individual being* that relates to *actuality* as desire and work; and third, as *consciousness of its being-for-self*.—We must now see how these three modes of its being are present and determined in that universal relationship.

215 First, then, if we consider it as *pure consciousness*, the Unchangeable One who has taken shape seems, since he is for pure consciousness, to be posited as he is in and for himself. But how he is in and for himself has not yet come about, as already noted. That he should be in consciousness as he is in and for himself would surely have to proceed from him rather than from consciousness. As it is, however, his presence here exists only one-sidedly, through consciousness, and for that very reason it is not complete and genuine, but remains burdened with imperfection or an opposition.

216 But although the unhappy consciousness does not possess this presence, it has at the same time gone beyond pure think-

ing, insofar as pure thinking is the abstract thinking of Stoicism, which *looks away* from *singularity* altogether, and the merely *restless* thinking of skepticism, which is in fact only singularity as unconscious contradiction and its ceaseless movement. The unhappy consciousness is beyond both of these. It brings and holds pure thinking and singularity together, but it has not yet been raised to that thinking *for which* the singularity of consciousness is reconciled with pure thinking itself. It stands rather in this middle ground, where abstract thinking touches the singularity of consciousness as singularity. It itself *is* this touching. It is the unity of pure thinking and singularity. This thinking singularity, or pure thinking, is also *for it*, and so is the Unchangeable as essentially itself singularity. But it is not *for it* that this object of its, the Unchangeable, which for it essentially has the shape of singularity, is *itself*: itself, which is the singularity of consciousness.

217 In this first mode, then, in which we consider it as *pure consciousness*, it does not *relate* to *its object* by thinking. It is itself *in itself* pure thinking singularity, and its object is just this; but *their relation to each other is not itself pure thinking*. So it merely *goes toward* thinking, so to speak, and is *devotion*. Its thinking as such remains the shapeless droning of bells, or a warm, misty fullness, a musical thinking that does not arrive at the concept, which would be the only immanent objective mode. Its object does indeed come to this infinite, pure inner feeling, but it enters in such a way that it enters not as comprehended, and therefore as something alien.[13] What we have here, then, is the inward movement of the *pure* heart, which *feels* itself, but painfully, as the division. It is the movement of an infinite *longing*, which has the certainty that its essence is such a pure heart, a pure *thinking* that *thinks itself as singularity*, and that it is known and recognized by this object precisely because the object

12 Here Hegel switches to the masculine (*der gestaltete Unwandelbare*), suggesting a person rather than a principle.

13 *Andacht* ("devotion") contains the root of *denken* ("to think"); "goes toward thinking" (*an das Denken hin*) plays on the word.

thinks itself as singularity. At the same time, however, this essence is the unattainable *beyond*, which flees when one tries to grasp it, or rather has already fled.[14] It has already fled. For on the one hand it is the Unchangeable that thinks itself as singularity, and so consciousness immediately reaches itself in it, *itself*, but as *what is opposed to the Unchangeable*. Instead of grasping the essence, it only *feels*, and has fallen back into itself. Since in reaching the essence it cannot keep itself, as this opposed thing, out of the way, it has grasped only inessentiality instead of the essence. On one side, then, in striving to reach *itself in the essence*, it grasps only its own separate actuality. On the other side, it cannot grasp the other *as individual*, or as *actual*. Wherever the other is sought, it cannot be found, for it is supposed to be precisely *a beyond*, something that cannot be found. Sought as individual, it is not a *universal*, thought *singularity*, not a concept, but something *individual* as an object, or *something actual*: an object of immediate sense-certainty, and for that very reason only something that has vanished. So all that can become present to consciousness is the *grave* of its life. But because this grave is itself an *actuality*, and it is against the nature of actuality to grant lasting possession, even this presence of the grave is only the struggle of an effort that must end in defeat.[15] But once consciousness has had this experience, that *the grave* of its *actual* unchangeable essence has *no actuality*, and that *vanished singularity*, as vanished, is not true singularity, it will give up seeking the unchangeable singularity as *actual*, or holding on to it as vanished. Only in this way does it become capable of finding singularity as true, or as universal.

218 At first, however, the *return of the heart into itself* is to be understood as meaning that it has actuality as something *individual*. It is the *pure heart*, which *for us* or *in itself* has found itself and is satisfied within itself. For although, *for it*, the essence separates itself from it in its feeling, this feeling is in itself *self*-feel-

14 "Heart" renders *Gemüt*, the inner life of feeling and disposition.

15 The grave alludes to the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Crusades fought to possess it.

ing. It has felt the object of its pure feeling, and this object is itself. So it emerges from this as self-feeling, or as something actual existing for itself.

DESIRE, WORK AND THANKSGIVING

In work and enjoyment the unhappy consciousness takes its powers as gifts of the Unchangeable and gives thanks.

In this return into itself, its *second relationship* has come about for us: that of desire and work. Desire and work confirm for consciousness the inward certainty of itself that it has attained for us, by sublating and enjoying the alien essence, namely that essence in the form of independent things. The unhappy consciousness, however, only *finds* itself as *desiring* and *working*. It is not present to it that its finding itself this way rests on the inner certainty of itself, and that its feeling of the essence is this self-feeling. Since it does not have this certainty *for itself*, its inner life remains, rather, the broken certainty of itself. The confirmation it would receive through work and enjoyment is therefore an equally *broken* one. Or rather, it must itself annihilate this confirmation, so that it does find confirmation in it, but only confirmation of what it is for itself, namely of its division.

219 The actuality against which desire and work turn is no longer, for this consciousness, something *null in itself*, something for it merely to sublate and consume. It is rather like consciousness itself: an *actuality broken in two*, which is null in itself only on the one side, while on the other it is also a sanctified world. It is the shape of the Unchangeable, for the Unchangeable has taken on singularity; and because, as the Unchangeable, it is universal, its singularity has in general the significance of all actuality.

220 If consciousness were independent consciousness for itself, and actuality were null in and for itself for it, it would attain the feeling of its independence in work and enjoyment, because it would itself be what sublated actuality. But since actuality is for it the shape of the Unchangeable, it cannot sub-

late actuality by its own power. Though it does arrive at the annihilation of actuality and at enjoyment, for it this happens essentially because the Unchangeable itself *surrenders* its shape and *leaves* it to consciousness to enjoy. — In this, consciousness for its part *likewise* appears as something actual, but equally as inwardly broken. This division presents itself in its working and enjoying, which break apart into a *relation to actuality*, or *being-for-self*, and a *being-in-itself*. That relation to actuality is *altering* or *acting*, the being-for-self that belongs to the *individual* consciousness as such. But in this, consciousness is also *in itself*, and this side belongs to the unchangeable beyond. It consists of the abilities and forces, an alien gift, which the Unchangeable likewise leaves to consciousness for its use.

[221] In its activity, then, consciousness is at first in the relationship of two extremes. It stands on one side as the active here-and-now, and opposite it stands passive actuality. The two are related to each other, but both have also gone back into the Unchangeable and hold fast to themselves. So from each side only a surface detaches itself against the other and enters into the play of movement against it.—The extreme of actuality is sublated by the active extreme. But actuality, for its part, can be sublated only because its unchangeable essence itself sublates it, repels itself from itself, and surrenders what it has repelled to activity. The active force appears as *the power* in which actuality dissolves. But for that very reason, for this consciousness, to which the *in-itself*, or the essence, is something other than itself, this power, in the form in which it appears in activity, is the beyond of itself. So instead of returning into itself from its activity and having confirmed itself for itself, consciousness rather reflects this movement of activity back into the other extreme. That extreme is thereby presented as purely universal, as the absolute power from which the movement proceeded in every direction, and which is supposed to be the essence both of the self-decomposing extremes as they first appeared and of their alternation itself.

[222] The unchangeable consciousness *renounces* its shape and *surrenders* it; the individual consciousness in return *gives thanks*, that is, *denies* itself the satisfaction of the consciousness of its *independence*, and assigns the essence of activity away from itself to the beyond. Through these two moments of *mutual* self-*surrender* by both parties, consciousness does indeed attain its *unity* with the Unchangeable. But at the same time this unity is affected by separation, broken again within itself, and the opposition of universal and individual emerges from it once more. For consciousness renounces the satisfaction of its self-feeling only *in appearance*; it obtains the *actual* satisfaction of it. For *it has been* desire, work and enjoyment; *it*, as consciousness, has *willed*, *done* and *enjoyed*. Likewise its *thanksgiving*, in which it recognizes the other extreme as the essence and sublates itself, is itself *its own* activity. This activity counterbalances the activity of the other extreme and sets an *equal* activity against the self-surrendering benefaction. If the other extreme leaves it its *surface*, consciousness *also* gives thanks, and in doing so, by giving up its activity, that is, its *essence* itself, it actually does more than the other, which only repels a surface from itself. The whole movement is thus reflected into the *extreme of singularity* not only in actual desiring, working and enjoying, but even in thanksgiving itself, where the opposite seems to happen. In this, consciousness feels itself as this individual, and does not let itself be deceived by the appearance of its renunciation, for the truth of that renunciation is that it has not given itself up. What has come about is only the doubled reflection into the two extremes. The result is the renewed split into the opposed consciousness of the *Unchangeable* and the consciousness of the *opposing* willing, accomplishing and enjoying, and of the self-renunciation itself, that is, of *singularity that is for itself* in general.

[223] With this, the *third relationship* in the movement of this consciousness has come about. It emerges from the second as a consciousness that has in truth proved itself independent through its willing and accomplishing. In the first relationship it

was only the *concept* of actual consciousness, or the *inner heart*, which is not yet actual in activity and enjoyment. The *second* relationship is this actualization, as outward activity and enjoyment. Having returned from this, however, consciousness is one that has *experienced* itself as actual and effective consciousness, or for which it is *true* that it is *in and for itself*. But in this, the enemy has now been found in its very own shape. In the struggle of the heart, individual consciousness is present only as a musical, abstract moment. In work and enjoyment, as the realization of this essenceless being, it can immediately forget *itself*, and its conscious *ownness* in this actuality is struck down by thankful recognition. But this striking down is in truth a return of consciousness into itself, indeed into itself as the actuality that is true for it.

224 This third relationship, in which this true actuality is the one extreme, is the *relation* of that actuality, as nothingness, to the universal essence. The movement of this relation still remains to be considered.

225 To begin with the opposed relation of consciousness, in which its *reality* is for it *immediately a nothingness*: its actual doing becomes a doing of nothing, and its enjoyment becomes a feeling of its unhappiness. Doing and enjoyment thereby lose all *universal content and significance*, for if they had these, they would have a being in and for itself. Both withdraw into singularity, and consciousness is bent on sublating singularity. Consciousness is conscious of itself as *this actual individual* in the animal functions. These functions are not performed naturally, as something that is null in and for itself and can acquire no importance or essentiality for spirit. Since it is in them that the enemy shows itself in its characteristic shape, they become instead the object of earnest effort, and precisely what matters most. But this enemy renews itself in its very defeat. By fixing its attention on the enemy, consciousness, far from being freed from it, keeps dwelling on it and forever sees itself as defiled. At the same time, the content of its striving is not something essential but the lowest, not something universal but the most indi-

vidual. So all we see is a personality confined to itself and its petty doing, brooding over itself, as unhappy as it is impoverished.

[226] But with both of these, the feeling of its unhappiness and the poverty of its doing, the consciousness of its unity with the Unchangeable is equally linked. For the attempted immediate annihilation of its actual being is *mediated* by the thought of the Unchangeable and takes place within this *relation*. The *mediated* relation constitutes the essence of the negative movement in which consciousness turns against its singularity. This movement, however, as *relation in itself*, is equally positive, and it will bring forth this *unity* of consciousness for consciousness itself.

THE MEDIATOR AND SACRIFICE

Through a mediator it renounces its will, property and enjoyment, and the idea of reason emerges.

[227] This mediated relation is therefore a syllogism. In it, singularity, which at first fixes itself as opposed to the *in-itself*, is joined together with this other extreme only through a third term. Through this middle term, the extreme of the unchangeable consciousness is for the inessential consciousness. This also implies that the inessential consciousness is likewise for the unchangeable one only through this middle. The middle is thus one that presents each extreme to the other and acts as the mutual servant of each in its dealings with the other. This middle is itself a conscious being, for it is an activity that mediates consciousness as such. The content of this activity is the annihilation that consciousness carries out on its singularity.

[228] In this, then, consciousness frees itself from doing and enjoyment as *its own*. As an extreme that *is for itself*, it thrusts away from itself the essence of its *will*, and it casts onto the middle, or the servant, the ownness and freedom of decision, and with it the *guilt* for its doing. This mediator, being in immediate relation with the unchangeable essence, serves by giving *counsel* on what is right. Since the action is compliance with

someone else's decision, it ceases to be one's own as regards the doing or the *will*. But its *objective* side still remains for the inessential consciousness, namely the *fruit* of its labor and its *enjoyment*. This too, therefore, it thrusts away from itself. Just as it renounced its will, so it renounces the *actuality* it obtained in labor and enjoyment. It renounces this actuality *partly* as the attained truth of its self-conscious *independence*—by busying itself with something wholly alien to it, something without meaning for it, which it pictures to itself and utters; partly as *external property*—by giving up some of the possessions it acquired through labor; and partly it renounces the *enjoyment* it has had—by once again denying it to itself entirely in fasting and mortification.

229 Through these moments—the surrender of its own decision, then of its property and enjoyment, and finally the positive moment of carrying on a business it does not understand—it truly and completely deprives itself of the consciousness of inner and outer freedom, of actuality as its *being-for-self*. It has the certainty of having truly externalized its *I* and of having made its immediate self-consciousness into a *thing*, into an objective being. — Only through this *actual* sacrifice could it prove its renunciation of itself. For only in such sacrifice does the *deceit* vanish that lies in the *inner* recognition of giving thanks with heart, disposition and lips. That recognition does indeed shift all the power of being-for-self away from itself and ascribe it to a gift from above. But in this very shifting it keeps for itself its *outer* ownness, in the possessions it does not give up, and its *inner* ownness, in the consciousness of the decision it has itself made and in the consciousness of a content it has itself determined—a content it has not exchanged for an alien one that would fill it with what has no meaning for it.

230 But in the sacrifice actually carried out, just as consciousness has sublated its *doing* as its own, so too its *unhappiness* has *in itself* departed from it. That this departure has taken place *in itself*, however, is a doing of the other extreme of the syllogism, which is the essence *that is in itself*. Yet the sacrifice made by the

inessential extreme was at the same time not a one-sided doing; it contained within it the doing of the other extreme. For the surrender of one's own will is negative only in one respect, *according to its concept* or *in itself*. At the same time it is positive: it is the positing of the will as an *other*, and specifically of the will as not individual but universal. For this consciousness, the positive significance of the individual will posited negatively is the will of the other extreme. Precisely because this will is an other for consciousness, it comes to be for consciousness not through consciousness itself but through the third term, the mediator, as counsel. *For consciousness*, therefore, its will does indeed become the universal will, the will that is *in itself*; but *consciousness itself* is *not*, *to itself*, this *in-itself*. The surrender of its own will as *individual* is not, for it, the positive side of the universal will according to the concept. Likewise its surrender of possessions and enjoyment has only the same negative significance, and the universal that thereby comes to be for it is not, for it, its *own doing*. This *unity* of the objective and being-for-self lies in the *concept* of doing, and for that reason it comes to be for consciousness as essence and *object*. But just as this unity is not, for consciousness, the concept of its doing, so neither does it become an object *for consciousness* immediately and through consciousness itself. Instead, consciousness lets the mediating servant pronounce to it this certainty, itself still a broken one: that its unhappiness is only *in itself* the reverse, namely a doing that finds self-satisfaction in its doing, or blessed enjoyment; that its wretched doing is likewise only *in itself* the reverse, namely absolute doing; and that, according to the concept, doing is doing only as the doing of the individual as such. But *for consciousness itself*, doing, and its actual doing, remains a wretched doing, its enjoyment remains pain, and the sublatedness of both, in the positive sense, remains a *beyond*. Yet in this object, its doing and being, as the doing and being of this *individual* consciousness, are being and doing *in themselves*. In this object, therefore, the representation of *reason* has come to be for

consciousness: the representation of consciousness's certainty that in its singularity it is absolutely *in itself*, or is all reality.

Reason: Observing Reason

V. Gewißheit und Wahrheit der Vernunft; A. Beobachtende Vernunft
Reason's certainty of being all reality; the observation of nature and of mind, physiognomy and phrenology.

V. GEWISSHEIT UND WAHRHEIT DER VERNUNFT.

231 Consciousness returns into itself in the thought it has grasped: that the *individual* consciousness is *in itself* absolute essence. For the unhappy consciousness, *being-in-itself* is the *beyond* of itself. But its movement has accomplished this in it: it has posited individuality in its complete development, the individuality that is *actual consciousness*, as the *negative* of itself, namely as the *objective* extreme. In other words, it has wrested its being-for-self out of itself and made it into being. In this, its *unity* with this universal has also come to be for it. For us, this unity no longer falls outside consciousness, since the sublated individual is the universal. And since consciousness preserves itself in this its negativity, this unity is, in consciousness as such, its essence. Its truth is what, in the syllogism in which the extremes appeared held absolutely apart, appears as the middle term. This middle declares to the unchangeable consciousness that the individual has renounced itself, and to the individual that the Unchangeable is no longer an extreme for it but is reconciled with it. This middle is the unity that knows both immediately and relates them to each other. And the consciousness of their unity, which the middle declares to consciousness and thereby to *itself*, is the certainty of being all truth.

[232] Now that self-consciousness is reason, its hitherto negative relationship to otherness turns into a positive one. Until now it has been concerned only with its independence and freedom, with saving and preserving itself for itself at the expense of the *world*, or of its own actuality, both of which appeared to it as the negative of its essence. But as reason, assured of itself, it has attained peace toward them and can tolerate them. For it is certain of itself as reality, certain that all actuality is nothing other than itself. Its thinking is itself immediately actuality; it therefore relates to actuality as idealism. As it grasps itself in this way, it is as if the world only now came to be for it. Before, it did not understand the world. It desired the world and worked on it; it withdrew from it into itself and annihilated it for itself, and annihilated itself as consciousness—both as consciousness of the world as essence and as consciousness of the world's nothingness. Only here, after the grave of its truth has been lost, after the annihilation of its actuality has itself been annihilated, and after the individuality of consciousness has become for it absolute essence in itself, does it discover the world as *its own* new actual world. This world interests it in its enduring, just as before it interested it only in its vanishing. For the world's *subsistence* becomes for it its own *truth* and *presence*: it is certain of experiencing only itself there.[1]

[233] Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality: this is how idealism expresses the concept of reason. Consciousness, as it *comes on the scene* as reason, has that certainty in itself *immediately*; and just so, *idealism* expresses it *immediately*: I am I. This means that the I which is my object is not what it was in self-consciousness in general, merely an *empty* object in general, nor what it was in free self-consciousness, merely an object that withdraws from the others, which still hold good *alongside* it. Rather, it is an object with the consciousness of the *non-being* of any other: the sole object, all reality and presence.

1 The "grave" recalls the unhappy consciousness's search for the Unchangeable at the empty tomb of Christ, treated earlier in the section on the unhappy consciousness.

Self-consciousness, however, is all reality not only *for itself* but also *in itself* only by *becoming* this reality, or rather by *proving* itself to be such.[2] It proves itself so along *the way* on which, first, in the dialectical movement of meaning, perception and the understanding, otherness *in itself* vanishes; and then, in the movement through the independence of consciousness in lordship and bondage, through the thought of freedom, skeptical liberation, and the struggle for absolute liberation waged by the consciousness divided within itself, otherness, insofar as it is only *for consciousness*, vanishes *for consciousness itself*. Two sides appeared one after the other: one in which the essence, or the true, had for consciousness the determinateness of *being*, the other in which it had the determinateness of being only *for consciousness*. But both were reduced to one truth: that what *is*, or the *in-itself*, only is insofar as it is *for* consciousness, and that what is *for consciousness* is also *in itself*. The consciousness that is this truth has this way behind it and has forgotten it, since it comes on the scene *immediately* as reason; or, this reason that comes on the scene immediately does so only as the *certainty* of that truth. It thus only *assures* us that it is all reality, but does not itself comprehend this; for that forgotten way is the comprehending of this immediately expressed assertion. And likewise, to someone who has not traveled that way, this assertion is incomprehensible when they hear it in this pure form—though in a concrete shape they no doubt make it themselves.

234 The idealism that does not present that way but begins with this assertion is therefore also a pure *assurance*, which neither comprehends itself nor can make itself comprehensible to others. It expresses an *immediate certainty*, and it is confronted by other immediate certainties that have been lost only along that way. With equal right, therefore, the *assurances* of these other certainties take their place *alongside* the *assurance* of that certainty. Reason appeals to the *self*-consciousness of every consciousness: *I am I*; my object and essence is *I*. And no con-

2 "I am I" (Ich bin Ich) is the first principle of Fichte's Science of Knowledge (1794), the idealism chiefly in view here.

sciousness will deny reason this truth. But in basing that truth on this appeal, reason sanctions the truth of the other certainty, namely: *there is an other for me*. Something other than *I* is my object and essence; or, in being my own object and essence, *I* am so only by withdrawing from the other in general and taking my place as an actuality *alongside* it.—Only when reason comes on the scene as *reflection* out of this opposed certainty does its assertion about itself appear not merely as certainty and assurance but as *truth*—and not *alongside* other truths but as the *only* one. Its *immediate appearance on the scene* is the abstraction of its *being present*, whose *essence* and *being-in-itself* is the absolute Concept, that is, the *movement of its having come to be*. — Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness, or to its object, in different ways, depending on the particular stage of the world spirit becoming conscious of itself at which it happens to stand. How the world spirit in each case *immediately* finds and determines itself and its object, or how it is *for itself*, depends on what it has already *become*, or what it already is *in itself*.

235 Reason is the certainty of being all *reality*. But this *in-itself*, or this *reality*, is still something wholly universal, the pure *abstraction* of reality. It is the first *positivity* that self-consciousness *is in itself, for itself*; and the I is therefore only the *pure essentiality* of what is, or the simple *category*. The *category* formerly meant the essentiality of what is—*indeterminately*, whether of what is in general or of what is as opposed to consciousness. Now it is the *essentiality* or simple *unity* of what is, but only as thinking actuality. In other words, the category is this: that self-consciousness and being are the *same* essence—the *same* not by comparison but in and for itself.[3] Only a one-sided, bad idealism lets this unity step once more to one side as consciousness, with an *in-itself* facing it on the other.— 236 Now this category, or *simple* unity of self-consciousness and being, has *difference* in itself. For its essence is precisely this: to be immediately equal to itself in *otherness*, or in absolute difference. Difference therefore *is*; but it

3 In Aristotle the categories are the most general kinds of being; in Kant they are the pure concepts of the understanding.

is perfectly transparent, a difference that is at the same time no difference. It appears as a *plurality* of categories. Idealism pronounces the *simple unity* of self-consciousness to be all reality and makes it *immediately* into the essence, without having comprehended it as absolutely negative essence—and only such an essence has negation, determinateness or difference in itself. Hence this second claim is even more incomprehensible than the first: that there are *differences* or *species* in the category. This assurance in general, like the assurance of any *definite number* of species of the category, is a new assurance—but one that itself implies that we need no longer accept it as a mere assurance. For since *difference* begins in the pure I, in pure understanding itself, this means that here *immediacy*, *assuring* and *finding* are given up, and *comprehending* begins. But to take up the plurality of categories once more, in one way or another, as something found—from the judgments, for example—and to rest content with them in that form, must in fact be regarded as a disgrace to science. Where could the understanding still demonstrate any necessity, if it cannot do so in itself, which is pure necessity?[4]

Now since the pure essentiality of things, as well as their difference, thus belongs to reason, we could strictly speaking no longer talk of *things* at all—that is, of something that for consciousness would only be the negative of itself. For to say that the many categories are *species* of the pure category means that *the pure category* is still their *genus* or *essence*, not opposed to them. But they are already the ambiguous element, which at the same time has in itself, in its *plurality*, otherness *as against* the pure category. Through this plurality they in fact contradict it, and the pure unity must sublate them in itself, thereby constituting itself as the *negative unity* of the differences. But as *negative* unity it excludes from itself both the *differences* as such and that first *immediate* pure unity as such; and so it is *individuality*. This is a new category: excluding consciousness, that is, the category which is this—that *an other* is for it. Individuality is the

4 Kant derived his table of categories from the table of the logical forms of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781).

category's transition from its concept to an *external* reality: the pure *schema*, which is consciousness and, by being individuality and an excluding One, is just as much a pointing toward an other. But this *other* of this category is only the *other first categories*, namely *pure essentiality* and *pure difference*. And in individuality—that is, precisely in the positedness of the other, or in this other itself—consciousness is equally itself.[5] Each of these different moments points to another; yet in them no otherness is at the same time ever reached. The pure category points to the *species*, which pass over into the negative category, or individuality; but individuality points back to them. It is itself pure consciousness, which in each of them remains this clear unity with itself—a unity, however, that is likewise directed to an other, which in being has vanished, and in having vanished is also produced again.

237 Here we see pure consciousness posited in a twofold way. On the one hand, it is the restless *going back and forth* that runs through all its moments and sees otherness hovering before it in them, an otherness that sublates itself as soon as it is grasped. On the other hand, it is rather the *calm unity* certain of its truth. For this unity, that movement is the *other*; for this movement, however, the calm unity is the other; and consciousness and object alternate in these reciprocal determinations. So at one time consciousness is for itself the searching that goes back and forth, and its object is the *pure in-itself* and essence; at another, consciousness is for itself the simple category, and the object is the movement of the differences. But consciousness as essence is this whole course itself: passing over from itself as simple category into individuality and the object, intuiting this course in the object, sublating it as something distinct, *appropriating* it, and declaring itself to be this certainty of being all reality, both itself and its object.

238 Its first declaration is only this abstract, empty word: that everything is *its own*. For the certainty of being all reality is at

5 In Kant a schema is the rule, bound up with time, that connects a pure category to sensible intuition.

first only the pure category. This first reason, which knows itself in the object, is expressed by empty idealism. Empty idealism grasps reason only as reason at first is to itself; it points out in all being this pure *Mine* of consciousness, pronounces things to be sensations or representations, and fancies that it has thereby shown this Mine to be complete reality. It must therefore at the same time be absolute empiricism. For to *fill* the empty *Mine*—that is, for its difference and all its development and formation—its reason needs an alien impetus, in which alone the *manifoldness* of sensing or representing would lie.[6] This idealism therefore becomes the same kind of self-contradictory ambiguity as skepticism, except that where skepticism expresses itself negatively, idealism expresses itself positively. But it no more succeeds than skepticism in bringing together its contradictory thoughts: that pure consciousness is all reality, and equally that the alien impetus, or sensuous sensing and representing, is an equal reality. Instead it throws itself back and forth from one to the other and has fallen into the bad—that is, the sensuous—infinity. Since reason is all reality in the sense of the abstract *Mine*, and the *other* is an *indifferent alien* to it, what is posited here is precisely that knowing of an other by reason which appeared earlier as *meaning*, *perception*, and the *understanding* that grasps what is meant and perceived. At the same time, the very concept of this idealism asserts that such knowing is not true knowing, for only the unity of apperception is the truth of knowing. The pure reason of this idealism wants to reach this *other*, which is *essential* to it—that is, the *in-itself*—but which it does not have within itself; and so by its own doing it is sent back to that knowing which is not a knowing of the true. It thus knowingly and willingly condemns itself to an untrue knowing, and cannot let go of meaning and perceiving, which for it have no truth.[7] It finds itself in immediate contradiction: it asserts as

6 "Alien impetus" (fremder Anstoß) recalls Fichte's term for the external check that sets the I's activity going.

7 The "unity of apperception" is Kant's name for the unity of the "I think" that must be able to accompany all my representations.

the essence two things that are utterly opposed—the *unity of apperception* and equally the *thing*. Whether the thing is called *alien impetus*, or *empirical* essence, or *sensibility*, or *the thing in itself*, it remains in its concept the same thing, alien to that unity.[8]

239 This idealism is caught in this contradiction because it asserts the *abstract concept* of reason as the true. Hence reality arises for it immediately, and just as much, as a reality that is rather not the reality of reason—while reason at the same time was supposed to be all reality. Reason thus remains a restless searching, which in its very searching declares the satisfaction of finding to be utterly impossible.—But actual reason is not so inconsistent. Rather, being at first only the *certainty* of being all reality, it is conscious in this *concept* that, as *certainty*, as *I*, it is not yet reality in truth; and it is driven to raise its certainty to truth and to fill the *empty* Mine.

A. OBSERVING REASON

Reason turns to the world to find itself there, first by observing and describing things.

240 This consciousness, for which *being* has the meaning of what is *its own*, we now see entering again into meaning and perceiving—not, however, as into the certainty of something merely *other*, but with the certainty of being this other itself. Earlier, it merely *happened* to perceive and *experience* various things about the thing; here it makes the observations and conducts the experience itself. Meaning and perceiving, which earlier sublated themselves for us, are now sublated by consciousness for itself. Reason sets out to *know* the truth: to find as concept what for meaning and perceiving is a thing—that is, to have in thinghood only the consciousness of itself. Reason therefore now has a universal *interest* in the world, because it is the certainty of being present in the world, or the certainty that the present is

8 "The thing in itself" is Kant's term for things as they are apart from the way they appear to us.

rational. It seeks its other, knowing that in it it possesses nothing other than itself; it seeks only its own infinity.

[241] At first it merely has an inkling of itself in actuality, or knows actuality only as *its own* in general. In this sense it proceeds to take universal possession of the property assured to it, and plants the sign of its sovereignty on every height and in every depth. But this superficial Mine is not its ultimate interest. The joy of this universal taking of possession still finds in its property the alien other that abstract reason does not have within itself. Reason has an inkling of itself as a deeper essence than the pure I *is*. It must demand that difference, *manifold being*, become the I's very own; that the I intuit itself as *actuality* and find itself present as shape and thing. But even if reason rummages through all the entrails of things and opens all their veins so that it may leap out from them to meet itself, it will not attain this happiness. It must first have completed itself within itself in order then to be able to experience its completion.

[242] Consciousness *observes*; that is, reason wants to find and have itself as an existing object, in an *actual, sensuously present* mode. The consciousness engaged in this observing means and says, to be sure, that it wants to experience *not itself* but, on the contrary, *the essence of things as things*. That this *consciousness* means and says this lies in the fact that it *is* reason, but reason as such is not yet its object. If it knew *reason* to be the same essence of things and of itself, and knew that reason can be present in its characteristic shape only in consciousness, it would rather descend into its own depths and seek reason there than in things. If it had found reason in those depths, reason would be directed out again from there to actuality, in order to intuit its sensuous expression in actuality—but it would at once take that expression essentially as *concept*. Reason, as it *immediately* comes on the scene as the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality, takes its reality in the sense of the *immediacy of being*. Likewise, it takes the unity of the I with this objective essence in the sense of an *immediate unity*, in which it has not yet separated and reunited the moments of being and I—a unity,

in other words, that it has not yet cognized. It therefore approaches things as observing consciousness, in the belief that it takes them in truth as sensuous things opposed to the I. But its actual doing contradicts this belief. For it *cognizes* things: it transforms their sensuousness *into concepts*, that is, precisely into a being that is at the same time I. It thereby transforms thinking into a thinking that is, or being into a being that is thought; and it in fact asserts that things have truth only as concepts. For this observing consciousness, what emerges in this is only what *things* are; for us, however, it is what *consciousness itself* is. But the result of its movement will be that it becomes for itself what it is in itself.

243 *The doing* of observing reason is to be considered in the moments of its movement: how it takes up nature, spirit, and finally the relation of the two as sensuous being, and seeks itself as actuality that is.

A. OBSERVATION OF NATURE

Observation describes things, sorts them by distinguishing marks, and finds its classifications blurring.

244 When thoughtless consciousness proclaims observation and experience to be the source of truth, its words may well sound as if it were solely a matter of tasting, smelling, feeling, hearing and seeing. In its zeal to recommend tasting, smelling and so on, it forgets to say that it has in fact, just as essentially, already determined for itself the object of this sensing, and that this determination counts with it for at least as much as the sensing. It will also readily admit that it is not concerned with just any perceiving whatever, and that it will not, for example, allow the perception that this penknife lies next to this snuffbox to count as an observation. What is perceived should at least have the significance of something *universal*, not of a *sensuous this*.

245 This universal is thus at first only *what remains self-equal*; its movement is only the uniform recurrence of the same doing. To this extent, consciousness finds in the object only *universality* or

the *abstract Mine*, and so it must take the object's proper movement upon *itself*. Since it is not yet the understanding of the object, it must at least be its memory, which expresses in a universal way what in actuality is present only in an individual way. This superficial lifting-out from individuality, and the equally superficial form of universality into which the sensuous is merely taken up without having become universal in itself—the *describing* of things—does not yet have movement in the object itself. The movement is rather only in the describing. Once the object has been described, therefore, it has lost its interest. When one object has been described, another must be taken up, and the search must go on continually so that describing does not run out. If it is no longer so easy to find new *whole* things, one must go back to those already found, divide them further, take them apart, and track down still more new sides of thinghood in them. This restless, unquiet instinct can never lack material. To find a new, distinctive genus, or even a new planet—which, though an individual, has the nature of a universal—can fall only to the lucky. But the boundaries of what is *distinctive*, like the elephant, the oak or gold—of what is *genus* and *species*—pass through many stages into the endless *particularization* of chaotic animals and plants, of kinds of rock, or of metals, earths and so on, which can only be exhibited by means of force and artifice. In this realm of the indeterminacy of the universal, where particularization approaches *individualization* again and here and there even descends entirely into it once more, an inexhaustible supply is opened up for observing and describing. But here, at the boundary of the universal, where a field it cannot survey opens up before it, it may have found, instead of an immeasurable wealth, only the limits of nature and of its own doing. It can no longer know whether what seems to be in itself is not a contingency. What bears the stamp of a confused or immature, feeble formation, barely developing out of elemental indeterminacy, cannot lay claim even to being described.

[246] Although this searching and describing seem to be concerned only with things, we see that it does not in fact proceed

by *sensuous perception*. Rather, that by which things are *cognized* matters more to it than the remaining range of sensuous properties, which the thing itself no doubt cannot do without, but which consciousness can dispense with. Through this distinction into the *essential* and the *inessential*, the concept rises up out of sensuous dispersion, and cognition thereby declares that it is concerned at least as essentially with *itself* as with things. Faced with this double essentiality, it begins to waver over whether what is essential and necessary for *cognition* is also so in *things*. On the one hand, the *distinguishing marks* are supposed only to serve cognition, which uses them to distinguish things from one another. On the other hand, what is to be cognized is not what is inessential in things, but that by which they themselves *break free* from the universal continuity of being in general, *separate themselves* from the other and are *for themselves*. The distinguishing marks are supposed to have not only an essential relation to cognition but also to be the essential determinatenesses of things; and the artificial system is supposed to conform to the system of nature itself and to express only that. This is necessary on the basis of the concept of reason. And reason's instinct —for in this observing reason behaves only as instinct—has also achieved this unity in its systems, namely where its objects are themselves so constituted that they have an essentiality or a *being-for-self* in them, and are not merely the accident of this *moment* or this *here*. The distinguishing marks of animals, for example, are taken from their claws and teeth. For in fact it is not only cognition that thereby *distinguishes* one animal from another; the animal itself thereby *sets itself apart*. Through these weapons it maintains itself *for itself*, separate from the universal. The plant, by contrast, does not attain *being-for-self* but only touches the boundary of individuality. It is at this boundary, where it displays the semblance of *division* into sexes, that it has therefore been taken up and distinguished. What stands still lower, however, can no longer distinguish itself from what is other, but is lost as soon as it comes into opposition. *Being at rest* and *being in relation* come into conflict with each other: in rela-

tion the thing is something other than it is at rest, whereas the individual is precisely this—to maintain itself in relation to what is other.[9] But what cannot do this, and *chemically* becomes something other than it is *empirically*, confuses cognition and draws it into the same conflict over whether to hold to one side or the other, since the thing itself is nothing that remains the same, and in it the two sides fall apart.

247 In such systems of the universal that remains self-equal, therefore, the self-equal has the significance of being just as much the self-equal of cognition as of things themselves. But this spreading out of *the determinatenesses that remain the same*, each of which calmly traces the series of its progression and is given room to go its own way, passes over just as essentially into its opposite: into the confusion of these determinatenesses. For the distinguishing mark, the universal determinateness, is the unity of opposites, of the determinate and of what is universal in itself; it must therefore split apart into this opposition. Now if on one side the determinateness overcomes the universal in which it has its essence, on the other side the universal likewise maintains its dominion over the determinateness, drives it to its limit, and there mingles its differences and essentialities. Observation, which kept the determinatenesses neatly apart and believed it had something fixed in them, sees one principle reaching over into the others, sees transitions and confusions forming. In this it sees joined what it first took to be absolutely separate, and separated what it had counted together. So this holding fast to calm, self-equal being must see itself teased, precisely in its most universal determinations—for example, in what essential distinguishing marks the animal or the plant has—by instances that rob it of every determination, silence the universality to which it had risen, and set it back to thoughtless observing and describing.

248 This observing, which confines itself to the simple, or restricts sensuous dispersion by means of the universal, thus

9 Linnaeus classified plants by their reproductive organs, his so-called sexual system.

finds in its object the *confusion of its principle*, because the determinate must by its nature lose itself in its opposite. Reason must therefore move on from *inert* determinateness, which had the semblance of permanence, to observing determinateness as it is in truth, namely as *relating itself to its opposite*. What are called essential distinguishing marks are *resting* determinatenesses. Expressed and grasped as *simple*, they do not present what constitutes their nature: to be vanishing *moments* of the movement that takes itself back into itself.

THE SEARCH FOR LAWS

Reason looks for laws and, through experiment, purifies them of their tie to sensuous things.

The instinct of reason now comes to look for determinateness in keeping with its nature, which is essentially not to be for itself but to pass over into its opposite. In doing so it searches for the *law* and the *concept* of the law. It searches for them, to be sure, likewise as for an actuality that *is*; but this actuality will in fact vanish for it, and the sides of the law will become pure moments or abstractions. The law thus emerges in the nature of the concept, which has in itself obliterated the indifferent subsistence of sensuous actuality.

[249] For observing consciousness, the *truth of the law* lies in *experience*, as the mode in which *sensuous being is for it*—not in and for itself. But if the law does not have its truth in the concept, it is something contingent, not a necessity—in fact, not a law at all. Yet the fact that the law is essentially as concept not only does not conflict with its being present for observation; on the contrary, for that very reason it has necessary *existence* and is there for observation. The universal in the *sense of the universality of reason* is also universal in the sense that observing consciousness gives it: namely, that it presents itself *for* consciousness as what is present and actual, or that the concept presents itself in the mode of thinghood and sensuous being—but without thereby losing its nature and sinking into inert subsistence or

indifferent succession. What is universally valid is also universally in force; what *ought* to be in fact also *is*; and what merely *ought* to be, without *being*, has no truth. The instinct of reason, for its part, rightly holds fast to this. It does not let itself be led astray by thought-entities that only *ought* to be and, as an *ought*, are supposed to have truth, even though they are met with in no experience—neither by hypotheses nor by all the other invisible things of a perennial ought. For reason is precisely this certainty of having reality; and what is not for consciousness as a self-subsistent being—that is, what does not appear—is nothing at all for consciousness.

250 That the truth of the law is essentially *reality* does indeed, for this consciousness that stays with observing, become once more an *opposition* to the concept and to what is universal in itself. Something such as its law is, is not for it an essence of reason; it supposes that in the law it obtains something *alien*. But it refutes this supposition of its own by its deed. For in that deed it does not itself take its universality to mean that *all individual* sensuous things must have shown it the appearance of the law before it can assert the law's truth. That stones fall when lifted from the ground and let go—for this it by no means requires that the experiment be made with all stones. It may well say that the experiment must at least have been tried with very many stones, from which one can then infer to the rest with the greatest probability, or with full right *by analogy*. But analogy not only gives no full right; by its very nature it refutes itself so often that, to judge by analogy itself, analogy rather permits no inference at all. *Probability*, to which the result of analogy would be reduced, loses in the face of *truth* all distinction between lesser and greater probability; however great it may be, it is nothing compared with truth. The instinct of reason, however, does in fact accept such laws as *truth*. Only in relation to their necessity, which it does not cognize, does it fall into this distinction and degrade the truth of the matter itself to probability. It does so to indicate the imperfect way in which truth is present for a consciousness that has not yet attained insight into

the pure concept; for universality is present only as *simple, immediate* universality. But at the same time, because of this universality, the law has truth for consciousness. That the stone falls is true for it because the stone is *heavy* for it—that is, because in its heaviness the stone has, *in and for itself*, the essential relation *to the earth* that expresses itself as falling. Consciousness thus has in experience the *being* of the law, but equally has the law as *concept*; and only *because of both circumstances* together is the law true for it. The law counts as law because it presents itself in appearance and is at the same time in itself concept.

[251] Because the law is at the same time *in itself a concept*, the instinct of reason in this consciousness necessarily sets out, without knowing that this is what it wants, to *purify* the law and its moments *into the concept*. It conducts experiments on the law. As the law first appears, it presents itself impurely, wrapped in individual sensuous being, with the concept that makes up its nature sunk in empirical material. In its experiments the instinct of reason aims to find out what follows under this or that set of circumstances. This seems only to plunge the law all the deeper into sensuous being. In fact, however, that sensuous being is lost in the process. The inner significance of this research is to find *pure conditions of* the law. The consciousness that expresses itself this way may think it is saying something else, but this means nothing other than raising the law entirely into the shape of the concept and *eradicating* every attachment of *its moments* to *determinate being*. Negative electricity, for example, may at first announce itself as *resinous* electricity, just as positive electricity announces itself as *vitreous* electricity. Through the experiments it loses this significance completely and becomes purely *positive* and *negative* electricity, neither of which belongs any longer to a particular kind of thing. It then ceases to be possible to say that there are bodies that are positively electric and others that are negatively electric.[10] In the

10 "Vitreous" and "resinous" electricity were the 18th-century names, going back to Charles du Fay (1733), for the charges produced by rubbing glass and resin.

same way, the relation of acid and base, and their movement toward each other, constitute a law in which these opposites appear as bodies. But these separated things have no actuality. The power that tears them apart cannot prevent them from immediately entering into a process again, for they are nothing but this relation. They cannot, like a tooth or a claw, remain on their own and be displayed that way. It is their essence to pass immediately into a neutral product, and this makes their *being* a being that is sublated in itself, or a universal being. Acid and base have truth only *as universals*. Glass and resin can be positively as well as negatively electric. In just the same way, acid and base are not bound as a property to this or that *actuality*; rather, every thing is only *relatively* acid or basic. What seems to be a decided base or acid takes on the opposite significance in relation to another thing in the so-called synsomaties.—In this way the result of the experiments sublates the moments or "spiritualizations" as properties of determinate things, and frees the predicates from their subjects. These predicates are found only as universals, which is what they are in truth. Because of this self-sufficiency they are therefore given the name of *matters*, which are neither bodies nor properties. And one takes good care not to call oxygen and the like, positive and negative electricity, heat and the like,[11] bodies.

252 *Matter*, by contrast, is not an *existing thing* but being as *universal*, or being in the manner of the concept. Reason, which is still instinct, makes this correct distinction without being conscious of what it is doing. By testing the law on all sensuous being, it is precisely thereby sublating the law's merely sensuous being. And by grasping the law's moments as *matters*, it has made their essentiality into something universal for it, and has expressed that essentiality, in this expression, as a non-sensuous sensuous thing, as an incorporeal and yet objective being.

253 We must now see what turn its result takes for this instinct, and what new shape of its observing thereby emerges. As the

truth of this experimenting consciousness we see the pure law, which frees itself from sensuous being. We see it as a *concept* that is present in sensuous being but moves self-sufficiently and unbound within it: immersed in sensuous being yet free of it, a *simple* concept. What is in truth the *result* and the *essence* now itself appears for this consciousness, but as an *object*. And since for this consciousness it is precisely not a *result*, and has no relation to the preceding movement, it appears as a *particular kind* of object, and consciousness's relation to it appears as a different kind of observing.

THE ORGANIC

Observation turns to living things, which preserve themselves and are purposes in their own right.

254 Such an object, which has the process within it in the *simplicity* of the concept, is the *organic*. The organic is this absolute fluidity in which the determinateness through which it would be only *for another* is dissolved. The inorganic thing has determinateness as its essence. For that reason it makes up the complete set of the moments of the concept only together with another thing, and so it is lost when it enters into the movement. In the organic being, by contrast, all the determinatenesses through which it is open to another are bound together under the simple organic unity. None of them appears as essential in such a way that it would relate itself freely to another; and so the organic preserves itself in its very relation.

255 As follows from this determination, the *sides* of the *law* that the instinct of reason here sets out to observe are, to begin with, *organic* nature and *inorganic* nature in their relation to each other. For organic nature, inorganic nature is precisely the freedom of *unbound* determinatenesses, opposed to organic nature's *simple concept*. In these determinatenesses the individual nature

11 "Synsomaties" (chemical combinations of bodies) is a term of the Hungarian chemist Jakob Joseph Winterl (1739–1809); "spiritualizations" (Begeistungen) likewise echoes his talk of active principles of acidity and basicity.

is *at the same time dissolved*; and *at the same time* it separates itself from their continuity and is *for itself*. Air, water, earth, zones and climate are universal elements of this kind. They make up the indeterminate, simple essence of individualities, and in them the individualities are at the same time reflected into themselves. Neither individuality nor the elemental is simply in and for itself. Rather, in the self-sufficient freedom in which they appear over against each other for observation, they relate to each other at the same time as *essential relations*—but in such a way that the self-sufficiency and indifference of the two toward each other predominate, and pass over only in part into abstraction. Here, then, the law is present as the relation of an element to the formation of the organic. The organic at one time has elemental being over against it, and at another time exhibits it in its organic reflection. But such *laws* as these—that animals belonging to the air are of the nature of birds, those belonging to the water of the nature of fish, that northern animals have thick fur, and so on—at once show a poverty that does not correspond to the diversity of the organic. Organic freedom knows how to withdraw its forms from these determinations again, and necessarily offers exceptions everywhere to such laws, or rules, or whatever one wants to call them. But besides this, even for the animals that do fall under them, the determination remains so superficial that the expression of its necessity cannot be anything but superficial either, and gets no further than "*great influence*"—where one does not know what really belongs to this influence and what does not. Such relations of the organic to the elemental are therefore in fact not to be called *laws*. For one thing, as already mentioned, such a relation by its content does not at all exhaust the range of the organic. For another, the moments of the relation themselves remain indifferent to each other and express no necessity. The *concept* of base lies in the concept of acid, just as negative electricity lies in the concept of positive electricity. But however often thick fur may be *found* together with the north, or the structure of fish with water, or the structure of birds with air, the concept of thick fur does not

lie in the concept of the north, nor the concept of the structure of fish in that of the sea, nor that of the structure of birds in that of the air. Because of this freedom of the two sides from each other, there also *are* land animals that have the essential characteristics of a bird, of a fish, and so on. Since the necessity cannot be grasped as an inner necessity of the essence, it also ceases to have sensuous existence and can no longer be observed in actuality; it has *stepped out* of actuality. Since it is not found in the real being itself, it is what is called teleological relation—a relation that is *external* to the things related, and therefore rather the opposite of a law. It is thought wholly freed from necessary nature, thought that leaves nature behind and moves on its own above it.

256 The relation of the organic to elemental nature touched on above does not express the essence of the organic; that essence, by contrast, is contained in the *concept of purpose*. For this observing consciousness, it is true, the concept of purpose is not the organic's own *essence*. For it, the concept falls outside the organic, and is then only that external, *teleological* relation. But as the organic was determined earlier, it is in fact the real purpose itself. For in *preserving itself* in its relation to another, it is precisely that natural being in which nature reflects itself into the concept, and in which the moments laid apart in necessity—a cause and an effect, an active and a passive—are taken together into one. So here something does not appear merely as the *result* of necessity. Rather, because it has returned into itself, the last, or the result, is just as much the *first*, which begins the movement, and is for itself the *purpose* that it actualizes. The organic does not produce something; it only *preserves itself*. In other words, what is produced is already present just as much as it is produced.

257 This determination must be discussed more closely, both as it is in itself and as it is for the instinct of reason, in order to see how that instinct finds itself in it but does not recognize itself in what it has found. The concept of purpose, then, to which observing reason rises, is present as an *actual* thing just

as much as it is reason's *conscious concept*. And it is not merely an *external relation* of this actual thing but its *essence*. This actual thing, which is itself a purpose, relates itself purposively to another. That is, its relation is a contingent one *as far as what the two immediately are is concerned:* immediately, both are self-sufficient and indifferent to each other. But the essence of their relation is other than what they seem to be in this way, and their doing has a different sense from the one it has *immediately* for sensuous perceiving. The necessity is hidden in what happens and shows itself only *at the end*—but in such a way that this very end shows that the necessity was also the first. The end shows this priority of itself, however, by the fact that nothing comes out of the alteration the doing has brought about except what already was. Or, if we begin from the first, then at its end, or in the result of its doing, this first only returns to itself. Precisely by doing so it shows itself to be something that has *itself* as its end—and so, as first, it has already come back to itself, or is *in and for itself*. What it attains through the movement of its doing, then, is *itself;* and that it attains only itself is its *self-feeling*. There is indeed a distinction here between *what it is* and *what it seeks*, but this is only the *semblance of a distinction*, and by this it is concept in its own self.

258 *Self-consciousness*, however, is constituted in just the same way: it distinguishes itself from itself in such a way that at the same time no distinction results. So in observing organic nature it finds nothing other than this essence. It finds itself as a thing, *as a life*, yet it still makes a distinction between what it itself is and what it has found—a distinction that is none. The instinct of the animal seeks food and consumes it, but thereby brings forth nothing other than itself. Just so, the instinct of reason, in its seeking, finds only reason itself. The animal ends with self-feeling. The instinct of reason, on the other hand, is at the same time self-consciousness. But because it is only instinct, it is set to one side over against consciousness and has its opposite in it. Its satisfaction is therefore split in two by this opposite. It does indeed find itself—namely, the *purpose*—and likewise finds this

purpose as a *thing*. But, first, for the instinct of reason the purpose falls *outside the thing* that presents itself as purpose. Second, this purpose as purpose is at the same time *objective*, and so for the instinct it does not fall within itself as consciousness either, but in another understanding.

259 Looked at more closely, this determination lies just as much in the concept of the thing—in the concept that it is *a purpose in its own self*. The thing *preserves itself;* and that means at the same time that it is its nature to conceal necessity and to present it in the form of *contingent* relation. For its freedom, or *being-for-self*, is precisely this: to relate itself to what is necessary to it as something indifferent. It thus presents itself as something whose concept falls outside its being. Reason, likewise, necessarily intuits its own concept as falling outside it, and hence as a *thing*—as something to which reason is *indifferent*, and which is thus, in turn, indifferent to reason and to its own concept. As instinct, reason also stays put within this *being*, or this *indifference*. For the instinct, the thing that expresses the concept remains something other than this concept, and the concept something other than the thing. So for reason the organic thing is a *purpose* in its own self only in such a way that the necessity falls outside the organic itself—the necessity that presents itself as hidden in the thing's doing, since in that doing what acts relates itself as something indifferent, something that is for itself.—But since the organic, as a purpose in its own self, cannot behave in any other way than as such a purpose, it is also apparent and sensuously present that it is a purpose in its own self, and it is observed as such. The organic shows itself as something that *preserves* itself, that *returns* and *has returned* into itself. But in this being, this observing consciousness does not recognize the concept of purpose. That is, it does not recognize that the concept of purpose exists not somewhere else, in an understanding, but precisely here, and is as a thing. It makes a distinction between the concept of purpose on the one hand, and being-for-self and self-preservation on the other—a distinction that is none. That it is none is not for this consciousness. What is

for it is a doing that appears contingent and indifferent to what comes about through it; and the unity that nevertheless ties the two together—that doing and this purpose—falls apart for it.

260 On this view, what belongs to the organic itself is the doing that lies midway between its first and its last, insofar as this doing has the character of singularity. But doing insofar as it has the character of universality, where the doer is posited as identical with what it produces—purposive doing as such—would not belong to the organic. That singular doing, which is only a means, comes through its singularity under the determination of a wholly singular, or contingent, necessity. What the organic does to preserve itself as an individual, or itself as a genus, is therefore entirely lawless as far as this immediate content goes; for the universal and the concept fall outside it. Its doing would thus be empty efficacy with no content of its own. It would not even be the efficacy of a machine, for a machine has a purpose, and its efficacy therefore has a determinate content. Abandoned in this way by the universal, it would be the activity only of something that is, *as* something that *is*—that is, an activity not at the same time reflected into itself, like the activity of an acid or a base. It would be an efficacy that could neither separate itself from its immediate existence, nor give up that existence—which is lost in the relation to its opposite—and still preserve itself. But the being whose efficacy is under consideration here is posited as a thing that *preserves itself* in its relation to its opposite. *Activity* as such is nothing but the pure, essenceless form of its being-for-self; and the substance of this activity, which is not merely determinate being but the universal—its *purpose*—does not fall outside it. It is activity that in its own self returns into itself, not activity turned back into itself by something alien.

261 This unity of universality and activity, however, is not for this *observing* consciousness. That unity is essentially the inner movement of the organic and can be grasped only as concept, whereas observation looks for the moments in the form of *being* and *permanence*. And the organic whole is essentially this: not to

have the moments in it in that way, and not to let them be found in it. Because of this, consciousness in its view transforms the opposition into one that fits that view.

THE OUTER AS EXPRESSION OF THE INNER

Observation seeks laws linking organic properties to bodily systems, and finds only empty quantitative ones.

262 In this way the organic being arises for consciousness as a relation of two moments that *are* and are *fixed*. It is an opposition whose two sides, on the one hand, seem to be given to consciousness in observation, and on the other hand, by their content, express the opposition of the organic *concept of purpose* and *actuality*. But because the concept as such is effaced here, they express it in an obscure and superficial way, in which thought has sunk down into representation. So we see the first meant, roughly, by the *inner*, the other by the *outer*; and their relation produces the law that *the outer is the expression of the inner*.

263 If we consider this inner with its opposite, and their relation to each other, more closely, it turns out, first, that the two sides of the law no longer read as they did in earlier laws, where they appeared as self-sufficient *things*, each as a particular body. Nor, second, are they such that the universal is supposed to have its existence somewhere else, *outside what is*. Rather, the organic being, undivided, is laid down as the basis, as the content of the inner and the outer, and is the same for both. The opposition is thereby now only a purely formal one, whose real sides have the same *in-itself* as their essence. At the same time, though, inner and outer are also opposed realities, and a being that is different for observation; so to observation each of them seems to have a content of its own. But since this distinctive content is the same substance, or organic unity, it can in fact be only a different form of that substance; and the observing consciousness indicates this when it says that the outer is only the *expression* of the inner.—We have already seen the same determinations of the relation in the concept of purpose: namely, the indifferent self-

sufficiency of the different sides, and within it their unity, in which they vanish.

264 We must now see what *shape* the inner and the outer have in their being. The inner as such must have an outer being and a shape just as much as the outer as such does. For it is an object, or is itself posited as something that is, and as present for observation.

265 Organic substance as *inner* is the *simple* soul, the pure *concept of purpose*, or the *universal*. In its division the universal remains universal fluidity just the same, and therefore appears in its *being* as the *doing* or *movement* of *vanishing* actuality. The *outer*, by contrast, opposed to that inner which is, consists in the *resting being* of the organic. The law, as the relation of that inner to this outer, therefore expresses its content in two ways: once in the presentation of universal *moments* or *simple essentialities*, and again in the presentation of the actualized essentiality, or the *shape*. Those first, simple organic *properties*, if we may call them that, are *sensibility, irritability* and *reproduction*.[12] These properties, or at least the first two, do seem to refer not to the organism in general but only to the animal organism. And the plant organism does in fact express only the simple concept of the organism, which does *not develop* its moments. So with regard to these moments, insofar as they are supposed to be there for observation, we must keep to the organism that presents their developed existence.

266 As for the properties themselves, they follow immediately from the concept of self-purpose. *Sensibility* expresses in general the simple concept of organic reflection into itself, or its universal fluidity. *Irritability* expresses organic elasticity, the capacity to behave at the same time *reactively* in reflection; it expresses the actualization opposed to the first, quiet *being-within-itself*, an actualization in which that abstract being-for-self is a being *for another*. *Reproduction*, however, is the action of this *whole* organ-

12 This triad was standard in German physiology and philosophy of nature around 1800 (Kielmeyer, Schelling), building on Albrecht von Haller's distinction between sensibility and irritability.

ism reflected into itself, its activity as purpose in itself, or as *genus*. In it the individual repels itself from itself and, generating, repeats either its organic parts or the whole individual. Taken in the sense of *self-preservation in general*, reproduction expresses the formal concept of the organic, or sensibility. But it is really the real organic concept, or the *whole*, which returns into itself—as individual, by producing the single parts of itself, or as genus, by producing individuals.

[267] The *other significance* of these organic elements, namely as the *outer*, is their *shaped* mode, in which they are present as *actual* parts, but at the same time also as *universal* parts, or organic *systems*: sensibility, say, as the nervous system, irritability as the muscular system, reproduction as the viscera that serve the preservation of the individual and the genus.

[268] Laws distinctive of the organic therefore concern a relation of the organic moments in their twofold significance: at one time to be a *part* of the organic *configuration*, at another to be a *universal, fluid* determinateness that runs through all those systems. In the expression of such a law, then, a determinate *sensibility*, for example, as a moment of the *whole* organism, would have its expression in a nervous system of a determinate formation; or it would be linked with a determinate *reproduction* of the organic parts of the individual, or with the propagation of the whole, and so on.—Both sides of such a law can be *observed*. The *outer*, by its concept, is *being for another*. Sensibility, for example, has its immediately actualized mode in the sensitive *system*; and as a *universal property* it is equally something objective in its *manifestations*. The side called the *inner* has its *own outer* side, which is distinct from what is called the *outer* in the whole.

[269] So the two sides of an organic law could certainly be observed, but not laws of their relation. And observation falls short not because, *as observation*, it is too short-sighted—as if one ought not to proceed empirically but should start from the idea. For such laws, if they were anything real, would in fact have to be actually present, and so would be observable. Observation

falls short, rather, because the thought of laws of this kind proves to have no truth.

[270] For a law, what emerged was the relation in which the universal organic *property* had made itself into a thing in an organic *system* and had its shaped imprint in it, so that the two would be the same essence, present once as universal moment and once as thing. But beyond this, the side of the inner is also, by itself, a relation of several sides. So the first thought of a law that presents itself is that of a relation of the universal organic activities or properties to one another. Whether such a law is possible must be decided from the nature of such a property. Such a property, however, as a universal fluidity, is on the one hand not something limited in the manner of a thing, holding itself within the distinction of an existence that would make up its shape. Rather, sensibility goes beyond the nervous system and through all the other systems of the organism. On the other hand, it is a universal *moment*, essentially undivided from and inseparable from reaction, or irritability, and reproduction. For as reflection into itself it has reaction absolutely within it. Mere being-reflected-into-itself is passivity, or dead being, not sensibility—just as action, which is the same as reaction, is not irritability without being-reflected-into-itself. Reflection in action or reaction, and action or reaction in reflection, is precisely that whose unity constitutes the organic—a unity synonymous with organic reproduction. It follows from this—to consider first the relation of sensibility and irritability to each other—that in every mode of actuality the same *magnitude* of sensibility must be present as of irritability; and that an organic phenomenon can be grasped and determined, or, if you like, explained, just as well in terms of the one as of the other. What one person takes, say, for high sensibility, another can just as well regard as high irritability, and as irritability *just as high*. If they are called *factors*, and this is not meant to be a meaningless word, then this very name states that they are *moments* of the concept. So the real object whose essence this concept constitutes has them in it in the same way; and if it is determined by the one as very sens-

itive, it must equally be described by the other as just as irritable.

271 If they are distinguished, as they must be, they are distinguished according to the concept, and their opposition is *qualitative*. But when, beyond this true difference, they are also posited as different in the way things that are differ, and for representation, as they might be sides of the law, they appear as *quantitatively* different. Their distinctive qualitative opposition thus passes over into *magnitude*. Laws then arise of the kind that, for example, sensibility and irritability stand in inverse ratio of their magnitude, so that as the one increases, the other decreases. Or better, taking magnitude itself straightaway as the content: that the magnitude of something increases as its smallness decreases.[13] — But suppose this law is given a determinate content: say, that the size of a hole *increases* the more what fills it *decreases*. Then this inverse ratio can just as well be turned into a direct one and expressed as: the size of the hole *increases* in direct ratio to the amount taken away. This is a *tautological* proposition, whether it is expressed as a direct or an inverse ratio. In its proper expression it means only that a magnitude increases as this magnitude increases. The hole, and what fills it and is taken away, are qualitatively opposed; but what is real in them, and its determinate magnitude in both, is one and the same. Likewise, increase of magnitude and decrease of smallness are the same, and their meaningless opposition runs out into a tautology. In just the same way the organic moments are inseparable in what is real in them, and in their magnitude, which is the magnitude of that reality. One decreases only along with the other and increases only along with it, for each has meaning absolutely only insofar as the other is present. Or rather, it is indifferent whether an organic phenomenon is considered as irritability or as sensibility—both in general, and equally when its magnitude is being discussed. It is just as indifferent whether one describes the enlargement of a hole as an increase of the hole as empti-

13 Hegel is alluding to the law, stated by Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer (1793) and taken up by Schelling, that sensibility and irritability vary inversely across organisms.

ness or as an increase of the filling taken out of it. Or a number, say *three*, remains equally large whether I take it as positive or as negative; and if I increase the three to four, the positive and the negative alike have become four. In the same way the south pole of a magnet is exactly as strong as its north pole, and a positive electricity, or an acid, exactly as strong as its negative, or as the base on which it acts.—A magnitude of this kind, such as that three, or a magnet, and so on, is what an organic *existence* is. It is what is increased and diminished; and when it is increased, *both* its factors are increased, just as *both* poles of the magnet, or both electricities, increase when a magnet or the like is strengthened. —Nor can the two differ in *intension* and *extension*: the idea that one could decrease in extension while increasing in intension, while the other, conversely, was supposed to diminish its intension while increasing in extension, falls under the same concept of empty opposition. Real intension is likewise absolutely just as great as extension, and vice versa.

272 Clearly, then, what really happens in this lawgiving is this. At first irritability and sensibility make up the determinate organic opposition. But this content is lost, and the opposition dissipates into the formal opposition of increase and decrease of magnitude, or of differing intension and extension—an opposition that no longer has anything to do with the nature of sensibility and irritability and no longer expresses it. That is why such an empty game of lawgiving is not tied to the organic moments. It can be played anywhere, with anything, and rests in general on unfamiliarity with the logical nature of these oppositions.

273 Finally, if instead of sensibility and irritability it is reproduction that is brought into relation with one or the other, then even the occasion for this lawgiving falls away. For reproduction does not stand in opposition to those moments as they stand to each other; and since this lawgiving rests on that opposition, here even the semblance of its taking place falls away.

274 The lawgiving just considered contains the distinctions of the organism in their significance as moments of its *concept*, and should really be an a priori lawgiving. But it essentially contains

within itself the thought that these distinctions have the significance of *things that are present*; and the merely observing consciousness has in any case only their existence to keep to. Organic actuality necessarily has in it such an opposition as its concept expresses, an opposition that can be determined as irritability and sensibility—just as both of these in turn appear different from reproduction. — The *externality* in which the moments of the organic concept are considered here is the inner's *own immediate* externality. It is not the *outer* that is the outer in the whole, and *shape*, and with which the inner is to be considered in relation later on.

[275] But if the opposition of the moments is grasped as it is in existence, then sensibility, irritability and reproduction sink down to common *properties*, universalities just as indifferent to one another as specific gravity, color, hardness and so on. In this sense it can certainly be observed that one organism is more sensitive, or more irritable, or of greater reproductive power than another;—or that the sensibility, etc., of one differs in *kind* from that of another, that one responds to particular stimuli differently from another, as the horse responds differently to oats than to hay, and the dog differently again to both, and so on. All this can be observed just as much as it can be observed that one body is harder than another, and so on. — But these sensuous properties—hardness, color and so on—like the phenomena of receptiveness to the stimulus of oats, of irritability for loads, or of the number and kind of young borne, essentially resist any lawfulness when they are related to and compared with one another. For the determinateness of their *sensuous being* consists precisely in existing in complete indifference to one another. What they display is not the unity of a relation but the freedom of nature released from the concept; not the moments of the concept themselves, but nature's irrational playing back and forth between those moments on the scale of contingent magnitude.

[276] The *other* side, according to which the simple moments of the organic concept are compared with the moments of the *con-*

figuration, would at last yield the law proper, the law that would state the true *outer* as the imprint of the *inner*.—Now since those simple moments are pervasive, fluid properties, they do not have, in the organic thing, a separated-out real expression of the kind that is called a single system of the shape. Or, if the abstract idea of the organism is truly expressed in those three moments only because they are nothing static but only moments of the concept and of movement, then the organism as configuration, by contrast, is not contained in three determinate systems of the kind that anatomy lays out. Insofar as such systems are supposed to be found in their actuality, and legitimated by this finding, it must also be pointed out that anatomy exhibits not just three such systems but a great many more.—Then, setting this aside, the sensitive *system* must in general mean something quite different from what is called the *nervous system*; the irritable *system* something different from the *muscular system*; the reproductive *system* something different from the *viscera* of reproduction. In the systems of *shape* as such, the organism is grasped from the abstract side of dead existence. Its moments, taken up in this way, belong to anatomy and the corpse, not to cognition and the living organism. As parts of this kind they have in fact ceased *to be*, for they cease to be processes. The *being* of the organism is essentially universality, or reflection into itself. So the *being* of its whole, like its moments, cannot consist in an anatomical system. Rather, their actual expression and externality are present only as a movement that runs its course through the various parts of the configuration; and in this movement whatever is torn out and fixed as a single system presents itself essentially as a fluid moment. So it is not actuality as anatomy finds it that may count as their reality, but only actuality as process—in which alone the anatomical parts, too, have a meaning.

277 The result, then, is this. The moments of the organic *inner*, taken by themselves, are not capable of furnishing sides of a law of being. For in such a law they would be predicated of an existence and distinguished from one another, and it would not be

possible to name each of them equally well in place of the other. Nor, when they are placed on one side, do they have their realization on the other side in a fixed system. For such a fixed system is just as little something that would have organic truth at all as it is the expression of those moments of the inner. Rather, what is essential to the organic, since it is in itself the universal, is in general to have its moments in actuality as equally universal—that is, as processes running through the whole—and not to give an image of the universal in an isolated thing.

278 In this way the *representation* of a *law* is lost altogether in the case of the organic. The law aims to grasp and express the opposition as resting sides, and in them the determinateness that is their relation to each other. The *inner*, to which the appearing universality belongs, and the *outer*, to which the parts of the resting shape belong, were supposed to make up the corresponding sides of the law. But held apart in this way, they lose their organic significance. And the representation of law is based precisely on this: that its two sides have an indifferent subsistence, one that is for itself, and that the relation is distributed between them as a twofold, mutually corresponding determinateness. Each side of the organic, rather, is in its own self this: to be simple universality, in which all determinations are dissolved, and to be the movement of this dissolving.

279 Insight into how this lawgiving differs from earlier forms will throw full light on its nature.—Let us look back, that is, on the movement of perceiving and of the understanding, which in that movement reflects itself into itself and thereby determines its object. There the understanding does not have before it, in its object, the *relation* of these abstract determinations—the universal and the singular, the essential and the external. Rather, it is itself the transition, and this transition does not become objective to it. Here, by contrast, the organic unity—that is, precisely the relation of those opposites, a relation that is pure transition—is itself the *object*. This transition, in its simplicity, is immediately *universality*. And since universality enters into difference, whose relation the law is supposed to express, the law's

moments are objects of this consciousness *as universal* ones, and the law states that the *outer* is the expression of the *inner*. Here the understanding has grasped *the thought* of law itself, whereas before it merely sought laws in general, and their moments hovered before it as a determinate content, not as the thoughts of them.—As regards content, then, what is to be obtained here are not laws that merely calmly take up differences that purely *are* into the form of universality. They are to be laws that, in these differences, immediately have the unrest of the concept as well, and with it, at the same time, the necessity of the relation of the sides. But the object, the organic unity, immediately unites infinite sublation, or the absolute negation of being, with calm being, and its moments are essentially *pure transition*. Precisely because of this, no sides *that are* result of the kind the law requires.

280 To obtain such sides, the understanding must hold on to the other moment of the organic relation: namely, the *being-reflected-into-itself* of organic existence. But this being is so completely reflected into itself that no determinateness over against another is left to it. *Immediate* sensuous being is immediately one with determinateness as such, and therefore expresses a qualitative difference in itself—as, for example, blue against red, acid against alkaline, and so on. But organic being that has returned into itself is completely indifferent to another. Its existence is simple universality, and it denies observation any lasting sensuous differences; or, what is the same thing, it shows its essential determinateness only as the *alternation* of determinatenesses *that are*. So the way the difference expresses itself as a difference that *is* is precisely this: that it is an *indifferent* difference, that is, *magnitude*. But in this the concept is effaced and necessity has vanished.—The content and filling of this indifferent being, however—the alternation of sensuous determinations—when taken together into the simplicity of an organic determination, then at the same time expresses this: that the content does not have precisely that determinateness, the determinate-

ness of the immediate property; and the qualitative falls solely into magnitude, as we saw above.

281 What is objective, when grasped as organic determinateness, has the concept in its own self, and this distinguishes it from what is there for the understanding when it behaves as purely perceiving in grasping the content of its laws. Even so, that grasping falls back entirely into the principle and manner of the merely perceiving understanding, because what is grasped is used for the moments of a *law*. For in this way it takes on the character of a fixed determinateness, the form of an immediate property or of a resting phenomenon. It is further taken up into the determination of magnitude, and the nature of the concept is suppressed. — The exchange of something merely perceived for something reflected into itself, of a merely sensuous determinateness for an organic one, thus loses its value once again—and it does so because the understanding has not yet sublated lawgiving.

282 Let us make the comparison with regard to this exchange by way of a few examples. Something that for perception is an animal with strong muscles is determined, say, as an animal organism of high irritability. What for perception is a state of great weakness is determined as a state of high sensibility, or, if one prefers, as an abnormal affection, and indeed a potentiation of it (expressions that translate the sensuous not into the Concept but into German-Latin). The understanding can also express the fact that the animal has strong muscles by saying that the animal possesses great *muscular force*—just as it can express great weakness as little *force*.[14] Determination by irritability has this advantage over determination as *force*: force expresses reflection into itself indeterminately, irritability expresses it determinately, for the *distinctive* force of muscle is precisely irritability. It also has this advantage over determination as *strong muscles*: as already in force, reflection into itself is at the same time contained in it. In the same way, weakness or

14 "Potentiation" (*Potenzierung*) belongs to the vocabulary of Schelling's philosophy of nature; Hegel mocks such Latinate coinages as "German-Latin."

little force, *organic passivity*, is expressed determinately by *sensibility*. But suppose this sensibility is taken thus for itself and fixed, is further combined with the determination of *magnitude*, and is opposed, as greater or lesser sensibility, to a greater or lesser irritability. Then each is reduced entirely to the sensuous element and to the common form of a property. Their relation is then not the Concept but, on the contrary, magnitude, into which the opposition now falls and so becomes a thoughtless difference. The indeterminateness of the expressions *force*, *strength* and *weakness* may indeed have been removed in the process. But there now arises an equally empty and indeterminate shuffling about among the oppositions of a higher and lower sensibility and irritability, as they rise and fall alongside and against each other. Strength and weakness are wholly sensuous, thoughtless determinations. No less so is greater or lesser sensibility and irritability: it is the sensuous appearance, thoughtlessly apprehended and just as thoughtlessly expressed. The place of those conceptless expressions has not been taken by the Concept. Instead, strength and weakness have been filled out with a determination which, taken by itself alone, rests on the Concept and has the Concept for its content, but which entirely loses this origin and character. — Through the form of simplicity and immediacy, then, in which this content is made into one side of a law, and through magnitude, which constitutes the element of difference among such determinations, the essence that originally is Concept and is posited as Concept retains the mode of sensuous perception. It remains as remote from cognition as it was in the determination by strength and weakness of force, or by immediate sensuous properties.

283 It still remains to consider, *for itself alone*, what the *outer* of the organic is, and how the opposition of *its* inner and outer is determined in it—just as the *inner* of the whole was first considered in its relation to its *own* outer.

284 The *outer*, considered for itself, is *configuration* in general, the system of life articulating itself in the *element* of *being*. It is also, essentially and at the same time, the being of the organic

being *for an other*—objective being in its *being-for-self*.—This *other* appears first as the organic being's outer, inorganic nature. If these two are considered in relation to a law, then, as we saw above, inorganic nature cannot constitute the side of a law over against the organic being, because the organic being is at the same time absolutely for itself and has a universal and free relation to inorganic nature.

285 But if the relationship of these two sides is determined more precisely in the organic shape itself, then this shape is, on one side, turned toward inorganic nature, while on the other it is *for itself* and reflected into itself. The *actual* organic being is the middle that joins the *being-for-self* of life together with the *outer* in general, or *being-in-itself*.—The extreme of being-for-self, however, is the inner as infinite One. This One takes the moments of the shape itself back into itself, out of their subsistence and their connection with the outer. It is the contentless, which gives itself its content in the shape and appears in the shape as its process. In this extreme, as simple negativity or *pure singularity*, the organic has its absolute freedom, through which it is indifferent to, and secure against, being-for-other and the determinateness of the moments of the shape. This freedom is at the same time the freedom of the moments themselves: it is their possibility of appearing and being apprehended as *existing*. And just as they are freed from and indifferent to what is outer, so in this freedom they are freed from and indifferent to one another, for the *simplicity* of this freedom is their *being*, or their simple substance. This Concept, or pure freedom, is one and the same life, however manifold the play in which the shape, or being-for-other, may roam about. It is a matter of indifference to this stream of life what kind of mills it drives. — First, it should be noted that this Concept is not to be taken here, as it was earlier when we considered the inner proper, in its form of *process* or of the development of its moments. It is to be taken in its form as *simple inner*, which constitutes the purely universal side over against the *actual* living being, or as the *element* of the *subsistence* of the existing members of the shape. For it is the shape

that we are considering here, and in the shape the essence of life is the simplicity of subsistence. Then *being-for-other*, or the determinateness of the actual configuration, taken up into this simple universality that is its essence, is an equally simple, universal, non-sensuous determinateness, and it can only be the determinateness that is expressed as *number*. — This determinateness is the middle of the shape, linking indeterminate life with actual life: simple like the former, and determinate like the latter. What in the former, the *inner*, would be number, the outer would have to express in its own way as manifold actuality, way of life, color and so on—in general, as the whole multitude of differences that develop in appearance.

286 Let us compare the two sides of the organic whole—the one the *inner*, the other the *outer*, each of which in turn has an inner and an outer in itself—with respect to the inner of each. The inner of the first was the Concept, as the restlessness of *abstraction*; the second, however, has for its inner resting universality, and in it also resting determinateness, number. The first, because in it the Concept develops its moments, deceptively promised laws through the semblance of necessity in the relation. The second, by contrast, renounces laws at once, since number shows itself to be the determination of one side of its laws. For number is precisely the wholly resting, dead and indifferent determinateness, in which all movement and relation are extinguished, and which has broken down the bridge to the living element of drives, to the way of life, and to the rest of sensuous existence.

287 This consideration of the *shape* of the organic as such, and of the inner as an inner merely of the shape, is in fact no longer a consideration of the organic. For the two sides that were supposed to be related are posited only as indifferent to each other, and the reflection into itself that constitutes the essence of the organic is thereby sublated. Instead, the attempted comparison of inner and outer is here transferred to inorganic nature. Here the infinite Concept is only the *essence*, which is either hidden within or falls outside, in self-consciousness, and no longer has

its objective presence, as it does in the organic. This relation of inner and outer must therefore still be considered in its proper sphere.

[288] First, then, that inner of the shape is the simple singularity of an inorganic thing: *specific gravity*. As simple being, it can be observed just as well as the determinateness of number, the only determinateness it is capable of—or, properly speaking, it can be found by comparing observations—and in this way it seems to provide one side of the law. Shape, color, hardness, toughness and a countless multitude of other properties would together make up the *outer* side, and would have to express the determinateness of the inner, number, so that each side would have its counterpart in the other.

[289] Now, because negativity is here grasped not as the movement of process but as *pacified* unity or *simple being-for-self*, it appears rather as that by which the thing resists the process and preserves itself within itself as indifferent to it. But because this simple being-for-self is a calm indifference toward what is other, specific gravity takes its place as *one property alongside* others; and with that, every necessary relation of specific gravity to this plurality, all lawfulness, ceases.—Specific gravity, as this simple inner, does not have difference *in itself*, or has only unessential difference; for it is precisely its *pure simplicity* that sublates all essential distinction. This unessential difference, *magnitude*, would therefore have to have its counterpart, or its *other*, in the other side, which is the plurality of properties, since only thereby is it difference at all. Suppose this plurality is itself gathered into the simplicity of the opposition and determined, say, as *cohesion*, so that cohesion is *being-for-self in otherness*, just as specific gravity is *pure being-for-self*. Then this cohesion is, first, this pure determinateness posited in the Concept, over against that other determinateness, and the procedure of law-giving would be the one considered above in relating sensibility to irritability.—Further, as the *concept* of being-for-self in otherness, cohesion is only the *abstraction* of the side that stands opposite specific gravity, and as such it has no existence. For

being-for-self in otherness is the process in which the inorganic would have to express its being-for-self as a *self-preservation* that would keep it from stepping out of the process as a moment of a product. But this is precisely contrary to its nature, which does not have purpose or universality in itself. Its process is rather only the determinate behavior by which its being-for-self, its specific gravity, *sublates* itself. This determinate behavior itself, in which its cohesion would consist in its true concept, and the determinate magnitude of its specific gravity are, however, concepts wholly indifferent to each other. If the kind of behavior were left entirely out of account and one confined oneself to the representation of magnitude, one might perhaps think of the following determination: that the greater specific weight, as a higher being-within-itself, would resist entering into the process more than the lesser. But on the contrary, the freedom of being-for-self proves itself only in the ease with which it engages with everything and maintains itself in this manifoldness. That intensity without extension of relations is a vacuous abstraction, for extension constitutes the *existence* of intensity. But the self-preservation of the inorganic in its relation falls, as has been pointed out, outside its nature, since the inorganic does not have the principle of movement within itself, or since its being is not absolute negativity and Concept.

290 If, on the other hand, this other side of the inorganic is considered not as process but as resting being, then it is ordinary cohesion. It is a *simple* sensuous property that has stepped aside, over against the released moment of *otherness*, which lies spread out in many indifferent properties; and cohesion itself, like specific gravity, takes its place among these properties. The multitude of properties together then makes up the other side to specific gravity. But in this multitude, as in the other side, *number* is the only determinateness. Number not only fails to express any relation or transition of these properties to one another; it is essentially just this: to have no necessary relation, and to present the eradication of all lawfulness—for it is the expression of determinateness as an *unessential* one. So a series of bodies

that expresses their difference as a numerical difference of their specific gravities by no means runs parallel to a series of differences in their other properties, even if, to make things easier, only one or a few of these properties are taken. For in fact it could only be the whole bundle of them that would have to make up the other side in this parallel. To order this bundle within itself and bind it into a whole, observation has, on the one hand, the determinations of magnitude of these many kinds of properties before it; on the other hand, however, their differences come in as qualitative. What in this heap would have to be marked as positive or negative, and would sublate one another—in general, the inner figuration and exposition of the formula, which would be very complex—would belong to the Concept. But the Concept is excluded precisely by the way in which the properties are supposed to lie there as *existing* and to be taken up as such. In this being, none shows the character of a negative toward another; one *is* just as much as another, and none otherwise indicates its place in the arrangement of the whole. — In a series that runs in parallel differences—whether the relation is meant as rising on both sides at once, or as rising only on the one side and falling on the other—the only concern is the *final* simple expression of this aggregated whole, which was supposed to constitute one side of the law over against specific gravity. But this one side, as an *existing result*, is nothing other than what has already been mentioned, namely a single property, such as, say, ordinary cohesion, alongside which the others, specific gravity among them, are indifferently present. And any other property can be chosen with equal right, that is, with equal wrong, as the representative of the whole other side. Any one of them, like any other, would only "represent" the essence —in plain German, *vorstellen*—but would not be the thing itself. So the attempt to find series of bodies that would run along a simple parallel of two sides, and express the essential nature of bodies according to a law of these sides, must be taken for a

thought that knows neither its own task nor the means by which it was to be carried out.[15]

291 Earlier, the relation of outer and inner in the shape that is supposed to present itself to observation was immediately carried over into the sphere of the inorganic. The determination that draws it there can now be specified more precisely, and from this there emerges yet another form and relation of this relationship. For in the organic, what in the inorganic seems to offer the possibility of such a comparison of inner and outer drops away altogether. The inorganic inner is a simple inner that offers itself to perception as an *existing* property. Its determinateness is therefore essentially magnitude, and as an existing property it appears indifferent to the outer, or to the many other sensuous properties. The being-for-self of the organically living, however, does not step aside in this way over against its outer, but has the principle of *otherness* within itself. If we determine being-for-self as *simple self-preserving relation to itself*, then its otherness is simple *negativity*, and organic unity is the unity of self-identical relating-to-itself and of pure negativity. This unity, as unity, is the inner of the organic; the organic is thereby in itself universal, or it is *genus*. But the freedom of the genus over against its actuality is different from the freedom of specific *gravity* over against the shape. The freedom of specific gravity is an *existing* freedom, that is, it steps aside as a particular property. But because it is *existing* freedom, it is also only *one determinateness*, which belongs *essentially* to this shape, or through which this shape, *as essence*, is something determinate. The freedom of the genus, however, is a universal freedom, indifferent to this shape or to its actuality. The *determinateness* that belongs to the *being-for-self* of the inorganic *as such* therefore falls, in the organic, *under its* being-for-self, just as in the inorganic it falls only under its *being*. Hence, although in the inorganic it is at the same time only a *property*, it still has the dignity of *essence*, because, as the simple negative, it stands opposed to existence

15 Hegel glosses the Latinate *repräsentieren* with the native *vorstellen*, which also means "to put in front of" or "to impersonate."

as being-for-other; and this simple negative, in its final singular determinateness, is a number. The organic, however, is a singularity that is itself pure negativity, and therefore eradicates within itself the fixed determinateness of number, which belongs to *indifferent being*. Insofar as the organic has in it the moment of indifferent being, and within that the moment of number, number can therefore be taken only as a play in it, not as the essence of its vitality.

[292] Pure negativity, the principle of process, does not fall outside the organic, so that the organic does not have it as one determinateness in its *essence*; rather, singularity itself is universal in itself. Even so, this pure singularity is not developed and actual in the organic in its moments as themselves *abstract* or *universal*. Instead, this expression falls outside that universality, which falls back into *inwardness*; and between actuality or shape —that is, self-developing singularity—and the organic universal, or the genus, there steps the *determinate* universal, the *species*. The existence that the negativity of the universal, or of the genus, attains is only the developed movement of a process that runs its course in the *parts of the existing shape*. Suppose the genus, as resting simplicity, had the distinct parts in it, and its *simple negativity* as such were thereby at the same time a movement running its course through equally simple parts, parts immediately universal in themselves, which as such moments would here be actual. Then the organic genus would be consciousness. As it is, however, the *simple determinateness*, as the determinateness of the species, is present in the genus in a spiritless way. Actuality begins from this determinateness; or what enters actuality is not the genus as such, that is, not thought at all. The genus, as actual organic being, is represented only by a representative. But this representative, number, seems to mark the transition from the genus to the individual configuration and to give observation both sides of necessity—once as simple determinateness, once as developed shape born out into manifoldness. What it signifies, rather, is the indifference and freedom of universal and singular toward each other. The singular is

abandoned by the genus to the essenceless difference of magnitude, but as something living it proves itself just as free of this difference. True universality, as it has been determined, is here only *inner essence*; as *determinateness of the species* it is formal universality. Over against this formal universality, that true universality steps over to the side of singularity, which is thereby a living singularity and, through its *inner*, rises above *its determinateness as species*. But this singularity is not at the same time a universal individual, that is, one in which universality would also have outer actuality; the universal individual falls outside the organically living. This *universal* individual, however, as it is *immediately* the individual of natural configurations, is not consciousness itself. If it were to be consciousness, its existence as a *single* organic living individual could not fall outside it.

293 We therefore see a syllogism in which one extreme is *universal life as universal*, or as genus, while the other extreme is *the same life as singular*, or as universal individual. The middle, however, is composed of both: the first seems to fit itself into the middle as *determinate* universality or *species*, the other as *singularity proper*, or single singularity.—And since this syllogism belongs in general to the side of *configuration*, it equally includes what is distinguished as inorganic nature.

294 Now, universal life, as *the simple essence of the genus*, develops from its side the differences of the Concept and must present them as a series of simple determinatenesses; this series is therefore a system of differences posited as indifferent, or a *numerical series*. Earlier, the organic in the form of singularity was set over against this essenceless difference, which neither expresses nor contains its living nature—and the same must be said of the inorganic with regard to its whole existence as developed in the multitude of its properties. Now, however, it is the universal individual that is to be regarded not only as free of every articulation of the genus, but also as its power. The genus divides itself into species according to the *universal determinateness* of number, or may also take single determinatenesses of its existence—for example figure, color and so on—as its principle

of division. In this quiet business it suffers violence from the side of the universal individual, *the earth*. The earth, as universal negativity, asserts against the systematizing of the genus the differences as it has them in itself—differences whose nature, because of the substance to which they belong, is different from the nature of the genus's differences. This activity of the genus becomes a wholly restricted business, which it may pursue only within those mighty elements, and which their unbridled violence everywhere interrupts, leaving it full of gaps and stunted.

[295] It follows from this that, in configured existence, reason can come to be for observation only *as life in general*. But in its differentiating, this life does not actually have in itself any rational ordering and articulation, and it is not a system of shapes grounded in itself.—Suppose that in the syllogism of organic configuration the middle, into which the species and its actuality as single individuality fall, had in itself the extremes of inner universality and universal individuality. Then this middle would have, in the *movement* of its actuality, the expression and nature of universality, and would be self-systematizing development. Thus *consciousness*, between universal spirit and its singularity, or sensuous consciousness, has for its middle the system of the shapes of consciousness, as a life of spirit ordering itself into a whole—the system that is being considered here, and which has its objective existence as world history. But organic nature has no history. It falls from its universal, life, directly down into the singularity of existence. The moments united in this actuality—simple determinateness and single vitality—produce becoming only as contingent movement, in which each is active in its own part and the whole is preserved. But this activity is, *for itself*, confined only to its own point, because the whole is not present in that point; and the whole is not present in it because here the whole is not *for itself* as a whole.

[296] Observing reason in organic nature, then, comes only to the intuition of itself as universal life in general. Beyond that, the intuition of this life's development and realization is available to it only according to wholly generally distinguished sys-

tems, whose determination, their essence, lies not in the organic as such but in the universal individual; and, *among* these differences of the earth, according to orderings that the genus attempts.

[297] Since, then, in its actuality the *universality of organic life* lets itself fall directly, without genuine mediation that is for itself, into the extreme of *singularity*, observing consciousness has before it only *meaning* as a thing. And if reason can take an idle interest in observing this meaning, it is confined to describing and recounting nature's opinions and whims. This spiritless freedom of meaning will indeed everywhere offer beginnings of laws, traces of necessity, allusions to order and sequence, clever and plausible relations. But in relating the organic to the existing differences of the inorganic—the elements, zones and climates—observation, as far as law and necessity are concerned, gets no further than *great influence*. The same holds on the other side, where individuality does not have the significance of the earth but that of the *One immanent* in organic life. This One, in immediate unity with the universal, does constitute the genus; but for that very reason the genus's simple unity is determined only as number, and therefore leaves qualitative appearance free. Here observation cannot get beyond *pleasant remarks, interesting relations, a friendly meeting of the Concept halfway*. But pleasant *remarks* are not *knowing of necessity*; *interesting* relations stop short at *interest*, and interest is still only opinion about reason; and the *friendliness* of the individual, with which it alludes to a concept, is a childlike friendliness, which becomes childish if it wants, or is meant, to count for something in and for itself.

B. OBSERVING SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: LOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS

Observation turns to thought and to the mind, and finds no genuine laws there either.

[298] Observation of nature finds the Concept realized in inorganic nature: laws whose moments are things that at the same time

behave as abstractions. But this Concept is not a simplicity reflected into itself. The life of organic nature, by contrast, is only this simplicity reflected into itself: the opposition of itself, as universal and singular, does not come apart in the essence of this life itself. Its essence is not the genus that would separate itself and move within its undifferentiated element, and in its opposition would at the same time be undifferentiated for itself. Observation finds this free Concept, whose universality has developed singularity just as absolutely within itself, only in the Concept itself existing as Concept, or in self-consciousness.

[299] Turning now back into itself, and directing itself at the Concept that is actual as free Concept, observation first finds the *laws of thought*. This singularity, which thought is in itself, is the abstract movement of the negative, taken back entirely into simplicity, and the laws are outside reality.—To say that they have no *reality* means nothing other than that they are without truth. They are indeed supposed to be, if not the *whole* truth, still *formal* truth. But what is purely formal, without reality, is a thought-thing, or empty abstraction without the internal division that would be nothing other than the content. — On the other hand, however, they are laws of pure thought, and pure thought is the universal in itself, and thus a knowing that immediately has being, and in it all reality, within itself. These laws are therefore absolute concepts and, inseparably, the essentialities of form as well as of things. Since universality moving within itself is the *divided* simple Concept, the Concept has in this way *content* in itself—and a content that is all content, only not a sensuous being. It is a content that neither contradicts form nor is separated from it at all; rather, it is essentially form itself, for form is nothing other than the universal separating itself into its pure moments.

[300] But as this form or content is *for observation* as observation, it takes on the determination of a *found*, given, that is, *merely existing* content. It becomes a *resting being* of relations, a multitude of separated necessities which, as a *fixed* content in and for itself, *in their determinateness*, are supposed to have truth, and so

are in fact withdrawn from form.—This absolute truth of fixed determinatenesses, or of many different laws, contradicts, however, the unity of self-consciousness, or of thought and form in general. What is declared to be a fixed law abiding in itself can only be a moment of the unity reflecting itself into itself; it can only appear as a vanishing magnitude. But when these laws are torn out of this connection of the movement by the consideration and set up singly, it is not content that they lack, for they have, rather, a determinate content. What they lack is rather form, which is their essence. In fact, these laws are not the truth of thought—not because they are supposed to be merely formal and to have no content, but rather for the opposite reason: because in their determinateness, or precisely *as a content* from which form has been taken away, they are supposed to count as something absolute. In their truth, as moments vanishing in the unity of thought, they would have to be taken as knowing, or as thinking movement, but not as *laws* of knowing. Observing, however, is not knowing itself and does not know it. Instead, it inverts the nature of knowing into the shape of *being*, that is, it grasps knowing's negativity only as *laws* of being.—It is sufficient here to have shown the invalidity of the so-called laws of thought from the general nature of the matter. The more detailed development belongs to speculative philosophy, where they show themselves as what they are in truth, namely single vanishing moments, whose truth is only the whole of the thinking movement, knowing itself.[16]

301 This negative unity of thought is for itself, or rather it is *being-for-self*, the principle of individuality, and in its reality it is *acting consciousness*. Observing consciousness is therefore led on by the nature of the matter to acting consciousness, as the reality of those laws. Since this connection is not for observing consciousness, it supposes that thought, in its laws, remains standing for it on one side, while on the other side it obtains another being in what is now its object, namely acting consciousness.

16 Hegel later treats the laws of identity and contradiction in his *Science of Logic* (1812–16).

Acting consciousness is for itself in such a way that it sublates otherness and has its actuality in this intuition of itself as the negative.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Psychology tries to explain individuals by their circumstances, but individuality decides what influences it.

302 Thus a *new field* opens up for *observation* in the *acting actuality of consciousness*. Psychology contains the multitude of laws according to which spirit behaves in various ways toward the various modes of its actuality, as an *otherness it finds already there*. On the one hand, spirit takes these modes into itself and *becomes conformed* to the habits, customs and ways of thinking it finds, as that in which it is an object to itself as actuality. On the other hand, it knows itself to be self-active against them, picks out of them with inclination and passion only what is particular for itself, and *makes* the objective *conform to itself*. In the first case it relates negatively to itself as singularity; in the second, to itself as universal being. — On the first side, independence gives what it finds only the *form* of conscious individuality in general, and as regards content it remains within the universal actuality it finds. On the other side, however, it gives that actuality at least a modification of its own that does not contradict its essential content; or else a modification through which the individual, as particular actuality and distinctive content, sets itself against that actuality—and becomes crime, when it sublates that actuality in a merely singular way, or, when it does so in a universal way and thus for all, puts another world, another right, law and customs in the place of those that exist.

303 Observing psychology first states its perceptions of the *universal modes* that it comes across in active consciousness, and finds a variety of faculties, inclinations and passions. And since, in recounting this collection, the reminder of the unity of self-consciousness cannot be suppressed, psychology must at least go so far as to be astonished that so many kinds of things, het-

erogeneous and contingent to one another, can be found together in spirit as in a sack—especially since they show themselves not as dead, resting things but as restless movements.

304 In recounting these various faculties, observation is on the universal side; the unity of these manifold capacities is the side opposed to this universality, *actual* individuality.—But to apprehend and recount the different actual individualities in turn in such a way that one person has more inclination to this, another more to that, and one more understanding than another, is something far less interesting than even enumerating the species of insects, mosses and so on. For these give observation the right to take them singly and conceptlessly, because they belong essentially to the element of contingent separation. To take conscious individuality spiritlessly as a *single* existing appearance, on the other hand, involves a contradiction, since its essence is the universal of spirit. But since this apprehending at the same time lets individuality enter into the form of universality, it finds *its law*, and now seems to have a rational purpose and to be carrying on a necessary business.

305 The moments that make up the content of the law are, on the one hand, individuality itself, and, on the other, its universal inorganic nature, namely the circumstances, situation, habits, customs, religion and so forth that it finds already there. It is from these that determinate individuality is to be comprehended. They contain what is determinate as well as what is universal, and are at the same time something *present*, which offers itself to observation and, on the other side, expresses itself in the form of individuality.

306 The law of this relationship of the two sides would now have to contain what effect and influence these determinate circumstances exert on individuality. But this individuality is precisely this: to be *just as much* the *universal*, and hence to flow together in a calm, immediate way with the *present* universal—customs, habits and so on—and to become conformed to it, *as* to set itself in opposition to it and rather to invert it; and also, in its singularity, to behave wholly indifferently toward it, neither let-

ting it act upon itself nor being active against it. *What* is to have an influence on individuality, and *what* influence it is to have—which really amount to the same thing—therefore depends only on individuality itself. To say that *through this* the individuality *has become this determinate one* means nothing other than that *it already was this*. Circumstances, situation, customs and so on, which are shown on the one hand as *present* and on the other as *in this determinate individuality*, express only its indeterminate essence, which is not what is at issue. If these circumstances, this way of thinking, these customs, the state of the world in general, had not been, then of course the individual would not have become what it is; for this universal substance is all those who find themselves in this state of the world. — But as the state of the world has particularized itself in *this* individual—and it is such an individual that is to be comprehended—it would have to have particularized itself in and for itself, and to have acted upon an individual in the determinateness it gave itself. Only so would it have made the individual into the determinate individual that it is. If the outer had constituted itself in and for itself in the way it appears in individuality, then individuality would be comprehended from it. We would have a double gallery of pictures, one the reflection of the other: the one the gallery of the complete determinateness and delimitation of outer circumstances, the other the same gallery translated into the way these circumstances are in the conscious being; the former the surface of the sphere, the latter the center, which represents that surface within itself.

[307] But the surface of the sphere, the world of the individual, immediately has an ambiguous meaning. It is *world and situation in and for themselves*, and it is *world of the individual*: *either* insofar as the individual has merely flowed together with it, has let it enter into itself just as it is, and has related to it only as formal consciousness—*or* else world of the individual in the way that what was present has been *inverted* by the individual. — Since, because of this freedom, actuality is capable of this double meaning, the world of the individual is to be comprehended

only from the individual itself. And the *influence* on the individual of actuality, which is represented as *being* in and for itself, acquires through the individual the absolutely opposite sense: the individual either *lets* the stream of inflowing actuality *have its way* with it, or breaks it off and inverts it. But in this way *psychological necessity* becomes so empty a phrase that, for whatever is supposed to have had this influence, there is the absolute possibility that it might also not have had it.

308 With this, the *being* that was supposed to be *in and for itself*, and to constitute one side of a law, indeed its universal side, drops away. Individuality is what *its* world, as *its own*, is. It is itself the circle of its doing, in which it has presented itself as actuality, and it is simply the unity of *being that is found present* and *being that is made*—a unity whose sides do not fall apart, as in the representation of psychological law, into a world present *in itself* and an individuality that is *for itself*. Or, if each side is considered thus for itself, then no necessity and no law of their relation to each other is to be found.

C. PHYSIOGNOMY AND PHRENOLOGY

Observation looks for the inner self in the body, first in the face and then in the skull.

309 Psychological observation finds no law of the relationship of self-consciousness to actuality, or to the world opposed to it. Through the indifference of the two to each other, it is driven back to the *distinctive determinateness* of real individuality, which is *in* and *for itself*, or contains the opposition of being-*for-self* and being-*in-itself* eradicated in its absolute mediation. Real individuality is the object that has now come to observation, or to which observation passes over.

310 The individual is in and for itself. It is *for itself*, or it is a free doing; but it is also *in itself*, or it has an *original* determinate *being*—a determinateness that, according to its concept, is the same as what psychology wanted to find outside it. *In the individual itself*, then, the opposition emerges: it is this double thing,

the movement of consciousness and the fixed being of an appearing actuality, an actuality that is immediately *its own* in it. This *being*, the *body* of the determinate individuality, is its *originality*, its not-having-done.[17] But since the individual is at the same time only what it has done, its body is also the expression of itself *produced* by it. It is at the same time a *sign*, which has not remained an immediate thing, but in which the individual only makes known what it *is*, in the sense that it sets its original nature to work.

311 If we consider the moments present here in relation to the previous view, there is here a universal human shape, or at least the universal shape of a climate, a continent, a people, just as before there were the same universal customs and culture. To this are added the particular circumstances and situation within universal actuality; here this particular actuality is the particular formation of the individual's shape.—On the other side, just as before the free doing of the individual, and actuality as *its own*, were set over against the actuality found present, so here the shape stands as the expression of *its* self-realization, posited by the individual itself: the features and forms of its self-active being. But the actuality, universal as well as particular, that was previously found outside the individual is here the individual's own actuality, its inborn body; and it is precisely into this body that the expression belonging to its doing falls. In the psychological consideration, actuality in and for itself and determinate individuality were supposed to be related to each other; here, however, the *whole* determinate *individuality* is the object of observation, and each side of its opposition is itself this whole. To the outer whole, therefore, belongs not only *original being*, the inborn body, but equally the body's formation, which belongs to the activity of the inner. The body is the unity of unformed and formed being, and the actuality of the individual permeated by being-for-self. This whole, which contains within itself both the determinate, original, fixed parts and the features

17 The section beginning here treats physiognomy, popularized by J. K. Lavater (1741–1801), and the "skull science" (phrenology) of F. J. Gall (1758–1828).

that arise solely through doing, *is*; and this *being* is the *expression* of the inner, of the individual posited as consciousness and movement.—This *inner*, likewise, is no longer the formal, contentless or indeterminate self-activity whose content and determinateness lay, as before, in outer circumstances. It is an original character, determinate in itself, whose form is only activity. What is considered here, then, is the relationship between these two sides: how it is to be determined, and what is to be understood by this *expression* of the inner in the outer.

FACE, HAND AND DEED

Hegel argues that a person's deeds, not facial features, are the true expression of who they are.

312 It is not, in the first place, as an *organ* that this outer makes the inner visible, or makes it in general into a being for another. For the inner, insofar as it is in the organ, is the *activity* itself. The speaking mouth, the working hand—and, if you like, the legs as well—are the organs that actualize and accomplish. They have in them doing *as doing*, or the inner as such. But the externality that the inner gains through them is the deed, as an actuality separated from the individual. Language and work are utterances in which the individual no longer keeps and possesses itself within itself. Instead it lets the inner come wholly outside itself and abandons it to what is other. One can therefore say just as well that these utterances express the inner too much as that they express it too little. *Too much*—because the inner itself breaks out in them, no opposition remains between them and it; they give not merely an *expression* of the inner but the inner itself, immediately. *Too little*—because the inner makes itself into an other in language and action, it thereby abandons itself to the element of transformation. This element inverts the spoken word and the accomplished deed, and makes them into something other than what they are in and for themselves as actions of this determinate individual. Through this externality —through the effect of others upon them—the works that actions

produce lose the character of being something that endures over against other individualities. Nor is that all. They relate to the inner they contain as a separate, indifferent outer. They can therefore, as inner, be something other than they appear, and this *through the individual* itself. Either the individual deliberately makes them, for the sake of appearance, into something other than they are in truth; or it is too clumsy to give itself the outward side it really wanted, and to fix that side so firmly that others cannot pervert its work. Doing, then, as an accomplished work, has a double and opposed meaning. Either it is the *inner* individuality and *not* its *expression*; or, as an outer, it is an actuality *free* from the inner, something wholly other than the inner.—Because of this ambiguity we must look about for the inner as it *still* is *in the individual itself*, but visibly or outwardly. In the organ, however, the inner is only as immediate *doing* itself, which gains its externality in the deed; and the deed either represents the inner or does not. Considered in terms of this opposition, then, the organ does not afford the expression we are looking for.

313 Now suppose the outer shape could express the inner individuality only insofar as it is not an organ or not *doing*—that is, only as a *resting* whole. Then it would behave as a subsisting thing that calmly received the inner, as something alien, into its passive existence, and thereby became the *sign* of the inner. It would be an external, contingent expression whose *actual* side is by itself meaningless—a language whose sounds and combinations of sounds are not the thing itself, but are linked with it by free caprice and are contingent for it.

314 Such an arbitrary connection between things that are external to one another yields no law. Physiognomy, however, is supposed to distinguish itself from other bad arts and worthless studies in this way: it considers determinate individuality in the *necessary* opposition of an inner and an outer—of character as a conscious being and of the same character as a shape that simply is. And it relates these moments to each other as they are related by their concept, so that they must constitute the con-

tent of a law. In astrology, palmistry and similar sciences, by contrast, it seems that only outer is related to outer, something to something alien to it. *This* constellation at birth—or, when this outer is moved closer to the body itself, *these* lines of the hand—are *outer* moments for a long or short life, and for the fate of the individual human being in general. As externalities they are indifferent to one another. They do not have for one another the necessity that is supposed to lie in the relation of an *outer* and an *inner*.

315 The hand, to be sure, seems to be not so much something outer for fate; it seems rather to relate to fate as its inner. For fate, again, is only the appearance of what the determinate individuality is *in itself*, as its inner, original determinateness.—Now, to know what individuality is in itself, the palmist, like the physiognomist, takes a shorter route than, for example, Solon, who thought he could know this only from and after the course of a whole life. Solon considered the appearance; they consider the *in-itself*.[18] That the hand must present the *in-itself* of individuality with regard to its fate is easy to see. After the organ of speech, it is above all the hand by which a human being brings himself to appearance and actualization. It is the ensouled master craftsman of his fortune. One may say of it that it *is* what a human being *does*. For in the hand, as the active organ of his self-accomplishment, he is present as what ensouls it; and since he is originally his own fate, the hand will therefore express this in-itself.

316 From this determination—that the *organ* of activity is *just as much* a *being* as it is the *doing* within it, or that the inner *being-in-itself* is itself *present* in the organ and has a *being for* others—there results a view of the organ different from the previous one. The organs in general proved unable to be taken as *expressions* of the inner because in them doing is present *as doing*, while doing *as deed* is merely outer; in this way inner and outer fall apart and are, or can be, alien to one another. According to the determina-

18 Solon (c. 640–560 BC), the Athenian lawgiver, told King Croesus to call no one happy until he had seen the end of his life (Herodotus 1.32).

tion just considered, however, the organ must also be taken as the *middle* between the two. For this very fact, that doing is *present* in it, at the same time constitutes an *externality* of doing —and indeed one different from the deed, since this externality remains with the individual and in it. — This middle and unity of inner and outer is, first of all, itself also external; but then this externality is at the same time taken up into the inner. As *simple* externality it stands opposed to dispersed externality. The latter is either only a *single* work or state, contingent with respect to the whole individuality, or else, as *whole* externality, it is fate, splintered into a multiplicity of works and states. The *simple lines of the hand*, then; likewise the *timbre* and *range* of the *voice*, as the individual determinateness of *language*; and language again as it receives, through the hand, a firmer existence than through the voice—namely *writing*, and writing in its particularity as *handwriting*—all this is an *expression* of the inner. As the *simple externality*, this expression in turn relates itself to the *manifold externality* of action and fate: it relates itself to them as their *inner*. — If, then, the determinate nature and innate peculiarity of the individual, together with what they have become through culture, are first taken as the *inner*, as the essence of action and fate, then this inner has its *appearance* and externality *first* in the individual's mouth, hand, voice and handwriting, as well as in the other organs and their lasting determinatenesses. Only *then* does it express itself *further* outward, in its actuality in the world.

317 Now this middle determines itself as the utterance that is at the same time taken back into the inner. Its existence is therefore not confined to the immediate organ of doing. It is rather the movement and form of the face and of the bodily configuration in general—a movement that accomplishes nothing. According to this concept, these features and their movement are doing held back, doing that remains with the individual. In their relation to actual doing, they are the individual's own supervision and observation of that doing: *utterance* as *reflection on* actual utterance. — The individual is not mute in and during

its outward doing, because in that doing it is at the same time reflected into itself, and it utters this being-reflected-into-itself. This theoretical doing, or the individual's talking with itself about its action, is audible to others as well, for it is itself an utterance.

318 In this inner, which remains inner in its utterance, what is observed is therefore the individual's *being*-reflected out of its actuality; and we have to see what the necessity posited in this unity amounts to.—This being-reflected is, first, different from the deed itself. It can therefore be something *other* than the deed, and be taken for something other than it is: one can see from a person's face whether he is *serious* about what he says or does.—Conversely, however, what is supposed to be the expression of the inner is at the same time an expression that *is*, and so it falls down into the determination of *being*, which is absolutely contingent for the self-conscious being. It is therefore indeed an expression, but at the same time also only like a *sign*: the constitution of what does the expressing is completely indifferent to the content expressed. In this appearance the inner is indeed the *visible* invisible, but without being tied to it. It can just as well be in another appearance, as another inner can be in the same appearance.—Lichtenberg is therefore right to say: *Suppose the physiognomist did catch a person for once; it would take only a stout resolve for that person to make himself incomprehensible again for thousands of years.*[19] — In the previous relation, the circumstances at hand were something that simply is, from which individuality took what *it* was able and willing to take, either yielding to them or perverting them; and for that reason they did not contain the necessity and essence of individuality. Likewise here, the immediate being of individuality as it appears is of a double kind. Either it expresses individuality's being-reflected out of actuality and its being-within-itself; or it is for individuality merely a sign, indifferent to what it signifies and therefore in

19 Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799), German physicist and aphorist, attacked Lavater's physiognomy in the essay "On Physiognomy, Against the Physiognomists" (1778).

truth signifying nothing. It is for individuality as much its face as its mask, which it can take off. — Individuality permeates its shape, moves and speaks in it. But this whole existence equally passes over into a being indifferent to the will and to action. Individuality erases from it the significance it formerly had—that of containing individuality's being-reflected-into-itself, or its true essence—and instead places this, conversely, in the will and in the deed.

319 Individuality *gives up* the *being-reflected-into-itself* that is expressed in the *features*, and *places its essence* in *the work*. In this it contradicts the relation laid down by the instinct of reason, as it applies itself to observing self-conscious individuality, regarding what that individuality's *inner* and *outer* are supposed to be. This point of view brings us to the real thought underlying physiognomic *science*—if one wants to call it that. The opposition this observing has run into is, in form, the opposition between the practical and the theoretical, both posited within the practical itself. It is the opposition between individuality actualizing itself in acting—taking acting in the most general sense—and the same individuality as, in this acting, it is at the same time out of it, reflected into itself, with acting as its object. Observing takes up this opposition in the same inverted relation in which it determines itself in appearance. It counts the *deed* itself and the work—whether of language or of a more fixed actuality—as the *inessential outer*, and the *being-within-itself* of individuality as the *essential inner*. Practical consciousness has two sides in it: intending and the deed, the *meaning* one has about one's action and the *action* itself. Of these, observation chooses the former as the true inner. This inner is supposed to have its more or less *inessential* utterance in the deed, but its true utterance in its shape. The latter utterance is the immediate sensuous presence of individual spirit. The inwardness that is supposed to be the true one is the peculiarity of the intention and the singularity of being-for-self—both of them spirit as *meant*. What observing has for its objects, then, is *meant* existence, and it is between existences of this kind that it seeks out laws.

320 The immediate meaning about the meant presence of spirit is natural physiognomy: the hasty judgment, at first sight, about the inner nature and the character belonging to a shape. The object of this meaning is of such a kind that it lies in its essence to be in truth something other than merely sensuous immediate being. It is true that what is present, and is the object of observing, is also just this being-reflected-into-itself out of the sensuous, within the sensuous: visibility as the visibility of the invisible. But precisely this sensuous immediate presence is the *actuality* of spirit as it is only for meaning. On this side, observing busies itself with its meant existence—with facial features, handwriting, tone of voice and so on. — It relates such existence to an equally *meant inner*. It is not the murderer or the thief that is to be known, but the *capacity to be one*. The fixed, abstract determinateness thereby loses itself in the concrete, infinite determinateness of the *single* individual, which now demands more artful portrayals than those qualifications. Such artful portrayals certainly say more than the qualifications "murderer," "thief," or "good-hearted," "unspoiled" and so on. But for their purpose—to express the meant being, or the single individuality—they are far from enough; no more so than portrayals of shape that go beyond the flat forehead, the long nose and so on. For the single shape, like the single self-consciousness, is inexpressible as meant being. The science of knowing human nature, which deals with the supposed human being—like physiognomy, which deals with his supposed actuality and wants to raise the unconscious judging of natural physiognomy to a knowing—is therefore something endless and bottomless. It can never get as far as saying what it means, because it only means, and its content is only something meant.

321 The *laws* that this science sets out to find are relations between these two meant sides, and can therefore themselves be nothing but empty meaning. Moreover, this supposed knowing busies itself with the actuality of spirit, and its object is precisely this: that spirit reflects itself into itself out of its sensuous existence, and that determinate existence is for spirit an indif-

ferent contingency. This knowing must therefore know immediately, of the laws it has found, that they say nothing—that it is really pure chatter, or merely *delivering oneself of an opinion*. The expression has the truth of stating these as one and the same: to state one's *opinion*, and thereby to bring forward not the matter itself but only an opinion *of oneself*. In *content*, however, these observations cannot differ from this one: "It always rains when we have our fair, says the shopkeeper; and it always rains when I hang out the washing, says the housewife."

322 Lichtenberg, who characterizes physiognomic observation in this way, also says this: "If someone said, 'You act, it is true, like an honest man, but I can see from your figure that you are forcing yourself, and are a rogue at heart'—truly, until the end of the world every decent fellow will answer such an address with a slap in the face."—This reply is *well aimed*, because it refutes the first presupposition of such a science of meaning: namely, that *the actuality* of a human being is his face and so on.—The *true being* of a human being is rather *his deed*. In the deed individuality is *actual*, and it is the deed that sublates the *meant* in both its sides. First, it sublates the meant as a bodily, resting being: in action, individuality presents itself rather as the *negative* essence, which only *is* insofar as it sublates being. Second, the deed equally sublates the inexpressibility of meaning with regard to self-conscious individuality, which in meaning is infinitely determined and determinable. In the accomplished deed this bad infinity is annihilated. The deed is something simply determinate, universal, to be grasped in an abstraction. It is murder, theft, or a good deed, a brave deed and so on, and it can be *said* of it what *it is*. It *is* this, and its being is not merely a sign but the matter itself.[20] It *is* this, and the individual human being *is* what the deed *is*. In the simplicity of *this being* he is a universal being that is for others, and he ceases to be merely something meant. It is true that he is not thereby posited as spirit. But we are speaking of his *being* as being; and *on the one hand*, the

20 "Bad infinity" is Hegel's term for an endless progression that never reaches completion, as opposed to true infinity.

double being of *shape* and of *deed* confront each other, and each is supposed to be his actuality. So it is rather the deed alone that must be affirmed as his *genuine being*—not his figure, which was supposed to express what he means by his deeds, or what people supposed he could merely do. Likewise, *on the other hand*, when his *work* and his inner *possibility*—capacity or intention—are set against each other, the work alone is to be regarded as his true actuality. This holds even if he himself is deceived about it, and, turning back into himself out of his action, believes that in this inner he is something other than he is in the *deed*. Individuality, in entrusting itself to the objective element by becoming a work, does indeed expose itself to being altered and inverted. But what constitutes the character of the deed is precisely this: whether it is an actual being that holds its ground, or only a meant work that passes away, null in itself. Objectivity does not alter the deed itself; it only shows *what* the deed is, that is, whether it *is* or whether it is *nothing*. — The dissection of this being into intentions and suchlike subtleties, by which the *actual* human being—that is, his deed—is supposed to be explained back into a meant being (just as he himself may well invent particular intentions about his actuality), must be left to the idleness of opinion. Suppose this idleness wants to put its deedless wisdom to work, to deny the character of reason in the agent, and to mishandle him by declaring that his being is not his deed but rather his figure and features. Then it must expect the reply mentioned above, which shows it that the figure is not the *in-itself*, but can rather itself be something to be handled.

323 If we now survey the whole range of relations in which self-conscious individuality can be observed as standing to its outer, one will be seen to remain which observation must still make its object. In psychology it is the *outer actuality* of *things* that is supposed to have its self-conscious *counterpart* in spirit and to make spirit comprehensible. In physiognomy, on the other hand, spirit is supposed to be known in its *own* outer, as in a being that would be the *language*—the visible invisibility—of its essence. What still remains is the determination of the side of

actuality in which individuality would express its essence in its immediate, fixed, purely existent actuality. — This last relation thus differs from the physiognomic one as follows. The physiognomic relation is the *speaking* presence of the individual, which in its *acting* utterance at the same time presents the utterance that *reflects* into itself and *contemplates* itself—an utterance that is itself movement, resting features that are themselves essentially a mediated being. In the determination still to be considered, however, the outer is at last a wholly *resting* actuality. It is not in itself a speaking sign; separated from self-conscious movement, it presents itself for itself and is as a mere thing.

THE SKULL

Phrenology treats the skull-bone as the outward reality of spirit and reads character from its bumps.

[324] Concerning the relation of the inner to this outer of its own, it is evident first of all that the relation seems to have to be grasped as that of *causal connection*. For the relation of one thing that is in itself to another that is in itself, taken as a *necessary* relation, is precisely this.

[325] For spiritual individuality to have an effect on the body, it must, as cause, itself be bodily. But the bodily element in which it is as cause is the organ—not, however, the organ of doing directed against outer actuality, but of the self-conscious being's doing within itself, directed outward only against its own body. It is not immediately evident which organs these can be. If one thought only of organs in general, the organ of work in general would readily be at hand, and likewise the organ of the sexual drive and so on. But such organs are to be regarded as instruments or parts that spirit, as one extreme, has as the middle term against the other extreme, which is an external *object*. What is intended here, however, is an organ in which the self-conscious individual, as an extreme, maintains itself *for itself* over against its own actuality opposed to it. This organ is not at

the same time turned outward but reflected in its action, and in it the side of *being* is not a *being for another*. In the physiognomic relation, too, the organ is indeed considered as an existence reflected into itself, one that comments on the doing. But this being is an objective one, and the result of physiognomic observation is that self-consciousness confronts precisely this actuality of its own as something indifferent. This indifference disappears in the fact that this being-reflected-into-itself is itself *operative*; that existence thereby acquires a necessary relation to it. But for it to be operative on existence, it must itself have a being, though not a properly objective one; and it is as this organ that it is supposed to be pointed out.

326 Now in ordinary life anger, for example, as an inner doing of this kind, is located in the liver. Plato even assigns to the liver something higher—something that some even consider the highest—namely prophecy, or the gift of uttering the sacred and eternal in a manner that is not rational. But the movement the individual has in the liver, the heart and so on cannot be regarded as its movement wholly reflected into itself. Rather, the movement is there in such a way that it has already struck into the individual's body, and has an animal existence that turns outward toward externality.[21]

327 The *nervous system*, on the other hand, is the immediate rest of the organic in its movement. The *nerves* themselves, it is true, are again the organs of consciousness already sunk into its outward orientation. But brain and spinal cord may be regarded as the immediate presence of self-consciousness that remains within itself—that is not objective and does not go outward either. Insofar as the moment of being that this organ has is a *being for another*, existence, it is dead being, no longer the presence of self-consciousness. But this *being-within-itself* is, by its concept, a fluidity in which the circles thrown into it immediately dissolve, and in which no difference expresses itself as a difference that *is*. Yet spirit itself is not something abstractly

21 In the *Timaeus* (71a–72b) Plato makes the liver the seat of divination, which comes to the soul only when reason is asleep or disturbed.

simple but a system of movements, in which it differentiates itself into moments while remaining free in this very differentiation; and it articulates its body in general into various functions and assigns a single part of it to only one function. Just so, it can also be imagined that the fluid *being* of spirit's *being-within-itself* is an articulated one. And it seems it must be imagined so. For the reflected-into-itself *being* of spirit in the brain is itself again only a middle between its pure essence and its bodily articulation—a middle that must therefore have in it the nature of both, and so, from the side of the latter, must also have in it articulation that *is*.

328 Spiritual-organic being has at the same time the necessary side of a *resting, subsisting* existence. As the extreme of being-for-self, spiritual-organic being must step back and have this resting existence over against it as the other extreme, which is then the object on which it acts as cause. If, now, brain and spinal cord are that bodily *being-for-self* of spirit, then skull and vertebral column are the other extreme, separated off and added to it: the fixed, resting thing.—But when anyone thinks of the proper place where spirit exists, it is not the back that comes to mind but only the head. So in examining a knowing such as the one before us, we can content ourselves with this reason—not too bad a one for it—for restricting this existence to the skull.[22] Should the back come to mind insofar as knowing and doing are sometimes partly driven *in* through it, but partly also driven *out*, this would prove nothing in favor of taking the spinal cord as part of the indwelling place of spirit, and the spinal column as its counterpart existence—because it would prove too much. For one can equally recall that other external ways of getting at the activity of spirit, in order to arouse or restrain it, are also popular.—The vertebral column, then, drops out *with justice*, if you like; and it is as well *constructed* as many other doctrines of the philosophy of nature that the skull alone does not, to be sure,

22 Gall's craniology, later called phrenology, claimed to read mental faculties from the shape of the skull.

contain the *organs* of spirit.[23] For this was excluded earlier from the concept of this relation, and that is why the skull was assigned to the side of existence. Or, if we may not appeal to the *concept* of the matter, experience surely teaches that although we see with the eye as an organ, we do *not* murder, steal, write poetry and so on with the skull.—We must therefore also refrain from using the expression *organ* for that *significance* of the skull of which we have still to speak. People like to say that for reasonable people what matters is not the word but the *matter*. Yet this gives no permission to designate a matter with a word that does not belong to it. For that is at once clumsiness and deception: it fancies and pretends that it merely lacks the right *word,* and hides from itself that what it in fact lacks is the matter, that is, the concept. If the concept were present, it would also have its right word.—For the moment, all that has been determined here is that, as the brain is the living head, so the skull is the caput mortuum [dead head: the worthless residue left in the alchemist's retort].

329 In this dead being, then, the spiritual movements and determinate modes of the brain would have to give themselves their presentation of outer actuality—an actuality that is nevertheless still in the individual itself. For their relation to the skull, which as dead being does not have spirit dwelling within it, the relation established above offers itself first: the outer, mechanical one. The organs proper—and these are in the brain—would then press the skull round here, beat it broad there, or push it flat, or however else one cares to picture this effect. Being itself a part of the organism, the skull must, it is true, be thought to have a living self-formation, as every bone does. Considered in this way, it is rather the skull that, for its part, presses on the brain and sets its outer limit—and as the harder of the two it is also better able to do so. But the same relation would still remain in determining the activity of each on the other. For whether the skull is what determines or what is determined

23 A joke about corporal punishment: learning beaten into pupils, and misbehavior beaten out of them.

would change nothing at all in the causal connection in general —except that the skull would then be made the immediate organ of self-consciousness, since the side of *being-for-self* would be found in it as *cause*. But since *being-for-self*, as *organic liveliness*, falls into *both* in the same way, the causal connection between them in fact falls away. The further development of the two, however, would be connected inwardly and would be an organic pre-established harmony. This harmony leaves the two mutually related sides free with respect to each other, and leaves each its own *shape*, which the shape of the other need not correspond to; and still more, it leaves shape and quality free with respect to each other—as the form of the grape and the taste of the wine are free with respect to each other.—But the determination of *being-for-self* falls on the side of the brain, and the determination of *existence* on the side of the skull. So within the organic unity a causal connection between them must *also* be posited: a necessary relation between them as external to each other, that is, a relation itself external, through which their *shape* would therefore be determined each by the other.[24]

330 As for the determination in which the organ of self-consciousness would be the active cause working on the opposite side, one can talk back and forth about it in many ways. For what is at issue is the constitution of a cause considered in terms of its *indifferent* existence, its shape and size—a cause whose inner and being-for-self are supposed to be precisely such as have nothing to do with immediate existence. The organic self-formation of the skull is, first, indifferent to mechanical action upon it; and the relation between these two relations, since the former is self-relation, is precisely this indeterminacy and limitlessness itself. Then, suppose the brain did take the differences of spirit up into itself as differences that are, and were a multiplicity of inner organs each occupying a different space. This contradicts nature, which gives the moments of

24 "Pre-established harmony" is Leibniz's doctrine that substances do not act on one another but are coordinated in advance by God, like perfectly synchronized clocks.

the concept an existence of their own: it places the *fluid simplicity* of organic life *purely on one side*, and its *articulation* and *division* into its differences likewise on the *other* side, so that these differences, as they are to be grasped here, show themselves as particular anatomical things. Even so, it would remain undetermined whether a spiritual moment, according as it was originally stronger or weaker, would have to possess a more *expanded* brain organ in the former case and a more *contracted* one in the latter, or just the reverse. — Likewise, whether its *development* would enlarge or diminish the organ, whether it would make it coarser and thicker or finer. Since it remains undetermined what the cause is like, it is equally left undetermined how the effect on the skull takes place—whether it is a widening, or a narrowing and letting-collapse. If this effect is determined, say, more *genteelly* as a *stimulation*, it remains undetermined whether this happens by swelling, like a cantharides plaster, or by shrinking, like vinegar.—Plausible reasons can be brought forward for all such views; for the organic relation, which intervenes just as much, lets one pass as well as the other and is indifferent to all this understanding.[25]

331 Observing consciousness, however, is not concerned with trying to determine this relation. For in any case it is not the brain as an *animal* part that stands on the one side, but the brain as the *being* of *self-conscious* individuality.—Individuality, as abiding character and self-moving conscious doing, is *for itself* and *within itself*. Over against this being-for-self and being-within-itself stands its actuality and existence for another. This being-for-self and being-within-itself is the essence and subject, which has in the brain a being that is *subsumed under it* and receives its worth only through the significance that dwells within it. The other side of self-conscious individuality, however—the side of its existence—is *being* as independent and subject, or as a *thing*, namely a bone: *the actuality and existence of the human being is his skull-bone*.—This is the relation, and the sense in which it is

25 A cantharides plaster, made from dried "Spanish fly" beetles, was used in medicine to raise blisters on the skin.

understood, that the two sides of this connection have for the consciousness observing them.

[332] This consciousness is now concerned with the more determinate relation of these sides. The skull-bone does indeed have, in general, the significance of being the immediate actuality of spirit. But the many-sidedness of spirit gives its existence a corresponding multiplicity of meanings. What must be gained is the determinateness of the significance of the individual places into which this existence is divided; and we must see how these places carry in themselves the pointer to that significance.

[333] The skull-bone is not an organ of activity, nor is it a speaking movement. One does not steal, murder and so on with the skull-bone; nor does it pull the slightest face at such deeds, so as to become a speaking gesture.—Nor, again, does this *thing that is* have the value of a *sign*. Facial expression and gesture, tone, even a pillar or a post driven into the ground on a deserted island, announce at once that something else is meant by them than what they immediately *merely are*. They at once give themselves out as signs, because they have a determinateness in them that points to something else precisely by not properly belonging to them. With a skull, as Hamlet with Yorick's, one can indeed let many things come to mind. But the skull-bone by itself is such an indifferent, innocent thing that nothing else is immediately to be seen or meant in it but only itself. It does remind us of the brain and its determinateness, and of skulls of other formations, but not of a conscious movement. For it has neither facial expression and gesture, nor anything imprinted on it that would announce itself as coming from a conscious doing. It is that actuality which was supposed to present, in individuality, another side of such a kind that it would no longer be being reflecting itself into itself, but purely *immediate being*.

[334] Further, since the skull does not itself feel, a more determinate significance might still seem to emerge for it in this way: determinate sensations might let us know, through their proximity, what is meant by it. Since a conscious mode of spirit has its feeling at a determinate place on the skull, this place might

in its shape indicate that mode and its particularity. Some people, for example, complain of feeling a painful tension somewhere in the head when they think hard, or even when they *think* at all. In the same way *stealing*, *murdering*, *writing poetry* and so on could each be accompanied by a sensation of its own, which would moreover have to have its own particular place. This place in the brain, being moved and exercised more in this way, would probably also develop the neighboring place in the bone more. Or that place in the bone, out of sympathy or consensus, would not be sluggish either, but would enlarge or shrink, or shape itself in some way or other. — What makes this hypothesis improbable, however, is that feeling in general is something indeterminate, and feeling in the head, as the center, might well be the general fellow-feeling of all suffering. Other sensations would then mingle with the thief's, murderer's or poet's head-tickle or pain. They could be distinguished from one another, and from those that can be called merely bodily, as little as the illness can be determined from the symptom of a headache if we restrict its meaning to the bodily alone.

335 In fact, from whichever side the matter is considered, all necessary mutual relation falls away, and so does any indication of it that speaks for itself. If the relation is nevertheless supposed to hold, what remains, and is necessary, is a *conceptless*, free pre-established harmony between the corresponding determinations of the two sides; for the one side *is supposed to be spiritless actuality, a mere thing*.—So there stand, on one side, a multitude of resting places on the skull, and on the other a multitude of properties of spirit, whose number and determination will depend on the state of psychology. The more wretched the conception of spirit, the easier the matter becomes from this side. For the properties become partly fewer, and partly more separated, more fixed and bonier, and thereby all the more similar to determinations of bone and comparable with them. But although the wretchedness of the conception of spirit makes much easier, a very great multitude still remains on both sides; and what remains for observation is the complete contingency

of their relation. Suppose each of the children of Israel were to take from the sand of the sea, to which they are supposed to correspond, the grain of which it is the sign. The indifference and arbitrariness that would assign each its own grain would be just as great as the arbitrariness that assigns their skull-sites and bone-forms to every faculty of the soul, every passion, and—what would likewise have to be considered here—the shades of character that the more refined psychology and knowledge of human nature like to speak of.—The murderer's skull has this—not organ, nor sign either, but this bump. But this murderer also has a multitude of other properties, as well as other bumps, and along with the bumps also hollows. One has the choice among bumps and hollows.[26] And again, his murderous disposition can be related to whatever bump or hollow one likes, and these in turn to whatever property one likes; for the murderer is neither only this abstraction of a murderer, nor does he have only one elevation and one hollow. The observations made on this subject must therefore sound every bit as good as the shopkeeper's and the housewife's rain at the fair and on washing day. Shopkeeper and housewife could also observe that it always rains when this neighbor walks by, or when roast pork is eaten. Just as the rain is indifferent to these circumstances, so, for observation, *this* determinateness of spirit is indifferent to *this* determinate being of the skull. For of the two objects of this observing, the one is a dry *being-for-self*, a bony property of spirit, just as the other is a dry *being-in-itself*. A thing as bony as both of them are is completely indifferent to everything else. It is just as indifferent to the high bump whether a murderer is in its neighborhood as it is to the murderer whether flatness is near him.

336 There does, to be sure, remain the *possibility*—and it cannot be overcome—that a bump at some place is connected with some property, passion and so on. One *can imagine* the murderer with a high bump here at this place on the skull, and the thief

26 God promises Abraham descendants as numerous as the sand on the seashore (Genesis 22:17). "Skull-sites" (Schädelstätten) puns on Schädelstätte, Luther's word for Golgotha, "the place of the skull."

with one there. From this side, skull-science is still capable of great extension. For at first it seems to restrict itself to connecting a bump with a property *in the same individual*, so that this individual possesses both. But natural skull-science already—for there must be such a thing just as much as there is a natural physiognomy—goes beyond this limit. It judges not only that a cunning person has a bump as thick as a fist sitting behind his ears; it also imagines that it is not the unfaithful wife herself but the other marital individual who has bumps on the forehead.— Likewise one can also *imagine* the person who lives under one roof with the murderer, or his neighbor, and further his fellow citizens and so on, with high bumps at some place on the skull—just as well as the flying cow that was first caressed by the crab riding on the donkey, and afterward, and so on.[27] — But if *possibility* is taken not in the sense of the possibility *of imagining*, but in the sense of *inner* possibility, or of the *concept*, then the object is an actuality of such a kind that it is, and is supposed to be, a pure thing without any such significance, and so can have that significance only in imagination.

337 Despite the indifference of the two sides to each other, the observer nevertheless sets to work determining relations. He is kept fresh, on the one hand, by the general rational ground that the *outer is the expression of the inner*. On the other, he supports himself with the analogy of animal skulls. These may well have a simpler character than human beings, but by the same token it becomes all the harder to say what character they have, since it cannot be so easy for anyone's imagination to enter properly into the nature of an animal. In assuring himself of the laws he claims to have discovered, then, the observer finds *excellent help* in a distinction that must necessarily occur to us here as well. — The *being* of spirit, at least, cannot be taken as something simply unshifted and unshiftable. The human being is free. It is conceded that *original* being consists only of *predispositions*, over which a person has much power, or which need favorable cir-

27 "Having it fist-thick behind the ears" is a German idiom for being sly; the bumps on the deceived husband's forehead are the cuckold's horns.

cumstances in order to be developed. That is, an *original* being of spirit must equally be declared to be one that does not exist as being. Suppose, then, that observations contradicted what it occurs to someone to assert as a law. If the weather were fine on market day or on washing day, the stall-keeper and the housewife could say that it *really ought* to rain, and that the *predisposition* to rain is *present* after all. Skull-observation does just the same: it says that this individual *really ought* to be as the skull, according to the law, declares, and has an *original predisposition* which, *however*, has not been developed; this quality is not present, but it *ought to be present*.—The *law* and the *ought* are grounded on the observation of actual rain, and of the actual cast of mind that goes with this determinateness of the skull. But if the *actuality* is not present, the *empty possibility* counts for just as much.—This possibility, i.e., the non-actuality of the law that has been put forward, and with it observations that contradict the law, must come in precisely because the freedom of the individual and the developing circumstances are indifferent to *being* in general—both to being as original inner being and to being as outer, bony being—and because the individual can also be something other than what it originally is inwardly, and still more something other than a bone.

338 We thus arrive at the possibility that this bump or hollow in the skull denotes both something actual and merely a *predisposition*, and indeed an indeterminate predisposition to something or other—that it denotes something non-actual. We see what always happens to a poor excuse: it can itself be used against the very thing it was meant to prop up. We see meaning brought by the nature of the matter to the point of *thoughtlessly* saying the *opposite* of what it holds fast to—of saying that something is indicated by this bone, but just as well *also not*.

339 What hovers before opinion itself in this excuse is the true thought, the very thought that annihilates opinion: that *being* as such is not the truth of spirit at all. Just as a predisposition is already an *original being* that has no share in the activity of spirit, so too, for its part, is the bone. What simply is, without

spiritual activity, is a thing for consciousness. So far from being the essence of consciousness, it is rather its opposite, and consciousness is *actual* to itself only through the negation and annihilation of such a being. — From this angle, to pass off a bone as the *actual existence* of consciousness must be regarded as an utter disavowal of reason. And the bone is passed off as exactly that when it is considered as the outer of spirit, for the outer is precisely the actuality that is. It is no help to say that from this outer one *only infers* the inner, which is *something else*, and that the outer is not the inner itself but only its *expression*. For in the relationship of the two to one another, it is precisely the side of the inner that has the determination of actuality that *thinks* itself and is *thought*, while the side of the outer has that of *actuality that is*. — So if someone is told, "You (your inner self) are this, *because* your *bone* is constituted thus," it means nothing other than: "I take a bone for *your actuality*." The retort to such a judgment with a slap in the face, mentioned in connection with physiognomy, first of all knocks the *soft* parts out of their shape and position, and proves only that they are no true *in-itself*, not the actuality of spirit.—Here the retort would really have to go so far as to smash in the skull of anyone who judges like this, in order to prove to him, in a way just as palpable as his wisdom, that for a human being a bone is nothing *in-itself*, much less *his* true actuality. —

340 The raw instinct of self-conscious reason will reject such a skull-science out of hand—reject this other, observing instinct of reason, which, having advanced to a presentiment of *cognition*, has grasped cognition in the spiritless form that the outer is the expression of the inner. But the worse a thought is, the less obvious it sometimes is where exactly its badness lies, and the harder it is to take it apart. For a thought is called the worse, the purer and emptier the abstraction that counts for it as the essence. The opposition at issue here, however, has as its terms individuality conscious of itself and the abstraction of externality that has become wholly a *thing*—that inner being of spirit, taken as fixed, spiritless being, set against just such being. —

With this, however, observing reason seems in fact to have reached its peak, at which it must abandon itself and go head over heels; for only what is utterly bad has in it the immediate necessity of inverting itself. — It can be said of the Jewish people that, precisely because it stands immediately before the gate of salvation, it is and has been the most rejected. What it ought to be in and for itself, this self-essentiality, it is not for itself; instead it places it beyond itself. Through this externalization it makes *possible* for itself a higher existence—if it could take its object back into itself again—than if it had remained within the immediacy of being. For spirit is all the greater, the greater the opposition out of which it returns into itself; and it creates this opposition for itself by sublating its immediate unity and by externalizing its being-for-self. But if such a consciousness does not reflect itself, the middle in which it stands is the unhallowed void, since what was supposed to fill that middle has become a fixed extreme. Thus this last stage of observing reason is its worst; but for that very reason its reversal is necessary.

341 For a survey of the series of relationships considered so far, which make up the content and object of observation, shows the following. In its *first mode*, the observation of the relationships of inorganic nature, *sensuous being* already *vanishes* for observation. The moments of its relationship present themselves as pure abstractions and as simple concepts, which were supposed to be firmly tied to the existence of things; but that existence is lost, so that the moment proves to be pure movement and something universal. This free process, complete within itself, retains the significance of something objective; but it now comes on the scene as a *One*. In the process of the inorganic, the One is the non-existent inner; but existing as a One, the process is the organic. — The One, as being-for-self or negative essence, stands over against the universal, withdraws from it and remains free for itself. The concept is thus realized only in the element of absolute singularization. It does not find in organic existence its true expression, which would be to be there *as universal*, but remains something outer, or, what is the same thing, an *inner* of

organic nature.—The organic process is free only *in itself*; it is not free *for itself*. The being-for-self of its freedom enters on the scene in *purpose*; it *exists* as another being, as a wisdom conscious of itself that lies outside that process. Observing reason therefore turns to this wisdom, to spirit—the concept existing as universality, or purpose existing as purpose—and now its own essence is its object.

342 It turns first to spirit in its purity. But since observing reason is the apprehension of an object moving within its differences as an object that simply *is*, what comes to be for it are *laws of thought*, relations of something enduring to something enduring. Yet since the content of these laws consists only of moments, they run together into the One of self-consciousness. —This new object, likewise taken as something that *is*, is *singular, contingent* self-consciousness. Observation therefore stands within spirit as merely meant, and within the contingent relationship of conscious actuality to unconscious actuality. Spirit, in itself alone, is the necessity of this relation; observation therefore moves in closer on its body, and compares its willing and acting actuality with its actuality reflected into itself and contemplative, which is itself objective. This outer, although it is a language of the individual that the individual has in its own self, is at the same time, as a sign, something indifferent to the content it was supposed to signify—just as that which posits the sign for itself is indifferent to the sign.

343 From this changeable language, therefore, observation finally returns to *fixed being*. In accordance with its concept, it declares that externality—not as organ, nor as language and sign, but as a *dead thing*—is the outer and immediate actuality of spirit. The very first observation, that of inorganic nature, sublated the view that the concept should be present as a thing; this last mode restores it, by making the actuality of spirit itself into a thing, or, expressed conversely, by giving dead being the significance of spirit.—Observation has thus come to express what our concept of it was: namely, that the certainty of reason seeks itself as objective actuality. — To be sure, it is not meant here

that spirit, which is represented by a skull, is being declared a thing. There is supposed to be no materialism, as it is called, in this thought; rather, spirit is supposed to be something other than these bones. But "it *is*" itself means nothing other than "it is a *thing*." If *being* as such, or thinghood, is predicated of spirit, then the true expression of this is that spirit is the kind of thing that *a bone is*. It must therefore be considered supremely important that the true expression has been found for saying purely of spirit, "*it is*." When it is otherwise said of spirit that *it is*, has *a being*, is a *thing*, a single *actuality*, what is *meant* is not something one can see or take in one's hand, bump into, and so on. But that is what is *said*; and what is said in truth is thereby expressed as follows: *the being of spirit is a bone*.

THE RESULT OF OBSERVING REASON

Observing reason ends in the claim that the self is a thing, a judgment that sublates itself.

344 This result now has a double significance. First, there is its true significance, insofar as it complements the result of the preceding movement of self-consciousness. The unhappy self-consciousness externalized its independence and wrestled its *being-for-self* out into a *thing*. In doing so it returned from self-consciousness into consciousness, that is, into the consciousness for which the object is a *being*, a *thing*.—But what is a thing here is self-consciousness; this thing is thus the unity of the I and of being, the *category*. Since the object is determined in this way for consciousness, consciousness *has reason*. Consciousness, like self-consciousness, *is in itself* really reason; but only of the consciousness for which the object has determined itself as the category can it be said that it *has* reason.—Knowing what reason is, however, is still distinct from this.—The category, which is the *immediate* unity of *being* and of *what is its own*, has to pass through both forms, and observing consciousness is precisely the consciousness to which the category presents itself in the form of *being*. In its result, consciousness expresses as a pro-

position that of which it is the unconscious certainty—the proposition that lies in the concept of reason. This is the *infinite judgment* that the self is a thing—a judgment that sublates itself.[28] — Through this result, then, what has specifically been added to the category is that it is this self-sublating opposition. The *pure* category, which is for consciousness in the form of *being* or *immediacy*, is the object still *unmediated*, merely *present*; and consciousness is an equally unmediated comportment. The moment of that infinite judgment is the transition from *immediacy* into mediation or *negativity*. The present object is therefore determined as a negative one, while consciousness is determined as *self*-consciousness over against it. In other words, the category, which in observation has passed through the form of *being*, is now posited in the form of being-for-self. Consciousness no longer wants to *find* itself *immediately*, but to produce itself through its own activity. *It itself* is the purpose of its doing, just as in observation it was concerned only with things.

345 The other significance of the result is the one already considered: that of concept-less observation. This observation knows no other way of grasping and expressing itself than by ingenuously declaring the bone to be the *actuality* of self-consciousness—the bone as it finds itself as a sensuous thing, which does not at the same time lose its objectivity for consciousness. But it has no clarity of consciousness about the fact that it is saying this. It does not grasp its proposition in the determinateness of its subject and predicate and of their relation, still less in the sense of the infinite, self-dissolving judgment and of the concept. — Rather, out of a deeper-lying self-consciousness of spirit, which appears here as a natural sense of decency, it hides from itself the disgrace of the concept-less, naked thought of taking a bone for the actuality of self-consciousness. And it whitewashes that thought through thoughtlessness itself: by mixing in all sorts of relations of cause and effect, of sign, organ,

28 Hegel puns on Seyn ("being") and das Seine ("what is its own"). An "infinite judgment," a term from traditional logic, here joins a subject and predicate that have no common measure.

and so on, which have no meaning here, and by concealing the glaring crudity of the proposition behind distinctions borrowed from them.

[346] Brain fibers and the like, considered as the being of spirit, are already a merely thought, hypothetical actuality—not one that is *there*, felt, seen; not the true actuality. If they *are there*, if they are seen, they are dead objects and then no longer count as the being of spirit. But objectivity proper must be *immediate, sensuous* objectivity, so that spirit is posited as actual in this objectivity as something dead—for the bone is what is dead insofar as it is in the living thing itself. — The concept underlying this representation is that reason is to itself *all thinghood*, even *purely objective* thinghood *itself*. But reason is this *in the concept*; in other words, only the concept is its truth. And the purer the concept itself is, the sillier the representation it sinks to when its content is not in the form of concept but in that of representation—when the self-sublating judgment is not taken with consciousness of its own infinity, but as a fixed proposition whose subject and predicate each count on their own account, the self fixed as self, the thing as thing, and yet the one is supposed to be the other.—Reason, which is essentially the concept, is immediately divided within itself into itself and its opposite, an opposition which for that very reason is just as immediately sublated. But when reason presents itself in this way, as itself and as its opposite, and is held fast in the wholly single moment of this falling-apart, it is apprehended irrationally. And the purer the moments of this falling-apart are, the more glaring is the appearance of this content, which either is solely for consciousness or is solely and ingenuously declared by it.—The *depth* that spirit drives forth from within, but only as far as its *representational consciousness*, where it lets it stand—together with this consciousness's *ignorance* of what it is saying—is the same conjunction of high and low that nature naively expresses in the living being when it combines the organ of its highest fulfillment, the organ of generation, with the organ of urination. — The infinite judgment, as infinite, would be the consummation of life that

comprehends itself; but the consciousness of life that remains at the level of representation behaves as urination.

Reason: The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness

V.B. Die Verwirklichung des vernünftigen Selbstbewußtseyns durch sich selbst
Pleasure and necessity, the law of the heart, virtue and the way of the world.

B. REASON ACTUALIZING ITSELF

Reason no longer seeks itself in things but sets out to produce itself through its own activity.

347 Self-consciousness found the thing as itself, and itself as a thing; that is, *it is for self-consciousness* that it is *in itself* objective actuality. It is no longer the *immediate* certainty of being all reality; it is a certainty for which the immediate in general has the form of something sublated, so that its *objectivity* counts only as a surface whose inner and essence is *self-consciousness itself*.—The object to which it relates positively is therefore a self-consciousness. This object is in the form of thinghood, that is, it is *independent*; but self-consciousness has the certainty that this independent object is nothing alien to it. It thereby knows that it is *in itself* recognized by the object. It is *spirit*, which has the certainty of having its unity with itself in the doubling of its self-consciousness and in the independence of both. This certainty must now be raised, for it, to truth. What it holds to be the case—that it is so *in itself* and in its *inner* certainty—is to enter its consciousness and come to be *for it*.

348 What the general stations of this actualization will be is already indicated, in general terms, by comparison with the

path so far. Just as observing reason repeated, in the element of the category, the movement of *consciousness*—namely sense-certainty, perception, and the understanding—so this reason will again pass through the double movement of *self-consciousness*, and go over from independence into its freedom. At first this active reason is conscious of itself only as an individual, and as such must demand and produce its actuality in the other. Then, however, as its consciousness rises to universality, it becomes *universal* reason, and is conscious of itself as reason, as something already recognized in and for itself, which unites all self-consciousness in its pure consciousness. It is the simple spiritual essence which, in coming at the same time to consciousness, is the *real substance* into which the earlier forms return as into their ground. Relative to this ground, those forms are only single moments of its becoming. They do indeed break loose and appear as shapes in their own right; but in fact they have *existence* and *actuality* only as borne by it, and they have their *truth* only insofar as they are and remain within it.

THE REALM OF ETHICAL LIFE

In the life of a free people, the individual finds its own essence in shared customs and laws.

349 Let us take this goal—which is the *concept* that has already arisen *for us*, namely recognized self-consciousness, which has the certainty of itself in the other free self-consciousness and precisely therein its truth—and take it up in its reality; or let us bring out this still inner spirit as the substance already developed into its existence. Then *the realm of ethical life* opens up in this concept.[1] For ethical life is nothing other than the absolute spiritual *unity* of the essence of individuals in their independent *actuality*. It is a self-consciousness universal in itself, which is so actual to itself in another consciousness that this other has complete independence, or is a thing for it; and

1 "Ethical life" renders Sittlichkeit, from Sitte ("custom"): the ethical order as lived in a people's customs and institutions.

which precisely therein is conscious of its *unity* with that other, and is self-consciousness only in this unity with this objective being. This ethical *substance*, taken in the *abstraction* of *universality*, is only the *thought* law; but it is just as much immediately actual *self-consciousness*, or it is *custom*. Conversely, the *single* consciousness is this existing One only insofar as it is conscious, in its singularity, of the universal consciousness as its own being, since its doing and existence are the universal custom.

350 In the life of a people, the concept of the actualization of self-conscious reason in fact has its complete reality. That concept is: to intuit, in the independence of the *other*, complete *unity* with it; or to have as object, as *my* being-for-*me*, this free *thinghood* of another which I find before me and which is the negative of my self. Reason is present as the fluid universal *substance*, as the unchangeable simple *thinghood*, which bursts apart into many completely independent beings, just as light bursts into stars, countless points each shining for itself. In their absolute being-for-self these beings are dissolved in the simple independent substance not only *in themselves* but *for themselves*. They are conscious of being these single independent beings through sacrificing their singularity, and through this universal substance being their soul and essence—just as this universal, in turn, is their *doing* as single individuals, or the work they have produced.

351 The *purely single* doing and striving of the individual relates to the needs it has as a natural being, that is, as *existing singularity*. That even these, its commonest functions, do not come to nothing but have actuality is brought about by the universal sustaining medium, by the *power* of the whole people.—But it is not only this *form* of the *persistence* of its doing in general that the individual has in the universal substance; it equally has *its content* there. What it does *is* the universal skill and custom of all. This content, insofar as it becomes completely singularized, is in its actuality interwoven with the doing of all. The *labor* of the individual for its needs is as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of its own, and it achieves the satisfaction of its own

needs only through the labor of others. — Just as the single individual in his *single* labor already accomplishes a *universal* labor *unconsciously*, so he in turn also accomplishes the universal labor as his *conscious* object. The whole becomes, *as a whole*, his work, for which he sacrifices himself, and precisely through this he receives himself back from it.—There is nothing here that is not reciprocal, nothing in which the independence of the individual does not, in the dissolution of its being-for-self, in the *negation* of itself, give itself its *positive* significance of being for itself. This unity of being-for-another, or of making oneself into a thing, and of being-for-self—this universal substance—speaks its *universal language* in the customs and laws of its people. But this existing, unchangeable essence is nothing other than the expression of the very single individuality that seems opposed to it. The laws express what each single individual *is* and *does*. The individual knows them not only as its *universal* objective thinghood, but equally knows itself in them, or knows them as *singularized* in its own individuality and in each of its fellow citizens. In the universal spirit, therefore, each has only the certainty of himself: the certainty of finding nothing else in actuality that is than himself. He is as certain of the others as of himself. — I intuit in all of them that they are, for themselves, only these independent beings, just as I am. I intuit in them free unity with the others in such a way that this unity exists through me just as it exists through the others themselves. Them as me, me as them.

352 In a free people, therefore, reason is in truth actualized. It is present, living spirit, in which the individual not only finds its *vocation*—that is, its universal and single essence—expressed and present as thinghood, but is itself this essence and has also attained its vocation. That is why the wisest men of antiquity declared *that wisdom and virtue consist in living in accordance with the customs of one's people*.[2]

353 But self-consciousness, which is at first spirit only *immediately* and *in its concept*, has stepped out of this happiness of hav-

ing attained its vocation and of living in it; or else—it has not yet attained this happiness; for both can be said equally well.

354 Reason *must step out of this happiness*. For only *in itself* or *immediately* is the life of a free people *real ethical life*; in other words, this ethical life is something that *is*. And so this universal spirit is itself also a single one: the whole of customs and laws, a *determinate* ethical substance. It sheds its limitation only in the higher moment, namely in *consciousness about its essence*, and has its absolute truth only in this cognition, not immediately in its *being*. In its being it is, on the one hand, limited; on the other, the absolute limitation is precisely this: that spirit is in the form of *being*.

355 Further, the *single* consciousness, as it immediately has its existence in real ethical life or in the people, is a solid trust. For this trust, spirit has not dissolved into its *abstract* moments, and so it also does not know itself as pure *singularity that is for itself*. But once it has arrived at this thought, as it must, this *immediate* unity with spirit, or its *being* in spirit—its trust—is lost. *Isolated* for itself, it is now its own essence; the universal spirit no longer is its essence. The *moment of this singularity of self-consciousness* is indeed within the universal spirit itself, but only as a vanishing quantity. As soon as it emerges for itself, it dissolves in the universal spirit just as immediately, and comes to consciousness only as trust. When the moment fixes itself in this way—and every moment, because it is a moment of the essence, must itself come to present itself as essence—the individual has stepped out in opposition to the laws and customs. They are now only a thought without absolute essentiality, an abstract theory without actuality; but the individual, as this I, is to itself the living truth.

356 Or else self-consciousness has *not yet attained this happiness* of being ethical substance, the spirit of a people. For having returned from observation, spirit is at first not yet actualized as such through itself; it is posited only as *inner* essence, or as

2 "Vocation" renders Bestimmung, which means both "determination" and "vocation" or "destiny."

abstraction.—Or spirit at first *is* only *immediately*; but in being immediately, it is *singular*. It is practical consciousness, which strides into the world it finds before it with the purpose of doubling itself in this determinateness of a single individual, of producing itself as this single individual, as its existing counterpart, and of becoming conscious of this unity of its actuality with objective being. It has the *certainty* of this unity. It holds that this unity is present *in itself*, or that this agreement between itself and thinghood already exists and has only still to come about *for it* through itself; or that its making is equally the *finding* of that unity. Since this unity is called *happiness*, this individual is thereby sent out into the world by its spirit *to seek its happiness*.[3]

357 If, then, the truth of this rational self-consciousness is, for us, ethical substance, then here, for self-consciousness, is the beginning of its experience of the ethical world. Insofar as self-consciousness has not yet become ethical substance, this movement presses toward it; and what is sublated in the movement are the single moments that count for self-consciousness in isolation. They have the form of an immediate willing, or of *natural drive*, which attains its satisfaction, and this satisfaction is itself the content of a new drive. — But insofar as self-consciousness has lost the happiness of being in the substance, these natural drives are bound up with consciousness of their purpose as the true vocation and essentiality. Ethical substance has sunk to a selfless predicate, whose living subjects are the individuals, who have to fill out their universality through themselves and to provide for their vocation out of their own resources. — In the first sense, then, those shapes are the becoming of ethical substance and precede it; in the second, they follow it, and resolve for self-consciousness what its vocation is. On the first side, in the movement in which it is experienced what the truth of the drives is, their immediacy or crudeness is lost, and their content passes over into a higher one. On the second side, what is lost is the false representation of consciousness, which places its voca-

3 Glück means both "happiness" and "luck" or "fortune"; sein Glück suchen is the idiom for "to seek one's fortune."

tion in the drives. On the first side, the *goal* they reach is immediate ethical substance; on the second, it is consciousness of that substance—and indeed a consciousness that knows it as its own essence. To that extent this movement would be the becoming of morality, a shape higher than ethical life. But these shapes make up at the same time only one side of morality's becoming, namely the side that falls within *being-for-self*, or in which consciousness sublates *its* purposes; not the side on which morality issues from substance itself. Since these moments cannot yet have the significance of being made into purposes in opposition to lost ethical life, they count here according to their naive content, and the goal they press toward is ethical substance. But since our times stand nearer to that form of these moments in which they appear after consciousness has lost its ethical life and, in seeking it, repeats those forms, they may rather be represented as they are expressed in this mode.

358 Self-consciousness, which is as yet only the concept of spirit, sets out on this path with the determinateness of being, as single spirit, the essence to itself. Its purpose is therefore to give itself actualization as a single individual and, as such, to enjoy itself in this actualization.

359 In the determination of being the essence to itself as something *that is for itself*, it is the *negativity* of the other. In its consciousness, therefore, it itself, as the positive, stands over against something that indeed *is*, but that has for it the significance of something that is not in itself. Consciousness appears split into this reality it finds before it and the *purpose* that it accomplishes by sublating that reality, making the purpose actual in its place. Its first purpose, however, is its *immediate*, abstract *being-for-self*: to intuit itself as *this single individual* in another, or to intuit another self-consciousness as itself. The experience of what the truth of this purpose is raises self-consciousness higher; from now on it is a purpose to itself insofar as it is at the same time *universal* and has the *law immediately* within itself. In fulfilling this *law* of its *heart*, however, it experiences that the *single* individual cannot preserve itself in the pro-

cess, and that the good can be carried out only by sacrificing it; and it becomes *virtue*. The experience that virtue has can be no other than that its purpose is already carried out in itself, that happiness is found immediately in doing itself, and that doing itself is the good. The concept of this whole sphere—that thinghood is the *being-for-self* of spirit itself—comes to be for self-consciousness in the movement of this sphere. Having found this concept, self-consciousness is thus reality to itself as individuality that immediately expresses itself, that no longer meets resistance in an opposed actuality, and for which only this self-expression itself is object and purpose.

A. PLEASURE AND NECESSITY

Self-consciousness plunges into life seeking pleasure and is crushed by an alien necessity.

360 Self-consciousness, which is to itself reality in general, has its object in its own self, but as an object it has as yet only *for itself* and that does not yet exist. *Being* stands over against it as an actuality other than its own; and it aims, by carrying out its being-for-self, to intuit itself as another independent being. This *first purpose* is to become conscious of itself as a single being in the other self-consciousness, or to make this other into itself. It has the certainty that *in itself* this other already is itself. — Insofar as it has raised itself out of ethical substance and the tranquil being of thought to its *being-for-self*, it has left behind it the law of custom and of existence, the findings of observation, and theory, like a gray shadow just vanishing. For all this is rather a knowing of something whose being-for-self and actuality are other than those of self-consciousness. In place of the heavenly-seeming spirit of the universality of knowing and doing, in which the feeling and enjoyment of singularity fall silent, the Earth Spirit has entered into it—the spirit for which only that

being counts as true actuality which is the actuality of the single consciousness.[4]

> It despises understanding and science,
> humanity's very highest gifts—/ it has given itself over to
> the devil
> and must perish.[5]

361 It therefore plunges into life, and brings to fulfillment the pure individuality in which it comes on the scene. It does not so much make its happiness as take it immediately and enjoy it. The shadows of science, laws, and principles, which alone stand between it and its own actuality, vanish like a lifeless mist that cannot hold its own against the certainty of its reality. It takes life for itself the way a ripe fruit is plucked, a fruit that comes to meet the hand just as much as it is taken.

362 Its doing is a doing of *desire* in one respect only. It does not aim at destroying the whole objective being, but only at the form of its otherness or independence, which is an unessential semblance; for *in itself* the objective being counts for it as the same essence, or as its own selfhood. The element in which desire and its object subsist independently and indifferently to one another is *living existence*; the enjoyment of desire sublates this existence insofar as it belongs to desire's object. But here this element, which gives both of them their separate actuality, is rather the category, a being that is essentially a *represented* being. It is therefore the *consciousness* of independence—whether natural consciousness, or consciousness developed into a system of laws—which maintains the individuals each for themselves. This separation does not exist in itself for self-consciousness, which knows the other as *its own* selfhood. It therefore arrives at the enjoyment of *pleasure*, at consciousness of its actualization in a consciousness that appears independent, or at the intuition of the unity of the two independent self-conscious-

4 The Earth Spirit (Erdgeist) is summoned by Faust in Goethe's Faust; the "gray" of theory echoes Mephistopheles' "Gray, dear friend, is all theory."

5 A free adaptation of Mephistopheles' lines in Goethe's Faust, where he says Faust would perish even had he not surrendered to the devil.

nesses. It attains its purpose, but precisely in doing so it experiences what the truth of that purpose is. It grasps itself as *this single, for-itself-existing* being; but the actualization of this purpose is itself the sublation of the purpose. For it becomes an object to itself not as *this single* being, but rather as the *unity* of itself and the other self-consciousness, and thus as sublated singular, or as *universal*.

363 The pleasure enjoyed does indeed have the positive significance that self-consciousness has become *itself* as objective self-consciousness; but it has equally the negative significance that it has sublated *itself*. And since self-consciousness grasped its actualization only in the first sense, its experience enters its consciousness as a contradiction. In this contradiction the attained actuality of its singularity sees itself annihilated by the negative *essence*, which, void of actuality, stands emptily over against that actuality and yet is its consuming power. This essence is nothing other than the *concept* of what this individuality is in itself. But this individuality is still the poorest shape of self-actualizing spirit; for it is to itself only the *abstraction* of reason, or the *immediacy* of the *unity* of *being-for-self* and *being-in-itself*. Its essence is thus only the *abstract* category. Yet this essence no longer has the form of *immediate, simple* being, as it did for observing spirit, where it is abstract *being*, or, posited as alien, *thinghood* in general. Here being-for-self and mediation have entered into this thinghood. It therefore appears as a *circle* whose content is the developed pure relation of the simple essentialities. The actualization this individuality has attained thus consists in nothing other than its having thrown this circle of abstractions out of the confinement of simple self-consciousness into the element of *being-for-it*, or of objective expansion. What becomes the *object* for self-consciousness in enjoyed pleasure, as its essence, is therefore the expansion of those empty essentialities: pure unity, pure difference, and their relation. Beyond that, the object that individuality experiences as its *essence* has no content. It is what is called *necessity*. For necessity, *fate*, and the like are precisely that of which one cannot say *what*

it does, what its determinate laws and positive content are. This is because it is the absolute pure concept itself, intuited as *being*: the simple and empty but irresistible and imperturbable *relation*, whose work is only the nothingness of singularity. Necessity is this *fixed connection* because what is connected are the pure essentialities or empty abstractions. Unity, difference, and relation are categories each of which is nothing in and for itself, only in relation to its opposite, and which therefore cannot come apart. They are related to one another through their *concept*, for they are the pure concepts themselves; and this *absolute relation* and abstract movement is what constitutes necessity. The merely single individuality, which as yet has only the pure concept of reason as its content, instead of plunging out of dead theory into life, has thus rather only plunged into consciousness of its own lifelessness, and receives itself only as empty and alien necessity, as *dead* actuality.

364 The transition takes place from the form of the *One* into that of *universality*, from one absolute abstraction into the other: from the purpose of pure *being-for-self*, which has cast off community with *others*, into the *pure* opposite, which is thereby an equally abstract *being-in-itself*. This therefore appears as follows: the individual has simply perished, and the absolute brittleness of singularity has been shattered to dust against an actuality just as hard but continuous. — Since the individual, as consciousness, is the unity of itself and its opposite, this downfall still exists for it—its purpose and its actualization, as well as the contradiction between what was the essence *for it* and what the essence is *in itself*. It experiences the double meaning that lies in what it did, namely in having *taken* its *life*: it took life, but in doing so it rather seized hold of death.[6]

365 This *transition* of its living being into lifeless necessity therefore appears to it as an inversion that nothing mediates. The mediating term would have to be that in which both sides were one. In it consciousness would recognize the one moment

6 Sich das Leben nehmen means both "to take life for oneself" and "to take one's own life."

in the other: its purpose and doing in its fate, and its fate in its purpose and doing, *its own essence* in this *necessity*. But for this consciousness this unity is precisely pleasure itself, or *simple, singular* feeling. The transition from the moment of this purpose of its own to the moment of its true essence is therefore, for it, a sheer leap into the opposite. For these moments are not contained and linked in feeling, but only in the pure self, which is something universal, or thinking. Through its experience, in which its truth was supposed to come to be for it, consciousness has therefore instead become a riddle to itself. The consequences of its deeds are not, for it, its deeds themselves. What befalls it is not, *for it*, the experience of what it is *in itself*. The transition is not a mere change of form of one and the same content and essence, represented once as the content and essence of consciousness, and the other time as the object or *intuited* essence of itself. *Abstract necessity* therefore counts as the merely negative, uncomprehended *power of universality*, on which individuality is shattered.

366 This is as far as the appearance of this shape of self-consciousness goes. The last moment of its existence is the thought of its loss in necessity, or the thought of itself as an essence absolutely *alien* to itself. Self-consciousness *in itself*, however, has survived this loss; for this necessity, or pure universality, is *its own* essence. This reflection of consciousness into itself, in which it knows necessity as *itself*, is a new shape of consciousness.

B. THE LAW OF THE HEART AND THE FRENZY OF SELF-CONCEIT

The individual tries to impose its heart's law on the world, and rages when others reject it.

367 What necessity in truth is in self-consciousness, it is for self-consciousness's new shape, in which self-consciousness is to itself what is necessary. It knows that it has the *universal*, or the *law*, *immediately* within itself. Because of this determination, that the law is *immediately* in consciousness's being-for-self, it is

called the *law* of the *heart*. Like the previous shape, this shape is, *for itself*, essence as *singularity*. But it is richer by the determination that this *being-for-self* counts for it as necessary or universal.[7]

368 The law, then, that is immediately self-consciousness's own, or a heart that nonetheless has a law within it, is the *purpose* that self-consciousness sets out to realize. It remains to be seen whether its realization will correspond to this concept, and whether in that realization it will experience this law of its own as the essence.

369 Over against this heart stands an actuality. For in the heart the law is at first only *for itself*: it is not yet realized, and is therefore at the same time something *other* than what the concept is. This other is thereby determined as an actuality that is the opposite of what is to be realized, and hence as the *contradiction* of the *law* and *singularity*. On the one hand, therefore, this actuality is a law by which the singular individuality is oppressed, a violent world order that contradicts the law of the heart. On the other hand, it is a humanity suffering under that order, which does not follow the law of the heart but is subject to an alien necessity. — This actuality, which appears *over against* the present shape of consciousness, is evidently nothing other than the previous divided relation of individuality and its truth: the relation of a cruel necessity by which individuality is crushed. *For us*, the previous movement confronts the new shape because the new shape has arisen from it in itself, so that the moment from which it comes is necessary for it. To the new shape, however, this moment appears as something it simply *finds before it*. For it has no consciousness of its own *origin*, and for it the essence consists rather in being *for itself*, or in being the negative over against this positive in-itself.

370 This individuality is therefore bent on sublating this necessity that contradicts the law of the heart, together with the suffering that necessity brings about. It is thus no longer the

7 Commentators often hear in this section echoes of Rousseau's cult of feeling and of Karl Moor, the idealistic rebel of Schiller's play *The Robbers* (1781).

frivolity of the previous shape, which wanted only singular pleasure. It is the earnestness of a lofty purpose, which seeks its pleasure in displaying its own *excellent* essence and in bringing about the *welfare of humanity*. What it realizes is itself the law, and its pleasure is therefore at the same time the universal pleasure of all hearts. For it the two are *undivided*. Its pleasure is what conforms to law, and the realization of the law of universal humanity is the preparation of its singular pleasure. For within itself individuality and what is necessary are *immediately* one; the law is law of the heart. Individuality has not yet been moved from its place. The unity of the two has not come about through the mediating movement of individuality, not yet through discipline. The realization of the immediate, *undisciplined* essence counts as the display of an excellence and as the bringing about of the welfare of humanity.

371 The law that stands opposed to the law of the heart, by contrast, is separated from the heart and free for itself. The humanity that belongs to this law does not live in the blissful unity of the law with the heart. It lives either in cruel division and suffering, or at least without the enjoyment of *itself* in *obeying* the law, and without the consciousness of its own excellence in *transgressing* it. Because that powerful divine and human order is separated from the heart, it is for the heart a *semblance*, which is to lose what still goes along with it, namely power and actuality. In its *content* that order may well agree by chance with the law of the heart, and then the heart can accept it. But what is essential for the heart is not what conforms to law, purely as such. What is essential is that in it the heart has the consciousness of *itself*, that it has satisfied *itself* in it. Where the content of universal necessity does not agree with the heart, however, that necessity is nothing in itself even as regards its content, and must give way to the law of the heart.

372 The individual, then, *carries out* the law of its heart. That law becomes a *universal order*, and pleasure becomes an actuality that conforms to law in and for itself. But in this realization the law has in fact escaped the individual; what comes about

immediately is only the relation that was supposed to be sublated. Precisely through its realization, the law of the heart ceases to be a law of the *heart*. For in its realization it takes on the form of *being*, and it is now a *universal power* to which *this* heart is indifferent. So the individual, by *establishing* its *own* order, no longer finds it to be its own. By realizing its law, therefore, the individual does not bring about *its* law. The realization is *in itself* its own, but for the individual it is an alien one; so all the individual brings about is its own entanglement in the actual order, and in that order as a superior power that is not merely alien to it but hostile.—By its deed it posits itself *in*, or rather *as*, the universal element of the actuality that is, and in its own view, too, its deed is supposed to have the value of a universal order. But in doing so it has set itself *free* from itself. As universality it grows on for itself and purifies itself of singularity. The individual, who wants to recognize universality only in the form of its immediate being-for-self, therefore does not recognize itself in this free universality, even though it belongs to it, since that universality is its own doing. This doing therefore has the inverted significance of *contradicting* the universal order, since its deed is supposed to be the deed of *its* singular heart, not free universal actuality. At the same time, the individual has in fact *recognized* that order, for its doing means positing its essence as *free actuality*, that is, recognizing actuality as its essence.

373 Through the concept of its doing, the individual has determined more precisely how the actual universality to which it has made itself belong turns against it. As *actuality*, its deed belongs to the universal. But the deed's content is the individual's own individuality, which wants to preserve itself as this *singular* individuality, opposed to the universal. No particular determinate law is at issue here. What has been raised to a law and is meant to be valid is the immediate unity of the singular heart with universality: the thought that in what is law *every heart* must recognize *itself*. But only the heart of this individual has posited its actuality in its deed, which expresses for it *its*

being-for-self or *its pleasure*. This deed is supposed to count immediately as universal. That is to say, it is in truth something particular and has only the form of universality; its *particular* content is supposed, *as such*, to count as universal. Hence in this content the others do not find the law of their own hearts carried out, but rather that *of someone else*. And precisely according to the universal law that in what is law every heart is to find itself, they turn against the actuality *the individual* set up, just as it turned against theirs. So just as the individual at first found only the rigid law opposed to its excellent intentions, it now finds the hearts of human beings themselves opposed to them, and detestable.

374 This consciousness knows universality only as *immediate*, and necessity only as necessity of the *heart*. So the nature of realization and of effective activity is unknown to it. It does not know that realization, as what *is*, is in its truth rather what is *universal in itself*. In that universal, the singularity of consciousness, which entrusts itself to it in order to *be* as *this* immediate *singularity*, instead perishes. Instead of this *being of its own*, then, consciousness attains in being the alienation *of itself*. That in which it does not recognize itself, however, is no longer dead necessity, but necessity as animated by universal individuality. It took this divine and human order, which it found in force, for a dead actuality. It fixes itself as this heart that is for itself and opposed to the universal, and so has no consciousness of itself in that order; it assumed that those who belong to the order would likewise have no consciousness of themselves in it. But it finds the order instead animated by the consciousness of all, and as the law of all hearts. It has the experience that actuality is a living order, and it has it precisely by realizing the law of its heart. For this means nothing other than that individuality becomes an object to itself as something universal, yet an object in which it does not recognize itself.

375 What emerges as the true for this shape of self-consciousness from its experience therefore *contradicts* what it is *for itself*. But what it is for itself has, for it, the form of absolute universal-

ity: it is the law of the heart, which is immediately one with *self*-consciousness. At the same time, the established and living order is equally its *own essence* and work. What it brings about is nothing but that order, and the order is in an equally immediate unity with self-consciousness. Self-consciousness thus belongs to a twofold, opposed essentiality; it is contradictory in itself and shattered in its innermost being. The law of *this* heart is only that in which self-consciousness recognizes itself. But through the realization of that law, the universally valid order has equally become its own *essence* and its own *actuality*. What contradicts itself in its consciousness is thus, for it, both in the form of essence and in the form of its own actuality.

376 In giving voice to this moment of its conscious downfall, and in it to the result of its experience, it shows itself as this inner inversion of itself. It is the derangement of a consciousness for which its essence is immediately non-essence and its actuality immediately non-actuality.—Derangement cannot be taken to mean simply that something inessential is held to be essential, or something non-actual to be actual. It does not mean that what is essential or actual for one person is not so for another, so that the consciousness of actuality and non-actuality, or of essentiality and inessentiality, would fall apart.[8] — If something is in fact actual and essential for consciousness in general, but not for me, then in my consciousness of its nullity I have at the same time, since I am consciousness in general, the consciousness of its actuality. When both are fixed, this is a unity that is madness in general. In such madness, however, only an *object* is deranged for consciousness, not consciousness as such, in and for itself. In the result of experience that has come about here, however, consciousness in its law is conscious of *itself* as this actual consciousness. At the same time, since this very same essentiality, this same actuality, is *alienated* from it, it is conscious, as self-consciousness, as absolute actuality, of its own non-actuality. In other words, the two sides, in their contra-

8 *Verrücktheit*, "madness" or "derangement," literally means being displaced (*verrückt*); Hegel plays on this sense in the preceding "moved from its place."

diction, count for it immediately as *its essence*, which is therefore deranged at its innermost core.

377 The heart that beats for the welfare of humanity therefore passes over into the raving of deranged self-conceit, into the fury of consciousness to preserve itself against its destruction. It does this by casting the perversity that it itself is out of itself, and by straining to regard it and declare it as an other. It therefore declares the universal order to be a perversion of the law of the heart and of its happiness. This perversion, it says, was invented by fanatical priests, debauched despots, and their servants, who compensate themselves for their own humiliation by humiliating and oppressing those beneath them, and it is wielded to the nameless misery of deceived humanity.—In this derangement of its own, consciousness declares *individuality* to be what deranges and perverts—but an individuality that is *alien* and *contingent*.[9] But the heart, or the *singularity of consciousness that wants to be immediately universal*, is itself what deranges and perverts. Its doing only brings it about that this contradiction comes to be for *its* consciousness. For the true, for it, is the law of the heart: something merely *meant*, which, unlike the established order, has not stood the light of day, but rather perishes as soon as it shows itself to it. This law of its own was supposed to have *actuality*. In this respect the law as *actuality*, as *valid order*, is for it purpose and essence. But immediately the *actuality*, precisely the law as *valid order*, is for it rather what is null. — Likewise its *own* actuality, *itself* as singularity of consciousness, is for it the essence. But its purpose is to posit that singularity as *being*. So what is immediately its essence is rather its self as non-singular: its purpose is the law, and precisely in the law a universality that it itself is supposed to be for its consciousness.— Through its doing, this concept of itself becomes its object. So it experiences its self rather as the non-actual, and non-actuality as its actuality. It is therefore not a contingent and alien indi-

9 *Verkehrung* and its cognates mean both "inversion" (turning upside down) and "perversion"; Hegel uses both senses at once throughout this section.

viduality, but precisely this heart that is, in every respect, in itself what is perverted and perverting.

[378] But since the immediately universal individuality is what is perverted and perverting, this universal order is no less perverted in itself, just as the raving derangement declared. For it is the law of all *hearts*, that is, of what is perverted. In the first place, the order proves to be the *law* of all hearts in the resistance that the law of one heart meets in the other individuals. The established laws are defended against the law of an individual because they are not unconscious, empty, and dead necessity. They are spiritual universality and substance, in which those in whom this universality has its actuality live as individuals and are conscious of themselves. So even if they complain about this order as if it ran counter to the inner law, and hold up the opinions of the heart against it, in fact they cling to it with their hearts as their essence. If this order is taken from them, or if they place themselves outside it, they lose everything. Since it is precisely in this that the actuality and power of the public order consist, this order appears as the self-identical, universally animated essence, and individuality as its form. — [379] But this order is just as much what is perverted.

For in being the law of all hearts, in all individuals being immediately this universal, it is an actuality that is only the actuality of individuality that is *for itself*, or of the heart. The consciousness that sets up the law of its heart therefore meets resistance from others, because it contradicts the *equally singular* laws of their hearts. In their resistance these others do nothing but set up their own law and make it prevail. The *universal* that is present is therefore only a universal resistance and struggle of all against one another. In it each makes its own singularity prevail, yet at the same time does not succeed, because that singularity meets the same resistance and is dissolved by the others in turn. What seems to be public *order*, then, is this universal feuding, in which each grabs what he can, exercises justice on the singularity of others, and establishes his own, which likewise vanishes at the hands of others. It is the *way of*

the world: the semblance of a lasting course that is only a *universality that is merely meant*, and whose content is rather the inessential play of singularities being established and dissolved.[10]

380 If we consider the two sides of the universal order against each other, the latter universality has as its content restless individuality. For this individuality opinion, or singularity, is law; the actual is non-actual, and the non-actual is the actual. But it is at the same time the *side of actuality* of the order, for the *being-for-self* of individuality belongs to it.—The other side is the *universal* as *tranquil* essence. For that very reason it is only something *inner*: it is not nothing at all, yet it is not actuality either, and it can become actual itself only through the sublation of the individuality that has arrogated actuality to itself. This shape of consciousness is *virtue*. In the law, in what is *in itself* true and good, it comes to itself not as singularity but only as *essence*. It knows individuality as what is perverted and perverting, and therefore holds that it must sacrifice the singularity of consciousness.

C. VIRTUE AND THE WAY OF THE WORLD

Virtue sets out to reform a selfish world by sacrificing individuality, and is defeated.

381 In the first shape of active reason, self-consciousness was for itself pure individuality, and empty universality stood over against it. In the second, each of the two parts of the opposition had *both* moments, law and individuality, within it; but one of them, the heart, was their immediate unity, the other their opposition. Here, in the relation of virtue and the way of the world, each of the two members is both the unity and the opposition of these moments. Each is a movement of law and individuality against each other, but the two movements are opposite. For the consciousness of virtue the *law* is what is *essential*, and individuality is what is to be sublated, both in its own con-

10 *Weltlauf*, literally "the course of the world": the everyday world as the play of self-seeking individuals.

sciousness and in the way of the world. In virtue's own consciousness, its individuality is to be brought under the discipline of the universal, of what is in itself true and good. But in this it still remains personal consciousness. True discipline is solely the sacrifice of the whole personality, as the proof that consciousness has in fact not remained stuck on singularities. In this singular sacrifice, individuality is at the same time wiped out in *the way of the world*, for it is also a simple moment common to both.—In the way of the world, individuality behaves in the reverse of the way it is posited in virtuous consciousness: it makes itself the essence and subordinates to itself what is good and true *in itself*. — Further, for virtue the way of the world is not only this universal *perverted by individuality*. The absolute *order* is likewise a common moment. In the way of the world it is present for consciousness not as *existing actuality*, but as the world's *inner essence*. So virtue does not, strictly speaking, first have to produce that order. For producing, as *doing*, is consciousness of individuality, and individuality is rather to be sublated. Through this sublation, however, room is merely made, as it were, for the *in-itself* of the way of the world to enter existence in and for itself.

382 The universal *content* of the actual way of the world has already emerged. Looked at more closely, it is again nothing other than the two preceding movements of self-consciousness. The shape of virtue has issued from them; since they are its origin, it has them before it. But it aims to sublate its origin and to realize itself, or to become *for itself*. The way of the world is thus, on the one hand, singular individuality seeking its pleasure and enjoyment. In doing so it finds its downfall and thereby satisfies the universal. But this satisfaction itself, like the other moments of this relation, is a perverted shape and movement of the universal. Actuality is only the singularity of pleasure and enjoyment, while the universal is opposed to it: a necessity that is only the empty shape of the universal, a merely negative reaction and a doing without content.—The other moment of the way of the world is individuality that wants to be law in and for itself

and, in this fancy, disturbs the established order. The universal law does indeed maintain itself against this self-conceit. It no longer appears as something opposed to consciousness and empty, not as a dead necessity, but as *necessity within consciousness itself*. But insofar as it exists as the *conscious* relation of an absolutely contradictory actuality, it is derangement; and insofar as it is *objective* actuality, it is perversity in general. In both sides, then, the universal does present itself as the power of their movement; but the *existence* of this power is only universal perversion.

383 From virtue the universal is now to receive its true actuality, through the sublation of individuality, the principle of perversion. Virtue's purpose is thereby to invert the perverted way of the world once more and to bring forth its true essence. In the way of the world this true essence is present at first only as its *in-itself*; it is not yet actual, and virtue therefore only *believes* in it. Virtue sets out to raise this faith to sight, yet without enjoying the fruits of its labor and sacrifice. For insofar as it is *individuality*, it is the *doing* of the struggle it takes up with the way of the world. But its purpose and true essence is to conquer the actuality of the way of the world, and the existence of the good that this brings about is therefore the end of its *doing*, or of the *consciousness* of individuality.[11] — How this struggle itself will be fought out, what virtue experiences in it, whether the way of the world will succumb and virtue triumph through the sacrifice virtue takes upon itself: all this must be decided by the nature of the living *weapons* the combatants wield. For the weapons are nothing but the *essence* of the combatants themselves, which only comes forth for the two of them reciprocally. Their weapons have thus already emerged from what is present in itself in this struggle.

384 For virtuous consciousness the *universal* is true in *faith*, or *in itself*. It is not yet an actual but an *abstract* universality. In this consciousness itself it is present *as purpose*; in the way of the world, as something *inner*. It is in precisely this determination

11 "Faith to sight" echoes 2 Corinthians 5:7: "we walk by faith, not by sight."

that the universal also presents itself in virtue to the way of the world. For virtue only *wants* to carry out the good, and does not yet itself pass it off as actuality. This determinateness can also be viewed in this way: in coming forward in the struggle against the way of the world, the good thereby presents itself as being *for an other*, as something that is not *in and for itself*. Otherwise it would not want first to give itself its truth by overcoming its opposite. That the good is at first only *for an other* means the same as what was shown about it earlier when it was considered from the opposite angle: namely, that it is at first an *abstraction*, which has reality only in the relation, not in and for itself.

385 The good or universal, then, as it appears here, is what are called *gifts, capacities, forces*. It is a way for the spiritual to be in which the spiritual is represented as a universal that needs the principle of individuality for its animation and movement, and has its *actuality* in that principle. By this principle, insofar as it is in the consciousness of virtue, this universal is *put to good use*; by the same principle, insofar as it is in the way of the world, it is *misused*. The universal is a passive instrument, governed by the hand of free individuality and indifferent to the use that individuality makes of it. It can be misused even to produce an actuality that is its own destruction. It is a lifeless material, lacking independence of its own, which can be shaped this way or otherwise, even to its own ruin.

386 Since this universal is at the disposal of the consciousness of virtue and of the way of the world alike, there is no telling whether virtue, so equipped, will vanquish vice. The weapons are the same: they are these capacities and forces. Virtue, to be sure, has placed in ambush its faith in the original unity of its purpose and the essence of the way of the world. This unity is supposed to fall upon the enemy from behind during the battle and accomplish the purpose *in itself*. As a result, for the knight of virtue his own *doing* and fighting is in fact really a sham fight. He *cannot* take it seriously, because he places his true strength in the good's being *in and for itself*, that is, in its accomplishing itself—and it is a sham fight that he also *may* not let become seri-

ous. For what he turns against the enemy, and finds turned against himself, and whose wear and damage he risks both in himself and in his enemy, is not supposed to be the good itself; it is to preserve and carry out the good that he fights. What is put at risk is only the indifferent gifts and capacities. Yet these are in fact nothing other than that very universal without individuality which is supposed to be preserved and actualized through the struggle.—At the same time, however, this universal is *already actualized* immediately by the very concept of the struggle. It is the *in-itself*, the *universal*; and its actualization means only this, that it is *at the same time for an other*. The two sides indicated above, according to each of which the good became an abstraction, *are no longer separated*; in and through the struggle the good is posited in both ways at once.—Virtuous consciousness, however, enters the struggle against the way of the world as against something opposed to the good. What the way of the world offers it here is the universal, not merely as an abstract universal but as one animated by individuality and being for an other—in other words, the *actual good*. Wherever virtue grapples with the way of the world, therefore, it always strikes at places that are the existence of the good itself. As the *in-itself* of the way of the world, the good is inseparably intertwined with every appearance of the way of the world, and it also has its existence in that world's actuality. So the way of the world is invulnerable to virtue. All the moments that virtue itself was supposed to stake and sacrifice are likewise such existences of the good, and hence inviolable relations. The fighting can therefore only be a wavering between preserving and sacrificing; or rather, neither sacrifice of what is one's own nor injury to what belongs to the other can take place. Virtue is not only like the combatant whose sole concern in battle is to keep his sword shining. It has even begun the fight in order to preserve the weapons. And not only can it not use its own weapons; it must also keep those of the enemy unharmed and protect them against itself. For all of them are noble parts of the good for whose sake it went into battle.

[387] For this enemy, by contrast, the essence is not the *in-itself* but *individuality*. Its force is therefore the negative principle, for which nothing is stable and absolutely holy, and which can risk and endure the loss of anything and everything. Its victory is therefore as certain from its own nature as from the contradiction in which its opponent entangles itself. What for virtue is *in itself* is for the way of the world only *for it*. The way of the world is free of every moment that is fixed for virtue and to which virtue is bound. It has such a moment in its power, because the moment counts for it only as one it can just as well sublate as let stand; and with the moment it also has in its power the virtuous knight who is tied to it. The knight cannot disentangle himself from this moment as from a cloak thrown over his shoulders, and free himself by leaving it behind. For to him it is the essence, which is not to be given up.

[388] Finally, as for the ambush from which the *good in-itself* is supposed to fall cunningly upon the way of the world from behind, this hope is null in itself. The way of the world is wakeful consciousness, certain of itself, which lets no one come at it from behind but faces its adversary everywhere. For it consists precisely in this: that everything is *for it*, that everything stands *before it*. As for the good *in-itself*: if it is *for* its enemy, then it is in the struggle we have seen. But insofar as it is not *for it* but *in itself*, it is the passive instrument of gifts and capacities, material without actuality. Represented as existence, it would be a consciousness asleep, left somewhere behind, who knows where.

[389] Virtue is therefore defeated by the way of the world. For its purpose is in fact the abstract, non-actual *essence*, and with regard to actuality its doing rests on *distinctions* that lie solely in *words*. It wanted to consist in bringing the good to *actuality* through the *sacrifice of individuality*; but the side of *actuality* is itself nothing other than the side of *individuality*. The good was supposed to be what is *in itself* and opposed to what *is*. But the *in-itself*, taken in its reality and truth, is rather *being itself*. The *in-itself* is at first the *abstraction of essence* as against actuality. But abstraction is precisely what is not true, but only *for conscious-*

ness. That, however, means that it is itself what is called *actual*; for the actual is what is essentially *for an other*, or it is *being*. The consciousness of virtue, however, rests on this distinction between the *in-itself* and *being*, a distinction that has no truth. — The way of the world was supposed to be the perversion of the good, because it had *individuality* as its principle. But individuality is the principle of *actuality*; for it is precisely the consciousness through which what is *in itself* is equally *for an other*. The way of the world does invert the unchangeable, but in fact it inverts it *from the nothing of abstraction into the being of reality*.

390 The way of the world therefore triumphs over what virtue consists in, in opposition to it. It triumphs over virtue, for which the essence is the inessential abstraction. But it does not triumph over anything real. It triumphs over the fabrication of distinctions that are no distinctions, over this pompous talk of the good of humanity and its oppression, of sacrifice for the good and the misuse of gifts. Ideal beings and purposes of this sort collapse as empty words that lift up the heart and leave reason empty; they edify but build nothing up. They are declamations whose only definite content is that the individual who claims to act for such noble purposes, and who mouths such excellent phrases, takes himself to be a being of excellence. It is a swelling that makes one's own head and other people's big—but big with empty inflation. — Ancient virtue had its determinate, secure meaning, for it had its *foundation full of content* in the *substance* of the people, and as its purpose an *actual, already existing* good. It was therefore also not directed against actuality as a *universal perversity*, nor against a *way of the world*. The virtue considered here, however, has stepped out of substance. It is a virtue without essence, a virtue only of representation and of words, which lack that content.—The emptiness of this rhetoric that battles the way of the world would be exposed at once if one had to say what its phrases mean; they are therefore *presupposed as familiar*. The demand to say what is familiar would be met either by a fresh torrent of phrases or by an appeal to the heart, which says *inwardly* what they mean; that is, the inability to say it *in*

fact would be admitted.—The nullity of that rhetoric seems also to have become certain, in an unconscious way, for the culture of our age. For all interest has vanished from the whole mass of those phrases and from the manner of puffing oneself up with them—a loss expressed in the fact that they produce nothing but boredom.

391 The result that emerges from this opposition, then, is that consciousness drops, like an empty cloak, the representation of a good *in itself* that would as yet have no actuality. In its struggle it has had the experience that the way of the world is not as bad as it looked; for its actuality is the actuality of the universal. With this experience the means of producing the good through the *sacrifice* of individuality falls away; for individuality is precisely the *actualization* of what is in itself. And the inversion ceases to be regarded as a perversion of the good. For it is rather precisely the inversion of the good from a mere purpose into actuality; the movement of individuality is the reality of the universal.

392 In fact, however, what stood opposed to the consciousness of what is in itself as the *way of the world* has thereby likewise been defeated and has vanished. In the way of the world, the *being-for-self* of individuality was opposed to essence or the universal, and appeared as an actuality separated from *being-in-itself*. But it has become evident that actuality is in undivided unity with the universal. So the *being-for-self* of the way of the world, too, proves to be no more—just as the *in-itself* of virtue is only a *point of view*. The individuality of the way of the world may well think that it acts only *for itself*, or *selfishly*. It is better than it thinks: its doing is at the same time a doing that *is in itself*, a *universal* doing.[12] When it acts selfishly, it simply does not know what it is doing; and when it assures us that all human beings act selfishly, it merely asserts that no human being has any consciousness of what doing is.—When it acts *for itself*, this is precisely the bringing into actuality of what at first is only *in*

12 Hegel puns on *Ansich* ("in-itself") and *Ansicht* ("view," "way of looking at things").

itself. The purpose of *being-for-self*, which thinks itself opposed to the in-itself, has therefore vanished: its empty cleverness, and its subtle explanations that know how to detect self-interest everywhere, have vanished just as much as the purpose of the *in-itself* and its rhetoric.

393 It is therefore *the doing and striving of individuality that is an end in itself; it is the use of forces, the play of their expressions*, that gives them life, when otherwise they would be the dead in-itself. The in-itself is not an unexecuted, existence-less, abstract universal. It is itself immediately this presence and actuality of the process of individuality.

Reason: Individuality Real in and for Itself

V.C. Die Individualität, welche sich an und für sich selbst reell ist
The spiritual animal kingdom, law-giving reason and law-testing reason.

C. INDIVIDUALITY REAL IN AND FOR ITSELF

Self-consciousness now takes its own activity and self-expression as its purpose.

394 Self-consciousness has now grasped the concept of itself that at first was only our concept of it: namely, that in its certainty of itself it is all reality. Purpose and essence are now, for it, the self-moving interpenetration of the universal—the gifts and capacities—and individuality.—The singular moments of this fulfillment and interpenetration, *prior to the unity* in which they have come together, are the purposes considered so far. They have vanished as abstractions and chimeras belonging to those first, insipid shapes of spiritual self-consciousness. These have their truth only in the merely meant being of the heart, of imagination, and of speeches. They do not have it in reason, which is now certain of its reality in and for itself. Reason no longer seeks to produce itself as a *purpose* in *opposition* to immediately existing actuality; it has the category as such as the object of its consciousness.—For the determination of the self-consciousness that is *for itself*, or *negative*, in which reason made its appearance, has been sublated. That self-consciousness *found before it* an *actuality* that was supposed to be its negative, and only by sublating that actuality did it realize its *purpose*. But *purpose* and *being-in-itself* have turned out to be the same as *being* for *an other*

and the *actuality found before it*. So truth no longer separates itself from certainty, whether the posited purpose is taken as certainty of itself and its realization as truth, or the purpose is taken as truth and actuality as certainty. Rather, essence and purpose in and for itself is the certainty of immediate reality itself, the interpenetration of the *in-itself* and *being-for-self*, of the universal and individuality. Doing is in itself its own truth and actuality, and the *presentation* or *expression of individuality* is for it an end in and for itself.

[395] With this concept, then, self-consciousness has returned into itself from the opposed determinations that the category had for it, and that its relation to the category had—first as observing, then as active self-consciousness. It has the pure category itself as its object; or it is the category that has become conscious of itself. Its account with its previous shapes is thereby settled. They lie behind it, forgotten; they do not confront it as a world it finds before it, but develop only within itself as transparent moments. Yet in its consciousness they still fall apart as a *movement* of distinct moments, which has not yet gathered itself into its substantial unity. But in *all* of them self-consciousness holds fast to the simple unity of being and self, which is their *genus*. —

[396] Consciousness has thereby cast off all opposition and every condition of its doing. It starts out fresh *from itself*, and goes not toward *an other* but *toward itself*. Since individuality is actuality in itself, the *material* of activity and the *purpose* of doing lie in the doing itself. Doing therefore looks like the movement of a circle that moves freely within itself in the void, unhindered, now expanding, now contracting, and, perfectly content, plays only in and with itself. The element in which individuality displays its shape has the significance of a pure reception of that shape. It is the daylight as such, to which consciousness wants to show itself. Doing alters nothing and opposes nothing. It is the pure form of translation from *not being seen* into *being seen*, and the content that is brought to light and presents itself is nothing other than what this doing already is in itself. It is *in*

itself—this is its form as *thought* unity; and it is *actual*—this is its form as *existing* unity. It is itself *content* only in this determination of simplicity, as against the determination of its passing over and its movement.

A. THE SPIRITUAL ANIMAL KINGDOM AND DECEPTION, OR THE MATTER ITSELF

Individuals express their natures in works, and learn what is at stake in a shared cause.

397 This individuality, which is real in itself, is at first again a *single* and *determinate* individuality. The absolute reality as which it knows itself is therefore, as it becomes conscious of that reality, the *abstract universal* reality. Without filling and content, this is only the empty thought of this category.—We must see how this concept of the individuality that is real in itself determines itself in its moments, and how the individuality's concept of itself enters its consciousness.

398 The concept of this individuality, as, being such, it is for itself all reality, is at first a *result*. It has not yet exhibited its movement and reality, and is here posited *immediately* as *simple being-in-itself*. But negativity, which is the same as what appears as movement, is present in the *simple in-itself* as *determinateness*. And *being*, or the simple in-itself, becomes a determinate range. The individuality therefore comes on the scene as an originally determinate nature. It is an *original* nature, because it *is in itself*. It is originally *determinate*, because the negative is in the *in-itself*, which is thereby a quality. This limitation of being, however, cannot *limit the doing* of consciousness, for that doing is here a complete *relating of itself to itself*. The relation to an other, which would be its limitation, is sublated. The original determinateness of nature is therefore only a simple principle—a transparent universal element. In it individuality remains free and equal to itself, just as it unfolds its differences in it unhindered, and it is pure interaction with itself in its realization. It is as with indeterminate animal life, which breathes its breath of life into, say, the element of water, air or earth, and within these again into

more determinate principles. Animal life immerses all its moments in them. Yet, despite that limitation by the element, it keeps them in its power and keeps itself in its unity. As this particular organization, it remains the same universal animal life.

399 This determinate original *nature* of consciousness, which remains free and whole within it, appears as the immediate and sole proper *content* of what the individual's purpose is. That content is indeed *determinate* content, but it is *content* at all only insofar as we consider *being-in-itself* in isolation. In truth, however, it is reality permeated by individuality. It is actuality as consciousness has it within itself as a single consciousness, and as, at first, it is posited *as being*, not yet as doing. For doing, however, this determinateness is not a limitation that doing would want to get beyond. On the one hand, considered as a quality that is, it is the simple color of the element in which doing moves. On the other hand, negativity is *determinateness* only in being; but *doing* is itself nothing other than negativity. In the individuality that does, therefore, determinateness is dissolved into negativity as such, or into the sum total of all determinateness.

400 Now, in *doing* and in the consciousness of doing, the simple original nature enters into the distinction that belongs to doing. Doing is present *first* as an object, and indeed as an *object* as it still belongs to *consciousness*, that is, as a *purpose*. It is thus opposed to an actuality already present. The *other* moment is the *movement* of the purpose represented as at rest. This is realization, as the relation of the purpose to wholly formal actuality, and hence the representation of the *transition* itself, or the *means*. The *third*, finally, is the object as it is no longer a purpose, of which the doer is immediately conscious as *its own*. It is the object as it is now outside the doer and *for it* as an *other*. — According to the concept of this sphere, however, these different sides must be held fast in such a way that the content remains the same in them and no distinction comes in. There is no distinction between individuality and being in general. There is none between the *purpose* and *individuality* as *original nature*,

nor between the purpose and the actuality already present. Likewise there is none between the *means* and individuality as absolute *purpose*. Nor is there any between the *actuality brought about* and the purpose, or the original nature, or the means.

401 First, then, the originally determinate nature of the individuality, its immediate essence, is not yet posited as doing. As such it is called a *particular* ability, talent, character, and so on. This peculiar tincture of spirit is to be regarded as the sole content of the purpose itself, and as that which alone is reality. Suppose one imagined consciousness as going beyond this and wanting to bring some other content into actuality. Then one would be imagining it as *a nothing* working its way into *nothingness*.—Further, this original essence is not only the content of the purpose. It is also, in itself, the *actuality* that otherwise appears as the *given* material of doing, as actuality *found already there* and to be shaped in doing. For doing is only a pure translation from the form of being not yet exhibited into the form of being exhibited. The being-in-itself of that actuality opposed to consciousness has sunk to mere empty semblance. When this consciousness determines itself to act, therefore, it does not let itself be misled by the semblance of the actuality already present. Likewise, it must gather itself out of its roaming about among empty thoughts and purposes and hold to the original content of its essence.—This original content is indeed *for* consciousness only *once consciousness has realized it*. But the distinction has fallen away between something that is *for* consciousness only *within it* and an actuality that exists in itself outside it. — Only so that what it is *in itself* may be *for it* must consciousness act; or, acting is precisely the becoming of spirit *as consciousness*. What it is *in itself*, therefore, consciousness knows from its actuality. Hence the individual cannot know what *it is* before it has brought itself into actuality through doing.—But in that case it seems unable to determine the *purpose* of its doing before it has done it. And yet at the same time, because it is consciousness, it must have the action before it in advance as *entirely its own*, that is, as a *purpose*. The individual setting out to act therefore seems

to find itself in a circle in which each moment already presupposes the other. It thus seems unable to find a beginning. It comes to know its original essence, which must be its purpose, only *from the deed*; but in order to do anything, it must *have the purpose beforehand*. For just this reason, however, it has to begin *immediately* and, whatever the circumstances, proceed to activity without further worry about *beginning*, *means* and *end*. For its essence, its nature as it is *in itself*, is all in one: beginning, means and end. As *beginning*, this nature is present in the *circumstances* of acting. And the *interest* the individual finds in something is the answer already given to the question whether anything is to be done here, and what. For what seems to be an actuality found already there is in itself the individual's original nature. This nature has only the semblance of a *being*—a semblance that lies in the concept of doing as dividing itself in two. But it expresses itself as *its* original nature in the *interest* the individual finds in it.—Likewise the *how*, or the *means*, is determined in and for itself. *Talent*, too, is nothing other than the determinate original individuality considered as an *inner means*, or as the *transition* of the purpose into actuality. The *actual* means and the real transition, however, is the unity of talent and of the nature of the matter present in the interest. In the means, talent represents the side of doing, and the nature of the matter the side of content. Both are individuality itself, as the interpenetration of being and doing. What is present, then, is: first, *circumstances* found already there, which are *in themselves* the original nature of the individual; next, the interest, which posits them precisely as *its own*, or as a *purpose*; and finally, the linking and sublation of this opposition in the *means*. This linking itself still falls within consciousness, and the whole just considered is one side of an opposition. This remaining semblance of opposition is sublated by the *transition* itself, or the *means*.—For the means is the *unity* of outer and inner, the opposite of the determinateness it has as *inner* means. It therefore sublates that determinateness and posits itself, this unity of doing and being, equally as *outer*: as individuality itself become actual, that is, individuality pos-

ited *for itself* as what *is*. In this way the whole action does not step outside itself, whether as the *circumstances*, or as *purpose*, or *means*, or *work*.

402 With the work, however, the distinction between original natures seems to come in. The work, like the original nature it expresses, is something *determinate*. For, released freely by doing as an *actuality that is*, it has negativity in it as a quality. Over against the work, however, consciousness determines itself as that which has determinateness in it as negativity *as such*, as doing. Consciousness is therefore the universal as against that determinateness of the work. It can thus *compare* the work with others, and from this grasp the individualities themselves as *different*. The individual who reaches further in its work it grasps either as a stronger energy of will or as a richer nature, that is, one whose original determinateness is less limited;—another, by contrast, it grasps as a weaker and poorer nature. 403 As against this inessential distinction of *magnitude*, *good* and *bad* would express an absolute distinction; but no such distinction occurs here. Whatever might be taken in one way or the other is equally a doing and a busy activity, a self-presentation and self-expression of an individuality, and therefore it is all good. It would really be impossible to say what the bad was supposed to be. What would be called a bad work is the individual life of a determinate nature that realizes itself in it. It would be spoiled into a bad work only by comparing thought. But such thought is something empty, since it goes beyond the essence of the work—to be a self-expression of individuality—and looks for and demands something else in it, who knows what. — Comparing thought could concern only the distinction mentioned above. But that distinction, as a distinction of magnitude, is in itself inessential. Here it is specifically so, because it would be different works or individualities that were being compared with one another; and these are no concern of one another, since each relates only to itself. The original nature alone is the *in-itself*, or what could be taken as the standard for judging the work, and conversely. But the two correspond to

each other. There is nothing *for* the individuality that is not *through* it. Or: there is no *actuality* that is not its nature and its doing, and no doing or in-itself of the individuality that is not actual. And only these moments are to be compared.

404 There is therefore no room at all for *exaltation*, or *lament*, or remorse. For all that sort of thing comes from thought that imagines some other *content* and some other *in-itself* than the original nature of the individual and its execution as present in actuality. Whatever it is that the individual does, and that befalls it, it has done, and is itself. It can have only the consciousness of the pure translation of *itself* from the night of possibility into the day of the present, from the *abstract in-itself* into the significance of *actual* being. And it can have the certainty that what comes its way in the day is nothing other than what lay sleeping in the night. The consciousness of this unity is indeed also a comparison. But what is compared has only the *semblance* of opposition—a semblance of form. For the self-consciousness of reason, which knows that individuality is in itself actuality, this is nothing more than semblance. The individual knows, then, that in its actuality it can find nothing but the unity of that actuality with itself, or only the certainty of itself in its truth, and that it therefore always attains its purpose. Knowing this, it can *experience only joy in itself*.

405 This is the concept that consciousness, certain of itself as the absolute interpenetration of individuality and being, forms of itself. Let us see whether this concept is confirmed for it by experience, and whether its reality agrees with it. The work is the reality that consciousness gives itself. It is that in which the individual is for itself what it is *in itself*—and in such a way that the consciousness *for which* the individual comes to be in the work is not the particular but the *universal* consciousness. In the work as such, consciousness has placed itself out into the element of universality, into the space of being that is without determinateness. Consciousness stepping back from its work is in fact the universal consciousness—because in this opposition it becomes *absolute negativity*, or doing—as against its work,

which is the *determinate*. It therefore goes beyond itself as work, and is itself the space without determinateness that does not find itself filled by its work. If earlier, in the concept, their unity was nevertheless preserved, this happened precisely because the work was sublated as a work that *is*. But the work is supposed to *be*, and we must see how, in the work's *being*, individuality will preserve its universality and know how to satisfy itself.—First, the work that has come into being is to be considered for itself. The work has received into itself the whole nature of individuality. Its *being* is therefore itself a doing in which all distinctions interpenetrate and dissolve. The work is thus thrown out into a *subsistence* in which the *determinateness* of the original nature in fact turns itself outward against other determinate natures. It encroaches on them, as they encroach on it, and it loses itself as a vanishing moment in this universal movement. *Within* the *concept* of individuality real in and for itself, all the moments—circumstances, purpose, means, and realization—are equal to one another, and the original determinate nature counts only as a universal element. By contrast, when this element becomes objective being, its *determinateness* as such comes to light in the work and receives its truth in its dissolution. More precisely, this dissolution presents itself as follows. In this determinateness the individual has become actual to itself as *this* individual. But determinateness is not only the content of actuality; it is equally its form. Or: actuality as such is precisely this determinateness—to be opposed to self-consciousness. From this side, actuality shows itself as actuality that has vanished from the concept, as merely *found already there* and *alien*. The work *is*, that is, it is for other individualities; and for them it is an alien actuality, in whose place *they* must put their own, in order to give themselves, through *their* doing, the consciousness of *their* unity with actuality. Or: *their* interest in that work, posited by *their* original nature, is different from the *peculiar* interest of this work, which is thereby made into something else. The work is therefore something perishable as such. It is extinguished by the counterplay of other forces and interests,

and it presents the reality of individuality as vanishing rather than as accomplished.

406 In its work, then, the opposition of doing and being arises for consciousness. In earlier shapes of consciousness this opposition was at the same time the *beginning* of doing; here it is only a *result*. In fact, however, it likewise lay at the basis when consciousness, as individuality real *in itself*, set about acting. For the *determinate original nature* was presupposed to acting as the *in-itself*, and pure accomplishing for the sake of accomplishing had that nature for its *content*. But pure doing is the form *equal to itself*, to which, therefore, the *determinateness* of the original nature is unequal. Here, as elsewhere, it makes no difference which of the two is called *concept* and which *reality*. The original nature is what is *thought*, or the *in-itself*, as against doing, in which it first has its reality. Or the original nature is the *being* both of individuality as such and of individuality as work, while doing is the original *concept*, as absolute transition, or as *becoming*. This *inadequacy* of concept and reality, which lies in its essence, is what consciousness experiences in its work. In the work, therefore, consciousness comes to be for itself as it is in truth, and its empty concept of itself vanishes.

407 In this fundamental contradiction of the work, which is the truth of this individuality that takes itself to be real in itself, all the sides of that individuality therefore again appear as contradictory. Or: the work is the content of the whole individuality, placed out from *doing* into *being*; and doing is the negative unity that holds all the moments captive. Now the work lets those moments go free, and in the element of subsistence they become indifferent to one another. Concept and reality thus separate, as purpose and as what the *original essentiality* is. It is a matter of chance whether the purpose has true essence, or whether the in-itself is made the purpose. Likewise concept and reality again fall apart as *transition* into actuality and as *purpose*. Or: it is a matter of chance whether the *means* that expresses the purpose is chosen. And finally, taking these inner moments together, whether or not they have a unity among themselves:

the individual's *doing* is again contingent with respect to *actuality* as such. *Fortune* decides as readily in favor of a badly determined purpose and badly chosen means as against them.

408 In its work, then, there arises for consciousness the *opposition* between willing and accomplishing, between purpose and means, and again between these inner moments taken together and actuality itself—and this, as a whole, comprises the *contingency of its doing*. But if so, the *unity* and *necessity* of its doing are equally present too. This side overreaches the other, and the *experience* of the *contingency of doing* is itself only a *contingent experience*. The *necessity* of doing consists in the fact that the *purpose* is related to *actuality* without qualification, and this unity is the concept of doing. Action takes place because doing is, in and for itself, the essence of actuality. In the work, it is true, there emerges the contingency that *being accomplished* has as against *willing* and *accomplishing*. And this experience, which seems as though it must count as the truth, contradicts that concept of action. But if we consider the content of this experience in its completeness, it is the *vanishing work*. What *preserves itself* is not the *vanishing*. Rather, the vanishing is itself actual and tied to the work, and it vanishes along with the work. The *negative* itself *perishes* together *with the positive whose negation* it is.

409 This vanishing of vanishing lies in the very concept of individuality real in itself. That in which the work vanishes, or what vanishes in the work, is *objective actuality*; and it was objective actuality that was supposed to give what has been called experience its supremacy over the concept individuality has of itself. But objective actuality is a moment that, even in this consciousness itself, no longer has any truth for itself. Its truth consists only in its unity with doing, and the *true work* is only that unity of *doing and being*, of *willing* and *accomplishing*. Because of the certainty that underlies its acting, then, even the actuality *opposed* to that certainty is, for consciousness, something that is only *for it*. Consciousness is self-consciousness returned into itself, for which all opposition has vanished. For it, therefore, the opposition can no longer arise in this form of its *being-for-self*

as against *actuality*. Rather, the opposition and negativity that come to light in the work thereby strike not only the content of the work, or of consciousness, but actuality as such. With it they strike the opposition that is present only through and in actuality, and the vanishing of the work.

THE MATTER ITSELF

Consciousness holds to the cause it serves as what endures beyond any particular work.

In this way, then, consciousness reflects itself into itself out of its perishable work, and maintains its concept and certainty as what *is* and *endures*, as against the experience of the *contingency* of doing. It in fact experiences its concept, in which actuality is only a moment, something *for it*, not what is in and for itself. It experiences actuality as a vanishing moment, which therefore counts for it only as *being* in general, whose universality is the same as doing. This unity is the true work. It is the *matter itself*, which simply asserts itself and is experienced as what endures, independent of the matter that is the *contingency* of individual doing as such, of circumstances, means and actuality.[1]

410 The *matter itself* is opposed to these moments only insofar as they are supposed to count in isolation. Essentially, however, as the interpenetration of actuality and individuality, it is their unity. It is just as much a doing, and as doing it is *pure doing* in general, *and thus equally the doing of this individual*; and this doing, as still belonging to the individual in opposition to actuality, is *purpose*. It is equally the *transition* from this determinateness into the opposite one. And finally, it is an *actuality* that is present *for consciousness*. The *matter itself* thus expresses the *spiritual* essentiality in which all these moments are sublated as counting for themselves, and so count only as universal. In it, consciousness's certainty of itself is, for consciousness, an

1 Die Sache selbst: "the matter itself"—what an undertaking is really about, its cause or business, as opposed to a mere Ding (thing). It gives this subsection its title.

objective essence, *a matter*. It is the object born out of self-consciousness as *its own*, without ceasing to be a free object in the proper sense.—The *thing* of sense-certainty and of perceiving now has its meaning for self-consciousness only through self-consciousness. On this rests the distinction between a *thing* and a *matter*.—In the matter itself, a movement corresponding to sense-certainty and perception will be run through.

411 In the *matter itself*, then, as the interpenetration of individuality and objectivity itself become objective, self-consciousness has arrived at its true concept of itself; or it has come to consciousness of its substance. At the same time, as it is here, it is a consciousness of that substance that has only just come about, and is therefore *immediate*. This is the determinate way in which spiritual essence is present here, not yet having developed into truly real substance. In this immediate consciousness of it, the *matter itself* has the form of *simple essence*. As universal, this essence contains all its various moments within it and belongs to them. But it is also indifferent to them as determinate moments, and free for itself; and it is as this free, *simple, abstract* matter itself that it *counts as the essence*. The various moments of the original determinateness, or of the *matter of this* individual—its purpose, the means, the doing itself, and actuality—are, for this consciousness, on the one hand single moments that it can abandon and give up in favor of the *matter itself*. On the other hand, they all have the matter itself as their essence only in such a way that it is found *in* each of these various moments as their *abstract* universal, and can be their *predicate*. The matter itself is not yet the subject. Rather, those moments count as subject, because they fall on the side of *singularity* in general, while the matter itself is as yet only the simple universal. It is the *genus*, which is found in all these moments as its *species*, and is equally free of them.

412 That consciousness is called *honest* which, on the one hand, has arrived at the idealism expressed by *the matter itself*, and, on the other, has the true in the matter itself as this formal universality. It is only ever concerned with the matter itself, and

therefore roams about among its various moments or species. When it fails to attain the matter itself in one of them, or in one sense, it gets hold of it for that very reason in another. It thus in fact always gains the satisfaction that, according to its concept, was supposed to fall to this consciousness's share. Come what may, it has accomplished and attained the *matter itself*; for the matter itself, as this *universal* genus of those moments, is the predicate of them all.

413 If it does not bring a *purpose* into *actuality*, it has at least *willed* it. That is, it makes the *purpose* as purpose, the *pure doing* that does nothing, into the *matter itself*; and so it can express itself and console itself by saying that something has, after all, been *done* and *kept busy at*. Since the universal itself contains the negative, or vanishing, under it, even the fact that the work destroys itself is *its* doing. It has provoked the others to it, and in the *vanishing* of its actuality it still finds satisfaction—just as naughty boys enjoy *themselves* in the slap they receive, namely, as its cause. Or perhaps it has *not even tried* to carry out the matter itself, and has *done nothing at all*; then it did not *care to*. For it, the *matter itself* is precisely the *unity* of its *decision* and *reality*. It asserts that *actuality* would be nothing other than what it *cares to do*. — Finally, something of interest to it may have come about without any contribution of its own. Then this *actuality* is, for it, the matter itself precisely in the interest it takes in it, even though it did not produce it. If it is a piece of good fortune that has befallen it personally, it holds on to it as its *deed* and *merit*. If it is otherwise some world event that is of no further concern to it, it makes this its own just the same. For it, *interest without deed* counts as a *side* it has taken, for or against, and has *fought against* or *upheld*.

414 As is clear, the *honesty* of this consciousness, like the satisfaction it experiences everywhere, in fact consists in its *not bringing together* the *thoughts* it has about the matter itself. For it, the *matter itself* is just as much *its* matter as *no work* at all, or *pure doing* and the *empty purpose*, or again an *actuality without deed*. It makes one meaning after another the subject of this predicate,

and forgets one after another. Now, in merely *having willed*, or again in *having not cared to*, the matter itself has the meaning of the *empty purpose*, and of the *thought* unity of willing and accomplishing. The consolation for the destruction of the purpose—that it was, after all, *willed*, or, after all, *purely done*—and likewise the satisfaction of having given the others something to do, make *pure doing*, or the utterly bad work, into the essence. For a work that is no work at all must be called a bad one. Finally, in the lucky case of *finding* actuality already there, this being without deed becomes the matter itself.

415 The truth of this honesty, however, is that it is not as honest as it looks. For it cannot be so thoughtless as actually to let these various moments fall apart like this. It must have an immediate consciousness of their opposition, because they are absolutely related to one another. *Pure* doing is essentially the doing of *this* individual, and this doing is just as essentially an *actuality*, or a matter. Conversely, *actuality* is essentially only as *its* doing, as well as *doing in general*; and *its* doing, just as it is doing in general, is at the same time also actuality. So while it seems to be concerned only with the *matter itself* as *abstract actuality*, it is also the case that it is concerned with the matter as *its* doing. But equally, while it seems to be concerned only with *doing* and *busy activity*, it is not in earnest about this; rather, it is concerned with *a matter*, and with the matter as *its own*. Finally, while it seems to want only *its* matter and *its* doing, it is again concerned with the *matter in general*, or with actuality that endures in and for itself.

416 Just as the matter itself and its moments appear here as *content*, they are equally necessarily present in consciousness *as forms*. They come on the scene as content only in order to vanish, each making room for the other. They must therefore be present in the determinateness of being *sublated*; but in that way they are sides of consciousness itself. The *matter itself* is present as the *in-itself*, or as consciousness's *reflection into itself*. The *displacement* of the moments by one another, however, is expressed in consciousness in such a way that they are posited in it not in

themselves but only for *an other*. Consciousness exposes one of the moments of the content to the light of day and presents it *for others*. But at the same time consciousness is reflected into itself out of that moment, and the opposite moment is equally present in it; it keeps this one for itself, as its own. At the same time, it is not that some one of them is *only* put out and another only kept inside. Rather, consciousness alternates between them; for it must make the one as well as the other into what is essential, both for itself and for the others.

HONESTY AND DECEPTION

Individuals claim devotion to the matter itself while pursuing their own doing, and deceive one another.

The whole is the self-moving interpenetration of individuality and the universal. But for this consciousness the whole is present only as the *simple* essence, and hence as the abstraction of *the matter itself*. Its moments therefore fall, as separate, outside that abstraction and apart from one another. And *as a whole* it is exhausted and exhibited only through the separating alternation of putting out and keeping for oneself. In this alternation consciousness holds one moment for itself and as essential in its reflection, but another only externally in *itself*, or for the *others*. Thus there arises a play of individualities with one another, in which they find themselves, and each other, both deceiving and deceived.

417 An individuality, then, sets about carrying something out. It seems thereby to have made something *its matter*. It acts, becomes in this for others, and seems to be concerned with *actuality*. The others therefore take its doing to be an interest in the matter as such, with the purpose that *the matter in itself be carried out*—no matter whether by the first individuality or by them. So they point out that this matter has already been brought about by them, or, if not, they offer and give their help. But that consciousness has already moved on from where they think it is. What interests it in the matter is *its* doing and busy activity; and

when they realize that this was *the matter itself*, they find themselves deceived.—But in fact their rushing up to help was itself nothing other than wanting to see and show *their* doing, not the *matter itself*. That is, they wanted to deceive the other in just the way they complain of having been deceived. — Now it has come out that one's *own doing* and *busy activity*, the play of *one's own forces*, counts as the matter itself. So consciousness seems to pursue its essence *for itself*, not for the others. It seems concerned only with doing as *its own*, not as a doing of *others*, and so seems to let the others likewise get on with *their* matter. But they are mistaken again: it has already moved on from where they thought it was. It is not concerned with the matter as *this, its own single* matter, but with the matter as a *matter*, as something universal that is for all. It therefore meddles in their doing and work. If it can no longer take the work out of their hands, it at least takes an interest in it by keeping itself busy judging. If it stamps the work with its approval and praise, this is meant in such a way that, in the work, it praises not only the work itself but at the same time *its own* magnanimity and moderation in having spoiled the work neither as a work nor by its censure. In showing an interest in the *work*, it enjoys *itself* in it. Likewise, the *work* it censures is welcome to it, for the sake of just this enjoyment of *its own* doing that the work provides. But those who consider themselves deceived by this meddling, or claim to be, were rather themselves wanting to deceive in the same way. They pass off their doing and activity as something that is only for themselves, in which they aimed only at *themselves* and *their own* essence. But in doing something, and so presenting themselves and showing themselves to the light of day, they directly contradict by their deed their pretense of wanting to exclude the day itself, universal consciousness, and the participation of all. Realization is rather a putting out of what is one's own into the universal element, whereby it becomes, and is meant to become, the *matter* of all.

[418] It is thus equally a deception of oneself and of others if one claims to be concerned only with the *pure matter*. A conscious-

ness that opens up a matter rather experiences that the others come hurrying up like flies to milk just set out, wanting to feel themselves busy with it. And they experience of that consciousness that it, too, is concerned with the matter not as an object but as *its own*. If, on the other hand, only *doing itself*—the use of forces and abilities, or the expression of this individuality—is supposed to be what is essential, then the experience is equally made, on both sides, that *all* stir themselves and consider themselves invited. Instead of a *pure* doing, or a *single* peculiar doing, what has been opened up is rather something that is just as much *for others*, or *a matter itself*. In both cases the same thing happens; it only has a different sense from the one that was assumed and was supposed to count. Consciousness experiences both sides as equally essential moments, and in this it experiences what the *nature of the matter itself* is. It is neither merely a matter opposed to doing in general and to single doing, nor a doing opposed to subsistence, which would be the *genus* free of these moments as its *species*. It is rather an essence whose *being* is the *doing* of the *single* individual and of all individuals, and whose doing is immediately *for others*, or is a *matter*—and is a matter only as the *doing of all and each*. It is the essence that is the essence of all beings: *spiritual essence*. Consciousness experiences that none of those moments is *subject*, but that each rather dissolves in the *universal matter itself*. The moments of individuality, which, owing to this consciousness's thoughtlessness, counted as subject one after another, gather themselves together into simple individuality, which, as *this* individuality, is just as immediately universal. The matter itself thereby loses the relation of a predicate and the determinateness of lifeless abstract universality. It is rather substance permeated by individuality. It is the subject in which individuality is as much itself, or *this* individuality, as it is *all* individuals. And it is the universal that is a *being* only as this doing of all and each—an actuality in that *this* consciousness knows it as its own single actuality and as the actuality of all. The pure *matter itself* is what was determined above as the *category*: being that is the I, or the I that is being—

but as *thinking*, which is still distinct from *actual self-consciousness*. Here, however, the moments of actual self-consciousness are posited as one with the simple category itself—both insofar as we call them its content (purpose, doing and actuality) and insofar as we call them its form (being-for-self and being-for-another). The category is thereby at the same time all content.

B. REASON AS LAWGIVER

Sound reason claims to know immediately what is right, and states laws for everyone.

[419] Spiritual essence, in its simple being, is *pure consciousness* and *this self*-consciousness. The originally *determinate nature* of the individual has lost its positive significance of being *in itself* the element and purpose of its activity. It is only a sublated moment, and the individual is a *self*, as universal self. Conversely, the *formal matter itself* has its filling in the individuality that does and differentiates itself within itself; for the differences of this individuality make up the *content* of that universal. The category is *in itself*, as the universal of *pure consciousness*. It is equally *for itself*, for the *self* of consciousness is equally its moment. It is absolute *being*, for that universality is the simple *self-equality of being*.

[420] What is the object for consciousness, therefore, has the significance of being the *true*. It *is* and *counts* in the sense of *being* and *counting in* and *for itself*. It is the *absolute matter*, which no longer suffers from the opposition between certainty and its truth, between the universal and the single, between the purpose and its reality. Its existence is rather the *actuality* and *doing* of self-consciousness. This matter is therefore the *ethical substance*, and the consciousness of it is *ethical* consciousness. Its object likewise counts for it as the *true*, for it unites self-consciousness and being in one unity. The object counts as the *absolute*, for self-consciousness cannot and will not go any further beyond this object, since in it self-consciousness is at home with itself. It *cannot*, for the object is all being and power;—it *will not*,

for the object is the *self*, or the will of this self. It is the *real* object in itself as object, for it has the distinction of consciousness within it. It divides itself into masses, which are the *determinate laws* of the absolute essence. These masses, however, do not cloud the concept. For within the concept the moments of being, of pure consciousness and of the self remain enclosed—a unity that constitutes the essence of these masses and, in this distinction, no longer lets these moments fall apart.

421 These laws, or masses, of the ethical substance are immediately recognized. One cannot ask about their origin and justification, nor look for anything other than them. For something other than the essence that is *in* and *for itself* could only be self-consciousness itself. But self-consciousness is nothing other than this essence, for it is itself the being-for-self of this essence. And this essence is the truth precisely because it is as much the *self* of consciousness as its *in-itself*, or pure consciousness.

422 Since self-consciousness knows itself as a moment of the *being-for-self* of this substance, it expresses the existence of the law within it in this way: *sound reason* knows immediately what is *right* and *good*. Just as *immediately* as it *knows* this, the law is also immediately *valid* for it, and it says immediately: this *is* right and good. And indeed *this*: these are *determinate* laws; this is the matter itself, filled and full of content.[2]

423 What gives itself so immediately must be just as immediately taken up and considered. We saw what the being that sense-certainty immediately pronounces to be was like. In the same way we must now see what the being pronounced by this immediate ethical certainty is like, that is, the immediately existing masses of the ethical essence. Examples of a few such laws will show this. Since we take them in the form of pronouncements of *knowing*, sound reason, we do not first have to bring in the moment that has to be asserted of them when they are regarded as *immediate* sensuous laws.

2 Gesunde Vernunft, "sound" or "healthy" reason, is close to what English calls common sense.

TRUTHFULNESS AND NEIGHBORLY LOVE

Hegel tests two familiar moral commands and finds that they dissolve into conditions and contingency.

424 "*Everyone ought to speak the truth.*"—To this duty, pronounced as unconditional, the condition will at once be added: *if* he knows the truth. So the command will now run: *everyone ought to speak the truth, each time according to his knowledge and conviction* of it. Sound reason, that is, this very ethical consciousness that knows immediately what is right and good, will also explain that this condition was already so bound up with its universal pronouncement that this is how it *meant* the command. In saying this, however, sound reason in fact admits that it had already violated the command in the very act of pronouncing it. It *said*: everyone ought to speak the truth. *But it meant* that he ought to speak it according to his knowledge and conviction of it. That is, it *said something other than what it meant*; and to say something other than what one means is not to speak the truth. The corrected untruth, or clumsiness, now runs: *everyone ought to speak the truth according to his knowledge and conviction of it at any given time.*—But with this, what the proposition wanted to pronounce as *universally necessary and in itself* valid has instead turned into complete *contingency*. For whether the truth is spoken is left to chance, to whether I know it and can convince myself of it. Nothing more is said than that truth and falsehood are to be spoken all mixed together, just as it happens that someone knows, means and grasps them. This *contingency of content* has *universality* only in the *form of a proposition* in which it is expressed. But as an ethical proposition it promises a universal and necessary *content*, and so, through the contingency of that content, it contradicts itself.—Suppose, finally, that the proposition is corrected to say that the contingency of knowledge and conviction of the truth is to fall away and that the truth *ought* also to be *known*. This would be a command that flatly contradicts the point from which we started. Sound reason was

at first supposed to have the ability to pronounce the truth *immediately*. Now, however, it is said that it *ought to know* the truth, which means that it does not know how to pronounce it *immediately*.—Considered from the side of *content*, the content has dropped out in the demand that one ought to *know* the truth. For this demand refers to *knowing in general*: one ought to know. What is demanded, then, is rather something free of all determinate content. But the topic here was a *determinate* content, *a difference* within the ethical substance. Yet this *immediate* determination of the substance is a content that has shown itself instead to be complete contingency. Raised into universality and necessity, so that *knowing* is pronounced as the law, it instead vanishes.

425 Another famous command is: *Love your neighbor as yourself*. It is addressed to the individual in relation to individuals, and asserts this *as* a relation *of the individual* to the *individual*, that is, as a relation of feeling. Active love aims at removing evil from a person and doing him good. (An inactive love has no being and is therefore presumably not what is meant.) For this purpose one must distinguish what the evil in him is, what good is suited to counter this evil, and what his well-being in general is. That is, I must love him with *understanding*. Love without understanding will harm him, perhaps more than hatred would.[3] Intelligent, essential beneficence, however, is in its richest and most important shape the intelligent universal action of the state. Compared with this action, the action of the individual as an individual becomes something so trivial that it is hardly worth talking about. The action of the state, moreover, has such great power that individual action might set itself against it, either by being outright crime on its own account or by cheating the universal, out of love for another, of the right and the share that the universal has in it. Such individual action would then be altogether useless and would be irresistibly destroyed. What is left to beneficence that is feeling is only the significance of an

3 The command comes from Leviticus 19:18 and is quoted by Jesus in the Gospels (e.g. Matthew 22:39).

entirely individual action, an emergency aid that is as contingent as it is momentary. Chance determines not only its occasion but also whether it is a *work* at all, and whether it is not at once dissolved again and even turned into evil. This action for the welfare of others, then, which is pronounced to be *necessary*, is such that it may exist or may not. If the occasion happens to present itself, it may be a work and may be good, or it may not. So this law has no more a universal content than the first one we considered. It does not express, as an absolute ethical law should, something that is *in and for itself*. In other words, such laws stop short at the *ought* and have no *actuality*; they are not *laws* but only *commands*.

426 In fact it is clear from the nature of the case itself that a universal absolute *content* must be renounced. The essence of the simple substance is to be this simple thing, and every *determinateness* posited in it is therefore *inadequate* to it. The command in its simple absoluteness itself pronounces *immediate ethical being*. The difference that appears in it is a determinateness, and therefore a content that stands *under* the absolute universality of this simple being. Since an absolute content must be renounced, the command can have only *formal universality*, that is, the property of not contradicting itself. For universality without content is formal universality, and absolute content itself amounts to a difference that is no difference, that is, to contentlessness.

427 What remains for lawgiving, then, is the *pure form* of *universality*, or in fact the *tautology* of consciousness. This tautology confronts the content and is a *knowing* not of the *existing* or actual *content*, but of the content's *essence* or self-identity.

428 The ethical essence is therefore not immediately itself a content. It is only a standard for whether a content is capable of being a law or not, by its not contradicting itself. Lawgiving reason is reduced to a merely *testing* reason.

C. REASON AS TESTER OF LAWS

Reason tests laws only for self-consistency, a standard that fits any content equally well.

429 A difference within the simple ethical substance is a contingency for it, and we saw this contingency emerge in the determinate command as contingency of knowing, of actuality and of action. The *comparison* of that simple being with the determinateness that does not correspond to it took place in us. In that comparison the simple substance showed itself to be formal universality, or pure *consciousness*, which, free of the content, confronts it and is a *knowing* of it as determinate content. In this way the universality remains the same as what the *matter itself* was. But in consciousness it is something different. It is no longer the thoughtless, inert genus, but is related to the particular and counts as the particular's power and truth. — At first this consciousness seems to be the same testing that we ourselves were a moment ago. Its activity seems able to be nothing other than what has already happened: a comparison of the universal with the determinate, from which their incongruity would result as before. But the relation of the content to the universal is different here, because the universal has acquired another meaning. It is *formal* universality, of which the determinate content is capable, for in this universality the content is considered only in relation to itself. In our testing, the universal, solid substance stood over against determinateness, and this determinateness developed as the contingency of the consciousness into which the substance entered. Here one term of the comparison has vanished. The universal is no longer the *existing* and *valid* substance, or what is right in and for itself. It is simple knowing, or form, which compares a content only with itself and examines whether it is a tautology. Laws are no longer given but *tested*, and for the testing consciousness the laws are *already* given. This consciousness takes up their *content* simply as it is. It does not go into the singularity and contingency that cling to the

content's actuality, as we did, but stops at the command as command and relates to it just as simply as it is itself its standard.

[430] For this reason, however, this testing does not get far. Precisely because the standard is tautology and indifferent to the content, it takes up this content just as readily as the opposite one.—Take the question: ought it to be a law in and for itself that there be *property*? *In and for itself*, that is, not because it is useful for other ends. The ethical essentiality consists precisely in the law's being equal only to itself, and so, through this self-equality, being grounded in its own essence and not conditioned. Property in and for itself does not contradict itself. It is an *isolated* determinateness, one posited as equal only to itself. Non-property, the ownerlessness of things, or common ownership of goods, contradicts itself just as little. That something belongs to no one, or to the first comer who takes possession of it, or to all together, and to each according to his need or in equal shares, is a *simple determinateness*, a *formal thought*, just like its opposite, property.—Of course, if the ownerless thing is regarded as a *necessary object* of *need*, then it is necessary that it become the possession of some single individual; and it would be contradictory instead to make the freedom of the thing into a law. But ownerlessness does not mean absolute ownerlessness either. Rather, the thing is to *come into possession* according to the *need* of the individual, and not in order to be stored up but to be used immediately. But to provide for need entirely by chance in this way contradicts the nature of the conscious being, which alone is under discussion. For such a being must represent its need to itself in the form of *universality*, provide for its whole existence, and acquire a lasting good. So the thought that a thing falls by chance to the next self-conscious life according to its need was not consistent with itself.—Under common ownership, provision would be made in a universal and lasting way. Either each then receives as much *as he needs*, and in that case this inequality contradicts the essence of consciousness, whose principle is the *equality* of individuals. Or goods are distributed *equally*,

according to the latter principle, and in that case the share lacks the relation to need that is, after all, its only concept.

[431] But if non-property appears contradictory in this way, that is only because it has not been left as a *simple* determinateness. The same happens to property when it is broken down into moments. The single thing that is my property thereby counts as something *universal, fixed, lasting*. This, however, contradicts its nature, which consists in being used and *vanishing*. At the same time it counts as *mine*, which all others recognize and from which they exclude themselves. But in my being recognized lies, rather, my equality with all, the opposite of exclusion.—What I possess is a *thing*, that is, a being for others in general, entirely universal and not determined to be only for me. That *I* possess it contradicts its universal thinghood. Property therefore contradicts itself on all sides just as much as non-property does. Each has in it these two opposed, self-contradicting moments of singularity and universality.—But each of these determinatenesses, represented *simply* as property or non-property without further development, is as *simple* as the other, that is, not self-contradictory.—The standard of law that reason has in itself therefore fits everything equally well, and so is in fact no standard at all.—It would be strange indeed if tautology, the principle of contradiction, which is admitted for the cognition of theoretical truth only as a formal criterion, that is, as something quite indifferent to truth and untruth, were *supposed to be more* than this for the cognition of practical *truth*.

[432] The two moments just considered were the filling of the previously empty spiritual essence. In them, the positing of immediate determinatenesses in the ethical substance, and then the knowing of them as to whether they are laws, have sublated themselves. The result thus seems to be that neither determinate laws nor a knowing of them can take place. But the substance is *consciousness* of itself as absolute *essentiality*, and this consciousness therefore cannot give up either the *difference* within the substance or the *knowing* of that difference. That law-giving and law-testing proved null means this: both, taken

singly and in isolation, are only unstable *moments* of ethical consciousness. And the movement in which they appear has the formal sense that through it the ethical substance presents itself as consciousness.

[433] Insofar as these two moments are more precise determinations of the consciousness of the *matter itself*, they can be regarded as forms of *honesty*. Honesty, which earlier busied itself with its formal moments, now busies itself with a content of the good and right that is supposed to be, and with testing such fixed truth. It thinks that it possesses the force and validity of the commands in sound reason and intelligent insight.

[434] Without this honesty, however, the laws do not count as the *essence* of *consciousness*, nor does testing count as an activity *within* consciousness. Instead, each of these moments appears *immediately* on its own as an *actuality*. The first then expresses an invalid setting up and existence of actual laws, the second an equally invalid liberation from them. As a determinate law, the law has a contingent content. Here this means that it is the law of a single consciousness, with an arbitrary content. That immediate lawgiving is therefore the tyrannical outrage that makes caprice into law and ethical life into obedience to caprice, that is, to laws that are *only* laws and not at the same time *commands*. Likewise the second moment, the testing of laws, insofar as it is isolated, signifies moving the immovable. It is the outrage of a knowing that reasons itself free of the absolute laws and takes them for a caprice alien to it.

[435] In both forms these moments are a negative relation to the substance, or to the real spiritual essence. In other words, in them the substance does not yet have its reality. Consciousness still contains the substance in the form of its own immediacy, and the substance is as yet only a *willing* and *knowing* of this individual, or the *ought* of a non-actual command and a knowing of formal universality. But since these modes have sublated themselves, consciousness has returned into the universal, and those oppositions have vanished. The spiritual essence is actual substance because these modes do not count singly but only as

sublated. The unity in which they are only moments is the self of consciousness. Now posited in the spiritual essence, this self makes the spiritual essence actual, filled and self-conscious.

436 For self-consciousness, then, the spiritual essence is first of all law that *is in itself*. The universality of testing, which was formal and not *in itself*, is sublated. The spiritual essence is equally an eternal law, which does not have its ground in the *will of this individual*. It is in and for itself, the absolute *pure will of all*, which has the form of immediate *being*. Nor is it a *command* that only *ought* to be: it *is* and *is valid*. It is the universal I of the category, which is immediately actuality, and the world is only this actuality. Since this *existing law* is valid without qualification, the obedience of self-consciousness is not service to a lord whose commands would be arbitrary and in which it would not know itself. Rather, the laws are thoughts of its own absolute consciousness, thoughts that it immediately *has*. Nor does it *believe* in them. For faith, too, does indeed behold the essence, but as an alien essence. Ethical *self*-consciousness is *immediately* one with the essence through the *universality* of its *self*. Faith, by contrast, begins from *single* consciousness. It is the movement of that consciousness, always approaching this unity without ever reaching the presence of its essence. — Ethical consciousness, on the other hand, has sublated itself as single. This mediation is complete, and only because it is complete is ethical consciousness the immediate self-consciousness of the ethical substance.

THE UNWRITTEN LAW

Ethical consciousness accepts the laws simply because they are, as Sophocles' Antigone does.

437 The difference of self-consciousness from the essence is therefore perfectly transparent. For this reason the *differences within the essence* itself are not contingent determinatenesses. Inequality could come only from self-consciousness; but because of the unity of the essence and self-consciousness,

these differences are the masses into which this unity is articulated, permeated by its life. They are spirits clear to themselves and undivided, stainless heavenly shapes that preserve in their differences the undefiled innocence and unanimity of their essence.—Self-consciousness is likewise a simple, clear *relation* to them. They *are*, and nothing more: that is what makes up its consciousness of its relation to them. This is how Sophocles' Antigone regards them, as the *unwritten* and *unerring* law of the gods: "not now and yesterday, but always it lives, and no one knows from where it appeared." They *are*.[4] If I ask about their origin and confine them to the point where they arose, I have gone beyond them. For then I am the universal, and they are what is conditioned and limited. If they have to justify themselves to my insight, I have already shaken their unwavering being-in-itself and regard them as something that may be true for me, or may not. The ethical disposition consists precisely in holding firmly and steadfastly to what is right, and in refraining from all moving, shaking and tracing back of it.—Something is deposited with me. It *is* the property of another, and I recognize it *because it is so*, and keep myself unwavering in this relation. If I keep the deposit for myself, then according to the principle of my testing, tautology, I commit no contradiction whatsoever. For then I no longer regard it as the property of another, and to keep something that I do not regard as another's property is perfectly consistent. A change of *view* is no contradiction, because what matters is not the view as view but the object and content, which is not supposed to contradict itself. When I give something away, I change the view that it is my property into the view that it is another's, without becoming guilty of a contradiction. Just as I can do this, so I can go the opposite way. — So it is not because I find something non-contradictory that it is right; it is right because it is what is right. That something *is* the property of another is the *foundation*. I do not have to reason about it. I do not have to seek out or entertain all sorts of thoughts, con-

4 In Sophocles' tragedy *Antigone* (5th century BC), lines 456–457, Antigone appeals to these divine laws to justify burying her brother against the king's decree.

nections and considerations, nor think of lawgiving or of testing. By such movements of my thought I would unsettle that relation, since I could in fact, as I pleased, make the opposite fit my indeterminate, tautological knowing just as well, and so make it into law. Rather, whether this determination or the opposite one is right is determined *in* and *for itself*. For my part I could make whichever I liked into law, and just as well neither; and as soon as I begin to test, I am already on an unethical path. It is because what is right is *in* and *for itself* for me that I am within the ethical substance. In this way the substance is the *essence* of self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is *its actuality* and *existence*, its *self* and *will*.

Spirit: True Spirit, Ethical Life

VI. Der Geist; A. Der wahre Geist, die Sittlichkeit
The ethical world of the Greek city, Antigone and guilt, and the condition of right.

VI. DER GEIST.

438 Reason is spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its world and of the world as itself.—The coming-to-be of spirit was shown in the immediately preceding movement, in which the object of consciousness, the pure category, rose to the concept of reason. In *observing* reason, this pure unity of the *I* and *being*, of being *for itself* and being *in itself*, is determined as the *in-itself* or as *being*, and the consciousness of reason *finds* itself. But the truth of observing is rather the sublation of this immediate instinct of finding, this unconscious existence of reason. The *intuited category*, the *found thing*, enters consciousness as the *being-for-self* of the I, which now knows itself in the objective essence as the *self*. But this determination of the category, as being-for-self opposed to being-in-itself, is equally one-sided, a moment that sublates itself. The category is therefore determined for consciousness as it is in its universal truth: as essence that is *in* and *for itself*. This still *abstract* determination, which constitutes the *matter itself*, is at first only the *spiritual essence*. Consciousness of it is a formal knowing of it, which busies itself with all sorts of content belonging to it. This consciousness is in fact still distinguished from the substance as a single consciousness. Either it gives arbitrary laws, or it thinks that it has the laws as they are in and for themselves in its knowing as such, and takes itself to

be the power that judges them.—Or, considered from the side of the substance: the substance is the spiritual essence that is *in* and *for itself*, but is not yet *consciousness* of itself.—The essence that is *in* and *for itself*, and that is at the same time actual as consciousness and represents itself to itself, is *spirit*.

439 Its spiritual *essence* has already been designated as the *ethical substance*; spirit, however, is *ethical actuality*. It is the *self* of actual consciousness, which it confronts—or rather, which confronts itself—as an objective actual *world*. For the self, though, this world has lost all meaning of something alien, just as the self has lost all meaning of a being-for-self separated from the world, whether dependent or independent. As the *substance* and the universal, self-identical, abiding essence, spirit is the unshaken and undissolved *ground* and *starting point* of the action of all, and their *purpose* and *goal*, as the in-itself, in thought, of all self-consciousness. — This substance is equally the universal *work*, which is produced through the *action* of all and each as their unity and equality; for it is *being-for-self*, the self, action. As *substance*, spirit is unwavering, just *self-identity*. But as *being-for-self* it is the dissolved essence, the kindly essence that sacrifices itself, on which each accomplishes his own work, tears the universal being apart and takes his share of it. This dissolution and singularization of the essence is precisely the *moment* of the action and self of all. It is the movement and soul of the substance, and the universal essence that has been brought about. Precisely because it is being dissolved in the self, the substance is not a dead essence but *actual* and *alive*.

440 Spirit is thus the self-supporting, absolute, real essence. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions of it. They consist in spirit's analyzing itself, distinguishing its moments and dwelling on single ones. This isolating of such moments has spirit itself as its *presupposition* and its *subsistence*; that is, it exists only in spirit, which is existence. Isolated in this way, the moments give the semblance of *being* as such. But that they are only moments or vanishing quantities was shown by their rolling onward and their return into their ground and essence;

and this essence is precisely this movement and dissolution of these moments. Here, where spirit, the reflection of those moments into itself, is posited, our reflection can briefly recall them from this side: they were consciousness, self-consciousness and reason. Spirit is thus *consciousness* in general, which comprises sense-certainty, perceiving and the understanding. It is this insofar as, in analyzing itself, it holds fast to the moment of being, for itself, *objective, existing* actuality, and abstracts from the fact that this actuality is its own being-for-self. If, on the contrary, it holds fast to the other moment of the analysis, that its object is its *being-for-self*, then it is self-consciousness. But as immediate consciousness of *being in and for itself*, as the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, it is the consciousness that *has reason*. As the word *having* indicates, this consciousness has the object as rationally determined *in itself*, or as having the value of the category; but in such a way that, for its consciousness, the object does not yet have the value of the category. It is the consciousness whose consideration we have just left behind. When, finally, it intuits this reason that it *has* as reason that *is*, as reason that is *actual* in it and is its world, then spirit is in its truth. It *is* spirit; it is the *actual ethical* essence.

441 Spirit is the *ethical life* of a *people* insofar as it is *immediate truth*: the individual that is a world. It must go on to become conscious of what it immediately is, sublate the beautiful ethical life, and through a series of shapes arrive at knowing itself. These shapes differ from the previous ones, however, in that they are real spirits, actualities in the proper sense: instead of shapes merely of consciousness, they are shapes of a world.

442 The *living ethical* world is spirit in its *truth*. As spirit first comes to an abstract *knowing* of its essence, ethical life perishes in the formal universality of legal right. Spirit, now divided within itself, traces out one of its worlds in its objective element, as in a hard actuality: the *realm of culture*. Over against it, in the element of thought, it traces out the *world of faith*, the *realm of essence*. Both worlds, however, are grasped by spirit, which returns into itself out of this loss of itself, that is, by the *concept*.

They are then thrown into confusion and revolutionized by *insight* and its spread, the *Enlightenment*. The realm that was divided and spread out into *this world* and the *beyond* returns into self-consciousness. In *morality*, self-consciousness now grasps itself as essentiality, and the essence as actual self. It no longer places its *world* and its *ground* outside itself, but lets everything die away within itself, and as *conscience* it is spirit *certain of itself*.

443 The ethical world, the world torn into this world and the beyond, and the moral world-view are thus the spirits whose movement and return into the simple self of spirit, the self that is for itself, will be developed. As their goal and result, the actual self-consciousness of absolute spirit will emerge.

A. TRUE SPIRIT: ETHICAL LIFE

Spirit first appears as the immediate ethical life of a people, which action splits into opposed powers.

444 Spirit in its simple truth is consciousness, and it splits its moments apart. *Action* separates it into the substance and the consciousness of the substance, and separates the substance as well as the consciousness. The substance, as universal *essence* and *purpose*, stands over against itself as *singularized* actuality. The infinite middle term is self-consciousness. *In itself* it is the unity of itself and the substance, and it now becomes this unity *for itself*. It unites the universal essence and its singularized actuality: it raises the latter to the former and acts ethically, and it brings the former down to the latter and carries out the purpose, the substance that was only thought. It brings forth the unity of its self and the substance as *its work*, and thereby as *actuality*.

445 When consciousness separates, the simple substance on the one hand acquires the opposition to self-consciousness. On the other hand, it thereby equally presents in itself the nature of consciousness, which is to distinguish itself within itself, as a world articulated into its masses. It thus splits into a differenti-

ated ethical essence, into a human and a divine law. Likewise the self-consciousness that confronts the substance assigns itself, according to its essence, to one of these powers. As knowing, it divides into ignorance of what it does and knowing of what it does, a knowing that is for that reason deceived. In its deed, therefore, it experiences the contradiction of *those powers* into which the substance divided itself, and their mutual destruction; and it experiences the contradiction between its knowing of the ethical character of its action and what is ethical in and for itself. And it finds *its own* downfall. In fact, however, through this movement the ethical substance has become *actual self-consciousness*, or *this* self has become what is *in* and *for itself*; but in this very process ethical life has perished.

A. THE ETHICAL WORLD: HUMAN AND DIVINE LAW, MAN AND WOMAN

The ethical substance divides into the human law of the community and the divine law of the family.

446 The simple substance of spirit divides itself as consciousness. In other words, just as consciousness of abstract, sensuous being passes over into perception, so too does the immediate certainty of real, ethical being. And just as for sensuous perception simple being becomes a thing of many properties, so for ethical perception the case of action becomes an actuality of many ethical relations. For sensuous perception, however, the useless multiplicity of properties contracts into the essential opposition of singularity and universality. Still more so for ethical perception, which is purified, substantial consciousness: here the multiplicity of ethical moments becomes twofold, a law of singularity and a law of universality. Each of these masses of the substance, however, remains the whole spirit. In sensuous perception things have no substance other than the two determinations of singularity and universality; here, by contrast, these determinations express only the superficial opposition of the two sides to each other.

447 In the essence we are considering here, singularity means *self-consciousness* in general, not a single, contingent consciousness. In this determination, therefore, the ethical substance is *actual* substance, absolute spirit *realized* in the multiplicity of existing *consciousness*. It is the *community*. *For us*, when we entered the practical shaping of reason in general, the community was the absolute essence; here it has emerged in its truth *for itself*, as conscious ethical essence, and as the *essence for the* consciousness that we have as our object. It is spirit that is *for itself* in that it holds itself in the *counter-reflection of the individuals*, and that is *in itself*, or substance, in that it preserves them within itself. As *actual substance*, spirit is *a people*; as *actual consciousness*, it is the *citizens* of the people. This consciousness has its *essence* in the simple spirit, and the certainty of itself in the *actuality* of this spirit, the whole people. In that actuality it immediately has its *truth*: not in something that is not actual, but in a spirit that *exists* and *is valid*.

448 This spirit can be called human law, because it exists essentially in the form of *actuality conscious of itself*. In the form of universality it is the *known* law and the *prevailing* custom. In the form of singularity it is the actual certainty of itself in the *individual* in general; and as the certainty of itself as *simple individuality* it is government. Its truth is open *validity*, lying in the light of day: an *existence* that, for immediate certainty, steps forth in the form of existence released into freedom.

449 But this ethical power and openness is confronted by another power, the *divine law*. For the ethical *power of the state*, as the *movement* of *self-conscious action*, has its opposite in the *simple* and *immediate essence* of ethical life. As *actual universality*, it is a force against individual being-for-self; and as actuality in general, it finds in the *inner* essence something other than what it is.

450 We have already noted that each of the opposed ways in which the ethical substance exists contains the whole substance and all the moments of its content. If, then, the community is the substance as actual action conscious of itself, the other side

has the form of immediate or existing substance. This immediate substance is, on the one hand, the inner concept or universal possibility of ethical life in general; on the other hand, it equally has in it the moment of self-consciousness. This moment expresses ethical life in the element of *immediacy* or *being*; it is an *immediate* consciousness of itself, both as essence and as this self, in another; that is, a *natural ethical* community. This is the *family*. As the *unconscious*, still inner concept, the family stands over against its own self-conscious actuality. As the *element* of the people's actuality, it stands over against the people itself. As *immediate* ethical *being*, it stands over against the ethical life that forms and maintains itself through *work* for the universal. It is the Penates over against the universal spirit.[1]

THE FAMILY AND THE DEAD

The family's distinctive ethical duty is to bury its dead and so rescue them from mere nature.

451 The *ethical being* of the family is determined as *immediate*. Even so, within itself the family is an *ethical* essence not *insofar* as it is the *natural* relation of its members, or insofar as their relation is the *immediate* relation of *single actual* individuals. For the ethical is in itself *universal*, and this natural relation is essentially just as much a spirit, and is ethical only as spiritual essence. We must see what the family's distinctive ethical character consists in.—First, because the ethical is what is universal in itself, the ethical relation among family members is not the relation of feeling or the relationship of love. The ethical, then, seems to have to be placed in the relation of the *single* family member to the *whole* family as the substance, so that his action and actuality have only the family as their purpose and content. But the conscious purpose that the *action* of this whole has, insofar as it is directed at the whole itself, is itself something singular. The acquisition and preservation of power and wealth is in

1 The Penates were the Roman gods of the household, guardians of the family hearth and larder.

part directed only at need and belongs to desire; in part, in its higher determination, it becomes something only mediate. This higher determination does not fall within the family itself but is directed at what is truly universal, the community. It is rather negative toward the family. It consists in setting the individual outside the family, subduing his naturalness and singularity, and drawing him toward *virtue*, toward life in and for the universal. The *positive* purpose proper to the family is the individual as such. Now, for this relation to be ethical, neither the one who acts nor the one to whom the action relates may appear by *contingency*, as happens, say, in some help or service. The content of the ethical action must be substantial, that is, whole and universal. The action can therefore relate only to the *whole* individual, or to him as universal. And this, again, not in such a way that it is merely *imagined* that a *service* promotes his whole happiness, while the service, as the immediate and actual action it is, only does something singular for him. Nor in such a way that the action, as education, really has him as a whole for its object in a *series* of efforts and produces him as its work; for there, apart from the purpose that is negative toward the family, the *actual action* has only a limited content. Nor, finally, in such a way that it is emergency aid by which the whole individual is in truth rescued; for such aid is itself a wholly contingent deed, whose occasion is an ordinary actuality that can be and also not be. The action, then, embraces the whole existence of the blood relative. It does not have as its object and content the citizen, for the citizen does not belong to the family; nor the one who is to become a citizen and is to *cease* to count as *this single individual*. Its object and content is *this* individual belonging to the family, taken as a *universal* essence, lifted out of sensuous, that is, singular actuality. Such an action no longer concerns the *living* but the *dead*: the one who has gathered himself up out of the long series of his scattered existence into one completed shape, and has risen out of the unrest of contingent life into the rest of simple universality. — Because the individual is *actual* and *sub-*

stantial only as a citizen, the individual who is not a citizen and belongs to the family is only the *non-actual*, marrowless shadow.

452 This universality that the individual as *such* attains is *pure being, death*. It is *immediate, natural having-become*, not the *action* of a *consciousness*. The duty of the family member is therefore to add this side, so that the individual's last *being*, this *universal* being, does not belong to nature alone and remain something irrational, but is something *done*, and the right of consciousness is asserted in it. Or rather, the meaning of the action is this: in truth the rest and universality of the self-conscious essence do not belong to nature; so the semblance of such an action, which nature has arrogated to itself, is to fall away and the truth is to be restored. — What nature did to him is the side from which his becoming universal presents itself as the movement of something *that is*. This movement does, it is true, itself fall within the ethical community and has the community as its purpose. Death is the completion and the highest work that the individual as such undertakes for the community. But insofar as the individual is essentially *singular*, it is contingent that his death was immediately connected with his work for the universal and was its result. On the one hand, even if it was, death is the *natural* negativity and the movement of the individual as something *that is*, in which consciousness does not return into itself and become self-consciousness. On the other hand, since the movement of what *is* consists in its being sublated and attaining *being-for-self*, death is the side of division, in which the being-for-self that is attained is something other than the being that entered the movement. — Because ethical life is spirit in its *immediate* truth, the sides into which its consciousness separates also fall into this form of *immediacy*. Singularity passes over into this *abstract* negativity, which has no consolation and reconciliation *in itself* and must receive them *essentially* through an *actual* and *external action*.—Blood kinship therefore supplements the abstract natural movement by adding the movement of consciousness. It interrupts the work of nature and snatches the blood relative from destruction; or rather, since destruction, his

becoming pure being, is necessary, it takes the deed of destruction upon itself. — What this achieves is that the *dead*, universal *being*, too, becomes something returned into itself, a *being-for-self*; or that the powerless, pure *singular* singularity is raised to *universal individuality*. The dead one, having released his *being* from his *action*, or negative One, is empty singularity, merely a passive *being for another*. He is exposed to every lower, irrational individuality and to the forces of abstract materials. Both are now more powerful than he: the former because of the life they have, the latter because of their negative nature. The family keeps away from him this dishonoring action of unconscious desire and abstract essences. It puts its own action in their place and weds the kinsman to the bosom of the earth, the elemental, imperishable individuality. In this way the family makes him a member of a community that instead overpowers and holds bound the forces of the single materials and the lower forms of life that sought to break loose against him and destroy him.

[453] This last duty therefore constitutes the complete *divine* law, or the positive *ethical* action toward the individual. Every other relation to him that does not stop at love but is ethical belongs to human law. It has the negative significance of raising the individual above his enclosure within the natural community, to which he belongs as an *actual* individual. Human right has for its content and power the actual ethical substance that is conscious of itself: the whole people. Divine right and law, however, has for its content and power the individual who is beyond actuality. Yet this individual is not without power. His power is the *abstract*, purely *universal*: the *elemental* individual. This elemental individual is the ground of individuality, which tears itself loose from the element and makes up the self-conscious actuality of the people. The elemental individual equally tears that individuality back into pure abstraction, as into its essence. —How this power presents itself in the people itself will be developed further.

[454] Now in the one law, as in the other, there are also *distinctions* and *gradations*. Both essences have the moment of con-

sciousness in them, and so distinction unfolds within them. This is what makes up their movement and their own peculiar life. Considering these distinctions shows how the two *universal essences* of the ethical world are *put into action* and what their *self-consciousness* is like. It also shows how they are *connected* and how they *pass over* into one another.

GOVERNMENT AND WAR

Government holds the community together and, through war, makes individuals feel their lord, death.

455 The *community* is the higher law, which holds openly in the light of the sun. It has its actual vitality in the *government*, for it is there that the community is an individual. The government is *actual* spirit *reflected into itself*, the simple *self* of the whole ethical substance. This simple force does allow the essence to spread itself out into its articulated structure, and to give each part subsistence and a being-for-self of its own. In this, spirit has its *reality* or its *existence*, and the family is the *element* of this reality. But spirit is at the same time the force of the whole. It gathers these parts back together into the negative One, gives them the feeling that they are not independent, and keeps them conscious that they have their life only in the whole. On the one hand, then, the community may organize itself into the systems of personal independence and of property, of the law of persons and the law of things. Likewise it may articulate the ways of working for what are at first individual ends—acquisition and enjoyment—into associations of their own, and make them independent. The spirit of the universal association is the *simplicity* and the *negative* essence of these systems, which isolate themselves. The government must not let these systems take root and harden in this isolation, for then the whole would fall apart and spirit would evaporate. To prevent this, it has to shake them to their core from time to time by wars. In this way it violates and throws into confusion the order they have arranged for themselves and their right to independence. The individuals,

absorbed in these systems, tear themselves loose from the whole and strive after inviolable *being-for-self* and personal security. Through the labor that war imposes, the government makes these individuals feel their lord, death. By dissolving the form of subsistence in this way, spirit prevents ethical existence from sinking into natural existence. It preserves the self of its consciousness and raises it into *freedom* and into its *force*.[2] — The negative essence shows itself to be the real *power* of the community and the *force* of its self-preservation. The community therefore has the truth and confirmation of its power in the essence of the *divine law* and in the *realm beneath the earth*.

BROTHER AND SISTER

Of the family relationships, only that of brother and sister is free of desire and fully ethical.

456 The divine law that holds sway in the family likewise has distinctions within it, and their relation makes up the living movement of its actuality. There are three relationships: husband and wife, parents and children, and siblings as brother and sister. The first is the *relationship* of *husband* and *wife*. It is the *immediate* self-knowing of one consciousness in the other, and the knowing of their being mutually recognized. Because this self-knowing is *natural* and not ethical, it is only the *representation* and the *image* of spirit, not actual spirit itself. — But a representation or image has its actuality in something other than itself. This relationship therefore has its actuality not in itself but in the child. The child is an other, whose coming-to-be the relationship is, and in which the relationship itself vanishes. And this alternation of generations rolling ever onward has its permanence in the people.—The piety of husband and wife toward each other is thus mixed with natural relation and with feeling, and their relationship does not have its return into itself within itself. The same is true of the second relationship, the *piety* of

2 An echo of the section on lordship and bondage, where death is called "the absolute lord."

parents and *children* toward each other. The piety of parents toward their children is affected by precisely this emotion. They have the consciousness of their actuality in the other, and they see being-for-self come to be in the other without getting it back; it remains an alien actuality, one of its own.—Conversely, the piety of children toward their parents is affected by the emotion of having their own coming-to-be, or their in-itself, in an other that is vanishing. They attain being-for-self and a self-consciousness of their own only by separating from their origin—a separation in which the origin dries up.

457 These two relationships remain within the passing-over and the inequality of the sides assigned to them.—The unmixed relationship, however, is the one between *brother* and *sister*. They are the same blood, but in them this blood has come to *rest* and *equilibrium*. They therefore do not desire each other. Nor has one given this being-for-self to the other, or received it from the other; rather, they are free individualities in relation to each other. The feminine, as sister, therefore has the highest *intimation* of ethical essence. It does not come to *consciousness* and actuality of that essence. For the law of the family is the essence that is *in itself*, the *inner* essence. It does not lie in the daylight of consciousness, but remains inner feeling and the divine withdrawn from actuality. The feminine is bound to these Penates. In them it beholds partly its universal substance and partly its singularity—but in such a way that this relation of singularity is not at the same time the natural relation of pleasure.—As *daughter*, woman must see her parents pass away with natural emotion and with ethical calm. Only at the cost of this relationship does she attain the *being-for-self* of which she is capable. So she does not behold her being-for-self in her parents in a positive way.—The relationships of *mother* and *wife*, however, involve singularity in several ways. Partly it is something natural that belongs to pleasure; partly it is something negative that sees in them only its own vanishing; and partly, for that very reason, it is something contingent that can be replaced by another. In the household of ethical life, these relationships of woman are foun-

ded not on *this* husband, not on *this* child, but on *a husband, children in general*—not on feeling but on the universal. The difference between her ethical life and that of the man consists precisely in this. In her vocation toward singularity and in her pleasure, she remains immediately universal and a stranger to the singularity of desire. In the man, by contrast, these two sides come apart. As a citizen he possesses the *self-conscious* force of *universality*, and in this way he purchases for himself the right of *desire* while at the same time keeping his freedom from it. Since singularity is mixed into this relationship of the wife, its ethical life is not pure. But insofar as it is pure, singularity is a matter of *indifference*, and the wife lacks the moment of knowing herself as *this* self in the other.—To the sister, however, the brother is the calm, equal essence as such. Her recognition in him is pure and unmixed with natural relation. The indifference of singularity, and its ethical contingency, are therefore not present in this relationship. Instead, the moment of the *singular self* that recognizes and is recognized may here assert its right, because it is bound up with the equilibrium of the blood and with a relation free of desire. The loss of a brother is therefore irreplaceable to the sister, and her duty toward him is the highest.

458 This relationship is at the same time the limit at which the family, enclosed within itself, dissolves and goes outside itself. The brother is the side through which the family's spirit becomes an individuality that turns toward others and passes over into the consciousness of universality. The brother leaves this *immediate*, *elemental*, and therefore properly *negative* ethical life of the family, in order to acquire and produce the actual ethical life that is conscious of itself.

459 He passes over from the divine law, in whose sphere he lived, to the human law. The sister, however, becomes—or the wife remains—the head of the household and the guardian of the divine law. In this way the two sexes overcome their natural being and appear in their ethical significance, as diversities that divide between them the two distinctions that ethical substance

gives itself. These two *universal* essences of the ethical world have their determinate *individuality* in *naturally* distinct self-consciousnesses. The reason is that ethical spirit is the *immediate* unity of substance with self-consciousness—an *immediacy* that, on the side of reality and distinction, therefore appears at the same time as the existence of a natural distinction. — It is the side that, in the shape of individuality that is real to itself, showed itself in the concept of spiritual essence as *originally determinate nature*. This moment now loses the indeterminateness it still had there, and the contingent diversity of dispositions and capacities. It is now the determinate opposition of the two sexes, whose naturalness at the same time acquires the significance of their ethical determination.[3]

460 The difference of the sexes and of their ethical content nevertheless remains within the unity of substance, and its movement is precisely the abiding coming-to-be of that substance. The man is sent out by the spirit of the family into the community, and in the community he finds his self-conscious essence. The family thereby has its universal substance and subsistence in him. Conversely, the community has in the family the formal element of its actuality, and in the divine law its force and confirmation. Neither of the two is in and for itself alone. In its living movement, human law proceeds from the divine, the law valid on earth from the law beneath the earth, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy—and it equally returns to where it came from. The power beneath the earth, by contrast, has its *actuality* on earth; through consciousness it becomes existence and activity.

THE HARMONY OF THE ETHICAL WORLD

The two laws, the two sexes and their unions form a calm, self-sustaining whole.

461 The universal ethical essences are thus substance as universal and substance as singular consciousness. They have the people

and the family as their universal actuality, but man and woman as their natural self and as the individuality that puts them into action. In this content of the ethical world we see the aims attained that the preceding, substanceless shapes of consciousness set for themselves. What reason grasped only as an object has become self-consciousness; and what self-consciousness had only within itself is present as true actuality.—Observation knew something as *found already there*, something in which the self was supposed to have no part. Here that is custom found already there—but an actuality that is at the same time the deed and work of the one who finds it. — The individual who seeks the pleasure *of enjoying his singularity* finds it in the family; and the necessity in which that pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizen of his people.—Or again: it is knowing the *law of the heart* as the law of all hearts, knowing the consciousness of the *self* as the recognized universal order.—It is *virtue*, which enjoys the fruits of its sacrifice. It brings about what it aims at, namely raising the essence into actual presence, and its enjoyment is this universal life.—Finally, the consciousness of *the matter itself* finds satisfaction in the real substance, which contains and preserves in a positive way the abstract moments of that empty category.[4] In the ethical powers, this consciousness has a genuine content. It has taken the place of the substanceless commands that sound reason wanted to give and to know. It thereby also has a standard of testing that is full of content and determined within itself—a standard for testing not laws, but what is done.[5]

462 The whole is a calm equilibrium of all its parts, and each part is a spirit at home in itself. It does not seek its satisfaction beyond itself, but has it within itself, because it is itself in this equilibrium with the whole.—This equilibrium, to be sure, can be alive only if inequality arises within it and is brought back to

3 A reference back to the section on individuality that is real in and for itself ("The spiritual animal kingdom").

4 These recall earlier shapes of reason: pleasure and necessity, the law of the heart, virtue and the way of the world, and "the matter itself" (die Sache selbst).

5 A reference to the preceding sections on reason as lawgiver and as tester of laws.

equality by *justice*. But justice is not an alien essence located in some beyond. Nor is it the actuality, unworthy of it, of mutual malice, treachery, ingratitude, and the like, which would carry out judgment in the manner of thoughtless chance, as an uncomprehended connection and an unconscious doing and not-doing. Rather, justice is the justice of *human* right. It brings back into the universal the being-for-self that steps out of equilibrium, the independence of the estates and of individuals. As such, justice is the government of the people, which is the individuality of the universal essence present to itself and the self-conscious will of all. — But there is also a justice that brings the universal back to equilibrium when it grows too powerful over the individual. This justice is equally the simple spirit of the one who has suffered wrong. It is not split into the one who suffered the wrong and some essence in a beyond. He himself is the power beneath the earth, and it is *his* Erinys that pursues vengeance; for his individuality, his blood, lives on in the house, and his substance has an enduring actuality. The wrong that can be done to the individual in the realm of ethical life is only this: that something merely *happens* to him.[6] The power that commits this wrong against consciousness, making it into a mere thing, is nature. It is the universality not of the *community* but the *abstract* universality of *being*. In undoing the wrong it has suffered, singularity therefore does not turn against the community, for it has not suffered at the community's hands. It turns against abstract being. As we have seen, the consciousness of the individual's blood undoes this wrong in such a way that what has *happened* becomes instead a *work*. In this way *being*, the *final* thing, is also something *willed*, and hence something gratifying.

463 In this way the ethical realm, in its *subsistence*, is an unblemished world, sullied by no discord. Likewise its movement is a calm becoming of one of its powers into the other, such that each itself preserves and brings forth the other. We do

6 The Erinyes, or Furies, were Greek goddesses of vengeance, especially for crimes against kin.

see this realm divide into two essences and their actuality. But their opposition is rather the confirmation of the one through the other; and where they touch each other immediately as actual, their middle term and element is their immediate interpenetration. The one extreme is universal spirit conscious of itself. Through the *individuality* of the *man*, it is joined together with its other extreme, its force and its element: *unconscious* spirit.[7] The *divine* law, on the other hand, has its individualization—or the *unconscious* spirit of the individual has its existence—in woman. Through her, as the *middle term*, this spirit rises up out of its non-actuality into actuality, out of what is unknowing and unknown into the conscious realm. The union of man and woman constitutes the active middle term of the whole. It is the element that is divided into these extremes of divine and human law, and it is equally their immediate union. This union makes those first two syllogisms into the same syllogism. It also unites into one the two opposed movements. One goes from actuality down to non-actuality: the movement of human law, which organizes itself into independent members, down to the danger and trial of death. The other goes from the law beneath the earth up to the actuality of daylight and to conscious existence. The first of these movements falls to the man, the second to the woman.

B. ETHICAL ACTION: HUMAN AND DIVINE KNOWING, GUILT AND FATE

The deed breaks the ethical harmony and sets divine and human law against each other.

464 But given the way the opposition is constituted in this realm, self-consciousness has not yet come into its right as *singular individuality*. In this realm, individuality counts on the one side only as *universal will*, on the other as the *blood* of the family. *This individual* counts only as the *non-actual shade*.—*No deed has yet*

7 Hegel uses the language of the syllogism here: man and woman are the middle terms that link the two extremes.

been committed; but the deed is the *actual self*.—The deed disturbs the calm organization and movement of the ethical world. In the ethical world, the order and harmony of its two essences appear as each confirming and completing the other. Through the deed, this becomes a transition of *opposites*, in which each proves to be the nullity of itself and of the other rather than their confirmation. It becomes the negative movement, or the eternal necessity of dreadful *fate*. This fate swallows up divine and human law alike, together with the two self-consciousnesses in which these powers have their existence, into the abyss of its *simplicity*. And for us it passes over into the *absolute being-for-self* of purely singular self-consciousness.

465 The *ground* from which this movement starts, and on which it takes place, is the realm of ethical life; but the *activity* of this movement is self-consciousness. As *ethical* consciousness, self-consciousness is the *simple, pure orientation* toward ethical essentiality, or duty. There is no arbitrary will in it, and likewise no struggle and no indecision, since the giving and testing of laws has been given up. Instead, for it ethical essentiality is what is immediate, unwavering, and free of contradiction. It therefore does not present the sorry spectacle of finding itself in a collision between passion and duty. Nor does it present the comic one of a collision between duty and duty—a collision that, in its content, is the same as that between passion and duty. For passion is just as capable of being represented as duty. When consciousness withdraws into itself from its immediate substantial essentiality, duty becomes the formally universal, into which any content fits equally well, as emerged above. The collision of duties is comic, however, because it expresses a contradiction: that of an *absolute that is opposed*. It is thus something absolute and, immediately, the nullity of this so-called absolute or duty. — Ethical consciousness, however, knows what it has to do, and has decided whether to belong to the divine or to the human law. This immediacy of its decisiveness is a *being-in-itself*, and so, as we have seen, it has at the same time the significance of a natural being. It is nature—not the contingency of circum-

stances or of choice—that assigns one sex to the one law and the other sex to the other. Or, conversely, the two ethical powers themselves give themselves their individual existence and actualization in the two sexes.

466 On the one hand, ethical life consists essentially in this immediate *decisiveness*, and therefore only the one law is the essence for consciousness. On the other hand, the ethical powers are actual in the *self* of consciousness. As a result, they acquire the significance of *excluding* each other and being *opposed* to each other. In self-consciousness they are *for themselves*, whereas in the *realm* of ethical life they are only *in themselves*. Because ethical consciousness is *decided* for one of them, it is essentially *character*. For it, the two do not have equal *essentiality*. The opposition therefore appears as an *unhappy* collision of duty merely with an *actuality* that has no rights. As self-consciousness, ethical consciousness is within this opposition. As such, it at the same time sets out to subject this opposing actuality by force to the law to which it belongs, or else to outwit it. It sees right only on its own side and wrong on the other. So the consciousness that belongs to the divine law sees on the other side human, contingent *violence*; while the consciousness assigned to human law sees on the other side the self-will and *disobedience* of inward being-for-self. For the commands of government are the universal, public sense that lies open to the day. The will of the other law, however, is the sense beneath the earth, locked away in the interior. In its existence it appears as the will of singularity, and in contradiction with the first law it is transgression.

467 Thus there arises in consciousness the opposition between the *known* and the *not known*, just as in substance there is the opposition between the *conscious* and the *unconscious*. The absolute *right* of ethical *self-consciousness* comes into conflict with the divine *right* of *essence*. For self-consciousness as consciousness, objective actuality as such has essence. But in its substance, self-consciousness is the unity of itself and this opposite; and ethical self-consciousness is the consciousness of substance. The

object, as opposed to self-consciousness, has therefore entirely lost the significance of having essence for itself. The spheres in which the object is only a *thing* have long since vanished. So too have these spheres in which consciousness fixes something from out of itself and makes a single moment into the essence. Against such one-sidedness, actuality has a force of its own. It stands in league with truth against consciousness, and only then shows consciousness what the truth is. Ethical consciousness, however, has drunk from the cup of absolute substance the forgetting of all one-sidedness of being-for-self, of its purposes and its own peculiar concepts. In these Stygian waters it has therefore at the same time drowned all essentiality of its own and all independent significance of objective actuality. Its absolute right is therefore this: when it acts according to ethical law, it should find in this actualization nothing other than the fulfillment of this law itself, and the deed should show nothing other than what ethical doing is.[8] — The ethical, being at once the absolute *essence* and the absolute *power*, can suffer no inversion of its content. If it were only the absolute *essence* without power, it could undergo an inversion at the hands of individuality. But individuality, as ethical consciousness, has renounced all inverting by giving up one-sided being-for-self. Conversely, mere power would be inverted by essence if it were still such a being-for-self. Because of this unity, individuality is the pure form of the substance, and the substance is the content. Doing is the transition from thought into actuality, but only as the movement of an opposition without essence, whose moments have no particular content or essentiality distinct from one another. The absolute right of ethical consciousness is therefore that the *deed*, the *shape* of its *actuality*, should be nothing other than what it *knows*.

468 But the ethical essence has split itself into two laws, and consciousness, as an undivided relation to law, is assigned to only one of them. This *simple* consciousness insists on the abso-

8 The Styx was a river of the Greek underworld; the drink of forgetting also evokes Lethe, the underworld river of oblivion.

lute right that the essence should have *appeared* to it, as ethical consciousness, as it is *in itself*. In the same way, this essence insists on the right of its *reality*, that is, on being double. At the same time, this right of essence does not stand over against self-consciousness as though it were somewhere else. It is self-consciousness's own essence. Only in self-consciousness does it have its existence and its power, and its opposition is the *deed* of *self-consciousness*. For self-consciousness, precisely by being a self for itself and proceeding to the deed, raises itself out of *simple immediacy* and itself posits the *division*. Through the deed it gives up the determinateness of ethical life, that of being the simple certainty of immediate truth. It posits the separation of itself into itself as the active side and into the actuality standing over against it, which for it is negative. Through the deed, therefore, it becomes *guilt*. For the deed is its *doing*, and doing is its ownmost essence. And *guilt* also acquires the significance of *crime*. For as simple ethical consciousness it has turned to the one law and renounced the other, and through its deed it violates that other law. — *Guilt* is not the indifferent, ambiguous essence according to which the deed, as it *actually* lies in the light of day, may or may not be the *doing* of its self. As if something external and contingent could attach itself to the doing, something not belonging to it, so that from this side the doing would be innocent! On the contrary, doing is itself this division: positing itself for itself, and positing over against this an alien, external actuality. That there is such an actuality belongs to the doing itself and comes about through it. Only non-doing, therefore, is innocent—like the being of a stone, and not even that of a child. — As for its content, however, ethical *action* has the moment of crime in it. For it does not sublate the *natural* distribution of the two laws between the two sexes. Rather, as an *undivided* orientation toward the law, it remains within *natural immediacy*. And as doing, it turns this one-sidedness into guilt: the guilt of seizing only one of the sides of the essence and relating negatively to the other, that is, violating it. Where guilt and crime, doing and acting fall within universal ethical life will be

expressed more precisely later. This much is immediately clear: it is not *this individual* who acts and is guilty. For as *this* self he is only the non-actual shade. Or else he is only as universal self; individuality is purely the *formal* moment of *doing* as such, and the content is the laws and customs—and, specifically for the individual, those of his estate. He is the substance as genus, which through its determinateness does become a species; but the species at the same time remains the universal of the genus. Within the people, self-consciousness descends from the universal only as far as particularity. It does not descend as far as singular individuality, which in its doing posits an exclusive self, an actuality negative to itself. Instead, its action rests on secure trust in the whole, into which nothing alien intrudes, neither fear nor enmity.

GUILT AND THE HIDDEN POWER

Every deed awakens a power it did not know, as with Oedipus, and the doer must acknowledge guilt.

469 Now ethical self-consciousness experiences in its deed the developed nature of *actual* action, whether it gave itself over to the divine or to the human law. The law manifest to it is linked in essence with the opposite law; the essence is the unity of both; but the deed has carried out only the one against the other. Yet because the one law is linked in essence with the other, fulfilling the one calls forth the other—and calls it forth as what the deed has made of it: a violated and now hostile essence demanding revenge. Only one side of the decision as such lies open to the day for the one who acts. But the decision is *in itself* the negative. It sets over against itself something other than itself, something alien to it, since the decision is knowing. Actuality therefore keeps hidden within itself the other side, the side alien to knowing, and does not show itself to consciousness as it is in and for itself. It does not show the son his father in the man who insulted him and whom he slays; it does not show him his mother in the queen whom he takes as his wife. In this way a

power that shuns the light lies in wait for ethical self-consciousness. It breaks forth only once the deed is done, and seizes self-consciousness in the act. For the accomplished deed is the sublated opposition of the knowing self and the actuality standing over against it.[9] The one who acts cannot deny the crime and its guilt. The deed is this: to move what was unmoved, to bring forth what had been locked up in mere possibility, and thereby to link the unconscious to the conscious, what is not to being. In this truth, then, the deed comes out into the sun. It comes out as something in which a conscious element is bound to an unconscious one, what is one's own to what is alien. It is the divided essence whose other side consciousness experiences—experiences also as its own, but as the power it has violated and roused to hostility.

470 It may be that the right which lay in ambush is present for acting *consciousness* not in its own proper shape, but only *in itself*, in the inner guilt of the decision and the action. But ethical consciousness is more complete, and its guilt purer, if it *knows beforehand* the law and the power it confronts. It then takes them to be violence and wrong, an ethical contingency, and, like Antigone, commits the crime knowingly. The accomplished deed inverts its view. The *accomplishment* itself declares that what is *ethical* must be *actual*; for the *actuality* of the purpose is the purpose of action. Action declares precisely the *unity* of *actuality* and *substance*. It declares that actuality is not contingent to essence, but that, in league with essence, it is granted to nothing that is not true right. For the sake of this actuality, and for the sake of its doing, ethical consciousness must recognize its opposite as its own actuality; it must recognize its guilt. *Because we suffer, we recognize that we have erred —*[10]

471 This recognition expresses the sublated discord between the ethical *purpose* and *actuality*. It expresses the return to the ethical *disposition*, which knows that nothing counts but what is

9 An allusion to Oedipus, who unknowingly killed his father and married his mother (Sophocles, Oedipus the King).

10 Hegel's free rendering of Antigone's words in Sophocles, Antigone 926.

right. With this, however, the one who acts gives up its *character* and the *actuality* of its self, and has perished. Its *being* consists in belonging to its ethical law as its substance. But in recognizing the opposite, this law has ceased to be its substance; and instead of its actuality it has attained non-actuality, the disposition. — Substance does appear *in* individuality as its *pathos*, and individuality appears as what animates substance and therefore stands above it. But it is a pathos that is at the same time individuality's character. Ethical individuality is immediately and in itself one with this, its universal. It has its existence only in it, and it cannot survive the downfall that this ethical power suffers at the hands of the opposing one.[11]

472 But in this it has the certainty that the individuality whose pathos is this opposing power *suffers no more evil than it has inflicted*. The movement of the ethical powers against each other, and of the individualities that set them into life and action, reaches its *true end* only when both sides undergo the same downfall. For neither power has any advantage over the other that would make it a *more essential* moment of substance. The equal essentiality of both, and their indifferent subsistence side by side, is their selfless being. In the *deed* they exist as self-essences, but as different ones. This contradicts the unity of the self, and it constitutes their lack of right and their necessary downfall.[12] *Character* likewise belongs, in one respect, to only one power, namely as regards its pathos or substance. In another respect, as regards knowing, each character, the one as much as the other, is divided into a conscious and an unconscious element. Each itself calls forth this opposition, and through the deed its not-knowing is also its own work; so each places itself in the guilt that consumes it. The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat of the other side, would therefore be only part of the work, and unfinished. The work advances inexorably toward

11 Greek for "passion" or "suffering"; Hegel uses it for the ethical power that possesses an individual as his defining passion.

12 An allusion to Antigone's following lines (Antigone 927–928): may her opponents suffer no more evil than they unjustly inflict on her.

the equilibrium of both. Only in the equal subjugation of both sides is absolute right accomplished. Only then does ethical substance come on the scene as the negative power that devours both sides—as all-powerful and just *fate*.

TWO BROTHERS AND A BURIAL

The quarrel of Eteocles and Polynices and the denied burial set the two laws in open conflict.

473 Suppose both powers are taken according to their determinate content and its individualization. Then the picture of their conflict, as it takes shape, presents itself in two ways. On its formal side, it is the conflict of ethical life and self-consciousness with unconscious nature and with a contingency that exists through nature. This contingency has a right against self-consciousness, because self-consciousness is only *true* spirit, only in *immediate* unity with its substance. On its content side, it is the rift between divine and human law. — The youth steps out of the unconscious essence, out of the spirit of the family, and becomes the individuality of the community. But that he still belongs to the nature from which he tore himself shows itself in this: he emerges in the contingency of two brothers, who with equal right seize possession of the community. For them, as they enter ethical essence, the inequality of earlier and later birth has no significance, since it is a natural distinction. But government, as the simple soul or self of the spirit of the people, does not tolerate a duality of individuality. And nature, as the chance of plurality, confronts the ethical necessity of this unity. The two brothers therefore fall out, and their equal right to the power of the state shatters both, for they are equally in the wrong.[13] Viewed in human terms, the one who committed the crime is he who, not being *in possession*, attacks the community at whose head the other stood. The one who has right on his side, by contrast, is he who knew how to treat the other only as an

13 Eteocles and Polynices, sons of Oedipus, agreed to rule Thebes in turn and killed each other in battle (Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes; Sophocles, Antigone).

individual, cut off from the community, and who drove him out in this powerlessness. He laid hands only on the individual as such, not on the community, not on the essence of human right. The community, attacked and defended by empty singularity, preserves itself, and the two brothers meet their downfall at each other's hands. For the individuality that stakes the danger of the whole on its own *being for itself* has expelled itself from the community and dissolves within itself. The community will honor the one who was found on its side. The other, however, who already on the city walls proclaimed its devastation, will be punished by the government—the restored simplicity of the community's self—through denial of the final honor. Whoever came to lay violent hands on the highest spirit of consciousness, the community, must be robbed of the honor of his whole, completed essence: the honor of the departed spirit.

474 The universal thus easily knocks off the pure apex of its pyramid, and it does win the *victory* over the rebellious principle of singularity, the family. But in doing so it has only entered into *combat* with the divine law—self-conscious spirit has entered into combat with unconscious spirit. For unconscious spirit is the other essential power, and therefore not destroyed by the first, only offended. Against the law that holds power and lies open to the day, however, it has its help for *actual* execution only in the bloodless shade. As the law of weakness and darkness, it therefore at first succumbs to the law of day and of force; for its authority holds below, not on earth. But the actual, having taken from the inward its honor and power, has thereby consumed its own essence. Manifest spirit has the root of its force in the underworld. The *certainty* of the people, sure of itself and assuring itself, has the *truth* of its oath, which binds all into one, only in the unconscious and mute substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness. As a result, the accomplishment of manifest spirit turns into its opposite. It experiences that its highest right is the highest wrong, and that its victory is rather its own downfall. The dead one, whose right has been injured, therefore knows how to find instruments for his revenge that

are equal in actuality and violence to the power that injured him.[14] These powers are other communities, whose altars the dogs or birds have defiled with the corpse. This corpse was not raised into unconscious universality by being returned, as was its due, to the elemental individual. It remained above the earth, in the realm of actuality, and now, as the force of the divine law, receives a self-conscious, actual universality. These communities rise up in hostility and destroy the community that has dishonored and broken its own force, the piety of the family.[15]

WOMANKIND AND WAR

The community suppresses the family, breeds its own inner enemy, and perishes through war and fortune.

475 In this representation, the movement of human and divine law has the expression of its necessity in individuals. In them the universal appears as a *pathos*, and the activity of the movement appears as *individual* doing, which gives the movement's necessity the semblance of contingency. But individuality and doing constitute the principle of singularity as such, which in its pure universality was called the inner divine law. As a moment of the manifest community, this principle has not only that efficacy beneath the earth, or external in its existence. It also has an existence and movement that is just as manifest, actual in the actual people. Taken in this form, what was represented as the simple movement of individualized pathos takes on a different appearance; and the crime, and the destruction of the community grounded in it, acquire the proper form of their existence.—Human law, then, is in its universal existence the community; in its activity in general, manhood; in its actual activity, the government. It *is*, *moves*, and *preserves* itself by consuming within itself the separateness of the Penates, the independent

14 An echo of the Roman proverb summum ius summa iniuria ("the highest right is the highest wrong"), quoted by Cicero.

15 An allusion to Tiresias' warning to Creon in Sophocles' Antigone that the altars are fouled by carrion from Polynices' corpse and that hostile cities will rise against Thebes.

division into families over which womankind presides, and by keeping them dissolved in the continuity of its fluidity. But the family is at the same time, in general, its element, and individual consciousness is the universal ground of its activity. The community gains its subsistence only by disrupting the happiness of the family and dissolving self-consciousness into the universal. In doing so, it produces its own inner enemy in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it: in womankind in general. Womankind—the eternal irony of the community—changes the universal purpose of the government into a private purpose by intrigue. It transforms the government's universal activity into a work of this particular individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament of the family. In this way it makes the earnest wisdom of mature age an object of mockery for the wantonness of immature youth, and of contempt for youth's enthusiasm. That wisdom has died to singularity—to pleasure and enjoyment, as well as to actual activity—and thinks of and cares for only the universal. In general, womankind raises the force of youth to what counts: the force of the son, in whom the mother has given birth to her lord; of the brother, in whom the sister has the man as her equal; of the youth, through whom the daughter, freed from her dependence, attains the enjoyment and dignity of womanhood. — But the community can preserve itself only by suppressing this spirit of singularity. And because this spirit is an essential moment, the community equally produces it—indeed, produces it precisely through its suppressive attitude toward it, as a hostile principle. Yet this principle, separating itself from the universal purpose, is merely evil and null in itself. It would therefore be powerless if the community itself did not recognize the force of youth—manhood, which is not yet mature and still stands within singularity—as the *force* of the whole. For the community is a people. It is itself individuality, and it is essentially for *itself* only in that *other individualities are for it*, in that it *excludes* them from itself and knows itself independent of them. The negative side of the community sup-

presses the singularization of individuals *within*, but is *self-active* toward the *outside*; and it has its weapons in individuality. War is the spirit and the form in which the essential moment of ethical substance—the absolute *freedom* of the ethical *self-essence* from all existence—is present in its actuality and confirmation. On the one hand, war makes the particular *systems* of property and personal independence, as well as particular *personality* itself, feel the force of the negative. On the other hand, it is precisely in war that this negative essence raises itself up as what preserves the whole. The brave youth in whom womankind takes its pleasure—the suppressed principle of corruption—comes into the light of day and is what counts. Now it is natural force, and what appears as the chance of fortune, that decide about the existence of ethical essence and about spiritual necessity. Because the existence of ethical essence rests on strength and fortune, it is *already decided* that it has perished.—Earlier, only the Penates perished in the spirit of the people. Now, in the same way, the *living* spirits of peoples perish through their individuality in a *universal* community, whose *simple universality* is spiritless and dead, and whose vitality is the *singular* individual as singular. The ethical shape of spirit has vanished, and another takes its place.

476 This downfall of the ethical substance, and its transition into another shape, is therefore determined by the fact that ethical consciousness is directed toward the law essentially *immediately*. This determination of immediacy means that nature in general enters into the action of ethical life. The actuality of ethical life only reveals the contradiction and the seed of corruption that the beautiful unanimity and tranquil equilibrium of ethical spirit contain in this very tranquillity and beauty. For immediacy has a contradictory meaning: it is both the unconscious tranquillity of nature and the self-conscious, restless tranquillity of spirit.—Because of this naturalness, this ethical people is in general an individuality determined by nature and therefore limited, and so it finds its sublation in another individuality. This determinateness, posited in existence, is limita-

tion, but it is equally the negative in general and the self of individuality. When it vanishes, the life of spirit is lost, and so is this substance that is conscious of itself in all. The substance now comes forth in them as a *formal universality*; it no longer dwells in them as living spirit. Instead, the simple, solid unity of their individuality has shattered into many points.

C. THE CONDITION OF RIGHT

After ethical life collapses, individuals count only as abstract legal persons.

[477] The universal unity into which the living, immediate unity of individuality and substance withdraws is the spiritless community. This community has ceased to be the individuals' substance, lacking consciousness of self, and in it they now count, according to their single being-for-self, as selves in their own right and as substances. The universal is splintered into the atoms of the absolutely many individuals; this dead spirit is an *equality* in which *all* count as *each*, as *persons*.—What in the world of ethical life was called the hidden divine law has in fact stepped out of its inwardness into actuality. In that world the *individual* counted, and was actual, only as the universal *blood* of the *family*. As *this* individual he was the *selfless*, *departed* spirit; but now he has stepped forth out of his unactuality. Because the ethical substance is only *true* spirit, spirit goes back into the *certainty* of itself. Spirit is the ethical substance as the *positive* universal, but its actuality is to be a *negative* universal *self*.—We saw the powers and shapes of the ethical world sink into the simple necessity of empty *fate*. This power of theirs is the substance reflecting itself into its simplicity; but the absolute essence reflecting into itself, precisely that necessity of empty fate, is nothing other than the *I* of self-consciousness.

[478] This I therefore now counts as the essence that is *in and for itself*. This *being-recognized* is its substantiality; but that substantiality is *abstract universality*, because its content is *this brittle self*, not the self dissolved in the substance.

479 Here, then, personality has stepped out of the life of the ethical substance; it is the independence of consciousness that *actually counts*. The *unactual thought* of this independence, which comes to be by *renouncing actuality*, appeared earlier as *Stoic* self-consciousness. Stoic self-consciousness proceeded from lordship and bondage, as the immediate existence of *self-consciousness*. In the same way, personality has proceeded from immediate *spirit*, which is the universal ruling will of all and equally their serving obedience. What for Stoicism was the *in-itself* only in *abstraction* is now an *actual world*. Stoicism is nothing other than the consciousness that brings the principle of the condition of right, spiritless independence, to its abstract form. By its flight from *actuality* it attained only the thought of independence. It is absolutely for *itself* because it does not tie its essence to any existence whatever, but gives up every existence and places its essence solely in the unity of pure thinking. In the same way, the right of the person is tied neither to a richer or mightier existence of the individual as such, nor to a universal living spirit. It is tied rather to the pure One of the individual's abstract actuality, or to the individual as self-consciousness in general.[16]

480 Now, just as the *abstract* independence of Stoicism exhibited its realization, so this realization will also repeat the movement of that abstract independence. Stoic independence passes over into the skeptical confusion of consciousness, into a drivel of the negative. This drivel wanders shapelessly from one contingency of being and thought to another; it dissolves them, it is true, in absolute independence, but just as much produces them again; and it is in fact only the contradiction between the independence and the dependence of consciousness.—In the same way, the personal independence of *right* is rather this same universal confusion and mutual dissolution. For what counts as the absolute essence is self-consciousness as the pure, *empty One* of

16 *Rechtszustand* ("condition of right", "legal status") is Hegel's term for a condition in which individuals count only as abstract legal persons; it is usually read as a portrait of imperial Rome.

the person. Over against this empty universality, the substance has the form of *filling* and of *content*; and this content is now left completely free and disordered, for the spirit that subjugated it and held it together in its unity is no longer present.—In its *reality*, therefore, this empty One of the person is a contingent existence and an essenceless moving and doing that never attains stable subsistence. Like skepticism, then, the formalism of right is by its concept without a content of its own. It finds before it a manifold subsistence, possession, and stamps on it the same abstract universality as skepticism does, whereby it is called *property*. But whereas in skepticism the actuality so determined is called *semblance* in general and has only a negative value, in right it has a positive one. That negative value consists in the actual having the meaning of the self as thinking, as the universal *in itself*. This positive value, by contrast, consists in the actual being *mine* in the sense of the category, as *a recognized* and *actual* validity.—Both are the same *abstract universal*. The actual content or *determinateness* of what is mine—whether it be an external possession or the inner wealth or poverty of spirit and character—is not contained in this empty form and does not concern it. The content therefore belongs to a *power of its own*, a power other than the formal universal: the power of chance and caprice. — In its actual validity itself, therefore, the consciousness of right experiences rather the loss of its reality and its complete inessentiality; and to call an individual a *person* is an expression of contempt.

THE LORD OF THE WORLD

A single person gathers all power to himself and exercises it as destructive violence over his subjects.

481 The free power of the content determines itself in the following way. The dispersal into the absolute *plurality* of personal atoms is, by the nature of this determinateness, at the same time gathered into *one* point, alien to them and equally spiritless. On the one hand, this point is, like the brittleness of their personal-

ity, a purely singular actuality. But in opposition to their empty singularity it has at the same time the meaning of all content, and so of the real essence for them; and over against their supposedly absolute, but in itself essenceless, actuality it is the universal power and absolute actuality. In this way this lord of the world is, for himself, the absolute person, who at the same time comprehends all existence within himself, and for whose consciousness no higher spirit exists.[17] He is a person; but he is the solitary person who has stepped forth over against *all*. These all make up the valid universality of the person; for the singular as such is true only as a universal plurality of singularity. Cut off from this plurality, the solitary self is in fact the unactual, powerless self.—At the same time this self is the consciousness of the content that has stepped forth over against that universal personality. But this content, freed from its negative power, is the chaos of spiritual powers. Unleashed as elemental beings, they move against one another madly and destructively in wild excess; their powerless self-consciousness is the impotent enclosure and the ground of their tumult. Knowing himself thus as the sum total of all actual powers, this lord of the world is the monstrous self-consciousness that knows itself as the actual god. But since he is only the formal self, which cannot tame those powers, his movement and self-enjoyment are an equally monstrous excess.

482 The lord of the world has the actual consciousness of what he is—the universal power of actuality—in the destructive violence that he exercises against the self of his subjects, which stands opposed to him. For his power is not the *concord* of spirit in which persons would know their own self-consciousness. Rather, they are persons for themselves, and, out of the absolute brittleness of their point-like nature, they exclude continuity with others. They therefore stand in a merely negative relation, both to one another and to him, who is their relation or continuity. As this continuity he is the essence and content of their formalism. But he is the content alien to them and the hostile

17 The "lord of the world" (*Herr der Welt*) evokes the Roman emperor.

essence, which rather sublates precisely what counts for them as their essence, their contentless being-for-self; and, as the continuity of their personality, he destroys just this personality. Legal personality therefore experiences rather its own lack of substance, as the content alien to it asserts itself in it—and it does assert itself in them, because it is their reality. The destructive burrowing in this essenceless ground, by contrast, gives itself the consciousness of its dominion over all; but this self is mere devastation, therefore only outside itself, and rather the throwing away of its self-consciousness.

483 Such is the side on which self-consciousness is *actual* as absolute essence. But the *consciousness driven back into itself* out of this actuality thinks this inessentiality of its own. We saw earlier how the Stoic independence of pure thinking passes through skepticism and finds its truth in the unhappy consciousness—the truth about how matters stand with its being in and for itself. If that knowing then appeared merely as the sole view of consciousness as such, here its *actual* truth has come on the scene. This truth consists in the fact that this *universal validity* of self-consciousness is the reality alienated from it. This *validity* is the universal actuality of the self; but it is immediately just as much the inversion; it is the loss of its essence. — The actuality of the self, which was not present in the ethical world, has been won by the self's going back into the *person*. What was united in the ethical world now appears developed, but alienated from itself.

Spirit: Self-Alienated Spirit, Culture

VI.B. Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung
Culture and its world, faith and pure insight, the Enlightenment, and absolute freedom and terror.

B. SELF-ALIENATED SPIRIT: CULTURE

Spirit now lives in a world it has made yet experiences as alien, split between actuality and faith.

484 The ethical substance kept the opposition enclosed within its simple consciousness, and kept this consciousness in immediate unity with its essence. For consciousness, therefore, the essence has the simple determinateness of *being*: consciousness is immediately directed toward it, and it is consciousness's custom. Consciousness does not count for itself as *this exclusive self*; nor does the substance have the meaning of an existence excluded from consciousness, with which consciousness would have to make itself one only through the alienation of itself, while at the same time bringing forth the substance. But the spirit whose self is the absolutely discrete has its content over against it as an equally hard actuality; and here the world has the determination of being something external, the negative of self-consciousness. But this world is a spiritual essence; it is in itself the interpenetration of being and individuality. This existence of the world is the *work* of self-consciousness; but it is equally an immediately present actuality alien to self-consciousness, which has a being of its own and in which self-consciousness does not know itself. The world is the external essence and the free content of right. But this external actuality, which the lord of the world of right comprehends within himself, is not

merely this elemental essence present to the self by chance. It is the self's labor—not its positive labor, but rather its negative labor. It receives its existence through self-consciousness's *own* externalization and divestment of its essence. Amid the devastation that reigns in the world of right, this externalization seems to inflict on self-consciousness the external violence of the unleashed elements. These elements, taken for themselves, are only pure devastation and the dissolution of themselves. But this dissolution, this negative essence of theirs, is precisely the self; it is their subject, their doing and becoming. This doing and becoming, however, through which the substance becomes actual, is the alienation of personality. For the self that counts in and for itself *immediately*, that is, *without alienation*, is without substance and is the plaything of those raging elements. *Its* substance is therefore its externalization itself; and externalization is the substance, or the spiritual powers ordering themselves into a world and thereby maintaining themselves.

485 In this way the substance is *spirit*, the self-conscious *unity* of the self and the essence; but each of the two also has the meaning of alienation for the other. Spirit is *consciousness* of an objective actuality that is free for itself. But opposed to this consciousness stands that unity of the self and the essence: opposed to *actual* consciousness stands *pure consciousness*. On the one hand, actual self-consciousness passes over through its externalization into the actual world, and the actual world passes back into it. On the other hand, precisely this actuality—both the person and objectivity—is sublated; they are purely universal. This alienation of theirs is *pure consciousness*, or the *essence*. The present has its opposite immediately in its *beyond*, which is its thinking and being-thought; just as the beyond has its opposite in the here and now, which is the beyond's actuality alienated from it.

486 This spirit therefore forms for itself not merely *one* world, but a doubled world, divided and opposed.—The world of ethical spirit is its own *present*; and therefore every power of that world is in this unity and, insofar as the two powers are distinguished,

in equilibrium with the whole. Nothing has the meaning of the negative of self-consciousness. Even the departed spirit is present in the *blood* of kinship, in the *self* of the family; and the universal *power* of government is the *will, the self of the people. Here, however, what is present means only objective* actuality, *which has its consciousness in the beyond. Each single moment, as* essence, receives this consciousness, and with it actuality, from another; and insofar as it is actual, its essence is something other than its actuality. Nothing has a spirit grounded in itself and dwelling within it; everything is outside itself in an alien spirit. The equilibrium of the whole is not the unity that remains with itself, and its tranquillity returned into itself; it rests instead on the alienation of what is opposed. The whole is therefore, like each single moment, a reality alienated from itself. It falls apart into one realm in which *self-consciousness* is *actually* both itself and its object, and into another, the realm of *pure* consciousness, which, lying beyond the first, has no actual presence but exists in *faith*. The ethical world went back from its separation into divine and human law and their shapes, and its consciousness went back from its separation into knowing and unconsciousness, into their fate—into the *self* as the *negative power* of this opposition. In the same way, these two realms of self-alienated spirit will also return into the *self*. But whereas that first self was the immediately valid *self*, the single *person*, this second self, which returns into itself from its externalization, will be the *universal self*, the consciousness that grasps the *concept*. And these spiritual worlds, all of whose moments claim for themselves a fixed actuality and an unspiritual subsistence, will dissolve in *pure insight*. Pure insight, as the self that *grasps* itself, completes culture. It apprehends nothing but the self, and everything as the self; that is, it *comprehends* everything, eradicates all objectivity, and transforms all *being-in-itself* into *being-for-self*. Turned against faith as the alien realm of *essence* lying in the beyond, it is *Enlightenment*. In this realm, too—where alienated spirit takes refuge as in the consciousness of self-same tranquillity—Enlightenment completes alienation. It throws the house-

hold that spirit keeps there into disorder by bringing in the implements of the world here below. Spirit cannot disown these implements as its property, because its consciousness likewise belongs to that world. — In this negative business pure insight at the same time realizes itself and brings forth its own object: the unknowable *absolute essence*, and the *useful*. Since in this way actuality has lost all substantiality, and nothing in it is any longer *in itself*, the realm of faith is overthrown, and so is that of the real world. This revolution brings forth *absolute freedom*, with which spirit, formerly alienated, has gone completely back into itself; it leaves this land of culture and passes over into another land, the land of *moral consciousness*.

I. THE WORLD OF SELF-ALIENATED SPIRIT

This world falls apart into the actual world of culture and the beyond of pure consciousness.

[487] The world of this spirit falls apart into a doubled world. The first is the world of actuality, or of spirit's alienation itself; the other is the world that spirit, rising above the first, builds for itself in the ether of pure consciousness. This second world, being *opposed* to that alienation, is for that very reason not free of it. It is rather only the other form of alienation, which consists precisely in having consciousness in two kinds of worlds, and which embraces both. What is considered here, then, is not the self-consciousness of the absolute essence as it is *in* and *for itself*—not religion—but *faith*, insofar as faith is *flight* from the actual world and is thus not *in* and *for itself*. This flight from the realm of the present is therefore, in itself, immediately twofold. Pure consciousness is the element into which spirit rises; but it is the element not only of *faith* but equally of the *concept*. The two therefore arrive together, and faith comes into consideration only in opposition to the concept.

A. CULTURE AND ITS REALM OF ACTUALITY

Individuals gain validity and actuality only by forming themselves and giving up their natural selves.

488 The spirit of this world is spiritual *essence* permeated by a *self*-consciousness. This self-consciousness knows itself as immediately present as *this being that is for itself*, and knows the *essence* as an actuality over against itself. But the existence of this world, like the actuality of self-consciousness, rests on a movement: self-consciousness externalizes its personality, thereby brings forth its world, and relates to that world as something alien, in such a way that it must now take possession of it. But the renunciation of its being-for-self is itself the production of actuality, and through this renunciation it therefore takes possession of actuality immediately.—Or: self-consciousness is only *something*, it has *reality* only insofar as it alienates itself. Thereby it posits itself as universal, and this universality of its own is its validity and actuality. This *equality* with all is therefore not the equality of right. It is not that immediate being-recognized and validity of self-consciousness simply because it *is*. Rather, self-consciousness counts as valid through the alienating mediation of having made itself conform to the universal. The spiritless universality of right takes every natural mode of character and of existence into itself and grants it a right. But the universality that counts here is universality that has *come to be*, and for that reason it is *actual*.

489 What gives the individual validity and actuality here, then, is *culture*. Its true *original nature* and substance is the spirit of the *alienation* of *natural* being. This externalization is therefore just as much the individual's *purpose* as its *existence*. It is at the same time the *means*, or the *transition*, both of *substance as thought* into *actuality* and, conversely, of *determinate individuality* into *essentiality*. This individuality *forms* itself into what it is *in itself*, and only thereby *is* it *in itself* and has actual existence. As much culture as it has, so much actuality and power. Although

the self here knows itself as actual as *this* self, its actuality nevertheless consists solely in the sublation of the natural self. The originally *determinate* nature is therefore reduced to the *inessential* difference of magnitude, to a greater or lesser energy of the will. But the will's purpose and content belong solely to the universal substance itself and can only be something universal. The particularity of a nature that becomes purpose and content is something *powerless* and *unactual*. It is a *kind* that toils vainly and ridiculously to put itself into effect; it is the contradiction of giving to the particular an actuality that is immediately the universal. If, therefore, individuality is falsely placed in the *particularity* of nature and character, then no individualities and characters are to be found in the real world; rather, individuals have an equal existence for one another. That supposed individuality is only an existence that is *meant*. It has no staying power in this world, where only what externalizes itself, and therefore only the universal, attains actuality.—What is *meant* therefore counts for what it is: a kind. A *kind* is not quite the same as *espèce* [a "sort", a nobody], "of all nicknames the most dreadful, for it denotes mediocrity and expresses the highest degree of contempt." But *kind*, and being *good of its kind*, is a German expression that adds to this meaning an honest face, as though it were not meant so badly—or that indeed does not yet contain the consciousness of what a kind is, and what culture and actuality are.[1]

490 What appears, in relation to the single *individual*, as his culture is the essential moment of the *substance* itself. It is the immediate passing over of the substance's thought universality into actuality, or the substance's simple soul, through which the *in-itself is something recognized* and is *existence*. The movement of individuality forming itself is therefore immediately the becoming of that individuality as the universal objective essence, that is, the becoming of the actual world. Although this world has come to be through individuality, for self-consciousness it is something immediately alienated, and it has for self-conscious-

1 The quotation comes from Goethe's 1805 German translation of Diderot's dialogue *Rameau's Nephew*, on which Hegel draws throughout this section.

ness the form of unshakeable actuality. But self-consciousness, certain at the same time that this world is its substance, sets about taking possession of it. It gains this power over the world through culture. From this side, culture appears as self-consciousness making itself conform to actuality, as far as the energy of its original character and talent allows. What appears here as the individual's dominion, to which the substance would be subjected and thereby sublated, is the same thing as the actualization of the substance. For the power of the individual consists in making itself conform to the substance, that is, in externalizing its self and so positing itself as the objective, existing substance. The individual's culture and its own actuality are therefore the actualization of the substance itself.

491 The self is actual to itself only as *sublated*. For itself, therefore, it does not constitute the unity of *consciousness* of itself and of the object; rather, the object is for it the negative of itself.—Through the self as its soul, then, the substance is developed in its moments in such a way that each opposite inspirits the other: each gives the other subsistence through its own alienation, and likewise receives subsistence from it. At the same time each moment has its determinateness as an insuperable validity and a fixed actuality over against the other. Thinking fixes this difference in the most universal way through the absolute opposition of *good* and *bad*, which flee each other and can in no way become the same. But this fixed being has as its soul the immediate transition into its opposite. Existence is rather the inversion of every determinateness into its opposite, and only this alienation is the essence and preservation of the whole. It is this actualizing movement and inspiriting of the moments that we must now consider. Alienation will alienate itself, and through this the whole will take itself back into its concept.

492 First, the simple substance itself is to be considered in the immediate organization of its existing moments, which are not yet inspirited.—Nature lays itself out into the universal elements. Among these, *air* is the *abiding*, purely universal, transparent essence; water is the essence that is always *sacrificed*; *fire*

is their *animating* unity, which always dissolves their opposition just as it divides their simplicity into that opposition; *earth*, finally, is the *firm knot* of this articulation and the *subject* of these essences as of their process, their going forth and their return. In just the same way, the inner *essence*, or the simple spirit of self-conscious actuality, lays itself out as a world into masses that are likewise universal, but spiritual: into the *first* mass, the spiritual essence that is *universal in itself* and *equal to itself*; — into the second, the essence that is *for itself*, that has become *unequal* within itself, that *sacrifices* itself and *surrenders* itself; and into the *third*, which, as self-consciousness, is subject and has the force of fire immediately in itself. In the first essence, self-consciousness is conscious of itself as *being-in-itself*; in the second, it has the becoming of *being-for-self* through the sacrifice of the universal. Spirit itself, however, is the being-*in*-and-*for*-itself of the whole. It *divides* itself into the substance as abiding and the substance as self-sacrificing, and equally *takes* the substance *back* again into its unity—both as the flame that breaks out and consumes the substance, and as the substance's abiding shape.— We see that these essences correspond to the community and the family of the ethical world, but without possessing the homely spirit that these have. On the other hand, whereas fate is alien to that homely spirit, here self-consciousness is, and knows itself to be, the actual power of these essences.

These members are to be considered both as they are first represented within pure consciousness, as *thoughts* or as essences that are *in themselves*, and as they are represented in actual consciousness, as *objective* essences.— [493] In that form of simplicity, the first, as the essence *that is equal to itself*, the immediate and unchangeable *essence* of all consciousness, is the *good*—the independent spiritual power of the *in-itself*, beside which the movement of consciousness that is for itself merely plays incidentally. The other, by contrast, is the *passive* spiritual essence, or the universal insofar as it gives itself up and lets individuals take from it the consciousness of their singularity; it is the null essence, the *bad*. — This absolute being-dissolved of

the essence is itself abiding. The first essence is the foundation, starting point and result of individuals, and in it they are purely universal. The second, by contrast, is on the one hand the self-sacrificing *being-for-another*, and on the other hand, for that very reason, the individuals' constant return to themselves as the *singular*, and their abiding *becoming-for-self*.

STATE POWER AND WEALTH

Good and bad take actual shape as state power and wealth, each proving the opposite of itself.

494 But these simple *thoughts* of good and bad are just as immediately alienated from themselves; they are *actual*, and they exist in actual consciousness as *objective* moments. Thus the first essence is *state power*, the other is *wealth*.—State power is both the simple *substance* and the universal *work*. It is the absolute *matter itself*, in which the *essence* of individuals is expressed for them, and in which their singularity is simply only consciousness of their *universality*. It is equally the work and the simple *result* in which the fact that it proceeds from their *doing* vanishes; it remains the absolute foundation and subsistence of all their doing.—Through this determination of its unchangeable self-equality, this *simple*, ethereal substance of their life is *being*, and therefore only *being-for-another*. State power is therefore, in itself, immediately the opposite of itself: *wealth*. Although wealth is the passive or null, it is likewise a universal spiritual essence. It is just as much the constantly *becoming result* of the *labor* and *doing of all* as it dissolves again into the *enjoyment* of all. In enjoyment individuality does become *for itself*, or *singular*; but this enjoyment is itself the result of universal doing, just as it in turn brings forth universal labor and the enjoyment of all. The *actual* has simply the spiritual meaning of being immediately universal. In this moment, to be sure, each individual thinks that he acts *self-interestedly*; for it is the moment in which he gives himself the consciousness of being for himself, and for that reason he does not take it for something spiritual. Yet even

when it is regarded merely externally, it becomes evident that in his enjoyment each gives all others something to enjoy, and in his labor works as much for all as for himself, while all work for him. His *being-for-self* is therefore in itself *universal*, and self-interest is something merely meant: it cannot manage to make actual what it means, namely to do something that would not benefit all.

[495] In these two spiritual powers, then, self-consciousness knows its substance, content and purpose; it beholds its twofold essence in them—in the one its *being-in-itself*, in the other its *being-for-self*.—At the same time, however, as spirit, it is the negative *unity* of their subsistence and of the separation of individuality and the universal, or of actuality and the self. Dominion and wealth are therefore present for the individual as objects, that is, as objects from which it knows itself to be *free*, and between which it believes it can choose, or even choose neither. As this free and *pure* consciousness, it stands over against the essence as something that is only *for it*. It then has the essence as *essence* within itself. — In this pure consciousness the moments of the substance are for it not state power and wealth, but the thoughts of *good* and *bad*.—Self-consciousness, moreover, is the relation of its pure consciousness to its actual consciousness, of what is thought to the objective essence; it is essentially *judgment*.—It is true that, for the two sides of the actual essence, it has already emerged from their immediate determinations which is the good and which the bad: the former is state power, the latter wealth. But this first judgment cannot be regarded as a spiritual judgment. For in it one side has been determined only as what is *in itself*, or the positive, and the other only as what is *for itself*, and the negative. But as spiritual essences, each of them is the interpenetration of both moments, and so is not exhausted by those determinations. And the self-consciousness that relates itself to them is *in* and *for itself*. It must therefore relate to each of them in both ways, and in this way their nature—to be determinations alienated from themselves—will come to light.

[496] Now, for self-consciousness, that object is *good* and *in itself* in which it finds itself, and that object is bad in which it finds its opposite. The *good* is the *equality* of objective reality with self-consciousness; the *bad* is their *inequality*. At the same time, what is good and bad *for it* is good and bad *in itself*. For self-consciousness is precisely that in which these two moments, being *in itself* and being *for it*, are the same. It is the actual spirit of the objective essences, and the judgment is the proof of its power over them, a power that *makes* them into what they are *in themselves*. Their criterion and their truth is not how they are, immediately in themselves, the *equal* or the *unequal*, that is, abstract being-in-itself or being-for-self; it is what they are in spirit's relation to them, their equality or inequality with spirit. At first they are posited as *objects*, and they become the *in-itself through spirit*. Spirit's *relation* to them therefore becomes at the same time their *reflection into themselves*, through which they receive actual spiritual being and *their spirit* comes forth. But just as their first *immediate determination* differs from spirit's *relation* to them, so the third—their own spirit—will also differ from the second. — To begin with, their *second in-itself*, which comes forth through spirit's relation to them, must already turn out differently from the *immediate* one. For this *mediation* by spirit rather sets the *immediate* determinateness in motion and makes it into something other.

[497] Accordingly, consciousness that is *in* and *for itself* does find in *state power* its *simple essence* and *subsistence* in general, but not its *individuality* as such; it finds its *in-itself*, but not its *being-for-self*. Rather, it finds there its doing, as single doing, disowned and subjugated to obedience. Before this power, therefore, the individual reflects itself into itself; state power is for it the oppressive essence, and the *bad*. For instead of being what is equal to individuality, it is what is utterly unequal to it.—Wealth, on the other hand, is the *good*: it aims at universal enjoyment, gives itself away, and procures for all the consciousness of their self. Wealth is *in itself* universal beneficence. If it withholds some benefit and does not oblige every need, this is a contin-

gency that does no harm to its universal and necessary essence, which is to impart itself to all individuals and to be a giver with a thousand hands.

[498] These two judgments give the thoughts of good and bad a content that is the opposite of the one they had for us.—But so far self-consciousness has related itself to its objects only incompletely, namely only by the standard of *being-for-self*. Yet consciousness is equally an essence that is *in itself*, and it must likewise make this side its standard; only thereby is the spiritual judgment completed. On this side, *state power* expresses its *essence* for it. State power is partly law at rest, partly government and command, which orders the single movements of universal doing: the one is the simple substance itself, the other its activity, which animates and maintains both itself and all. The individual thus finds its ground and essence expressed, organized and put into action in state power. — Through the enjoyment of *wealth*, on the other hand, it does not experience its universal essence. It receives only the *transitory* consciousness and enjoyment of itself as a singularity that is for itself, and of its *inequality* with its essence.—Here, then, the concepts of good and bad receive a content opposite to the previous one.

NOBLE AND BASE CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness that finds itself equal to state power and wealth is noble; the unequal one is base.

[499] Each of these two ways of judging finds an *equality* and an *inequality*. The first judging consciousness finds state power *unequal* to it and the enjoyment of wealth *equal*; the second, by contrast, finds the former equal to it and the latter *unequal*. There is a twofold *finding-equal* and a twofold *finding-unequal*, an opposite relation to the two real essentialities.—We must ourselves judge this differing judging, and to do so we must apply the standard that has been set up. According to it, the relation of consciousness that *finds equality* is the *good*, and the relation that finds inequality is the *bad*; and these two modes of rela-

tion are now themselves to be held fast as *different shapes of consciousness*. By behaving in different ways, consciousness itself comes under the determination of difference, of being good or bad. This is not according to whether it had *being-for-self* or pure *being-in-itself* as its principle, for both are equally essential moments. The twofold judging that was considered presented the principles separately, and therefore contains only *abstract* modes of *judging*. Actual consciousness has both principles in it, and the difference falls solely within its *essence*, namely in the *relation* of itself to the real.

500 This relation takes opposite forms: the one is a relating to state power and wealth as to something *equal*, the other as to something *unequal*.—The consciousness of the relation that finds equality is the *noble* consciousness. In the public power it regards what is equal to itself: it has in this power its *simple essence* and the putting into action of that essence, and it stands in the service of actual obedience as well as of inner respect toward it. It regards wealth likewise, because wealth procures for it the consciousness of its other essential side, *being-for-self*. It therefore likewise regards wealth as *essence* in relation to itself, recognizes the one from whom it receives its enjoyment as a benefactor, and holds itself obliged to gratitude.

501 The consciousness of the other relation, by contrast, is the *base* consciousness, which holds fast to its *inequality* with the two essentialities. In sovereign power, therefore, it sees a fetter and an oppression of *being-for-self*; so it hates the ruler, obeys only with secret malice, and is always on the point of revolt. In wealth, through which it attains the enjoyment of its being-for-self, it likewise sees only inequality, namely inequality with the abiding *essence*. Since through wealth it arrives only at the consciousness of singularity and of transitory enjoyment, it loves wealth but despises it; and with the vanishing of enjoyment, which is in itself vanishing, it regards its relationship to the rich man as having vanished too.

502 These relations at first express only the *judgment*: the determination of what the two essences are as *objects* for con-

sciousness, not yet of what they are *in* and *for themselves*. The reflection presented in the judgment is, on the one hand, at first only *for us* a positing of the one determination as well as of the other, and hence an equal sublation of both; it is not yet their reflection for consciousness itself. On the other hand, the two essences at first only *are* immediately *essences*: they have neither *become* this, nor do they have *self*-consciousness in them. That for which they are is not yet what animates them; they are predicates that are not yet themselves subject. Because of this separation, the whole of spiritual judging also still falls apart into two consciousnesses, each of which lies under a one-sided determination. — The two sides of alienation were at first *indifferent* to each other: the one side being the *in-itself* of pure consciousness, namely the determinate *thoughts* of good and bad, the other their *existence* as state power and wealth. Just as this indifference first raised itself to the relation of the two, to *judgment*, so this external relation must raise itself to inner unity, that is, into the relation of thinking to actuality; and the spirit of the two shapes of judgment must come forth. This happens when the *judgment* becomes a *syllogism*, the mediating movement in which the necessity and the middle term of the two sides of the judgment come forth.

FROM SERVICE TO FLATTERY

The noble consciousness serves the state, and its silent heroism turns into the heroism of flattery.

503 In the judgment, then, the noble consciousness finds itself over against state power in such a way that state power is not yet a self, but only the universal substance. Yet the noble consciousness is conscious of this substance as its *essence*, as its purpose and absolute content. Relating itself positively to state power in this way, it relates negatively to its own purposes, its particular content and existence, and lets them vanish. It is the heroism of *service*—the *virtue* that sacrifices singular being to the universal and thereby brings the universal into existence—the *person* who

of his own accord renounces possession and enjoyment, and who acts, and is actual, for the power that exists.

504 Through this movement the universal is joined together with existence in general, just as the existent consciousness forms itself into essentiality through this externalization. What this consciousness alienates in service is its consciousness sunk in existence; but the *being* that is alienated is the *in-itself*. Through this culture, therefore, it gains respect for itself and in the eyes of others.—State power, however, which was at first only the *thought* universal, the *in-itself*, becomes through this very movement the universal that *is*, actual power. It is actual power only in the actual obedience that it obtains through self-consciousness's *judgment* that it is the *essence*, and through self-consciousness's free sacrifice. This doing, which joins essence together with the self, brings forth a *twofold* actuality: itself as that which has *true* actuality, and state power as the *true*, which *counts*.

505 Through this alienation, however, state power is not yet a self-consciousness that knows itself as state power. What is valid is only its *law*, or its *in-itself*; it has as yet no *particular will*. For the serving self-consciousness has not yet externalized its pure self and thereby inspirited state power with it; so far it has done this only with its being. It has sacrificed to state power only its *existence*, not its being-*in-itself*.—This self-consciousness counts as one that conforms to the *essence*; it is recognized for the sake of its *being-in-itself*. In it the others find their *essence* put into action, but not their being-for-self; their thinking or pure consciousness is fulfilled, but not their individuality. It therefore counts in their *thoughts*, and enjoys *honor*. It is the *proud* vassal. He is active on behalf of state power insofar as that power is not its own will but an *essential* will. He counts in his own eyes only in this *honor*, only in the *essential* representation of general opinion, not in the *grateful* representation of individuality, for he has not helped individuality to its *being-for-self*. His *language*, if it were related to the state power's own will, which has not yet

come into being, would be the *counsel* he gives for the general good.

[506] State power is therefore still without a will of its own in the face of counsel, and does not decide between the various opinions about the general good. It is not yet *government*, and thus not yet, in truth, actual state power.—The *being-for-self*, the *will* that has not yet been sacrificed as will, is the inner, withdrawn spirit of the estates. Over against its talk of the *general* good, this spirit keeps its *particular* good in reserve for itself, and it is inclined to make this chatter about the general good a substitute for action. The sacrifice of existence that takes place in service is indeed complete when it has gone as far as death. But the danger of death, once endured and survived, leaves behind a determinate existence and with it a *particular for-itself*. This for-itself makes the counsel for the general good ambiguous and suspect, and in fact keeps its own opinion and its particular will in reserve against the authority of the state. It therefore still stands in an unequal relation to that authority, and falls under the determination of base consciousness: that of always being on the point of rebellion.

[507] This contradiction, which being-for-self has to sublate, has the form of standing in inequality to the universality of state power. But it also contains another form: the externalization of existence, in completing itself (namely in death), is itself an externalization that merely *is*, not one that returns into consciousness. Consciousness does not survive it and exist *in* and *for itself*; it only passes over into its unreconciled opposite. The true sacrifice of *being-for-self* is therefore solely the one in which it gives itself up as completely as in death, yet in this externalization equally preserves itself. It thereby becomes actual as what it is in itself: as the identical unity of itself and of itself as its opposite. Because the withdrawn inner spirit, the self as such, steps forth and alienates itself, state power is at the same time raised to a self of its own. Without this alienation, the deeds of honor of the noble consciousness and the counsels of its insight

would remain ambiguous; they would still harbor that withdrawn, hidden reserve of particular intention and self-will.

LANGUAGE AS ALIENATION

Language is the existence of the pure self; through it the self alienates itself and exists for others.

508 This alienation, however, takes place solely in *language*, which here appears in its distinctive significance.—In the world of ethical life language is *law* and *command*; in the world of actuality it is at first *counsel*. There it has the *essence* for its content and is the form of that essence. Here, however, it takes the form that it itself is as its content, and counts as *language*. It is the force of speaking as such that accomplishes what has to be accomplished. For language is the *existence* of the pure self as self; in it the *singularity* of self-consciousness, *existing for itself*, enters existence as such, so that it is *for others*. *I*, as this *pure* I, is not otherwise *there*. In every other expression it is sunk in an actuality, in a shape from which it can withdraw. From its action, as from its physiognomic expression, it is reflected back into itself, and leaves such incomplete existence lying there soulless—an existence in which there is always as much too much as too little. Language, however, contains the I in its purity; it alone speaks the *I*, the I itself. This *existence* of the I is, as *existence*, an objectivity that has the I's true nature in it. *I* is *this* I—but equally the *universal* I. Its appearing is just as immediately the externalization and vanishing of *this* I, and thereby its remaining in its universality. The *I* that expresses itself is *heard*. It is a contagion in which it has immediately passed over into unity with those for whom it is there, and is universal self-consciousness.—In its being *heard*, its *existence* itself has immediately *died away*; this otherness of it has been taken back into itself. And precisely this is its existence: as a self-conscious *now*, as it is there, not to be there, and through this vanishing to be there. This vanishing is thus itself immediately its remaining. It is its own knowing of itself, and its knowing of itself as some-

thing that has passed over into another self, that has been heard and is universal.

509 Spirit acquires this actuality here because the extremes whose *unity* it is have just as immediately the determination of being actualities of their own, each for itself. Their unity is broken up into rigid sides, each of which is, for the other, an actual object excluded from it. The unity therefore emerges as a *middle*, which is excluded and distinguished from the separated actuality of the sides. It therefore has itself an actual objectivity distinguished from its sides, and is *for them*; that is, it is something existent. *Spiritual substance* as such enters existence only when it has gained, as its sides, self-consciousnesses of such a kind that they know this pure self as an actuality that is *immediately valid*, and in this know just as immediately that they are this only through alienating *mediation*. Through the former, the moments are purified into the self-knowing category, and thereby to the point of being moments of spirit; through the latter, spirit enters existence as spirituality.—Spirit is thus the middle, which presupposes those extremes and is generated by their existence. But it is equally the spiritual whole breaking forth between them, which divides itself into them and, through this contact, first generates each into the whole in its principle. —That the two extremes are already sublated and broken up *in themselves* produces their unity; and this unity is the movement that joins the two together, exchanges their determinations, and joins them together—and indeed *in each extreme*. This mediation thus posits the *concept* of each of the two extremes in its actuality; in other words, it makes what each is *in itself* into its *spirit*.

510 The two extremes, state power and noble consciousness, are broken up by this. State power is broken up into the abstract universal that is obeyed, and into the will that exists for itself but does not yet belong to that universal itself. Noble consciousness is broken up into the obedience of sublated existence, or the *being-in-itself* of self-respect and honor, and into pure being-for-self not yet sublated, the will that still remains in reserve. The two moments to which both sides are purified, and which

are therefore moments of language, are the *abstract universal*, which is called the general good, and the *pure self*, which in service renounced its consciousness sunk in manifold existence. In the concept the two are the same, for the pure self is precisely the abstractly universal; their unity is therefore posited as their middle. But the *self* is at first actual only at the extreme of consciousness, while the *in-itself* is actual only at the extreme of state power. What consciousness lacks is that state power should have passed over to it not merely as *honor* but actually. What state power lacks is that it should be obeyed not merely as the so-called *general good* but as will—that is, that it should be the deciding self. The unity of the concept, in which state power still stands and to which consciousness has purified itself, becomes actual in this *mediating movement*, whose simple existence, as *middle*, is language. — Language, however, does not yet have as its sides two selves present as *selves*; for state power is only now being inspirited into a self. This language is therefore not yet spirit as it completely knows and expresses itself.

511 Because noble consciousness is the extreme of the self, it appears as that from which *language* proceeds—the language through which the sides of the relationship take shape as ensouled wholes.—The heroism of silent service becomes the *heroism* of *flattery*. This speaking reflection of service constitutes the spiritual middle that breaks itself up. It reflects not only its own extreme into itself, but also reflects the extreme of universal power back into this very self; and it makes that power, which is at first only *in itself*, into *being-for-self* and into the singularity of self-consciousness. The spirit of this power thereby becomes: to be an *unlimited monarch*.—*Unlimited*: the language of flattery raises power into its purified *universality*; this moment, as the product of language, of existence purified into spirit, is a purified self-equality.—*Monarch*: language likewise raises *singularity* to its peak. What noble consciousness externalizes on this side of simple spiritual unity is the pure *in-itself of its thinking*, its I itself. More precisely, language raises singularity, which is otherwise only something *meant*, into its existent purity by giving

the monarch his proper *name*. For it is in the name alone that the *difference* of the individual from all others is not merely *meant* but is actually made by all. In the name the individual *counts* as a pure individual no longer only in his own consciousness but in the consciousness of all. Through the name, then, the monarch is absolutely set apart from all, exempted, and solitary; in it he is the atom that can communicate nothing of its essence and has no equal.—This name is thus the reflection into itself, or the *actuality*, that universal power has *in itself*; through the name it is the *monarch*. Conversely, he, *this individual*, knows *himself, this individual*, to be universal power, because the nobles place themselves around the throne not only as ready to serve state power but as *ornaments*, and because they are always *telling* the one who sits on it what he *is*.

512 The language of their praise is in this way the spirit that joins the two extremes together within *state power itself*. It reflects abstract power into itself and gives it the moment of the other extreme—willing and deciding *being-for-self*—and thereby self-conscious existence. Or: through this, this *singular, actual* self-consciousness comes to *know itself with certainty* as the power. It is the point of the self into which the many points have flowed together through the externalization of *inner certainty*. — But since this spirit proper to state power consists in having its actuality and nourishment in the sacrifice of the doing and thinking of noble consciousness, state power is *independence alienated from itself*. Noble consciousness, the extreme of *being-for-self*, receives back the extreme of *actual universality* in return for the universality of thinking that it externalized; the power of the state has *passed over* to it. It is only in noble consciousness that state authority is truly put into action; in its *being-for-self*, state authority ceases to be the *inert essence* it appeared to be as the extreme of abstract being-in-itself.—Considered *in itself*, *state power reflected into itself*, or the fact that it has become spirit, means nothing other than that it has become a *moment* of *self-consciousness*, that is, that it exists only as *sublated*. State power is now, then, the essence as one whose spirit it is to be sacrificed

and abandoned; in other words, it exists as *wealth*.—It does indeed at the same time remain standing as an actuality over against wealth, into which, according to its concept, it is always turning. But it is an actuality whose concept is precisely this movement: through the service and veneration by which it comes to be, to pass over into its opposite, into the externalization of power. For itself, therefore, the distinctive *self* that is its will becomes, through noble consciousness casting itself away, a universality that externalizes itself—a complete singularity and contingency, abandoned to every more powerful will. What remains to it of *universally* recognized and incommunicable independence is the empty name.

513 If, then, noble consciousness determined itself as that which related itself to universal power in an *equal* way, its truth is rather this: in its service it keeps its own being-for-self for itself, while in the genuine renunciation of its personality it is the actual sublation and tearing apart of universal substance. Its spirit is the relationship of complete inequality. On the one hand, it keeps its will in its honor. On the other hand, in giving up that will, it partly alienates itself from its inner self and becomes the highest inequality with itself, and partly subjects universal substance to itself and makes that substance completely unequal to itself. — It is evident that the determinateness it had in *judgment* against what was called base consciousness has thereby disappeared, and with it base consciousness too. The latter has achieved its purpose, namely to bring universal power under being-for-self.

WEALTH AND ITS CLIENT

Wealth dispenses selfhood as a benefit, and the client answers with abjection and rebellion.

514 Enriched in this way by universal power, self-consciousness exists as *universal beneficence*; or universal power is *wealth*, which is itself in turn an object for consciousness. For wealth is, for consciousness, the universal that has indeed been subjug-

ated, but that through this first sublation has not yet returned absolutely into the self.—The *self* does not yet have *itself as self* for its object, but the *sublated universal essence*. Since wealth has only just come into being, what is posited is the *immediate* relation of consciousness to it—a consciousness that has therefore not yet displayed its inequality with wealth. This is noble consciousness, which receives its being-for-self from the universal that has become inessential, and therefore recognizes wealth and is grateful to the benefactor.

[515] Wealth already has in it the moment of being-for-self. It is not the selfless universal of state power, nor the ingenuous inorganic nature of spirit; it is that nature as it holds fast to itself, through will, against anyone who wants to seize it for enjoyment. But since wealth has only the form of essence, this one-sided being-for-self—which is not *in itself* but rather the sublated in-itself—is the individual's return into itself, a return devoid of essence in its enjoyment. Wealth therefore itself needs to be brought to life. The movement of its reflection consists in this: that wealth, which is only for itself, should become *being-in-and-for-itself*, and that wealth, which is sublated essence, should become essence. In this way it acquires its own spirit in itself. — [516] Since the form of this movement was set out earlier, it is enough here to determine its content.

Here, then, noble consciousness does not relate itself to the object as essence in general; rather, what is alien to it is *being-for-self* itself. It *finds* its self as such *already there*, alienated, as an objective, fixed actuality that it has to receive from another fixed being-for-self. Its object is being-for-self, and so its *own*. But because it is an object, it is at the same time immediately an alien actuality, which is a being-for-self of its own, a will of its own. That is, consciousness sees its self in the power of an alien will, and it depends on that will whether it chooses to let consciousness have its self.

[517] Self-consciousness can abstract from any single aspect, and therefore, in an obligation concerning such an aspect, it retains its being recognized and its *validity in itself* as an essence

existing for itself. Here, however, it sees itself, on the side of its pure, innermost *actuality*, or of its I, as outside itself and belonging to another. It sees its *personality* as such dependent on the contingent personality of another, on the chance of a moment, on caprice, or on some other utterly indifferent circumstance.—In the condition of right, what is in the power of the objective essence appears as a *contingent content* from which one can abstract; that power does not affect the *self* as *such*—rather, the self is recognized. Here, however, the self sees the certainty of itself as such to be the most essenceless thing of all, and pure personality to be absolute impersonality. The spirit of its gratitude is therefore the feeling both of this deepest abjection and of the deepest rebellion. Since the pure I itself beholds itself outside itself and torn apart, in this disruption everything that has continuity and universality—everything called law, good, and right—has at the same time fallen apart and gone to ruin. Everything equal has been dissolved, for what is present is the *purest inequality*: the absolute inessentiality of the absolutely essential, the being-outside-itself of being-for-self. The pure I itself is absolutely broken apart.

[518] So if this consciousness does indeed receive back from wealth the objectivity of being-for-self, and sublates it, then this reflection is not only incomplete according to its concept, like the preceding reflection, but unsatisfied for consciousness itself. Since the self receives itself as something objective, this reflection is the immediate contradiction posited in the pure I itself. As self, however, it stands at the same time immediately above this contradiction. It is the absolute elasticity that sublates this sublatedness of the self in turn, that rejects this abjection—its being-for-self becoming something alien to it—and that, rebelling against this receiving of itself, is *for itself* in the very act of *receiving*.

[519] Since, then, the relationship of this consciousness is bound up with this absolute disruption, the distinction in its spirit between being determined as noble and as *base* falls away, and both are the same.—The spirit of beneficent wealth can, further,

be distinguished from the spirit of the consciousness that receives the benefaction, and must be considered separately.—Wealth was being-for-self devoid of essence, the essence abandoned. Through imparting itself, however, it becomes the *in-itself*. In fulfilling its determination to sacrifice itself, it sublates the singularity of enjoying only for itself; and as sublated singularity it is *universality* or *essence*.—What it imparts, what it gives to others, is *being-for-self*. But it does not give itself as a selfless nature, as the condition of life that ingenuously gives itself away. It gives itself as a self-conscious essence that holds itself for itself. It is not the inorganic power of the element, which the receiving consciousness knows to be perishable in itself; it is power over the self, a power that knows itself to be *independent* and *arbitrary*, and that knows at the same time that what it dispenses is the self of another.—Wealth thus shares abjection with the client, but in place of rebellion comes arrogance. For on the one side it knows, as the client does, that *being-for-self* is a contingent *thing*; but it is itself this contingency, in whose power personality stands. In this arrogance, which fancies that by means of a meal it has acquired another's I-self and thereby won the submission of that other's innermost essence, wealth overlooks the other's inner rebellion. It overlooks the complete casting-off of all fetters, this pure disruption. Since the *self-equality* of being-for-self has become utterly unequal to this disruption, everything equal, everything that endures, has been torn apart for it; and it therefore tears apart most of all the opinion and outlook of the benefactor. Wealth stands immediately before this innermost abyss, before this bottomless depth in which all support and substance have vanished; and in this depth it sees nothing but a common thing, a plaything of its mood, an accident of its caprice. Its spirit is to be wholly essenceless opinion, the surface forsaken by spirit.

THE LANGUAGE OF DISRUPTION

The disrupted consciousness sees through every value and wittily expresses the inversion of all things.

[520] Just as self-consciousness had its language in relation to state power—or as spirit emerged as the actual middle between these extremes—so too it has language in relation to wealth; but still more does its rebellion have its language. The language that gives wealth the consciousness of its essentiality, and thereby takes possession of it, is likewise the language of flattery, but of ignoble flattery; for what it pronounces as essence it knows to be the essence that has been abandoned, that is not *in itself*. The language of flattery, however, is, as already noted, spirit that is still one-sided. For its moments are indeed the *self*, purified to pure existence through the culture of service, and the *being-in-itself* of power. But the pure concept, in which the simple *self* and the *in-itself*—that pure I and this pure essence or thinking—are the same, this unity of the two sides between which the interaction takes place, is not in the consciousness of this language. For this consciousness, the object is still the *in-itself* in opposition to the self; or the *object* is not at the same time its own *self* as such. — [521] The language of disruption, however, is the perfect language and the true existing spirit of this whole world of culture. This self-consciousness, to which belongs the rebellion that rejects its own abjection, is immediately absolute self-equality in absolute disruption, the pure mediation of pure self-consciousness with itself. It is the equality of the identical judgment, in which one and the same personality is both subject and predicate. But this identical judgment is at the same time the infinite judgment; for this personality is absolutely split in two, and subject and predicate are utterly *indifferent beings* that have nothing to do with each other, without necessary unity—so much so that each is the power of a personality of its own. *Being-for-self* has *its being-for-self* for its object, as something utterly *other* and at the same time just as immediately as *itself*. It has

itself as an other—not in the sense that this other has a different content, but in the sense that the content is the same self in the form of absolute opposition and of a completely indifferent existence of its own.—Here, then, we have the spirit of this real world of culture, *conscious* of itself in its truth and of its *concept*.

This spirit is this absolute and universal inversion and alienation of actuality and of thought: *pure culture*. What is experienced in this world is that neither the *actual essences* of power and wealth, nor their determinate *concepts*, good and bad, nor the consciousness of good and bad—noble and base consciousness—have truth. Rather, all these moments invert themselves, each into the other, and each is the opposite of itself.—Universal power, which is the *substance*, attains a spirituality of its own through the principle of individuality; but it receives its own self only as the name attached to it, and, in being *actual* power, it is rather the powerless essence that sacrifices itself. — But this abandoned, selfless essence, or the self that has become a thing, is rather the return of essence into itself; it is *being-for-self that is for itself*, the existence of spirit.—The *thoughts* of these essences, of *good* and *bad*, are likewise inverted in this movement: what is determined as good is bad, and what is determined as bad is good. The forms of consciousness of each of these moments, judged as noble and as base consciousness, are in their truth rather just as much the inversion of what these determinations are supposed to be. The noble is just as base and abject as abjection turns into the nobility of the most cultivated freedom of self-consciousness. — Considered formally, everything is likewise, *outwardly*, the inversion of what it is *for itself*. And again, what it is for itself it is not in truth, but something other than what it wants to be: being-for-self is rather the loss of itself, and its alienation from itself is rather self-preservation.—What is present, then, is this: all the moments exercise a universal justice upon one another; each alienates itself in itself just as much as it forms itself into its opposite and in this way inverts that opposite.—True spirit, however, is precisely this unity of what is absolutely separated; and indeed it comes into

existence as their middle precisely through the *free actuality* of these *selfless* extremes themselves. Its existence is universal *talk* and disruptive *judging*, in which all those moments that are supposed to count as essences and actual members of the whole dissolve; and this judging is equally the game of dissolving itself that it plays with itself. This judging and talking is therefore what is true and invincible, while it overpowers everything; it is what *alone truly* matters in this real world. Through it every part of this world gets to have its spirit expressed, or to be spoken of with spirit and told what it is.—Honest consciousness takes each moment as an abiding essentiality, and is the uncultured thoughtlessness of not knowing that it is just as much doing the inverse. The disrupted consciousness, however, is the consciousness of inversion—indeed of absolute inversion. The concept is what rules in it: the concept that brings together thoughts which, for honesty, lie far apart. Its language is therefore witty.[2]

522 The content of what spirit says of and about itself is thus the inversion of all concepts and realities, the universal deception of itself and of others; and for that very reason the shamelessness of stating this deception is the greatest truth. This talk is the derangement of the musician "who heaped up and mixed together thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of every kind of character; now with a deep bass he descended into hell, then he tightened his throat and with a falsetto tore apart the heights of the air, by turns raging, soothed, imperious, and mocking."—To the calm consciousness, which honestly sets the melody of the good and the true in the equality of tones, that is, in a single note, this talk appears as "a farrago of wisdom and madness, a medley of as much skill as baseness, of ideas as correct as they are false, of so complete a perversion of feeling, of such utter shamefulness, as of total openness and truth. It will not be able to refrain from entering into all these tones, and from running up and down the whole scale of feelings, from the

2 "Witty" renders geistreich, literally "rich in spirit" (Geist); Hegel plays on the word throughout this passage.

deepest contempt and rejection to the highest admiration and emotion; into these a ridiculous streak will be blended that robs them of their nature." Those others will have, in their very openness, a reconciling trait, and in their shattering depth the all-powerful trait that gives spirit to itself.

523 If, over against the talk of this confusion that is clear to itself, we consider the talk of that *simple consciousness* of the true and the good, it can only be monosyllabic compared with the open and self-aware eloquence of the spirit of culture. For simple consciousness can tell that spirit nothing it does not itself know and say. If simple consciousness goes beyond its monosyllables, it therefore says the same thing that spirit pronounces, but in doing so it commits the further folly of supposing that it is saying something new and different. Even its syllables, *shameful, base*, are already this folly, for spirit says them of itself. Suppose this spirit in its talk inverts everything monotonous, because what is thus equal to itself is only an abstraction and in its actuality is inversion in itself. Suppose, on the other hand, the straightforward consciousness takes under its protection the good and the noble—that is, what keeps itself equal in its expression—in the only way possible here, namely by saying that it does not lose its value because it is *linked* with the bad or *mixed* with it, since that is its *condition* and *necessity*, and in this consists the *wisdom* of nature. Then this consciousness, supposing that it was contradicting, has merely summed up the content of spirit's talk in a trivial way. This trivial way, by making the *opposite* of the noble and good into the *condition* and *necessity* of the noble and good, thoughtlessly supposes it is saying something other than this: that what is called noble and good is in its essence the inversion of itself, just as the bad, conversely, is the excellent.

524 Simple consciousness may replace this spiritless *thought* with the *actuality* of the excellent, presenting it in the *example* of a fictional case, or even of a true anecdote, and so showing that the excellent is not an empty name but *exists*. Then the *universal* actuality of inverted doing stands against it: the whole real

world, in which that example amounts only to something wholly isolated, an *espèce* [a mere specimen]. And to present the existence of the good and noble as an individual anecdote, whether fictional or true, is the bitterest thing that can be said of it. — If, finally, simple consciousness demands the dissolution of this whole world of inversion, it cannot demand of the *individual* that he withdraw from it. For Diogenes in his tub is conditioned by that world, and the demand made on the single individual is precisely what counts as bad, namely to care for oneself *for oneself* as a *single individual*.[3] But directed at universal *individuality*, the demand for this withdrawal cannot mean that reason should give up again the spiritual, cultured consciousness it has attained, sink the widespread wealth of its moments back into the simplicity of the natural heart, and relapse into the wildness and proximity of animal consciousness, which is called nature, and also innocence. Rather, the demand for this dissolution can be addressed only to the *spirit* of culture itself: that it return to itself out of its confusion as *spirit*, and gain a still higher consciousness.

525 In fact, however, spirit has already accomplished this in itself. The disruption of consciousness, conscious of itself and expressing itself, is scornful laughter at existence, as well as at the confusion of the whole and at itself; it is at the same time the dying away of this whole confusion, a dying away that still hears itself.—This vanity of all actuality and of every determinate concept, a vanity that hears itself, is the double reflection of the real world into itself: once in *this self* of consciousness, as *this* self; and again in its pure *universality*, or in thinking. On the first side, the spirit that has come to itself has turned its gaze into the world of actuality, and still has that world as its purpose and immediate content. On the other side, its gaze is partly turned only into itself and negative toward that world, and partly turned away from it toward heaven, so that the beyond of that world is its object.

3 Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412–323 BC), the Cynic philosopher who flouted social convention and was said to live in a large storage jar.

[526] On that first side of the return into the self, the *vanity* of all *things* is its *own vanity*; that is, the self *is* vain. It is the self existing for itself, which knows not only how to judge everything and chatter about everything, but how to express wittily, in their *contradiction*, the fixed essences of actuality as well as the fixed determinations that judgment posits; and this contradiction is their truth.—Considered according to its form, it knows everything as alienated from itself: *being-for-self* separated from *being-in-itself*, what is meant and the purpose separated from the truth, and, separated again from both, *being-for-another*, what is professed separated from the real meaning and the true matter and intention. — It thus knows how to express correctly each moment in opposition to the other—in general, the inversion of all; it knows better what each is than each is, however it may be determined. Since it knows the substantial by the side of the *discord* and *conflict* that the substantial unites within itself, but not by the side of this unity, it understands very well how to *judge* the substantial, but has lost the ability to *grasp* it.—This vanity, moreover, needs the vanity of all things in order to give itself, from them, the consciousness of the self; it therefore produces that vanity itself, and is the soul that sustains it. Power and wealth are the highest ends of its exertion. It knows that through renunciation and sacrifice it forms itself into the universal, attains possession of it, and in this possession has universal validity; power and wealth are the actual, recognized powers. But this validity of its own is itself vain. Precisely in taking possession of them, it knows them not to be self-subsistent essences; rather, it knows itself as their power, and them as vain. That in possessing them it thus stands outside them, it presents in witty language, which is therefore its highest interest and the truth of the whole. In this language, *this* self—as this pure self belonging neither to actual nor to thought determinations—becomes for itself a spiritual self, of truly universal validity. It *is* the self-disrupting nature of all relationships and the conscious disrupting of them. But only as rebellious self-consciousness does it know its own disruption, and in this

knowing of it, it has immediately raised itself above it. In that vanity all content becomes something negative, which can no longer be grasped positively. The positive object is only the *pure I itself*; and the disrupted consciousness is *in itself* this pure self-equality of self-consciousness that has returned to itself.

B. FAITH AND PURE INSIGHT

Beyond the world of culture rises the world of pure consciousness, split into faith and pure insight.

527 The spirit of self-alienation has its existence in the world of culture. But since this whole has become alienated from itself, beyond it stands the non-actual world of *pure consciousness*, or of *thinking*. Its content is what is purely thought; thinking is its absolute element. But since thinking is at first the *element* of this world, consciousness only *has* these thoughts; it does not yet *think* them, or does not know that they are thoughts. Rather, they are there for it in the form of *representation*. For consciousness steps out of actuality into pure consciousness, but it is itself still, in general, within the sphere and determinateness of actuality. The disrupted consciousness is only *in itself* the *self-equality* of pure consciousness—for us, not for itself. It is therefore only the *immediate* elevation, not yet complete in itself, and it still has within itself its opposite principle, by which it is conditioned, without having mastered it through the mediated movement. Hence the essence of its thought counts for it as *essence* not only in the form of the abstract in-itself, but in the form of something *commonly actual*—an actuality that has merely been raised into another element without having lost there the determinateness of an actuality that is not thought. — This essence must be essentially distinguished from the *in-itself* that is the essence of *Stoic* consciousness. For Stoic consciousness, what counted was only the *form of thought* as such, a thought that in addition has some content alien to it, taken from actuality; but for the consciousness in question, it is not the *form of thought* that counts. It must likewise be distinguished from the *in-itself* of virtuous con-

sciousness. For virtuous consciousness, essence does indeed stand in relation to actuality—it is the essence of actuality itself—but it is only a non-actual essence as yet. For the consciousness in question, essence counts as an actual essence, even though it lies beyond actuality. Likewise, the right and good in itself of law-giving reason, and the universal of law-testing consciousness, do not have the determination of actuality. — If, then, within the world of culture itself, pure thinking fell as one side of alienation—namely as the standard of abstract good and bad in judging—it has now, having passed through the movement of the whole, been enriched with the moment of actuality and thereby of content. This actuality of the essence, however, is at the same time only an actuality of *pure* consciousness, not of *actual* consciousness. Though raised into the element of thinking, it does not yet count for this consciousness as a thought; rather, it lies for consciousness beyond its own actuality. For the actuality of the essence is the flight from consciousness's own actuality.

[528] As *religion*—for it is clear that religion is what we are talking about—appears here as the faith of the world of culture, it does not yet appear as it is *in and for itself*.—It has already appeared to us under other kinds of determinateness: namely as the *unhappy consciousness*, as a shape of the substanceless movement of consciousness itself.—In ethical substance, too, it appeared as faith in the underworld. But the consciousness of the departed spirit is not really *faith*, not essence posited in the element of pure consciousness beyond the actual; rather, the departed spirit itself has immediate presence, and its element is the family. — Here, however, religion has on the one hand emerged from *substance*, and is the pure consciousness of it; on the other hand, this pure consciousness is alienated from its actual consciousness, *essence* from its *existence*. Religion is thus no longer the substanceless movement of consciousness; but it still has the determinateness of opposition to actuality as *this* actuality in general, and to the actuality of self-consciousness in particular. It is therefore essentially only a *faith*.

[529] This *pure consciousness* of the absolute essence is an *alienated* consciousness. We must look more closely at how that of which it is the other determines itself; pure consciousness is to be considered only in connection with this other. At first, namely, this pure consciousness seems to have only the *world* of actuality over against it. But since it is the flight from that world, and thereby the *determinateness* of *opposition*, it has this determinateness in itself. Pure consciousness is therefore essentially alienated from itself within itself, and faith constitutes only one side of it. The other side has at the same time already arisen for us. Pure consciousness is, namely, the reflection out of the world of culture in such a way that the substance of that world, as well as the masses into which it is articulated, showed themselves to be what they are in themselves: *spiritual* essentialities, absolutely restless movements or determinations that immediately sublate themselves in their opposite. Their essence, simple consciousness, is thus the simplicity of *absolute difference*, which immediately is no difference. It is thus pure *being-for-self*—not as that of *this individual*, but as the self that is *universal* within itself, as restless movement that attacks and pervades the *tranquil essence* of the *matter at hand*. In it, therefore, the certainty that knows itself immediately as truth—pure thinking—is present as the *absolute concept* in the power of its *negativity*. This negativity annihilates every objective essence that is supposed to stand over against consciousness, and makes it into a being of consciousness.—This pure consciousness is at the same time just as much *simple*, precisely because its difference is no difference. But as this form of simple reflection into itself, it is the element of faith, in which spirit has the determinateness of *positive universality*, of *being-in-itself*, as against that being-for-self of self-consciousness. — Driven back into itself from the essenceless world that only dissolves itself, spirit is, in truth, in undivided unity, both the *absolute movement* and *negativity* of its appearing and the essence of that movement *satisfied* within itself, its positive *rest*. But lying, in general, under the determinateness of *alienation*, these two moments fall apart as a twofold conscious-

ness. The first is *pure insight*, as the spiritual *process* that gathers itself together in *self*-consciousness—a process that has over against it the consciousness of the positive, the form of objectivity or of representation, and turns against it; the object proper to pure insight, however, is only the *pure I*.—The simple consciousness of the positive, or of tranquil self-equality, on the other hand, has the inner *essence* as essence for its object. Pure insight therefore has, at first, no content in itself, because it is negative being-for-self; to faith, on the other hand, content belongs, without insight. While pure insight does not step outside self-consciousness, faith does indeed likewise have its content in the element of pure self-consciousness, but in *thinking*, not in *concepts, in pure consciousness, not in pure self-consciousness*. Faith is thus indeed pure consciousness of *essence*, that is, of the *simple inner*, and so it *is* thinking—the chief moment in the nature of faith, and one that is usually overlooked. The *immediacy* with which essence is in faith lies in the fact that its object is *essence*, that is, *pure thought*. This *immediacy*, however, insofar as *thinking* enters *consciousness*, or pure consciousness enters self-consciousness, acquires the significance of an objective *being* that lies beyond the consciousness of the self. It is through this significance, which the immediacy and simplicity of *pure thinking* acquires in *consciousness*, that the *essence* of faith falls from thinking down into *representation* and becomes a supersensible world that is supposed to be essentially an *other* of self-consciousness.—In pure insight, by contrast, the transition of pure thinking into consciousness has the opposite determination. Objectivity has the significance of a merely negative content, one that sublates itself and returns into the self; that is, only the self is really its own object, or the object has truth only insofar as it has the form of the self.

THE WORLD OF FAITH

Faith represents the absolute essence as a series of spirits and serves it in devotion.

530 Faith and pure insight belong jointly to the element of pure consciousness, and so they are also jointly the return from the actual world of culture. They therefore present themselves under three aspects. In the first, each is *in* and *for itself*, outside all relation. In the second, each relates itself to the *actual* world that is opposed to pure consciousness. In the third, each relates itself, within pure consciousness, to the other.

531 The aspect of *being in and for itself* in the *believing* consciousness is its absolute object, whose content and determination have already emerged. For according to the concept of faith, this object is nothing other than the real world raised into the universality of pure consciousness. The articulation of the real world therefore also makes up the organization of the world of faith. The difference is that in the world of faith the parts, as they are spiritualized, do not become alienated from themselves. They are instead essences that are in and for themselves, spirits that have returned into themselves and remain with themselves. — Hence it is only for us that the movement of their passing over is an alienation of the determinateness in which they are distinct, and only for us that it forms a *necessary* series. For faith, their difference is a tranquil diversity, and their movement is a *happening*.

532 To name them briefly by the external determination of their form: in the world of culture, state power, or the good, came first. So here too the first is *the absolute essence*, spirit that is in and for itself, insofar as it is the simple eternal *substance*. But in realizing its concept, which is to be spirit, this substance passes over into *being for another*. Its self-identity becomes the *actual* absolute essence that *sacrifices* itself. It becomes a *self*, but a transient self. Hence the third is the return of this alienated

self and of the humbled substance into their first simplicity. Only in this way is substance represented as spirit. —[4]

533 Thought has taken these distinct essences back into themselves out of the flux of the actual world, and so they are changeless eternal spirits, whose being consists in thinking the unity that they make up. Though thus removed from self-consciousness, these essences nevertheless reach into it. Were the essence to remain unmoved in the form of the first simple substance, it would remain alien to self-consciousness. But the externalization of this substance, and then its spirit, has the moment of actuality in it. Through this it comes to share in the believing self-consciousness. In other words, the believing consciousness belongs to the real world.

534 In this second relation, the believing consciousness on the one hand has its own actuality in the real world of culture, and makes up that world's spirit and existence, which we have already considered. On the other hand, it confronts this actuality of its own as something vain, and is the movement of sublating it. This movement does not consist in its having a witty consciousness of that world's inversion. For it is the simple consciousness, which counts wit among vain things, since wit still has the real world as its purpose. Rather, over against the tranquil realm of its thinking, actuality stands as a spiritless existence, which is therefore to be overcome in an external way. This obedience of service and praise sublates sensuous knowing and doing, and so brings forth the consciousness of unity with the essence that is in and for itself. It does not do so as a unity actually beheld. This service is only a continual bringing forth, which does not completely reach its goal in the present. The community does attain it, for the community is universal self-consciousness. But for individual self-consciousness the realm of pure thought necessarily remains a beyond of its actuality. Or, insofar as that realm has entered actuality through the externalization of the eternal essence, it is an uncomprehended sensu-

4 The three moments correspond to the Christian Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

ous actuality. But one sensuous actuality remains indifferent to another, and the beyond has merely acquired, in addition, the determination of distance in space and time. — But the Concept, the actuality of spirit that is present to itself, remains in the believing consciousness the *inner*, which is everything and effects everything but does not itself come forth.

PURE INSIGHT

Pure insight knows everything as self and calls on all consciousness to become rational for itself.

535 In *pure insight*, however, the Concept is what alone is actual. This third aspect of faith, being an object for pure insight, is the real relation in which faith appears here.—Pure insight itself is likewise to be considered under three aspects: first as in and for itself; then in relation to the actual world, insofar as it is still present positively, namely as vain consciousness; and finally in that relation to faith.

536 We have seen what pure insight is in and for itself. Faith is the tranquil pure *consciousness* of spirit as the *essence*, and in the same way pure insight is spirit's *self*-consciousness. It therefore knows the essence not as *essence* but as absolute *self*. It thus sets out to sublate every independence that is *other* than self-consciousness, whether that of the actual or of what is *in itself*, and to make it into *concept*. It is not only the certainty of self-conscious reason that it is all truth. It *knows* that it is this.

537 But when the concept of pure insight first appears, it is not yet *realized*. Accordingly, its consciousness still appears as a *contingent, individual* consciousness, and what is the essence for it appears as a *purpose* that it has to actualize. At first it has only the *intention* of making *pure insight universal*. That is, it intends to make everything that is actual into concept, and into a concept in every self-consciousness. The intention is *pure*, for its content is pure insight. This insight is likewise *pure*, for its content is only the absolute concept, which has no opposition in an object and is not restricted within itself. Two aspects lie immedi-

ately in the unrestricted concept. The first is that everything objective has only the meaning of *being-for-self*, of self-consciousness. The second is that self-consciousness has the meaning of something *universal*: pure insight is to become the property of every self-consciousness. This second aspect of the intention is a result of culture. In culture the differences of objective spirit have perished, namely the parts of its world and the determinations of judgment passed on them. So too have the differences that appear as originally determinate natures. Genius, talent, and special abilities in general belong to the world of actuality insofar as that world still has in it the aspect of being a spiritual animal kingdom. In that kingdom, amid mutual violence and confusion, individuals fight and cheat one another over the essences of the real world.—Differences, it is true, have no place in that world as honest espèces [species]. Individuality neither contents itself with the unactual *matter itself*, nor has it a *particular* content and purposes of its own. Rather, it counts only as something universally valid, namely as cultivated. Difference is reduced to lesser or greater energy—a difference of *magnitude*, that is, an inessential one. But even this last diversity has perished, because in the complete disruption of consciousness the difference turned into an absolutely qualitative one. In that disruption, what is the other for the I is only the I itself. In this infinite judgment all one-sidedness and peculiarity of the original being-for-self is erased. The self knows itself, as pure self, to be its own object, and this absolute equality of the two sides is the element of pure insight.—Pure insight is therefore the simple *essence*, undifferentiated within itself, and likewise the universal *work* and universal possession. In this *simple* spiritual substance, self-consciousness gives itself, and preserves in every object, the consciousness of *this* individuality of its own, or of its *doing*. Conversely, its individuality is *equal to itself* and universal in that substance. — This pure insight is thus the spirit that calls out to *all* consciousness: *Be for yourselves* what you all are *in yourselves—rational*.

II. THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Pure insight spreads as Enlightenment and turns the force of the concept against faith.

538 The distinctive object against which pure insight directs the force of the concept is faith, as the form of pure consciousness that confronts it in the same element. But pure insight also has a relation to the actual world, for, like faith, it is the return from that world into pure consciousness. We must first see what its activity is like when directed against the impure intentions and perverse insights of that world.

539 Mention was already made above of the tranquil consciousness that stands over against this whirl, which dissolves itself and produces itself anew. This consciousness makes up the side of pure insight and intention. But, as we saw, no *particular insight* into the world of culture falls within this tranquil consciousness. Rather, that world itself has the most painful feeling and the truest insight about itself. It feels that it is the dissolution of everything that tries to make itself fast, that it has been broken on the wheel through every moment of its existence and shattered in every bone.—It is likewise the language of this feeling, and the judging, witty talk about every aspect of its condition. Pure insight can therefore have no activity or content of its own here. It can only act as the formal, faithful *apprehending* of this witty insight that the world has into itself, and of its language. This language is scattered, and its judging is a momentary babble that at once forgets itself again and is a whole only for a third consciousness. So this third consciousness can distinguish itself as *pure* insight only by gathering those scattered traits into one universal picture and then making them into an insight of all.

540 By this simple means pure insight will bring the confusion of this world to its dissolution. For it has turned out that the essence of this actuality is not the masses, the determinate concepts and individualities. Rather, this actuality has its substance

and support solely in the spirit that exists as judging and discussing. It is solely the interest in having a content for this reasoning and chatter that preserves the whole and the masses into which it is articulated. In this language of insight, the self-consciousness of insight is still, to itself, something *that is for itself, this individual*. But the vanity of the content is at the same time the vanity of the self that knows the content to be vain. Now the tranquilly apprehending consciousness gathers into a collection the most apt and incisive formulations of all this witty prattle of vanity. As it does so, the soul that still holds the whole together, the vanity of witty judging, perishes along with the rest of the vanity of existence. The collection shows most people a better wit than their own, or at least shows everyone a more varied one. It shows knowing-better and judging in general to be something universal and now universally known. With this the only interest that still remained is extinguished, and individual seeing-into dissolves into universal insight.[5]

Yet above vain knowing the knowing of the essence still stands firm, and pure insight appears in genuine activity only insofar as it comes forward against faith.

A. THE STRUGGLE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT WITH SUPERSTITION

The Enlightenment attacks faith as a web of priestly deceit, error and superstition.

[541] Consciousness has taken up a negative attitude in various ways: in skepticism, and in theoretical and practical idealism. These are subordinate shapes compared with this shape of *pure insight* and its diffusion, *Enlightenment*. For pure insight is born of substance, knows the pure *self* of consciousness as absolute, and takes it on against the pure consciousness of the absolute essence of all actuality.—Faith and insight are the same pure consciousness, but they are opposed in form. For faith the

5 Probably an allusion to the French *Encyclopédie* (1751–1772) of Diderot and d'Alembert.

essence is *thought*, not *concept*, and therefore something utterly opposed to *self*-consciousness; for pure insight the essence is the *self*. Hence each is, for the other, the utterly negative of the other. — As the two come forward against each other, all *content* falls to faith, for in its tranquil element of thought every moment gains subsistence.—Pure insight, by contrast, is at first without content, and is rather the pure disappearing of content. But through its negative movement against what is negative to it, it will realize itself and give itself a content.

[542] Pure insight knows faith as what is opposed to it, to reason and truth. For pure insight, faith is in general a web of superstition, prejudices, and errors. Beyond that, the consciousness of this content organizes itself, for pure insight, into a realm of error. In this realm false insight is, on the one hand, the *general mass* of consciousness: immediate, naive, and without reflection into itself. But it also contains the moment of reflection into itself, or of self-consciousness, separated from naivety. This moment is an insight that remains in the background for itself, together with an evil intention, and the mass is beguiled by it. That mass is the victim of the deceit of a *priesthood*. The priesthood acts out its envious vanity of remaining sole possessor of insight, as well as its other self-interest, and at the same time conspires with *despotism*. Despotism is the synthetic, conceptless unity of the real realm and this ideal realm—a strangely inconsistent being. It stands above the bad insight of the multitude and the bad intention of the priests, and also unites both within itself. Despising both, it uses the deceiving priesthood to draw from the stupidity and confusion of the people the advantage of tranquil domination and of gratifying its lusts and caprice. Yet at the same time it is itself the same dullness of insight, the same superstition and error.

[543] Enlightenment does not engage these three sides of the enemy without distinction. Its essence is pure insight, what is in and for itself *universal*, and so its true relation to the other extreme is the one in which it aims at what is *common* and *equal* in both. The side of *individuality* that isolates itself from the uni-

versal naive consciousness is what is opposed to Enlightenment, and Enlightenment cannot touch it directly. The will of the deceiving priesthood and of the oppressive despot is therefore not the immediate object of its activity. Its object is rather the will-less insight that does not individualize itself into being-for-self. This insight is the *concept* of rational self-consciousness, which has its existence in the mass but is not yet present in it as concept. But pure insight tears this honest insight and its naive essence away from prejudices and errors. In doing so, it wrests out of the hands of the bad intention the reality and power of its deceit. The realm of that intention has its *ground* and *material* in the conceptless consciousness of the general mass—just as *being-for-self* has its *substance* in *simple* consciousness in general.

544 The relation of pure insight to the naive consciousness of the absolute essence now has two aspects. On the one hand, pure insight is *in itself* the same as that consciousness. On the other hand, that consciousness, in the simple element of its thought, lets the absolute essence and its parts have their way and give themselves subsistence. It lets them count only as its *in-itself*, and hence in an objective manner, while it disowns its own *being-for-self* in this in-itself.—According to the first aspect, this faith is, for pure insight, *in itself* pure *self*-consciousness and has only to become this *for itself*. Insofar as this is so, pure insight has in this concept of faith the element in which it realizes itself in place of false insight.

THE SILENT INFECTION

Pure insight spreads like an infection until, one fine morning, the old idol lies on the floor.

545 From this aspect, the two are essentially the same, and the relation of pure insight takes place through and in the same element. So its communication is *immediate*, and its giving and receiving are an undisturbed flowing into each other. Whatever other pegs may have been driven into consciousness, it is *in itself* this simplicity in which everything is dissolved, forgotten,

and naive, and which is therefore utterly receptive to the concept. The communication of pure insight is therefore to be compared to a quiet expansion, or to the *diffusion* of, say, a scent in an unresisting atmosphere. It is a penetrating infection. It does not first make itself noticeable as something opposed to the indifferent element into which it insinuates itself, and therefore it cannot be warded off. Only when the infection has spread is *it for consciousness,* which had carelessly abandoned itself to it. What consciousness received into itself was indeed the simple essence, equal to itself and to consciousness. But it was at the same time the simplicity of *negativity* reflected into itself, which afterwards also unfolds, in keeping with its nature, as something opposed, and thereby reminds consciousness of its former way. This negativity is the concept, which is the simple knowing that knows itself and at the same time its opposite, but knows this opposite as sublated within it. Hence, as soon as pure insight is for consciousness, it has already spread. The struggle against it betrays that the infection has already taken place. The struggle comes too late, and every remedy only worsens the disease, for the disease has seized the marrow of spiritual life, namely consciousness in its concept, or its pure essence itself. There is therefore no force in consciousness that could overpower it. Because it is in the essence itself, its still isolated manifestations can be pushed back and its superficial symptoms subdued. This is highly advantageous to it. Now it neither squanders its force uselessly nor shows itself unworthy of its essence, as happens when it breaks out in symptoms and isolated eruptions against the content of faith and against the coherence of faith's external actuality. Instead, as an invisible and unnoticed spirit, it creeps through and through the noble parts, and soon has taken thorough possession of all the vitals and members of the unconscious idol. And "*one fine morning* it gives its comrade a nudge with the elbow, and bang! crash![6] the idol lies on the floor."—On *one fine morning* whose noon is not bloody,

6 Again from *Rameau's Nephew*, where a foreign god quietly settles beside the native idol and one day topples it.

when the infection has penetrated all the organs of spiritual life. Then memory alone still preserves the dead mode of the previous shape of spirit, as a history that has passed away one knows not how. And the new serpent of wisdom, raised up for worship, has in this way painlessly shed only a withered skin.[7]

546 But this silent, continuous weaving of spirit in the simple interior of its substance, where spirit conceals its own doing from itself, is only one side of the realization of pure insight. Its diffusion does not consist only in like joining with like, and its actualization is not merely an expansion without opposition. The doing of the negative essence is just as essentially a developed movement that differentiates itself within itself. As conscious doing, this movement must set out its moments in determinate, manifest existence. It must be present as a loud uproar and a violent struggle with what is opposed as such.

547 We must therefore see how *pure insight* and *intention* conducts itself *negatively* toward the other that it finds before it as opposed to it.—Pure insight and intention, conducting itself negatively, can only be the negative of itself, since its concept is all essentiality and there is nothing outside it. As insight, therefore, it becomes the negative of pure insight: it becomes untruth and unreason. As intention, it becomes the negative of pure intention: it becomes lie and impurity of purpose.

548 It entangles itself in this contradiction by engaging in strife and supposing that it is combating something *other*.—It only supposes this, for its essence, as absolute negativity, is to have otherness within itself. The absolute concept is the category. It is this: that knowing and the *object* of knowing are the same. Hence what pure insight declares to be its other, what it declares to be error or lie, can be nothing other than itself. It can condemn only what it is. What is not rational has no *truth*, or what is not comprehended *is* not. So when reason speaks of something *other* than itself, it in fact speaks only of itself; in doing so it does not step outside itself.—This struggle with its opposite

7 The serpent raised up for worship recalls the bronze serpent Moses lifted up (Numbers 21:8–9). The shedding of skin is an old image of renewal.

therefore also carries the significance of being its *actualization*. For actualization consists precisely in the movement of developing the moments and taking them back into itself. One part of this movement is the differentiation in which comprehending insight sets itself over against itself as *object*. As long as it lingers in this moment, it is alienated from itself. As pure insight it is without any *content*. The movement of its realization consists in *its own self* becoming content for it. No other content can come to it, because it is the self-consciousness of the category. But in opposing, it at first knows the content only as *content* and not yet as itself, and so it fails to recognize itself in it. Its completion therefore has this sense: to recognize as its own the content that was at first objective to it. Its result, however, will be neither the restoration of the errors it combats nor merely its initial concept. It will be an insight that recognizes the absolute negation of itself as its own actuality, as itself—in other words, its concept that recognizes itself. — The nature of Enlightenment's struggle with errors is to combat itself in them and to condemn in them what it itself asserts. This nature is *for us*; it is what Enlightenment and its struggle are *in themselves*. But the first side of this struggle is Enlightenment's defilement, which comes from taking the negative attitude up into its self-identical *purity*. This is how Enlightenment is an *object for faith*. Faith thus experiences it as lie, unreason, and bad intention, just as faith is, for Enlightenment, error and prejudice.—With regard to its content, Enlightenment is at first empty insight, to which its content appears as an other. It therefore *finds* this content *already there*, in this shape in which it is not yet its own: as an existence wholly independent of it, in faith.

549 Enlightenment thus apprehends its object first and in general by taking it as *pure insight*; not recognizing itself, it declares the object to be error. In *insight* as such, consciousness grasps an object in such a way that the object becomes for it the essence of consciousness. It becomes an object that consciousness permeates, in which consciousness maintains itself, remains with itself and present to itself. Since consciousness is thereby the

movement of this object, it produces it. Enlightenment correctly describes faith as precisely this when it says that what is the absolute essence for faith is a being of faith's own consciousness, its own thought, something produced by consciousness. In saying so, it declares faith to be error and invention about the very thing that Enlightenment itself is. — Enlightenment wants to teach faith the new wisdom, but in this it tells faith nothing new. For faith, too, its object is exactly this: the pure essence of its own consciousness. Consequently faith's consciousness does not posit itself as lost and negated in its object, but rather trusts it. And that means precisely that it finds itself *in it* as *this* consciousness, or as *self*-consciousness. When I trust someone, the *certainty of himself* that he has is for me the *certainty of myself*. I know my being-for-myself in him: I know that he recognizes it, and that it is purpose and essence for him. But faith is trust, because its consciousness *relates* itself *immediately* to its object, and thus also beholds that it is *one* with its object and in it. — Further, since that in which I recognize myself is an object for me, I am in it at the same time to myself an *other* self-consciousness in general. That is, I am a self-consciousness that has become alienated in it from its particular individuality, namely from its naturalness and contingency. Yet in it I partly remain self-consciousness, and partly am, precisely in it, *essential* consciousness, as pure insight is.—The concept of insight contains more than this: that consciousness recognizes itself in the object into which it has insight, and has itself *immediately* in it, without leaving what is thought and only then returning into itself. Consciousness is also aware of itself as the *mediating* movement, or of itself as *doing* or producing. Thereby this unity of itself as *self* and of the object is *for it* in thought. — Faith, too, is precisely this consciousness. *Obedience and doing* are a necessary moment, through which the certainty of being in the absolute essence comes about. This doing of faith does not, it is true, appear to be something by which the absolute essence itself is produced. But the absolute essence of faith is essentially not the *abstract* essence that would lie beyond the believing consciousness. It is

the spirit of the community, the unity of the abstract essence and self-consciousness. The doing of the community is an essential moment in the absolute essence's being this spirit of the community. It is this spirit *only by being produced* by consciousness—or rather, *not without* being produced by consciousness. For essential as producing is, it is equally essential that producing is not the sole ground of the essence; it is only a moment. The essence is at the same time in and for itself.

[550] From the other side, the concept of pure insight is, to itself, an *other* as its object, for precisely this negative determination makes up the object. So from this other side, too, pure insight declares the essence of faith to be something *alien* to self-consciousness, something that is not *its* essence but has been foisted on it like a changeling. But here Enlightenment is utterly foolish. Faith experiences it as talk that does not know what it is saying and does not understand the matter when it speaks of priestly fraud and deception of the people. Enlightenment speaks of this as if, by some hocus-pocus of conjuring priests, something absolutely *alien* and *other* were passed off on consciousness as the essence. And at the same time it says that this is an essence of consciousness, that consciousness believes in it, trusts it, and seeks to win its favor. That is, it says that consciousness beholds in it *its pure* essence just as much as *its* individual and universal *individuality*, and through its doing produces this unity of itself with its essence. What Enlightenment declares to be *alien* to consciousness, it immediately declares to be what is most *its own*.—How then can it speak of fraud and deception? Since it *immediately* says of faith the opposite of what it asserts about faith, it shows itself to faith rather as the conscious *lie*. How are deception and fraud to take place where consciousness, in its truth, immediately has the *certainty of itself*? Where it possesses *itself* in its object, since it just as much finds itself there as produces itself? The difference is no longer present even in the words.—When the general question was posed, *whether it is permissible to deceive a people*, the answer ought in fact to have been that the question is worthless,

because in this matter it is impossible to deceive a people.[8] — Brass in place of gold and forged bills of exchange in place of genuine ones may well be sold here and there. A lost battle may be palmed off on many as a victory, and other lies about sensuous things and individual events may be made credible for a while. But in the knowing of the essence, where consciousness has the immediate *certainty of itself*, the very thought of deception falls away entirely.

HOW FAITH EXPERIENCES THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Faith sees the Enlightenment distort its object, the grounds of its belief, and its service.

551 Let us look further at how faith experiences Enlightenment in the *distinct* moments of its consciousness; so far our account has concerned these moments only in general. These moments are: pure thinking, or, as object, the *absolute essence* in and for itself; then consciousness's *relation* to it as a *knowing*, the *ground of its faith*; and finally its relation to it in its doing, or *its service*. Pure insight has mistaken and disowned itself in faith in general, and in these moments it will behave just as perversely.

552 Pure insight behaves negatively toward *the absolute essence* of the believing consciousness. This essence is pure *thinking*, and pure thinking posited within itself as object or as the *essence*. In the believing consciousness, this *in-itself* of thinking acquires, for the consciousness that is for itself, the form of objectivity—but only its empty form. It has the determination of something *represented*. Pure insight, however, is pure consciousness on the side of the *self that is for itself*. So to pure insight the *other* appears as something *negative* of *self-consciousness*. This other could still be taken either as the pure *in-itself* of thinking or as the *being* of sense-certainty. But this other is at the same time for the *self*, and the self, as a *self* that has an object, is actual consciousness. So pure insight's own distinctive object as such is

8 Echoes the Berlin Academy's prize question for 1780, set at Frederick the Great's suggestion: "Is it useful to deceive the people?"

an ordinary *thing that is*, a thing of *sense-certainty*. This object of its own appears to it in faith's *representation*. It condemns that representation, and in it condemns its own object. Against faith, however, it already commits an injustice in taking faith's object to be its own. Accordingly it says of faith that its absolute essence is a piece of stone, a block of wood that has eyes and does not see; or else some bread dough that grew in the field, was transformed by human beings, and is sent back onto the field;—or whatever other ways faith anthropomorphizes the essence and makes it objective and representable to itself.[9]

553 Enlightenment, which passes itself off as the pure, here turns what for spirit is eternal life and Holy Spirit into an actual *perishable thing*. It soils it with the view of sense-certainty, a view that is in itself null. This view is not present at all to faith in its worship, so that Enlightenment simply lies about faith. What faith reveres is for faith by no means stone, or wood, or bread dough, or any other temporal, sensuous thing. Enlightenment may take it into its head to say that faith's object is nevertheless *also* this, or even that it is this in itself and in truth. But, on the one hand, faith knows *that "also"* just as well; only for faith it lies outside its worship. On the other hand, for faith nothing like a stone and so forth is *in itself* at all. For faith, the essence of pure thinking alone is in itself.

554 The *second moment* is the relation of faith, as *knowing* consciousness, to this essence. For faith as thinking pure consciousness, this essence is immediate. But pure consciousness is just as much a *mediated* relation of certainty to truth, and this relation makes up the *ground* of *faith*. For Enlightenment this ground likewise becomes a contingent *knowing of contingent* events. But the ground of knowing is the *knowing* universal, and in its truth it is absolute *spirit*. In abstract pure consciousness, or thinking as such, absolute spirit is only absolute *essence*; as self-consciousness, it is the *knowing* of itself. Pure insight likewise posits this knowing universal, *simple self-knowing spirit*, as the

9 Echoes Psalm 115:5 on idols ("They have eyes, but they see not"); the bread is the consecrated host of the Eucharist.

negative of self-consciousness. Pure insight is itself, to be sure, *pure mediated*—that is, self-mediating—thinking; it is pure knowing. But it is *pure insight, pure knowing* that does not yet know itself; that is, it is not yet for pure insight that it is this pure mediating movement. So this movement appears to it, like everything that it itself is, as an other. Engaged, then, in its actualization, pure insight develops this essential moment of its own. But the moment appears to it as belonging to faith, and, since its determinateness is to be external to pure insight, as a contingent knowing of just such ordinary actual histories. Here, then, it falsely imputes to religious faith that faith's certainty is grounded on a few *individual historical testimonies*. Considered as historical testimonies, these would admittedly not afford the degree of certainty about their content that newspaper reports give us about any event.—It further imputes that faith's certainty rests on the accident of the *preservation* of these testimonies: preservation by means of paper, on the one hand, and, on the other, by the skill and honesty with which they were transferred from one paper to another; and finally on the correct grasp of the sense of dead words and letters. In fact, however, it does not occur to faith to tie its certainty to such testimonies and contingencies. In its certainty faith is a naive relation to its absolute object, a pure knowing of it. It does not mix letters, paper, and copyists into its consciousness of the absolute essence, nor does it mediate itself with that essence through things of that kind. Rather, this consciousness is the self-mediating ground of its knowing. It is spirit itself that bears witness to itself, both in the *inner being* of the *individual* consciousness and through the *universal presence* of everyone's faith in it. Faith may also want to give itself, from history, the kind of grounding, or at least confirmation, of its content that Enlightenment speaks of, and may seriously think and act as if everything depended on it. If so, it has already let itself be seduced by Enlightenment. Its efforts to ground or secure itself in this way are only testimonies it gives of its own infection.

555 The third aspect still remains: *the relation of consciousness to the absolute essence* as a *doing*. This doing is the sublation of the particularity of the individual, or of the natural mode of its being-for-self. From it the individual gains the certainty of being pure self-consciousness: the certainty that in its doing—that is, as individual consciousness *that is for itself*—it is one with the essence. — In doing, *purposiveness* and *purpose* are distinguished. With regard to this doing, too, pure insight *behaves negatively* and, as in the other moments, disowns itself. So with regard to *purposiveness* it must present itself as lack of understanding, since to it insight combined with intention—the agreement of purpose and means—appears as an other, indeed as the opposite. With regard to *purpose*, it must make what is bad, enjoyment and possession, its purpose, and thereby prove itself the most impure intention, since pure intention, as an other, is likewise impure intention.

556 Accordingly, with regard to *purposiveness*, we see Enlightenment find it foolish when the believing individual gains the higher consciousness of not being chained to natural enjoyment and pleasure by *actually* denying itself natural enjoyment and pleasure, and so proves *by deed* that its contempt for them is no *lie* but is *true*. — Likewise, Enlightenment finds it foolish that the individual absolves itself of its determinateness—being absolutely individual, excluding all others, and possessing property —by giving up its property itself. By doing so the individual shows *in truth* that it is not in earnest about its isolation. It shows that it is exalted above the natural necessity of individualizing itself, and of denying, in this absolute individualization of being-for-self, that others are the same *as itself*.—Pure insight finds both of these ill-suited to their purpose as well as wrong. They are *ill-suited to their purpose* because denying oneself pleasure and giving away a possession is no way to prove oneself free of pleasure and possession. Pure insight will therefore, conversely, declare anyone a *fool* who, in order to eat, adopts the means of actually eating. — Pure insight also finds it *wrong* to deny oneself a meal and to give away butter and eggs—not for

money, nor money for butter and eggs, but outright, without getting anything of the sort in return. It declares a meal, or the possession of such things, to be an end in itself. It thereby declares itself in fact to be a very impure intention, one whose most essential concern is such enjoyment and possession. As pure intention, it also asserts in turn the necessity of rising above natural existence and above greed for the means of that existence. Only it finds it foolish and wrong that this elevation should be proved *by deed*. In other words, this pure intention is in truth deceit. It pretends to and demands an *inward* elevation, but declares it superfluous, foolish, and even wrong to take this seriously, to put it *actually into practice*, and to *prove its truth*.—It thus disowns itself both as pure insight, since it disowns immediately purposive doing, and as pure intention, since it disowns the intention of proving itself free from the purposes of individuality.

THE POSITIVE TRUTHS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The Enlightenment offers an empty supreme being, sensuous things, and utility in place of faith.

[557] This is how Enlightenment gives itself to be experienced by faith. It appears in this bad light because, precisely through its relation to an other, it gives itself a *negative reality*, or presents itself as the opposite of itself. But pure insight and intention must give itself this relation, for this relation is its actualization. —This actualization appeared at first as negative reality. Perhaps its *positive reality* is better constituted; let us see how that stands. —When all prejudice and superstition have been banished, the question arises: *What next? What is the truth that Enlightenment has spread in their place?*—It has already expressed this positive content in uprooting error, for that alienation of itself is just as much its positive reality. — In what for faith is absolute spirit, Enlightenment takes whatever *determination* it discovers there as wood, stone, and so on, as individual actual things. In this way it conceives *all determinateness* in general—that is, all con-

tent and filling of that spirit—as a *finitude*, as *human essence and representation*. So the *absolute essence* becomes for it a *vacuum*, to which no determinations, no predicates can be attributed. Such a coupling would be criminal in itself; indeed, it is precisely the coupling in which the monsters of superstition have been begotten.[10] Reason, *pure insight*, is indeed not itself empty, since the negative of itself is *for it* and is its content. It is rich—but only in individuality and limitation. To let nothing of this kind belong to the absolute essence, or be attributed to it, is its insightful way of life. That way of life knows how to put itself and its wealth of finitude in their place, and to treat the absolute with due dignity.

558 Over against this empty essence stands the *second moment* of Enlightenment's positive truth: *individuality* in general, of consciousness and of all being, excluded from an absolute essence, as *absolute being in and for itself*. Consciousness in its very first actuality is *sense-certainty* and *meaning*. Here, after the whole path of its experience, it returns to that point and is again a knowing of what is *purely negative of itself*: of *sensuous things*, that is, of things that *are*, which stand indifferently over against its *being-for-self*. Here, however, it is not *immediate* natural consciousness; it has *become* such for itself. At first it was abandoned to all the entanglement into which its unfolding plunges it; now pure insight has led it back to its first shape. So it has *experienced* that shape as the *result*. This sense-certainty is *grounded* on the insight into the nullity of all other shapes of consciousness, and hence of everything beyond sense-certainty. It is therefore no longer meaning; it is rather the absolute truth. This nullity of everything that goes beyond sense-certainty is indeed only a negative proof of this truth. But the truth admits of no other proof. For the positive truth of sense-certainty in itself is precisely the *unmediated* being-for-self of the concept itself as object, and indeed in the form of otherness. It is this: every consciousness is *absolutely certain* that it *is*, that there are

10 Hegel puns on *beilegen* (to attribute a predicate) and *Beilager* (the consummation of a marriage).

other actual things outside it, and that in its *natural* being it, like these things, is *in and for itself*, or *absolute*.

559 *The third moment of the truth of the Enlightenment*, finally, is the relationship of individual beings to the absolute essence: the relation between the first two moments. As pure insight into what is *self-equal* or *unlimited*, insight also *goes beyond* the *unequal*, that is, beyond finite actuality, or beyond itself as mere otherness. As the beyond of this otherness it has *the void*, and it is to this void that it relates sensuous actuality. The two sides do not enter as *content* into the determination of this *relationship*. One of them is the void, so a content is present only through the other, sensuous actuality. The *form* of the relation, however, can be made into whatever one likes, since the side of the *in-itself* has a hand in determining it. The form is what is *in itself negative*, and therefore what is opposed to itself: being as much as nothing, the *in-itself* as much as its *opposite*. Or, what comes to the same thing, the relation of *actuality* to the *in-itself* as the *beyond* is just as much a *negating* as a *positing* of actuality. Strictly speaking, then, finite actuality can be taken in whatever way one happens to need it. So the sensuous is now related *positively* to the absolute as to the *in-itself*, and sensuous actuality is itself *in itself*: the absolute makes it, fosters it and cherishes it. But sensuous actuality is also related to the absolute as to its opposite, as to its *non-being*. In this relationship it is not in itself, but only *for an other*. In the preceding shape of consciousness the *concepts* of the opposition were determined as *good* and *bad*. For pure insight, by contrast, they become the purer abstractions of *being in itself* and *being for an other*.

560 Both ways of considering it, the positive as well as the negative relation of the finite to the in-itself, are in fact equally necessary. Everything, then, is as much *in itself* as it is *for an other*; in other words, everything is *useful*.—Everything gives itself up to others: now it lets itself be used by others and is *for them*; and now it gets back up on its hind legs, so to speak, plays hard to get with others, is for itself, and uses the other in its turn.—For human beings, as the thing that is *conscious* of this

relation, their essence and their position follow from this. As they immediately are, as natural consciousness, they are *in themselves good*; as individuals they are *absolute*, and everything else is *for them*. And indeed, since for them, as the animal conscious of itself, the moments have the significance of universality, *everything* exists for their pleasure and delight. Just as they came from God's hand, they walk about in the world as in a garden planted for them. — They must also have picked from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. In this they possess a utility that distinguishes them from everything else. For, as chance would have it, their nature, which is good in itself, is *also* so constituted that an excess of delight does it harm. Or rather, their individuality *also has its beyond* within it: it can go beyond itself and destroy itself. Against this, reason is a useful means for them of duly limiting this going-beyond, or rather of preserving themselves while going beyond what is determinate; for this is the force of consciousness. The enjoyment of a conscious being that is in itself *universal* must itself, in its variety and duration, be not something determinate but universal. Moderation therefore has the function of preventing pleasure from being cut short in its variety and duration; that is to say, the function of moderation is immoderation.—Just as everything is useful to human beings, so they too are useful, and their vocation is equally to make themselves members of the troop who serve the common good and are of use to all. Exactly as much as they look after themselves, they must also give themselves to others; and as much as they give themselves, so much do they look after themselves: one hand washes the other. Wherever they find themselves, they are in the right place; they are of use to others and are put to use.

561 Different things are useful to one another in different ways. But all things have this useful reciprocity through their essence, namely through being related to the absolute in a twofold way: positively, whereby they are *in and for themselves*, and negatively, whereby they are *for others*. The *relation* to the absolute essence, or religion, is therefore, of everything useful, the most useful of

all. For it is *pure use itself*: it is this subsisting of all things, or their being *in and for themselves*, and the falling of all things, or their *being for an other*.

562 To faith, of course, this positive result of the Enlightenment is as much an abomination as its negative attitude toward faith. This *insight* into the absolute essence, which sees nothing in it but precisely the *absolute* essence, *the être suprême* [the supreme being], *or the void*; this *intent* that everything in its immediate existence is *in itself*, or good; and finally the claim that the concept of utility exhaustively expresses the *relation* of the individual conscious being to the absolute essence, that is, *religion*: all this is utterly *abhorrent* to faith.[11] To faith, this peculiar *wisdom* of the Enlightenment necessarily appears at once as *flatness* itself and as the *confession* of flatness. For it consists in knowing nothing of the absolute essence—or, what is the same thing, in knowing of it only this entirely flat truth, that it is just the *absolute essence*—and, by contrast, in knowing only of finitude, and indeed in knowing finitude as the true, and this knowing of finitude as the true as the highest.

THE RIGHT OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The Enlightenment prevails because it brings together thoughts that faith itself keeps apart.

563 Faith has divine right against the Enlightenment, the right of absolute *self-equality* or of pure thinking, and it suffers nothing but wrong at the Enlightenment's hands. For the Enlightenment distorts faith in all its moments and makes them into something other than what they are in faith. The Enlightenment, however, has only human right against faith and on behalf of its own truth. For the wrong it commits is the right of *inequality*, and consists in inverting and altering—a right that belongs to the nature of *self-consciousness* in opposition to the simple essence, or *thinking*. But since its right is the right of self-consciousness,

11 French: "supreme being," the deists' name for God, later the object of Robespierre's Cult of the Supreme Being (1794).

it will not merely *also* keep its right, so that two equal rights of spirit would remain facing each other with neither able to satisfy the other. Rather, it will assert the absolute right, because self-consciousness is the negativity of the concept, which is not only *for itself* but also reaches over into its opposite; and faith itself, because it is consciousness, will not be able to deny the Enlightenment its right.

564 For the Enlightenment does not confront the believing consciousness with principles of its own, but with principles that this consciousness itself contains. It merely brings together for it its *own thoughts*, which fall apart for it without its being aware of it. It merely reminds it, in the case of *one* of its modes, of the *others* that it *also* has, but one of which it always forgets when attending to another. The Enlightenment proves itself pure insight toward the believing consciousness precisely in that it sees the whole in a *determinate* moment. It thus brings forward the *opposite* that relates to that moment, and, by inverting each into the other, brings out the negative essence of both thoughts: the *concept*. To faith, the Enlightenment appears as distortion and lies because it points out the *otherness* of faith's moments. In doing so, it seems to faith to make them immediately into something other than what they are in their singularity. But this *other* is just as essential, and in truth it is present in the believing consciousness itself; only, this consciousness does not think of it, but keeps it somewhere else. It is therefore neither alien to this consciousness, nor can it be denied by it.

565 But the Enlightenment itself, which reminds faith of the opposite of its separated moments, is just as little enlightened about itself. It behaves purely *negatively* toward faith, insofar as it excludes faith's content from its own purity and takes that content for the *negative* of itself. It therefore neither knows itself in this negative, in the content of faith, nor, for this very reason, does it bring the two thoughts together: the one it brings forward, and the one against which it brings it forward. Since it does not realize that what it condemns in faith is immediately its own thought, it is itself caught in the opposition of the two

moments. It recognizes only one of them—in each case the one opposed to faith—while separating the other from it, exactly as faith does. It therefore does not produce the unity of the two as their unity, that is, the concept; but the concept *arises* for it of its own accord, or it merely finds it as *already there*. For in itself the realization of pure insight is precisely this: that pure insight, whose essence is the concept, first becomes to itself something absolutely *other* and disowns itself—for the opposition within the concept is the absolute opposition—and then comes back from this otherness to itself, or to its concept. — The Enlightenment, however, *is* only this movement. It is the still unconscious activity of the pure concept, which does come to itself as object but takes this object for an *other*, and which also does not know the nature of the concept: namely, that it is what is undifferentiated that absolutely divides itself.—Against faith, then, insight is the *power* of the concept insofar as it is the movement and the relating of the moments that lie apart in faith's consciousness—a relating in which their contradiction comes to light. Herein lies the absolute *right* of the might that insight exercises over faith. But the *actuality* that this might attains lies precisely in the fact that the believing consciousness is itself the concept, and therefore itself recognizes the opposite that insight brings to it. Insight therefore remains in the right against the believing consciousness, because it asserts in it what is necessary to that consciousness and what it has within itself.

566 First, the Enlightenment asserts the moment of the concept that consists in being an *activity* of *consciousness*. It asserts this *against* faith: that faith's absolute essence is the essence of *its own* consciousness as a self, or that it is *produced* by consciousness. For the believing consciousness, its absolute essence, just as it is *in itself* for it, is at the same time not like an alien thing that *stands* within it, no one knows how or from where. Rather, its trust consists precisely in *finding* itself in this essence as *this* personal consciousness, and its obedience and service consist in producing the essence, through its own *activity*, as *its* absolute essence. Strictly speaking, the Enlightenment

merely reminds faith of this, when faith declares the *in-itself* of the absolute essence to be purely *beyond* the *activity* of consciousness. — But while the Enlightenment does bring to faith's one-sidedness the opposite moment of faith's *activity*, as against the *being* of which alone faith thinks here, it likewise fails to bring its own thoughts together. It isolates the pure moment of *activity* and declares of the *in-itself* of faith that it is *only* something *produced* by consciousness. But activity isolated and opposed to the *in-itself* is contingent activity, and, as representational activity, a generating of fictions—representations that are not *in themselves*. And this is how the Enlightenment regards the content of faith.—Conversely, however, pure insight equally says the opposite. By asserting the moment of *otherness* that the concept contains, it declares the essence of faith to be one that is *no concern* of consciousness, that lies *beyond* it and is alien and unknown to it. To faith, too, its essence is like this: on the one hand faith trusts in it and has in it the *certainty of itself*; on the other hand this essence is unsearchable in its ways and unattainable in its being.

567 Further, the Enlightenment asserts a right against the believing consciousness that this consciousness itself concedes, when it regards the object of faith's veneration as stone and wood, or otherwise as a finite, anthropomorphic determinateness. For since this consciousness is divided—it has a *beyond* of *actuality* and a pure *this side* of that beyond—there is in fact *also* present in it this view of the sensuous thing, according to which the thing *holds good in* and *for itself*. But it does not bring together these two thoughts of *what is in and for itself*, which for it is at one time the *pure essence* and at another an ordinary *sensuous thing*. — Even its pure consciousness is affected by the latter view. For, because it lacks the concept, the distinctions of its supersensible realm are a series of independent *shapes*, and their movement is no *happening*; that is, they exist only in *representation* and have the mode of sensuous being about them.—The Enlightenment, for its part, likewise isolates *actuality* as an essence forsaken by spirit, and determinateness as a fixed

finitude that would not be a *moment* in the spiritual movement of essence itself—a moment being not nothing, and also not a something that *is* in and for itself, but something vanishing.

[568] It is clear that the same holds for the *ground* of *knowing*. The believing consciousness itself recognizes a contingent *knowing*, for it has a relationship to contingent things, and the absolute essence itself exists for it in the form of a represented, ordinary actuality. The believing consciousness is thus *also* a certainty that does not have the truth within itself, and it confesses itself to be such an inessential consciousness, on this side of the spirit that makes itself certain of itself and proves itself.—But it forgets this moment in its spiritual, immediate knowing of the absolute essence. — The Enlightenment, however, which reminds it of this moment, in turn thinks *only* of contingent knowing and forgets the other. It thinks only of the mediation that takes place through an *alien* third, not of the mediation in which the immediate is itself the third, through which it mediates itself with the other, namely with *itself*.

[569] Finally, in its view of faith's *activity*, the Enlightenment finds the throwing away of enjoyment and possessions wrong and inexpedient.—As regards its being wrong, the Enlightenment obtains the agreement of the believing consciousness, in that this consciousness itself recognizes this actuality of owning property, holding on to it and enjoying it. It behaves all the more exclusively and stubbornly in asserting its property, and gives itself over all the more crudely to its enjoyment, because its religious activity—which *gives up* possession and enjoyment—falls beyond this actuality and buys it freedom for that other side. Because of this opposition, this service of sacrificing natural drives and enjoyment in fact has no truth: retention takes place *alongside* sacrifice. The sacrifice is only a *sign*, which carries out actual sacrifice on only a small part, and therefore in fact only *represents* it.

[570] As regards *expediency*, the Enlightenment finds it clumsy to throw away *a* possession in order to know and prove oneself free of possession *as such*, or to deny oneself *an* enjoyment in

order to know and prove oneself free of enjoyment *as such*. The believing consciousness itself takes absolute activity to be a *universal* activity. For it, not only is the action of its absolute essence, as its object, universal; the individual consciousness, too, is supposed to prove itself wholly and universally free of its sensuous nature. But throwing away a *single* possession, or renouncing a *single* enjoyment, is not this *universal* action. In an action, the *purpose*, which is universal, and the *execution*, which is individual, would essentially have to stand before consciousness in their incongruity. So this action proves to be one in which consciousness has no share, and this acting accordingly proves really too *naive* to be an action. It is too naive to fast in order to prove oneself free of the pleasure of meals—too naive, like Origen, to cut other pleasure away *from the body* in order to prove it done with.[12] The action proves to be an *external* and *individual* doing; but desire is rooted *inwardly* and is something *universal*. Its pleasure neither vanishes along with the instrument, nor through individual deprivation.

571 Here, however, the Enlightenment for its part isolates the *inward*, the *non-actual*, as against actuality, just as it held fast to the externality of thinghood against the inwardness of faith in its intuition and devotion. It places what is essential in the *intention*, in *thought*, and thereby spares itself the actual accomplishment of liberation from natural purposes. On the contrary, this inwardness is itself the formal element that has its fulfillment in the natural drives. And these drives are justified precisely by being inward, by belonging to *universal* being, to nature.

572 The Enlightenment thus has irresistible might over faith because the moments it asserts are found in faith's own consciousness. If we look more closely at the effect of this force, the Enlightenment's conduct toward faith seems to tear apart the *beautiful* unity of *trust* and immediate *certainty*; to pollute faith's *spiritual* consciousness with base thoughts of *sensuous* actuality; and to destroy faith's heart, *at peace* and *secure* in its submission,

12 Origen (c. AD 185–254), Christian theologian who, according to Eusebius, castrated himself in a literal reading of Matthew 19:12.

through the *vanity* of the understanding and of one's own will and achievement. But in fact the Enlightenment rather initiates the sublation of the *thoughtless*, or rather *conceptless separation* that is present in faith. The believing consciousness uses double weights and measures. It has two kinds of eyes, two kinds of ears, two kinds of tongue and speech; it has all its representations doubled, without comparing this double meaning. Or: faith lives in two kinds of perception—the one the perception of *sleeping* consciousness, living purely in conceptless thoughts, the other that of waking consciousness, living purely in sensuous actuality—and in each it keeps a household of its own.—The Enlightenment illuminates that heavenly world with the representations of the sensuous world, and points out to it this finitude, which faith cannot deny. Faith cannot deny it because faith is self-consciousness, and hence the unity to which both modes of representation belong and in which they do not fall apart; for they belong to the same indivisible, *simple* self into which faith has passed.

573 Faith has thereby lost the content that filled its element, and it collapses into a dull weaving of spirit within itself. It has been driven out of its kingdom, or this kingdom has been plundered: the waking consciousness has seized for itself all the kingdom's distinctions and expanse, reclaimed all its parts as the property of the earth, and returned them to it. But faith is not satisfied on that account. For through this illumination only individual being has arisen everywhere, so that what speaks to spirit is only essenceless actuality and finitude forsaken by spirit. — Since faith is without content and cannot remain in this void, or since, in going beyond the finite, which is the only content, it finds only the void, it is a *pure longing*. Its truth is an empty *beyond*, for which no fitting content can any longer be found, since everything has been put to other uses.—Faith has thus in fact become the same as the Enlightenment, namely the consciousness of the relation of the finite, which is in itself, to the predicateless, unknown and unknowable absolute—except *that the Enlightenment* is *satisfied* Enlightenment, while *faith* is

unsatisfied Enlightenment. Whether the Enlightenment can remain in its satisfaction, however, remains to be seen. That longing of the troubled spirit, which mourns the loss of its spiritual world, lies in wait. The Enlightenment itself bears this blemish of unsatisfied longing: as *pure object*, in its *empty* absolute essence; as *activity* and *movement*, in *going beyond* its individual being to the unfilled beyond; as *filled object*, in the *selflessness* of the useful. It will sublate this blemish. Closer consideration of the positive result, which for it is the truth, will show that the blemish is already sublated in itself within that result.

B. THE TRUTH OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The Enlightenment splits into two parties, deists and materialists, which in truth hold the same concept.

574 The dull weaving of spirit, which no longer distinguishes anything within itself, has thus withdrawn into itself beyond consciousness, while consciousness, by contrast, has become clear to itself.—The first moment of this clarity is determined, in its necessity and its condition, by the fact that pure insight—insight that is *in itself* the concept—actualizes itself. It does so by positing otherness, or determinateness, within itself. In this way it is negative pure insight, that is, negation of the concept; this negation is equally pure; and with this the *pure thing* has come into being, the absolute essence that has no further determination. Determined more closely, pure insight, as absolute concept, is a distinguishing of distinctions that are no longer distinctions—of abstractions or pure concepts that no longer support themselves, but have their hold and their distinctness only through *the whole of the movement*. This distinguishing of what is not distinguished consists precisely in the absolute concept making itself its own *object* and positing itself as the *essence* over against that *movement*. The essence thereby lacks the side in which the abstractions or distinctions are *held apart*, and so becomes *pure thinking* as *pure thing*. — This, then, is precisely that dull, unconscious weaving of spirit within itself into which faith sank when

it lost its differentiated content.—It is at the same time that *movement* of pure self-consciousness for which this essence is supposed to be the absolutely alien beyond. For because this pure self-consciousness is movement in pure concepts, in distinctions that are no distinctions, it in fact collapses into unconscious weaving, that is, into pure *feeling* or pure *thinghood*. — But the self-alienated concept—for here it still stands at the stage of this alienation—does not see this *same essence* of the two sides, of the movement of self-consciousness and of its absolute essence; it does not see that they have the *same essence*, which is in fact their substance and subsistence. Since it does not see this unity, the essence counts for it only in the form of the objective beyond, while the distinguishing consciousness, which in this way has the in-itself outside itself, counts as a finite consciousness.

575 Over that absolute essence the Enlightenment falls into the same conflict with itself that it previously had with faith, and splits into two parties. A party proves itself the *victorious* one only by breaking up into two parties. For in doing so it shows that it possesses within itself the principle it was fighting, and has thus sublated the one-sidedness with which it first appeared. The interest that was divided between it and the other party now falls entirely within it and forgets the other, because it finds within itself the opposition that occupies it. At the same time, however, the opposition has been raised into the higher, victorious element, in which it presents itself in purified form. So the discord that arises within a party, which looks like a misfortune, rather proves its good fortune.

576 Pure essence itself has no distinction in it. Distinction therefore comes to it in this way: two such pure essences emerge for consciousness, or a twofold consciousness of it.—The pure absolute essence exists only in pure thinking, or rather it is pure thinking itself; it is therefore utterly *beyond* the finite, beyond *self*-consciousness, and only the negative essence. But in this way it is precisely *being*, the negative of self-consciousness. As the *negative* of self-consciousness, it is *also* related to it. It is *external being*, which, related to self-consciousness, in which the

distinctions and determinations fall, receives in itself the distinctions of being tasted, seen, and so on; and this relationship is *sense*-certainty and perception.

577 If we start from this *sensuous* being, into which that negative beyond necessarily passes, but abstract from these determinate ways in which consciousness relates to it, what is left is pure *matter*, as the dull weaving and moving within itself. What is essential here is to consider that *pure matter* is only what is *left over* when we *abstract* from seeing, feeling, tasting and so on. That is, it is not what is seen, tasted, felt and so on. What is seen, felt, tasted is not *matter*, but color, a stone, a salt, and so on; matter is rather *pure abstraction*. And thereby the *pure essence* of *thinking*, or pure thinking itself, is present as the absolute that is not distinguished within itself, not determinate, and without predicates.

578 One Enlightenment calls the absolute essence that predicateless absolute which lies in thinking, beyond actual consciousness, and which was the starting point;—the other calls it *matter*. If they were distinguished as *nature* on the one hand and spirit or *God* on the other, then unconscious weaving within itself would lack, in order to be nature, the wealth of unfolded life;—and spirit or God would lack consciousness that distinguishes itself within itself. Both, as we have seen, are simply the same concept. The difference lies not in the matter itself, but purely in the different starting points of the two cultivated standpoints, and in each one's coming to a halt at its own point in the movement of thinking.[13] If they got past this, they would meet and recognize as the same what is, as one of them claims, an abomination to the one and a folly to the other. For to the one, the absolute essence is in its pure thinking, or immediately for pure consciousness, outside finite consciousness—the *negative* beyond of finite consciousness. Suppose it reflected that, on the one hand, that simple immediacy of thinking is nothing other than *pure being*; and on the other, that what is *negative* for

13 The two parties are usually identified as the deists, who acknowledge a supreme being, and the materialists, such as Holbach (*System of Nature*, 1770).

consciousness at the same time relates to it—that in the negative judgment the *is* (the copula) equally holds the two separated terms together. Then the relation of this beyond to consciousness would emerge in the determination of an *external being*, and hence as the same as what is called *pure matter*; the missing moment of *presence* would be gained.[14] — The other Enlightenment starts from sensuous being, then *abstracts* from the sensuous relation of tasting, seeing and so on, and makes it into the pure *in-itself*, into *absolute matter*, that which is neither felt nor tasted. In this way this being has become the predicateless simple, the essence of *pure consciousness*; it is the pure concept as *being in itself*, or *pure thinking within itself*. This insight does not, in its consciousness, take the opposite step: from what *is*, which is *purely* being, to what is thought, which is the same as what *purely* is—or from the purely positive to the purely negative. Yet the positive is *pure* only through negation, while the *purely* negative, as pure, is equal to itself within itself and precisely thereby positive. — In other words, neither has arrived at the concept of Cartesian metaphysics, that *being in itself* and *thinking* are the same. Neither has arrived at the thought that *being, pure being*, is not something *concrete* and *actual*, but *pure abstraction*; and conversely, that pure thinking, self-equality, or essence, is on the one hand the *negative* of self-consciousness and hence *being*, and on the other, as immediate simplicity, likewise nothing other than *being*. *Thinking* is *thinghood*, or *thinghood* is *thinking*.

UTILITY

In utility pure insight finds its object and its world, and heaven is transplanted down to earth.

[579] At this point the essence has *division* within it only in the sense that it belongs to two ways of considering it. On the one hand, the essence must have distinction within itself; on the

14 An echo of 1 Corinthians 1:23, where Christ crucified is "a stumbling block" to some and "foolishness" to others.

other, it is precisely here that the two ways of considering it come together into one. For the abstract moments of pure being and of the negative, by which the two ways are distinguished, are then united in the object of these ways of considering.—The common universal is the abstraction of pure quivering within itself, or of pure thinking of itself. This simple movement of rotation about its own axis must fling itself apart, because it is itself movement only by distinguishing its moments. This distinguishing of the moments leaves the unmoved behind as the empty husk of pure *being*, which is no longer actual thinking, no longer life within itself; for the distinguishing, as the distinction, is all content. But the distinguishing, which posits itself *outside* that *unity*, is thereby the alternation of the moments that *does not return into itself*—the alternation of being *in itself*, being *for an other*, and being *for itself*. It is actuality as it is object for the actual consciousness of pure insight: *utility*.

580 However bad utility may look to faith, or to sentimentality, or even to the abstraction that calls itself speculation and fixes the *in-itself* for itself, it is in utility that pure insight completes its realization and is its own *object*. It no longer disowns this object, and the object no longer has for it the value of the void or of the pure beyond. For pure insight, as we saw, is the concept itself as existing, or pure personality equal to itself, distinguishing itself within itself in such a way that each of the distinguished terms is itself pure concept, that is, is immediately not distinguished. It is simple, pure self-consciousness, which is just as much *for itself* as *in itself* in an immediate unity. Its *being-in-itself* is therefore not abiding *being*; it immediately ceases to be something in its distinction. But such a being, which immediately has no hold, is not *in itself* but essentially *for an other*, which is the power that absorbs it. But this second moment, opposed to the first, to *being-in-itself*, vanishes just as immediately as the first. Or rather, as *being only for an other*, it is *vanishing* itself; and what is there is being that has *returned* into itself, *being-for-self posited*. This simple being-for-self, however, as self-equality, is rather *a being*, and thereby *for an other*.—This nature

of pure insight in the *unfolding of its moments*, or pure insight as *object*, is what the useful expresses. The useful is something that subsists *in itself*, a thing; this being-in-itself is at the same time only a pure moment. It is therefore absolutely *for an other*, but it is for an other just as much as it is in itself. These opposed moments have returned into the inseparable unity of being-for-self. But though the useful does express the concept of pure insight, it does not express it as such, but as *representation*, or as pure insight's *object*. It is only the restless alternation of those moments, one of which is indeed the having-returned-into-itself as such, but only as *being-for-self*, that is, as an abstract moment that steps aside over against the others. The useful itself is not the negative essence that would have these moments in their opposition at the same time *undivided* in *one and the same respect*, or as a *thinking* in itself, as they are in pure insight. The moment of *being-for-self* is indeed present in the useful, but not in such a way that it *reaches over* the other moments, the *in-itself* and *being for an other*, and would thus be the *self*. In the useful, then, pure insight has its own concept in its *pure* moments as its *object*. It is the consciousness of this *metaphysics*, but not yet the comprehension of it; it has not yet arrived at the *unity* of *being* and the *concept* itself. Because the useful still has the form of an object for pure insight, pure insight has a *world* which it distinguishes from itself—a world no longer in and for itself, to be sure, but a world all the same. But since the oppositions have come out at the apex of the concept, the next stage will be that they collapse together, and that the Enlightenment experiences the fruits of its deeds.

581 If we consider the object now attained in relation to this whole sphere, the actual world of culture had drawn itself together into the *vanity* of self-consciousness—into *being-for-self*, which still has the confusion of that world as its content and is still the *individual* concept, not yet the concept that is *universal* for itself. Returned into itself, however, this concept is *pure insight*: pure consciousness as the pure *self*, or negativity, just as faith is this same pure consciousness as *pure thinking*, or positiv-

ity. Faith has in that self the moment that completes it;—but since faith perishes through this completion, it is now in pure insight that we see the two moments: as the absolute essence, which is purely *thought*, or negative—and as *matter*, which is what positively *is*.—This completeness still lacks that *actuality* of self-consciousness which belongs to the *vain* consciousness—the world out of which thinking raised itself to itself. What is lacking is attained in utility, insofar as pure insight has gained positive objectivity in it; pure insight is thereby actual consciousness, satisfied within itself. This objectivity now makes up its *world*. It has become the truth of the whole preceding world, the ideal as well as the real. The first world of spirit is the widespread realm of its self-dispersing existence and of the individualized *certainty* of itself—just as nature disperses its life into infinitely varied shapes without their *genus* being present. The second world contains the *genus*, and is the realm of *being-in-itself*, or of *truth*, opposed to that certainty. The third, however, the useful, is *truth* that is equally the *certainty* of itself. The realm of the truth of *faith* lacks the principle of *actuality*, or of the certainty of itself as this *individual*. But actuality, or the certainty of itself as this individual, lacks the *in-itself*. In the object of pure insight the two worlds are united. The useful is the object insofar as self-consciousness sees through it and has in it the *individual certainty* of itself, its enjoyment (its *being-for-self*). In this way self-consciousness *sees into* the object, and this insight contains the *true* essence of the object (to be something seen through, or to be *for an other*). This insight is therefore itself *true knowing*. And self-consciousness just as immediately has the universal certainty of itself, its *pure consciousness*, in this relationship, in which *truth* as well as presence and *actuality* are thus united. The two worlds are reconciled, and heaven is transplanted down to earth.

III. ABSOLUTE FREEDOM AND TERROR

Consciousness claims absolute freedom, abolishes all social estates, and can act only by destroying.

582 In utility, consciousness has found its concept. But this concept is, on the one hand, still *object*, and on the other, for that very reason, still *purpose*, which consciousness does not yet immediately possess. Utility is still a predicate of the object, not the subject itself, not its immediate and sole *actuality*. It is the same thing that appeared earlier: that *being-for-self* had not yet shown itself to be the substance of the other moments, whereby the useful would be immediately nothing other than the self of consciousness, and consciousness would thereby be in possession of it.—This withdrawal of the form of objectivity from the useful, however, has already taken place *in itself*; and out of this inner revolution there emerges the actual revolution of actuality, the new shape of consciousness: *absolute freedom*.[15]

583 That is, there is in fact nothing more than an empty semblance of objectivity separating self-consciousness from possession. For, on the one hand, all subsistence and validity of the determinate members of the organization of the actual world and the world of faith have gone back into this simple determination, as into their ground and spirit. On the other hand, this determination no longer has anything of its own for itself; it is rather pure metaphysics, pure concept, or knowing of self-consciousness. For of the *being in* and *for itself* of the useful as object, consciousness recognizes that *its being-in-itself* is essentially *being for an other*. Being-in-itself, as what is *selfless*, is in truth the passive, or what is for another self. But the object exists for consciousness in this abstract form of *pure being-in-itself*, for consciousness is pure *insight*, whose distinctions are in the pure form of concepts.—The *being-for-self*, however, into which being for an other returns, the self, is not a self of its own

15 This begins the section "Absolute Freedom and Terror," Hegel's account of the French Revolution and the Terror of 1793–94.

belonging to what is called the object, distinct from the I. For consciousness as pure insight is not an *individual* self, over against which the object would likewise stand as a self of its *own*. It is the pure concept, the gazing of the self into the self, the absolute seeing of *itself* doubled. The certainty of itself is the universal subject, and its knowing concept is the essence of all actuality. If, then, the useful was only the alternation of the moments that does not return into its own *unity*, and was therefore still an object for knowing, it now ceases to be so. For knowing is itself the movement of those abstract moments. It is the universal self, the self both of itself and of the object, and, as universal, the unity of this movement returning into itself.

584 With this, spirit is present as *absolute freedom*. It is self-consciousness that grasps itself: it grasps that its certainty of itself is the essence of all the spiritual masses of the real as well as the supersensible world, or conversely, that essence and actuality are consciousness's knowing of *itself*.—It is conscious of its pure personality and therein of all spiritual reality, and all reality is only spiritual. The world is for it simply its will, and this will is universal will. And indeed it is not the empty thought of will, which is placed in tacit or represented consent, but really universal will, the will of all *individuals* as such.[16] For will is in itself the consciousness of personality, or of each and every one. And it is supposed to be as this true, actual will: as the *self*-conscious essence of each and every personality, so that each always does everything undividedly, and what appears as the doing of the whole is the immediate and conscious doing of *each*.

585 This undivided substance of absolute freedom ascends the throne of the world without any power being able to resist it. For in truth consciousness alone is the element in which the spiritual essences or powers have their substance. So their whole system, which organized and maintained itself through division into masses, has collapsed, now that the individual consciousness grasps the object as having no other essence than

16 Hegel has in view Rousseau's "general will" (*The Social Contract*, 1762) and theories that ground political authority in tacit consent or in representation.

self-consciousness itself, or as being absolutely the concept. What made the concept into an *object* that *is* was its distinction into separate, *subsisting* masses. But as the object becomes concept, nothing subsisting remains in it any longer; negativity has permeated all its moments. It enters existence in such a way that each individual consciousness raises itself out of the sphere to which it was allotted. It no longer finds its essence and its work in this particular mass, but grasps its self as the *concept* of will, and all masses as the essence of this will; and it can therefore realize itself only in a work that is the whole work. In this absolute freedom, then, all the social estates—which are the spiritual essences into which the whole articulates itself—are abolished. The individual consciousness that belonged to such a member, and willed and accomplished within it, has sublated its limit: its purpose is the universal purpose, its language the universal law, its work the universal work.

586 Here the object and *difference* have lost the meaning of *utility*, which was the predicate of all real being. Consciousness does not begin its movement from the object as from *something alien*, from which it would only then return into itself. Instead, the object is for consciousness consciousness itself. The opposition therefore consists solely in the difference between *individual* and *universal* consciousness. But the individual consciousness is itself, immediately and for itself, that which had only *the semblance* of opposition: it is universal consciousness and will. The *beyond* of this actuality of its own hovers over the corpse of the vanished independence of real being, or of being that was believed in, only as the exhalation of a stale gas, the empty Etre suprême [supreme being].

587 Once the distinct spiritual masses have been sublated, together with the limited life of individuals and its two worlds, all that is present, then, is the movement of universal self-consciousness within itself. This movement is an interaction of universal self-consciousness in the form of *universality* and in the form of *personal* consciousness. The universal will goes *into itself* and is an *individual* will, which the universal law and work con-

front. But this *individual* consciousness is just as immediately conscious of itself as universal will. It is conscious that its object is law it has given and work it has accomplished. So when it passes over into activity and creates objectivity, it makes nothing individual, but only laws and actions of state.

588 This movement is thereby the interaction of consciousness with itself, in which it releases nothing in the shape of a *free object* standing over against it. It follows that it cannot arrive at any positive work—neither at universal works of language nor at those of actuality, neither at laws and universal institutions of *conscious* freedom, nor at deeds and works of *willing* freedom.—The work that freedom giving itself *consciousness* might make of itself would consist in its making itself, as *universal* substance, into an *object* and an *enduring being*. This otherness would be the difference within it, according to which it would divide itself into enduring spiritual masses and into the members of various powers. These masses would be, on the one hand, the *thought-things* of a separate legislative, judicial and executive *power*; on the other hand, they would be the *real essences* that emerged in the real world of culture, and, if the content of universal activity were considered more closely, the particular masses of labor, which are further distinguished as more specific *estates*.—Universal freedom, having in this way divided itself into its members and precisely thereby made itself into a substance that *is*, would thereby be free of single individuality, and would distribute the *multitude* of *individuals* among its various members. But the action and being of personality would thereby find itself restricted to one branch of the whole, to one kind of action and being. Placed in the element of *being*, personality would take on the meaning of a *determinate* personality; it would cease to be, in truth, universal self-consciousness. Here self-consciousness cannot let itself be cheated out of *actuality*—neither by the *idea* of obedience to *self-given* laws that assign it a part, nor by its *representation* in legislation and universal action. It cannot be cheated out of the actuality of giving the law *itself*, and of accomplishing not an individual work but the universal work *itself*. For

where the self is only *represented* and *imagined*, it is not *actual*; where it is *stood in for*, it is not.

THE FURY OF DISAPPEARING

Universal freedom produces no work but death, and suspicion takes the place of guilt.

589 Just as individual self-consciousness does not find itself in this *universal work* of absolute freedom as existent substance, so it does not find itself in the proper *deeds* and *individual* actions of its will either. For the universal to arrive at a deed, it must gather itself into the One of individuality and place an individual self-consciousness at its head; for the universal will is *actual* will only in a self that is one. But thereby *all other individuals* are excluded from the *whole* of this deed and have only a limited share in it, so that the deed would not be the deed of *actual universal* self-consciousness.—Universal freedom, therefore, can produce no positive work or deed; all that is left to it is *negative action*; it is merely the *fury* of disappearing.

590 But the highest actuality, the one most opposed to universal freedom—or rather the sole object that still comes to be for it—is the freedom and individuality of actual self-consciousness itself. For that universality, which does not let itself arrive at the reality of organic articulation and whose aim is to maintain itself in undivided continuity, at the same time differentiates itself within itself, because it is movement, or consciousness in general. And indeed, by virtue of its own abstraction, it divides itself into equally abstract extremes: into simple, inflexible, cold universality, and into the discrete, absolute, hard brittleness and stubborn point-like isolation of actual self-consciousness. Now that universality has finished destroying the real organization and subsists for itself, this is its sole object—an object that no longer has any other content, possession, existence or external extension, but is only this knowing of itself as an absolutely pure and free individual self. The only thing by which this object can be grasped is its *abstract* existence as such.—Since

these two are indivisibly and absolutely for themselves, and so can send no part into the middle through which they might be linked, their relation is wholly *unmediated* pure negation—and indeed the negation of the individual as something that *is* within the universal. The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore *death*—and a *death*, moreover, that has no inner scope or fulfillment. For what is negated is the unfulfilled point of the absolutely free self. It is thus the coldest, flattest death, with no more significance than chopping through a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water.

591 In the flatness of this single syllable lies the wisdom of the government, the universal will's understanding of how to accomplish itself. The government is itself nothing other than the self-establishing point, or the individuality, of the universal will. As a willing and accomplishing that proceeds from one point, it wills and accomplishes at the same time a determinate ordinance and action. On the one hand, it thereby excludes the remaining individuals from its deed; on the other, it thereby constitutes itself as a government that is a determinate will, and is thereby opposed to the universal will. It therefore simply cannot present itself otherwise than as a *faction*. Only the *victorious* faction is called the government; and precisely in its being a faction lies, immediately, the necessity of its downfall. Conversely, its being the government is what makes it a faction and guilty. When the universal will holds on to the government's actual action as the crime it commits against that will, the government, for its part, has nothing determinate and external through which the guilt of the will opposed to it could show itself. For opposed to the government, as the *actual* universal will, there stands only the non-actual pure will, the *intention*. *Being suspected* therefore takes the place of *being guilty*, or has its meaning and effect. And the external reaction against this actuality, which lies in the simple inwardness of intention, consists in the dry annihilation of this self that is, from which there is nothing else to take away but its very being.

[592] In this, its own proper *work*, absolute freedom becomes an object to itself, and self-consciousness experiences what absolute freedom *is*. *In itself* it is just this *abstract self-consciousness*, which annihilates within itself all difference and all subsistence of difference. As this, it is its own object; the *terror* of death is the intuition of this negative essence of its own. But absolutely free self-consciousness finds this reality of its own quite different from what its concept of itself was—namely, that the universal will was only the *positive* essence of personality, and that personality knew itself in it only positively, or as preserved. Rather, for this self-consciousness—which, as pure insight, utterly separates its positive and its negative essence, the predicateless absolute as pure *thinking* and as pure *matter*—the absolute *transition* from the one into the other is here present in its actuality.—The universal will, as absolutely *positive* actual self-consciousness, turns round into the *negative* essence, because it is this self-conscious actuality *heightened* into *pure* thinking or into *abstract* matter; and it proves to be equally the *sublating* of *thinking oneself*, or of self-consciousness.

FROM TERROR TO MORALITY

Having felt the fear of death, spirit passes into the land of moral self-consciousness.

[593] As the *pure* self-identity of the universal will, absolute freedom therefore has *negation* within it, and with it *difference* in general, and it develops this difference again as *actual* difference. For in the self-identical universal will, pure *negativity* has the *element* of subsistence, or the *substance*, in which its moments are realized; it has the matter that it can use for its determinateness. And insofar as this substance has shown itself to be the negative for individual consciousness, the organization of the spiritual masses takes shape once more, and the multitude of individual consciousnesses is assigned to them. These individuals, having felt the fear of their absolute lord, death, once more accept negation and distinctions, arrange themselves

under the masses, and return to a divided and limited work—but thereby to their substantial actuality.

[594] Out of this tumult, spirit would be hurled back to its starting point, the ethical and real world of culture, which would merely have been refreshed and rejuvenated by the fear of the lord that had once again entered people's hearts. Spirit would have to run through this cycle of necessity anew and repeat it again and again, if the result were only the complete interpenetration of self-consciousness and substance. This would be an interpenetration in which self-consciousness, having experienced the force of its universal essence as negative toward itself, would want to know and find itself not as this particular, but only as universal, and could therefore also bear the objective actuality of universal spirit, which excludes it as a particular. — But in absolute freedom there was no interaction between a consciousness that is sunk in manifold existence, or that fixes determinate aims and thoughts for itself, and an *external* world with validity, whether of actuality or of thought. What interacted was, rather, the world simply in the form of consciousness, as universal will, and likewise self-consciousness drawn together out of all extended existence, or manifold aim and judgment, into the simple self. The culture that self-consciousness attains in interaction with that essence is therefore the most sublime and the last: to see its pure, simple actuality immediately vanish and pass over into empty nothingness. In the world of culture itself, self-consciousness does not get as far as intuiting its negation or alienation in this form of pure abstraction. Rather, its negation there is a filled negation: either the honor or the wealth that it gains in place of the self from which it had alienated itself; or the language of spirit and insight that the disrupted consciousness attains; or the heaven of faith; or the useful of the Enlightenment. All these determinations are lost in the loss that the self undergoes in absolute freedom. Its negation is meaningless death, the pure terror of the negative, which has nothing positive, nothing fulfilling, within it. — At the same time, however, this negation in its actuality is not some-

thing *alien*. It is neither the universal *necessity* lying beyond, in which the ethical world perishes, nor the individual contingency of one's own possessions or of the whim of the possessor, on which the disrupted consciousness sees itself dependent. Rather, it is the *universal will*, which in this its final abstraction has nothing positive and can therefore give nothing back in return for the sacrifice. But for that very reason it is unmediatedly one with self-consciousness; or it is the purely positive because it is the purely negative. And meaningless death, the unfilled negativity of the self, turns round in its inner concept into absolute positivity. For consciousness, the immediate unity of itself with the universal will—its demand to know itself as this determinate point within the universal will—is transformed into the utterly opposite experience. What vanishes for it in this experience is abstract *being*, or the immediacy of the substanceless point; and this vanished immediacy is the universal will itself, which consciousness now knows itself to be, insofar as it is *sublated immediacy*, insofar as it is pure knowing or pure will. Consciousness thereby knows the universal will as itself, and itself as essence—but not as the essence that *immediately is*. It knows the universal will neither as the revolutionary government nor as the anarchy striving to constitute anarchy, nor itself as the center of this faction or of the one opposed to it. Rather, the *universal will* is its *pure knowing and willing*, and *it* is universal will, as this pure knowing and willing. In this it does not lose *itself*, for pure knowing and willing is rather itself, as the atomic point of consciousness. It is thus the interaction of pure knowing with itself: pure *knowing* as *essence* is the universal will, but this *essence* is simply nothing but pure knowing. Self-consciousness is thus the pure knowing of essence as pure knowing. Further, self-consciousness as an *individual self* is only the form of the subject, or of actual action, and it knows this form as *form*. Likewise, for self-consciousness, *objective* actuality, *being*, is utterly selfless form; for such actuality would be what is not known, whereas this knowing knows knowing as the essence.

595 Absolute freedom has thus settled within itself the opposition between universal and individual will. Self-alienated spirit, driven to the peak of its opposition, in which pure willing and the pure willer are still distinct, reduces this opposition to a transparent form and finds itself in it.—Just as the realm of the actual world passes over into the realm of faith and insight, so absolute freedom passes over from its self-destroying actuality into another land of self-conscious spirit. In this land, in this non-actuality, absolute freedom counts as the true. Spirit refreshes itself on the thought of it, insofar as spirit *is thought* and remains so, and knows this being that is enclosed in self-consciousness as the perfect and complete essence. The new shape of *moral spirit* has arisen.

Spirit: Spirit Certain of Itself, Morality

VI.C. Der seiner selbst gewiße Geist. Die Moralität
The moral worldview, dissemblance, conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and forgiveness.

C. SPIRIT CERTAIN OF ITSELF: MORALITY

Self-consciousness now knows its own knowing as the substance, and duty as its essence.

596 The ethical world showed that its fate and its truth was the spirit that had merely departed within it, the *individual self*. But this *person* of legal *right* has its substance and fulfillment outside itself. The movement of the world of culture and of faith sublates this abstraction of the person; and through completed alienation, through the highest abstraction, substance becomes for the self of spirit first the *universal will*, and finally its own property. Here, then, knowing seems at last to have become completely equal to its truth. For its truth is this knowing itself, and all opposition between the two sides has vanished—and not merely *for us*, or *in itself*, but for self-consciousness itself. For self-consciousness has become master over the opposition of consciousness itself. This opposition rests on the opposition between the certainty of oneself and the object. But now the object is for self-consciousness the certainty of itself, knowing—just as the certainty of itself as such no longer has aims of its own, and so is no longer in determinateness, but is pure knowing.

597 For self-consciousness, then, its knowing is *substance* itself. For it, substance is just as much *immediate* as absolutely *mediated*, in an undivided unity. *Immediate*: like ethical conscious-

ness, it knows and does its duty itself, and belongs to duty as to its own nature. But it is not *character*, as ethical consciousness is —which, on account of its immediacy, is a determinate spirit, belongs to only one of the ethical essentialities, and has the side of *not knowing*.—It is *absolute mediation*, like the consciousness that forms itself through culture and the believing consciousness. For it is essentially the movement of the self to sublate the abstraction of *immediate existence* and to become universal to itself—but neither through pure alienation and the tearing apart of its self and of actuality, nor through flight. Rather, it is *immediately present* to itself in its substance, for substance is its knowing; substance is the pure certainty of itself, intuited. And precisely *this immediacy*, which is its own actuality, is all actuality. For the immediate is *being* itself; and as pure immediacy, purified by absolute negativity, it is pure being, it is *being* in general, or *all* being.

598 The absolute essence is therefore not exhausted by the determination of being the simple *essence* of *thinking*; rather, it is all *actuality*, and this actuality exists only as knowing. What consciousness did not know would have no meaning and can be no power for it; all objectivity and all world have withdrawn into its knowing will. It is absolutely free in that it knows its freedom, and precisely this knowing of its freedom is its substance and aim and sole content.

A. THE MORAL WORLD-VIEW

Moral consciousness sets duty against an indifferent nature and postulates their harmony.

599 Self-consciousness knows duty as the absolute essence. It is bound only by duty, and this substance is its own pure consciousness; duty cannot take on the form of something alien for it. But enclosed within itself in this way, moral self-consciousness is not yet posited and considered as *consciousness*. The object is immediate knowing, and, being thus purely permeated by the self, it is not an object. But since self-consciousness is

essentially mediation and negativity, its concept includes relation to an *otherness*; and so it is consciousness. On the one hand, because duty constitutes its sole essential aim and object, this otherness is for it a completely *meaningless* actuality. But because this consciousness is so completely enclosed within itself, it relates to this otherness in a completely free and indifferent way. On the other hand, therefore, existence is an existence that self-consciousness has left completely free, an existence that likewise relates only to itself. The freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer, too, the negative object of its consciousness. This object is thereby a world rounded off within itself into an individuality of its own, an independent whole of its own peculiar laws, as well as an independent course and free realization of these laws—a *nature* in general, whose laws, like its action, belong to itself, as a being that is unconcerned about moral self-consciousness, just as moral self-consciousness is unconcerned about it.

600 From this determination there develops a *moral world-view*, which consists in the *relation* between *moral* being-in-and-for-itself and *natural* being-in-and-for-itself. This relation is based, on the one hand, on the complete *indifference* toward each other, and the *independence* proper to each, of *nature* and of *moral* aims and activity; on the other hand, on the consciousness that duty alone is essential and that nature is completely dependent and inessential. The moral world-view contains the development of the moments contained in this relation between such thoroughly conflicting presuppositions.[1]

601 First, then, moral consciousness in general is presupposed. Duty counts for it as the essence—for it, which is *actual* and *active*, and which fulfills duty in its actuality and deed. But for this moral consciousness there is at the same time the presupposed freedom of nature; or it *experiences* that nature is unconcerned with giving it the consciousness of the unity of its actuality with

1 Hegel's "moral world-view" reconstructs above all Kant's practical philosophy, including the postulates of practical reason in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788); Fichte is also in view.

nature's own, and so lets it *perhaps become happy*, *perhaps* also *not*. Immoral consciousness, by contrast, perhaps finds its realization by chance, where moral consciousness sees only an *occasion* for acting, but does not see itself granted, through that acting, the happiness of carrying it out and of enjoying its accomplishment. It therefore finds, rather, grounds for complaint about such a state of incongruity between itself and existence, and about the injustice that restricts it to having its object only as *pure duty*, but refuses to let it see this object, and *itself*, realized.

602 Moral consciousness cannot renounce happiness and leave this moment out of its absolute aim. The aim that is expressed as *pure duty* essentially has this about it: that it contains this *individual* self-consciousness. *Individual conviction* and the knowing of it constituted an absolute moment of morality. This moment in the aim that has become *objective*, in duty *fulfilled*, is the *individual* consciousness intuiting itself as realized—or *enjoyment*. Enjoyment thus lies, not indeed immediately in the concept of morality considered as *disposition*, but in the concept of its *realization*. Thereby, however, it also lies in morality as *disposition*; for disposition aims not to remain disposition as opposed to action, but to *act*, or to realize itself. The aim, then, expressed as the whole together with the consciousness of its moments, is this: that fulfilled duty be just as much a purely moral action as realized *individuality*, and that *nature*, as the side of *singularity* against the abstract aim, be *one* with that aim.—However necessary the experience of the disharmony between the two sides may be, since nature is free, it is equally the case that duty alone is the essential, and nature, over against it, is the selfless. That whole *aim* which harmony constitutes contains actuality itself within it. It is at the same time the *thought* of *actuality*. The harmony of morality and nature—or, since nature comes into consideration only insofar as consciousness experiences nature's unity with itself, the harmony of morality and happiness—is *thought* as necessarily *being*; that is, it is *postulated*. For *demanding* expresses that something not yet actual is thought as *being*: a

necessity not of the *concept* as concept, but of *being*. But necessity is at the same time essentially relation through the concept. The demanded *being* therefore does not belong to the representing of contingent consciousness; it lies in the concept of morality itself, whose true content is the *unity* of *pure* and *individual* consciousness. To individual consciousness it belongs that this unity be *for it* as an actuality—which in the *content* of the aim is happiness, but in its *form* is existence in general.—This demanded existence, or the unity of the two, is therefore not a wish; nor, considered as an aim, is it one whose attainment would still be uncertain. Rather, it is a demand of reason, or reason's immediate certainty and presupposition.

THE POSTULATES

The demand for harmony gives rise to a whole circle of postulates, ending in a holy lawgiver.

603 That first experience and this postulate are not the only ones; rather, a whole circle of postulates opens up. For nature is not merely this completely free *external* mode in which, as in a pure object, consciousness would have to realize its aim. Consciousness is *in itself* essentially something *for which* this other free actuality exists; that is, it is itself something contingent and natural. This nature, which is its own, is *sensuousness*. In the *shape* of willing, as *drives* and *inclinations*, sensuousness has for itself a *determinate* essentiality of its own, or *individual aims*, and is thus opposed to the pure will and its pure aim. Over against this opposition, however, what is essential for pure consciousness is rather the relation of sensuousness to it, sensuousness's absolute unity with it. Both pure thinking and the sensuousness of consciousness are *in themselves one consciousness*, and pure thinking is precisely that for which and in which this pure unity exists; but for pure thinking, as consciousness, there is the opposition between itself and the drives. In this conflict between reason and sensuousness, what is essential for reason is that the conflict dissolve, and that the unity of the two emerge

as a *result*. This is not that *original* unity consisting in both being in one individual, but a unity that emerges from the *known* opposition of the two. Only such unity is *actual* morality. For it contains the opposition through which the self is consciousness, or is for the first time an actual self, a self in fact, and at the same time universal. Or: in it is expressed that *mediation* which, as we see, is essential to morality.—Of the two moments of the opposition, sensuousness is simply *otherness,* or the negative, whereas the pure thought of duty is the essence, of which nothing can be given up. So the unity to be produced seems able to come about only through the sublation of sensuousness. But since sensuousness is itself a moment of this becoming, the moment of *actuality*, one will at first have to be content to express the unity by saying that sensuousness is *in conformity* with morality. — This unity is likewise a *postulated being*; it is not *there*. For what *is there* is consciousness, or the opposition between sensuousness and pure consciousness. But at the same time it is not an in-itself like the first postulate, in which free nature constitutes one side, so that nature's harmony with moral consciousness falls outside that consciousness. Rather, nature here is the nature that is in consciousness itself; and what is at issue here is morality as such, a harmony that is the acting self's own. Consciousness therefore has to bring this harmony about itself and to keep making progress in morality. But the *completion* of this harmony is to be *postponed to infinity*; for if it actually came about, moral consciousness would sublate itself. For *morality* is moral *consciousness* only as the negative essence, for whose pure duty sensuousness has only a *negative* significance, is only *not in conformity*. In harmony, however, *morality* vanishes as *consciousness*, or its *actuality* vanishes—just as in moral *consciousness*, or actuality, its *harmony* vanishes. Completion is therefore not actually attainable, but is only to be thought as an *absolute task,* that is, as a task that simply remains a task.[2] At the same time, however, its content is to be thought as

2 An allusion to Kant's postulate of immortality, which he grounds in the need for an endless progress toward holiness.

one that simply *must be*, and does not remain a task—whether one imagines consciousness in this goal as wholly sublated or not. How the matter really stands can no longer be clearly made out in the dark distance of infinity, to which, for precisely this reason, the attainment of the goal has to be pushed off. Properly speaking, it will have to be said that the determinate representation is not supposed to be of interest and is not to be sought, because this leads to contradictions—of a task that is to remain a task and yet be fulfilled, of a morality that is no longer to be consciousness, no longer to be actual. But the consideration that completed morality would contain a contradiction would damage the holiness of the moral essentiality, and absolute duty would appear as something non-actual.

604 The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective nature, the final end of the *world*; the other, the harmony of morality and the sensuous will, the final end of *self-consciousness* as such. The first, then, is harmony in the form of the *in-itself*, the other in the form of *being-for-self*. But what connects these two extreme final ends, which are thought, as their middle term, is the movement of *actual* action itself. They are harmonies whose moments, in their abstract distinctness, have not yet become an object. This happens in actuality, in which the sides appear in consciousness proper, each as the *other* of the other. The postulates that thereby arise contain harmonies that are *in and for themselves*, whereas before they contained only the separated harmonies that are *in themselves* and *for themselves*.

605 As the *simple knowing* and *willing* of pure *duty*, moral consciousness is related in action to the object opposed to its simplicity—to the actuality of the *manifold case*—and thereby has a manifold moral *relationship*. Here there arise, as regards content, the *many* laws in general, and as regards form, the conflicting powers of knowing consciousness and of what lacks consciousness.—As for, first, the *many duties*: for moral consciousness in general only the *pure duty* in them counts. The *many duties*, as many, are *determinate* duties and therefore, as such, nothing holy for moral consciousness. At the same time, how-

ever, they are *necessary* through the concept of *action*, which includes a manifold actuality and therefore a manifold moral relation, and so they must be regarded as being in and for themselves. Further, since they can exist only in a moral *consciousness*, they exist at the same time in a consciousness other than the one for which only pure duty, as pure, is in and for itself and holy.

606 It is therefore postulated that there is *another* consciousness, which hallows the many duties, or which knows and wills them as duties. The first consciousness maintains pure duty as *indifferent* to all *determinate content*, and duty is only this indifference to content. The other, however, contains the equally essential relation to action and the *necessity* of *determinate* content. Since duties count for it as *determinate* duties, content as such is just as essential to it as the form by which content is duty. This consciousness is thereby one in which universal and particular are simply one; its concept is therefore the same as the concept of the harmony of morality and happiness. For this opposition likewise expresses the separation of *self-identical* moral consciousness from actuality, which, as *manifold being*, conflicts with the simple essence of duty. But whereas the first postulate expresses only the harmony of morality and nature that *is*, because nature in it is this negative of self-consciousness, the moment of *being*, now, by contrast, this *in-itself* is essentially posited as consciousness. For what is now has the form of the *content* of *duty*, or is the *determinateness* in the *determinate duty*. The in-itself is thus the unity of terms that exist as *simple essentialities*, essentialities of thought, and therefore only in a consciousness. This consciousness is thus now a lord and ruler of the world, who brings about the harmony of morality and happiness, and at the same time hallows duties as *many*. The latter means that for the consciousness of *pure duty* the determinate duty cannot be immediately holy. But because the determinate duty is equally *necessary* for the sake of actual action, which is determinate, its necessity falls outside that consciousness into another. This other consciousness is thus what

mediates between determinate and pure duty, and is the ground of the determinate duty's also being valid.

607 In actual action, however, consciousness relates itself as this self, as a completely individual one. It is directed toward actuality as such and has actuality as its aim, for it wants to accomplish something. *Duty in general* thus falls outside it into another being, which is consciousness and the holy lawgiver of pure duty. For the acting consciousness, precisely because it is acting, what is other than pure duty counts immediately. Pure duty is therefore the content of another consciousness, and it is holy for the acting consciousness only mediately, namely in that other.

608 Since it is thereby posited that the validity of duty as holy *in and for itself* falls outside actual consciousness, actual consciousness thereby stands altogether on one side, as the *imperfect* moral consciousness. As regards its *knowing*, it thus knows itself as one whose knowing and conviction are incomplete and contingent; likewise, as regards its *willing*, as one whose aims are affected by sensuousness. On account of its unworthiness, therefore, it cannot regard happiness as necessary, but only as something contingent, and can expect it only from grace.

609 But although its actuality is imperfect, duty nonetheless counts as the essence for its *pure* will and knowing. In concept, insofar as the concept is opposed to reality, or in thought, it is therefore perfect. The absolute essence, however, is precisely this thought, postulated beyond actuality. It is therefore the thought in which morally imperfect knowing and willing count as perfect; and the absolute essence, taking them as fully valid, thereby also dispenses happiness according to worthiness, namely according to the *merit ascribed* to them.

610 Herewith the world-view is completed. For in the concept of moral self-consciousness the two sides, pure duty and actuality, are posited in one unity, and thereby neither the one nor the other is posited as being in and for itself, but each as a *moment*, or as sublated. This comes to be for consciousness in the last part of the moral world-view. For consciousness places pure

duty in a being other than itself—that is, it posits pure duty partly as something *represented*, partly as something that is not what counts in and for itself; instead, what is not moral counts as perfect. Likewise, it posits itself as one whose actuality, which is incommensurate with duty, is sublated, and which, as *sublated* —or in the *representation* of the absolute essence—no longer contradicts morality.

611 For moral consciousness itself, however, its moral world-view does not have the significance that in it it develops its own concept and makes this concept its object. It is conscious neither of this opposition of form nor of the opposition as regards content, whose parts it does not relate to and compare with one another. Instead, in its development it rolls onward without being the *concept* that holds the moments together. For it knows only the *pure essence*—or the object insofar as it is *duty*, insofar as it is the *abstract* object of its pure consciousness—as pure knowing, or as itself. It thus relates itself only by thinking, not by comprehending. Hence the object of its *actual* consciousness is not yet transparent to it. It is not the absolute Concept, which alone grasps *otherness* as such, or its absolute opposite, as itself. Its own actuality, like all objective actuality, counts for it, to be sure, as the *inessential*; but its freedom is the freedom of pure thinking, and for that very reason nature has at the same time arisen over against this freedom as something equally free. Because both are in it in the same way—the *freedom of being* and the enclosedness of being within consciousness—its object becomes one that *is* and that is *at the same time* only *thought*. In the last part of its world-view, the content is essentially posited in such a way that its *being* is a *represented* being; and this combination of being and thinking is expressed as what it in fact is: *representing*.

612 When we consider the moral world-view in such a way that this objective mode is nothing other than the concept of moral self-consciousness itself, which it makes objective to itself, then this consciousness of the form of its origin yields another shape in which it is presented.—The first thing from which we start is

actual moral self-consciousness, or the fact that *there is such a thing*. For the concept posits it in the determination that for it all actuality whatever has essence only insofar as it conforms to duty; and the concept posits this essence as knowing, that is, in immediate unity with the actual self. This unity is thus itself actual; it *is* a moral actual consciousness. — Now this consciousness, as consciousness, represents its content to itself as an object, namely as the *final end of the world*, as the harmony of morality and all actuality. But since it represents this unity as an *object*, and is not yet the Concept that has power over the object as such, the unity is for it a negative of self-consciousness. In other words, the unity falls outside it, as a beyond of its actuality—but at the same time as something that is *also* thought as *being*, though only thought.

613 What is thereby left to it—to it which, as self-consciousness, is *something other* than the object—is the non-harmony of the consciousness of duty and actuality, and indeed of its own actuality. The proposition thus now runs: *there is no morally complete actual* self-consciousness. And since the moral exists at all only insofar as it is complete—for duty is the *pure*, unmixed *in-itself*, and morality consists only in conformity to this pure—the second proposition runs, in general, that there is *no morally actual* self-consciousness.

614 But since, thirdly, it is one self, it is *in itself* the unity of duty and actuality. This unity therefore becomes its object, as completed morality—but as a *beyond* of its actuality—a beyond that is nevertheless supposed to be actual.

615 In this goal, the synthetic unity of the first two propositions, self-conscious actuality and duty alike are posited only as sublated moments. For neither exists singly; but these two, whose essential determination is to be *free of the other*, are thus, each of them, no longer free of the other in the unity, and so each is sublated. As regards content, therefore, they become an object as terms of which *each counts for the other*; and as regards form, in such a way that this exchange between them is at the same time only *represented*.—Or: what is *actually not* moral is

nevertheless moral in representation, because it is equally pure thinking and raised above its actuality; and it is taken as fully valid. The first proposition, that there *is* a moral self-consciousness, is thereby restored, but combined with the second, that there *is* none. That is: there *is* one, but only in representation; or, there is indeed none, but another nevertheless lets it count as one.

B. DISSEMBLANCE

The moral world-view keeps setting up positions and displacing them, never in earnest about any.

616 In the moral world-view we see, on the one hand, consciousness *itself consciously producing* its object. We see that it neither comes upon the object as something alien, nor has the object come to be for it unconsciously; rather, it everywhere proceeds from a ground on the basis of which it *posits the objective essence*. It therefore knows this essence as itself, for it knows itself as the *active* agent that produces it. It seems, then, to arrive here at its rest and satisfaction; for it can find these only where it no longer needs to go beyond its object, because the object no longer goes beyond it. On the other hand, however, it itself rather places the object *outside itself*, as a beyond of itself. But this being that is in and for itself is equally posited as something that is not free of self-consciousness, but exists for the sake of self-consciousness and through it.

617 The moral world-view is therefore in fact nothing other than the elaboration of this underlying contradiction in its various aspects. It is—to use a Kantian expression here, where it is most apt—a *whole nest* of thoughtless contradictions. In this development consciousness proceeds by fixing one moment, passing directly from there to the other, and sublating the first. But once it *has set up* this second moment, it *also displaces* it

again, and instead makes the opposite into the essence.[3] At the same time, consciousness is conscious of its contradiction and of its *displacing, too*. For it passes from one moment to the opposite *immediately*, *in relation to that very moment*. *Because* a moment has no reality for it, it posits that very moment as *real*; or, what is the same thing, in order to assert *one moment* as being in itself, it asserts the *opposite* moment as what is in itself. It thereby confesses that it is in fact not in earnest about any of them. This is to be examined more closely in the moments of this dizzying movement.

618 Let us first leave aside the presupposition that there is an actual moral consciousness, since it is not made immediately in relation to anything preceding, and turn to the harmony of morality and nature, the first postulate. This harmony is supposed to be *in itself*: not for actual consciousness, not present. Rather, the present is only the contradiction of the two. In the present, *morality* is assumed to be *on hand*, and actuality is so placed that it is not in harmony with morality. But the *actual* moral consciousness is an *acting* one; it is precisely in this that the actuality of its morality consists. In *action* itself, however, this position is immediately displaced. For action is nothing other than the realization of the inner moral purpose, nothing other than the production of an *actuality determined by the purpose*, or of the harmony of the moral purpose and actuality itself. At the same time, the accomplishment of the action is for consciousness: it is the *presence* of this unity of actuality and purpose. In the accomplished action, consciousness realizes itself as this individual, or beholds existence returned into itself, and enjoyment consists in this. So the actuality of the moral purpose also contains that form of it which is called enjoyment and happiness. — Action thus in fact immediately fulfills what was set up as not taking place, as meant to be only a postulate, only a beyond. Through

3 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 609/B 637), calls the cosmological proof "a whole nest of dialectical presumptions." Hegel plays on *aufstellen* (set up) and *verstellen* (displace, misplace, but also dissemble); the section title *Die Verstellung* carries both senses, "displacement" and "dissemblance."

the deed, then, consciousness declares that it is not in earnest about postulating, since the meaning of action is rather this: to make present what was not supposed to be in the present. And the harmony is postulated for the sake of action—for what is to become *actual* through action must be so *in itself*, otherwise its actuality would not be *possible*. So the connection of action and postulate is constituted in such a way that for the sake of action, that is, for the sake of the *actual* harmony of purpose and actuality, this harmony is posited as *not actual*, as *beyond*.

619 When *action* takes place, then, the *incongruity* of purpose and actuality is not taken in earnest at all; action itself, on the other hand, seems to be taken in earnest. But in fact the actual action is only the action of an *individual* consciousness, and so is itself only something individual, and the work is contingent. The purpose of reason, however, as the universal, all-embracing purpose, is nothing less than the whole world: a final purpose that goes far beyond the content of this individual action, and must therefore be placed beyond all actual action altogether. Because the general good is supposed to be carried out, nothing good gets done. In fact, however, the *nullity* of actual action and the *reality* of the *whole* purpose alone, which have now been set up, are displaced again in every respect. The moral action is not something contingent and limited, for its essence is pure *duty*. Pure duty constitutes the *sole, whole* purpose; and so the action, as the realization of this purpose, is the accomplishment of the whole absolute purpose, however limited its content may otherwise be. Or again, suppose actuality is taken as nature, which has its *own* laws and is opposed to pure duty, so that duty cannot realize its law in it. Then, since duty as such is the essence, what matters is in fact *not the accomplishment* of pure duty, which is the whole purpose. For accomplishment would have as its purpose not pure duty but its opposite, *actuality*. But the claim that actuality does not matter is displaced again. For according to the concept of moral action, pure duty is essentially *active* consciousness; so action certainly ought to take place, absolute duty

ought to be expressed in the whole of nature, and the moral law ought to become natural law.

620 If, then, we let this *highest good* count as the essence, consciousness is not in earnest about morality at all. For in this highest good nature does not have a law other than the one morality has. Moral action itself thereby falls away, since action exists only on the presupposition of something negative that is to be sublated by the action. But if nature conforms to the moral law, then that law would surely be violated by action, by the sublating of what is.—In that assumption, then, the essential state is admitted to be one in which moral action is superfluous and does not take place at all. The postulate of the harmony of morality and actuality—a harmony posited by the concept of moral action, which is to bring the two into agreement—is therefore also expressed, from this side, as follows: because moral action is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is that moral action should not exist at all.

621 If we put together these moments through which consciousness rolled onward in its moral representing, it becomes clear that it sublates each of them again in its opposite. It starts from the point that *for it* morality and actuality are not in harmony. But it is not in earnest about this, for in action the presence of this harmony is *for it*. Yet it is not in earnest about this *action* either, since action is something individual; for it has so lofty a purpose, *the highest good*. This, however, is again only a dissemblance of the matter, for in the highest good all action and all morality would fall away. Or, strictly speaking, it is not in earnest about *moral* action; rather, what is most desirable, the absolute, is that the highest good be carried out and moral action become superfluous.

622 From this result consciousness must roll onward in its contradictory movement, and necessarily displace again the *sublating* of moral action. Morality is the in-itself. For morality to take place, the final purpose of the world cannot be carried out; rather, the moral consciousness must be *for itself* and must find before it a *nature opposed* to it. But in its own self it must be per-

fected. This leads to the second postulate: the harmony of moral consciousness with the nature that is immediately in it, namely sensuousness. The moral self-consciousness sets up its purpose as pure, as independent of inclinations and drives, so that it has obliterated the purposes of sensuousness within itself.—But it displaces again this sublation of the sensuous being that it has set up. It acts; it brings its purpose into actuality. And the self-conscious sensuousness that is supposed to be sublated is precisely this middle term between pure consciousness and actuality—it is the instrument or organ by which pure consciousness realizes itself, and is what is called drive and inclination. So consciousness is not in earnest about sublating inclinations and drives, for these are precisely *self-consciousness realizing itself*. But neither are they supposed to be *suppressed*; they are only to *conform* to reason. And they do conform to it, for moral *action* is nothing other than consciousness realizing itself, and so giving itself the shape of a *drive*; that is, moral action is immediately the present harmony of drive and morality. But in fact drive is not only this empty shape, which could have within it a spring other than itself and be driven by that spring. For sensuousness is a nature that has its own laws and springs within itself. Morality therefore cannot be in earnest about being the driving spring of the drives, the angle of inclination of the inclinations. For since the drives and inclinations have their own fixed determinateness and their own peculiar content, it would rather be the consciousness that they conformed to that conformed to them—a conformity the moral self-consciousness will not stand for. The harmony of the two is thus only *in itself*, and *postulated*. — In moral action the *present* harmony of morality and sensuousness was just now set up; but this *has now been* displaced. The harmony lies beyond consciousness in a misty distance where nothing can any longer be precisely distinguished or comprehended; for the comprehending of this unity that we just attempted did not work.—In this in-itself, however, consciousness gives itself up altogether. This in-itself is its moral perfection, in which the struggle of morality and sensuousness has

ceased, and sensuousness conforms to morality in a way that cannot be grasped. — That is why this perfection is again only a dissemblance of the matter. For in it *morality* itself would in fact rather give itself up. Morality is only consciousness of the absolute purpose as the *pure* purpose, and so in *opposition* to all other purposes. It is the *activity* of this pure purpose to the same extent that it is conscious of rising above sensuousness, of the admixture of sensuousness, and of its opposition to and struggle with it.—That it is not in earnest about moral perfection, consciousness itself declares immediately by displacing that perfection out into *infinity*, that is, by asserting that it is never perfected.

623 What is valid for it, then, is rather only this intermediate state of non-perfection—a state that is nonetheless supposed at least to be a *progress* toward perfection. But it cannot be even this, for progress in morality would rather be an approach toward morality's demise. The goal, namely, would be the nothing mentioned above, the sublation of morality and of consciousness itself; and to come ever nearer and nearer to nothing means to *decrease*. Besides, *progress* in general, like *decrease*, would assume differences of *magnitude* in morality; but there can be no question of these in it. In morality, as the consciousness for which the ethical purpose is *pure* duty, no diversity at all is to be thought of, least of all the superficial diversity of magnitude. There is only a single virtue, only a single pure duty, only a single morality.

HAPPINESS, ENVY AND THE HOLY LAWGIVER

Complaints that the wicked prosper prove to be envy, and the holy lawgiver another dissemblance.

624 Since, then, consciousness is not in earnest about moral perfection but rather about the intermediate state—that is, as just discussed, about non-morality—we come back from another side to the content of the first postulate. For it is impossible to see how happiness can be demanded for this moral conscious-

ness on the ground of its *worthiness*. It is conscious of its non-perfection, and so in fact cannot demand happiness as a merit, as something of which it is worthy. It can only ask for it out of free grace—that is, it can only long for happiness as *such,* in and for itself—and expect it not on that absolute ground but according to chance and caprice. — Non-morality declares precisely here what it is: that what matters to it is not morality but happiness in and for itself, without relation to morality.

625 Through this second side of the moral world-view, the other assertion of the first side is also sublated, the one in which the disharmony of morality and happiness is presupposed.—For people claim to have the experience that in this present world things often go badly for the moral person, whereas they often go well for the immoral one. But the intermediate state of imperfect morality, which has turned out to be the essential one, clearly shows that this perception, this would-be experience, is only a dissemblance of the matter. For since morality is imperfect—that is, since morality in fact is *not*—what can there be to the experience that things go badly for it? — Since it has at the same time emerged that what matters is happiness in and for itself, it becomes clear that the judgment that things go well for the immoral person did not mean that some wrong takes place here. Since morality in general is imperfect, calling an individual immoral falls away *in itself*, and so has only an arbitrary ground. The sense and content of this judgment of experience is thus solely this: that happiness in and for itself ought not to fall to some people—that is, it is *envy*, which takes morality as its cloak. The reason, however, why so-called good fortune should fall to others is good friendship: for them and for itself, this grace—that is, this chance—is what it gladly *grants* and *wishes*.

626 Morality in the moral consciousness is therefore imperfect —this is what is now set up. But its essence is to be only the *perfect, pure* morality; imperfect morality is therefore impure, or it is immorality. Morality itself, then, is in a being other than actual consciousness: it is a holy moral lawgiver.—The morality that is *imperfect* in consciousness, which is the ground of this

postulating, means *first of all* this: morality, in being posited as *actual* in consciousness, stands in relation to an *other*, to an existence, and so itself acquires within it otherness or difference, from which there arises a manifold multitude of moral commandments. At the same time, however, the moral self-consciousness regards these *many* duties as inessential. For what matters to it is only the *one* pure duty, and *for it* the many duties, insofar as they are *determinate*, have no truth. So they can have their truth only in an other, and they are—what they are not for moral self-consciousness—holy through a holy lawgiver.—But this itself is again only a dissemblance of the matter. For the moral self-consciousness is, to itself, the absolute, and duty is simply and solely what *it knows* as duty. But it knows only pure duty as duty; what is not holy to it is not holy in itself, and what is not holy in itself cannot be made holy by the holy being. Moreover, the moral consciousness is not in earnest at all about letting something be made holy *by a consciousness other* than itself; for to it only that is holy which is holy to it *through itself and within it*.—So it is just as little in earnest about this other being's being holy; for in that being something was supposed to attain essentiality which, for the moral consciousness—that is, in itself—has no essentiality.

627 If the holy being was postulated so that in it duty would have its validity not as pure duty but as a plurality of *determinate* duties, then this must be displaced again, and the other being must be holy only insofar as in it *pure duty* alone has validity. And in fact pure duty has validity only in an other being, not in the moral consciousness. Although pure morality alone seems to hold in the moral consciousness, this must nevertheless be put differently, for that consciousness is at the same time natural consciousness. In it, morality is affected and conditioned by sensuousness, and so is not in and for itself but a contingency of the free *will*; while in it as pure *will*, morality is a contingency of *knowing*. *In and for itself*, therefore, morality is in an other being.

628 This being, then, is here the purely perfected morality, because in it morality does not stand in relation to nature and sensuousness. But the *reality* of pure duty is its *realization* in nature and sensuousness. The moral consciousness locates its imperfection in the fact that in it morality has a *positive* relation to nature and sensuousness, since it regards it as an essential moment of morality that morality should have simply and solely a *negative* relation to them. The pure moral being, by contrast, because it is exalted above the *struggle* with nature and sensuousness, does not stand in a *negative* relation to them. So in fact all that remains to it is the *positive* relation to them—that is, precisely what just now counted as the imperfect, the immoral. *Pure morality*, however, completely separated from actuality, so that it would likewise be without positive relation to it, would be an unconscious, non-actual abstraction, in which the concept of morality—to be the thinking of pure duty, and a willing and doing—would be utterly sublated. This so purely moral being is therefore again a dissemblance of the matter, and must be given up.

629 In this purely moral being, however, the moments of the contradiction in which this synthetic representing drifts about come so close together—as do the opposed *Alsos* that it lets follow one another, one opposite always relieving the other, without bringing these thoughts of its together—that consciousness must here give up its moral world-view and flee back into itself.[4]

630 Consciousness acknowledges its morality as not perfected because it is affected by a sensuousness and nature opposed to that morality. This sensuousness and nature partly clouds morality itself as such, and partly gives rise to a multitude of duties, through which consciousness is put in a quandary in the concrete case of actual action. For each case is the concretion of many moral relations, just as an object of perception in general is a thing of many properties; and since the *determinate* duty is a

4 The "Also" recalls the chapter on perception, where the Thing is a bundle of properties joined only by "also."

purpose, it has a content, and its *content* is part of the purpose, so that morality is not pure.—Morality therefore has its *reality* in an other being. But this reality means nothing other than that morality is here *in* and *for itself—for itself*, that is, that it is the morality of a *consciousness*; *in itself*, that is, that it has *existence* and *actuality*.—In that first, imperfect consciousness, morality is not carried out; in it, morality is the *in-itself* in the sense of a *thought-entity*. For it is associated with nature and sensuousness, with the actuality of being and of consciousness, which makes up its content, and nature and sensuousness are what is morally null.—In the second consciousness, morality is present as *perfected*, and not as an unexecuted thought-entity. But this perfection consists precisely in the fact that morality has, in a *consciousness, actuality*, as well as *free actuality*, existence in general; that it is not the empty but the filled morality, rich in content.—That is, the perfection of morality is placed in the fact that what was just now determined as morally null is present in it and within it. On the one hand, morality is supposed to have validity simply and solely as the non-actual thought-entity of pure abstraction; but equally, in this mode, it is supposed to have no validity. Its truth is supposed to consist in being opposed to actuality, entirely free of it and empty—and again in being actuality.

631 The syncretism of these contradictions, laid out in the moral world-view, collapses in on itself. For the difference on which it rests—the difference between something that must necessarily be thought and posited and yet is at the same time inessential—becomes a difference that no longer lies even in the words. What is in the end posited as something different, both as the null and as the real, is one and the very same thing: existence and actuality. And what is supposed to be absolutely only the *beyond* of actual being and consciousness, and equally supposed to be the null only in it and as a beyond, is pure duty and the knowing of pure duty as the essence. The consciousness that makes this difference which is no difference—that declares actuality to be at once the null and the real, and pure morality likewise to be both the true essence and what is without essence—

expresses together the thoughts it previously separated. It declares, itself, that it is not in earnest about this determination and about setting apart the moments of the *self* and of the *in-itself*. Rather, what it declares to be the absolute, as what *is* outside consciousness, it in fact keeps enclosed within the self of self-consciousness; and what it declares to be the absolutely *thought*, or the absolute *in-itself*, it for that very reason takes to be something that has no truth. — It becomes apparent to consciousness that setting these moments apart is a dissemblance, and it would be *hypocrisy* if it nevertheless kept to it. But as pure moral self-consciousness it flees back into itself with abhorrence from this inequality between its *representing* and what its *essence* is—from this untruth that declares true what it regards as untrue. It is *pure conscience*, which spurns such a moral representation of the world. It is, *within itself*, the simple spirit certain of itself, which acts conscientiously and immediately, without the mediation of those representations, and has its truth in this immediacy.[5] — But if this world of dissemblance is nothing other than the development of the moral self-consciousness in its moments, and hence its *reality*, then by going back into itself it will become nothing different in its essence. Its going back into itself is rather only the *attained consciousness* that its truth is a pretended one. It *would* still *have to pass* this truth *off* as *its* truth, since it would have to express and present itself as an objective representation; but it *would know* that this is only a dissemblance. It would thus in fact be hypocrisy, and that *spurning* of that dissemblance would already be the first expression of hypocrisy.

5 Gewissen (conscience) is linked in German to gewiss (certain) and Gewissheit (certainty); Hegel exploits this, defining conscience as spirit certain of itself.

C. CONSCIENCE, THE BEAUTIFUL SOUL, EVIL AND ITS FORGIVENESS

Conscience acts on its own immediate certainty, giving empty duty a content of its own.

632 The antinomy of the moral world-view—that there is a moral consciousness and that there is none; or that the validity of duty is a beyond of consciousness and, conversely, takes place only in consciousness—had been drawn together into the representation in which the non-moral consciousness would count as moral, its contingent knowing and willing would be accepted as fully weighty, and happiness would fall to it by grace. The moral self-consciousness did not take this self-contradictory representation upon itself but transferred it to a being other than itself. But this placing outside itself of what it must think as necessary is just as much a contradiction in form as that representation is in content. But in itself, what appears as contradictory—what the moral world-view drifts about in, separating it and dissolving it again—is the same thing. Pure duty, as *pure knowing*, is nothing other than the *self* of consciousness, and the self of consciousness is *being* and actuality;—likewise, what is supposed to be beyond *actual* consciousness is nothing other than pure thinking, and so is in fact the self. Because this is so, self-consciousness, *for us* or *in itself*, goes back into itself and knows as itself that being in which the *actual* is at the same time *pure knowing* and *pure duty*. To itself it is what is fully valid in its contingency, what knows its immediate singularity as pure knowing and acting, as the true actuality and harmony.

633 This *self of conscience*, spirit immediately certain of itself as absolute truth and being, is the *third self*, which has come to be for us out of the third world of spirit; it should be briefly compared with the preceding selves. The totality or actuality that presents itself as the truth of the ethical world is the self of the *person*; its existence is *being-recognized*. Just as the person is the self empty of substance, so this existence of the person is likewise abstract actuality. The person *counts*, and does so immedi-

ately. The self is the point resting immediately in the element of its being; it is without separation from its universality, so the two are not in movement and relation to each other. The universal is in the self without distinction; it is not the content of the self, nor is the self filled by itself.—The *second self* is the world of culture come to its truth, or the spirit of division restored to itself—absolute freedom. In this self, that first immediate unity of singularity and universality comes apart. The universal, which likewise remains purely spiritual essence, being-recognized, or universal will and knowing, is the *object* and content of the self and its universal actuality. But it does not have the form of existence free of the self; in this self, therefore, it arrives at no filling and no positive content, at no world. The moral self-consciousness does indeed let its universality go free, so that it becomes a nature of its own, and equally it holds it fast within itself as sublated. But it is only the dissembling play of alternation between these two determinations. Only as conscience does it have, in its *self-certainty*, the *content* for the previously empty duty, as well as for empty right and the empty universal will; and because this self-certainty is equally the *immediate*, it has existence itself.

634 Having arrived at this truth of its own, the moral self-consciousness thus abandons—or rather sublates within itself—the separation from which the dissemblance arose: the separation of the *in-itself* and the *self*, of pure duty as pure *purpose* and *actuality* as a nature and sensuousness opposed to the pure purpose. Having thus returned into itself, it is *concrete* moral spirit. This spirit does not make the consciousness of pure duty into an empty standard that would be opposed to actual consciousness; rather, pure duty, like the nature opposed to it, is a sublated moment. This spirit is, in immediate unity, a *self-realizing moral* being, and its action is immediately a *concrete* moral shape.

635 A case for action is at hand; it is an objective actuality for the knowing consciousness. This consciousness, as conscience, knows the case in an immediate, concrete way, and at the same time the case is only as conscience knows it. Knowing is contin-

gent insofar as it is something other than the object. But spirit certain of itself is no longer such a contingent knowing, a creating within itself of thoughts from which actuality would be distinct. Rather, since the separation of the *in-itself* and the *self* is sublated, the case is immediately, in the sense-*certainty* of knowing, as it is *in itself*; and it is *in itself* only in the way it is in this knowing. — Action, as realization, is thereby the pure form of the will: the mere conversion of actuality as a case that *is* into an actuality that is *done*, the conversion of the mere mode of *objective* knowing into the mode of knowing actuality as something produced by consciousness. Just as sense-certainty is taken up immediately into the in-itself of spirit, or rather converted into it, so this conversion too is simple and unmediated: a transition through the pure concept without change of the content, which is determined by the interest of the consciousness that knows of it.—Furthermore, conscience does not separate the circumstances of the case into different duties. It does not relate itself as a *positive universal medium* in which the many duties would each, on its own account, acquire unshifting substantiality. If it did, *either* no action at all could take place—because every concrete case contains opposition in general, and as a moral case contains the opposition of duties, so that in determining the action one side, one duty, would always be *violated*;—*or*, if action did take place, the violation of one of the opposed duties would actually occur. Conscience is rather the negative One, or absolute self, which obliterates these various moral substances. It is simple action in accordance with duty, which fulfills not this or that duty but knows and does what is concretely right. It is thus only here that there is moral *action* as action at all, into which the preceding deedless consciousness of morality has passed. — The concrete shape of the deed may be analyzed by a distinguishing consciousness into various properties—that is, here, into various moral relations—and these may either each be declared absolutely valid, as each must be if it is to be duty, or else be compared and examined. In the simple moral action of conscience, the duties are so buried that all these individual

beings are immediately *impaired*, and the testing shaking of duty does not occur at all in the unwavering certainty of conscience.

[636] Just as little is there present in conscience that uncertainty of consciousness which goes back and forth: now placing so-called pure morality outside itself in another, holy being and regarding itself as the unholy, now again placing moral purity in itself and placing the connection of the sensuous with the moral in the other being.

[637] Conscience renounces all these positions and dissemblances of the moral world-view by renouncing the consciousness that grasps duty and actuality as contradictory. According to that consciousness, I act morally when I am *conscious* of accomplishing only pure duty and not *anything else*—which in fact means: *when I do not* act. But when I actually act, I am conscious of an *other*, of an *actuality* that is at hand and of one that I want to produce; I have a *determinate* purpose and fulfill a *determinate* duty. There is *something other* in it than the pure duty that alone was supposed to be intended. — Conscience, by contrast, is the consciousness that, when the moral consciousness declares *pure duty* to be the essence of its action, this pure purpose is a dissemblance of the matter. For the matter itself is that pure duty consists in the empty abstraction of pure thinking, and has its reality and content only in a determinate actuality—an actuality which is the actuality of consciousness itself, and of consciousness not as a thought-entity but as an individual. Conscience has its truth, *for itself*, in the *immediate certainty* of itself. This *immediate*, concrete certainty of itself is the essence. If we consider it according to the opposition of consciousness, its own immediate *singularity* is the content of moral doing; and the *form* of moral doing is precisely this self as pure movement, namely as *knowing*, or *its own conviction*.

[638] Considered more closely in its unity and in the meaning of its moments: the moral consciousness grasped itself only as the *in-itself* or *essence*; but as conscience it grasps its *being-for-self* or its *self*.—The contradiction of the moral world-view *dissolves*; that is, the difference underlying it proves to be no difference, and it

converges into pure negativity. But this negativity is precisely the *self*—a simple *self* that is as much *pure* knowing as it is knowing of itself as *this individual* consciousness. This self therefore makes up the content of the previously empty essence, for it is the *actual*, which no longer has the meaning of being a nature alien to the essence and independent in its own laws. As the negative, it is the *difference* of the pure essence, a content, and indeed one that holds in and for itself.

639 Further, this self, as pure self-identical knowing, is the *absolutely universal*, so that precisely this knowing, *as its own* knowing, as conviction, is *duty*. Duty is no longer the universal that confronts the self; rather, it is known to have no validity in this separation. It is now the law that exists for the sake of the self, not the self that exists for the sake of the law. But law and duty do not for that reason have only the meaning of *being-for-self*, but also of *being-in-itself*; for this knowing, by virtue of its self-identity, is precisely the *in-itself*. This *in-itself* also separates itself, within consciousness, from that immediate unity with being-for-self; confronting it in this way, it is *being, being for another*. — Duty, precisely as duty abandoned by the self, is now known to be only a *moment*. It has sunk from its meaning of being the *absolute essence* to being that is not a self, not *for itself*, and so it is *being for another*. But this *being for another* remains an essential moment precisely because the self, as consciousness, constitutes the opposition of being-for-self and being for another, and because duty is now immediately *actual* in its own right, no longer merely abstract pure consciousness.

640 This *being for another*, then, is the substance that is *in itself*, distinct from the self. Conscience has not given up pure duty, or the *abstract in-itself*; rather, pure duty is the essential moment of relating to others as *universality*. It is the common element of self-consciousnesses, and this element is the substance in which the deed has *subsistence* and *actuality*: the moment of *being recognized* by others. The moral self-consciousness lacks this moment of being-recognized, of *pure consciousness* that *exists*; and it is therefore not acting consciousness at all, not realizing con-

sciousness. Its *in-itself* is for it either the abstract *non-actual* essence, or *being* as an *actuality* that is not spiritual. But the *existing actuality* of conscience is one that is a *self*, that is, existence conscious of itself, the spiritual element of being recognized. Doing is therefore only the translation of its *individual* content into the *objective* element, in which that content is universal and recognized; and precisely the fact that it is recognized makes the action actuality. The action is recognized, and thereby actual, because the existing actuality is immediately linked with conviction or knowing—or because knowing of one's purpose is immediately the element of existence, universal recognition. For the *essence* of the action, duty, consists in conscience's *conviction* of it; this conviction is precisely the *in-itself* itself. It is the self-*consciousness* that is *in itself universal*, or *being-recognized*, and hence actuality. What is done with conviction of duty is therefore immediately something that has subsistence and existence. There is thus no longer any question of good intentions failing to come about, or of things going badly for the good person. Rather, what is known as duty accomplishes itself and comes to actuality, precisely because what accords with duty is the universal of all self-consciousnesses: what is recognized, and therefore what is. Taken separately and on its own, however, without the content of the self, this duty is *being for another*, the transparent, which has only the meaning of contentless essentiality in general.

641 If we look back to the sphere in which *spiritual reality* first entered, the concept there was that the expression of individuality is what is *in and for itself*. But the shape that immediately expressed this concept was the *honest consciousness*, which drifted about with the *abstract matter itself*. There this *matter itself* was a *predicate*; only in conscience is it a *subject* that has posited all the moments of consciousness in itself, and for which all these moments—substantiality in general, external existence, and the essence of thinking—are contained in this certainty of itself. The *matter itself* has substantiality in general in ethical life, external existence in culture, the self-knowing essentiality

of thinking in morality; and in conscience it is the *subject* that knows these moments in itself. Whereas the honest consciousness only ever seizes *the empty matter itself*, conscience gains it in its fulfillment, which conscience gives it through itself. Conscience is this power because it knows the moments of consciousness as *moments* and, as their negative essence, governs them.

THE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

Conscience can fill duty with any content, and so binds and looses as it pleases.

642 If we consider conscience in relation to the individual determinations of the opposition that appears in action, and its consciousness of their nature, then it first relates itself, as the *knower*, to the *actuality* of the *case* in which action is to be taken. Insofar as the moment of *universality* is present in this knowing, it belongs to the knowing of conscientious action to encompass the actuality at hand in an unrestricted way, and so to know the circumstances of the case exactly and take them into consideration. But because this knowing *knows* universality as a *moment*, it is a knowing of these circumstances that is conscious of not encompassing them, or of not being conscientious in this respect. The truly universal and pure relation of knowing would be a relation to something not *opposed*, to itself. But *action*, through the opposition essential to it, relates to something negative of consciousness, to an *actuality that is in itself*. Compared with the simplicity of pure consciousness, this actuality—the absolutely *other*, or multiplicity *in itself*—is an absolute plurality of circumstances, which divides and spreads out infinitely: backward into its conditions, sideways in its coexistence, forward in its consequences.—The conscientious consciousness is aware of this nature of the matter and of its relation to it. It knows that it is not acquainted with the case in which it acts in the universality required, and that its pretense of this conscientious consideration of all the circumstances is null. This

acquaintance with and consideration of all the circumstances is not, however, entirely absent; but it is present only as a *moment*, as something that is only for *others*. And its incomplete knowing, because it is *its* knowing, counts for it as sufficient, complete knowing.

643 The same holds for the universality of the *essence*, or the determination of content by pure consciousness.—Conscience, stepping forward to act, relates to the many sides of the case. The case splits apart, and so does the relation of pure consciousness to it, whereby the multiplicity of the case is a multiplicity of *duties*.—Conscience knows that it has to choose and decide among them; for none of them is absolute in its determinateness or content—only *pure duty* is. But this abstraction has, in its reality, attained the meaning of the self-conscious I. Spirit certain of itself rests within itself as conscience, and its *real* universality, or its duty, lies in its pure *conviction* of duty. This *pure* conviction is, as such, as empty as pure *duty*—pure in the sense that nothing in it, no determinate content, is duty. But action must take place; the individual must *determine* it. And spirit certain of itself, in which the in-itself has attained the meaning of the self-conscious I, knows that it has this determination and content in the immediate *certainty* of itself. As determination and content, this certainty is *natural* consciousness, that is, the drives and inclinations.—Conscience acknowledges no content as absolute for it, for it is absolute negativity of everything determinate. It determines *from itself*. But the sphere of the self into which determinateness as such falls is so-called sensuousness; if conscience is to have a content drawn from the immediate certainty of itself, nothing is at hand but sensuousness.—Everything that presented itself in earlier shapes as good or bad, as law and right, is an *other* than the immediate certainty of itself. It is a *universal* that is now a being for another; or, considered differently, an object that, mediating consciousness with itself, steps between consciousness and its own truth, and separates consciousness from itself rather than being its immediacy. — For conscience, however, the certainty of itself is pure immediate

truth; and this truth is therefore its immediate certainty of itself represented as *content*—that is, in general, the caprice of the individual and the contingency of its unconscious natural being.

644 This content counts at the same time as moral *essentiality*, or as *duty*. For pure duty, as already emerged when laws were tested, is utterly indifferent to every content and tolerates any content. Here it also has the essential form of *being-for-self*. This form of individual conviction is nothing other than the consciousness of the emptiness of pure duty. It is the consciousness that pure duty is only a moment, and that its substantiality is a predicate whose subject is the individual. The individual's arbitrary will gives duty its content; it can attach any content to this form and fasten its conscientiousness to that content. — An individual increases his property in a certain way. It is a duty for everyone to provide for the maintenance of himself and his family, and no less for the *possibility* of becoming useful to his fellow human beings and of doing good to those in need. The individual is conscious that this is a duty, for this content is immediately contained in his certainty of himself. He sees, further, that in this case he is fulfilling this duty. Others may perhaps regard this certain way as fraud. *They* hold to other sides of the concrete case, whereas *he* holds fast to this side by being conscious of the increase of his property as pure duty. — In the same way, what others call violence and wrongdoing fulfills the duty of asserting one's independence against others. What they call cowardice fulfills the duty of preserving one's life and the possibility of being useful to one's fellows. What they call courage, on the other hand, actually violates both duties. But cowardice must not be so clumsy as not to know that preserving life, and preserving the possibility of being useful to others, are duties. It must not fail to be *convinced* that its action conforms to duty, or fail to know that conformity to duty consists in *knowing*. Otherwise it would commit the clumsiness of being immoral. Since morality lies in the consciousness of having fulfilled one's duty, the action called cowardice will lack this no more than the action called courage. The abstraction called duty is capable of

this content, as it is of any other. Consciousness therefore knows what it does as duty. And since it knows this, and conviction about duty is itself what conforms to duty, it is recognized by the others. Through this the action counts and has actual existence.

645 This freedom inserts any content it pleases into the universal, passive medium of pure duty and knowing, one content as well as another. Against it, there is no point in asserting that some other content ought to be inserted. For whatever content it might be, each bears the *stain of determinateness*. Pure knowing is free of determinateness: it can disdain any determinate content, just as it can take any one up. All content, in being determinate, stands on the same level as every other—even when it seems to have precisely the character that the particular is sublated in it. In the actual case, duty splits into *opposition* in general, and thereby into the opposition of *singularity* and *universality*. It might therefore seem that the duty whose content is the universal itself would immediately have in it the nature of pure duty, so that form and content would fully correspond. Then, for example, action for the general good would be preferable to action for the good of the individual. But this universal duty is, in general, what is *present* as substance existing in and for itself, as right and law. It holds *independently* of the individual's knowing and conviction, as well as of his immediate interest. It is therefore precisely that against whose *form* morality as such is directed. As for its *content*, this too is *determinate*, insofar as the general good is *opposed* to the individual good. Its law is therefore one from which conscience knows itself to be absolutely free. Conscience grants itself the absolute authority to add to it or take away from it, to neglect it as well as to fulfill it.—Moreover, that distinction between duty toward the individual and duty toward the universal is, by the nature of opposition in general, nothing fixed. On the contrary, what the individual does for himself also benefits the universal. The more he has provided for himself, the greater is his *possibility of being useful to others*—and not only that: his *actuality* itself consists only in

being and living in connection with others. His individual enjoyment essentially means giving up what is his own to others and helping them to acquire their own enjoyment. So in fulfilling duty toward the individual, and hence toward oneself, one also fulfills duty toward the universal. — The *weighing* and *comparing* of duties that would come in here would amount to calculating the advantage the universal would gain from an action. But, for one thing, morality would thereby fall prey to the necessary *contingency* of *insight*. For another, it is precisely the essence of conscience to *cut short* this *calculating* and weighing, and to decide from itself without such reasons.

646 In this way, then, conscience acts and maintains itself in the unity of the *in-itself* and of *being-for-self*, in the unity of pure thinking and individuality. It is spirit certain of itself, which has its truth within itself: in its self, in its knowing, and in this knowing as the knowing of duty. It maintains itself in this precisely because whatever is *positive* in the action—the content as well as the form of duty, and the knowing of duty—belongs to the self, to its certainty of itself. Whatever would *confront* the self *as its own in-itself*, by contrast, counts as not true, only as sublated, only as a moment. What counts, therefore, is not *universal knowing* in general but *its own knowledge* of the circumstances. Into duty, as universal *being-in-itself*, conscience inserts the content it takes from its natural individuality, for that is the content present in it. Through the universal medium in which this content exists, it becomes the *duty* that conscience performs. Precisely by this, empty pure duty is posited as sublated, or as a moment: this content is duty's sublated emptiness, its fulfillment.—But conscience is equally free of every content whatever. It absolves itself of every determinate duty that is supposed to hold as law. In the strength of its certainty of itself, it has the majesty of absolute autarky, the power to bind and to loose.[6] — This *self-determination* is therefore immediately what absolutely conforms to duty. Duty is knowing itself. But this

6 An echo of Matthew 16:19 and 18:18: "whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."

simple selfhood is the in-itself, for the *in-itself* is pure self-equality, and self-equality is present in this consciousness. —

[647] This pure knowing is immediately *being for another*, for as pure self-equality it is *immediacy*, or being. But this being is at the same time the pure universal, the selfhood of all; in other words, the action is recognized and therefore actual. This being is the element through which conscience stands immediately in a relation of equality with all self-consciousness. And the meaning of this relation is not the selfless law but the self of conscience.

[648] But because this right thing that conscience does is at the same time *being for another*, an inequality seems to befall conscience. The duty it accomplishes is a *determinate* content. This content is indeed the *self* of consciousness, and so its *knowing* of itself, its *equality* with itself. But once accomplished and placed in the universal medium *of being*, this equality is no longer *knowing*. It is no longer that distinguishing which just as immediately sublates its distinctions. Instead, in *being*, the distinction is posited as enduring, and the action is a *determinate* one, unequal to the element of the self-consciousness of all, and so not necessarily recognized. Both sides—the acting conscience and the universal consciousness that recognizes this action as duty—are equally *free* of the determinateness of this doing. Because of this freedom, the relation within their common medium of connection is instead one of complete inequality. As a result, the consciousness for which the action exists finds itself completely uncertain about the acting spirit that is certain of itself. This spirit acts; it posits a determinateness as existing. The others hold to this *being* as its truth, and in it they are certain of the acting spirit; in it, the spirit has declared *what* counts for it as duty. But it is free of any *determinate* duty. It has moved beyond the place where the others think it actually is; and for it, this medium of being itself, and duty as existing *in itself*, count only as a moment. What it puts before them, therefore, it also displaces again—or rather, it has immediately displaced it. For its *actuality*, as far as it is concerned, is not this duty and

determination that it has put out into the world, but the actuality it has in the absolute certainty of itself.

649 The others, therefore, do not know whether this conscience is morally good or evil. Or rather, not only can they not know it; they must also take it to be evil. For just as conscience is free of the *determinateness* of duty, and of duty as existing *in itself*, so are they. What it puts before them, they themselves know how to displace. It is something through which only the *self* of another is expressed, not their own. They know themselves to be free of it; more than that, they must dissolve it in their own consciousness and reduce it to nothing by judging and explaining it, in order to preserve their own self.

650 But the action of conscience is not only this *determination* of being, abandoned by the pure self. What is to count and be recognized as duty is so solely through knowing it and being convinced of it as duty—through knowing oneself in the deed. When the deed ceases to have this self in it, it ceases to be what alone is its essence. Its existence, abandoned by this consciousness, would be an ordinary actuality, and the action would appear to us as the satisfaction of one's pleasure and desire. What is to *exist* here is essentiality solely by being *known* as individuality expressing itself. And this *being-known* is what is recognized, and what, *as such*, is to have *existence*.

651 The self enters existence *as a self*; spirit certain of itself exists as such for others. Its *immediate* action is not what counts and is actual. What is recognized is not the *determinate*, not what *exists in itself*, but solely the self-knowing *self* as such. The element of persistence is universal self-consciousness. What enters this element cannot be the *effect* of the action: the effect does not hold out in it and gains no permanence. Only self-consciousness is what is recognized and attains actuality.

THE LANGUAGE OF CONVICTION

The action of conscience counts through its declaration of conviction, which others recognize.

652 Here again, then, we see *language* as the existence of spirit. Language is self-consciousness existing *for others*: self-consciousness that is immediately *present as such*, and that as *this* self-consciousness is universal. It is the self separating itself from itself, which becomes objective to itself as pure I—I. In this objectivity it preserves itself as *this* self, just as it immediately flows together with the others and is *their* self-consciousness. It hears itself just as it is heard by the others, and this hearing is precisely *existence that has become self*.

653 The content that language has gained here is no longer the inverted, inverting and disrupted self of the world of culture. It is spirit that has returned into itself: certain of itself, and certain in its self of its truth, or of its being recognized, and recognized as this knowing. The language of ethical spirit is law and simple command, and the lament, which is more a tear shed over necessity. Moral consciousness, on the other hand, is still *mute*, shut up within itself in its inner life. For in it the self does not yet have existence; existence and the *self* still stand only in an external relation to each other. Language, however, emerges only as the middle term between independent and recognized self-consciousnesses. The *existing self* is immediately universal, manifold recognition—a recognition that remains simple in this manifoldness. The content of the language of conscience is *the self that knows itself as essence*. This alone is what that language expresses, and this expressing is the true actuality of the doing and what makes the action count. Consciousness expresses its *conviction*. This conviction is that in which alone the action is duty, and the action *counts* as duty only because the conviction is *expressed*. For universal self-consciousness is free of the *determinate* action *that now simply exists*. *The action* as *existence* counts for nothing with it; what counts is the *conviction* that the

action is duty. And this conviction is actual in language. — To actualize the action, here, does not mean translating its content from the form of *purpose* or *being-for-self* into the form of *abstract* actuality. It means translating it from the form of immediate *certainty* of itself—a certainty that knows its knowing, or being-for-self, as the essence—into the form of the *assurance* that consciousness is convinced of duty and, as conscience, knows duty *from itself*. This assurance, then, assures us that consciousness is convinced that its conviction is the essence.

654 Is the assurance that one acts from conviction about duty *true*? Is what is done *actually duty*? These questions or doubts have no meaning when directed at conscience.—Asking whether the *assurance is true* would presuppose that the inner intention differs from the one professed. That is, it would presuppose that the willing of the individual self could separate itself from duty, from the will of universal and pure consciousness: the universal will would be placed in the words, while the individual will would really be the true motive of the action. But this very distinction between universal consciousness and the individual self is what has sublated itself, and its sublation is conscience. The immediate knowing of the self certain of itself is law and duty. Its intention, by being its intention, is what is right. All that is required is that it know this, and that it state its conviction that its knowing and willing are what is right. Uttering this assurance in itself sublates the form of its particularity. In doing so, the self recognizes the *necessary universality of the self*. In calling itself *conscience*, it calls itself pure self-knowing and pure abstract willing. That is, it calls itself a universal knowing and willing that recognizes the others and is *equal* to them—for they are precisely this pure self-knowing and willing—and that is therefore also recognized by them. In the willing of the self certain of itself, in this knowing that the self is the essence, lies the essence of what is right.—Whoever says, then, that he acts in this way from conscience speaks the truth, for his conscience is the knowing and willing self. But he must essentially *say* so, for this self must at the same time be the *universal* self. It is not universal

in the *content* of the action, for this content, because of its *determinateness*, is in itself indifferent. Universality lies rather in the form of the action, and it is this form that must be posited as actual. The form is the *self*, which as such is actual in language, declares itself to be the true, and precisely in doing so recognizes all selves and is recognized by them.

655 Conscience, then, in the majesty of its elevation above determinate law and every content of duty, puts whatever content it pleases into its knowing and willing. It is moral genius, which knows the inner voice of its immediate knowing as a divine voice. And since in this knowing it knows existence just as immediately, it is the divine creative power that has life in its concept. It is equally worship within itself, for its action is the beholding of its own divinity.

656 This solitary worship is at the same time essentially the worship of a *community*, and pure inner self-*knowing* and self-hearing advances to the moment of *consciousness*. Its beholding of itself is its *objective* existence, and this objective element is the utterance of its knowing and willing as something *universal*. Through this utterance the self becomes something that counts, and the action becomes a deed carried out. The actuality and persistence of its doing is universal self-consciousness. But the utterance of conscience posits its certainty of itself as a pure and therefore universal self. The others let the action count because of this speech, in which the self is expressed and recognized as the essence. The spirit and substance of their bond is thus the mutual assurance of their conscientiousness and good intentions, rejoicing in this mutual purity, and refreshing themselves in the glory of knowing and uttering, of cherishing and nurturing such excellence.—Insofar as this conscience still distinguishes its *abstract* consciousness from its *self-consciousness*, its life is only *hidden* in God. God is indeed *immediately* present to its spirit and heart, to its self. But what is manifest—its actual consciousness and the mediating movement of that consciousness—is for it something other than that hidden inner life and the immediacy of the present essence. In the consumma-

tion of conscience, however, the distinction between its abstract consciousness and its self-consciousness sublates itself.[7] Conscience knows that *abstract* consciousness is precisely *this self*, this being-for-self certain of itself. It knows that the *difference* is precisely *sublated* in the *immediacy* of the *relation* of the self to the in-itself—the in-itself which, posited outside the self, is the abstract essence, hidden from the self. For a relation is *mediating* when the terms related are not one and the same, but each is an *other* for the other, and they are one only in a third. An *immediate* relation, however, in fact means nothing other than unity. Raised above the thoughtlessness of still taking these distinctions, which are no distinctions, for distinctions, consciousness knows the immediacy of the essence's presence in it as the unity of the essence and its self. It therefore knows its self as the living in-itself, and knows this knowing of its own as religion—religion which, as knowing that is beheld or that exists, is the community's speaking about its spirit.

THE BEAUTIFUL SOUL

Fearing to stain its purity by action, the beautiful soul withdraws into itself and fades away.

657 Here, then, we see self-consciousness withdrawn into its innermost depths, for which all externality as such vanishes—withdrawn into the intuition of I = I, in which this I is all essentiality and existence. It sinks into this concept of itself, for it has been driven to the very point of its extremes. And this happens in such a way that the distinct moments through which it is real, or is *consciousness*, are not merely these pure extremes for us. Rather, what it is for itself, what is *in itself* for it, and what is *existence* for it have evaporated into abstractions that no longer have any hold, any substance, for this consciousness itself. And everything that was essence for consciousness until now has gone back into these abstractions. — Refined to this purity, consciousness is in its poorest shape, and the poverty that consti-

7 An allusion to Colossians 3:3: "your life is hidden with Christ in God."

tutes its sole possession is itself a vanishing. This absolute *certainty*, into which substance has dissolved, is absolute *untruth*, which collapses in on itself. It is absolute *self-consciousness*, in which *consciousness* sinks away.

658 If we consider this sinking within itself, then for consciousness the *substance* that exists *in itself* is *knowing*, as *its* knowing. As consciousness, it is divided into the opposition between itself and the object, which for it is the essence. But this very object is what is perfectly transparent: it is *its self*, and its consciousness is only the knowing of itself. All life and all spiritual essentiality have gone back into this self and lost their difference from the I itself. The moments of consciousness are therefore these extreme abstractions, none of which holds firm; each loses itself in the other and generates it. It is the unhappy consciousness's alternation with itself—but an alternation that, for consciousness itself, takes place within it, and that is conscious of being the concept of reason, which the unhappy consciousness is only *in itself*. As consciousness, its absolute certainty of itself thus immediately turns into a sound that dies away, into the objectivity of its being-for-self. But this created world is its *speech*, which it has just as immediately heard, and whose echo only comes back to it. This return therefore does not mean that consciousness is *in* and *for itself* in it. For the essence is for it no *in-itself*, but itself. Nor does it have *existence*, for the objective never gets as far as being a negative of the actual self—just as the self never gets as far as actuality. It lacks the power of externalization, the power to make itself into a thing and to endure being. It lives in anxiety that it will stain the splendor of its inner life through action and existence. To preserve the purity of its heart, it flees contact with actuality and persists in its obstinate powerlessness: powerless to renounce its self, which has been sharpened to the ultimate abstraction, and to give itself substantiality—to transform its thought into being and entrust itself to absolute difference. The hollow object it produces for itself therefore now fills it with the consciousness of emptiness. Its doing is yearning, which only loses itself as it becomes an object devoid of

essence, and which, falling back upon itself beyond this loss, finds itself only as lost. In this transparent purity of its moments, an unhappy, so-called *beautiful soul*, it smolders out within itself and vanishes like a shapeless vapor dissolving into thin air.[8]

EVIL AND HYPOCRISY

Acting conscience appears evil and hypocritical to the universal consciousness that judges it.

659 But this silent flowing together of the marrowless essentialities of evaporated life must also be taken in its other sense—the *actuality* of conscience and the *appearance* of its movement—and conscience must be considered as acting.—The *objective* moment in this consciousness was determined above as universal consciousness. Self-knowing knowing, as *this* self, is distinct from other selves. Language, in which all recognize one another as acting conscientiously—this universal equality—falls apart into the inequality of singular being-for-self. Each consciousness is just as absolutely reflected into itself out of its universality. Through this, the opposition of singularity to other individuals and to the universal necessarily comes on the scene, and this relationship and its movement must now be considered. — In other words, this universality and duty have the utterly opposite meaning of determinate *singularity*, which exempts itself from the universal. For this singularity, pure duty is only universality that has come to the *surface* and is turned outward: duty lies only in the words and counts as being for another. Conscience, directed at first only *negatively* against duty as *this determinate duty at hand*, knows itself to be free of it. But in filling empty duty with a *determinate* content *from itself*, it has positive consciousness of the fact that it, as *this* self, makes the content for itself. Its pure self, as empty knowing, is without content and

8 A phrase current in Goethe ("Confessions of a Beautiful Soul" in *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*), Schiller and the Romantics, for a soul whose moral feeling is purely inward and harmonious.

without determination. The content it gives this self is taken from its self *as this* determinate self, from itself as natural individuality. In speaking of the conscientiousness of its action, it is indeed conscious of its pure self. But in the *purpose* of its action, as actual content, it is conscious of itself as this particular individual. It is conscious of the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is for others—the opposition between universality, or duty, and its being reflected out of universality.

660 If the opposition that conscience enters into as *acting* is thus expressed in its inner life, it is at the same time the outward inequality in the element of existence, the inequality of its particular singularity against other individuals.—Its particularity consists in this: the two moments that constitute its consciousness, the self and the in-itself, count in it with *unequal value*. Specifically, they count with the determination that the certainty of itself is the essence *as against the in-itself*, or the *universal*, which counts only as a moment. Opposed to this inner determination, then, stands the element of existence, or universal consciousness. For universal consciousness, it is instead universality—duty—that is the essence, while singularity, which is for itself as against the universal, counts only as a sublated moment. For this consciousness that holds fast to duty, the first consciousness counts as *evil*, because it is the inequality of its *being-within-itself* with the universal. And since the first consciousness at the same time declares its doing to be equality with itself, to be duty and conscientiousness, it counts as *hypocrisy*.

661 The *movement* of this opposition is, first, the formal establishment of equality between what evil is in itself and what it declares itself to be. It must come to light that it is evil, and thus that its existence is equal to its essence: the *hypocrisy* must be *unmasked*.—This return of the inequality present in hypocrisy into equality has not already been achieved just because hypocrisy, as the saying goes, proves its respect for duty and virtue by assuming their *semblance* and using it as a mask, for its own consciousness no less than for another's—as if this recognition

of its opposite contained equality and agreement in itself.[9] — But hypocrisy has at the same time just as much stepped out of this recognition in language and is reflected into itself. In using what exists *in itself* only as *being for another*, it rather displays its own contempt for it and shows everyone that it lacks essence. For what can be used as an external tool shows itself to be a thing that has no weight of its own.

662 Nor is this equality brought about either by the evil consciousness's one-sided insistence on itself or by the judgment of the universal consciousness.—Suppose the evil consciousness disowns itself in the face of the consciousness of duty. Suppose it maintains that what the latter declares to be baseness, absolute inequality with the universal, is action according to inner law and conscience. Then in this one-sided assurance of equality, its inequality with the other remains, since the other neither believes nor recognizes that assurance.—Or, since one-sided insistence on *one* extreme dissolves itself, evil would thereby indeed confess itself to be evil. But in doing so it would *immediately* sublate itself; it would not be hypocrisy, nor would it unmask itself as such. Evil does in fact confess itself to be evil by asserting that, in opposition to the recognized universal, it acts according to *its* inner law and conscience. For if this law and conscience were not the law of its *singularity* and *arbitrary will*, it would not be something inner, something its own, but what is universally recognized. Whoever says, therefore, that he acts toward others according to *his* law and conscience is in fact saying that he mistreats them. But *actual* conscience is not this insistence on a knowing and willing that sets itself against the universal. Rather, the universal is the element of its *existence*, and its language declares its doing to be *recognized* duty.

663 Just as little is the universal consciousness's insistence on its judgment the unmasking and dissolution of hypocrisy.—In crying out against hypocrisy—"bad," "base," and so on—the universal consciousness appeals in such judgment to *its* law, just as

9 The saying is La Rochefoucauld's: "Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue" (*Maxims*, 218).

the *evil* consciousness appeals to *its own*. For the universal consciousness comes forward in opposition to the evil one, and so as a particular law. It therefore has no advantage over the other; rather, it legitimates the other. This zeal does precisely the opposite of what it means to do. It shows that what it calls true duty, and what is supposed to be *universally* recognized, is something *unrecognized*, and so concedes to the other the equal right of being-for-self.

THE JUDGING CONSCIOUSNESS

The judge who only judges proves as base and hypocritical as the one it condemns.

664 But this judgment also has another side, from which it becomes the introduction to the dissolution of the opposition at hand.—The consciousness *of the universal* does not relate to the first consciousness as *actual* and *acting*, for it is the first that is the actual one. It relates to it as opposed to it, as what is not caught up in the opposition of singularity and universality that arises in action. It remains in the universality of *thought*; it relates to the other as *apprehending*, and its first action is only judgment.—Through this judgment it now places itself, as was just noted, *alongside* the first; and the first, *through this equality*, comes to behold itself in this other consciousness. For the consciousness of duty relates in an *apprehending, passive* way. But it thereby contradicts itself as the absolute will of duty, as what determines itself purely from itself. It is easy for it to keep itself pure, since it *does not act*. It is the hypocrisy that wants its judging to be taken for an *actual* deed, and that proves its righteousness not by action but by uttering excellent sentiments. It is thus constituted exactly like the consciousness it reproaches for placing duty only in its words. In both, the side of actuality is equally distinct from speech: in the one, through the *self-interested purpose* of the action; in the other, through the *absence of action* altogether. Yet the necessity of action lies in the very talk of duty, since duty without a deed has no meaning at all.

665 But judging is also to be regarded as a positive action of thought, and it has a positive content. Through this side, the contradiction present in the apprehending consciousness, and its equality with the first, become still more complete.—The acting consciousness declares this determinate doing of its own to be duty, and the judging consciousness cannot deny it this. For duty itself is the contentless form that is capable of any content. Or: the concrete action, diverse within itself in its many-sidedness, has in it the universal side, which is taken as duty, just as much as the particular side, which makes up the individual's share and interest in it. The judging consciousness, however, does not stop at that side of duty, or at the agent's knowing that this is his duty, the relationship and station belonging to his actuality. Instead it holds to the other side. It plays the action into the inner, and explains it by an *intention* different from the action itself, and by a self-interested *motive*. Just as every action can be considered in terms of its conformity to duty, so it can also be considered in this other way, in terms of *particularity*; for as action it is the actuality of the individual.—This judging thus takes the action out of its existence and reflects it into the inner, or into the form of its own particularity. — If the action is accompanied by fame, the judging consciousness knows this inner as a *craving* for fame. If the action fits the individual's station in general, without going beyond it—and if it is such that the individuality does not have its station hanging on it as an external determination, but fills out this universality by itself and thereby shows itself capable of something higher—then judgment knows its inner as ambition, and so on. In action generally, the agent comes to behold *itself* in objectivity, or to the feeling of itself in its existence, and so to enjoyment. Judgment therefore knows the inner as a drive toward one's own happiness—even if this happiness consisted only in inner moral vanity, in enjoying the consciousness of one's own excellence, and in the foretaste of the hope of a future happiness.—No action can escape such judging. For duty for duty's sake, this pure purpose, is what is not actual. It has its actuality in the doing of

individuality, and the action thereby has in it the side of particularity. — No one is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the hero is not a hero, but because the valet—is a valet, whose dealings with the hero are not with a hero but with someone who eats, drinks and gets dressed, in short, with someone in the singularity of need and representation. In the same way, there is no action for judging in which it could not set the side of the individuality's singularity against the universal side of the action, and play the valet of morality to the agent.[10]

666 This judging consciousness is thus itself *base*, because it divides the action, produces the action's inequality with itself, and holds it fast. It is, further, *hypocrisy*. It passes off such judging not as *another way* of being evil but as the *right consciousness* of the action. In its unactuality and in the vanity of knowing so well and knowing better, it sets itself above the deeds it disparages, and wants its deedless talk to be taken for an excellent *actuality*.—Making itself equal in this way to the agent it judges, it is recognized by the agent as the same as the agent. The agent finds itself not merely apprehended by the judging consciousness as something alien and unequal to it. Rather, it finds the judging consciousness, by that consciousness's own constitution, equal to itself.

CONFESSION AND THE HARD HEART

The evil consciousness confesses, but the hard heart refuses to answer in kind.

Beholding this equality and *declaring* it, the agent *confesses* itself to the other. It expects that the other, having in fact made itself equal to it, will likewise respond to its *speech*, declare its own equality in its speech, and that the existence of recognition will come about. Its confession is not an abasement, a humiliation, a throwing of itself away before the other. For this declaration is not one-sided, as though it posited its *inequality* with the other. It

10 A proverb usually attributed to Madame Cornuel (17th century); Hegel reuses the point in his lectures on the philosophy of history.

speaks out solely for the sake of beholding the other's *equality* with it. From its side, it declares *their equality* in its confession—and it declares it because language is the *existence* of spirit as immediate self. It therefore expects the other to contribute its part to this existence.

667 But the confession of the evil one—*That is what I am*—is not followed by this reply of an equal confession. That was not what the judging had in mind—quite the contrary! The judging consciousness repels this community and is the hard heart that is for itself and rejects continuity with the other.—With this the scene is reversed. The one who confessed sees itself repelled, and sees the other in the wrong. The other refuses to let its inner come out into the existence of speech. Against evil it sets the beauty of its own soul; against the confession it sets the stiff neck of a character that remains equal to itself, and the muteness of keeping to itself and not throwing itself away before another. Here the highest indignation of spirit certain of itself is posited. For it beholds itself as this *simple knowing of the self* in the other—and in such a way that even the external shape of this other is not, as wealth was, something without essence, not a thing. What is held up against it is thought, knowing itself. It is this absolutely fluid continuity of pure *knowing* that refuses to enter into communication with it—with the one who in its confession has already renounced *separate being-for-self*, and has posited itself as sublated particularity, and thereby as continuity with the other, as universal. The other, however, reserves for *itself* its uncommunicative being-for-self, and in the one who confesses it retains the very same thing, though the confessor has already cast it off. It thereby shows itself to be the consciousness forsaken by spirit and denying spirit. For it does not recognize that spirit, in the absolute certainty of itself, is master over every deed and actuality, and can cast them off and make them not have happened. At the same time, it does not recognize the contradiction it commits in not letting the casting-off that has taken place in *speech* count as true casting-off—while it itself has the certainty of its spirit not in an actual action, but in its

inner life, and has the existence of that inner life in the *speech* of its judgment. It is therefore the hard heart itself that obstructs the other's return from the deed into the spiritual existence of speech and into the equality of spirit. Through this hardness it produces the inequality that still remains.

668 Insofar, then, as spirit certain of itself, as beautiful soul, does not possess the power to externalize the knowing of itself that it keeps to itself, it cannot attain equality with the consciousness it has repelled. It therefore cannot attain the beheld unity of itself in the other; it cannot attain existence. Equality therefore comes about only negatively, as a being devoid of spirit. The beautiful soul, lacking actuality, is caught in the contradiction between its pure self and that self's necessity to externalize itself into being and turn over into actuality. It stands in the *immediacy* of this opposition held fast—an immediacy that alone is the middle term and reconciliation of the opposition heightened to its pure abstraction, and that is pure being, or empty nothingness. As consciousness of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy, it is therefore shattered into derangement and wastes away in yearning consumption. In this it does in fact give up its hard holding fast to *its being-for-self*, but it brings forth only the spiritless unity of being.

FORGIVENESS

The hard heart breaks, the two forgive each other, and their mutual recognition is absolute spirit.

669 The true equalization—namely, the *self-conscious* and *existing* one—is already contained, as to its necessity, in what has gone before. The breaking of the hard heart and its elevation to universality is the same movement that was expressed in the consciousness that confessed itself. The wounds of spirit heal and leave no scars behind. The deed is not what is imperishable; spirit takes it back into itself. The side of singularity present in the deed—whether as intention or as the existing negativity and limitation of the intention—is what immediately vanishes. The

actualizing *self*, the form of its action, is only a *moment* of the whole; and so too is the knowing that determines through judgment and fixes the distinction between the singular and the universal sides of action. The evil consciousness posits this externalization of itself, or posits itself as a moment, lured out into the existence of confession by beholding itself in the other. But just as the one-sided, unrecognized existence of its particular being-for-self had to break, so the other's one-sided, unrecognized judgment must break. And just as the first displays the power of spirit over its actuality, so the second displays spirit's power over its own determinate concept.

670 This other consciousness, however, renounces the dividing thought and the hardness of the being-for-self that clings to that thought, because it in fact beholds itself in the first. The first, which throws away its actuality and makes itself into a *sublated This*, thereby in fact presents itself as universal. It returns from its external actuality into itself as essence, and so universal consciousness recognizes itself in it. — The forgiveness that it extends to the first is its renunciation of itself, of its own *nonactual* essence. It equates this essence with that other essence, which was *actual* action. What had been called evil, because of the determination the action received in thought, it now recognizes as good. Or rather, it lets go of this distinction made by determinate thought, and of its own judgment, which determines things for itself, just as the other lets go of its own determining of the action for itself.—The word of reconciliation is *existing* spirit. This spirit beholds the pure knowing of itself as *universal* essence in its opposite, in the pure knowing of itself as *individuality* that is absolutely within itself—a mutual recognition that is *absolute spirit*.[11]

671 Absolute spirit enters existence only at the peak where its pure knowing of itself is opposition to and interchange with itself. Knowing that its *pure knowing* is the abstract *essence*, it is this knowing duty, in absolute opposition to the knowing that knows itself, as the absolute *individuality* of the self, to be the

11 "The word of reconciliation" echoes Paul, 2 Corinthians 5:19.

essence. The former is the pure continuity of the universal, which knows the individuality that knows itself as essence to be what is in itself null, to be *evil*. The latter, however, is absolute discreteness, which knows itself as absolute in its pure One, and knows that universal as the non-actual, which is only *for others*. Both sides have been refined to this purity, in which there is no longer any selfless existence in them, nothing that is the negative of consciousness. Rather, that *duty* is the self-identical character of its knowing of itself, and this evil likewise has its purpose in its *being-within-itself* and its actuality in its speech. The content of this speech is the substance of its subsistence; the speech is the assurance of spirit's certainty within itself.—Both spirits certain of themselves have no purpose other than their pure self, and no reality and existence other than just this pure self. But they are still distinct, and the distinctness is absolute, because it is posited in this element of the pure concept. Nor is it absolute only for us; it is so for the concepts themselves that stand in this opposition. For these concepts are indeed *determinate* in relation to each other, but at the same time they are universal in themselves. They therefore fill out the whole extent of the self, and this self has no content other than this determinateness of its own, which neither goes beyond it nor is more limited than it. For the one determinateness, the absolutely universal, is pure knowing of itself just as much as the other, the absolute discreteness of individuality, and both are only this pure knowing of oneself. Both determinatenesses are therefore the knowing pure concepts, whose determinateness is itself immediately knowing, or whose *relation* and opposition is the I. Through this they are, *for each other*, these utterly opposed terms. It is the completely *inner* that has in this way come to stand over against itself and has entered existence. Together they make up *pure knowing*, which through this opposition is posited as *consciousness*. But it is not yet *self-consciousness*. It has this actualization in the movement of this opposition. For this opposition is rather itself the *indiscrete continuity* and *equality* of I = I. And each, *for itself*, sublates itself in its own self, precisely

through the contradiction of its pure universality, which at the same time still resists its equality with the other and separates itself from it. Through this externalization, this knowing, divided in its *existence*, returns into the unity of the *self*. It is the *actual* I, the universal knowing *of itself* in its *absolute opposite*, in the knowing that is *within itself*—a knowing which, on account of the purity of its separated being-within-itself, is itself completely universal. The reconciling *Yes, in which both I's let go of their opposed* existence*, is the* existence *of the* I expanded into a duality. In this duality the I remains equal to itself, and in its complete externalization and in its opposite it has certainty of itself;—it is God appearing in the midst of those who know themselves as pure knowing.

Religion

VII. Die Religion
Natural religion, the Greek religion of art, and the revealed religion.

VII. DIE RELIGION.

672 In the shapings encountered so far, which may be distinguished in general as *consciousness, self-consciousness, reason,* and *spirit*, *religion* too has indeed appeared, as consciousness of the *absolute essence* in general. But it appeared only from the *standpoint of consciousness*, a consciousness that is conscious of the absolute essence. The absolute essence has not appeared *in and for* itself in those forms, nor has the self-consciousness of spirit.

673 Already *consciousness*, insofar as it is *understanding*, becomes consciousness of the *supersensible*, or of the *inner* of objective existence. But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever else one may call it, is *selfless*. It is at first only the *universal*, which is still far from being spirit that knows itself as spirit.—Next, *self-consciousness,* which reached its culmination in the shape of the *unhappy* consciousness, was only the *pain* of spirit struggling to work its way back out into objectivity but failing to reach it. The unity of *individual* self-consciousness with its unchangeable *essence*, which self-consciousness strives to bring about, therefore remains a *beyond* for it. — The immediate existence of *reason*, which for us emerged from that pain, and the distinctive shapes of reason have no religion, because the self-consciousness of reason knows or seeks *itself* in *immediate* presence.

674 In the ethical world, on the other hand, we saw a religion, namely the *religion* of the *underworld*. It is faith in the fearful, unknown night of *fate*, and in the Eumenides of the *departed spirit*:—fate being pure negativity in the form of universality, the Eumenides the same negativity in the form of singularity. In this latter form, then, the absolute essence is indeed the *self*, and it is *present*, since the self cannot be otherwise. But the *singular* self is *this* singular shade, which has the universality that is fate separated from it. The shade is indeed a shade, a *sublated This*, and thus a universal self. But that negative meaning has not yet turned over into this positive one, and so the sublated self at the same time still immediately means this particular, essenceless self.[1] — Fate without the self, however, remains the unconscious night, which comes neither to distinctions within itself nor to the clarity of knowing itself.

675 This faith in the nothingness of necessity and in the underworld becomes *faith* in *heaven*, because the departed self must unite with its universality, unfold in it what it contains, and so become clear to itself. But we saw this *realm* of faith unfold its content only in the element of thought, without the concept, and for that reason perish in its fate, namely in the *religion* of the *Enlightenment*. In this religion the supersensible beyond of the understanding is restored, but in such a way that self-consciousness stands satisfied on this side, and knows the supersensible, *empty* beyond—which is neither to be known nor to be feared—neither as self nor as power.

676 Finally, the religion of morality restores the absolute essence as a positive content; but this content is united with the negativity of the Enlightenment. It is a *being* that is just as much taken back into the self and remains enclosed in it, and a *differentiated content* whose parts are negated just as immediately as they are set up. The fate, however, into which this contradictory movement sinks is the self conscious of itself as the fate of *essentiality* and *actuality*.

1 The Eumenides ("kindly ones") is a euphemistic name for the Furies; Hegel uses the singular.

677 In religion, spirit that knows itself is immediately its own pure *self-consciousness*. The shapes of spirit that have been considered—true spirit, self-alienated spirit, and spirit certain of itself—together make up spirit in its *consciousness*, which, confronting its *world*, does not recognize itself in it. But in conscience spirit subjects to itself not only its objective world in general but also its representation and its determinate concepts, and it is now self-consciousness that is at home with itself. In this self-consciousness spirit, *represented as object*, has for itself the significance of being universal spirit, which contains within itself all essence and all actuality. But it is not in the form of free actuality, or of nature appearing as independent. Spirit does have *shape*, or the form of being, inasmuch as it is the *object* of its consciousness. But because in religion this consciousness is posited in the essential determination of being *self*-consciousness, the shape is completely transparent to itself. And the actuality that spirit contains is enclosed in it, or sublated in it, just as when we say *all actuality*: it is *thought*, universal actuality.

678 Since, then, in religion the determination of spirit's consciousness proper does not have the form of free *otherness*, spirit's *existence* is distinct from its *self-consciousness*, and its actuality proper falls outside religion. There is indeed one spirit of both, but its consciousness does not encompass both at once. Religion appears as one part of existence and of all its doings and dealings, the other part of which is life in its actual world. Now, just as we know that spirit in its world and spirit conscious of itself as spirit, or spirit in religion, are the same, so the completion of religion consists in the two becoming equal to each other. It consists not only in spirit's actuality being encompassed by religion, but, conversely, in spirit, as spirit conscious of itself, becoming actual to itself and *the object of its consciousness*.—Insofar as spirit in religion *represents* itself to itself, it is indeed consciousness, and the actuality enclosed in religion is the shape and the garment of its representation. In this representation, however, actuality does not receive its full due, namely to be not merely a garment but independent, free existence. And

conversely, because this actuality lacks completion within itself, it is a *determinate* shape that does not attain what it is supposed to present, namely spirit conscious of itself. For its shape to express spirit itself, the shape would have to be nothing other than spirit, and spirit would have to appear to itself, or be actual, as it is in its essence. Only in this way would there also be achieved what may seem to be the demand for the opposite, namely that the *object* of its consciousness should at the same time have the form of free actuality. But only spirit that is object to itself as absolute spirit is to itself an actuality as free as it remains conscious of itself in it.

RELIGION AND THE MOMENTS OF SPIRIT

Religion presupposes consciousness, self-consciousness, reason and spirit, whose moments do not follow one another in time.

679 Insofar as self-consciousness and consciousness proper—*religion* and spirit in its world, or the *existence* of spirit—are at first distinguished, the latter consists in the whole of spirit insofar as its moments present themselves as falling apart, each for itself. The moments, however, are *consciousness*, *self-consciousness*, *reason*, and *spirit*—spirit, that is, as immediate spirit, which is not yet consciousness of spirit. Their totality, *taken together*, constitutes spirit in its worldly existence in general; spirit as such contains the previous shapings in their universal determinations, the moments just named. Religion presupposes the whole course of these moments, and is their *simple* totality or absolute self. — The course of these moments, moreover, is not to be represented as taking place in time in relation to religion. Only spirit as a whole is in time, and the shapes that are shapes of the whole of *spirit* as such present themselves in a succession. For only the whole has actuality proper, and hence the form of pure freedom with respect to anything else, a form that expresses itself as time. But the *moments* of the whole—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—have, because they are moments, no existence distinct from one another.—Just as spirit

was distinguished from its moments, so, thirdly, the individualized determination of these moments must be distinguished from the moments themselves. For we saw each of those moments in turn differentiate itself within itself in a course of its own and take on different shapes. In consciousness, for example, sense-certainty and perception were distinguished. These latter sides fall apart in time and belong to a *particular whole*.—For spirit descends from its *universality* through *determination* to *singularity*. The determination, or middle term, is *consciousness, self-consciousness*, and so on. *Singularity*, however, is made up of the shapes of these moments. These shapes therefore present spirit in its singularity or *actuality*, and are distinguished in time, but in such a way that each later shape retains the earlier ones within it.

680 If, therefore, religion is the completion of spirit, into which its individual moments—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—*go back* and *have gone back* as into their *ground*, then together these moments make up the *existing actuality* of the whole of spirit. This spirit only *is* as the movement of these its sides, a movement that differentiates them and returns into itself. The coming-to-be of *religion in general* is contained in the movement of the universal moments. But each of these attributes has been presented not only as it determines itself in general, but as it is *in and for itself*, that is, as it runs its course within itself as a whole. What has thereby come about, therefore, is not only the coming-to-be of religion *in general*; rather, those complete courses of the *individual* sides at the same time contain the *determinatenesses of religion* itself. The whole of spirit, the spirit of religion, is once again the movement of coming, out of its immediacy, to *knowing* what it is *in itself* or immediately; and of achieving that the *shape* in which it appears for its consciousness should be perfectly equal to its essence, and that it should behold itself as it is.—In this coming-to-be, spirit is therefore itself in *determinate* shapes, which make up the differences of this movement; at the same time, a determinate religion accordingly also has a *determinate actual* spirit. If, then,

consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit belong to self-knowing spirit in general, the *determinate* shapes of self-knowing spirit have as their own the *determinate* forms that developed within consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, within each of them in particular. The *determinate* shape of religion picks out for its actual spirit, from among the shapes of each of its moments, the one that corresponds to it. The *one* determinateness of religion reaches through all the sides of its actual existence and stamps this common imprint upon them.

681 In this way the shapes that have appeared so far now arrange themselves differently from the order in which they appeared in their series; on this point, the necessary remarks must first be made briefly.—In the series we considered, each moment, deepening itself within itself, developed into a whole in its own distinctive principle. And cognition was the depth, or the spirit, in which these moments, which have no subsistence of their own, had their substance. This substance, however, has now come forth. It is the depth of spirit certain of itself, which does not permit the individual principle to isolate itself and make itself into a whole within itself. Rather, gathering all these moments into itself and holding them together, this depth advances in the entire wealth of its actual spirit, and all the particular moments of that spirit take up and receive into themselves, in common, the same determinateness of the whole.—This spirit certain of itself, together with its movement, is their true actuality, and the *being in and for itself* that belongs to each individual moment. — The single series up to now marked its retrogressions by knots in its progress, but from these knots it continued on again in a single line. Now, however, it is as it were broken at these knots, the universal moments, and has fallen apart into many lines. Gathered into a single bundle, these lines at the same time unite symmetrically, so that the like differences into which each particular line had shaped itself within itself coincide. — It is evident, moreover, from the whole presentation how the coordination of universal directions set

out here is to be understood, so that it becomes superfluous to remark that these differences are to be grasped essentially only as moments of becoming, not as parts. In actual spirit they are attributes of its substance; in religion, on the other hand, they are rather only predicates of the subject.—Likewise, all forms in general are indeed contained *in themselves*, or *for us*, in spirit and in each spirit. But where spirit's actuality is concerned, all that matters is which determinateness is for spirit in its *consciousness*: in which determinateness it has expressed its self, or in which shape it knows its essence.

682 The distinction that was drawn between *actual* spirit and spirit that knows itself as spirit, or between spirit itself as consciousness and as self-consciousness, is sublated in the spirit that knows itself in accordance with its truth: its consciousness and its self-consciousness are brought into balance. But since religion here is at first *immediate*, this distinction has not yet gone back into spirit. Only the *concept* of religion is posited. In this concept the essence is *self-consciousness*, which is to itself all truth and contains all actuality in this truth. This self-consciousness, as consciousness, has itself for its object. Spirit, which at first knows itself *immediately*, is thus spirit to itself in the *form* of *immediacy*, and the determinateness of the shape in which it appears to itself is that of *being*. This being, to be sure, is *filled* neither with sensation or manifold material, nor with any other one-sided moments, purposes, and determinations, but with spirit, and it is known by itself as all truth and actuality. In this way, however, this *filling* is not equal to its *shape*, nor is spirit as essence equal to its consciousness. Spirit is actual as absolute spirit only when it is to itself in its *truth* just as it is in the *certainty of itself*; or when the extremes into which it divides itself as consciousness are for one another in the shape of spirit. The shaping that spirit takes on as the object of its consciousness remains filled with the certainty of spirit, as with its substance. Through this content, any sinking of the object down to pure objectivity, to the form of the negativity of self-consciousness, vanishes. The immediate unity of spirit with itself is the founda-

tion, or pure consciousness, *within* which consciousness splits apart. Enclosed in this way within its pure self-consciousness, spirit does not exist in religion as the creator of a *nature* in general. Rather, what it produces in this movement are its shapes as spirits, which together make up the completeness of its appearance. And this movement itself is the coming-to-be of its complete actuality through the individual sides of that actuality, that is, through its incomplete actualities.

THREE FORMS OF RELIGION

Hegel previews natural religion, the religion of art and the revealed religion.

683 The first actuality of spirit is the concept of religion itself, or religion as *immediate* and thus *natural religion*. In it spirit knows itself as its object in a natural or immediate shape. The *second*, however, is necessarily this: that spirit knows itself in the shape of *sublated naturalness*, or of the *self*. It is thus *artificial religion*; for the shape rises to the form of the *self* through the *producing* activity of consciousness, whereby consciousness beholds in its object its own doing, or the self. The *third*, finally, sublates the one-sidedness of the first two: the *self* is just as much an *immediate* self as *immediacy is self*.[2] If in the first spirit is, in general, in the form of consciousness, and in the second in that of self-consciousness, then in the third it is in the form of the unity of both. It has the shape of *being in and for itself*; and since it is thus represented as it is in and for itself, this is *revealed religion*. But although spirit does indeed attain its true *shape* in this religion, the *shape* itself and *representation* are still the unconquered side. From this side spirit must pass over into the *Concept*, in order to dissolve the form of objectivity entirely within the Concept—which likewise encloses this, its opposite, within itself.[3] Then spirit will have grasped the Concept of itself, in the way that so

2 *Künstlich* here means "made by art": this is the religion of art treated below.
3 *Offenbar* means both "revealed" and "manifest, open to view."

far only we have grasped it; and its shape, or the element of its existence, since it is the Concept, is spirit itself.

A. NATURAL RELIGION

Spirit first knows itself in the natural, immediate shape of being.

684 Spirit that knows spirit is consciousness of itself, and is to itself in the form of the objective: it *is*. And it is at the same time *being-for-self. It is for itself*; it is the side of *self*-consciousness, and indeed as against the side of its consciousness, or of relating itself to itself as *object*. In its consciousness lies the opposition, and thereby the *determinateness* of the shape in which it appears to itself and knows itself. This determinateness alone is what matters in this consideration of religion, for spirit's unshaped essence, or its pure concept, has already emerged. The distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness, however, falls at the same time within the latter. The shape of religion contains the existence of spirit neither as nature free of thought nor as thought free of existence. It is rather existence preserved in thinking, as well as something thought that is there for itself. —One religion differs from another according to the *determinateness* of this shape in which spirit knows itself. But it must at the same time be noted that presenting this knowing of itself according to this *individual determinateness* does not in fact exhaust the whole of an actual religion. The series of different religions that will emerge equally presents, once again, only the different sides of a single religion, indeed of *every single one*; and the representations that seem to distinguish one actual religion from another occur in each. But at the same time the diversity must also be regarded as a diversity of religion. For since spirit finds itself in the distinction between its consciousness and its self-consciousness, the movement has as its goal to sublate this principal distinction and to give the shape that is the object of consciousness the form of self-consciousness. This distinction, however, is not already sublated by the fact that the shapes contained in consciousness also have the moment of the self in

them, and that the god is *represented as self-consciousness*. The *represented* self is not the *actual* self. For the self, like every other more specific determination of the shape, to belong to that shape in truth, two things are required. On the one hand, it must be posited in the shape by the doing of self-consciousness; on the other hand, the lower determination must show itself to be sublated and comprehended by the higher. For what is represented ceases to be merely represented and alien to its knowing only when the self has produced it, and so beholds the determination of the object as *its own*, and hence beholds itself in the object. — Through this activity the lower determination has at the same time vanished; for doing is the negative that carries itself out at the expense of an other. Insofar as the lower determination still occurs, it has withdrawn into inessentiality; just as, conversely, where the lower still dominates but the higher also occurs, the one has its place selflessly beside the other. So although the different representations within a single religion do present the whole movement of its forms, the character of each religion is determined by the particular unity of consciousness and self-consciousness. That is, it is determined by the fact that self-consciousness has taken into itself the determination of the object of consciousness, has through its doing made that determination completely its own, and knows it as the essential one in contrast to the others. — The truth of faith in a determination of the religious spirit shows itself in this: that the *actual* spirit is constituted like the shape in which it beholds itself in religion. Thus, for example, the incarnation of God that occurs in Eastern religion has no truth, because the actual spirit of that religion is without this reconciliation.—It does not belong here to return from the totality of determinations to the individual one, and to show in which shape, within that determination and its particular religion, the completeness of the others is contained. The higher form, when set back under a lower one, lacks its significance for self-conscious spirit; it belongs only superfi-

cially to that spirit and to its representation.[4] The higher form is to be considered in its own proper significance, and there where it is the principle of this particular religion and is confirmed by that religion's actual spirit.

A. THE LUMINOUS ESSENCE

Spirit is intuited as formless light, the dawn that fills and consumes all shapes.

685 Spirit, as the *essence* that is *self-consciousness*—or the self-conscious essence that is all truth and knows all actuality as itself—is, as against the reality it gives itself in the movement of its consciousness, at first only *its concept*. As against the day of this unfolding, this concept is the night of its essence; as against the existence of its moments as independent shapes, it is the creative mystery of its birth. This mystery contains its revelation within itself. For existence has its necessity in this concept, because the concept is spirit that knows itself, and thus has in its essence the moment of being consciousness and of representing itself objectively. — It is the pure I, which in its externalization, in itself as *universal object*, has the certainty of itself; or, this object is for the I the interpenetration of all thought and all actuality.

686 In the immediate first division of absolute spirit that knows itself, its shape has the determination that belongs to *immediate consciousness*, or to *sense*-certainty. Spirit beholds itself in the form of *being*—not, however, the spiritless *being*, filled with contingent determinations of sensation, that belongs to sense-certainty, but being filled with spirit. This being likewise includes the form that appeared in immediate *self-consciousness*: the form of the *lord*, as against the self-consciousness of spirit that withdraws from its object.—This *being*, filled with the concept of spirit, is therefore the *shape* of the *simple* relation of spirit to itself, or the shape of shapelessness. By virtue of this determina-

4 Hegel probably has in mind the incarnations (avatars) of the gods in Hindu religion.

tion, this shape is the pure, all-containing and all-filling *luminous essence* of the dawn, which preserves itself in its formless substantiality. Its otherness is the equally simple negative, *darkness*. The movements of its own externalization, its creations in the unresisting element of its otherness, are outpourings of light. In their simplicity they are at the same time its becoming-for-itself and its return from its existence—streams of fire that consume all shaping. The difference it gives itself does indeed proliferate in the substance of existence and shape itself into the forms of nature. But the essential simplicity of its thinking roams about in them without stability and without understanding, expands their boundaries into the measureless, and dissolves their beauty, heightened into splendor, in its sublimity.[5]

687 The content that this pure *being* develops, or its perceiving, is therefore an inessential play going on alongside this substance, which only *rises* without *going down* into itself, becoming subject, and making its differences firm through the self. Its determinations are only attributes that do not attain independence but remain mere names of the many-named One. This One is clothed with the manifold forces of existence and the shapes of actuality as with a selfless ornament. They are only messengers of its power, lacking any will of their own, visions of its glory, and voices of its praise.

688 This reeling life, however, must determine itself to *being-for-self* and give its vanishing shapes subsistence. The *immediate being* in which it sets itself over against its consciousness is itself the *negative* power that dissolves its differences. It is therefore in truth the *self*; and spirit accordingly passes over to knowing itself in the form of the self. Pure light scatters its simplicity into an infinity of forms and offers them up as a sacrifice to being-for-self, so that the individual may take subsistence for itself from its substance.

5 Hegel's "luminous essence" (*Lichtwesen*) is generally taken to refer to the ancient Persian, Zoroastrian religion of light.

B. PLANT AND ANIMAL

Spirit scatters into many spirits, from peaceful flower religion to hostile peoples worshipping animals.

689 Self-conscious spirit, which has gone into itself out of the shapeless essence, or has raised its immediacy to the self in general, determines its simplicity as a multiplicity of being-for-self. It is the religion of spiritual *perception*, in which spirit falls apart into the countless plurality of weaker and stronger, richer and poorer spirits. This pantheism, at first the *peaceful* subsistence of these spirit-atoms, becomes a *hostile* movement within itself. The innocence of the *religion of flowers*, which is only the selfless representation of the self, passes over into the seriousness of a life of struggle, into the guilt of the *religion of animals*; the calm and impotence of contemplative individuality passes over into destructive being-for-self. — It is of no use to have taken the *death of abstraction* away from the things of perception and to have raised them to beings of spiritual perception. The ensoulment of this realm of spirits has death within it, through the determinateness and the negativity that encroach upon their innocent indifference. Through this negativity, the dispersal into the multiplicity of peaceful plant shapes becomes a hostile movement, in which the hatred of their being-for-self wears them down.—The *actual* self-consciousness of this dispersed spirit is a host of isolated, unsociable spirits of peoples, who in their hatred fight one another to the death and become conscious of specific animal shapes as their essence. For they are nothing but animal spirits, animal lives that set themselves apart and are conscious of themselves without universality.

690 In this hatred, however, the determinateness of purely negative being-for-self wears itself away, and through this movement of the concept spirit enters into another shape. *Sublated being-for-self* is the *form* of the *object*: a form produced by the self, or rather one that is itself the produced self, the self wearing itself away, that is, becoming a thing. Over the animal spirits

that merely tear one another apart, therefore, the one who works gains the upper hand, whose doing is not merely negative but pacified and positive. The consciousness of spirit is thus now the movement that has gone beyond immediate *being-in-itself* as well as beyond abstract *being-for-self*. Since the in-itself has been reduced through the opposition to a determinateness, it is no longer the proper form of absolute spirit. It is instead an actuality that spirit's consciousness finds set against itself as ordinary existence, and which it sublates. And this consciousness is not only this sublating being-for-self; it also produces its representation, being-for-self set out into the form of an object. This producing, however, is not yet complete; it is a conditioned activity, the forming of something already there.

C. THE ARTIFICER

Spirit works like an instinctive craftsman, making pyramids, obelisks, statues and sphinx-like mixed shapes.

691 Here, therefore, spirit appears as the *artificer*. Its doing, by which it produces itself as object but has not yet grasped the thought of itself, is an instinctive labor, like that of bees building their cells.[6]

692 The first form, because it is the immediate one, is the abstract form of the understanding, and the work is not yet in itself filled with spirit. The crystals of pyramids and obelisks—simple combinations of straight lines with flat surfaces and equal proportions of parts, in which the incommensurability of the round is eliminated—are the works of this artificer of strict form. Because the form is merely a product of the understanding, it is not its own meaning in itself, not the spiritual self. The works, therefore, either receive spirit only into themselves, as an alien, departed spirit that has abandoned its living interpenetration with actuality and, itself dead, takes up its dwelling in these lifeless crystals;—or they relate externally to spirit, as to a

6 The artificer's religion is generally taken to be that of ancient Egypt, with its pyramids, obelisks and animal-headed gods.

spirit that is itself there externally and not as spirit—as to the rising light that casts its meaning upon them.

693 The separation from which working spirit starts—between *being-in-itself*, which becomes the material it works on, and *being-for-self*, which is *the side* of working self-consciousness—has become objective to it in its work. Its further effort must be aimed at sublating this separation of soul and body: at clothing and shaping the soul in its own self, and at ensouling the body. As the two sides are brought closer to each other, they nevertheless retain toward each other the determinateness of represented spirit and of its surrounding shell. Spirit's unity with itself contains this opposition of singularity and universality. As the work draws nearer to itself in its sides, something else happens at the same time: it draws nearer to working self-consciousness, and this self-consciousness comes, in the work, to know itself as it is in and for itself. In this way, however, self-consciousness at first makes up only the abstract side of the *activity* of spirit, an activity that does not yet know its content within itself but in its work, which is a thing. The artificer itself, the whole spirit, has not yet appeared. It is still the inner, hidden essence, which is present as a whole only as split into active self-consciousness and the object it has produced.

694 The surrounding dwelling, then—the external actuality that has so far been raised only into the abstract form of the understanding—the artificer works up into a more ensouled form. For this it uses plant life, which is no longer sacred, as it was to the earlier, impotent pantheism. Instead, the artificer, which grasps itself as the essence that is for itself, takes plant life as something useful and relegates it to the exterior, to ornament. Yet it is not used unchanged: the worker of self-conscious form at the same time eliminates the transience that the immediate existence of this life has, and brings its organic forms closer to the stricter and more universal forms of thought. The organic form, which, left free, proliferates in particularity, is on the one hand subjugated by the form of thought; on the other hand, it raises these rectilinear and flat shapes to a more

ensouled roundness—a mixture that becomes the root of free architecture.

695 This dwelling, the side of the *universal element*, or the inorganic nature of spirit, now also encloses within itself a shape of *singularity*. This shape brings the spirit that had previously been separated from existence, whether within it or outside it, closer to actuality, and thereby makes the work more equal to active self-consciousness. The worker first takes up the form of *being-for-self* in general, the *animal shape*. That it is no longer immediately conscious of itself in animal life it proves by constituting itself, over against that life, as the producing force, and by knowing itself in it as in *its own* work. The animal shape thereby at the same time becomes a sublated shape and the hieroglyph of another meaning, of a thought. Hence the worker also no longer uses the animal shape alone and entire, but mixes it with the shape of thought, the human shape. But the work still lacks the shape and existence in which the self exists as self;—it still lacks this: to declare in its own self that it encloses an inner meaning. It lacks language, the element in which the fulfilling sense itself is present. The work, therefore, even when it has been entirely purified of the animal element and bears the shape of self-consciousness alone, is still a soundless shape. It needs the ray of the rising sun in order to have sound—a sound that, produced by light, is only a ringing and not language, and shows only an outer self, not the inner one.[7]

696 Over against this outer self of the shape stands the other shape, which indicates that it has something *inner* within it. Nature, returning into its essence, reduces its living multiplicity —which individualizes itself and becomes confused in its movement—to an inessential casing that is the *covering of the inner*. And this inner is at first still simple darkness, the unmoved, the black formless stone.

697 Both presentations contain *inwardness* and *existence*—the two moments of spirit; and both presentations contain both

7 An allusion to the colossal statues of Memnon at Thebes, one of which was said in antiquity to sound at sunrise.

moments at once in an opposed relation: the self both as inner and as outer. The two are to be united.—The soul of the statue in human form does not yet come from within; it is not yet language, the existence that is inward in its own self. And the inner of the multiform existence is still what is soundless, what does not differentiate itself within itself and is still separated from its outer, to which all the differences belong. — The artificer therefore unites the two by mixing the natural and the self-conscious shape. And these ambiguous beings, riddles to themselves—the conscious wrestling with the unconscious, pairing the simple inner with the many-shaped outer, the darkness of thought with the clarity of utterance—break out into the language of a deep wisdom that is hard to understand.[8]

698 In this work the instinctive labor ceases that produced the unconscious work over against self-consciousness. For in it the activity of the artificer, which constitutes self-consciousness, is met by an inner that is equally self-conscious and expresses itself. In it the artificer has worked its way up to that division of its consciousness in which spirit meets spirit. In this unity of self-conscious spirit with itself, insofar as spirit is to itself the shape and object of its consciousness, its mixtures with the unconscious mode of the immediate natural shape are therefore purified away. These monsters of shape, speech, and deed dissolve into spiritual shaping—into an outer that has gone into itself, an inner that expresses itself out of itself and in its own self; into thought, which is existence that gives birth to itself, preserves its shape in keeping with itself, and is clear. Spirit is an *artist*.

B. THE RELIGION OF ART

The artificer becomes an artist, and the free ethical people knows its god in works of art.

699 Spirit has raised the shape in which it is for its consciousness into the form of consciousness itself, and it produces such a

shape for itself. The artificer has given up *synthetic* labor, the *mixing* of the heterogeneous forms of thought and of the natural. Since the shape has gained the form of self-conscious activity, the artificer has become a spiritual worker.

700 If we ask which *actual* spirit it is that, in art-religion, has the consciousness of its absolute essence, it turns out that it is *ethical* or *true* spirit. This spirit is not only the universal substance of all individuals. Rather, since this substance has, for actual consciousness, the shape of consciousness, this means that the substance, which has individualization, is known by them as their own essence and work.[9] For them, then, this substance is neither the luminous essence, in whose unity the being-for-self of self-consciousness is contained only negatively, only as passing away, and in which self-consciousness beholds the lord of its actuality;—nor is it the restless mutual consumption of peoples who hate one another;—nor their subjugation into castes, which together give the appearance of the organization of a completed whole, but a whole that lacks the universal freedom of individuals. Rather, spirit is the free people, in which custom constitutes the substance of all—a substance whose actuality and existence each and every individual knows as their own will and deed.

701 The religion of the ethical spirit, however, is its elevation above its actuality. It is the going back *from its truth* into the pure *knowing of itself*. The ethical people lives in immediate unity with its substance and does not have within it the principle of the pure singularity of self-consciousness. For that reason its religion first appears in its completion only when it *parts* from its *subsistence*. For the *actuality* of the ethical substance rests partly on its calm *immutability* in the face of the absolute movement of self-consciousness. It therefore rests on the fact that self-consciousness has not yet gone into itself out of its calm

8 Hegel is thinking of the Egyptian sphinx, part human and part animal, a traditional emblem of the riddle.

9 Art-religion (*Kunstreligion*) is Hegel's term for the religion of classical Greece, whose gods were known through sculpture, hymn and drama.

custom and its firm trust.—It rests partly on the substance's organization into a multiplicity of rights and duties, and on its distribution into the masses of the estates and their particular activity, which work together to form the whole.—It therefore rests on the fact that the individual is content with the limitation of his existence and has not yet grasped the unlimited thought of his free self. But that calm, *immediate* trust in the substance goes back into trust *in itself* and into the *certainty of itself*. The multiplicity of rights and duties, like the limited activity, is the same dialectical movement of the ethical as the multiplicity of things and their determinations—a movement that finds its rest and stability only in the simplicity of spirit certain of itself. —The completion of ethical life into free self-consciousness, and the fate of the ethical world, is therefore individuality that has gone into itself. It is the absolute levity of the ethical spirit, which has dissolved within itself all the fixed distinctions of its subsistence and the masses of its organic articulation, and, perfectly sure of itself, has arrived at boundless joy and the freest enjoyment of itself. This simple certainty of spirit within itself is ambiguous. It is calm subsistence and firm truth, and it is equally absolute unrest and the passing away of ethical life. But it turns over into the latter. For the truth of the ethical spirit is at first still only this substantial essence and trust, in which the self does not know itself as free singularity. That essence and trust therefore perish in this inwardness, that is, in the self's becoming free. Once trust is broken, then, and the substance of the people is shattered within itself, spirit, which was the middle between extremes that had no subsistence, has now stepped out into the extreme of self-consciousness grasping itself as essence. This is spirit certain within itself, which mourns the loss of its world and now brings forth its essence, raised above actuality, out of the purity of the self.

[702] In such an epoch absolute art emerges. Before this, art is instinctive working. Sunk in existence, it works its way out of existence and into it. It does not have its substance in free ethical life, and therefore does not have free spiritual activity for

the self that works. Later, spirit goes beyond art in order to gain its higher presentation. That is, it seeks to be not merely the *substance* born out of the self, but, in its presentation as object, to be *this self*. It seeks not merely to give birth to itself out of its concept, but to have its concept itself for its shape, so that the concept and the work of art it produces know each other as one and the same.

703 Since the ethical substance has thus withdrawn from its existence into its pure self-consciousness, this self-consciousness is the side of the concept, or of *activity*, with which spirit brings itself forth as object. It is pure form, because in ethical obedience and service the individual has worked off all unconscious existence and fixed determination, just as the substance itself has become this fluid essence. This form is the night in which substance was betrayed and made itself into subject. It is out of this night of pure certainty of itself that the ethical spirit is resurrected as the shape freed from nature and from its own immediate existence.[10]

704 The *existence* of the pure concept into which spirit has fled from its body is an individual, whom spirit chooses as the vessel of its pain. Spirit is present in this individual as the individual's universal and as its power, from which the individual suffers violence—as its pathos, given over to which the individual's self-consciousness loses its freedom. But that positive power of universality is subdued by the pure self of the individual, as the negative power. This pure activity, conscious of its inalienable force, wrestles with the unshaped essence. Becoming master of it, the activity has made the pathos its material and given itself its content; and this unity comes forth as a work: universal spirit individualized and represented.

10 "The night in which substance was betrayed" echoes Paul's words about "the night in which he was betrayed" (1 Corinthians 11:23).

A. THE ABSTRACT WORK OF ART

The god appears as a statue, then in the hymn and the oracle.

705 The first work of art, as the immediate one, is the abstract and individual work. For its part, it has to move out of the immediate and objective mode toward self-consciousness; self-consciousness, on the other hand, for itself aims in the cult at sublating the distinction it initially sets up between itself and its spirit, and thereby at bringing forth the work of art that is animated in itself.[11]

706 The first mode, in which the artistic spirit sets its shape and its active consciousness furthest apart from each other, is the immediate one: the shape *is there* as a *thing* in general.—In itself this shape falls apart into the distinction between singularity, which has the shape of the self in it, and universality, which presents the inorganic essence in relation to the shape, as its environment and dwelling. Through the elevation of the whole into the pure concept, this dwelling gains its pure form, the form that belongs to spirit. It is neither the crystal of the understanding, which houses the dead or is shone upon by the external soul, nor the mixture of the forms of nature and of thought that first issues from the plant, in which the activity of thought is still an *imitation*. Rather, the concept strips away whatever of root, branches and foliage still clings to the forms, and purifies them into structures in which the rectilinear and flat surfaces of the crystal are raised into incommensurable ratios. In this way the animation of the organic is taken up into the abstract form of the understanding, while at the same time its essence—incommensurability for the understanding—is preserved.

707 The indwelling god, however, is the black stone drawn out of its animal casing and suffused with the light of consciousness. The human shape strips off the animal shape with which it was mixed. For the god the animal is only a contingent disguise.

11 Cult (*Kultus*): religious worship and ritual practice.

It steps alongside the god's true shape, no longer counts for anything on its own, and has sunk to signifying something else, to a mere sign. By this same token the god's shape in itself also strips off the neediness of the natural conditions of animal existence, and it intimates that the inner arrangements of organic life are fused into its surface and belong to that surface alone.—The *essence* of the god, however, is the unity of the universal existence of nature and of self-conscious spirit, which in its actuality appears as standing over against that universal existence.[12] Being at the same time and at first an *individual* shape, the god's existence is one of the elements of nature, just as his self-conscious actuality is the individual spirit of a people. But in this unity that element is the element reflected into spirit: nature transfigured by thought and united with self-conscious life. The shape of the gods therefore has its natural element within it as something sublated, as a dim memory. The wild essence and the confused struggle of the free existence of the elements, the unethical realm of the Titans, have been vanquished and banished to the fringe of the actuality that has become clear to itself, to the murky borders of the world that finds itself in spirit and is at peace.[13] These old gods, into which the essence of light, begetting with darkness, first particularizes itself—Heaven, Earth, Ocean, the Sun, the blind Typhonic fire of the earth, and so on—are replaced by shapes that retain only a dimly recollective echo of those Titans. These shapes are no longer natural beings but the clear ethical spirits of self-conscious peoples.[14]

708 This simple shape has thus eliminated in itself the unrest of infinite individualization and gathered it together into calm individuality. This is the unrest of individualization both as the natural element, which is necessary only as universal essence but behaves contingently in its existence and movement, and as

12 The "black stone" recalls the formless stone of the preceding section on the artificer.

13 In Greek myth the Titans are the older generation of gods overthrown by Zeus and the Olympians.

14 Typhon: a monstrous fire-breathing giant of Greek myth, associated with volcanic fire.

the people, which, scattered into the particular masses of activity and the individual points of self-consciousness, has an existence of manifold sense and activity. Standing over against the shape, therefore, is the moment of unrest: over against it—the *essence*—stands *self-consciousness*, which, as the birthplace of the shape, has kept nothing for itself except to be *pure activity*. What belongs to substance the artist gave entirely to his work. To himself, however, as a determinate individuality, he gave no actuality in his work. He could confer completion on the work only by externalizing his particularity, disembodying himself and rising to the abstraction of pure doing.—In this first, immediate production, the separation between the work and his self-conscious activity has not yet been reunited. The work is therefore not, for itself, what is actually animated; it is a *whole* only together with its *becoming*. What is common in the work of art—that it is produced in consciousness and made by human hands—is the moment of the concept existing as concept, which stands over against the work. And if this concept, as artist or as beholder, is selfless enough to declare the work of art absolutely animated in itself and to forget itself, the one who makes or beholds, then against this the concept of spirit must be held fast, for spirit cannot do without the moment of being conscious of itself. This moment, however, stands over against the work, because in this, its first division, spirit gives the two sides their abstract determinations of *activity* and of being a *thing*, set against each other, and their return into the unity from which they set out has not yet been achieved.

709 The artist thus experiences in his work that he did *not* produce a being *equal to himself*. A consciousness does indeed come back to him from it, in that an admiring crowd reveres the work as the spirit that is its own essence. But this animation, by returning his self-consciousness to him only as admiration, is rather a confession, made by this animation to the artist, that it is not his equal. Since the work comes back to him as joy in general, he does not find in it the pain of his forming and begetting, nor the strain of his labor. The admirers may also go on to judge

the work, or bring it offerings, placing their consciousness in it in whatever way. If they set themselves above it with their expertise, he knows how much more his *deed* is than their comprehension and talk. If they place themselves *beneath* it and recognize in it the *essence* that rules them, he knows himself to be the master of that essence.

710 The work of art therefore requires another element for its existence, and the god another mode of coming forth than this one, in which he falls from the depths of his creative night into the opposite, into externality, into the determination of the *thing* that lacks self-consciousness. This higher element is *language*—an existence that is immediately self-conscious existence. As *individual* self-consciousness is there in language, it is there just as immediately as a *universal* contagion. The complete particularization of being-for-self is at the same time the fluidity and the universally shared unity of the many selves; language is the soul existing as soul. The god, then, who has language as the element of his shape, is the work of art animated in itself, which has immediately in its existence the pure activity that stood over against it when it existed as a thing. In other words, self-consciousness, as its essence becomes objective, remains immediately with itself. Being thus with itself in its essence, it is *pure thinking*, or devotion, whose *inwardness* at the same time has *existence* in the hymn. Devotion retains within itself the singularity of self-consciousness, and, being heard, this singularity is at the same time there as universal. Devotion kindled in all is the spiritual stream that, in the multiplicity of self-consciousness, is conscious of itself as the same *doing* of all and as *simple being*. Spirit, as this universal self-consciousness of all, holds its pure inwardness as well as the being for others and the being-for-self of individuals in one single unity.

711 This language differs from another language of the god, one that is not the language of universal self-consciousness. The *oracle*, both of the god of the art-religion and of the preceding religions, is the god's necessary first language. For it lies in his *concept* that he is the essence of nature as well as of spirit, and

therefore has not only natural but also spiritual existence. Insofar as this moment lies only in his *concept* and is not yet realized in religion, language is, for the religious self-consciousness, the language of an *alien* self-consciousness. The self-consciousness that is still alien to its community *is* not yet *there* in the way its concept demands. The self is simple and therefore utterly *universal* being-for-self; but the self that is separated from the self-consciousness of the community is at first only an *individual* one.—The content of this peculiar and individual language results from the universal determinateness in which absolute spirit in general is posited in its religion.—Thus the universal spirit of the sunrise, which has not yet particularized its existence, utters equally simple and universal propositions about essence. Their substantial content is sublime in its simple truth, but because of this very universality it at the same time appears trivial to self-consciousness as it develops further.

712 The self that has developed further and raises itself to *being-for-self* is master over the pure pathos of substance, over the objectivity of the rising essence of light. It knows that simplicity of truth as what *is in itself*—as what does not have the form of contingent existence through an alien language, but is known *as the sure and unwritten law of the gods, which lives eternally, and of which no one knows whence it appeared.*[15] — The universal truth that was revealed by the essence of light has here withdrawn into the inner or the lower, and has thereby been freed from the form of contingent appearance. By contrast, in the art-religion the god's shape has taken on consciousness and hence singularity in general. The god's own language—the god who is the spirit of the ethical people—is therefore the oracle, which knows that people's particular affairs and makes known what is useful regarding them. The universal truths, however, because they are known as *what is in itself*, are claimed by *knowing thought* as its own, and their language is no longer alien to it but its own. That sage of antiquity sought what is good and beautiful in his own thinking, but left it to his daimon to know the poor,

15 From Sophocles, *Antigone* 456–457, quoted earlier in the chapter on spirit.

contingent content of knowledge—whether it would be good for him to associate with this person or that, or good for an acquaintance to make this journey, and similar insignificant matters. In the same way, universal consciousness fetches its knowledge of the contingent from birds, or from trees, or from the fermenting earth whose vapor robs self-consciousness of its composure. For the contingent is what lacks composure and is alien; and so the ethical consciousness, too, lets itself be determined about it, as by a throw of dice, in a manner that lacks composure and is alien.[16] When the individual determines himself through his understanding and chooses with deliberation what may be useful to him, this self-determination is grounded in the determinateness of his particular character. That determinateness is itself the contingent. The understanding's knowledge of what is useful to the individual is therefore knowledge of just the same kind as that of those oracles or of the lot. The only difference is that whoever consults the oracle or the lot thereby expresses the ethical disposition of indifference toward the contingent, whereas the one who deliberates treats what is in itself contingent as an essential interest of his thinking and knowing. Higher than both, however, is to make deliberation the oracle for contingent action, yet to know this deliberate action itself as something contingent, because of its side of relation to the particular and because of its usefulness.

713 The true self-conscious existence that spirit receives in language—a language that is not the language of an alien, and therefore contingent, non-universal self-consciousness—is the work of art we have just seen. It stands over against the thing-like existence of the statue. As the statue is existence at rest, so this work is vanishing existence. In the statue, objectivity, freely released, lacks its own immediate self. In the hymn, by contrast, objectivity remains too much enclosed within the self, comes

16 The sage is Socrates, whose daimon was an inner voice warning him off particular actions; the birds, trees and vapors refer to Greek augury, the oracle of the oaks at Dodona and the Pythia at Delphi.

too little to shape, and, like time, is immediately no longer there even as it is there.

THE CULT

Through purification, sacrifice and festival the worshipper and the god come together.

[714] The movement of the two sides constitutes the *cult*. In this movement the divine shape *moving* in the pure feeling element of self-consciousness and the divine shape *at rest* in the element of thinghood mutually give up their different determinations, and the unity that is the concept of their essence comes into existence. In the cult the self gives itself the consciousness of the divine essence's descending to it from its beyond; and this essence, previously unactual and merely objective, thereby receives the proper actuality of self-consciousness.

[715] This concept of the cult is already contained and present in itself in the stream of hymnic song. This devotion is the immediate, pure satisfaction of the self through and in itself. It is the purified soul, which in this purity is immediately only essence and one with essence. Because of its abstraction, it is not consciousness that distinguishes its object from itself; it is thus only the night of the object's existence and the *prepared site* of its shape. The *abstract cult* therefore raises the self to being this pure *divine element*. The soul accomplishes this purification consciously. Yet it is not yet the self that has descended into its depths and knows itself as evil. Rather, it is something that *is*: a soul that cleanses its externality by washing and clothes it in white garments, and leads its inwardness along the represented path of labors, punishments and rewards—the path of culture in general, which externalizes particularity—by which it arrives at the dwellings and the community of the blessed.

[716] This cult is at first only a *secret* one, that is, a merely represented, unactual accomplishment. It must be *actual* action; an unactual action contradicts itself. Through actual action *consciousness proper* raises itself into its *pure* self-consciousness. In

consciousness proper the essence has the significance of a free object; through the actual cult this object returns into the self. And insofar as, in pure consciousness, the object has the significance of the pure essence dwelling beyond actuality, this essence descends, through this mediation, from its universality to singularity, and thus joins together with actuality.

[717] How the two sides enter into the action is determined as follows. For the self-conscious side, insofar as it is *actual* consciousness, the essence presents itself as *actual nature*. On the one hand, nature belongs to it as possession and property and counts as existence that is not *in itself*. On the other hand, nature is *its own* immediate actuality and singularity, which it equally regards as non-essence and sublates. At the same time, however, for its *pure* consciousness this external nature has the *opposite* significance: namely, it is the essence that *is in itself*, to which the self sacrifices its unessentiality, just as, conversely, the self sacrifices the unessential side of nature to itself. The action is spiritual movement because it is twofold in this way. It sublates the abstraction of the *essence*, as devotion determines the object, and makes the essence actual; and it sublates the *actual*, as the one acting determines the object and himself, and raises it into universality.

[718] The action of the cult itself therefore begins with the pure *surrender* of a possession, which the owner, seemingly without any use to himself, pours out or lets rise up in smoke. In doing so, before the essence of his pure consciousness, he renounces possession, the right of property and its enjoyment, personality, and the return of his doing into the self. He reflects the action into the universal, or into the essence, rather than into himself. —Conversely, however, the *essence that is* equally perishes in this. The animal that is sacrificed is the *sign* of a god; the fruits that are consumed are the *living* Ceres and Bacchus *themselves*.—In the animal die the powers of the upper law, which has blood and actual life; in the fruits die the powers of the lower law, which, bloodless, possesses secret, cunning power.—The sacrifice of the divine substance, insofar as it is *doing*, belongs to the self-con-

scious side. But for this actual doing to be possible, the essence must already have sacrificed itself *in itself*. This it has done by giving itself *existence* and making itself into the *individual animal* and the *fruit*. This renunciation, which the essence has thus already accomplished *in itself*, the acting self presents in existence and for its own consciousness, and it replaces that *immediate* actuality of the essence with a higher one, namely *the actuality of the self*. For the unity that has come about—the result of the sublated singularity and separation of the two sides—is not merely negative fate but has positive significance. Only to the abstract, subterranean essence is what is sacrificed to it wholly given over. This marks the reflection of possession and of being-for-self into the universal as distinct from the self as such. At the same time, however, this is only a small *part*. The rest of the sacrificing is only the destruction of what is unusable, and is rather the preparation of the offering for a meal, whose feast cheats the action of its negative significance. In the first kind of sacrifice the one who offers keeps back the greater part, and in the second he keeps back what is usable for *his own enjoyment*. This enjoyment is the negative power that sublates both the *essence* and *singularity*. At the same time it is the positive actuality in which the *objective* existence of the essence is transformed into *self-conscious* existence, and the self has consciousness of its unity with the essence.

[719] This cult, moreover, is indeed an actual action, yet its significance lies more in devotion alone. What belongs to devotion is not produced objectively, just as the result, in *enjoyment*, robs itself of its existence. The cult therefore goes further. It makes good this lack, first of all, by giving its devotion an *objective subsistence*: it becomes the common labor, or the individual labor anyone can perform, that produces the dwelling and adornment of the god in his honor. — In this way, on the one hand, the objectivity of the statue is sublated; for through this consecration of his gifts and labors the worker disposes the god favorably toward himself and beholds his own self as belonging to the god. On the other hand, this doing is not the individual labor of

the artist; this particularity is dissolved in universality. But it is not only the honor of the god that comes about, and the blessing of his favor does not flow upon the worker merely in *representation*. The labor also has a significance that reverses its first one, the significance of externalization and of honor paid to another. The dwellings and halls of the god are for human use; the treasures kept in them belong, in case of need, to human beings. The honor the god enjoys in his adornment is the honor of the people, rich in art and magnanimous. At festivals the people likewise adorn their own dwellings and garments, as well as their activities, with graceful implements. In this way they receive, for their gifts, the return from the grateful god and the proofs of his favor, in which they bound themselves to him through labor. They receive it not in hope and in some later actuality; rather, in paying honor and offering gifts, they immediately have the enjoyment of their own wealth and finery.

B. THE LIVING WORK OF ART

Bacchic revelry and the athlete honored like a statue present the god in living bodies.

720 The people that approaches its god in the cult of the art-religion is the ethical people, which knows its state and the actions of the state as its own will and achievement. This spirit, standing over against the self-conscious people, is therefore not the essence of light, which, being selfless, does not contain within it the certainty of individuals, but is only their universal essence and the lordly power in which they vanish. The cult of the religion of this simple, shapeless essence therefore gives back to its adherents only this, in general: that they are the people of their god. It gains for them only their subsistence and simple substance in general, but not their actual self, which is instead rejected. For they revere their god as the empty depth, not as spirit. The cult of the art-religion, on the other hand, lacks that abstract *simplicity* of the essence, and therefore lacks its *depth*. But the *essence* that is *immediately united with the self* is *in itself*

spirit and *knowing truth*, though not yet known truth, or truth that knows itself in its depth. Because the essence here has the self within it, its appearance is friendly to consciousness. In the cult, consciousness receives not only the universal justification of its subsistence but also its self-conscious existence within the essence. Conversely, the essence does not have selfless actuality in a rejected people whose substance alone is recognized, but in the people whose *self* is recognized in its substance.

721 From the cult, then, self-consciousness emerges satisfied in its essence, and the god has entered into it as into his dwelling-place. This *dwelling-place* is for itself the night of substance, or its pure individuality. It is no longer, however, the tense individuality of the artist, which has not yet been reconciled with its essence as that essence becomes *objective*. It is the satisfied night, which has its pathos within it and has no need of it, because it returns from intuition, from objectivity that has been sublated.—This *pathos* is for itself the essence of the *sunrise*, but an essence that has now *set* within itself and has its setting—self-consciousness, and with it existence and actuality—in itself.—Here it has run through the movement of its actualization. Lowering itself from its pure essentiality into an objective natural force and its expressions, this essence is an existence for the other, for the self, by which it is consumed. The silent essence of selfless nature attains in its fruit the stage at which, preparing and digesting itself, it offers itself to the life that has a self. In the usefulness of being able to be eaten and drunk, nature reaches its highest perfection; for in this it is the possibility of a higher existence and touches spiritual existence.—In its metamorphosis the earth-spirit has developed partly into quietly vigorous substance, partly into spiritual fermentation: in the first case into the feminine principle of nourishment, in the second into the masculine principle of the self-propelling force of self-conscious existence.

722 In this enjoyment, then, that rising essence of light is betrayed as what it is; the enjoyment is its mystery. For the mystical is not the concealment of a secret, nor ignorance. It con-

sists rather in the self's knowing itself to be one with the essence, so that the essence is revealed. Only the self is revealed to itself; or what is revealed is so only in the immediate certainty of the self. But it is in this certainty that the simple essence has been posited through the cult. As a usable thing, the essence not only has an existence that is seen, felt, smelled and tasted, but is also an object of desire. Through actual enjoyment it becomes one with the self, and is thereby completely betrayed to the self and revealed to it. — What is said to be revealed to reason, or to the heart, is in fact still secret. For it still lacks the actual certainty of immediate existence, both the objective certainty and the certainty that enjoys. In religion, however, this certainty is not only thoughtless and immediate but at the same time the purely knowing certainty of the self.

723 What has thus become revealed through the cult to self-conscious spirit within itself is the *simple* essence as a twofold movement. On the one hand, it rises up out of its nocturnal concealment into consciousness, to be consciousness's silently nourishing substance. On the other hand, it loses itself again in the subterranean night, in the self, and lingers above only with a silent mother's longing.—The pure impulse, however, is the many-named essence of light of the sunrise, and its reeling life. Having equally let go of its abstract being, this life first enters into the objective existence of the fruit; then, surrendering itself to self-consciousness, it attains proper actuality in it; and now it roams about as a throng of frenzied women, the untamed revel of nature in self-conscious shape.[17]

724 As yet, however, what has been betrayed to consciousness is only absolute spirit as this simple essence, not as spirit in itself; or only *immediate* spirit, the spirit of nature. Its self-conscious life is therefore only the mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus, not of the other gods, the properly upper gods, whose individuality includes self-consciousness as such as

17 The "mother's longing" recalls Demeter mourning Persephone, taken to the underworld; the "throng of frenzied women" are the Maenads, the female followers of Dionysus.

an essential moment. Spirit, then, has not yet sacrificed itself to consciousness as *self-conscious* spirit, and the mystery of bread and wine is not yet the mystery of flesh and blood.

725 This unsettled reeling of the god must come to rest as an *object*, and the enthusiasm that did not reach consciousness must bring forth a work. This work confronts the enthusiasm as the statue confronted the enthusiasm of the earlier artist—as a work equally complete, yet not as something lifeless in itself but as a *living* self.—Such a cult is the festival that human beings hold in their own honor, though they do not yet put into it the significance of the absolute essence. For only the *essence* is revealed to them, not yet spirit—not the essence as something that *essentially* takes on human shape. But this cult lays the ground for this revelation and sets out its moments one by one. So here it sets out the *abstract* moment of the living *corporeality* of the essence, as earlier it set out the unity of both in unconscious frenzy. The human being thus puts himself in the place of the statue, as a shape trained and worked out for perfectly free *movement*, just as the statue is perfectly free *rest*. If each individual knows how to present himself at least as a torchbearer, one among them rises above the rest: he is shaped movement, the smooth elaboration and fluid force of all the limbs. He is an ensouled, living work of art that pairs strength with its beauty. To him falls, as the prize of his strength, the adornment with which the statue was honored, and the honor among his people of being, in place of the stone god, the highest bodily presentation of their essence.[18]

726 In the two presentations just encountered, the unity of self-consciousness and spiritual essence is present, but they still lack their equilibrium. In Bacchic enthusiasm the self is outside itself; in beautiful corporeality it is the spiritual essence that is outside itself. The dullness of consciousness in the first, and its wild stammering, must be taken up into the clear existence of the second; and the spiritless clarity of the second must be

18 Torch races and athletic contests were part of Greek religious festivals; victors were honored with crowns and statues.

taken up into the inwardness of the first. The perfect element, in which inwardness is just as external as externality is internal, is once again language. But it is neither the language of the oracle, wholly contingent and individual in its content, nor the hymn, full of feeling and praising only the individual god, nor the contentless stammering of Bacchic frenzy. Rather, language has gained its clear and universal content. Its *clear* content: for the artist has worked his way out of the first, wholly substantial enthusiasm into shape, into an existence of his own, pervaded in all its stirrings by the self-conscious soul and living along with it. Its *universal* content: for in this festival, which is the honor of the human being, the one-sidedness of the statues vanishes, since they contain only a national spirit, a determinate character of the divine. The beautiful fighter is indeed the honor of his particular people. But he is a bodily singularity in which the detail and seriousness of significance, and the inner character of the spirit that carries the particular life, concerns, needs and customs of his people, have gone under. In this externalization into complete corporeality, spirit has laid aside the particular impressions and echoes of nature that it enclosed within itself as the actual spirit of the people. Its people is therefore no longer conscious, in it, of its own particularity, but rather of having laid that particularity aside, and of the universality of its human existence.

C. THE SPIRITUAL WORK OF ART

The epic joins gods and heroes in language, sung by the bard.

[727] The spirits of peoples that become conscious of the shape of their essence in a particular animal merge into one. In the same way, the particular beautiful spirits of peoples unite into one pantheon, whose element and dwelling is language. The pure intuition of itself as *universal humanity* takes the following form in the actuality of a people's spirit: that spirit joins with the others with which it forms one nation by nature in a common undertaking, and for this work forms a collective people, and

thereby a collective heaven. This universality that spirit reaches in its existence is, however, only the first one. It only begins from the individuality of the ethical, has not yet overcome its immediacy, and has not formed one state out of these peoples.[19] The ethical life of the actual spirit of a people rests partly on the immediate trust of individuals in the whole of their people, and partly on the immediate share that all, regardless of differences of estate, take in the decisions and actions of the government. In the union—at first not into a lasting order but only for a common action—that freedom of participation by each and all is *for the time being* set aside. This first community is therefore more an assembly of individualities than the rule of abstract thought, which would rob individuals of their self-conscious share in the will and deed of the whole.

728 The assembly of the spirits of peoples forms a circle of shapes that now embraces the whole of nature as well as the whole ethical world. These shapes, too, stand under the *supreme command* of the one rather than under his *supreme rule*. For themselves they are the universal substances of what the *self-conscious* essence *in itself* is and does. This self-conscious essence, however, constitutes the force, and at first at least the center, around which those universal essences exert themselves —a center that at first seems to connect their affairs only contingently. But it is the return of the divine essence into self-consciousness that already contains the ground for self-consciousness forming the center for those divine powers. And this return conceals their essential unity, at first, under the form of a friendly, external relation between the two worlds.[20]

729 The same universality that belongs to this content necessarily also belongs to the form of consciousness in which the content appears. It is no longer the actual doing of the cult, but a doing that is raised not yet into the concept, but at first only into

19 The common undertaking of the Greek peoples alludes to the expedition against Troy sung by Homer.

20 "The one" is Zeus among the gods, as Agamemnon is among the Greek leaders in Homer.

representation, into the synthetic linking of self-conscious and external existence. The existence of this representation, *language*, is the first language, the *epic* as such. The epic contains the universal content at least as the *completeness* of the world, though not as the *universality* of *thought*. The *singer* is the individual and actual one from whom, as the subject of this world, it is produced and carried. His pathos is not the stupefying power of nature but Mnemosyne: reflection and inwardness that has come to be, the recollection of the formerly immediate essence.[21] He is the organ that vanishes in its content; what counts is not his own self but his Muse, his universal song. What is in fact present, however, is the syllogism in which the extreme of universality, the world of the gods, is linked through the middle term of particularity with singularity, the singer. The middle term is the people in its heroes. They are individual human beings like the singer, but only *represented* ones, and thereby at the same time *universal*, like the free extreme of universality, the gods.

730 In this epic, then, what comes about *in itself* in the cult—the relation of the divine to the human—is, in general, *presented* to consciousness. The content is an *action* of the essence that is conscious of itself. *Acting* disturbs the calm of substance and stirs up the essence, so that its simplicity is divided and opened up into the manifold world of natural and ethical powers. The action is the violation of the calm earth: the pit which, animated by blood, calls forth the departed spirits, who, thirsting for life, receive it in the doing of self-consciousness.[22] The affair toward which the universal effort is directed acquires two sides. There is the side of the *self*, of being accomplished by a totality of actual peoples and the individualities at their head; and there is the *universal* side, of being accomplished by their substantial powers. The *relation* of the two, however, was determined earlier as the *synthetic* connection of the universal and the individual,

21 Mnemosyne: in Greek myth the goddess of memory and mother of the Muses.
22 An allusion to *Odyssey* 11, where Odysseus fills a pit with sacrificial blood to summon the shades of the dead.

that is, as *representing*. On this determinateness depends the judgment of this world.—The relationship of the two is therefore a mixture that distributes the unity of doing inconsistently and needlessly tosses the action from one side to the other. The universal powers have the shape of individuality, and with it the principle of acting, within them. Their working therefore appears as a doing just as free, and just as wholly their own, as that of human beings. Gods and humans alike have therefore done one and the same thing. The seriousness of those powers is a ridiculous superfluity, since they are in fact the force of acting individuality;—and the exertion and labor of individuality is an equally useless effort, since the powers are rather the ones that steer everything. — The ephemeral mortals, who are nothing, are at the same time the mighty *self* that subjects the universal essences to itself, wounds the gods and, in general, procures for them actuality and an interest in acting. Conversely, these impotent universalities, who feed on the gifts of human beings and only through them get something to do, are the natural essence and the material of all events, and equally the ethical matter and the pathos of acting.[23] Their elemental natures are first brought into actuality and active relationship by the free self of individuality. Yet they are equally the universal that withdraws from this connection and remains unlimited in its determination. Through the invincible elasticity of its unity, this universal extinguishes the point-like singularity of the agent and its figurations, keeps itself pure, and dissolves everything individual in its fluidity.

731 Just as the universal powers fall into this contradictory relation with the opposing nature of the self, so too their universality comes into conflict with their own determination and with its relation to others. They are the eternal, beautiful individuals who rest in their own existence and are exempt from transience and from alien force.—But they are at the same time *determinate* elements, *particular* gods, who therefore relate themselves to others. And their relation to others, which by its

23 In *Iliad* 5 the mortal Diomedes wounds Aphrodite and Ares.

opposition is a strife with them, is a comic self-forgetting of their eternal nature.—Determinateness is rooted in the divine subsistence, and within the limits of that subsistence it has the independence of the whole individuality. Because of this, their characters at the same time lose the sharpness of their distinctiveness and blend into one another in their ambiguity. — A purpose of their activity, and their activity itself, is directed against an other, and hence against an invincible divine force. It is therefore a contingent, empty puffing-up that dissolves just as readily, and it turns the apparent seriousness of the action into a harmless game, sure of itself, with no result and no success. But suppose that, in the nature of their divinity, the negative, or its determinateness, appears only as the inconsistency of their activity and the contradiction between purpose and success, and that their self-sufficient security keeps the upper hand over what is determinate. Then precisely because of this, the *pure force* of the *negative* confronts that divine nature—and confronts it as its final power, against which the gods can do nothing. They are the universal and the positive over against the *singular self* of mortals, which cannot hold out against their power. But for that very reason the *universal self* hovers above them and above this whole world of representation to which the entire content belongs. It hovers there as the *conceptless emptiness* of *necessity*—a happening toward which the gods conduct themselves without a self, and in mourning, for these *determinate* natures do not find themselves in this purity.

[732] This necessity, however, is the *unity of the concept*. To it the contradictory substantiality of the individual moments is subject; in it the inconsistency and contingency of their doing is brought into order, and the play of their actions receives its seriousness and worth in the actions themselves. The content of the world of representation plays out its movement freely and on its own in the *middle*, gathered around the individuality of a hero. Yet in all his strength and beauty the hero feels his life broken, and he mourns as he looks ahead to an early death. For *singularity that is firm within itself and actual* is shut out to the extremes

and split into its moments, which have not yet found each other and united.[24] The one singular, the *abstract* and non-actual one, is necessity, which has no share in the life of the middle. Neither does the other, the *actual* singular—the singer, who keeps himself outside that life and disappears into his representation. Both extremes must draw nearer to the content. The one, necessity, has to fill itself with the content; the other, the language of the singer, must take part in it; and the content, previously left to itself, must receive within it the certainty and fixed determination of the negative.

TRAGEDY

Actors speak as heroes, and the divine splits into opposed powers that destroy one another.

733 This higher language, *tragedy*, therefore gathers the scattered moments of the essential and acting world more closely together. The *substance* of the divine separates *according to the nature of the concept* into its shapes, and its *movement* likewise conforms to the concept. As regards form, language, by entering into the content, ceases to be narrative, just as the content ceases to be something represented. The hero is himself the one who speaks, and the performance shows the listener, who is at the same time a spectator, *self-conscious* human beings who *know* their right and their purpose, the power and the will of their determinateness, and who know how to *say* them. They are artists. Unlike the language that accompanies ordinary doing in actual life, they do not voice the *outer* side of their decision and undertaking unconsciously, naturally and naively. Rather, they give outward expression to the inner essence, they prove the right of their action, and they deliberately assert and determinately express the pathos to which they belong—free of contingent circumstances and of the particularity of personalities, in its universal individuality. The *existence* of these characters, finally, is *actual* human beings, who put on the persons of the

24 The hero is Achilles, who in Homer's *Iliad* knows that he is fated to die young.

heroes and present them in actual speech—speech that is not narrative but their own. Just as it is essential to the statue that it be made by human hands, so the actor is essential to his mask—not as an external condition from which the contemplation of art would have to abstract. Or, insofar as that contemplation must indeed abstract from him, this very fact says that art does not yet contain within itself the true, genuine self.

734 The *universal ground* on which the movement of these shapes, generated from the concept, takes place is the consciousness of the first, representing language and of its selfless content, which was left to fall apart. It is the common people in general, whose wisdom comes to speech in the *chorus* of the *aged*. The people finds its representative in the feebleness of age, because it itself makes up only the positive and passive material of the individuality of government that confronts it. Lacking the power of the negative, it cannot hold together and tame the wealth and colorful fullness of the divine life. Instead it lets that life run apart, and in its reverent hymns it praises each individual moment as an independent god—now this one, now another. But where the people senses the seriousness of the concept as it strides over these shapes and shatters them, and where it comes to see how badly its praised gods fare when they venture onto this ground where the concept rules, it is not itself the negative power that intervenes by acting. Rather, it keeps to the selfless thought of that power, to the consciousness of an *alien fate*, and brings forward the empty wish for calm and the feeble talk of appeasement. It feels *fear* of the higher powers, which are the immediate arms of substance; fear of their struggle with one another; and fear of the simple self of necessity, which crushes them too, just as it crushes the living who are bound to them.—It feels *pity* for these living beings, whom it knows at the same time to be the same as itself. In all this there is for the chorus only the inactive terror of this movement, the equally helpless lament, and, at the end, the empty calm of resignation to necessity—a necessity whose work is grasped

neither as the necessary action of character nor as the doing of the absolute essence within itself.[25]

735 On this spectating consciousness, as on the indifferent ground of representation, spirit makes its entrance—not in its scattered manifoldness, but in the simple split of the concept. Its substance therefore shows itself torn apart only into its two extreme powers. These elemental *universal* beings are at the same time self-conscious *individualities*: heroes who place their consciousness in one of these powers, have in it the determinateness of their character, and constitute its activation and actuality.—As was mentioned, this universal individualization descends further, to the immediate actuality of existence proper, and presents itself to a crowd of spectators, which has in the chorus its counter-image, or rather its own representation giving voice to itself.

736 The content and the movement of the spirit that is here its own object have already been considered as the nature and realization of the ethical substance. In its religion, spirit attains consciousness of itself, or presents itself to its consciousness in its purer form and simpler shape. Through its concept, the ethical substance split, according to its *content*, into the two powers that were determined as *divine* and *human* right, or the right of the underworld and the right of the upper world—the former the *family*, the latter the *power of the state*—and of these the first was the *feminine* and the second the *masculine character*. So now the circle of gods, previously many-formed and wavering in its determinations, is restricted to these powers, which by this determination are brought closer to individuality proper. For the earlier dispersion of the whole into the manifold, abstract forces that appear as substances is the *dissolution* of the *subject*, which grasps them only as *moments* in its self; and individuality is therefore only the superficial form of those beings. Conversely, any difference of *characters* beyond the one just named must be counted as contingent personality, external in itself.

25 Fear and pity are the emotions that, according to Aristotle's *Poetics*, tragedy arouses.

[737] At the same time the essence divides itself according to its *form*, that is, according to *knowing*. The *acting* spirit, as consciousness, stands over against the object on which it acts, and which is therefore determined as the *negative* of the knower. The one who acts thus finds itself in the opposition of knowing and not-knowing. It takes its purpose from its character and knows this purpose as the ethical essentiality; but because of the determinateness of its character it knows only the one power of substance, and the other is hidden from it. Present actuality is therefore one thing *in itself* and another for consciousness. In this relation the upper and the lower right take on the meaning of the power that knows and reveals itself to consciousness, and of the power that conceals itself and lies in wait in ambush. The one is the *side of light*: the god of the oracle who, in his natural moment, sprang from the all-illuminating sun and knows and reveals everything—*Phoebus*, and *Zeus*, who is his father. But the commands of this truth-speaking god, and his announcements of what *is*, are in fact deceptive. For this knowing is, in its concept, immediately not-knowing, because *consciousness*, in acting, is in itself this opposition. The one who was able to unlock the riddling Sphinx herself, and the one who trusted like a child, are therefore both sent to ruin by what the god reveals to them.[26] This priestess, through whom the beautiful god speaks, is nothing other than the equivocal sisters of fate, who drive to crime by their promises and, by the double-tongued nature of what they gave out as certain, deceive the one who relied on the obvious sense. Hence there is a consciousness purer than the latter—the one that believes the witches—and more thoughtful and thorough than the former—the one that trusts the priestess and the beautiful god. When the father's spirit itself reveals the crime that murdered him, this consciousness hesitates to take revenge on the strength of that revelation

26 Oedipus solved the Sphinx's riddle; Orestes trustingly obeyed Apollo's command to avenge his father by killing his mother. Both were ruined by the oracle.

and arranges for further proofs—on the ground that this revealing spirit might also be the devil.[27]

738 This mistrust is well founded, because the knowing consciousness places itself in the opposition between the certainty of itself and the objective essence. The right of the ethical—which holds that actuality is nothing *in itself* as against the absolute law—learns by experience that its knowing is one-sided, that its law is only the law of its character, that it has laid hold of only the one power of substance. The action itself is this inversion of what is *known* into its *opposite*, into *being*. It is the reversal of the right of character and of knowing into the right of the opposite with which it is bound up in the essence of substance—into the Erinys of the other power and character, now roused to hostility. This *lower* right sits with *Zeus* on the throne and enjoys equal standing with the revealed right and the knowing god.[28]

739 The acting individuality restricts the divine world of the chorus to these three beings. The one is *substance*: as much the power of the hearth and the spirit of family piety as the universal power of the state and of government. Since this difference belongs to substance as such, it does not individualize itself in representation into two distinct shapes; instead, in actuality it has the two persons of its characters. The difference of knowing and not-knowing, on the other hand, falls within *each* of the *actual self-consciousnesses*—and only in abstraction, in the element of universality, is it divided between two individual shapes. For the self of the hero has existence only as a whole consciousness, and is therefore essentially the *whole* difference that belongs to form; but its substance is determinate, and only one side of the difference of content belongs to it. Hence the two sides of consciousness, which in actuality have no separate individuality of their own, each receive their particular shape *in rep-*

27 The priestess is the Pythia at Delphi; the sisters of fate are the witches in Shakespeare's *Macbeth*; the hesitant avenger is Hamlet, who fears his father's ghost "may be the devil."

28 Echoes Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, where Justice is said to sit beside Zeus on his throne.

resentation: the one the shape of the revealing god, the other that of the Erinys who keeps herself hidden. On the one hand both enjoy equal honor; on the other, the *shape* of *substance*, Zeus, is the necessity of the *relation* of the two to each other. Substance is the relation in which knowing is for itself but has its truth in the simple; in which the difference through which actual consciousness exists has its ground in the inner essence that effaces it; in which the self-transparent *assurance* of *certainty* has its confirmation in *oblivion*.

740 Consciousness opened up this opposition through action. Acting according to the revealed knowing, it experiences the deceit of that knowing; and, devoted in its content to one attribute of substance, it violated the other and so gave the other right against itself. In following the knowing god, it laid hold instead of what was not revealed, and it pays for having trusted a knowing whose ambiguity—since ambiguity is its nature—had to be present *for it* as well, together with a *warning* against it. The frenzy of the priestess, the inhuman shape of the witches, the voice of the tree, of the bird, the dream, and so on, are not the ways in which truth appears; they are warning signs of deception, of thoughtlessness, of the singularity and contingency of the knowing. Or, what is the same thing: the opposing power that consciousness violates is present as declared law and valid right, whether the law of the family or of the state. Consciousness, by contrast, followed its own knowing and hid from itself what was manifest. But the truth of the powers of content and of consciousness that come forward against each other is the result that both are equally in the right, and therefore, in the opposition that action produces, equally in the wrong. The movement of the doing proves their unity in the mutual downfall of both powers and of the self-conscious characters. The reconciliation of the opposition with itself is the *Lethe* of the *underworld*, in death—or the *Lethe* of the *upper world*, as absolution: not from guilt, for consciousness cannot deny its guilt, since it acted, but from the crime, and as its atoning calm. Both are *oblivion*: the having-vanished of the actuality and doing of the powers of sub-

stance, of their individualities, and of the powers of the abstract thought of good and evil. For none of them on its own is the essence. The essence is rather the rest of the whole within itself: the unmoved unity of fate; the quiet existence, and with it the inactivity and lifelessness, of family and government; the equal honor, and with it the indifferent non-actuality, of Apollo and the Erinys; and the return of their inspiration and activity into the simple Zeus.

741 This fate completes the depopulation of heaven—that thoughtless mixing of individuality and essence, a mixing through which the doing of the essence appears inconsistent, contingent and unworthy of itself; for individuality, clinging to the essence only superficially, is what is inessential. The expulsion of such essenceless representations, which philosophers of antiquity demanded, thus already begins in tragedy as such. It begins there because the division of substance is governed by the concept, so that individuality is the essential, and the determinations are the absolute characters.[29] The self-consciousness represented in tragedy therefore knows and recognizes only one highest power. It knows this Zeus only as the power of the state or of the hearth; and, in the opposition of knowing, only as the father of the knowing of the *particular* as it takes shape—and as the Zeus of the oath and of the Erinys, of the *universal*, of the inner that dwells in concealment. The further moments, on the other hand, which scatter from the concept into representation and which the chorus acknowledges one after another, are not the pathos of the hero. For him they sink to passion—to contingent, essenceless moments which the selfless chorus may well praise, but which are incapable of constituting the character of the heroes, or of being declared and respected by them as their essence.

742 But the persons of the divine essence itself, like the characters of its substance, also merge into the simplicity of the unconscious. With respect to self-consciousness, this necessity has the

29 Xenophanes attacked Homer's and Hesiod's portrayal of the gods, and Plato in the *Republic* would banish such poetry from the ideal city.

determination of being the negative power of all the shapes that come forward—a power in which self-consciousness does not recognize itself, but rather perishes. The self appears only as allotted to the *characters*, not as the middle of the movement. But self-consciousness, the simple *certainty* of itself, is in fact the negative power, the unity of Zeus, of the *substantial* essence, and of *abstract* necessity; it is the spiritual unity into which everything returns. Because actual self-consciousness is still distinguished from substance and fate, it is *partly* the chorus, or rather the watching crowd, which this movement of the divine life fills with fear as something *alien*, or in which, as something close at hand, the movement produces only the emotion of inactive *pity*. Partly, insofar as consciousness joins in the action and belongs to the characters, this union is an external one, a *hypocrisy*, because the true union—that of self, fate and substance—is not yet present. The hero who appears before the spectator falls apart into his mask and the actor, into the persona and the actual self.[30]

743 The self-consciousness of the heroes must step out from behind its mask and present itself as knowing itself to be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the absolute powers themselves, and as no longer separated from the chorus, the universal consciousness.

COMEDY

The actual self drops the mask and shows the gods and ethical powers to be empty.

744 *Comedy*, then, has first of all the side in which actual self-consciousness presents itself as the fate of the gods. These elemental beings, as *universal* moments, are no self and are not actual. They are indeed endowed with the form of individuality, but this form is only imagined into them and does not belong to them in and for themselves; the actual self does not have such an abstract moment as its substance and content. The self, the

30 Greek *hypokrisis* originally meant playing a part on stage.

subject, is therefore raised above such a moment as above a single property, and, clothed in this mask, it gives voice to the irony of this property, which wants to be something for itself. The puffing-up of the universal essentiality is betrayed to the self. It shows itself caught in an actuality and lets the mask fall precisely in wanting to be something respectable. Appearing here in its meaning as something actual, the self plays with the mask that it puts on for the moment in order to be its persona. But from this semblance it just as quickly steps forth again in its own nakedness and ordinariness, which it shows to be no different from the genuine self, the actor, or from the spectator.

745 This general dissolution of shaped essentiality as such in its individuality becomes more serious in its content—and thereby more wanton and more bitter—the more serious and necessary the meaning that content has. The divine substance unites within itself the meaning of natural and of ethical essentiality. With regard to the natural, actual self-consciousness already shows itself—in using nature for its adornment, its dwelling and so on, and in feasting on its sacrifice—to be the fate to which the secret has been betrayed of how things stand with nature's self-essentiality. In the mystery of bread and wine it makes this self-essentiality its own, together with the meaning of the inner essence; and in comedy it is conscious of the irony of this meaning altogether. — Now insofar as this meaning contains the ethical essentiality, it is partly the people in its two sides—the state, or *demos* proper, and the singularity of the family—and partly self-conscious pure knowing, the rational thinking of the universal.—That *demos*, the universal mass, which knows itself as lord and ruler and as the understanding and insight that deserve respect, is constrained and fooled by the particularity of its actuality. It presents the ridiculous contrast between its opinion of itself and its immediate existence, between its necessity and its contingency, between its universality and its commonness.[31] The principle of the people's singular-

31 Aristophanes' comedy *Knights* puts the Athenian people on stage as the doddering old man Demos, flattered and manipulated by demagogues.

ity, separated from the universal, may come forward in the genuine shape of actuality, openly take over the community whose secret harm it is, and run it. When that happens, the contrast is betrayed more immediately between the universal as a theory and what matters in practice: the complete liberation of the purposes of immediate singularity from the universal order, and the mockery with which those purposes treat that order.

746 Rational *thinking* frees the divine essence from its contingent shape. In opposition to the conceptless wisdom of the chorus, which brings out all sorts of moral maxims and lets a host of laws and determinate concepts of duty and right hold good, rational thinking raises them into the simple ideas of the *beautiful* and the *good*.—The movement of this abstraction is the consciousness of the dialectic that these maxims and laws contain within themselves, and hence of the vanishing of the absolute validity in which they previously appeared. As the contingent determination and superficial individuality that representation lent to the divine essentialities vanish, these are left, on their *natural* side, with only the nakedness of their immediate existence: they are clouds, a vanishing vapor, like those representations.[32] Having become, in their *thought* essentiality, the *simple* thoughts of the *beautiful* and the *good*, these tolerate being filled with any content whatever. The force of dialectical knowing abandons the determinate laws and maxims of action to the pleasure and levity of youth, which is thereby led astray, and it puts weapons of deceit into the hands of the anxiety and care of old age, which is confined to the particular concerns of life. The pure thoughts of the beautiful and the good thus present a comic spectacle. Through their liberation from opinion—which contains both their determinateness as content and their absolute determinateness, the firm hold of consciousness—they

32 Alludes to Aristophanes' *Clouds*, which mocks Socrates and presents the Clouds as the new gods of the thinkers.

become empty, and precisely thereby the plaything of opinion and of the caprice of contingent individuality.[33]

747 Here, then, the previously unconscious fate—which consisted in empty rest and oblivion and was separated from self-consciousness—is united with self-consciousness. The *singular self* is the negative force through which and in which the gods, as well as their moments—existing nature and the thoughts of their determinations—vanish. At the same time it is not the emptiness of vanishing: it preserves itself in this very nothingness, is at home with itself and is the sole actuality. The religion of art has completed itself in this self and has gone back completely into itself. Because it is the singular consciousness, in the certainty of itself, that presents itself as this absolute power, the power has lost the form of something *represented*, something *separated* from *consciousness* as such and alien to it, as were the statue, the living beautiful bodiliness, the content of the epic, and the powers and persons of tragedy.—Nor is the unity the *unconscious* unity of the cult and the mysteries.—Rather, the genuine self of the actor coincides with his persona, and so does the spectator, who is completely at home in what is presented to him and sees himself performing. What this self-consciousness intuits is that whatever takes on the form of essentiality over against it is instead dissolved in it—in its thinking, its existence and its doing—and is at its mercy. It is the return of everything universal into the certainty of itself, which is thereby this complete absence of fear before anything alien and of any essentiality in it; it is a well-being, a letting-oneself-be-well, of consciousness such as is no longer found anywhere outside this comedy.

C. THE REVEALED RELIGION

The self is the absolute essence; its reversal leads to the God who becomes human.

748 Through the religion of art, spirit has passed from the form of *substance* into that of the *subject*. For art *produces* spirit's shape,

and so posits in it *doing*, or *self-consciousness*, which in fearsome substance merely vanishes and which in trust does not grasp itself. This incarnation of the divine essence starts from the statue, which has only the *outer* shape of the self in it, while the *inner* shape, its activity, falls outside it. In the cult, however, the two sides have become one; and in the result of the religion of art this unity, in its completion, has at the same time passed over to the extreme of the self. In the spirit that is completely certain of itself in the singularity of consciousness, all essentiality has sunk away. The proposition that expresses this levity runs: *the self is the absolute essence*. The essence, which was substance and in which the self was accidentality, has sunk to a predicate; and spirit, in *this self-consciousness*, over against which nothing stands in the form of essence, has lost its *consciousness*.

749 This proposition—*the self is the absolute essence*—plainly belongs to non-religious, actual spirit, and we must recall which shape of that spirit expresses it. That shape will at the same time contain the movement and the inversion of the proposition, which lowers the self to a predicate and raises substance to subject. It will do so, namely, not in such a way that the inverted proposition makes substance into subject *in itself* or *for us*—or, what is the same, restores substance so that the consciousness of spirit is led back to its beginning, natural religion—but in such a way that this inversion is brought about *for* and *through self-consciousness* itself. Because self-consciousness gives itself up consciously, it is preserved in its externalization and remains the subject of substance; but as having likewise externalized itself, it at the same time has the consciousness of substance. Or: since through its sacrifice it *produces* substance as subject, that subject remains its own self. What is achieved by this is the following. In the two propositions—in the first, the proposition of original substantiality, the subject merely vanishes, and in the second substance is merely predicate—both sides are present in each, but with opposite inequality of value. Out of this there

33 In *Clouds* the old Strepsiades learns sophistry to cheat his creditors, and his son uses it to justify beating his father.

emerges the union and interpenetration of the two natures, in which both, with equal value, are just as much *essential* as they are merely *moments*. Through this, spirit is just as much *consciousness* of itself as of its *objective* substance, as it is simple *self-consciousness* remaining within itself.

750 The religion of art belongs to the ethical spirit that we saw earlier perish in the *condition of right*, that is, in the proposition: *the self as such*, the *abstract person, is absolute essence*. In ethical life the self is immersed in the spirit of its people; it is *fulfilled* universality. But *simple singularity* rises out of this content, and its levity refines it into the person, into the abstract universality of right. In this abstract universality the *reality* of the ethical spirit is lost. The spirits of the individual peoples, emptied of content, are gathered into one pantheon—not into a pantheon of representation, whose powerless form lets each go its own way, but into the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which strips them of their bodies and grants being in and for itself to the spiritless self, the singular person.

751 But through its emptiness this self has let the content go free. Consciousness is the essence only *within itself*; its own *existence*, the legal recognition of the person, is unfulfilled abstraction. So it possesses, rather, only the thought of itself; or, as it *exists* and knows itself as object, it is what is *not actual*. It is therefore only the Stoic *independence* of *thinking*; and this, passing through the movement of skeptical consciousness, finds its truth in the shape that was called the *unhappy self-consciousness*.

752 The unhappy self-consciousness knows how things stand with the actual validity of the abstract person, and likewise with its validity in pure thought. It knows such validity rather as complete loss; it itself is this loss become conscious of itself, and the externalization of its knowing of itself.—We see that this unhappy consciousness forms the counterpart and completion of the consciousness that is completely happy within itself, the comic consciousness. Into the comic consciousness all divine essence returns; or it is the complete *externalization* of *substance*.

The unhappy consciousness, conversely, is the tragic fate of the *certainty of itself* that is supposed to be in and for itself.

THE DEATH OF THE GODS

The unhappy consciousness utters "God is dead," and the works of ancient art become a memory.

It is the consciousness of the loss of all *essentiality* in *this certainty* of itself, and of the loss of precisely this knowing of itself —the loss of substance as well as of the self. It is the pain that expresses itself in the harsh words: *God is dead*.[34]

753 In the condition of right, then, the ethical world and its religion have sunk into the comic consciousness, and the unhappy consciousness is the knowing of this *whole* loss. It has lost both the self-worth of its immediate personality and that of its mediated, its *thought*, personality. Likewise, trust in the eternal laws of the gods has fallen silent, as have the oracles that made particular things known. The statues are now corpses from which the animating soul has fled, just as the hymns are words from which faith has fled. The tables of the gods are without spiritual food and drink, and from its games and festivals consciousness no longer receives back the joyful unity of itself with the essence. The works of the Muse lack the force of the spirit that saw its certainty of itself emerge from the crushing of gods and humans. They are now what they are for us: beautiful fruits broken from the tree. A friendly fate has handed them to us, as a girl presents such fruits. It does not give us the actual life of their existence—not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements that made up their substance, nor the climate that made up their determinateness, nor the change of seasons that governed the process of their growth.—So too fate, with the works of that art, gives us not their world, not the spring and summer of the ethical life in which they blossomed and ripened, but only the veiled recollection of that actuality. —

34 Echoes a Lutheran Good Friday hymn by Johann Rist (1641), "O Traurigkeit, o Herzeleid," with the line "Gott selbst ist tot" ("God himself is dead").

Our activity in enjoying them is therefore not worship, through which our consciousness would attain its complete truth, a truth that would fill it. It is rather an external activity: it wipes, say, raindrops or specks of dust from these fruits, and in place of the inner elements of the ethical actuality that surrounded, generated and inspired them, it erects the sprawling scaffolding of the dead elements of their external existence—language, historical circumstances and so on—not in order to live our way into them, but only to represent them within ourselves. But just as the girl who hands us the picked fruits is more than the nature of those fruits, spread out into its conditions and elements—the tree, air, light and so on — which offered them immediately—for in a higher way she gathers all this together into the radiance of the self-conscious eye and the offering gesture—so the spirit of fate that presents those works of art to us is more than the ethical life and actuality of that people. For it is the *recollection* of the spirit that was still *externalized* in them; it is the spirit of tragic fate, which gathers all those individual gods and attributes of substance into the one pantheon—into the spirit that is conscious of itself as spirit.

754 All the conditions for the emergence of this spirit are present, and this totality of its conditions constitutes its *becoming*, its *concept*, or its emergence *in itself*.—The circle of the productions of art embraces the forms of the externalizations of absolute substance. Absolute substance is there in the form of individuality: as a thing, as an object *that is* for sensuous consciousness;—as pure language, or the becoming of the shape whose existence does not step outside the self and is a purely *vanishing* object;—as immediate *unity* with universal *self-consciousness* in its inspiration, and as mediated unity in the doing of the cult;—as beautiful *self-like bodiliness*; and finally as existence raised into *representation*, and the expansion of that existence into a world which in the end gathers itself into a universality that is equally *pure certainty of itself*. — These forms, and on the other side the *world* of the *person* and of right, the devastating wildness of the elements of the content set free, likewise the

thought person of Stoicism and the unstable restlessness of skeptical consciousness, make up the periphery of shapes that stand around, expectant and pressing, the birthplace of spirit as it becomes self-consciousness. The all-pervading pain and longing of the unhappy self-consciousness is their center and the shared birth-pang of spirit's emergence—the simplicity of the pure concept, which contains those shapes as its moments.

755 This concept has in it the two sides that were presented above as the two inverted propositions. The one side is that *substance* externalizes itself and becomes self-consciousness; the other, conversely, that *self-consciousness* externalizes itself and makes itself into thinghood, or into the universal self. In this way the two sides have come to meet each other, and through this their true union has arisen. The externalization of substance, its becoming self-consciousness, expresses the transition into the opposite, the unconscious transition of *necessity*; in other words, it expresses that substance is *in itself* self-consciousness. Conversely, the externalization of self-consciousness expresses that self-consciousness is *in itself* the universal essence; or, since the self is pure being-for-self that remains at home with itself in its opposite, it expresses that it is *for self-consciousness* that substance is self-consciousness, and precisely thereby spirit. Of this spirit, which has left the form of substance and enters existence in the shape of self-consciousness, it can therefore be said—if one wants to use relations taken from natural procreation—that it has an *actual* mother but a father who is *in itself*. For *actuality*, or self-consciousness, and the *in-itself*, as substance, are its two moments; through their reciprocal externalization, each becoming the other, spirit enters existence as their unity.

756 Self-consciousness may grasp, one-sidedly, only *its own* externalization. Even if its object is thereby already just as much being as self for it, and it knows all existence as spiritual essence, true spirit has nevertheless not yet come to be for it—insofar, namely, as being as such, or substance, has not *in itself* likewise, on its side, externalized itself and become self-con-

sciousness. For then all existence is spiritual essence only *from the standpoint of consciousness*, not in itself. Spirit is in this way only *imagined into* existence. This imagining is the *enthusiasm* that lays beneath nature as well as history, beneath the world as well as the mythical representations of earlier religions, an inner sense different from the one they immediately offer to consciousness in their appearance—and, in the case of the religions, different from the one that the self-consciousness whose religions they were knew in them. But this meaning is a borrowed one, a garment that does not cover the nakedness of the appearance and earns neither faith nor veneration; it remains the murky night and private rapture of consciousness.[35]

[757] For this meaning of the objective, then, not to be mere imagination, it must be *in itself*; that is, it must *first* spring for consciousness from the *concept* and come forth in its necessity. This is how self-knowing *spirit* has arisen for us: through the cognition of *immediate consciousness*, or of the consciousness of the object *that is*, by way of its necessary movement. This concept, which as immediate also had the shape of *immediacy* for its consciousness, *secondly* gave itself the shape of self-consciousness *in itself*—that is, by the very same necessity of the concept by which *being*, or *immediacy*, the contentless object of sensuous consciousness, externalizes itself and becomes I for consciousness. — But the *immediate in-itself*, or *necessity that is*, is distinct from the *thinking in-itself*, the *cognition* of *necessity*. This difference, however, does not at the same time lie outside the concept, for the *simple unity* of the concept is *immediate being* itself. The concept is just as much what externalizes itself, or the becoming of *intuited necessity*, as it is at home with itself in that necessity and knows and comprehends it.—The *immediate in-itself* of spirit, which gives itself the shape of self-consciousness, means nothing other than that the actual world spirit has arrived at this knowing of itself. Only then does this knowing

35 *Schwärmerei*: enthusiasm in the pejorative sense of visionary zeal that reads hidden meanings into things.

also enter spirit's consciousness, and enter it as truth. How that came about has emerged above.

GOD BECOME HUMAN

Faith sees the divine as an actual human being, and the divine essence is revealed.

758 That absolute spirit has given itself the shape of self-consciousness *in itself*, and thereby also for its *consciousness*, now appears as follows: it is the *faith of the world* that spirit *exists* as a self-consciousness, that is, as an actual human being; that spirit is there for immediate certainty; that the believing consciousness *sees* and *feels* and *hears* this divinity. So it is not imagination; it is *actually so*. Consciousness, then, does not start from *its own* inner self, from thought, and join together *within itself* the thought of the God with existence. Rather, it starts from immediate, present existence and recognizes the God in it. — The moment of *immediate being* is present in the content of the concept in this way: the religious spirit, in the return of all essentiality into consciousness, has become a *simple* positive self, just as actual spirit as such, in the unhappy consciousness, became this very *simple*, self-conscious negativity. The self of existent spirit thereby has the form of complete immediacy. It is posited neither as something thought or represented nor as something produced, as was the case with the immediate self partly in natural religion and partly in the religion of art. Rather, this God is intuited sensuously and immediately as a self, as an actual individual human being; only so *is* he self-consciousness.

759 This incarnation of the divine essence—the fact that it essentially and immediately has the shape of self-consciousness —is the simple content of the absolute religion. In this religion the essence is known as spirit; or the religion is the essence's consciousness of itself as being spirit. For spirit is the knowing of itself in its externalization: the essence that is the movement of keeping its equality with itself in its otherness. This, however,

is substance insofar as, in its accidentality, it is likewise reflected into itself—not indifferent to that accidentality as to something inessential, and therefore finding itself in something alien, but remaining *within itself* in it; that is, insofar as it is *subject* or *self*.—In this religion, therefore, the divine essence is *revealed*. Its being revealed manifestly consists in this: that what it is, is known. But it is known precisely in being known as spirit, as an essence that is essentially *self-consciousness*.—For *consciousness*, something in its object is secret when the object is an *other* or something *alien* to it, and when consciousness does not know it as *itself*. This secrecy ceases when the absolute essence as spirit is the object of consciousness; for then, in its relation to consciousness, the object is as *self*. That is, consciousness immediately knows itself in it, or is revealed to itself in it. Consciousness itself is revealed to itself only in its own certainty of itself. That object of consciousness is the *self*; but the self is nothing alien—it is inseparable unity with itself, the immediately universal. It is the pure concept, pure thinking or *being-for-self*, which is immediately *being*, and therefore *being for another*, and which, as this *being for another*, has immediately returned into itself and is at home with itself. It is therefore what is truly and solely revealed. The Gracious, the Just, the Holy, Creator of heaven and earth, and so on, are *predicates* of a subject—universal moments that have their support in this point, and that exist only when consciousness goes back into thinking. — When *they* are known, their ground and essence, the *subject* itself, is not yet revealed; and likewise the *determinations* of the universal are not *this universal* itself. The *subject* itself, however, and with it *this pure universal*, is revealed as *self*; for the self is precisely this inner reflected into itself, which is immediately there and is the very certainty of that self for which it is there. This—to be, by its *concept*, what is revealed—is therefore the true shape of spirit; and this shape of spirit, the concept, is likewise alone its essence and substance. Spirit is known as self-consciousness and is immediately revealed to self-consciousness, for it is self-con-

sciousness itself. The divine nature is the same as the human nature, and it is this unity that is intuited.

760 Here, then, consciousness—or the way in which the essence is for consciousness itself, its shape—is in fact equal to its self-consciousness. This shape is itself a self-consciousness. It is thereby at the same time an object that *is*, and this *being* has just as immediately the significance of *pure thought*, of the absolute essence.—The absolute essence, which is there as an actual self-consciousness, seems to have *descended* from its eternal simplicity. In fact, however, only in doing so has it reached its *highest* essence. For only when the concept of essence has attained its simple purity is it the absolute *abstraction* that is *pure thought*, and hence the pure singularity of the self. Equally, on account of its simplicity, it is the *immediate*, or *being*. — What is called sensuous consciousness is precisely this pure *abstraction*; it is this thinking for which *being*, the *immediate*, is. The lowest is thus at the same time the highest. What is revealed, having come out entirely onto the *surface*, is for that very reason the *deepest*. That the highest essence is seen, heard and so on as a self-consciousness that is—this, then, is in fact the completion of its concept. Through this completion the essence is as immediately *there* as it is essence.

761 At the same time, this immediate existence is not solely and merely immediate consciousness; it is religious consciousness. The immediacy inseparably has the significance not only of a self-consciousness that *is*, but of the purely thought or absolute *essence*. What we are conscious of in our concept—that *being is essence*—the religious consciousness is conscious of. This *unity* of being and essence, of *thought* that immediately *is existence*, is the *thought* of this religious consciousness, or its *mediated* knowing. It is just as much *its immediate* knowing. For this unity of being and thought is *self*-consciousness, and is itself *there*; in other words, the *thought* unity has at the same time this shape of what it is. God is thus *revealed* here as *he is*; *he is* thus *there* as he is *in himself*; he is there as spirit. God is attainable only in pure speculative knowing. He is only in that knowing and is only that

knowing itself, for he is spirit; and this speculative knowing is the knowing of the revealed religion. Speculative knowing knows him as *thought*, or pure essence. It knows this thought as being and as existence, and existence as the negativity of itself, hence as self—as *this* self and as universal self. This is exactly what the revealed religion knows. — The hopes and expectations of the preceding world pressed toward this revelation alone: to intuit what the absolute essence is, and to find itself in it. This joy of seeing itself in the absolute essence comes to self-consciousness and seizes the whole world. For the absolute essence is spirit. It is the simple movement of those pure moments, which itself expresses this: that only by being intuited as *immediate* self-consciousness is the essence known as spirit.

762 This concept of spirit that knows itself as spirit is itself the immediate concept and not yet developed. The essence is spirit, or it has appeared, it is revealed. This first being-revealed is itself *immediate*. But immediacy is equally pure mediation, or thought, and must therefore present this in itself as such.—Considered more precisely: in the immediacy of self-consciousness, spirit is *this singular* self-consciousness, opposed to the *universal* one. It is an exclusive One which, for the consciousness *for which* it is there, has the still unresolved form of a *sensuous other*. This consciousness does not yet know spirit as its own. In other words, spirit, as it is a *singular* self, is not yet there equally as a universal self, as every self. Or: the shape does not yet have the form of the *Concept*, that is, of the universal self—the self that in its immediate actuality is equally something sublated, is thought, universality, without losing its actuality in this universality.—But the nearest form of this universality, itself immediate, is not yet the form *of thought* itself, *of the Concept as Concept*. It is the universality of actuality, the totality of selves, and the raising of existence into representation. So it is everywhere; to cite a specific example, the sublated *sensuous This* is at first the thing of *perception*, not yet the *universal* of the understanding.

763 This individual human being, then, as whom the absolute essence is revealed, accomplishes in himself, as an individual,

the movement of *sensuous being*. He is the *immediately* present God; as a result, his *being* passes over into *having-been*. The consciousness for which he has this sensuous presence ceases to see him, to hear him; it *has* seen and heard him. And only because it merely *has* seen and heard him does it itself become spiritual consciousness. In other words, just as he formerly stood before it as *sensuous existence*, he has now risen *in the spirit*. — For as a consciousness that sees and hears him sensuously, it is itself only immediate consciousness. It has not sublated the disparity of objectivity, has not taken it back into pure thought, but knows this objective individual as spirit—not itself. In the disappearance of the immediate existence of what was known as the absolute essence, the immediate acquires its negative moment. Spirit remains the immediate self of actuality, but as the *universal self-consciousness* of the community, which rests in its own substance, just as this substance is universal subject in it. It is not the individual for himself, but he together with the consciousness of the community, and what he is for this community, that is the complete whole of spirit.

764 *Past* and *distance*, however, are only the imperfect form in which the immediate mode is mediated, or posited as universal. This mode is only superficially dipped into the element of thought; it is preserved there *as* a sensuous mode and not made one with the nature of thought itself. It has only been raised into *representation*, for representation is the synthetic combination of sensuous immediacy and its universality, or thought.

765 This *form of representation* constitutes the determinateness in which spirit, in this its community, becomes conscious of itself. It is not yet spirit's self-consciousness grown to its Concept as Concept; the mediation is still incomplete. In this combination of being and thought, then, there is the defect that the spiritual essence is still burdened with an unreconciled split into a here and a beyond. The *content* is the true content; but all its moments, posited in the element of representation, have the character of not being conceptually grasped. They appear instead as completely independent sides that relate to one

another *externally*. For the true content also to obtain its true form for consciousness, a higher culture of consciousness is necessary. Consciousness must raise its intuition of the absolute substance into the Concept and, *for itself*, bring its consciousness into balance with its self-consciousness, as this has happened for us, or *in itself*.

SPIRIT IN ITS COMMUNITY

The community represents its content in three elements: pure thought, representation and self-consciousness.

766 This content is to be considered as it is in its consciousness.—Absolute spirit is *content*; as such it is in the shape of its *truth*. But its truth is not merely to be the substance of the community, or the community's *in-itself*, nor merely to step up out of this inwardness into the objectivity of representation. It is to become an actual self, to reflect itself into itself, and to be subject. This, then, is the movement that spirit accomplishes in its community; this is its life. What this self-revealing spirit is *in and for itself* is therefore not brought out by, as it were, unravelling its rich life in the community and tracing it back to its first thread—say, to the representations of the first, imperfect community, or even to what the actual human being said. At the root of this tracing back lies the instinct to get to the Concept. But it confuses the *origin*, as the *immediate existence* of the first appearance, with the *simplicity* of the *Concept*. Through this impoverishment of the life of spirit—through clearing away the community's representation and its doing with respect to that representation—what arises, instead of the Concept, is rather mere externality and singularity: the historical mode of the immediate appearance, and the spiritless recollection of a single, merely supposed shape and of its past.

767 Spirit is the content of its consciousness first in the form of *pure substance*; that is, it is the content of its pure consciousness. This element of thought is the movement of descending into existence, or singularity. The middle between them is their syn-

thetic combination, the consciousness of becoming-other, or representing as such. The third is the return from representation and otherness, or the element of self-consciousness itself.—These three moments constitute spirit. Its coming apart in representation consists in its being in a *determinate* way; but this determinateness is nothing other than one of its moments. Its detailed movement, then, is this: to spread out its nature in each of its moments as in an element. As each of these circles completes itself within itself, this reflection of it into itself is at the same time the transition into the other. *Representation* forms the middle between pure thought and self-consciousness as such, and is only *one* of the determinatenesses. At the same time, however, as has been shown, its character of being the synthetic combination is spread over all these elements and is their common determinateness.

768 The content itself that is to be considered has already come up in part as the representation of the *unhappy* and of the *believing* consciousness.—In the unhappy consciousness, however, it appeared in the determination of a content *brought forth from consciousness* and *longed for*, in which spirit can neither be satisfied nor find rest, because it is not yet its content *in itself*, or as its *substance*.—In the believing consciousness, by contrast, it was considered as the selfless *essence* of the world, or as the essentially *objective* content of representing—of a representing that flees actuality altogether and is therefore without the *certainty of self-consciousness*, a certainty that separates itself from it partly as the vanity of knowing, partly as pure insight. — The consciousness of the community, on the other hand, has this content as its *substance*, just as the content is the community's *certainty* of its own spirit.

THE FIRST ELEMENT: PURE THOUGHT

Represented in pure thought, the eternal essence begets an other and knows itself in it.

769 Spirit, represented first as substance in the *element of pure thought*, is thereby immediately the simple, self-identical, eternal *essence*—an essence that has, however, not this abstract *significance* of essence, but the significance of absolute spirit. Yet spirit is this: not to be significance, not the inner, but the actual. The simple eternal essence would therefore be spirit only in empty name if it stopped at the representation and expression of the simple eternal essence. But because the simple essence is abstraction, it is in fact the *negative in itself*—namely the negativity of thought, or negativity as it is in itself in *essence*. That is, it is absolute *difference* from itself, or its pure becoming-other. As *essence*, it is only *in itself*, or for us. But since this purity is precisely abstraction or negativity, it is *for itself*, or the *self*, the *Concept*.—It is thus *objective*. And since representation grasps and expresses the *necessity* of the Concept just stated as a *happening*, it will be said that the eternal essence *begets* an other for itself. But in this otherness it has just as immediately returned into itself. For the difference is difference *in itself*: it is immediately different only from itself, and is thus the unity that has returned into itself.

770 Three moments are thus distinguished: *essence*; *being-for-self*, which is the otherness of essence and for which essence is; and *being-for-self*, or knowing oneself, *in the other*. Essence intuits only itself in its being-for-self; in this externalization it remains only with itself. The being-for-self that excludes itself from essence is essence's *knowing of itself*. It is the word which, once spoken, leaves the speaker externalized and emptied out, but which is just as immediately heard; and only this hearing of itself is the existence of the word.[36] So the differences that are

36 The passage alludes to the Word (Logos) of John 1:1, which the doctrine of the Trinity identifies with the Son.

made are just as immediately dissolved as they are made, and just as immediately made as they are dissolved; and the true and actual is precisely this movement circling within itself.

771 This movement within itself expresses the absolute essence as *spirit*. The absolute essence that is not grasped as spirit is only the abstract void, just as spirit that is not grasped as this movement is only an empty word. When its *moments* are grasped in their purity, they are the restless concepts that only are by being their own opposite in themselves and by having their rest in the whole. But the *representing* of the community is not this *conceptually comprehending* thought. It has the content without its necessity, and instead of the form of the Concept it brings the natural relations of father and son into the realm of pure consciousness. Since it thus comports itself *representationally* within thought itself, the essence is indeed revealed to it. But because of this synthetic representation, the moments of the essence partly fall apart for it, so that they do not relate to one another through their own concept. Partly, too, representing steps back from this its pure object and relates to it only externally. The object is revealed to it by something alien, and in this thought of spirit it does not cognize itself, does not cognize the nature of pure self-consciousness. It is necessary to go beyond the form of representation and beyond those relations taken from the natural world—and hence, above all, beyond taking the moments of the movement that spirit is for isolated, unwavering substances or subjects instead of for transitional moments. Insofar as this is so, this going beyond, as was noted earlier with respect to another aspect, is to be regarded as a pressing of the Concept. But since it is only instinct, it misunderstands itself: along with the form it rejects the content too, and, what comes to the same thing, degrades the content to a historical representation and an heirloom of tradition. In this, only the purely external element of faith is retained, and so retained as something dead and devoid of cognition. The *inner* element of faith, however, has vanished, because this would be the Concept that knows itself as Concept.

[772] Absolute spirit, represented in *pure essence*, is indeed not *abstract* pure essence. Rather, pure essence has sunk to being an *element* precisely because it is only a moment in spirit. But the presentation of spirit in this element has in itself, as to form, the same defect that *essence* as essence has. Essence is the abstract, and therefore the negative of its simplicity, an other. Likewise, *spirit* in the element of essence is the *form* of *simple unity*, which is therefore just as essentially a becoming-other. — Or, what is the same, the relation of the eternal essence to its being-for-self is the immediately simple relation of pure thought. In this *simple* intuition of itself in the other, *otherness* is therefore not posited as such. It is difference as, in pure thought, it is immediately *no difference*—a recognition *of love*, in which the two are not *opposed* to each other in their essence.—Spirit expressed in the element of pure thought is itself essentially this: to be not merely in that element but *actual*. For its very concept contains *otherness*, that is, the sublation of the pure, merely thought concept.

THE SECOND ELEMENT: CREATION AND FALL

Spirit creates a world; the human being falls into good and evil.

[773] The element of pure thought, because it is the abstract, is itself rather the *other* of its simplicity, and therefore passes over into the element of *representation* proper. In this element the moments of the pure Concept acquire a *substantial* existence over against one another, just as they are *subjects*. These subjects do not have, for a third, the indifference of being toward one another; rather, reflected into themselves, they separate themselves from one another and set themselves against one another.

[774] Spirit that is thus only eternal or abstract becomes *an other* to itself, or enters into existence, and immediately into *immediate existence*. It therefore *creates* a *world*. This *creating* is representation's word for the *Concept* itself in its absolute movement. It stands for the fact that the simple, stated as absolute, or pure thought, because it is the abstract, is rather the negative, and hence what is opposed to itself, or the *other*. Or, to say the same

thing in yet another form: what is posited as *essence* is simple *immediacy*, or *being*. But as immediacy or being it lacks the self, and so, lacking inwardness, it is *passive*, or *being for another*. — This *being for another* is at the same time *a world*. Spirit in the determination of *being for another* is the tranquil subsistence of the moments previously enclosed in pure thought. It is thus the dissolution of their simple universality and their falling apart into their own particularity.

[775] The world, however, is not merely this spirit thrown apart into completeness and into the external order of that completeness. Since spirit is essentially the simple self, this self is equally present in the world: the *existing* spirit, which is the singular self that has consciousness and distinguishes itself, as other or as world, from itself.—As this singular self is at first so immediately posited, it is not yet *spirit for itself*. It thus *is* not *as* spirit; it can be called *innocent*, but hardly *good*. For it to be in fact self and spirit, it must first become an *other* to itself, just as the eternal essence presents itself as the movement of being equal to itself in its otherness. Since this spirit is determined as at first immediately existing, or as dispersed into the multiplicity of its consciousness, its becoming-other is the *going-into-itself* of knowing in general. Immediate existence turns into thought, or merely sensuous consciousness turns into the consciousness of thought. And because this thought comes from immediacy, or is *conditioned* thought, it is not pure knowing. It is thought that has otherness in it, and is thus the self-opposed thought of *good* and *evil*. The human being is represented in such a way that it *happened*, as something not necessary, that he lost the form of self-identity by plucking from the tree of the knowledge of *good* and *evil*, and was driven out of the state of innocent consciousness—out of nature that offered itself without labor, and out of paradise, the garden of animals.

[776] Since this going-into-itself of existing consciousness immediately determines itself as becoming *unequal* to itself, *evil* appears as the first existence of consciousness that has gone into itself. And because the thoughts of *good* and *evil* are absolutely

opposed, and this opposition is not yet resolved, this consciousness is essentially only evil. At the same time, however, precisely because of this opposition, the *good* consciousness is also present over against it, and so is their relation to each other.—Insofar as immediate existence turns into *thought*, and *being-within-itself* is partly itself thinking, while the moment of the essence's *becoming-other* is thereby more precisely determined, the becoming-evil can be shifted further back, out of the existing world and into the first realm of thought. It can thus be said that it was already the first-born son of light who, in going into himself, fell, but that another was at once begotten in his place. Moreover, a form such as *falling*, like *son*, belongs merely to representation and not to the Concept. Such a form degrades the moments of the Concept into representation, or, conversely, carries representation over into the realm of thought.—It is just as much a matter of indifference whether one adds to the simple thought of *otherness* in the eternal essence a multiplicity of other shapes, and locates the *going-into-itself* in them.[37] This coordination must nonetheless be approved, because through it this moment of *otherness* expresses diversity as well, as it should—not as plurality in general, but at the same time as determinate diversity. Thus one part, the Son, is the simple that knows itself as essence; the other part, however, is the externalization of being-for-self, which lives only in praise of the essence. Into this part, in turn, can be placed the taking-back of the externalized being-for-self and the going-into-itself of evil. Insofar as otherness falls into two, spirit would be more determinate in its moments; if they are counted, it would be expressed as a fourfold unity—or, since the multitude itself falls again into two parts, namely those that remained good and those that became evil, even as a fivefold unity.[38] — Counting the moments, however, can in general be regarded as useless. For one thing, what

37 The "first-born son of light" is Lucifer ("light-bearer"), the fallen angel of Christian tradition.

38 Hegel coins these words on the model of *Dreieinigkeit*, "Trinity" (literally "threefold unity").

is distinguished is itself equally only *one*—namely the *thought* of difference, which is only one thought—just as it is *this* distinguished thing, the second over against the first. For another, the thought that gathers the many into one must be dissolved out of its universality and differentiated into more than three or four distinct things. Over against the absolute determinateness of the abstract one, the principle of number, this universality appears as indeterminateness in relation to number itself, so that one could speak only of *numbers* in general — that is, not of a *definite number* of differences. Here, then, it is quite superfluous to think of number and counting at all, just as elsewhere the mere difference of magnitude and quantity is devoid of concept and says nothing.

INCARNATION, DEATH AND RECONCILIATION

The divine essence empties itself, dies, and is reconciled with its existence.

[777] *Good* and *evil* were the determinate differences of thought that emerged. Since their opposition is not yet resolved, and they are represented as beings of thought, each independent for itself, the human being is the self without essence and the synthetic ground of their existence and their struggle. But these universal powers belong just as much to the self; in other words, the self is their actuality. In accordance with this moment, therefore, it happens that, just as evil is nothing other than the going-into-itself of spirit's natural existence, so, conversely, the good enters into actuality and appears as an existing self-consciousness. — What in purely thought spirit is merely hinted at, as the *becoming-other* of the divine essence in general, here comes closer to its realization for representation. For representation, this realization consists in the self-abasement of the divine essence, which renounces its abstraction and non-actuality.—The other side, evil, representation takes as a happening alien to the divine essence. To grasp evil within the divine essence itself, *as its wrath*, is the highest and hardest effort of representation wrest-

ling with itself—an effort that, lacking the Concept, remains fruitless.[39]

778 The alienation of the divine essence is thus posited in its twofold way. The self of spirit and its simple thought are the two moments whose absolute unity is spirit itself. Its alienation consists in their coming apart, and in one having an unequal value relative to the other. This inequality is therefore twofold, and two combinations arise whose common moments are those just named. In one, the *divine essence* counts as the essential, while natural existence and the self count as the inessential, to be sublated. In the other, conversely, *being-for-self* counts as the essential, and the simple divine as the inessential. Their still empty middle is *existence* in general, the mere commonality of their two moments.

779 The resolution of this opposition does not come about so much through the struggle of the two, which are represented as separate and independent beings. It lies in their *independence* that each must, *in itself*, through its concept, dissolve in itself. The struggle only takes place where both cease to be these mixtures of thought and independent existence, and where they confront each other only as thoughts. For then, as determinate concepts, they are essentially only in the opposed relation. As independent, on the other hand, they have their essentiality outside the opposition; their movement is thus their own free movement. Just as the movement of both is thus movement *in itself*, because it is to be considered in them themselves, so too it is begun by whichever of the two is determined as what is in itself over against the other. This is represented as a voluntary act. But the necessity of its externalization lies in the concept: what is in itself, being so determined only within the opposition, for that very reason has no genuine subsistence. It is therefore the one for which not being-for-self but the simple counts as the essence that externalizes itself, goes to its death, and thereby reconciles the absolute essence with itself. For in this

39 The self-abasement echoes Philippians 2:7, where Christ "emptied himself"; evil as God's wrath recalls the mystic Jakob Böhme (1575–1624).

movement it presents itself as *spirit*. The abstract essence is alienated from itself; it has natural existence and the actuality of a self. This otherness of it, or its sensuous presence, is taken back through the second becoming-other and posited as sublated, as *universal*. Through this the essence has become itself in its sensuous presence. The immediate existence of actuality has ceased to be something alien or external to it, since it is sublated, universal. This death is therefore its rising as spirit.

The sublated immediate presence of the self-conscious essence is that essence as universal self-consciousness. This concept of the sublated singular self that is absolute essence therefore immediately expresses the constitution of a community. Having dwelt until now in representation, this community now returns into itself as into the self; and spirit thus passes from the second element of its determination, representation, into the *third*, self-consciousness as such.—If we consider further how that representation conducts itself as it proceeds, we see first the expression that the divine essence takes on human nature. In this it is already *stated* that *in themselves* the two are not separate. Likewise, in the claim that the divine essence externalizes itself *from the beginning*, that its existence goes into itself and becomes evil, it is not stated but *contained* that *in itself* this evil existence is not something alien to the divine essence. The absolute essence would have only this empty name if there were in truth something *other* to it, if there were a *fall* from it. The moment of *being-within-itself* is, rather, the essential moment of the *self* of spirit. — [780] That *being-within-itself*, and with it *actuality*, belongs to the essence itself—this, which for us is *Concept*, and insofar as it is Concept, appears to representational consciousness as an inconceivable *happening*; for it, the *in-itself* takes on the form of *indifferent being*. But the thought that those moments which seem to flee each other—the absolute essence and the self that is for itself—are not separate *also* appears to this representing—for it possesses the true content—but only afterwards—in the externalization of the divine essence that becomes flesh. This representation is in this way

still *immediate* and therefore not spiritual; it knows the human shape of the essence only as a particular, not yet universal shape. It becomes spiritual for this consciousness in the movement in which the shaped essence sacrifices its immediate existence again and returns to the essence; only the essence *reflected into itself* is spirit.—The *reconciliation* of the divine essence with the *other* in general, and specifically with the *thought* of the other, *evil*, is thus represented here. — Suppose this reconciliation is expressed according to *its concept* by saying that it consists in this: that *in itself evil* is *the same* as *good*; or that the divine essence is *the same* as nature in its whole extent, just as nature separated from the divine essence is only *nothing*. Then this must be regarded as an unspiritual way of expressing oneself, one that necessarily gives rise to misunderstandings.—If evil is *the same* as good, then evil is precisely not evil, nor good good; rather, both are sublated. Evil in general is being-for-self that is within itself, and good is the selfless simple. When both are thus expressed according to their concept, their unity at once becomes clear. For being-for-self that is within itself is simple knowing, and the selfless simple is likewise pure being-for-self that is within itself.—Therefore, just as much as it must be said that, according to this concept of theirs, good and evil—that is, insofar as they are not good and evil—are *the same*, it must equally be said that they are *not* the same but absolutely *different*. For simple being-for-self, or pure knowing too, is likewise pure negativity, or absolute difference in itself. — Only these two propositions together complete the whole. The asserting and affirming of the first must be countered with insurmountable stubbornness by holding fast to the other. Since both are equally right, both are equally wrong. Their wrong consists in taking such abstract forms as *the same* and *not the same*, *identity* and *non-identity*, for something true, fixed and actual, and in resting on them. Neither the one nor the other has truth. Truth lies in their very movement: the simple "same" is abstraction and thereby absolute difference, while absolute difference, as difference in itself, is different from itself and is thus self-iden-

tity. The same holds for the *sameness* of the divine essence and nature in general, and human nature in particular. The divine essence is nature insofar as it is not essence; nature is divine according to its essence. But it is spirit in which both abstract sides are posited as they are in truth, namely as *sublated*—a positing that cannot be expressed by the judgment and its spiritless "*is*," the copula.—Likewise, nature is *nothing outside* its essence; but this nothing itself equally *is*. It is absolute abstraction, thus pure thought or being-within-itself; and with the moment of its opposition to spiritual unity it is *evil*. The difficulty in these concepts lies solely in clinging to the "*is*" and forgetting thought, in which the moments equally *are* and *are not*—are only the movement that spirit is.—This spiritual unity, or the unity in which the differences are only as moments, or as sublated, is what has come to be for representational consciousness in that reconciliation. And since it is the universality of self-consciousness, self-consciousness has ceased to be representational; the movement has gone back into it.

THE THIRD ELEMENT: THE COMMUNITY

The mediator's death becomes the universal self-consciousness of the community, which still only represents its reconciliation.

[781] Spirit is thus posited in the third element, in *universal self-consciousness*; it is its *community*. The movement of the community, as self-consciousness that distinguishes itself from its representation, is to *bring forth* what has come to be *in itself*. The dead divine man, or human God, is *in itself* universal self-consciousness; he has to become this *for this self-consciousness*. Or: this self-consciousness constitutes one side of the opposition of representation, namely the evil side, for which natural existence and singular being-for-self count as the essence. This side is represented as independent, not yet as a moment. Because of its independence, therefore, it has to raise itself to spirit in and for itself, or to present spirit's movement in itself.

[782] This side *is natural spirit*. The self has to withdraw from this naturalness and go into itself, which would mean becoming *evil*. But natural spirit is already evil *in itself*; going-into-itself therefore consists in *convincing itself* that natural existence is evil. Into representational consciousness falls the *existing* becoming-evil and being-evil of the world, as well as the *existing* reconciliation of the absolute essence. Into *self-consciousness* as such, however, what is thus represented falls, as to form, only as a sublated moment. For the *self* is the negative, and hence *knowing* —a knowing that is a pure activity of consciousness within itself. —This moment of the *negative* must likewise express itself in the content. For the essence is *in itself* already reconciled with itself and is spiritual unity, in which the parts of representation are *sublated*, or are *moments*. This shows itself as follows: each part of representation here receives the *opposite* significance from the one it had before. Each significance is thereby completed by the other, and only thereby is the content a spiritual one. Since the determinateness is just as much its own opposite, unity in otherness—the spiritual—is complete. So, too, earlier, for us or *in itself*, the opposed significances were united, and even the abstract forms of *the same* and *not the same*, of *identity* and *non-identity*, were sublated.

[783] If, then, in representational consciousness the *becoming-inward* of natural self-consciousness was *existing evil*, the *becoming-inward* in the element of self-consciousness is the *knowing* of *evil* as something that is *in itself* in existence. This knowing is, admittedly, a becoming-evil, but only the becoming of the *thought* of *evil*, and it is therefore recognized as the first moment of reconciliation. For as a return into itself out of the immediacy of nature, which is determined as evil, it is an abandoning of that immediacy, and the dying away of sin. It is not natural existence as such that consciousness abandons, but natural existence as something known at the same time as evil. The immediate movement of *going-into-itself* is just as much a mediated one—it presupposes itself, or is its own ground. For the ground of going-into-itself is that nature has already gone into

itself in itself. Because of evil the human being must go into himself, but *evil* is itself the going-into-itself.—Precisely because of this, this first movement is itself only the immediate one, or its *simple concept*: it is the same as its ground. The movement, or the becoming-other, must therefore still first appear in its more proper form.

[784] Besides this immediacy, then, the *mediation* of representation is necessary. *In itself*, the *knowing* of nature as the untrue existence of spirit, and this universality of the self that has gone into itself, is the reconciliation of spirit with itself. For self-consciousness that does not comprehend, this *in-itself* takes on the form of something that *is* and is *represented to it*. Comprehending, therefore, is for it not a grasping of this Concept, which knows sublated naturalness as universal, hence as reconciled with itself. It is a grasping of that *representation* according to which the divine essence is reconciled with its existence through the *happening* of its own externalization—through its becoming human, which has happened, and through its death. — The grasping of this representation now expresses more precisely what was earlier called, within it, spiritual resurrection—the becoming of its singular self-consciousness into the universal, or into the community.—The *death* of the divine man, *as death*, is *abstract* negativity, the immediate result of the movement that ends only in *natural* universality. In spiritual self-consciousness death loses this natural significance; it becomes its concept just stated. From what it immediately signifies, the nonbeing of *this individual*, death is transfigured into the *universality* of spirit, which lives in its community, dies in it daily, and rises again.

[785] What belongs to the element *of representation*—that absolute spirit, as *a singular* spirit, or rather as a *particular* one, represents the nature of spirit in its existence—is thus here transposed into self-consciousness itself, into the knowing that preserves itself in its *otherness*. This knowing therefore does not actually *die*, as the *particular one is represented* as having *actually* died. Rather, its particularity dies away in its universality, that

is, in its *knowing*, which is the essence reconciling itself with itself. The immediately preceding *element of representation* is thus here posited as sublated; in other words, it has returned into the self, into its concept. What in that element merely was has become subject. — By the same token, the *first element, pure thought*, and the spirit eternal within it, is no longer beyond representational consciousness or beyond the self. Rather, the return of the whole into itself is precisely this: to contain all moments within itself.—The death of the mediator, as grasped by the self, is the sublation of his *objectivity*, or of his *particular being-for-self*; this *particular* being-for-self has become universal self-consciousness.—On the other hand, the *universal* has, through this very fact, become self-consciousness, and the pure or non-actual spirit of mere thought has become *actual*.—The death of the mediator is the death not only of his *natural side*, or of his particular being-for-self. What dies is not only the husk, stripped from the essence and already dead, but also the *abstraction* of the divine essence. For insofar as his death has not yet completed the reconciliation, the mediator is the one-sided, which knows the simple of thought as the *essence* in opposition to actuality. This extreme of the self does not yet have equal value with the essence; the self has this equal value only in spirit. The death of this representation therefore contains at the same time the death of the *abstraction of the divine essence*, which is not posited as self. This death is the painful feeling of the unhappy consciousness that *God himself has died*. This harsh expression is the expression of the innermost simple knowing of oneself, the return of consciousness into the depth of the night of I = I, which no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside itself. This feeling is thus in fact the loss of *substance* and of substance's standing over against consciousness. But at the same time it is the pure *subjectivity* of substance, or the pure certainty of itself that substance lacked as object, as the immediate, or as pure essence. This knowing, then, is the *spiritualization* by which substance has become subject: its abstraction and life-

lessness have died, and it has therefore become *actual* and simple and universal self-consciousness.[40]

786 Spirit is thus spirit knowing *itself*. It knows *itself*; what is object for it is, or its representation is the true, absolute *content*; as we saw, it expresses spirit itself. At the same time, spirit is not only *content* of self-consciousness, and not only object *for it*; it is also *actual spirit*. It is this by running through the three elements of its nature; this movement through itself constitutes its actuality. What moves is spirit. It is the subject of the movement, and it is equally *the moving* itself, or the substance through which the subject passes. The concept of spirit had come to be for us when we entered upon religion: namely as the movement of spirit certain of itself, which forgives evil and in doing so at the same time lets go of its own simplicity and hard unchangeableness—or as the movement in which what is absolutely *opposed* cognizes itself as *the same*, and this cognition breaks forth as the *Yes* between these extremes. This concept the religious consciousness, to which the absolute essence is revealed, *intuits*. It sublates the *distinction* between its *self* and *what it intuits*. As it is the subject, so it is also the substance; and it thus *is* itself spirit, precisely because and insofar as it is this movement.

787 But this community is not yet perfected in this, its self-consciousness. Its content is present for it, in general, in the form of *representation*, and this division still clings to the community's *actual spirituality* too—to its return out of its representing—just as the element of pure thinking itself was burdened with it. The community does not also have consciousness of what it is. It is spiritual self-consciousness that is not an object to itself as this self-consciousness, or does not open itself up to consciousness of itself; rather, insofar as it is consciousness, it has representations, the ones we have examined.—We see self-consciousness, at its last turning point, become *inward* to itself and attain *knowing* of its *being-within-itself*; we see it externalize its natural existence and gain pure negativity. But the *positive* meaning—namely,

40 Hegel's word *Begeistung* (roughly "en-spiriting") is built on *Geist*, "spirit."

that this negativity or pure *inwardness* of *knowing* is just as much the *self-identical essence*, or that substance here succeeds in being absolute self-consciousness—is something *other* for the devotional consciousness. It grasps this aspect—that the pure becoming-inward of knowing is *in itself* absolute simplicity, or substance—as the representation of something that is not so by its *concept*, but as the act of an *alien* satisfaction. In other words, it is not for this consciousness that this depth of the pure self is the power by which the *abstract essence* is drawn down from its abstraction and raised to a self by the might of this pure devotion.[41] — The doing of the self therefore retains this negative meaning toward that essence, because the externalization of substance, from substance's side, is an *in-itself* for the self, which the self does not equally grasp and comprehend, or does not find in *its own* doing as such.—Since this unity of essence and self has come about *in itself*, consciousness also still has this *representation* of its reconciliation—but as a representation. It attains satisfaction by *externally* adding to its pure negativity the positive meaning of its unity with essence; its satisfaction therefore itself remains burdened with the opposition of a beyond. Its own reconciliation therefore enters its consciousness as something *distant*, as a distance of the *future*, just as the reconciliation that the other *self* accomplished appears as a distance of the *past*. Just as the *singular* divine human being has a father who is *in itself* and only an *actual* mother, so too the universal divine human being, the community, has its *own doing* and *knowing* for its father, but for its mother the *eternal love* that it only *feels*, and does not intuit in its consciousness as an actual, immediate *object*. Its reconciliation is therefore in its heart, but still divided from its consciousness, and its actuality is still broken. What enters its consciousness as the *in-itself*, or the side of *pure mediation*, is the reconciliation lying in the beyond; but what enters it as *present*, as the side of *immediacy* and *existence*, is the world, which still has its transfiguration to await. The world is indeed

41 "Satisfaction" (*Genugtuung*) in the theological sense: atonement made by another on one's behalf.

reconciled with essence *in itself*; and of *essence* it is indeed known that it no longer recognizes the object as alienated from itself, but, in its love, as identical with itself. But for self-consciousness this immediate presence does not yet have the shape of spirit. The spirit of the community is thus, in its immediate consciousness, separated from its religious consciousness. The religious consciousness does declare that they are not separated *in themselves*, but this is an *in-itself* that is not realized, or has not yet become equally absolute being-for-self.

Absolute Knowing

VIII. Das absolute Wissen
Spirit knows itself as spirit and recollects the whole of its journey.

VIII. DAS ABSOLUTE WISSEN.

[788] The spirit of the revealed religion has not yet overcome its consciousness as such; or, what is the same, its actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness. Spirit itself in general, and the moments that distinguish themselves within it, fall within representation and within the form of objectivity. The *content* of representation is absolute spirit; and all that remains is to sublate this mere form. Or rather, since this form belongs to *consciousness as such*, its truth must already have emerged in the configurations of consciousness. — This overcoming of the object of consciousness is not to be taken one-sidedly, as meaning that the object showed itself returning into the self. It is to be taken more determinately: both that the object as such presented itself to the self as vanishing, and, still more, that it is the externalization of self-consciousness that posits thinghood, and that this externalization has not merely negative but positive meaning—and has it not only for us, or in itself, but for self-consciousness itself. *For self-consciousness*, the negative of the object, or the object's sublating of itself, thereby has positive meaning; in other words, self-consciousness *knows* this nothingness of the object, on the one hand, by externalizing itself—for in this externalization it posits *itself* as object, or, for the sake of the inseparable unity of *being-for-self*, posits the object as itself. On the other hand, there lies here at the same

time this other moment: self-consciousness has equally sublated this externalization and objectivity and taken it back into itself, and so is at home with itself in *its* otherness as such.—This is the movement of *consciousness*, and in this movement consciousness is the totality of its moments.—Consciousness must likewise relate itself to the object according to the totality of the object's determinations, and must have grasped it in this way according to each of them. This totality of its determinations makes the object *in itself* a spiritual being, and for consciousness it truly becomes this through the apprehension of each single one of these determinations as the self, or through the spiritual relation to them just mentioned.

[789] The object is thus partly *immediate* being, or a thing in general—which corresponds to immediate consciousness; partly a becoming-other of itself, its relation, or *being for another* and *being-for-self*, determinateness—which corresponds to *perception*; partly *essence*, or the object as universal—which corresponds to the understanding. As a whole, the object is the syllogism, or the movement of the universal through determination to singularity, as well as the reverse movement from singularity, through singularity as sublated, or through determination, to the universal.—It is according to these three determinations, then, that consciousness must know the object as itself. Yet it is not knowing as the pure comprehension of the object that is under discussion here. Rather, this knowing is to be exhibited only in its becoming, or in its moments, from the side that belongs to consciousness as such; and the moments of the Concept proper, or of pure knowing, are to be exhibited in the form of configurations of consciousness. That is why the object, in consciousness as such, does not yet appear as the spiritual essentiality that we have just declared it to be. And consciousness's relation to the object is not the consideration of it in this totality as such, nor in its pure form as Concept. It is partly a shape of consciousness in general, partly a number of such shapes which *we* gather together, and in which the totality of the moments of the object

and of consciousness's relation can be exhibited only as dissolved into its moments.

RECOLLECTING THE SHAPES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The object is known as the self through observing reason, Enlightenment, morality and conscience.

790 For this side of apprehending the object as it is in the shape of consciousness, we therefore need only recall the earlier shapes of consciousness that have already come before us.—With regard to the object, then, insofar as it is immediate, an *indifferent being*, we saw observing reason *seek* and *find* itself in this indifferent thing—that is, be conscious of its own doing as something just as external as the object, of which it is conscious only as something immediate.—We also saw it, at its peak, express its determination in the infinite judgment that *the being of the I is a thing*. — And, indeed, a sensuous, immediate thing. When the I is called a *soul*, it is indeed also represented as a thing, but as an invisible, intangible thing, and so on—thus in fact not as immediate being, and not as what one means by a thing.—That judgment, taken as it immediately reads, is spiritless, or rather spiritlessness itself. But according to its *concept* it is in fact the richest in spirit; and this *inner* side of it, which is not yet *present* in it, is what the two other moments still to be considered express.

791 *The thing is I*: in fact, in this infinite judgment the thing is sublated. It is nothing in itself; it has meaning only in relation, only *through the I* and *its relation* to the I.—This moment emerged for consciousness in pure insight and Enlightenment. Things are simply *useful*, and are to be considered only in terms of their usefulness.—The *cultured* self-consciousness, which has traversed the world of self-alienated spirit, has through its externalization produced the thing as itself. It therefore still retains itself in the thing and knows the thing's lack of independence, or that the thing is *essentially* only *being for another*. Or, to express the *relation* completely—that is, what alone constitutes the nature of the object here—then for this self-consciousness

the thing counts as something *existing for itself*. It declares sense-certainty to be absolute truth, but declares this *being-for-self* itself to be a moment that only vanishes and passes over into its opposite, into a being for another that has been surrendered.

792 But in this the knowing of the thing is not yet complete. The thing must be known not only according to the immediacy of being and according to determinateness, but also as *essence* or *inner*, as the self. This is present in *moral self-consciousness*. Moral self-consciousness knows its knowing as the *absolute essentiality*, or knows *being* simply as pure will or knowing; it *is* nothing but this will and knowing. To anything else there belongs only inessential being—that is, being that does not *exist in itself*—only its empty husk. Insofar as moral consciousness releases *existence* from the self in its representation of the world, it equally takes it back into itself. Finally, as conscience, it is no longer this still alternating placing and displacing of existence and self; rather, it knows that its *existence* as such is this pure certainty of itself. The objective element into which, in acting, it puts itself forth is nothing other than the self's pure knowing of itself.

793 These are the moments of which the reconciliation of spirit with its consciousness proper is composed. Taken by themselves they are isolated, and it is their spiritual unity alone that constitutes the force of this reconciliation. The last of these moments, however, is necessarily this unity itself, and, as is evident, it in fact binds them all into itself. The spirit that is certain of itself in its existence has as the element of its *existence* nothing but this knowing of itself. Its declaration that what it does, it does from conviction of duty—this, its language, is the *validity* of its action.—Action is the first separation, *existing in itself*, of the simplicity of the Concept, and the return out of this separation. This first movement turns over into the second, in that the element of recognition posits itself as *simple* knowing of duty over against the *difference* and *division* that lie in action as such, and in this way forms an iron actuality over against action. In forgiveness, however, we saw how this hardness gives itself up and externalizes itself. Here, then, actuality, as *immedi-*

ate existence, has for self-consciousness no other meaning than to be pure knowing;—and likewise, as *determinate* existence, or as relation, what stands opposed is a knowing, partly of this purely singular self, partly of knowing as universal. In this it is at the same time posited that the *third* moment, *universality* or *essence*, counts for each of the two opposed sides only as *knowing*. And finally they likewise sublate the empty opposition that still remains, and are the knowing of I = I: this *singular* self that is immediately pure, or universal, knowing.

THE FINAL RECONCILIATION

The religious and the conscious sides of reconciliation are united in the simple unity of the Concept.

794 This reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness thus shows itself to have been brought about from two sides: on the one hand in the religious spirit, on the other in consciousness itself as such. The two are distinguished from each other in that the former is this reconciliation in the form of *being-in-itself*, the latter in the form of *being-for-self*. As they have been considered, they at first fall apart. In the order in which its shapes came before us, consciousness arrived—partly at the single moments of this reconciliation, partly at their unification—long before religion, too, gave its object the shape of actual self-consciousness. The unification of the two sides has not yet been exhibited. It is this unification that closes this series of the configurations of spirit; for in it spirit comes to know itself not only as it is *in itself*, or according to its absolute *content*, nor only as it is *for itself*, according to its contentless form or from the side of self-consciousness, but as it is *in and for itself*.

795 This unification, however, has already taken place *in itself*—in religion too, in the return of representation into self-consciousness—but not in its proper form, for the religious side is the side of the *in-itself*, which stands opposed to the movement of self-consciousness. The unification therefore belongs to this other side, which, within the opposition, is the side of reflection

into itself—hence the side that contains both itself and its opposite, and contains them not only *in itself* or in a universal way, but *for itself*, that is, developed and differentiated. The content, as well as the other side of self-conscious spirit insofar as it is the *other* side, is present and has been exhibited in its completeness. The unification still lacking is the simple unity of the Concept. The Concept, too, is already present on the side of self-consciousness itself; but as it appeared in what preceded, it has, like all the other moments, the form of being a *particular shape* of *consciousness*.—It is thus that part of the shape of spirit certain of itself which remains within its concept and was called the *beautiful soul*. The beautiful soul is, namely, spirit's knowing of itself in its pure, transparent unity—the self-consciousness that knows this pure knowing of pure *being-within-itself* as spirit—not only the intuition of the divine but the divine's intuition of itself. —Since this Concept holds itself fast in opposition to its realization, it is the one-sided shape whose vanishing into empty vapor we saw—but also its positive externalization and forward movement. Through this realization, the insistence on itself of this objectless self-consciousness—the *determinateness* of the Concept over against its *fulfillment*—is sublated. Its self-consciousness gains the form of universality, and what remains to it is its true Concept, or the Concept that has attained its realization. It is the Concept in its truth, namely in unity with its externalization: the knowing of pure knowing—not as abstract *essence*, which is duty, but of pure knowing as the essence that is *this* knowing, *this* pure self-consciousness, which is thus at the same time a true *object*, for the Concept is the self that is for itself.

[796] This Concept gave itself its fulfillment, on the one hand, in the *acting* spirit certain of itself, and on the other, in *religion*. In religion it gained the absolute *content as content*, or in the form of *representation*, of otherness for consciousness. In the former shape, by contrast, the form is the self itself, for that shape contains the *acting* spirit certain of itself: the self carries through the life of absolute spirit. This shape is, as we see, that simple

Concept, but one that gives up its eternal *essence*, *exists*, or acts. It has its *dividing*, or emergence, in the *purity* of the Concept, for this purity is absolute abstraction or negativity. Likewise it has the element of its actuality, or of being, within it, in pure knowing itself; for pure knowing is simple *immediacy*, which is *being* and *existence* just as much as it is *essence*—the former negative thinking, the latter positive thinking itself. Finally, this existence is just as much the being reflected into itself out of pure knowing—both as existence and as duty—that is, being *evil*. This going-into-itself constitutes the *opposition* of the *Concept*, and is thus the emergence of the *non-acting, non-actual* pure knowing of essence. But its emergence in this opposition is participation in it. The pure knowing of essence has *in itself* externalized its simplicity, for it is the *dividing*, or negativity, that the Concept is. Insofar as this dividing is *becoming for itself*, it is evil; insofar as it is the *in-itself*, it is what remains good.—Now what first happens *in itself* is at the same time *for consciousness*, and is itself likewise twofold: both *for consciousness* and as its *being-for-self*, or its own doing. The same thing that has already been posited *in itself* thus now repeats itself as consciousness's knowing of it and as conscious doing. Each, for the sake of the other, gives up the independence of the determinateness in which it comes forward against the other. This giving-up is the same renunciation of the one-sidedness of the Concept that constituted the beginning *in itself*; but it is now *its own* renunciation, just as the Concept it renounces is its own.—That *in-itself* of the beginning is, as negativity, in truth just as much the *mediated*; so it now *posits* itself as it is in truth, and the *negative* is, as the *determinateness* of each for the other, and in itself, what sublates itself. One of the two sides of the opposition is the disparity between *being-within-itself* in its *singularity* and universality; the other is the disparity between its abstract universality and the self. The former dies to its being-for-self, externalizes itself, confesses; the latter renounces the hardness of its abstract universality and thereby dies to its lifeless self and its unmoved universality. So the former has completed itself through the moment of universality

that is essence, and the latter through the universality that is self. Through this movement of action spirit has emerged—spirit, which is spirit only by *existing*, by raising its existence into *thought* and thereby into absolute *opposition*, and by returning from this opposition precisely through it and within it—as the pure universality of knowing, which is self-consciousness; as self-consciousness, which is the simple unity of knowing.

797 What in religion was *content*, or the form of representing an *other*, is here the self's own *doing*. It is the Concept that binds the two, so that the *content* is the self's own *doing*;—for this Concept is, as we see, the knowing of the self's doing within itself as all essentiality and all existence, the knowing of *this subject* as *substance*, and of substance as this knowing of its doing.—What we have added here is solely, on the one hand, the *gathering together* of the single moments, each of which in its principle presents the life of the whole of spirit; and, on the other, the holding fast of the Concept in the form of the Concept—the Concept whose content would already have emerged in those moments, and which would already have emerged by itself in the form of a *shape of consciousness*.

ABSOLUTE KNOWING AND SCIENCE

Spirit gives its true content the form of the self and so becomes science.

798 This last shape of spirit—spirit that gives its complete and true content at the same time the form of the self, and thereby realizes its Concept just as much as it remains in its Concept in this realization—is absolute knowing. It is spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit, or *comprehending knowing*. *Truth* is not only *in itself* perfectly equal to *certainty*; it also has the *shape* of the certainty of itself, or it is in its existence—that is, for the knowing spirit—in the *form* of knowing itself. Truth is the *content*, which in religion is still unequal to its certainty. But this equality lies in the content's having received the shape of the self. Thereby what is essence itself—namely the *Concept*—has become the element of existence, or the *form of objectivity* for consciousness.

Spirit *appearing* to consciousness in this element, or, what is the same here, produced in it by spirit itself, *is science*.

799 The nature, moments and movement of this knowing have thus turned out as follows: it is the pure *being-for-self* of self-consciousness. It is I, which is *this* I and no other, and which is just as immediately *mediated*, or sublated, *universal* I.—It has a *content* that it *distinguishes* from itself; for it is pure negativity, or self-division; it is *consciousness*. This content is, in its very difference, the I, for it is the movement of sublating itself, or the same pure negativity that the I is. In the content, as something distinguished, the I is reflected into itself; the content is *comprehended* only because the I is at home with itself in its otherness. This content, stated more determinately, is nothing other than the very movement just expressed; for it is spirit that traverses itself, and does so *for itself* as spirit, in that it has the shape of the Concept in its objectivity.

SCIENCE, TIME AND HISTORY

Spirit appears in time until it grasps its pure Concept; nothing is known that is not in experience.

800 As for the *existence* of this Concept, however, *science* does not appear in time and actuality until spirit has attained this consciousness about itself. As the spirit that knows what it is, it does not exist earlier—and nowhere else—than after completing the labor of mastering its imperfect configuration, of procuring for its consciousness the shape of its essence, and in this way of bringing its *self-consciousness* into balance with its *consciousness*. —Spirit that is in and for itself, differentiated into its moments, is knowing that is *for itself*, *comprehension* in general, which as such has not yet reached *substance*, or is not in itself absolute knowing.

801 Now in actuality the knowing substance is there earlier than its form, or its shape as Concept. For substance is the as yet undeveloped *in-itself*, or the ground and Concept in its still unmoved simplicity—hence the *inwardness* or self of spirit that

does not yet *exist*. What *exists* is there as the still undeveloped simple and immediate, or as the object of *representing* consciousness in general. Cognition is the spiritual consciousness for which what is *in itself* is only insofar as it is *being for* the *self* and being *of the self*, or Concept; for this reason cognition at first has only a poor object, compared with which substance and the consciousness of substance are richer. The manifestness that substance has in this consciousness is in fact concealment, for substance is still *selfless being*, and only the certainty of itself is manifest to itself. At first, therefore, only the *abstract moments* of substance belong to *self*-consciousness. But as these moments, being pure movements, drive themselves further, self-consciousness enriches itself, until it has wrested the whole of substance from consciousness, absorbed into itself the entire structure of substance's essentialities, and—since this negative relation to objectivity is just as much positive, a positing—produced substance out of itself and thereby at the same time restored it for consciousness. In the *Concept* that knows itself as Concept, therefore, the *moments* appear earlier than the *fulfilled whole*, whose becoming is the movement of those moments. In *consciousness*, by contrast, the whole—though uncomprehended—is earlier than the moments.—*Time* is the *Concept* itself that *exists* and represents itself to consciousness as empty intuition. That is why spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time just so long as it does not *grasp* its pure Concept—that is, does not annul time. Time is the *external*, intuited pure self, *not grasped* by the self: the Concept merely intuited. When the Concept grasps itself, it sublates its temporal form, comprehends intuiting, and is comprehended and comprehending intuiting. — Time therefore appears as the fate and necessity of spirit that is not complete within itself: the necessity of enriching the share that self-consciousness has in consciousness; of setting in motion the *immediacy* of the *in-itself*—the form in which substance is in consciousness; or, conversely, taking the in-itself as the *inward*, of realizing and revealing what is at first only *inward* —that is, of claiming it for the certainty of itself.

[802] For this reason it must be said that nothing is *known* that is not in *experience*—or, as the same thing is also put, that is not present as *felt truth*, as the eternal *inwardly revealed*, as the holy that is *believed*, or whatever other expressions are used. For experience is precisely this: that the content—and the content is spirit—is *in itself* substance and therefore an *object* of *consciousness*. But this substance that spirit is, is its *becoming* what it is *in itself*; and only as this becoming that reflects itself into itself is it in itself, in truth, *spirit*. Spirit is in itself the movement that cognition is—the transformation of that *in-itself* into the *for-itself*, of *substance* into *the subject*, of the object of *consciousness* into the object of *self-consciousness*, that is, into an object that is equally sublated, or into the *Concept*. This movement is the circle that returns into itself, that presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at the end. — Insofar as spirit is necessarily this distinguishing within itself, its whole, as intuited, stands over against its simple self-consciousness. And since that whole is what is distinguished, it is distinguished into its intuited pure Concept, *time*, and into the content, or the *in-itself*. Substance, as subject, has in it the necessity, *at first inner*, of presenting itself within itself as what it is *in itself*: *as spirit*. Only the completed objective presentation is at the same time the reflection of substance, or its becoming the self.—Therefore, until spirit has completed itself *in itself*, as world spirit, it cannot reach its completion as *self-conscious* spirit. The content of religion therefore expresses what *spirit is* earlier in time than science does; but science alone is spirit's true knowing of itself.

[803] The movement of driving forth the form of its knowing of itself is the labor that spirit accomplishes as *actual history*. The religious community, insofar as it is at first the substance of absolute spirit, is the crude consciousness. Its existence is all the more barbarous and harsh the deeper its inner spirit is, and its dull self has all the harder a labor with its essence, the content of its consciousness that is alien to it. Only after it has given up the hope of sublating that alienness in an external—that is, alien—way does it turn to itself, because the sublated alien way

is the return into self-consciousness. It turns to its own world and present, discovers them as its property, and has thus taken the first step toward descending from the *intellectual world*, or rather toward inspiriting that world's abstract element with the actual self. Through observation, on the one hand, it finds existence as thought and comprehends it; and, conversely, it finds existence in its thinking. In this way it first expresses, itself abstractly, the immediate *unity* of thinking *and being*, of abstract essence and the self; it revives the first luminous essence in a *purer* form, namely as the unity of extension and being—for extension is a simplicity more like pure thinking than light is—and thereby reawakens in thought the *substance* of the sunrise. Yet at the same time spirit recoils in horror from this abstract unity, from this *selfless* substantiality, and asserts individuality against it.[1] But only after spirit has externalized this individuality in culture, thereby made it existence and carried it through in all existence—having arrived at the thought of utility, and having grasped existence as its own will in absolute freedom—does it thereby turn the thought of its innermost depth outward and express essence as I = I. This I = I, however, is the movement that reflects itself into itself. For since this equality, as absolute negativity, is absolute difference, the self-equality of the I stands over against this pure difference, which—being pure, and at the same time objective for the self that knows itself—must be expressed as *time*. So, just as essence was earlier expressed as the unity of thought and extension, it would have to be grasped as the unity of thought and time. But difference left to itself, restless and unstable time, rather collapses into itself; it is the objective rest of *extension*, and extension is pure equality with itself—the I. — Or: the I is not only the self; it is the *equality of the self with itself*. But this equality is perfect and immediate unity with itself; in other words, *this subject* is just as much *substance*. Substance by itself alone would be empty intuiting, or the intuit-

1 The unity of thought and extension alludes to Descartes and Spinoza; the "luminous essence" and "the sunrise" recall the Eastern religion of light treated earlier under natural religion.

ing of a content that, as determinate, would have only accidentality and would lack necessity. Substance would count as the absolute only insofar as it was thought or intuited as *absolute unity*, and all content, in its diversity, would have to fall outside it, into reflection, which does not belong to it—because substance would not be subject, not what reflects on itself and into itself, not comprehended as spirit. If a content were nevertheless to be spoken of, it would be partly only in order to cast it into the empty abyss of the absolute, and partly it would be picked up externally from sense perception. Knowing would seem to have arrived at things, at the difference from itself and at the difference of manifold things, without anyone comprehending how or from where.

804 Spirit, however, has shown itself to us to be neither merely the withdrawal of self-consciousness into its pure inwardness, nor the mere submersion of self-consciousness in substance and the non-being of its difference, but *this movement* of the self: the self that externalizes itself and sinks itself into its substance, and that equally, as subject, has gone out of substance into itself, making substance its object and content just as much as it sublates this difference of objectivity and content. That first reflection out of immediacy is the subject's distinguishing itself from its substance, or the Concept dividing itself—the going-into-itself and becoming of the pure I. Since this difference is the pure doing of I = I, the Concept is the necessity and the rising-up of *existence*, which has substance for its essence and subsists for itself. But the subsisting of existence for itself is the Concept posited in determinateness, and thereby equally the Concept's movement *within itself* of going down into simple substance, which is subject only as this negativity and movement. — The I does not have to hold itself fast in the *form* of *self-consciousness* against the form of substantiality and objectivity, as if it were afraid of its externalization. The force of spirit is rather to remain equal to itself in its externalization and, as what is *in* and *for itself*, to posit *being-for-self* just as much as a mere moment as being-in-itself. Nor is the I a third thing that throws the differ-

ences back into the abyss of the absolute and declares their equality there. Rather, knowing consists in this seeming inactivity, which only watches how what is differentiated moves within itself and returns into its unity.

FROM SCIENCE BACK TO NATURE AND HISTORY

Science releases itself into nature and history, and history is recollected as a gallery of spirits.

805 In knowing, then, spirit has concluded the movement of its shaping, insofar as that shaping is burdened with the unovercome difference of consciousness. It has gained the pure element of its existence, the Concept. The content, according to the *freedom* of its *being*, is the self-externalizing self, or the *immediate* unity of self-knowing. The pure movement of this externalization, considered in the content, constitutes the content's *necessity*. The diverse content is, as *determinate*, in relation, not in itself; and it is its own restlessness to sublate itself, or *negativity*. Thus necessity or diversity, like free being, is equally the self; and in this selflike *form*, in which existence is immediately thought, the content is *Concept*. Since spirit has thus gained the Concept, it unfolds existence and movement in this ether of its life, and is *science*. In science the moments of its movement no longer present themselves as determinate *shapes* of *consciousness*; rather, since consciousness's difference has returned into the self, they present themselves as *determinate concepts* and as their organic movement grounded in itself. Whereas in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* each moment is the difference between knowing and truth, and the movement in which that difference sublates itself, science by contrast does not contain this difference and its sublation. Instead, since the moment has the form of the Concept, it unites the objective form of truth and that of the knowing self in immediate unity. The moment does not come forward as this movement of passing back and forth from consciousness or representation into self-consciousness and vice versa. Rather, its pure shape,

freed from its appearance in consciousness—the pure Concept—and the Concept's forward movement depend solely on its pure *determinateness*. Conversely, to each abstract moment of science there corresponds a shape of appearing spirit in general. Just as existing spirit is not richer than science, so it is not poorer in its content either. To cognize the pure concepts of science in this form of shapes of consciousness constitutes the side of their reality. According to this side, their essence, the Concept—which is posited in science in its *simple* mediation as *thinking*—breaks apart the moments of this mediation and presents itself according to the inner opposition.

[806] Science contains within itself this necessity of externalizing itself from the form of the pure Concept, and it contains the transition of the Concept into *consciousness*. For spirit that knows itself—precisely because it grasps its Concept—is immediate equality with itself, which in its difference is *certainty of the immediate*, or *sensuous consciousness*: the beginning from which we set out. This releasing of itself from the form of its self is the highest freedom and security of its knowing of itself.

[807] Yet this externalization is still incomplete. It expresses the *relation* of the certainty of itself to the object, which, precisely by being in the relation, has not gained its complete freedom. Knowing knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its limit. To know one's limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself. This sacrifice is the externalization in which spirit presents its becoming spirit in the form of *free, contingent happening*, intuiting its pure *self* as *time* outside it, and likewise its *being* as space. This last becoming of spirit, *nature*, is its living, immediate becoming; nature, spirit externalized, is in its existence nothing but this eternal externalization of its *subsisting* and the movement that establishes the *subject*.

[808] But the other side of its becoming, *history*, is *knowing*, self-*mediating* becoming—spirit externalized into time. Yet this externalization is equally the externalization of itself; the negative is the negative of itself. This becoming presents a sluggish movement and succession of spirits, a gallery of images, each of

which, endowed with the complete wealth of spirit, moves so sluggishly precisely because the self has to penetrate and digest this whole wealth of its substance. Since its completion consists in perfectly *knowing* what *it is*, its substance, this knowing is its *going-into-itself*, in which it abandons its existence and gives its shape over to recollection. In going into itself, spirit is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness; but its vanished existence is preserved in that night. And this sublated existence—the previous one, but reborn from knowing—is the new existence, a new world and shape of spirit. In it spirit has to begin all over again, just as naively, with its immediacy, and raise itself up again from there, as if all that preceded were lost for it and it had learned nothing from the experience of earlier spirits. But *re-collection* (*Er-Innerung*) has preserved that experience, and is the inner and in fact higher form of substance.[2] If, then, this spirit begins its culture all over again, seeming to start only from itself, it is at the same time on a higher level that it begins. The realm of spirits that has formed itself in existence in this way makes up a succession in which one relieved the other, and each took over the realm of the world from its predecessor. Their goal is the revelation of the depth, and this depth is *the absolute Concept*. This revelation is therefore the sublation of the Concept's depth, or its *extension*—the negativity of this I that is within itself, which is its externalization or substance—and its *time*: that this externalization externalizes itself within itself, and so, in its extension, is equally in its depth, the self. *The goal*, absolute knowing, or spirit that knows itself as spirit, has for its path the recollection of the spirits as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm. Their preservation, from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is history; from the side of their comprehended organization, it is the *science* of *appearing knowing*. Both together, comprehended history, form the recollection and the Golgotha of absolute spirit, the actuality, truth and certainty of its throne,

2 Hegel hyphenates *Erinnerung*, "recollection," to bring out its literal sense of making inward (*er-innern*).

without which it would be lifeless and solitary; only—from the chalice of this realm of spirits foams forth for it its infinity.[3]

3 The closing lines adapt the end of Schiller's poem "Friendship" (1782), where the friendless Creator finds his infinity foaming up to him "from the chalice of the whole realm of souls."