Being and Time

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

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Sein und Zeit

Translated with AI (OpenAI GPT-5.6 Sol and Claude)



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INTRODUCTION

In 1927 Martin Heidegger published the first half of *Being and Time* in Husserl's phenomenological yearbook. It asks a question he thought philosophy had forgotten since Plato and Aristotle: what do we mean when we say that something *is*? His way in is through the one being for whom its own being is an issue, the being we ourselves are, which he calls *Dasein*.

This is a private preview of the whole of the 1927 text: the Introduction (§§1–8) and both divisions of Part One (§§9–83). §§1–12 were drafted with AI (OpenAI GPT-5.6 Sol) and reviewed with Claude; §§13–83 were translated with AI (Claude Opus 5.5). The translation has not been reviewed by a human specialist. The German of 1927 is in the public domain in the United States, where this page is meant to be read; it is still under copyright in many other countries.

Introduction, Chapter One: The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being

Einleitung. Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein. Erstes Kapitel: Notwendigkeit, Struktur und Vorrang der Seinsfrage
§§1–4

§ 1. THE NECESSITY OF AN EXPLICIT REPETITION OF THE QUESTION OF BEING

1.1 The question just mentioned has today fallen into oblivion, although our age counts its renewed affirmation of "metaphysics" as progress. Nevertheless, people regard themselves as exempt from the exertions of rekindling a *battle of giants over Being*. And yet the question broached is not just any question. It kept Plato and Aristotle absorbed in inquiry, only, to be sure, to fall silent from then on—as a thematic question of genuine investigation. What the two achieved has persisted through manifold shifts and "overpaintings" all the way into Hegel's "Logic." And what was once wrested from the phenomena through the utmost exertion of thought, even if only fragmentarily and in initial attempts, has long since been trivialized.

1.2 Nor is that all. On the basis of the Greek approaches to interpreting Being, a dogma has developed that not only declares the question of the meaning of Being superfluous but also sanctions the failure to ask it. It is said: "Being" is the most universal and emptiest concept. As such, it resists every attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and therefore indefin-

able concept require any definition. Everyone constantly uses it and already understands in each case what they mean by it. Thus what, as something concealed, drove ancient philosophizing into unrest and kept it there has become a matter of self-evidence as clear as day—so much so that anyone who still asks about it is accused of a methodological error.

1.3 At the beginning of this investigation, we cannot discuss in detail the prejudices that ever anew sow and nurture the absence of any need to ask about Being. They are rooted in ancient ontology itself. This, in turn, can be adequately interpreted—with respect to the ground from which the basic ontological concepts have grown, the adequacy of the demonstration of the categories, and their completeness—only by following the guiding thread of the previously clarified and answered question of Being. We shall therefore pursue the discussion of these prejudices only far enough to make the necessity of repeating the question of the meaning of Being intelligible. There are three of them:

1.4 1. "Being" is the "most universal" concept: *τὸ ὂν ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων*. *Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit.* "An understanding of Being is always already included in everything one apprehends in beings." But the "universality" of "Being" is not that of a genus. "Being" does not delimit the highest region of beings insofar as they are conceptually articulated according to genus and species: *οὔτε τὸ ὂν γένος*. The "universality" of Being "surpasses" every generic universality. In the terminology of medieval ontology, "Being" is a "transcendens." Aristotle already recognized the unity of this transcendentally "universal," over against the multiplicity of the highest generic concepts with substantive content, as the unity of analogy. With this discovery, despite all his dependence on Plato's ontological way of posing the question, Aristotle placed the problem of Being on a fundamentally new basis. To be sure, even he did not illuminate the darkness of these categorial connections. Medieval ontology discussed this problem in many ways, above all in

the Thomist and Scotist schools, without attaining fundamental clarity. And when, finally, Hegel determines "Being" as the "indeterminate immediate" and makes this determination the basis for all subsequent categorial explications of his "Logic," he maintains the same direction of view as ancient ontology, except that he relinquishes the problem already posed by Aristotle: the unity of Being over against the multiplicity of "categories" with substantive content. Accordingly, when one says that "Being" is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that it is the clearest concept and requires no further discussion. The concept of "Being" is, rather, the darkest.[1]

1.5 2. The concept "Being" is indefinable. This was inferred from its highest universality. And rightly so—if *definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*. In fact, "Being" cannot be conceived as a being; *enti non additur aliqua natura*: "Being" cannot be brought to determinacy by having a being predicated of it. Being cannot, by way of definition, be derived from higher concepts or presented through lower ones. But does it follow from this that "Being" can no longer present a problem? By no means; the only possible conclusion is: "Being" is not anything like a being. Therefore, the mode of determining beings that is legitimate within certain limits—the "definition" of traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology—is not applicable to Being. The indefinability of Being does not exempt us from asking about its meaning; rather, it calls us precisely to do so.[2]

1.6 3. "Being" is the self-evident concept. In all knowing and asserting, in every comportment toward beings, and in every comportment toward oneself, use is made of "Being," and the expression is understood "without further ado." Everyone

1 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* B 4, 1001a21. Heidegger quotes the Greek: "Being is the most universal of all." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I–II, question 94, article 2. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* B 3, 998b22. Heidegger quotes the Greek: "Being is not a genus."

2 Heidegger cites Blaise Pascal, *Pensées et opuscules*, ed. Léon Brunschvicg, 7th ed. (Paris, 1912), p. 169: one cannot define Being without using "is," and therefore using the word being defined inside its own definition.

understands: “The sky is blue”; “I am glad” and the like. Yet this average intelligibility merely demonstrates unintelligibility. It makes manifest that an enigma lies a priori in every comportment and every Being toward beings as beings. That we always already live in an understanding of Being while the meaning of Being is at the same time shrouded in darkness proves the fundamental necessity of repeating the question of the meaning of “Being.”

1.7 Appealing to self-evidence within the sphere of the basic concepts of philosophy, and especially with regard to the concept “Being,” is a dubious procedure, if indeed the “self-evident,” and it alone, “the secret judgments of common reason” (Kant), is to become and remain the explicit theme of the analytic (“the philosophers’ business”).

1.8 The consideration of these prejudices, however, also made clear that not only is the answer to the question of Being lacking, but even the question itself is obscure and without direction. To repeat the question of Being therefore means: first of all, adequately to work out how the question is to be posed.

§ 2. THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE QUESTION OF BEING

2.1 The question of the meaning of Being is to be posed. If it is a fundamental question, or indeed the fundamental question, then questioning of this kind requires an appropriate transparency. We must therefore briefly discuss what belongs to a question as such, so that, on this basis, the question of Being can be brought into view as a privileged question.

2.2 Every questioning is a seeking. Every seeking receives its prior direction from what is sought. Questioning is a cognitive search for beings with respect to the fact that they are and the way they are. This cognitive search can become an “investigation,” a determination that lays bare that toward which the question is directed. Questioning, as questioning about something, has what it asks about. Every questioning about something is, in some way, addressed to something. Besides what is asked about,

questioning also involves something it interrogates. In investigative—that is, specifically theoretical—questioning, what is asked about is to be determined and brought into conceptual form. What is asked about then contains, as what is properly intended, what is asked for—that at which questioning reaches its goal. Questioning itself, as the comportment of a being—the questioner—has its own character of Being. Questioning can be carried out as "casual asking" or as the explicit posing of a question. What is distinctive about the latter is that questioning becomes transparent to itself beforehand with respect to all the constitutive features of the question just mentioned.

2.3 The question of the meaning of Being is to be posed. We are thus faced with the need to discuss the question of Being in relation to the structural moments just cited.

2.4 As a seeking, questioning requires prior guidance from what is sought. The meaning of Being must therefore already be available to us in some way. It has been indicated: we always already move within an understanding of Being. Out of this grow the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency toward a concept of Being. We do not know what "Being" signifies. But even when we ask, "what is 'Being'?" we remain within an understanding of "is," without being able to fix conceptually what "is" means. We do not even know the horizon from which we should grasp and fix the meaning. This average and vague understanding of Being is a fact.

2.5 This understanding of Being may waver and blur to any degree, even moving at the very boundary of mere acquaintance with a word—this indeterminacy of the understanding of Being that is always already available is itself a positive phenomenon that calls for clarification.

2.6 Yet an investigation into the meaning of Being will not seek to provide this clarification at the outset. The interpretation of the average understanding of Being acquires its necessary guiding thread only with a fully developed concept of Being. From the clarity of that concept and from the modes of explicitly understanding it that belong to the concept, it will be possible to

determine what the darkened, or not yet illuminated, understanding of Being means, and what forms of darkening, or of hindrance to an explicit illumination of the meaning of Being, are possible and necessary.

2.7 The average, vague understanding of Being may also be shot through with inherited theories and opinions about Being, in such a way that these theories remain hidden as sources of the prevailing understanding.—What is sought in questioning about Being is not entirely unknown, even though at first it is altogether ungraspable.

2.8 What is asked about in the question to be worked out is Being: that which determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings, however they may be considered, are always already understood. The Being of beings "is" not itself a being. The first philosophical step in understanding the problem of Being consists in not *μῦθόν τινα διηγεῖσθαι*—"telling no story"—i.e., in not determining beings as beings, with regard to their origin, by tracing them back to another being, as though Being had the character of a possible being. Being, as what is asked about, therefore requires a mode of showing proper to it, one that differs essentially from the discovery of beings.[3]

2.9 Accordingly, what is asked for—the meaning of Being—will likewise require a conceptuality of its own, one that again differs essentially from the concepts within which beings become determinate in their meaning. Insofar as Being constitutes what is asked about, and Being means the Being of beings, it follows that beings themselves are what is interrogated by the question of Being. They are, so to speak, interrogated with regard to their Being. But if they are to yield the features of their Being without distortion, they must, in turn, first have become accessible as they are in themselves. With respect to what it interrogates, the question of Being requires the attainment and prior securing of the right mode of access to beings. But we use "being" of many things and in different senses. Everything we speak about,

3 Plato, *Sophist* 242c. The Stranger warns against treating Being as though one were merely "telling a story" about beings and their origins.

everything we have in mind, and everything toward which we comport ourselves in one way or another is a being; we ourselves are also beings, both in what we are and in how we are. Being lies in the fact that a being is and in the way it is, in reality, presence-at-hand, subsistence, validity, Dasein, and in the "there is." From which being is the meaning of Being to be read off? From which being is the disclosure of Being to take its point of departure?

2.10 Is the point of departure arbitrary, or does a particular being have priority in working out the question of Being? Which is this exemplary being, and in what sense does it have priority? If the question of Being is to be posed explicitly and carried out in full transparency to itself, then, in light of what has been explained so far, working out this question requires the explication of the way of looking toward Being, understanding its meaning, and grasping that meaning conceptually; the preparation of the possibility of making the right choice of the exemplary being; and the working out of the genuine mode of access to this being. Looking toward something, understanding and grasping it, choosing it, and gaining access to it are constitutive comportments of questioning and thus are themselves modes of Being of a particular being—the being that each of us, as a questioner, is. Working out the question of Being therefore means: making a being—the one that questions—transparent in its Being. The asking of this question, as a mode of Being of a being, is itself essentially determined by what is asked about in it—by Being. We use the term Dasein for this being, which we ourselves each are and which, among other things, has questioning as a possibility of Being. The explicit and transparent posing of the question of the meaning of Being requires a prior, adequate explication of a being (Dasein) with respect to its Being.

2.11 But is such an undertaking not obviously circular? Having first to determine beings in their Being and then, on that basis, intending only then to pose the question of Being—what is this other than going in a circle? Is not what the answer to this ques-

tion is first supposed to provide already "presupposed" in working out the question? Formal objections, such as the charge of a "circle in the proof," always easy to raise in the domain of inquiry into principles, are invariably sterile when concrete paths of investigation are under consideration. They contribute nothing to understanding the matter and impede advance into the field of investigation.

2.12 In fact, however, the posing of the question just described contains no circle at all. Beings can be determined in their Being without an explicit concept of the meaning of Being already needing to be available. Were this not so, there could as yet be no ontological knowledge, and the actual existence of such knowledge can hardly be denied. "Being" is indeed "presupposed" throughout ontology to date, but not as a concept already available—not in the form in which it is sought. The "presupposing" of Being has the character of looking toward Being in advance, in such a way that, on the basis of this look, the being given in advance is provisionally articulated in its Being. This guiding look toward Being grows out of the average understanding of Being in which we always already move and which ultimately belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself. Such "presupposing" has nothing to do with positing a foundational proposition from which a sequence of propositions is deductively derived. There can be no "circle in the proof" at all in posing the question of the meaning of Being, because answering the question is not a matter of grounding by derivation but of a showing that lays bare the ground.

2.13 There is no "circle in the proof" in the question of the meaning of Being, but there is a peculiar "backward- or forward-relatedness" of what is asked about (Being) to questioning as a mode of Being of a being. The fact that questioning is essentially affected by what it asks about belongs to the most intrinsic meaning of the question of Being. This says only: the being with the character of Dasein has a relation—perhaps even a privileged one—to the question of Being itself. But does this not already establish a particular being in its priority of Being,

thereby giving in advance the exemplary being that is to serve as what the question of Being primarily interrogates? What has been discussed so far neither establishes Dasein's priority nor settles whether it can, or even must, function as the being to be interrogated primarily. Nevertheless, something like a priority of Dasein has announced itself.

§ 3. THE ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF BEING

3.1 The characterization of the question of Being along the guiding thread of the formal structure of the question as such has brought out this question's distinctive character, and has done so in such a way that working it out, let alone solving it, calls for a series of fundamental considerations. But the distinctive status of the question of Being will come fully to light only when it has been adequately delimited with respect to its function, its intention, and its motives.

3.2 So far, the need to repeat the question has been motivated, for one thing, by the venerability of its origin, but above all by the absence of a definite answer, and even by the lack of any adequate formulation of the question. But one may demand to know what purpose this question is meant to serve. Does it remain nothing more than the business of free-floating speculation about the most general generalities—is it, indeed, only that—or is it at once the most fundamental and most concrete question?

3.3 Being is in each case the Being of a being. The totality of beings can, according to its various regions, become a field for laying bare and delimiting determinate domains of subject matter. These domains in turn—for example, history, nature, space, life, Dasein, language, and the like—can be thematized as objects in corresponding scientific investigations. Scientific research singles out and initially fixes these domains of subject matter naïvely and crudely. The elaboration of the domain in its basic structures has, in a certain way, already been accomplished through prescientific experience and interpretation of

the region of Being within which the domain of subject matter itself is delimited. The "basic concepts" that have arisen in this way initially remain the guiding threads for the first concrete disclosure of the domain. Although the main weight of research always lies in this positivity, its genuine progress takes place not so much in gathering results and preserving them in "handbooks" as in questioning the fundamental constitutions of the domain in question—a questioning usually prompted, reactively, by a growing knowledge of the matters.

3.4 The genuine "movement" of the sciences takes place in a revision of their basic concepts that is more or less radical and more or less self-transparent. The level of a science is determined by the extent to which it is capable of undergoing a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises within the sciences, the relation of positive investigative questioning to the matters themselves that it questions begins to waver. Everywhere today, tendencies have emerged in the various disciplines to place research on new foundations.

3.5 Mathematics, seemingly the most rigorous and most firmly structured science, has entered a "crisis of foundations." The struggle between formalism and intuitionism concerns gaining and securing the primary mode of access to what is to be the object of this science. The theory of relativity in physics grows out of the tendency to bring out the intrinsic interconnection of nature itself as it exists "in itself." As a theory of the conditions of access to nature itself, it seeks, by determining all relativities, to preserve the invariance of the laws of motion and thereby brings itself face to face with the question of the structure of the domain of subject matter given to it, with the problem of matter. In biology, a tendency is awakening to question back behind the determinations of organism and life supplied by mechanism and vitalism, and to determine anew the way of Being of living beings as such. In the historical human sciences, the drive to penetrate through what has been handed down, its presentation, and its transmission to historical actuality itself has intensified: literary history is to become a history of problems. Theo-

logy seeks a more primordial interpretation of the human being's Being toward God, an interpretation prefigured by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within faith. It is slowly beginning once again to understand Luther's insight that its dogmatic systematics rests on a "foundation" that did not grow out of a questioning that is primarily one of faith, and whose conceptuality not only fails to suffice for the theological problematic but conceals and distorts it.

3.6 Basic concepts are the determinations in which the domain of subject matter underlying all the thematic objects of a science comes to be understood in advance in a way that guides all positive investigation. Accordingly, these concepts receive their genuine demonstration and "grounding" only in a correspondingly prior thorough investigation of the domain itself. But insofar as each of these domains is drawn from a realm of beings themselves, such prior research that creates basic concepts is nothing other than an interpretation of these beings in terms of the fundamental constitution of their Being. Such research must run ahead of the positive sciences; and it can. The work of Plato and Aristotle is proof of this. Such a grounding of the sciences differs in principle from the "logic" that limps behind, examining a contingent state of a science with respect to its "method." It is productive logic in the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into a determinate domain of Being, first discloses it in its constitution of Being, and makes the structures gained available to the positive sciences as transparent directives for questioning. Thus, for example, what is philosophically primary is not a theory of concept formation in historiography, nor a theory of historical knowledge, nor yet a theory of history as the object of historiography, but the interpretation of genuinely historical beings in terms of their historicality. So too, the positive yield of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason lies in its initial approach to working out what belongs to nature in general, not in a "theory" of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an a priori subject-matter logic of nature as a domain of Being.

3.7 But such questioning—ontology taken in the broadest sense and without reliance on ontological orientations and tendencies—itself still requires a guiding thread. Ontological questioning is indeed more primordial than the ontic questioning of the positive sciences. Yet even it remains naïve and opaque if its investigations into the Being of beings leave the meaning of Being in general unexamined. And precisely the ontological task of a genealogy of the various possible ways of Being—a genealogy that does not construct deductively—requires a preliminary clarification of "what, then, we actually mean by this expression 'Being'."

3.8 The question of Being therefore aims not only at an a priori condition for the possibility of the sciences that thoroughly investigate beings as beings of this or that kind and in doing so always already move within an understanding of Being, but also at the condition for the possibility of the ontologies themselves that precede the ontic sciences and ground them. Any ontology, however rich and tightly interlocked the system of categories at its disposal may be, remains fundamentally blind and a distortion of its very own intention unless it has first adequately clarified the meaning of Being and grasped this clarification as its fundamental task.

3.9 Ontological research itself, properly understood, gives the question of Being its ontological priority, a priority extending beyond the mere revival of a venerable tradition and the advancement of a problem that has so far remained opaque. But this scientific priority, grounded in the subject matter itself, is not the only one.

§ 4. THE ONTIC PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF BEING

4.1 Science in general can be defined as the whole constituted by a nexus of grounding relations among true propositions. This definition is not complete, nor does it capture science in its meaning. As modes of human comportment, sciences have the way of Being of this being (the human being). We refer to this

being terminologically as Dasein. Scientific research is neither the only nor the most immediate possible way of Being of this being. Moreover, Dasein itself is marked out ahead of other beings. This distinction must provisionally be brought to light. In doing so, the discussion must anticipate the analyses that follow and that alone will provide the genuine demonstration.

4.2 Dasein is a being that does not merely occur among other beings. Rather, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its Being, its own Being is at issue for it. It then belongs to this constitution of Dasein's Being that, in its Being, it has a relation of Being to this Being. And this in turn means: Dasein understands itself in its Being in some way and with some degree of explicitness. It is characteristic of this being that, with and through its Being, that Being is disclosed to the being itself. Understanding of Being is itself a determination of Dasein's Being. Dasein's ontic distinction lies in the fact that it is ontological.

4.3 Being ontological does not yet mean here: developing ontology. If, therefore, we reserve the title ontology for explicit theoretical questioning about the meaning of beings, then Dasein's being ontological in the sense meant here must be called preontological. But this does not mean anything like simply being ontic, but rather being in the way of an understanding of Being.

4.4 The Being itself toward which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and toward which it always somehow comports itself, we call existence. And because the essence of this being cannot be determined by specifying a what with substantive content, but instead lies in the fact that it has in each case to be its Being as its own, the term Dasein was chosen as a pure expression of Being to designate this being.

4.5 Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence, a possibility of itself: to be itself or not to be itself. These possibilities have either been chosen by Dasein itself, or Dasein has drifted into them, or it has always already grown up within them. Existence is decided only by each Dasein itself, in the manner of taking it up or failing to do so. The question of existence can only ever be resolved through existing itself. The self-under-

standing that guides this we call existentiell. The question of existence is an ontic "matter" for Dasein. This does not require the ontological structure of existence to be theoretically transparent. The question concerning this structure aims to lay out what constitutes existence. We call the interconnection of these structures existentiality. Its analytic has the character not of an existentiell understanding, but of an existential one.

4.6 As regards its possibility and necessity, the task of an existential analytic of Dasein is prefigured in Dasein's ontic constitution. But insofar as existence determines Dasein, the ontological analytic of this being always already requires a prior look toward existentiality. We understand existentiality, however, as the constitution of Being of the being that exists. But the idea of Being already lies within the idea of such a constitution of Being. Thus the possibility of carrying out the analytic of Dasein also depends on the prior elaboration of the question of the meaning of Being in general.

4.7 Sciences are ways of Being of Dasein in which it also comports itself toward beings that it need not itself be. Yet the following belongs essentially to Dasein: Being in a world. The understanding of Being that belongs to Dasein therefore concerns, with equal primordiality, both the understanding of something like "world" and the understanding of the Being of beings that become accessible within the world. The ontologies that take as their theme beings whose character of Being is not that of Dasein are accordingly grounded and motivated in Dasein's own ontic structure, which encompasses within itself the determinacy of a pre-ontological understanding of Being.

4.8 Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all the others can arise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein.

4.9 Dasein accordingly has priority over all other beings in several respects. The first priority is ontic: this being is determined in its Being by existence. The second priority is ontological: on the basis of its determination by existence, Dasein is "ontological" in itself. But with equal primordiality—as a constituent of

its understanding of existence—the following also belongs to Dasein: an understanding of the Being of all beings whose way of Being is not that of Dasein. Dasein therefore has the third priority, as the ontic-ontological condition for the possibility of all ontologies. Dasein has thus proved to be the being that, ahead of all other beings, must be interrogated first in ontological terms.

4.10 The existential analytic, for its part, ultimately has existentiell—that is, ontic—roots. Only when philosophically investigative questioning is itself taken up in an existentiell manner as a possibility of Being of Dasein as it exists in each case does the possibility exist of disclosing the existentiality of existence, and with it the possibility of undertaking an adequately grounded ontological problematic at all. With this, however, the ontic priority of the question of Being has also become clear.

4.11 The ontic-ontological priority of Dasein was recognized early on, without Dasein itself thereby being grasped in its genuine ontological structure or even being posed as a problem with that aim. Aristotle says: *ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστιν*. The soul (of the human being) is, in a certain way, all beings; the "soul," which constitutes the Being of the human being, discovers, in its ways of being, *αἴσθησις* and *νόησις*, all beings with respect to the fact that they are and the way they are, that is, always also in their Being. This proposition, which points back to the ontological thesis of Parmenides, was taken up by Thomas Aquinas in a characteristic discussion. Within the task of deriving the "transcendentals," that is, the characters of Being that extend beyond every possible determination of a being in terms of substantive content and genus, beyond every *modus specialis entis*, and that necessarily pertain to every something, whatever it may be, the verum too is to be demonstrated as such a transcendens. This is done by appealing to a being that, by virtue of its way of Being, itself has the capacity to "come together" with any being whatsoever. This distinguished being, the *ens, quod natum est convenire cum omni ente*, is the soul (anima). The priority of "Dasein" over all other beings that emerges here, though not ontologic-

ally clarified, plainly has nothing in common with a bad subjectivization of the totality of beings. –[4]

4.12 The demonstration of the ontic-ontological distinctive status of the question of Being is grounded in the preliminary indication of Dasein's ontic-ontological priority. But the analysis of the structure of the question of Being as such (§ 2) encountered a distinctive function of this being within the very posing of the question. Here Dasein revealed itself as the being that must first be adequately elaborated ontologically if the questioning is to become transparent. But it has now been shown that the ontological analytic of Dasein constitutes fundamental ontology as such, and hence that Dasein functions as the being that must, in principle, be questioned in advance about its Being.

4.13 If the interpretation of the meaning of Being becomes the task, Dasein is not only the primary being to be questioned; it is moreover the being that always already, in its Being, comports itself toward what is asked about in this question. The question of Being is then nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency of Being belonging to Dasein itself, the preontological understanding of Being.

4 Aristotle, *De Anima* III.8, 431b21; compare III.5, 430a14ff. Heidegger quotes the Greek: "The soul is, in a certain way, all beings." Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones de veritate*, question 1, article 1c; compare the more rigorous and divergent derivation of the transcendentals in *De natura generis*.

Introduction, Chapter Two: The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being

Einleitung. Zweites Kapitel: Die Doppelaufgabe in der Ausarbeitung der Seinsfrage. Die Methode der Untersuchung und ihr Aufriß
§§5–8

§ 5. THE ONTOLOGICAL ANALYTIC OF DASEIN AS LAYING BARE THE HORIZON FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF BEING IN GENERAL

5.1 In characterizing the tasks involved in the "posing" of the question of Being, it was shown that what is required is not only a fixing of the being that is to function as what is primarily interrogated, but also an explicit appropriation and securing of the right mode of access to this being. Which being assumes the privileged role within the question of Being has been discussed. But how is this being, Dasein, to be made accessible and, in an interpretation that understands, as it were, brought into view?

5.2 The ontic-ontological priority demonstrated for Dasein could tempt one to suppose that this being must also be what is primarily given, both ontically and ontologically, not only in the sense of an "immediate" graspability of the being itself, but also with respect to an equally "immediate" prior givenness of its way of Being. To be sure, Dasein is ontically not merely near but even the nearest—indeed, we ourselves are it in each case. Even so—or precisely for that reason—it is ontologically the most distant. To be sure, it belongs to its ownmost Being to have an

understanding of that Being and always already to maintain itself within a certain interpretedness of its Being. But this by no means says that this nearest pre-ontological interpretation of its own Being could be adopted as an appropriate guiding thread, as though this understanding of Being had to arise from a thematically ontological reflection on its ownmost constitution of Being. Rather, in keeping with a way of Being that belongs to it, Dasein tends to understand its own Being from the being to which it essentially relates constantly and in the first instance—from the "world." In Dasein itself, and thus in its own understanding of Being, lies what we will show to be the ontological back-reflection of the understanding of world upon the interpretation of Dasein.

5.3 Thus Dasein's ontic-ontological priority is the reason why its specific constitution of Being—understood in the sense of the "categorial" structure belonging to it—remains concealed from Dasein. Ontically, Dasein is "nearest" to itself; ontologically, it is most distant from itself; yet pre-ontologically, it is not foreign to itself after all.

5.4 For now, this indicates only that an interpretation of this being faces peculiar difficulties, which are grounded in the way of Being of the thematic object and of the thematizing comportment themselves, and not, say, in an inadequate endowment of our faculty of cognition or in a lack of an adequate conceptual apparatus that is apparently easy to remedy.

5.5 Yet because an understanding of Being not only belongs to Dasein but also takes shape or disintegrates along with Dasein's own way of Being in each case, Dasein can possess a rich interpretedness. Philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, "politics," poetry, biography, and historiography have pursued Dasein's comportments, capacities, powers, possibilities, and fortunes, each along different paths and to varying extents. The question remains, however, whether these interpretations were as primordial in their existential execution as they may have been primordial in existentiell terms. The two need not necessarily go together, but neither do they exclude each other. Exist-

entiell interpretation can call for an existential analytic, if indeed philosophical cognition is grasped in its possibility and necessity. Only when Dasein's basic structures have been adequately worked out with explicit orientation toward the problem of Being itself will what has so far been gained in the interpretation of Dasein receive its existential justification.

5.6 An analytic of Dasein must therefore remain the first concern in the question of Being. But then the problem of gaining and securing the guiding mode of access to Dasein becomes all the more pressing. Put negatively: no arbitrary idea of Being and actuality, however "self-evident" it may be, may be brought to bear upon this being in a constructive-dogmatic manner; nor may any "categories" prefigured by such an idea be imposed ontologically upon Dasein without scrutiny. Rather, the mode of access and interpretation must be chosen in such a way that this being can show itself in itself and from itself. Specifically, this mode is to show the being in the way it is in the first instance and for the most part, in its average everydayness. In this everydayness, not arbitrary and accidental structures but essential ones are to be brought out, structures that persist as determinative of Being in every way of Being of factical Dasein. The preparatory bringing-out of the Being of this being then emerges from a look toward the basic constitution of Dasein's everydayness.

5.7 The analytic of Dasein, conceived in this way, remains wholly oriented toward the guiding task of working out the question of Being. Its limits are determined by this. It cannot aim to provide a complete ontology of Dasein, though such an ontology must of course be developed if anything like a "philosophical" anthropology is to stand on a philosophically adequate basis. With a possible anthropology, or rather its ontological grounding, as its aim, the interpretation that follows offers only some, though not inessential, "pieces." But the analysis of Dasein is not only incomplete; to begin with, it is also provisional. At first it merely brings out the Being of this being without interpreting its meaning. Rather, it is meant to prepare the laying bare of the horizon for the most primordial interpret-

ation of Being. Once this horizon has been gained, the preparatory analytic of Dasein calls for its repetition on the higher and proper ontological basis.

5.8 The meaning of the Being of the being we call Dasein will be shown to be temporality. This demonstration must prove itself in the repeated interpretation of the provisionally indicated structures of Dasein as modes of temporality. But with this interpretation of Dasein as temporality, the answer to the guiding question—the question that asks about the meaning of Being in general—is not thereby already given. The ground for gaining this answer has, however, been prepared.

5.9 By way of indication, it was shown: a pre-ontological Being belongs to Dasein as an ontic constitution. Dasein is such that, in being, it understands something like Being. Holding fast to this connection, it is to be shown that the point from which Dasein inexplicitly understands and interprets anything like Being at all is time. Time must be brought to light and genuinely grasped as the horizon of all understanding of Being and every interpretation of Being. To make this intelligible requires a primordial explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of Being, starting from temporality as the Being of Dasein that understands Being. This task as a whole also entails the demand to distinguish the concept of time thus gained from the vulgar understanding of time, which has become explicit in an interpretation of time of the kind that has crystallized in the traditional concept of time—a concept that has persisted from Aristotle through and beyond Bergson. In doing so, it must be made clear both that and how this concept of time and the vulgar understanding of time as such arise from temporality. The vulgar concept of time is thereby restored to its own independent legitimacy—contrary to Bergson's thesis that the time meant by this concept is space.

5.10 "Time" has long functioned as an ontological—or rather, ontic—criterion for the naive differentiation of the various regions of beings. One sets "temporal" beings (the processes of nature and the events of history) apart from "non-temporal"

beings (spatial and numerical relations). It is customary to distinguish the "timeless" meaning of propositions from the "temporal" course of propositional assertions. Furthermore, one finds a "chasm" between "temporal" beings and the "supratemporal" eternal and attempts to bridge it. Here "temporal" in each case means as much as being "in time," a determination that, to be sure, is still obscure enough. The fact remains: time, in the sense of "being in time," functions as a criterion for separating regions of Being. How time comes to have this distinctive ontological function, and indeed by what right precisely something like time functions as such a criterion, and, finally, whether its genuine potential ontological relevance comes to expression in this naively ontological use of time—none of this has so far been either asked or investigated. "Time"—specifically within the horizon of the vulgar understanding of time—has, as it were, "of itself" fallen into this "self-evident" ontological function and has maintained itself in it to this day.

5.11 By contrast, on the ground of the worked-out question of the meaning of Being, it must be shown both that and how the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, rightly seen and rightly explicated.

5.12 If Being is to be grasped from time and the various modes and derivatives of Being, in their modifications and derivations, do in fact become intelligible from a look toward time, then Being itself—not, say, merely beings as beings "in time"—is thereby made visible in its "temporal" character. But "temporal" can then no longer mean merely "being in time." What is "nontemporal," as well as what is "supratemporal," is also "temporal" with respect to its Being. This in turn is so not merely in the manner of a privation over against something "temporal" as a being "in time," but in a positive sense, one that admittedly still has to be clarified. Because the expression "temporal" is already taken, in the meaning just cited, by prephilosophical and philosophical usage, and because the expression will also be claimed for a different meaning in the investigations that follow, we call the primordial meaning-determinacy of Being and of its charac-

teristics and modes from time its Temporal determinacy. The fundamental ontological task of interpreting Being as such therefore includes within itself the working out of the Temporality of Being. It is only in the exposition of the problematic of Temporality that the concrete answer to the question of the meaning of Being is given.

5.13 Because Being can only ever be grasped from a look toward time, the answer to the question of Being cannot lie in an isolated and blind proposition. The answer is not grasped by repeating what it says propositionally, especially when it is passed on as a free-floating result for merely taking note of a "standpoint" that may differ from the way the matter has been treated so far. Whether the answer is "new" is of no consequence and remains an external matter. What is positive about it must lie in its being old enough to learn to grasp the possibilities prepared by "those of old." In accordance with its ownmost meaning, the answer gives an instruction for concrete ontological research to begin its investigative questioning within the horizon that has been laid bare—and it gives only that.

5.14 If, in this way, the answer to the question of Being becomes an instruction furnishing a guiding thread for research, then this means that it is adequately given only when the specific way of Being of ontology hitherto, together with the fortunes of its questioning, finding, and failing, comes to be seen from the answer itself as something necessary in accordance with Dasein.

§ 6. THE TASK OF A DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY

6.1 All research—and not least research moving within the sphere of the central question of Being—is an ontic possibility of Dasein. Its Being finds its meaning in temporality. Yet temporality is at the same time the condition of the possibility of historicality as a temporal way of Being of Dasein itself, quite apart from whether and how it is a being "in time." The determination

of historicality is prior to what one calls history (world-historical happening). Historicality means the constitution of Being of Dasein's "happening" as such, on the ground of which alone such things as "world-history" and historical belonging to world-history first become possible. In its factical Being, Dasein is in each case how and "what" it already was. Whether explicitly or not, it is its past. And not merely in such a way that its past, as it were, trails along "behind" it and it possesses what is past as a property still present-at-hand, which at times continues to exert an effect within it. Dasein "is" its past in the manner of its Being, which, roughly speaking, in each case "happens" from out of its future. Dasein, in its particular way of being and thus also with the understanding of Being belonging to it, has grown up into a handed-down interpretation of Dasein and within it. From this interpretation it understands itself in the first instance and, within a certain range, does so constantly. This understanding discloses the possibilities of its Being and regulates them. Its own past—and that always means the past of its "generation"—does not follow after Dasein but has in each case already gone ahead of it.

6.2 This elementary historicality of Dasein can remain hidden from Dasein itself. But it can also be discovered in a certain way and cultivated in its own right. Dasein can discover tradition, preserve it, and explicitly follow it up. The discovery of tradition and the disclosure of what it "hands down" and how it hands it down can be taken up as a task in its own right. Dasein thereby brings itself into the way of Being of historiographic questioning and research. But historiography—more precisely, historiographicity—is possible as a way of Being of questioning Dasein only because Dasein is determined in the ground of its Being by historicality. If this remains hidden from Dasein, and for as long as it does, Dasein is also denied the possibility of historiographic questioning and of discovering history. The absence of historiography is no proof against Dasein's historicality but, as a deficient mode of this constitution of Being, is proof of it. An age can be non-historiographic only because it is "historical."

6.3 On the other hand, if Dasein has seized the possibility inherent in it not only of making its existence transparent to itself, but of asking after the meaning of existentiality itself—that is, prior to this, after the meaning of Being as such—and if, in such questioning, a view of Dasein's essential historicality has opened up, then the following insight is unavoidable: questioning about Being, which was indicated with respect to its ontic-ontological necessity, is itself characterized by historicality. The working out of the question of Being must therefore, from the ownmost meaning of Being of questioning itself insofar as it is historical, hear the directive to ask after its own history, that is, to become historiographic, in order, through a positive appropriation of the past, to bring itself into full possession of its ownmost possibilities of questioning. In accordance with the mode of enactment belonging to it—that is, as a prior explication of Dasein in its temporality and historicality—the question of the meaning of Being is brought by itself to understand itself as a historiographic question.

6.4 Yet the preparatory interpretation of Dasein's fundamental structures with regard to its nearest and average way of Being, in which it is consequently also historical in the first instance, will make the following manifest: Dasein not only has an inclination to fall prey to its world, in which it is, and to interpret itself reflectively back out of that world; together with this, Dasein also falls prey to its tradition, grasped more or less explicitly. This tradition takes Dasein's own guidance, questioning, and choosing out of its hands. This applies not least to the understanding rooted in Dasein's ownmost Being—the ontological understanding—and to its capacity for development.

6.5 The tradition that thereby comes to dominate, in the first instance and for the most part, makes what it "hands down" so inaccessible that it instead conceals it. It consigns what has been handed down to taken-for-grantedness and blocks access to the primordial "sources" from which the transmitted categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. Tradition even causes such an origin to be forgotten altogether. It cultivates a

lack of need even to understand the necessity of such a return. Tradition uproots Dasein's historicality to such a degree that Dasein now moves only within an interest in the manifold array of possible types, currents, and standpoints of philosophizing in the most remote and alien cultures, and seeks through this interest to conceal its own groundlessness. The consequence will be that, for all its historiographic interest and all its zeal for a philologically "objective" interpretation, Dasein no longer understands the most elementary conditions that alone make possible a positive return to the past in the sense of productively appropriating it.

6.6 At the outset (§ 1), it was shown that the question of the meaning of Being has not only remained unresolved, has not only failed to be posed adequately, but, despite all interest in "metaphysics," has fallen into oblivion. Greek ontology, together with its history—a history that, through manifold filiations and distortions, still determines philosophy's conceptuality today—is proof that Dasein understands itself and Being as such in terms of the "world," and that the ontology which has thus grown up falls prey to tradition, which lets it sink into taken-for-grantedness and into mere material to be worked over anew (as it is for Hegel). This uprooted Greek ontology becomes a fixed body of doctrine in the Middle Ages. Its systematic structure is anything but a joining together of inherited pieces into an edifice. Within the limits of a dogmatic adoption of the Greek basic conceptions of Being, this systematic structure still contains much work that leads farther and remains to be unearthed. In its scholastic form, Greek ontology passes essentially by way of Suarez's Disputationes metaphysicae into the "metaphysics" and transcendental philosophy of the modern age, and still determines the foundations and aims of Hegel's "Logic." Insofar as certain privileged regions of Being come into view in the course of this history and henceforth primarily guide the problematic (Descartes' ego cogito, subject, I, reason, spirit, person), they remain, in keeping with the pervasive neglect of the question of Being, uninterrogated as to Being and the structure of their

Being. Instead, the categorial stock of traditional ontology is transferred to this being with corresponding formalizations and merely negative restrictions, or else dialectic is called on for help with the aim of an ontological interpretation of the substantiality of the subject.

6.7 If the question of Being itself is to gain transparency with respect to its own history, the hardened tradition must be loosened and the concealments it has produced stripped away. We understand this task as the destruction of the transmitted stock of ancient ontology, carried out along the guiding thread of the question of Being and leading back to the primordial experiences in which the first and thereafter guiding determinations of Being were gained.

6.8 This demonstration of the provenance of the basic ontological concepts—the investigative issuing of a "birth certificate" for them—has nothing to do with a bad relativization of ontological standpoints. Nor does the destruction have the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. On the contrary, it is to mark out this tradition in its positive possibilities—and that always means in its limits—limits that are factically given with the particular posing of the question and with the delimitation of the possible field of investigation mapped out in advance by that question. The destruction does not take a negating stance toward the past; its critique strikes "today" and the prevailing way of treating the history of ontology, whether framed doxographically, as intellectual history, or as a history of problems. Yet the destruction does not seek to bury the past in nullity; it has a positive intention; its negative function remains inexplicit and indirect.

6.9 Within the present treatise, whose aim is a fundamental working out of the question of Being, the destruction of the history of ontology—which belongs essentially to the posing of the question and is possible only within it—can be carried out only at fundamentally decisive stations in that history.

6.10 In keeping with the positive tendency of the destruction, one must ask in the first instance whether and to what extent, in

the course of the history of ontology, the interpretation of Being was ever brought together thematically with the phenomenon of time, and whether the problematic of Temporality necessary for this was worked out in principle and could have been worked out. The first and only one who traveled some distance along a path of investigation toward the dimension of Temporality—or rather, who let the force of the phenomena themselves drive him in that direction—is Kant. Once the problematic of Temporality has been established, it may be possible to bring light into the darkness of the doctrine of schematism. Along this path, however, it can then also be shown why this domain, in its proper dimensions and its central ontological function, had to remain closed to Kant. Kant himself knew that he was venturing into a dark domain: "This schematism of our understanding, as regards appearances and their mere form, is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose true procedures we shall scarcely ever divine from nature and lay before our eyes without concealment." What Kant here, as it were, recoils from must be brought to light thematically and fundamentally if the expression "Being" is indeed to have a demonstrable meaning. In the end, the very phenomena brought out in the following analysis under the title "Temporality" are the most secret judgments of "common reason," whose analytic Kant determines to be the "business of philosophers."

6.11 In pursuing the task of the destruction along the guiding thread of the problematic of Temporality, the following treatise attempts to interpret the chapter on schematism and, from there, Kant's doctrine of time. At the same time, it is shown why insight into the problematic of Temporality had to remain denied to Kant. Two things prevented this insight: first, the neglect of the question of Being altogether and, in connection with it, the lack of a thematic ontology of Dasein—in Kantian terms, a prior ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject. Instead, despite all essential further developments, Kant dogmatically adopts Descartes' position. Second, however, despite taking this phenomenon back into the subject, his analysis of

time remains oriented by the inherited vulgar understanding of time, and this ultimately prevents Kant from working out the phenomenon of a "transcendental time-determination" in its own structure and function. As a result of this twofold aftereffect of tradition, the decisive connection between time and the "I think" remains shrouded in complete darkness; it does not even become a problem.

6.12 By taking over Descartes' ontological position, Kant shares in an essential neglect: that of an ontology of Dasein. In terms of Descartes' ownmost tendency, this neglect is decisive. With "cogito sum," Descartes claims to furnish philosophy with a new and secure ground. But what he leaves undetermined in this "radical" beginning is the way of Being of res cogitans, more precisely the meaning of Being of the "sum." The stay at the second station on the path of the destructive return into the history of ontology is devoted to working out the inexplicit ontological foundations of "cogito sum." The interpretation not only proves that Descartes had to neglect the question of Being altogether; it also shows why, on the strength of the absolute "being-certain" of the cogito, he came to believe himself exempt from the question of the meaning of this being's Being.

6.13 For Descartes, however, matters do not stop with this neglect alone and thus with the complete ontological indeterminacy of res cogitans sive mens sive animus. Descartes carries out the fundamental reflections of his "Meditationes" by transferring medieval ontology onto this being, which he posits as fundamentum inconcussum. The res cogitans is ontologically determined as ens, and for medieval ontology the meaning of Being of ens is fixed in the understanding of ens as ens creatum. God as ens infinitum is the ens increatum. Createdness, however, in the broadest sense of something's having-been-produced, is an essential structural moment of the ancient concept of Being. The apparent new-beginning of philosophizing reveals itself as the planting of a fateful prejudice, on the ground of which the ensuing age neglected a thematic ontological analytic of the "mind" along the guiding thread of the question of Being

and at the same time as a critical confrontation with inherited ancient ontology.

6.14 Any expert on the Middle Ages sees that Descartes is "dependent" on medieval scholasticism and uses its terminology. But philosophically nothing is gained by this "discovery" for as long as it remains obscure what fundamental import the way medieval ontology works its way into the ontological determination—or non-determination—of res cogitans has for the ensuing period. This import can be assessed only once the meaning and limits of ancient ontology have first been shown on the basis of an orientation toward the question of Being. In other words, the destruction finds itself faced with the task of interpreting the ground of ancient ontology in the light of the problematic of Temporality. In this, it becomes manifest that the ancient interpretation of the Being of beings is oriented toward the "world" or "nature" in the broadest sense, and that it in fact gains its understanding of Being from "time." The external evidence for this—but admittedly only that—is the determination of the meaning of Being as παρουσία, or οὐσία, which in ontological-temporal terms means "presence." A being is grasped in its Being as "presence"; that is, it is understood with regard to a particular mode of time, the "present."

6.15 The problematic of Greek ontology, like that of every ontology, must take its guiding thread from Dasein itself. Dasein—that is, the Being of the human being—is circumscribed in the vulgar as well as the philosophical "definition" as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, the living creature whose Being is essentially determined by the capacity to speak. The λέγειν (cf. § 7, B) is the guiding thread for gaining the structures of Being of the being encountered in speaking to it and speaking about it. Therefore ancient ontology, as it takes shape in Plato, becomes "dialectic." As the ontological guiding thread itself is progressively worked out—that is, the "hermeneutics" of λόγος—the possibility of a more radical formulation of the problem of Being grows. "Dialectic," which was a genuine philosophical predicament, becomes superfluous. Therefore Aristotle "no longer had any

understanding" for it, because he set it on a more radical ground and thereby did away with it. The λέγειν itself, or the νοεῖν—the simple apprehension of something present-at-hand in its pure presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken as the leading-string for the interpretation of Being—has the temporal structure of the pure "making-present" of something. The being that shows itself in and for this apprehension, and that is understood as the being in the proper sense, accordingly receives its interpretation with regard to—the present; that is, it is conceived as presence (οὐσία).

6.16 Yet this Greek interpretation of Being is carried out without any explicit knowledge of the guiding thread functioning in it, without knowledge or even understanding of the fundamental ontological function of time, without insight into the ground of the possibility of this function. On the contrary, time itself is taken as one being among other beings, and an attempt is made to grasp time itself in its structure of Being from the horizon of the understanding of Being that is inexplicitly and naively oriented toward it.

6.17 Within the following fundamental working out of the question of Being, the detailed temporal interpretation of the foundations of ancient ontology—above all of its highest and purest scientific stage in Aristotle—cannot be presented. Instead, this working out offers an interpretation of Aristotle's treatise on time, which can be chosen as the discrimen for the basis and limits of the ancient science of Being.

6.18 Aristotle's treatise on time is the first fully executed interpretation of this phenomenon to have been handed down to us. It has essentially determined every subsequent conception of time—including Bergson's. At the same time, analysis of the Aristotelian concept of time makes it clear in retrospect that Kant's conception of time moves within the structures brought out by Aristotle, which means that Kant's basic ontological orientation—for all the differences of a new mode of questioning—remains the Greek one.

6.19 Only in carrying out the destruction of the ontological tradition does the question of Being gain its genuine concretion. In this destruction it secures for itself full proof of the inescapability of the question of the meaning of Being and thus demonstrates the meaning of speaking of a "repetition" of this question.

6.20 Every investigation in this field, where "the matter itself is deeply shrouded," will guard against overestimating its results. For questioning of this kind constantly compels itself to face the possibility of disclosing a still more primordial and more universal horizon from which the answer to the question: what does "Being" mean? could be drawn. Such possibilities can be discussed seriously and with positive gain only if the question of Being is first reawakened at all and a field for critically assessable confrontations has been secured.

§ 7. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD OF THE INVESTIGATION

7.1 With the preliminary characterization of the investigation's thematic object (the Being of beings, or the meaning of Being in general), its method too seems already to be prefigured. Distinguishing Being from beings and explicating Being itself is the task of ontology. And the method of ontology remains questionable in the highest degree as long as one seeks counsel, for example, from historically handed-down ontologies or attempts of that kind. Since the term ontology is used for this investigation in a formally broad sense, the path of clarifying its method by tracing its history rules itself out of its own accord.

7.2 Using the term ontology does not endorse any particular philosophical discipline that would stand in connection with the others. The aim is not at all to fulfill the task of a discipline given in advance; on the contrary, if anything, a discipline may take shape from the substantive necessities of determinate questions and from the mode of treatment demanded by the "things themselves."

7.3 With the guiding question about the meaning of Being, the investigation stands at the fundamental question of philosophy as such. The mode of treating this question is phenomenological. This treatise thereby commits itself neither to a "standpoint" nor to a "school of thought," because phenomenology is neither and can never become either as long as it understands itself. The expression "phenomenology" signifies primarily a concept of method. It characterizes not the substantive What of the objects of philosophical research, but the How of these. The more genuinely a concept of method is operative, and the more comprehensively it determines the fundamental course of a science, the more primordially it is rooted in confrontation with the things themselves, and the farther it is from what we call a technical maneuver, of which there are many even in the theoretical disciplines.

7.4 The title "phenomenology" expresses a maxim that can be formulated as follows: "to the things themselves!"—against all free-floating constructions and accidental discoveries, against adopting concepts that are only seemingly verified, against the seeming questions that often spread themselves out as "problems" through generations. Yet this maxim—one might object—is quite self-evident and, moreover, expresses the principle of every scientific cognition. One cannot see why this self-evidence should expressly be incorporated into the title of a research undertaking. What is at issue is indeed a "self-evidence" that we want to bring nearer to ourselves, insofar as this matters for shedding light on the procedure of this treatise. We set out only the preliminary concept of phenomenology.

7.5 The expression has two constituent parts: phenomenon and logos; both go back to Greek terms: φαινόμενον and λόγος. Considered externally, the title phenomenology is formed on the same pattern as theology, biology, and sociology, names that are translated as: science of God, of life, of community. Phenomenology would accordingly be the science of phenomena. The preliminary concept of phenomenology is to be brought out by characterizing what is meant by the two parts of the title,

"phenomenon" and "logos," and by fixing the meaning of the name composed from them. The history of the word itself, which presumably arose in Wolff's school, is of no importance here.

7.6 A. The Concept of the Phenomenon

7.7 The Greek expression φαινόμενον, to which the term "phenomenon" goes back, is derived from the verb φαίνεσθαι, which means: to show itself; φαινόμενον therefore says: what shows itself, what is self-showing, the manifest. φαίνεσθαι itself is a middle-voice formation of φαίνω, to bring into daylight, to place in brightness; φαίνω belongs to the stem φα-, like φῶς, light, brightness, i.e., that within which something can become manifest, visible in itself. We must therefore retain as the meaning of the expression "phenomenon": what shows itself in itself, the manifest. The φαινόμενα, "phenomena," are then the totality of what lies in daylight or can be brought to light, which the Greeks sometimes simply identified with τὰ ὄντα (beings). A being can now show itself from itself in different ways, depending on the mode of access to it. It is even possible for a being to show itself as what it is not in itself. In this self-showing, the being "looks" "as though it were

7.8 ...". We call such self-showing semblance. And so in Greek too the expression φαινόμενον, phenomenon, means what looks like something, the "ostensible," "semblance"; φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν means a good that looks like one—but "in actuality" is not what it gives itself out to be. For the further understanding of the concept of phenomenon, everything depends on seeing how the things named in the two meanings of φαινόμενον ("phenomenon" as what shows itself and "phenomenon" as semblance) are structurally related to one another. Only insofar as something, by its very meaning, lays claim to showing itself, i.e., to being a phenomenon, can it show itself as something it is not, can it "merely look as though it were ..." In the meaning φαινόμενον ("semblance"), the primordial meaning (phenomenon: the manifest) is already included along with it as founding the second. We terminologically reserve the designa-

tion "phenomenon" for the positive and primordial meaning of φαινόμενον, and distinguish phenomenon from semblance as the privative modification of phenomenon. But what the two terms express has in the first instance absolutely nothing to do with what is called "appearance" or even "mere appearance."

7.9 Thus one speaks of "appearances of illness." What is meant are bodily occurrences that show themselves and, in showing themselves as what thus shows itself, "indicate" something that does not itself show itself. The occurrence of such occurrences, their self-showing, goes together with the presence of disturbances that do not themselves show themselves. Appearance as appearance "of something" therefore says precisely not: showing itself, but the announcing-itself, by way of something that does show itself, of something that does not show itself. Appearing is a not-showing-itself. This "not," however, must in no way be conflated with the privative not that determines the structure of semblance. What does not show itself in the manner of what appears can never seem either. All indications, representations, symptoms, and symbols have the formal basic structure of appearing just cited, although they still differ among themselves.

7.10 Although "appearing" is not, and never is, a self-showing in the sense of phenomenon, appearing is nevertheless possible only on the ground of something's showing itself. But this self-showing, which also makes appearing possible, is not appearing itself. Appearing is announcing-itself through something that shows itself. If one then says that with the word "appearance" we point to something in which something appears, without itself being an appearance, this does not delimit the concept of phenomenon but presupposes it; this pre-supposition, however, remains covered over because, in this determination of "appearance," the expression "appear" is used in two senses. That in which something "appears" means that in which something announces itself, i.e., does not show itself; and in the phrase "without itself being 'an appearance,'" appearance means self-showing. This self-showing, however, belongs essentially to the

"wherein" in which something announces itself. Phenomena, therefore, are never appearances, but every appearance depends on phenomena. If phenomenon is defined with the help of a concept of "appearance" that is, moreover, still unclear, then everything is turned upside down, and a "critique" of phenomenology on this basis is indeed a curious undertaking.

7.11 The expression "appearance" can itself once again mean two things: first, appearing in the sense of announcing-itself as not-showing-itself, and then the announcing thing itself—what, in its self-showing, indicates something that does not show itself. Finally, appearing can be used as a designation for the genuine sense of phenomenon as self-showing. If these three different states of affairs are designated "appearance," confusion is unavoidable.

7.12 But the confusion is still essentially heightened by the fact that "appearance" can take on yet another meaning. If the announcing thing, which in its self-showing indicates the nonmanifest, is understood as what occurs on the nonmanifest itself and emanates from it, in such a way that the nonmanifest is thought as what is essentially never manifest—then appearance means bringing-forth, or what is brought forth, which, however, does not constitute the genuine Being of what brings it forth: appearance in the sense of "mere appearance." The brought-forth announcing thing does indeed show itself, and does so in such a way that, as an emanation of what it announces, it continually veils within itself precisely what it announces. But this veiling not-showing is once again not semblance. Kant uses the term appearance in this coupling. For him, appearances are first the "objects of empirical intuition," what shows itself in such intuition. This what-shows-itself (phenomenon in the genuine, primordial sense) is at the same time "appearance" as the announcing emanation of something that hides itself in the appearance.

7.13 Insofar as a phenomenon is constitutive for "appearance" in the meaning of announcing-itself through something that shows itself, while this phenomenon can be modified privatively

into semblance, appearance too can become mere semblance. In certain lighting someone can look as if their cheeks were flushed; this redness, which shows itself, can be taken as an announcement of the presence of fever, which in turn once again indicates a disturbance in the organism.

7.14 Phenomenon—showing itself in itself—means a distinctive mode in which something is encountered. Appearance, by contrast, means an ontic relation of reference within beings themselves, such that what refers (what announces) can fulfill its possible function only if it shows itself in itself, if it is "phenomenon." Appearance and semblance are themselves founded in phenomenon in different ways. The confusing multiplicity of the "phenomena" named by the designations phenomenon, semblance, appearance, and mere appearance can be disentangled only if the concept of phenomenon is understood from the outset: what shows itself in itself.

7.15 If, in this formulation of the concept of phenomenon, it remains indeterminate which being is addressed as phenomenon, and if it remains open in general whether what shows itself is in each case a being or a characteristic of the Being of beings, then only the formal concept of phenomenon has been obtained. But if what shows itself is understood as a being accessible, for example, through empirical intuition in Kant's sense, then the formal concept of phenomenon receives a legitimate application. Phenomenon in this use fulfills the meaning of the ordinary concept of phenomenon. This ordinary concept, however, is not the phenomenological concept of phenomenon. Within the horizon of Kant's problematic, what is phenomenologically understood by phenomenon can, allowing for other differences, be illustrated as follows: what already shows itself within appearances—the phenomenon understood in the ordinary way—in advance and along with them, though unthematically, can be brought thematically to show itself; and these things that thus show themselves in themselves ("forms of intuition") are phenomena of phenomenology. For space and time must evidently be able to show themselves in this way; they must be

able to become phenomena if Kant, in saying that space is the a priori wherein of an order, is thereby to lay claim to a transcendental assertion grounded in the matter itself.

7.16 But if the phenomenological concept of phenomenon is now to be understood at all, regardless of how what shows itself may be more closely determined, then insight into the meaning of the formal concept of phenomenon and its legitimate application in an ordinary meaning is an indispensable prerequisite.—Before the preliminary concept of phenomenology is fixed, the meaning of λόγος must be delimited, so that it becomes clear in what sense phenomenology can be a "science of" phenomena at all.

7.17 B. The Concept of Logos

7.18 The concept of λόγος has many meanings in Plato and Aristotle, and in such a way that the meanings pull apart without being positively guided by a basic meaning. This is in fact only a semblance, one that persists as long as interpretation is unable adequately to grasp the basic meaning in its primary content. If we say that the basic meaning of λόγος is discourse, this literal translation acquires full validity only through a determination of what discourse itself means. The later history of the meanings of the word λόγος, and above all the manifold and arbitrary interpretations of subsequent philosophy, continually cover over the genuine meaning of discourse, which lies openly enough in daylight. λόγος is "translated"—that is, always interpreted—as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground, relation. But how could "discourse" be modified so that λόγος means everything just listed, and does so within scientific usage? Even if λόγος is understood in the sense of assertion, and assertion as "judgment," this seemingly legitimate translation can still miss the fundamental meaning, especially if judgment is understood in the sense of some contemporary "theory of judgment." λόγος does not mean judgment, and in any event does not mean it primarily, if judgment is understood as a "combining" or a "taking a position" (acceptance—rejection).

7.19 λόγος as discourse means, rather, δηλουν: to make manifest what, in discourse, the discourse is "about." Aristotle explicated this function of discourse more sharply as ἀποφαίνεσθαι. The λόγος lets something be seen (φαίνεσθαι), namely what the discourse is about, and it does so for the one engaging in discourse (middle voice), or for those engaging in discourse with one another. Discourse "lets be seen" ἀπὸ ... from the very thing itself about which the discourse is. In discourse (ἀπόφανσις), provided it is genuine, what is said is to be drawn from that about which discourse is, so that discursive communication, in what it says, makes manifest what it is speaking about and thus makes it accessible to the other. This is the structure of λόγος as ἀπόφανσις. Not every "discourse" has this mode of making-manifest in the sense of a letting-see that points something out. Requesting (εὐχή), for example, also makes manifest, but in another way.

7.20 In its concrete enactment, discoursing (letting-see) has the character of speaking, of vocal utterance in words. The λόγος is φωνή, and specifically φωνή μετὰ φαντασίας—vocal utterance in which something is in each case sighted.

7.21 And only because the function of λόγος as ἀπόφανσις lies in a letting-see that points something out can λόγος have the structural form of σύνθεσις. Synthesis here does not mean combining and linking representations, manipulating mental occurrences, with respect to which connections the "problem" is then supposed to arise of how they, as something inner, agree with the physical outside. Here συν has a purely apophantic meaning and says: to let something be seen in its being-together with something, to let something be seen as something.

7.22 And again, because λόγος is a letting-see, it can be true or false. Everything also depends on keeping free of a constructed concept of truth in the sense of an "agreement." This idea is by no means primary in the concept of ἀλήθεια. The "Being-true" of λόγος as ἀληθεύειν means: in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι, to take the being about which there is discourse out of its hiddenness and let it be seen as unconcealed (ἀληθές), to uncover it. Corres-

pondingly, "Being-false," ψεύδεσθαι, means deception in the sense of covering over: placing something in front of something else (in the mode of letting-see) and thereby passing it off as something it is not.

7.23 But because "truth" has this meaning and λόγος is a determinate mode of letting-see, λόγος precisely must not be designated the primary "place" of truth. If, as has now become customary across the board, truth is determined as what "properly" belongs to judgment, and this thesis is moreover supported by an appeal to Aristotle, then not only is this appeal groundless, but above all the Greek concept of truth is misunderstood. "True" in the Greek sense—and more primordially than the λόγος just mentioned—is αἴσθησις, the simple sensory apprehension of something. Insofar as an αἴσθησις is in each case directed toward its ἴδια, toward the beings genuinely accessible solely through it and for it—for example, seeing toward colors—apprehension is always true. This means: seeing always uncovers colors, hearing always uncovers tones. "True" in the purest and most primordial sense—i.e., solely uncovering, so that it can never cover over—is pure νοεῖν, the apprehension that simply looks toward the simplest determinations of the Being of beings as such. This νοεῖν can never cover over, can never be false; at most it can remain a non-apprehension, ἀγνοεῖν, and fail to suffice for simple, adequate access.

7.24 What no longer has the enactment-form of pure letting-see, but in pointing out has recourse in each case to something else and thus lets something be seen as something, takes on, with this synthesis-structure, the possibility of covering over. "Judgment-truth," however, is only the counter-case to this covering-over—that is, a multiply founded phenomenon of truth. Realism and Idealism miss with equal thoroughness the meaning of the Greek concept of truth, from which alone the possibility of anything like a "doctrine of Ideas" as philosophical cognition can be understood.

7.25 And because the function of λόγος lies in simply letting something be seen, in letting beings be apprehended, λόγος can

mean reason. And because λόγος, in turn, is used not only in the meaning of λέγειν but at the same time in that of λεγόμενον, what has been shown as such, and because the latter is nothing other than the ὑποκείμενον, that which, for every address and discussion that approaches it, always already lies there as present-at-hand and serves as its ground, λόγος qua λεγόμενον means ground, ratio. And finally, because λόγος qua λεγόμενον can also mean what is addressed as something, what has become visible in its relation to something, in its "relatedness," λόγος acquires the meaning of connection and relation.

7.26 This interpretation of "apophantic discourse" may suffice to clarify the primary function of λόγος.

7.27 C. The Preliminary Concept of Phenomenology

7.28 When what has been brought out in the interpretation of "phenomenon" and "logos" is concretely called to mind, an internal relation between what these designations mean leaps into view. The expression phenomenology can be formulated in Greek: λέγειν τὰ φαινόμενα; but λέγειν means ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Phenomenology then means: ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα: to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of the research that gives itself the name phenomenology. Yet this expresses nothing other than the maxim formulated above: "To the things themselves!"

7.29 The title phenomenology thus has a meaning different from designations such as theology and the like. These name the objects of the respective science in their particular substantive matter. "Phenomenology" neither names the object of its research nor does the title characterize that object's substantive matter. The word gives information only about the How of the pointing out and the mode of treatment of what is to be treated in this science. Science "of" phenomena means: a grasping of its objects such that everything about them that comes up for discussion must be dealt with through direct pointing out and direct verification. The expression "descriptive phenomenology," fundamentally tautological, has the same meaning. Description does not here mean a procedure modeled, for example, on

botanical morphology—the title again has a prohibitive meaning: keeping at a distance all non-verifying determination. The character of description itself, the specific meaning of λόγος, can first be fixed from the "matterhood" of what is to be "described," i.e., brought to scientific determinacy in the mode of encounter proper to phenomena. Formally, the meaning of the formal and ordinary concept of phenomenon warrants calling any pointing out of a being, just as it shows itself in itself, phenomenology.

7.30 In view of what must the formal concept of phenomenon now be de-formalized into the phenomenological concept, and how does the latter differ from the ordinary one? What is it that phenomenology is to "let be seen"? What is it that must be called "phenomenon" in a distinctive sense? What is necessarily, by its essence, the theme of an explicit pointing out? Evidently it is what in the first instance and for the most part precisely does not show itself, what is hidden over against what in the first instance and for the most part does show itself, yet at the same time is something that essentially belongs to what in the first instance and for the most part shows itself, in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and ground.

7.31 But what remains hidden in an exceptional sense, or falls back again into covering-over, or shows itself only "disguised," is not this or that being but, as the preceding reflections have shown, the Being of beings. It can be covered over so extensively that it is forgotten and the question about it and its meaning fails to arise. What therefore, in a distinctive sense and by virtue of its ownmost substantive matter, demands to become phenomenon, phenomenology has thematically taken into its "grasp" as its object.

7.32 Phenomenology is the mode of access to what is to become the theme of ontology and the verifying mode of determining it. Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. In the phenomenological concept of phenomenon, what shows itself is the Being of beings, its meaning, its modifications, and its derivatives. And this self-showing is not just any kind of self-showing, still

less anything like appearing. Least of all can the Being of beings ever be something "behind" which something else still stands "that does not appear."

7.33 "Behind" the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothing else, but what is to become phenomenon can indeed be hidden. And precisely because the phenomena are in the first instance and for the most part not given, phenomenology is needed. Coveredness is the counterconcept to "phenomenon."

7.34 The possible ways in which phenomena can be covered are various. First, a phenomenon can be covered in the sense that it has not yet been uncovered at all. Of its subsistence there is neither knowledge nor ignorance. A phenomenon can also be buried. This means: it was once uncovered before, but fell back into covering-over. This can become total, or else, as is the rule, what was previously uncovered is still visible, though only as semblance. Yet however much semblance, just so much "Being." This covering-over as "disguise" is the most frequent and the most dangerous, because here the possibilities of deception and misdirection are especially persistent. The available structures of Being and their concepts, while veiled as to the ground in which they are rooted, may perhaps claim their right within a "system." On account of their constructive interlocking in a system, they present themselves as something that needs no further justification and is "clear," and so can serve as the starting point for a progressive deduction.

7.35 Covering-over itself, whether understood as hiddenness, burial, or disguise, in turn has two possibilities. There are accidental forms of covering-over and necessary ones, i.e., those grounded in the mode of subsistence of what has been uncovered. Every phenomenological concept and proposition originally drawn is, as a communicated assertion, open to the possibility of degeneration. It is passed on with an empty understanding, loses its rootedness in the ground, and becomes a free-floating thesis. The possibility that what was originally "graspable" will harden and become ungraspable lies in the con-

crete work of phenomenology itself. And the difficulty of this research consists precisely in making it, in a positive sense, critical of itself.

7.36 The mode in which Being and the structures of Being are encountered in the mode of phenomenon must first be won from the objects of phenomenology. Therefore the starting point of the analysis, as well as access to the phenomenon and the passage through the prevailing coverings-over, require their own methodological safeguarding. In the idea of an "originary" and "intuitive" grasping and explication of phenomena lies the opposite of the naïveté of an accidental, "immediate," and unconsidered "looking."

7.37 On the ground of the preliminary concept of phenomenology just delimited, the terms "phenomenal" and "phenomenological" can now also be fixed in their meaning. "Phenomenal" names what is given and can be explicated in the mode of encounter of phenomenon; hence the talk of phenomenal structures. "Phenomenological" names everything that belongs to the mode of pointing out and explication and that constitutes the conceptuality required in this research.

7.38 Because, in the phenomenological understanding, phenomenon is always only what constitutes Being, while Being is always the Being of beings, aiming at a laying bare of Being first requires a proper bringing-forward of the being itself. This being must likewise show itself in the mode of access genuinely belonging to it. And so the ordinary concept of phenomenon becomes phenomenologically relevant. The preliminary task of a "phenomenological" securing of the exemplary being as the point of departure for the analytic proper is always already prefigured by the goal of that analytic.

7.39 Taken in terms of substantive matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of beings—ontology. In the elucidation given of the tasks of ontology, there arose the need for a fundamental ontology that takes as its theme the ontologically and ontically distinctive being, Dasein, in such a way that it brings itself before the cardinal problem, the question about the mean-

ing of Being in general. The investigation itself will show: the methodological meaning of phenomenological description is interpretation. The λόγος of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of ἑρμηνεύειν, through which the authentic meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein's own Being are made known to the understanding of Being that belongs to Dasein itself. The phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics in the primordial meaning of the word, according to which it designates the work of interpretation. But insofar as uncovering the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein in general brings out the horizon for every further ontological research into beings that are not of Dasein's kind, this hermeneutics is at the same time "hermeneutics" in the sense of working out the conditions for the possibility of every ontological investigation. And finally, insofar as Dasein has ontological priority over all beings—as a being in the possibility of existence—hermeneutics as an interpretation of the Being of Dasein acquires a specific third sense—the, philosophically understood, primary sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence. Rooted in this hermeneutics, insofar as it works out Dasein's historicity ontologically as the ontic condition for the possibility of historiography, is what can be called "hermeneutics" only derivatively: the methodology of the historiographical human sciences.

7.40 Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is not a genus of beings, and yet it concerns every being. Its "universality" must be sought higher. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every being and every possible ontic determinateness of a being. Being is the transcendens without qualification. The transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive insofar as the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation lie in it. Every disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcendental cognition. Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis.

7.41 Ontology and phenomenology are not two different disciplines, alongside others, that belong to philosophy. The two titles characterize philosophy itself in terms of its object and its mode

of treatment. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, proceeding from the hermeneutics of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has secured the end of the guiding thread of all philosophical questioning at the place from which such questioning springs and to which it rebounds.

7.42 The following investigations have become possible only on the ground laid by E. Husserl, with whose "Logical Investigations" phenomenology achieved its breakthrough. The elucidations of the preliminary concept of phenomenology indicate that what is essential to it does not lie in its being actual as a philosophical "school of thought." Possibility stands higher than actuality. Phenomenology is understood solely by grasping it as a possibility.

7.43 In view of the unwieldiness and "unloveliness" of the expression in the analyses that follow, this remark may be appended: it is one thing to report narratively about beings, another to grasp beings in their Being. For the latter task, not only are words usually lacking, but above all "grammar." If it is permissible to point to earlier research analyzing Being, incomparable in its level, then one should compare ontological passages in Plato's "Parmenides" or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle's "Metaphysics" with a narrative passage from Thucydides, and one will see how unheard-of were the formulations that their philosophers expected the Greeks to bear. And where the powers are substantially lesser and, moreover, the domain of Being to be disclosed is ontologically far more difficult than the one given to the Greeks, the cumbersomeness of concept formation and the harshness of expression will increase.

§ 8. THE OUTLINE OF THE TREATISE

8.1 The question of the meaning of Being is the most universal and the emptiest; yet at the same time it contains the possibility of its own sharpest individualization to the Dasein in each case. Attaining the basic concept "Being" and preliminarily delineat-

ing the ontological conceptuality it requires, together with that conceptuality's necessary modifications, call for a concrete guiding thread. The universality of the concept of Being does not conflict with the "specialized character" of the investigation —that is, with advancing toward it by way of a specific interpretation of a particular being, Dasein, in which the horizon for an understanding and possible interpretation of Being is to be gained. Yet this being is itself intrinsically "historical," so that the ownmost ontological illumination of this being necessarily becomes a "historiographical" interpretation.

8.2 The working out of the question of Being thus forks into two tasks; corresponding to them, the treatise is divided into two parts:

8.3 First Part: The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of Being.

8.4 Second Part: Basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as its guiding thread.

8.5 The first part is divided into three sections: 1. The preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein. 2. Dasein and temporality. 3. Time and Being.

8.6 The second part is likewise divided threefold:

8.7 1. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time as a preliminary stage of a problematic of Temporality.

8.8 2. The ontological foundation of Descartes' "cogito sum" and the taking over of medieval ontology into the problematic of the "res cogitans."

8.9 3. Aristotle's treatise on time as the discrimen of the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology.

Division One, Chapter I: The Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein

Erster Teil. Erster Abschnitt: Die vorbereitende Fundamentalanalyse des Daseins. Erstes Kapitel: Die Exposition der Aufgabe einer vorbereitenden Analyse des Daseins
§§9–11

§ 9. THE THEME OF THE ANALYTIC OF DASEIN

9.1 In each case, we ourselves are the being whose analysis is the task. The Being of this being is in each case mine. In its Being, this being itself relates to its Being. As a being of this Being, it is delivered over to its own Being. Being is what matters to this being itself in each case. Two things follow from this characterization of Dasein:

9.2 1. The "essence" of this being lies in its having-to-be. The what-being (essentia) of this being must, insofar as one can speak of it at all, be understood from its Being (existentia). Here it is precisely the ontological task to show that, when we choose the designation existence for the Being of this being, this title does not have and cannot have the ontological meaning of the traditional term existentia; ontologically, existentia amounts to being-present-at-hand, a way of Being that does not essentially belong to a being with the character of Dasein. Confusion is avoided by always using the interpretive expression presence-at-hand for the title existentia and assigning existence as a determination of Being to Dasein alone.

9.3 The "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence. The characteristics that can be brought out in this being are therefore not present-at-hand "properties" of a present-at-hand being that "looks" such-and-such a way, but possible ways for it to be in each case, and only that. All of this being's being-so is primarily Being. Accordingly, the title "Dasein," by which we designate this being, expresses not its What, as table, house, tree do, but Being.

9.4 2. The Being that matters to this being in its Being is in each case mine. Dasein is therefore never to be grasped ontologically as a case and exemplar of a genus of beings taken as present-at-hand. To this being, its Being is "indifferent" [gleichgültig]; looked at closely, it "is" in such a way that its Being can be neither indifferent nor non-indifferent to it. In addressing Dasein, in keeping with this being's character of in-each-case-mineness, the personal pronoun must always be said along with it: "I am," "you are."

9.5 And Dasein, in turn, is mine in each case in this or that way of being. It has always already decided somehow in what way Dasein is mine in each case. The being for which, in its Being, this very Being matters comports itself toward its Being as its ownmost possibility. Dasein is its possibility in each case, and does not merely "have" it as a property in the manner of something present-at-hand. And because Dasein is essentially its possibility in each case, this being can, in its Being, "choose" itself, gain itself; it can lose itself, or never gain itself, or gain itself only "seemingly." Only insofar as, in its essence, it is possibly its own—that is, is a being that belongs to itself—can it have lost itself, and only insofar as this is so can it not yet have gained itself. The two modes of Being, ownness and unownness—these expressions have been chosen as technical terms in the strict sense of the words—are grounded in the fact that Dasein as such is determined by in-each-case-mineness. Dasein's unownness, however, does not mean a "less" Being or a "lower" degree of Being. Rather, unownness can determine Dasein in its fullest

concretion, in its busyness, excitedness, interestedness, and capacity for enjoyment.

9.6 The two characteristics of Dasein just sketched—first, the priority of "existentia" over essentia, and then in-each-case-mineness—already indicate that an analytic of this being is confronted with a distinctive phenomenal domain. This being does not, and never does, have the way of Being of what is merely present-at-hand within the world. Accordingly, it is not to be presented in advance as a theme in the manner of finding what is present-at-hand. The right advance presentation of it is so far from self-evident that determining this presentation itself constitutes an essential part of the ontological analytic of this being. The possibility of making the Being of this being intelligible at all stands or falls with the secure accomplishment of the right advance presentation of this being. However provisional the analysis may be, it always already demands that the right point of departure be secured.

9.7 As a being, Dasein determines itself in each case from a possibility that it is and somehow understands in its Being. This is the formal sense of Dasein's constitution of existence. Yet for the ontological interpretation of this being, this contains the directive to develop the problematic of its Being from the existentiality of its existence. This cannot, however, mean constructing Dasein from a concrete possible idea of existence. At the outset of the analysis, Dasein is precisely not to be interpreted in the difference of a determinate way of existing, but to be uncovered in its indifferent way of being in the first instance and for the most part. This indifference of Dasein's everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this being. All existing is what it is by emerging from this way of Being and returning to it. We call this everyday indifference of Dasein averageness.

9.8 And since average everydayness constitutes what this being is ontically in the first instance, it has been and continues to be skipped over again and again in the explication of Dasein. What is ontically nearest and familiar is what is ontologically

farthest, unrecognized, and constantly overlooked in its ontological significance. When Augustine asks: Quid autem propinquius meipso mihi? and must answer: ego certe laboro hic et laboro in meipso: factus sum mihi terra difficultatis et sudoris nimii, this holds true not only of the ontic and pre-ontological opacity of Dasein but, to an even greater degree, of the ontological task of not only not missing this being in its phenomenally nearest way of Being, but making it accessible through a positive characterization.

9.9 Dasein's average everydayness, however, must not be taken as a mere "aspect." Even in it, and even in the mode of unownness, the structure of existentiality is there a priori. Even in it, Dasein's Being matters to Dasein in a determinate way, and Dasein relates to that Being in the mode of average everydayness, even if only in the mode of flight from that Being and of forgetting it.

9.10 The explication of Dasein in its average everydayness does not, however, yield merely average structures in the sense of a blurred indeterminacy. What ontically is in the mode of averageness can very well be grasped ontologically in sharply defined structures that structurally do not differ from ontological determinations, for example, of Dasein's Being in ownness.

9.11 All the explicata that arise from the analytic of Dasein are obtained with a look toward its structure of existence. Since their determination comes from existentiality, we call Dasein's characteristics of Being existentials. They must be sharply distinguished from the determinations of Being belonging to beings without the character of Dasein; these we call categories. In doing so, we take up and retain this expression in its primary ontological meaning. Ancient ontology takes the being encountered within the world as the exemplary ground of its interpretation of Being. The mode of access to it is held to be νοεῖν or, as the case may be, λόγος. Therein the being is encountered. The Being of this being, however, must become graspable in a distinctive λέγειν (letting see), so that this Being becomes intelligible in advance as what it is and already is in

every being. The always already prior addressing of Being in speaking about (λόγος) the being is κατηγορεῖσθαι. This initially means: to accuse publicly, to tell someone something to their face before everyone. Used ontologically, the term means: to tell the being to its face, as it were, what it always already is as a being, that is, to let everyone see it in its Being. What is sighted and visible in such seeing are the κατηγορίαι. They encompass the a priori determinations of the being that can be addressed and spoken about in different ways in λόγος. Existentials and categories are the two fundamental possibilities for characteristics of Being. The being corresponding to them requires in each case a different way of primary interrogation: a being is a Who (existence) or a What (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). The connection between the two modes of characteristics of Being can be discussed only from within the clarified horizon of the question of Being.

9.12 It was already indicated in the Introduction that the existential analytic of Dasein also advances a task whose urgency is scarcely less than that of the question of Being itself: the laying bare of the a priori that must be visible if philosophical discussion of the question "what the human being is" is to be possible. The existential analytic of Dasein is prior to all psychology and anthropology, and, all the more, to biology. By being set off against these possible investigations of Dasein, the theme of the analytic can acquire still sharper bounds. Its necessity can thereby at the same time be proved even more compellingly.

§ 10. THE DELIMITATION OF THE ANALYTIC OF DASEIN FROM ANTHROPOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND BIOLOGY

10.1 After an initial positive outline of the theme of an investigation, its prohibitive characterization always remains pertinent, although discussions of what is not to be done can easily become unfruitful. It is to be shown that the lines of questioning and investigations hitherto directed toward Dasein, notwithstanding their substantive fruitfulness, miss the genuine philosophical problem; hence, as long as they persist in this failure,

they are not entitled to claim that they can accomplish at all what, at bottom, they seek. The delimitations of the existential analytic from anthropology, psychology, and biology concern only the foundational ontological question. "From the standpoint of the theory of science," they are necessarily inadequate, if only because the scientific structure of the disciplines named —not, say, the "scientific character" of those working to advance them—is today questionable through and through and requires fresh impulses that must spring from the ontological problematic.

10.2 By way of historical orientation, then, the aim of the existential analytic can be clarified: Descartes, who is credited with the discovery of the cogito sum as the point of departure for modern philosophical questioning, investigated the cogitare of the ego—within certain limits. By contrast, he leaves the sum entirely unexamined, although it is posited just as primordially as the cogito. The analytic poses the ontological question of the Being of the sum. Only once this has been determined can the way of Being of the cogitationes be grasped.

10.3 Admittedly, this historical exemplification of the analytic's aim is at the same time misleading. One of its first tasks will be to demonstrate that the positing of an I and subject as initially given misses the phenomenal content of Dasein from the ground up. Every idea of a "subject" still—unless purified by a prior basic ontological determination—carries forward, ontologically, the positing of the subjectum (ὑποκείμενον), however vigorously one may resist the "soul-substance" or the "reification of consciousness" ontically. Thinghood itself must first have its ontological provenance demonstrated before one can ask what, positively, is to be understood by the unreified Being of subject, soul, consciousness, spirit, and person. These labels all name determinate, "elaborable" domains of phenomena, but their use always goes hand in hand with a curious absence of any need to ask about the Being of the being so designated. It is therefore no terminological caprice when we avoid these labels,

as well as the expressions "life" and "human being," in designating the being that we ourselves are.

10.4 On the other hand, however, implicit in the properly understood tendency of every scientifically serious "philosophy of life"—a term that says about as much as "botany of plants"—is a tendency toward an understanding of the Being of Dasein. It remains striking, and this is its foundational defect, that "life" itself does not become an ontological problem as a way of Being.

10.5 W. Dilthey's investigations are kept in motion by the constant question about "life." He seeks to understand the "lived experiences" of this "life," in their structural and developmental nexus, from the whole of this life itself. What is philosophically relevant in his "human-science psychology" is not that it no longer seeks to orient itself by psychic elements and atoms or to piece together the life of the soul, aiming instead at the "whole of life" and the "forms"—but that, throughout all this, he was above all on the way toward the question about "life." To be sure, it is here that the limits of his problematic and of the conceptuality in which it had to articulate itself show themselves most strongly. These limits, however, are shared with Dilthey and Bergson by all currents of "personalism" shaped by them and all tendencies toward a philosophical anthropology. Even the phenomenological interpretation of personhood, which is more radical and more transparent at the level of foundations, does not enter the dimension of the question of the Being of Dasein. Despite all differences in questioning, execution, and worldview orientation, the interpretations of personhood in Husserl and Scheler agree in a negative respect. They no longer pose the question of "Being-a-person" itself. We choose Scheler's interpretation as an example, not only because it is accessible in the literature, but because Scheler expressly emphasizes Being-a-person as such and seeks to determine it by delimiting the specific Being of acts from everything "psychic." According to Scheler, a person must never be thought of as a thing or a substance; the person "is rather the immediately co-experienced unity of living-through—not a merely thought thing behind and

outside what is immediately lived through." A person is not a thing-like, substantial Being. Furthermore, the Being of the person cannot be exhausted by being a subject of acts of reason governed by a certain lawfulness.

10.6 The person is not a thing, not a substance, not an object. This emphasizes the same point that Husserl intimates when he requires for the unity of the person a constitution essentially different from that of natural things. What Scheler says of the person he also formulates for acts: "But an act is never also an object; for it belongs to the essence of the Being of acts to be experienced only in enactment itself and to be given in reflection." Acts are something non-psychic. It belongs to the essence of the person that the person exists only in the enactment of intentional acts; the person is therefore essentially not an object. Every psychic objectification, that is, every construal of acts as something psychic, is identical with depersonalization. In any case, the person is given as the enactor of intentional acts that are connected through the unity of a sense. Psychic Being, therefore, has nothing to do with Being-a-person. Acts are enacted; the person is the act-enactor. But what is the ontological sense of "to enact"; how is the person's way of Being to be determined positively in ontological terms? But the critical question cannot stop here. The question concerns the Being of the whole human being, customarily conceived as a unity of body, soul, and spirit. Body, soul, and spirit may in turn name domains of phenomena that, with a view to particular investigations, can be detached and made thematic in their own right; within certain limits, their ontological indeterminacy may not matter. In the question of the Being of the human being, however, this Being cannot be calculated by summing the ways of Being of body, soul, and spirit, which themselves, moreover, have yet in turn to be determined. And even an ontological attempt proceeding in this way would have to presuppose an idea of the Being of the whole. But what blocks or misdirects the foundational question of the Being of Dasein is the pervasive orientation toward ancient-Christian anthropology, whose inad-

equate ontological foundations are overlooked by personalism and philosophy of life as well. Traditional anthropology carries within itself:

10.7 1. The definition of the human being: ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, as interpreted: animal rationale, rational living being. Here, however, the way of Being of the ζῷον is understood in the sense of presence-at-hand and occurrence. The λόγος is a higher endowment, whose way of Being remains just as obscure as that of the being composed in this way.

10.8 2. The other guiding thread for determining the Being and essence of the human being is a theological one: καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν, faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram et similitudinem. On this basis, Christian-theological anthropology arrives at an explication of the being we call the human being while also incorporating the ancient definition. But just as the Being of God is interpreted ontologically with the resources of ancient ontology, so all the more is the Being of the ens finitum. In the course of the modern age, the Christian definition was de-theologized. But the idea of "transcendence," that the human being is something that reaches out beyond itself, has its roots in Christian dogmatics, of which one would not wish to say that it had ever made the Being of the human being into an ontological problem. This idea of transcendence, according to which the human being is more than a being endowed with understanding, has made itself felt in various modifications. Its origin may be illustrated by the following quotations: "His praeclaris dotibus excelluit prima hominis conditio, ut ratio, intelligentia, prudentia, iudicium non modo ad terrenae vitae gubernationem suppeterent, sed quibus transcenderet usque ad Deum et aeternam felicitatem" "For the fact that the human being directs his gaze toward God and God's word clearly shows that, by nature, he is born somewhat nearer to God, takes after God somewhat more, and has some attraction toward God; all this doubtless flows from his having been created in the image of God."

10.9 The sources relevant to traditional anthropology—the Greek definition and the theological guiding thread—indicate that, in determining the essence of the being "human being," the question of its Being remains forgotten; this Being is instead understood as "self-evident" in the sense of the presence-at-hand of the other created things. In modern anthropology, these two guiding threads become intertwined with the methodological point of departure from the res cogitans, consciousness, the nexus of lived experience. But insofar as the cogitationes also remain ontologically undetermined, or are once again tacitly taken "self-evidently" as something "given," whose "Being" is subject to no question, the anthropological problematic remains undetermined in its decisive ontological foundations.

10.10 The same holds no less for "psychology," whose anthropological tendencies are unmistakable today. Nor can the missing ontological foundation be replaced by incorporating anthropology and psychology into a general biology. In the order of possible apprehension and explication, biology as the "science of life" is founded in the ontology of Dasein, though not exclusively in it. Life is a way of Being of its own, but is essentially accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life proceeds by way of a privative interpretation; it determines what must be if something like only-still-living is to be. Life is neither sheer presence-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. Dasein, in turn, can never be determined ontologically by positing it as life—(ontologically undetermined)—and as, over and above that, something else.

10.11 Pointing out that anthropology, psychology, and biology lack an unequivocal answer, adequately grounded ontologically, to the question of the way of Being of this being that we ourselves are passes no judgment on the positive work of these disciplines. On the other hand, however, it must repeatedly be brought to awareness that these ontological foundations can never be hypothetically inferred after the fact from empirical material; rather, they are always already "there" even when empirical material is merely being collected. The fact that posit-

ive research does not see these foundations and regards them as self-evident is no proof that they do not lie at the foundation of such research and are not problematic in a more radical sense than any thesis of positive science can ever be.

§ 11. THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC AND THE INTERPRETATION OF PRIMITIVE DASEIN. THE DIFFICULTIES IN GAINING A "NATURAL CONCEPT OF WORLD"

11.1 The interpretation of Dasein in its everydayness, however, is not identical with the description of a primitive stage of Dasein, knowledge of which may be empirically mediated by anthropology. Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness. Rather, everydayness is a mode of Being of Dasein even—and precisely—when Dasein moves within a highly developed and differentiated culture. On the other hand, primitive Dasein too has its possibilities of non-everyday Being; it has its specific everydayness. Orienting the analysis of Dasein toward the "life of primitive peoples" can have positive methodological significance, insofar as "primitive phenomena" are often less covered over and less complicated by an already far-reaching self-interpretation of the Dasein concerned. Primitive Dasein often speaks more directly out of a primordial absorption in the "phenomena" (taken in the prephenomenological sense). The conceptuality that, from our point of view, may be awkward and crude can be positively conducive to a genuine bringing-out of the ontological structures of the phenomena.

11.2 But so far our knowledge of primitive peoples has been supplied by ethnology. And already in the initial "collection" of the material, as well as in its sifting and processing, ethnology moves within certain preliminary concepts and interpretations of human Dasein in general. It is not settled whether the everyday psychology—or even the scientific psychology and sociology—that the ethnologist brings along provides the scientific warrant for an adequate possibility of access to, interpretation of, and transmission of the phenomena to be investigated. Here too,

the state of affairs is the same as with the disciplines mentioned earlier. Ethnology itself already presupposes a sufficient analytic of Dasein to serve as its guiding thread. But since the positive sciences neither "can" nor should wait for philosophy's ontological work, research will go forward not as "progress," but as a repetition and an ontologically more transparent purification of what has been discovered ontically.

11.3 However easy the formal demarcation of the ontological problematic from ontic research may be, carrying out an existential analytic of Dasein—and, above all, establishing its point of departure—is not without difficulties. Bound up with its task is a desideratum that has long troubled philosophy, yet philosophy has failed time and again to fulfill it: the elaboration of the idea of a "natural concept of world." The wealth of knowledge available today about the most varied and most remote cultures and forms of Dasein appears conducive to taking up this task fruitfully. But this is mere appearance. At bottom, such overabundant knowledge is a temptation to misrecognize the real problem. Syncretistically comparing everything with everything and sorting it all into types does not by itself yield genuine knowledge of essences. That the manifold can be mastered in a table does not guarantee a real understanding of what lies there in ordered form. The genuine principle of order has a subject-matter content of its own, one that is never found through ordering but is already presupposed in it. Thus, ordering world-pictures requires an explicit idea of world in general. And if "world" is itself a constitutive element of Dasein, the conceptual elaboration of the phenomenon of world requires an insight into the basic structures of Dasein.

11.4 The positive characterizations and negative considerations of this chapter were intended to set the right course for understanding the tendency and questioning stance of the interpretation that follows. Ontology can contribute only indirectly to advancing the existing positive disciplines. It has, for itself, a self-standing purpose, if indeed, over and above a taking cogniz-

ance of beings, the question of Being is the spur to all scientific seeking.

11.5 Chapter Two: Being-in-the-world in General as the Basic Constitution of Dasein

Division One, Chapter II: Being-in-the-World in General as the Basic Constitution of Dasein

Erster Abschnitt. Zweites Kapitel: Das In-der-Welt-sein überhaupt als Grundverfassung des Daseins
§§12–13

§ 12. THE PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD ON THE BASIS OF AN ORIENTATION TOWARD BEING-IN AS SUCH

12.1 In the preparatory discussions (§ 9), we already brought into relief characteristics of Being that are intended to cast a reliable light on the further investigation, but that at the same time will themselves receive their structural concretion in this investigation. Dasein is a being that, in its Being, comports itself understandingly toward this Being. This indicates the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is a being that I myself am in each case. In-each-case-mineness belongs to existing Dasein as the condition of the possibility of ownness and unownness. Dasein exists in each case in one of these modes, or in their modal indifference.

12.2 These determinations of Dasein's Being must now, however, be seen and understood a priori on the basis of the constitution of Being that we call Being-in-the-world. The proper starting point for the analytic of Dasein lies in the interpretation of this constitution.

12.3 The compound expression "Being-in-the-world" already indicates in its very coinage that it means a unitary phe-

nomenon. This primary finding must be seen as a whole. Its inability to be dissolved into components that could be pieced together does not exclude a multiplicity of structural moments constitutive of this constitution. The phenomenal finding indicated by this expression does in fact afford a threefold look toward it. If we pursue it while maintaining our prior hold on the phenomenon as a whole, the following can be brought out:

12.4 1. The "in the world"; with respect to this moment, the task arises of inquiring into the ontological structure of "world" and determining the idea of worldhood as such (cf. Chapter 3 of this division).

12.5 2. The being that in each case is in the manner of Being-in-the-world. Along with this being, what is sought is that which we inquire after in asking "Who?" In a phenomenological demonstration, it is to be determined who it is that is in the mode of Dasein's average everydayness (cf. Chapter 4 of this division).

12.6 3. Being-in as such; the ontological constitution of inhood itself must be brought out (cf. Chapter 5 of this division). Every bringing into relief of one of these constitutive moments also brings the others into relief; that is to say, each time this involves seeing the whole phenomenon. Being-in-the-world is indeed an a priori necessary constitution of Dasein, but it is nowhere near sufficient to determine its Being fully. Before the separate thematic analysis of the three phenomena brought into relief, an orienting characterization of the last-mentioned constitutive moment is to be attempted.

12.7 What does Being-in mean? We first complete the expression by adding "in the world" and are inclined to understand this Being-in as "being in ..." This term names the way of Being of a being that is "in" another, as the water is "in" the glass and the garment "in" the wardrobe. We mean by "in" the relation of Being between two beings extended "in" space, with respect to their location in this space. Water and glass, garment and wardrobe, are alike "in" space "at" a location. This relation of Being can be extended, for example: the bench in the lecture hall, the

lecture hall in the university, the university in the city, and so on, all the way to: the bench "in outer space." These beings, whose Being "in" one another can be determined in this way, all have the same way of Being: presence-at-hand as things that occur "within" the world. Presence-at-hand "in" something present-at-hand, and being present-at-hand along with something of the same way of Being in the sense of a determinate locational relation, are ontological characteristics that we call categorial—characteristics that belong to beings with a non-Dasein way of Being.

12.8 Being-in, by contrast, means a constitution of Dasein's Being and is an existential. It therefore cannot mean the presence-at-hand of a body-thing (the human body) "in" a present-at-hand being. Being-in no more means a spatial "inside-one-another" of present-at-hand things than "in" originally means a spatial relation of the kind just named; "in" derives from innan-, to dwell, habitare, to stay; "an" means: I am accustomed to it, familiar with it; I tend something; it has the meaning of colo in the sense of habito and diligo. This being, to which Being-in belongs in this meaning, we characterized as the being that I myself am in each case. The expression "bin" ("am") is related to "bei" ("by," "alongside"); "ich bin" ("I am") in turn says: I dwell, I stay alongside ... the world, as that which is familiar to me in this or that way. Being, as the infinitive of "I am"—that is, understood as an existential—means dwelling alongside ..., being familiar with ... Being-in is accordingly the formal existential expression of the Being of Dasein, which has the essential constitution of Being-in-the-world.

12.9 The "Being alongside" the world, in the sense of absorption in the world that remains to be interpreted more closely, is an existential grounded in Being-in. Because these analyses are concerned with seeing an originary structure of Dasein's Being, in accordance with whose phenomenal content the concepts of Being must be articulated, and because this structure cannot in principle be grasped through inherited ontological categories, this "Being alongside" too must be brought into closer view. We

again proceed by setting it off against a relation of Being that is ontologically different in essence—that is, categorial—and that we express with the same linguistic resources. Such phenomenal bringings-into-view of fundamental ontological differences that are easily blurred must be carried out explicitly, even at the risk of discussing "what is self-evident." The present state of the ontological analytic shows, however, that we are far from having these self-evident matters adequately "in our grasp"; still more rarely have we interpreted them in their sense of Being, and less still do we possess the appropriate structural concepts in a securely coined form.

12.10 The "Being alongside" the world as an existential never means anything like the joint presence-at-hand of things that occur. There is no such thing as the "side-by-side" of a being called "Dasein" with another being called "world." We do, of course, sometimes express linguistically the togetherness of two present-at-hand things, for example, as follows: "The table stands "by" the door," "the chair "touches" the wall." Strictly speaking, there can never be any question of "touching"—not because, in the end, close examination can always establish a gap between chair and wall, but because in principle the chair cannot touch the wall, even if the gap were zero. That would presuppose that the wall could show itself—could be something encountered—"for" the chair. A being can touch a being present-at-hand within the world only if it inherently has the way of Being of Being-in—if, along with its Da-sein, something like world is already discovered for it, from out of which a being can reveal itself in touching and thereby become accessible in its presence-at-hand. Two beings that are present-at-hand within the world and that, moreover, are worldless in themselves can never "touch" one another; neither can "be" "alongside" the other. The qualification "which, moreover, are worldless" must not be omitted, because even a being that is not worldless—for example, Dasein itself—is present-at-hand "in" the world; more precisely, it can, with a certain justification and within certain limits, be conceived as merely present-at-hand. This requires a

complete looking-away from, or failure to see, the existential constitution of Being-in. But this possible conception of "Dasein" as something present-at-hand and now nothing but present-at-hand must not be conflated with a mode of "presence-at-hand" proper to Dasein. This presence-at-hand becomes accessible not by looking away from the specific structures of Dasein, but only through a prior understanding of them. Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain "factual presence-at-hand." And yet the "factuality" of the fact of one's own Dasein is ontologically fundamentally different from the factual occurrence of a kind of rock. We call the factuality of the factum Dasein, which every Dasein is in each case, its facticity. The intricate structure of this determination of Being can itself begin to be grasped as a problem only in the light of the basic existential constitutions of Dasein already worked out. The concept of facticity contains within itself: the Being-in-the-world of an "innerworldly" being, such that this being can understand itself as bound up, in its "destiny," with the Being of the being that encounters it within its own world.

12.11 For now, it is only a matter of seeing the ontological difference between Being-in as an existential and the "insideness" of present-at-hand things among one another as a category. When we delimit Being-in in this way, we do not thereby deny Dasein every kind of "spatiality." On the contrary, Dasein itself has its own "Being-in-space," which in turn is possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world as such. Being-in therefore cannot be clarified ontologically by an ontic characterization either—for example, by saying: Being-in in a world is a spiritual property, and the human being's "spatiality" is a feature of its bodiliness, which is always at the same time "founded" by corporeality. One is then once again left with the joint presence-at-hand of a spirit-thing constituted in this way with a body-thing, while the Being of the being thus composed as such remains all the more obscure. Only an understanding of Being-in-the-world as the essential structure of Dasein makes insight into Dasein's existential spatiality possible. This insight guards against a failure to

see this structure, or against crossing it out in advance; such crossing-out is motivated not ontologically but "metaphysically" by the naive view that the human being is initially a spiritual thing that is then subsequently placed "in" a space.

12.12 In its facticity, Dasein's Being-in-the-world has always already dispersed, or even splintered, into determinate ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of such ways of Being-in can be indicated by the following illustrative list: having to do with something, producing something, cultivating and tending something, using something, giving something up and letting it be lost, undertaking, carrying through, exploring, interrogating, observing, discussing, determining … These ways of Being-in have the way of Being of concern, which has yet to be characterized in detail. Deficient modes of concern also include leaving undone, neglecting, forgoing, resting—all modes of "only still" in relation to possibilities of concern. The title "concern" initially bears its prescientific meaning and can signify: carrying something out, completing it, "putting it in order." The expression can also mean obtaining something for oneself, in the sense of "procuring something for oneself." Furthermore, we also use the expression in a characteristic turn of phrase: I am concerned that the undertaking will fail. Here "concern" means something like fearing. In contrast to these prescientific, ontic meanings, the expression "concern" is used in the present investigation as an ontological term (an existential), designating the Being of a possible Being-in-the-world. The title has not been chosen because Dasein is, for instance, initially and to a large extent economic and "practical," but because Dasein's Being itself is to be made visible as care. This expression, in turn, is to be grasped as an ontological structural concept (cf. Chapter 6 of this division). The expression has nothing to do with "toil," "melancholy," and "worry about life," which can be found ontically in every Dasein. Things of this sort, just like "carefreeness" and "cheerfulness," are ontically possible only because Dasein, understood ontologically, is care. Because Being-in-the-world

belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being toward the world is essentially concern.

12.13 According to what has been said, Being-in is not a "property" that Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not, without which it could be just as well as with it. It is not the case that the human being "is" and, in addition, has a relation of Being to the "world" that it occasionally acquires. Dasein is never "initially" a being that is, as it were, free of Being-in and that sometimes has the whim to take up a "relation" to the world. Taking up relations to the world in this way is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This constitution of Being does not first come about because, besides the being with the character of Dasein, another being is present-at-hand and comes together with it. This other being can "meet" "with" Dasein only insofar as it can show itself from itself at all within a world.

12.14 The phrase much used today, "the human being has its environment," says nothing ontologically so long as this "having" remains indeterminate. The very possibility of this "having" is founded in the existential constitution of Being-in. Because it is essentially a being in this way, Dasein can explicitly discover the being it encounters in its environment, know about it, have it at its disposal, and "have" the "world." Ontically trivial talk of "having an environment" is ontologically a problem. Solving it requires nothing other than first determining Dasein's Being in an ontologically adequate way. If biology—especially once again since K. E. v. Baer—makes use of this constitution of Being, one must not conclude that its philosophical use is "biologism." For biology too, as a positive science, can never find and determine this structure—it must presuppose it and constantly make use of it. The structure itself, however, even as the a priori of biology's thematic object, can be explicated philosophically only if it has first been grasped as a structure of Dasein. Only from an orientation toward the ontological structure understood in this way can the constitution of the Being of "life" be delimited a priori by way of privation. Both ontically

and ontologically, Being-in-the-world as concern has priority. In the analytic of Dasein, this structure receives its fundamental interpretation.

12.15 But has the determination of this constitution of Being given so far not moved exclusively within negative statements? We hear only what this supposedly so fundamental Being-in is not. Indeed. Yet this predominance of negative characterization is no accident. Rather, it itself attests the peculiarity of the phenomenon and is thereby positive in a genuine sense appropriate to the phenomenon itself. The phenomenological showing of Being-in-the-world has the character of rejecting dissemblings and coverings-over, because this phenomenon is always already itself "seen" in some way in every Dasein. And this is so because it constitutes a basic constitution of Dasein and, together with Dasein's Being, is always already disclosed to Dasein's understanding of Being. Yet the phenomenon has also, for the most part, always already been just as thoroughly misinterpreted or interpreted in an ontologically inadequate way. But this "seeing in a certain way and yet mostly misinterpreting" is itself grounded in nothing other than this very constitution of Dasein's Being, in accordance with which Dasein initially understands itself ontologically—and that means its Being-in-the-world as well—in terms of beings that Dasein itself is not but that encounter it "within" its world, and in terms of their Being.

12.16 In Dasein itself and for it, this constitution of Being is always already familiar in some way. If it is now to be known, then the knowing that is explicit in such a task takes precisely itself—as knowing the world—to be the exemplary relation of the "soul" to the world. Knowing the world (νοεῖν), or addressing and speaking about "world" (λόγος), therefore functions as the primary mode of Being-in-the-world, without Being-in-the-world being grasped as such. But because this structure of Being remains ontologically inaccessible, yet is nevertheless ontically experienced as a "relation" between a being (world) and a being (soul), and because Being is initially understood by taking its ontological bearings from beings as innerworldly beings, an

attempt is made to grasp this relation between the beings named on the basis of these beings and in terms of their Being, that is, as presence-at-hand. Being-in-the-world—although experienced and acquainted with prephenomenologically—becomes invisible by way of an ontologically inappropriate interpretation. One is now acquainted with the constitution of Dasein only—and indeed as something self-evident—in the form imposed on it by the inappropriate interpretation. In this form, it then becomes the "evident" point of departure for the problems of the theory of knowledge or the "metaphysics of knowledge." For what is more self-evident than that a "subject" relates itself to an "object," and vice versa? This "subject-object relation" must be presupposed. Yet this remains a presupposition—although unassailable in its facticity, nevertheless precisely for that reason quite disastrous—if its ontological necessity and, above all, its ontological sense are left in the dark.

12.17 Because knowing the world for the most part and exclusively serves as the exemplar of the phenomenon of Being-in, and not only for the theory of knowledge—for practical comportment is understood as the "non-" and "atheoretical" comportment—and because this priority of knowing misdirects the understanding of knowing's ownmost way of Being, Being-in-the-world is to be brought out still more sharply with a look toward knowing the world, and knowing the world itself is to be made visible as an existential "modality" of Being-in.

§ 13. THE EXEMPLIFICATION OF BEING-IN BY MEANS OF A FOUNDED MODE. KNOWING THE WORLD

Knowing the world is shown to be a founded mode of Being-in-the-world, not a subject–object relation.

13.1 If Being-in-the-world is a basic constitution of Dasein in which it moves not only in general but pre-eminently in the mode of everydayness, then it must also always already have been experienced ontically. For it to remain totally veiled would be unintelligible, especially since Dasein has at its disposal an understanding of its own Being, however indefinitely this

understanding may function. But as soon as the "phenomenon of knowing the world" was itself grasped, it at once fell into an "external," formal interpretation. The index of this is the still customary way of positing knowing as a "relation between subject and object," which harbors as much "truth" as emptiness. But subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and world.

13.2 Even if it were feasible to determine Being-in ontologically in a primary way from Being-in-the-world that *knows*, the first task this would demand would still be a phenomenal characterization of knowing as a Being in and toward the world. When this relation of Being is reflected upon, what is given in the first instance is a being called nature, as that which is known. Knowing itself is not to be found in this being. If it "is" at all, then it belongs solely to the being that knows. But even in this being, the human thing, knowing is not present-at-hand. At any rate it cannot be ascertained externally in the way that, say, bodily properties can. Now since knowing belongs to this being but is not an external quality, it must be "inside." The more unequivocally one maintains that knowing is in the first instance and properly "inside," indeed that it has nothing at all of the way of Being of a physical or psychical being, the more one believes one is proceeding without presuppositions in the question of the essence of knowledge and in clarifying the relation between subject and object. For only now can a problem arise, namely the question: How does this knowing subject get out of its inner "sphere" into one that is "other and external"? How can knowing have an object at all? How must the object itself be thought so that in the end the subject knows it without needing to venture the leap into another sphere? In this approach, with its many variations, the question of the way of Being of this knowing subject is, however, consistently left out, even though one constantly, if tacitly, always already has its mode of Being in the theme whenever its knowing is discussed. To be sure, one hears in each case the assurance that the inside and the "inner sphere" of the subject is certainly not thought of as a "box" or a "casing." But what the "inside" of immanence, in which knowing is ini-

tially shut in, positively means, and how the character of Being of this "Being-inside" of knowing is grounded in the subject's way of Being: about this there is silence. But however this inner sphere may be interpreted, as soon as the question is simply posed of how knowing gets "out" of it and attains a "transcendence," it comes to light that one finds knowing problematic without first having clarified how and what this knowing, which poses such riddles, actually is at all.

13.3 In this approach one remains blind to what is already tacitly said along with even the most provisional thematization of the phenomenon of knowledge: knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world; it has its ontic foundation in this constitution of Being. To this pointer to the phenomenal findings—*knowing is a way of Being of Being-in-the-world*—one might object: but surely such an interpretation of knowing annihilates the problem of knowledge; what is left to ask if one *presupposes* that knowing is already alongside its world, which it is supposed to reach only by the subject's transcending? Quite apart from the fact that the question just formulated once again brings to light the constructive "standpoint," which has not been demonstrated phenomenally, what authority, then, decides *whether* and *in what sense* a problem of knowledge is supposed to exist, if not the phenomenon of knowing itself and the way of Being of the knower?

13.4 If we now ask what shows itself in the phenomenal findings of knowing itself, then we must hold fast to this: knowing itself is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world, which essentially constitutes the Being of Dasein. This Being-already-alongside is in the first instance not merely a fixed staring at something purely present-at-hand. Being-in-the-world, as concern, is *captivated* by the world it is concerned with. For knowing to be possible as the observational determining of what is present-at-hand, there must first be a *deficiency* in our concernful having-to-do-with the world. In refraining from all producing, manipulating, and the like, concern settles into the only mode of Being-in that now still remains: into just-tarry-

ing-alongside... *On the basis* of this way of Being toward the world, which lets beings encountered within the world be encountered only in their pure *outward look* (εἶδος), and *as* a mode of this way of Being, an explicit looking at what is encountered in this way becomes possible. This *looking at* is in each case a definite taking of direction toward..., a sighting of what is present-at-hand. It takes a "point of view" from the encountered beings in advance. Such looking at itself enters the mode of an independent dwelling alongside innerworldly beings. In a *"dwelling"* of this sort—as refraining from any manipulation and use—the *perceiving* of what is present-at-hand takes place. Perceiving is carried out as *addressing* and *discussing* something as something. On the basis of this *interpreting* in the broadest sense, perceiving becomes *determining.* What is perceived and determined can be expressed in sentences and, as what is thus *asserted,* retained and preserved. This perceptive retaining of an assertion about... is itself a way of Being-in-the-world, and it must not be interpreted as a "process" by which a subject procures representations of something, which, once appropriated in this way, remain stored "inside," and with regard to which the question may then occasionally arise of how they "agree" with reality.

13.5 In directing itself toward... and in grasping, Dasein does not first go out of an inner sphere in which it is initially encapsulated; rather, by its primary way of Being it is always already "outside," alongside beings it encounters in the world that has in each case already been uncovered. And the determining dwelling alongside the beings to be known is not a leaving of the inner sphere; rather, even in this "Being-outside" alongside the object, Dasein is "inside" in the correctly understood sense; that is, it is Dasein itself, as Being-in-the-world, that knows. And again, perceiving what is known is not a return of the grasping that went out, bringing back the booty it has seized into the "casing" of consciousness; rather, even in perceiving, preserving, and retaining, the knowing Dasein *remains outside as Dasein.* In "merely" knowing about a nexus of Being among beings, in

"only" representing them, in "just" "thinking" of them, I am no less alongside beings outside in the world than in an *originary* grasping. Even forgetting something, in which every relation of Being to what was formerly known seems to be extinguished, must be conceived *as a modification of primordial Being-in*; and the same holds for all deception and every error.

13.6 The nexus of foundation we have pointed out among the modes of Being-in-the-world that are constitutive for knowing the world makes plain that in knowing, Dasein gains a new *standing in Being* toward the world that has in each case already been uncovered in Dasein. This new possibility of Being can develop independently, become a task, and, as science, take over the guidance of Being-in-the-world. But knowing neither first *creates* a "commercium" [interchange] of the subject with a world, nor does this commercium *arise* from an action of the world upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded in Being-in-the-world. Therefore Being-in-the-world, as basic constitution, demands a *prior* interpretation.

Division One, Chapter III: The Worldhood of the World

Erster Abschnitt. Drittes Kapitel: Die Weltlichkeit der Welt
§§14–24

§ 14. THE IDEA OF THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD IN GENERAL

Chapter 3 begins: four meanings of "world" are distinguished, and worldhood is identified as an existential.

14.1 Being-in-the-world is first to be made visible with regard to the structural moment "world." Accomplishing this task seems easy, and so trivial that one still believes one may dispense with it. What can it mean to describe "the world" as a phenomenon? To let what shows itself of "beings" within the world be seen. The first step here is an enumeration of what there is "in" the world: houses, trees, human beings, mountains, stars. We can *depict* the "outward look" of these beings and *recount* what happens in and with them. But this clearly remains a pre-phenomenological "business," which cannot be phenomenologically relevant at all. The description stays stuck to beings. It is ontic. But what is sought, surely, is Being. "Phenomenon" in the phenomenological sense was formally determined as that which shows itself as Being and structure of Being.

14.2 To describe the "world" phenomenologically will accordingly mean: to demonstrate the Being of the beings present-at-hand within the world and to fix it conceptually and categorially. The beings within the world are things: natural things and "value-laden" things. Their thinghood becomes a problem; and

insofar as the thinghood of the latter is built upon the thinghood of nature, the Being of natural things, nature as such, is the primary theme. The character of Being of natural things, of substances, which founds everything else, is substantiality. What makes up its ontological meaning? With this we have given the investigation an unequivocal direction of questioning.

14.3 But are we asking ontologically about the "world" here? The problematic we have characterized is undoubtedly ontological. But even if it succeeds in the purest explication of the Being of nature, in conformity with the basic assertions that mathematical natural science makes about these beings, this ontology never hits upon the phenomenon "world." Nature is itself a being that is encountered within the world and becomes uncoverable along various paths and at various stages.

14.4 Should we, then, hold first to the beings alongside which Dasein dwells in the first instance and for the most part, the "value-laden" things? Do they not "properly" show the world in which we live? Perhaps they do in fact show something like "world" more penetratingly. But these things too are, after all, beings "within" the world.

14.5 *Neither the ontic depiction of innerworldly beings nor the ontological interpretation of the Being of these beings hits, as such, upon the phenomenon "world."* In both kinds of access to "objective Being," "world" is already "presupposed," and in different ways.

14.6 Can "world" perhaps, in the end, not be addressed at all as a determination of the beings we have named? Yet we do call these beings innerworldly. Is "world" perhaps a character of Being of Dasein? And does every Dasein then "initially" have its own world? Does "world" not thereby become something "subjective"? How, then, is a "common" world still to be possible, "in" which we after all *are*? And when the question of the "world" is posed, *which* world is meant? Neither this one nor that one, but *the worldhood of world in general.* By what path do we encounter this phenomenon?

14.7 "Worldhood" is an ontological concept and means the structure of a constitutive moment of Being-in-the-world. But

Being-in-the-world we know as an existential determination of Dasein. Worldhood is accordingly itself an existential. When we ask ontologically about the "world," we by no means leave the thematic field of the analytic of Dasein. Ontologically, "world" is not a determination *of* those beings that Dasein essentially is *not*, but a character of Dasein itself. This does not rule out that the investigation of the phenomenon "world" must take its path by way of innerworldly beings and their Being. The task of a phenomenological "description" of the world is so far from obvious that even determining it adequately calls for essential ontological clarifications.

14.8 From the reflections we have carried out, and from the frequent use of the word "world," its ambiguity leaps to the eye. Disentangling this ambiguity can give an indication of the phenomena meant in the various meanings and of how they are interconnected.

14.9 1. World is used as an ontic concept and then means the totality of beings that can be present-at-hand within the world.

14.10 2. World functions as an ontological term and means the Being of the beings named under no. 1. And indeed "world" can become the title for the region that in each case embraces a manifold of beings; for example, when we speak of the "world" of the mathematician, world means the region of the possible objects of mathematics.

14.11 3. World can again be understood in an ontic sense, but now not as the beings that Dasein essentially is not and that can be encountered within the world, but as that *"wherein"* a factical Dasein, as this Dasein, "lives." World here has a pre-ontological, existentiell meaning. Here again there are various possibilities: world means the "public" we-world, or one's "own" and nearest (domestic) environment.

14.12 4. Finally, world designates the ontological-existential concept of *worldhood.* Worldhood itself can be modified into the structural whole of any particular "worlds," but it contains within itself the a priori of worldhood in general. We use the expression world as a technical term for the meaning fixed

under no. 3. If it is sometimes used in the first sense, this meaning is marked with quotation marks.

14.13 The variant "worldly" then terminologically means a way of Being of Dasein, and never a way of Being of the beings present-at-hand "in" the world. These we call belonging to the world, or innerworldly.

14.14 A glance at ontology up to now shows that the failure to grasp Being-in-the-world as a constitution of Dasein goes together with *skipping over* the phenomenon of worldhood. Instead, one tries to interpret the world in terms of the Being of the beings that are present-at-hand within the world but that, moreover, are initially not uncovered at all: in terms of nature. Nature, understood ontologically and categorially, is a limit case of the Being of possible innerworldly beings. Dasein can uncover beings as nature only in a definite mode of its Being-in-the-world. This knowing has the character of a certain deworlding of the world. "Nature," as the categorial sum of the structures of Being of definite beings encountered within the world, can never make *worldhood* intelligible. But even the phenomenon "nature," in the sense, say, of the Romantic concept of nature, can be grasped ontologically only in terms of the concept of world, that is, in terms of the analytic of Dasein.

14.15 With regard to the problem of an ontological analysis of the worldhood of the world, the ontology that has been handed down—if it sees the problem at all—is moving in a blind alley. On the other hand, an interpretation of the worldhood of Dasein, and of the possibilities and kinds of its becoming worldly, will have to show *why* Dasein, in the way of Being of knowing the world, skips over the phenomenon of worldhood both ontically and ontologically. But the very fact of this skipping over also indicates that special precautions are needed in order to gain, for access to the phenomenon of worldhood, the right phenomenal point of departure, one that prevents such skipping over.

14.16 The methodological directive for this has already been given. Being-in-the-world, and accordingly the world as well,

are to become the theme of the analytic within the horizon of average everydayness, as the *nearest* way of Being of Dasein. We must follow up everyday Being-in-the-world, and, by keeping phenomenally to it, something like world must come into view.

14.17 The nearest world of everyday Dasein is the *environment.* The investigation takes its course from this existential character of average Being-in-the-world to the idea of worldhood in general. We seek the worldhood of the environment (environmentality) by way of an ontological interpretation of the inner-*environmental* beings encountered nearest. The expression Umwelt [environment] contains, in its "Um" [around], a reference to spatiality. The "round about," which is constitutive for the environment, does not, however, have a primarily "spatial" meaning. Rather, the spatial character that indisputably belongs to an environment can be clarified only in terms of the structure of worldhood. From here, the spatiality of Dasein indicated in § 12 becomes phenomenally visible. But ontology has tried precisely to interpret the Being of the "world" as res extensa [extended thing] on the basis of spatiality.[1] The most extreme tendency toward such an ontology of the "world," and one oriented, moreover, by contrast with the res cogitans [thinking thing], which coincides with Dasein neither ontically nor ontologically, shows itself in *Descartes.* By marking itself off from this ontological tendency, the analysis of worldhood attempted here can make itself clearer. It proceeds in three stages: A. Analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general. B. Illustrative contrast between the analysis of worldhood and the ontology of the "world" in *Descartes.* C. The aroundness of the environment and the "spatiality" of Dasein.[2]

1 The German *Umwelt* is literally the "world around" us; its prefix *um-* means "around."

2 René Descartes (1596–1650), French philosopher; *res extensa* and *res cogitans* are his terms for extended (material) substance and thinking substance.

A. THE ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTALITY AND WORLDHOOD IN GENERAL. § 15. THE BEING OF THE BEINGS ENCOUNTERED IN THE ENVIRONMENT

The things we deal with are equipment, and their way of Being is readiness-to-hand.

15.1 The phenomenological demonstration of the Being of the beings encountered nearest is carried out following the guiding thread of everyday Being-in-the-world, which we also call our *dealings in* the world and *with* innerworldly beings. These dealings have already dispersed themselves into a manifold of ways of concern. But the nearest kind of dealings is, as has been shown, not a knowing that just perceives, but a concern that manipulates and uses things and has its own "knowledge." The phenomenological question concerns in the first instance the Being of the beings encountered in such concern. To secure the kind of seeing required here, a methodological preliminary remark is needed.

15.2 In the disclosure and explication of Being, beings are in each case what is pre-thematic and co-thematic; Being is what properly stands as the theme. Within the domain of the present analysis, the pre-thematic beings we posit are those that show themselves in environmental concern. These beings are not, here, the object of a theoretical knowing of the "world"; they are what is used, what is produced, and the like. As beings encountered in this way, they come pre-thematically into the view of a "knowing" which, as phenomenological, looks primarily at Being and, on the basis of this thematizing of Being, co-thematizes the beings in question in each case. This phenomenological interpreting is accordingly not a knowing of the qualities that beings have as beings, but a determining of the structure of their Being. But as an investigation of Being, it becomes the independent and explicit carrying out of the understanding of Being that always already belongs to Dasein and is "alive" in all dealings with beings. The phenomenologically pre-thematic beings—here, then, what is used, what is in the course of being

produced—become accessible when we put ourselves into such concern. Strictly speaking, this talk of putting ourselves into it is misleading, for we do not first need to put ourselves into this way of Being of concernful dealings. Everyday Dasein always already *is* in this way; for example, in opening the door, I make use of the handle. Rather, gaining phenomenological access to the beings encountered in this way consists in thrusting aside the interpretive tendencies that crowd in and run alongside, which cover over the phenomenon of such "concern" altogether and, together with it, even more so the beings *as* they are encountered of themselves *in* concern and for it. These insidious mistakes become clear if we now ask, by way of investigation: Which beings are to become the pre-theme and be established as the pre-phenomenal ground?

15.3 One answers: things. But with this self-evident answer, the pre-phenomenal ground we are seeking has perhaps already been missed. For in addressing beings as "things" (res) there lies a tacitly anticipatory ontological characterization. An analysis that goes on from such beings to ask about Being comes upon thinghood and reality. Ontological explication thus progressively finds characters of Being such as substantiality, materiality, extendedness, side-by-side-ness… But the beings encountered in concern are, in this Being, initially hidden even pre-ontologically. In naming things as the beings "initially given," one goes astray ontologically, although ontically one means something else. What one actually means remains undetermined. Or else one characterizes these "things" as "value-laden" things. What does value mean ontologically? How are this "adhering" and this Being-laden to be grasped categorially? Leaving aside the obscurity of this structure of value-ladenness, has the phenomenal character of Being of what is encountered in concernful dealings thereby been hit upon?

15.4 The Greeks had an appropriate term for "things": *πράγματα*, that is, that with which one has to do in concernful dealings (*πρᾶξις*). But ontologically they left precisely the specifically "pragmatic" character of the *πράγματα* in the dark and

determined them "initially" as "mere things." We call the beings encountered in concern *equipment.* In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, for sewing, for working, for traveling, for measuring. The way of Being of equipment must be brought out. This is done by following the guiding thread of a prior delimitation of what makes an item of equipment equipment: equipmentality.[3]

15.5 Strictly speaking, there never "is" *an* item of equipment. To the Being of equipment there always belongs, in each case, a totality of equipment in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially "something in order to...." The various ways of the "in-order-to," such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, handiness, constitute a totality of equipment. In the structure "in-order-to" there lies a *reference* of something to something. The phenomenon indicated by this term can be made visible in its ontological genesis only in the analyses that follow. For the present, the task is to get a manifold of references phenomenally into view. Equipment, in keeping with its equipmentality, always is *in terms of* its belonging to other equipment: writing equipment, pen, ink, paper, desk pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These "things" never show themselves initially on their own, so as then to fill a room as a sum of real things. What is encountered nearest, although not grasped thematically, is the room, and this again not as what is "between the four walls" in a geometric, spatial sense—but as equipment for dwelling. In terms of the room, the "furnishings" show themselves, and in these, the particular "individual" item of equipment. *Before* this, a totality of equipment has in each case already been uncovered.

15.6 The dealings that are in each case tailored to the equipment, in which alone it can show itself genuinely in its Being, for example hammering with the hammer, neither *grasp* this being thematically as a thing that occurs, nor does the using, say, know about the structure of equipment as such. Hammer-

3 *Zeug* (equipment) is a collective noun; Heidegger's list plays on compounds such as *Schreibzeug* (writing things), *Werkzeug* (tool) and *Fahrzeug* (vehicle).

ing does not merely have, in addition, a knowledge of the hammer's character as equipment; rather, it has appropriated this equipment in a way that could not be more appropriate. In such using dealings, concern subordinates itself to the in-order-to that is constitutive for the equipment in question; the less the hammer-thing is merely stared at, the more actively it is taken hold of and used, the more primordial our relation to it becomes, and the more unveiledly it is encountered as what it is: as equipment. Hammering itself uncovers the specific "handiness" of the hammer. The way of Being of equipment in which it reveals itself from itself we call readiness-to-hand. Only because equipment has *this* "Being-in-itself" and does not merely occur is it handy in the broadest sense and at our disposal. The sharpest just-*looking at* the "outward look" of things, however they may be constituted, cannot uncover what is ready-to-hand. A gaze that looks at things only "theoretically" lacks any understanding of readiness-to-hand. But dealings that use and manipulate are not blind; they have their own kind of sight, which guides the manipulating and gives it its specific thingly character. Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold of references of the "in-order-to." The sight of such accommodating is *circumspection.*[4]

15.7 "Practical" comportment is not "atheoretical" in the sense of being sightless, and its difference from theoretical comportment does not lie only in the fact that in the one case we observe and in the other we *act*, and that acting, so as not to remain blind, applies theoretical knowledge; rather, observing is just as primordially a concern as acting has *its* sight. Theoretical comportment is just-looking, without circumspection. Because it is without circumspection, this looking is not therefore without rules; it forms its canon in *method.*

15.8 What is ready-to-hand is neither grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself initially thematic for circumspection in a cir-

4 *Zuhandenheit* comes from *zuhanden,* "at hand" or "to hand," in contrast to *Vorhandenheit,* the presence-at-hand of what merely lies before us. *Umsicht,* circumspection, is literally "looking around."

cumspective way. What is peculiar to what is initially ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it withdraws, as it were, precisely in order to be properly ready-to-hand. Nor is that alongside which our everyday dealings initially dwell the tools themselves; rather, the work, what is to be produced in each case, is what is primarily concerned with and therefore also what is ready-to-hand. The work bears the referential totality within which equipment is encountered.

15.9 The work to be produced, as the what-for of hammer, plane, needle, has for its part the way of Being of equipment. The shoe to be produced is for wearing (footwear); the clock that has been made is for telling the time. The work chiefly encountered in concernful dealings—the one being worked on—lets the what-for of its usability, a usability that belongs essentially to it, always already be encountered along with it. The work that has been ordered, for its part, is only on the basis of its use and of the referential nexus of beings uncovered in that use.

15.10 But the work to be produced is not only usable for...; producing is itself in each case a using of something for something. In the work there lies at the same time a reference to "materials." It depends on leather, thread, nails, and the like. Leather in turn is produced from hides. These are taken from animals that are bred by others. Animals also occur within the world without being bred, and even when they are bred, these beings in a certain way produce themselves. In the environment, therefore, beings also become accessible that in themselves need no producing and are always already ready-to-hand. Hammer, tongs, nail refer in themselves to—they consist of—steel, iron, ore, stone, wood. In equipment that is used, "nature" is also uncovered through the use: "nature" in the light of natural products.

15.11 But nature must not be understood here as what is merely present-at-hand—nor as the power of nature either. The forest is timberland, the mountain a quarry, the river water power, the wind is wind "in the sails." Along with the uncovered "environ-

ment," the "nature" uncovered in this way is encountered. Its way of Being as ready-to-hand can be disregarded, and nature itself can be uncovered and determined solely in its pure presence-at-hand. But to this uncovering of nature, nature as what "stirs and strives," what assails us, what takes us captive as landscape, remains hidden. The botanist's plants are not the flowers along the field's edge; the geographically fixed "rising" of a river is not the "spring in the dell."

15.12 The work that has been produced refers not only to the what-for of its usability and the whereof of its consisting; under simple conditions of craft, there lies in it at the same time the reference to the one who wears and uses it. The work is cut to fit his body; he "is" there too as the work comes into being. In the production of mass-produced goods this constitutive reference is by no means missing; it is merely indeterminate, pointing to anyone at all, to the average. Along with the work, therefore, we encounter not only beings that are ready-to-hand but also beings with the way of Being of Dasein, for whom what is produced becomes ready-to-hand in their concern; and together with this we encounter the world in which the wearers and consumers live, a world that is at the same time ours. The work concerned with in each case is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop, say, but in the *public world.* Along with this public world, *environing nature* is uncovered and accessible to everyone. In paths, streets, bridges, buildings, nature is uncovered by concern in a definite direction. A covered railway platform takes bad weather into account; public lighting installations take darkness into account, that is, the specific alternation of the presence and absence of daylight, the "position of the sun." In clocks, account is in each case taken of a definite constellation in the world-system. When we look at the clock, we tacitly make use of the "position of the sun," according to which the official astronomical regulation of time-measurement is carried out. In using the clock equipment that is initially and inconspicuously ready-to-hand, environing nature is ready-to-hand along with it. It belongs to the essence of the uncover-

ing function of each concernful absorption in the nearest world of work that, depending on the kind of absorption in it, the innerworldly beings brought along in the work, that is, in its constitutive references, remain uncoverable in various degrees of explicitness and to various extents of circumspective penetration.

15.13 The way of Being of these beings is readiness-to-hand. It must not, however, be understood as a mere character of how they are taken, as if such "aspects" were talked into the "beings" initially encountered, as if a world-stuff initially present-at-hand in itself were in this way "subjectively colored." An interpretation headed in this direction overlooks the fact that, for this to be so, beings would first have to be understood and uncovered as purely present-at-hand, and would have to have priority and take the lead in the course of our uncovering and appropriating dealings with the "world." But this already runs counter to the ontological meaning of knowing, which we have shown to be a *founded* mode of Being-in-the-world. Knowing presses forward to exposing what is merely present-at-hand only *by way of* what is ready-to-hand in concern. *Readiness-to-hand is the ontological-categorial determination of beings as they are "in themselves."* But surely "there is" what is ready-to-hand only on the basis of what is present-at-hand. Yet does it follow from this—granting the thesis for once—that readiness-to-hand is ontologically founded in presence-at-hand?

15.14 But even if, in further ontological interpretation, readiness-to-hand should prove itself to be the way of Being of the beings initially uncovered within the world, and even if its primordiality over against pure presence-at-hand could be demonstrated—has what we have explicated so far gained the slightest thing for the ontological understanding of the phenomenon of world? After all, in interpreting these innerworldly beings we have always already "presupposed" world. Putting these beings together does not, surely, yield something like "world" as their sum. Does any path at all lead from the Being of these beings to the demonstration of the phenomenon of world?

§ 16. THE WORLDLY CHARACTER OF THE ENVIRONMENT ANNOUNCING ITSELF IN INNERWORLDLY BEINGS

Damaged, missing, or obstructive equipment makes the referential whole, and so the world, conspicuous.

16.1 World is itself not an innerworldly being, and yet it determines these beings so thoroughly that they can be encountered, and beings once uncovered can show themselves in their Being, only insofar as "there is" world. But how "is there" world? If Dasein is ontically constituted by Being-in-the-world, and if an understanding of the Being of its self belongs just as essentially to its Being, however indeterminate that understanding may be, does it not then have an understanding of world, a pre-ontological understanding, which admittedly lacks, and can lack, explicit ontological insights? Does not something like world show itself to concernful Being-in-the-world along with the beings encountered within the world, that is, along with their innerworldliness? Does this phenomenon not come into a pre-phenomenological view? Does it not always already stand in such a view, without demanding a thematically ontological interpretation? Does Dasein itself, within the scope of its concernful absorption alongside the ready-to-hand equipment, have a possibility of Being in which, *along with* the innerworldly beings it is concerned with, their worldhood in a certain way lights up for it?

16.2 If such possibilities of Being of Dasein can be pointed out within concernful dealings, then a path opens up for pursuing the phenomenon that lights up in this way, and for trying, as it were, to "corner" it and to question it about the structures that show themselves in it.

16.3 To the everydayness of Being-in-the-world belong modes of concern that let the beings concerned with be encountered in such a way that the worldly character of what is innerworldly comes to the fore. The nearest ready-to-hand beings can be come across in concern as unusable, as not fitted for their definite use. A tool turns out to be damaged, the material unsuitable.

In each case *equipment* is here ready-to-hand. But what uncovers the unusability is not the ascertaining of properties by looking at them, but the circumspection of using dealings. In such uncovering of unusability, the equipment becomes conspicuous. *Conspicuousness* presents the ready-to-hand equipment in a certain unreadiness-to-hand. But this implies: what cannot be used just lies there—it shows itself as an equipment-thing that looks thus and so and that, in its readiness-to-hand, as looking thus, was constantly present-at-hand as well. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in the equipment, only to withdraw again into the readiness-to-hand of what is concerned with, that is, of what is being repaired. This presence-at-hand of the unusable does not yet simply lack all readiness-to-hand; equipment that is present-at-hand *in this way* is not yet a thing that merely occurs somewhere. The damage to the equipment is not yet a mere alteration of a thing, a change of properties that simply occurs in something present-at-hand.

16.4 But concernful dealings come up not only against something unusable *within* what is already ready-to-hand in each case; they also find something that is missing, something that is not only not "handy" but not "to hand" at all. Missing something in this way, as coming across something unready-to-hand, again uncovers what is ready-to-hand in a certain just-Being-present-at-hand. In noticing what is unready-to-hand, what is ready-to-hand enters the mode of *obtrusiveness.* The more urgently what is missing is needed, and the more properly it is encountered in its unreadiness-to-hand, the more obtrusive what is ready-to-hand becomes, so much so that it seems to lose the character of readiness-to-hand. It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand that cannot be budged without what is missing. Standing before it at a loss, as a deficient mode of concern, uncovers the just-Being-present-at-hand of something ready-to-hand.

16.5 In dealings with the "world" we are concerned with, what is unready-to-hand can be encountered not only in the sense of what is unusable or simply missing, but as something unready-to-hand that is precisely *not* missing and *not* unusable, but that

"lies in the way" of concern. That to which concern cannot turn, for which it has "no time," is *un*ready-to-hand in the manner of what does not belong here, of what has not been attended to. This unready-to-hand thing disturbs us and makes visible the obstinacy of what is to be concerned with in the first instance and beforehand. With this obstinacy, the presence-at-hand of what is ready-to-hand announces itself in a new way, as the Being of what still lies before us and calls to be attended to.

16.6 The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy have the function of bringing to the fore, in what is present-at-hand, the character of presence-at-hand. But in this, what is ready-to-hand is not yet merely observed and stared at as something present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand that makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of the equipment. The equipment does not yet veil itself into mere things. The equipment becomes "stuff" in the sense of something one would like to thrust away; but in such a tendency to thrust away, what is ready-to-hand shows itself as still ready-to-hand, in its unrelenting presence-at-hand.[5]

16.7 But what is this pointer to the modified way of encountering what is ready-to-hand, in which its presence-at-hand is revealed, supposed to accomplish for clarifying the phenomenon of world? Even with the analysis of this modification we are still standing at the Being of what is innerworldly; we have not yet come any closer to the phenomenon of world. It has not yet been grasped, but we have now put ourselves in a position to bring the phenomenon into view.

16.8 In conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy, what is ready-to-hand in a certain way loses its readiness-to-hand. But this readiness-to-hand is itself understood, although unthematically, in dealings with what is ready-to-hand. It does not simply vanish; rather, in the conspicuousness of the unusable it takes its leave, as it were. Readiness-to-hand shows itself once more,

5 In everyday German *Zeug* also means "stuff" or "junk," which is the sense Heidegger quotes here.

and precisely in doing so the worldly character of what is ready-to-hand also shows itself.

16.9 The structure of the Being of what is ready-to-hand as equipment is determined by references. The peculiar and self-evident "in-itself" of the nearest "things" is encountered in the concern that uses them without explicitly heeding them, a concern that can come up against something unusable. An item of equipment is unusable: this implies that the constitutive reference of the in-order-to to a for-that has been disturbed. The references themselves are not observed; rather, they are "there" in concern's placing itself under them. But in a disturbance of reference—in unusability for...—the reference becomes explicit. Not yet, even now, as an ontological structure, but ontically, for the circumspection that is brought up short by the damage to the tool. With this circumspective arousing of the reference to the particular for-that, the for-that itself comes into sight, and along with it the nexus of work, the whole "workshop," and indeed as that wherein concern always already dwells. The nexus of equipment lights up not as something never seen before, but as a whole that has constantly been sighted beforehand in circumspection. But with this whole, the world announces itself.

16.10 Likewise, the missing of something ready-to-hand, whose everyday Being-around was so self-evident that we never even took notice of it, is a break in the referential nexuses uncovered in circumspection. Circumspection comes up against emptiness and only now sees for what and with what the missing item was ready-to-hand. Once again the environment announces itself. What lights up in this way is itself not one ready-to-hand thing among others, and still less something present-at-hand that, say, founds the ready-to-hand equipment. It is in the "there" before any ascertaining or observing. It is itself inaccessible to circumspection, insofar as circumspection always goes toward beings; but it has in each case already been disclosed for circumspection. "Disclose" and "disclosedness" are used as technical terms in what follows and mean "unlock"—"unlockedness." "Disclos-

ing" accordingly never means anything like "obtaining indirectly by an inference."[6]

16.11 That the world does not "consist" of what is ready-to-hand is shown, among other things, by the fact that the lighting up of the world in the modes of concern we have interpreted goes together with a deworlding of what is ready-to-hand, so that its just-Being-present-at-hand comes to the fore. If, in the everyday concern with the "environment," the ready-to-hand equipment is to be able to be encountered in its "Being-in-itself," then the references and referential totalities in which circumspection is "absorbed" must remain unthematic for circumspection, and all the more so for a grasping that is non-circumspective and "thematic." The world's not announcing itself is the condition of the possibility of what is ready-to-hand not stepping out of its inconspicuousness. And in this the phenomenal structure of the Being-in-itself of these beings is constituted.

16.12 Privative expressions such as inconspicuousness, unobtrusiveness, unobstinacy mean a positive phenomenal character of the Being of what is initially ready-to-hand. These "un-"s mean the character of what is ready-to-hand holding itself in, that which we have in view with Being-in-itself, which, characteristically, we "initially" ascribe to what is present-at-hand, as what can be thematically ascertained. With a primary and exclusive orientation toward what is present-at-hand, the "in-itself" cannot be clarified ontologically at all. Yet an interpretation must be demanded if talk of the "in-itself" is to be ontologically significant. One usually appeals to this in-itself of Being ontically and emphatically, and with phenomenal justification. But this ontic appeal does not already fulfill the claim of the ontological assertion supposedly given with such an appeal. The analysis so far already makes plain that the Being-in-itself of innerworldly beings can be grasped ontologically only on the basis of the phenomenon of world.

16.13 But if the world can light up in a certain way, it must be disclosed at all. With the accessibility of innerworldly ready-to-

hand things for circumspective concern, world has in each case already been predisclosed. It is accordingly something "wherein" Dasein as a being in each case already was, something to which, in any arriving at something, however explicit, it can only ever come back.

16.14 According to our interpretation so far, Being-in-the-world means: unthematic, circumspective absorption in the references constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of the totality of equipment. Concern always already is as it is on the basis of a familiarity with world. In this familiarity Dasein can lose itself in what is encountered within the world and be captivated by it. What is it with which Dasein is familiar? Why can the worldly character of what is innerworldly light up? How, more precisely, is the referential totality to be understood within which circumspection "moves," and whose possible breaks push the readiness-to-hand of beings to the fore?

16.15 To answer these questions, which aim at working out the phenomenon and problem of worldhood, a more concrete analysis is required of the structures into whose nexus of construction the questions we have raised are inquiring.

§ 17. REFERENCE AND SIGNS

An analysis of signs clarifies reference and shows how signs make the environment explicitly accessible.

17.1 In our provisional interpretation of the structure of Being of the ready-to-hand (of "equipment"), the phenomenon of reference became visible. It did so only in rough outline, however, and so we stressed at the same time that this phenomenon, so far merely indicated, needed to be uncovered with regard to its ontological provenance. It also became clear that reference and the totality of references will in some sense be constitutive for worldhood itself. So far we have seen the world light up only in and for certain ways of environmental concern with what is

6 In ordinary German *erschließen* can also mean "to infer" (from *Schluß*, conclusion); Heidegger excludes this sense.

ready-to-hand, and indeed *together with* its readiness-to-hand. The further we advance in understanding the Being of inner-worldly beings, therefore, the broader and more secure the phenomenal ground for laying bare the phenomenon of the world will become.

17.2 We again take our start from the Being of the ready-to-hand, this time with the aim of grasping the phenomenon of *reference* itself more sharply. To this end we attempt an ontological analysis of an item of equipment in which "references" can be found in more than one sense. We find "equipment" of this kind in *signs*. This word names many things. It covers not only different *kinds* of sign; Being-a-sign-for ... can itself be formalized into a *universal kind of relation*, so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological guideline for a "characterization" of all beings whatsoever.

17.3 In the first instance, however, signs are themselves items of equipment, and their specific character as equipment consists in *showing*. Signs of this kind are signposts, boundary stones, the storm-warning ball for shipping, signals, flags, signs of mourning, and the like. Showing can be defined as a "kind" of referring. Referring, taken in an extremely formal way, is *relating*. But relation does not function as the genus for "kinds" of reference that might be differentiated into, say, sign, symbol, expression, and meaning. Relation is a formal determination. By way of "formalization" it can be read off directly from every kind of connection, whatever its content and way of Being.

17.4 Every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference. Every "showing" is a reference, but not every referring is a showing. This implies at the same time that every "showing" is a relation, but not every relating is a showing. The formally general character of relation thus comes to light. Nothing is gained for investigating the phenomena of reference, sign or even meaning by characterizing them as relation. In the end it must even be shown that "relation" itself, *because of* its formally general character, has its ontological origin in a reference.

17.5 Even if the present analysis confines itself to interpreting the sign as distinct from the phenomenon of reference, the closed multiplicity of possible signs cannot be adequately investigated within this limit either. Among signs there are indications, portents and retrospective signs, reminders, and identifying marks. The showing of each differs, quite apart from what in each case serves as such a sign. From these "signs" we must distinguish trace, remnant, monument, document, testimony, symbol, expression, appearance, and meaning. These phenomena are easily formalized on the basis of their formal character of relation. Today we are especially quick, guided by such a "relation," to subject all beings to an "interpretation" that always "fits" because at bottom it says nothing—no more than the handy schema of form and content does.

17.6 As our example of a sign we choose one that is to serve as an example in another respect in a later analysis. Motor cars have recently been fitted with a red, rotatable arrow. Its position at any given time—at a crossroads, for example—shows which way the car will take. The position of the arrow is controlled by the driver. This sign is an item of equipment that is ready-to-hand not only in the driver's concern (steering). Those who are not riding in the car—and they in particular—also make use of this equipment, namely by giving way to the appropriate side or by stopping. This sign is ready-to-hand within the world in the whole of the nexus of equipment made up of means of transport and traffic regulations. As an item of equipment, this equipment for showing is constituted by reference.[7] It has the character of the in-order-to, its definite serviceability; it is for showing. This showing of the sign can be taken as "referring." But here we must note: this "referring" as showing is not the ontological structure of the sign as equipment.

17.7 Rather, "referring" as showing is grounded in the structure of Being of equipment, in serviceability for. Serviceability does not by itself make a being a sign. The equipment "hammer" is

7 Heidegger means the mechanical direction indicator of 1920s cars, a small arm or arrow that swung out from the side of the vehicle.

also constituted by a serviceability, but that does not make the hammer a sign. The "reference" showing is the ontic concretion of the what-for of a serviceability, and it determines an item of equipment for this what-for. The reference "serviceability for," by contrast, is an ontological-categorial determinateness of equipment *as* equipment. That the what-for of the serviceability receives its concretion in showing is accidental to the constitution of equipment as such. Even this example of the sign roughly shows the difference between reference as serviceability and reference as showing. The two coincide so little that only in their unity do they make possible the concretion of a particular kind of equipment. Showing is fundamentally different from referring as the constitution of equipment. But just as certainly, it is indisputable that the sign in turn has a peculiar and even distinctive relation to the way of Being of the totality of equipment ready-to-hand in the environment in each case, and to its worldly character. In concernful dealings, equipment for showing has a *preeminent* use. Ontologically, however, it cannot be enough simply to state this fact. The ground and meaning of this preeminence must be clarified.

17.8 What does the showing of a sign mean? We can answer this only if we define the kind of dealings appropriate to equipment for showing. In these dealings its readiness-to-hand must also become genuinely graspable. What is the appropriate having-to-do-with signs? Taking our orientation from the example mentioned (the arrow), we must say: the corresponding comportment (Being) toward the sign we encounter is "giving way" or "stopping" in the face of the approaching car that carries the arrow. Giving way, as taking a direction, belongs essentially to Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Dasein is always somehow directed and under way; standing and staying are only limiting cases of this directed "being-under-way." The sign addresses itself to a specifically "spatial" Being-in-the-world. The sign is properly "grasped" precisely *not* when we stare at it and register it as a thing for showing that occurs before us. Even if we follow with our eyes the direction in which the arrow points and look at

something present-at-hand within the region into which it points, even then the sign is not properly encountered. It addresses itself to the circumspection of concernful dealings, in such a way that circumspection, following its directive and going along with it, brings the "around" of the environment in each case into an explicit "survey." Circumspective surveying does not *grasp* the ready-to-hand; rather, it gains an orientation within the environment. Another possibility of experiencing equipment is that the arrow is encountered as an item of equipment belonging to the car. Here the specific equipmental character of the arrow need not be uncovered; it may remain completely undetermined what it is supposed to show and how, and yet what is encountered is no pure thing. As against our closest finding of a multiplicity of equipment that is in many ways undetermined, the experience of things requires a *determinateness* of its own.

17.9 Signs of the kind described let the ready-to-hand be encountered. More precisely, they let a nexus of it become accessible in such a way that concernful dealings give themselves an orientation and secure it. A sign is not a thing that stands in a showing relation to another thing; it is *an item of equipment that explicitly raises a totality of equipment into circumspection, so that together with this the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself.* In indications and portents, "what is coming" "shows itself," but not in the sense of something merely occurring that is added to what is already present-at-hand. "What is coming" is something we get ready for, or "were not ready for" insofar as we were busy with something else. In retrospective signs, what has taken place and run its course becomes circumspectively accessible. The reminder shows "where" one stands in each case. Signs always primarily show that "in which" one lives, that alongside which concern dwells, and what involvement there is with it.

17.10 The peculiar equipmental character of signs becomes especially clear in the "instituting of signs." This takes place in and out of a circumspective fore-sight that needs the ready-to-

hand possibility of letting the particular environment announce itself for circumspection at any time through something ready-to-hand. But to the Being of what is closest ready-to-hand within the world belongs the character, already described, of holding itself in and not stepping forward. Circumspective dealings in the environment therefore need an item of equipment ready-to-hand that, in its equipmental character, takes over the "work" of *letting* what is ready-to-hand *become conspicuous*. That is why the production of such equipment (signs) must pay heed to its conspicuousness. But even as so conspicuous, signs are not left to be present-at-hand just anywhere; they are "put up" in a definite way with a view to easy accessibility.

17.11 The instituting of signs, however, need not necessarily take place by producing an item of equipment that is not yet ready-to-hand at all. Signs also arise in the *taking-as-a-sign* of something already ready-to-hand. In this mode the instituting of signs reveals a still more primordial meaning. Showing does not merely provide the circumspectively oriented availability of a ready-to-hand totality of equipment and of the environment in general; the instituting of signs can even uncover for the first time. What is taken as a sign first becomes accessible through its readiness-to-hand. Suppose, for example, that in farming the south wind "counts" as a sign of rain. Then this "counting," or the "value attaching" to this being, is not an extra added to something already present-at-hand in itself—the current of air and a definite geographical direction. As this merely occurring thing, which is how it may be accessible to meteorology, the south wind is *never in the first instance* present-at-hand, only then to take over, now and then, the function of a portent. On the contrary, it is precisely the circumspection of farming, in the way it takes the wind into account, that first uncovers the south wind in its Being.

17.12 But, it will be objected, *what* is taken as a sign must surely first have become accessible in itself and been grasped *before* the sign is instituted. Certainly, it must already be there to be found in some way or other. The only question is *how* the being is

uncovered in this prior encounter: as a pure thing that occurs, or rather as equipment not understood, as something ready-to-hand with which one had so far not known "what to do," and which therefore still veiled itself from circumspection. *Here again, one must not interpret the equipmental characters of the ready-to-hand that circumspection has not yet uncovered as mere thinghood, pregiven for a grasping of what is merely present-at-hand.*

17.13 The readiness-to-hand of signs in everyday dealings, and the conspicuousness that belongs to signs and can be produced with various aims and in various ways, do not merely document the inconspicuousness constitutive of what is closest ready-to-hand. The sign itself takes its conspicuousness from the inconspicuousness of the totality of equipment ready-to-hand that is "self-evident" in everydayness—for example, the familiar "knot in the handkerchief" as a reminder. What it is to show is in each case something to be concerned with in the circumspection of everydayness. This sign can show many things, and things of the most diverse kinds. The breadth of what can be shown in such a sign is matched by the narrowness of its intelligibility and use. Not only is it, as a sign, mostly ready-to-hand only for its "institutor"; it can become inaccessible even to the institutor, so that a second sign is needed for the possible circumspective usability of the first. The knot that can no longer be used as a sign does not thereby lose its character as a sign. Rather, it acquires the disquieting obtrusiveness of something closest ready-to-hand.

17.14 One might be tempted to illustrate the preeminent role of signs in everyday concern for the understanding of the world itself by the abundant use of "signs" in primitive Dasein, for instance in fetish and magic. Certainly the instituting of signs that underlies such use of signs does not take place with a theoretical aim or by way of theoretical speculation. The use of signs remains entirely within an "immediate" Being-in-the-world. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that interpreting fetish and magic by the guideline of the idea of the sign in general is not sufficient to grasp the kind of "readiness-to-hand" of

the beings encountered in the primitive world. With regard to the phenomenon of the sign, the following interpretation might be given: for primitive humans, the sign coincides with what is shown. The sign itself can stand in for what is shown, not only in the sense of replacing it, but in such a way that the sign itself always *is* what is shown. This remarkable coincidence of the sign with what is shown, however, is not due to the sign-thing's having already undergone a certain "objectification," so that it is experienced as a pure thing and transposed, along with what is shown, into the same region of Being of the present-at-hand. The "coinciding" is not an identification of things previously isolated; it is the sign's not-yet-becoming-free from what it signifies. Such use of signs is still entirely absorbed in Being toward what is shown, so that a sign as such cannot yet detach itself at all. The coinciding is grounded not in a first objectification but in the complete absence of any. But this means that signs are not uncovered as equipment at all, and that in the end what is "ready-to-hand" within the world does not have the way of Being of equipment at all. Perhaps even this ontological guideline (readiness-to-hand and equipment) can accomplish nothing for an interpretation of the primitive world—though certainly the ontology of thinghood can accomplish still less. But if an understanding of Being is constitutive for primitive Dasein and the primitive world at all, then it is all the more urgent to work out the "formal" idea of worldhood. Or rather, we need to work out a phenomenon that can be modified in such a way that all ontological assertions to the effect that, in a given phenomenal context, something is *not yet* this or *no longer* this, acquire a *positive* phenomenal meaning from what it is *not*.

17.15 The foregoing interpretation of the sign was meant only to provide a phenomenal foothold for characterizing reference. The relation between sign and reference is threefold:

17.16 1. Showing, as a possible concretion of the what-for of a serviceability, is founded in the structure of equipment in general, in the in-order-to (reference).

17.17 2. The showing of the sign, as the equipmental character of something ready-to-hand, belongs to a totality of equipment, to a referential nexus.

17.18 3. The sign is not only ready-to-hand along with other equipment; in its readiness-to-hand the environment becomes in each case explicitly accessible for circumspection. *A sign is something ontically ready-to-hand that, as this definite item of equipment, at the same time functions as something that indicates the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of the totality of references, and of worldhood.* This is the root of the preeminence of this ready-to-hand within the environment with which circumspection is concerned. If reference is to be the ontological foundation for signs, therefore, it cannot itself be conceived as a sign. Reference is not the ontic determinateness of something ready-to-hand, since it constitutes readiness-to-hand itself. In what sense is reference the ontological "presupposition" of the ready-to-hand, and to what extent is it, as this ontological foundation, at the same time a constituent of worldhood in general?

§ 18. INVOLVEMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE: THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD

Involvement is the Being of the ready-to-hand, and the worldhood of the world is significance.

18.1 The ready-to-hand is encountered within the world. The Being of this being, readiness-to-hand, therefore stands in some ontological relation to the world and to worldhood. In everything ready-to-hand the world is always already "there." The world is already uncovered beforehand together with everything encountered, though unthematically. But it can also light up in certain ways of environmental dealings. It is the world from out of which the ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand. How can the world let the ready-to-hand be encountered? Our analysis so far has shown that what is encountered within the world is freed in its Being for concernful circumspection, for taking account. What does this prior freeing mean, and how is it to be understood as an ontological distinction of the world?

What problems does the question of the worldhood of the world lead us to face?

18.2 The equipmental constitution of the ready-to-hand was indicated as reference. How can the world free beings of this way of Being with regard to their Being, and why are these beings the first to be encountered? As definite references we named serviceability for, detrimentality, usability, and the like. The what-for of a serviceability and the for-which of a usability each prefigure the possible concretion of the reference. But the "showing" of the sign and the "hammering" of the hammer are not properties of the being. They are not properties at all, if this term is to designate the ontological structure of a possible determinateness of things. The ready-to-hand has at most suitabilities and unsuitabilities, and its "properties" are, as it were, still bound up in these—just as presence-at-hand, as a possible way of Being of something ready-to-hand, is bound up in readiness-to-hand. Serviceability (reference), however, as the constitution of equipment, is not a suitability of a being either; it is the condition, in terms of Being, of the possibility that the being can be determined by suitabilities. What, then, is reference supposed to mean? The Being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of reference—this means that it has in itself the character of *having-been-referred*. A being is uncovered with a view to this: that, as the being it is, it is referred to something. There is an involvement *with* it *in* something. The character of Being of the ready-to-hand is *involvement*. Involvement implies letting something be involved with something in something. The relation of "with ... in ..." is to be indicated by the term reference.

18.3 Involvement is the Being of innerworldly beings, the Being toward which such a being is always already, in the first instance, freed. With it, as a being, there is in each case an involvement. That it has an involvement is the *ontological* determination of the Being of this being, not an ontic assertion about the being. The with-which of the involvement is the what-for of serviceability, the for-which of usability. With the what-for of serviceability there can in turn be an involvement. For

example, *with* this ready-to-hand thing, which we therefore call a hammer, the involvement lies in hammering; with hammering, the involvement lies in making something fast; with making fast, in protection against bad weather; and this protection "is" for the sake of Dasein's finding shelter, that is, for the sake of a possibility of its Being. *What* involvement there is with something ready-to-hand is in each case prefigured by the totality of involvements. The totality of involvements that constitutes, for example, what is ready-to-hand in a workshop in its readiness-to-hand is "earlier" than the single item of equipment; likewise the totality of involvements of a farm, with all its implements and lands. But the totality of involvements itself ultimately goes back to a what-for in which there is *no* further involvement. This what-for is itself not a being in the way of Being of the ready-to-hand within a world. It is a being whose Being is determined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose constitution of Being worldhood itself belongs. This primary what-for is not a for-that as a possible with-which of an involvement. The primary "what-for" is a for-the-sake-of-which. The "for-the-sake-of," however, always concerns the Being of *Dasein*, for which, in its Being, this very Being is essentially what matters. The connection just indicated, which leads from the structure of involvement to the Being of Dasein itself as the proper and only for-the-sake-of-which, is not to be pursued in more detail for the time being. First, "letting be involved" requires a clarification carried far enough for us to bring the phenomenon of worldhood into *the* definiteness we need in order to raise problems about it at all.

18.4 Ontically, letting be involved means: within a factical concern, letting something ready-to-hand *be* so and so, *as* it now is, and *so that* it is so. We take this ontic meaning of "letting be" in a fundamentally ontological way. In doing so we interpret the meaning of the prior freeing of what is initially ready-to-hand within the world. Letting something "be" beforehand does not mean first bringing it into its Being and producing it. It means uncovering something that is always already a "being" in its readiness-to-hand, and so letting the being that has this Being

be encountered. This "a priori" letting be involved is the condition of the possibility that the ready-to-hand is encountered, so that Dasein, in its ontic dealings with beings so encountered, can let them be involved in the ontic sense. Letting be involved understood ontologically, by contrast, concerns the freeing of *everything* ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand. This holds whether, taken ontically, it is left to its involvement, or whether it is rather a being that ontically is precisely *not* left to its involvement—the being that in the first instance and for the most part is what is concerned with, which we, as an uncovered being, do not "let be" as it is, but work on, improve, or smash.

18.5 The always-already-having-let-be-involved that frees toward involvement is an *a priori perfect* that characterizes the way of Being of Dasein itself. Letting be involved, understood ontologically, is the prior freeing of beings for their readiness-to-hand within the environment. From the with-which of letting be involved, the by-which of the involvement is freed. Concern encounters it as this ready-to-hand thing. Insofar as a *being* shows itself to concern at all, that is, insofar as it is uncovered in its Being, it is always already something ready-to-hand in the environment, and precisely not "initially" just "world-stuff" that is present-at-hand.[8]

18.6 Involvement itself, as the Being of the ready-to-hand, is in each case uncovered only on the basis of the prior uncoveredness of a totality of involvements. In uncovered involvement, that is, in the ready-to-hand we encounter, there accordingly lies, uncovered beforehand, what we called the worldly character of the ready-to-hand. This totality of involvements, uncovered beforehand, harbors within itself an ontological relation to the world. Letting be involved, which frees beings toward a totality of involvements, must itself already have somehow disclosed that toward which it frees them. That toward which what is ready-to-hand in the environment is freed—in such a way that it first becomes accessible *as* an innerworldly being—

8 Heidegger borrows the grammatical "perfect," the tense of what has already been completed: the letting be involved has always already taken place.

cannot itself be conceived as a being of this uncovered way of Being. It is essentially not uncoverable, if from now on we hold to *uncoveredness* as the term for a possibility of Being of all beings *not* of the kind of Dasein.

18.7 But what does it mean to say that that toward which inner-worldly beings are initially freed must be disclosed beforehand? An understanding of Being belongs to Dasein's Being. An understanding has its Being in understanding. If the way of Being of Being-in-the-world belongs to Dasein essentially, then the understanding of Being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of Being. The prior disclosing of that toward which what is encountered within the world is freed is nothing other than the understanding of the world toward which Dasein, as a being, always already comports itself.

18.8 The prior letting be involved in ... with ... is grounded in an understanding of such things as letting be involved, the with-which of the involvement and the by-which of the involvement. Such things, and what further underlies them—such as the for-that, as that in which there is involvement, and the for-the-sake-of-which to which every what-for ultimately goes back—all this must be disclosed beforehand in a certain intelligibility. And what is that in which Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, understands itself pre-ontologically? In understanding the relational nexus just mentioned, Dasein has referred itself to an in-order-to. It has done so from out of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is, and which it has seized explicitly or inexplicitly, in an owned or an unowned way. This in-order-to prefigures a for-that, as a possible with-which of a letting be involved, which structurally lets something be involved *with* something. Dasein always already refers itself, from out of a for-the-sake-of-which, to the by-which of an involvement; that is, insofar as it is, it always already lets beings be encountered as ready-to-hand. That *in which* Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of referring itself is the *toward-which* of the prior letting beings be encountered. *The in-which of self-referring understanding, as the toward-which of letting beings be encountered in the way of Being of*

involvement, is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which Dasein refers itself is what makes up the *worldhood* of the world.

18.9 That in which Dasein always already understands itself in this way is something with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity with the world does not necessarily require a theoretical transparency of the relations that constitute the world as world. But the possibility of an explicit ontological-existential interpretation of these relations is indeed grounded in the familiarity with the world that is constitutive for Dasein, and that in turn helps make up Dasein's understanding of Being. This possibility can be explicitly seized insofar as Dasein has set itself the task of a primordial interpretation of its Being and its possibilities, or even of the meaning of Being in general.

18.10 The analyses so far, however, have only laid bare the horizon within which something like world and worldhood is to be sought. For our further consideration, it must first be made clearer as what the nexus of Dasein's referring itself is to be grasped ontologically.

18.11 *Understanding*, which will be analyzed more thoroughly below (cf. § 31), holds the relations indicated in a prior disclosedness. In familiarly holding itself in them, it holds them *before* itself as that within which its referring moves. Understanding lets itself be referred in and by these relations themselves. We take the relational character of these relations of referring as *signifying*. In its familiarity with these relations, Dasein "signifies" to itself: it primordially gives itself to understand its Being and potentiality-for-Being with regard to its Being-in-the-world. The for-the-sake-of-which signifies an in-order-to; this in-order-to, a for-that; this for-that, a with-which of letting be involved; and this, a by-which of the involvement. These relations are bound together among themselves as a primordial wholeness. They are what they are as this sig-nifying, in which Dasein gives itself its Being-in-the-world to understand beforehand. We call the relational whole of this signifying *significance*. It is what makes up the structure of the world, of that in

which Dasein as such always already is. *Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontic condition of the possibility of the uncoverability of beings that are encountered in a world in the way of Being of involvement (readiness-to-hand), and that can thus make themselves known in their in-itself.*[9] Dasein as such is in each case this: with its Being, a nexus of the ready-to-hand is essentially already uncovered—Dasein, insofar as it is, has in each case already assigned itself to a "world" that it encounters, and this *assignedness* belongs essentially to its Being.

18.12 But significance itself, with which Dasein is always already familiar, harbors within itself the ontological condition of the possibility that Dasein, understanding and interpreting, can disclose such things as "meanings"; and these in turn found the possible Being of word and language.

18.13 Disclosed significance, as the existential constitution of Dasein, of its Being-in-the-world, is the ontic condition of the possibility of the uncoverability of a totality of involvements.

18.14 If we thus determine the Being of the ready-to-hand (involvement), and even worldhood itself, as a referential nexus, are we not volatilizing the "substantial Being" of innerworldly beings into a system of relations? And since relations are always something "thought," are we not dissolving the Being of innerworldly beings into "pure thinking"?

18.15 Within the present field of investigation, the differences of structure and dimension in the ontological problematic, which we have repeatedly marked, must be kept apart in principle. 1. The Being of the innerworldly beings initially encountered (readiness-to-hand). 2. The Being of *the* beings (presence-at-hand) that can be found and determined by passing through the beings initially encountered in a way that uncovers independently. 3. The Being of the ontic condition of the possibility of the uncoverability of innerworldly beings in general, the worldhood of the world. The last-named Being is an *existential* determination of Being-in-the-world, that is, of Dasein. The two con-

9 Heidegger hyphenates *Be-deuten* ("signifying") to bring out *deuten*, "to point" or "to interpret."

cepts of Being named before it are *categories* and concern beings whose Being is not of the kind of Dasein. The referential nexus that, as significance, constitutes worldhood can be grasped formally in the sense of a system of relations. Only it must be noted that such formalizations level off the phenomena to the point where the actual phenomenal content is lost, especially in the case of relations as "simple" as those significance harbors within itself. By their phenomenal content, these "relations" and "relata"—the in-order-to, the for-the-sake-of, the by-which of an involvement—resist every mathematical functionalization. Nor are they something thought, first posited in a "thinking"; they are relations in which concernful circumspection as such always already dwells. This "system of relations," as what constitutes worldhood, is so far from volatilizing the Being of the ready-to-hand within the world that only on the basis of the worldhood of the world can these beings be uncovered in their "substantial" "in-itself" at all. And only if innerworldly beings can be encountered at all is it possible to make accessible, in the field of these beings, what is merely present-at-hand. On the basis of their Being-merely-present-at-hand, these beings can be determined mathematically, with regard to their "properties," in "functional concepts." Functional concepts of this kind are ontologically possible at all only with reference to beings whose Being has the character of pure substantiality. Functional concepts are only ever possible as formalized concepts of substance.[10]

18.16 So that the specifically ontological problematic of worldhood may stand out still more sharply, the interpretation of worldhood will be clarified, before the analysis is carried further, by an extreme counter-case.

10 An allusion to Ernst Cassirer's *Substance and Function* (*Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*, 1910).

B. SETTING OFF THE ANALYSIS OF WORLDHOOD AGAINST DESCARTES' INTERPRETATION OF THE WORLD

Descartes' ontology of the world is examined as an extreme contrasting case.

18.17 The investigation will be able to secure the concept of worldhood, and of the structures contained in this phenomenon, only step by step. The interpretation of the world initially starts from an innerworldly being, only then to lose sight of the phenomenon of world altogether. Because of this, we attempt to clarify this approach ontologically in what is perhaps its most extreme execution. We not only give a brief account of the basic features of the ontology of the "world" in *Descartes*, but ask about its presuppositions and try to characterize them in the light of what we have gained so far. This discussion is meant to let us see on what fundamentally undiscussed ontological "foundations" the interpretations of the world that come after *Descartes*—and all the more those that precede him—move.

18.18 *Descartes* sees the basic ontological determination of the world in extensio [extension]. Extension helps constitute spatiality—according to *Descartes* it is even identical with it—and spatiality remains in some sense constitutive for the world. To this extent, the discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the "world" at the same time offers a negative foothold for the positive explication of the spatiality of the environment and of Dasein itself. With regard to *Descartes'* ontology we shall treat three things: 1. The determination of the "world" as res extensa [extended thing] (§ 19). 2. The foundations of this ontological determination (§ 20). 3. The hermeneutical discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the "world" (§ 21). The following consideration will receive its detailed grounding only through the phenomenological destruction of the "cogito sum" [I think, I am] (cf. Part Two, Division 2).

§ 19. THE DETERMINATION OF THE "WORLD" AS RES EXTENSA

Descartes defines corporeal substance by extension, reducing hardness, color, and motion to its modes.

19.1 *Descartes* distinguishes the "ego cogito" [I think] from the "res corporea" [corporeal thing]. From then on this distinction determines, ontologically, the distinction between "nature and spirit." However many variations of content this opposition may be fixed in ontically, the unclarity of its ontological foundations, and of the terms of the opposition themselves, has its nearest root in the distinction *Descartes* drew. Within what understanding of Being did he determine the Being of these beings? The term for the Being of a being that is in its own right is substantia. The expression means sometimes the *Being* of a being as substance, *substantiality*, sometimes the being itself, *a substance*. This ambiguity of substantia, which the ancient concept of *οὐσία* [substance, beingness] already carries with it, is not accidental.

19.2 The ontological determination of the res corporea requires the explication of substance, that is, of the substantiality of this being as a substance. What makes up the proper Being-in-itself of the res corporea? How can a substance as such, that is, its substantiality, be grasped at all? Et quidem ex quolibet attributo substantia cognoscitur; sed una tamen est cuiusque substantiae praecipua proprietas, quae ipsius naturam essentiamque constituit, et ad quam aliae omnes referuntur. Substances become accessible in their "attributes," and each substance has a distinctive property from which the essence of the substantiality of a particular substance can be read off. What is this property in the case of the res corporea? Nempe *extensio* in longum, latum, profundum substantiae corporeae naturam constituit.[11] For extension in length, breadth, and depth makes up the proper Being of the corporeal substance that we call the "world." What

11 The Latin passages in §§ 19–20 are from Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy* (1644), Part I.

gives extensio this distinction? Nam omne aliud quod corpori tribui potest, extensionem praesupponit [For everything else that can be attributed to body presupposes extension]. Extension is *the* constitution of Being of the being under discussion, which must already "be" before all other determinations of Being, so that these can "be" what they are. Extension must be "assigned" to the corporeal thing primarily. Accordingly, the proof of extension, and of the substantiality of the "world" characterized by it, is carried out by showing how all other determinatenesses of this substance—above all divisio, figura, motus [division, shape, motion]—can be conceived only as modi [modes] of extensio, and how, conversely, extensio remains intelligible sine figura vel motu [without shape or motion].

19.3 Thus a corporeal thing, while preserving its total extension, can nevertheless change the distribution of that extension along the various dimensions in many ways, and present itself in manifold shapes as one and the same thing. Atque unum et idem corpus, retinendo suam et eandem quantitatem, diversis modis potest extendi: nunc scilicet magis secundum longitudinem minusque secundum latitudinem vel profunditatem ac paulo post e contra magis secundum latitudinem et minus secundum longitudinem.

19.4 Shape is a modus of extensio, and so, no less, is motion; for motus is grasped only si de nullo nisi locali cogitemus ac de vi a qua excitatur non inquiramus [if we think of none but local motion and do not inquire into the force by which it is produced]. If motion is a property of the res corporea that has being, then, in order to be experienceable in its Being, it must be conceived from the Being of this being itself, from extensio, that is, as pure change of place. Something like "force" contributes nothing to the determination of the *Being* of this being. Determinations such as durities (hardness), pondus (weight) and color can be taken away from matter, and it still remains what it is. These determinations do not make up its proper Being, and insofar as they *are*, they prove to be modes of extensio. *Descartes* tries to show this in detail with regard to

"hardness": Nam quantum ad duritiem nihil aliud de illo sensus nobis indicat, quam partes durorum corporum resistere motui manuum nostrarum, cum in illas incurrunt. Si enim, quotiescumque manus nostrae versus aliquam partem moventur, corpora omnia ibi existentia recederent eadem celeritate qua illae accedunt, nullam unquam duritiem sentiremus. Nec ullo modo potest intelligi, corpora quae sic recederent, idcirco naturam corporis esse amissura; nec proinde ipsa in duritie consistit. Hardness is experienced in touching. What does the sense of touch "tell" us about hardness? The parts of the hard thing "resist" the movement of the hand, for instance an attempt to push them away. If, on the other hand, the hard, that is, unyielding, bodies were to change their place at the same speed at which the hand "running up against" them changes its place, then it would never come to touching; hardness would not be experienced and hence would never *be* either. But there is no way to see why bodies yielding at such a speed should thereby lose anything of their Being-a-body. If they retain it even at an altered speed that makes something like "hardness" impossible, then hardness does not belong to the Being of these beings either. Eadem ratione ostendi potest, et pondus, et colorem et alias omnes eius modi qualitates, quae in materia corporea sentiuntur, ex eo tolli posse, ipsa integra remanente, unde sequitur, a nulla ex illis eius sc. extensionis naturam dependere [By the same reasoning it can be shown that weight, color, and all other qualities of this kind that are perceived in corporeal matter can be taken away from it while it remains intact; from which it follows that its nature, that is, the nature of extension, depends on none of them]. What makes up the Being of the res corporea, then, is extensio: the omnimodo divisibile, figurabile et mobile, that which can change in every way of divisibility, shaping, and motion; the capax mutationum [capable of changes], that which holds out through all these changes, remanet. That in the corporeal thing which satisfies such *constant remaining* is what properly is in it, in such a way that the substantiality of this substance is thereby characterized.

§ 20. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL DETERMINATION OF THE "WORLD"

Descartes' idea of substance as needing nothing else leaves the meaning of Being unclarified.

20.1 The idea of Being to which the ontological characterization of the res extensa goes back is substantiality. Per *substantiam* nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum. By substance we can understand nothing other than a being that *is* in such a way that it needs no other being in order *to be*. The Being of a "substance" is characterized by a not-needing. That which in its Being has no need whatsoever of any other being satisfies the idea of substance in the proper sense—this being is the ens perfectissimum [most perfect being]. Substantia quae nulla plane re indigeat, unica tantum potest intelligi, nempe Deus [Only one substance can be understood that needs nothing at all, namely God]. "God" is here a purely ontological term, when it is understood as ens perfectissimum. At the same time, what is "self-evidently" co-meant in the concept of God makes possible an ontological interpretation of the constitutive moment of substantiality, not-needing. Alias vero omnes (res), non nisi ope concursus Dei existere percipimus [But all other things, we perceive, exist only with the help of God's concurrence]. Every being that is not God needs to be produced, in the broadest sense, and preserved. Being produced as something present-at-hand, or not needing to be produced, makes up the horizon within which "Being" is understood. Every being that is not God is *ens creatum* [created being]. Between the two beings there is an "infinite" difference of Being, and yet we address the created as well as the creator *as beings*. We therefore use Being with such breadth that its meaning embraces an "infinite" difference. So with a certain right we can also call created beings substance. Relative to God, to be sure, these beings need to be produced and preserved. But within the region of created beings, the "world" in the sense of the ens creatum, there are beings that, relative to creaturely producing

and preserving—that of human beings, for example—"need no other being." There are two such substances: the res cogitans [thinking thing] and the res extensa.

20.2 The Being of *the* substance whose distinguishing proprietas [property] is extensio thus becomes ontologically determinable in principle once the meaning of Being *"common"* to the three substances—the one infinite and the two finite—has been clarified. But nomen substantiae non convenit Deo et illis *univoce*, ut dici solet in Scholis, hoc est quod Deo et creaturae sit communis [the name "substance" does not apply to God and to them *univocally*, as they say in the Schools, that is, as a meaning common to God and creatures]. Here *Descartes* touches on a problem that often occupied medieval ontology: the question of the way in which the meaning of Being means the being addressed in each case. In the assertions "God is" and "the world is," we assert Being. But this word "is" cannot mean each of these beings with the same meaning (*συνωνύμως*, univoce), since there is an *infinite* difference of Being between the two. If the signifying of "is" were univocal, then the created would be meant as uncreated, or the uncreated would be dragged down to something created. Yet "Being" does not function as a mere identical name either; in both cases "Being" is understood. Scholasticism conceives the positive meaning of the signifying of "Being" as "analogical" signifying, as distinct from univocal or merely equivocal signifying. Following *Aristotle*, in whom the problem is prefigured, as it is in the starting point of Greek ontology generally, various kinds of analogy were fixed, and the "schools" also differ according to these in how they conceive the signifying function of Being. *Descartes* lags far behind Scholasticism in working the problem through ontologically; indeed, he evades the question. Nulla eius [substantiae] nominis significatio potest distincte intelligi, quae Deo et creaturis sit communis [No signification of its (that is, substance's) name that would be common to God and to creatures can be distinctly understood]. This evasion means that *Descartes* leaves undiscussed the meaning of Being contained in the idea of substantiality, and the char-

acter of the "universality" of this signification. To be sure, medieval ontology inquired into what Being itself means as little as ancient ontology did. It is therefore not surprising that a question such as that of the way in which Being signifies makes no headway, so long as it is to be discussed on the basis of an unclarified meaning of Being that the signification "expresses." The meaning remained unclarified because it was held to be "self-evident."

20.3 *Descartes* not only evades the ontological question of substantiality altogether; he explicitly stresses that substance as such, that is, its substantiality, is in advance, in and of itself, inaccessible. Verumtamen non potest substantia primum animadverti ex hoc solo, quod sit existens, quia hoc solum per se nos non afficit [Yet substance cannot first be noticed merely from the fact that it is an existing thing, because this alone does not of itself affect us]. "Being" itself does not "affect" us, and therefore it cannot be apprehended. "Being is not a real predicate," according to *Kant's* dictum, which merely reproduces Descartes' proposition. With this, the possibility of a pure problematic of Being is renounced in principle, and a way out is sought by which the determinations of substances characterized above are then obtained. Because "Being" is in fact not accessible *as a being*, Being is expressed through determinatenesses of the being in question that themselves are, through attributes.[12] But not through just any attributes; rather, through those that most purely satisfy the meaning of Being and of substantiality, which is, after all, expressly presupposed. In the substantia finita [finite substance] as res corporea, the primarily necessary "assignment" is extensio. Quin et facilius intelligimus substantiam extensam, vel substantiam cogitantem, quam substantiam solam, omisso eo quod cogitet vel sit extensa [Indeed, we understand extended substance or thinking substance more easily than substance alone, leaving aside whether it thinks or is extended]; for substantiality can be separated and found only

12 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A598/B626.

ratione tantum [by reason alone], not realiter [in reality], as the substantial being itself can.

20.4 The ontological foundations of the determination of the "world" as res extensa have thus become clear. They consist in the idea of substantiality—an idea whose meaning-of-Being is not only unclarified but passed off as unclarifiable—presented by the detour through the most preeminent substantial property of the substance in each case. The determination of substance through a substantial being is also the reason for the ambiguity of the term. What is intended is substantiality, and it is understood from a characteristic of substance that is in being. Because the ontic is slipped underneath the ontological, the expression substantia functions sometimes in an ontological meaning, sometimes in an ontic one, but mostly in a blurred ontic-ontological meaning. Behind this slight difference of meaning, however, lies concealed a failure to master the fundamental problem of Being. Working out this problem requires "tracking down" the equivocations in the *right way*. Whoever attempts something of this sort is not "busying themselves" with "mere meanings of words," but must venture forward into the most primordial problematic of the "things themselves" in order to get such "nuances" straight.

§ 21. THE HERMENEUTICAL DISCUSSION OF THE CARTESIAN ONTOLOGY OF THE "WORLD"

Guided by Being as constant presence-at-hand, Descartes skips over the world and the ready-to-hand.

21.1 The critical question arises: does this ontology of the "world" seek the phenomenon of the world at all, and if not, does it at least determine some innerworldly being far enough that its worldly character can be made visible in it? *Both questions must be answered in the negative.* The being that *Descartes* tries to grasp ontologically, in principle, by means of extensio is rather one that becomes uncoverable only by passing through an innerworldly being that is ready-to-hand in the first instance. But even if that is correct, and even if the ontological characteriza-

tion of *this* particular innerworldly being (nature) leads into obscurity—both the idea of substantiality and the meaning of the existit [exists] and ad existendum [in order to exist] taken up into its definition—there still remains the possibility that an ontology grounded on the radical separation of God, I, and "world" poses and advances the ontological problem of the world in some sense. If, however, even this possibility does not obtain, then it must be explicitly shown that *Descartes* does not merely give an ontologically mistaken determination of the world, but that his interpretation and its foundations led him to *skip over* both the phenomenon of the world and the Being of the innerworldly beings that are ready-to-hand in the first instance.[13]

21.2 In the exposition of the problem of worldhood (§ 14), we pointed out how much depends on gaining an appropriate access to this phenomenon. In the critical discussion of the Cartesian approach we shall accordingly have to ask: which way of Being of Dasein is fixed as the appropriate kind of access to *the* being with whose Being, as extensio, *Descartes* equates the Being of the "world"? The sole and genuine access to this being is knowing, intellectio, and indeed in the sense of mathematical-physical knowledge. Mathematical knowledge counts as the kind of grasping of beings that can at all times be certain of securely possessing the Being of the beings grasped in it. Whatever, by its way of Being, is such that it satisfies the Being that becomes accessible in mathematical knowledge *is* in the proper sense. This being is that *which always is what it is*. Hence, in the beings of the world that are experienced, their proper Being is made up of whatever can be shown to have the character of *constantly remaining*, as remanens capax mutationum [that which remains, capable of changes]. What properly *is* is what perpetually remains. That is what mathematics knows. What is accessible in beings *through mathematics* makes up their Being. Thus the "world" has its Being dictated to it, as it were, from a

13 From Descartes' definition of substance (*Principles of Philosophy* I, 51): a thing that so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist.

definite idea of Being that lies wrapped up in the concept of substantiality, and from the idea of a knowledge that knows beings *in this way*. *Descartes* does not let innerworldly beings present their way of Being to him. Rather, on the basis of an idea of Being (Being = constant presence-at-hand) whose origin is unrevealed and whose legitimacy is undemonstrated, he prescribes to the world, as it were, its "proper" Being. So what determines the ontology of the world is not primarily his reliance on a science that happens to be especially esteemed, mathematics. It is the fundamentally ontological orientation toward Being as constant presence-at-hand—a Being that mathematical knowledge satisfies in an exceptional sense when it grasps it. *Descartes* thus explicitly carries out, in philosophy, the switching-over of the effects of traditional ontology onto modern mathematical physics and its transcendental foundations.

21.3 *Descartes* has no need to pose the problem of the appropriate access to innerworldly beings. Under the unbroken dominance of traditional ontology, the genuine way of grasping what properly is has been decided in advance. It lies in *νοεῖν*, "intuition" in the broadest sense, of which *διανοεῖν*, "thinking," is only a founded form of enactment. And it is from this basic ontological orientation that *Descartes* gives his "critique" of the other still possible kind of access to beings, one that apprehends by intuiting: sensatio (*αἴσθησις*), as against intellectio.

21.4 *Descartes* knows very well that beings do not initially show themselves in their proper Being. What is "initially" given is this particular piece of wax—a thing of definite color, taste, hardness, coldness, and sound. But this, and whatever the senses give in general, remains ontologically without importance. Satis erit, si advertamus sensuum perceptiones non referri, nisi ad istam corporis humani cum mente coniunctionem, et nobis quidem ordinarie exhibere, quid ad illam externa corpora prodesse possint aut nocere [It will be enough if we notice that the perceptions of the senses refer only to this union of the human body with the mind, and that they ordinarily show us what external bodies can benefit or harm it]. The senses do not

let beings be known in their Being at all. They merely report the usefulness and harmfulness of "external" innerworldly things for the human being, who is burdened with a body. Nos non docent, qualia (corpora) in seipsis existant [They do not teach us what (bodies) are like as they exist in themselves]; through the senses we gain no information at all about beings in their Being.[14] Quod agentes, percipiemus naturam materiae, sive corporis in universum spectati, non consistere in eo quod sit res dura vel ponderosa vel colorata vel alio aliquo modo sensus afficiens: sed tantum in eo, quod sit res extensa in longum, latum et profundum [If we do this, we shall perceive that the nature of matter, or of body considered in general, does not consist in its being a thing that is hard or heavy or colored, or that affects the senses in some other way, but only in its being a thing extended in length, breadth, and depth].[15]

21.5 How little *Descartes* is able to let what shows itself in sensibility present itself in its own way of Being, let alone determine that way of Being, becomes clear from a critical analysis of the interpretation he gives of the experience of hardness and resistance (cf. § 19).

21.6 Hardness is taken as resistance. But resistance, no more than hardness, is understood in a phenomenal sense, as something experienced in itself and determinable in such experience. For *Descartes*, resistance amounts to not giving way from one's place, that is, not undergoing any change of location. A thing's resisting then means remaining at a definite location relative to another thing that is changing its location, or else changing location at such a speed that it can be "caught up with" by that other thing. With this interpretation of the experience of hardness, the way of Being of sensory apprehending is obliterated, and with it the possibility of grasping in their Being the beings encountered in such apprehending. *Descartes* translates the way of Being of apprehending something into the only way of Being he knows. The apprehending of something becomes a

14 Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* II, 3.
15 Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* II, 4.

definite side-by-side-presence-at-hand of two res extensae that are present-at-hand, and the relation of motion between the two is itself in the mode of extensio, which primarily characterizes the presence-at-hand of the corporeal thing. It is true that the possible "fulfillment" of a tactile comportment demands a distinctive "nearness" of what can be touched. But that does not mean that touch, and the hardness that may make itself known in it, consist, ontologically conceived, in the different velocities of two corporeal things. Hardness and resistance do not show themselves at all unless there is a being that has the way of Being of Dasein, or at least of something living.

21.7 Thus for *Descartes* the discussion of the possible *ways of access to* innerworldly beings comes under the dominance of an idea of Being that has been read off from one particular region of these beings themselves.

21.8 The idea of Being as persistent presence-at-hand not only motivates an extreme determination of the Being of innerworldly beings and their identification with the world as such. At the same time, it prevents the comportments of Dasein from being brought into view in an ontologically appropriate way. But with that the way is completely blocked to seeing, in addition, the founded character of all sensory and intellectual apprehending, and to understanding these as a possibility of Being-in-the-world. The Being of "Dasein," however, to whose basic constitution Being-in-the-world belongs, *Descartes* conceives in the same way as the Being of the res extensa: as substance.

21.9 But do these critical discussions not foist upon *Descartes* a task that lay entirely outside his horizon, and then "demonstrate" that he failed to solve it? How is *Descartes* supposed to identify a particular innerworldly being and its Being with the world, if he does not know the phenomenon of the world at all, and so does not know anything like innerworldliness?

21.10 Where the confrontation concerns fundamentals, it must not keep only to theses that can be grasped doxographically. It must take its orientation from the substantive tendency of the problematic, even if that tendency does not get beyond an

ordinary formulation. That *Descartes*, with the res cogitans and the res extensa, not only *wanted to pose* the problem of "I and world" but claimed a radical solution to it, is clear from his *Meditations* (cf. esp. I and VI). His basic ontological orientation toward the tradition lacked all positive critique. That this made it impossible for him to lay free a primordial ontological problematic of Dasein, necessarily obstructed his view of the phenomenon of the world, and could force the ontology of the "world" into the ontology of a particular innerworldly being—this is what the foregoing discussions were meant to prove.

21.11 But, it will be objected, even if the problem of the world, and also the Being of the beings encountered nearest in the environment, do in fact remain covered over, *Descartes* nonetheless laid the foundation for the ontological characterization of *that* innerworldly being which founds every other being in its Being: material nature. On it, the fundamental stratum, the remaining strata of innerworldly actuality are built up. In the extended thing as such are grounded, first of all, those determinations that show themselves as qualities but are "at bottom" quantitative modifications of the modes of extensio itself. On these qualities, which are themselves still reducible, the specific qualities are then based: beautiful and not beautiful, fitting and unfitting, usable and unusable. If one takes one's primary orientation from thinghood, these qualities must be conceived as non-quantifiable value-predicates, by which the initially merely material thing is stamped as a good. With this stratification, however, the consideration does arrive at the beings that we characterized ontologically as equipment ready-to-hand. The Cartesian analysis of the "world" thus first makes possible the secure construction of the structure of what is ready-to-hand in the first instance. All it needs is the easily accomplished completion of the natural thing into the full thing of use.

21.12 But, leaving aside the specific problem of the world, can the Being of what is encountered in the first instance within the world be reached ontologically in this way? With material thinghood, is not a Being tacitly posited—the constant presence-at-

hand of things—which receives so little ontological supplementation from the subsequent furnishing of beings with value-predicates that, on the contrary, these value-characters themselves remain merely ontic determinations of a being that has the way of Being of a thing? The addition of value-predicates cannot give the slightest new information about the Being of goods; *it merely presupposes for them, once again, the way of Being of pure presence-at-hand.* Values are *present-at-hand* determinations of a thing. In the end, values have their ontological origin solely in the prior positing of the actuality of things as the fundamental stratum. Yet even pre-phenomenological experience shows, in the being that is taken to be a thing, something that cannot be fully understood through thinghood. So the Being of things needs supplementing. What, then, does the Being of values, or their "validity," which *Lotze* conceived as a mode of "affirmation," mean ontologically? What does this "adhering" of values to things signify ontologically? As long as these determinations remain in the dark, reconstructing the thing of use from the natural thing is an ontologically questionable undertaking, quite apart from the fundamental inversion of the problematic. And does this reconstruction of the thing of use, which has first been "skinned," not always already need a *prior, positive view of the phenomenon whose wholeness the reconstruction is supposed to restore?* But if the ownmost constitution of Being of this phenomenon has not first been appropriately explicated, is the reconstruction not building without a plan?[16] This reconstruction and "supplementation" of the traditional ontology of the "world" ends up, in its result, at the same *beings* from which the above analysis of the readiness-to-hand of equipment and of the totality of involvements started out. Insofar as it does, it gives the semblance that the *Being* of these beings has in fact been clarified, or has at least become a *problem*. But just as little as *Descartes*, with extensio as proprietas [property], hits upon the Being of substance, can recourse to "value" characteristics so

16 Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), German philosopher whose concept of validity (*Geltung*) shaped the Neo-Kantian philosophy of values.

much as bring Being as readiness-to-hand into view, let alone let it become an ontological theme.

21.13 *Descartes* sharpened the narrowing of the question of the world to the question of the thinghood of nature, as the innerworldly being that is accessible in the first instance. He entrenched the opinion that the supposedly most rigorous ontic *knowing* of a being is also the possible access to the primary Being of the beings uncovered in such knowledge. But at the same time we must see that the "supplementations" of the ontology of things, too, move in principle on the same dogmatic basis as *Descartes*.

21.14 We have already indicated (§ 14) that the skipping-over of the world and of the beings encountered in the first instance is not accidental, not an oversight that could simply be made good, but is grounded in an essential way of Being of Dasein itself. The analytic of Dasein must first have made transparent those main structures of Dasein that are most important within the framework of this problematic. The concept of Being as such must have been assigned the horizon of its possible intelligibility, so that readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, too, first become ontologically intelligible in a primordial way. Only then can the critique just carried out of the Cartesian ontology of the world—which is in principle still customary today—be given its philosophical justification.

21.15 For this it must be shown (cf. Part One, Division 3):

21.16 1. Why, at the beginning of the ontological tradition that is decisive for us—explicitly in *Parmenides*—was the phenomenon of the world skipped over? Where does the constant recurrence of this skipping-over come from?[17]

21.17 2. Why do innerworldly beings step in as the ontological theme in place of the phenomenon that has been skipped over?

21.18 3. Why are these beings found in the first instance in "nature"?

17 Parmenides of Elea (early 5th century BC), Greek philosopher whose poem on Being stands at the beginning of Western ontology.

21.19 4. Why is the supplementation of such an ontology of the world, which is experienced as necessary, carried out with the help of the phenomenon of value?

21.20 Only in the answers to these questions will a positive understanding of the *problematic* of the world be reached, the origin of its being missed be shown, and the legitimate ground for rejecting the traditional ontology of the world be demonstrated.

21.21 The observations on *Descartes* were meant to bring us to see the following. The seemingly self-evident starting point in the things of the world, no more than the orientation toward the supposedly most rigorous knowledge of beings, guarantees that we gain the ground on which the nearest ontological constitutions of the world, of Dasein, and of innerworldly beings can be encountered phenomenally.

21.22 But if we recall that spatiality evidently co-constitutes innerworldly beings, then a "rescue" of the Cartesian analysis of the "world" does become possible after all. By radically bringing out extensio as the praesuppositum [presupposition] for every determination of the res corporea, *Descartes* prepared the way for the understanding of an a priori whose content *Kant* then fixed more penetratingly. Within certain limits, the analysis of extensio remains independent of the failure to give an explicit interpretation of the Being of extended beings. Positing extensio as the basic determination of the "world" has its phenomenal justification. By going back to it, however, neither the spatiality of the world, nor the spatiality, uncovered in the first instance, of the beings encountered in the environment, let alone the spatiality of Dasein itself, can be ontologically conceived.

C. THE AROUNDNESS OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE "SPATIALITY" OF DASEIN

The spatiality of the environment and of Dasein is to be derived from worldhood.

21.23 In the context of the first sketch of Being-in (cf. § 12), Dasein had to be marked off from a way of Being in space that we call

insideness. This means: a being that is itself extended is enclosed by the extended boundaries of something extended. The being that is inside and what encloses it are both present-at-hand in space. Rejecting such an insideness of Dasein in a spatial container was not meant, however, to exclude in principle every spatiality of Dasein. It was meant only to keep the way clear for seeing the spatiality that is constitutive of Dasein. This spatiality must now be brought out. But insofar as *innerworldly* beings are likewise in space, their spatiality will stand in an ontological connection with the world. Hence we must determine in what sense space is a constituent of the world, which for its part was characterized as a structural moment of Being-in-the-world. In particular, it must be shown how the aroundness of the environment—the specific spatiality of the beings encountered in the environment—is itself founded by the worldhood of the world, and not, conversely, how the world for its part is present-at-hand in space. The investigation of the spatiality of Dasein and of the spatial determinateness of the world takes its start from an analysis of what is ready-to-hand in space within the world. The consideration passes through three stages: 1. the spatiality of what is ready-to-hand within the world (§ 22), 2. the spatiality of Being-in-the-world (§ 23), 3. the spatiality of Dasein, and space (§ 24).[18]

§ 22. THE SPATIALITY OF THE READY-TO-HAND WITHIN THE WORLD

Equipment has its place within regions, uncovered circumspectively before any measured space.

22.1 If space constitutes the world in a sense yet to be determined, it cannot be surprising that, already in the preceding ontological characterization of the Being of what is innerworldly, we had to keep it in view as something inner-spatial as well. So far, this spatiality of the ready-to-hand has not been explicitly

18 "Aroundness" renders *das Umhafte*, formed from the *um* ("around") in *Umwelt*, literally the "world around."

grasped phenomenally, nor has it been shown how it is interlocked with the structure of Being of the ready-to-hand. That is now the task.

22.2 To what extent have we already come upon the spatiality of the ready-to-hand in characterizing it? We spoke of what is ready-to-hand *in the first instance*. This means not only the being that in each case is encountered *first*, before others, but at the same time the being that is "nearby." What is ready-to-hand in everyday dealings has the character of *nearness*. Looked at closely, this nearness of equipment is already intimated in the term that expresses its Being: "readiness-to-hand." What is "to hand" has in each case a different nearness, which is not settled by measuring intervals. This nearness regulates itself from the circumspectively "calculating" manipulating and using. The circumspection of concern at the same time fixes what is near in this way with regard to the direction in which the equipment is accessible at any time. The directed nearness of equipment means that equipment does not merely have its position in space, present-at-hand somewhere. As equipment, it is essentially put in place and stowed away, set up, laid ready. Equipment has its *place*, or else it "lies around," which must be distinguished in principle from merely occurring at an arbitrary position in space. The place in each case is determined as the place of this item of equipment for..., from a whole of places, directed toward one another, that belongs to the nexus of equipment ready-to-hand in the environment. The place and the multiplicity of places must not be interpreted as the where of an arbitrary presence-at-hand of things. The place is in each case the definite "over there" and "there" where an item of equipment *belongs*. Its belonging-somewhere in each case corresponds to the equipmental character of the ready-to-hand, that is, to its belonging, in terms of involvement, to a totality of equipment. But underlying the belonging-somewhere of a totality of equipment, a belonging that can be given places, is the whither as such, as the condition of its possibility—the whither into which a nexus of equipment has its totality of places assigned. This

whither of possible equipmental belonging-somewhere, which in concernful dealings is circumspectively held in view beforehand, we call the *region*.

22.3 "In the region of" means not only "in the direction of," but at the same time in the surroundings of something that lies in that direction. The place, constituted by direction and remoteness—nearness is only a mode of remoteness—is already oriented toward a region and within it. Something like a region must first be uncovered if the assigning and finding of places for a totality of equipment circumspectively at one's disposal is to become possible. This regional orientation of the multiplicity of places of the ready-to-hand makes up the aroundness, the around-us, of the beings encountered nearest in the environment. What is given in the first instance is never a three-dimensional multiplicity of possible positions filled up with things present-at-hand. This dimensionality of space is still veiled in the spatiality of the ready-to-hand. The "above" is "on the ceiling," the "below" is "on the floor," the "behind" is "by the door." All the wheres are uncovered, and circumspectively interpreted, through the comings and goings of everyday dealings; they are not ascertained and recorded by observational measurement of space.

22.4 Regions are not first formed by things present-at-hand together; they are in each case already ready-to-hand in the individual places. The places themselves are either assigned to the ready-to-hand in the circumspection of concern, or else found. What is constantly ready-to-hand, which circumspective Being-in-the-world takes into account from the outset, therefore has its place. The where of its readiness-to-hand is taken into account for concern and oriented toward the rest of what is ready-to-hand. Thus the sun, whose light and warmth are in everyday use, has its distinctive places, uncovered by circumspection according to the varying usability of what it bestows: sunrise, midday, sunset, midnight. The places of this something that is ready-to-hand in varying ways and yet uniformly and constantly

become emphatic "indications" of the regions that lie in them.[19] These regions of the sky, which need not yet have any geographical meaning at all, provide the prior whither for every particular shaping of regions that can be occupied by places. The house has its sunny side and its weather side; the distribution of its "rooms" is oriented toward these, and within the rooms, again, the "furnishings," according to their equipmental character. Churches and graves, for example, are laid out according to the rising and the setting of the sun—the regions of life and death, from which Dasein itself is determined with regard to its ownmost possibilities of Being in the world. The concern of Dasein, for which in its Being this very Being matters, uncovers beforehand the regions with which a decisive involvement lies in each case.[20] The prior uncovering of the regions is co-determined by the totality of involvements for which the ready-to-hand is freed as something encountered.

22.5 The prior readiness-to-hand of the region in each case has, in an even more primordial sense than the Being of the ready-to-hand, the *character of inconspicuous familiarity*. It itself becomes visible only by becoming conspicuous when the ready-to-hand is uncovered circumspectively, and indeed in the deficient modes of concern. When we fail to find something in *its* place, the region of the place often becomes explicitly accessible as such for the first time. Space, which in circumspective Being-in-the-world is uncovered as the spatiality of the totality of equipment, belongs in each case to the beings themselves as their place. Bare space is still veiled. Space is split up into places. But this spatiality has its own unity through the worldly totality of involvements of what is spatially ready-to-hand. The "environment" does not set itself up in a space given beforehand. Rather, its specific worldhood, in its significance, articulates the nexus of involvements of a totality, in each case, of circumspectively assigned places. The world in each case uncovers the spatiality

19 In German, *Aufgang, Mittag, Niedergang, Mitternacht* (sunrise, midday, sunset, midnight) also name the cardinal points east, south, west, and north.
20 *Räume* means both "rooms" and "spaces."

of the space that belongs to it. Letting the ready-to-hand be encountered in its environmental space remains ontically possible only because Dasein itself is "spatial" with regard to its Being-in-the-world.

§ 23. THE SPATIALITY OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

Dasein is spatial through de-severance, bringing things near, and through directionality.

23.1 If we ascribe spatiality to *Dasein*, then this "Being in space" must evidently be conceived in terms of the way of Being of this being. The spatiality of Dasein, which is essentially not a presence-at-hand, can mean neither anything like occurring at a position in "world-space," nor Being-ready-to-hand at a place. Both are ways of Being of beings encountered within the world. Dasein, however, is "in" the world in the sense of concernful, familiar dealings with the beings encountered within the world. So if spatiality belongs to it in any way, this is possible only on the basis of this Being-in. But the spatiality of Being-in shows the characters of *de-severance* and *directionality*.[21]

23.2 By de-severance, as a way of Being of Dasein with regard to its Being-in-the-world, we do not understand anything like remoteness (nearness), let alone interval. We use the expression de-severance in an active and transitive meaning. It means a constitution of Being of Dasein, with regard to which removing something, putting it away, is only one particular, factical mode. De-severing means making the farness vanish, that is, the remoteness of something: bringing-near. Dasein is essentially de-severing; as the being that it is, it lets beings in each case be encountered in nearness. De-severance uncovers remoteness. Remoteness, like interval, is a categorial determination of beings that are not of the kind of Dasein. De-severance, by contrast, must be held fast as an existential. Only insofar as beings

21 *Ent-fernung*: Heidegger splits the ordinary word *Entfernung* (distance, removal) so that *ent-* reads as undoing and *Ferne* as farness—making farness disappear, bringing near.

are uncovered at all for Dasein in their remoteness do "distances" and intervals become accessible in innerworldly beings themselves, in relation to others. Two points are just as little desevered from each other as any two things are, because none of these beings, by its way of Being, can de-sever. They merely have an interval that can be found and measured in de-severing.

23.3 De-severing is, in the first instance and for the most part, circumspective bringing-near: bringing into nearness as procuring, making ready, having to hand. But certain kinds of purely cognitive uncovering of beings also have the character of bringing-near. *In Dasein there lies an essential tendency toward nearness.* All the kinds of increase in speed that we are more or less compelled to go along with today push toward overcoming remoteness. With "radio," for example, Dasein today carries out a deseverance of the "world"—one whose meaning for Dasein cannot yet be surveyed—by way of an expansion of the everyday environment.

23.4 De-severing does not necessarily involve an explicit estimate of how far something ready-to-hand is from Dasein. Above all, remoteness is never grasped as an interval. If farness is to be estimated, this is done relative to distances in which everyday Dasein keeps itself. Taken computationally, these estimates may be imprecise and fluctuating; in the everydayness of Dasein they have their *own* and thoroughly intelligible *determinateness*. We say: it is a stroll to there, a stone's throw, "a pipeful away." These measures express not only that they do not intend to "measure," but also that the estimated remoteness belongs to a being toward which one goes in concernful circumspection. But even when we make use of fixed measures and say "it is half an hour to the house," this measure must be taken as an estimate. "Half an hour" is not 30 minutes but a duration that has no "length" at all in the sense of a quantitative stretching-along. This duration is in each case interpreted in terms of habitual everyday "errands." Remotenesses are circumspectively estimated in the first instance, and even where "officially" calculated measures are known. Because what is de-severed is ready-to-

hand in such estimates, it retains its specifically innerworldly character. It even belongs to this that the paths of our dealings to remote beings are of different lengths every day. What is ready-to-hand in the environment is, after all, not present-at-hand for an eternal observer exempt from Dasein; it is encountered in the circumspectively concernful everydayness of Dasein. On its ways, Dasein does not traverse a stretch of space as a corporeal thing present-at-hand; it does not "eat up kilometers." Bringing-near and de-severing are in each case concernful Being toward what is brought near and de-severed. An "objectively" long path can be shorter than an "objectively" very short one, which is perhaps "hard going" and seems endlessly long to one. *But it is in such "seeming" that the world in each case is first properly ready-to-hand.* The objective intervals of things present-at-hand do not coincide with the remoteness and nearness of what is ready-to-hand within the world. The former may be known exactly, but this knowledge remains blind; it does not have the function of the circumspectively uncovering bringing-near of the environment. One uses such knowledge only in and for a concernful Being, which does not measure stretches, toward the world that "bears on" one.[22]

23.5 Starting from a prior orientation toward "nature" and the "objectively" measured intervals between things, one is inclined to pass off such interpretation and estimation of distance as "subjective." But this is a "subjectivity" that perhaps uncovers what is most real in the "reality" of the world—a "subjectivity" that has nothing to do with "subjective" arbitrariness or with subjectivistic "views" of a being that is "in itself" otherwise. *The circumspective de-severing of Dasein's everydayness uncovers the Being-in-itself of the "true world," of the beings alongside which Dasein, as existing, always already is.*

23.6 The primary, and even exclusive, orientation toward remotenesses as measured intervals covers over the primordial spatiality of Being-in. What is supposedly "nearest" is by no

22 German *vorkommen* means both "to seem" (as in "seems long") and "to occur"; Heidegger plays on *Vorkommen* as the mere occurrence of what is present-at-hand.

means what has the smallest interval "from us." What is "nearest" lies in what is de-severed within an average range of reach, grasp, and sight. Because Dasein is essentially spatial in the manner of de-severance, its dealings always keep to an "environment" that it has in each case de-severed within a certain leeway. Hence we initially always hear and see past what is "nearest" in terms of interval. Seeing and hearing are distance senses not because of their range, but because Dasein, as de-severing, predominantly dwells in them. For someone who, for example, wears glasses that are so near in terms of interval that they "sit on the nose," this item of equipment in use is environmentally more remote than the picture on the wall opposite. This equipment has so little nearness that often it cannot even be found at first. Equipment for seeing, and likewise equipment for hearing—the telephone receiver, for example—has the inconspicuousness of what is ready-to-hand in the first instance, as described above. This also holds, for example, of the street, the equipment for walking. In walking, it is touched with every step and seems to be the nearest and most real of everything ready-to-hand; it slides along, as it were, against certain parts of the body, the soles of the feet. And yet it is more remote than the acquaintance whom one meets during such walking "on the street," at a "distance" of twenty paces. Circumspective concern decides about the nearness and farness of what is ready-to-hand in the environment in the first instance. That alongside which concern dwells from the outset is what is nearest, and it regulates the de-severances.

23.7 When Dasein, in concern, brings something into its nearness, this does not mean fixing something at a spatial position that has the smallest interval from some point of the body. "Nearby" means: in the surroundings of what is circumspectively ready-to-hand in the first instance. Bringing-near is not oriented toward the I-thing encumbered with a body, but toward concernful Being-in-the-world, that is, toward what is in each case encountered first in it. The spatiality of Dasein is therefore also not determined by stating the position at which a corporeal

thing is present-at-hand. It is true that we also say of Dasein that it in each case occupies a place. But this "occupying" must be distinguished in principle from Being-ready-to-hand at a place from out of a region. Occupying a place must be conceived as de-severing what is ready-to-hand in the environment into a region circumspectively uncovered in advance. Dasein understands its here in terms of the environmental over-there. The here does not mean the where of something present-at-hand, but the alongside-which of a de-severing Being alongside..., together with this de-severance. In accordance with its spatiality, Dasein is initially never here but over there; from this over-there it comes back to its here, and again only in such a way that it interprets its concernful Being toward... in terms of what is ready-to-hand over there. This becomes completely clear from a phenomenal peculiarity of the de-severance structure of Being-in.

23.8 As Being-in-the-world, Dasein essentially keeps itself in a de-severing. This de-severance, the farness of the ready-to-hand from Dasein itself, is something Dasein can *never cross*. The remoteness of something ready-to-hand from Dasein can indeed itself be found by Dasein as an interval, if it is determined in relation to a thing thought of as present-at-hand at the place that Dasein previously occupied. Dasein can subsequently traverse this between of the interval, but only in such a way that the interval itself becomes a de-severed one. So little has Dasein crossed its de-severance that it has rather taken it along and constantly takes it along, *because Dasein is essentially de-severance, that is, spatial.* Dasein cannot wander about within the current range of its de-severances; it can only ever change them. Dasein is spatial in the manner of circumspectively uncovering space, and in such a way that it constantly comports itself de-severingly toward the beings thus encountered spatially.

23.9 As de-severing Being-in, Dasein at the same time has the character of *directionality*. Every bringing-near has already taken up in advance a direction into a region, from which what is de-severed approaches, so as to be found with regard to its

place. Circumspective concern is directing de-severing. In this concern, that is, in Dasein's Being-in-the-world itself, the need for "signs" is given in advance; this equipment takes over the explicit and easily handled indication of directions. It explicitly holds open the regions used circumspectively, the whither, in each case, of belonging, going, bringing, and fetching. If Dasein *is*, then, as directing-de-severing, it always already has its uncovered region. Directionality, like de-severance, as modes of Being of Being-in-the-world, is guided beforehand *by the circumspection* of concern.

23.10 From this directionality arise the fixed directions of right and left. Just as it does its de-severances, Dasein constantly takes these directions along with it. The spatialization of Dasein in its "bodiliness," which harbors a problematic of its own not to be treated here, is marked out along these directions too. Hence what is ready-to-hand and used for the body—gloves, for example, which are to go along with the movements of the hands—must be directed toward right and left. A hand tool, by contrast, which is held in the hand and moved with it, does not go along with the specifically "handy" movement of the hand. Hence, although they are handled with the hand, there are no right-handed and left-handed hammers.

23.11 It must be noted, however, that the directionality that belongs to de-severance is founded by Being-in-the-world. Left and right are not something "subjective" for which the subject has a feeling; they are directions of directedness into a world that is always already ready-to-hand. "By the mere feeling of a difference between my two sides," I could never find my way about in a world. The subject with the "mere feeling" of this difference is a constructed posit that disregards the true constitution of the subject: that Dasein, with this "mere feeling," always already is in a world, *and must be*, in order to be able to orient itself. This becomes clear from the example with which *Kant* tries to clarify the phenomenon of orientation.[23]

23.12 Suppose I step into a familiar but dark room which, during my absence, has been rearranged so that everything that stood on the right now stands on the left. If I am to orient myself, the "mere feeling of the difference" between my two sides is of no help at all, as long as some definite object has not been grasped—one of which *Kant* remarks in passing, "whose position I have in my memory." But what does that mean other than: I necessarily orient myself in and from a Being always already alongside a "known" world? The nexus of equipment of a world must already be given to Dasein beforehand. That I am always already in a world is no less constitutive for the possibility of orientation than the feeling for right and left. That this constitution of Being of Dasein is self-evident does not entitle us to suppress its ontologically constitutive role. Nor does *Kant* suppress it, any more than any other interpretation of Dasein does. But constantly making use of this constitution does not release us from giving an appropriate ontological explication of it; it demands one. The psychological interpretation that the I has something "in memory" means, at bottom, the existential constitution of Being-in-the-world. Because *Kant* does not see this structure, he also misconstrues the full context of what constitutes a possible orientation. Directedness toward right and left is grounded in the essential directionality of Dasein as such, which for its part is essentially co-determined by Being-in-the-world. Admittedly, *Kant* is not concerned with a thematic interpretation of orientation either. He merely wants to show that every orientation needs a "subjective principle." Here, however, "subjective" will be meant to signify: a priori. Yet the a priori of directedness toward right and left is grounded in the "subjective" a priori of Being-in-the-world, which has nothing to do with a determinateness restricted beforehand to a worldless subject.

23.13 As constitutive characters of Being-in, de-severance and directionality determine the spatiality of Dasein: its Being, concernfully and circumspectively, in the uncovered, innerworldly space. The foregoing explication of the spatiality of what is

23 Kant, "What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?" (1786).

ready-to-hand within the world and of the spatiality of Being-in-the-world first provides the presuppositions for working out the phenomenon of the spatiality of the world and for posing the ontological problem of space.

§ 24. THE SPATIALITY OF DASEIN, AND SPACE

Space is neither in the subject nor the world in space; pure space arises by deworlding.

24.1 As Being-in-the-world, Dasein has in each case already uncovered a "world." This uncovering, founded in the worldhood of the world, was characterized as freeing beings for a totality of involvements. Freeing letting-be-involved takes place in the manner of circumspective self-referring, which is grounded in a prior understanding of significance. It has now been shown that circumspective Being-in-the-world is spatial. And only because Dasein is spatial in the manner of de-severance and directionality can what is ready-to-hand in the environment be encountered in its spatiality. The freeing of a totality of involvements is, equiprimordially, a de-severing-directing letting-be-involved in a region, that is, a freeing of the spatial belonging-somewhere of the ready-to-hand. In the significance with which Dasein, as concernful Being-in, is familiar lies the essential co-disclosedness of space.

24.2 The space thus disclosed with the worldhood of the world still has nothing of the pure multiplicity of the three dimensions. In this nearest disclosedness, space still remains hidden as the pure wherein of a metrical ordering of positions and determination of locations. That toward which space is uncovered beforehand in Dasein we have already indicated with the phenomenon of the region. We understand the region as the whither of the possible belonging of the nexus of equipment ready-to-hand, which is to be able to be encountered as directionally de-severed, that is, as placed. Belonging is determined from the significance that is constitutive for the world, and it articulates, within the possible whither, the hither and thither.

The whither as such is prefigured by the whole of references anchored in a for-the-sake-of-which of concern, within which freeing letting-be-involved refers itself. *With* what is encountered as ready-to-hand, there is in each case an involvement in a region. To the totality of involvements that makes up the Being of what is ready-to-hand in the environment belongs a regional spatial involvement. On its basis, the ready-to-hand becomes something that can be found and determined according to form and direction. Depending on the possible transparency of concernful circumspection, what is ready-to-hand within the world is de-severed and directed along with the factical Being of Dasein.

24.3 Letting innerworldly beings be encountered, which is constitutive for Being-in-the-world, is a "giving-space." This "giving space," which we also call *making room,* is freeing the ready-to-hand for its spatiality. As the uncovering pregiving of a possible totality of places determined by involvement, this making room makes possible the factical orientation in each case. Dasein, as circumspective concern with the world, can rearrange, clear away, and "make room for" things only because making room—understood as an existential—belongs to its Being-in-the-world. But neither the region uncovered beforehand in each case nor, in general, the spatiality in each case is explicitly in view. In itself it is present for circumspection in the inconspicuousness of the ready-to-hand, in concern with which circumspection is absorbed. With Being-in-the-world, space is uncovered in the first instance in this spatiality.[24] On the basis of the spatiality thus uncovered, space itself becomes accessible to knowing.

24.4 *Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space.* Rather, space is "in" the world insofar as Being-in-the-world, which is constitutive for Dasein, has disclosed space. Space is not found in the subject, nor does the subject regard the world "as if" it were in a space. Rather, the "subject," ontologically well understood—Dasein—is spatial. And because Dasein is spatial in the

24 *Einräumen,* built on *Raum* (space, room), ordinarily means to put things away in their places, or to concede.

way described, space shows itself as an a priori. This title does not mean anything like a prior belonging to a subject that is initially still worldless and throws a space out of itself. Apriority here means: the precedence of encountering space (as region) in the environmental encountering of the ready-to-hand in each case.

24.5 The spatiality of what is circumspectively encountered in the first instance can become thematic for circumspection itself, and a task for calculation and measurement—for example, in building a house or in surveying land. With this still predominantly circumspective thematization of the spatiality of the environment, space itself already comes into view in a certain way. Pure looking-at can then pursue the space that shows itself in this way, giving up what was previously the only possible access to space: circumspective calculation. The "formal intuition" of space uncovers the pure possibilities of spatial relations. Here there is a sequence of stages in laying free pure, homogeneous space, from the pure morphology of spatial shapes, to Analysis Situs [analysis of position, i.e., topology], to the purely metrical science of space. The consideration of these connections does not belong in this investigation. Within its problematic, the aim was only to fix ontologically the phenomenal ground on which the thematic uncovering and working-out of pure space sets in.

24.6 The uncovering of space that is free of circumspection and now only looks at neutralizes the environmental regions into the pure dimensions. The places, and the circumspectively oriented totality of places of the equipment ready-to-hand, collapse into a multiplicity of positions for arbitrary things. With this, the spatiality of what is ready-to-hand within the world loses its character of involvement. The world loses its specific aroundness; the environment becomes the natural world. The "world" as a totality of equipment ready-to-hand is spatialized into a nexus of extended things that are now only present-at-hand. Homogeneous natural space shows itself only by way of a kind of uncovering of the beings encountered that has the character

of a specific *deworlding* of the worldly character of the ready-to-hand.

24.7 In accordance with its Being-in-the-world, Dasein is always already given uncovered space, though unthematically. Space in itself, by contrast, initially still remains covered over with regard to the pure possibilities it contains of the mere Being-spatial of something. That space essentially *shows itself in a world* does not yet decide the kind of its Being. It need not have the way of Being of something that is itself spatially ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Nor does the Being of space have the way of Being of Dasein. The Being of space itself cannot be conceived in the way of Being of the res extensa. But from this it follows neither that space must be determined ontologically as a "phenomenon" of this res—in its Being it would then not be distinguished from it—nor, still less, that the Being of space could be equated with that of the res cogitans and conceived as merely "subjective," quite apart from how questionable the *Being* of this subject is.

24.8 The perplexity about how to interpret the Being of space, which persists to this day, is grounded not so much in an inadequate knowledge of the subject matter of space itself as in the lack of a fundamental transparency about the possibilities of Being in general and about their ontological-conceptual interpretation. What is decisive for understanding the ontological problem of space is to free the question of the Being of space from the narrowness of the concepts of Being that happen to be available and are, moreover, mostly crude. It is also to steer the problematic of the Being of space, with a view to the phenomenon itself and to the various phenomenal spatialities, in the direction of clarifying the possibilities of Being in general.

24.9 In the phenomenon of space we can find neither the only ontological determinateness of the Being of innerworldly beings nor even the one that is primary among others. Still less does space constitute the phenomenon of world. Space can be grasped only by going back to the world. Not only does space first become accessible through the deworlding of the environ-

ment. Spatiality can be uncovered at all only on the basis of world, and in such a way that space nevertheless *co*-constitutes the world, in keeping with the essential spatiality of Dasein itself with regard to its basic constitution of Being-in-the-world.

24.10 The analysis of the worldhood of the world constantly brought the whole phenomenon of Being-in-the-world into view. Yet not all of its constitutive moments stood out with the same phenomenal distinctness as the phenomenon of world itself. The ontological interpretation of the world by way of what is ready-to-hand within the world has been put first for a reason. Dasein in its everydayness, which remains a constant theme, not only is in a world at all but comports itself toward the world in one predominant way of Being. In the first instance and for the most part Dasein is captivated by its world. This way of Being, absorption in the world, and with it the Being-in that underlies it in general, essentially determine the phenomenon we are now to pursue with the question: *who* is it that is Dasein in everydayness? All the structures of Dasein's Being, and hence also the phenomenon that answers this who-question, are ways of its Being. Their ontological characterization is an existential one. We therefore need to set up the question correctly and to outline the path along which a further phenomenal domain of Dasein's everydayness is to be brought into view. Investigating in the direction of the phenomenon through which the question of the who can be answered leads to structures of Dasein that are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: *Being-with* and *Dasein-with*. Grounded in this way of Being is the mode of everyday Being-a-self. Its explication makes visible what we may call the "subject" of everydayness: *the they*. The chapter on the "who" of average Dasein accordingly has the following structure: 1.[25] the approach to the existential question of the who of Dasein (§ 25); 2. the Dasein-with of Others and everyday Being-with (§ 26); 3. everyday Being-a-self and the they (§ 27).

25 *Das Man*: Heidegger's noun formed from the impersonal pronoun *man* ("one," as in "one says"); rendered "the they."

Division One, Chapter IV: Being-in-the-World as Being-with and Being-a-Self. The "They"

Erster Abschnitt. Viertes Kapitel: Das In-der-Welt-sein als Mit- und Selbstsein. Das »Man«
§§25–27

§ 25. THE APPROACH TO THE EXISTENTIAL QUESTION OF THE WHO OF DASEIN

The "who" of everyday Dasein may turn out not to be the I at all.

25.1 The answer to the question of who this being (Dasein) is in each case was seemingly already given in the formal indication of Dasein's basic determinations (cf. § 9). Dasein is a being that I myself am in each case; its Being is in each case mine. This determination *indicates* an *ontological* constitution, but no more than that. At the same time it contains the *ontic*—though crude—statement that in each case an I is this being, and not Others. The who is answered in terms of the I itself, the "subject," the "self." The who is what maintains itself as something identical through the change of comportments and lived experiences, and in doing so relates itself to this manifold. Ontologically we understand it as what is always already and constantly present-at-hand in a closed region and for that region, as what lies at the basis in an eminent sense, as the *subjectum*. As the same in manifold otherness, this has the character of the *self*. One may reject a soul-substance, just as one may reject the thinghood of consciousness and the objecthood of the person. Ontologically, one still keeps to positing something whose Being, whether expli-

citly or not, retains the meaning of presence-at-hand. Substantiality is the ontological guideline for determining the being in terms of which the who-question is answered. Dasein is tacitly conceived in advance as something present-at-hand. In any case, the indefiniteness of its Being always implies this meaning of Being. Presence-at-hand, however, is the way of Being of a being that is not of the character of Dasein.

25.2 The ontic obviousness of the assertion that it is I who am Dasein in each case must not mislead us into thinking that it unmistakably marks out the path for an ontological interpretation of what is thus "given." It even remains questionable whether the ontic content of that assertion adequately renders the phenomenal content of everyday Dasein. It could be that the who of everyday Dasein is precisely *not* I myself in each case.

25.3 In arriving at ontic-ontological assertions, the phenomenal demonstration drawn from the way of Being of the being itself is to keep priority even over the most obvious answers, those that have always been customary, and over the formulations of problems drawn from them. If it is to do so, then the phenomenological interpretation of Dasein must be protected, with regard to the question now to be asked, against an inversion of the problematic.

25.4 But does it not go against the rules of all sound method if the approach to a problematic does not keep to the evident givens of its thematic field? And what is more indubitable than the givenness of the I? And does this givenness not instruct us to disregard everything else that is "given," so that the I can be worked out primordially? We would disregard not only a "world" that is, but also the Being of other "I"s. Perhaps what this kind of giving gives—the simple, formal, reflective perceiving of the I—is indeed evident. This insight even opens access to an independent phenomenological problematic, which has its fundamental importance, as a framework, as a "formal phenomenology of consciousness."

25.5 In the present context of an existential analytic of factical Dasein, the question arises whether this way of giving the I dis-

closes Dasein in its everydayness, if it discloses it at all. Is it self-evident a priori that access to Dasein must be a simply perceiving reflection on the I of acts? What if this kind of "self-giving" on Dasein's part led the existential analytic astray, and did so in a way grounded in the Being of Dasein itself? Perhaps, in addressing itself most immediately, Dasein always says: I am it—and in the end says so most loudly when it is "not" this being. What if the constitution of Dasein whereby it is mine in each case were the reason why, in the first instance and for the most part, Dasein is *not itself*? What if the existential analytic, with the approach mentioned above—starting from the givenness of the I—walked into a trap, as it were, set by Dasein itself and by a self-interpretation of Dasein that lies close at hand? What if it turned out that the ontological horizon for determining what is accessible in simple giving remains in principle undetermined? One can indeed always say of this being, with ontic justification, that "I" am it. But an ontological analytic that makes use of such assertions must subject them to reservations in principle. The "I" may be understood only in the sense of a noncommittal *formal indication* of something that, in the particular phenomenal context of Being, may perhaps reveal itself as its "opposite." In that case "not-I" by no means amounts to a being that essentially lacks "I-hood." Rather, it means a definite way of Being of the "I" itself, for example self-lostness.

25.6 But the positive interpretation of Dasein given so far already rules out starting from the formal givenness of the I if we aim at a phenomenally adequate answer to the who-question. The clarification of Being-in-the-world showed that there "is" not in the first instance, and there is never given, a bare subject without world. And so, in the end, an isolated I without the Others is just as little given in the first instance. But if "the Others" are always already *there with* Dasein in Being-in-the-world, then even this phenomenal finding must not mislead us. We must not take the *ontological* structure of what is thus "given" as self-evident and in no need of investigation. The task is to make the kind of this Dasein-with in most immediate everydayness

phenomenally visible and to interpret it in an ontologically appropriate way.

25.7 The ontic obviousness of the Being-in-itself of inner-worldly beings leads us to the conviction that the meaning of this Being is ontologically self-evident, and it lets the phenomenon of the world be overlooked. In the same way the ontic obviousness that Dasein is mine in each case harbors a possible way of leading the corresponding ontological problematic astray. *In the first instance* the who of Dasein is not only a problem *ontologically*; it also remains covered over *ontically*.

25.8 But is the existential-analytical answer to the who-question then without any guideline at all? By no means. Admittedly, among the formal indications of Dasein's constitution of Being given above (§§ 9 and 12), the guideline is not so much the one discussed so far. It is rather the indication according to which the "essence" of Dasein is grounded in its existence. *If the "I" is an essential determinateness of Dasein, then it must be interpreted existentially.* The who can then be answered only by phenomenally demonstrating a definite way of Being of Dasein. If Dasein is its self in each case only *in existing*, then the constancy of the self, just as much as its possible "non-self-constancy," demands an existential-ontological way of posing the question as the only appropriate access to its problematic.

25.9 But if the self is to be conceived "only" as a way of the Being of this being, then that seems tantamount to making the actual "core" of Dasein evaporate. Such fears, however, feed on the wrongheaded preconception that the being in question does, at bottom, have the way of Being of something present-at-hand. They hold to it even if one keeps away from this being the massiveness of a corporeal thing that simply occurs. Yet the *"substance"* of the human being is not spirit as the synthesis of soul and body but *existence*.

§ 26. THE DASEIN-WITH OF OTHERS AND EVERYDAY BEING-WITH

Others are encountered from the world; Being-with is an existential, and solicitude its mode.

26.1 The answer to the question of the who of everyday Dasein is to be obtained by analyzing *that* way of Being in which Dasein maintains itself in the first instance and for the most part. The investigation takes its orientation from Being-in-the-world, the basic constitution of Dasein by which every mode of its Being is co-determined. We said that the preceding explication of the world had also already brought the remaining structural moments of Being-in-the-world into view. If we were right, then that explication must also in a certain way have prepared the answer to the who-question.

26.2 The "description" of the most immediate environment, for example the work-world of the craftsman, showed that the others for whom the "work" is destined are "encountered along with" the equipment being worked on. In the way of Being of what is ready-to-hand here, that is, in its involvement, there lies an essential reference to possible wearers, for whom it is supposed to be "cut to fit the body." Likewise, in the material used, its producer or "supplier" is encountered as the one who "serves" well or badly. The field, for example, along which we walk "outside," shows itself as belonging to so-and-so and kept in good order by him. The book we use was bought at ..., given by ..., and the like. The boat anchored at the shore refers, in its Being-in-itself, to an acquaintance who makes his trips in it; but even as "someone else's boat" it shows Others. The Others who are "encountered" in this way in the ready-to-hand context of equipment in the environment are not somehow added in thought to a thing that is initially just present-at-hand. Rather, these "things" are encountered from out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for the Others, a world that is also always already mine in advance. In the analysis so far, the range of what is encountered within the world was initially narrowed

down to ready-to-hand equipment or present-at-hand nature, and thus to beings whose character is not that of Dasein. This restriction was necessary not only to simplify the explication, but above all because the way of Being of the Dasein of Others encountered within the world differs from readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. Dasein's world thus frees a being that is not only different from equipment and things in general. In keeping with its way of Being *as Dasein*, this being is itself "in" the world in the manner of Being-in-the-world, the very world in which it is at the same time encountered as innerworldly. This being is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; rather, it is *just like* the Dasein that frees it—it *is there too, and there with it*. If one insisted on identifying world in general with innerworldly beings, one would have to say that "world" is also Dasein.

26.3 Yet the characterization of the encounter with *Others* is, after all, again oriented toward one's *own* Dasein in each case. Does it not also start out by singling out and isolating the "I," so that a transition from this isolated subject to the Others must then be sought? To avoid this misunderstanding, we must note in what sense "the Others" are spoken of here. "The Others" does not mean the whole remainder of everyone besides me, from which the I stands out. The Others are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself, those among whom one is too. This Being-there-too with them does not have the ontological character of a "with"-presence-at-hand within a world. The "with" is something of the character of Dasein; the "too" means the sameness of Being as circumspectively concerned Being-in-the-world. "With" and "too" are to be understood *existentially* and not categorially. On the basis of this Being-in-the-world characterized by the *with*, the world is always already the one that I share with the Others. The world of Dasein is a *with-world*. Being-in is *Being-with* Others. Their Being-in-themselves within the world is *Dasein-with*.

26.4 The Others are not encountered by first grasping one's own subject, initially present-at-hand, and distinguishing it from the

other subjects that also occur. Nor are they encountered in a primary looking at oneself, in which the against-which of a distinction would first be fixed. They are encountered from out of the *world*, in which Dasein, concerned and circumspective, essentially dwells. Theoretically concocted "explanations" of the presence-at-hand of Others readily force themselves on us. Against them we must hold fast to the phenomenal fact we have pointed out: that Others are encountered *environmentally*. This most immediate and elementary worldly way in which Dasein is encountered goes so far that even one's *own* Dasein becomes "findable" for itself *in the first instance* by *looking away* from "lived experiences" and the "center of acts," or by not yet "seeing" them at all. Dasein finds "itself" in the first instance in *what* it pursues, uses, expects, averts—in what is ready-to-hand in the environment, with which it is in the first instance *concerned*.

26.5 And even when Dasein explicitly addresses itself as: I-here, this locative determination of the person must be understood in terms of Dasein's existential spatiality. In interpreting that spatiality (§ 23) we already intimated that this I-here does not mean an eminent point of the I-thing. It understands itself as Being-in in terms of the over-there of the ready-to-hand world, where Dasein dwells as *concern*.

26.6 *W. von Humboldt* drew attention to languages that express the "I" by "here," the "you" by "there," the "he" by "over there," and that thus—to put it grammatically—render the personal pronouns by adverbs of place. It is disputed which is the original meaning of expressions of place, the adverbial or the pronominal. The dispute loses its footing once we note that the adverbs of place relate to the I qua Dasein. The "here," "over there," and "there" are not primarily pure determinations of the location of innerworldly beings present-at-hand at positions in space; they are characteristics of Dasein's primordial spatiality. The supposed adverbs of place are determinations of Dasein; their

meaning is primarily existential and not categorial.[1] But neither are they pronouns. Their meaning lies prior to the distinction between adverbs of place and personal pronouns. The properly spatial meaning that these expressions have for Dasein, however, documents something about an interpretation of Dasein that theory has not distorted. Such an interpretation sees Dasein immediately in its spatial—that is, de-severing and directing—"Being alongside" the world it is concerned with. In the "here," Dasein, absorbed in its world, does not speak toward itself. It speaks away from itself, toward the "over there" of something circumspectively ready-to-hand, and yet it means *itself* in its existential spatiality.

26.7 Dasein understands itself in the first instance and for the most part in terms of its world, and the Dasein-with of Others is often encountered from out of what is ready-to-hand within the world. But even when Others become, as it were, thematic in their Dasein, they are not encountered as present-at-hand person-things. We meet them "at work," that is, primarily in their Being-in-the-world. Even when we see the Other "just standing around," the Other is never grasped as a present-at-hand human-thing. Rather, "standing around" is an existential mode of Being: an unconcerned, uncircumspective lingering alongside everything and nothing. The Other is encountered in his Dasein-with in the world.

26.8 But surely the expression "Dasein" shows clearly that this being "in the first instance" is unrelated to Others, and that it can of course afterward also be "with" others. It must not be overlooked, however, that we use the term Dasein-with to designate *that* Being in terms of which the Others, who are, are freed within the world. This Dasein-with of the Others is disclosed within the world for a Dasein, and so also for those who are there-with, only because Dasein is essentially, in itself, Being-with. The phenomenological assertion "Dasein is essentially

1 Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), Prussian scholar and statesman and a founder of comparative linguistics; the reference is to his 1829 essay on the kinship of adverbs of place with pronouns in certain languages.

Being-with" has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not mean to establish ontically that I am factically not present-at-hand alone, and that others of my kind occur as well. Suppose the proposition that Dasein's Being-in-the-world is essentially constituted by Being-with meant something of this sort. Then Being-with would not be an existential determinateness that belongs to Dasein of itself, from its way of Being. It would be a property that turns up in each case on the basis of the occurrence of Others. Being-with determines Dasein existentially even when an Other is factically not present-at-hand and perceived. Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be *missing* only *in* and *for* a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its possibility is the proof of this. On the other hand, factical Being-alone is not removed by a second human specimen occurring "beside" me, or perhaps ten of them. Even when these and more are present-at-hand, Dasein can be alone. Being-with and the facticity of Being-with-one-another are therefore not grounded in several "subjects" occurring together. Yet Being-alone "among" many does not in turn mean, as regards the Being of the many, that they are merely present-at-hand there. Even in Being "among them," they are *there with*; their Dasein-with is encountered in the mode of indifference and strangeness. Being missing and "being away" are modes of Dasein-with. They are possible only because Dasein as Being-with lets the Dasein of others be encountered in its world. Being-with is a determinateness of one's own Dasein in each case; Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of others insofar as it is freed for a Being-with by that Being-with's world. One's own Dasein is Dasein-with, as encountered for Others, only insofar as it has the essential structure of Being-with.

[26.9] Suppose Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world. Then it must be interpreted in terms of the phenomenon of *care*, as which the Being of Dasein in general is determined (cf. Chapter 6 of this division). The same holds for circumspective dealings with what is ready-to-hand within the

world, which we characterized by anticipation as concern. The character of Being of concern cannot belong to Being-with, even though this way of Being, like concern, is a *Being toward* beings encountered within the world. But the being toward which Dasein comports itself as Being-with does not have the way of Being of ready-to-hand equipment; it is itself Dasein. This being is not concerned with; it falls within *solicitude*.[2]

26.10 Even "concern" with food and clothing, and the nursing of the sick body, is solicitude. But we understand this expression, in keeping with our use of concern, as a term for an existential. "Solicitude" as a factical social institution, for example, is grounded in Dasein's constitution of Being as Being-with. Its factical urgency is motivated by the fact that Dasein maintains itself in the first instance and for the most part in the deficient modes of solicitude. Being-for-, Being-against-, and Being-without-one-another, passing one another by, not-mattering-to-one-another: these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely the modes last named, those of deficiency and indifference, that characterize everyday and average Being-with-one-another. These modes of Being again show the character of inconspicuousness and obviousness, which belongs to the everyday inner-worldly Dasein-with of Others just as much as to the readiness-to-hand of the equipment concerned with daily. These indifferent modes of Being-with-one-another easily mislead ontological interpretation into interpreting this Being, in the first instance, as the sheer presence-at-hand of several subjects. There seem to be only slight variants of the same way of Being here. And yet ontologically there is an essential difference between the "indifferent" occurring-together of arbitrary things and the not-mattering-to-one-another of beings who are with one another.

26.11 With regard to its positive modes, solicitude has two extreme possibilities. It can, as it were, take "care" away from the Other and put itself in his place in concern: it can *leap in* for him. This solicitude takes over for the Other what is to be con-

2 *Fürsorge*, literally "caring-for," is built, like *Besorgen* (concern), on *Sorge* (care). In ordinary German it also means welfare work.

cerned with. The Other is thereby thrown out of his place. He steps back, so as afterward to take over what is concerned with as something finished and at his disposal, or else to disburden himself of it entirely. In such solicitude the Other can become the dependent and the dominated, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from the one dominated. This solicitude that leaps in and takes away "care" determines Being-with-one-another to a large extent, and for the most part it pertains to concern with the ready-to-hand.

26.12 Opposed to it there is the possibility of a solicitude that does not so much leap in for the Other as *leap ahead* of him in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being. It does so not in order to take "care" away from him, but in order, for the first time, to give it back to him properly as such. This solicitude essentially pertains to owned care—that is, to the existence of the Other—and not to a *what* with which he is concerned. It helps the Other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for* it.

26.13 Solicitude proves to be a constitution of Dasein's Being which, in its various possibilities, is bound up both with Dasein's Being toward the world it is concerned with and with its owned Being toward itself. Being-with-one-another is grounded in the first instance, and often exclusively, in what is concerned with in common in such Being. A Being-with-one-another that arises from one's doing the same thing mostly not only keeps within outward limits but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The Being-with-one-another of those employed in the same affair often feeds only on mistrust. Conversely, joint commitment to the same cause is determined by Dasein that has in each case been expressly taken hold of. Only this *owned* bond makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the other in his freedom for himself.

26.14 Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of positive solicitude—the one that leaps in and dominates and the one that leaps ahead and liber-

ates. It brings forth manifold mixed forms, whose description and classification lie outside the limits of this investigation.

26.15 Just as *circumspection* belongs to concern as a way of uncovering the ready-to-hand, so solicitude is guided by *considerateness* and *forbearance*. Along with solicitude, both can run through the corresponding deficient and indifferent modes, down to *inconsiderateness* and the looking-past that guides indifference.[3]

26.16 The world frees not only the ready-to-hand as beings encountered within the world, but also Dasein, the Others in their Dasein-with. But in keeping with its ownmost meaning of Being, this being freed in the environment is Being-in in the same world in which, as encountered for others, it is there with. Worldhood was interpreted (§ 18) as the referential whole of significance. In its prior, understanding familiarity with significance, Dasein lets the ready-to-hand be encountered as something uncovered in its involvement. The referential nexus of significance is anchored in Dasein's Being toward its ownmost Being. With this Being there can essentially be no involvement; it is rather the Being *for the sake of which* Dasein itself is as it is.

26.17 According to the analysis just carried out, however, Being-with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, the Being that matters to Dasein in its very Being. As Being-with, therefore, Dasein essentially "is" for the sake of Others. This must be understood as an existential assertion about essence. Even when a particular factical Dasein does *not* turn to Others, believes it has no need of them, or else misses them, it *is* in the mode of Being-with. In Being-with as the existential for-the-sake-of Others, these Others are already disclosed in their Dasein. This disclosedness of Others, constituted beforehand with Being-with, accordingly also helps make up significance, that is, worldhood, which is anchored in the existential for-the-sake-of-which. Hence the worldhood of the world thus constituted, in which

3 The German words share the root *Sicht* (sight): *Umsicht* (looking around, circumspection), *Rücksicht* (looking back, considerateness), *Nachsicht* (forbearance), and *Nachsehen* (looking past).

Dasein essentially always already is, lets the environmentally ready-to-hand be encountered in a particular way. At one with it, as what is circumspectively concerned with, the Dasein-with of Others is encountered. It lies in the structure of the world-hood of the world that the Others are not in the first instance present-at-hand as free-floating subjects alongside other things. They show themselves in their particular environmental Being in the world, from out of what is ready-to-hand in that world.

26.18 The disclosedness of the Dasein-with of Others that belongs to Being-with means this: because Dasein's Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already contains the understanding of Others. Like understanding in general, this understanding is not an acquaintance that has grown out of knowing. It is a primordially existential way of Being that first makes knowing and acquaintance possible at all. Knowing oneself is grounded in primordially understanding Being-with. In the first instance, it moves in keeping with the most immediate way of Being of Being-in-the-world as Being-with. It moves in an understanding acquaintance with what Dasein, along with the Others, circumspectively finds in the environment and is concerned with. Solicitous concern is understood from out of what is concerned with and along with the understanding of it. Thus the Other is in the first instance disclosed in concernful solicitude.

26.19 But in the first instance and for the most part solicitude dwells in the deficient or at least indifferent modes—in the indifference of passing one another by. Because of this, the most immediate and essential knowing of oneself requires getting to know oneself. And when knowing oneself even loses itself in the ways of reserve, of hiding oneself and of disguising oneself, Being-with-one-another needs special paths in order to come close to the Others, or to get "behind" them.

26.20 But opening oneself up or closing oneself off is grounded in the particular way of Being of Being-with-one-another; indeed, it *is* nothing other than this way of Being itself. In the same way, the explicit solicitous disclosure of the Other in each

case arises only from primary Being-with him. Such a disclosure of the Other is *thematic*, but not theoretical-psychological. It now easily becomes the phenomenon that first comes into view for the theoretical problematic of understanding "the psychical life of others." What thus, phenomenally, represents "in the first instance" a way of Being-with-one-another that understands is, however, at the same time taken as what "in the beginning" and primordially makes possible and constitutes Being toward Others at all. This phenomenon, not very felicitously called *"empathy,"* is then supposed, ontologically, to build the bridge, as it were, from one's own subject, initially given alone, to the other subject, initially closed off altogether.[4]

26.21 Being toward Others is, to be sure, ontologically different from Being toward present-at-hand things. The "other" being itself has the way of Being of Dasein. In Being with and toward Others there thus lies a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein. But this relationship, one would like to say, is surely already constitutive for one's own Dasein in each case, which has an understanding of Being of itself and so comports itself toward Dasein. The relationship of Being toward Others then becomes a projection of one's own Being toward oneself "into another." The Other is a duplicate of the self.

26.22 But it is easy to see that this seemingly obvious consideration rests on weak ground. The presupposition this argument relies on—that Dasein's Being toward itself is Being toward an Other—does not hold. As long as this presupposition has not evidently been shown to be legitimate, it remains puzzling how it is supposed to disclose Dasein's relationship to itself to the Other as Other.

26.23 Being toward Others is not only an independent, irreducible relation of Being; as Being-with, it already is, together with the Being of Dasein. Admittedly, it cannot be disputed that the mutual knowing of one another that is alive on the basis of Being-with often depends on how far one's own Dasein has

4 *Einfühlung*, literally "feeling oneself into," was the standard term for empathy in the psychology and phenomenology of the time.

understood itself in each case. But that means only: how far it has not made its essential Being-with others opaque to itself and disguised it. This is possible only if Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is always already with Others. "Empathy" does not first constitute Being-with. It is possible only on the basis of Being-with, and it is motivated in its unavoidability by the predominant deficient modes of Being-with.

26.24 That "empathy" is not a primordial existential phenomenon, any more than knowing in general is, does not mean, however, that there is no problem regarding it. Its special hermeneutics will have to show how Dasein's own various possibilities of Being mislead and obstruct Being-with-one-another and its knowing of oneself, so that genuine "understanding" is suppressed and Dasein takes refuge in surrogates. It will also have to show what positive existential condition a right understanding of others presupposes for its possibility. The analysis has shown: Being-with is an existential constituent of Being-in-the-world. Dasein-with proves to be a way of Being in its own right of beings encountered within the world. Insofar as Dasein *is* at all, it has the way of Being of Being-with-one-another. This cannot be conceived as the summative result of the occurrence of several "subjects." Coming across a number of "subjects" is itself possible only because the Others, encountered in the first instance in their Dasein-with, are now treated merely as "numbers." Such a number is uncovered only by a definite Being-with- and -toward-one-another. This "inconsiderate" Being-with "reckons" with the Others without seriously "counting on them," or even wanting to "have anything to do" with them.

26.25 One's own Dasein, like the Dasein-with of Others, is encountered in the first instance and for the most part from out of the with-world concerned with in the environment. In being absorbed in the world concerned with—and that means, at the same time, in Being-with toward the Others—Dasein is not itself. *Who* is it, then, that has taken over Being as everyday Being-with-one-another?

§ 27. EVERYDAY BEING-A-SELF AND THE THEY

The who of everyday Dasein is the they, which levels down possibilities and disburdens Dasein.

27.1 The *ontologically* relevant result of the preceding analysis of Being-with lies in an insight: the "subject character" of one's own Dasein and of the Others is determined existentially, that is, in terms of certain ways to be. In what is concerned with in the environment, the Others are encountered as what they are; they *are* what they pursue.

27.2 In concern with what one has taken hold of with, for, and against the Others, there constantly rests the care about a difference from the Others. It may be only a matter of evening out the difference from them. Or one's own Dasein, lagging behind the Others, may want to catch up with them. Or Dasein, having priority over the Others, may be intent on keeping them down. Being-with-one-another is disquieted—hidden from itself—by the care about this distance. Expressed existentially, it has the character of *distantiality*. The more inconspicuous this way of Being is to everyday Dasein itself, the more stubbornly and primordially it takes effect.[5]

27.3 But this distantiality, which belongs to Being-with, implies that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in *subjection* to the Others. It is not Dasein itself that *is*; the Others have taken its Being away from it. The Others dispose, as they please, of Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being. These Others, moreover, are not *definite* Others. On the contrary, any Other can stand in for them. What is decisive is only the inconspicuous domination by the Others, which Dasein as Being-with has already taken over unawares. One belongs to the Others oneself and consolidates their power. "The Others," as one calls them in order to cover up one's own essential belonging to them, are those who in the first instance and for the most part *"are there"*

5 *Abständigkeit*: Heidegger's coinage from *Abstand* (distance, gap), the distance one keeps or measures between oneself and others.

in everyday Being-with-one-another. The who is not this one and not that one, not oneself and not some and not the sum of all. The "who" is the neuter, *the they*.

27.4 It was shown earlier how the public "environment" is always already ready-to-hand and concerned with in the most immediate environment. In using public transportation, in making use of news services (the newspaper), every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the way of Being of "the Others," in such a way, indeed, that the Others vanish still further in their distinctiveness and explicitness. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability the they unfolds its real dictatorship. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge literature and art as *they* see and judge; but we also withdraw from "the crowd" as *they* withdraw; we find "shocking" what *they* find shocking. The they, which is nothing definite and which all are, though not as a sum, prescribes the way of Being of everydayness.

27.5 The they itself has ways of its own to be. The tendency of Being-with that we called distantiality is grounded in the fact that Being-with-one-another as such concerns itself with *averageness*. Averageness is an existential character of the they. In its Being, averageness is essentially what matters to the they. That is why the they factically maintains itself in the averageness of what is proper, of what one accepts as valid and what not, of what one grants success and what one denies it. This averageness, in marking out in advance what can and may be ventured, keeps watch over every exception that thrusts itself forward. Every priority is silently kept down. Everything primordial is smoothed over overnight as long familiar. Everything won by struggle becomes easy to handle. Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness in turn reveals an essential tendency of Dasein, which we call the *leveling down* of all possibilities of Being.

27.6 Distantiality, averageness, and leveling down, as modes of Being of the they, constitute what we know as "publicness." Pub-

licness in the first instance regulates every interpretation of the world and of Dasein, and it is right in everything. It is so not on the basis of an eminent and primary relationship of Being to "things," and not because it has at its disposal a transparency of Dasein that it has explicitly appropriated. It is so on the basis of not going into "the matters," because it is insensitive to all differences of level and of genuineness. Publicness obscures everything and passes off what has thus been covered over as what is familiar and accessible to everyone.

27.7 The they is present everywhere, but in such a way that it has also always already slipped away wherever Dasein presses for a decision. Because the they, however, provides every judgment and decision in advance, it takes responsibility away from Dasein in each case. The they can, as it were, afford to have "one" constantly appeal to it. It can most easily answer for everything, because it is no one who needs to vouch for anything. It always "was" the they, and yet it can be said that it was "no one." In the everydayness of Dasein, most things are brought about by that of which we must say: it was no one.

27.8 In this way the they *disburdens* Dasein in each case in its everydayness. Not only that: with this disburdening of Being, the they accommodates Dasein, insofar as Dasein has a tendency to take things lightly and make them easy. And because the they constantly accommodates Dasein in each case with this disburdening of Being, it retains and consolidates its stubborn domination.

27.9 Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The *they*, with which the question of the *who* of everyday Dasein is answered, is the *nobody* to whom every Dasein has always already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another.

27.10 The characters of Being of everyday Being-among-one-another that we have set out are distantiality, averageness, leveling down, publicness, disburdening of Being, and accommodation. In them lies Dasein's most immediate "constancy." This constancy concerns not the continuing presence-at-hand of something but the way of Being of Dasein as Being-with. In

being in the modes named, the self of one's own Dasein and the self of the Other have not yet found themselves, or have lost themselves. One is in the manner of non-self-constancy and unownness. This way of Being does not signify any lessening of Dasein's facticity, any more than the they, as the nobody, is a nothing. On the contrary, in this way of Being Dasein is an ens realissimum [a most real being], if "reality" is understood as Being of the character of Dasein.

27.11 To be sure, the they is as little present-at-hand as Dasein in general. The more openly the they carries on, the more elusive and hidden it is—but also the less it is nothing. To unprejudiced ontic-ontological "seeing," it reveals itself as the "most real subject" of everydayness. And if it is not accessible in the way a present-at-hand stone is, that does not decide in the least about its way of Being. We may not decree prematurely that this they is "really" nothing. Nor may we pay homage to the opinion that the phenomenon has been ontologically interpreted if we "explain" it, say, as the result, joined together after the fact, of several subjects being present-at-hand together. Rather, conversely, the working out of the concepts of Being must be guided by these undeniable phenomena.

27.12 Nor is the they something like a "universal subject" hovering over several subjects. One can arrive at this conception only if the Being of "subjects" is not understood in a way appropriate to Dasein, and if subjects are posited as factually present-at-hand cases of a genus that occurs. Given this approach, the only possibility left ontologically is to understand everything that is not a case in the sense of species and genus. The they is not the genus of Dasein in each case, nor can it be found in this being as a lasting property. That traditional logic also fails in the face of these phenomena cannot be surprising, if we consider that it has its foundation in an ontology of the present-at-hand—and a crude one at that. That is why, however many improvements and extensions it receives, it cannot in principle be made more flexible. These reforms of logic oriented toward the "human sciences" only increase the ontological confusion.

27.13 *The they is an existential and belongs, as a primordial phenomenon, to the positive constitution of Dasein.* It in turn has various possibilities of becoming concrete in a way appropriate to Dasein. The insistence and explicitness of its domination can change historically.

27.14 The self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self*, which we distinguish from the *owned* self—that is, from the *self* that has been expressly taken hold of. As they-self, Dasein in each case is *dispersed* into the they and must first find itself. This dispersal characterizes the "subject" of the way of Being we know as concerned absorption in the world encountered most immediately. If Dasein is familiar to itself as they-self, this means at the same time that the they marks out in advance the most immediate interpretation of the world and of Being-in-the-world. The they itself, for the sake of which Dasein is in an everyday way, articulates the referential nexus of significance. Dasein's world frees the beings encountered for a totality of involvements that is familiar to the they, and within the limits fixed by the averageness of the they. *In the first instance* factical Dasein is in the with-world, uncovered in an average way. *In the first instance* it is not "I," in the sense of my own self, who "am," but the Others, in the manner of the they. In terms of the they and as the they, I am in the first instance "given" to "myself." In the first instance Dasein is the they, and for the most part it remains so. When Dasein expressly uncovers the world and brings it close to itself, when it discloses its owned Being to itself, this uncovering of "world" and disclosing of Dasein always takes place as a clearing away of coverings-over and obscurings. It takes place as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bolts itself off against itself.

27.15 With the interpretation of Being-with and of Being-a-self in the they, the question of the who of the everydayness of Being-with-one-another has been answered. At the same time these considerations have yielded a concrete understanding of Dasein's basic constitution. Being-in-the-world has become visible in its everydayness and averageness.

27.16 Everyday Dasein draws the pre-ontological interpretation of its Being from the most immediate way of Being of the they. Ontological interpretation initially follows this tendency of interpretation: it understands Dasein in terms of the world and comes across it as an innerworldly being. Not only that: the "most immediate" ontology of Dasein also lets the "world" supply it with the meaning of Being in terms of which these "subjects" that are are understood. But because in this absorption in the world the phenomenon of world itself is passed over, its place is taken by what is present-at-hand within the world, by things. The Being of the being that *is there-with* is conceived as presence-at-hand. Thus the demonstration of the positive phenomenon of Being-in-the-world in its most immediate everydayness makes possible an insight into the root of the ontological interpretation's failure to grasp this constitution of Being. *It is this constitution itself, in its everyday way of Being, that in the first instance fails to grasp itself and covers itself over.*

27.17 If the Being of everyday Being-with-one-another, which ontologically seems to approach pure presence-at-hand, is already fundamentally different from it, then the Being of the owned self can be conceived as presence-at-hand even less. *Owned Being-a-self* does not rest on an exceptional condition of the subject, detached from the they. It *is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential.*

27.18 But then the sameness of the self that exists in an owned way is separated ontologically by a chasm from the identity of the I that persists throughout the manifold of lived experiences.

Division One, Chapter V: Being-in as Such

Erster Abschnitt. Fünftes Kapitel: Das In-Sein als solches
§§28–38

§ 28. THE TASK OF A THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF BEING-IN

Chapter 5 begins: Dasein is its "there," its disclosedness, whose constitution will now be analyzed.

28.1 In its preparatory stage the existential analytic of Dasein has as its guiding theme the basic constitution of this being, Being-in-the-world. Its next goal is to bring out phenomenally the unified, primordial structure of Dasein's Being, from which its possibilities and ways "to be" are ontologically determined. Up to now, the phenomenal characterization of Being-in-the-world has been directed toward the world as a structural moment and toward answering the question of the who of this being in its everydayness. But already when we first marked out the tasks of a preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, an orientation about *Being-in as such* was sent on ahead and demonstrated in the concrete mode of knowing the world.

28.2 Taking up this supporting structural moment in advance arose from the intention of keeping the analysis of the individual moments encircled, from the outset, by a sustained preview of the structural whole, and of preventing any disruption and splintering of the unified phenomenon. Now the task is to steer the interpretation back to the phenomenon of Being-in, while preserving what was gained in the concrete analysis of world and who. A more penetrating consideration of this phenomenon should, however, not only force the structural wholeness of Being-in-the-world once again, and more securely,

before the phenomenological gaze. It should also pave the way for grasping the primordial Being of Dasein itself: care.

28.3 But what more can be pointed out in Being-in-the-world, beyond the essential relations of Being alongside the world (concern), Being-with (solicitude), and Being-a-self (who)? At most there remains the possibility of broadening the analysis by a comparative characterization of the variations of concern and its circumspection, of solicitude and its considerateness, and of setting Dasein off from beings not of the kind of Dasein by a sharper explication of the Being of all possible innerworldly beings. Without question there are unfinished tasks in this direction. What has been set out so far needs supplementing in many ways with a view to a self-contained working-out of the existential a priori of philosophical anthropology. But that is not what the present investigation aims at. *Its aim is one of fundamental ontology.* If, accordingly, we inquire thematically into Being-in, we certainly cannot want to annihilate the primordiality of the phenomenon by deriving it from others, that is, by an inappropriate analysis in the sense of a dissolution. But the underivability of something primordial does not rule out a manifold of characters of Being that are constitutive for it. If such characters show themselves, then they are existentially equiprimordial. The phenomenon of the *equiprimordiality* of the constitutive moments has often been disregarded in ontology, owing to a methodologically unbridled tendency to trace the provenance of each and every thing back to a simple "primal ground."

28.4 In what direction must we look for the phenomenal characterization of Being-in as such? We get the answer by recalling what was entrusted to the phenomenologically retaining gaze when the phenomenon was indicated: Being-in as distinct from the present-at-hand insideness of something present-at-hand "in" something else; Being-in not as a property of a present-at-hand subject, effected or even merely triggered by the presence-at-hand of a "world"; Being-in, rather, as the essential way of Being of this being itself. But then what else presents itself with

this phenomenon than the present-at-hand commercium [interchange] *between* a present-at-hand subject and a present-at-hand object? This interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content if it said: *Dasein is the Being* of this "between." Even so, orientation by the "between" would remain misleading. It goes along, without examination, with the ontologically indeterminate positing of the beings between which this between as such "is." The between is already conceived as the result of the convenientia [coming together] of two things present-at-hand. But positing these beforehand always already *shatters* the phenomenon, and there is no prospect of ever putting it back together from the fragments. Not only is the "cement" missing; the "schema" according to which the joining is to be carried out has been shattered, or rather was never revealed beforehand. What is ontologically decisive is to prevent the shattering of the phenomenon beforehand, that is, to secure its positive phenomenal content. That this requires considerable elaborateness only expresses the fact that something ontically self-evident has been ontologically distorted in many ways, to the point of invisibility, in the traditional way of treating the "problem of knowledge."

28.5 The being that is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world *is* itself in each case its "there." In the familiar meaning of the word, the "there" points to "here" and "over there." The "here" of an "I-here" is always understood in terms of a ready-to-hand "over there," in the sense of a de-severing, directing, concernful Being toward it. The existential spatiality of Dasein, which in this way determines its "location," is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world. The over there is the determinateness of something encountered *within the world*. "Here" and "over there" are possible only in a "there," that is, only if there is a being which, as the Being of the "there," has disclosed spatiality. This being bears in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. The expression "there" means this essential disclosedness. Through it, this being (Dasein) is "there" for itself, together with the Da-sein of world.

28.6 The ontically figurative talk of the lumen naturale [natural light] in human beings means nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this being: that it is in such a way as to be its "there." To say that it is "illuminated" means: it is cleared in itself as Being-in-the-world—not by another being, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for a being existentially cleared in this way does what is present-at-hand become accessible in the light, or hidden in the dark. Dasein brings its "there" along with it from the very start. Lacking it, it not only factically is not, but is not at all the being with this essence. *Dasein is its disclosedness.*[1]

28.7 The constitution of this Being is to be set out. But insofar as the essence of this being is existence, the existential proposition "Dasein is its disclosedness" means at the same time: the Being that matters to this being in its Being is to be its "there." Besides characterizing the primary constitution of the Being of disclosedness, the course of the analysis requires an interpretation of the way of Being in which this being is its "there" *in an everyday way*.

28.8 The chapter that undertakes the explication of Being-in as such, that is, of the Being of the "there," falls into two parts: A. The existential constitution of the "there." B. The everyday Being of the "there" and the falling of Dasein.

28.9 We see the two equiprimordial constitutive ways of being the "there" in *attunement* and in *understanding*. In each case their analysis receives the necessary phenomenal confirmation through the interpretation of a concrete mode that is important for the problematic to follow. Attunement and understanding are equiprimordially determined by *discourse*.

28.10 Under A (the existential constitution of the "there") we shall accordingly treat: Da-sein as attunement (§ 29), fear as a mode of attunement (§ 30), Da-sein as understanding (§ 31), understanding and interpretation (§ 32), assertion as a derivat-

1 *Lichtung*: a clearing in a forest; the word belongs with *Licht*, "light," and *lichten*, "to thin out, to open up."

ive mode of interpretation (§ 33), Da-sein, discourse, and language (§ 34).

28.11 The analysis of the characters of Being of *Da-sein* is an existential one. This means: the characters are not properties of something present-at-hand, but essentially existential ways to be. Their way of Being in everydayness must therefore be set out.

28.12 Under B (the everyday Being of the "there" and the falling of Dasein), the following are analyzed as existential modes of the everyday Being of the "there," corresponding to the constitutive phenomenon of discourse, to the sight that lies in understanding, and to the interpretation (construal) that belongs to understanding: idle talk (§ 35), curiosity (§ 36), ambiguity (§ 37). In these phenomena a basic way of the Being of the "there" becomes visible, which we interpret as *falling*—a "falling" that shows a kind of movedness existentially its own (§ 38).

A. THE EXISTENTIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE "THERE." § 29. DA-SEIN AS ATTUNEMENT

Moods disclose Dasein's thrownness, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and the world's power to matter.

29.1 What we indicate *ontologically* by the term attunement is *ontically* the most familiar and most everyday thing there is: mood, Being-attuned. Prior to any psychology of moods—a field that, moreover, still lies completely fallow—this phenomenon must be seen as a fundamental existential and outlined in its structure.[2]

29.2 The undisturbed equanimity and the inhibited ill humor of everyday concern, the slipping over from the one into the other and back, the sliding off into bad moods, are ontologically not nothing, even if these phenomena go unnoticed as supposedly the most indifferent and fleeting things in Dasein. That moods can be spoiled and can change over means only that

2 *Befindlichkeit*: from *sich befinden*, "to find oneself" (in a place, a state), as in *wie befinden Sie sich?* ("how are you doing?"); rendered here as "attunement."

Dasein is always already attuned. The often persistent, even, and pallid lack of mood, which must not be confused with a bad mood, is so far from being nothing that it is precisely in it that Dasein becomes weary of itself. Being has become manifest as a burden. Why, one does not *know*. And Dasein cannot know anything of the kind, because the disclosive possibilities of cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosing of moods, in which Dasein is brought before its Being as the "there." And again, an elated mood can relieve one of the manifest burden of Being. This possibility of mood, too, discloses the burdensome character of Dasein, even while relieving it. Mood makes manifest "how one is and how one is faring." In this "how one is," Being-attuned brings Being into its "there."

29.3 In attunedness Dasein is always already disclosed, in the manner of mood, as *the* being to which Dasein has been delivered over in its Being, as the Being which, existing, it has to be. Disclosed does not mean known as such. And precisely in the most indifferent and harmless everydayness, the Being of Dasein can break forth as the naked "that it is and has to be." The pure "that it is" shows itself; the where-from and the where-to remain in the dark. That Dasein, just as much in its everyday way, does not "give in" to such moods—that is, does not follow up their disclosing and does not let itself be brought before what is disclosed—is no proof *against* the phenomenal fact of the disclosedness, in the manner of mood, of the Being of the "there" in its "that." It is evidence for it. For the most part Dasein *ontically*-existentielly evades the Being disclosed in mood. *Ontologically*-existentially this means: in that to which such a mood does not turn, Dasein is unveiled in its Being-delivered-over to the "there." In the evasion itself the "there" *is* disclosed.

29.4 This character of Dasein's Being—veiled in its where-from and where-to, but in itself all the more unveiledly disclosed—this "that it is," we call the *thrownness* of this being into its "there," in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the "there." The expression thrownness is meant to suggest the *facticity of being delivered over*. The "that it is and has to be" disclosed

in Dasein's attunement is not the "that" which expresses, ontologically and categorially, the factuality belonging to presence-at-hand. Such factuality becomes accessible only in an establishing of facts that looks at things. Rather, the "that" disclosed in attunement must be conceived as an existential determinateness of *the* being that is in the manner of Being-in-the-world. *Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum [brute fact] of something present-at-hand, but a character of Dasein's Being that has been taken up into existence, even though it is initially thrust aside.* The "that" of facticity can never be found in an intuiting.

29.5 A being with the character of Dasein is its "there" in such a way that, whether explicitly or not, it finds itself in its thrownness. In attunement Dasein is always already brought before itself. It has always already found itself—not as a perceiving finding-itself-before-itself, but as an attuned finding-itself. As a being delivered over to its Being, it also remains delivered over to the fact that it must always already have found itself—found in a finding that springs not so much from a direct seeking as from a fleeing. Mood does not disclose by looking at thrownness, but as a turning toward and turning away. For the most part mood does not turn toward the burdensome character of Dasein that is manifest in it, least of all as Being-relieved in an elated mood. This turning away is what it is always in the manner of attunement.

29.6 One would completely misconstrue, phenomenally, *what* mood discloses and *how* it discloses, if one sought to set alongside what is disclosed that which the attuned Dasein "at the same time" is acquainted with, knows, and believes. Even if Dasein is "sure" of its "where-to" in faith, or thinks it knows about its where-from through rational enlightenment, all this counts for nothing against the phenomenal fact that mood brings Dasein before the "that" of its "there," which, as such, stares it in the face in inexorable enigmaticalness. Existential-ontologically there is not the slightest justification for disparaging the "evidence" of attunement by measuring it against the apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of what is purely

present-at-hand. But no less a falsification of the phenomena is *the one* that shunts them off into the refuge of the irrational. Irrationalism—as the counterpart of rationalism—only talks with a squint about that to which rationalism is blind.

29.7 That a Dasein factically can, should, and must master its mood with knowledge and will may signify, in certain possibilities of existing, a priority of willing and cognition. Only this must not mislead us into denying, ontologically, that mood is a primordial way of Being of Dasein, in which it is disclosed to itself *prior to* all cognition and willing and *beyond* the range of their disclosing. And moreover, we never master a mood free of mood, but always from a counter-mood. As the *first* essential ontological character of attunement, we obtain: *Attunement discloses Dasein in its thrownness, and in the first instance and for the most part in the manner of an evasive turning away.*

29.8 Already here it becomes visible that attunement is far removed from anything like finding a psychical state. So little does it have the character of a grasping that first turns around and back that all immanent reflection can find "lived experiences" only because the "there" is already disclosed in attunement. "Mere mood" discloses the "there" more primordially; but it also *closes it off* correspondingly more stubbornly than any *not*-perceiving.

29.9 This is shown by *bad mood*. In it Dasein becomes blind to itself, the environment it is concerned with veils itself, the circumspection of concern is misled. Attunement is so little reflected that it assails Dasein precisely in its unreflecting devotion and surrender to the "world" it is concerned with. Mood assails us. It comes neither from "outside" nor from "inside," but rises, as a way of Being-in-the-world, out of Being-in-the-world itself. With this, however, we move beyond a negative demarcation of attunement from the reflective grasping of the "inner" to a positive insight into its disclosive character. *Mood has always already disclosed Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes a directing-oneself-toward... possible in the first place.* Being-attuned is not related in the first instance to the psychical. It is not itself an inner state

which then, in some enigmatic way, gets outside and rubs off on things and persons. Here the *second* essential character of attunement shows itself. It is a basic existential way of the *equiprimordial disclosedness* of world, Dasein-with, and existence, because existence is itself essentially Being-in-the-world.

29.10 Besides these two essential determinations of attunement that have been explicated—the disclosing of thrownness and the disclosing, in each case, of Being-in-the-world as a whole—a *third* must be noted, which contributes above all to a more penetrating understanding of the worldhood of the world. We said earlier: the world, already disclosed beforehand, lets what is innerworldly be encountered. This prior disclosedness of the world, which belongs to Being-in, is co-constituted by attunement. Letting-be-encountered is primarily *circumspective*, not merely a sensing or a staring. Letting-be-encountered in circumspective concern has—as we can now see more sharply from attunement—the character of being affected. But being affected by the unserviceability, resistance, or threateningness of what is ready-to-hand becomes ontologically possible only because Being-in as such has been existentially determined beforehand in such a way that it can be *touched* in this way by what is encountered within the world. This susceptibility to being touched is grounded in attunement, which, as such, has disclosed the world with regard to, for example, the possibility of being threatened. Only something that is in the attunement of fearing, or of fearlessness, can uncover what is ready-to-hand in the environment as threatening. The attunedness of attunement existentially constitutes Dasein's openness to the world.

29.11 And only because the "senses" belong ontologically to a being that has the way of Being of attuned Being-in-the-world can they be "stirred" and "have a sense for" something, so that what stirs them shows itself in affection. Something like affection would not come about even under the strongest pressure and resistance; resistance would essentially never be uncovered, if attuned Being-in-the-world had not already made itself dependent on a susceptibility, prefigured by moods, to

being touched by innerworldly beings. *Existentially, attunement implies a disclosive dependence on world, out of which what touches us can be encountered.* Indeed, *ontologically* we must, as a matter of principle, leave the primary uncovering of the world to "mere mood." A pure intuition, even if it were to penetrate into the innermost veins of the Being of something present-at-hand, could never uncover anything like the threatening.

29.12 That everyday circumspection, on the basis of the primarily disclosive attunement, makes mistakes and is to a large extent subject to deception is, measured against the idea of an absolute knowledge of the "world," a *μὴ ὄν* [non-being]. But such ontologically unjustified evaluations completely misconstrue the existential positivity of deceivability. Precisely in the unsteady seeing of the "world," flickering with mood, does what is ready-to-hand show itself in its specific worldhood, which is never the same from one day to the next. Theoretical looking-at has always already dimmed the world down to the uniformity of what is purely present-at-hand—though within this uniformity, admittedly, lies enclosed a new wealth of what can be uncovered in pure determining. But even the purest *θεωρία* [contemplation] has not left all mood behind it. Even to its looking-at, what is now merely present-at-hand shows itself in its pure outward look only when *θεωρία* can let it come toward itself in *tranquil* lingering alongside..., in *ῥᾳστώνη* [ease] and *διαγωγή* [leisurely pastime].—One will not want to confuse the demonstration of the existential-ontological constitution of cognitive determining in the attunement of Being-in-the-world with an attempt to deliver science over, ontically, to "feeling."[3]

29.13 Within the problematic of this investigation, the various modes of attunement and the interconnections of their founding cannot be interpreted. These phenomena have long been known ontically under the heading of the affects and feelings, and have always been considered in philosophy. It is no accident that the first interpretation of the affects to be handed down and

3 An allusion to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A 2, 982b22–24: theoretical knowledge began once what was needed for life, for ease and for pastime, had been provided.

carried out systematically is not treated within the framework of "psychology." *Aristotle* investigates the *πάθη* [affects] in the second book of his *Rhetoric*. Contrary to the traditional orientation of the concept of rhetoric toward something like a "school subject," this work must be understood as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being-with-one-another. Publicness, as the way of Being of the they (cf. § 27), not only has its attunedness in general; it needs mood and "makes" it for itself. The orator speaks into it and out of it. He needs to understand the possibilities of mood in order to rouse and guide it in the right way.

29.14 The further development of the interpretation of the affects in the Stoa, and likewise its handing down to the modern age by patristic and scholastic theology, are well known. What goes unnoticed is that the basic ontological interpretation of the affective in general has hardly been able to take a single step forward worth mentioning since Aristotle. On the contrary: thematically, the affects and feelings come under the psychical phenomena, of which they usually function as the third class, alongside representing and willing. They sink to the level of accompanying phenomena.

29.15 It is to the credit of phenomenological research that it has again created a freer view of these phenomena. Not only that: *Scheler*, taking up impulses above all from *Augustine* and *Pascal*, has directed the problematic toward the interconnections of founding between the "representing" acts and the acts that "take an interest." Admittedly, here too the existential-ontological foundations of the phenomenon of the act in general still remain in the dark.

29.16 Attunement not only discloses Dasein in its thrownness and in its dependence on the world always already disclosed with its Being. It is itself the existential way of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the "world" and lets itself be touched by it in such a way that, in a certain manner, it evades itself. The existential constitution of this evasion will become clear in the phenomenon of falling.

29.17 Attunement is a basic existential way in which Dasein is its "there." It not only characterizes Dasein ontologically but, because of its disclosing, is at the same time of fundamental methodological significance for the existential analytic. Like every ontological interpretation in general, the analytic can only, as it were, sound out beings already disclosed beforehand with regard to their Being. And it will keep to Dasein's distinctive and most far-reaching possibilities of disclosure, in order to receive from them the elucidation of this being. Phenomenological interpretation must give Dasein itself the possibility of primordial disclosing and, as it were, let it interpret itself. It only goes along with this disclosing, in order to raise the phenomenal content of what is disclosed existentially into a concept.

29.18 With a view to the interpretation, to follow later, of one such existential-ontologically significant basic attunement of Dasein, anxiety (cf. § 40), the phenomenon of attunement is to be demonstrated still more concretely in the determinate mode of *fear*.

§ 30. FEAR AS A MODE OF ATTUNEMENT

Fear is analyzed by what is feared, fearing itself, and what fear is about.

30.1 The phenomenon of fear can be considered in three respects: we shall analyze the in-the-face-of-which of fear, fearing, and the about-which of fear. These possible and mutually belonging perspectives are not accidental. With them the structure of attunement in general comes to light. The analysis is completed by pointing to the possible modifications of fear, each of which concerns different structural moments in it.

30.2 The *in-the-face-of-which* of fear, the "fearsome," is in each case something encountered within the world, with the way of Being of the ready-to-hand, of the present-at-hand, or of Dasein-with. We are not to give an ontic report on the beings that can often and for the most part be "fearsome"; rather, the fearsome

is to be determined phenomenally in its fearsomeness. What belongs to the fearsome as such, as encountered in fearing? That in the face of which we fear has the character of threateningness. Several things belong to this: 1. What is encountered has detrimentality as its kind of involvement. It shows itself within a nexus of involvements. 2. This detrimentality aims at a determinate range of what can be affected by it. As thus determinate, it itself comes from a determinate region. 3. The region itself, and what comes from it, is known as something about which there is something not quite "right." 4. The detrimental, as something threatening, is not yet within controllable nearness, but it is drawing near. In such approaching, the detrimentality radiates out, and in this it has the character of threatening. 5. This approaching takes place within nearness. Something that may be detrimental in the highest degree, and that is even constantly coming closer, but far off, remains veiled in its fearsomeness. But as something approaching in nearness, the detrimental is threatening: it can strike, and yet may not. In approaching, this "it can, and yet in the end it may not" intensifies. It is fearsome, we say. *6.* This implies: the detrimental, as something drawing near in nearness, carries with it the revealed possibility of staying away and passing by, and this does not lessen or extinguish fearing, but develops it.

30.3 *Fearing itself* is the freeing, which lets itself be touched, of the threatening as thus characterized. It is not that a future evil (malum futurum) is first established and then feared. But neither does fearing first ascertain what is approaching; rather, it uncovers it beforehand in its fearsomeness. And in fearing, fear can then, looking explicitly, "make clear" to itself what is fearsome. Circumspection sees the fearsome because it is in the attunement of fear. Fearing as a slumbering possibility of attuned Being-in-the-world—"fearfulness"—has already disclosed the world in such a way that something like the fearsome can draw near from it. The being-able-to-draw-near is itself freed by the essential existential spatiality of Being-in-the-world.

30.4 That *about which* fear fears is the very being that is afraid: Dasein. Only a being to which, in its Being, this very Being matters can be afraid. Fearing discloses this being in its endangerment, in its being left to itself. Fear always unveils Dasein in the Being of its "there," even if with varying explicitness. If we fear about our house and home, this is no counterinstance to the above determination of the about-which of fear. For Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is in each case a concernful Being alongside. For the most part and in the first instance, Dasein *is* in terms of *what* it is concerned with. The endangering of this is a threat to Being alongside. Fear discloses Dasein predominantly in a privative way. It bewilders us and makes us "lose our heads." At the same time fear closes off the endangered Being-in, in that it lets it be seen, so that when fear has subsided, Dasein must first find its way about again.

30.5 Fearing about, as being afraid in the face of, always—whether privatively or positively—equiprimordially discloses innerworldly beings in their threateningness and Being-in with regard to its being threatened. Fear is a mode of attunement.

30.6 But fearing about can also concern others, and we then speak of fearing for them. This fearing for... does not take the fear away from the Other. That is ruled out if only because the Other *for* whom we fear need not be afraid at all. We fear *for* the Other most of all precisely when *the Other* is *not* afraid and rushes recklessly toward what threatens. Fearing for... is a way of co-attunement with Others, but not necessarily a being-afraid-along-with or even a fearing-with-one-another. One can fear about... without being afraid. Yet, looked at precisely, fearing about... is still a being afraid *oneself*. What is "feared for" here is Being-with the Other, who could be torn away from one. The fearsome does not aim directly at the one who fears along with the Other. Fearing about... knows itself, in a certain way, to be unaffected, and yet it is co-affected in the being affected of the Dasein-with for which it fears. Fearing about is therefore not a weakened being afraid. What is at issue here is not degrees of

"feeling-tones," but existential modes. Nor does fearing about... lose its specific genuineness if it is not "actually" afraid after all.

30.7 The constitutive moments of the full phenomenon of fear can vary. Different possibilities of Being of fearing arise accordingly. To the structure of encounter of the threatening belongs drawing close in nearness. Insofar as something threatening, in its "not yet, but at any moment," suddenly strikes into concernful Being-in-the-world, fear becomes *alarm*. In the threatening we must therefore distinguish: the closest drawing-close of what threatens, and the way the drawing-close itself is encountered, its suddenness. That in the face of which we are alarmed is in the first instance something known and familiar. If, by contrast, the threatening has the character of something utterly unfamiliar, fear becomes *dread*. And where something threatening is encountered with the character of the dreadful and at the same time has the character of encounter belonging to the alarming—suddenness—there fear becomes *terror*. Further variations of fear we know as shyness, timidity, apprehensiveness, being taken aback. All modifications of fear, as possibilities of finding-oneself, point to the fact that Dasein as Being-in-the-world is "fearful." This "fearfulness" must not be understood in the ontic sense of a factical, "isolated" disposition, but as an existential possibility of the essential attunement of Dasein in general—which, admittedly, is not the only one.

§ 31. DA-SEIN AS UNDERSTANDING

Understanding is Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, with the existential structure of projection.

31.1 Attunement is *one* of the existential structures in which the Being of the "there" holds itself. Equiprimordially with it, this Being is constituted by *understanding*. Attunement in each case has its understanding, even if only by keeping it down. Understanding is always attuned. If we interpret understanding as a fundamental existential, this indicates that the phenomenon is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein's *Being*. By contrast, "under-

standing" in the sense of *one* possible kind of cognition among others, distinguished, say, from "explaining," must, together with explaining, be interpreted as an existential derivative of the primary understanding, which co-constitutes the Being of the "there" in general.

31.2 Our investigation so far has in fact already come upon this primordial understanding, without explicitly letting it enter the theme. To say that Dasein, existing, is its "there" means, first: world is "there"; its *Da-sein* is Being-in. And Being-in is likewise "there," namely as that for the sake of which Dasein is. In the for-the-sake-of-which, existing Being-in-the-world as such is disclosed, and this disclosedness was called understanding. In understanding the for-the-sake-of-which, the significance grounded in it is co-disclosed. The disclosedness of understanding, as that of the for-the-sake-of-which and of significance, equiprimordially concerns the full Being-in-the-world. Significance is that upon which world as such is disclosed. To say that the for-the-sake-of-which *and* significance are disclosed in Dasein means: Dasein is a being to which, as Being-in-the-world, it itself matters.

31.3 In ontic talk we sometimes use the expression "to understand something" in the sense of "being able to manage a matter," "being up to it," "being able to do something." What one is able to do in understanding as an existential is not a what, but Being as existing. Existentially, understanding contains Dasein's way of Being as potentiality-for-Being. Dasein is not something present-at-hand that also possesses, as an extra, the ability to do something; it is primarily Being-possible. Dasein is in each case what it can be, and how it is its possibility. The essential Being-possible of Dasein concerns the ways we have characterized—concern with the "world," solicitude for others—and, in all this and always already, the potentiality-for-Being toward itself, for its own sake.[4] The Being-possible that Dasein in each case is existentially is distinguished just as much from empty, logical

4 German *verstehen* (to understand) echoes *vorstehen* (to be in charge of, to manage), much as English speaks of "knowing how" to do something.

possibility as from the contingency of something present-at-hand, insofar as this or that can "happen" to the latter. As a modal category of presence-at-hand, possibility means what is *not yet* actual and what is *not ever* necessary. It characterizes the *merely* possible. It is ontologically lower than actuality and necessity. Possibility as an existential, by contrast, is the most primordial and ultimate positive ontological determinateness of Dasein. Initially, like existentiality in general, it can only be prepared as a problem. Understanding, as disclosive potentiality-for-Being, provides the phenomenal ground for seeing it at all.

31.4 Possibility as an existential does not mean a free-floating potentiality-for-Being in the sense of the "indifference of arbitrary choice" (libertas indifferentiae). As essentially attuned, Dasein has always already got itself into determinate possibilities. As the potentiality-for-Being that it *is*, it has let some of them go by; it constantly waives the possibilities of its Being, seizes them, and grasps wrongly. But this means: Dasein is Being-possible delivered over to itself, *thrown possibility* through and through. Dasein is the possibility of Being-free *for* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Being-possible is transparent to Dasein itself in various possible ways and degrees.

31.5 Understanding is the Being of such potentiality-for-Being, which is never outstanding as something not yet present-at-hand, but, as something essentially never present-at-hand, *"is"* with the Being of Dasein in the sense of existence. Dasein is in such a way that it has in each case understood, or not understood, to be in this way or that. As such understanding it "knows" *where* it stands with itself, that is, with its potentiality-for-Being. This "knowing" has not first grown out of an immanent self-perception; it belongs to the Being of the "there," which is essentially understanding. And only *because* Dasein, understanding, is its "there" *can* it lose its way and misjudge itself. And insofar as understanding is attuned, and as such is existentially surrendered to thrownness, Dasein has always already lost its way and misjudged itself. In its potentiality-for-Being it is

therefore delivered over to the possibility of first finding itself again in its possibilities.

31.6 *Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being, in such a way that this Being, in itself, discloses the "where it stands" of its Being with itself.* The structure of this existential must be grasped still more sharply.

31.7 As disclosing, understanding always concerns the whole basic constitution of Being-in-the-world. As potentiality-for-Being, Being-in is in each case potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Not only is the world, qua world, disclosed as possible significance; the freeing of the innerworldly itself frees these beings for *their* possibilities. What is ready-to-hand is uncovered as such in its service*ability*, us*ability*, detriment*ality*. The totality of involvements reveals itself as the categorial whole of a *possibility* of the nexus of what is ready-to-hand. But the "unity" of the manifold present-at-hand, nature, likewise becomes uncoverable only on the basis of the disclosedness of a *possibility* of it. Is it an accident that the question of the Being of nature aims at the "conditions of its *possibility*"? In what is such questioning grounded? With regard to this questioning itself, the question cannot fail to arise: *why* are beings not of the kind of Dasein understood in their Being when they are disclosed with regard to the conditions of their possibility? *Kant* presupposes something of the kind, perhaps rightly. But this presupposition itself, least of all, can be left without its right being demonstrated.

31.8 Why does understanding, in all the essential dimensions of what can be disclosed in it, always press into possibilities? Because understanding in itself has the existential structure we call *projection*. It projects the Being of Dasein upon its for-the-sake-of-which just as primordially as upon significance, as the worldhood of its world in each case. The projective character of understanding constitutes Being-in-the-world with regard to the disclosedness of its "there" as the "there" of a potentiality-for-Being. Projection is the existential constitution of Being of the leeway of factical potentiality-for-Being. And as thrown, Dasein

is thrown into the way of Being of projecting.[5] Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself toward a plan that has been thought up, according to which Dasein arranges its Being. Rather, as Dasein, it has always already projected itself, and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always already and always still understands itself in terms of possibilities. The projective character of understanding means, further, that understanding does not itself grasp thematically that upon which it projects, the possibilities. Such grasping deprives what is projected precisely of its character of possibility and drags it down to a given, intended content, whereas projection, in throwing, throws possibility before itself as possibility and lets it *be* as such. Understanding, as projecting, is the way of Being of Dasein in which it *is* its possibilities as possibilities.

31.9 On the basis of the way of Being constituted by the existential of projection, Dasein is constantly "more" than it factually is —if one wanted to register it, and could register it, as something present-at-hand in its stock of Being. But it is never more than it factically is, because potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially to its facticity. Yet as Being-possible, Dasein is also never less; that is, what it is *not yet* in its potentiality-for-Being, it is existentially. And only because the Being of the "there" receives its constitution through understanding and its projective character, because it is what it becomes or does not become, can it, understanding, say to itself: "Become what you are!"[6]

31.10 Projection always concerns the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. As potentiality-for-Being, understanding itself has possibilities, prefigured by the range of what can essentially be disclosed in it. Understanding *can* place itself primarily in the disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can understand itself in the first instance and for the most part in terms of its world. Or else understanding throws itself primarily

5 *Entwurf*, *entwerfen*: in ordinary German "draft, design, sketch"; literally a "throwing forth," it answers to *Geworfenheit*, "thrownness."

6 An echo of Pindar, *Pythian Odes* 2.72 ("become what you are, having learned it"), a phrase made famous by Nietzsche.

into the for-the-sake-of-which; that is, Dasein exists as itself. Understanding is either owned, springing from one's own self as such, or unowned. The "un-" does not mean that Dasein cuts itself off from its self and understands "only" the world. World belongs to its Being-a-self as Being-in-the-world. Owned and unowned understanding alike *can*, in turn, be genuine or ungenuine. As potentiality-for-Being, understanding is permeated through and through by possibility. But shifting itself into one of these basic possibilities of understanding does not lay the other aside. *Rather, because understanding in each case concerns the full disclosedness of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, the self-shifting of understanding is an existential modification of projection as a whole.* In understanding world, Being-in is always co-understood; understanding of existence as such is always an understanding of world.

31.11 As factical Dasein, it has always already shifted its potentiality-for-Being into one possibility of understanding.

31.12 In its projective character, understanding existentially makes up what we call Dasein's *sight*. Dasein is this sight, which existentially is along with the disclosedness of the "there," and it is it equiprimordially according to the basic ways of its Being already marked out: as the circumspection of concern, as the considerateness of solicitude, as sight directed at Being as such, for the sake of which Dasein in each case is as it is. The sight that relates primarily and as a whole to existence we call *transparency*. We choose this term to designate "self-knowledge" rightly understood, in order to indicate that what is at issue is not the perceptual tracking down and inspecting of a point called the self, but an understanding grasp of the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world *all the way through* its essential constitutive moments. A being that exists sights "itself" only insofar as it has become transparent to itself equiprimordially in its Being alongside the world and in Being-with Others, as the constitutive moments of its existence.

31.13 Conversely, Dasein's opacity is rooted not solely and primarily in "egocentric" self-deceptions, but just as much in ignorance of the world.

31.14 The expression "sight" must, of course, be guarded against a misunderstanding. It corresponds to the clearedness as which we characterized the disclosedness of the "there." "Seeing" not only does not mean perceiving with the bodily eyes; it does not mean the pure non-sensory apprehending of something present-at-hand in its presence-at-hand either. For the existential meaning of sight, only *that* peculiarity of seeing is claimed which lets the beings accessible to it be encountered in themselves without being covered over. Every "sense," of course, achieves this within its genuine domain of uncovering. But from the beginning the tradition of philosophy has been oriented primarily to "seeing" as the mode of access to beings *and to Being*. To preserve the connection with this tradition, one can formalize sight and seeing to the point where a universal term is obtained that characterizes every access to beings and to Being as access in general.

31.15 By showing how all sight is grounded primarily in understanding—the circumspection of concern is understanding as *common sense*—pure intuition is deprived of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the traditional ontological priority of the present-at-hand. "Intuition" and "thinking" are both already remote derivatives of understanding. Even the phenomenological "seeing of essences" is grounded in existential understanding. This kind of seeing may be decided upon only when the explicit concepts of Being and of the structure of Being have been obtained, which alone can become phenomena in the phenomenological sense.[7]

31.16 The disclosedness of the "there" in understanding is itself a way of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. In the projectedness of its Being upon the for-the-sake-of-which, together with its projectedness upon significance (world), lies the disclosedness of

7 "Seeing of essences" (*Wesensschau*): the term of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), founder of phenomenology, for the intuitive grasp of essential structures.

Being in general. In projecting upon possibilities, an understanding of Being is already taken up in advance. Being is understood in projection, not ontologically conceived. A being that has the way of Being of essential projection of Being-in-the-world has the understanding of Being as a constitutive element of its Being. What was earlier posited dogmatically now receives its demonstration from the constitution of the Being in which Dasein, as understanding, is its "there." A clarification of the existential meaning of this understanding of Being that is satisfactory within the limits of this whole investigation can be reached only on the basis of the Temporal interpretation of Being.

31.17 As existentials, attunement and understanding characterize the primordial disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. In the manner of attunedness Dasein "sees" possibilities in terms of which it is. In projectively disclosing such possibilities, it is always already attuned. The projection of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is delivered over to the fact of thrownness into the "there." Does not the explication of the existential constitution of the Being of the "there," in the sense of thrown projection, make the Being of Dasein more enigmatic? Indeed it does. We must first let the full enigmatic character of this Being emerge, even if only in order to be able to fail in a genuine way at its "solution" and to pose anew the question of the Being of thrown-projecting Being-in-the-world.

31.18 In order even just to bring into view, initially, in a phenomenally adequate way the everyday way of Being of attuned understanding, of the full disclosedness of the "there," a more concrete working-out of these existentials is needed.

§ 32. UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETATION

Interpretation develops understanding through the "as" and the fore-structure; the circle must be entered rightly.

32.1 As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities. This understanding *Being toward possibilities* is itself a poten-

tiality-for-Being, because these possibilities, as disclosed, recoil upon Dasein. The projecting of understanding has its own possibility of developing itself. We call the development of understanding interpretation. In interpretation, understanding appropriates what it has understood, and does so understandingly. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different; it becomes itself. Existentially, interpretation is grounded in understanding; understanding does not arise from interpretation. Interpretation is not the taking-cognizance of what has been understood, but the working-out of the possibilities projected in understanding. In keeping with the course of these preparatory analyses of everyday Dasein, we shall pursue the phenomenon of interpretation in the understanding of the world—that is, in unowned understanding, and indeed in the mode of its genuineness.

32.2 Out of the significance disclosed in understanding the world, concernful Being alongside what is ready-to-hand gives itself to understand what involvement there can in each case be with what it encounters. Circumspection uncovers; this means that the "world" already understood is interpreted. What is ready-to-hand comes *explicitly* into the sight that understands. All preparing, putting to rights, repairing, improving, supplementing, is carried out in such a way that what is circumspectively ready-to-hand is laid out in its in-order-to and is concerned with in accordance with its laid-outness, which has now become visible. What has been circumspectively laid out with regard to its in-order-to as such, what is *explicitly* understood, has the structure of *something as something*. To the circumspective question of what this particular ready-to-hand thing is, the circumspectively interpretive answer runs: it is for... Giving the what-for is not simply naming something. Rather, what is named is understood *as* that *as* which the thing in question is to be taken. What is disclosed in understanding, what is understood, is always already accessible in such a way that its "as what" can be explicitly set off in it. The "as" makes up the structure of the explicitness of something understood; it constitutes interpreta-

tion. Circumspective-interpretive dealings with what is environmentally ready-to-hand, which "see" it *as* a table, a door, a wagon, a bridge, need not necessarily also already lay out what has been circumspectively interpreted in a determining *assertion*. All pre-predicative simple seeing of what is ready-to-hand is in itself already understanding and interpreting. But is it not the absence of this "as" that makes up the simplicity of a pure perceiving of something? The seeing of this sight is in each case already understanding and interpreting. It harbors within itself the explicitness of the referential relations (of the in-order-to) that belong to the totality of involvements from out of which what is simply encountered is understood. The articulation of what is understood, in the interpretive drawing-near to beings along the guideline of "something as something," lies *before* any thematic assertion about it. In such an assertion the "as" does not turn up for the first time; it is only now expressed, and this is possible only because it lies there as something expressible. That the explicitness of asserting can be absent in simply looking at something does not entitle us to deny this simple seeing any articulating interpretation, and hence the as-structure. The simple seeing of the things closest to us in our having-to-do-with... carries the structure of interpretation within it so primordially that it is precisely a grasping of something that is, as it were, *free of the "as"* that requires a certain readjustment. Just-having-something-before-us, and nothing more, is found in pure staring, *as no-longer-understanding*. This as-free grasping is a privation of *simply* understanding seeing; it is not more primordial than such seeing, but derived from it. That the "as" is ontically unexpressed must not seduce us into overlooking it as the a priori existential constitution of understanding.

32.3 But if every perceiving of ready-to-hand equipment is already understanding and interpreting, and lets something be encountered circumspectively as something, does this not mean precisely that initially something purely present-at-hand is experienced, which is then taken *as* a door, *as* a house? That would be a misunderstanding of the specific disclosive function

of interpretation. Interpretation does not, as it were, throw a "meaning" over the naked present-at-hand, nor does it stick a value onto it. Rather, with what is encountered within the world as such there is in each case already an involvement, disclosed in understanding the world, and interpretation lays this involvement out.

32.4 What is ready-to-hand is always already understood from out of the totality of involvements. This totality need not be explicitly grasped by a thematic interpretation. Even when it has passed through such an interpretation, it recedes again into an understanding that does not set it off. And precisely in this mode it is the essential foundation of everyday, circumspective interpretation. Such interpretation is in each case grounded in a *fore-having*. As the appropriation of understanding, it moves in understanding Being toward a totality of involvements that is already understood. The appropriation of what is understood but still veiled always carries out the unveiling under the guidance of a point of view, which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted. Interpretation is in each case grounded in a *fore-sight*, which "cuts into" what has been taken into fore-having with a view to a particular interpretability.[8] What is understood, held in fore-having and aimed at "foresightedly," becomes conceptually graspable through interpretation. Interpretation can draw the conceptuality belonging to the being to be interpreted from that being itself, or else force it into concepts that the being, given its way of Being, resists. However that may be—interpretation has in each case already decided, finally or provisionally, for a particular conceptuality; it is grounded in a *fore-conception*.

32.5 The interpretation of something as something is essentially founded by fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. Interpretation is never a presuppositionless grasping of something given in advance. When the particular concretion of interpretation in the sense of exact textual interpretation likes to

8 German *Vorhabe*, *Vorsicht*, *Vorgriff*: literally a having, a sighting, and a grasping "in advance." In ordinary German *Vorsicht* means "caution."

appeal to what "stands there," then what initially "stands there" is nothing other than the self-evident, undiscussed preconception of the interpreter. This preconception necessarily lies in every starting point of interpretation, as what is already "posited" with interpretation as such—that is, what is given in advance in fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception.

32.6 How is the character of this "fore-" to be conceived? Is the matter settled if one says, formally, "a priori"? Why does this structure belong to understanding, which we have identified as a fundamental existential of Dasein? How is the structure of the "as," which belongs to what is interpreted as such, related to it? This phenomenon evidently cannot be broken up "into pieces." But does that rule out a primordial analytic? Are we to accept such phenomena as "ultimates"? Then the question would still remain: why? Or do the fore-structure of understanding and the as-structure of interpretation show an existential-ontological connection with the phenomenon of projection? And does this phenomenon point back to a primordial constitution of Being of Dasein?

32.7 Before these questions are answered—and the preparation so far is far from sufficient for that—we must examine whether what becomes visible as the fore-structure of understanding and qua as-structure of interpretation does not itself already represent a unitary phenomenon. Extensive use is indeed made of this phenomenon in philosophical problematics, without the primordiality of the ontological explication measuring up to what is so universally used.

32.8 In the projecting of understanding, beings are disclosed in their possibility. The character of possibility corresponds in each case to the way of Being of the being understood. Innerworldly beings in general are projected upon world—that is, upon a whole of significance in whose referential relations concern, as Being-in-the-world, has made itself fast in advance. When an innerworldly being has been uncovered along with the Being of Dasein—that is, has come to be understood—we say that it has meaning. Strictly speaking, however, what is understood

is not the meaning but the being, or rather Being. Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. What can be articulated in understanding disclosure we call meaning. *The concept of meaning* comprises the formal framework of what necessarily belongs to what understanding interpretation articulates. *Meaning is the upon-which of projection, structured by fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, from out of which something becomes intelligible as something.* Insofar as understanding and interpretation make up the existential constitution of the Being of the "there," meaning must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness belonging to understanding. Meaning is an existential of Dasein, not a property that attaches to beings, lies "behind" them, or floats somewhere as an "intermediate realm." Only Dasein "has" meaning, insofar as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be "fulfilled" by the beings that can be uncovered in it. *Only Dasein, therefore, can be meaningful or meaningless.* This means: its own Being, and the beings disclosed along with it, can be appropriated in understanding or remain withheld in incomprehension.

32.9 If we hold fast to this fundamentally ontological-existential interpretation of the concept of "meaning," then all beings whose way of Being is not that of Dasein must be conceived as unmeaning, as essentially devoid of meaning as such. "Unmeaning" here signifies no evaluation; it gives expression to an ontological determination. *And only what is unmeaning can run counter to meaning.* What is present-at-hand, as something encountered in Dasein, can, as it were, run up against Dasein's Being—for example, natural events that break in upon us and destroy.[9]

32.10 And if we ask about the meaning of Being, the investigation does not become profound and does not brood over anything that stands behind Being; rather, it asks about Being itself, insofar as Being stands within the intelligibility of Dasein. The

9 German *unsinnig* ordinarily means "nonsensical" and *widersinnig* "absurd"; Heidegger uses them literally, as "without meaning" and "against meaning."

meaning of Being can never be set in opposition to beings, or to Being as the supporting "ground" of beings, because "ground" becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness.

32.11 As the disclosedness of the "there," understanding always concerns the whole of Being-in-the-world. In every understanding of world, existence is understood along with it, and vice versa. Further, all interpretation moves within the fore-structure we have characterized. Any interpretation that is to contribute understanding must already have understood what is to be interpreted. This fact has always been noticed, even if only in the domain of derivative ways of understanding and interpretation—in philological interpretation. Philological interpretation belongs within the compass of scientific knowing. Knowledge of this kind demands the rigor of a demonstration that grounds. Scientific proof must not already presuppose what it is its task to ground. But if interpretation must in each case already move within what is understood and draw its nourishment from it, how is it to produce scientific results without moving in a circle —especially if the presupposed understanding moves, moreover, within the common knowledge of people and the world? Yet according to the most elementary rules of logic the *circle* is a circulus vitiosus [vicious circle]. With that, however, the business of historiographical interpretation remains banished a priori from the domain of rigorous knowledge. As long as this fact of the circle in understanding is not got rid of, historiography must content itself with less rigorous possibilities of knowledge. It is allowed to make up for this defect to some extent by the "spiritual importance" of its "objects." It would of course be more ideal, even in the opinion of historians themselves, if the circle could be avoided and there were hope of one day creating a historiography as independent of the standpoint of the observer as knowledge of nature supposedly is.

32.12 *But to see a vitiosum [something vicious] in this circle and to look for ways of avoiding it, or even just to "feel" it as an inevitable imperfection, is to misunderstand understanding from the ground up.*

The point is not to assimilate understanding and interpretation to a particular ideal of knowledge, which is itself only a variety of understanding—a variety that has lost its way in the legitimate task of grasping what is present-at-hand in its essential unintelligibility. Rather, fulfilling the basic conditions of possible interpreting lies in not mistaking, from the outset, the essential conditions under which interpreting is carried out. What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. This circle of understanding is not a ring within which any arbitrary kind of knowledge moves; it is the expression of the existential *fore-structure* of Dasein itself. The circle must not be degraded to a vitiosum, not even to a tolerated one. In it lies hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial knowing. To be sure, this possibility is seized in a genuine way only when interpretation has understood that its first, constant, and last task remains never to let its fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception be presented to it in each case by chance ideas and popular conceptions, but to secure the scientific theme by working these out from the things themselves. Because understanding, in its existential meaning, is the potentiality-for-Being of Dasein itself, the ontological presuppositions of historiographical knowledge in principle transcend the idea of rigor of the most exact sciences. Mathematics is not more rigorous than historiography, only narrower with respect to the range of existential foundations relevant to it.

32.13 The "circle" in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, a phenomenon rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein, in interpretive understanding. A being to which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being itself matters has an ontological circular structure. If, however, we note that "circle" belongs ontologically to a way of Being of presence-at-hand (subsistence), we shall have to avoid altogether using this phenomenon to characterize anything like Dasein ontologically.

§ 33. ASSERTION AS A DERIVATIVE MODE OF INTERPRETATION

Assertion levels the hermeneutical "as" to the apophantical "as" of presence-at-hand.

33.1 All interpretation is grounded in understanding. What is articulated as such in interpretation, and what is prefigured as articulable in understanding in general, is meaning. Insofar as assertion (the "judgment") is grounded in understanding and represents a derivative form in which interpretation is carried out, it *too* "has" a meaning. This meaning, however, cannot be defined as what occurs "in" a judgment alongside the act of judging. The explicit analysis of assertion in the present context has several aims.

33.2 First, assertion can be used to demonstrate in what way the structure of the "as," which is constitutive for understanding and interpretation, can be modified. Understanding and interpretation are thereby brought into an even sharper light. Second, the analysis of assertion has a distinctive place within the problematic of fundamental ontology, because in the decisive beginnings of ancient ontology the λόγος functioned as the sole guideline for access to what properly is and for determining the Being of these beings. Finally, assertion has from ancient times been regarded as the primary and proper "locus" of *truth*. This phenomenon is so closely coupled with the problem of Being that the present investigation, as it proceeds, necessarily comes up against the problem of truth; indeed, even now, though inexplicitly, it already stands within its dimension. The analysis of assertion is meant to help prepare this problematic.

33.3 In what follows we assign three meanings to the term *assertion*. They are drawn from the phenomenon the term designates, are connected with one another, and in their unity delimit the full structure of assertion.

33.4 1. Assertion means primarily *pointing out*. With this we hold fast to the primordial meaning of λόγος as ἀπόφανσις: letting beings be seen from themselves. In the assertion "The ham-

mer is too heavy," what is uncovered for sight is not a "meaning" but a being in the mode of its readiness-to-hand. Even if this being is not near enough to be grasped and "seen," the pointing out means the being itself and not, say, a mere representation of it—neither something "merely represented" nor, still less, a psychical state of the one asserting, the asserter's representing of this being.

33.5 2. Assertion amounts to *predication*. A "predicate" is "asserted" of a "subject"; the subject is *determined* by the predicate. What is asserted in this meaning of assertion is not, say, the predicate, but "the hammer itself." What does the asserting—that is, the determining—lies, on the other hand, in the "too heavy." What is asserted in the second meaning of assertion, what is determined as such, has undergone a narrowing of content compared with what is asserted in the first meaning of the term. Every predication is what it is only as pointing out. The second meaning of assertion has its foundation in the first. The members of predicative articulation, subject—predicate, arise within pointing out. Determining does not first uncover. Rather, as a mode of pointing out, it initially precisely *restricts* seeing to what shows itself—the hammer—as such, so that, through the explicit *de-restriction* of the gaze, it can make what is manifest *explicitly* manifest in its determinateness. In the face of what is already manifest—the hammer that is too heavy—determining first takes a step back. The "positing of the subject" dims the being down to "the hammer there," so that, by carrying out the undimming, it lets what is manifest be seen *in* its determinable determinateness. Positing the subject and positing the predicate, together with positing the one along with the other, are through and through "apophantical" in the strict sense of the word.

33.6 3. Assertion means *communication*, speaking forth. As such it has a direct relation to assertion in the first and second meanings. It is letting someone see with us what has been pointed out in the manner of determining. Letting someone see with us shares with the other the being pointed out in its determinateness. What is "shared" is the common seeing *Being toward* what

is pointed out—a Being toward it that must be held fast as Being-in-the-world, namely in *that* world from out of which what is pointed out is encountered. To assertion as communication understood existentially in this way, as sharing-with, belongs being spoken out. What is asserted, as something communicated, can be "shared" by others with the one asserting, without their having the being pointed out and determined near enough to grasp and see. What is asserted can be "passed on." The range of sharing with one another in seeing widens.[10] At the same time, however, what is pointed out can, precisely in being passed on, become veiled again—although even the knowing and being acquainted that grow out of such hearsay still always mean the being itself, and do not, say, "affirm" a "valid meaning" that has been passed around. Hearsay, too, is a Being-in-the-world and a Being toward what is heard.

33.7 The theory of "judgment" prevailing today, oriented predominantly to the phenomenon of "validity," will not be discussed at length here. Let it suffice to point out how questionable, in many ways, this phenomenon of "validity" is—a phenomenon that since *Lotze* has readily been passed off as a "primal phenomenon" that cannot be traced back any further. It owes this role only to its not having been clarified ontologically. The "problematic" that has settled around this verbal idol is no less opaque. Validity means, first, the *"form" of actuality* that belongs to the content of judgment insofar as this content subsists unchangingly over against the changing "psychical" process of judging. Given the state of the question of Being in general, as characterized in the introduction to this treatise, it can hardly be expected that "validity," as "ideal Being," should be distinguished by any special ontological clarity. Validity then also means the validity of the valid meaning of the judgment with respect to the "object" meant in it, and so moves into the meaning of *"objective validity"* and objectivity in general. The meaning that is thus "valid" *of* beings, and in itself "timelessly"

10 German *Mitteilung* (communication) is built from *mit* (with) and *teilen* (to share); Heidegger hyphenates it to bring this out.

valid, is then "valid" once more, in the sense of being valid *for* everyone who judges rationally. Validity now means *bindingness*, "universal validity." And if one goes so far as to advocate a "critical" theory of knowledge, according to which the subject does not "really" "get out" to the object, then validity as validity of the object—objectivity—is grounded on the valid subsistence of the true (!) meaning. The three meanings of "being valid" we have set out—as a mode of Being of what is ideal, as objectivity, and as bindingness—are not only opaque in themselves; they also constantly become entangled with one another. Methodological caution demands that we not choose such iridescent concepts as the guideline of interpretation. We do not restrict the concept of meaning in advance to the meaning "content of judgment"; we understand it as the existential phenomenon we have characterized, in which the formal framework of what can in general be disclosed in understanding and articulated in interpretation becomes visible.

33.8 If we take together the three meanings of "assertion" we have analyzed, in a unified view of the full phenomenon, the definition runs: *Assertion is a pointing out that communicates and determines.* It remains to ask: by what right do we take assertion at all as a mode of interpretation? If it is something of the kind, then the essential structures of interpretation must recur in it. The pointing out of assertion is carried out on the basis of what is already disclosed in understanding, or circumspectively uncovered. Assertion is not a free-floating comportment that could of itself primarily disclose beings in general; it always already maintains itself on the basis of Being-in-the-world. What was shown earlier with regard to knowing the world holds no less of assertion. It needs a fore-having of something disclosed at all, which it points out in the manner of determining. Further, in setting out to determine, there already lies a directed taking-a-look at what is to be asserted. That with a view to which the being given in advance is aimed at takes over, in carrying out the determination, the function of what determines. Assertion needs a fore-sight, in which, as it were, the predicate that is to

be set off and assigned is loosened from its inexplicit enclosedness in the being itself. To assertion as determining communication there belongs in each case an articulation, in terms of meanings, of what is pointed out; it moves within a particular conceptuality: The hammer is heavy, heaviness belongs to the hammer, the hammer has the property of heaviness. The foreconception that is always also involved in asserting mostly remains inconspicuous, because language in each case already harbors within itself a developed conceptuality. Like interpretation in general, assertion necessarily has its existential foundations in fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.

33.9 But in what respect does assertion become a *derivative* mode of interpretation? What has been modified in it? We can point out the modification if we keep to limiting cases of assertion that function in logic as normal cases and as examples of the "simplest" phenomena of assertion. What logic takes as its theme with the categorical assertoric sentence—for example, "the hammer is heavy"—it has also always already understood "logically," before any analysis. Without further scrutiny, it is already presupposed as the "meaning" of the sentence that the hammer-thing has the property of heaviness. In concernful circumspection there are "initially" no such assertions. Circumspection does, however, have its specific ways of interpreting, which, with reference to the "theoretical judgment" just mentioned, may run: "The hammer is too heavy," or rather just: "Too heavy," "The other hammer!" The primordial carrying-out of interpretation lies not in a theoretical assertoric sentence but in circumspectively and concernfully laying aside or exchanging the unsuitable tool, "without wasting a word." From the absence of words we must not infer the absence of interpretation. On the other hand, circumspectively *spoken* interpretation is not necessarily already an assertion in the defined sense. *Through what existential-ontological modifications does assertion spring from circumspective interpretation?*

33.10 The being held in fore-having—the hammer, for example—is initially ready-to-hand as equipment. If this being becomes

the "object" of an assertion, then, as soon as we set out to make the assertion, a change-over in the fore-having takes place in advance. The *ready-to-hand by-which* of having-to-do-with, of performing a task, becomes the *"about-which"* of the assertion that points out. The fore-sight aims at something present-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand. *Through* the view-point, and *for* it, the ready-to-hand becomes veiled as ready-to-hand. Within this uncovering of presence-at-hand, which covers over readiness-to-hand, what is encountered as present-at-hand is determined in its Being-present-at-hand-in-such-and-such-a-way. Only now is access opened to something like *properties*. The what *as* which assertion determines the present-at-hand is drawn *from* the present-at-hand as such. The as-structure of interpretation has undergone a modification. In its function of appropriating what is understood, the "as" no longer reaches out into a totality of involvements. As regards its possibilities of articulating referential relations, it is cut off from significance, which constitutes environmentality. The "as" is pushed back into the uniform plane of what is merely present-at-hand. It sinks to the structure of a determining just-letting-see of what is present-at-hand. This leveling off of the primordial "as" of circumspective interpretation to the as of determining presence-at-hand is the distinctive privilege of assertion. Only in this way does assertion gain the possibility of a pure demonstration that just looks at things.

33.11 Thus assertion cannot disavow its ontological provenance from understanding interpretation. The primordial "as" of circumspectively understanding interpretation (*ἑρμηνεία*) we call the existential-*hermeneutical* "as," as distinct from the *apophantical* "as" of assertion.

33.12 Between interpretation still wholly veiled in concernful understanding and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand, there are manifold intermediate stages: assertions about events in the environment, depictions of what is ready-to-hand, "situation reports," the recording and fixing of the "facts of the case," the description of how matters stand, the narration of what has occurred.

These "sentences" cannot be traced back to theoretical assertoric sentences without essentially distorting their meaning. Like theoretical assertions themselves, they have their "origin" in circumspective interpretation.

33.13 As knowledge of the structure of the λόγος advanced, it was inevitable that this phenomenon of the apophantical "as" should come into view in some form. The way it was initially seen is not accidental, and it has not failed to have its effect on the subsequent history of logic.

33.14 For philosophical consideration the λόγος itself is a being and, in keeping with the orientation of ancient ontology, something present-at-hand. Initially present-at-hand—that is, to be found like things—are the words and the sequence of words in which the λόγος expresses itself. This first search for the structure of the λόγος thus present-at-hand finds a *Being-present-at-hand-together* of several words. What establishes the unity of this together? It lies, as *Plato* recognized, in the fact that the λόγος is always λόγος τινός [discourse about something]. With a view to the being manifest in the λόγος, the words are put together into *one* verbal whole. *Aristotle* saw more radically: every λόγος is at once σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις [putting together and taking apart], not either the one—say, as a "positive judgment"—or the other—as a "negative judgment."[11] Rather, every assertion, whether affirmative or negative, whether true or false, is equiprimordially σύνθεσις *and* διαίρεσις. Pointing out is putting together and taking apart. *Aristotle*, however, did not press the analytic question further to the problem: what phenomenon within the structure of the λόγος is it, then, that permits and demands that every assertion be characterized as synthesis and diairesis?

33.15 What was supposed to be phenomenally hit upon with the formal structures of "combining" and "separating"—more precisely, with their unity—is the phenomenon of "something as something." In accordance with this structure, something is understood with regard to something—in being taken together with it, in such a way that this *understanding* confrontation,

11 See Plato, *Sophist* 262e; for Aristotle, cf. *De Anima* III.6 and *On Interpretation* 1.

articulating *interpretively*, at the same time takes apart what has been taken together. If the phenomenon of the "as" remains covered over and, above all, veiled in its existential origin from the hermeneutical "as," then *Aristotle's* phenomenological approach to the analysis of the λόγος disintegrates into an external "theory of judgment," according to which judging is a combining or separating of representations and concepts.

33.16 Combining and separating can then be further formalized into a "relating." In symbolic logic, judgment is dissolved into a system of "coordinations"; it becomes the object of a "calculation," but not the theme of ontological interpretation. The possibility and impossibility of an analytic understanding of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, of "relation" in judgment in general, is closely bound up with the state, at any given time, of the basic ontological problematic.

33.17 How far this problematic affects the interpretation of the λόγος, and how far, conversely, the concept of "judgment," by a strange repercussion, affects the ontological problematic, is shown by the phenomenon of the *copula*. This "bond" brings to light that the structure of synthesis is initially posited as self-evident, and that it has also retained its authoritative interpretive function. But if the formal characters of "relation" and "combination" can contribute nothing phenomenally to the substantive structural analysis of the λόγος, then in the end the phenomenon meant by the term copula has nothing to do with bond and combination. The "is" and its interpretation—whether it is expressed linguistically in a word of its own or indicated in the verb ending—then move, however, into the problem-context of the existential analytic, if assertion and understanding of Being are existential possibilities of Being of Dasein itself. The working-out of the question of Being (cf. Part One, Division 3) will accordingly encounter this peculiar phenomenon of Being within the λόγος again.

33.18 For the time being, the only point was to make clear, by showing that assertion is derived from interpretation and understanding, that the "logic" of the λόγος is rooted in the exist-

ential analytic of Dasein. Recognizing the ontologically inadequate interpretation of the λόγος at the same time sharpens our insight into the non-primordiality of the methodological basis on which ancient ontology grew up. The λόγος is experienced as something present-at-hand and interpreted as such; likewise, the beings it points out have the meaning of presence-at-hand. This meaning of Being itself remains undifferentiated, not set off against other possibilities of Being, so that Being in the sense of formal Being-something is at the same time fused with it, without even a pure regional separation of the two having been achievable.

§ 34. DA-SEIN AND DISCOURSE. LANGUAGE

Discourse, with hearing and keeping silent, is the existential foundation of language.

34.1 The fundamental existentials that constitute the Being of the "there," the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, are attunement and understanding. Understanding harbors within itself the possibility of interpretation, that is, of appropriating what is understood. Insofar as attunement is equiprimordial with understanding, it maintains itself in a certain understanding. A certain interpretability likewise corresponds to it. With assertion, an extreme derivative of interpretation was made visible. Clarifying the third meaning of assertion as communication (speaking forth) led to the concept of saying and speaking, which has so far been left unconsidered—and intentionally so. That language becomes a theme *only now* is meant to indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness. *The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse.* In our interpretation so far of attunement, understanding, interpretation, and assertion, we have constantly made use of this phenomenon, but in the thematic analysis we have, as it were, suppressed it.

34.2 *Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with attunement and understanding.* Intelligibility is always already articulated, even

before appropriative interpretation. Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility. It therefore already underlies interpretation and assertion. What can be articulated in interpretation, and thus more primordially already in discourse, we called meaning. What is articulated as such in discursive articulation we call the whole of meanings. This whole can be broken up into meanings. As what is articulated of the articulable, meanings are always laden with meaning. If discourse, the articulation of the intelligibility of the "there," is a primordial existential of disclosedness, and disclosedness is primarily constituted by Being-in-the-world, then discourse too must essentially have a specifically *worldly* way of Being.[12] The attuned intelligibility of Being-in-the-world *expresses itself as discourse.* The whole of meanings of intelligibility *comes to word.* Words accrue to meanings. But word-things are not supplied with meanings.

34.3 Discourse's being spoken out is language. This totality of words, as that in which discourse has a "worldly" Being of its own, can thus be come upon as an innerworldly being, like something ready-to-hand. Language can be broken up into word-things that are present-at-hand. Discourse is existentially language, because the being whose disclosedness it articulates in terms of meanings has the way of Being of thrown Being-in-the-world, dependent on the "world."

34.4 As the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness, discourse is constitutive for Dasein's existence. To discursive speaking belong, as possibilities, *hearing* and *keeping silent*. In these phenomena the constitutive function of discourse for the existentiality of existence first becomes fully clear. Initially, the task is to work out the structure of discourse as such.

34.5 Discoursing is the "signifying" articulating of the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world, to which Being-with belongs, and which maintains itself in each case in a particular way of concernful Being-with-one-another. Such Being-with-one-another is

12 Heidegger distinguishes *Sinn* (meaning, what can be articulated in understanding) from *Bedeutungen* (the particular meanings into which the articulated whole breaks up); both are rendered "meaning(s)" here.

discursive as assenting and refusing, summoning, warning, as having things out, consulting, speaking up for someone, further as "making assertions," and as talking in the manner of "giving a talk." Discoursing is discourse about... The *about-which* of discourse does not necessarily, indeed for the most part does not, have the character of the theme of a determining assertion. A command, too, is issued about—; a wish has its about-which. Speaking up for someone does not lack its about-which. Discourse necessarily has this structural moment, because it co-constitutes the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world and is prefigured in its own structure by this basic constitution of Dasein. What discourse talks about is always "addressed" in a particular respect and within certain limits. In all discourse there lies *what is spoken* as such—what is said as such in each particular wishing, asking, expressing oneself about... In what is spoken, discourse communicates itself.

34.6 The phenomenon of *communication* must, as was already indicated in the analysis, be understood in an ontologically broad sense. Assertive "communication"—giving information, for example—is a special case of communication grasped in principle existentially. In such communication the articulation of understanding Being-with-one-another is constituted. It brings about the "sharing" of co-attunement and of the understanding of Being-with. Communication is never anything like a transporting of lived experiences—opinions and wishes, for example—from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with is essentially already manifest in co-attunement and co-understanding. In discourse, Being-with is "explicitly" *shared*; that is, it already *is*, only unshared, as something not seized and appropriated.

34.7 All discourse about..., which communicates in what it speaks, has at the same time the character of *expressing oneself*. In discoursing, Dasein speaks itself *out*—not because it is initially encapsulated as something "inner" over against an outside, but because, as Being-in-the-world, it is, understandingly, already "outside." What is expressed is precisely this Being-out-

side, that is, the particular way of attunement (of mood), which, as was shown, concerns the full disclosedness of Being-in. The linguistic index of the making-known of attuned Being-in, which belongs to discourse, lies in intonation, modulation, the tempo of discourse, "in the way one speaks." Communicating the existential possibilities of attunement—that is, disclosing existence—can become an aim in its own right of "poetic" discourse.

34.8 Discourse is the articulation, in terms of meanings, of the attuned intelligibility of Being-in-the-world. Its constitutive moments are: the about-which of discourse (what is talked about), what is spoken as such, communication, and making-known. These are not properties that can merely be scraped together empirically from language; they are existential characters rooted in the constitution of Being of Dasein, which first make anything like language ontologically possible. In the factical linguistic shape of a particular discourse, some of these moments may be missing or remain unnoticed. That they often do *not* find "verbal" expression is only the index of a particular kind of discourse, which, insofar as it is, must in each case be in the totality of the structures mentioned.

34.9 Accordingly, attempts to grasp the "essence of language" have always oriented themselves to one single one of these moments, and have conceived language along the guideline of the idea of "expression," of "symbolic form," of communication as "assertion," of the "intimation" of lived experiences, or of the "shaping" of life. But nothing would be gained for a fully adequate definition of language if one tried to push these various determining pieces together syncretistically. What remains decisive is first to work out the ontological-existential whole of the structure of discourse on the basis of the analytic of Dasein.

34.10 The connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility becomes clear from an existential possibility that belongs to discoursing itself: hearing. It is not by chance that when we have not heard "rightly," we say we have not "understood." Hearing is constitutive for discoursing. And just as vocal

utterance is grounded in discourse, so acoustic perception is grounded in hearing. Hearing as heeding… is Dasein's existential Being-open, as Being-with, for the other. Hearing even constitutes the primary and owned openness of Dasein for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, as the hearing of the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears because it understands. As understanding Being-in-the-world with others, it is "in thrall" to Dasein-with and to itself, and in this thrall it belongs.[13] Heeding-one-another, in which Being-with develops, has the possible ways of following and going along with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, opposing, defying, and turning away.

34.11 On the basis of this existentially primary ability to hear, something like *listening* is possible, which is itself phenomenally still more primordial than what psychology "initially" defines as hearing: the sensing of tones and the perceiving of sounds. Listening, too, has the way of Being of understanding hearing. "Initially" we never, ever hear noises and complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling.

34.12 It already takes a very artificial and complicated attitude to "hear" a "pure noise." But the fact that we initially hear motorcycles and wagons is the phenomenal evidence that Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, always already dwells alongside what is innerworldly and ready-to-hand, and initially not at all alongside "sensations," whose swarm would first have to be formed in order to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off in order finally to arrive at a "world." As essentially understanding, Dasein is initially alongside what is understood.

34.13 Even in explicitly hearing the discourse of another, we initially understand what is said—more precisely, we are already in advance, together with the other, alongside the beings the discourse is about. We do *not*, on the other hand, initially hear what

13 The German plays on *hören* (hear), *hörig* (in thrall to, obedient to), and *zugehörig* (belonging).

is spoken out in the vocal utterance. Even where the speaking is indistinct, or the language even foreign, we initially hear *unintelligible* words and not a pure manifold of tone-data.

34.14 In "natural" hearing of the about-which of discourse, we can, to be sure, at the same time hear the way in which it is said, the "diction"—but this too only in a prior co-understanding of what is spoken; for only so is there the possibility of assessing the how of its being said in its appropriateness to the thematic about-which of the discourse.

34.15 Likewise, speaking in return, as an answer, initially arises directly from understanding the about-which of the discourse, which is already "shared" in Being-with.

34.16 Only where the existential possibility of discoursing and hearing is given can someone listen. Someone who "cannot hear" and "must feel" may perhaps be very well able to listen—and precisely for that reason. Just-hearing-around is a privation of understanding hearing. Discoursing and hearing are grounded in understanding. Understanding arises neither from a great deal of talking nor from busily hearing around. Only one who already understands is able to listen.[14]

34.17 Another essential possibility of discoursing, *keeping silent*, has the same existential foundation. One who keeps silent in talking with others can "give to understand"—that is, develop understanding—in a more owned way than one who never runs out of words. Speaking a great deal about something does not in the least guarantee that understanding is thereby advanced. On the contrary: long-winded talking about things covers over, and brings what is understood into a sham clarity—that is, into the unintelligibility of the trivial. But keeping silent does not mean being mute. Someone who is mute, on the contrary, has a tendency to "speak." Someone who is mute has not only not proven the ability to keep silent; they even lack any possibility of proving such a thing. And no more than someone who is mute does one who is by nature accustomed to speaking little show that

14 An allusion to the German proverb "Wer nicht hören will, muß fühlen" (whoever will not hear must feel), i.e., those who do not heed learn the hard way.

they keep silent and are able to keep silent. One who never says anything is also unable, at a given moment, to keep silent. Keeping silent in an owned way is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say—that is, must have at its disposal an owned and rich disclosedness of itself. Then reticence makes manifest and strikes down "idle talk." As a mode of discoursing, reticence articulates the intelligibility of Dasein so primordially that genuine ability to hear, and transparent Being-with-one-another, spring from it.

34.18 Because discourse is constitutive for the Being of the "there"—that is, for attunement and understanding—and Dasein means Being-in-the-world, Dasein, as discoursing Being-in, has already expressed itself. Dasein has language. Is it chance that the Greeks, whose everyday existing had been largely transposed into talking with one another, and who at the same time "had eyes" to see, defined the essence of the human being, in their pre-philosophical as well as their philosophical interpretation of Dasein, as *ζῷον λόγον ἔχον* [the living being that has discourse]? The later interpretation of this definition of the human being in the sense of animal rationale, "rational living being," is not "false," to be sure, but it covers over the phenomenal ground from which this definition of Dasein is taken. The human being shows itself as a being that discourses. This does not mean that the possibility of vocal utterance belongs to it, but that this being is in the manner of uncovering the world and Dasein itself. The Greeks have no word for language; they understood this phenomenon "initially" as discourse. But because, for philosophical reflection, the *λόγος* came into view predominantly as assertion, the working-out of the basic structures of the forms and components of discourse was carried out along the guideline of *this logos*. Grammar sought its foundation in the "logic" of this logos. But this logic is grounded in the ontology of the present-at-hand. The basic stock of "categories of meaning," which passed over into subsequent linguistics and is in principle still authoritative today, is oriented to discourse as assertion. If, on the other hand, we take this phenomenon in the fun-

damental primordiality and breadth of an existential, the necessity arises of relocating linguistics onto ontologically more primordial foundations. The task of *liberating* grammar from logic requires *beforehand* a *positive* understanding of the a priori basic structure of discourse in general as an existential, and cannot be carried out after the fact by improving and supplementing what has been handed down. With this in view, we must ask about the basic forms of a possible articulation, in terms of meanings, of what can be understood in general—not only of innerworldly beings cognized in theoretical consideration and expressed in sentences. The theory of meaning does not emerge of its own accord from a comprehensive comparison of as many and as remote languages as possible. Nor is it enough, say, to take over the philosophical horizon within which *W. von Humboldt* made language into a problem. The theory of meaning is rooted in the ontology of Dasein. Whether it flourishes or decays depends on the fate of that ontology.

34.19 In the end, philosophical research must at some point resolve to ask what way of Being belongs to language at all. Is it an item of equipment ready-to-hand within the world, or does it have Dasein's way of Being, or neither of the two? What kind of Being does language have, such that it can be "dead"? What does it mean ontologically that a language grows and decays? We possess a science of language, yet the Being of the beings it takes as its theme is obscure. Even the horizon for the question that would investigate it is veiled. Is it an accident that meanings are in the first instance and for the most part "worldly," prefigured by the significance of the world, and indeed often predominantly "spatial"? Or is this "fact" existential-ontologically necessary, and if so, why? Philosophical research will have to forgo "philosophy of language" in order to inquire into the "things themselves," and it will have to bring itself into the position of a conceptually clarified problematic.

34.20 The present interpretation of language was meant only to point out the ontological "place" of this phenomenon within Dasein's constitution of Being. Above all, it was meant to pre-

pare the analysis that follows. Taking a fundamental way of Being of discourse as its guide, and in connection with other phenomena, that analysis attempts to bring the everydayness of Dasein into view in an ontologically more primordial way.

B. THE EVERYDAY BEING OF THE "THERE" AND THE FALLING OF DASEIN

The everyday disclosedness of the they is examined through three phenomena.

34.21 In going back to the existential structures of the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, the interpretation has in a certain way lost sight of Dasein's everydayness. The analysis must win back this phenomenal horizon, which it had thematically set out. The question now arises: what are the existential characters of the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, insofar as, as everyday, it maintains itself in the way of Being of the they? Does a specific attunement belong to the they, a special understanding, discoursing, and interpreting? The answer to these questions becomes all the more urgent when we recall that Dasein is in the first instance and for the most part absorbed in the they and mastered by it. Is not Dasein, as thrown Being-in-the-world, thrown precisely in the first instance into the publicness of the they? And what does this publicness mean, if not the specific disclosedness of the they?

34.22 If understanding must be conceived primarily as Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, then an analysis of the understanding and interpreting that belong to the they will let us gather which possibilities of its Being Dasein, as the they, has disclosed and appropriated to itself. These possibilities themselves, however, then reveal an essential tendency of Being of everydayness. And this tendency, once adequately explicated in ontological terms, must finally unveil a primordial way of Being of Dasein—in such a way, indeed, that from it the phenomenon of thrownness we have indicated becomes demonstrable in its existential concreteness.

34.23 Initially, what is required is to make the disclosedness of the they, that is, the everyday way of Being of discourse, sight, and interpretation, visible in certain phenomena. With reference to these, it may not be superfluous to remark that the interpretation has a purely ontological intent and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein and from "philosophy-of-culture" aspirations.

§ 35. IDLE TALK

Idle talk understands everything without appropriating anything, and so closes off what it seems to disclose.

35.1 The expression "idle talk" is not to be used here in a disparaging sense. As a term, it signifies a positive phenomenon, one that constitutes the way of Being of everyday Dasein's understanding and interpreting. For the most part, discourse expresses itself, and it has always already expressed itself. It is language. But then understanding and interpretation always already lie in what is expressed. Language, as expressedness, harbors within itself an interpretedness of Dasein's understanding. Like language, this interpretedness is not simply something present-at-hand; its Being is itself of Dasein's kind. Dasein is delivered over to it in the first instance, and within certain limits constantly. It regulates and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the attunement that goes with it.[15] In the whole of its articulated nexuses of meaning, expressedness preserves an understanding of the disclosed world and, equiprimordially with it, an understanding of the Dasein-with of Others and of one's own Being-in in each case. The understanding thus already deposited in expressedness concerns the uncoveredness of beings that has been attained and handed down in each case, as well as the understanding of Being current in each case, and the available possibilities and horizons for fresh interpretation and conceptual articulation. Going bey-

15 In ordinary German *Gerede* means gossip or chatter; Heidegger uses it as a neutral technical term.

ond a mere pointer to the fact of this interpretedness of Dasein, however, we must now ask about the existential way of Being of discourse as expressed and as expressing itself. If it cannot be conceived as something present-at-hand, what is its Being, and what does this say, in principle, about the everyday way of Being of Dasein?

35.2 Discourse that expresses itself is communication. Its tendency of Being aims at bringing the hearer to participate in the disclosed Being toward what the discourse talks about.

35.3 Owing to the average intelligibility that already lies in the language spoken when one expresses oneself, the communicated discourse can be understood to a large extent without the hearer entering into a primordially understanding Being toward what the discourse is about. One understands not so much the being that is talked about; rather, one already listens only to what is said in the talk as such. This is what is understood; what the talk is about is understood only approximately, superficially. One means *the same thing*, because one understands what is said in common, in *the same* averageness.

35.4 Hearing and understanding have clung in advance to what is said in the talk as such. Communication does not "share" the primary relation of Being to the being talked about; rather, Being-with-one-another moves in talking with one another and in concern with what is said in the talk. What matters to it is that there be talk. Having-been-said, the dictum, the pronouncement now vouch for the genuineness of the discourse and of its understanding, and for their fidelity to the matter. And because this talking has lost, or else never gained, the primary relation of Being to the being talked about, it communicates itself not by way of a primordial appropriation of this being, but by way of *passing the word along* and *repeating it*. What is said in the talk as such spreads in ever wider circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so. Idle talk is constituted in this repeating and passing along, through which the lack of groundedness, present from the start, intensifies into complete groundlessness. And idle talk does not remain con-

fined to vocal repetition; it spreads into what is written, as "scribbling." Here the repeating is grounded not so much in hearsay. It feeds on what one has picked up from reading. The average understanding of the reader will *never* be *able* to decide what has been primordially drawn and won and what has merely been repeated. Even more: average understanding will not even want such a distinction, will not need it, since, after all, it understands everything.

35.5 The groundlessness of idle talk does not bar its way into publicness; it encourages it. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any prior appropriation of the matter. Idle talk already guards against the danger of failing in such an appropriation. Idle talk, which anyone can snatch up, not only releases one from the task of genuine understanding; it also develops an indifferent intelligibility to which nothing is any longer closed off.

35.6 Discourse, which belongs to the essential constitution of Being of Dasein and helps make up its disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk, and, as idle talk, of not so much keeping Being-in-the-world open in an articulated understanding as closing it off and covering over innerworldly beings. No intention to deceive is needed for this. Idle talk does not have the way of Being of *consciously passing off* something as something. The groundless having-been-said and being-passed-along is enough for disclosing to be turned around into closing off. For what is said is always understood in the first instance as "saying," that is, as uncovering. Idle talk is therefore, by its very nature, a closing off, in keeping with its characteristic *omission* of going back to the ground of what is talked about.

35.7 This closing off is intensified once again by the fact that idle talk, in which an understanding of what is talked about has supposedly been reached, holds back every new questioning and all debate on the strength of this supposition, and in a peculiar way suppresses and retards them.

35.8 This interpretedness of idle talk has always already established itself in Dasein. We come to know many things initially in

this way, and not a few never get beyond such an average understanding. Dasein can never withdraw from this everyday interpretedness, into which it initially grows. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all uncovering anew and appropriating anew, are carried out. It is not the case that a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this interpretedness, is ever placed before the open country of a "world" in itself, so as merely to look at what it encounters. The dominance of public interpretedness has even already decided about the possibilities of Being-attuned, that is, about the basic way in which Dasein lets the world matter to it. The they traces out attunement; it determines what one "sees," and how.

35.9 Idle talk, which closes off in the way we have characterized, is the way of Being of Dasein's uprooted understanding. It does not, however, occur as a present-at-hand condition of something present-at-hand; rather, being existentially uprooted, it itself is in the manner of constant uprooting. Ontologically, this means: Dasein that maintains itself in idle talk is, as Being-in-the-world, cut off from the primary and primordially genuine relations of Being to the world, to Dasein-with, and to Being-in itself. It keeps itself in suspension, and in this way it is nonetheless always alongside the "world," with Others, and toward itself. Only a being whose disclosedness is constituted by attuned-understanding discourse, that is, a being that, in this ontological constitution, *is* its "there," the "in-the-world," has the possibility of Being of such uprooting. This uprooting does not constitute a not-Being of Dasein; rather, it is Dasein's most everyday and most stubborn "reality."

35.10 It lies, however, in the obviousness and self-assurance of average interpretedness that, under its protection, the uncanniness of the suspension in which Dasein can drift toward an ever-growing groundlessness remains hidden from Dasein itself in each case.

§ 36. CURIOSITY

Curiosity seeks novelty only to see, never tarrying and never dwelling anywhere.

36.1 In the analysis of understanding and of the disclosedness of the "there" in general, we pointed to the lumen naturale [natural light] and called the disclosedness of Being-in Dasein's *clearing*, in which something like sight first becomes possible. With a view to understanding, the basic kind of all disclosing that belongs to Dasein, sight was conceived in the sense of the genuine appropriation of beings toward which Dasein can comport itself in accordance with its essential possibilities of Being.

36.2 The basic constitution of sight shows itself in a peculiar tendency of Being of everydayness toward "seeing." We designate it with the term *curiosity*, which, characteristically, is not restricted to seeing, and which expresses the tendency toward a peculiar perceiving letting-the-world-be-encountered. We interpret this phenomenon with a fundamental existential-ontological intent, not in the narrowed orientation toward knowing, which already early on, and not by accident in Greek philosophy, is conceived in terms of the "desire to see." The treatise that stands first in the collection of *Aristotle's* treatises on ontology begins with the sentence: *πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει* [All human beings by nature reach out for knowing]. The care for seeing lies essentially in the Being of the human being.[16] This introduces an investigation that seeks to lay bare the origin of the scientific investigation of beings and their Being in the way of Being of Dasein just mentioned. This Greek interpretation of the existential genesis of science is no accident. In it there comes to explicit understanding what was prefigured in the sentence of *Parmenides*: *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι* [for apprehending and Being are the same]. Being is what shows itself in pure intuitive apprehending, and only this

16 The opening sentence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; the Greek verb for knowing, *εἰδέναι*, is related to the verb for seeing.

seeing uncovers Being. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure intuition. From then on this thesis remains the foundation of Western philosophy. Hegel's dialectic has its motive in it, and it is possible only on its basis.

36.3 It was *Augustine* above all who noticed the remarkable priority of "seeing," in connection with his interpretation of concupiscentia [desire]. Ad oculos enim proprie videre pertinet: seeing properly belongs to the eyes. Utimur autem hoc verbo etiam in ceteris sensibus cum eos ad cognoscendum intendimus. But we also use this word "see" for the other senses when we put ourselves into them—in order to know. Neque enim dicimus: audi quid rutilet; aut, olfac quam niteat; aut, gusta quam splendeat; aut, palpa quam fulgeat: videri enim dicuntur haec omnia. For we do not say: hear how that shimmers, or smell how that gleams, or taste how that shines, or feel how that glows; rather, in all these cases we say: *see*; we say that all this is seen.[17] Dicimus autem non solum, vide quid luceat, quod soli oculi sentire possunt, and we do not say only: see how that shines, which the eyes alone can perceive, sed etiam, vide quid sonet; vide quid oleat, vide quid sapiat, vide quam durum sit. We also say: see how that sounds, see how it smells, see how that tastes, see how hard that is. Ideoque generalis experientia sensuum concupiscentia sicut dictum est oculorum vocatur, quia videndi officium in quo primatum oculi tenent, etiam ceteri sensus sibi de similitudine usurpant, cum aliquid cognitionis explorant. Therefore the experience of the senses in general is called the "lust of the eyes," because the other senses too, by a certain similarity, appropriate to themselves the function of seeing when it is a matter of knowing, a function in which the eyes have priority.

36.4 What is the nature of this tendency toward mere-perceiving? What existential constitution of Dasein becomes intelligible in the phenomenon of curiosity?

36.5 Being-in-the-world is initially absorbed in the world of its concern. Concern is guided by circumspection, which uncovers

17 Augustine, *Confessions*, Book X, chapter 35.

what is ready-to-hand and preserves it in its uncoveredness. Circumspection gives all procuring and performing its path of procedure, the means of carrying it out, the right occasion, the appropriate moment. Concern can come to rest, in the sense of a restful interruption of performing, or as getting finished. In rest, concern does not disappear; circumspection, however, becomes free; it is no longer bound to the world of work. In resting, care settles into the circumspection that has become free. The circumspective uncovering of the world of work has the character of Being of de-severing. Circumspection that has become free no longer has anything ready-to-hand whose bringing-near it must concern itself with. As essentially de-severing, it procures new possibilities of de-severing for itself; that is to say, it tends away from what is nearest ready-to-hand into a distant and alien world. Care becomes concern with the possibilities of seeing the "world" merely in its *outward look*, while resting and tarrying. Dasein seeks what is far away simply in order to bring it close to itself in its outward look. Dasein lets itself be carried along solely by the outward look of the world, a way of Being in which it concerns itself with becoming rid of itself as Being-in-the-world, rid of its Being alongside what is ready-to-hand in the nearest everyday way.

36.6 Curiosity that has become free, however, concerns itself with seeing not in order to understand what is seen, that is, to come into a Being toward it, but *only* in order to see. It seeks the new only in order to leap from it once again to something new. What matters to the care of this seeing is not grasping and knowingly Being in the truth, but possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. Hence curiosity is characterized by a specific *not-tarrying* alongside what is nearest. Hence, too, it does not seek the leisure of contemplative tarrying, but restlessness and excitement through what is ever new and through the changing of what is encountered. In its not-tarrying, curiosity concerns itself with the constant possibility of *distraction*. Curiosity has nothing to do with the admiring contemplation of beings, with *θαυμάζειν* [wondering]. What matters to it is not being brought

by wonder into not-understanding; rather, it concerns itself with a knowing, but merely in order to have known. The two moments constitutive of curiosity, *not-tarrying* in the environment of concern and *distraction* into new possibilities, found the third essential character of this phenomenon, which we call *never dwelling anywhere*. Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world unveils a new way of Being of everyday Dasein, one in which it constantly uproots itself.

36.7 Idle talk also governs the ways of curiosity; it says what one must have read and seen. Curiosity's Being-everywhere-and-nowhere is delivered over to idle talk. These two everyday modes of Being of discourse and of sight are not merely present-at-hand alongside each other in their tendency to uproot; rather, *one* way to be drags the *other* along with it. Curiosity, to which nothing is closed off, and idle talk, for which nothing remains not understood, give themselves, that is, the Dasein that is in this way, the guarantee of a supposedly genuine "living life." With this supposition, however, a third phenomenon shows itself, one that characterizes the disclosedness of everyday Dasein.

§ 37. AMBIGUITY

Ambiguity makes it undecidable what is genuinely understood, and pervades Being-with-one-another.

37.1 When, in everyday Being-with-one-another, we encounter the sort of thing that is accessible to everyone and about which everyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in genuine understanding and what is not. This ambiguity extends not only to the world, but just as much to Being-with-one-another as such, and even to Dasein's Being toward itself.

37.2 Everything looks as if it had been genuinely understood, grasped, and spoken, and yet at bottom it has not been; or it does not look so, and yet at bottom it has been. Ambiguity concerns not only the disposal over, and management of, what is

accessible for use and enjoyment; it has already established itself in understanding as potentiality-for-Being, in the manner of projection and of the presenting of Dasein's possibilities. Not only does everyone know and discuss what is at hand and what occurs; everyone also already knows how to talk about what is yet to happen, what is not yet at hand but "actually" ought to be done. Everyone has always already surmised and sensed in advance what others also surmise and sense. This Being-on-the-scent, and on the scent from hearsay at that—whoever is genuinely "on the scent" of something does not talk about it—is the most insidious way in which ambiguity presents possibilities to Dasein, only to stifle their force at the same time.

37.3 For suppose that what *one* surmised and sensed were one day actually put into practice: then it is precisely ambiguity that has already seen to it that interest in the thing realized dies away at once. After all, this interest exists only in the manner of curiosity and idle talk, for as long as there is the possibility of noncommittal merely-surmising-along. Being-in-on-it, when and for as long as one is on the scent, refuses to follow once the carrying out of what was surmised begins. For with this, Dasein is in each case forced back upon itself. Idle talk and curiosity lose their power. And they are already taking their revenge. Faced with the carrying out of what one surmised along with others, idle talk is readily at hand with the verdict: one could have done that too, for—after all, one did surmise it too. In the end, idle talk is even annoyed that what it surmised and constantly demanded now *actually* happens. For with that it has been robbed of the opportunity to go on surmising.

37.4 But the time of Dasein that commits itself, in the reticence of carrying things out and of genuinely failing, is different from the time of idle talk, which "lives faster"; seen publicly, it is an essentially slower one. And so this idle talk has long since arrived at something else, at whatever is newest at the time. What was surmised earlier and has now been carried out has come too late in view of what is newest. In their ambiguity, idle talk and curiosity see to it that what is genuinely and newly cre-

ated is outdated for publicness by the time it emerges. It can become free in its positive possibilities only when the covering idle talk has become ineffective and the "common" interest has died away.

37.5 The ambiguity of public interpretedness passes off talking-over-in-advance and curious surmising as what is actually happening, and stamps carrying out and acting as something belated and of no importance. The understanding of Dasein in the they is therefore constantly *mistaken* in its projections as regards the genuine possibilities of Being. Dasein is always ambiguously "there," that is, in *that* public disclosedness of Being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most resourceful curiosity keep the "bustle" going, there where, day in and day out, everything happens and, at bottom, nothing.

37.6 This ambiguity always plays into curiosity's hands what it is looking for, and gives idle talk the semblance that everything is being decided in it.

37.7 This way of Being of the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, however, also pervades Being-with-one-another as such. The Other is initially "there" in terms of what one has heard about the Other, what one says and knows about the Other. Idle talk initially inserts itself into the midst of primordial Being-with-one-another. Everyone first and initially keeps watch on the Other: on what comportment the Other will adopt, on what the Other will say about it. Being-with-one-another in the they is not at all a closed-off, indifferent side-by-side, but a tense, ambiguous watching-out-for-one-another, a secret listening-in-on-one-another. Under the mask of the for-one-another, an against-one-another is at play.

37.8 It should be noted here that ambiguity does not first spring from an explicit intention to dissemble and distort, and that it is not first called forth by the individual Dasein. It already lies in Being-with-one-another as *thrown* Being-with-one-another in a world. Publicly, however, it is precisely hidden, and *one* will always resist the claim that this interpretation fits the way of Being of the interpretedness of the they. It would be a misunder-

standing if the explication of these phenomena sought to prove itself through the agreement of the they.

37.9 The phenomena of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity have been set out in such a way that a connection of Being already indicates itself among them. The way of Being of this connection must now be grasped existential-ontologically. The basic kind of Being of everydayness is to be understood within the horizon of the structures of Being of Dasein obtained so far.

§ 38. FALLING AND THROWNNESS

Everyday Dasein falls prey to the world, a tempting, tranquilizing, alienating plunge into the they.

38.1 Idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity characterize the way in which Dasein, in everyday life, is its "there," the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. As existential determinations, these characters are not present-at-hand in Dasein; they help make up its Being. In them and in their connection of Being there unveils itself a basic kind of Being of everydayness, which we call the *falling* of Dasein.

38.2 The title, which expresses no negative evaluation, is meant to signify: Dasein is in the first instance and for the most part *alongside* the "world" of its concern. This Being-absorbed alongside ... mostly has the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the they. Dasein has in the first instance always already fallen away from itself as an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-self, and has fallen prey to the "world." Fallenness into the "world" means absorption in Being-with-one-another insofar as this is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. What we called the unownness of Dasein now receives a sharper determination through the interpretation of falling. But unowned and not-owned by no means signify "not really," as if with this mode of Being Dasein altogether lost its Being.[18] Unownness is so far from meaning anything like no-longer-Being-in-the-world that it

18 *Eigentlich*, Heidegger's term for "owned," is also everyday German for "really"; *eigentlich nicht* means "not really."

amounts precisely to a distinctive Being-in-the-world, one that is completely taken in by the "world" and by the Dasein-with of Others in the they. Not-Being-its-self functions as a *positive* possibility of the being that, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world. This *not-Being* must be conceived as Dasein's nearest way of Being, in which it maintains itself for the most part.

38.3 The fallenness of Dasein must therefore not be taken as a "fall" from a purer and higher "primal state." Of this we not only have no experience ontically; ontologically, too, we have no possibilities or guiding clues for interpreting it.

38.4 Dasein, as falling, has already fallen away *from itself* as factical Being-in-the-world; and what it has fallen prey to is not some being that it first comes up against, or perhaps does not, in the course of its Being, but the *world*, which itself belongs to its Being. Falling is an existential determination of Dasein itself, and asserts nothing about Dasein as something present-at-hand, about present-at-hand relations to beings from which it "descends," or to beings with which it has subsequently entered into a commercium [interchange].

38.5 The ontological-existential structure would also be misunderstood if one wanted to ascribe to it the meaning of a bad and deplorable ontic property, one that might perhaps be eliminated at more advanced stages of human culture.

38.6 In our first pointing to Being-in-the-world as the basic constitution of Dasein, and likewise in our characterization of its constitutive structural moments, the analysis of the *constitution of Being* left the way of Being of this constitution phenomenally unnoticed. It is true that the possible basic kinds of Being-in, concern and solicitude, were described. But the question of the everyday way of Being of these ways to be remained undiscussed. It was also shown that Being-in is anything but a merely contemplative or active standing-over-against, that is, a Being-present-at-hand-together of a subject and an object. Nonetheless, the semblance was bound to remain that Being-in-the-world functions as a rigid framework within which Dasein's possible comportments toward its world run their course, without

touching the "framework" itself in its Being. But this supposed "framework" itself helps make up the way of Being of Dasein. An *existential mode* of Being-in-the-world is documented in the phenomenon of falling.

38.7 Idle talk discloses to Dasein its understanding Being toward its world, toward Others, and toward itself, but in such a way that this Being toward ... has the mode of a groundless floating. Curiosity discloses anything and everything, but in such a way that Being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides nothing from Dasein's understanding, but only in order to hold Being-in-the-world down in the uprooted everywhere-and-nowhere.

38.8 Only with the ontological clarification of the way of Being of everyday Being-in-the-world that shows through in these phenomena do we obtain an existentially adequate determination of Dasein's basic constitution. What structure does the "movedness" of falling show?

38.9 Idle talk, and the public interpretedness contained in it, is constituted in Being-with-one-another. It is not present-at-hand within the world as a product detached from Being-with-one-another, existing for itself. Nor can it be volatilized into a "universal" that, because it belongs essentially to nobody, is "actually" nothing and occurs "really" only in the individual Dasein that speaks. Idle talk is the way of Being of Being-with-one-another itself; it does not first arise through certain circumstances that act on Dasein "from outside." But if Dasein itself, in idle talk and public interpretedness, presents itself with the possibility of losing itself in the they, of falling prey to groundlessness, this means: Dasein prepares for itself the constant temptation to fall. Being-in-the-world is in itself *tempting*.

38.10 Having in this way already become a temptation to itself, public interpretedness holds Dasein fast in its fallenness. Idle talk and ambiguity, having-seen-everything and having-understood-everything, develop the supposition that the disclosedness of Dasein, thus available and prevailing, could guarantee Dasein the security, genuineness, and fullness of all the possibil-

ities of its Being. The self-certainty and decidedness of the they spread a growing sense that there is no need of owned, attuned understanding. The they's supposition that it is nurturing and leading a full and genuine "life" brings a *tranquilization* into Dasein, for which everything is "in the best of order" and to which all doors stand open. Falling Being-in-the-world, tempting itself, is at the same time *tranquilizing*.

38.11 This tranquilization in unowned Being, however, does not lure one into standstill and inactivity; it drives one into the unrestrained "bustle." Being-fallen into the "world" does not now somehow come to rest. The tempting tranquilization *intensifies* falling. With particular regard to the interpretation of Dasein, the opinion may now arise that understanding the most alien cultures, and the "synthesis" of these with one's own, leads to Dasein's complete and, for the first time, genuine enlightenment about itself. Versatile curiosity and restless knowing-everything feign a universal understanding of Dasein. At bottom, however, it remains undetermined and unasked *what* is actually to be understood; it remains not understood that understanding itself is a potentiality-for-Being that must become free solely in one's *ownmost* Dasein. In this tranquilized comparing of itself with everything, which "understands" everything, Dasein drifts toward an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. Falling Being-in-the-world, as tempting-tranquilizing, is at the same time *alienating*.

38.12 This alienation, in turn, cannot mean that Dasein is factically torn away from itself. On the contrary, it drives Dasein into a way of Being to which the most exaggerated "self-dissection" matters, a way of Being that tries its hand at every possibility of interpretation, so that the "characterologies" and "typologies" it displays themselves already become too many to survey. This alienation, which *closes off* from Dasein its ownness and possibility, even if only as the possibility of a genuine failure, does not, however, deliver it over to beings that it itself is not; rather, it forces it into its unownness, into a possible way of Being *of itself*.

By its own movedness, the tempting-tranquilizing alienation of falling leads to Dasein's *getting entangled* in itself.

38.13 The phenomena we have pointed out, temptation, tranquilization, alienation, and self-entanglement (entanglement), characterize the specific way of Being of falling. We call this "movedness" of Dasein in its own Being the *downward plunge*. Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of unowned everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from it by public interpretedness, and hidden in such a way that it is interpreted as "ascent" and "concrete life."

38.14 The kind of movement of the downward plunge into and within the groundlessness of unowned Being in the they constantly tears understanding away from projecting owned possibilities, and tears it into the tranquilized supposition that it possesses, or can attain, everything. This constant tearing-away from ownness, while always feigning it all the same, together with the tearing-into the they, characterizes the movedness of falling as a *whirl*.

38.15 Falling does not merely determine Being-in-the-world existentially. At the same time, the whirl reveals the character of throw and of movedness that belongs to thrownness, which can force itself upon Dasein in its attunement. Thrownness is not only not a "settled fact"; it is also not a closed-off fact. It belongs to the facticity of this fact that Dasein, *as long as* it is what it is, remains in the throw and is whirled into the unownness of the they. Thrownness, in which facticity lets itself be seen phenomenally, belongs to Dasein, for which, in its Being, this Being itself is what matters. Dasein exists factically.

38.16 But does this demonstration of falling not bring out a phenomenon that speaks directly *against* the determination by which the formal idea of existence was indicated? Can Dasein be conceived as a being in whose Being its potentiality-for-Being is what *matters*, if this very being, in its everydayness, *has lost itself* and, in falling, "lives" *away from itself*? Falling prey to the world, however, is a phenomenal "proof" *against* the existentiality of Dasein only if Dasein is posited as an isolated I-subject, as a self-

point from which it moves away. Then the world is an object. Falling prey to it is then reinterpreted ontologically as presence-at-hand in the manner of an innerworldly being. If, however, we hold fast to the Being of Dasein in the constitution of *Being-in-the-world* that we have pointed out, it becomes evident that falling, as the *way of Being of this Being-in*, rather represents the most elemental proof *for* the existentiality of Dasein. In falling, what matters is nothing other than the potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, even if in the mode of unownness. Dasein *can* fall only *because* understanding-attuned Being-in-the-world is what matters to it. Conversely, *owned* existence is nothing that floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way of seizing hold of that everydayness.

38.17 Nor does the phenomenon of falling give something like a "night view" of Dasein, an ontically occurring property that might serve to supplement the harmless aspect of this being. Falling unveils an *essential* ontological structure of Dasein itself, one that is so far from determining its night side that it constitutes all its days in their everydayness.

38.18 The existential-ontological interpretation therefore also makes no ontic assertion about the "corruption of human nature," not because the necessary evidence is lacking, but because its problematic lies *prior to* any assertion about corruption and incorruption. Falling is an ontological concept of movement. It is not decided ontically whether human beings are "drowned in sin," in the status corruptionis [state of corruption], whether they walk in the status integritatis [state of integrity], or whether they find themselves in an intermediate stage, the status gratiae [state of grace]. But faith and "worldview," insofar as they make assertions one way or the other, and if they make assertions about Dasein as Being-in-the-world, will have to come back to the existential structures we have set out, provided that their assertions at the same time lay claim to *conceptual* understanding.

38.19 The guiding question of this chapter asked about the Being of the "there." Our theme became the ontological constitu-

tion of the disclosedness that belongs essentially to Dasein. Its Being is constituted in attunement, understanding, and discourse. The everyday way of Being of disclosedness is characterized by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. These in turn show the movedness of falling, with its essential characters of temptation, tranquilization, alienation, and entanglement.

38.20 With this analysis, however, the whole of the existential constitution of Dasein has been laid bare in its main features, and the phenomenal ground has been gained for the "summarizing" interpretation of the Being of Dasein as care.

Division One, Chapter VI: Care as the Being of Dasein

Erster Abschnitt. Sechstes Kapitel: Die Sorge als Sein des Daseins
§§39–44

§ 39. THE QUESTION OF THE PRIMORDIAL WHOLENESS OF DASEIN'S STRUCTURAL WHOLE

Chapter 6 begins: anxiety will reveal the Being of Dasein as a whole to be care.

39.1 Being-in-the-world is a structure that is primordially and constantly *whole*. In the preceding chapters (Division One, Chapters 2–5) it was made phenomenally clear as a whole and, always on this basis, in its constitutive moments. The preview of the whole of the phenomenon given at the outset has now lost the emptiness of the first general sketch. Admittedly, the phenomenal *multiplicity* of the constitution of the structural whole and of its everyday way of Being can now easily obstruct the *unified* phenomenological view of the whole as such. But this view must remain all the freer, and be held in readiness all the more securely, now that we pose the question toward which the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein as such is striving: *how is the wholeness of the structural whole we have pointed out to be determined existential-ontologically?*

39.2 Dasein exists factically. We are asking about the ontological unity of existentiality and facticity, or about the essential belonging of the latter to the former. On the basis of the attunement that essentially belongs to it, Dasein has a way of Being in

which it is brought before itself and disclosed to itself in its thrownness. Thrownness, however, is the way of Being of a being that in each case itself *is* its possibilities, in such a way that it understands itself in and from them (projects itself onto them). Being-in-the-world, to which Being alongside what is ready-to-hand belongs just as primordially as Being-with Others, is in each case for the sake of itself. The self, however, is in the first instance and for the most part unowned, the they-self. Being-in-the-world has always already fallen. *The average everydayness of Dasein* can accordingly be determined as *falling-disclosed, thrown-projecting Being-in-the-world, for which, in its Being alongside the "world" and in its Being-with Others, its ownmost potentiality-for-Being itself is what matters.*

39.3 Can we succeed in grasping this structural whole of Dasein's everydayness in its wholeness? Can the Being of Dasein be brought out in a unified way, such that from it the essential equiprimordiality of the structures we have pointed out becomes intelligible, together with the existential possibilities of modification that belong to them? Is there a way to obtain this Being phenomenally on the basis of the present starting point of the existential analytic?

39.4 Negatively, this is beyond question: the wholeness of the structural whole cannot be reached phenomenally by assembling its elements. That would require a blueprint. The Being of Dasein, which ontologically supports the structural whole as such, becomes accessible to us in a full look *through* this whole *to one* primordially unified phenomenon, a phenomenon that already lies in the whole in such a way that it ontologically founds every structural moment in its structural possibility. The "summarizing" interpretation therefore cannot be a gathering-up of what has been gained so far. The question of the basic existential character of Dasein is essentially different from the question of the Being of something present-at-hand. Everyday environmental experience, which remains directed ontically and ontologically toward innerworldly beings, cannot offer Dasein in an ontically primordial way for ontological analysis.

Likewise, the immanent perception of lived experiences lacks an ontologically adequate guiding clue. On the other hand, the Being of Dasein is not to be deduced from an idea of the human being. Can we gather from the interpretation of Dasein so far what ontic-ontological access to itself Dasein, *of its own accord*, demands as the only appropriate one?

39.5 An understanding of Being belongs to the ontological structure of Dasein. In being, Dasein is disclosed to itself in its Being. Attunement and understanding constitute the way of Being of this disclosedness. Is there an understanding attunement in Dasein in which it is disclosed to itself in a distinctive way?

39.6 If the existential analytic of Dasein is to retain fundamental clarity about its function in fundamental ontology, then, in order to master its preliminary task, bringing out the Being of Dasein, it must seek one of the *most far-reaching* and *most primordial* possibilities of disclosure, one that lies in Dasein itself. The kind of disclosing in which Dasein brings itself before itself must be such that in it Dasein itself becomes accessible in a certain way *simplified*. With what is disclosed in it, the structural wholeness of the Being we are seeking must then come to light in an elemental way.

39.7 As an attunement that satisfies such methodological requirements, the phenomenon of *anxiety* is taken as the basis of the analysis. Working out this basic attunement, and characterizing ontologically what is disclosed in it as such, starts from the phenomenon of falling and marks anxiety off from the related phenomenon of fear analyzed earlier. As a possibility of Being of Dasein, anxiety, together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it, provides the phenomenal ground for explicitly grasping the primordial wholeness of Being of Dasein. Dasein's Being unveils itself as *care*. The ontological working-out of this basic existential phenomenon requires that it be marked off from phenomena that might initially be identified with care. Such phenomena are will, wish, addiction, and urge. Care cannot be derived from them, because they themselves are founded in it.

39.8 The ontological interpretation of Dasein as care, like every ontological analysis, lies, with what it gains, far removed from what remains accessible to the pre-ontological understanding of Being, let alone to ontic acquaintance with beings. It should come as no surprise that what is known ontologically strikes the common understanding as strange, since it is acquainted only with what is ontically familiar. Nevertheless, even the ontic starting point of the ontological interpretation of Dasein qua care attempted here might seem far-fetched and theoretically contrived; to say nothing of the violence one might see in the fact that the traditional and well-tried definition of the human being is left out of account. Hence the existential interpretation of Dasein as care needs a pre-ontological confirmation. This confirmation lies in showing that Dasein, early on, whenever it expressed itself about itself, already interpreted itself as care *(cura)*, albeit only pre-ontologically.

39.9 The analytic of Dasein, which presses forward as far as the phenomenon of care, is meant to prepare the fundamental-ontological problematic, *the question of the meaning of Being in general*. In order to direct our gaze explicitly toward this from what has been gained, beyond the special task of an existential a priori anthropology, we must, looking back, grasp still more penetratingly *those* phenomena that stand in the closest connection with the guiding question of Being. These are, first, the modes of Being explicated so far, readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, which determine innerworldly beings whose character is not that of Dasein. Because the ontological problematic has so far understood Being primarily in the sense of presence-at-hand ("reality," "world"-actuality), while the Being of Dasein remained ontologically undetermined, we need a discussion of the ontological connection between care, worldhood, readiness-to-hand, and presence-at-hand (reality). This leads to a sharper determination of the concept of *reality*, in connection with a discussion of the epistemological ways of posing the question, those of realism and idealism, that are oriented toward this idea.

39.10 Beings *are* independently of the experience, acquaintance, and grasping through which they are disclosed, uncovered, and determined. But Being "is" only in the understanding of that being to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs. Being can therefore be unconceptualized, but it is never completely not understood. In the ontological problematic, *Being and truth* have been brought together since ancient times, if not actually identified. This documents the necessary connection between Being and understanding, even if its primordial grounds perhaps remain hidden. For an adequate preparation of the question of Being, then, we need an ontological clarification of the phenomenon of *truth*. This is carried out initially on the basis of what the preceding interpretation has gained with the phenomena of disclosedness and uncoveredness, interpretation, and assertion.

39.11 The conclusion of the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein accordingly has as its theme: the basic attunement of anxiety as a distinctive disclosedness of Dasein (§ 40); the Being of Dasein as care (§ 41); the confirmation of the existential interpretation of Dasein as care in terms of Dasein's pre-ontological self-interpretation (§ 42); Dasein, worldhood, and reality (§ 43); Dasein, disclosedness, and truth (§ 44).

§ 40. THE BASIC ATTUNEMENT OF ANXIETY AS A DISTINCTIVE DISCLOSEDNESS OF DASEIN

Anxiety, unlike fear, faces no particular thing but Being-in-the-world itself, and so individualizes Dasein.

40.1 One of Dasein's possibilities of Being is to give ontic "information" about Dasein itself as a being. Such information is possible only in the disclosedness that belongs to Dasein, which is grounded in attunement and understanding. To what extent is anxiety a distinctive attunement? How is Dasein, in anxiety, brought before itself by its own Being, so that the being dis-

closed in anxiety can be defined phenomenologically as such in its Being, or so that this definition can be adequately prepared?[1]

40.2 With the aim of pressing forward to the Being of the wholeness of the structural whole, we take as our point of departure the concrete analyses of falling that were carried out last. Absorption in the they and alongside the "world" one concerns oneself with reveals something like a *flight* of Dasein in the face of itself as an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-self. Yet this phenomenon of Dasein's flight *in the face of itself* and of its ownness seems to be the least suited of all to serve as the phenomenal ground for the investigation that follows. For in this flight Dasein precisely does *not* bring itself before itself. In keeping with the ownmost tendency of falling, the turning-away leads *away from* Dasein. But with phenomena of this kind, the investigation must guard against confusing ontic-existentiell characterization with ontological-existential interpretation, or against overlooking the positive phenomenal foundations for the latter that lie in the former.

40.3 Existentielly, it is true, the ownness of Being-a-self is closed off and pushed aside in falling. But this closedness is only the *privation* of a disclosedness, which reveals itself phenomenally in the fact that Dasein's flight is flight *in the face of* itself. In what the flight is in the face of, Dasein is precisely coming up "behind" itself. Only because Dasein, ontologically and essentially, is brought before itself at all by the disclosedness that belongs to it, *can* it flee *in the face of* itself. In this falling turning-away, to be sure, what the flight is in the face of is *not grasped*; indeed, it is not even experienced in a turning-toward. But in the turning-away *from* it, it is disclosed, "there." On the basis of its character of disclosedness, the existentiell-ontic turning-away gives the phenomenal possibility of grasping existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees, as such. Within the ontic "away from" that lies in the turning-away, that in the face of which Dasein flees can be understood and brought

1 "Information" renders *Aufschluß* (literally an "unlocking"), which shares its root with *erschließen*, "disclose."

to a concept in a phenomenologically interpreting "turning-toward."

40.4 Accordingly, orienting the analysis by the phenomenon of falling does not in principle condemn it to having no prospect of learning something ontologically about the Dasein disclosed in that phenomenon. On the contrary—here of all places, the interpretation is least at the mercy of an artificial self-apprehension of Dasein. It merely carries out the explication of what Dasein itself discloses ontically. The possibility of pressing forward to the Being of Dasein by interpretively going along with it and following after it within an attuned understanding increases, the more primordial the phenomenon is that functions methodologically as disclosing attunement. That anxiety accomplishes something of this kind is, initially, only a claim.

40.5 We are not entirely unprepared for the analysis of anxiety. It is true that it still remains obscure how anxiety is ontologically connected with fear. Obviously there is a phenomenal kinship. An indication of this is the fact that the two phenomena mostly remain undistinguished: what is fear gets called anxiety, and what has the character of anxiety gets called fear. We shall try to press forward to the phenomenon of anxiety step by step.

40.6 We called Dasein's falling prey to the they and to the "world" it concerns itself with a "flight" in the face of itself. But not every shrinking back in the face of..., not every turning away from..., is necessarily flight. Shrinking back in the face of what fear discloses—in the face of the threatening—is founded in fear, and it has the character of flight. The interpretation of fear as an attunement showed that what fear is in the face of is in each case a detrimental innerworldly being, which approaches from a definite region, draws near within nearness, and may stay away. In falling, Dasein turns away from itself. That in the face of which it shrinks back must, as such, have the character of threatening; yet it is a being with the same way of Being as the being that shrinks back: it is Dasein itself. That in the face of which it shrinks back cannot be grasped as something "fearsome," because anything of that kind is always encountered as

an innerworldly being. The only threat that can be "fearsome," and that is uncovered in fear, always comes from innerworldly beings.

40.7 The turning-away of falling is therefore also not a fleeing founded on a fear of innerworldly beings. A character of flight grounded in this way belongs to the turning-away all the less, since the turning-away precisely *turns toward* innerworldly beings, as absorption in them. *Rather, the turning-away of falling is grounded in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible.*

40.8 To understand what is said about Dasein's falling flight in the face of itself, we must recall Being-in-the-world as the basic constitution of this being. *That in the face of which anxiety is anxious is Being-in-the-world as such.* How does that in the face of which anxiety is anxious differ phenomenally from that in the face of which fear is afraid? That in the face of which anxiety is anxious is not an innerworldly being. Hence it can essentially have no involvement. The threat does not have the character of a definite detrimentality that strikes what is threatened in a definite respect, with regard to a particular factical potentiality-for-Being. That in the face of which anxiety is anxious is completely indefinite. This indefiniteness not only leaves factically undecided which innerworldly being is threatening; it means that innerworldly beings are not "relevant" at all. Nothing that is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. The totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, uncovered within the world, is as such of no consequence whatsoever. It collapses into itself. The world has the character of complete insignificance. In anxiety one does not encounter this or that thing with which, as something threatening, there could be an involvement.

40.9 Accordingly, anxiety also does not "see" a definite "here" and "there" from which the threatening approaches. That what threatens is *nowhere* is what characterizes that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. Anxiety "does not know" what it is in the face of which it is anxious. But "nowhere" does not mean

nothing; rather, it contains region as such, the disclosedness of world as such for essentially spatial Being-in. What threatens therefore cannot approach from a definite direction within nearness either; it is already "there"—and yet nowhere; it is so near that it constricts one and takes one's breath away—and yet nowhere.

40.10 In that in the face of which anxiety is anxious, the "it is nothing and nowhere" becomes manifest. The obstinacy of the innerworldly nothing and nowhere means phenomenally: *that in the face of which anxiety is anxious is the world as such.* The complete insignificance that makes itself known in the nothing and nowhere does not mean that the world is absent. It means that innerworldly beings in themselves are so completely without consequence that, on the basis of this *insignificance* of the innerworldly, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself.

40.11 What constricts is not this or that, nor is it everything present-at-hand taken together as a sum; it is the *possibility* of the ready-to-hand as such, that is, the world itself. When anxiety has subsided, everyday discourse usually says: "it was really nothing." This way of talking does in fact hit ontically upon *what* it was. Everyday discourse is directed toward concern with the ready-to-hand and talking about it. That in the face of which anxiety is anxious is nothing of what is ready-to-hand within the world. But this nothing of the ready-to-hand, which is all that everyday circumspective discourse understands, is not a total nothing. The nothing of readiness-to-hand is grounded in the most primordial "something," in the *world.* The world, however, belongs ontologically and essentially to the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. If, then, what turns out to be that in the face of which anxiety is anxious is the nothing—that is, the world as such—then this means: *that in the face of which anxiety is anxious is Being-in-the-world itself.*

40.12 Being anxious discloses the world as world, primordially and directly. It is not as if we first abstract from innerworldly beings by deliberation and think only of the world, in the face of

which anxiety then arises. Rather, anxiety, as a mode of attunement, is what first discloses the *world as world.* This does not mean, however, that in anxiety the worldhood of the world is conceptually grasped.

40.13 Anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of..., but, as attunement, at the same time *anxiety about....* That about which anxiety is anxious is not a *definite* way of Being and possibility of Dasein. The threat is, after all, itself indefinite, and therefore cannot penetrate threateningly into this or that factically concrete potentiality-for-Being. That about which anxiety is anxious is Being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety, what is ready-to-hand in the environment sinks away, and so do innerworldly beings in general. The "world" can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, in falling, in terms of the "world" and the public interpretedness. It throws Dasein back upon that about which it is anxious: its owned potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein down to its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which, as understanding, essentially projects itself upon possibilities. With that about which it is anxious, anxiety therefore discloses Dasein *as Being-possible*—and indeed as that which it can be solely from itself, as individualized, in individualization.

40.14 Anxiety reveals in Dasein its *Being toward* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, that is, its *Being-free for* the freedom of choosing and seizing hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein before its *Being-free for*... (propensio in... [inclination toward...]) the ownness of its Being as possibility, which it always already is. But this Being is at the same time that to which Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is delivered over.

40.15 That *about which* anxiety is anxious reveals itself as that *in the face of which* it is anxious: Being-in-the-world. The selfsameness of what anxiety is in the face of and what it is about extends even to being anxious itself. For being anxious, as attunement, is a basic way of Being-in-the-world. *The existential selfsameness of disclosing with what is disclosed—such that in the latter the world*

is disclosed as world, and Being-in as an individualized, pure, thrown potentiality-for-Being—makes it clear that with the phenomenon of anxiety a distinctive attunement has become the theme of our interpretation. Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as "solus ipse" [oneself alone]. But this existential "solipsism" is so far from transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless emptiness of occurring without a world that it brings Dasein, in an extreme sense, precisely before its world as world, and thereby brings Dasein itself before itself as Being-in-the-world.

40.16 That anxiety as a basic attunement discloses in this way is, once again, most impartially attested by Dasein's everyday interpretation of itself and its everyday discourse. Attunement, as was said earlier, makes manifest "how one is." In anxiety one feels "*uncanny*." This expresses, first of all, the peculiar indefiniteness of that alongside which Dasein finds itself in anxiety: the nothing and nowhere. But uncanniness here also means, at the same time, not-Being-at-home. In our first phenomenal indication of Dasein's basic constitution, and in clarifying the existential meaning of Being-in as distinct from the categorial meaning of "insideness," Being-in was defined as dwelling alongside..., Being-familiar with.... This character of Being-in was then made visible more concretely through the everyday publicness of the they,[2] which brings tranquilized self-assurance, the self-evident "Being-at-home," into Dasein's average everydayness. Anxiety, on the other hand, fetches Dasein back from its falling absorption in the "world." Everyday familiarity collapses into itself. Dasein is individualized—but individualized *as* Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters the existential "mode" of the *not-at-home*. Nothing else is meant by talk of "uncanniness."

40.17 Now it becomes phenomenally visible what falling, as flight, flees in the face of. Not in the face of innerworldly beings; on the contrary, it flees precisely toward them, as the beings alongside which concern, lost in the they, can dwell in tranquilized familiarity. Falling flight *into* the at-home of publicness is flight *in the face of* the not-at-home, that is, in the face of the

2 The German *unheimlich* (uncanny) contains *Heim*, "home": literally, "un-homely."

uncanniness that lies in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, delivered over to itself in its Being. This uncanniness constantly pursues Dasein and threatens, though not explicitly, its everyday lostness in the they. This threat can factically go together with complete security and self-sufficiency in everyday concern. Anxiety can arise in the most harmless situations. Nor is there any need for darkness, in which one commonly feels uncanny more easily. In the dark there is, in an emphatic way, "nothing" to see, although the world is precisely *still* "there," and *more obtrusively* so.

40.18 When we interpret Dasein's uncanniness existential-ontologically as the threat that strikes Dasein itself from itself, we are not claiming that in factical anxiety uncanniness has also always already been understood in this sense. The everyday way in which Dasein understands uncanniness is the falling turning-away that "dims" the not-at-home. The everydayness of this fleeing, however, shows phenomenally that anxiety as a basic attunement belongs to Dasein's essential constitution of Being-in-the-world—a constitution which, as existential, is never present-at-hand, but itself always *is* in a mode of factical Dasein, that is, in an attunement. Tranquilized, familiar Being-in-the-world is a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the other way around. *The not-at-home must be conceived existential-ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon.*

40.19 And only because anxiety always already latently determines Being-in-the-world can Being-in-the-world, as concernful and attuned Being alongside the "world," be afraid. Fear is anxiety that has fallen prey to the "world"—unowned anxiety, hidden from itself as such.

40.20 Factically, then, the mood of uncanniness mostly remains existentielly not understood. Moreover, given the predominance of falling and publicness, "owned" anxiety is rare. Anxiety is often "physiologically" conditioned. This fact, in its facticity, is an *ontological* problem, not only with regard to its ontic causation and the form of its course. A physiological triggering of

anxiety is possible only because Dasein is anxious in the very ground of its Being.

40.21 Still rarer than the existentiell fact of owned anxiety are attempts to interpret this phenomenon in its fundamental existential-ontological constitution and function. The reasons for this lie partly in the neglect of the existential analytic of Dasein as such, but particularly in the failure to recognize the phenomenon of attunement. Yet the factical rarity of the phenomenon of anxiety cannot deprive it of its suitability to take on a *fundamental* methodological function for the existential analytic. On the contrary—the rarity of the phenomenon is an index that Dasein, which for the most part remains covered over from itself in its ownness by the public interpretedness of the they, becomes disclosable in a primordial sense in this basic attunement.

40.22 It is true that it belongs to the essence of every attunement to disclose, in each case, the full Being-in-the-world in all its constitutive moments (world, Being-in, self). But in anxiety there lies the possibility of a distinctive disclosing, because anxiety individualizes. This individualization fetches Dasein back from its falling and makes ownness and unownness manifest to it as possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein, which is mine in each case, show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves, undisguised by innerworldly beings, to which Dasein in the first instance and for the most part clings.

40.23 To what extent has this existential interpretation of anxiety gained a phenomenal basis for answering the guiding question of the Being of the wholeness of Dasein's structural whole?

§ 41. THE BEING OF DASEIN AS CARE

The unity of existence, facticity, and falling is defined as care: ahead-of-itself, already-in, alongside.

41.1 With the aim of grasping ontologically the wholeness of the structural whole, we must first ask: Can the phenomenon of

anxiety, and what is disclosed in it, give the whole of Dasein phenomenally and equiprimordially, in such a way that our searching gaze toward wholeness can find fulfillment in what is thus given? The entire content of what lies in it can be registered in a formal enumeration. Being anxious, as an attunement, is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which anxiety is anxious is thrown Being-in-the-world; that about which anxiety is anxious is potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Accordingly, the full phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characters of this being are existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen. These existential determinations do not belong together as pieces of a composite, one of which might sometimes be missing. Rather, a primordial nexus is woven through them, and it constitutes the wholeness of the structural whole that we are seeking. In the unity of the determinations of Dasein's Being we have named, Dasein's Being becomes ontologically graspable as such. How is this unity itself to be characterized?

41.2 Dasein is a being for which, in its Being, that very Being is what matters. The "it matters..." has become clearer in the constitution of Being of understanding, as self-projecting Being toward one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This potentiality-for-Being is that for the sake of which Dasein in each case is as it is. In its Being, Dasein has always already put itself together with a possibility of itself. Being-free *for* one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and thus for the possibility of ownness and unownness, shows itself in anxiety in a primordial, elemental concretion. But Being toward one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means ontologically: in its Being, Dasein is always already *ahead* of itself. Dasein is always already "beyond itself"—not as comportment toward other beings that it is *not*, but as Being toward the potentiality-for-Being that it itself is. We conceive this structure of Being of the essential "it matters..." as Dasein's *Being-ahead-of-itself*.

41.3 This structure, however, concerns the whole of Dasein's constitution. Being-ahead-of-itself does not mean anything like

an isolated tendency in a worldless "subject"; it characterizes Being-in-the-world. But to Being-in-the-world it belongs that, delivered over to itself, it has always already been thrown *into a world.* Dasein's being abandoned to itself shows itself primordially and concretely in anxiety. Grasped more fully, Being-ahead-of-itself means: *ahead-of-itself-in-already-Being-in-a-world.* As soon as this essentially unitary structure is seen phenomenally, what was brought out earlier in the analysis of worldhood also becomes clearer. There it emerged that the referential whole of significance, which constitutes worldhood, is "anchored" in a for-the-sake-of-which. The clamping together of the referential whole—of the manifold relations of the "in-order-to"—with that which matters to Dasein does not mean welding together a present-at-hand "world" of objects with a subject. It is rather the phenomenal expression of Dasein's primordially whole constitution, whose wholeness has now been explicitly set out as ahead-of-itself-in-already-Being-in.... To put it another way: existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.

41.4 And again: Dasein's factical existing is not only, in general and indifferently, a thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world; it is always also already absorbed in the world it concerns itself with. In this falling Being alongside..., there announces itself—explicitly or not, understood or not—the fleeing in the face of uncanniness, which for the most part remains covered over, along with latent anxiety, because the publicness of the they suppresses everything unfamiliar. In ahead-of-itself-already-Being-in-a-world there lies essentially included the falling *Being alongside* the innerworldly ready-to-hand that is concerned with.

41.5 The formally existential wholeness of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-already-Being-in-(the-world-) as Being-alongside (beings encountered within the world). This Being fills in the meaning of the term *care,* which is used in a purely ontological-existential way.

Excluded from this meaning is every ontically intended tendency of Being, such as worry or carefreeness.

41.6 Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being alongside the ready-to-hand could be grasped in the previous analyses as *concern*, and Being with the Dasein-with of Others encountered within the world as *solicitude*. Being-alongside... is concern, because as a way of Being-in it is determined by Being-in's basic structure, care. Care does not, say, characterize only existentiality, detached from facticity and falling; it embraces the unity of these determinations of Being. Nor, therefore, does care mean primarily and exclusively an isolated comportment of the I toward itself. The expression "self-care," formed by analogy with concern and solicitude, would be a tautology. Care cannot mean a special comportment toward the self, because the self is already characterized ontologically by Being-ahead-of-itself; and in this determination the other two structural moments of care, Being-already-in... and Being-alongside..., are also *posited along with it*.

41.7 In Being-ahead-of-itself, as Being toward one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, lies the existential-ontological condition of the possibility of *Being-free for* owned existentiell possibilities. The potentiality-for-Being is that for the sake of which Dasein in each case is as it factically is. But insofar as this Being toward the potentiality-for-Being is itself determined by freedom, Dasein *can* also comport itself toward its possibilities *without willing it*; it *can* be unowned, and factically it is so in the first instance and for the most part. The owned for-the-sake-of-which remains unseized; the projection of its own potentiality-for-Being is left to the disposal of the they. In Being-ahead-of-itself, therefore, the "itself" in each case means the self in the sense of the they-self. Even in unownness Dasein essentially remains ahead-of-itself, just as Dasein's falling flight in the face of itself still shows *the* constitution of Being according to which, for this being, *its Being is what matters.*

41.8 As a primordial structural wholeness, care lies existentially-a priori "before" every factical "comportment" and "cir-

cumstance" of Dasein; that is, it is always already *in* every one of them. The phenomenon therefore by no means expresses a priority of "practical" comportment over theoretical. The merely intuitive determining of something present-at-hand has the character of care no less than a "political action" or taking one's ease and amusing oneself. "Theory" and "practice" are possibilities of Being of a being whose Being must be defined as care.

41.9 Hence, too, the attempt fails to trace the phenomenon of care, in its essentially indivisible wholeness, back to particular acts or drives such as willing and wishing, or urge and addiction, or to build it up out of these.

41.10 Willing and wishing are ontologically and necessarily rooted in Dasein as care; they are not simply ontologically indifferent lived experiences occurring in a "stream" that is completely indefinite as to the meaning of its Being. The same holds no less of addiction and urge. They too are grounded in care, insofar as they can be purely demonstrated in Dasein at all. This does not rule out that urge and addiction are ontologically constitutive also of beings that merely "live." The ontological basic constitution of "living," however, is a problem in its own right, and can be unfolded only by way of reductive privation from the ontology of Dasein.

41.11 Care is ontologically "earlier" than these phenomena, which, of course, can always be adequately "described" within certain limits without the full ontological horizon needing to be visible, or even known at all. For the present fundamental-ontological investigation, which aims neither at a thematically complete ontology of Dasein nor, still less, at a concrete anthropology, it must suffice to indicate how these phenomena are existentially grounded in care.

41.12 The potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which Dasein is itself has the way of Being of Being-in-the-world. Accordingly, the relation to innerworldly beings lies ontologically in it. Care is always—even if only privatively—concern and solicitude. In willing, a being that is understood, that is, projected upon its possibility, is seized as something to be concerned with, or as

something to be brought into its Being through solicitude. *That is why* to willing there belongs in each case something willed, which has already determined itself in terms of a for-the-sake-of-which. Constitutive for the ontological possibility of willing are: the prior disclosedness of the for-the-sake-of-which as such (Being-ahead-of-itself); the disclosedness of what can be concerned with (the world as the in-which of Being-already); and Dasein's understanding self-projection upon a potentiality-for-Being toward a possibility of the "willed" being. In the phenomenon of willing, the underlying wholeness of care shows through.

41.13 Dasein's understanding self-projection, as factical, is always already alongside a world that has been uncovered. From this world it takes its possibilities—and it does so, in the first instance, in accordance with the interpretedness of the they. This interpretation has from the outset restricted the possibilities open to free choice to the range of what is familiar, attainable, tolerable—of what is proper and fitting. This leveling off of Dasein's possibilities to what is initially available in everyday life at the same time brings about a dimming of the possible as such. The average everydayness of concern becomes blind to possibilities and tranquilizes itself with what is merely "actual." This tranquilization does not rule out an extensive busyness of concern; it awakens it. What is then willed is not positive new possibilities; rather, what is available is changed "tactically" in such a way that the semblance arises that something is happening.

41.14 Tranquilized "willing" under the guidance of the they nevertheless does not mean that Being toward the potentiality-for-Being is extinguished, but only that it is modified. Being toward possibilities then shows itself mostly as mere *wishing*. In wishing, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities that not only remain unseized in concern, but whose fulfillment is not even considered or expected. On the contrary: the predominance of Being-ahead-of-itself in the mode of mere wishing brings with it a lack of understanding of factical possibilities.

Being-in-the-world whose world is projected primarily as a wish-world has lost itself, without a hold, to what is available—yet in such a way that what is available, as the only thing ready-to-hand, is never enough in the light of what is wished for. Wishing is an existential modification of understanding self-projection which, having fallen prey to thrownness, merely *hankers after* possibilities.[3] Such hankering *closes off* the possibilities; what is "there" in wishful hankering becomes the "actual world." Ontologically, wishing presupposes care.

41.15 In hankering, Being-already-alongside... has priority. Ahead-of-itself-in-already-Being-in... is modified accordingly. Falling hankering reveals Dasein's *addiction* to being "lived" by the world in which it in each case is. Addiction shows the character of Being-out-for.... Being-ahead-of-itself has lost itself in an "only-always-already-Being-alongside...." The "toward" of addiction is a letting oneself be drawn by that which the addiction hankers after. When Dasein, as it were, sinks into an addiction, it is not merely that an addiction is still present-at-hand; rather, the full structure of care is modified. Having become blind, Dasein makes all possibilities serve the addiction.

41.16 The urge "to live," by contrast, is a "toward" that brings its impetus along with it from itself. It is "toward at any price." The urge seeks to crowd out other possibilities. Here too Being-ahead-of-itself is unowned, even though being assailed by the urge comes from what does the urging itself. The urge can override the attunement Dasein has in each case, and understanding. But Dasein is then not, and never, a "mere urge" to which other comportments of controlling and guiding are sometimes added; rather, as a modification of full Being-in-the-world, it is always already care.

41.17 In the pure urge, care has not yet become free, although it is care that first makes it ontologically possible for Dasein to be urged on from itself. In addiction, on the other hand, care is always already bound. Addiction and urge are possibilities

3 "Hanker after" renders *nachhängen*, which shares its root with *Hang* (addiction), discussed below.

rooted in Dasein's thrownness. The urge "to live" cannot be annihilated; the addiction to being "lived" by the world cannot be rooted out. But because, and only because, both are ontologically grounded in care, they can be modified ontically and existentielly by care as owned care.

41.18 The expression "care" means a basic existential-ontological phenomenon which is nevertheless *not simple* in its structure. The ontologically elemental wholeness of the structure of care cannot be traced back to an ontic "primal element," just as surely as Being cannot be "explained" in terms of beings. In the end it will turn out that the idea of Being in general is just as little "simple" as the Being of Dasein. The definition of care as Being-ahead-of-itself—in-already-Being-in...—as Being-alongside... makes it clear that this phenomenon, too, is still structurally *articulated* in itself. But is this not the phenomenal indication that the ontological question must be pushed further still, so as to bring out an *even more primordial* phenomenon that ontologically sustains the unity and wholeness of the structural manifold of care? Before the investigation pursues this question, it requires a retrospective and sharpened appropriation of what has been interpreted so far, with a view to the fundamental-ontological question of the meaning of Being in general. Before that, however, it must be shown that what is ontologically "new" in this interpretation is ontically quite old. The explication of Dasein's Being as care does not force Dasein under an idea we have thought up; it brings us to an existential concept of what has already been disclosed ontic-existentielly.

§ 42. CONFIRMATION OF THE EXISTENTIAL INTERPRETATION OF DASEIN AS CARE FROM DASEIN'S PRE-ONTOLOGICAL SELF-INTERPRETATION

An ancient Latin fable of Cura, who shaped the human being, attests care pre-ontologically.

42.1 In the foregoing interpretations, which finally led to bringing out care as the Being of Dasein, everything depended on gaining the appropriate *ontological* foundations for the being that we

ourselves in each case are and that we call "human being." To this end, the analysis had from the outset to be turned out of the direction of the approach that has been handed down but is ontologically unclarified and fundamentally questionable—the approach prescribed by the traditional definition of the human being. Measured against that definition, the existential-ontological interpretation may seem strange, especially if "care" is understood merely ontically as "worry" and "distress." We shall therefore now cite a pre-ontological testimony, even though its evidential force is "only historical."

42.2 But let us bear in mind that in this testimony Dasein speaks out about itself "primordially," not determined by theoretical interpretations and without aiming at any. Let us note, further, that Dasein's Being is characterized by historicality—though this has yet to be demonstrated ontologically. *If* Dasein is "historical" in the ground of its Being, then an assertion that comes out of its history and goes back into it, and that moreover lies *prior* to all science, acquires a special weight—though never a purely ontological one. The understanding of Being that lies in Dasein itself expresses itself pre-ontologically. The testimony cited below is meant to make clear that the existential interpretation is not an invention, but that, as an ontological "construction," it has its ground and, with it, its elemental prefigurations.

42.3 The following self-interpretation of Dasein as "care" is set down in an old fable: Cura cum fluvium transiret, videt cretosum lutum sustulitque cogitabunda atque coepit fingere. dum deliberat quid iam fecisset, Jovis intervenit. rogat eum Cura ut det illi spiritum, et facile impetrat. cui cum vellet Cura nomen ex sese ipsa imponere, Jovis prohibuit suumque nomen ei dandum esse dictitat. dum Cura et Jovis disceptant, Tellus surrexit simul suumque nomen esse volt cui corpus praebuerit suum.[4]

42.4 sumpserunt Saturnum iudicem, is sic aecus iudicat: 'tu Jovis quia spiritum dedisti, in morte spiritum, tuque Tellus, quia

4 The fable is no. 220 of the *Fabulae* attributed to Hyginus (2nd century AD); Heidegger's own translation follows.

dedisti corpus, corpus recipito, Cura enim quia prima finxit, teneat quamdiu vixerit. sed quae nunc de nomine eius vobis controversia est, homo vocetur, quia videtur esse factus ex humo.' "Once, when 'Care' was crossing a river, she saw some clayey soil; thoughtfully she took a piece of it and began to shape it. While she is pondering to herself what she has made, Jupiter comes along. 'Care' asks him to bestow spirit on the shaped piece of clay. Jupiter gladly grants her this. But when she then wanted to give her own name to what she had formed, Jupiter forbade it and demanded that his name be given to it. While 'Care' and Jupiter were quarreling over the name, Earth (Tellus) also rose up and desired that her name be given to what had been formed, since she, after all, had offered it a piece of her body. The disputants took Saturn as their judge. And Saturn gave them the following decision, which seemed just: 'You, Jupiter, because you gave the spirit, shall receive the spirit at its death; you, Earth, because you gave the body, shall receive the body. But because "Care" first formed this creature, let "Care" possess it as long as it lives. And because there is a dispute about the name, let it be called "homo," since it is made of humus (earth).'"

42.5 This pre-ontological testimony acquires a special importance in that it not only sees "care" as that to which human Dasein belongs "for its lifetime," but also in that this priority of "care" emerges in connection with the familiar conception of the human being as a composite of body (earth) and spirit. Cura *prima* finxit: this being has the "origin" of its Being in care. Cura teneat, quamdiu vixerit: this being is not released from this origin, but held fast by it, pervaded by it, as long as this being "is in the world." "Being-in-the-world" bears the stamp of "care" in accordance with its Being. This being receives its name (homo) not with regard to its Being, but in relation to what it consists of (humus). The decision as to wherein the "primordial" Being of this creature is to be seen rests with Saturn, "time." The pre-ontological definition of the essence of the human being expressed in the fable has thus from the outset kept in view *the*

way of Being that pervades the human being's *temporal sojourn in the world*.[5]

42.6 The history of the meaning of the ontic concept "cura" even lets further basic structures of Dasein show through. *Burdach* draws attention to a double meaning of the term "cura," according to which it means not only "anxious exertion" but also "carefulness" and "devotion." Thus *Seneca* writes in his last letter (ep. 124): "Among the four natures that exist (tree, animal, human being, god), the last two, which alone are endowed with reason, differ in that god is immortal and the human being mortal. Now in their case, the good of the one, namely god, is perfected by his nature; that of the other, the human being, by *care (cura):* unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis."[6]

42.7 The perfectio [perfection] of the human being—becoming what one can be in one's Being-free for one's ownmost possibilities (projection)—is an "accomplishment" of "care." But equiprimordially, care determines the basic way of this being according to which it is handed over to the world it concerns itself with (thrownness). The "double meaning" of "cura" means *one* basic constitution in its essentially twofold structure of thrown projection.

42.8 Compared with the ontic interpretation, the existential-ontological interpretation is not, say, merely a theoretical-ontic generalization. That would only mean: ontically, all of a human being's comportments are "full of care" and guided by a "devotion" to something. The "generalization" is an *a priori-ontological* one. It does not mean ontic properties that constantly turn up, but a constitution of Being that always already underlies them. Only this constitution makes it ontologically possible for this being to be addressed ontically as cura. The existential condi-

5 Saturn was identified with the Greek god Kronos, whose name was associated in antiquity with *chronos*, "time."

6 Konrad Burdach (1859–1936), German literary historian. Seneca (c. 4 BC–AD 65), Roman Stoic philosopher; letter 124 is the last of his *Letters to Lucilius*.

tion of the possibility of "the cares of life" and "devotion" must be conceived as care in a primordial, that is, ontological, sense.

42.9 On the other hand, the transcendental "generality" of the phenomenon of care and of all fundamental existentials has the breadth that provides the ground on which *every* ontic interpretation of Dasein in terms of a worldview moves, whether it understands Dasein as "the cares of life" and need, or in the opposite way.

42.10 The "emptiness" and "generality" of the existential structures, which obtrude themselves ontically, have their *own* ontological definiteness and fullness. Hence the whole of Dasein's constitution is itself not simple in its unity, but shows a structural articulation, which is expressed in the existential concept of care.

42.11 The ontological interpretation of Dasein has brought the pre-ontological self-interpretation of this being as "care" to the *existential concept* of care. The analytic of Dasein, however, does not aim at an ontological foundation for anthropology; its purpose is fundamental-ontological. This purpose, it is true, has tacitly determined the course of our considerations so far, the selection of phenomena, and the limits to which the analysis has pressed forward. But with regard to the guiding question of the meaning of Being and its working-out, the investigation must now *explicitly* secure what has been gained so far. This cannot be achieved, however, by an external summary of what has been discussed. Rather, what could only be roughly indicated at the beginning of the existential analytic must, with the help of what has been gained, be sharpened into a more penetrating understanding of the problem.

§ 43. DASEIN, WORLDHOOD, AND REALITY

The problem of reality is re-examined in light of Dasein, world, and care.

43.1 The question of the meaning of Being becomes possible at all only if there *is* something like an understanding of Being.

Understanding of Being belongs to the way of Being of the being we call Dasein. The more appropriately and primordially we have been able to explicate this being, the more surely will the further course of working out the fundamental-ontological problem reach its goal.

43.2 In pursuing the tasks of a preparatory existential analytic of Dasein, the interpretation of understanding, meaning, and interpretation arose. The analysis of Dasein's disclosedness showed further that, with this disclosedness, Dasein, in accordance with its basic constitution of Being-in-the-world, is revealed equiprimordially with regard to world, Being-in, and self. Further, in the factical disclosedness of world, innerworldly beings are uncovered along with it. This implies that the Being of these beings is always already understood in a certain way, even though it is not appropriately conceived ontologically. The pre-ontological understanding of Being does indeed embrace all beings that are essentially disclosed in Dasein; but the understanding of Being itself has not yet articulated itself in accordance with the various modes of Being.

43.3 The interpretation of understanding showed at the same time that, in the first instance and for the most part, understanding has already shifted itself into the understanding of the "world," in accordance with the way of Being of falling. Even where what is at stake is not only ontic experience but ontological understanding, the interpretation of Being takes its orientation in the first instance from the Being of innerworldly beings. In doing so, the Being of what is initially ready-to-hand is skipped over, and beings are first conceived as a present-at-hand nexus of things (res). *Being* acquires the meaning of *reality*. Substantiality becomes the basic determinacy of Being. Corresponding to this displacement of the understanding of Being, the ontological understanding of Dasein, too, moves into the horizon of this concept of Being. *Dasein*, too, like other beings, is *really present-at-hand.* And so *Being in general* acquires the meaning of *reality.* Accordingly, the concept of reality has a peculiar priority in the ontological problematic. This priority blocks the

way to a genuine existential analytic of Dasein—indeed, it even blocks the view of the Being of what is initially ready-to-hand within the world. It finally forces the problematic of Being in general in a wrong direction. The other modes of Being are defined negatively and privatively with regard to reality.

43.4 Therefore not only the analytic of Dasein, but the working-out of the question of the meaning of Being in general, must be turned out of its one-sided orientation toward Being in the sense of reality. What must be demonstrated is this: reality is not only *one* way of Being *among* others; rather, it stands ontologically in a definite nexus of foundation with Dasein, world, and readiness-to-hand. This demonstration requires a fundamental discussion of the *problem of reality,* its conditions and its limits.

43.5 Under the heading "problem of reality," various questions are mixed together: 1. whether the beings supposedly "transcendent to consciousness" *are* at all; 2. whether this reality of the "external world" can be adequately *proved*; 3. to what extent these beings, if they are real, can be known in their Being-in-themselves; 4. what the meaning of these beings, reality, signifies at all. With regard to the fundamental-ontological question, the following discussion of the problem of reality treats three things: a) reality as a problem of the Being and provability of the "external world," b) reality as an ontological problem, c) reality and care.

A) REALITY AS A PROBLEM OF BEING AND OF THE PROVABILITY OF THE "EXTERNAL WORLD"

Proofs of an external world, Kant's included, are called misguided because Dasein is already in a world.

43.6 In the order of the questions about reality just listed, the ontological one—what reality means at all—comes first. But as long as a pure ontological problematic and methodology were lacking, this question, if it was explicitly raised at all, necessarily became entangled with the discussion of the "problem of the external world"; for the analysis of reality is possible only on the basis of appropriate access to the real. And intuitive knowing

has always been regarded as the way of grasping the real. Such knowing "is" as a comportment of the soul, of consciousness. Insofar as the character of the in-itself and of independence belongs to reality, the question of the meaning of reality becomes linked with the question of the possible independence of the real "from consciousness," or of the possible transcendence of consciousness into the "sphere" of the real. The possibility of an adequate ontological analysis of reality depends on how far that *from which* there is supposed to be independence, that *which* is supposed to be transcended, has *itself* been clarified with regard to its *Being*. Only in this way does the way of Being of transcending, too, become ontologically graspable. And finally, the primary kind of access to the real must be secured, in the sense of deciding the question whether knowing can take on this function at all.

43.7 The investigations that *come before* a possible ontological question about reality have been carried out in the foregoing existential analytic. According to it, knowing is a *founded* mode of access to the real. The real is essentially accessible only as innerworldly beings. All access to such beings is ontologically founded in Dasein's basic constitution, Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world has the more primordial constitution of Being of care (ahead of itself—already Being in a world—as Being alongside innerworldly beings).

43.8 The question whether there is a world at all, and whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense as a question posed by *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world—and who else should pose it? Moreover, it remains burdened with an ambiguity. World as the in-which of Being-in, and "world" as innerworldly beings, the with-which of concernful absorption, are lumped together, or not even distinguished in the first place. But world is essentially disclosed *with the Being* of Dasein; with the disclosedness of world, the "world" has in each case also already been uncovered. Admittedly, it is precisely innerworldly beings in the sense of the real, of what is merely present-at-hand, that can still remain covered over. But even the real can be uncovered

only on the basis of a world already disclosed. And only on this basis can the real still remain *hidden*. The question of the "reality" of the "external world" is raised without any prior clarification of the *phenomenon of world* as such. Factically, the "problem of the external world" constantly takes its orientation from innerworldly beings (things and objects). Thus these discussions drift into a problematic that is ontologically almost impossible to disentangle.

43.9 The entanglement of the questions—the confusion of what is to be proved with what is proved, and with that by means of which the proof is carried out—shows itself in *Kant's* "Refutation of Idealism." *Kant* calls it "a scandal of philosophy and of universal human reason" that there is still no cogent proof of the "Dasein of things outside us," one that would strike down all skepticism. He himself presents such a proof, and he does so as the grounding of the "theorem": "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own Dasein proves the Dasein of objects in space outside me."[7]

43.10 First of all, it must be expressly noted that *Kant* uses the term "Dasein" to designate the way of Being which in the present investigation is called "presence-at-hand." For *Kant*, "consciousness of my Dasein" means consciousness of my presence-at-hand in *Descartes'* sense. The term "Dasein" means both the presence-at-hand of consciousness and the presence-at-hand of things.

43.11 The proof of the "Dasein of things outside me" rests on the fact that change and permanence belong equiprimordially to the essence of time. My presence-at-hand—that is, the presence-at-hand of a manifold of representations given in inner sense—is change that is present-at-hand. But determinacy in time presupposes something permanent that is present-at-hand. This, however, cannot be "in us," "because it is precisely through this permanent that my Dasein in time can first be determined." With

7 Kant's "Refutation of Idealism" is a section added to the second edition (1787) of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In Kant's usage "Dasein" is the ordinary German word for existence, as the next paragraph explains.

the change that is present-at-hand and empirically posited "in me," something permanent that is present-at-hand "outside me" is therefore necessarily co-posited empirically. This permanent is the condition of the possibility of the presence-at-hand of change "in me." The experience of the Being-in-time of representations posits, equiprimordially, what changes "in me" and what is permanent "outside me."

43.12 The proof is, to be sure, not a causal inference, and is therefore not burdened with the drawbacks of one. *Kant* gives, as it were, an "ontological proof" from the idea of a being that is temporal. At first it seems as if *Kant* had given up the Cartesian approach of a subject found in isolation. But this is only semblance. That *Kant* demands a proof for the "Dasein of things outside me" at all already shows that he takes the subject, the "in me," as the base point of the problematic. And the proof itself is accordingly carried out by starting from the change empirically given *"in me."* For only "in me" is the "time" that sustains the proof experienced. Time provides the ground for the proof's leap into the "outside me." Moreover, *Kant* emphasizes: "The problematical [idealism], which... alleges only the inability to prove through immediate experience a Dasein outside our own, is reasonable and in keeping with a thorough philosophical way of thinking: namely, to permit no decisive judgment before a sufficient proof has been found."

43.13 But even if the ontic priority of the isolated subject and of inner experience were given up, *Descartes'* position would still be retained ontologically. What *Kant* proves—granting for once the legitimacy of the proof and of its basis at all—is the necessary co-presence-at-hand of beings that change and beings that are permanent. But this coordination of two things present-at-hand does not yet mean even the co-presence-at-hand of subject and object. And even if that were proved, what is ontologically decisive would still remain covered over: the basic constitution of the "subject," of Dasein, as Being-in-the-world. *The co-presence-at-hand of the physical and the psychical is ontically and ontologically completely different from the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world.*

43.14 *Kant* presupposes the distinction *and the connection* between the "in me" and the "outside me"—factically with justification, but without justification in terms of what his proof sets out to do. Likewise it has not been demonstrated that what is established about the co-presence-at-hand of what changes and what is permanent, with time as the guiding thread, also holds for the connection between the "in me" and the "outside me." But if the whole of the distinction and connection between the "inside" *and* the "outside" that the proof presupposes were seen —if what is presupposed with this presupposition were ontologically grasped—then the very possibility of holding that the proof of the "Dasein of things outside me" is still outstanding and necessary would collapse.

43.15 The "scandal of philosophy" does not consist in the fact that this proof is still outstanding, but *in the fact that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again.* Expectations, intentions and demands of this kind grow out of an ontologically inadequate way of positing *that from which*, independently and "outside" of it, a "world" is to be proved as present-at-hand. It is not the proofs that are inadequate; rather, the way of Being of the being that does the proving and demands proof is *underdetermined.* Hence the semblance can arise that by demonstrating the necessary co-presence-at-hand of two things present-at-hand something has been proved, or has even become provable, about Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Dasein, rightly understood, resists such proofs, because in its Being it always already *is* what subsequent proofs deem it necessary first to demonstrate to it.

43.16 If one wanted to conclude from the impossibility of proofs for the presence-at-hand of things outside us that this presence-at-hand must therefore be "accepted merely on *faith*," the inversion of the problem would not be overcome. The prior opinion would persist that, fundamentally and ideally, it ought to be possible to carry out a proof. By restricting oneself to a "belief in the reality of the external world," one affirms the inappropriate approach to the problem even when this belief is expressly given back its own "right." One goes along in principle with the

demand for a proof, even though one tries to satisfy it by a route other than that of a stringent proof.

43.17 Even if one wanted to appeal to the claim that the subject must presuppose, and indeed unconsciously always already does presuppose, that the "external world" is present-at-hand, the constructive positing of an isolated subject would still remain in play. The phenomenon of Being-in-the-world would be as little reached by this as by demonstrating a co-presence-at-hand of the physical and the psychical. With presuppositions of this kind, Dasein always already comes "too late," because insofar as it makes this presupposition as a being—and otherwise the presupposition is not possible—it is, *as a being*, always already in a world. "Earlier" than every presupposition and comportment of Dasein is the "a priori" of the constitution of Being in the way of Being of care.

43.18 *Believing* in the reality of the "external world," whether rightly or wrongly; *proving* this reality, whether adequately or inadequately; *presupposing* it, whether explicitly or not—attempts of this kind, which have not mastered their own ground in full transparency, presuppose a subject that is initially *worldless*, or not sure of its world, and that fundamentally must first assure itself of a world. Being-in-a-world is thereby made to rest from the outset on apprehending, supposing, being certain and believing—a comportment that is itself always already a founded mode of Being-in-the-world.

43.19 The "problem of reality," in the sense of the question whether an external world is present-at-hand and whether it can be proved, turns out to be an impossible one—not because its consequences lead to aporias that cannot be settled, but because the very being that is thematic in this problem, as it were, refuses such a way of posing the question. What is to be proved is not that and how an "external world" is present-at-hand; what is to be demonstrated is why Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has the tendency first to bury the "external world" "epistemologically" in nullity, only then to prove it. The reason for this lies in Dasein's falling and in the shift, motivated by it, of the primary

understanding of Being to Being as presence-at-hand. If the question is posed "critically" within this ontological orientation, then what it finds as initially and solely certain to be present-at-hand is a mere "interior." After the primordial phenomenon of Being-in-the-world has been shattered, the joining-together with a "world" is carried out on the basis of the remnant that is left, the isolated subject.

43.20 The many attempts to solve the "problem of reality" that have been worked out by the varieties of realism and idealism, and by the positions mediating between them, cannot be discussed at length in the present investigation. As certainly as a kernel of genuine questioning is to be found in all of them, so mistaken would it be to try to arrive at a tenable solution of the problem by reckoning up what is correct in each. What is needed instead is the fundamental insight that the various epistemological schools go astray not so much as epistemological theories; rather, because they neglect the existential analytic of Dasein altogether, they never even gain the ground for a phenomenally secured problematic. Nor can this *ground* be gained by subsequent phenomenological improvements of the concepts of subject and consciousness. These do not guarantee that the inappropriate *way of posing the question* will not persist after all.

43.21 With Dasein as Being-in-the-world, innerworldly beings are always already disclosed. This existential-ontological assertion seems to agree with the thesis of *realism* that the external world is really present-at-hand. Insofar as the existential assertion does not deny the presence-at-hand of innerworldly beings, it agrees in its result—doxographically, as it were—with the thesis of realism. But it differs in principle from every realism in that realism holds the reality of the "world" to be in need of proof and at the same time provable. Both of these are precisely negated in the existential assertion. What separates it completely from realism, however, is realism's lack of ontological understanding. For realism tries to explain reality ontically, through real causal connections between real things.

43.22 As against realism, *idealism*—however opposed and untenable it may be in its result—has a fundamental priority, provided it does not misunderstand itself as "psychological" idealism. When idealism emphasizes that Being and reality are only "in consciousness," this expresses an understanding of the fact that Being cannot be explained by beings. But insofar as it remains unclarified what this understanding of Being itself means ontologically, how it is possible, and that it belongs to the constitution of Being of Dasein, idealism builds its interpretation of reality in a void. That Being cannot be explained by beings, and that reality is possible only in the understanding of Being, does not after all release us from asking about the Being of consciousness, of the res cogitans itself. In consequence of the idealist thesis, the ontological analysis of consciousness itself is prefigured as an unavoidable preliminary task. Only because Being is "in consciousness"—that is, understandable in Dasein—can Dasein also understand characters of Being such as independence, the "in-itself," reality in general, and bring them to a concept. Only for that reason are "independent" beings, as something innerworldly that is encountered, accessible to circumspection.

43.23 If the term idealism amounts to an understanding that Being can never be explained by beings but is, for every being, always already the "transcendental," then idealism holds the only right possibility of a philosophical problematic. In that case *Aristotle* was no less an idealist than *Kant*. If idealism means tracing all beings back to a subject or consciousness whose only distinguishing features are that they remain *undetermined* in their Being and are characterized at most negatively as "unthinglike," then this idealism is methodologically no less naive than the crudest realism.

43.24 There remains the possibility of placing the problematic of reality *before* any orientation by "standpoint," with the thesis: every subject is what it is only for an object, and vice versa. In this formal approach, however, the terms of the correlation, like the correlation itself, remain ontologically undetermined. Yet

fundamentally the whole of the correlation is necessarily thought as "somehow" *in being*, and hence with regard to a definite idea of Being. Of course, if the existential-ontological ground has first been secured by demonstrating Being-in-the-world, then the correlation just mentioned can subsequently be recognized as a formalized, ontologically indifferent relation.

43.25 Discussing the unexpressed presuppositions of the merely "epistemological" attempts to solve the problem of reality shows that this problem must be taken back into the existential analytic of Dasein as an ontological problem.

B) REALITY AS AN ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Reality as resistance, in Dilthey and Scheler, presupposes an already disclosed world.

43.26 If the term reality means the Being of beings present-at-hand within the world (res)—and nothing else is understood by it—then for the analysis of this mode of Being this implies: *inner-worldly* beings can be grasped ontologically only if the phenomenon of innerworldliness has been clarified. But innerworldliness is grounded in the phenomenon of *world*, which in turn, as an essential structural moment of Being-in-the-world, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. Being-in-the-world, again, is ontologically bound together in the structural whole of the Being of Dasein, which was characterized as care. With this, however, the foundations and horizons have been marked out whose clarification first makes the analysis of reality possible. Only in this context does the character of the in-itself also become ontologically intelligible. It was by orienting ourselves toward this context of problems that the earlier analyses interpreted the Being of innerworldly beings.

43.27 To be sure, within certain limits a phenomenological characterization of the reality of the real can be given even without an explicit existential-ontological basis. This is what *Dilthey* attempted in the treatise mentioned above. The real is experienced in impulse and will. Reality is *resistance*, or more

precisely, resistantness. The analytical working-out of the phenomenon of resistance is what is positive in that treatise, and the best concrete confirmation of the idea of a "descriptive and analytic psychology." But the proper effect of the analysis of the phenomenon of resistance is held back by the epistemological problematic of reality. The "principle of phenomenality" does not let *Dilthey* arrive at an ontological interpretation of the Being of consciousness. "The will and its inhibition appear within the same consciousness."[8] The way of Being of this "appearing," the meaning of Being of the "within," the relation of Being between consciousness and the real itself—all this requires ontological determination. That this determination is lacking is ultimately due to the fact that *Dilthey* left "life"—"behind" which, to be sure, one cannot go—standing in ontological indifference. But ontological interpretation of Dasein does not mean going back ontically to some other being. That *Dilthey* has been refuted epistemologically cannot prevent us from making fruitful what is positive in his analyses—precisely what remained uncomprehended in these refutations.

43.28 Thus *Scheler* has recently taken up *Dilthey's* interpretation of reality. He advocates a "voluntative theory of Dasein." Here Dasein is understood in the Kantian sense as presence-at-hand. The "Being of objects is given immediately only in relatedness to drive and will." *Scheler* not only emphasizes, as *Dilthey* does, that reality is never given primarily in thinking and apprehending; above all he also points out that knowing, in turn, is not itself judging, and that knowledge is a "relation of Being."

43.29 Fundamentally, what already had to be said about the ontological indeterminacy of the foundations in *Dilthey* holds for this theory too. Nor can the fundamental ontological analysis of "life" be inserted afterward as a substructure. It sustains and conditions the analysis of reality, the full explication of res-

8 The treatise, cited in a footnote not reproduced here, is Dilthey's "Contributions to the Solution of the Question of the Origin of Our Belief in the Reality of the External World" (1890); the "descriptive and analytic psychology" is the program of his *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology* (1894).

istantness and its phenomenal presuppositions. Resistance is encountered in a not-getting-through, as the hindering of a wanting-to-get-through. But with this wanting, something is already disclosed that drive and will are *out for*. The ontic indeterminacy of this toward-which, however, must not be overlooked ontologically, or even taken as nothing. The Being-out-for..., which comes up against resistance and alone can "come up against" it, is itself already *alongside* a totality of involvements. The uncoveredness of this totality, however, is grounded in the disclosedness of the referential whole of significance. *The experience of resistance, that is, the striving uncovering of what resists, is ontologically possible only on the basis of the disclosedness of world.* Resistantness characterizes the Being of innerworldly beings. Factically, experiences of resistance determine only the scope and direction of the uncovering of beings encountered within the world. Their summation does not first initiate the disclosure of world; it presupposes it. The "against" and the "counter" are sustained in their ontological possibility by disclosed Being-in-the-world.

43.30 Nor is resistance experienced in a drive or will that "appears" on its own. These turn out to be modifications of care. Only beings of this way of Being can come up against something resistant as something innerworldly. If, accordingly, reality is determined by resistantness, two things must be noted: first, this touches only *one* character of reality among others; second, resistantness necessarily presupposes an already disclosed world. Resistance characterizes the "external world" in the sense of innerworldly beings, but never in the sense of the world. *"Consciousness of reality" is itself a way of Being-in-the-world*. All the "problematic of the external world" necessarily comes back to this basic existential phenomenon.

43.31 If the "cogito sum" [I think, I am] were to serve as the starting point of the existential analytic of Dasein, it would need not only to be reversed but also to have its content confirmed ontologically and phenomenally in a new way. The first assertion is then: "sum" [I am], and indeed in the sense: I-am-in-a-

world. As a being of this kind, "I am" in the possibility of Being toward various comportments (cogitationes) as ways of Being alongside innerworldly beings. *Descartes*, by contrast, says: cogitationes are present-at-hand, and in them an ego is also present-at-hand as a worldless res cogitans.

c) Reality and Care

Reality depends on care, though the real does not; the substance of the human being is existence.

43.32 As an ontological term, reality refers to innerworldly beings. If it serves to designate this way of Being in general, then readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand function as modes of reality. But if one leaves this word its traditional meaning, then it means Being in the sense of the pure presence-at-hand of things. Yet not all presence-at-hand is the presence-at-hand of things. The "nature" that "embraces" us is indeed an innerworldly being, but it shows neither the way of Being of what is ready-to-hand nor that of what is present-at-hand in the manner of "natural thinghood." However this Being of "nature" may be interpreted, all modes of Being of innerworldly beings are ontologically founded in the worldhood of the world, and thereby in the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. From this springs the insight: reality has no priority among the modes of Being of innerworldly beings, nor can this way of Being at all characterize anything like world and Dasein in an ontologically appropriate way.

43.33 In the order of the ontological connections of foundation, and of possible categorial and existential verification, *reality is referred back to the phenomenon of care*. That reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein cannot mean that the real could be what it is in itself only if and as long as Dasein exists.

43.34 To be sure, "there is" Being only as long as Dasein—that is, the ontic possibility of an understanding of Being—*is*. If Dasein does not exist, then "independence" also "is" not, and the "in-itself" also "is" not. Such things are then neither intelligible nor unintelligible. Then innerworldly beings, too, can neither be

uncovered nor lie in hiddenness. *Then* it can be said neither that beings are nor that they are not. *Now*, as long as there is an understanding of Being and thereby an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that *then* beings will still continue to be.

43.35 The dependence of Being—not of beings—on the understanding of Being that has been pointed out, that is, the dependence of reality—not of the real—on care, secures the further analytic of Dasein against an uncritical interpretation of Dasein that takes the idea of reality as its guiding thread, an interpretation that nevertheless keeps forcing itself upon us. Only an orientation toward existentiality, *positively* interpreted in ontological terms, guarantees that in the factical course of the analysis of "consciousness" or of "life" some meaning of reality, however indifferent, is not after all made the basis.

43.36 That beings of the way of Being of Dasein cannot be conceived in terms of reality and substantiality we expressed by the thesis: *the substance of the human being is existence.* The interpretation of existentiality as care, and the delimitation of care over against reality, do not, however, mean the end of the existential analytic; they merely let the entangled problems in the question of Being, of its possible modes, and of the meaning of such modifications stand out more sharply: only if the understanding of Being *is* do beings become accessible as beings; only if there are beings of the way of Being of Dasein is the understanding of Being possible as a being.

§ 44. DASEIN, DISCLOSEDNESS, AND TRUTH

Truth is traced from assertion back to the disclosedness of Dasein.

44.1 Since ancient times philosophy has linked truth with Being. The first uncovering of the Being of beings, by *Parmenides*, "identifies" Being with the perceiving understanding of Being: *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι* [for perceiving and Being are the same]. In his outline of the history of the uncovering of the *ἀρχαί* [first principles], *Aristotle* emphasizes that the philosoph-

ers before him were led by "the things themselves" and compelled to question further: *αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν* [the thing itself showed them the way and compelled them to inquire]. He also characterizes the same fact with the words *ἀναγκαζόμενος δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς φαινομένοις*: he (Parmenides) was compelled to follow what showed itself in itself. Elsewhere it is said: *ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκαζόμενοι*, compelled by "truth" itself, they inquired.[9] *Aristotle* designates this inquiry as *φιλοσοφεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας*, "philosophizing" about "truth," or also as *ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας*, a letting-be-seen that points out, with regard to and within the compass of "truth." Philosophy itself is determined as *ἐπιστήμη τῆς ἀληθείας*, the science of "truth." At the same time, however, it is characterized as *ἐπιστήμη, ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν*, as the science that contemplates beings as beings, that is, with regard to their Being.

44.2 What is meant here by "inquiring about 'truth,'" by science of "truth"? In this inquiry, is "truth" made the theme in the sense of a theory of knowledge or of judgment? Evidently not, for "truth" means the same as "thing," "what shows itself." But then what does the expression "truth" mean, if it can be used as a term for "beings" and "Being"?

44.3 But if *truth* rightly stands in a primordial connection with *Being*, then the phenomenon of truth moves into the compass of the problematic of fundamental ontology. In that case, must this phenomenon not already be encountered within the preparatory fundamental analysis, the analytic of Dasein? In what ontic-ontological connection does "truth" stand with Dasein and with the ontic determinacy of Dasein that we call the understanding of Being? Can the reason why Being necessarily goes together with truth, and truth with Being, be pointed out from this understanding?

44.4 These questions cannot be avoided. Because Being does indeed "go together" with truth, the phenomenon of truth has

9 The Aristotle passages come from Book I of the *Metaphysics*.

already been thematic in the earlier analyses, though not explicitly under this title. Now, in view of the sharpening of the problem of Being, the task is to delimit the phenomenon of truth explicitly and to fix the problems it contains. In doing so, what was set out earlier is not simply to be summarized. The investigation makes a new start.

44.5 The analysis starts from the *traditional concept of truth* and tries to lay bare its ontological foundations (a). From these foundations the *primordial* phenomenon of truth becomes visible. From this phenomenon the *derivativeness* of the traditional concept of truth can be shown (b). The investigation makes clear that the question of the *way of Being* of truth necessarily belongs together with the question of the "essence" of truth. Together with this goes the clarification of the ontological meaning of the phrase that "there is truth," and of the kind of necessity with which "we must presuppose" that "there is" truth (c).

A) THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF TRUTH AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

Truth as agreement is examined, and an assertion's truth is shown to be its uncovering.

44.6 Three theses characterize the traditional conception of the essence of truth and the opinion about its first definition: 1. The "locus" of truth is the assertion (the judgment). 2. The essence of truth lies in the "agreement" of the judgment with its object. 3. *Aristotle*, the father of logic, both assigned truth to judgment as its primordial locus and set going the definition of truth as "agreement."

44.7 A history of the concept of truth, which could be presented only on the basis of a history of ontology, is not intended here. A few characteristic references to what is well known will introduce the analytical discussions.

44.8 *Aristotle* says: *παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμοιώματα*, the "lived experiences" of the soul, the *νοήματα* ("representations"), are likenings to things. This assertion, which is by no means offered as an explicit definition of the essence of

truth, became one of the occasions for developing the later formulation of the essence of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei [the adequation of intellect and thing]. Thomas Aquinas, who for this definition refers to Avicenna—who in turn took it over from *Isaac Israeli's Book of Definitions* (10th century)—also uses, for adaequatio (likening), the terms correspondentia (correspondence) and convenientia (concurrence).[10]

44.9 The Neo-Kantian epistemology of the nineteenth century often characterized this definition of truth as the expression of a methodologically backward, naive realism, and declared it incompatible with a way of posing questions that has passed through *Kant's* "Copernican turn." In doing so one overlooks what *Brentano* had already drawn attention to: that *Kant* too holds fast to this concept of truth, so much so that he does not even put it up for discussion: "The old and famous question with which it was supposed that the logicians could be driven into a corner... is this: *What is truth?* The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed..."[11]

44.10 "If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then this object must thereby be distinguished from others; for a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related, even though it contains something that might well hold of other objects." And in the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic *Kant* says: "Truth and semblance are not in the object insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it insofar as it is thought."

44.11 The characterization of truth as "agreement," adaequatio, *ὁμοίωσις* [likening], is indeed very general and empty. But it will surely have some justification if it holds its ground in spite of the most diverse interpretations of knowledge, which does after all bear this distinctive predicate. We now ask about the foundations of this "relation." *What is tacitly co-posited in this relational*

10 Isaac Israeli (c. 855–c. 955), Jewish philosopher and physician in North Africa; Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980–1037), Persian philosopher.
11 Franz Brentano (1838–1917), Austrian philosopher and teacher of Husserl.

whole—adaequatio intellectus et rei? What ontological character does what is co-posited itself have?

44.12 What does the term "agreement" mean at all? Agreement of something with something has the formal character of a relation of something to something. Every agreement, and hence also "truth," is a relation. But not every relation is agreement. A sign points *to* what it shows. Showing is a relation, but not an agreement of the sign with what is shown. Evidently, however, not every agreement means something like the convenientia fixed in the definition of truth either. The number 6 agrees with 16 − 10. The numbers agree; they are equal with regard to how many. Equality is *one* way of agreement. To agreement there structurally belongs something like a "with regard to." What is it, with regard to which what is related in the adaequatio agrees? In clarifying the "relation of truth," the peculiar character of the terms of the relation must also be taken into account. With regard to what do intellectus and res agree? Do they, in their way of Being and their essential content, offer anything at all with regard to which they can agree? If equality is impossible because the two are not of the same kind, are the two (intellectus and res) then perhaps similar? But knowledge is supposed, after all, to "give" the thing *such as* it is. The "agreement" has the relational character of "such—as." In what way is this relation possible as a relation between intellectus and res? These questions make it clear: to clarify the structure of truth it is not enough simply to presuppose this relational whole; rather, we must inquire back into the context of Being that sustains this whole as such.

44.13 But does this require unrolling the "epistemological" problematic of the subject–object relation, or can the analysis restrict itself to interpreting the "immanent consciousness of truth," and thus remain "within the sphere" of the subject? According to general opinion, what is true is knowledge. But knowledge is judging. In judgment we must distinguish between judging as a *real* psychical process and what is judged as an *ideal* content. Of the latter it is said that it is "true." The real psychical

process, by contrast, is present-at-hand or not. Accordingly, it is the ideal content of judgment that stands in the relation of agreement. This relation therefore concerns a connection between the ideal content of judgment and the real thing as that *about which* judgment is made. Is the agreeing, in its way of Being, real or ideal, or neither of the two? *How is the relation between what is ideally in being and what is really present-at-hand to be grasped ontologically?* After all, it does subsist—and in factical judgments it subsists not only between the content of judgment and the real object, but at the same time between the ideal content and the real performance of judgment; and here, evidently, even more "intimately"?

44.14 Or may one not ask about the ontological meaning of the relation between the real and the ideal (the *μέθεξις* [participation])? The relation is, after all, supposed to *subsist.* What does subsistence mean ontologically?

44.15 What is supposed to deny the legitimacy of this question? Is it by chance that this problem has not budged for more than two thousand years? Does the inversion of the question already lie in the approach, in the ontologically unclarified separation of the real and the ideal?

44.16 And, with regard to the "actual" judging of what is judged, is the separation of real performance and ideal content not altogether unjustified? Is the actuality of knowing and judging not broken apart into two modes of Being and "layers," whose piecing-together never gets at the way of Being of knowing? Is psychologism not right in resisting this separation, even though it neither clarifies ontologically the way of Being of the thinking of what is thought nor even so much as recognizes it as a problem?

44.17 In the question of the way of Being of the adaequatio, going back to the division between the performance and the content of judgment does not advance the discussion; it only makes clear that clarifying the way of Being of knowing itself becomes unavoidable. The analysis this requires must try at the same time to bring into view the phenomenon of truth that

characterizes knowledge. When does truth become phenomenally explicit in knowing itself? When knowing verifies itself *as true*. Self-verification assures it of its truth. The relation of agreement must accordingly become visible in the phenomenal context of verification.

44.18 Suppose someone with their back turned to the wall makes the true assertion: "The picture on the wall is hanging askew." This assertion is verified when the one making it turns around and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall. What is verified in this verification? What is the meaning of the confirmation of the assertion? Is it, say, that an agreement of the "knowledge" or of the "known" with the thing on the wall is established? Yes and no, depending on whether what the expression "the known" means is interpreted in a phenomenally appropriate way. To what is the one making the assertion related when they judge—not perceiving the picture but "merely representing" it? To "representations," perhaps? Certainly not, if representation here is supposed to mean representing as a psychical process. Nor is the one asserting related to representations in the sense of what is represented, insofar as this means an "image" of the real thing on the wall. Rather, the asserting that "merely represents" is, in its ownmost meaning, related to the real picture on the wall. It is this that is meant, and nothing else. Any interpretation that slips in something else here, supposedly meant in the asserting that merely represents, falsifies the phenomenal facts about what the assertion is about. Asserting is a Being toward the thing itself that is. And what is verified by the perception? Nothing other than *that* it *is* the being itself that was meant in the assertion. What gets confirmed is that the asserting Being toward what is asserted is a pointing-out of the being, *that* it *uncovers* the being toward which it is. What is verified is the Being-uncovering of the assertion. In carrying out the verification, knowing remains related solely to the being itself. The confirmation plays itself out, as it were, in this being itself. The being meant shows itself *just as* it is in itself; that is, *it*, in self-sameness, is just as it is pointed out, uncovered, as being in the

assertion. Representations are not compared, neither among themselves nor in *relation* to the real thing. What is to be verified is not an agreement of knowing and object, or even of the psychical and the physical, but neither is it an agreement between "contents of consciousness" among themselves. What is to be verified is solely the Being-uncovered of the being itself, *it* in the how of its uncoveredness. This uncoveredness is confirmed when what is asserted, that is, the being itself, shows itself *as the same*. *Confirmation* means: *the being's showing itself in selfsameness.* Confirmation takes place on the basis of the being's showing itself. This is possible only because the knowing that asserts and is confirmed is, in its ontological meaning, an *uncovering Being toward* the real being itself.

44.19 That the assertion *is true* means: it uncovers the being in itself. It asserts, it points out, it "lets" the being "be seen" (*ἀπόφανσις*) in its uncoveredness. The *Being-true (truth)* of the assertion must be understood as *Being-uncovering*. Truth thus by no means has the structure of an agreement between knowing and object in the sense of a likening of one being (subject) to another (object).

44.20 Being-true as Being-uncovering is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world. This phenomenon, in which we recognized a basic constitution of Dasein, is the *foundation* of the primordial phenomenon of truth. This primordial phenomenon is now to be pursued more penetratingly.

b) The primordial phenomenon of truth and the derivativeness of the traditional concept of truth

Dasein is in truth and untruth at once; agreement is derived from uncoveredness.

44.21 Being-true (truth) means Being-uncovering. But is this not a highly arbitrary definition of truth? With such violent conceptual determinations one may succeed in eliminating the idea of agreement from the concept of truth. Must this dubious gain not

be paid for by thrusting the "good" old tradition into nullity? But the seemingly *arbitrary* definition contains only the *necessary* interpretation of what the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy primordially divined and also understood pre-phenomenologically. The Being-true of the λόγος as ἀπόφανσις is ἀληθεύειν in the manner of ἀποφαίνεσθαι: letting beings be seen in their unconcealment (uncoveredness), taking them out of hiddenness. The ἀλήθεια, which *Aristotle*, in the passages cited above, equates with πρᾶγμα and φαινόμενα, means the "things themselves," what shows itself, *beings in the how of their uncoveredness*. And is it by chance that in one of the fragments of *Heraclitus*, the *oldest* philosophical teachings that deal *explicitly* with the λόγος, the phenomenon of truth we have brought out, in the sense of uncoveredness (unconcealment), shows through? Those who lack understanding are set over against the λόγος and the one who speaks and understands it. The λόγος is φράζων ὅκως ἔχει: it tells how it is with beings. To those who lack understanding, by contrast, what they do λανθάνει, remains in hiddenness; ἐπιλανθάνονται, they forget, that is, for them it sinks back again into hiddenness. Thus unconcealment, ἀ-λήθεια, belongs to the λόγος.[12] The translation by the word "truth," and still more the theoretical conceptual determinations of this expression, cover over the meaning of what the Greeks, as a pre-philosophical understanding, "self-evidently" took as the basis for the terminological use of ἀλήθεια.

44.22 In adducing such evidence we must guard against unbridled word-mysticism. Nonetheless, it is in the end the business of philosophy to preserve the *power of the most elemental words* in which Dasein expresses itself from being leveled off by the common understanding into unintelligibility, which in turn functions as a source of pseudo-problems.

44.23 What was set out earlier about λόγος and ἀλήθεια in what was, as it were, a dogmatic interpretation has now received its phenomenal verification. The "definition" of truth put forward is

12 Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 500 BC); the passage paraphrased is his fragment 1.

not a *shaking off* of the tradition but its primordial *appropriation* —all the more so if we succeed in demonstrating that and how the theory had to arrive at the idea of agreement on the basis of the primordial phenomenon of truth.

44.24 Nor is the "definition" of truth as uncoveredness and Being-uncovering a mere explanation of a word; it grows out of the analysis of those comportments of Dasein that we are initially accustomed to call "true."

44.25 Being-true as Being-uncovering is a mode of Being of Dasein. What makes this uncovering itself possible must necessarily be called "true" in a still more primordial sense. *Only the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering itself show the most primordial phenomenon of truth.*

44.26 Uncovering is a mode of Being of Being-in-the-world. Circumspective concern, or also the concern that lingers in looking at something, uncovers innerworldly beings. These become what is uncovered. They are "true" in a second sense. What is primarily "true," that is, uncovering, is Dasein. Truth in the second sense means not Being-uncovering (uncovering) but Being-uncovered (uncoveredness).

44.27 But the earlier analysis of the worldhood of the world and of innerworldly beings showed that the uncoveredness of innerworldly beings is *grounded* in the disclosedness of the world. Disclosedness, however, is the basic way of Dasein according to which it *is* its "there." Disclosedness is constituted by attunement, understanding and discourse, and concerns equiprimordially the world, Being-in and the self. The structure of care as *Being-ahead-of-itself*—Being-already-in a world—as Being-alongside innerworldly beings harbors within itself the disclosedness of Dasein. *With* and *through* this disclosedness there is uncoveredness; hence only with the *disclosedness* of Dasein is the *most primordial* phenomenon of truth reached. What was demonstrated earlier regarding the existential constitution of the "there," and regarding the everyday Being of the "there," concerned nothing other than the most primordial phenomenon of truth. Insofar as Dasein essentially *is* its disclosed-

ness, and, as disclosed, discloses and uncovers, it is essentially "true." *Dasein is "in the truth."* This assertion has an ontological meaning. It does not mean that Dasein is ontically always, or even ever, led "into all truth," but that disclosedness of its ownmost Being belongs to its existential constitution.[13]

44.28 Taking up what was gained earlier, the full existential meaning of the proposition "Dasein is in the truth" can be rendered by the following determinations:

44.29 1. *Disclosedness in general* belongs essentially to the constitution of Being of Dasein. It embraces the whole of the structure of Being that has become explicit through the phenomenon of care. To this structure belongs not only Being-in-the-world but Being alongside innerworldly beings. With the Being of Dasein and its disclosedness, there is, equiprimordially, uncoveredness of innerworldly beings.

44.30 2. *Thrownness* belongs to the constitution of Being of Dasein, and indeed as a constitutive item of its disclosedness. In thrownness it is revealed that Dasein, as mine in each case and as this Dasein, always already is in a definite world and alongside a definite range of definite innerworldly beings. Disclosedness is essentially factical.

44.31 3. *Projection* belongs to the constitution of Being of Dasein: disclosive Being toward its potentiality-for-Being. As understanding, Dasein *can understand itself* in terms of the "world" and of Others, or in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The latter possibility means: Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This *owned* disclosedness shows the phenomenon of the most primordial truth in the mode of ownness. The most primordial, and indeed most owned, disclosedness in which Dasein can be as a potentiality-for-Being is the *truth of existence*. It receives its existential-ontological determinacy only in the context of an analysis of the ownness of Dasein.

44.32 4. *Falling* belongs to the constitution of Being of Dasein. In the first instance and for the most part, Dasein is lost in its

"world." Understanding, as projection upon possibilities of Being, has shifted itself there. Absorption in the they means the dominance of public interpretedness. What is uncovered and disclosed stands in the mode of disguisedness and closedness through idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Being toward beings is not extinguished, but uprooted. Beings are not completely hidden; they are precisely uncovered, but at the same time disguised; they show themselves—but in the mode of semblance. Likewise, what was previously uncovered sinks back again into disguisedness and hiddenness. *Because Dasein is essentially falling, it is, in its constitution of Being, in "untruth"*. This term, like the expression "falling," is used here ontologically. In its existential-analytical use, any ontically negative "evaluation" must be kept at a distance. Closedness and coveredness belong to the *facticity* of Dasein. The full existential-ontological meaning of the proposition "Dasein is in the truth" also says, equiprimordially, "Dasein is in untruth." But only insofar as Dasein is disclosed is it also closed off; and insofar as innerworldly beings are always already uncovered with Dasein, such beings, as what can be encountered within the world, are covered over (hidden) or disguised.

44.33 Hence Dasein must essentially appropriate explicitly even what has already been uncovered, *against* semblance and disguise, and assure itself of uncoveredness again and again. All the more does every new uncovering take place not on the basis of complete hiddenness but by starting from uncoveredness in the mode of semblance. Beings look like..., that is, they are in a certain way already uncovered and yet still disguised.

44.34 Truth (uncoveredness) must always first be wrested from beings. Beings are torn out of hiddenness. The factical uncoveredness in each case is, as it were, always a *robbery*. Is it by chance that the Greeks express themselves about the essence of truth in a *privative* expression (*ἀ-λήθεια*)? In such self-expression of Dasein, does there not announce itself a primordial

13 "Into all truth" echoes John 16:13, where the Spirit of truth "will guide you into all truth."

understanding of its own Being—the understanding, even if only pre-ontological, that Being-in-untruth makes up an essential determination of Being-in-the-world?

44.35 That the goddess of truth who guides *Parmenides* sets him before both paths, the path of uncovering and the path of concealing, means nothing other than this: Dasein is always already in the truth and in untruth. The path of uncovering is won only in *κρίνειν λόγῳ*, in distinguishing between the two understandingly and deciding for the one.[14]

44.36 The existential-ontological condition for Being-in-the-world's being determined by "truth" and "untruth" lies in *that* constitution of Being of Dasein which we characterized as *thrown projection*. It is a constitutive item of the structure of care.

44.37 The existential-ontological interpretation of the phenomenon of truth has yielded the following. 1. Truth in the most primordial sense is the disclosedness of Dasein, to which the uncoveredness of innerworldly beings belongs. 2. Dasein is equiprimordially in the truth and in untruth.

44.38 Within the horizon of the traditional interpretation of the phenomenon of truth, these propositions can become fully evident only if it can be shown: 1. that truth, understood as agreement, has its source in disclosedness, and does so by way of a definite modification; 2. that the way of Being of disclosedness itself leads to its derivative modification being what comes into view in the first instance and what guides the theoretical explication of the structure of truth.

44.39 The assertion and its structure, the apophantical "as," are founded in interpretation and its structure, the hermeneutical "as," and further in understanding, the disclosedness of Dasein. Truth, however, counts as a distinguishing determination of the assertion, which is derivative in this way. Accordingly, the roots of the truth of assertion reach back into the disclosedness of understanding. Beyond this indication of where the truth of

14 In the proem of Parmenides' poem an unnamed goddess receives him and lays out the paths of inquiry.

assertion comes from, however, the phenomenon of *agreement* must now be *explicitly* shown in its derivativeness.

44.40 Being alongside innerworldly beings, concern, is uncovering. But discourse belongs essentially to the disclosedness of Dasein. Dasein speaks itself out; *itself*—as uncovering Being toward beings. And as such it speaks itself out, in the assertion, about beings that have been uncovered. The assertion communicates beings in the how of their uncoveredness. The Dasein that takes in the communication brings itself, in taking it in, into the uncovering Being toward the beings under discussion. The assertion that has been spoken out contains, in what it is about, the uncoveredness of beings. This uncoveredness is preserved in what is spoken out. What is spoken out becomes, as it were, something innerworldly that is ready-to-hand, which can be taken up and passed on in speech. On the basis of this preservation of uncoveredness, what is spoken out, as something ready-to-hand, has in itself a relation to the beings about which what is spoken out is in each case an assertion. Uncoveredness is in each case uncoveredness of ... Even in repeating what has been said, the Dasein that repeats it comes into a Being toward the very beings under discussion. But it is relieved of, and considers itself relieved of, any primordial re-enactment of the uncovering.

44.41 Dasein does not need to bring itself face to face with the beings themselves in an "originary" experience, and yet it correspondingly remains in a Being toward them. To a great extent, uncoveredness is appropriated not by one's own uncovering in each case, but by hearsay of what has been said. Being absorbed in what has been said belongs to the way of Being of the they. What is spoken out as such takes over the Being toward the beings uncovered in the assertion. But if these beings are to be explicitly appropriated with regard to their uncoveredness, this means: the assertion is to be shown to be uncovering. The assertion that has been spoken out, however, is something ready-to-hand, and indeed in such a way that, as preserving uncoveredness, it has in itself a relation to the uncovered beings. Showing

its Being-uncovering now means: showing the relation of the assertion that preserves the uncoveredness *to* the beings. The assertion is something ready-to-hand. The beings to which it has a relation as uncovering are innerworldly ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. The relation itself thus presents itself as present-at-hand. But the relation lies in the fact that the uncoveredness preserved in the assertion is in each case uncoveredness of ... The judgment "contains something that holds of the objects" (*Kant*). Through being switched over to a relationship between things present-at-hand, however, the relation now itself acquires the character of presence-at-hand. Uncoveredness of ... becomes the present-at-hand conformity of something present-at-hand, the assertion spoken out, *to* something present-at-hand, the beings under discussion. And if the conformity is seen only as a relationship between things present-at-hand, that is, if the way of Being of the terms of the relationship is understood indiscriminately as merely present-at-hand, then the relation shows itself as the present-at-hand agreement of two present-at-hand things.

44.42 *With the assertion's having been spoken out, the uncoveredness of beings moves into the way of Being of the innerworldly ready-to-hand. But insofar as a relation to what is present-at-hand persists in the uncoveredness, as uncoveredness of ..., the uncoveredness (truth) in its turn becomes a present-at-hand relationship between things present-at-hand (intellectus and res [intellect and thing]).*

44.43 The existential phenomenon of uncoveredness, founded in the disclosedness of Dasein, becomes a present-at-hand property that still harbors the character of a relation within itself, and as such a property it is broken apart into a present-at-hand relationship. Truth as disclosedness and as uncovering Being toward uncovered beings has become truth as agreement between innerworldly things present-at-hand. With this, the ontological derivativeness of the traditional concept of truth has been shown.

44.44 Yet what is last in the order of existential-ontological connections of foundation counts ontically-factically as what is first

and closest. This fact, in turn, is grounded, as regards its necessity, in the way of Being of Dasein itself. Absorbed in concern, Dasein understands itself in terms of what it encounters within the world. The uncoveredness that belongs to uncovering is found in the first instance within the world, in what is *ex*pressed. But not only is truth encountered as something present-at-hand; the understanding of Being in general understands all beings in the first instance as present-at-hand. The closest ontological reflection on the "truth" that is ontically encountered in the first instance understands the λόγος (assertion) as λόγος τινός (assertion about ..., uncoveredness of ...), but interprets the phenomenon, as something present-at-hand, with regard to its possible presence-at-hand. But because presence-at-hand has been equated with the meaning of Being in general, the question whether this way of Being of truth and the structure it has when it is encountered closest are primordial or not *cannot* come alive at all. *Dasein's understanding of Being, which holds sway in the first instance and which even today has not been overcome in principle and explicitly, itself covers over the primordial phenomenon of truth.*

44.45 At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that among the Greeks, who were the first to develop this closest understanding of Being scientifically and bring it to dominance, the primordial, if pre-ontological, understanding of truth was also alive, and even—at least in *Aristotle*—held its own against the covering-over that lay in their ontology.

44.46 *Aristotle* never defended the thesis that the primordial "locus" of truth is the judgment. He says rather that the λόγος is the mode of Being of Dasein that can be uncovering *or* covering over. This *twofold possibility* is what is distinctive about the Being-true of the λόγος: it is the comportment that *can also cover over*. And because Aristotle never asserted the thesis mentioned, he was also never in the position of having to "extend" the concept of truth from the λόγος to pure νοεῖν [apprehending]. The "truth" of αἴσθησις [sense perception] and of the seeing of "ideas" is primordial uncovering. And only because νόησις

[apprehension] primarily uncovers can the *λόγος* as *διανοεῖν* [thinking through] also have the function of uncovering.

44.47 The thesis that the genuine "locus" of truth is the judgment not only invokes *Aristotle* wrongly; in its content, too, it misconstrues the structure of truth. It is not the assertion that is the primary "locus" of truth; *on the contrary*, the assertion, as a mode of appropriating uncoveredness and as a way of Being-in-the-world, is grounded in uncovering, or in the *disclosedness* of Dasein. The most primordial "truth" is the "locus" of assertion and the ontological condition of the possibility that assertions can be true or false (uncovering or covering over).

44.48 Truth, understood in the most primordial sense, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. The term signifies an existential. But with this, the answer is already prefigured to the question about the way of Being of truth and about the meaning of the necessity of the presupposition that "there is truth."

c) The way of Being of truth and the presupposition of truth

There is truth only as long as Dasein is; why we must presuppose truth.

44.49 Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is an essential way of Being of Dasein. *"There is" truth only insofar as and as long as Dasein is.* Beings are uncovered only *when*, and disclosed only *as long as*, Dasein in general *is*. *Newton's* laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatever, are true only as long as Dasein *is*. Before there was any Dasein at all, and after there is no longer any Dasein at all, there was no truth and there will be none, because truth, as disclosedness, uncovering and uncoveredness, *cannot* then *be*. Before *Newton's* laws were uncovered, they were not "true"; it does not follow from this that they were false, still less that they would become false if ontically no uncoveredness were possible any longer. Nor does this "restriction" imply any diminishing of the Being-true of "truths."

44.50 That *Newton's* laws were neither true nor false before him cannot mean that the beings they point out in uncovering them had not been there before. The laws became true through *Newton*; with them, beings in themselves became accessible for Dasein. With the uncoveredness of beings, these beings show themselves precisely as the beings that already were before. To uncover in this way is the way of Being of "truth."

44.51 That there are "eternal truths" will be adequately proved only when it has been successfully demonstrated that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity. As long as this proof is still outstanding, the proposition remains a fanciful claim, which gains nothing in legitimacy from the fact that philosophers commonly "believe" it.

44.52 *All truth, in accordance with its essential way of Being, which is of the kind that Dasein has, is relative to the Being of Dasein.* Does this relativity mean something like: all truth is "subjective"? If one interprets "subjective" as "left to the discretion of the subject," then certainly not. For uncovering, in its ownmost meaning, withdraws asserting from "subjective" discretion and brings the uncovering Dasein face to face with the beings themselves. And only *because* "truth," as uncovering, *is a way of Being of Dasein* can it be withdrawn from *Dasein's* discretion. The "universal validity" of truth, too, is rooted solely in the fact that Dasein can uncover beings in themselves and set them free. Only in this way can these beings in themselves bind every possible assertion, that is, every pointing-out of them. Is truth, rightly understood, in the least impaired by the fact that it is ontically possible only in the "subject" and stands and falls with the subject's Being?

44.53 From the way of Being of truth, conceived existentially, the meaning of the presupposition of truth now also becomes intelligible. *Why must we presuppose that there is truth?* What does "presuppose" mean? What is meant by the "must" and the "we"? What does it mean to say "there is truth"? "We" presuppose truth because "we," being in the way of Being of Dasein, *are* "in the truth." We do not presuppose it as something "outside" and

"above" us, toward which we also comport ourselves, alongside other "values." It is not we who presuppose "truth"; rather, it is *truth* that makes it ontologically possible at all for us to *be* in such a way that we "presuppose" something. Truth is what first *makes possible* anything like presupposition.

44.54 What does "presuppose" mean? To understand something as the ground of the Being of another being. Such understanding of beings in their connections of Being is possible only on the ground of disclosedness, that is, of Dasein's Being-uncovering. To presuppose "truth," then, means to understand it as something for the sake of which Dasein is. But Dasein—this lies in its constitution of Being as care—is always already ahead of itself. It is a being for which, in its Being, what matters is its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Disclosedness and uncovering belong essentially to the Being and potentiality-for-Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. What matters to Dasein is its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, that is, among other things, the circumspectively uncovering concern with innerworldly beings. In Dasein's constitution of Being as care, in Being-ahead-of-itself, lies the most primordial "presupposing." *Because this presupposing of itself belongs to the Being of Dasein, "we" must also presuppose "ourselves" as determined by disclosedness.* This "presupposing," which lies in the Being of Dasein, does not comport itself toward beings not of Dasein's kind, which there also are besides, but solely toward Dasein itself. The truth that is presupposed, or the "there is" by which its Being is supposed to be determined, has the way of Being, or the meaning of Being, of Dasein itself. We must "make" the presupposition of truth because, with the Being of the "we," it *is* already "made."

44.55 We *must* presuppose truth; as the disclosedness of Dasein it *must be*, just as Dasein itself, as in each case mine and as this one, *must* be. This belongs to Dasein's essential thrownness into the world. *Has Dasein, as itself, ever freely decided, and will it ever be able to decide, whether it wants to come into "Dasein" or not?* "In itself" there is no way of seeing why beings should be *uncovered*, why *truth* and *Dasein* must be. The customary refutation of skep-

ticism, of the denial of the Being or of the knowability of "truth," stops halfway. What it shows in formal argumentation is merely that, if judgments are made, truth is presupposed.[15] It amounts to pointing out that "truth" belongs to assertion, that pointing-out is, by its meaning, an uncovering. In this it is *left unclarified why* this must be so, wherein the ontological ground lies for this necessary connection of Being between assertion and truth. Likewise, the way of Being of truth, and the meaning of presupposing and of its ontological foundation in Dasein itself, remain completely obscure. Moreover, it goes unrecognized that even when nobody *judges*, truth is already presupposed, insofar as Dasein is at all.

44.56 A skeptic cannot be refuted, any more than the Being of truth can be "proved." The skeptic, if he factically *is*, in the manner of negating truth, also *does not need* to be refuted. Insofar as he *is* and has understood himself in this Being, he has, in the despair of suicide, extinguished Dasein and with it truth. Truth cannot be proved in its necessity, because Dasein, for itself, cannot first be put to the proof. Just as little as it has been proved that there are "eternal truths," just so little has it been proved that there has never—as the refutations of skepticism, despite what they undertake, basically believe—"been" a "real" skeptic. Perhaps more often than the harmlessness of the formal-dialectical attempts to catch "skepticism" off guard would care to admit.

44.57 And so, in the question about the Being of truth and the necessity of presupposing it, just as in the question about the essence of knowledge, an "ideal subject" is generally posited. The explicit or inexplicit motive for this lies in the demand, legitimate but itself still in need of ontological grounding, that philosophy has the "a priori," and not "empirical facts" as such, for its theme. But does positing an "ideal subject" satisfy this demand? Is it not a *fantastically idealized* subject? With the concept of such a subject, is it not precisely the a priori of the merely "factual" subject, Dasein, that is missed? Does not the

15 "Dasein" in quotation marks is here the ordinary German word for existence.

determination that it is equiprimordially in the truth and in untruth belong to the a priori of the factical subject, that is, to the facticity of Dasein?

44.58 The ideas of a "pure I" and of a "consciousness in general" are so far from containing the a priori of "real" subjectivity that they skip over the ontological characters of the facticity and the constitution of Being of Dasein, or rather do not see them at all. Rejecting a "consciousness in general" does not mean negating the a priori, any more than positing an idealized subject guarantees the apriority of Dasein, grounded in the matter itself.

44.59 The claim that there are "eternal truths," like the conflation of the phenomenally grounded "ideality" of Dasein with an idealized absolute subject, belongs to those residues of Christian theology within the problematic of philosophy that have not yet, by a long way, been radically driven out.

44.60 The Being of truth stands in a primordial connection with Dasein. And only because Dasein is as constituted by disclosedness, that is, by understanding, can anything like Being be understood at all, is an understanding of Being possible.

44.61 "There is" Being—not beings—only insofar as truth is. And truth *is* only insofar as and as long as Dasein is. Being and truth "are" equiprimordially. What it means to say that Being "is," when it is after all supposed to be distinct from all beings, can be asked concretely only once the meaning of Being and the full scope of the understanding of Being in general have been clarified. Only then can we also set out primordially what belongs to the concept of a science *of Being as such*, and to its possibilities and variations. And in delimiting this research and its truth, research as the uncovering *of beings*, and its truth, will have to be determined ontologically.

44.62 The answer to the question of the meaning of Being is still outstanding. What has the fundamental analysis of Dasein carried out so far provided for working out this question? By laying bare the phenomenon of care, we clarified the constitution of Being of that being to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs. The Being of Dasein was thereby at

the same time delimited from modes of Being (readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, reality) that characterize beings not of Dasein's kind. Understanding itself was elucidated, and with this the methodological transparency of the understanding-and-interpreting procedure of the interpretation of Being is also secured.

44.63 If with care the primordial constitution of Being of Dasein has been reached, then on this basis it must also be possible to bring to a concept the understanding of Being that lies in care, that is, to delimit the meaning of Being. But *has* the most primordial existential-ontological constitution of Dasein been disclosed with the phenomenon of care? Does the manifold of structures that lies in the phenomenon of care give the most primordial wholeness of the Being of factical Dasein? Has the investigation so far brought Dasein *as a whole* into view at all?

Division Two, Chapter I: The Possible Being-a-Whole of Dasein and Being-toward-Death

Zweiter Abschnitt: Dasein und Zeitlichkeit. Erstes Kapitel: Das mögliche Ganzsein des Daseins und das Sein zum Tode
§§45–53

§ 45. THE RESULT OF THE PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DASEIN AND THE TASK OF A PRIMORDIAL EXISTENTIAL INTERPRETATION OF THIS BEING

The analysis so far has missed Dasein's ownness and wholeness; death, conscience, and temporality come next.

45.1 What has been gained by the preparatory analysis of Dasein, and what is being sought? What we have *found* is the basic constitution of the being that is our theme, Being-in-the-world, whose essential structures are centered in disclosedness. The wholeness of this structural whole revealed itself as care. In care the Being of Dasein is contained. The analysis of this Being took as its guiding thread what had been determined in advance as the essence of Dasein: existence. In formal indication, the term means: Dasein *is* as an understanding potentiality-for-Being for which, in its Being, this Being itself matters. The being that is in this way is in each case I myself. Working out the phenomenon of care gave us insight into the concrete constitution of existence, that is, into its equiprimordial connection with the facticity and the falling of Dasein.

45.2 What is *sought* is the answer to the question of the meaning of Being in general and, before that, the possibility of a radical

working-out of this basic question of all ontology. But laying bare the horizon in which something like Being in general becomes intelligible amounts to clarifying the possibility of the understanding of Being in general, which itself belongs to the constitution of the being we call Dasein. The understanding of Being, as an essential moment of Dasein's Being, can be *radically* clarified, however, only if the being to whose Being it belongs has been interpreted *primordially* in itself with regard to its Being.

45.3 May we claim the ontological characterization of Dasein qua care as a *primordial* interpretation of this being? By what standard is the existential analytic of Dasein to be assessed as to its primordiality or non-primordiality? What, after all, does the *primordiality* of an ontological interpretation mean at all?

45.4 Ontological investigation is one possible kind of interpretation, which was characterized as the working-out and appropriation of an understanding. Every interpretation has its fore-having, its fore-sight and its fore-conception. If, as interpretation, it becomes the explicit task of a piece of research, then the whole of these "presuppositions," which we call the *hermeneutical situation*, needs to be clarified and secured beforehand, from and in a basic experience of the "object" to be disclosed. Ontological interpretation, which is supposed to lay bare beings with regard to their own constitution of Being, is obliged to bring the being that is its theme into the fore-having through an initial phenomenal characterization, to which all the subsequent steps of the analysis must be commensurate. These steps, however, at the same time need to be guided by the possible fore-sight on the way of Being of the being in question. Fore-having and fore-sight then at the same time prefigure the conceptuality (fore-conception) into which all the structures of Being are to be raised.

45.5 A *primordial* ontological interpretation, however, not only requires in general a hermeneutical situation secured through phenomenal commensurateness; it must also explicitly make sure whether it has brought the *whole* of the being that is its

theme into the fore-having. Likewise, a first prefiguring of the Being of this being, even a phenomenally grounded one, is not enough. Rather, the fore-sight on Being must hit upon this Being with regard to the *unity* of the structural moments that belong to it and are possible. Only then can the question of the meaning of the unity of the wholeness of Being of the whole being be posed and answered with phenomenal certainty.

45.6 Did the existential analysis of Dasein that has been carried out arise from a hermeneutical situation of such a kind that it guarantees the primordiality demanded by fundamental ontology? Can we advance from the result obtained—the Being of Dasein is care—to the question of the primordial unity of this structural whole?

45.7 How do things stand with the fore-sight that has so far guided the ontological procedure? We determined the idea of existence as an understanding potentiality-for-Being for which its Being itself matters. But as in each case *mine*, the *potentiality-for-Being* is free for ownness or unownness or the modal indifference of the two. Starting from average everydayness, the interpretation so far has confined itself to the analysis of indifferent or unowned existing. To be sure, even along this path a concrete determination of the existentiality of existence could be, and had to be, reached. Nevertheless, the ontological characterization of the constitution of existence remained burdened with an essential deficiency. Existence means potentiality-for-Being—but also owned potentiality-for-Being. As long as the existential structure of the owned potentiality-for-Being is not taken into the idea of existence, the fore-sight guiding an *existential* interpretation lacks primordiality.

45.8 And how do matters stand with the fore-having of the hermeneutical situation so far? When and how has the existential analysis made sure that, by starting from everydayness, it forced the *whole* of Dasein—this being from its "beginning" to its "end"—into the phenomenological gaze that gives it its theme? It was indeed claimed that care is the wholeness of the structural whole of Dasein's constitution. But does not the very starting

point of the interpretation already involve renouncing the possibility of bringing Dasein into view as a whole? Everydayness is, after all, precisely the Being "between" birth and death. And if existence determines the Being of Dasein, and its essence is co-constituted by potentiality-for-Being, then, as long as Dasein exists, it must, in being able to be, in each case *not yet be* something. A being whose essence is made up by existence essentially resists the possibility of being grasped as a whole being. Not only has the hermeneutical situation so far failed to make sure of "having" the whole being; it even becomes questionable whether this having is attainable at all, and whether a primordial ontological interpretation of Dasein must not founder—on the way of Being of the very being that is its theme.

45.9 One thing has become unmistakable: *the existential analysis of Dasein so far cannot lay claim to primordiality.* In the fore-having there was only ever the *unowned* Being of Dasein, and this as *unwhole*. If the interpretation of the Being of Dasein, as the foundation for working out the basic question of ontology, is to become primordial, then it must first have brought the Being of Dasein existentially to light in its possible *ownness* and *wholeness*.

45.10 Thus arises the task of placing Dasein as a whole into the fore-having. This means, however, first of all raising the question of this being's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole at all. In Dasein, as long as it is, there is in each case still something outstanding that it can be and will be. But to what is thus outstanding belongs the "end" itself. The "end" of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, belonging to potentiality-for-Being, that is, to existence, limits and determines the wholeness of Dasein that is possible in each case. Dasein's Being-at-an-end in death, and so the Being-a-whole of this being, can, however, be included in a phenomenally appropriate way in the discussion of possible *Being-a-whole* only if an ontologically adequate, that is, an *existential*, concept of death has been obtained. In the manner of Dasein, however, death *is* only in an existentiell *Being-toward-death*. The existential structure of this Being proves to be the

ontological constitution of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. The whole existing Dasein can accordingly be brought into the existential fore-having. But can Dasein also exist *as a whole in an owned way*? How is the ownness of existence to be determined at all, if not with a view to owned existing? Where do we get the criterion for this? Evidently Dasein itself must, in its Being, give in advance the possibility and manner of its owned existence, if indeed this can neither be forced upon it ontically nor invented ontologically. But the attestation of an owned potentiality-for-Being is given by conscience. Like death, this phenomenon of Dasein demands a genuinely existential interpretation. This interpretation leads to the insight that an owned potentiality-for-Being of Dasein lies in *wanting-to-have-a-conscience*. But this existentiell possibility tends, by the meaning of its Being, toward being existentielly determined by Being-toward-death.

45.11 With the demonstration of an *owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole* of Dasein, the existential analytic makes sure of the constitution of the *primordial* Being of Dasein; but at the same time the owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole becomes visible as a mode of care. With this, the phenomenally adequate ground for a primordial interpretation of the meaning of Dasein's Being is also secured.

45.12 The primordial ontological ground of the existentiality of Dasein, however, is *temporality*. Only in terms of temporality does the articulated structural wholeness of the Being of Dasein as care become existentially intelligible. The interpretation of the meaning of Dasein's Being cannot stop at this demonstration. The existential-temporal analysis of this being needs concrete confirmation. The ontological structures of Dasein obtained earlier must be laid bare, going back over them, with regard to their temporal meaning. Everydayness reveals itself as a mode of temporality. But through this repetition of the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, the phenomenon of temporality itself at the same time becomes more transparent. In terms of temporality it then becomes intelligible why Dasein, at

the ground of its Being, is and can be historical, and *as historical* is able to develop historiography.

45.13 If temporality makes up the primordial meaning of Dasein's Being, and if in its Being *this Being itself* matters to this being, then care must need "time" and accordingly reckon with "time." Dasein's temporality develops "time-reckoning." The "time" experienced in it is the closest phenomenal aspect of temporality. Out of it grows the everyday, ordinary understanding of time. And this unfolds into the traditional concept of time.

45.14 Clarifying the origin of the "time" "in which" inner-worldly beings are encountered, time as within-time-ness, reveals an essential possibility of the temporalizing of temporality. With this, the way is prepared for understanding a still more primordial temporalizing of temporality. In it is grounded the understanding of Being that is constitutive for the Being of Dasein. The projection of a meaning of Being in general can be carried out within the horizon of time.

45.15 The investigation contained in the present division therefore passes through the following stages: the possible Being-a-whole of Dasein, and Being-toward-death (Chapter 1); Dasein's attestation of an owned potentiality-for-Being, and resoluteness (Chapter 2); Dasein's owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, and temporality as the ontological meaning of care (Chapter 3); temporality and everydayness (Chapter 4); temporality and historicality (Chapter 5); temporality and within-time-ness as the origin of the ordinary concept of time (Chapter 6).

§ 46. THE SEEMING IMPOSSIBILITY OF GRASPING AND DETERMINING ONTOLOGICALLY THE BEING-A-WHOLE OF DASEIN

As long as Dasein is, something is always outstanding, so it seems it can never be grasped whole.

46.1 The inadequacy of the hermeneutical situation from which the preceding analysis of Dasein arose is to be overcome. With regard to the fore-having of the whole of Dasein, which must

necessarily be obtained, we must ask whether this being, as existing, can become accessible in its Being-a-whole at all. Weighty reasons, lying in the constitution of Being of Dasein itself, seem to speak for the impossibility of the required giving-in-advance.

46.2 A possible Being-a-whole of this being is evidently contradicted, by its ontological meaning, by care, which forms the wholeness of Dasein's structural whole. The primary moment of care, the "ahead-of-itself," means, after all: Dasein exists in each case for the sake of itself. "As long as it is," right up to its end, it comports itself toward its potentiality-for-Being. Even when, still existing, it has nothing more "before it" and has "closed its accounts," its Being is still determined by the "ahead-of-itself." Hopelessness, for example, does not tear Dasein away from its possibilities; it is only a distinctive mode of *Being toward* these possibilities. No less does the disillusioned "being braced *for* anything" harbor the "ahead-of-itself" within itself. This structural moment of care says unambiguously that in Dasein there is always still something *outstanding*, something that, as a potentiality-for-Being of Dasein itself, has not yet become "actual." In the essence of Dasein's basic constitution there accordingly lies a *constant incompleteness*. The unwholeness signifies something outstanding in potentiality-for-Being.

46.3 But as soon as Dasein "exists" in such a way that absolutely nothing is outstanding in it any longer, it has also, by that very token, already become no-longer-Being-there. Eliminating what is outstanding in its Being means annihilating its Being. As long as Dasein *is* as a being, it has never reached its "totality." But if it gains it, the gain becomes the loss of Being-in-the-world altogether. It then never again becomes experienceable *as a being*.

46.4 The reason why it is impossible to experience Dasein ontically as a whole in being, and consequently to determine it ontologically in its Being-a-whole, does not lie in an imperfection of the *faculty of knowledge*. The obstacle lies on the side of the *Being* of this being. What cannot even *be in the way* in which an experiencing purports to grasp Dasein eludes, in principle,

any experienceability. But then does not reading off the ontological wholeness of Being from Dasein remain a hopeless undertaking?

46.5 The "ahead-of-itself," as an essential structural moment of care, cannot be struck out. But is what we inferred from it also sound? Was not the impossibility of grasping the whole of Dasein concluded by merely formal argumentation? Or was not Dasein, at bottom, inadvertently posited as something present-at-hand, ahead of which something not-yet-present-at-hand is constantly being pushed? Did the argumentation grasp the not-yet-Being and the "ahead" in a genuine *existential* sense? Was the talk of "end" and "wholeness" phenomenally commensurate with Dasein? Did the expression "death" have a biological or an existential-ontological meaning, or indeed any adequately and securely delimited meaning at all? And have all the possibilities of making Dasein accessible in its totality really been exhausted?

46.6 These questions demand an answer before the problem of Dasein's wholeness can be set aside as void. The question of Dasein's wholeness, the existentiell question about a possible potentiality-for-Being-a-whole as well as the existential question about the constitution of Being of "end" and "wholeness," harbors within itself the task of a positive analysis of phenomena of existence that have so far been deferred. At the center of these considerations stand the ontological characterization of the Being-at-an-end that belongs to Dasein and the obtaining of an existential concept of death. The investigations related to this are divided as follows: the possibility of experiencing the death of Others and the possibility of grasping a whole Dasein (§ 47); something outstanding, end and wholeness (§ 48); how the existential analysis of death is distinguished from possible interpretations of the phenomenon (§ 49); the preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of death (§ 50); Being-toward-death and the everydayness of Dasein (§ 51); everyday Being-toward-death and the full existential concept of death (§ 52); existential projection of an owned Being-toward-death (§ 53).

§ 47. THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERIENCING THE DEATH OF OTHERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF GRASPING A WHOLE DASEIN

The death of Others cannot substitute, because no one can take another's dying away.

47.1 Dasein's reaching its totality in death is at the same time the loss of the Being of the "there." The transition to no-longer-Dasein lifts Dasein precisely out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced. Such a thing may indeed be denied to the Dasein in each case with regard to itself. All the more compelling, though, is the death of Others. An ending of Dasein thus becomes "objectively" accessible. Dasein can gain an experience of death, especially since it is essentially Being-with Others. This "objective" givenness of death must then also make possible an ontological delimitation of Dasein's wholeness.

47.2 Does this obvious expedient, drawn from Dasein's way of Being as Being-with-one-another, of choosing the Dasein of Others that has come to an end as a substitute theme for the analysis of Dasein's wholeness, lead to the goal we have set?

47.3 The Dasein of Others, too, with its totality reached in death, is a no-longer-Dasein in the sense of no-longer-Being-in-the-world. Does not dying mean going-out-of-the-world, losing Being-in-the-world? Yet the no-longer-Being-in-the-world of the one who has died is still—understood in the extreme—a Being in the sense of the Being-nothing-more-than-present-at-hand of a corporeal thing that we encounter. In the dying of Others we can experience the remarkable phenomenon of Being that can be defined as the changeover of a being from Dasein's way of Being (or that of life) to no-longer-Dasein. The *end* of this being qua Dasein is the *beginning* of this being qua something present-at-hand.

47.4 This interpretation of the changeover from Dasein to Being-nothing-more-than-present-at-hand, however, misses the phenomenal facts, inasmuch as the being that still remains does

not amount to a mere corporeal thing. Even the corpse that is present-at-hand is, theoretically regarded, still a possible object of pathological anatomy, whose tendency of understanding remains oriented to the idea of life. What is nothing more than present-at-hand is "more" than a *lifeless* material thing. In it we encounter something *unliving* that has lost its life.

47.5 But even this characterization of what still remains does not exhaust the full phenomenal findings as they pertain to Dasein.

47.6 The "deceased," who, unlike the one who has died, has been torn away from "those left behind," is an object of "concern" in the form of funeral rites, burial and the tending of graves. And that, in turn, is because in his way of Being he is "still more" than an item of equipment, ready-to-hand in the environment, that one could merely concern oneself with. In lingering alongside him in mourning and remembrance, those left behind *are with him*, in a mode of honoring solicitude. The relationship of Being toward the dead must therefore not be grasped as a *concernful* Being alongside something ready-to-hand, either.

47.7 In such Being-with the dead, the deceased *himself* is no longer factically "there." Being-with, however, always means Being-with-one-another in the same world. The deceased has abandoned our *"world"* and left it behind. It is *from out of this world* that those who remain can still *be with him*.

47.8 The more appropriately the no-longer-Dasein of the deceased is grasped phenomenally, the more clearly it shows itself that such Being-with the dead precisely does *not* experience the deceased's actual having-come-to-an-end. Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but more as one that those who remain experience. In suffering the loss, however, there is no access to the loss of Being as such that the dying person "suffers." We do not experience the dying of Others in the genuine sense; at most we are always only "present."

47.9 And even if it were possible and feasible, by being present, to make the dying of Others "psychologically" clear to ourselves,

the way to be that is thereby meant, namely coming-to-an-end, would by no means be grasped. The question concerns the ontological meaning of the dying of the one who dies, as a possibility of Being of *his* Being, and not the way the deceased is Dasein-with and still-Dasein with those who have remained. The suggestion that we take death as experienced in Others as the theme for the analysis of Dasein's end and wholeness can give, neither ontically nor ontologically, what it presumes itself able to give.

47.10 Above all, however, the reference to the dying of Others as a substitute theme for the ontological analysis of Dasein's completion and wholeness rests on a presupposition that can be shown to be a total misconception of Dasein's way of Being. This presupposition lies in the opinion that Dasein can be replaced at will by another, so that what remains unexperienceable in one's own Dasein becomes accessible in someone else's. But is this presupposition really so groundless?

47.11 Among the possibilities of Being of Being-with-one-another in the world there indisputably belongs the *substitutability* of one Dasein by another. In the everydayness of concern, manifold and constant use is made of such substitutability. Every going to ..., every bringing of ... is substitutable within the range of the "environment" that is closest concerned with. The wide manifold of substitutable ways of Being-in-the-world extends not only to the worn-smooth modes of public with-one-another, but equally concerns those possibilities of concern that are restricted to definite ranges and tailored to occupations, social estates and stages of life. Such substitution, however, is by its meaning always substitution "in" and "at" something, that is, in concerning oneself with something. But everyday Dasein understands itself in the first instance and for the most part in terms of *what* it is accustomed to concern itself with. "One *is*" what one does. With regard to this Being, the everyday Being-absorbed-with-one-another alongside the "world" that is concerned with, substitutability is not only possible at all; it even

belongs to the with-one-another as a constituent. *Here* one Dasein can, and even must, within certain limits, *"be"* the other.

47.12 This possibility of substitution breaks down completely, however, when it is a matter of substituting for the possibility of Being that makes up Dasein's coming-to-an-end and, as such, gives it its totality. *No one can take the Other's dying away from him.* Someone can indeed "go to his death for another." But that always means: sacrificing oneself for the Other *"in some definite matter."* Such dying for ... can never mean, however, that the Other has thereby had his death taken away from him in the slightest. Every Dasein must in each case take dying upon itself. Death, insofar as it "is," is essentially in each case mine. And indeed it signifies a peculiar possibility of Being in which what matters is, purely and simply, the Being of Dasein, in each case one's own. In dying it becomes evident that death is ontologically constituted by in-each-case-mineness and existence. Dying is not an occurrence but a phenomenon to be understood existentially, and that in a distinctive sense still to be delimited more closely.

47.13 But if "ending," as dying, constitutes the wholeness of Dasein, then the Being of the totality itself must be conceived as an existential phenomenon of Dasein, in each case one's own. In "ending," and in the Being-a-whole of Dasein constituted by it, there is essentially no substitution. The proposed way out fails to recognize this existential state of affairs when it puts forward the dying of Others as a substitute theme for the analysis of wholeness.

47.14 Thus the attempt to make Dasein's Being-a-whole accessible in a phenomenally appropriate way has once again failed. But the result of these reflections does not remain negative. They were carried out with an orientation, albeit a rough one, to the phenomena. Death has been indicated as an existential phenomenon. This pushes the investigation into a purely existential orientation to Dasein, in each case one's own. For the analysis of death as dying, the only possibility that remains is either to

bring this phenomenon to a purely *existential* concept or else to renounce an ontological understanding of it.

47.15 Further, in characterizing the transition from Dasein to no-longer-Dasein as no-longer-Being-in-the-world, it became evident that the going-out-of-the-world of *Dasein* in the sense of dying must be distinguished from a going-out-of-the-world of what merely lives. We designate the ending of a living thing, as a technical term, perishing. The difference can become visible only by delimiting Dasein's kind of ending from the end of a life. Dying can, to be sure, also be taken physiologically and biologically. But the medical concept of "exitus" [literally, a going out] does not coincide with that of perishing.[1]

47.16 From the discussion so far of the possibility of grasping death ontologically, it also becomes clear that substructures of beings of another way of Being (presence-at-hand or life), thrusting themselves forward unnoticed, threaten to confuse the interpretation of the phenomenon, indeed even the *first* appropriate *giving-in-advance* of it. This can be countered only by seeking, for the further analysis, an adequate ontological determinacy of the constitutive phenomena, namely end and wholeness.

§ 48. SOMETHING OUTSTANDING, END, AND WHOLENESS

Death is not like a debt outstanding, a ripening fruit, or a finished road: Dasein is toward its end.

48.1 Within the framework of this investigation, the ontological characterization of end and wholeness can only be provisional. To deal with it adequately, it is not enough to bring out the *formal* structure of end as such and of wholeness as such. It also requires working out their possible regional structural variations: variations that are deformalized, related in each case to definite "content-bearing" beings, and determined from the Being of those beings. This task in turn presupposes a suffi-

1 *Verenden*, here "perishing," is the ordinary German word for the death of an animal.

ciently unambiguous, positive interpretation of the ways of Being that call for a regional division of the universe of beings. Understanding these modes of Being, however, requires a clarified idea of Being as such. An adequate treatment of the ontological analysis of end and wholeness founders not only on the breadth of the theme. It also founders on a difficulty of principle: to master this task, precisely what this investigation is seeking (the meaning of Being as such) would already have to be presupposed as found and known.

48.2 The prevailing interest of the following considerations belongs to the "variations" of end and wholeness. As ontological determinations of Dasein, these variations are to guide a primordial interpretation of this being. Keeping constantly in view the existential constitution of Dasein that has already been brought out, we must try to decide how far the concepts of end and wholeness that initially push themselves forward are ontologically inappropriate to Dasein, however undetermined they may remain categorially. The rejection of such concepts must be developed further into a positive *assignment* of them to their specific region. In this way the understanding of end and wholeness, in their variation as existentials, is consolidated, and this guarantees the possibility of an ontological interpretation of death.

48.3 But if the analysis of Dasein's end and wholeness takes so wide-ranging an orientation, this nevertheless cannot mean that the existential concepts of end and wholeness are to be obtained by way of a deduction. On the contrary, the task is to take the existential meaning of Dasein's coming-to-an-end from Dasein itself, and to show how such "ending" can constitute a *Being-a-whole* of the being that *exists.*

48.4 What has been discussed about death so far can be formulated in three theses: 1. As long as Dasein is, there belongs to it a not-yet that it will be—something constantly outstanding. 2. The coming-to-its-end of what is in each case not-yet-at-an-end (the removal of what is outstanding, in terms of Being) has the character of no-longer-Dasein. 3. Coming-to-an-end includes within

itself a mode of Being in which there is absolutely no substituting for the Dasein in each case.

48.5 In Dasein there is a constant "unwholeness" that cannot be struck out, and that finds its end with death. But may the phenomenal state of affairs—that this not-yet "belongs" to Dasein as long as it is—be interpreted as *something outstanding*? With reference to what kind of being do we speak of something outstanding? The expression means what does indeed "belong" to a being but is still lacking. Being outstanding, as lacking, is grounded in a belonging. What is outstanding, for example, is the remainder still to be received in the settling of a debt. What is outstanding is not yet available. Paying off the "debt," as removing what is outstanding, means the "coming in," that is, the successive arrival, of the remainder, by which the not-yet is filled up, as it were, until the sum owed is "all together." Being outstanding therefore means: the not-yet-Being-together of what belongs together. Ontologically, this involves the unreadiness-to-hand of pieces still to be brought in. These have the same way of Being as those already ready-to-hand, and the latter, for their part, do not have their way of Being modified by the coming-in of the remainder. The existing not-together is canceled out by a cumulative piecing-together. *The being in which something is still outstanding has the way of Being of what is ready-to-hand.* The together, or the not-together founded in it, we characterize as a *sum.*

48.6 This not-together, which belongs to such a mode of the together—lacking as something outstanding—is, however, in no way able to determine ontologically the not-yet that belongs to Dasein as its possible death. This being does not have the way of Being of what is innerworldly and ready-to-hand at all. The togetherness of the being that Dasein is "in its course," until it has fulfilled "its course," is not constituted by an "ongoing" piecing-on of beings that are already, of themselves, ready-to-hand somehow and somewhere. Dasein *is* not together only once its not-yet has been filled up—so far from it that it is then precisely no longer. Dasein in each case always already exists in

just such a way that its not-yet *belongs* to it. But are there not beings that are as they are, and to which a not-yet can belong, without these beings having to have Dasein's way of Being?

48.7 One can say, for example: in the case of the moon, the last quarter is still outstanding until it is full. The not-yet diminishes as the shadow that covers it over disappears. And yet the moon is always already present-at-hand as a whole. Leaving aside the fact that the moon can never be grasped *wholly*, even when it is full, the not-yet here in no way means a not-yet-Being-together of the parts that belong to it; it concerns solely the perceptual *grasping*. The not-yet that belongs to Dasein, however, does not merely remain inaccessible, provisionally and at times, to one's own experience and that of others; it "is" not yet "actual" at all. The problem concerns not the *grasping* of Dasein's not-yet but its possible *Being* or *not-Being*. Dasein must, as itself, *become* what it is not yet—that is, *be* it. In order, then, to be able to determine *the Dasein-like Being of the not-yet* by comparison, we must consider beings to whose way of Being becoming belongs.

48.8 The unripe fruit, for example, goes toward its ripeness. In ripening, what it is not yet is in no way pieced onto it as something not-yet-present-at-hand. The fruit brings itself to ripeness, and such bringing-itself characterizes its Being as fruit. Nothing conceivable that might be added to it could remove the fruit's unripeness if this being did not come to ripeness *of itself*. The not-yet of unripeness does not mean something other, standing outside, that could be present-at-hand at and together with the fruit, indifferent to it. It means the fruit itself in its specific way of Being. The sum that is not yet complete is, as something ready-to-hand, "indifferent" to the lacking remainder that is unready-to-hand. Strictly speaking, it can be neither non-indifferent nor indifferent to it. The ripening fruit, however, is not only not indifferent to its unripeness as something other than itself; in ripening, it *is* the unripeness. The not-yet is already included in its own Being, and by no means as an arbitrary determination but as a constitutive element. Correspondingly, Dasein too, as long as it is, *is in each case already its not-yet*.

48.9 What makes up the "unwholeness" in Dasein, the constant ahead-of-itself, is neither something outstanding in a summative togetherness nor, still less, a not-yet-having-become-accessible. It is a not-yet that a Dasein in each case has to be, as the being that it is. Nevertheless, the comparison with the fruit's unripeness, while showing a certain agreement, also shows essential differences. To heed them is to recognize our talk of end and ending so far in its indefiniteness.

48.10 Ripening, the specific Being of the fruit, as a way of Being of the not-yet (of unripeness), agrees formally with Dasein in that the one, like the other, in a sense still to be delimited, in each case already *is* its not-yet. Even so, this cannot mean that ripeness as "end" and death as "end" also coincide with regard to their ontological structure as end. With ripeness, the fruit *fulfills* itself. But is the death at which Dasein arrives a fulfillment in this sense? With its death, Dasein has indeed "fulfilled its course." Has it thereby also necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities? Or are they not, rather, precisely taken from it? Even "unfulfilled" Dasein ends. On the other hand, Dasein need not come to ripeness only with its death—so little so that it may already have gone past ripeness before the end. For the most part it ends in unfulfillment, or else disintegrated and used up.

48.11 Ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself. The question becomes more urgent: *in what sense, at all, must death be conceived as the ending of Dasein?*

48.12 Ending initially means *stopping*, and this in turn in ontologically different senses. The rain stops. It is no longer present-at-hand. The road stops. This ending does not make the road disappear; rather, this stopping determines the road as this road that is present-at-hand. Ending as stopping can therefore mean: passing into non-presence-at-hand, or else, precisely, presence-at-hand only with the end. This latter kind of ending can in turn either determine something present-at-hand as *unfinished*—a road under construction breaks off—or else constitute the "finishedness" of something present-at-hand—with the last brushstroke the painting is finished.

48.13 But ending as becoming finished does not include fulfillment. On the other hand, whatever wants to be fulfilled must indeed reach its possible finishedness. Fulfillment is a founded mode of "finishedness." Finishedness itself is possible only as a determination of something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand.

48.14 Ending in the sense of disappearing, too, can be modified further in accordance with the way of Being of the being in question. The rain is at an end, that is, has disappeared. The bread is at an end, that is, used up, no longer available as something ready-to-hand.

48.15 *None of these modes of ending allows death, as the end of Dasein, to be adequately characterized.* If dying, as Being-at-an-end, were understood in the sense of an ending of the kind discussed, Dasein would thereby be posited as something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. In death, Dasein is neither fulfilled, nor has it simply disappeared, nor, still less, has it become finished or wholly available as something ready-to-hand.

48.16 Rather, just as Dasein constantly, as long as it is, already *is* its not-yet, so too it always already *is* its end. The ending meant by death signifies not a Being-at-an-end of Dasein but a *Being-toward-the-end* of this being. Death is a way to be that Dasein takes over as soon as it is. "As soon as a human being comes to life, he is at once old enough to die."[2]

48.17 Ending as Being-toward-the-end requires its ontological clarification from Dasein's way of Being. And presumably it is only from the existential determination of ending that the possibility of an existing Being of the not-yet that lies "before" the "end" becomes intelligible. Likewise, it is only the existential clarification of Being-toward-the-end that provides a sufficient basis for delimiting the possible meaning of talk of a wholeness of Dasein—if indeed this wholeness is to be constituted by death as "end."

48.18 The attempt to arrive at an understanding of Dasein's wholeness, starting from a clarification of the not-yet and pro-

ceeding by way of a characterization of ending, did not reach its goal. It showed only *negatively*: the not-yet that Dasein in each case *is* resists interpretation as something outstanding. The end *toward* which Dasein, existing, *is* remains inappropriately determined by a Being-at-an-end. At the same time, however, the consideration was meant to make clear that its course must be reversed. A positive characterization of the phenomena in question (Being-not-yet, ending, wholeness) succeeds only with an unambiguous orientation toward Dasein's constitution of Being. This unambiguousness, however, is secured negatively against wrong turns by insight into the regional belonging of those structures of end and wholeness that run counter to Dasein ontologically.

48.19 The positive existential-analytical interpretation of death and of its character as end is to be carried out with the basic constitution of Dasein obtained so far, the phenomenon of care, as its guiding thread.

§ 49. HOW THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF DEATH IS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PHENOMENON

The analysis sets aside biology, psychology, theology, and questions about life after death.

49.1 The unambiguousness of the ontological interpretation of death should first be consolidated by bringing explicitly to awareness what this interpretation does *not* ask about, and on what matters it would be vain to expect information and direction from it.

49.2 Death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life. Life must be understood as a way of Being to which a Being-in-the-world belongs. This way of Being can be fixed ontologically only in a privative orientation toward Dasein. Dasein too can be con-

2 The quotation comes from *Der Ackermann aus Böhmen* (*The Plowman of Bohemia*), a dialogue between a plowman and Death written by Johannes von Tepl around AD 1400.

sidered as pure life. For the biological-physiological line of questioning, it then moves into the domain of Being we know as the animal and plant world. In this field, ontic ascertainment can yield data and statistics on the life span of plants, animals, and human beings. Connections between life span, reproduction, and growth can be recognized. The "kinds" of death, its causes, the "arrangements" and ways in which it occurs can be investigated.

49.3 This biological-ontic investigation of death rests on an ontological problematic. It remains to be asked how the ontological essence of death is determined from that of life. In a certain way, the ontic investigation of death has always already decided this. More or less clarified preliminary concepts of life and death are at work in it. They need to be sketched out in advance by the ontology of Dasein. Within the ontology of Dasein, which is ranked *before* an ontology of life, the existential analysis of death is in turn ranked *after* a characterization of Dasein's basic constitution. We have called the ending of what is alive *perishing*. Dasein too "has" its physiological death, the death that belongs to life—not, however, ontically isolated, but co-determined by its primordial way of Being. Dasein can also end without dying in an owned way; on the other hand, qua Dasein, it does not simply perish. Insofar as all this holds, we designate this intermediate phenomenon as *demise*. *Dying*, however, is to stand as the term for the *mode of Being* in which Dasein *is toward* its death. Accordingly we must say: Dasein never perishes. But Dasein can have its demise only as long as it dies.[3] The medical-biological investigation of demise can obtain results that may also become ontologically significant, once the basic orientation for an existential interpretation of death has been secured. Or must illness and death as such—even medically—be conceived primarily as existential phenomena?

49.4 The existential interpretation of death lies before all biology and ontology of life. But it is also what first founds all bio-

3 "Demise" renders *Ableben*, the ordinary, somewhat formal German word for passing away, which Heidegger here fixes as a term.

graphical-historiographical and ethnological-psychological investigation of death. A "typology" of "dying," as a characterization of the states and ways in which demise is "lived through," already presupposes the concept of death. Moreover, a psychology of "dying" gives information about the "living" of the "dying person" rather than about dying itself. This merely reflects the fact that Dasein does not first die—or does not die in an owned way at all—with and in the lived experience of its factical demise. In the same way, the conceptions of death among primitive peoples, and their comportments toward death in magic and cult, primarily shed light on the understanding of *Dasein*, whose interpretation already requires an existential analytic and a corresponding concept of death.

49.5 On the other hand, the ontological analysis of Being-toward-the-end does not preempt any existentiell stance toward death. If death is defined as the "end" of Dasein, that is, of Being-in-the-world, this involves no ontic decision about whether "after death" another Being, higher or lower, is still possible, whether Dasein "lives on" or even, "outlasting" itself, is "immortal." Nothing is decided ontically about the "other world" and its possibility, any more than about "this world"—as though norms and rules for comportment toward death were to be put forward for "edification." The analysis of death does, however, remain purely "this-worldly" insofar as it interprets the phenomenon solely with regard to how it *reaches into* the Dasein in each case, as that Dasein's possibility of Being. Only when death has been conceived in its full ontological essence can one even *ask*, meaningfully, legitimately, and with methodological assurance, what *may be after death.* Whether such a question represents a possible *theoretical* question at all is left undecided here. The this-worldly ontological interpretation of death comes before any ontic, otherworldly speculation.

49.6 Finally, whatever might be discussed under the heading of a "metaphysics of death" lies outside the domain of an existential analysis of death. The questions of how and when death "came into the world," and what "meaning" it can and should

have as evil and suffering in the universe of beings, necessarily presuppose not only an understanding of the character of Being of death, but also the ontology of the universe of beings as a whole, and in particular the ontological clarification of evil and negativity as such.

49.7 The existential analysis is methodologically prior to the questions of a biology, psychology, theodicy, and theology of death. Taken ontically, its results show the peculiar *formality* and emptiness of all ontological characterization. This, however, must not blind us to the rich and intricate structure of the phenomenon. If Dasein as such never becomes accessible as something present-at-hand, because Being-possible belongs in its own way to its way of Being, then all the less may we expect to be able simply to read off the ontological structure of death—if indeed death is a distinctive possibility of Dasein.

49.8 On the other hand, the analysis cannot hold to an idea of death dreamed up haphazardly and arbitrarily. This arbitrariness can be checked only by a prior ontological characterization of the way of Being in which the "end" reaches into Dasein's average everydayness. This requires that the structures of everydayness brought out earlier be fully called to mind. That existentiell possibilities of Being-toward-death also resonate in an existential analysis of death lies in the essence of all ontological investigation. All the more explicitly must existentiell noncommitment go together with the existential definition of concepts—and especially with regard to death, in which Dasein's character of possibility can be revealed most sharply. The existential problematic aims solely at bringing out the ontological structure of Dasein's Being *toward* the end.

§ 50. THE PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF DEATH

Death is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational possibility, not to be outstripped, disclosed in anxiety.

50.1 The considerations of something outstanding, end, and wholeness have shown the necessity of interpreting the phe-

nomenon of death as Being-toward-the-end in terms of Dasein's basic constitution. Only in this way can it become clear to what extent a Being-a-whole constituted by Being-toward-the-end is possible in Dasein itself, in accordance with its structure of Being. Care was made visible as the basic constitution of Dasein. The ontological meaning of this expression was expressed in the "definition": ahead-of-itself-already-Being-in (the world) as Being-alongside beings encountered (within the world). This expresses the fundamental characters of Dasein's Being: in the ahead-of-itself, existence; in the Being-already-in ..., facticity; in the Being alongside ..., falling. If indeed death belongs in a distinctive sense to Dasein's Being, then it (or Being-toward-the-end) must be determinable in terms of these characters.

50.2 In the first instance, what is needed is simply to make clear, in a preliminary sketch, how Dasein's existence, facticity, and falling reveal themselves in the phenomenon of death.

50.3 The interpretation of the not-yet—and with it also of the uttermost not-yet, Dasein's end—in the sense of something outstanding was rejected as inappropriate, for it involved the ontological distortion of Dasein into something present-at-hand. Being-at-an-end means, existentially: Being-toward-the-end. The uttermost not-yet has the character of something *toward which* Dasein *comports itself.* The end is impending for Dasein. Death is not something not yet present-at-hand, not the last outstanding item reduced to a minimum, but rather something *impending.*[4]

50.4 As Being-in-the-world, however, Dasein may have many things impending. The character of impending does not by itself distinguish death. On the contrary: this interpretation too might still suggest the supposition that death must be understood in the sense of an impending event encountered in the environment. A thunderstorm, for example, can be impending, the remodeling of the house, the arrival of a friend—beings, accord-

4 "Something impending" renders *Bevorstand*, coined as a counterpart to *Ausstand* ("something outstanding"); *bevorstehen*, "to be imminent," literally means "to stand before."

ingly, that are present-at-hand, ready-to-hand, or there-with. Impending death does not have Being of this kind.

50.5 But Dasein can also have impending, for example, a journey, a confrontation with Others, a renunciation of something that Dasein itself can be: its own possibilities of Being, which are grounded in Being-with Others.

50.6 Death is a possibility of Being that Dasein in each case has to take over itself. With death, Dasein is impending for itself in its *ownmost* potentiality-for-Being. In this possibility, what matters to Dasein is its Being-in-the-world, without qualification. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. When Dasein is impending for itself as this possibility of itself, it is *wholly* referred to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it is impending for itself in this way, all its relations to other Dasein are undone. This ownmost, non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one. As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein is unable to outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the utter impossibility of Dasein. Thus *death* reveals itself as the *possibility that is ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped.* As such, it is something *distinctively* impending. The existential possibility of this distinctive impending is grounded in the fact that Dasein is essentially disclosed to itself, and indeed in the manner of the ahead-of-itself. This structural moment of care has its most primordial concretion in Being-toward-death. Being-toward-the-end becomes phenomenally clearer as Being toward the distinctive possibility of Dasein that we have characterized.

50.7 But Dasein does not procure for itself the possibility that is ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped subsequently and occasionally, in the course of its Being. Rather, if Dasein exists, it is already *thrown* into this possibility. That it is delivered over to its death, and that death thus belongs to Being-in-the-world—of this, Dasein in the first instance and for the most part has no explicit, let alone theoretical, knowledge. Thrownness into death reveals itself to Dasein more primordially and more penetratingly in the attunement of anxiety. Anxi-

ety in the face of death is anxiety "in the face of" the potentiality-for-Being that is ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped. That in the face of which this anxiety is anxious is Being-in-the-world itself. That about which this anxiety is anxious is Dasein's potentiality-for-Being as such. Anxiety in the face of death must not be confused with a fear of demise. It is not an arbitrary and accidental "weak" mood of the individual. As a basic attunement of Dasein, it is the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being *toward* its end. With this, the existential concept of dying becomes clearer: thrown Being toward the potentiality-for-Being that is ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped. The demarcation against a pure disappearing, but also against a mere perishing, and finally against a "lived experience" of demise, gains in sharpness.

50.8 Being-toward-the-end does not first arise through, and as, an attitude that crops up now and then. It belongs essentially to Dasein's thrownness, which reveals itself in attunement (mood) in one way or another. The factical "knowing" or "not knowing" about its ownmost Being-toward-the-end that prevails in Dasein in each case is only the expression of the existentiell possibility of holding oneself in this Being in different ways. That factically many people in the first instance and for the most part do not know about death must not be passed off as proof that Being-toward-death does not belong "universally" to Dasein. It proves only that Dasein, in the first instance and for the most part, covers over its ownmost Being-toward-death, fleeing *in the face of* it. Dasein dies factically as long as it exists, but in the first instance and for the most part in the manner of *falling*. For factical existing is not only, in general and indifferently, a thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world; it is always also already absorbed in the "world" it is concerned with. In this falling Being alongside ..., the flight from uncanniness makes itself known—that is, now, flight in the face of one's ownmost Being-toward-death. Existence, facticity, falling characterize Being-toward-the-end and are accordingly constitutive of the existential concept of death. *As regards its ontological possibility, dying is grounded in care.*

50.9 But if Being-toward-death belongs primordially and essentially to Dasein's Being, then it must also be demonstrable in everydayness too—even if in the first instance in an unowned way. And if Being-toward-the-end should even offer the existential possibility for an existentiell Being-a-whole of Dasein, then this would provide the phenomenal confirmation of the thesis: care is the ontological term for the wholeness of Dasein's structural whole. For the full phenomenal justification of this proposition, however, a *preliminary sketch* of the connection between Being-toward-death and care is not enough. This connection must become visible above all in Dasein's nearest *concretion*, its everydayness.

§ 51. BEING-TOWARD-DEATH AND THE EVERYDAYNESS OF DASEIN

Everyday talk that "one dies" tranquilizes Dasein and flees from its own death.

51.1 Bringing out average everyday Being-toward-death takes its orientation from the structures of everydayness obtained earlier. In Being-toward-death, Dasein comports itself *toward itself* as a distinctive potentiality-for-Being. But the self of everydayness is the they, which is constituted in public interpretedness. This interpretedness expresses itself in idle talk. Idle talk must therefore make manifest in what way everyday Dasein interprets its Being-toward-death for itself. The foundation of interpretation is in each case an understanding that is always also attuned, that is, in a mood. So we must ask: how has the attuned understanding that lies in the idle talk of the they disclosed Being-toward-death? How does the they comport itself, understandingly, toward Dasein's possibility that is ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped? What attunement discloses to the they its being delivered over to death, and in what way?

51.2 The publicness of everyday Being-with-one-another "knows" death as something constantly occurring that one encounters, as a "case of death." Someone or other, whether

close by or farther off, "dies." Strangers "die" daily and hourly. "Death" is encountered as a familiar innerworldly event. As such it remains in the inconspicuousness characteristic of what is encountered every day. For this event, too, the they has already secured an interpretation. The talk about it, spoken out or, more often, held back and "fleeting," means to say: one also dies, in the end, sometime; but initially one remains unaffected oneself.

51.3 The analysis of the "one dies" reveals unambiguously the way of Being of everyday Being-toward-death. In such talk, death is understood as an indefinite something that must first arrive from somewhere, but that for oneself is initially *not yet present-at-hand* and therefore no threat. The "one dies" spreads the opinion that death strikes, as it were, the they. The public interpretation of Dasein says "one dies," because this lets everyone else, and one oneself, talk oneself into believing: in each case, not I in particular; for this they is the *nobody*. "Dying" is leveled off to an occurrence that does indeed strike Dasein but belongs specifically to no one. If ever idle talk is marked by ambiguity, it is in this talk about death. Dying, which is essentially mine in such a way that no one can take my place, is inverted into a publicly occurring event that the they encounters. The talk we have characterized speaks of death as a constantly occurring "case." It passes death off as something always already "actual," and veils its character of possibility, and together with it the moments of non-relationality and of not being outstripped that belong to it. With such ambiguity, Dasein puts itself in a position to lose itself in the they with regard to a distinctive potentiality-for-Being that belongs to its ownmost self. The they sanctions and heightens the *temptation* to cover over one's ownmost Being-toward-death.

51.4 The evasion of death that covers it over dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in Being-with-one-another, "those closest" often still try to persuade precisely the "dying person" that they will escape death and soon return to the tranquilized everydayness of the world they are concerned with. Such "soli-

citude" even thinks it "consoles" the "dying person" in this way. It wants to bring them back into Dasein by helping them to veil completely their ownmost, non-relational possibility of Being. In this way the they, concerning itself, provides a *constant tranquilization about death.* At bottom, however, this tranquilization is meant not only for the "dying person" but just as much for "those who console." And even in the case of demise, publicness is still not to be disturbed and unsettled by the event in its concerned carefreeness. Indeed, not infrequently the dying of Others is seen as a social inconvenience, if not even a tactlessness, from which publicness is to be protected.

51.5 At the same time, however, together with this tranquilization, which forces Dasein away from its death, the they establishes its own right and standing through the tacit regulation of the way in which *one* is to comport oneself toward death at all. Even "thinking about death" counts publicly as cowardly fear, insecurity on the part of Dasein, and gloomy flight from the world. *The they does not let the courage for anxiety in the face of death arise.* The dominance of the public interpretedness of the they has also already decided upon the attunement from which one's stance toward death is to be determined. In anxiety in the face of death, Dasein is brought before itself as delivered over to the possibility not to be outstripped. The they concerns itself with converting this anxiety into a fear of an approaching event. Anxiety, made ambiguous as fear, is moreover passed off as a weakness that a self-assured Dasein must not know. What is "proper," according to the silent decree of the they, is indifferent calm in the face of the "fact" that one dies. The cultivation of such a "superior" indifference *alienates* Dasein from its ownmost, non-relational potentiality-for-Being.

51.6 Temptation, tranquilization, and alienation, however, mark the way of Being of *falling.* As falling, everyday Being-toward-death is a constant *flight in the face of death.* Being *toward* the end has the mode of an *evasion of it*—an evasion that reinterprets, understands in an unowned way, and veils. That one's own Dasein in each case factically is always already dying, that

is, is in a Being toward its end—this fact Dasein conceals from itself by recasting death into the case of death occurring every day to Others, which at most assures us still more clearly that "one oneself" is, after all, still "alive." But with its falling flight *in the face of* death, Dasein's everydayness attests that the they itself, too, is always already determined *as Being-toward-death*, even when it does not explicitly occupy itself with "thinking about death." *Even in average everydayness, this potentiality-for-Being that is ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped is constantly what matters to Dasein, even if only in the mode of concerning itself with an untroubled indifference toward the uttermost possibility of its existence.*

51.7 At the same time, however, bringing out everyday Being-toward-death gives direction for the attempt to secure the full existential concept of Being-toward-the-end, through a more penetrating interpretation of falling Being-toward-death as evasion *of death.* From the *in-the-face-of-which of the flight*, once it has been made sufficiently visible phenomenally, it must be possible to project phenomenologically how evasive Dasein itself understands its death.

§ 52. EVERYDAY BEING-TOWARD-THE-END AND THE FULL EXISTENTIAL CONCEPT OF DEATH

Death is certain yet indefinite as to when; the full existential concept of death is stated.

52.1 In the existential preliminary sketch, Being-toward-the-end was defined as Being toward the potentiality-for-Being that is ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped. Existing Being toward this possibility brings itself before the utter impossibility of existence. Beyond this seemingly empty characterization of Being-toward-death, the concretion of this Being in the mode of everydayness was revealed. In accordance with the tendency to fall that is essential to everydayness, Being-toward-death proved to be an evasion of death that covers it over. Previously the investigation passed from the formal preliminary sketch of the ontological structure of death to the concrete ana-

lysis of everyday Being-toward-the-end. Now, in the reverse direction, the full existential concept of death is to be obtained through a supplementary interpretation of everyday Being-toward-the-end.

52.2 The explication of everyday Being-toward-death kept to the idle talk of the they: one also dies, sometime, but not yet for the time being. So far only the "one dies" as such has been interpreted. In the "sometime, but not yet for the time being," everydayness concedes something like a *certainty* of death. Nobody doubts that one dies. But this "not doubting" need not already harbor within it *the* Being-certain that corresponds to what death, in the sense of the distinctive possibility characterized, is as it reaches into Dasein. Everydayness stops at this ambiguous concession of the "certainty" of death—in order to weaken it by covering over dying still more, and to make its thrownness into death easier for itself.

52.3 By its very meaning, the evasion of death that covers it over cannot be "certain" of death *in an owned way*—and yet it *is* certain of it. What about the "certainty of death"?

52.4 To be certain of a being means: to *hold* it for true as something true. But truth means the uncoveredness of beings. All uncoveredness, however, is grounded ontologically in the most primordial truth, the dis-closedness of Dasein. As a being that is disclosed-disclosing and uncovering, Dasein is essentially "in the truth." *But certainty is grounded in truth, or belongs to it equiprimordially.* The expression "certainty," like the term "truth," has a double meaning. Primordially, truth means Being-disclosive as a comportment of Dasein. The meaning derived from this refers to the uncoveredness of beings. Correspondingly, certainty primordially means Being-certain as a way of Being of Dasein. In a derived meaning, however, the being of which Dasein can be certain is also called "certain."

52.5 One mode of certainty is *conviction.* In conviction, Dasein lets its understanding Being toward the matter uncovered (true) be determined solely by the testimony of that matter itself. Holding-for-true is adequate, as holding-oneself-in-the-truth, if

it is grounded in the uncovered being itself and, as Being toward the being so uncovered, has become transparent to itself with regard to its appropriateness to that being. Something of this kind is lacking in arbitrary invention, or in a mere "view" about a being.

52.6 The adequacy of holding-for-true is measured by the claim to truth to which it belongs. This claim receives its legitimacy from the way of Being of the being to be disclosed and from the direction of the disclosing. With the diversity of beings, and in accordance with the guiding tendency and scope of the disclosing, the kind of truth changes, and with it certainty. The present consideration remains restricted to an analysis of Being-certain with regard to death, which in the end represents a distinctive *certainty of Dasein.*

52.7 Everyday Dasein for the most part covers over the possibility of its Being that is ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped. This factical tendency to cover over confirms the thesis: Dasein, as factical, is in "untruth." Accordingly, the certainty that belongs to such covering-over of Being-toward-death must be an inappropriate holding-for-true, and not, say, uncertainty in the sense of doubting. Inappropriate certainty keeps what it is certain of in coveredness. If "one" understands death as an event encountered in the environment, then the certainty related to it does not get at Being-toward-the-end.

52.8 One says: it is certain that "death" comes. *One* says it, and the they overlooks that, in order to be able to be certain of death, one's own Dasein in each case must itself be certain of its ownmost, non-relational potentiality-for-Being. One says that death is certain, and thereby plants in Dasein the semblance that it is *itself* certain of its death. And where does the ground of everyday Being-certain lie? Evidently not in mere mutual persuasion. After all, one experiences the "dying" of Others every day. Death is an undeniable "fact of experience."

52.9 How everyday Being-toward-death understands the certainty grounded in this way betrays itself when it tries to "think" about death even with critical caution—and that surely means

appropriately. So far as one knows, all human beings "die." For every human being, death is probable in the highest degree, but not, after all, "unconditionally" certain. Strictly speaking, death may be credited with "only" *empirical* certainty. This necessarily falls short of the highest certainty, the apodictic, which we attain in certain domains of theoretical knowledge.

52.10 In this "critical" determination of the certainty of death and of its impending, what is revealed in the first instance is once again the misrecognition, characteristic of everydayness, of Dasein's way of Being and of the Being-toward-death that belongs to it. *That demise, as an event that occurs, is "only" empirically certain decides nothing about the certainty of death.* Cases of death may be the factical occasion for Dasein's first paying attention to death at all. But as long as it remains in the empirical certainty indicated, Dasein cannot become certain of death at all, as death "is." Although in the publicness of the they Dasein seemingly "talks" only of this "empirical" certainty of death, *at bottom* it does *not*, after all, hold exclusively and primarily to the cases of death that occur. *In evading its death*, even everyday Being-toward-the-end is nevertheless certain of death in a different way from what it would itself like to admit in purely theoretical reflection. Everydayness for the most part veils this "different way" from itself. It does not dare to become transparent to itself in it. With the everyday attunement we have characterized—the "anxiously" concerned, seemingly anxiety-free superiority over against the certain "fact" of death—everydayness concedes a certainty "higher" than a merely empirical one. One *knows* about certain death, and yet "is" not certain of it in an owned way. The falling everydayness of Dasein is familiar with the certainty of death, and yet evades Being-certain. But from what it evades, this evasion attests phenomenally that death must be conceived as the possibility that is ownmost, nonrelational, not to be outstripped, and *certain.*

52.11 One says: death certainly comes, but not yet for the time being. With this "but ..." the they denies death its certainty. The "not yet for the time being" is not merely a negative assertion

but a self-interpretation of the they, with which it refers itself to what, initially, still remains accessible to Dasein and open to its concern. Everydayness presses into the urgency of concern and rids itself of the fetters of weary, "inactive thinking about death." Death is postponed to "sometime later," and indeed with an appeal to so-called "general judgment." Thus the they covers over what is peculiar to the certainty of death: *that it is possible at any moment.* Together with the certainty of death goes the *indefiniteness* of its when. Everyday Being-toward-death evades this indefiniteness by conferring definiteness on it. Such defining, however, cannot mean calculating when demise will occur. Dasein rather flees in the face of such definiteness. Everyday concern makes the indefiniteness of certain death definite for itself by pushing in front of it the surveyable urgencies and possibilities of the immediate everyday.

52.12 But covering over the indefiniteness also strikes at the certainty. Thus death's ownmost character of possibility is veiled: certain and yet indefinite, that is, possible at any moment.

52.13 The complete interpretation of the everyday talk of the they about death, and of death's way of reaching into Dasein, led to the characters of certainty and indefiniteness. The full existential-ontological concept of death can now be delimited in the following determinations: *Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational, certain and as such indefinite possibility, not to be outstripped. Death is*, as the end of *Dasein*, in the Being of this being *toward* its end.

52.14 The delimitation of the existential structure of Being-toward-the-end serves to work out a way of Being of Dasein in which it can be *whole as Dasein.* Even everyday Dasein always already *is toward* its end, that is, is constantly coming to grips with its death, however "fleetingly." This shows that the end which concludes and determines Being-a-whole is not something at which Dasein arrives only at the last, in its demise. In Dasein, as the being that is toward its death, the uttermost not-yet of itself, in front of which all others lie, is always already

included. Therefore the formal inference from Dasein's not-yet—which, moreover, has been ontologically inappropriately interpreted as something outstanding—to its un-wholeness is not valid. *The phenomenon of the not-yet, taken from the ahead-of-itself, is, like the structure of care in general, so little a counter-instance against a possible existent Being-a-whole that this ahead-of-itself is what first makes such a Being-toward-the-end possible at all.* The problem of the possible Being-a-whole of the being that we ourselves in each case are is legitimate if care, as Dasein's basic constitution, "hangs together" with death as the uttermost possibility of this being.

52.15 It remains questionable, however, whether this problem has yet been adequately worked out. Being-toward-death is grounded in care. As thrown Being-in-the-world, Dasein is always already delivered over to its death. As a being that is toward its death, it dies factically, and indeed constantly, as long as it has not come to its demise. That Dasein dies factically also says that it has always already decided, one way or another, in its Being-toward-death. The everyday falling evasion *of* death is an *unowned* Being *toward* death. Unownness has possible ownness as its ground. Unownness characterizes a way of Being into which Dasein can shift itself, and for the most part always has, but into which it need not shift itself necessarily and constantly. Because Dasein exists, it determines itself, as the being it is, in each case from a possibility that it itself *is* and understands.

52.16 Can Dasein also *understand in an owned way* its possibility that is ownmost, non-relational, not to be outstripped, certain, and as such indefinite—that is, hold itself in an owned Being toward its end? As long as this owned Being-toward-death has not been brought out and ontologically determined, the existential interpretation of Being-toward-the-end suffers from an essential deficiency.

52.17 Owned Being-toward-death signifies an existentiell possibility of Dasein. This ontic potentiality-for-Being must in turn be ontologically possible. What are the existential conditions of this possibility? How is it itself to become accessible?

§ 53. EXISTENTIAL PROJECTION OF AN OWNED BEING-TOWARD-DEATH

Owned Being-toward-death is anticipation, which frees Dasein for death and for its whole potentiality-for-Being.

53.1 Factically, Dasein maintains itself in the first instance and for the most part in an unowned Being-toward-death. How is the ontological possibility of an *owned* Being-toward-death to be characterized "objectively" if, in the end, Dasein never comports itself toward its end in an owned way, or if this owned Being must, by its very meaning, remain hidden from the Others? Is not the projection of the existential possibility of so questionable an existentiell potentiality-for-Being a fantastical undertaking? What is needed for such a projection to get beyond a merely poetizing, arbitrary construction? Does Dasein itself provide directives for this projection? Can grounds for its phenomenal legitimacy be drawn from Dasein itself? Can the ontological task now posed obtain, from the analysis of Dasein carried out so far, prior indications that will force what it has in view onto a secure path?

53.2 The existential concept of death has been fixed, and with it that toward which an owned Being-toward-the-end is supposed to be able to comport itself. Further, unowned Being-toward-death has been characterized, and with this it has been indicated in advance, prohibitively, how owned Being-toward-death *cannot* be. With these positive and prohibitive directives it must be possible to project the existential edifice of an owned Being-toward-death.

53.3 Dasein is constituted by disclosedness, that is, by an attuned understanding. *Owned* Being-toward-death *cannot evade* its ownmost, non-relational possibility, and in this flight *cover it over* and *reinterpret* it for the common sense of the they. The existential projection of an owned Being-toward-death must therefore set out those moments of such a Being which constitute it as an understanding of death—in the sense of a Being

toward the possibility we have characterized, a Being that neither flees nor covers over.

53.4 In the first instance, the task is to characterize Being-toward-death as a *Being toward a possibility*—indeed, toward a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself. Being toward a possibility, that is, toward something possible, can mean: Being-out-for something possible, in the sense of concern with its actualization. In the field of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, such possibilities are constantly encountered: what is attainable, controllable, practicable, and the like. Concernful Being-out-for something possible has a tendency to *annihilate* the *possibility* of the possible by making it available. But the concernful actualization of ready-to-hand equipment (as producing, making ready, rearranging, and so on) is always only relative, insofar as even what has been actualized still has—and precisely has—the character of Being of involvement. Even though actualized, it remains, as something actual, something possible for..., characterized by an in-order-to. The present analysis is merely meant to make clear how concernful Being-out-for comports itself toward the possible: not by contemplating the possible thematically and theoretically as possible, let alone with regard to its possibility as such, but in such a way that it looks *circum*spectively away from the possible toward its for-which-possible.

53.5 The Being-toward-death in question obviously cannot have the character of concernful Being-out-for its actualization. For one thing, death as something possible is not something possible that is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but a possibility of Being of *Dasein*. For another, concern with actualizing this possible would have to mean bringing about one's demise. But in doing so Dasein would deprive itself of precisely the ground for an existing Being-toward-death.

53.6 If, then, Being-toward-death does not mean an "actualization" of death, it cannot mean dwelling on the end in its possibility. Such comportment would lie in "thinking about death." Comportment of this kind ponders the possibility—when and

how it might perhaps be actualized. This brooding over death does not, admittedly, entirely take away its character of possibility—death is still brooded over as something coming—but it does weaken that character through a calculating will to have death at its disposal. As something possible, death is supposed to show as little as possible of its possibility. In Being-toward-death, by contrast—if it is indeed to disclose, understandingly, the possibility we have characterized *as such*—the possibility must be understood, unweakened, *as a possibility*, developed *as a possibility*, and, in one's comportment toward it, *endured as a possibility*.

53.7 Dasein comports itself toward something possible in its possibility, however, in *expecting*. For a Being-intent upon it, something possible can be encountered, unhindered and undiminished, in its "whether or not, or after all." But with the phenomenon of expecting, does not the analysis come upon the same way of Being toward the possible that was already characterized in concernful Being-out-for something? All expecting understands and "has" its possible with regard to whether and when and how it will actually be present-at-hand. Expecting is not merely an occasional looking away from the possible to its possible actualization, but is essentially a *waiting for that actualization*. In expecting, too, there lies a leaping away from the possible and a gaining of a foothold in the actual, for the sake of which what is expected is expected. Starting from the actual and heading toward it, the possible is drawn into the actual in the manner of expectation.

53.8 Being toward the possibility as Being-toward-death, however, is to comport itself toward *death* in such a way that death reveals itself, in this Being and for it, *as possibility*. We fix such Being toward the possibility terminologically as *anticipation of the possibility*. But does not this comportment harbor a drawing-near to the possible, and with the nearness of the possible does not its actualization emerge? This drawing-near, however, does not tend toward a concernful making-available of something actual; rather, in drawing nearer understandingly, the possibil-

ity of the possible only becomes "greater."[5] *The closest nearness of Being-toward-death as possibility is as far as possible from anything actual.* The more unveiledly this possibility is understood, the more purely does understanding press forward into the possibility *as the possibility of the impossibility of existence as such*. Death as possibility gives Dasein nothing to "actualize," and nothing that Dasein itself, as something actual, could *be*. It is the possibility of the impossibility of any comportment toward..., of every existing. In anticipation of this possibility it becomes "ever greater"; that is, it reveals itself as one that knows no measure at all, no more or less, but signifies the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence. By its essence, this possibility offers no foothold for being intent on something, for "picturing" the possible actuality and thereby forgetting the possibility. Being-toward-death, as anticipation of the possibility, first of all *makes* this possibility *possible* and sets it free as such.

53.9 Being-toward-death is anticipation of a potentiality-for-Being of *that* being whose way of Being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses itself to itself with regard to its uttermost possibility. But to project oneself upon one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means: to be able to understand oneself in the Being of the being so revealed—to exist. Anticipation proves to be the possibility of understanding one's *ownmost* uttermost potentiality-for-Being, that is, the possibility of *owned existence*. Its ontological constitution must become visible when the concrete structure of anticipation of death is set out. How is this structure to be delimited phenomenally? Evidently, by determining those characters of anticipatory disclosing which must belong to it if it is to be able to become the pure understanding of the ownmost, non-relational, not-to-be-outstripped, certain and, as such, indefinite possibility. It must be borne in mind that understanding does not primarily mean gaping at a meaning, but under-

5 "Anticipation" renders *Vorlaufen*, literally "running ahead"; Heidegger contrasts it with expecting (*Erwarten*).

standing oneself in the potentiality-for-Being that reveals itself in projection.

53.10 Death is Dasein's *ownmost* possibility. Being toward it discloses to Dasein its *ownmost* potentiality-for-Being, in which what matters is, purely and simply, Dasein's Being. In this it can become manifest to Dasein that, in this distinctive possibility of itself, it remains torn away from the they—that is, that by anticipating it can always already tear itself away from the they. But it is only the understanding of this "can" that reveals Dasein's factical lostness in the everydayness of the they-self.

53.11 The ownmost possibility is *non-relational*. Anticipation lets Dasein understand that it has to take over, solely from itself, the potentiality-for-Being in which its ownmost Being is, purely and simply, what matters. Death does not just "belong" indifferently to one's own Dasein; it *lays claim* to Dasein *as an individual*. The non-relationality of death, understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualizing is a way of disclosing the "there" for existence. It makes manifest that all Being alongside what is concerned with, and every Being-with Others, fails when our ownmost potentiality-for-Being is what matters. Dasein can be *itself in an owned way* only if it makes this possible for itself, from itself. The failing of concern and solicitude, however, by no means signifies that these ways of Dasein are cut off from owned Being-a-self. As essential structures of Dasein's constitution, they belong to the condition of the possibility of existence as such. Dasein is itself in an owned way only insofar as, *as* concernful Being alongside … and solicitous Being with …, it projects itself primarily upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and not upon the possibility of the they-self. Anticipation of the non-relational possibility forces the anticipating being into the possibility of taking over its ownmost Being of its own accord, out of itself.

53.12 The ownmost, non-relational possibility is *not to be outstripped*. Being toward it lets Dasein understand that what lies before it, as the uttermost possibility of existence, is to give itself up. But anticipation does not, as unowned Being-toward-

death does, evade the fact that this possibility is not to be outstripped; rather, it *frees itself for* it. Becoming free, in anticipation, *for* one's own death frees one from lostness in the possibilities that thrust themselves upon one by chance—and does so in such a way that it first lets one understand and choose, in an owned way, the factical possibilities that lie short of the possibility not to be outstripped. Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility is to give itself up, and thus shatters every rigid insistence on the existence reached in each case. By anticipating, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself and the potentiality-for-Being it has understood, and against "becoming too old for its victories" (Nietzsche).[6] Free for its ownmost possibilities—possibilities determined by the *end*, that is, understood as *finite*—Dasein dispels the danger that, from its finite understanding of existence, it might fail to recognize the possibilities of existence of Others that outstrip it, or else, misinterpreting them, force them back onto its own—so as to divest itself, in this way, of its ownmost factical existence. But as the non-relational possibility, death individualizes only so that, as the possibility not to be outstripped, it may make Dasein, as Being-with, understanding toward the potentiality-for-Being of Others. Because anticipation of the possibility not to be outstripped also discloses all the possibilities lying short of it, there lies in it the possibility of an existentiell taking-in-advance of the *whole* of Dasein, that is, the possibility of existing as a *whole potentiality-for-Being*.

53.13 The ownmost, non-relational possibility not to be outstripped is *certain*. The way of *being* certain of it is determined by the truth (disclosedness) that corresponds to it. But Dasein discloses the certain possibility of death as a possibility only in such a way that, anticipating it, it *makes* this possibility *possible* for itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The disclosedness of the possibility is grounded in the anticipatory making-possible. Holding oneself in this truth, that is, Being-certain of

6 From Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part I, "On Free Death," where some are said to grow too old for their truths and their victories.

what is disclosed, requires anticipation all the more. The certainty of death cannot be calculated from ascertaining cases of death that are encountered. It does not keep to a truth of what is present-at-hand at all—a truth of what, with regard to its uncoveredness, is encountered most purely when beings are merely looked at and so let be encountered in themselves. Dasein must first have lost itself in states of affairs—which can be a task and possibility of care in its own right—in order to attain the pure matter-of-factness, that is, the indifference, of apodictic evidence. If Being-certain in relation to death does not have this character, that does not mean that it is of a lower degree than such evidence, but rather: *it does not belong at all to the graded order of evidences about what is present-at-hand.*

53.14 Holding death for true—death *is* in each case only one's own—is of another kind, and is more primordial, than any certainty concerning an innerworldly being that is encountered, or concerning formal objects; for it is certain of Being-in-the-world. As such, it lays claim not merely to *one* definite comportment of Dasein, but to Dasein in the full ownness of its existence. Only in anticipation can Dasein make itself certain of its ownmost Being in its wholeness not to be outstripped. Hence the evidence of an immediate givenness of lived experiences, of the I, and of consciousness must necessarily lag behind the certainty contained in anticipation. And this is not because the kind of apprehension belonging to it would not be rigorous, but because in principle it cannot hold *for true* (disclosed) what at bottom it wants to "have there" as true: Dasein, which I myself *am*, and which, as potentiality-for-Being, I can be in an owned way only by anticipating.

53.15 The ownmost, non-relational, not-to-be-outstripped and certain possibility is *indefinite* with regard to its certainty. How does anticipation disclose this character of Dasein's distinctive possibility? How does anticipatory understanding project itself upon a certain potentiality-for-Being that is constantly possible—in such a way that the when, in which the utter impossibility of existence becomes possible, remains constantly indefinite? In

anticipation of the indefinitely certain death, Dasein opens itself to a constant *threat* arising out of its "there" itself. Being-toward-the-end must hold itself in this threat, and is so little able to screen it off that it must rather develop the indefiniteness of the certainty. How is the genuine disclosing of this constant threat existentially possible? All understanding is attuned. Mood brings Dasein before the thrownness of its "that-it-is-there." *But the attunement that is able to hold open the constant and utter threat to itself, arising out of Dasein's ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety*. In anxiety Dasein finds itself *before* the nothing of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious *about* the potentiality-for-Being of the being so determined, and in this way discloses the uttermost possibility. Because anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein and, in this individualizing of itself, lets it become certain of the wholeness of its potentiality-for-Being, the basic attunement of anxiety belongs to this self-understanding of Dasein from its ground. Being-toward-death is essentially anxiety. Unmistakable, though "only" indirect, attestation of this is given by the Being-toward-death we have characterized, when it perverts anxiety into cowardly fear and, in overcoming that fear, betrays its cowardice in the face of anxiety.

53.16 The characterization of owned Being-toward-death as existentially projected can be summarized thus: *Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self and brings it before the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude—of being itself, however, in the passionate freedom toward death: a freedom released from the illusions of the they, factical, certain of itself, and anxious.*

53.17 All the relations, belonging to Being-toward-death, to the full content of Dasein's uttermost possibility as characterized are gathered in this: to reveal, unfold, and hold fast the anticipation constituted by them as the making-possible of this possibility. The existentially projecting delimitation of anticipation has made visible the *ontological* possibility of an existentiell owned Being-toward-death. With this, however, there then emerges the possibility of an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Dasein

—*but still only as an ontological possibility. True,* the existential projection of anticipation kept to the structures of Dasein obtained earlier, and let Dasein, as it were, project itself upon this possibility, without holding up before it an ideal of existence with "content" and forcing it upon Dasein "from outside." And yet this existentially "possible" Being-toward-death remains, existentielly, a fantastical imposition. The ontological possibility of an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Dasein means nothing so long as the corresponding ontic potentiality-for-Being has not been demonstrated from Dasein itself. Does Dasein ever factically throw itself into such a Being-toward-death? Does it even so much as *demand*, from the ground of its ownmost Being, an owned potentiality-for-Being that is determined by anticipation?

53.18 Before these questions are answered, we must investigate to what extent *at all*, and in what way, Dasein, from its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, *gives testimony* to a possible *ownness* of its existence—in such a way that it not only makes this ownness known as *existentielly* possible, but *demands* it of itself.

53.19 The pending question of an owned Being-a-whole of Dasein and its existential constitution will be brought onto phenomenal ground that can stand the test only when it can keep to a possible ownness of its Being that is attested by Dasein itself. If we succeed in laying bare phenomenologically such an attestation and what is attested in it, then the problem arises anew *whether anticipation of death, projected so far only in its ontological possibility, stands in an essential connection with the owned potentiality-for-Being that has been attested*.

Division Two, Chapter II: The Attestation, in Dasein, of an Authentic Potentiality-for-Being, and Resoluteness

Zweiter Abschnitt. Zweites Kapitel: Die daseinsmäßige Bezeugung eines eigentlichen Seinkönnens und die Entschlossenheit
§§54–60

§ 54. THE PROBLEM OF THE ATTESTATION OF AN OWNED EXISTENTIELL POSSIBILITY

Dasein must find itself attested; this attestation is the voice of conscience.

54.1 What we are seeking is an owned potentiality-for-Being of Dasein that is attested by Dasein itself in its existentiell possibility. Before that, this attestation itself must let itself be found. If it is to "give Dasein to understand" itself in its possible owned existence, it will have its root in the Being of Dasein. The phenomenological demonstration of such an attestation therefore includes showing that it originates in Dasein's constitution of Being.

54.2 The attestation is to give an owned *potentiality-for-Being-a-self* to understand. With the expression "self" we answered the question of the *who* of Dasein. The selfhood of Dasein was determined formally as a *way of existing*, that is, not as a being that is present-at-hand. For the most part, the who of Dasein is not *I myself*, but the they-self. Owned Being-a-self is determined as an existentiell modification of the they, which is to be delim-

ited existentially. What lies in this modification, and what are the ontological conditions of its possibility?

54.3 With lostness in the they, Dasein's nearest factical potentiality-for-Being—the tasks, rules, and standards, the urgency and scope of concernful-solicitous Being-in-the-world—has always already been decided. The they has always already relieved Dasein of seizing these possibilities of Being. The they even hides the tacit relief it has carried out, relieving Dasein of explicitly *choosing* these possibilities. It remains indefinite who "actually" chose. This being carried along, without choosing, by nobody, through which Dasein entangles itself in unownness, can be reversed only if Dasein expressly fetches itself back from lostness in the they to itself. This fetching back, however, must have *that* way of Being *through the neglect of which* Dasein lost itself in unownness. Fetching oneself back from the they, that is, the existentiell modification of the they-self into *owned* Being-a-self, must be carried out as *making up for a choice*. But making up for the choice means *choosing this choice*, deciding for a potentiality-for-Being, and doing so from one's own self. In choosing the choice, Dasein first of all *makes* its owned potentiality-for-Being *possible* for itself.

54.4 But because Dasein is *lost* in the they, it must first *find* itself. In order to find *itself* at all, it must be "shown" to itself in its possible ownness. Dasein needs the attestation of a potentiality-for-Being-a-self that, in terms of *possibility*, it always already *is*.

54.5 What will be claimed as such an attestation in the following interpretation is familiar to Dasein's everyday self-interpretation as the *voice of conscience*. That the "fact" of conscience is disputed, that its function as an authority for Dasein's existence is variously assessed, and that "what it says" is interpreted in manifold ways—all this could tempt us to abandon the phenomenon only if the "dubiousness" of this fact, or of its interpretation, did not precisely *prove* that what lies before us here is a *primordial* phenomenon of Dasein. The following analysis

places conscience in the thematic fore-having of a purely existential investigation with a fundamental-ontological aim.

54.6 First, conscience is to be traced back to its existential foundations and structures and made visible *as* a phenomenon of Dasein, holding fast to the constitution of Being of this being obtained so far. The ontological analysis of conscience set up in this way comes before any psychological description of lived experiences of conscience and their classification; it lies equally outside any biological "explanation," that is, dissolution, of the phenomenon. But no less is its distance from a theological exegesis of conscience, let alone from claiming this phenomenon for proofs of God's existence or for an "immediate" consciousness of God.

54.7 Nevertheless, even in this restricted investigation of conscience, its yield must be neither exaggerated nor subjected to perverse demands and so diminished. As a phenomenon of Dasein, conscience is not a fact that occurs and is occasionally present-at-hand. It *"is"* only in Dasein's way of Being, and makes itself known as a fact only ever with and in factical existence. The demand for an "inductive empirical proof" of the "factuality" of conscience and of the legitimacy of its "voice" rests on an ontological perversion of the phenomenon. But this perversion is also shared by every superior criticism of conscience as a fact that occurs only at times and is not "universally established and establishable." The fact of conscience cannot be subjected to such proofs and counterproofs at all. This is not a deficiency, but merely the mark of its ontological otherness as compared with what is environmentally present-at-hand.

54.8 Conscience gives "something" to understand; it *discloses*. From this formal characterization arises the directive to take the phenomenon back into Dasein's *disclosedness*. This basic constitution of the being that we ourselves in each case are is constituted by attunement, understanding, falling, and discourse. A more penetrating analysis of conscience reveals it as a *call*. Calling is a mode of *discourse*. The call of conscience has the character of an *appeal* to Dasein, calling it to its ownmost potentiality-

for-Being-a-self, and this in the manner of a *summons* to its own-most Being-guilty.[1]

54.9 This existential interpretation is necessarily far removed from everyday ontic common sense, even though it sets out the ontological foundations of what the ordinary interpretation of conscience has always understood within certain limits and has brought to a concept as a "theory" of conscience. The existential interpretation therefore needs to be confirmed by a critique of the ordinary interpretation of conscience. From the phenomenon as set out, it can be brought out to what extent it attests an owned potentiality-for-Being of Dasein. To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing. Understanding the appeal reveals itself as *wanting-to-have-a-conscience*. But in this phenomenon lies what we are seeking: the existentiell choosing of the choice of a Being-a-self, which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call *resoluteness*. The division of the analyses of this chapter is thereby laid out in advance: the existential-ontological foundations of conscience (§ 55); the call-character of conscience (§ 56); conscience as the call of care (§ 57); understanding the appeal, and guilt (§ 58); the existential interpretation of conscience and the ordinary interpretation of conscience (§ 59); the existential structure of the owned potentiality-for-Being attested in conscience (§ 60).

§ 55. THE EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSCIENCE

Conscience discloses, as a call that breaks Dasein's listening to the they.

55.1 The analysis of conscience takes as its starting point an indifferent finding about this phenomenon: that in some way or other it gives one something to understand. Conscience discloses, and therefore belongs within the range of those existential phenomena that constitute the *Being of the "there"* as dis-

1 Heidegger distinguishes *Ruf* (call), *Anruf* (appeal: calling to someone) and *Aufruf* (summons: calling someone up to something).

closedness. The most general structures of attunement, understanding, discourse, and falling have been laid out. If we bring conscience into this phenomenal context, this is not a matter of schematically applying the structures obtained there to a particular "case" of Dasein's disclosure. Rather, the interpretation of conscience will not only carry the earlier analysis of the disclosedness of the "there" further, but grasp it more primordially with regard to Dasein's owned Being.

55.2 Through disclosedness, the being we call Dasein is in the possibility of *being* its "there." With its world, it is there for itself—and indeed, in the first instance and for the most part, in such a way that it has disclosed its potentiality-for-Being to itself in terms of the "world" it is concerned with. The potentiality-for-Being as which Dasein exists has always already abandoned itself to definite possibilities. And this because it is a thrown being, a thrownness disclosed more or less clearly and penetratingly by its Being-attuned. Understanding belongs equiprimordially to attunement (mood). Through understanding, Dasein "knows" where it stands with itself, insofar as it has projected itself upon possibilities of itself, or else, absorbed in the they, has let such possibilities be presented to it by the they's public interpretedness. This presenting, however, is made possible existentially by the fact that Dasein, as understanding Being-with, can *hear* Others. Losing itself in the publicness of the they and its idle talk, it *fails to hear* its own self in hearing the they-self. If Dasein is to be able to be brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself—and brought back, indeed, by itself—then it must first be able to find itself: itself, which has failed to hear itself and fails to hear itself in *listening* to the they. This listening must be broken; that is, Dasein itself must give it the possibility of a hearing that interrupts it. The possibility of such a break lies in being appealed to without mediation. The call breaks Dasein's listening to the they, a listening that fails to hear itself, if, in accordance with its character as a call, it awakens a hearing that is in every respect of the opposite character to the lost hearing. If lost hearing is dazed by the "noise" of the mani-

fold ambiguity of everyday "new" idle talk, the call must call without noise, unambiguously, with no foothold for curiosity. *What gives to understand by calling in this way is conscience.*

55.3 We take calling as a mode of discourse. Discourse articulates intelligibility. Characterizing conscience as a call is by no means just an "image," like, say, *Kant's* representation of conscience as a court of justice. We must only not overlook that vocal utterance is not essential to discourse, and therefore not to the call either. Every uttering and "calling out" already presupposes discourse. When everyday interpretation knows of a "voice" of conscience, what is meant is not so much an utterance, which factically is never to be found; rather, "voice" is taken as the giving-to-understand. In the disclosive tendency of the call lies the moment of a jolt, of an abrupt rousing. The call comes from afar, into the distance. It strikes whoever wants to be fetched back.[2]

55.4 With this characterization of conscience, however, only the phenomenal horizon for the analysis of its existential structure has so far been outlined. The phenomenon is not compared with a call, but understood as discourse, in terms of the disclosedness constitutive of Dasein. From the outset our consideration avoids the path that initially offers itself for an interpretation of conscience: one traces conscience back to one of the faculties of the soul—intellect, will, or feeling—or explains it as a mixture of these. In the face of a phenomenon of the kind of conscience, the ontological-anthropological inadequacy of a free-floating framework of classified faculties of the soul or personal acts leaps to the eye.

§ 56. THE CALL-CHARACTER OF CONSCIENCE

Conscience appeals to the self, says nothing, and speaks solely in the mode of keeping silent.

56.1 To discourse belongs what it is about, what is talked about. Discourse gives information about something, and does so in a

definite respect. From what is thus talked about, it draws what it, as this discourse, in each case says—what is said as such. In discourse as communication, this becomes accessible to the Dasein-with of Others, for the most part by way of vocal utterance in language.

56.2 What, in the call of conscience, is talked about, that is, appealed to? Obviously, Dasein itself. This answer is as indisputable as it is indefinite. If the call had so vague a target, it would at most remain an occasion for Dasein to pay attention to itself. But it belongs essentially to Dasein that, with the disclosedness of its world, it is disclosed to itself, so that it always already *understands itself*. The call strikes Dasein in this everyday-average, concernful always-already-understanding-itself. The they-self of concernful Being-with Others is struck by the call.

56.3 And to what is it appealed? To its *own self*. Not to what Dasein counts for, is able to do, or concerns itself with in public with-one-another, let alone to what it has taken up, what it has committed itself to, or what it has let itself be carried along by. Dasein as it is, understood in a worldly way, for Others and for itself is *passed over* in this appeal. The call to the self takes not the slightest notice of all this. Because only the *self* of the they-self is appealed to and brought to hear, the *they* collapses. That the call *passes over* the they and the public interpretedness of Dasein by no means signifies that it does not *also strike* it. Precisely *in passing it over*, the call pushes the they, bent on public prestige, into insignificance. The self, however, deprived in the appeal of this shelter and this hiding place, is brought to itself by the call.

56.4 It is to the self that the they-self is appealed. Not, however, to the self that can become an "object" of judgment for itself; not to the self of an agitated-curious and unsteady dissection of its "inner life"; and not to the self of an "analytical" gaping at states of the soul and their backgrounds. The appeal to the self in the they-self does not force it inward upon itself, so that it might

2 In the *Metaphysics of Morals* (Doctrine of Virtue, § 13), Kant describes conscience as an inner court in which one is at once accused and judge.

close itself off from the "external world." The call leaps over all this and scatters it, in order to appeal solely to the self, which nevertheless is in no other way than as Being-in-the-world.

56.5 But how are we to determine what is *said* in this discourse? *What* does conscience call to the one appealed to? Strictly speaking—nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no information about events in the world, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it strive to open a "soliloquy" in the self appealed to. "Nothing" is called-to the self appealed to; rather, it is *summoned* to itself, that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. In accordance with its tendency as a call, the call does not bring the self appealed to into a "negotiation"; rather, as a summons to its ownmost *potentiality*-for-Being-a-self, it is a calling-forth (calling "forward") of Dasein into its ownmost possibilities.

56.6 The call dispenses with any vocal utterance. It does not even put itself into words—and yet it remains anything but obscure and indefinite. *Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent.* In this way it not only loses nothing of its perceptibility, but forces Dasein, appealed to and summoned, into its own reticence. The lack of a verbal formulation of what is called in the call does not push the phenomenon into the indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, but merely indicates that the understanding of what is "called" may not cling to the expectation of a communication or the like.

56.7 What the call discloses is nevertheless unequivocal, even though it may be interpreted differently in individual Dasein according to its possibilities of understanding. For all the apparent indefiniteness of the call's content, the sure *direction of impact* of the call must not be overlooked. The call does not first need to grope about in search of the one to be appealed to, nor does it need any mark to tell whether that one is the one meant or not. "Deceptions" arise in conscience not through the call's mistaking itself (mis-calling itself), but only from the way the call is *heard*—from the fact that, instead of being understood in an owned way, it is drawn by the they-self into a negotiating soliloquy and perverted in its disclosive tendency.

56.8 What must be held fast is this: the call that we characterize as conscience is an appeal to the they-self in its self; as this appeal, it is the summons of the self to its potentiality-for-Being-a-self, and thus a calling-forth of Dasein to its possibilities.

56.9 But we attain an ontologically adequate interpretation of conscience only when it can be made clear not only *who* is called by the call, but *who* itself *calls*, how the one appealed to comports itself toward the caller, and how this "relationship" must be grasped ontologically as a connection of Being.

§ 57. CONSCIENCE AS THE CALL OF CARE

The caller is Dasein itself, anxious in its uncanniness, calling itself back from the they.

57.1 Conscience summons Dasein's self from lostness in the they. The self appealed to remains indefinite and empty in its what. What Dasein, in the first instance and for the most part, understands itself *as* in interpreting itself in terms of what it is concerned with is passed over by the call. And yet the self is struck unequivocally and unmistakably. Not only is the one appealed to meant by the call "without regard to the person"; the caller, too, keeps itself in a striking indefiniteness. It not only refuses to answer questions about name, standing, origin, and reputation; although it by no means disguises itself in the call, it also gives not the slightest possibility of making it familiar to an understanding of Dasein oriented in a "worldly" way. The caller of the call—this belongs to its phenomenal character—keeps every becoming-known utterly at a distance. It goes against the kind of its Being to let itself be drawn into observation and talk. The peculiar indefiniteness and indefinability of the caller is not nothing, but a *positive* distinction. It makes known that the caller is solely absorbed in summoning to ..., that it wants *to be heard only as such*, and beyond that not to be chattered about. But in that case, is it not appropriate to the phenomenon to refrain from asking the caller who it is? For existentiell hearing of the

factical call of conscience, yes; but not for the existential analysis of the facticity of calling and the existentiality of hearing.

57.2 But is there any necessity at all to raise explicitly the question of *who* calls? Does it not answer itself for Dasein just as unequivocally as the question of who is appealed to in the call? *In conscience Dasein calls itself.* This understanding of the caller may be more or less awake in the factical hearing of the call. Ontologically, however, the answer that Dasein is the caller and the one appealed to *at once* is by no means sufficient. As appealed to, *is* Dasein not "there" otherwise than as calling? Does the ownmost potentiality-for-Being-a-self perhaps function as the caller?

57.3 The call, after all, is precisely not, and never, planned, nor prepared, nor voluntarily performed *by ourselves*. "It" calls, against expectation and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from an Other who is in the world with me. The call comes *from* me and yet *over* me.

57.4 This phenomenal finding is not to be explained away. It has indeed been taken as the starting point for interpreting the voice as an alien power that juts into Dasein. Continuing in this direction of interpretation, one supplies the power thus fixed with an owner, or takes it itself as a person making itself known (God). Conversely, one tries to reject this interpretation of the caller as the expression of an alien power and at the same time to explain conscience away "biologically" altogether. Both interpretations skip over the phenomenal finding too hastily. The procedure is made easier by a tacitly guiding, ontologically dogmatic thesis: what *is*—that is, what is as factual as the call—must be *present-at-hand*; what cannot be objectively demonstrated as *present-at-hand is not* at all.

57.5 Over against this methodological hastiness, we must hold fast not only to the phenomenal finding as such—that the call, coming from me and over me, is addressed to me—but also to the ontological prefiguration, lying in this finding, of the phenomenon as a phenomenon *of Dasein*. The existential constitu-

tion of *this* being can offer the only guideline for interpreting the way of Being of the "it" that calls.

57.6 Does the analysis of Dasein's constitution of Being carried out so far show a way of making ontologically intelligible the way of Being of the caller, and with it that of calling as well? That the call is not explicitly performed *by me*, but rather that "it" calls, does not yet justify seeking the caller in a being that is not of Dasein's kind. Dasein, after all, always exists, in each case, factically. It is not a free-floating projecting of itself; rather, determined by thrownness as the fact of the being that it is, it has always already been, and constantly remains, delivered over to existence. But Dasein's facticity differs essentially from the factuality of something present-at-hand. Existing Dasein does not encounter itself as something innerworldly present-at-hand. Yet neither does thrownness cling to Dasein as a character that is inaccessible and irrelevant to its existence. As thrown, it is thrown *into existence*. It exists as a being that has to be as it is and as it can be.

57.7 That it is factically may be hidden as regards the *why*; but the "that" *itself* is disclosed to Dasein. The thrownness of this being belongs to the disclosedness of the "there," and reveals itself constantly in the attunement it has in each case. Attunement brings Dasein, more or less explicitly and in an owned way, before its "that it is and, as the being that it is, has to be in being able to be." For the most part, however, mood *closes off* thrownness. Dasein flees from thrownness into the relief of the supposed freedom of the they-self. This flight was characterized as flight from the uncanniness that at bottom determines individualized Being-in-the-world. Uncanniness reveals itself properly in the basic attunement of anxiety and, as the most elemental disclosedness of thrown Dasein, places its Being-in-the-world before the nothing of the world, in the face of which it is anxious, in anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. *What if Dasein, finding itself at the ground of its uncanniness, were the caller of the call of conscience?*

57.8 Nothing speaks against this; in its favor, however, speak all the phenomena that have so far been set out in characterizing the caller and its calling.

57.9 In its who, the caller can be determined in a "worldly" way by *nothing*. It is Dasein in its uncanniness, primordial thrown Being-in-the-world as not-at-home, the bare "that" in the nothing of the world. The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self—something like an *alien* voice. What could be more alien to the they, lost in the manifold "world" it is concerned with, than the self, individualized down to itself in uncanniness, thrown into the nothing? "It" calls, and yet gives the concernfully curious ear nothing to hear that might be passed on and talked about in public. But what, indeed, is Dasein to report from the uncanniness of its thrown Being? *What* else remains to it but its own potentiality-for-Being, revealed in anxiety? How else is it to call than as summoning to this potentiality-for-Being, which alone is what matters to it?

57.10 The call reports no events, and it calls, too, without any vocal utterance. The call discourses in the uncanny mode of *keeping silent*. And it does so only because the call does not call the one appealed to into the public idle talk of the they, but *calls* it, out of that talk, *back into the reticence of the existent potentiality-for-Being*. And in what is the uncanny, yet not self-evident, cold assurance with which the caller strikes the one appealed to grounded, if not in the fact that Dasein, individualized down to itself in its uncanniness, is for itself utterly unmistakable? What so radically deprives Dasein of the possibility of misunderstanding itself and failing to recognize itself in terms of something else, if not its forsakenness in being left to itself?

57.11 Uncanniness is the basic kind of Being-in-the-world, albeit one that is covered over in everydayness. Dasein itself, as conscience, calls from the ground of this Being. The "it calls me" is a distinctive discourse of Dasein. The call, attuned by anxiety, first of all makes possible for Dasein the projection of itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The call of conscience, understood existentially, first makes known what was earlier

merely asserted: uncanniness pursues Dasein and threatens its self-forgetful lostness.

57.12 The proposition that Dasein is the caller and the one appealed to at once has now lost its formal emptiness and self-evidence. *Conscience reveals itself as the call of care:* the caller is Dasein, anxious in its thrownness (Being-already-in ...) about its potentiality-for-Being. The one appealed to is this very Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (ahead-of-itself ...). And Dasein is summoned by the appeal out of falling into the they (Being-already-alongside the world it is concerned with). The call of conscience, that is, conscience itself, has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, at the ground of its Being, is care.

57.13 So there is no need to take refuge in powers not of Dasein's kind—especially since recourse to them clarifies the uncanniness of the call so little that it rather annihilates it. Does not the reason for the misguided "explanations" of conscience lie, in the end, in the fact that, already in fixing the phenomenal finding of the call, one took *too short* a view, and tacitly presupposed Dasein in some accidental ontological determinacy or indeterminacy? Why seek information from alien powers before one has made sure that, at the outset of the analysis, Dasein's Being has not been rated *too low*, that is, posited as a harmless subject that somehow occurs, equipped with personal consciousness?

57.14 And yet, in interpreting the caller—who, seen in a worldly way, is "nobody"—as a power, there seems to lie an unprejudiced acknowledgment of something "objectively to be found." But, seen rightly, this interpretation is only a flight from conscience, a way out by which Dasein slinks away from the thin wall that, as it were, separates the they from the uncanniness of its Being. This interpretation of conscience passes itself off as an acknowledgment of the call in the sense of a "universally" binding voice that speaks "not merely subjectively." More than that, this "universal" conscience is heightened into a "world-conscience," which in its phenomenal character is an "it" and "nobody," and

so, after all, the very thing that speaks there, in the individual "subject," as this indefinite something.

57.15 But this "public conscience"—what is it other than the voice of the they? Dasein can arrive at the dubious invention of a "world-conscience" only *because* conscience, in its ground and essence, is *in each case mine*. And this is so not only in the sense that it is in each case one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being that is appealed to, but because the call comes from the being that I myself in each case am.

57.16 The foregoing interpretation of the caller, which follows purely the phenomenal character of calling, does not diminish the "power" of conscience or make it "merely subjective." On the contrary: only in this way are the inexorability and unequivocalness of the call set free. The "objectivity" of the appeal first receives its due when the interpretation leaves it its "subjectivity"—a subjectivity which, to be sure, denies the they-self its dominion.

57.17 Nevertheless, the interpretation of conscience as the call of care that has now been carried out will be met with a counterquestion. Can an interpretation of conscience that strays so far from "natural experience" stand the test? How is conscience to function as a *summoner* to one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, when in the first instance and for the most part it merely *reproves* and *warns*? Does conscience speak in such an indefinite, empty way about an ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and not rather definitely and concretely, with reference to lapses and omissions that have occurred or are intended? Does the alleged appealing stem from the *"bad"* conscience or from the *"good"* one? Does conscience give anything positive at all; does it not rather function only critically?

57.18 The legitimacy of such misgivings cannot be disputed. It can be demanded of an interpretation of conscience that "one" recognize in it the phenomenon in question as it is experienced every day. Satisfying this demand, however, does not in turn mean acknowledging the ordinary ontic understanding of conscience as the primary authority for an ontological interpreta-

tion. On the other hand, the misgivings listed are premature as long as the analysis of conscience they concern has not yet been brought to its goal. So far the attempt has only been to trace conscience, *as a phenomenon of Dasein*, back to the ontological constitution of this being. This served as preparation for the task of making conscience intelligible as an *attestation of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being* that lies in Dasein itself.

57.19 What conscience attests, however, first reaches its full determinateness when it has been delimited clearly enough what character the *hearing* that genuinely corresponds to the calling must have. The *owned* understanding that "follows" the call is not a mere addendum attached to the phenomenon of conscience, a process that sets in or may also fail to occur. Only *from* understanding the appeal, and together *with* it, can the *full* lived experience of conscience be grasped. If the caller and the one appealed to are in each case one's own Dasein, *itself at once*, then every failure to hear the call, every way of mishearing *oneself*, involves a *definite way of Being* of Dasein. A free-floating call to which "nothing ensues" is, existentially considered, an impossible fiction. "That *nothing* ensues" signifies, in terms of Dasein, something *positive*.

57.20 Thus, too, only the analysis of understanding the appeal can lead to an explicit discussion of *what the call gives to be understood*. But only with the preceding general ontological characterization of conscience is the possibility given of grasping existentially the "guilty" that is called in conscience. All experiences and interpretations of conscience agree that the "voice" of conscience somehow speaks of "guilt."

§ 58. UNDERSTANDING THE APPEAL, AND GUILT

Being-guilty is existentially Being-the-ground of a nullity; understanding the call is wanting-to-have-a-conscience.

58.1 In order to grasp phenomenally what is heard in understanding the appeal, we must go back once more to the appeal. Appealing to the they-self means summoning the ownmost self

to its potentiality-for-Being, and indeed as Dasein, that is, as concernful Being-in-the-world and Being-with Others. The existential interpretation of that to which the call summons can therefore, insofar as it rightly understands its methodological possibilities and tasks, not seek to delimit any concrete, individual possibility of existence. What can and is meant to be pinned down is not what is in each case existentielly called, in this or that Dasein, into this, but what *belongs* to the *existential condition of the possibility* of the factical-existentiell potentiality-for-Being in each case.

58.2 The existentiell, hearing understanding of the call is the more owned, the more non-relationally Dasein hears and understands *its* Being-appealed-to, and the less what one says, what is proper and what counts, distorts the meaning of the call. And what lies essentially in the ownness of understanding the appeal? What is in each case essentially *given* to be understood in the call, even though it is not always factically understood?

58.3 We have already assigned the answer to this question with the thesis that the call "says" *nothing* that could be talked over; it gives no information about events. The call points Dasein *forward to* its potentiality-for-Being, and does so as a call *from* uncanniness. The caller is, to be sure, indefinite—but the whence from which it calls does not remain a matter of indifference for the calling. This whence—the uncanniness of thrown individualization—is also called in the calling, that is, also disclosed. The whence of the calling, in calling forth to ..., is the whither of the calling back. The call does not give an ideal, universal potentiality-for-Being to be understood; it discloses it as the potentiality-for-Being of the Dasein in each case, individualized in each case. The disclosive character of the call is fully determined only when we understand it as a calling-back that calls forth. Only in orientation toward the call so conceived can we ask *what* it gives to be understood.

58.4 But is the question of what the call says not answered more easily and more reliably by "simply" pointing to what is heard, or failed to be heard, throughout all experiences of conscience:

that the call addresses Dasein as "guilty," or, as in the warning conscience, points to a possible "guilty," or, as the "good" conscience, confirms that one is "conscious of no guilt"? If only this "guilty," experienced "in agreement," were not determined so entirely differently in the experiences and interpretations of conscience! And even if the meaning of this "guilty" could be grasped unanimously, the *existential concept* of this Being-guilty remains in the dark. But if Dasein addresses itself as "guilty," where else is the idea of guilt to be drawn from, if not from the interpretation of the Being of Dasein? Yet the question arises anew: *who says how we are guilty and what guilt means?* The idea of guilt cannot be arbitrarily thought up and forced upon Dasein. But if an understanding of the essence of guilt is possible at all, then this possibility must be prefigured in Dasein. How are we to find the trail that can lead to the unveiling of the phenomenon? All ontological investigations of phenomena such as guilt, conscience, and death must start from what the everyday interpretation of Dasein "says" about them. Dasein's falling way of Being also entails that its interpretation is for the most part "oriented" in an *unowned* way and does not hit upon the "essence," because the primordially appropriate ontological formulation of the question remains foreign to it. But in every seeing-amiss there is also unveiled a pointer to the primordial "idea" of the phenomenon. But where do we get the criterion for the primordial existential meaning of the "guilty"? From the fact that this "guilty" turns up as a predicate of the "I am." Does what is understood as "guilt" in an unowned interpretation perhaps lie in the Being of Dasein as such, in such a way that Dasein, insofar as it in each case factically exists, also *is* guilty?

58.5 Appealing to the unanimously heard "guilty" is therefore not yet the answer to the question of the existential meaning of what is called in the call. What is called must first come to its concept, so that it can be made intelligible what the "guilty" that is called means, and why and how its meaning is distorted by the everyday interpretation.

58.6 Everyday common sense initially takes "Being-guilty" in the sense of "owing," of "having something chalked up with someone." One is to give back to the Other something to which the Other has a claim. This "Being-guilty" as *"having debts"* is a way of Being-with Others in the field of concern as procuring and supplying. Depriving, borrowing, withholding, taking, robbing—that is, failing in some way to satisfy the claims of Others to property—are also modes of such concern. Being-guilty of this kind is related to *what can be concerned with*.[3]

58.7 Being-guilty then has the further meaning of *"being responsible for,"* that is, being the cause or author of something, or also "being the occasion" for something. In the sense of this "having responsibility" for something, one can "be guilty" without "owing" anything to an Other or coming to be "guilty." Conversely, one can owe an Other something without oneself being responsible for it. An Other can "incur debts" with Others "on my behalf."

58.8 These ordinary meanings of Being-guilty, as "having debts to ..." and "having responsibility for ...," can go together and determine a comportment that we call *"making oneself guilty,"* that is, violating a right through being responsible for having debts, and making oneself punishable. The demand that one fails to satisfy, however, need not necessarily relate to property; it can regulate public Being-with-one-another in general. "Making oneself guilty," determined in this way as a violation of right, can at the same time have the character of *"becoming guilty toward Others."* This happens not through the violation of right as such, but through my being responsible for the Other's being endangered in their existence, led astray, or even broken. This becoming guilty toward Others is possible without violating the "public" law. The formal concept of Being-guilty in the sense of having-become-guilty toward the Other can thus be defined as follows: *Being-the-ground* for a lack in the Dasein of an Other, in such a way that this Being-the-ground itself is determined as

3 German *Schuld* means both "guilt" and "debt," and *schuldig sein* both "to be guilty" and "to owe"; the analysis that follows turns on this double sense.

"deficient" in terms of its for-which. This deficiency is the failure to satisfy a demand addressed to existing Being-with Others.

58.9 Let us leave open how such demands arise, and in what way, on the basis of this origin, their character as demand and as law must be conceived. In any case, *Being-guilty* in the last-named sense, as the violation of a "moral demand," is a *way of Being of Dasein*. This holds, of course, also of Being-guilty as "making oneself punishable," as "having debts," and of every "having responsibility for ...." These too are comportments of Dasein. If one takes "burdened with moral guilt" as a "quality" of Dasein, little is said by this. On the contrary, it only becomes evident that this characterization is not sufficient to delimit ontologically this kind of "determinateness of Being" of Dasein from the comportments mentioned before. Indeed, the concept of moral guilt is so little clarified ontologically that interpretations of this phenomenon could become and remain dominant that include in its concept the idea of deserving punishment, and even of having debts to ..., or even determine it in terms of these ideas. But in this way the "guilty" is again pushed off into the domain of concern in the sense of reckoning up claims so as to balance them.

58.10 The phenomenon of guilt, which is not necessarily related to "having debts" and to the violation of right, can be clarified only if one first asks in principle about Dasein's *Being*-guilty, that is, conceives the idea of "guilty" in terms of Dasein's way of Being.

58.11 For this purpose the idea of "guilty" must be *formalized* to the point where the ordinary phenomena of guilt that relate to concernful Being-with Others *drop out*. The idea of guilt must not only be lifted beyond the domain of reckoning concern, but also detached from the relation to an ought and a law by offending against which one takes guilt upon oneself. For here too guilt is still necessarily determined as a *lack*, as the absence of something that ought to be and can be. But absence means non-presence-at-hand. Lack, as the non-presence-at-hand of something that ought to be, is a determination of the Being of the present-

at-hand. In this sense nothing can essentially be lacking in existence—not because it would be perfect, but because its character of Being remains distinct from all presence-at-hand.

58.12 Nevertheless, the idea of "guilty" contains the character of the *not*. If the "guilty" is to be able to determine existence, then this raises the ontological problem of clarifying existentially the *not-character* of this "not." Furthermore, the idea of "guilty" includes what is expressed indifferently in the concept of guilt as "having responsibility for": Being-the-ground for .... We therefore define the formally existential idea of "guilty" as follows: Being-the-ground for a Being determined by a "not"—that is, *Being-the-ground of a nullity*. If the idea of the *not* that lies in the existentially understood concept of guilt excludes relatedness to something present-at-hand that is possible or demanded; if, accordingly, Dasein is not to be measured at all against something present-at-hand or valid that it itself is not, or that is not in *its* way, that is, *exists*—then the possibility falls away of reckoning up that which is thus the ground as itself "deficient" on account of its Being-the-ground for a lack. One cannot simply reckon back from a lack "caused" in the manner of Dasein, the nonfulfillment of a demand, to the deficiency of the "cause." Being-the-ground for ... need not have the same not-character as the privative that is grounded in it and arises from it. The ground need not first receive its nullity back from what it grounds. But this implies: *Being-guilty does not first result from an incurring of guilt; on the contrary, incurring guilt first becomes possible "on the ground" of a primordial Being-guilty.* Can such a Being-guilty be demonstrated in the Being of Dasein, and how is it existentially possible at all?

58.13 The Being of Dasein is care. It comprises facticity (thrownness), existence (projection), and falling. In being, Dasein is thrown, *not* brought into its "there" by itself. In being, it is determined as a potentiality-for-Being that belongs to itself and yet has *not* given itself into its own possession as itself. Existing, it never gets back behind its thrownness, so as to be able, in each case expressly, first to release this "that it is and

has to be" from *its Being*-a-self and lead it into the "there." Thrownness, however, does not lie behind it as an event that factually occurred and then fell away again from Dasein, something that happened to it; rather, as long as it is, *Dasein is* constantly, as care, its "that." *As this being*, delivered over to which it can exist solely as the being that it is, it *is*, *in existing*, the ground of its potentiality-for-Being. Although it has *not itself* laid the ground, it rests in the ground's weight, which its mood makes manifest to it as a burden.

58.14 And how *is* it this thrown ground? Solely by projecting itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. The self, which as such has to lay the ground of itself, can *never* gain power over that ground, and yet, in existing, it has to take over Being-the-ground. To be its own thrown ground is the potentiality-for-Being that matters to care.

58.15 Being-the-ground, that is, existing as thrown, Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent *before* its ground, but in each case only *from it* and *as this ground*. Being-the-ground accordingly means *never* having power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up. This *not* belongs to the existential meaning of thrownness. Being-the-ground, it *is* itself a nullity of itself. Nullity by no means signifies non-presence-at-hand or not-subsisting; it means a "not" that constitutes this *Being* of Dasein, its thrownness. The not-character of this "not" is determined existentially: in being a *self*, Dasein is the thrown being *as* a self. *Released* from the ground, *not through* itself but *to* itself, so as to be *as this ground*. Dasein is not itself the ground of its Being in the sense that this ground would first arise from its own projection; but as Being-a-self it is the *Being* of the ground. The ground is always only the ground of a being whose Being has to take over Being-the-ground.

58.16 Dasein is its ground by existing, that is, in such a way that it understands itself in terms of possibilities and, understanding itself thus, is the thrown being. But this implies that, as a potentiality-for-Being, it stands in each case in one possibility or another; it constantly is *not* some other possibility and has given

that possibility up in its existentiell projection. Projection is not only determined, as in each case thrown, by the nullity of Being-the-ground; *as projection* it is itself essentially *null*. This determination again by no means signifies the ontic property of being "unsuccessful" or "worthless," but an existential constituent of the structure of Being of projecting. The nullity meant here belongs to Dasein's Being-free for its existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, *is* only in the choice of the one—that is, in bearing the not-having-chosen and the not-being-able-also-to-choose the others.

58.17 In the structure of thrownness, as well as in that of projection, there lies essentially a nullity. And it is the ground for the possibility of the nullity of *un*owned Dasein in falling, as which Dasein in each case always already factically is. *Care itself is, in its essence, permeated through and through with nullity.* Care—the Being of Dasein—accordingly means, as thrown projection: the (null) Being-the-ground of a nullity. And this means: *Dasein as such is guilty*, if indeed the formal existential determination of guilt as Being-the-ground of a nullity rightly holds.

58.18 Existential nullity by no means has the character of a privation, of a lack measured against a staked-out ideal that is not attained in Dasein; rather, the Being of this being is already null *as projecting*, *before* anything that it can project and for the most part attains. This nullity, therefore, does not turn up in Dasein occasionally either, attaching to it as an obscure quality that it could get rid of once it had progressed far enough.

58.19 Nevertheless, the *ontological meaning of the notness* of this existential nullity still remains obscure. But this also holds of the *ontological essence of the "not" in general*. Ontology and logic have, to be sure, asked a great deal of the "not," and have thereby in places made its possibilities visible, without unveiling it itself ontologically. Ontology found the "not" before it and made use of it. But is it so self-evident, then, that every "not" signifies something negative in the sense of a lack? Is its positivity exhausted by its constituting "transition"? Why does all dialectic take refuge in negation without grounding anything of the sort

dialectically *itself*, or even being able to pin it down *as a problem*?[4] Has the *ontological origin* of notness ever been made a problem at all, or, *prior* to that, has anyone even looked *for the conditions* on the basis of which the problem of the "not" and its notness, and their possibility, can be raised? And where else are these conditions to be found *than in the thematic clarification of the meaning of Being in general*?

58.20 Even for the ontological interpretation of the phenomenon of guilt, the concepts of privation and lack—which are moreover not very transparent—are not sufficient, although, if conceived formally enough, they admit of wide application. Least of all can we come closer to the existential phenomenon of guilt by orienting ourselves toward the idea of evil, the malum as privatio boni [evil as the privation of the good]. For the *bonum* and the privatio have the same ontological provenance in the ontology of the *present-at-hand*, a provenance that also belongs to the idea of "value" "abstracted" from it.[5]

58.21 A being whose Being is care can not only burden itself with factical guilt; it *is* guilty in the ground of its Being, and this Being-guilty first gives the ontological condition for Dasein's being able to become guilty in factically existing. This essential Being-guilty is equiprimordially the existential condition of the possibility of the "morally" good and evil, that is, of morality in general and its factically possible formations. Primordial Being-guilty cannot be determined by morality, because morality already presupposes it for itself.

58.22 But what experience speaks for this primordial Being-guilty of Dasein? Let us not forget the counter-question, however: "is" guilt "there" only when a consciousness of guilt awakens, or does not primordial Being-guilty make itself known precisely in the fact that guilt is "asleep"? That this Being-guilty in the first instance and for the most part remains undisclosed,

4 An allusion to Hegel's dialectic, in which negation drives the "transition" (*Übergang*) from one determination to the next.

5 The classical doctrine, going back to Augustine and the Neoplatonists, that evil is not a being in its own right but the absence of a good.

that it is kept closed off by Dasein's falling Being, only *unveils* the nullity we have spoken of. Being-guilty is more primordial than any *knowledge* of it. And only because Dasein is guilty in the ground of its Being, and as thrown and falling closes itself off from itself, is conscience possible—if indeed the call at bottom gives *this Being-guilty* to be understood.

58.23 The call is the call of care. Being-guilty constitutes the Being that we call care. In uncanniness Dasein stands together with itself primordially. Uncanniness brings this being face to face with its undisguised nullity, which belongs to the possibility of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Insofar as, for Dasein—as care—its Being is what matters, it summons itself, as the factically falling they-self, out of uncanniness to its potentiality-for-Being. The appeal is a calling-back that calls forth: *forth* into the possibility of itself taking over, in existing, the thrown being that it is; *back* into thrownness, so as to understand it as the null ground that it has to take up into existence. The calling-back of conscience that calls forth gives Dasein to understand that it—the null ground of its null projection, standing in the possibility of its Being—is to bring itself back to itself from its lostness in the they, that is, that it *is guilty*.

58.24 What Dasein gives itself to understand in this way would then, after all, be a piece of knowledge about itself. And the hearing that corresponds to such a call would be a *taking note* of the fact "guilty." But if the call is supposed to have the character of summoning, does this interpretation of conscience not lead to a complete inversion of the function of conscience? Summoning to Being-guilty—does that not mean a summons to wickedness?

58.25 Not even the most violent interpretation will want to burden conscience with such a meaning of the call. But then what is "summoning to Being-guilty" still supposed to mean?

58.26 The meaning of the call becomes clear if understanding, instead of substituting the derivative concept of guilt in the sense of an incurred guilt that has "arisen" through a deed or an omission, holds to the existential meaning of Being-guilty. To

demand this is not arbitrary, if the call of conscience, coming from Dasein itself, is directed solely at this being. But then summoning to Being-guilty means calling forth to the potentiality-for-Being that I, as Dasein, always already am. This being need not first load a "guilt" upon itself through lapses or omissions; it is only to *be* the "guilty"—as which it is—*in an owned way*.

58.27 Hearing the appeal rightly is then tantamount to understanding oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, that is, to projecting oneself upon one's *ownmost* owned potentiality-for-becoming-guilty. Understandingly letting oneself be called forth to this possibility includes Dasein's *becoming free* for the call: readiness for being-able-to-be-appealed-to. In understanding the call, Dasein is *in thrall to its ownmost possibility of existence*. It has chosen itself.[6]

58.28 With this choice Dasein makes possible for itself its ownmost Being-guilty, which remains closed off to the they-self. The common sense of the they knows only satisfying or failing to satisfy the handy rule and the public norm. It reckons up infringements of them and looks for ways to settle them. It has slunk away from its ownmost Being-guilty so as to talk all the louder about mistakes. In the appeal, however, the they-self is appealed to the ownmost Being-guilty of the self. Understanding the call is choosing—not choosing conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is *having*-a-conscience, as Being-free for one's ownmost Being-guilty. *Understanding the appeal* means *wanting-to-have-a-conscience*.

58.29 This does not mean wanting to have a "good conscience," nor a willful cultivation of the call, but solely readiness for being appealed to. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience is just as far removed from seeking out factical incurred guilt as it is from the tendency toward a *liberation* from guilt in the sense of the essential "guilty."

58.30 *Wanting-to-have-a-conscience is, rather, the most primordial existentiell presupposition for the possibility of factically becoming*

6 *Hörig* ("in thrall to," "in bondage to") echoes *hören* ("hear"): hearing the call is belonging to it.

guilty. In understanding the call, Dasein lets its ownmost self *take action in itself* from out of its chosen potentiality-for-Being. Only so can it *be* responsible. Every action, however, is factically necessarily "conscienceless," not only because it does not avoid factical moral guilt, but because, on the null ground of its null projecting, it has in each case already, in Being-with Others, become guilty toward them. Thus wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes the taking-over of the essential consciencelessness within which alone the existentiell possibility of *being* "good" subsists.

58.31 Although the call gives no information, it is nevertheless not merely critical but *positive*; it discloses Dasein's most primordial potentiality-for-Being as Being-guilty. Conscience accordingly reveals itself as an *attestation* belonging to the Being of Dasein, in which conscience calls Dasein itself before its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Can the owned potentiality-for-Being thus attested be determined existentially in a more concrete way? A prior question arises: can the exhibiting, now carried out, of a potentiality-for-Being attested in Dasein itself lay claim to sufficient evidence as long as the disconcerting impression has not disappeared that conscience has here been interpreted one-sidedly back onto the constitution of Dasein, hastily passing over all the findings familiar to the ordinary interpretation of conscience? Can the phenomenon of conscience as it "actually" is still be recognized at all in the foregoing interpretation? Was not an idea of conscience deduced here, with all too assured boldness, from Dasein's constitution of Being?

58.32 In order to secure access to the last step of the interpretation of conscience—the existential delimitation of the owned potentiality-for-Being attested in conscience—for the ordinary understanding of conscience as well, the connection between the results of the ontological analysis and everyday experiences of conscience must be explicitly demonstrated.

§ 59. THE EXISTENTIAL INTERPRETATION OF CONSCIENCE AND THE ORDINARY INTERPRETATION OF CONSCIENCE

The ordinary objections from the bad, good, warning, and critical conscience are answered.

59.1 Conscience is the call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world, which summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience emerged as the corresponding understanding of the appeal. These two determinations cannot readily be brought into harmony with the ordinary interpretation of conscience. They even seem to contradict it directly. We call the interpretation of conscience ordinary because, in characterizing the phenomenon and describing its "function," it keeps to what *one* knows as conscience, and to how one follows it or fails to follow it.

59.2 But *must* the ontological interpretation agree with the ordinary interpretation at all? Is the ordinary interpretation not subject to a suspicion that is ontological in principle? If Dasein in the first instance and for the most part understands itself in terms of what it is concerned with, and interprets all its comportments as concern, will it not interpret, in a falling and covering-over manner, precisely *that* mode of its Being which, as call, seeks to bring it back from its lostness in the concerns of the they? Everydayness takes Dasein as something ready-to-hand that is concerned with, that is, managed and reckoned up. "Life" is a "business," whether or not it covers its costs.

59.3 And so, with regard to the ordinary way of Being of Dasein itself, there is no guarantee that the interpretation of conscience arising from it, and the theories of conscience oriented toward that interpretation, have gained the appropriate ontological horizon for their interpretation. Nevertheless, ordinary experience of conscience too must somehow—pre-ontologically—hit upon the phenomenon. Two things follow from this. On the one hand, the everyday interpretation of conscience cannot count as the final criterion for the "objectivity" of an ontological analysis. On the other hand, this analysis has no right to disregard the

everyday understanding of conscience and to pass over the anthropological, psychological, and theological theories of conscience based on it. *If* the existential analysis has laid bare the phenomenon of conscience in its ontological rootedness, then it is precisely from this analysis that the ordinary interpretations must become intelligible—not least in where they miss the phenomenon, and why they cover it over. Since, however, within the problematic of this treatise the analysis of conscience stands only in the service of the fundamental ontological question, the characterization of the connection between the existential interpretation of conscience and the ordinary interpretation of conscience must content itself with pointing out the essential problems.

59.4 What the ordinary interpretation of conscience would like to object to the interpretation presented here, of conscience as the summons of care to Being-guilty, is fourfold: 1. Conscience has an essentially critical function. 2. Conscience speaks in each case relative to a definite deed that has been done or willed. 3. The "voice," as experience shows, is never related so radically to the Being of Dasein. 4. The interpretation takes no account of the basic forms of the phenomenon: the "evil" and the "good" conscience, the "reproving" and the "warning" conscience.

59.5 Let the discussion begin with the misgiving named last. In all interpretations of conscience the "evil," "bad" conscience has priority. Conscience is primarily "evil." This shows that every experience of conscience first experiences something like a "guilty." But how, in the idea of the bad conscience, is the making known of Being-evil understood? The "lived experience of conscience" turns up *after* the deed has been done or omitted. The voice follows upon the transgression and points back to the event that occurred through which Dasein has burdened itself with guilt. If conscience makes known a "Being-guilty," then this cannot take place as a summons to …, but only as a reminding reference back to the guilt that has been incurred.

59.6 But does the "fact" that the voice comes afterward rule out that the call is at bottom a calling-forth after all? That the voice

is conceived as a *subsequent* stirring of conscience does not yet prove a primordial understanding of the phenomenon of conscience. What if the factical incurring of guilt were only the occasion for the factical calling of conscience? What if the interpretation of the "evil" conscience just described stopped halfway? That this is so is evident from the ontological fore-having into which this interpretation brings the phenomenon. The voice is something that turns up, has its place in the sequence of present-at-hand lived experiences, and follows upon the lived experience of the deed. But neither the call nor the deed that has occurred nor the guilt taken on are occurrences with the character of something present-at-hand that runs its course. The call has the way of Being of care. In it Dasein "is" ahead of itself, in such a way that it at the same time directs itself back to its thrownness. Only the most immediate approach, which posits Dasein as a sequential nexus of lived experiences following one after another, makes it possible to take the voice as something that comes afterward, something later and therefore necessarily pointing back. The voice does call back, but beyond the deed that has occurred, back into the thrown Being-guilty that is "earlier" than any incurring of guilt. At the same time, however, the calling-back calls forth to *Being*-guilty as something to be seized in one's own existence, so that owned existentiell *Being*-guilty precisely "follows upon" the call, not the other way around. At bottom the bad conscience is so far from being merely reproving and pointing back that it rather calls back into thrownness by pointing forward. *The order of succession of lived experiences running their course does not give the phenomenal structure of existing.*

59.7 If even the characterization of the "bad" conscience does not reach the primordial phenomenon, this holds all the more of the characterization of the "good" conscience, whether one takes it as an independent form of conscience or as one essentially founded in the "bad" conscience. Just as the "bad" conscience makes known a "Being-evil," the "good" conscience would have to make known the "Being-good" of Dasein. It is easy

to see that in this way conscience, formerly the "emanation of divine power," now becomes the servant of Pharisaism. It is supposed to let human beings say of themselves: "I am good"; who can say that, and who would be less willing to affirm it of himself than precisely the good person? But this impossible consequence of the idea of the good conscience only brings to light that conscience calls a Being-guilty.

59.8 In order to escape this consequence, the "good" conscience has been interpreted as a privation of the "bad" one and defined as the "experienced lack of the bad conscience." It would accordingly be an experience of the call's not turning up, that is, of my having nothing to reproach myself with. But how is this "lack" *"experienced"*? The supposed experience is not the experiencing of a call at all, but a making sure that a deed attributed to Dasein was not committed by it and that it is *therefore* innocent. Becoming certain of not having done something does *not at all* have the character of a phenomenon of conscience. On the contrary: this becoming certain can rather mean a forgetting of conscience, that is, stepping out of the possibility of being able to be appealed to. This "certainty" harbors within it the tranquilizing suppression of wanting-to-have-a-conscience, that is,[7] of understanding one's ownmost, constant Being-guilty. The "good" conscience is neither an independent nor a founded form of conscience; that is, it is not a phenomenon of conscience at all.

59.9 Insofar as talk of a "good" conscience arises from the experience of conscience of everyday Dasein, everyday Dasein thereby only betrays that, even when it speaks of the "bad" conscience, it does not at bottom hit upon the phenomenon. For factically the idea of the "bad" conscience is oriented toward that of the "good" conscience. The everyday interpretation keeps to the dimension of concernful reckoning up and balancing of "guilt" and "innocence." It is within this horizon, then, that the voice of conscience is "experienced."

59.10 With the characterization of how primordial the ideas of a "bad" and a "good" conscience are, the distinction between a

conscience that points forward and warns and one that points back and reproves has also already been decided. The idea of the warning conscience seems, to be sure, to come closest to the phenomenon of the summons to .... It shares with the summons the character of pointing forward. But this agreement is only a semblance. The experience of a warning conscience, again, sees the voice only as oriented toward the willed deed, against which it wants to guard. The warning, however, as a check on what is willed, is possible only because the "warning" call aims at Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, that is, at understanding oneself in Being-guilty, on which what is "willed" first shatters. The warning conscience does not have the function of regulating, moment by moment, a remaining free of incurred guilt. The experience of a "warning" conscience, again, sees the calling tendency of conscience only so far as it remains accessible to the common sense of the they.

59.11 The misgiving named third appeals to the fact that everyday experience of conscience *knows nothing* of anything like being summoned to Being-guilty. This must be granted. But does everyday experience of conscience thereby already guarantee that the full possible content of the call of the voice of conscience has been heard in it? Does it follow that the theories of conscience based on the ordinary experience of conscience have assured themselves of the appropriate ontological horizon for analyzing the phenomenon? Does not an essential way of Being of Dasein, falling, rather show that this being ontically understands itself in the first instance and for the most part in terms of the horizon of concern, while ontologically it determines Being in the sense of presence-at-hand? But this gives rise to a twofold covering-over of the phenomenon. Theory sees a sequence of lived experiences or "psychic processes" that for the most part is even completely indeterminate in its way of Being. In experience, conscience is encountered as a judge and admonisher with whom Dasein negotiates, reckoning.

7 Heidegger plays on *Gewissen* (conscience) and *gewiß* (certain): "making sure" and "becoming certain" are *Sichvergewissern* and *Gewißwerden*.

59.12 That *Kant* bases his interpretation of conscience on the "idea of a court of justice" as its guiding idea is no accident; it is suggested by the idea of the moral *law*—although his concept of morality remains far removed from utilitarian morality and eudaemonism. The theory of value too, whether it is approached formally or materially, has a "metaphysics of morals," that is, an ontology of Dasein and of existence, as its unspoken ontological presupposition. Dasein counts as a being to be concerned with, and this concern has the meaning of "realizing values" or fulfilling norms.

59.13 Appealing to the range of what everyday experience of conscience knows, as the sole authority for the interpretation of conscience, can justify itself only when it has first considered whether conscience can become accessible in it at all in an owned way.

59.14 This also deprives of its force the further objection that the existential interpretation overlooks the fact that the call of conscience in each case relates to a definite deed that has been "realized" or willed. That the call is often experienced with such a calling tendency, again, cannot be denied. The only question is whether this experience of the call lets the call fully "call itself out." The commonsense interpretation may suppose that it is keeping to the "facts," and yet in the end, through its very common sense, it has already restricted the disclosive range of the call. Just as little as the "good" conscience can be put in the service of a "Pharisaism," just as little may the function of the "bad" conscience be reduced to indicating incurred guilt that is present-at-hand or warding off possible incurred guilt. As if Dasein were a "household" whose debts need only be duly balanced so that the self can stand, as an uninvolved spectator, "beside" these sequences of lived experience.

59.15 But if relatedness to factically "present-at-hand" guilt, or to a factically willed culpable deed, is not primary for the call, and if the "reproving" and "warning" conscience therefore do not express primordial functions of the call, then the ground is also cut from under the misgiving named first: that the existen-

tial interpretation fails to recognize the "essentially" *critical* achievement of conscience. This misgiving too springs from a view of the phenomenon that is genuine within certain limits. For in fact nothing can be pointed out in the content of the call that the voice "positively" recommends and commands. But how is this missing positivity of the achievement of conscience understood? Does the "negative" character of conscience follow from it?

59.16 A "positive" content in what is called is missed *because one expects to be given, in each case, usable information about available, calculable, secure possibilities of "taking action."* This expectation is grounded in the horizon of interpretation of commonsense concern, which forces Dasein's existing under the idea of a regulable course of business. Such expectations—which in part also underlie, unspoken, the demand for a *material* ethics of value as against a "merely" formal one—are indeed disappointed by conscience. The call of conscience gives no such "practical" instructions, *solely because* it summons Dasein to existence, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-a-self. With the expected, unambiguously calculable maxims, conscience would deny existence nothing less than—*the possibility of taking action*. But because conscience evidently cannot be "positive" in this way, it also does not function "merely negatively" in the same way.[8] The call discloses nothing that could be positive or negative as *something to be concerned with,* because it means a Being that is ontologically quite different: *existence*. In the existential sense, by contrast, the rightly understood call gives what is "most positive" of all, that is, the ownmost possibility that Dasein can present to itself, as a calling-back that calls forth into the factical potentiality-for-Being-a-self in each case. To hear the call in an owned way means bringing oneself into factical action. But we first gain the fully adequate interpretation of what is called in the

8 The contrast of a "material" and a "merely formal" ethics alludes to Max Scheler's *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* (1913–16), directed against Kant.

call by bringing out the existential structure that lies in the understanding of the appeal that *hears in an owned way*, as such.

59.17 First it was necessary to show how the phenomena that alone are familiar to the ordinary interpretation of conscience point back, when understood in an ontologically appropriate way, to the primordial meaning of the call of conscience; and then that the ordinary interpretation arises from the limitations of Dasein's falling self-interpretation and—because falling belongs to care itself—is by no means accidental either, *for all its self-evidence*.

59.18 The ontological critique of the ordinary interpretation of conscience could be subject to the misunderstanding that, in demonstrating the *existential* non-primordiality of everyday experience of conscience, some judgment was meant to be passed on the *existentiell* "moral quality" of the Dasein that keeps to that experience. Just as little as existence is necessarily and directly impaired by an ontologically inadequate understanding of conscience, just as little is the existentiell understanding of the call guaranteed by an existentially appropriate interpretation of conscience. Seriousness is no less possible in the ordinary experience of conscience than lack of seriousness is in a more primordial understanding of conscience. Nevertheless, the existentially more primordial interpretation also discloses *possibilities* of more primordial existentiell understanding, as long as ontological conceiving does not let itself be cut off from ontic experience.

§ 60. THE EXISTENTIAL STRUCTURE OF THE OWNED POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING ATTESTED IN CONSCIENCE

Wanting-to-have-a-conscience is resoluteness: reticent, anxious self-projection that discloses the situation.

60.1 The existential interpretation of conscience is meant to bring out an attestation of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being that *is* in Dasein itself. The way in which conscience attests is not an indifferent making-known. It is a summons that calls forth to Being-guilty. What is attested in this way is "grasped" in

the hearing that understands the call without distortion, in the sense the call itself intends. Understanding the appeal, as a *mode of Being* of Dasein, is what first gives the phenomenal content of what is attested in the call of conscience. We characterized the owned understanding of the call as wanting-to-have-a-conscience. This letting-the-ownmost-self-act-in-itself, out of itself, in its Being-guilty, represents phenomenally the owned potentiality-for-Being attested in Dasein itself. Its existential structure must now be laid bare. Only in this way do we advance to the basic constitution of the *ownness* of Dasein's existence, a constitution disclosed in Dasein itself.

60.2 As understanding oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, wanting-to-have-a-conscience is a way of Dasein's *disclosedness*. Besides understanding, disclosedness is constituted by attunement and discourse. Existentiell understanding means: projecting oneself upon the factical possibility of potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world that is in each case ownmost. But the *potentiality*-for-Being is understood only in existing in this possibility.

60.3 What mood corresponds to such understanding? Understanding the call discloses one's own Dasein in the uncanniness of its individualization. The uncanniness that is also revealed in understanding is genuinely disclosed by the attunement of anxiety that belongs to it. The fact of the *anxiety of conscience* is phenomenal confirmation that in understanding the call Dasein is brought before its own uncanniness. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes readiness for anxiety.

60.4 The third essential moment of disclosedness is *discourse*. To the call, as Dasein's primordial discourse, there corresponds no counter-discourse—let alone in the sense of negotiating back and forth about what conscience says. The understanding hearing of the call denies itself counter-discourse not because it has been overpowered by a "dark power" that forces it down, but because it appropriates the content of the call un-covered-over. The call brings one before constant Being-guilty and so fetches the self back from the loud idle talk of the common sense of the

they. Accordingly, the mode of articulating discourse that belongs to wanting-to-have-a-conscience is *reticence*. Keeping silent was characterized as an essential possibility of discourse. Whoever wants to give something to be understood by keeping silent must "have something to say." In the appeal, Dasein gives itself to understand its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Hence this calling is a keeping silent. The discourse of conscience never comes to utterance. Conscience calls only silently. That is, the call comes from the soundlessness of uncanniness, and it calls the Dasein it summons back, as a Dasein that is to become still, into the stillness of itself. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience therefore understands this silent discourse appropriately only in reticence. Reticence takes the word away from the commonsensical idle talk of the they.

60.5 The commonsense interpretation of conscience, which "sticks strictly to the facts," takes the silent discourse of conscience as an occasion to pass conscience off as something that is not ascertainable at all and not present-at-hand. That *one*, hearing and understanding only loud idle talk, cannot "establish" any call is blamed on conscience, with the excuse that it is "mute" and evidently not present-at-hand. With this interpretation the they merely covers over its own failure to hear the call and the shortened range of its "hearing."

60.6 The disclosedness of Dasein that lies in wanting-to-have-a-conscience is thus constituted by the attunement of anxiety, by understanding as self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive, owned disclosedness, attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—*the reticent self-projection, ready for anxiety, upon one's ownmost Being-guilty*—we call *resoluteness*.[9]

60.7 Resoluteness is a distinctive mode of Dasein's disclosedness. But disclosedness was earlier interpreted existentially as *primordial truth*. Primarily, this truth is not a quality of "judg-

9 German *Entschlossenheit* (resoluteness) echoes *Erschlossenheit* (disclosedness): both are built on *schließen*, "to lock," so that resoluteness literally suggests an "unclosedness."

ment," nor of any particular comportment at all, but an essential constituent of Being-in-the-world as such. Truth must be conceived as a fundamental existential. The ontological clarification of the proposition "Dasein is in the truth" pointed to the primordial disclosedness of this being as the *truth of existence*, and, for the delimitation of this truth, referred us to the analysis of Dasein's ownness.

60.8 Now, with resoluteness, we have reached the most primordial truth of Dasein, because it is *owned* truth. The disclosedness of the "there" discloses equiprimordially Being-in-the-world, in each case as a whole—that is, the world, Being-in, and the self that this being is as "I am." With the disclosedness of world, innerworldly beings are always already uncovered. The uncoveredness of what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand is grounded in the disclosedness of the world; for freeing the current totality of involvements of what is ready-to-hand requires a pre-understanding of significance. Understanding significance, Dasein in its concern assigns itself circumspectively to what is ready-to-hand as it is encountered. The understanding of significance, as disclosedness of the current world, is in turn grounded in the understanding of the for-the-sake-of-which, to which all uncovering of the totality of involvements goes back. The for-the-sake-of of finding shelter, of livelihood, of getting ahead: these are nearest and constant possibilities of Dasein, upon which this being, whose Being matters to it, has always already projected itself. Thrown into its "there," Dasein is factically, in each case, reliant on a definite "world"—its own. At one with this, its nearest factical projections are guided by concernful *lostness* in the they. This lostness can be appealed to by the Dasein that is in each case one's own, and the appeal can be understood in the manner of resoluteness. But this *owned* disclosedness then modifies equiprimordially both the uncoveredness of the "world" that is founded in it and the disclosedness of the Dasein-with of Others. The ready-to-hand "world" does not become different in its "content," the circle of Others is not exchanged, and yet understanding, concernful Being toward

what is ready-to-hand and solicitous Being-with the Others are now determined in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-a-self.

60.9 Resoluteness, as *owned Being-a-self*, does not detach Dasein from its world, does not isolate it into a free-floating I. How indeed could it—when, as owned disclosedness, it is nothing other than *Being-in-the-world in an owned way*? Resoluteness brings the self precisely into its current concernful Being alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being-with the Others.

60.10 From the for-the-sake-of-which of the potentiality-for-Being it has chosen for itself, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Resoluteness toward itself first brings Dasein into the possibility of letting the Others who are with it "be" in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and of co-disclosing this potentiality in leaping-ahead-and-freeing solicitude. Resolute Dasein can become the "conscience" of Others. It is from the owned Being-a-self of resoluteness that owned with-one-another first arises—not from ambiguous and jealous arrangements and talkative fraternizing in the they and in what one wants to undertake.

60.11 In its ontological essence, resoluteness is in each case that of a particular factical Dasein. The essence of this being is its existence. Resoluteness "exists" only as understanding, self-projecting resolution. But upon what does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness? To what is it to resolve? *Only* the resolution itself can give the answer. It would be a complete misunderstanding of the phenomenon of resoluteness to think that it is merely a receptive taking hold of possibilities that have been laid before one and recommended. *The resolution is precisely what first discloses, projects, and determines the current factical possibility.* To resoluteness there necessarily *belongs* the *indefiniteness* that characterizes every factically thrown potentiality-for-Being of Dasein. Resoluteness is sure of itself only as resolution. But the *existentiell indefiniteness* of resoluteness, which in each case first

becomes definite in the resolution, nevertheless has its *existential definiteness*.

60.12 The what-for of resoluteness is ontologically prefigured in the existentiality of Dasein in general, as potentiality-for-Being in the manner of concernful solicitude. As care, however, Dasein is determined by facticity and falling. Disclosed in its "there," it maintains itself equiprimordially in truth and untruth. This holds "in an owned way" precisely of resoluteness as owned truth. Resoluteness appropriates untruth in an owned way. Dasein is always already, and perhaps soon again, in irresoluteness. This term expresses only the phenomenon that was interpreted as being delivered up to the prevailing interpretedness of the they. As they-self, Dasein is "lived" by the commonsense ambiguity of publicness, in which no one resolves and which has nevertheless always already decided. Resoluteness means letting oneself be summoned out of lostness in the they. The irresoluteness of the they nonetheless remains dominant; only it cannot challenge resolute existence. As the counterconcept to resoluteness understood existentially, irresoluteness does not mean an ontic-psychical condition in the sense of being burdened with inhibitions. Even the resolution remains reliant on the they and its world. Understanding this is part of what the resolution discloses, insofar as it is resoluteness that first gives Dasein owned transparency. In resoluteness Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being matters to it—a potentiality that, as thrown, can project itself only upon definite factical possibilities. The resolution does not withdraw from "reality"; rather, it first uncovers what is factically possible—in such a way that it seizes it as it is possible as ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the they. The existential definiteness of the resolute Dasein that is possible in each case encompasses the constitutive moments of an existential phenomenon we have so far passed over, which we call situation.

60.13 In the term situation (*Lage*—"in der Lage sein," "to be in a position to") a spatial meaning resonates. We shall not try to eradicate it from the existential concept. For it lies also in the

"there" of Dasein. To Being-in-the-world there belongs a spatiality of its own, characterized by the phenomena of de-severance and directionality. Dasein "makes room" insofar as it factically exists. But the spatiality proper to Dasein, on the basis of which existence in each case determines its "location," is grounded in the constitution of Being-in-the-world. The primary constituent of this constitution is disclosedness. Just as the spatiality of the "there" is grounded in disclosedness, so the situation has its foundations in resoluteness. The situation is the "there" disclosed in each case in resoluteness—the "there" as which the existing being is there.[10] The situation is not a present-at-hand frame in which Dasein turns up, or into which it might even just bring itself. Far removed from any present-at-hand mixture of the circumstances and accidents we encounter, the situation *is* only through and in resoluteness. Only when the self is resolute for the "there" as which, in existing, it has to be, does the current factical involvement-character of the circumstances disclose itself to it. Only to resoluteness can what we call accidents *be-fall* from the with-world and the environment.[11]

60.14 *To the they, by contrast, the situation is essentially closed off.* The they knows only the *"general position,"* loses itself in the nearest *"opportunities,"* and sustains Dasein by reckoning up the "accidents," which, failing to recognize them for what they are, it takes for its own achievement and passes off as such.

60.15 Resoluteness brings the Being of the "there" into the existence of its situation. But resoluteness delimits the existential structure of the owned potentiality-for-Being attested in conscience, of wanting-to-have-a-conscience. In this we recognized the appropriate understanding of the appeal. From this it becomes fully clear that the call of conscience, when it summons to potentiality-for-Being, does not hold up an empty ideal of existence but *calls forth into the situation*. This existential positivity of the rightly understood call of conscience at the same time makes clear to what extent restricting the tendency of the

10 *Lage* means "position" or "site"; the idiom *in der Lage sein* means "to be able to."
11 *Zu-fallen* (to fall to someone, befall) plays on *Zufälle* (accidents, chance events).

call to guilt that has been incurred or is being contemplated fails to recognize the disclosive character of conscience, and only apparently conveys to us a concrete understanding of its voice. The existential interpretation of understanding the appeal as resoluteness reveals conscience as the way of Being, enclosed in the ground of Dasein, in which Dasein—attesting its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—makes its factical existence possible for itself.

60.16 This phenomenon, brought out under the heading of resoluteness, can hardly be lumped together with an empty "habitus" and an indefinite "velleity." Resoluteness does not first represent a situation to itself by taking note of it; it has already placed itself in it. As resolute, Dasein already *acts*. We are deliberately avoiding the term "action." For in the first place it would, after all, have to be taken so broadly that activity would also encompass the passivity of resistance. In the second place it suggests a misunderstanding in the ontology of Dasein: that resoluteness is a special comportment of the practical faculty as opposed to a theoretical one.[12] But care, as concernful solicitude, embraces the Being of Dasein so primordially and wholly that it must in each case already be presupposed as a whole when theoretical and practical comportment are distinguished. It cannot first be pieced together out of these faculties with the help of a dialectic that is necessarily groundless because existentially ungrounded. *Resoluteness, however, is only the ownness of care itself, cared for in care and possible as care.*

60.17 To present the factical existentiell possibilities in their main features and interconnections, and to interpret them according to their existential structure, falls within the range of tasks of a thematic existential anthropology. For the fundamental-ontological purpose of the present investigation, the existential delimitation of the owned potentiality-for-Being that is attested in conscience, out of Dasein itself, for Dasein itself, is sufficient.

12 *Habitus* (a settled disposition) and *velleitas* (a mere inclination without will) are terms of scholastic philosophy.

60.18 With the working out of resoluteness as the reticent self-projection, ready for anxiety, upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, the investigation is put in a position to delimit the ontological meaning of the *owned* potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Dasein that we have been seeking. Dasein's ownness is now neither an empty title nor an invented idea. But even so, owned Being-toward-death, existentially deduced as owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, still remains a purely existential projection, lacking an attestation in terms of Dasein. Only when this attestation has been found does the investigation satisfy what its problematic requires: the demonstration of an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Dasein that has been existentially confirmed and clarified. For only when this being has become phenomenally accessible in its ownness and wholeness does the question of the meaning of the Being of *this* being—to whose existence an understanding of Being in general belongs—come onto ground that can stand the test.

Division Two, Chapter III: The Authentic Potentiality-for-Being-a-Whole of Dasein, and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care

Zweiter Abschnitt. Drittes Kapitel: Das eigentliche Ganzseinkönnen des Daseins und die Zeitlichkeit als der ontologische Sinn der Sorge
§§61–66

§ 61. PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE METHODOLOGICAL STEP FROM THE DELIMITATION OF DASEIN'S OWNED BEING-A-WHOLE TO THE PHENOMENAL LAYING BARE OF TEMPORALITY

The task is to join anticipation and resoluteness and so reach temporality as care's meaning.

61.1 An owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Dasein was projected existentially. The analysis of the phenomenon revealed owned Being-toward-death as *anticipation*. Dasein's owned potentiality-for-Being was shown in its existentiell attestation and at the same time interpreted existentially as *resoluteness*. How are these two phenomena to be brought together? Did not the ontological projection of the owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole lead into a dimension of Dasein that lies far from the phenomenon of resoluteness? What is death supposed to have in common with the "concrete situation" of action? Does not the attempt to force resoluteness and anticipation together lead us astray into an intolerable, thoroughly unphenomenological con-

struction that can no longer even claim for itself the character of a phenomenally grounded ontological projection?

61.2 An external binding-together of the two phenomena rules itself out. There still remains, as the only methodically possible way, to start from the phenomenon of resoluteness as attested in its existentiell possibility and to ask: *Does resoluteness, in its ownmost existentiell tendency of Being, itself point ahead to anticipatory resoluteness as its ownmost owned possibility?* What if resoluteness, by its own meaning, were to bring itself into its ownness only once it projects itself not upon arbitrary possibilities, each merely the nearest, but upon the uttermost possibility—the one that lies ahead of every factical potentiality-for-Being of Dasein and, as such, enters more or less undisguisedly into every potentiality-for-Being of Dasein that is factically seized? What if resoluteness, as the *owned* truth of Dasein, were to reach the *owned certainty that belongs to it* only in anticipation of death? What if only in *anticipation* of death were every factical "*provisionality*" of resolving understood in an owned way—that is, existentielly *caught up with*?[1]

61.3 As long as the existential interpretation does not forget that the thematic being given to it in advance has the way of Being of *Dasein*, and cannot be pieced together into something present-at-hand out of present-at-hand pieces, its steps must all be guided by the idea of *existence*. For the question of the possible connection between anticipation and resoluteness, this means nothing less than the demand to project these existential phenomena upon the existentiell possibilities prefigured in them, and to "think these through to the end" existentially. In this way the working out of anticipatory resoluteness as an existentielly possible owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole loses the character of an arbitrary construction. It becomes the interpretive freeing of Dasein *for* its uttermost possibility of existence.

61.4 With this step the existential interpretation at the same time makes known its ownmost methodical character. Up to

now—apart from remarks that were occasionally necessary—explicit methodological discussions have been set aside. The task was first of all to "advance" to the phenomena. *Before* the meaning of the Being of the being revealed in its basic phenomenal content is laid bare, the course of the investigation needs a pause—not for the sake of "rest," but to give the investigation a sharpened impetus.

61.5 Genuine method is grounded in an appropriate preview of the basic constitution of the "object," or domain of objects, to be disclosed. Genuine methodological reflection—which is to be clearly distinguished from empty discussions of technique—therefore at the same time provides insight into the way of Being of the thematic being. Clarifying the methodological possibilities, requirements, and limits of the existential analytic in general is what first secures the necessary transparency for its ground-laying step, the revealing of the meaning of the Being of care. *But the interpretation of the ontological meaning of care must be carried out on the basis of a full and constant phenomenological making-present of the existential constitution of Dasein brought out so far.*

61.6 Dasein is ontologically different in principle from everything present-at-hand and real. Its "subsistence" is grounded not in the substantiality of a substance but in the "*self-constancy*" of the existing self, whose Being was conceived as care. The phenomenon of the *self*, included in care, needs a primordial and owned existential delimitation, as opposed to the preparatory demonstration of the unowned they-self. Along with this goes a fixing of the possible ontological questions that are to be addressed to the "self" at all, if indeed it is neither substance nor subject.[2]

61.7 We then question the phenomenon of care, only thus sufficiently clarified, as to its ontological meaning. The determina-

1 *Vorlaufen* (anticipation) and *Vorläufigkeit* (provisionality) share a root; *einholen* means to catch up with, overtake.

2 *Selbständigkeit* ordinarily means "independence"; Heidegger hears in it the self's standing, its constancy (*Ständigkeit*).

tion of this meaning becomes the laying bare of temporality. This demonstration does not lead into remote, separate domains of Dasein; it only grasps the entire phenomenal content of Dasein's basic existential constitution in the ultimate foundations of its own ontological intelligibility. *Temporality is experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein's owned Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness.* If temporality makes itself known primordially here, then presumably the temporality of anticipatory resoluteness is a distinctive mode of temporality itself. Temporality can *temporalize* itself in various possibilities and in various ways. The basic possibilities of existence, the ownness and unownness of Dasein, are grounded ontologically in possible temporalizings of temporality.

61.8 If the ontological character of its own Being is already remote from Dasein, given the predominance of the falling understanding of Being (Being as presence-at-hand), then the primordial foundations of this Being are all the more so. It should therefore not be surprising if at first glance temporality does not correspond to what is accessible to the ordinary understanding as "time." The concept of time found in the ordinary experience of time, and the problematic that grows out of that experience, therefore cannot function without examination as criteria for the appropriateness of an interpretation of time. Rather, the investigation must *beforehand* familiarize itself with the primordial phenomenon of temporality, so as to illuminate, *from it* first of all, the necessity and the kind of origin of the ordinary understanding of time, as well as the ground of its dominance.

61.9 The primordial phenomenon of temporality is secured by showing that all the fundamental structures of Dasein brought out so far are at bottom "temporal" with regard to their possible wholeness, unity, and unfolding, and are to be conceived as modes of the temporalizing of temporality. Thus, from the laying bare of temporality, the existential analytic acquires the task of *repeating* the analysis of Dasein already carried out, in the sense of an interpretation of the essential structures with regard

to their temporality. Temporality itself prefigures the basic directions of the analyses this requires. Accordingly, the chapter is divided as follows: Dasein's existentielly owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole as anticipatory resoluteness (§ 62); the hermeneutical situation gained for an interpretation of the meaning of the Being of care, and the methodical character of the existential analytic in general (§ 63); care and selfhood (§ 64); temporality as the ontological meaning of care (§ 65); Dasein's temporality and the tasks arising from it of a primordial repetition of the existential analysis (§ 66).

§ 62. DASEIN'S EXISTENTIELLY OWNED POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING-A-WHOLE AS ANTICIPATORY RESOLUTENESS

Resoluteness becomes owned and whole only as anticipation of death: anticipatory resoluteness.

62.1 To what extent does resoluteness, "thought through to the end" in accordance with its ownmost tendency of Being, lead to owned Being-toward-death? How is the connection between wanting-to-have-a-conscience and Dasein's existentially projected owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole to be conceived? Does welding the two together yield a new phenomenon? Or does it remain with resoluteness as attested in its existentiell possibility—in such a way that resoluteness can undergo an *existentiell modalization* through Being-toward-death? But what does it mean to "think through to the end" existentially the phenomenon of resoluteness?

62.2 Resoluteness was characterized as the reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, a self-projection that demands anxiety of itself. Being-guilty belongs to the Being of Dasein and means: *Being*-the-null-ground of a nullity. The "guilty" that belongs to the Being of Dasein admits neither of increase nor of decrease. It lies *before* any quantification, if quantification has any meaning at all. Nor is Dasein essentially guilty *at times* and *then again not* guilty. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience resolves upon this Being-guilty. It lies in the very meaning of resoluteness to project itself upon this Being-guilty, which

Dasein is *as long as it is*. The existentiell taking over of this "guilt" in resoluteness is therefore carried out in an owned way only when resoluteness, in its disclosing of Dasein, has become so transparent to itself that it understands Being-guilty *as constant*. But this understanding becomes possible only if Dasein discloses to itself its potentiality-for-Being "up to its end." Existentially, however, Dasein's *Being-at-an-end* means: Being *toward* the end. Resoluteness becomes, in an owned way, what it can be *as understanding Being-toward-the-end*—that is, as anticipation of death. Resoluteness does not merely "have" a connection with anticipation as with something other than itself. *It harbors owned Being-toward-death within itself as the possible existentiell modality of its own ownness.* This "connection" must be made clear phenomenally.

62.3 Resoluteness means: letting oneself be called forth to one's ownmost *Being*-guilty. Being-*guilty* belongs to the Being of Dasein itself, which we determined primarily as potentiality-for-Being. "Dasein 'is' constantly guilty" can only mean that it always maintains itself in this Being as owned or unowned existing. Being-guilty is not merely an abiding property of something constantly present-at-hand, but the *existentiell possibility* of *being* guilty in an owned or unowned way. The "guilty" *is* in each case only in the current factical potentiality-for-Being. Because it belongs to the *Being* of Dasein, Being-guilty must therefore be conceived as potentiality-for-Being-guilty. Resoluteness projects itself upon this potentiality-for-Being, that is, understands itself in it. This understanding therefore maintains itself in a primordial possibility of Dasein. It maintains itself *in it* in an *owned* way when resoluteness primordially is what it tends to be. But we revealed Dasein's primordial Being toward its potentiality-for-Being as Being-toward-death, that is, toward the distinctive possibility of Dasein that has been characterized. Anticipation discloses this possibility as possibility. Resoluteness therefore becomes a primordial Being toward Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being only *as anticipatory*. Resoluteness understands the

"can" of the potentiality-for-Being-guilty only when it "qualifies" itself as Being-toward-death.

62.4 When resolute, Dasein takes over in an owned way, in its existence, the fact that it *is* the null ground of its nullity. We conceived death existentially as the possibility, characterized above, of the *im*-possibility of existence, that is, as the utter nullity of Dasein. Death is not tacked onto Dasein at its "end"; rather, as care, Dasein is the thrown (that is, null) ground of its death. The nullity that primordially pervades the Being of Dasein reveals itself to Dasein itself in owned Being-toward-death. Anticipation first makes Being-guilty manifest from the ground of the *whole* Being of Dasein. Care harbors death and guilt equiprimordially within itself. Only anticipatory resoluteness understands the potentiality-for-Being-guilty *in an owned way and wholly*, that is, *primordially*.

62.5 Understanding the call of conscience reveals lostness in the they. Resoluteness fetches Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-a-self. One's own potentiality-for-Being becomes transparent in an owned way and wholly in understanding Being-toward-death as toward the *ownmost* possibility.

62.6 In its appeal, the call of conscience passes over all of Dasein's "worldly" standing and abilities. Relentlessly, it individualizes Dasein down to its potentiality-for-Being-guilty, which it asks Dasein to be in an owned way. The unbroken sharpness of the essential individualization down to one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being is disclosed by anticipation of death as the *non-relational* possibility. Anticipatory resoluteness lets the potentiality-for-Being-guilty, as ownmost and non-relational, strike wholly home in its conscience.

62.7 Wanting-to-have-a-conscience means readiness for the appeal to one's ownmost Being-guilty, which has always already determined factical Dasein *before* any factical incurring of guilt and *after* it has been paid off. This prior and constant Being-guilty first shows itself uncovered in its priority when this priority is placed within the possibility that is utterly *not to be outstripped* for Dasein. When resoluteness, anticipating, has *caught*

up the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being, Dasein's owned existence can no longer be *outstripped* by anything.

62.8 With the phenomenon of resoluteness we were led before the primordial *truth* of existence. As resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical potentiality-for-Being, in such a way that Dasein itself *is* this revealing and Being-revealed. To truth there belongs in each case a corresponding holding-for-true. The explicit appropriation of what is disclosed or uncovered is Being-certain. The primordial truth of existence requires an equiprimordial Being-certain, as maintaining oneself in what resoluteness discloses. Resoluteness *gives* itself the current factical situation and *brings* itself into it. The situation cannot be calculated in advance and given in advance like something present-at-hand waiting to be grasped. It is disclosed only in a free resolving, undetermined beforehand but open to determinability. *What, then, does the certainty that belongs to such resoluteness mean?* It is to maintain itself in what is disclosed by the resolution. But this means: it precisely cannot *become rigidly fixed* on the situation; it must understand that the resolution, in accordance with its own disclosive meaning, must be kept free and *held open* for the current factical possibility. The certainty of the resolution means: *keeping oneself free for* its possible and, in each case, factically necessary *taking back*. Such holding-for-true on the part of resoluteness (as truth of existence), however, by no means lets one fall back into irresoluteness. On the contrary: this holding-for-true, as resolutely keeping oneself free for taking back, is *owned resoluteness toward the repetition of itself*. But precisely with this, lostness in irresoluteness is existentielly undermined. The holding-for-true that belongs to resoluteness tends, by its meaning, to keep itself free *constantly*, that is, for Dasein's *whole* potentiality-for-Being. This constant certainty is guaranteed to resoluteness only by its comporting itself toward the possibility of which it can *be* utterly certain. In its death Dasein must utterly "take itself back." Constantly certain of this

—that is, *anticipating*—resoluteness gains its owned and whole certainty.

62.9 But Dasein is equiprimordially in untruth. Anticipatory resoluteness at the same time gives it the primordial certainty of its closedness. Anticipatorily resolute, Dasein *holds* itself open for the constant lostness in the irresoluteness of the they, a lostness possible from the ground of its own Being. Irresoluteness, as a constant possibility of Dasein, is *co-certain*. Resoluteness that is transparent to itself understands that the *indefiniteness* of the potentiality-for-Being becomes definite in each case only in the resolution upon the current situation. It knows about the indefiniteness that pervades a being that exists. But if this knowing is to correspond to owned resoluteness, it must itself arise from an owned disclosing. The *indefiniteness* of one's own potentiality-for-Being—even though it has in each case become certain in the resolution—is revealed *wholly* only in Being-toward-death. Anticipation brings Dasein before a possibility that remains constantly certain and yet at every moment indefinite as to when the possibility becomes impossibility. It makes manifest that this being is thrown into the indefiniteness of its "limit-situation," and in being resolute toward this, Dasein gains its owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. The indefiniteness of death is disclosed primordially in anxiety. But this primordial anxiety is what resoluteness strives to demand of itself. It clears away every covering-over of Dasein's being abandoned to itself. The nothing before which anxiety brings us reveals the nullity that determines Dasein in its *ground*—a ground that itself is as thrownness into death.[3]

62.10 The analysis revealed, one after another, the *moments of modalization* that arise from owned Being-toward-death as toward the ownmost, non-relational, not-to-be-outstripped, certain, and yet indefinite possibility—moments toward which resoluteness tends of itself. Resoluteness is, in an owned way and wholly, what it can be only as *anticipatory resoluteness*.

3 "Limit-situation" (*Grenzsituation*) is a term of Karl Jaspers, from his *Psychology of Worldviews* (1919).

62.11 Conversely, however, only the interpretation of the "connection" between resoluteness and anticipation has reached the full existential understanding of anticipation itself. Up to now anticipation could count only as an ontological projection. Now it has been shown that anticipation is not a possibility invented and forced upon Dasein, but the *mode* of an existentiell potentiality-for-Being attested in Dasein—a mode that Dasein demands of itself, if indeed it understands itself in an owned way as resolute. Anticipation "is" not in the manner of a free-floating comportment; it must be conceived as *the possibility of its ownness hidden in existentielly attested resoluteness, and therefore attested along with it*. Owned "thinking about death" is wanting-to-have-a-conscience that has become existentielly transparent to itself.

62.12 If resoluteness, as owned, tends toward the mode delimited by anticipation, and anticipation constitutes Dasein's owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, then in existentielly attested resoluteness an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Dasein is attested along with it. *The question of the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is a factical-existentiell one. Dasein answers it as resolute.* The question of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has now completely shed the character it showed at the start, as though it were merely a theoretical, methodological question of the analytic of Dasein, arising from the effort to have a complete "givenness" of the whole of Dasein. The question of Dasein's wholeness, discussed at first only ontologically and methodologically, had its justification—but only because the ground of that justification goes back to an ontic possibility of Dasein.

62.13 Clarifying the "connection" between anticipation and resoluteness, in the sense of the possible modalization of the latter by the former, has become the phenomenal demonstration of an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Dasein. If with this phenomenon we have hit upon a mode of Being of Dasein in which it brings itself to and before itself, then this phenomenon must remain ontically and ontologically unintelligible to the everyday, commonsense interpretation of Dasein by the they. It would be a misunderstanding to push this existentiell possibility aside

as "unproven," or else to want to "prove" it theoretically. Nevertheless, the phenomenon needs protection against the crudest distortions.

62.14 Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way out, invented in order to "overcome" death. It is the understanding that follows the call of conscience and that frees for death the possibility of becoming *master* of Dasein's *existence* and of dispersing, at bottom, every fugitive self-covering-over. Nor does wanting-to-have-a-conscience, determined as Being-toward-death, mean a world-fleeing seclusion; it brings one, without illusions, into the resoluteness of "action." Nor again does anticipatory resoluteness stem from an "idealistic" demand that soars above existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of basic factical possibilities of Dasein. Together with the sober anxiety that brings one before the individualized potentiality-for-Being goes an armed joy in this possibility. In it Dasein becomes free from the "contingencies" of being entertained, which busy curiosity procures for itself primarily from the events of the world. The analysis of these basic moods, however, goes beyond the limits drawn for the present interpretation by its fundamental-ontological aim.

62.15 But does not the ontological interpretation of Dasein's existence that has been carried out rest on a definite ontic conception of owned existence, a factical ideal of Dasein? That is indeed so. Not only must this fact not be denied, nor conceded under compulsion; it must be grasped in its *positive necessity* from the thematic object of the investigation. Philosophy will never want to dispute its "presuppositions," but neither may it merely admit them. It grasps the presuppositions and, together with them, brings that for which they are presuppositions to a more penetrating unfolding. This is the function of the methodological reflection now required.

§ 63. THE HERMENEUTICAL SITUATION GAINED FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF THE BEING OF CARE, AND THE METHODOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC IN GENERAL

The analysis defends its "violence" and its circle as belonging to understanding itself.

63.1 With anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein has been made phenomenally visible with regard to its possible ownness and wholeness. The hermeneutical situation, which was previously insufficient for interpreting the meaning of the Being of care, has acquired the required primordiality. Dasein has been placed in the fore-having primordially, that is, with regard to its owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. The guiding fore-sight, the idea of existence, has gained its definiteness through the clarification of the ownmost potentiality-for-Being. And with Dasein's structure of Being worked out concretely, its ontological distinctiveness over against everything present-at-hand has become so clear that the fore-conception of Dasein's existentiality has sufficient articulation to guide securely the conceptual working out of the existentials.

63.2 The path of the analytic of Dasein traversed so far has become the concrete demonstration of the thesis that was merely thrown out at the beginning: *The being that we ourselves are in each case is ontologically the farthest.* The reason for this lies in care itself. Falling Being alongside what is nearest concerned with in the "world" guides the everyday interpretation of Dasein and ontically covers over the owned Being of Dasein, thereby denying the ontology directed at this being its appropriate basis. That is why the primordial phenomenal presentation of this being is anything but self-evident, even if ontology initially follows the pull of the everyday interpretation of Dasein. Rather, the laying bare of the primordial Being of Dasein must be *wrested* from Dasein *in opposition to* the falling ontic-ontological tendency of interpretation.

63.3 Not only the demonstration of the most elementary structures of Being-in-the-world, the delimitation of the concept of world, the clarification of the nearest and average who of this being—the they-self—and the interpretation of the "there," but above all the analyses of care, death, conscience, and guilt show *how*, in Dasein itself, concernful common sense has taken control of the potentiality-for-Being and its disclosure, that is, its closing-off.

63.4 The *way of Being* of Dasein therefore *demands* of an ontological interpretation that has set itself the goal of primordiality in phenomenal demonstration *that it conquer the Being of this being against this being's own tendency to cover over.* For the claims—or rather the complacency and tranquilized self-evidence—of the everyday interpretation, existential analysis therefore constantly has the character of *violence*. This character does indeed especially distinguish the ontology of Dasein, but it belongs to every interpretation, because the understanding that develops in interpretation has the structure of projecting. But is there not in each case a specific *guidance* and *regulation* for this? And where are ontological projections to get the evidence of phenomenal appropriateness for their "findings"? Ontological interpretation projects a being given in advance upon the Being proper to it, so as to bring it to a concept with regard to its structure. Where are the signposts for the direction of the projection, so that it hits upon Being at all? And what if the being that becomes thematic for the existential analytic even conceals, *in* its way of being, the Being that belongs to it? Answering these questions must at first be restricted to the clarification of the analytic of Dasein that they call for.

63.5 Self-interpretation belongs to the Being of Dasein. In the circumspective-concernful uncovering of the "world," concern is also sighted. Dasein factically always already understands itself in definite existentiell possibilities, even if its projections stem only from the common sense of the they. Existence is, whether explicitly or not, whether appropriately or not, somehow understood along with this. Every ontic understanding has

its "implications," even if these are only *pre*-ontological, that is, not grasped theoretically-thematically. Every ontologically explicit question about the Being of Dasein has already been prepared for by Dasein's way of Being.

63.6 But nevertheless, from what can we tell what makes up the "owned" existence of Dasein? Without an existentiell understanding, all analysis of existentiality surely remains groundless. Does not the interpretation of Dasein's ownness and wholeness that has been carried out rest on an ontic conception of existence that may be possible but need not be binding for everyone? Existential interpretation will never want to take it upon itself to issue a decree about existentiell possibilities and obligations. But must it not justify itself with regard to *those* existentiell possibilities with which it gives the ontological interpretation its ontic ground? If the Being of Dasein is essentially potentiality-for-Being and Being-free for its ownmost possibilities, and if Dasein exists in each case only in freedom for them or in unfreedom against them, can ontological interpretation then do anything other than take *ontic possibilities* (ways of the potentiality-for-Being) as its basis and project *these* upon *their ontological possibility*? And if Dasein for the most part interprets itself in terms of lostness in concern with the "world," is not the determination of the ontic-existentiell possibilities gained in opposition to this, together with the existential analysis grounded on it, the way of disclosing this being that is appropriate to it? *Does not the violence of the projection then become the freeing of the undisguised phenomenal content of Dasein?*

63.7 The "violent" presentation of possibilities of existence may be methodically required—but can it be withdrawn from free caprice? If the analytic takes anticipatory resoluteness as its basis, as an existentielly owned potentiality-for-Being—a possibility to which Dasein itself summons, and does so from the ground of its existence—is this possibility then an *arbitrary* one? Is the mode of Being in which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being comports itself toward its distinctive possibility, death, one that

has been picked up by chance? *Does Being-in-the-world have a higher authority for its potentiality-for-Being than its death?*

63.8 The ontic-ontological projection of Dasein upon an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole may even be non-arbitrary—but does this already justify the existential interpretation carried out on this phenomenon? Where does it get its guiding thread, if not from a "presupposed" idea of existence in general? By what were the steps of the analysis of unowned everydayness regulated, if not by the concept of existence that had been posited? And when we say that Dasein "falls," and that the ownness of its potentiality-for-Being must therefore be wrested from it in opposition to this tendency of Being—from what standpoint are we speaking? Is not everything, however dimly, already illuminated by the light of the "presupposed" idea of existence? Where does this idea get its right? Was the first projection that pointed to it without guidance? By no means.

63.9 The formal indication of the idea of existence was guided by the understanding of Being that lies in Dasein itself. Without any ontological transparency, this understanding nonetheless reveals: the being that we call Dasein is in each case I myself, and indeed as a potentiality-for-Being to which it matters to be this being. Dasein understands itself as Being-in-the-world, although without adequate ontological definiteness. Being in this way, it encounters beings with the way of Being of what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand. However far the distinction between existence and reality may be from an ontological concept, and even if Dasein at first understands existence as reality, Dasein is not merely present-at-hand; it has always already *understood itself*, in whatever mythical and magical interpretation. For otherwise it would not "live" in a myth and would not attend to its magic in rite and cult. The idea of existence we have posited is the existentielly nonbinding prefiguring of the formal structure of the understanding of Dasein in general.

63.10 Under the guidance of this idea, the preparatory analysis of nearest everydayness was carried out, up to the first concep-

tual delimitation of care. This phenomenon made possible a sharper grasp of existence and of the relations to facticity and falling that belong to it. The delimitation of the structure of care provided the basis for a first ontological distinction between existence and reality. This led to the thesis: the substance of the human being is existence.

63.11 But even this formal and existentielly nonbinding idea of existence already harbors within itself a definite, if not yet brought to light, ontological "content," which, just like the idea of reality delimited over against it, "presupposes" an idea of Being in general. Only within the horizon of *that* idea can the distinction between existence and reality be made. After all, both mean *Being*.

63.12 But is not the ontologically clarified idea of Being in general first to be gained by working out the understanding of Being that belongs to Dasein? This understanding, however, can be grasped primordially only on the basis of a primordial interpretation of Dasein guided by the idea of existence. Does it not thus finally become entirely obvious that the fundamental-ontological problem we have unfolded moves in a "circle"?

63.13 It is true that in analyzing the structure of understanding in general we already showed that what is faulted with the inappropriate expression "circle" belongs to the essence and distinctive character of understanding itself. Nevertheless, with a view to clarifying the hermeneutical situation of the fundamental-ontological problematic, the investigation must now come back explicitly to the "circle argument." The "circle objection" raised against the existential interpretation amounts to this: the idea of existence and of Being in general is "presupposed," and Dasein is interpreted "accordingly," in order to gain from this the idea of Being. But what does "presupposing" mean? With the idea of existence, is a proposition posited from which we deduce further propositions about the Being of Dasein according to the formal rules of consequence? Or does this presupposing have the character of understanding projection, in such a way that the interpretation that develops such under-

standing *precisely lets what is to be interpreted have its say for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord whether, as this being, it yields the constitution of Being upon which it was disclosed in the projection by way of formal indication?* Can beings have their say with regard to their Being in any other way at all? In the existential analytic a "circle" in proof cannot even be "avoided," because it does not prove according to the rules of the "logic of consequence" *at all*. What common sense, supposing that it is meeting the highest rigor of scientific investigation, wishes to eliminate by avoiding the "circle" is nothing less than the basic structure of care. Primordially constituted by care, Dasein is always already ahead-of-itself. In being, it has always already projected itself upon definite possibilities of its existence, and in such existentiell projections it has pre-ontologically co-projected something like existence and Being. But can this projecting, which is essential to Dasein, then be denied to research—research that, *like all research, is itself a way of Being of disclosing Dasein*, and that seeks to develop the understanding of Being belonging to existence and bring it to a concept?

63.14 The "circle objection," however, itself comes from a way of Being of Dasein. To the common sense of concernful absorption in the they, something like a projecting, let alone an ontological one, necessarily remains strange, because common sense "on principle" shuts itself off from it. Whether "theoretically" or "practically," common sense concerns itself only with beings that can be surveyed circumspectively. What distinguishes common sense is that it thinks it experiences only "factual" beings, so that it can rid itself of an understanding of Being. It fails to see that beings can be "factually" experienced only when Being has already been understood, even if not conceived. Common sense misunderstands understanding. And *that is why* it must also necessarily pass off as "violent" whatever lies beyond the reach of its understanding, or any going beyond toward it.

63.15 Talk of the "circle" of understanding expresses a twofold failure to see: 1. that understanding itself makes up a basic kind of the Being of Dasein; 2. that this Being is constituted as care.

To deny the circle, to conceal it, or even to want to overcome it, means to entrench this failure to see once and for all. Rather, the effort must aim at leaping into this "circle" primordially and wholly, so as to secure for oneself, already at the start of the analysis of Dasein, a full view of Dasein's circular Being. Not too much but *too little* is "presupposed" for the ontology of Dasein if one "starts out" from a worldless I, only to provide it afterward with an object and an ontologically groundless relation to that object. *The gaze does not reach far enough* when "life" is made the problem *and then death is also taken into account on occasion*. The thematic object is *artificially and dogmatically curtailed* when one restricts oneself "initially" to a "theoretical subject," in order then to supplement it "on the practical side" with an appended "ethics."

63.16 This may suffice to clarify the existential meaning of the hermeneutical situation of a primordial analytic of Dasein. With the exhibiting of anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein has been brought into the fore-having with regard to its owned wholeness. The ownness of the potentiality-for-Being-a-self guarantees the fore-sight toward primordial existentiality, and this in turn ensures that the appropriate existential concepts are coined.

63.17 The analysis of anticipatory resoluteness led at the same time to the phenomenon of primordial and owned truth. Earlier it was shown how the understanding of Being that prevails in the first instance and for the most part conceives Being in the sense of presence-at-hand, and so covers over the primordial phenomenon of truth. But if "there is" Being only insofar as truth "is," and if the understanding of Being varies according to the kind of truth, then primordial and owned truth must guarantee the understanding of the Being of Dasein and of Being in general. The ontological "truth" of the existential analysis develops on the basis of primordial existentiell truth. The latter, however, does not necessarily need the former. The most primordial, fundamental existential truth, toward which the problematic of fundamental ontology strives—as a preparation for the

question of Being in general—is the *disclosedness of the meaning of the Being of care.* To lay this meaning free, the full structural content of care must be kept at the ready, undiminished.

§ 64. CARE AND SELFHOOD

The self is found not in an I-substance or subject but in owned, resolute self-constancy.

64.1 The unity of the constitutive moments of care—existentiality, facticity, and fallenness—made possible the first ontological delimitation of the wholeness of Dasein's structural whole. The structure of care was brought to the existential formula: ahead-of-itself—Being-already-in (a world) as Being-alongside (inner-worldly beings that are encountered). The wholeness of the structure of care does not first arise from coupling parts together; nevertheless it is *articulated*. We had to assess this ontological result as to how far it satisfies the demands of a *primordial* interpretation of Dasein. Reflection showed that neither *whole* Dasein nor its *owned* potentiality-for-Being had been made the theme. The attempt to grasp whole Dasein phenomenally, however, seemed to founder precisely on the structure of care. The ahead-of-itself presented itself as a not-yet. The ahead-of-itself, characterized in the sense of something outstanding, revealed itself to a genuinely existential consideration, however, as *Being-toward-the-end*, which every Dasein is in the ground of its Being. Likewise we made clear that care, in the call of conscience, summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Understanding the appeal revealed itself—when understood primordially—as anticipatory resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness includes within itself an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Dasein. The structure of care does not speak *against* a possible Being-a-whole but is the *condition of the possibility* of such an existentiell potentiality-for-Being. In the course of these analyses it became clear that the existential phenomena of death, conscience, and guilt are anchored in the phenomenon of care. *The articulation of the wholeness of the structural*

whole has become still richer, and with it the existential question of the unity of this wholeness has become still more urgent.

64.2 How are we to conceive this unity? How can Dasein exist in a unified way in the ways and possibilities of its Being that have been named? Evidently only in such a way that it *is* this Being *itself* in its essential possibilities—that in each case *I* am this being. The "I" seems to "hold together" the wholeness of the structural whole. From time immemorial the "I" and the "self" have been conceived in the "ontology" of this being as the supporting ground (substance or subject). And indeed the present analytic, already in its preparatory characterization of everydayness, came upon the question of the who of Dasein. It turned out that in the first instance and for the most part Dasein is *not* itself but is lost in the they-self. The they-self is an existentiell modification of the owned self. The question of the ontological constitution of selfhood remained unanswered. To be sure, the guideline of the problem was already fixed in principle: if the self belongs to the essential determinations of Dasein, whose "essence," however, lies in *existence*, then I-hood and selfhood must be conceived *existentially*. Negatively, it also turned out that the ontological characterization of the they forbids any use of categories of presence-at-hand (substance). In principle it became clear that care cannot be derived ontologically from reality or built up with categories of reality. Care already harbors within itself the phenomenon of the self, if indeed the thesis is justified that the expression "care for self," on the analogy of solicitude as care for Others, is a *tautology*. But then the problem of the ontological determination of the selfhood of Dasein sharpens into the question of the existential "connection" between care and selfhood.

64.3 The clarification of the existentiality of the self takes its "natural" point of departure from the everyday self-interpretation of Dasein, which expresses itself about "itself" in *I-saying*. It need not be uttered aloud. With "I" this being means itself. The content of this expression is taken to be absolutely simple. In each case it means only me and nothing further. As this simple

thing, the "I" is also not a determination of other things; it is *itself* not a predicate but the absolute "subject." What is expressed and addressed in I-saying is always met with as the same thing, persisting throughout. The characters of "simplicity," "substantiality," and "personality," which *Kant*, for example, laid at the basis of his doctrine "On the Paralogisms of Pure Reason," spring from a genuine pre-phenomenological experience.[4] The question remains whether what is experienced ontically in this way may be interpreted ontologically with the help of the "categories" named.

64.4 It is true that *Kant*, in strict conformity with the phenomenal content given in I-saying, shows that the ontic theses about the soul-substance inferred from the characters named are unjustified. But this merely rejects an *ontic* misexplanation of the I. It by no means yet gains the *ontological* interpretation of selfhood, or even secures it and prepares it positively. Although *Kant* tries more rigorously than his predecessors to hold fast to the phenomenal content of I-saying, he nevertheless slips back into the *same* inappropriate ontology of the substantial whose ontic foundations he had theoretically denied to the I. This is to be shown more precisely, in order thereby to fix the ontological meaning of starting the analysis of selfhood from I-saying. Kant's analysis of the "I think" will now be brought in by way of illustration only so far as is required for clarifying the problematic named.

64.5 The "I" is a bare consciousness that accompanies all concepts. Through it "nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts." "Consciousness in itself (is) not so much a representation … but a form of representation in general." The "I think" is "the form of apperception, which clings to every experience and precedes it."[5]

64.6 *Kant* rightly captures the phenomenal content of the "I" in the expression "I think," or—if the inclusion of the "practical

4 The chapter of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (Transcendental Dialectic) that criticizes the inferences of rational psychology about the soul.

5 Quotations from the Paralogisms chapter of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

person" in "intelligence" is also taken into account—as "I act." In *Kant*'s sense, I-saying must be taken as I-think-saying. *Kant* seeks to fix the phenomenal content of the I as res cogitans [thinking thing]. When he calls this I "logical subject," that does not mean that the I in general is a concept obtained merely by logical means. Rather, the I is the subject of logical comportment, of combining. "I think" means: I combine. All combining is "*I* combine." In every taking-together and relating, the I always already lies at the ground—*ὑποκείμενον* [what underlies]. That is why the subjectum is "consciousness in itself" and not a representation, but rather the "form" of representation. That is to say: the I think is not something represented but the formal structure of representing as such, through which something like what is represented first becomes possible. Form of representation means neither a framework nor a universal concept, but that which, as *εἶδος* [form], makes everything represented and every representing what it is. The I, understood as form of representation, amounts to saying that it is "logical subject."

64.7 What is positive in Kant's analysis is twofold: on the one hand, he sees that it is impossible to reduce the I ontically to a substance; on the other, he holds fast to the I as "I think." Nevertheless, he again takes this I as subject, and thus in an ontologically inappropriate sense. For the ontological concept of the subject characterizes *not the selfhood of the I qua self, but the sameness and constancy of something always already present-at-hand.* To determine the I ontologically as *subject* means to posit it as something always already present-at-hand. The Being of the I is understood as the reality of the res cogitans.

64.8 But why is it that *Kant* cannot make ontological use of the genuine phenomenal starting point with the "I think," and must fall back to the "subject," that is, to the substantial? The I is not only "I think" but "I think something." But does not *Kant* himself stress again and again that the I remains related to its representations and is nothing without them? For him, however, these representations are the "empirical," which is "accompanied" by the I—the appearances to which it "clings." Yet *Kant* nowhere

shows the way of Being of this "clinging" and "accompanying." At bottom, however, it is understood as the constant co-presence-at-hand of the I with its representations. *Kant* did avoid cutting the I off from thinking, but without taking the "I think" itself in its full essential content as "I think something," and above all without seeing the ontological "presupposition" for the "I think something" as the basic determinateness of the self. For even the starting point of the "I think something" is ontologically underdetermined, because the "something" remains undetermined. If by it is understood an *innerworldly* being, then this tacitly implies the presupposition of *world*; and it is precisely this phenomenon that co-determines the constitution of Being of the I, if indeed the I is to be able to be something like "I think something." I-saying means the being that I am in each case, as: "I-am-in-a-world." *Kant* did not see the phenomenon of world, and he was consistent enough to keep the "representations" away from the a priori content of the "I think." But in this way the I was again forced back into an *isolated* subject that accompanies representations in an ontologically quite undetermined way.

64.9 *In I-saying, Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world.* But does everyday I-saying mean *itself as* being-in-the-world? Here we must distinguish. In saying "I," Dasein certainly means the being that it itself is in each case. But everyday self-interpretation tends to understand itself in terms of the "world" it is concerned with. In meaning itself ontically, it *is mistaken* about the way of Being of the being that it itself is. And this holds above all for the basic constitution of Dasein, Being-in-the-world.

64.10 What motivates this "fleeting" I-saying? Dasein's falling, as which Dasein *flees* from itself into the they. "Natural" I-talk is carried out by the they-self. What expresses itself in the "I" is the self that, in the first instance and for the most part, I am *not* in an owned way. For absorption in the everyday multiplicity and headlong rush of what is concerned with, the self of the self-forgetful I-am-concerned shows itself as the simple thing that is constantly the same but indeterminately empty. After all, one *is*

what one concerns oneself with. That "natural" ontic I-talk overlooks the phenomenal content of the Dasein meant in the I gives the ontological interpretation of the I *no right to join in this overlooking* and to force an inappropriate "categorial" horizon upon the problematic of the self.[6]

64.11 To be sure, by refusing to follow everyday I-talk, the ontological interpretation of the "I" by no means already gains the *solution* to the problem; but it does gain the *prefiguring of the direction* in which further questioning must go. The I means the being that one is as "being-in-the-world." But Being-already-in-a-world, as Being-alongside-the-innerworldly-ready-to-hand, equiprimordially means ahead-of-itself. "I" means the being to which the Being of the being that it is *matters*. With "I," care expresses itself, in the first instance and for the most part in the "fleeting" I-talk of concern. The they-self says I-I most loudly and most often, because at bottom it *is not* itself *in an owned way* and evades its owned potentiality-for-Being. If the ontological constitution of the self can be traced back neither to an I-substance nor to a "subject," but if, conversely, the everyday fleeting saying of I-I must be understood in terms of the *owned* potentiality-for-Being, then it does not yet follow that the self is then the constantly present-at-hand ground of care. Selfhood can be read off existentially only from the owned potentiality-for-Being-a-self, that is, from the ownness of the Being of Dasein *as care.* It is from this ownness that the *constancy of the self*, as the supposed persistence of the subjectum, receives its clarification. But the phenomenon of the owned potentiality-for-Being also opens our eyes to the *constancy of the self* in the sense of having gained a stand. *The constancy of the self*, in the double sense of steadfastly standing firm, is the *owned* counterpossibility to the non-self-constancy of irresolute falling. Existentially, *self-constancy* means nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. The ontological structure of anticipatory resoluteness reveals the existentiality of the selfhood of the self.

6 German *flüchtig* means both "fleeting" and "fugitive," echoing Dasein's flight (*Flucht*) from itself.

64.12 Dasein *is itself in an owned way* in the primordial individualization of reticent resoluteness that expects anxiety of itself. Owned Being-a-self, *as silent*, precisely does not say "I-I"; rather, in reticence it *"is"* the thrown being that it can be in an owned way. The self that the reticence of resolute existence reveals is the primordial phenomenal ground for the question of the Being of the "I." Only a phenomenal orientation toward the meaning of the Being of the owned potentiality-for-Being-a-self puts us in a position to discuss what ontological justification can be assigned to substantiality, simplicity, and personality as characters of selfhood. The ontological question of the Being of the self must be wrested out of the fore-having, constantly suggested by predominant I-saying, of a persistently present-at-hand self-thing.

64.13 *Care does not need to be founded in a self; rather, existentiality, as a constituent of care, provides the ontological constitution of Dasein's self-constancy, to which, in keeping with the full structural content of care, its factical Being-fallen into non-self-constancy belongs.* The structure of care, fully conceived, includes the phenomenon of selfhood. This phenomenon is clarified by interpreting the meaning of care, which was determined as Dasein's wholeness of Being.

§ 65. TEMPORALITY AS THE ONTOLOGICAL MEANING OF CARE

Future, having-been, and present are shown to be the ecstatic unity that makes care possible.

65.1 The characterization of the "connection" between care and selfhood aimed not only at clarifying the special problem of I-hood; it was meant to serve as the last preparation for grasping phenomenally the wholeness of Dasein's structural whole. The *unbroken discipline* of existential questioning is needed if, in the end, the way of Being of Dasein is not after all to be turned, for the ontological gaze, into a mode of presence-at-hand, however wholly indifferent. Dasein becomes "essential" in owned existence, which constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness. This

mode of the ownness of care contains the primordial self-constancy and wholeness of Dasein. The laying free of the ontological meaning of the Being of Dasein must be carried out in an undistracted, existentially understanding view of these.

65.2 What is sought ontologically with the meaning of care? What does *meaning* signify? Our investigation encountered this phenomenon in connection with the analysis of understanding and interpretation. According to that analysis, meaning is that in which the intelligibility of something maintains itself, without itself coming into view explicitly and thematically. Meaning signifies the upon-which of the primary projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as what it is. Projecting discloses possibilities, that is, what makes possible.

65.3 To lay free the upon-which of a projection means to disclose what makes possible what is projected. Methodologically, this laying free requires us to trace the projection—mostly inexplicit—that underlies an interpretation, in such a way that what is projected in the projecting is disclosed and becomes graspable with regard to its upon-which. To bring out the meaning of care, then, means: to follow the projection that underlies and guides the primordial existential interpretation of Dasein in such a way that its upon-which becomes visible in what it projects. What is projected is the Being of Dasein, and indeed as disclosed in what constitutes it as an owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. The upon-which of what is thus projected—of the disclosed Being so constituted—is that which itself makes possible this constitution of Being as care. With the question of the meaning of care we are asking: *what makes possible the wholeness of the articulated structural whole of care in the unity of its unfolded articulation?*

65.4 Strictly speaking, meaning signifies the upon-which of the primary projection of the understanding of Being. Being-in-the-world, disclosed to itself, understands, equiprimordially with the Being of the being that it itself is, the Being of the beings it uncovers as innerworldly—albeit unthematically, and even still

undifferentiated into its primary modes of existence and reality. All ontic experience of beings, the circumspective calculating of what is ready-to-hand as well as the positive scientific cognition of what is present-at-hand, is grounded in projections, more or less transparent in each case, of the Being of the beings in question. But these projections harbor within themselves an upon-which from which, as it were, the understanding of Being draws its nourishment.

65.5 When we say that beings "have meaning," this signifies that they have become accessible *in their Being*, and it is this Being, projected upon its upon-which, that first "properly" "has meaning." Beings "have" meaning only because, having been disclosed in advance as Being, they become intelligible in the projection of Being, that is, in terms of its upon-which. The primary projection of the understanding of Being "gives" meaning. The question of the meaning of the Being of a being makes its theme the upon-which of the understanding of Being that underlies all *Being* toward beings.

65.6 With regard to its existence, Dasein is disclosed to itself in an owned or an unowned way. Existing, it understands itself, and in such a way that this understanding is not a pure grasping but makes up the existentiell Being of its factical potentiality-for-Being. The Being that is disclosed is that of a being to which this Being matters. The meaning of this Being—that is, of care—which makes care possible in its constitution, primordially makes up the Being of the potentiality-for-Being. The meaning of the Being of Dasein is not something other, floating free, and "outside" of Dasein itself; it is self-understanding Dasein itself. What makes possible the Being of Dasein, and thereby its factical existence?

65.7 What is projected in the primordial existential projection of existence revealed itself as anticipatory resoluteness. What makes possible this owned Being-a-whole of Dasein with regard to the unity of its articulated structural whole? Grasped in formal existential terms, without now constantly naming the full structural content, anticipatory resoluteness is Being *toward*

the ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being. Something like this is possible only in such a way that Dasein *can, at all,* come toward itself in its ownmost possibility, and in this letting-itself-come-toward-itself sustain the possibility as possibility, that is, exist. Letting itself *come toward* itself in the distinctive possibility while sustaining it is the primordial phenomenon of the *future*. If owned or unowned *Being-toward-death* belongs to the Being of Dasein, then this is possible only as something *futural* in the sense now indicated, which is still to be determined more closely.[7] "Future" here does not mean a now that, not yet having become "actual," will only be at some later point, but the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes toward itself. Anticipation makes Dasein futural *in an owned way*, and in such a way that anticipation itself is possible only insofar as Dasein, *as something that is,* is always already coming toward itself at all, that is, is futural in its Being in general.

65.8 Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its essential Being-guilty. This understanding means taking over Being-guilty in existing, being the thrown ground of nullity. But taking over thrownness means being Dasein in an owned way in how *it always already was*. Taking over thrownness, however, is possible only in such a way that futural Dasein can be its ownmost "as it always already was," that is, its "having-been." Only insofar as Dasein is at all as "I *am*-as-having-been" can it, futurally, come toward itself in such a way that it comes *back*. Being futural in an owned way, Dasein is *having-been* in an owned way. Anticipation of the uttermost and ownmost possibility is the understanding coming-back to one's ownmost having-been. Dasein can *be* having-been in an owned way only insofar as it is futural. In a certain way, having-been arises from the future.

65.9 Anticipatory resoluteness discloses the situation of the "there" in each case in such a way that existence, in acting, circumspectively concerns itself with what is factically ready-to-hand in the environment. Resolute Being alongside what is

7 *Zukunft* (future) is heard here as *zu-kommen*, "coming-toward."

ready-to-hand in the situation—that is, letting what is environmentally *present* be encountered in action—is possible only in a *making present* of this being. Only as *present*, in the sense of making present, can resoluteness be what it is: letting what it seizes upon in action be encountered undisguised.[8]

65.10 Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness, making present, brings itself into the situation. Having-been arises from the future, in such a way that the future that has been (better: the future that is in the process of having been) releases the present from itself. This phenomenon, unified in this way as a future that makes present in the process of having been, we call *temporality*. Only insofar as Dasein is determined as temporality does it make possible for itself the owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness that we have characterized. *Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of owned care*.

65.11 The phenomenal content of this meaning, drawn from the constitution of Being of anticipatory resoluteness, fills out the meaning of the term temporality. The terminological use of this expression must first keep away all the meanings of "future," "past," and "present" that press in from the ordinary concept of time. This also holds for the concepts of a "subjective" and an "objective," or an "immanent" and a "transcendent," "time." Insofar as Dasein understands itself in the first instance and for the most part in an unowned way, we may suppose that the "time" of the ordinary understanding of time does represent a genuine phenomenon, but a derivative one. It arises from unowned temporality, which itself has its own origin. The concepts of "future," "past," and "present" initially grew out of the unowned understanding of time. The terminological delimitation of the corresponding primordial and owned phenomena struggles with the same difficulty that all ontological terminology remains bound up with. In this field of investigation, violent measures are not arbitrariness but a necessity grounded in the matter itself. In order, however, to be able to demonstrate

8 Heidegger distinguishes *anwesend* (present, in the sense of presence) from *Gegenwart* (the present) and *Gegenwärtigen* (making present).

without gaps how unowned temporality originates from primordial and owned temporality, we first need a concrete working-out of the primordial phenomenon, which so far has been characterized only roughly.

65.12 If resoluteness makes up the mode of owned care, but is itself possible only through temporality, then the phenomenon arrived at with regard to resoluteness must itself represent only one modality of temporality, which makes care as such possible at all. Dasein's wholeness of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (a world) as Being-alongside (inner-worldly beings that are encountered). When this articulated structure was first fixed, it was pointed out that, with regard to this articulation, the ontological question must be pushed still further back, until the unity of the wholeness of the structural manifold has been laid free. *The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.*

65.13 The ahead-of-itself is grounded in the future. The Being-already-in... makes known within itself having-been. The Being-alongside... is made possible in making present. After what has been said, it goes without saying that the "ahead" (*Vor*) in "ahead-of-itself" and the "already" are not to be taken in terms of the ordinary understanding of time. The "ahead" does not mean the "before" in the sense of the "not-yet-now—but later"; just as little does the "already" mean a "no-longer-now—but earlier." If the expressions "ahead" and "already" had *this* time-related meaning, which they can also have, then saying that care is temporal would be saying that it is something that is "earlier" and "later," "not yet" and "no longer," all at once. Care would then be conceived as a being that occurs and runs its course "in time." The *Being* of a being with the character of Dasein would become something *present-at-hand.* If this is impossible, then the time-related meaning of these expressions must be a different one. The "ahead" and the "ahead-of" indicate the future, as that which first of all makes it possible at all that Dasein can be in such a way that its potentiality-for-Being *matters* to it. Projecting oneself upon the "for the sake of itself,"

grounded in the future, is an essential character of *existentiality. Its primary meaning is the future.*

65.14 Likewise, the "already" means the existential temporal meaning of the Being of the being that, insofar as it *is*, is always already something thrown. Only because care is grounded in having-been can Dasein exist as the thrown being that it is. "As long as" Dasein factically exists, it is never past, but it always already *has been*, in the sense of "I *am*-as-having-been." And it *can* only *be* as having-been as long as it is. By contrast, we call past a being that is no longer present-at-hand. That is why Dasein, in existing, can never ascertain itself as a present-at-hand matter of fact that comes into being and passes away "in the course of time" and is already partly past. It always "finds itself" only as a thrown fact. In *attunement*, Dasein is assailed by itself as the being that, still being, it already was, that is, which it constantly *is* as having-been. The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in having-been. With the expressions "ahead" and "already," the formulation of the structure of care indicates the temporal meaning of existentiality and facticity.

65.15 By contrast, no such indication is given for the third constitutive moment of care: falling Being-alongside... This is not meant to signify that falling is not also grounded in temporality, but to suggest that the *making present* in which *falling* prey to the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand one is concerned with is *primarily* grounded remains, in the mode of primordial temporality, *enclosed* in future and having-been. Resolute, Dasein has precisely brought itself back from falling, in order to be all the more "there," in an owned way, in the "moment of *vision*" for the disclosed situation.

65.16 Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way primordially constitutes the wholeness of the structure of care. The moments of care are not pieced together by any accumulation, any more than temporality itself is first composed "in the course of time" out of future, having-been, and present. Temporality "is" not a *being* at all. It is not; rather, it *temporalizes* itself. Why we nevertheless cannot

avoid saying "temporality 'is'—the meaning of care," "temporality 'is'—determined in such and such a way," can be made intelligible only from the clarified idea of Being and of the "is" in general. Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein's modes of Being, above all the basic possibility of owned and unowned existence.

65.17 Future, having-been, and present show the phenomenal characters of the "toward-itself," the "back to," and the "letting be encountered *by*." The phenomena of toward..., back to..., alongside... reveal temporality as the *ἐκστατικόν* [what stands outside itself] pure and simple. *Temporality is the primordial "outside-of-itself" in and for itself.* We therefore call the phenomena characterized—future, having-been, present—the *ecstases* of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, a being that only then steps out of *itself*; rather, its essence is temporalizing in the unity of the *ecstases.* What is characteristic of the "time" accessible to the ordinary understanding consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that in it, as a pure sequence of nows without beginning or end, the ecstatic character of primordial temporality is leveled off. In its existential meaning, however, this leveling off is itself grounded in a particular possible temporalizing, in accordance with which temporality, as unowned, temporalizes the "time" just mentioned. If, therefore, it is shown that the "time" accessible to Dasein's common sense is *not* primordial but rather arises from owned temporality, then, in accordance with the principle *a potiori fit denominatio* [a thing is named after what is foremost in it], we are justified in calling the *temporality* now laid free *primordial time.*

65.18 In listing the ecstases we have always named the future first. This is meant to indicate that the future has a priority in the ecstatic unity of primordial and owned temporality, even though temporality does not first come into being through an accumulation and succession of the ecstases, but in each case temporalizes itself in their equiprimordiality. Within this equiprimordiality, however, the modes of temporalizing differ. And

the difference lies in the fact that temporalizing can be determined primarily by the different ecstases. Primordial and owned temporality temporalizes itself from the owned future, in such a way that, futurally having-been, it first awakens the present. *The primary phenomenon of primordial and owned temporality is the future.* The priority of the future will itself be modified in accordance with the modified temporalizing of unowned temporality, but it will still come to light even in derivative "time."

65.19 Care is Being-toward-death. We determined anticipatory resoluteness as owned Being toward the possibility we characterized: the utter impossibility of Dasein. In such Being toward its end, Dasein exists wholly, in an owned way, as the being that it can be, "thrown into death." It does not have an end at which it merely stops; it *exists finitely.* The owned future, which primarily temporalizes *the* temporality that makes up the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness, thereby reveals itself *as finite.* But does "time not go on" despite my own no-longer-Dasein? And can there not still lie unlimitedly much "in the future," and come to us from it?

65.20 These questions must be answered in the affirmative. Nevertheless, they contain no objection to the finitude of primordial temporality—because they are no longer about it at all. The question is not what all may still happen "in a time that goes on," or what kind of letting-come-toward-itself can be encountered "out of this time," but how coming-toward-itself is primordially determined *itself as such*. Its finitude does not primarily mean a stopping; it is a character of temporalizing itself. The primordial and owned future is the toward-itself, toward *itself*, existing as the possibility of nullity that is not to be outstripped. The ecstatic character of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact that it closes the potentiality-for-Being, that is, is itself closed, and as such makes possible the resolute existentiell understanding of nullity. Primordial and owned coming-toward-itself is the meaning of existing in one's ownmost nullity. The thesis of the primordial finitude of temporality does not dispute that "time goes on"; it is meant merely to hold fast to

the phenomenal character of primordial temporality, which shows itself in what is projected in the primordial existential projection of Dasein itself.

65.21 The temptation to overlook the finitude of the primordial and owned future, and thus of temporality, or to hold it to be impossible "a priori," arises from the constant pressing forward of the ordinary understanding of time. If this understanding rightly knows an endless time, and only that, this does not yet prove that it also understands this time and its "infinity." What does it mean to say that time "goes on" and "keeps passing"? What does the "in time" mean in general, and the "in" and "out of the future" in particular? In what sense is "time" endless? Such things demand clarification if the ordinary objections to the finitude of primordial time are not to remain groundless. This clarification, however, can be achieved only if an appropriate way of posing the question with regard to finitude and infinitude has been gained. And this arises from an understanding view of the primordial phenomenon of time. The problem cannot be: *how does* the *"derived"* infinite time, "in which" what is present-at-hand comes into being and passes away, become *primordial* finite temporality? It is rather: how does *un*owned temporality arise from finite owned temporality, and how does unowned temporality, *as un*owned, temporalize an *in*-finite time from finite temporality? Only because primordial time is *finite* can the "derived" time temporalize itself as *in-finite.* In the order in which we come to grasp it by understanding, the finitude of time becomes fully visible only when "endless time" has been brought out, so that the one can be set against the other.

65.22 We summarize the analysis of primordial temporality so far in the following theses: Time is primordially as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such it makes possible the constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially ecstatic. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially from the future. Primordial time is finite.

65.23 Yet the interpretation of care as temporality cannot remain restricted to the narrow basis gained so far, even though

it has taken the first steps with a view to Dasein's primordial, owned Being-a-whole. The thesis that the meaning of Dasein is temporality must prove itself in the concrete content of the basic constitution of this being, as it has been brought out.

§ 66. DASEIN'S TEMPORALITY AND THE TASKS ARISING FROM IT OF A MORE PRIMORDIAL REPETITION OF THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS

Heidegger sets out the tasks ahead: everydayness, historicality, and within-time-ness must be interpreted temporally.

66.1 The phenomenon of temporality that has been laid free demands not only a more far-reaching confirmation of its constitutive power; only through such confirmation does it itself come into view with regard to the basic possibilities of temporalizing. We call the demonstration of the possibility of Dasein's constitution of Being on the basis of temporality the "temporal" interpretation, for short, though only provisionally.

66.2 The next task, going beyond the temporal analysis of Dasein's owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole and a general characterization of the temporality of care, is to make visible the *unownness* of Dasein in its specific temporality. Temporality first showed itself in anticipatory resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness is the owned mode of disclosedness, which for the most part maintains itself in the unownness of the falling self-interpretation of the they. The characterization of the temporality of disclosedness in general leads to the temporal understanding of the concernful Being-in-the-world that is closest to us, and thus of the average indifference of Dasein with which the existential analytic began. We called the average way of Being of Dasein, in which it maintains itself in the first instance and for the most part, everydayness. Through the repetition of the earlier analysis, *everydayness* must reveal itself in its *temporal* meaning, so that the problematic enclosed in temporality comes to light and the apparent "self-evidence" of the preparatory analyses disappears entirely. Temporality is indeed to prove itself in all the essential structures of Dasein's basic constitution. Never-

theless, this does not lead to an external, schematic running-through-again of the analyses already carried out, in the sequence in which they were presented. The differently directed course of the temporal analysis is meant to make the connection between the earlier considerations clearer and to remove their contingency and apparent arbitrariness. Beyond these methodological necessities, however, motives that lie in the phenomenon itself make themselves felt and compel a different articulation of the repeating analysis.

66.3 The ontological structure of the being that I *myself* am in each case centers in the self-constancy of existence. Because the self can be conceived neither as substance nor as subject but is grounded in existence, the analysis of the unowned self, the they, was left entirely within the course of the preparatory interpretation of Dasein. Now that selfhood has been *explicitly* taken back into the structure of care, and thus of temporality, the temporal interpretation of self-constancy and non-self-constancy acquires a weight of its own. It needs a separate thematic treatment. But it does not merely provide, for the first time, the proper safeguard against the paralogisms and against ontologically inappropriate questions about the Being of the I in general; in keeping with its central function, it also provides a more primordial insight into the *structure of temporalizing* of temporality. This structure reveals itself as the *historicality* of Dasein. The proposition "Dasein is historical" proves to be a fundamental existential-ontological assertion. It is far removed from a merely ontic establishment of the fact that Dasein occurs in a "world-history." The historicality of Dasein, however, is the ground of a possible historiographical understanding, which in turn carries within it the possibility of developing historiography, explicitly taken up, as a science.

66.4 The temporal interpretation of everydayness and historicality secures the view of primordial time sufficiently to uncover primordial time itself as the condition of the possibility and necessity of the everyday experience of time. As a being to which its Being matters, Dasein *expends itself* primarily, whether

explicitly or not, *for itself*. In the first instance and for the most part, care is circumspective concern. Expending itself for the sake of itself, Dasein "uses itself up." In using itself up, Dasein uses itself, that is, its time. Using time, it reckons with it. Circumspective, reckoning concern initially uncovers time and leads to the development of a reckoning of time. Reckoning with time is constitutive for Being-in-the-world. The concernful uncovering of circumspection, reckoning with its time, lets the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand it has uncovered be encountered in time. Innerworldly beings thus become accessible as "being in time." We call the time-determinateness of innerworldly beings *within-time-ness*. The "time" initially found ontically in within-time-ness becomes the basis on which the ordinary and traditional concept of time is formed. Time as within-time-ness, however, arises from an essential kind of temporalizing of primordial temporality. This origin means that the time "in which" what is present-at-hand comes into being and passes away is a genuine phenomenon of time, and not an externalization of a "qualitative time" into space, as *Bergson*'s ontologically quite undetermined and inadequate interpretation of time would have us believe.[9]

66.5 Only the working-out of Dasein's temporality as everydayness, historicality, and within-time-ness gives an unsparing insight into the *complications* of a primordial ontology of Dasein. As Being-in-the-world, Dasein factically exists with and alongside innerworldly beings that are encountered. The Being of Dasein therefore receives its comprehensive ontological transparency only within the horizon of the clarified Being of beings that are not of the character of Dasein—that is, also of what, neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand, merely "subsists." But the interpretation of the variations of the Being of everything of which we say that it is requires an idea of Being in general that has first been sufficiently illuminated. As long as this idea has not been attained, the *repeating* temporal analysis

9 Henri Bergson (1859–1941), French philosopher who contrasted lived duration with time spatialized for measurement.

of Dasein also remains incomplete and burdened with unclarities—not to speak at length of the difficulties in the subject matter itself. The existential-temporal analysis of Dasein, for its part, demands a renewed repetition within the framework of a discussion, in principle, of the concept of Being.

Division Two, Chapter IV: Temporality and Everydayness

Zweiter Abschnitt. Viertes Kapitel: Zeitlichkeit und Alltäglichkeit
§§67–71

§ 67. THE BASIC CONTENT OF DASEIN'S EXISTENTIAL CONSTITUTION, AND A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF ITS TEMPORAL INTERPRETATION

The earlier analyses are recalled, and the plan for their temporal interpretation is laid out.

67.1 The preparatory analysis has made accessible a manifold of phenomena. However much we concentrate on the structural whole of care that founds them, this manifold must not vanish from phenomenological view. The *primordial* wholeness of Dasein's constitution, *as articulated*, does not exclude such a manifold; it demands one. The primordiality of a constitution of Being does not coincide with the simplicity and uniqueness of an ultimate building block. The ontological origin of Dasein's Being is not "less" than what springs from it. Rather, it surpasses that in potency from the outset, and all "springing-from" in the ontological field is degeneration. Ontological advance toward the "origin" does not arrive at ontic things that are self-evident to "common understanding." Rather, it is precisely to this advance that the questionability of everything self-evident opens up.

67.2 To bring the phenomena obtained in the preparatory analysis back into phenomenological view, a reference to the stages

it went through must suffice. The delimitation of care resulted from the analysis of disclosedness, which constitutes the Being of the "there." Clarifying this phenomenon meant giving a provisional interpretation of Dasein's basic constitution, Being-in-the-world. The investigation began by characterizing it, so as to secure from the outset an adequate phenomenal horizon against the inappropriate, mostly inexplicit ontological predeterminations of Dasein. Being-in-the-world was first characterized with regard to the phenomenon of the world. More precisely, the explication moved from the ontic-ontological characterization of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand *"in"* the environment to setting off innerworldliness, so as to make the phenomenon of worldhood in general visible by means of it. The structure of worldhood, significance, turned out, however, to be clamped together with that upon which the understanding that essentially belongs to disclosedness projects itself: with Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, *for the sake of which* it exists.

67.3 The temporal interpretation of everyday Dasein is to start from the structures in which disclosedness is constituted. These are: understanding, attunement, falling, and discourse. The modes of the temporalizing of temporality that are to be laid bare with regard to these phenomena provide the ground for determining the temporality of Being-in-the-world. This leads back once more to the phenomenon of the world and allows us to delimit the specifically temporal problematic of worldhood. This delimitation must prove itself by characterizing the Being-in-the-world that is closest and everyday: falling, circumspective concern. The temporality of this concern makes possible the modification of circumspection into a perceiving that looks at things, and into the theoretical knowing grounded in such perceiving. The temporality of Being-in-the-world that emerges in this way proves at the same time to be the foundation of Dasein's specific spatiality. The temporal constitution of distance and directionality is to be shown. Taken as a whole, these analyses reveal a possibility of temporality's temporalizing in which Dasein's unownness is ontologically grounded. They lead us

before the question of how the temporal character of everydayness—the temporal meaning of the "in the first instance and for the most part" we have constantly used so far—is to be understood. Pinning down this problem makes clear that, and to what extent, the clarification of the phenomenon achieved up to that point is not sufficient.

67.4 The present chapter is accordingly divided as follows: the temporality of disclosedness in general (§ 68); the temporality of Being-in-the-world and the problem of transcendence (§ 69); the temporality of the spatiality characteristic of Dasein (§ 70); the temporal meaning of Dasein's everydayness (§ 71).

§ 68. THE TEMPORALITY OF DISCLOSEDNESS IN GENERAL

Understanding, attunement, falling, and discourse are each traced back to the one temporality.

68.1 Resoluteness, characterized with regard to its temporal meaning, represents an owned disclosedness of Dasein. This disclosedness constitutes a being in such a way that, existing, it can itself be its "there." With respect to its temporal meaning, care has so far been characterized only in its basic features. To demonstrate its concrete temporal constitution means to interpret temporally, one by one, its structural moments: understanding, attunement, falling, and discourse. Every understanding has its mood. Every attunement is understanding. Attuned understanding has the character of falling. Understanding, attuned in a falling way, articulates itself with regard to its intelligibility in discourse. The temporal constitution of each of these phenomena leads back in each case to the *one* temporality that guarantees the possible structural unity of understanding, attunement, falling, and discourse.

a) The temporality of understanding

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future: owned anticipation or unowned awaiting.

68.2 By the term "understanding" we mean a fundamental existential—neither a particular *kind of knowing*, distinguished, say, from explaining and conceiving, nor knowing at all in the sense of thematic grasping. Understanding does, however, constitute the Being of the "there" in such a way that a Dasein, on the basis of understanding, can in existing develop the various possibilities of sight: of looking around, of just looking at. All explaining, as an understanding uncovering of what is not understood, is rooted in Dasein's primary understanding.

68.3 Conceived primordially and existentially, understanding means: *projective Being toward a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which Dasein in each case exists*. Understanding discloses Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being in such a way that Dasein, understanding, in each case somehow knows where it stands with itself. This "knowing," however, is not having uncovered a fact; it is holding oneself in an existentiell possibility. The corresponding not-knowing does not consist in understanding's failing to occur; it must count as a deficient mode of the projectedness of the potentiality-for-Being. Existence can be questionable. For "being-in-question" to become possible, a disclosedness is needed. Projective self-understanding in an existentiell possibility is grounded in the future, as coming-toward-itself out of the possibility as which Dasein in each case exists. The future makes ontologically possible a being that is in such a way that, understanding, it exists in its potentiality-for-Being. Projecting, which is at bottom futural, does not primarily grasp the projected possibility thematically in an act of meaning. It throws itself into it as possibility. Understanding, Dasein in each case is as it can be. Resoluteness turned out to be primordial and owned existing. In the first instance and for the most part, of course, Dasein remains irresolute—that is, closed off in its ownmost

potentiality-for-Being, to which it brings itself in each case only in individualization. This implies that temporality does not constantly temporalize itself out of the owned future. This inconstancy, however, does not mean that temporality sometimes lacks a future, but that the temporalizing of the future is modifiable.

68.4 As the terminological designation of the owned future we retain the expression *anticipation*. It indicates that Dasein, existing in an owned way, lets itself come toward itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that the future must first win itself, not out of a present, but out of the unowned future. The formally indifferent term for the future lies in the designation of the first structural moment of care: the *ahead-of-itself.* Factically, Dasein is constantly ahead-of-itself, but only inconstantly—as regards its existentiell possibility—anticipating.

68.5 How, by contrast, is the unowned future to be set off? Just as the owned future was revealed by way of resoluteness, this ecstatic mode can reveal itself only by going back ontologically from everyday, concernful, unowned understanding to its existential-temporal meaning. As care, Dasein is essentially ahead-of-itself. In the first instance and for the most part, concernful Being-in-the-world understands itself from *what* it is concerned with. Unowned *understanding* projects itself upon what can be concerned with, what is feasible, urgent, unavoidable in the business of everyday occupation. But what is concerned with is as it is for the sake of the potentiality-for-Being that cares. This potentiality lets Dasein come toward itself in its concernful Being alongside what is concerned with. Dasein does not primarily come toward itself in its ownmost, non-relational potentiality-for-Being. Rather, in concern it is *awaiting itself from what the object of its concern yields or denies.* Dasein comes toward itself from what it is concerned with. The unowned future has the character of *awaiting.* Concernful self-understanding as the they-self, from what one is busy with, has the "ground" of its possibility in this ecstatic mode of the future. And *only because* factical Dasein is in this way *awaiting* its potentiality-for-Being

from what it is concerned with can it *expect* and wait for... Awaiting must always already have disclosed the horizon and range from out of which something can be expected. *Expecting is a mode of the future—of the future that temporalizes itself in an owned way as anticipation—founded in awaiting.* Hence anticipation contains a more primordial Being-toward-death than concerned expecting of death does.

68.6 Understanding, as existing in a potentiality-for-Being projected in whatever way, is *primarily* futural. But it would not temporalize itself if it were not temporal—that is, determined equiprimordially by having-been and present. The way in which the last-named ecstasis co-constitutes unowned understanding has already become clear in rough outline. Everyday concern understands itself from the potentiality-for-Being that comes to meet it out of possible success and failure with regard to what is concerned with in each case. To the unowned future, awaiting, there corresponds a Being of its own *alongside* what is concerned with. The ecstatic mode of this present (Gegen-wart) reveals itself when we bring in, for comparison, this same ecstasis in the mode of owned temporality. To the anticipation of resoluteness there belongs a present in accordance with which a resolution discloses the situation.[1] In resoluteness the present is not only brought back from distraction in what is most immediately concerned with, but is held in the future and in having-been. The present that is held in owned temporality, and is therefore the *owned present*, we call the *moment of vision.* This term must be understood in the active sense, as an ecstasis. It means Dasein's resolute carrying-away—one that is, however, *held* in resoluteness—to whatever possibilities and circumstances to be concerned with are encountered in the situation. The phenomenon of the moment of vision can *in principle not* be clarified in terms of the *now*. The now is a temporal phenomenon belonging to time as within-time-ness: the now "in which" something comes into being, passes away or is present-at-hand.

1 Heidegger hyphenates *Gegenwart* (present) to bring out its parts, *gegen* (toward, over against) and *warten* (to wait).

Nothing can occur "in the moment of vision"; rather, as the owned present (Gegen-wart), the moment of vision *first lets* whatever can be "in a time" as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand *be encountered*.

68.7 In distinction from the moment of vision as the owned present, we call the unowned present *making present.* Formally understood, every present makes present, but not every present is "of the moment of vision." When we use the expression "making present" without qualification, we always mean the unowned kind, which is irresolute and without a moment of vision. Making present will become clear only from the temporal interpretation of falling prey to the "world" one is concerned with, a falling that has its existential meaning in making present. But insofar as unowned understanding projects the potentiality-for-Being from what can be concerned with, this means that it temporalizes itself out of making present. The moment of vision, conversely, temporalizes itself out of the owned future.

68.8 Unowned understanding temporalizes itself as a making-present awaiting, and to its ecstatic unity there must belong a corresponding *having-been*. The owned coming-toward-itself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming back to the ownmost self, thrown into its individualization. This ecstasis makes it possible for Dasein resolutely to take over the being that it already is. In anticipation, Dasein *fetches* itself *forth again* into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Owned having-*been* we call *repetition.* But unowned self-projection upon possibilities drawn from what is concerned with, by making it present, is possible only in that Dasein has *forgotten* itself in its ownmost *thrown* potentiality-for-Being. This forgetting is not nothing, nor merely the lack of remembering; it is a "positive" ecstatic mode of having-been in its own right.[2] The ecstasis (carrying-away) of forgetting has the character of a backing away *in the face of* one's ownmost having-been, a backing away that is closed off to itself

2 The German plays on *wiederholen* (to repeat) and *wieder vorholen* (to fetch forth again).

—in such a way, indeed, that this backing away in the face of... ecstatically closes off the in-the-face-of-which, and at one with it closes off itself. *Forgottenness*, as unowned having-been, thus relates to one's own thrown *Being*; it is the temporal meaning of the way of Being according to which, in the first instance and for the most part, I have been—*am*. And only on the basis of this forgetting can concernful, awaiting making present *retain*—namely, retain beings not of Dasein's kind that are encountered in the environment. To this retaining there corresponds a not-retaining, which represents a "forgetting" in the derivative sense.

68.9 Just as expectation is possible only on the basis of awaiting, so *remembering* is possible only on the basis of forgetting, *and not the other way around*. For in the mode of forgottenness, having-been primarily "discloses" the horizon into which Dasein, lost in the "externality" of what is concerned with, can remember. *Forgetting-making-present awaiting* is an ecstatic unity of its own, in accordance with which unowned understanding temporalizes itself with regard to its temporality. The unity of these ecstases closes off the owned potentiality-for-Being and is thus the existential condition of the possibility of irresoluteness. Although unowned, concernful understanding determines itself from making present what is concerned with, the temporalizing of understanding is nonetheless carried out primarily in the future.

B) THE TEMPORALITY OF ATTUNEMENT

Moods are grounded primarily in having-been, as the analyses of fear and anxiety show.

68.10 Understanding is never free-floating but always attuned. The "there" is in each case equiprimordially disclosed—or closed off—by mood. Attunedness brings Dasein before its thrownness in such a way that this thrownness is precisely not known as such, but is disclosed far more primordially in "how one is feeling." Existentially, *Being*-thrown means finding oneself in this way or that. Attunement is therefore grounded in having-been. Mood

represents the way in which I am, primarily, in each case the thrown being. How can the temporal constitution of attunedness be made visible? How does the existential connection between attunement and understanding become intelligible from the ecstatic unity of temporality in each case?

68.11 Mood discloses in the manner of turning toward and turning away from one's own Dasein. *Bringing before* the "that" of one's own thrownness—whether revealing it in an owned way or covering it over in an unowned way—becomes existentially possible only if Dasein's Being, by its meaning, constantly *is* having-been. Bringing before the thrown being that one oneself is does not first create the having-been; rather, the ecstasis of having-been first makes possible finding-oneself in the manner of being-attuned. Understanding is grounded primarily in the future; *attunement*, by contrast, temporalizes itself *primarily* in having-been. Mood temporalizes itself; that is, its specific ecstasis belongs to a future and a present, though in such a way that having-been modifies the equiprimordial ecstases.

68.12 We emphasized that moods are indeed known ontically but are not recognized in their primordial existential function. They are taken to be fleeting lived experiences that "color" the whole "state of the soul." What, for observation, has the character of fleetingly emerging and disappearing belongs to the primordial constancy of existence. But even so, what are moods supposed to have in common with "time"? That these "lived experiences" come and go, that they run their course "in time," is a trivial observation—certainly, and an ontic-psychological one at that. The task, however, is to demonstrate the ontological structure of attunedness in its existential-temporal constitution. And to begin with, the only question can be to make the temporality of mood visible at all in the first place. The thesis "attunement is grounded primarily in having-been" means that the basic existential character of mood is a *bringing back to…* This bringing back does not first produce having-been; rather, for existential analysis, attunement in each case reveals a mode of having-been. The temporal interpretation of attunement therefore can-

not aim to deduce moods from temporality and dissolve them into pure phenomena of temporalizing. All that is required is to prove that moods, in what they "mean" existentielly and how they mean it, *are not possible except on the basis of temporality*. The temporal interpretation confines itself to the phenomena of fear and anxiety, which have already been analyzed in a preparatory way.

68.13 We begin the analysis by demonstrating the temporality of *fear*. Fear was characterized as an unowned attunement. To what extent is having-been the existential meaning that makes it possible? Which mode of this ecstasis characterizes the specific temporality of fear? Fear is fearing in the face of something threatening, which, detrimental to Dasein's factical potentiality-for-Being, approaches in the way described within the range of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand that one is concerned with. Fearing discloses something threatening in the manner of everyday circumspection. A merely intuiting subject could never uncover anything of the kind. But is not this disclosing of fearing in the face of... a letting-come-toward-oneself? Has fear not rightly been defined as the expectation of an arriving evil (malum futurum [future evil])? Is not the primary temporal meaning of fear the future, and anything but having-been? Indisputably, fearing not only "relates" to what is "futural" in the sense of what is only arriving "in time"; this relating itself is futural in the primordially temporal sense. An *awaiting* evidently belongs to the existential-temporal constitution of fear. But in the first instance this means only that the temporality of fear is *unowned*. Is fearing in the face of... merely an expecting of something threatening that is arriving? Expecting something threatening that is arriving need not already be fear, and it is so far from being fear that it lacks precisely fear's specific character as a mood. This character lies in the fact that the awaiting of fear lets what threatens *come back* to the factically concernful potentiality-for-Being. What threatens can be awaited as coming *back to* the being that I am, and Dasein can thus be threatened, only if the to-which of this back to... is already ecstatically open

at all. That fearful awaiting fears for "itself"—that is, that fearing in the face of... is in each case a fearing *about*...—is where the mood-character and *affect*-character of fear lie. Its existential-temporal meaning is constituted by a forgetting of oneself: the confused backing away in the face of one's own factical potentiality-for-Being, as which threatened Being-in-the-world is concerned with what is ready-to-hand. *Aristotle* rightly defines fear as *λύπη τις ἢ ταραχή*, as a being weighed down or a confusion. Being weighed down forces Dasein back upon its thrownness, but in such a way that this thrownness is precisely closed off. The confusion is grounded in a forgetting. The forgetful backing away in the face of a factical, resolute potentiality-for-Being clings to the possibilities of saving oneself and evading that have already been uncovered beforehand by circumspection.[3] Because concern that is afraid forgets itself, and therefore does not *seize* any *definite* possibility, it jumps from the nearest possibility to the next nearest. All "possible" possibilities—that is, impossible ones too—offer themselves. The one who is afraid stays with none of them. The "environment" does not disappear; it is encountered in a no-longer-knowing-one's-way-about in *it*. To self-forgetting in fear belongs this *confused making present* of whatever comes first. It is well known, for example, that the people living in a burning house often "save" the most indifferent thing, whatever is most immediately ready-to-hand. The self-forgetful making present of a tangle of hovering possibilities makes possible the confusion that constitutes the mood-character of fear. The forgottenness of this confusion also modifies awaiting and characterizes it as the weighed-down or confused awaiting that differs from a pure expecting.

68.14 The specific ecstatic unity that existentially makes being-afraid possible temporalizes itself primarily out of the forgetting we have characterized, which, as a mode of having-been, modifies in their temporalizing the present and future that belong to it. The temporality of fear is an awaiting-making-present forget-

3 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II.5, 1382a21: fear is "a kind of pain or disturbance."

ting. The commonsense interpretation of fear, in keeping with its orientation toward what is encountered within the world, seeks in the first instance to define the in-the-face-of-which of fear as the "arriving evil," and correspondingly to define the relation to it as expectation. Whatever else belongs to the phenomenon remains a "feeling of pleasure or displeasure."

68.15 How does the temporality of *anxiety* relate to that of fear? We called this phenomenon a basic attunement. It brings Dasein before its ownmost Being-thrown and reveals the uncanniness of everyday, familiar Being-in-the-world. Like fear, anxiety is formally determined by an *in-the-face-of-which* of being anxious and an *about-which*. The analysis showed, however, that these two phenomena coincide. This is not to say that the structural characters of the in-the-face-of-which and the about-which have fused, as if anxiety were anxious neither in the face of... nor about... That the in-the-face-of-which and the about-which coincide is meant to say that the being that fulfills them is the same —namely, Dasein. In particular, the in-the-face-of-which of anxiety is not encountered as something definite that can be concerned with. The threat does not come from what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, but rather precisely from the fact that nothing ready-to-hand or present-at-hand "says" anything at all to one any longer. Environmental beings no longer have any involvement. The world in which I exist has sunk into insignificance, and the world thus disclosed can free beings only in the character of non-involvement. The nothing of the world, in the face of which anxiety is anxious, does not mean that in anxiety one experiences, say, an absence of what is present-at-hand within the world. What is present-at-hand must be encountered precisely so that there can be *no involvement whatsoever* with it, and so that it can show itself in an empty mercilessness. This implies, however, that concernful awaiting finds nothing from which it could understand itself; it grasps at the nothing of the world. But, thrust up against the world, understanding is brought by anxiety to Being-in-the-world as such—and this in-the-face-of-which of anxiety is at the same time its about-which.

Being-anxious in the face of... has neither the character of an expectation nor that of an awaiting at all. The in-the-face-of-which of anxiety is, after all, already "there": Dasein itself. Is anxiety then not constituted by a future? Certainly—but not by the unowned future of awaiting.

68.16 The insignificance of the world disclosed in anxiety reveals the nullity of what can be concerned with—that is, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-for-Being of existence founded primarily on what is concerned with. But revealing this impossibility means letting the possibility of an owned potentiality-for-Being light up. What temporal meaning does this revealing have? Anxiety is anxious about naked Dasein as thrown into uncanniness. It brings Dasein back to the pure "that" of its ownmost, individualized thrownness. This bringing back does not have the character of evasive forgetting—but not that of remembering either. Just as little, however, does anxiety already involve a repeating taking-over of existence into resolution. On the contrary, anxiety brings Dasein back to its thrownness *as something possible that can be repeated*. And in this way it also reveals the possibility of an owned potentiality-for-Being, which, in repeating, must as futural come back to the thrown "there." *Bringing before repeatability is the specific ecstatic mode of the having-been that constitutes the attunement of anxiety.*

68.17 The forgetting constitutive of fear confuses Dasein and lets it drift back and forth between "worldly" possibilities it has not seized. In contrast to this unheld making present, the present of anxiety is *held* in bringing itself back to one's ownmost thrownness. By its existential meaning, anxiety cannot lose itself in something that can be concerned with. When something of this kind happens in an attunement similar to it, that attunement is fear, which everyday understanding confuses with anxiety. Although the present of anxiety is *held*, it does not yet have the character of the moment of vision, which temporalizes itself in resolution. Anxiety only brings one into the mood of a *possible* resolution. Its present holds the moment of vision,

as which anxiety itself, and only anxiety, is possible, *poised to leap*.

68.18 The peculiar temporality of anxiety—that it is grounded primordially in having-been, and that future and present temporalize themselves only out of having-been—shows how the potency that distinguishes the mood of anxiety is possible. In anxiety, Dasein is taken back completely to its naked uncanniness and stupefied by it. This stupefaction, however, not only *takes* Dasein back from its *"worldly"* possibilities but at the same time *gives* it the possibility of an *owned* potentiality-for-Being.

68.19 Neither of the two moods, fear and anxiety, however, ever just "occurs" in isolation in the "stream of lived experiences"; each in each case de-termines an understanding, or is determined by one. Fear has its occasion in environmental beings one is concerned with. Anxiety, by contrast, springs from Dasein itself. Fear assails us from the innerworldly. Anxiety rises from Being-in-the-world as thrown Being-toward-death. Understood temporally, this "arising" of anxiety from Dasein means that the future and present of anxiety temporalize themselves out of a primordial having-been, in the sense of a bringing back to repeatability. But anxiety can arise in an owned way only in a resolute Dasein. The resolute one knows no fear, but understands precisely the possibility of anxiety as the mood that does not inhibit and confuse it.[4] Anxiety frees one from "null" possibilities and lets one become free *for* owned ones.

68.20 Although both modes of attunement, fear and anxiety, are grounded primarily in a *having-been*, their origin differs with regard to the temporalizing proper to each within the whole of care. Anxiety springs from the *future* of resoluteness; fear, from the lost present, which fearfully fears fear, only to fall prey to it all the more.

68.21 But does the thesis of the temporality of moods perhaps hold only for the phenomena selected for analysis? How is a temporal meaning to be found in the pallid lack of mood that

4 "De-termine" renders *be-stimmen*, which Heidegger hyphenates to bring out *Stimmung* (mood) in *bestimmen* (to determine).

pervades the "gray everyday"? And how do matters stand with the temporality of moods and affects such as hope, joy, enthusiasm, cheerfulness? That not only fear and anxiety but other moods too are existentially founded in a having-been becomes clear if we merely name phenomena such as weariness, sadness, melancholy, despair. Their interpretation, admittedly, must be placed on the broader basis of a worked-out existential analytic of Dasein. But even a phenomenon such as hope, which seems to be founded entirely in the future, must be analyzed in a way corresponding to fear. Hope has been characterized as the expectation of a bonum futurum [future good], in distinction from fear, which relates to a malum futurum [future evil]. What is decisive for the structure of the phenomenon, however, is not so much the "futural" character of that *to which* hope relates as the existential meaning of *hoping itself*. Here too the mood-character lies primarily in hoping as *hoping-for-oneself*. In hoping, one takes oneself *along*, as it were, into the hope and brings oneself toward what is hoped for. But this presupposes having-won-oneself. That hope *lightens*, as against oppressive apprehension, says only that this attunement too remains related to the burden, in the mode of having-*been*. An elevated—better, an elevating—mood is ontologically possible only in an ecstatic-temporal relation of Dasein to the thrown ground of itself.

68.22 Finally, the pallid lack of mood of indifference, which clings to nothing and presses toward nothing, which gives itself over to whatever each day brings and yet in a certain way takes everything along with it, demonstrates *most forcefully* the power of *forgetting* in the everyday moods of closest concern. Just living along, letting everything "be" as it is, is grounded in a forgetful giving-oneself-over to thrownness. It has the ecstatic meaning of an unowned having-been. Indifference, which can go together with headlong busyness, must be sharply distinguished from equanimity. *Equanimity* springs from resoluteness, which, in the moment of *vision*, has its eye on the possible situations of

the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole disclosed in anticipation of death.[5]

68.23 Only a being that, by the meaning of its Being, finds itself attuned—that is, that in existing has in each case already been and exists in a constant mode of having-been—can be affected. Ontologically, affection presupposes making present, in such a way that in it Dasein can be brought back to itself as having-been. How the *stimulation* and *touching* of the senses in something that merely lives are to be delimited ontologically, how and where the Being of animals, for example, is constituted by a "time" at all, remains a problem in its own right.

c) The Temporality of Falling

Curiosity reveals falling as a making present that leaps away from future and having-been.

68.24 The temporal interpretation of understanding and attunement came upon not only an ecstasis that is *primary* for the phenomenon in question in each case, but always at the same time upon *whole* temporality. Just as the future primarily makes understanding possible, and having-been makes mood possible, so the third constitutive structural moment of care, *falling*, has its existential meaning in the *present*. The preparatory analysis of falling began with an interpretation of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. The temporal analysis of falling is to take the same course. We restrict the investigation, however, to a consideration of curiosity, because the specific temporality of falling is most easily seen in it. The analysis of idle talk and ambiguity, by contrast, already presupposes clarification of the temporal constitution of discourse and of construing (interpretation).

68.25 *Curiosity* is a distinctive tendency of Dasein's Being, in accordance with which Dasein concerns itself with being able to see. Like the concept of sight, "seeing" is not restricted to perceiving with the "bodily eyes." Perceiving in the broader sense

5 "In the moment of *vision*" renders *augenblicklich* ("momentary"), with Heidegger stressing its root *Blick* (glance, look).

lets what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand be encountered in itself, "in the flesh," with regard to how it looks. This letting-be-encountered is grounded in a present. The present provides, in general, the ecstatic horizon within which beings can be *present* in the flesh. Curiosity, however, does not make present what is present-at-hand in order to *understand* it by tarrying alongside it; it seeks to see *only* in order to see and to have seen. As this making present that entangles itself in itself, curiosity stands in an ecstatic unity with a corresponding future and having-been. The craving for the new is indeed an advance toward something not-yet-seen, but in such a way that making present seeks to withdraw from awaiting. Curiosity is futural in an altogether unowned way, and this again in such a way that it does not await a *possibility*, but in its craving already desires that possibility only as something actual. Curiosity is constituted by an unheld making present, which, only making present, thereby constantly seeks to run away from the awaiting in which it is nonetheless, unheld, "held." The present "leaps away" from the awaiting that belongs to it, in the emphatic sense of running away. The "leaping-away" making present of curiosity is, however, so little devoted to the "matter at hand" that, in gaining sight of it, it is already looking away toward the next thing.[6] The making present that constantly "leaps away" from the awaiting of a definite possibility that has been seized makes ontologically possible the *not-tarrying* that distinguishes curiosity. Making present does not "leap away" from awaiting in such a way that, understood ontically as it were, it detaches itself from awaiting and leaves it to itself. The "leaping away" is an ecstatic modification of awaiting, such that awaiting *leaps after* making present. Awaiting gives itself up, as it were; it no longer lets even unowned possibilities of concern come toward itself from what is concerned with, unless they are possibilities for an unheld making present. The ecstatic modification of awaiting, by the making present that leaps away, into an awaiting that leaps after

6 *Neugier* (curiosity) is literally "craving for the new." *Entspringen* means both "to spring from, originate" and "to escape, run away."

is the existential-temporal condition of the possibility of *distraction.*

68.26 Through the awaiting that leaps after it, making present is more and more left to itself. It makes present for the sake of the present. Entangling itself in itself in this way, distracted not-tarrying becomes *never dwelling anywhere.* This mode of the present is the most extreme counter-phenomenon to the *moment of vision.* In *never dwelling anywhere,* Dasein is everywhere and nowhere. The *moment of vision* brings existence into the situation and discloses the owned "there."

68.27 The more unowned the present is—that is, the more making present comes to "itself"—the more it flees, closing off, in the face of a definite potentiality-for-Being, and the less, then, can the future come back to the thrown being. In the "leaping away" of the present there lies at the same time a growing forgetting. That curiosity always already holds on to what is next and has forgotten what came before is not a result that follows only *from* curiosity; it is the ontological condition of curiosity itself.

68.28 The characteristics of falling that were pointed out—temptation, tranquilization, alienation, and self-entanglement—mean, with regard to their temporal meaning, that the "leaping-away" making present, by its ecstatic tendency, seeks to temporalize itself out of itself. Dasein entangles itself—this characterization has an ecstatic meaning. The carrying-away of existence in making present does not, after all, mean that Dasein detaches itself from its I and self. Even in the most extreme making present it remains temporal—that is, awaiting, forgetting. Even in making present, Dasein still understands itself, although it is alienated from its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is grounded primarily in the owned future and having-been. But insofar as making present always offers something "new," it does not let Dasein come back to itself and constantly tranquilizes it anew. This tranquilization, in turn, strengthens the tendency to leap away. It is not the endless, unsurveyable extent of what has not yet been seen that "produces" curiosity; it is the falling kind of temporalizing of the present that leaps away.

Even when one has seen everything, curiosity precisely *invents* something new.

68.29 The mode of temporalizing in which the present "leaps away" is grounded in the essence of temporality, which is *finite*. Thrown into Being-toward-death, Dasein in the first instance and for the most part flees in the face of this thrownness, which has been revealed more or less explicitly. The present leaps away from its owned future and having-been, so as to let Dasein come to owned existence only by way of a detour through itself. The origin of the "leaping away" of the present—that is, of falling into lostness—is primordial, owned temporality itself, which makes thrown Being-toward-death possible.

68.30 Thrownness, *before* which Dasein can indeed be brought in an *owned* way so as to understand itself in it in an owned way, nevertheless remains closed off to Dasein as regards its ontic whence and how. This closedness, however, is by no means merely a factually existing not-knowing; it constitutes Dasein's facticity. It co-determines the *ecstatic* character of existence's being abandoned to its own null ground.

68.31 The throw of Being-thrown into the world is not, in the first instance, caught by Dasein in an owned way; the "movedness" that lies in it does not already come to a "standstill" just because Dasein is now "there." Dasein is swept along in thrownness; that is, as something thrown into the world, it loses itself to the "world" in its factical dependence on what is to be concerned with. The present, which makes up the existential meaning of being-taken-along, never of itself gains a different ecstatic horizon—unless it is brought back from its lostness in a resolution, so that, as the held moment of vision, it discloses the situation in each case and, at one with it, the primordial "limit-situation" of Being-toward-death.

D) THE TEMPORALITY OF DISCOURSE

Discourse is temporal in itself, though its full analysis must await the question of Being.

68.32 The full disclosedness of the "there," constituted by understanding, attunement, and falling, receives its articulation through discourse. Hence discourse does not temporalize itself primarily in any one definite ecstasis. But because discourse factically expresses itself for the most part in language, and speaks in the first instance in the manner of concernful discussing and addressing of the "environment," *making present* does, admittedly, have a *privileged* constitutive function.

68.33 The tenses, like the other temporal phenomena of language—"aspects" and "temporal levels"—do not arise from the fact that discourse "also" expresses itself about "temporal" processes, that is, processes encountered "in time." Nor do they have their ground in the fact that speaking runs its course "in a psychical time." Discourse is temporal *in itself*, insofar as all discoursing about..., of... and to... is grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. The *aspects* are rooted in the primordial temporality of concern, whether or not that concern relates to what is within time. With the help of the ordinary and traditional concept of time, to which linguistics of necessity resorts, the problem of the existential-temporal structure of the aspects *cannot even be posed*.[7] But because discourse is in each case a discussing of beings, although not primarily and predominantly in the sense of theoretical asserting, the analysis of the temporal constitution of discourse and the explication of the temporal characters of linguistic formations can be undertaken only once the problem of the fundamental connection between Being and truth has been unfolded from the problematic of temporality. Then the ontological meaning of the "is" can also be delimited, which an extrinsic theory of propositions and judgments has

7 "Aspects" renders *Aktionsarten* (literally "kinds of action"), the linguists' term for the way a verb presents the unfolding of an action.

disfigured into the "copula." Only from the temporality of discourse—that is, of Dasein in general—can the "genesis" of "meaning" be clarified and the possibility of concept formation be made ontologically intelligible.

68.34 Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (anticipation or awaiting). Attunement temporalizes itself primarily in having-been (repetition or forgottenness). Falling is rooted temporally primarily in the present (making present or moment of vision). All the same, understanding is in each case a "having-been" present. All the same, attunement temporalizes itself as a "making-present" future. All the same, the present "leaps away" from, or is held by, a having-been future. This makes visible that *temporality temporalizes itself wholly in each ecstasis; that is, in the ecstatic unity of the full temporalizing of temporality in each case lies the ground of the wholeness of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling—that is, the unity of the structure of care.*

68.35 Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstases. The future is *not earlier* than having-been, and having-been is *not later* than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a having-been-making-present future.

68.36 The disclosedness of the "there" and Dasein's basic existentiell possibilities, ownness and unownness, are founded in temporality. But disclosedness always pertains equiprimordially to the whole of *Being-in-the-world*—to Being-in as well as to the world. By orienting ourselves to the temporal constitution of disclosedness, we must therefore also be able to demonstrate the ontological condition of the possibility that there can be beings that exist as Being-in-the-world.

§ 69. THE TEMPORALITY OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AND THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD

Ecstatic temporality clears the "there" and makes Being-in-the-world possible.

69.1 The ecstatic unity of temporality, that is, the unity of the "outside-itself" in the carryings-away of future, having-been, and present, is the condition of the possibility that there can be a

being which exists as its "there." The being that bears the title Da-sein is *"cleared."* The light that constitutes this clearedness of Dasein is no ontically present-at-hand power, and no source of a radiating brightness that occasionally occurs in this being. What essentially clears this being, that is, makes it both "open" and "bright" for itself, was defined as care, before any "temporal" interpretation. The full disclosedness of the "there" is grounded in care. Only this clearedness makes possible all illumination and brightening, every apprehending, "seeing," and having of something. We understand the light of this clearedness only if we do not look for an implanted power that is present-at-hand, but instead question Dasein's whole constitution of Being, care, as to the unitary ground of its existential possibility. *Ecstatic temporality clears the "there" primordially.* It is the primary regulative of the possible unity of all of Dasein's essential existential structures.

69.2 Only from the rootedness of Da-sein in temporality does the existential *possibility* of the phenomenon that we made recognizable at the outset of the analytic of Dasein as its basic constitution become intelligible: *Being-in-the-world.* At the beginning, the task was to secure the unbreakable structural unity of this phenomenon. The question of the *ground of the possible unity* of this *articulated* structure remained in the background. With the aim of protecting the phenomenon from the most self-evident and therefore most pernicious tendencies to split it apart, the nearest everyday mode of Being-in-the-world, *concernful* Being alongside what is ready-to-hand within the world, was interpreted in greater detail. Now that *care* itself has been ontologically delimited and traced back to its existential ground, temporality, *concern* can in its turn be conceived *explicitly* in terms of care, or of temporality.

69.3 The analysis of the temporality of concern keeps initially to the mode of circumspective having-to-do-with what is ready-to-hand. It then pursues the existential-temporal possibility that circumspective concern is modified into an uncovering of inner-worldly beings that "only" looks at them, in the sense of certain

possibilities of scientific research. The interpretation of the temporality of circumspective as well as of theoretically concernful Being alongside what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand *within the world* shows at the same time how this same temporality is already in advance the condition of the possibility of Being-in-the-world, in which Being alongside *innerworldly* beings is grounded in general. The thematic analysis of the temporal constitution of Being-in-the-world leads to these questions: In what way is anything like world possible at all? In what sense *is* world? What does the world transcend, and how? How do the "independent" innerworldly beings "hang together" with the transcending world? The *ontological exposition* of these questions is not yet their answer. It does, however, accomplish the clarification, necessary beforehand, of *those* structures with regard to which the problem of transcendence has to be posed. The existential-temporal interpretation of Being-in-the-world considers three things: a) the temporality of circumspective concern; b) the temporal meaning of the modification of circumspective concern into theoretical knowing of what is present-at-hand within the world; c) the temporal problem of the transcendence of the world.

A) THE TEMPORALITY OF CIRCUMSPECTIVE CONCERN

Dealing with equipment is shown to rest on awaiting, retaining, and making present.

69.4 How do we gain the direction of view for the analysis of the temporality of concern? We called concernful Being alongside the "world" dealings in and with the environment. As exemplary phenomena of Being alongside... we chose using, manipulating, and producing what is ready-to-hand, together with their deficient and indifferent modes, that is, Being alongside what belongs to everyday needs. Dasein's owned existence, too, keeps itself in such concern—even when concern remains "a matter of indifference" to it. The ready-to-hand that is concerned with does not cause concern, as though concern arose only on the

basis of the effects of innerworldly beings. Being alongside what is ready-to-hand can neither be explained ontically in terms of the ready-to-hand, nor, conversely, can the ready-to-hand be derived from this Being alongside it. Yet concern as a way of Being of Dasein, and what is concerned with as what is ready-to-hand within the world, are also not merely *present-at-hand together.* Nevertheless there is a "connection" between them. From the rightly understood by-which of dealings, a light falls on concernful dealings themselves. Conversely, missing the phenomenal structure of the by-which of dealings results in misconstruing the existential constitution of dealing. For the analysis of the beings encountered nearest, it is indeed already an essential gain if the specific equipmental character of these beings is not skipped over. But beyond that we must understand that concernful dealings never stay with a single item of equipment. Using and manipulating a particular item of equipment remains, as such, oriented toward a nexus of equipment. If, for example, we look for a "mislaid" item of equipment, what is meant is neither merely nor primarily only what is sought, in an isolated "act"; rather, the compass of the totality of equipment has already been uncovered beforehand. All "going to work" and taking hold does not come upon an isolated, pregiven item of equipment out of nothing; rather, in taking hold of an item of equipment it comes back to it from the work-world that has always already been disclosed.

69.5 For the analysis of dealings with a view to their by-which, this yields the directive not to orient existing Being alongside the beings concerned with toward an isolated, ready-to-hand item of equipment, but precisely toward the totality of equipment. Reflecting on the distinctive character of Being of ready-to-hand equipment, *involvement*, also compels us to grasp the by-which of dealings in this way. We understand this term ontologically. The locution: something has its involvement *by* something *with* something, is not meant to establish a fact ontically but to indicate the way of Being of what is ready-to-hand. The relational character of involvement, of the "by... with...," indic-

ates that *one* item of equipment is ontologically impossible. It may be that only a single item of equipment is ready-to-hand and the other is "missing." But in this the belonging of what happens to be ready-to-hand *to* another makes itself known. Concernful dealings can let what is ready-to-hand be encountered circumspectively at all only if they already understand something like involvement, the involvement that something in each case has by something with something. The circumspective-uncovering Being alongside... of concern is a letting-be-involved, that is, an understanding projection of involvement. *If letting-be-involved makes up the existential structure of concern, and concern, as Being alongside..., belongs to the essential constitution of care, and if care in turn is grounded in temporality, then the existential condition of the possibility of letting-be-involved must be sought in a mode of the temporalizing of temporality.*

69.6 Letting-be-involved lies in the simplest handling of an item of equipment. Its with-which has the character of the what-for; with a view to this, the equipment is usable or in use. The understanding of the what-for, that is, of the with-which of the involvement, has the temporal structure of awaiting. Only in awaiting the what-for can concern at the same time come back to something of the sort with which there is the involvement. The *awaiting* of the with-which, together with the *retaining* of the by-which of the involvement, makes possible, in its ecstatic unity, the specifically manipulating making present of the equipment.

69.7 Awaiting the what-for is neither contemplating the "purpose" nor expecting the impending completion of the work to be produced. It does not have the character of a thematic grasping at all. But retaining that by which there is the involvement does not mean holding on to it thematically either. Manipulating dealings comport themselves no more toward the with-which alone than toward the by-which of letting-be-involved. Rather, letting-be-involved constitutes itself in the unity of awaiting retaining, in such a way that the making present arising from this makes possible concern's characteristic absorption in its

world of equipment. "Proper," wholly devoted busying oneself with... is neither only alongside the work, nor alongside the tool, nor alongside both "together." Letting-be-involved, grounded in temporality, has already established the unity of the relations in which concern circumspectively "moves."

69.8 A specific *forgetting* is essential to the temporality that constitutes letting-be-involved. In order to be able to "really" go to work and manipulate, "lost" in the world of equipment, the self must forget itself. But insofar as in the unity of the temporalizing of concern an *awaiting* in each case leads the way, concernful Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being is nevertheless, as we shall yet show, placed into care.

69.9 Awaiting-retaining making present constitutes the familiarity in accordance with which Dasein, as Being-with-one-another, "knows its way about" in the public environment. We understand letting-be-involved existentially as a letting-"be." On its basis what is ready-to-hand can be encountered by circumspection *as the being* that it is. We can therefore clarify the temporality of concern further if we attend to *those* modes of circumspectively letting something be encountered that were characterized earlier as conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy. As regards its "true in-itself," ready-to-hand equipment is encountered precisely not for a thematic perception of things, but in the inconspicuousness of what is found "as a matter of course" and "objectively." But if something in the whole of these beings becomes conspicuous, this implies the possibility that the totality of equipment as such obtrudes along with it. How must letting-be-involved be existentially structured so that it can let something conspicuous be encountered? The question now aims not at factical occasions that direct attention to something pregiven, but at the ontological meaning of this directability as such.

69.10 What is unusable—for example, the definite failure of a tool—can become conspicuous only in and for manipulating dealings. Even the sharpest and most persistent "perceiving" and "representing" of things could never uncover anything like

damage to the tool. Handling must be capable of being disturbed so that something unhandy can be encountered. But what does that mean *ontologically*? Awaiting-retaining making present is held up, as regards its absorption in the relations of involvement, by what later turns out to be damage. Making present, which is equiprimordially awaiting the what-for, is held fast by the equipment in use, in such a way that only now are the what-for and the in-order-to explicitly encountered. Making present itself, however, can in turn come across something unsuitable for... only insofar as it already moves in an awaiting retaining of that by which something has its involvement with something. Making present is "held up": this means that, in unity with retaining awaiting, it shifts even further into itself and so constitutes the "inspecting," examining, and removing of the disturbance. If concernful dealings were merely a succession of "lived experiences" running their course "in time," however intimately these might be "associated," letting conspicuous, unusable equipment be encountered would remain ontologically impossible. Letting-be-involved as such, whatever nexus of equipment it makes accessible for dealings, must be grounded in the ecstatic unity of awaiting-retaining making present.

69.11 And how is it possible to "ascertain" what is missing, that is, what is unready-to-hand, not merely ready-to-hand in an unhandy way? What is unready-to-hand is circumspectively uncovered in *missing* it. Missing, and the "noting" of something's not being present-at-hand that is founded in it, have their own existential presuppositions. Missing is by no means a not-making-present, but a deficient mode of the present in the sense of the un-making-present of something expected or always already available. If circumspective letting-be-involved were not "from the outset" *awaiting* what is concerned with, and if awaiting did not temporalize itself *in unity with* a making present, Dasein could never "find" that something is missing.

69.12 Conversely, the possibility of *being surprised* by something is grounded in the fact that the *awaiting* making present of something ready-to-hand is *not awaiting* something else that

stands in a possible nexus of involvement with it. The not-awaiting of lost making present first discloses the "horizonal" leeway within which something surprising can befall Dasein.

69.13 What concernful dealings do not master—as producing and procuring, but also as warding off, keeping at a distance, protecting oneself against...—reveals itself in its insurmountability. Concern puts up with it. But putting up with... is a distinct mode of circumspectively letting something be encountered. On the basis of this uncovering, concern can come across what is inconvenient, disturbing, obstructing, endangering, what is in general somehow resistant. The temporal structure of putting up with lies in an awaiting-making-present *not-retaining*. Awaiting making present, for example, does not count "on" what is unsuitable yet nonetheless available. Not reckoning with... is a mode of taking into account that which one *cannot* rely on. It is not forgotten but retained, so that it remains ready-to-hand precisely *in its unsuitability*. Ready-to-hand things of this kind belong to the everyday stock of the factically disclosed environment.

69.14 Only insofar as what resists is uncovered on the basis of the ecstatic temporality of concern can factical Dasein understand itself in its abandonment to a "world" of which it never becomes master. Even when concern remains restricted to the urgency of what is needed every day, it is still never a pure making present; it arises from an awaiting retaining, on the ground of which, or as which "ground," Dasein exists in a world. That is why factically existing Dasein always already knows its way about in a certain way, even in a foreign "world."

69.15 The letting-be-involved of concern, founded by temporality, is a still wholly pre-ontological, unthematic understanding of involvement and readiness-to-hand. To what extent temporality ultimately also founds the understanding of these determinations of Being as such will be shown in what follows. Before that, the temporality of Being-in-the-world must be demonstrated more concretely. With this aim we trace the "emergence" of theoretical comportment toward the "world" out of circum-

spective concern with what is ready-to-hand. Both the circumspective and the theoretical uncovering of innerworldly beings are founded on Being-in-the-world. The existential-temporal interpretation of these ways of uncovering prepares the temporal characterization of this basic constitution of Dasein.

B) THE TEMPORAL MEANING OF THE MODIFICATION OF CIRCUMSPECTIVE CONCERN INTO THE THEORETICAL UNCOVERING OF WHAT IS PRESENT-AT-HAND WITHIN THE WORLD

Science arises when a changed understanding of Being projects nature mathematically and thematizes the present-at-hand.

69.16 When, in the course of the *existential-ontological* analyses, we ask about the "emergence" of *theoretical* uncovering out of *circumspective* concern, this already implies that what is being made the problem is not the *ontic* history and development of science, its factical occasions and immediate aims. Seeking the *ontological genesis* of theoretical comportment, we ask: What are the existentially necessary conditions, lying in Dasein's constitution of Being, of the possibility that Dasein can exist in the manner of scientific research? This way of posing the question aims at an *existential concept of science.* From it is to be distinguished the "logical" concept, which understands science with regard to its result and defines it as a "nexus of grounding of true, that is, valid propositions." The existential concept understands science as a way of existence, and thus as a mode of Being-in-the-world that uncovers or discloses beings or Being. A fully adequate existential interpretation of science can, however, be carried out only when the *meaning of Being and the "connection" between Being and truth* have been *clarified* in terms of the temporality of existence. The following considerations prepare the understanding of *this central problematic*, within which the idea of phenomenology, too, will first be developed, as distinct from the preliminary concept indicated in the introduction.

69.17 In keeping with the stage our inquiry has reached so far, a further restriction is imposed on the interpretation of theoretical comportment. We investigate only the changeover from circumspective concern with what is ready-to-hand to the investigation of what is present-at-hand as found-before-us within the world, with the guiding aim of pressing on to the temporal constitution of Being-in-the-world in general.

69.18 It is tempting to characterize the changeover from "practically" circumspective manipulating, using, and the like, to "theoretical" investigating in the following way: pure looking at beings arises when concern *refrains* from any manipulation. What is decisive in the "emergence" of theoretical comportment would then lie in the *disappearance* of praxis. Precisely if one posits "practical" concern as the primary and predominant way of Being of factical Dasein, "theory" will owe its ontological possibility to the *lack* of praxis, that is, to a *privation*. But the discontinuation of a specific manipulation in concernful dealings does not simply leave behind the circumspection guiding it as a remainder. Rather, concern then shifts expressly into a merely-looking-around. But this by no means yet reaches the "theoretical" attitude of science. On the contrary, the lingering that sets in when manipulation is discontinued can take on the character of a sharpened circumspection, as "inspecting," checking what has been achieved, as surveying the "operations that are at a standstill." Refraining from the use of equipment is so far from being "theory" already that the lingering, "contemplating" circumspection remains wholly bound to the ready-to-hand equipment concerned with. "Practical" dealings have their *own* ways of lingering. And just as praxis has its specific sight ("theory"), so theoretical research is not without its own praxis. Reading off the measured values as the result of an experiment often requires an intricate "technical" setup of the experimental arrangement. Observation under the microscope depends on the production of "preparations." The archaeological excavation that precedes the interpretation of the "find" calls for the crudest manipulations. But even the "most abstract" working

out of problems and fixing of what has been gained manipulates, for example, writing equipment. However "uninteresting" and "self-evident" such components of scientific research may be, they are by no means ontologically indifferent. Explicitly pointing out that scientific comportment, as a way of Being-in-the-world, is not merely a "purely intellectual activity" may look pedantic and superfluous. If only this triviality did not make it clear that it is by no means obvious where the ontological boundary between "theoretical" and "atheoretical" comportment actually runs!

69.19 It will be objected that all manipulation in science stands merely in the service of pure contemplation, of the investigating uncovering and disclosing of the "things themselves." "Seeing," taken in the widest sense, regulates all "arrangements" and retains priority. "In whatever way and by whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates to them immediately, *and at which all thinking as a means is aimed* (emphasis added), is *intuition*." From the beginnings of Greek ontology up to today, the idea of intuitus [intuition] has guided every interpretation of knowledge, whether or not it is factically attainable.[8] In accordance with the priority of "seeing," the demonstration of the existential genesis of science will have to begin by characterizing the *circumspection* that guides "practical" concern.

69.20 Circumspection moves within the relations of involvement of the nexus of ready-to-hand equipment. It is itself in turn guided by a more or less explicit survey of the totality of equipment of the world of equipment in each case, and of the public environment that belongs to it. This survey is not merely a subsequent gathering-up of what is present-at-hand. What is essential to the survey is the primary understanding of the totality of involvements within which factical concern in each case sets in. The survey that illuminates concern receives its "light" from Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, *for the sake of which* concern

8 The quotation is the opening sentence of the Transcendental Aesthetic in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (A19/B33).

exists as care. The "surveying" circumspection of concern *brings* what is ready-to-hand *closer* to Dasein, in each case of using and manipulating, by way of interpreting what has been sighted. We call the specific circumspective-interpretive bringing-near of what is concerned with *deliberation.* The schema peculiar to it is the "if-then": if this or that, for example, is to be produced, put to use, or prevented, then these or those means, ways, circumstances, or opportunities are needed. Circumspective deliberation illuminates Dasein's particular factical position in the environment with which it is concerned. Accordingly, it never merely "establishes" the presence-at-hand of a being or its properties. Deliberation can also be carried out without what is circumspectively brought near in it being itself ready-to-hand within reach and present within the nearest range of sight. Bringing the environment near in circumspective deliberation has the existential meaning of a *making present.* For *en*visaging is only a mode of making present. In envisaging, deliberation directly catches sight of what is needed but unready-to-hand.[9] Envisaging circumspection does not relate, say, to "mere representations."

69.21 Circumspective making present, however, is a phenomenon founded in several ways. First, it belongs in each case to a full ecstatic unity of temporality. It is grounded in a *retaining* of the nexus of equipment in concern with which Dasein is *awaiting* a possibility. What has already been opened up in awaiting retaining is brought nearer by deliberative making present or envisaging. But for deliberation to be able to move in the schema of the "if-then," concern must already understand a nexus of involvements "in a surveying way." What is addressed with the "if" must already be understood *as this or that*. This does not require that the understanding of equipment be expressed in a predication. The schema "something as something" is already prefigured in the structure of pre-predicative understanding. The as-structure is ontologically grounded in

9 "Envisaging" renders *Vergegenwärtigung*, calling to mind what is not bodily there; it differs from *Gegenwärtigung* (making-present) only by the prefix *ver-*, which Heidegger stresses.

the temporality of understanding. Only insofar as Dasein, awaiting a possibility, that is, here a what-for, has come back to a for-that, that is, retains something ready-to-hand, can, *conversely*, the making present that belongs to this awaiting retaining, starting from what is retained, *explicitly bring it nearer* in its referredness to the what-for. Deliberation that brings near must, in the schema of making present, adapt itself to the way of Being of what is to be brought near. The character of involvement of what is ready-to-hand is not first uncovered by deliberation, but only brought near by it, in such a way that deliberation lets that *with which* there is an involvement *by* something be seen circumspectively *as* this.

69.22 The rootedness of the present in the future and in having-been is the existential-temporal condition of the possibility that what is projected in the understanding belonging to circumspective understanding can be brought nearer in a making present, in such a way that the present must thereby adapt itself to what is encountered in the horizon of awaiting retaining, that is, must interpret it in the schema of the as-structure. This gives the answer to the question posed earlier, whether the as-structure stands in an existential-ontological connection with the phenomenon of projection. *Like understanding and interpretation in general, the "as" is grounded in the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality.* In the fundamental analysis of Being, and specifically in connection with the interpretation of the "is," which as copula gives "expression" to addressing something *as* something, we must make the as-phenomenon our theme once again and delimit the concept of "schema" existentially.

69.23 But what is the temporal characterization of circumspective deliberation and its schemata supposed to contribute to answering the pending question of the genesis of theoretical comportment? Only this much: it clarifies the situation, as it pertains to Dasein, of the changeover from circumspective concern to theoretical uncovering. The analysis of the changeover itself may be attempted by following the guiding thread of an

elementary assertion of circumspective deliberation and its possible modifications.

69.24 In the circumspective use of tools we can say: the hammer is too heavy, or too light. The sentence: the hammer is heavy, can also give expression to a concernful deliberation and mean: it is not light, that is, handling it takes strength, or it will make manipulation difficult. But the sentence *can* also say: the being lying before us, which we already know circumspectively as a hammer, has a weight, that is, the "property" of heaviness: it exerts a pressure on what it rests on; if that is removed, it falls. Discourse understood in this way is no longer spoken within the horizon of the awaiting retaining of a totality of equipment and its relations of involvement. What is said is drawn from looking at what belongs to a being with "mass" as such. What is now sighted belongs to the hammer not as a tool but as a corporeal thing subject to the law of gravity. Circumspective discourse about "too heavy" or "too light" now no longer has any "meaning," that is, the being now encountered offers nothing in itself with reference to which it could be "found" too heavy or too light.

69.25 Why is it that in the modified discourse its about-which, the heavy hammer, shows itself differently? Not because we keep our distance from manipulating, nor because we merely *look away* from the equipmental character of this being, but because we look at the ready-to-hand thing we encounter "anew," as something present-at-hand. *The understanding of Being* that guides concernful dealings with innerworldly beings *has changed over.* But is scientific comportment already constituted by our "taking" what is ready-to-hand as present-at-hand instead of deliberating about it circumspectively? Moreover, what is ready-to-hand can also be made the theme of scientific investigation and determination, for example in researching an environment, the milieu, in the context of a historiographical biography. The everyday ready-to-hand nexus of equipment, its historical emergence and exploitation, its factical role in Dasein, is the object of the science of economics. What is ready-

to-hand does not need to lose its equipmental character in order to become the "object" of a science. The modification of the understanding of Being seems not to be necessarily constitutive for the genesis of theoretical comportment "toward things." Certainly—if modification is supposed to mean a change in the way of Being, understood in understanding, of the beings lying before us.

69.26 For the first characterization of the genesis of theoretical comportment out of circumspection, we took as our basis a way of theoretically grasping innerworldly beings, physical nature, in which the modification of the understanding of Being amounts to a changeover. In the "physical" assertion "the hammer is heavy," not only is the tool character of the being encountered *overlooked*, but along with it that which belongs to every ready-to-hand item of equipment: its place. The place becomes a matter of indifference. Not that what is present-at-hand loses its "location" altogether. The place becomes a space-time position, a "world-point" that is in no way distinguished from any other. This implies: not only is the multiplicity of places of ready-to-hand equipment, bounded within the environment, modified into a pure multiplicity of positions, but the beings of the environment are *unbounded* altogether. The universe of what is present-at-hand becomes the theme.

69.27 In the present case, an unbounding of the environment belongs to the modification of the understanding of Being. But following the guiding thread of the understanding of Being in the sense of presence-at-hand, which now takes the lead, the unbounding at the same time becomes a delimitation of the "region" of what is present-at-hand. The more appropriately the Being of the beings to be investigated is understood in the guiding understanding of Being, and the more appropriately the whole of beings, as a possible subject area of a science, is accordingly articulated in its basic determinations, the more secure the particular perspective of methodical questioning becomes.

69.28 The classic example of the historical development of a science, but at the same time also of its ontological genesis, is the emergence of mathematical physics. What is decisive for its formation lies neither in a higher esteem for the observation of "facts," nor in the "application" of mathematics in determining natural processes—but in the *mathematical projection of nature itself.* This projection uncovers in advance something constantly present-at-hand (matter) and opens the horizon for the guiding look toward its quantitatively determinable constitutive moments (motion, force, location, and time). Only "in the light" of a nature projected in this way can anything like a "fact" be found and set up for an experiment regulatively delimited on the basis of the projection. The "grounding" of "factual science" became possible only because researchers understood: there are, in principle, no "mere facts." What is decisive in the mathematical projection of nature is, again, not primarily the mathematical as such, but that this projection *discloses an a priori.* And so what makes mathematical natural science exemplary does not consist in its specific exactness and its binding character for "everyone," but in the fact that in it the beings that are its theme are uncovered in the only way in which beings can be uncovered: in the prior projection of their constitution of Being. With the working out, in basic concepts, of the guiding understanding of Being, the guiding threads of the methods are determined, as are the structure of the conceptuality, the corresponding possibility of truth and certainty, the manner of grounding and proof, the mode of bindingness, and the kind of communication. The whole of these moments constitutes the full existential concept of science.

69.29 The scientific projection of beings that are always already encountered in some way lets their way of Being be explicitly understood, in such a way that the possible paths to the pure uncovering of innerworldly beings thereby become manifest. The whole of this projecting, to which belong the articulation of the understanding of Being, the delimitation of the subject area guided by it, and the prefiguring of the conceptuality appropri-

ate to the beings, we call *thematizing*. It aims at freeing the beings encountered within the world in such a way that they can "throw themselves against" a pure uncovering, that is, become objects. Thematizing objectifies. It does not first "posit" the beings, but frees them in such a way that they become "objectively" open to questioning and determination. Objectifying Being alongside what is present-at-hand within the world has the character of a *distinctive making present*.[10] It differs from the present of circumspection above all in that the uncovering done by the science in question awaits solely the uncoveredness of what is present-at-hand. This awaiting of uncoveredness is grounded existentielly in a resoluteness of Dasein by which it projects itself upon its potentiality-for-Being in the "truth." This projection is possible because Being-in-the-truth makes up a determination of Dasein's existence. The origin of science in owned existence cannot be pursued further here. All that matters now is to understand that and how the thematizing of inner-worldly beings presupposes Dasein's basic constitution, Being-in-the-world.

69.30 In order for the thematizing of what is present-at-hand, the scientific projection of nature, to become possible, *Dasein must transcend* the beings thematized. Transcendence does not consist in objectification; rather, objectification presupposes transcendence. But if the thematizing of what is present-at-hand within the world is a changeover of circumspectively uncovering concern, then a transcendence of Dasein must already underlie "practical" Being alongside what is ready-to-hand.

69.31 If, further, thematizing modifies and articulates the understanding of Being, then the being that thematizes, Dasein, insofar as it exists, must already understand something like Being. The understanding of Being can remain neutral. Readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand are then not yet distinguished, and still less conceived ontologically. But for Dasein to be able to deal with a nexus of equipment, it must understand

10 "Throw themselves against" (*entgegenwerfen*) plays on *Gegenstand* and Latin *obiectum*, "what is thrown against."

something like involvement, even if unthematically: *a world must be disclosed to it.* The world is disclosed with Dasein's factical existence, if indeed this being essentially exists as Being-in-the-world. And if, finally, Dasein's Being is grounded in temporality, then temporality must make possible Being-in-the-world and thus Dasein's transcendence, which in turn bears concernful Being alongside innerworldly beings, whether theoretical or practical.

c) The temporal problem of the transcendence of the world

The world is transcendent because temporality has horizonal schemata for each of its ecstases.

69.32 The understanding of a totality of involvements included in circumspective concern is grounded in a prior understanding of the relations of the in-order-to, the what-for, the for-that, and the for-the-sake-of. The nexus of these relations was set forth earlier as significance. Their unity makes up what we call world. The question arises: How is anything like world ontologically possible in its unity with Dasein? In what way must world *be* so that Dasein can exist as Being-in-the-world?

69.33 Dasein exists for the sake of a potentiality-for-Being of itself. Existing, it is thrown, and as thrown it is delivered over to beings that it needs *in order* to be able to be as it is, namely *for the sake of* itself. Insofar as Dasein factically exists, it understands itself in this nexus of the for-the-sake-of itself with a particular in-order-to. That *within which* existing Dasein understands *itself is* "there" along with its factical existence. The within-which of primary self-understanding has the way of Being of Dasein. Existing, Dasein *is* its world.

69.34 We defined Dasein's Being as care. Its ontological meaning is temporality. That and how temporality constitutes the disclosedness of the "there" has been shown. In the disclosedness of the "there," world is disclosed along with it. The unity of significance, that is, the ontological constitution of the world, must then likewise be grounded in temporality. *The existential-tem-*

poral condition of the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as ecstatic unity, has something like a horizon. The ecstases are not simply carryings-away to... Rather, a "where-to" of the carrying-away belongs to the ecstasis. We call this where-to of the ecstasis the horizonal schema. The ecstatic horizon is different in each of the three ecstases. The schema in which Dasein comes toward itself *futurally*, whether in an owned or an unowned way, is the *for-the-sake-of-itself.* The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in attunement as thrown we take as the *in-the-face-of-which* of thrownness, or as the to-which of abandonment. It characterizes the horizonal structure of *having-been.* Existing for the sake of itself in abandonment to itself as thrown, Dasein, as Being alongside..., is at the same time making present. The horizonal schema of the *present* is determined by the *in-order-to*.

69.35 The unity of the horizonal schemata of future, having-been, and present is grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. The horizon of temporality as a whole determines that *upon which* the factically existing being is essentially *disclosed*. With factical Da-sein, in each case a potentiality-for-Being is projected in the horizon of the future, "Being-already" is disclosed in the horizon of having-been, and what is concerned with is uncovered in the horizon of the present. The horizonal unity of the schemata of the ecstases makes possible the primordial connection of the in-order-to relations with the for-the-sake-of. This implies: on the basis of the horizonal constitution of the ecstatic unity of temporality, something like a disclosed world belongs to the being that is in each case its "there."

69.36 Just as the present springs from future and having-been in the unity of the temporalizing of temporality, so the horizon of a present temporalizes itself equiprimordially with the horizons of the future and having-been. Insofar as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world *is* too. Temporalizing itself with regard to its Being as temporality, Dasein *is* essentially "in a world" on the basis of the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality. The world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes

itself in temporality. It "is" "there" with the outside-itself of the ecstases. If no *Dasein* exists, no world is "there" either.

69.37 Factical concernful Being alongside what is ready-to-hand, the thematizing of what is present-at-hand, and the objectifying uncovering of these beings *already presuppose world*, that is, are possible only as ways of Being-in-the-world. Grounded in the horizonal unity of ecstatic temporality, the world is transcendent. It must already be ecstatically disclosed so that innerworldly beings can be encountered from out of it. Ecstatically, temporality already holds itself in the horizons of its ecstases and, temporalizing itself, comes back to the beings encountered in the "there." With Dasein's factical existence, innerworldly beings are already encountered as well. That such beings are uncovered along with existence's own "there" is not at Dasein's discretion. Only *what* it uncovers and discloses in each case, in *which* direction, *how far*, and *how*, is a matter of its freedom, though always within the limits of its thrownness.

69.38 The relations of significance that determine the structure of the world are therefore not a network of forms that a worldless subject pulls over some material. Rather, factical Dasein, ecstatically understanding itself and its world in the unity of the "there," comes back from these horizons to the beings encountered in them. Understandingly coming back to... is the existential meaning of letting beings be encountered in making present, beings that are therefore called innerworldly. The world is, as it were, already "further outside" than any object can ever be. The "problem of transcendence" cannot be reduced to the question: How does a subject get out to an object, where the totality of objects is identified with the idea of the world? What must be asked is: What makes it ontologically possible that beings can be encountered within the world and, as encountered, be objectified? Going back to the transcendence of the world, founded ecstatic-horizonally, gives the answer.

69.39 If the "subject" is conceived ontologically as existing Dasein, whose Being is grounded in temporality, then it must be said: world is "subjective." But this "subjective" world, as tem-

poral-transcendent, is then "more objective" than any possible "object."

69.40 By tracing Being-in-the-world back to the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality, we have made intelligible the existential-ontological possibility of this basic constitution of Dasein. At the same time it becomes clear that the concrete working out of the structure of the world in general and of its possible variations can be undertaken only if the ontology of possible innerworldly beings is oriented securely enough toward a clarified idea of Being in general. A possible interpretation of this idea requires first that the temporality of Dasein be set forth, and the present characterization of Being-in-the-world serves that purpose.

§ 70. THE TEMPORALITY OF THE SPATIALITY CHARACTERISTIC OF DASEIN

Dasein's making room, directionality, and de-severance are grounded in temporality.

70.1 Although the expression "temporality" does not mean what talk of "space and time" understands by time, spatiality nevertheless also seems to make up a basic determinateness of Dasein corresponding to temporality. The existential-temporal analysis therefore seems to come up against a limit with Dasein's spatiality, so that this being which we call Dasein must be addressed, side by side, as "temporal" "and also" as spatial. Is the existential-temporal analysis of Dasein brought to a halt by the phenomenon that we came to know as the spatiality characteristic of Dasein and showed to belong to Being-in-the-world?

70.2 That, in the course of the existential interpretation, talk of Dasein's "spatio-temporal" determinateness cannot mean that this being is present-at-hand "in space and also in time" needs no further discussion. Temporality is the meaning of Being of care. Dasein's constitution and its ways to be are ontologically possible only on the basis of temporality, regardless of whether this being occurs "in time" or not. But then Dasein's specific spatiality, too, must be grounded in temporality. On the other hand,

the demonstration that this spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality cannot aim at deducing space from time or dissolving it into pure time. If Dasein's spatiality is "embraced" by temporality in the sense of existential founding, then this connection, which is to be clarified in what follows, is also different from the priority of time over space in Kant's sense. That the empirical representations of what is present-at-hand "in space" run their course "in time" as psychical occurrences, and that the "physical" thus also occurs "in time" indirectly, is not an existential-ontological interpretation of space as a form of intuition, but the ontic observation that what is psychically present-at-hand runs its course "in time."[11]

70.3 We are to ask, in existential analysis, about the temporal conditions of the possibility of the spatiality characteristic of Dasein, which in turn founds the uncovering of innerworldly space. First we must recall in what way Dasein is spatial. Dasein can *be* spatial only as care, in the sense of factically falling existing. Put negatively, this means: Dasein is never present-at-hand in space, not even initially. It does not fill out a piece of space as a real thing or an item of equipment does, such that its boundary with the space surrounding it would itself be only a spatial determination of space. Dasein takes up—in the literal sense—space. It is by no means only present-at-hand in the piece of space that its physical body fills out. Existing, it has always already made room for itself, for a leeway. It determines its own location in each case in such a way that it comes back from the space it has made room for to the "place" it has occupied. In order to be able to say that Dasein is present-at-hand at a position in space, we must first *take* this being in an ontologically inappropriate way. Nor does the difference between the "spatiality" of an extended thing and that of Dasein lie in Dasein's *knowing* about space; for taking up space is so far from being identical with a "representing" of what is spatial that such representing presupposes it. Nor may Dasein's spatiality be inter-

11 Kant holds in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that time, as the form of inner sense, is the condition of all appearances, and so indirectly of outer ones as well.

preted as an imperfection that adheres to existence on account of the fatal "linking of the spirit to a body." Rather, because Dasein is "spiritual," *and only for that reason*, it can be spatial in a way that remains essentially impossible for an extended corporeal thing.

70.4 Dasein's making room for itself is constituted by directionality and de-severance. How is anything of this kind existentially possible on the basis of Dasein's temporality? The founding function of temporality for Dasein's spatiality will be indicated briefly, only so far as is necessary for the later discussions of the ontological meaning of the "coupling" of space and time. Dasein's making room includes the self-directing uncovering of something like a *region*. By this expression we mean in the first instance the where-to of the possible belonging-somewhere of equipment that is ready-to-hand in the environment and can be placed. In all finding, handling, moving around, and clearing away of equipment, a region has already been uncovered. Concernful Being-in-the-world is directed—directing itself. Belonging-somewhere has an essential relation to involvement. It is always factically determined in terms of the nexus of involvements of the equipment concerned with. The relations of involvement are intelligible only within the horizon of a disclosed world. The horizonal character of this world also first makes possible the specific horizon of the where-to of belonging-somewhere within a region. The self-directing uncovering of a region is grounded in an ecstatically retaining awaiting of the possible toward-there and toward-here. Making room for oneself, as a directed awaiting of a region, is equiprimordially a bringing-near (de-severing) of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. From the region uncovered beforehand, concern, de-severing, comes back to what is nearest. Bringing-near, and likewise estimating and measuring the distances within what is present-at-hand within the world and has been desevered, are grounded in a making present that belongs to the unity of temporality in which directionality, too, becomes possible.

70.5 Because Dasein as temporality is ecstatic-horizonal in its Being, it can factically and constantly take along with it a space it has made room for. With regard to this ecstatically taken-up space, the here of its factical position or situation in each case never means a position in space, but the leeway, opened up in directionality and de-severance, of the compass of the totality of equipment with which it is most nearly concerned.

70.6 In the bringing-near that makes possible the handling and being-busied that are "absorbed in the matter at hand," the essential structure of care makes itself known: falling. The existential-temporal constitution of falling is distinguished by the fact that in it, and so also in the bringing-near founded "in the present," the forgetting that awaits leaps after the present. In making something present by bringing it near from its over-there, the making present forgets the over-there and loses itself in itself. This is why, when the "observation" of innerworldly beings begins in such a making present, the semblance arises that "initially" only a thing is present-at-hand—here, to be sure, but indeterminately in a space in general.

70.7 *Only on the basis of ecstatic-horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space.* The world is not present-at-hand in space; yet space can be uncovered only within a world. The ecstatic temporality of the spatiality that belongs to Dasein makes intelligible precisely the independence of space from time. Conversely, it also makes intelligible the "dependence" of Dasein on space, which reveals itself in the well-known phenomenon that Dasein's self-interpretation, and the stock of meanings of language in general, are to a large extent pervaded by "spatial representations." This priority of the spatial in the articulation of meanings and concepts has its ground not in some specific power of space but in the way of Being of Dasein. Temporality, essentially falling, loses itself in making present. It understands itself not only circumspectively in terms of the ready-to-hand that is concerned with; it also takes from what making present constantly encounters in the ready-to-hand as present—namely, spatial relations—the guiding threads for artic-

ulating what is understood and interpretable in understanding in general.

§ 71. THE TEMPORAL MEANING OF DASEIN'S EVERYDAYNESS

Everydayness proves to be a problem that the analysis of temporality has not yet mastered.

71.1 The analysis of the temporality of concern showed that the essential structures of Dasein's constitution of Being, which were interpreted *before* temporality was brought out, with the aim of leading toward it, must themselves be existentially *taken back into temporality*. In its first approach the analytic did not choose a particular, distinctive possibility of Dasein's existence as its theme, but oriented itself toward the inconspicuous, average way of existing. We called the way of Being in which Dasein maintains itself in the first instance and for the most part *everydayness*.

71.2 What this expression means at bottom, and when ontologically delimited, remained obscure. Nor, at the beginning of the investigation, was there any way even to make the existential-ontological meaning of everydayness into a problem. Now the meaning of the Being of Dasein has been clarified as temporality. Can there still be any doubt about the existential-temporal meaning of the title "everydayness"? Nevertheless, we are far from an ontological concept of this phenomenon. It even remains questionable whether the explication of temporality carried out so far is sufficient to delimit the existential meaning of everydayness.

71.3 Everydayness evidently means *that* way of existing in which Dasein maintains itself "every day." And yet "every day" does not mean the sum of the "days" allotted to Dasein in its "lifetime." Although "every day" is not meant to be understood in terms of the calendar, such a temporal determination does also resonate in the meaning of the "everyday." Primarily, however, the expression everydayness means a particular *how* of existence, one that pervades Dasein "all its life long." In the pre-

ceding analyses we often used the expression "in the first instance and for the most part." "In the first instance" means: the way in which Dasein is "manifest" in the with-one-another of publicness, even if "at bottom" it has existentielly "overcome" precisely everydayness. "For the most part" means: the way in which Dasein shows itself to everyone, not always, but "as a rule."

71.4 Everydayness means the how in accordance with which Dasein "lives from day to day," whether in all its comportments or only in certain ones prescribed by Being-with-one-another. To this how there further belongs the comfort of habit, even if habit forces one toward what is burdensome and "repugnant." The tomorrow that everyday concern keeps awaiting is the "eternal yesterday." The monotony of everydayness takes as variety whatever the day happens to bring. Everydayness determines Dasein even when it has not chosen the they as its "hero."[12]

71.5 These manifold characteristics of everydayness, however, by no means mark it as a mere "aspect" that Dasein presents when "one" "looks at" the doings and dealings of human beings. Everydayness is a way *to be*—a way to which, of course, public manifestness belongs. But as a way of its own existing, everydayness is also more or less familiar to each "individual" Dasein, and indeed through the attunement of a pallid lack of mood. Dasein can dully "suffer" from everydayness, sink into its dullness, or evade it by seeking new distraction for its distractedness in its affairs. But existence can also, in the moment of vision—and of course often only "for the moment"—master the everyday, though never extinguish it.

71.6 What is so familiar *ontically* in Dasein's factical interpretedness that we do not even pay attention to it harbors riddle upon riddle existential-ontologically. The "natural" horizon for the first approach of the existential analytic of Dasein is *only seemingly self-evident*.

71.7 But after the interpretation of temporality given so far, do we find ourselves in a more promising position with regard to the existential delimitation of the structure of everydayness? Or does precisely this confusing phenomenon make evident the inadequacy of the preceding explication of temporality? Have we not so far constantly immobilized Dasein in certain positions and situations, and "consistently" disregarded the fact that, living from day to day, it *stretches itself along* "temporally" in the succession of its days? Monotony, habit, the "as yesterday, so today and tomorrow," the "for the most part"—none of these can be grasped without going back to Dasein's "temporal" stretching-along.

71.8 And does it not also belong to existing Dasein that, in spending its time, it takes "time" into account day in, day out, and regulates this "account" astronomically, by the calendar? Only when we include in the interpretation of Dasein's temporality both Dasein's everyday "happening" and the reckoning with "time" that it concerns itself with in this happening does our orientation become comprehensive enough to make the ontological meaning of everydayness as such into a problem. But because what is meant by the title everydayness is at bottom nothing other than temporality, and temporality makes the *Being* of Dasein possible, an adequate conceptual delimitation of everydayness can succeed only within the framework of a discussion, in principle, of the meaning of Being in general and its possible modifications.

12 "The eternal yesterday" (*das ewig Gestrige*) quotes Schiller, *Wallenstein's Death* I.4.

Division Two, Chapter V: Temporality and Historicity

Zweiter Abschnitt. Fünftes Kapitel: Zeitlichkeit und Geschichtlichkeit
§§72–77

§ 72. THE EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL EXPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY

Dasein's stretching-along between birth and death is posed as the problem of its historical happening.

72.1 All the efforts of the existential analytic serve the one goal of finding a possibility of answering the question of the *meaning of Being* in general. Working out this *question* requires delimiting *the* phenomenon in which something like Being itself becomes accessible: the *understanding of Being*. But this belongs to Dasein's constitution of Being. Only when this being has first been interpreted primordially enough can the understanding of Being included in its constitution of Being itself be grasped. Only then, on this basis, can the question be raised of the Being understood in it and of the "presuppositions" of this understanding.

72.2 Although many structures of Dasein still lie in darkness in their particulars, the required primordial interpretation of Dasein seems to have been reached with the clarification of temporality as the primordial condition of the possibility of *care*. Temporality was brought out with a view to Dasein's owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. The temporal interpretation of care was then confirmed by demonstrating the temporality of

concernful Being-in-the-world. The analysis of the owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole revealed the equiprimordial nexus of death, guilt, and conscience, rooted in care. Can Dasein be understood still more primordially than in the projection of its owned existence?

72.3 Although we have so far seen no possibility of a more radical approach for the existential analytic, a serious misgiving awakens precisely in view of the preceding discussion of the ontological meaning of everydayness: has the whole of Dasein, with regard to its owned *Being-a-whole*, really been brought into the fore-having of the existential analysis? The way of posing the question that relates to Dasein's wholeness may possess its genuine ontological unambiguousness. The question itself may even have found its answer with regard to Being-toward-the-*end*. But death is only the "end" of Dasein—formally taken, only the *one* end that encloses the wholeness of Dasein. The other "end," however, is the "beginning," "birth." Only the being "between" birth and death presents the whole we are looking for. Accordingly, for all its tendency toward *existing* Being-a-whole, and despite its genuine explication of owned and unowned Being-toward-death, the orientation of the analytic so far has remained "one-sided." Dasein was thematic only as it exists, so to speak, "forward," leaving everything that has been "behind it." Not only did Being-toward-the-beginning remain unheeded, but above all the *stretching-along* of Dasein *between* birth and death. Precisely the "connectedness of life," in which Dasein after all constantly maintains itself in some way, was overlooked in the analysis of Being-a-whole.

72.4 Even though what is addressed as the "connectedness" between birth and death is ontologically completely obscure, must we not then take back our approach of temporality as the meaning of the Being of Dasein's wholeness? Or does the *temporality* we have brought out first provide the *ground* for giving the existential-ontological question of this "connectedness" an unambiguous direction? Perhaps it is already a gain, in the field

of these investigations, if we learn not to take the problems too lightly.

72.5 What seems "simpler" than characterizing the "connectedness of life" between birth and death? It *consists of* a succession of lived experiences "in time." If one pursues this characterization of the connectedness in question, and above all its ontological presumption, more penetratingly, something remarkable emerges. In this succession of lived experiences, "properly" only the lived experience present-at-hand "in the current now" is ever "actual." The past lived experiences and those only just arriving, by contrast, are no longer, or not yet, "actual." Dasein traverses the span of time granted to it between the two limits in such a way that, being "actual" only in the now in each case, it hops, as it were, through the succession of nows of its "time." That is why one says that Dasein is "temporal." Throughout this constant change of lived experiences, the self maintains itself in a certain sameness. Opinions diverge when it comes to determining this persisting element and its possible relation to the change of lived experiences. The Being of this persisting-and-changing connectedness of lived experiences remains undetermined. But at bottom, whether one wants to admit it or not, what is posited in this characterization of the connectedness of life is something present-at-hand "in time," though of course something "unthinglike."

72.6 In view of what was worked out, under the title of temporality, as the meaning of the Being of care, it turns out that, with the ordinary interpretation of Dasein as the guiding thread—an interpretation justified and adequate within its limits—a genuine ontological analysis of Dasein's *stretching-along* between birth and death not only cannot be carried out but cannot even be fixed as a problem.

72.7 Dasein does not exist as the sum of the momentary actualities of lived experiences that arrive and vanish one after another. Nor does this one-after-another gradually fill up a framework. For how is such a framework supposed to be present-at-hand, when in each case only the "current" lived

experience is "actual," and the limits of the framework—birth and death—lack actuality, as what is past and what is only just arriving? At bottom, even the ordinary conception of the "connectedness of life" does not have in mind a framework spanned "outside" Dasein and encompassing it, but rightly looks for it in Dasein itself. Yet the tacit ontological positing of this being as something present-at-hand "in time" makes every attempt at an ontological characterization of the Being "between" birth and death fail.

72.8 Dasein does not first fill up, through the phases of its momentary actualities, some path or stretch "of life" that is somehow present-at-hand. Rather, it stretches *itself* along in such a way that its own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching-along. The "between" with regard to birth and death already lies *in the Being* of Dasein. By no means, on the other hand, *"is"* Dasein actual at one point in time and, besides that, "surrounded" by the non-actuality of its birth and its death. Understood existentially, birth is not, and never is, something past in the sense of what is no longer present-at-hand; just as little does death have the way of Being of something outstanding that is not yet present-at-hand but is arriving. Factical Dasein exists as born; and as born it is also already dying, in the sense of Being-toward-death. Both "ends" and their "between" *are* as long as Dasein factically exists, and they *are* in the only way possible on the basis of Dasein's Being as *care*. In the unity of thrownness and fleeing or anticipatory Being-toward-death, birth and death "hang together" in the manner of Dasein. As care, Dasein *is* the "between."

72.9 But the constitutional whole of care has the possible *ground* of its unity in temporality. The ontological clarification of the "connectedness of life"—that is, of the specific stretching-along, movedness, and persistence of Dasein—must accordingly be approached within the horizon of the temporal constitution of this being. The movedness of existence is not the motion of something present-at-hand. It is determined in terms of Dasein's stretching-along. The specific movedness of this *stretched stretch-*

ing-itself-along we call the *happening* of Dasein. The question of Dasein's "connectedness" is the ontological problem of its happening. To lay bare the *structure of happening* and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility means to gain an *ontological* understanding of *historicality*.[1]

72.10 With the analysis of the specific movedness and persistence proper to Dasein's happening, the investigation comes back to the problem touched on immediately before temporality was laid bare: the question of the constancy of the self, which we determined as the who of Dasein. Self-constancy is a mode of Being of Dasein and is therefore grounded in a specific temporalizing of temporality. The analysis of happening leads to the problems of a thematic investigation of temporalizing as such.

72.11 If the question of historicality leads back to these "origins," then the *locus* of the problem of history has already been decided. It must not be sought in historiography as the science of history. The theory-of-science way of treating the problem of "history" may aim not only at the "epistemological" *(Simmel)* clarification of historiographical apprehension, or at the logic of concept formation in historiographical presentation *(Rickert)*, but may also orient itself toward the "side of the object." Even so, in this way of posing the question, history in principle always becomes accessible only as the *object* of a science. The basic phenomenon of history, which lies prior to and at the ground of any possible thematization by historiography, has thereby been irretrievably set aside.[2] How history can become a possible *object* of historiography can be gathered only from the way of Being of the historical, from historicality and its rootedness in temporality.

72.12 If historicality itself is to be clarified in terms of temporality, and primordially in terms of *owned* temporality, then it lies in the essence of this task that it can be carried out only by way

1 "Happening" renders *Geschehen*, which shares its root with *Geschichte* (history) and *geschichtlich* (historical).

2 Georg Simmel (1858–1918) and Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), German philosophers who wrote on the theory of historical knowledge; Rickert on historical concept formation.

of a phenomenological construction. The existential-ontological constitution of historicality must be conquered *against* the ordinary interpretation of Dasein's history, which covers it over. The existential construction of historicality has its definite footholds in the ordinary understanding of Dasein, and is guided by the existential structures gained so far.

72.13 By characterizing the ordinary concepts of history, the investigation first gains an orientation about the moments commonly held to be essential to history. In doing so it must become clear what is primordially addressed as historical. This marks the point of departure for the exposition of the ontological problem of historicality.

72.14 The guiding thread for the existential construction of historicality is provided by the interpretation, already carried out, of Dasein's owned potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, and by the analysis of care as temporality that grew out of it. The existential projection of Dasein's historicality merely brings to unveiling what already lies veiled in the temporalizing of temporality. In keeping with the rootedness of historicality in care, Dasein exists in each case as historical in an owned or an unowned way. What stood in view for the existential analytic of Dasein as the nearest horizon, under the title everydayness, becomes clear as Dasein's unowned historicality.

72.15 Disclosure and interpretation belong essentially to Dasein's happening. From this way of Being of the being that exists historically there arises the existentiell possibility of an explicit disclosure and grasping of history. Thematization—that is, the *historiographical* disclosure of history—is the presupposition for the possible "construction of the historical world in the human sciences." The existential interpretation of historiography as a science aims solely at demonstrating its ontological provenance from Dasein's historicality. Only from here can the limits be marked out within which a theory of science ori-

ented toward the factical business of science may expose itself to the contingencies of its ways of posing questions.[3]

72.16 *The analysis of Dasein's historicality attempts to show that this being is not "temporal" because it "stands in history," but that, conversely, it exists historically, and can exist historically, only because it is temporal in the ground of its Being.*

72.17 Nevertheless, Dasein must also be called "temporal" in the sense of Being "in time." Even without a developed historiography, factical Dasein needs and uses calendar and clock. What happens "with it" it experiences as happening "in time." In the same way, the processes of lifeless and living nature are encountered "in time." They are within-time. It would therefore seem natural to place the analysis of the origin of the "time" of within-time-ness from temporality—an analysis deferred to the next chapter—before the discussion of the connection between historicality and temporality. However, in order to strip the ordinary characterization of the historical with the help of the time of within-time-ness of its seeming self-evidence and exclusiveness, historicality is first to be "deduced" purely from Dasein's primordial temporality, as the connection "in the matter itself" also demands. But insofar as time as within-time-ness also "stems" from Dasein's temporality, historicality and within-time-ness prove to be equiprimordial. The ordinary interpretation of the temporal character of history therefore retains its right within its limits.

72.18 After this first characterization of the course of the ontological exposition of historicality in terms of temporality, is there any further need to give explicit assurance that the following investigation does not believe it can solve the problem of history at a stroke? The poverty of the "categorial" means available, and the uncertainty of the primary ontological horizons, become all the more obtrusive the more the problem of history is brought to its *primordial rootedness*. The following reflection is content to indicate the ontological locus of the problem of historicality. At

3 The quoted phrase is the title of Dilthey's *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften* (1910).

bottom, the following analysis is concerned solely with furthering, for its part and by preparing the way, the appropriation of *Dilthey's* researches that still lies ahead of the present generation.

72.19 The exposition of the existential problem of historicality—necessarily limited, moreover, by its fundamental-ontological aim—is organized as follows: the ordinary understanding of history and the happening of Dasein (§ 73); the basic constitution of historicality (§ 74); Dasein's historicality and world-history (§ 75); the existential origin of historiography from Dasein's historicality (§ 76); the connection of the preceding exposition of the problem of historicality with the researches of Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck (§ 77).

§ 73. THE ORDINARY UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY AND DASEIN'S HAPPENING

The ordinary meanings of history are examined, and Dasein is shown to be primarily historical.

73.1 The immediate goal is to find the point of departure for the primordial question of the essence of history—that is, for the existential construction of historicality. This point is marked by what is primordially historical. The reflection therefore begins with a characterization of what is meant, in the ordinary interpretation of Dasein, by the expressions "history" and "historical." They have several meanings.

73.2 The most obvious ambiguity of the term "history"—often noted, but by no means "fortuitous"—shows itself in the fact that it means both "historical actuality" and the possible science of it. For the time being we set aside the meaning of "history" in the sense of the science of history (historiography).

73.3 Among the meanings of the expression "history" that mean neither the science of history nor history as its object, but this being itself, not necessarily objectified, one claims a privileged use: the meaning in which this being is understood as something *past*. This meaning makes itself known in the saying: this or that already belongs to history. "Past" here means, for

one thing: no longer present-at-hand; or also: still present-at-hand, to be sure, but without "effect" on the "present." However, the historical as what is past also has the opposite meaning, when we say: one cannot escape history. Here history means what is past but nevertheless still has an after-effect. However that may be, the historical as what is past is understood in a positive or privative relation of effect to the "present," in the sense of what is actual "now" and "today." Here "the past" has yet another remarkable double meaning. What is past belongs irretrievably to an earlier time; it belonged to the events of that time, and can nevertheless still be present-at-hand "now"—for example, the remains of a Greek temple. With it, a "piece of the past" is still "present."

73.4 Next, history means not so much "the past" in the sense of what is past, as *provenance* from it. Whatever "has a history" stands in the connectedness of a becoming. Here the "development" is sometimes a rise, sometimes a decline. What "has a history" in this way can at the same time "make" history. As "epoch-making," it determines a "future" "in the present." History here means a nexus of events and "effects" that runs through "past," "present," and "future." Here the past has no special priority.

73.5 History further means the whole of the beings that change "in time"—and indeed, as distinguished from nature, which likewise moves "in time," the transformations and destinies of human beings, of human associations, and of their "culture." Here history means not so much the way of Being, the happening, as the region of beings that one distinguishes from nature with regard to the essential determination of human existence by "spirit" and "culture"—even though nature too belongs in a certain way to history so understood.

73.6 And finally, what counts as "historical" is what has been handed down as such, whether it is known historiographically or taken over as self-evident, its provenance hidden.

73.7 If we take these four meanings together, the result is: history is the specific happening of existing Dasein that comes to

pass in time, in such a way that the happening which, in Being-with-one-another, is "past" and at the same time "handed down" and still at work counts as history in the emphatic sense.

73.8 The four meanings are connected by the fact that they relate to the human being as the "subject" of events. How is the character of happening of these events to be determined? Is happening a succession of processes, an alternating emergence and disappearance of occurrences? In what way does this happening of history belong to Dasein? Is Dasein already factically "present-at-hand" beforehand, only to get "into a history" now and then? Does Dasein first *become* historical by being entangled with circumstances and occurrences? Or is the Being of Dasein first constituted by happening, so that something like circumstances, occurrences, and destinies are ontologically possible *only because Dasein is historical in its Being*? Why, in the "temporal" characterization of Dasein happening "in time," does precisely the past have an emphatic function?

73.9 If history belongs to the Being of Dasein, and this Being is grounded in temporality, then it seems natural to begin the existential analysis of historicality with *those* characteristics of the historical that evidently have a temporal meaning. A sharper characterization of the remarkable priority of "the past" in the concept of history is therefore to prepare the exposition of the basic constitution of historicality.

73.10 "Antiquities" kept in a museum—household utensils, for example—belong to a "past time" and are nevertheless still present-at-hand in the "present." To what extent is this equipment historical, when it is *not yet* past? Only because it has become an *object* of historiographical interest, of the preservation of antiquities, and of regional studies? But such equipment can be a *historiographical object* only because it somehow *is historical* in itself. The question repeats itself: by what right do we call this being historical, when it is not past? Or do these "things," although they are still present-at-hand today, nevertheless have "something past" "about them"? *Are* they, present-at-hand as they are, still what they were? Evidently the "things"

have changed. The utensils have become fragile or worm-eaten "in the course of time." But in this transience, which goes on even while they are present-at-hand in the museum, there does not lie *the* specific character of pastness that makes them something historical. What, then, is past about this equipment? What *were* the "things" that they no longer are today? They are still the particular equipment for use—but out of use. Yet suppose they were still in use today, like many heirlooms among household goods: would they then not yet be historical? Whether in use or out of use, they are nevertheless no longer what they were. What is "past"? Nothing other than the *world* within which, belonging to a nexus of equipment, they were encountered as ready-to-hand and were used by a concernful Dasein that was in-the-world. *The world* is no longer. But what was formerly *innerworldly* in that world is still present-at-hand. As equipment belonging to a world, what is *now* still present-at-hand can nevertheless belong to the *"past."* But what does the no-longer-Being of a world mean? World *is* only in the mode of *existing* Dasein, which *factically* is as Being-in-the-world.

73.11 The historical character of the antiquities still preserved is thus grounded in the "past" of the Dasein to whose world they belonged. Accordingly, only "past" Dasein would be historical, but not "present" Dasein. But can Dasein be *past* at all, if we determine "past" as "now *no longer present-at-hand or ready-to-hand*"? Evidently Dasein can *never* be past—not because it is imperishable, but because it can essentially never be *present-at-hand*; rather, if it is, it *exists*. Dasein that no longer exists, however, is, in the ontologically strict sense, not past but *having-been-there*. The antiquities still present-at-hand have a character of "pastness" and of history on the basis of their equipmental belonging to, and provenance from, a world that has been—the world of a Dasein that has-been-there. It is this Dasein that is primarily historical. But does Dasein first *become* historical by no longer being there? Or *is* it not historical precisely as factically existing? *Is Dasein only something that has been, in the sense of*

having-been-there, or has it been as something futural that makes present—that is, in the temporalizing of its temporality?

73.12 This preliminary analysis of equipment that is still present-at-hand and yet somehow "past," belonging to history, makes it clear that such a being is historical only on the basis of its belonging to a world. But the world has the way of Being of the historical because it makes up an ontological determination of Dasein. It further turns out that the temporal determination "past" lacks an unambiguous meaning and is evidently distinct from *having-been*, which we came to know as constitutive of the ecstatic unity of Dasein's temporality. But in the end this only sharpens the riddle of why precisely "the past"—or, to speak more appropriately, having-been—*predominantly* determines the historical, when having-been temporalizes itself equiprimordially with present and future.

73.13 *Primarily* historical—so we contend—is Dasein. *Secondarily* historical, however, is what is encountered within the world: not only equipment ready-to-hand in the broadest sense, but also *environmental nature* as "historical ground." The being not of Dasein's kind that is historical on the basis of its belonging to a world we call the world-historical. It can be shown that the ordinary concept of "world-history" arises precisely from an orientation toward this secondarily historical. The world-historical is not historical only on the basis of a historiographical objectification; it is historical *as the being* that it is in itself, as encountered within the world.

73.14 The analysis of the historical character of an item of equipment still present-at-hand not only led back to Dasein as what is primarily historical; it also made it doubtful whether the temporal characterization of the historical may be oriented primarily toward the Being-in-time of something present-at-hand at all. Beings do not become "more historical" as they move into an ever more remote past, so that the oldest would be the most properly historical. But again, the "temporal" distance from the now and today has no primarily constitutive importance for the historicality of the properly historical being. This is

not because that being is not "in time" and is timeless, but because it exists *so primordially temporally* as something present-at-hand "in time," passing away or arriving, can never, by its ontological essence, exist.

73.15 Long-winded considerations, it will be said. No one denies that at bottom human Dasein is the primary "subject" of history, and the ordinary concept of history cited above says so clearly enough. But the thesis "Dasein is historical" does not mean merely the ontic fact that the human being represents a more or less important "atom" in the machinery of world-history and remains the plaything of circumstances and events. It poses the problem: *to what extent, and on the basis of what ontological conditions, does historicality belong, as an essential constitution, to the subjectivity of the "historical" subject?*

§ 74. THE BASIC CONSTITUTION OF HISTORICALITY

Owned historicality is resolute self-handing-down of inherited possibilities: fate, destiny, and repetition.

74.1 Dasein factically has its "history" in each case, and it can have something of the sort because the Being of this being is constituted by historicality. This thesis is to be justified with the aim of exposing the *ontological* problem of history as an existential one. The Being of Dasein was delimited as care. Care is grounded in temporality. Within the scope of temporality, then, we must look for a happening that determines existence as historical. Thus the interpretation of Dasein's historicality turns out, at bottom, to be only a more concrete working out of temporality. We first revealed temporality with a view to the owned way of existing, which we characterized as anticipatory resoluteness. To what extent does an owned happening of Dasein lie in this?

74.2 Resoluteness was determined as reticent self-projection, ready for anxiety, upon one's own Being-guilty. It attains its ownness as *anticipatory* resoluteness. In it Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-Being in such a way that

it faces death, so as to take over wholly, in its thrownness, the being that it itself is. Resolutely taking over one's own factical "there" means at the same time resolving upon the situation. What Dasein *factically* resolves upon in each case, the existential analysis is in principle unable to discuss. But the present investigation also excludes the existential projection of factical possibilities of existence. Nevertheless we must ask from where the possibilities upon which Dasein factically projects itself can be drawn *at all*. Anticipatory self-projection upon the possibility of existence that is not to be outstripped—death—guarantees only the wholeness and ownness of resoluteness. But the factically disclosed possibilities of existence are surely not to be taken from death. All the less so, since anticipation of the possibility does not mean speculating about it, but precisely coming back to the factical "there." Is taking over the thrownness of the self into its world supposed to disclose a horizon from which existence wrests its factical possibilities? Was it not said, moreover, that Dasein never gets behind its thrownness? Before we decide too hastily whether or not Dasein draws its owned possibilities of existence from thrownness, we must make sure of the full concept of this basic determination of care.

74.3 Thrown, Dasein is indeed delivered over to itself and to its potentiality-for-Being, *but as Being-in-the-world*. Thrown, it is dependent upon a "world" and factically exists with Others. In the first instance and for the most part the self is lost in the they. It understands itself in terms of the possibilities of existence that "circulate" in the "average" public interpretedness of Dasein current in each case today. For the most part these possibilities have been made unrecognizable by ambiguity, but they are nonetheless familiar. Owned existentiell understanding is so far from withdrawing from the interpretedness that has come down to it that it is in each case out of this interpretedness, against it, and yet again for it, that it seizes the chosen possibility in resolution.

74.4 The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses the factical possibilities of owned existing in each case

from the heritage that it *takes over* as thrown. Resolutely coming back to thrownness harbors within it a *handing oneself down* of possibilities that have come down to one, though not necessarily *as* having come down. If everything "good" is heritage, and the character of "goodness" lies in making owned existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage is in each case constituted in resoluteness. The more ownedly Dasein resolves—that is, the more unambiguously it understands itself in terms of its ownmost, distinctive possibility in anticipation of death—the more unequivocal and the less accidental is its finding, in choosing, of the possibility of its existence. Only anticipation of death drives out every accidental and "provisional" possibility.[4] Only Being-free *for* death gives Dasein its goal outright and thrusts existence into its finitude. The finitude of existence, once seized, pulls one back from the endless multiplicity of the nearest possibilities that offer themselves—those of comfort, of taking things lightly, of shirking—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its *fate*. This is our term for Dasein's primordial happening, lying in owned resoluteness, in which Dasein, free for death, *hands itself down* to itself in a possibility that it has inherited and yet has chosen.

74.5 Dasein can be struck by the blows of fate only because, at the ground of its Being, it *is* fate in the sense characterized. Existing fatefully in resoluteness that hands itself down, Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is disclosed for the "coming toward it" of "fortunate" circumstances and for the cruelty of accidents. Fate does not first arise from the collision of circumstances and occurrences. Even someone irresolute is driven about by them—more so than one who has chosen—and yet can "have" no fate.

74.6 When Dasein, anticipating, lets death become powerful in itself, then, free for death, it understands itself in the *superior power* that belongs to its finite freedom. It does so in order to take over, in this freedom—which in each case only "is" in hav-

4 *Sich überliefern*: hand oneself down (also, deliver oneself over); *Überlieferung*, elsewhere "tradition," here names this act of handing down. "Provisional" (*vorläufig*) echoes *Vorlaufen*, anticipation.

ing chosen the choice—the *powerlessness* of being abandoned to itself, and to become clear-sighted for the accidents of the disclosed situation. But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, essentially exists in Being-with Others, its happening is a co-happening and is determined as *destiny*. This is our term for the happening of the community, of the people. Destiny is not composed of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as several subjects occurring together. In Being-with-one-another in the same world, and in resoluteness for definite possibilities, fates are already guided in advance. Only in communication and in struggle does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its "generation" makes up the full, owned happening of Dasein.

74.7 Fate is the powerless superior power, holding itself ready for adversities, of reticent self-projection, ready for anxiety, upon one's own Being-guilty. As the ontological condition of its possibility, fate requires the constitution of Being of care, that is, temporality. Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude dwell together equiprimordially in the Being of a being, as they do in care, can that being exist in the mode of fate, that is, be historical in the ground of its existence.

74.8 *Only a being that is essentially futural in its Being, so that, free for its death and shattering against it, it can let itself be thrown back upon its factical "there"—that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been—can, by handing down to itself the inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for "its time." Only owned temporality, which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate, that is, owned historicality.*

74.9 It is not necessary that resoluteness *explicitly* know the provenance of the possibilities upon which it projects itself. But in Dasein's temporality, and only in it, lies the possibility of fetching the existentiell potentiality-for-Being upon which Dasein projects itself *explicitly* from the understanding of Dasein that has been handed down. Resoluteness that comes back to itself and hands itself down then becomes the *repetition* of a pos-

sibility of existence that has come down to us. *Repetition is explicit handing down*, that is, going back into possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there. The owned repetition of a possibility of existence that has been—that Dasein chooses its hero—is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in this that the choice is first chosen that makes one free for a following-in-struggle and for loyalty to what can be repeated. The repeating self-handing-down of a possibility that has been does not, however, disclose the Dasein that has-been-there in order to actualize it once again. The repetition of the possible is neither a bringing back of the "past" nor a binding of the "present" back to what is "obsolete." Repetition, springing from a resolute self-projection, does not let itself be persuaded by the "past" merely to let it return as what was formerly actual. Rather, repetition *responds to* the possibility of existence that has-been-there. But the response to the possibility in resolution is at the same time, *as belonging to the moment of vision*, the *revocation* of what is working itself out in the today as "past." Repetition neither gives itself over to what is past nor aims at progress. In the moment of vision, owned existence is indifferent to both.[5]

74.10 We characterize repetition as the mode of self-handing-down resoluteness through which Dasein exists explicitly as fate. But if fate constitutes Dasein's primordial historicality, then history has its essential weight neither in what is past, nor in the today and its "connection" with what is past, but in the owned happening of existence, which springs from Dasein's *future*. As a mode of Being of Dasein, history has its root so essentially in the future that death, as the possibility of Dasein we have characterized, throws anticipatory existence back upon its *factical* thrownness, and so first gives *having-been* its peculiar priority in the historical. *Owned Being-toward-death, that is, the finitude of temporality, is the hidden ground of Dasein's historicality.* Dasein does not first become historical in repetition; rather,

5 Heidegger plays on *wieder* (again) and *wider* (against) in *erwidern* (to respond) and *Widerruf* (revocation).

because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating. For this no historiography is yet needed.

74.11 The anticipatory handing down of oneself to the "there" of the moment of vision, which lies in resoluteness, we call fate. Destiny too is grounded in it—by destiny we understand Dasein's happening in Being-with Others. Fateful destiny can be explicitly disclosed in repetition with regard to its bond to the heritage that has come down to it. Repetition first makes Dasein's own history manifest to it. Happening itself, and the disclosedness belonging to it, or the appropriation of this disclosedness, is grounded existentially in the fact that Dasein, as temporal, is ecstatically open.

74.12 What we have so far characterized as historicality, in conformity with the happening that lies in anticipatory resoluteness, we call Dasein's *owned* historicality. From the phenomena of handing down and repetition, which are rooted in the future, it has become clear why the happening of owned history has its weight in having-been. But it remains all the more enigmatic in what way this happening, as fate, is supposed to constitute the whole "connectedness" of Dasein from its birth to its death. What clarification can going back to resoluteness contribute? Is a resolution not, after all, in each case just *one* more individual "lived experience" in the succession of the whole connectedness of lived experiences? Is the "connectedness" of owned happening supposed to consist of an unbroken succession of resolutions? Why is it that the question of the constitution of the "connectedness of life" does not find a sufficiently satisfying answer? Could it be that, in the end, the investigation in its haste clings too much to the answer, without first having examined the *question* as to its legitimacy? Nothing has become so clear from the course of the existential analytic so far as the fact that the ontology of Dasein succumbs again and again to the temptations of the ordinary understanding of Being. Methodologically, this can be countered only by our tracing the *origin* of the question of the constitution of Dasein's connectedness—a question that seems

so utterly "self-evident"—and determining in what ontological horizon it moves.

74.13 If historicality belongs to the Being of Dasein, then unowned existing too must be historical. What if it was Dasein's *unowned* historicality that determined the direction of questioning toward a "connectedness of life," and obstructed access to owned historicality and to the "connectedness" peculiar to it? However that may be, if the exposition of the ontological problem of history is to be sufficiently complete, we cannot in any case do without a consideration of Dasein's unowned historicality.

§ 75. DASEIN'S HISTORICALITY AND WORLD-HISTORY

Unowned historicality loses itself in the world-historical and the today; owned historicality is loyal repetition.

75.1 In the first instance and for the most part, Dasein understands itself in terms of what it encounters in the environment and what it is circumspectively concerned with. This understanding is not a mere taking-note of itself that simply accompanies all of Dasein's comportments. Understanding means projecting oneself upon the possibility of Being-in-the-world that obtains in each case, that is, existing as this possibility. In this way understanding, as common sense, also constitutes the unowned existence of the they. What everyday concern encounters in public Being-with-one-another is not only equipment and work, but at the same time what "goes on" with them: "business affairs," undertakings, incidents, accidents. The "world" is at once ground and stage, and as such it belongs to everyday trade and traffic. In public Being-with-one-another, Others are encountered in the kind of bustle in which "one oneself" "swims along." One knows this bustle, discusses it, favors it, fights it, retains it and forgets it, always with an eye primarily to *what* is being pursued in it and what "comes out of it." We initially calculate the progress, standstill, readjustment, and "net result" of the individual Dasein from the course, state, change, and avail-

ability of what is concerned with. However trivial this reference to the understanding of Dasein proper to everyday common sense may be, ontologically it is by no means transparent. But then why should the "connectedness" of Dasein not be determined in terms of what is concerned with and "experienced"? Do not equipment and work, and everything with which Dasein dwells, belong to "history" too? Is the happening of history, then, only the isolated running-off of "streams of lived experience" in individual subjects?

75.2 Indeed, history is neither the nexus of motion of changes in objects nor the free-floating sequence of lived experiences of "subjects." Does the happening of history, then, concern the "linkage" of subject and object? If one does assign the happening to the subject-object relation, then one must also ask about the way of Being of the linkage as such, if it is this linkage that fundamentally "happens." The thesis of Dasein's historicality does not say that the worldless subject is historical, but that the being that exists as Being-in-the-world is historical. *The happening of history is the happening of Being-in-the-world.* Dasein's historicality is essentially the historicality of world, which, on the basis of ecstatic-horizonal temporality, belongs to the temporalizing of that temporality. Insofar as Dasein factically exists, what is uncovered within the world is also already encountered. *With the existence of historical Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have in each case already been drawn into the history of the world.* Equipment and work—books, for example—have their "fates"; buildings and institutions have their history. But nature too is historical. Precisely *not*, to be sure, insofar as we speak of "natural history"; but certainly as landscape, as an area for settlement and exploitation, as battlefield and place of worship. These innerworldly beings *are* historical as such, and their history does not mean something "external" that merely accompanies the "inner" history of the "soul." We call these beings the *world-historical*. Here we must heed the double meaning of the expression "world-history," which we have chosen and which is understood here ontologic-

ally. It means, first, the happening of world in its essential, existent unity with Dasein. At the same time, however—insofar as with the factically existent world innerworldly beings are in each case uncovered—it means the innerworldly "happening" of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. A historical world is factically only as the world of innerworldly beings. What "happens" with equipment and work as such has a character of movedness of its own, which up to now has remained completely in the dark. A ring, for example, that is "handed over" and "worn" does not, in this Being, simply undergo changes of location. The movedness of the happening in which something "happens with it" cannot be grasped at all in terms of motion as change of location. This holds of all world-historical "processes" and events, and in a certain way also of "natural disasters." We are all the less able to pursue here the problem of the ontological structure of world-historical happening—quite apart from the fact that this would necessarily take us beyond the limits of our theme—since the aim of this exposition is precisely to lead us before the ontological enigma of the movedness of happening in general.

[75.3] All that is needed is to delimit *the* range of phenomena that is necessarily co-intended, ontologically, when we speak of Dasein's historicality. On the basis of the temporally founded transcendence of the world, something world-historical is always already "objectively" there in the happening of existing Being-in-the-world, *without being grasped historiographically.* And because factical Dasein, falling, is absorbed in what it is concerned with, it understands its history initially as world-history. And because, further, the ordinary understanding of Being understands "Being" indifferently as presence-at-hand, the Being of the world-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of what is present-at-hand as it arrives, is present, and vanishes. And because, finally, the meaning of Being in general counts as the self-evident par excellence, the question of the way of Being of the world-historical and of the movedness of

happening in general is "really, after all," only the fruitless fussiness of verbal hair-splitting.

75.4 Everyday Dasein is dispersed into the many sorts of things that "happen" daily. The opportunities and circumstances that concern keeps "tactically" awaiting in advance make up "fate." It is only from what it is concerned with that Dasein, existing in an unowned way, first computes its history for itself. And because, driven about by its "business affairs," it must first *gather itself together* out of the *dispersion* and the *disconnectedness* of what has just "happened," if it wants to come to itself, it is only from the horizon of understanding of unowned historicality that *the question* arises at all of a "connectedness" of Dasein that has to be established—in the sense of the lived experiences of the subject, which are "also" present-at-hand. The possibility that this horizon of questioning holds sway is grounded in the irresoluteness that makes up the essence of the in-constancy of the self.

75.5 With this, the *origin* of the question of a "connectedness" of Dasein, in the sense of the unity of the linkage of lived experiences between birth and death, has been shown. The provenance of the question at the same time betrays its inappropriateness with a view to a primordial existential interpretation of the wholeness of Dasein's happening. On the other hand, given the predominance of this "natural" horizon of questioning, it becomes explicable why it looks as though precisely Dasein's owned historicality—fate and repetition—were least of all able to provide the phenomenal ground for bringing what the question of the "connectedness of life" fundamentally intends into the shape of an ontologically grounded problem.

75.6 The question cannot be: by what means does Dasein gain the unity of connectedness for a subsequent linking of the sequence of "lived experiences" that have occurred and are occurring? It must rather be: in which of its own ways of Being does it *lose itself in such a way that it must, as it were, only subsequently gather itself together out of the dispersion and think up for itself an encompassing unity for this togetherness?* Lostness in the they and in the world-historical revealed itself earlier as flight

from death. This flight from … reveals Being-*toward*-death as a basic determination of care. Anticipatory resoluteness brings this Being-toward-death into owned existence. But the happening of this resoluteness—the repetition of the heritage of possibilities that, anticipating, hands itself down—we interpreted as owned historicality. Does the primordial, unlost stretchedness of the whole of existence, a stretchedness that has no need of any connectedness, perhaps lie in this historicality? The resoluteness of the self against the inconstancy of dispersion is in itself the *stretched continuity* in which Dasein, as fate, holds birth and death and their "between" "drawn into" its existence—in such a way, indeed, that in such constancy it is there, in the moment of vision, for the world-historical of its situation in each case. In the fateful repetition of possibilities that have been, Dasein brings itself back "immediately"—that is, temporally, ecstatically—to what has already been before it. With this handing-down of the heritage to itself, however, "birth" is then, in the coming back from the possibility of death that is not to be outstripped, *caught up into existence*—so that existence may, to be sure, only accept the thrownness of its own "there" more free of illusion.

[75.7] Resoluteness constitutes the *loyalty* of existence to its own self. As resoluteness *ready for anxiety*, loyalty is at the same time possible reverence for the sole authority that a free existing can have: the repeatable possibilities of existence. Resoluteness would be ontologically misunderstood if one wanted to think that it *is* actual as a "lived experience" only as long as the "act" of resolving "lasts." In resoluteness lies the existentiell constancy which, by its essence, has already taken in advance every possible moment of vision that springs from it. Resoluteness as fate is freedom for *giving up* a particular resolution, as the situation may possibly demand. The continuity of existence is not thereby interrupted, but precisely confirmed in the moment of vision. Continuity is not first formed through and out of the joining together of "moments"; rather, these spring from the *already*

stretched temporality of repetition, which is futurally having-been.

75.8 In unowned historicality, by contrast, the primordial stretchedness of fate is hidden. Inconstant as they-self, Dasein makes present its "today." Awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old. The they evades choice. Blind to possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and preserves the "actual" that is left over from the world-historical that has been—the remnants, and the information about them that is present-at-hand. Lost in making present the today, it understands the "past" in terms of the "present." The temporality of owned historicality, on the other hand, is, as anticipatory-repeating moment of vision, a *de-presenting* of the today and a weaning away from the conventions of the they. Unowned historical existence, by contrast, laden with the legacy of the "past," which has become unrecognizable to it, seeks the modern. Owned historicality understands history as the "recurrence" of the possible, and therefore knows that a possibility recurs only if existence is open for it, fatefully and in the moment of vision, in resolute repetition.

75.9 The existential interpretation of Dasein's historicality constantly and unawares finds itself in shadow. The obscurities are all the harder to shake off because even the possible dimensions of appropriate questioning have not been disentangled, and in all of them the *enigma* of *Being* and—as has now become clear—of *motion* is at work. Nonetheless, a projection of the ontological genesis of historiography as a science from Dasein's historicality may be ventured. It serves as preparation for the clarification, to be carried out in what follows, of the task of a historiographical destruction of the history of philosophy.

§ 76. THE EXISTENTIAL ORIGIN OF HISTORIOGRAPHY FROM DASEIN'S HISTORICALITY

Historiography is rooted in historicality and has the possibilities of Dasein that has-been-there as its theme.

76.1 That historiography, like every science, is, as a way of Being of Dasein, factically and in each case "dependent" on the "prevailing worldview" needs no discussion. Beyond this fact, however, we must ask about the ontological possibility of the origin of the sciences from Dasein's constitution of Being. This origin is still scarcely transparent. In the present context, the analysis is meant to make the existential origin of historiography recognizable in outline only to the extent that Dasein's historicality and its rootedness in temporality are thereby brought still more clearly to light.

76.2 If Dasein's Being is in principle historical, then evidently every factical science remains bound to this happening. But historiography has Dasein's historicality as its presupposition in yet another way, one that is peculiar to it and distinctive.

76.3 One would like to make this clear initially by pointing out that historiography, as the science of Dasein's history, must have the primordially historical being as its "presupposition," as its possible "object." But history must not only *be* for a historiographical object to become accessible, and historiographical knowing is not only historical as a comportment of Dasein that happens; rather, *the historiographical disclosure of history is in itself*, whether or not it is factically carried out, *rooted by its ontological structure in Dasein's historicality.* This connection is what is meant when we speak of the existential origin of historiography from Dasein's historicality. To elucidate it means, methodologically: to project the *idea* of historiography ontologically from Dasein's historicality. The point, by contrast, is not to "abstract" the concept of historiography from the factical business of science today, or to assimilate it to that business. For what guarantees, in principle, that this factical procedure does in fact represent historiography in its primordial and owned possibilities?

And even if it does—on which we refrain from any decision—the concept could still be "uncovered" in the fact only when guided by the already understood idea of historiography. Conversely, however, the existential idea of historiography is not given a higher right by the historian's confirming that his factical comportment agrees with it. Nor does it become "false" because he disputes any such agreement.

76.4 It lies in the idea of historiography as a science that it has seized upon the *disclosure* of historical beings as its own task. Every science is constituted primarily through thematizing. What is known prescientifically in Dasein, as disclosed Being-in-the-world, is projected upon its specific Being. With this projection the region of beings is delimited. The ways of access to these beings receive their methodological "direction"; the structure of the conceptuality of interpretation receives its preliminary outline. If—setting aside the question of the possibility of a "history of the present"—we assign historiography the task of disclosing the "past," then the historiographical thematizing of history is possible only if a "past" has always already been disclosed at all. Quite apart from whether sufficient sources are available for a historiographical envisaging of the past, the *way to it* must in any case be *open* for the historiographical return into it. That this is so, and how it becomes possible, is by no means evident.

76.5 But insofar as Dasein's Being is historical—that is, open in its having-been on the basis of ecstatic-horizonal temporality—the thematizing of the "past" that can be carried out in existence has a clear path in general. And because Dasein, *and only Dasein*, is primordially historical, what historiographical thematizing offers as a possible object of research must have the way of Being of *Dasein that has-been-there*. With factical Dasein as Being-in-the-world there *is* in each case also world-history. If that Dasein is no longer there, then the world too has-been-there. This is not contradicted by the fact that what was formerly ready-to-hand within the world nevertheless does not yet pass away and, as something of the world that has-been-there which

has not passed away, can be found "historiographically" for a present.

76.6 Remains, monuments, and reports that are still present-at-hand are *possible* "material" for the concrete disclosure of Dasein that has-been-there. Such things *can* become *historiographical* material only because, by their own way of Being, they have a *world-historical* character. And they *become* material only by being understood in advance with regard to their innerworldliness. The world already projected is determined by way of interpreting the world-historical, "preserved" material. The procuring, sifting, and securing of the material is not what first sets the return to the "past" in motion; rather, it already presupposes *historical Being toward* Dasein that has-been-there, that is, the historicality of the historian's existence. This historicality founds historiography as a science existentially, down to its most inconspicuous, "artisanal" operations.

76.7 If historiography is rooted in historicality in this way, then it must also be possible to determine from here what the *object* of historiography "really" is. The delimitation of the primordial theme of historiography will have to be carried out in keeping with owned historicality and with the disclosure of what has-been-there that belongs to it: repetition. Repetition understands Dasein that has-been-there in its owned possibility that has been. The "birth" of historiography from owned historicality then means: the primary thematizing of the historiographical object projects Dasein that has-been-there upon its ownmost possibility of existence. So historiography is supposed to have the *possible* as its theme? Is not its whole "meaning" bent solely on the *"facts,"* on how it factually has been?[6]

76.8 But what does it mean: Dasein is "factual"? If Dasein is "properly" actual only in existence, then its "factuality" is surely constituted precisely in resolutely projecting itself upon a chosen potentiality-for-Being. But then what has "factually" been there in an owned way is the existentiell possibility in

6 The phrase echoes the historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), who famously held that history should show "*wie es eigentlich gewesen*" (how it actually was).

which fate, destiny, and world-history were factically determined. Because existence in each case is only as factically thrown, historiography will disclose the quiet force of the possible all the more penetratingly, the more simply and concretely it understands having-been-in-the-world in terms of its possibility and "only" presents it.

76.9 If historiography, itself growing out of owned historicality, reveals Dasein that has-been-there in its possibility by repeating it, then it has already made manifest the "universal" in what happens only once. The question whether historiography has as its object only the series of unique, "individual" occurrences, or "laws" as well, is mistaken at the root. Its theme is neither what has happened only once nor some universal floating above it, but the possibility that has factically existed. This possibility is not repeated as such—that is, not understood in an owned historiographical way—if it is perverted into the pallor of a supratemporal model. Only factical owned historicality, as resolute fate, can disclose history that has-been-there in such a way that in repetition the "force" of the possible strikes into factical existence, that is, comes toward it in its futurality. Historiography therefore—no more than the historicality of unhistoriographical Dasein—by no means takes its start from the "present" and from what is "actual" only today, in order to grope its way back from there to something past; rather, *historiographical* disclosure too temporalizes itself *from the future.* The *"selection"* of what is to become a possible object for historiography *has already been made*, in the factical, existentiell *choice* of the historicality of Dasein, in which historiography first of all arises and in which alone it *is*.

76.10 The historiographical disclosure of the "past," grounded in fateful repetition, is so little "subjective" that it alone guarantees the "objectivity" of historiography. For the objectivity of a science is regulated primarily by whether it can *bring* the thematic being that belongs to it *before* understanding, without covering it over, in the primordiality of its Being. In no science are the "universal validity" of standards and the claims to "universality"

that the they and its common sense demand *less* possible criteria of "truth" than in owned historiography.

76.11 Only because the central theme of historiography is in each case the *possibility* of existence that has-been-there, and because this existence always exists factically in a world-historical way, can historiography demand of itself an unrelenting orientation toward the "facts." For this reason factical research branches out in many directions and makes the history of equipment, of works, of culture, of the spirit, and of ideas its object. At the same time, history, as handing itself down, is in itself in each case in an interpretedness that belongs to it and that itself has its own history, so that historiography for the most part penetrates to what has-been-there itself only by way of the history of tradition. This is why concrete historiographical research can in each case keep itself at varying degrees of closeness to its proper theme. The historian who from the outset "throws himself" upon the "worldview" of an age has not thereby yet proven that he understands his object in an owned historical way and not merely "aesthetically." And on the other hand, the existence of a historian who "only" edits sources can be determined by an owned historicality.

76.12 So too, then, the dominance of a differentiated historiographical interest, extending even to the most remote and primitive cultures, is in itself no proof yet of the owned historicality of a "time." In the end, the emergence of a problem of "historicism" is the clearest sign that historiography is striving to alienate Dasein from its owned historicality. Owned historicality does not necessarily need historiography. Unhistoriographical ages are not as such already unhistorical.

76.13 The possibility that historiography can in general be either of "use" or of "disadvantage" "for life" is grounded in the fact that life is historical at the root of its Being and accordingly, as factically existing, has always already decided for owned or unowned historicality. *Nietzsche* recognized what is essential about "the use and disadvantage of historiography for life" in his second *Untimely Meditation* (1874), and said it in a way both

unambiguous and penetrating. He distinguishes three kinds of historiography—the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical—without explicitly demonstrating the necessity of this triad and the ground of its unity. *The threefold character of historiography is prefigured in Dasein's historicality.* This historicality at the same time lets us understand to what extent owned historiography must be the factically concrete unity of these three possibilities. *Nietzsche's* division is not accidental.[7] The beginning of his "Meditation" suggests that he understood more than he made known.

76.14 As historical, Dasein is possible only on the basis of temporality. Temporality temporalizes itself in the ecstatic-horizonal unity of its carryings-away. As futural, Dasein exists in an owned way in resolutely disclosing a chosen possibility. Coming back to itself resolutely, it is, repeating, open for the "monumental" possibilities of human existence. The historiography that springs from such historicality is "monumental." As having-been, Dasein is delivered over to its thrownness. In the repeating appropriation of the possible there lies prefigured at the same time the possibility of reverently preserving the existence that has-been-there, in which the possibility seized upon became manifest. As monumental, owned historiography is therefore "antiquarian." Dasein temporalizes itself, in the unity of future and having-been, as present. The present discloses the today in an owned way—namely, as moment of vision. But insofar as the today is interpreted in terms of the futural-repeating understanding of a possibility of existence that has been seized upon, owned historiography becomes a de-presenting of the today, that is, a suffering self-detachment from the falling publicness of the today. As owned, monumental-antiquarian historiography is necessarily a critique of the "present." Owned historicality is the foundation of the possible unity of the three modes of historiography. But the *ground* of the foundation of owned his-

7 Nietzsche's essay "*Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben*" is usually translated as "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life"; Heidegger's *Historie* is rendered here as "historiography."

toriography is *temporality* as the existential meaning of the Being of care.

76.15 The concrete presentation of the existential-historical origin of historiography is carried out in the analysis of the thematizing that constitutes this science. Historiographical thematizing has its principal element in the formation of the hermeneutical situation, which opens up with the resolution of historically existing Dasein to the repeating disclosure of what has-been-there. The possibility and the structure of *historiographical truth* are to be expounded from the *owned disclosedness* ("truth") *of historical existence*. But because the basic concepts of the historiographical sciences—whether they concern the objects of these sciences or their manner of treatment—are concepts of existence, the theory of the human sciences presupposes a thematically existential interpretation of Dasein's *historicality*. This is the constant goal that the research of *W. Dilthey* seeks to approach, and which is illuminated more penetratingly by the ideas of Count *Yorck* von Wartenburg.

§ 77. THE CONNECTION OF THE FOREGOING EXPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICALITY WITH THE RESEARCHES OF W. DILTHEY AND THE IDEAS OF COUNT YORCK

Letters of Count Yorck to Dilthey are quoted to show their shared aim of understanding historicality.

77.1 The laying-out of the problem of history that has been carried out here grew out of the appropriation of Dilthey's work. It was confirmed and at the same time consolidated by the theses of Count Yorck, which are found scattered through his letters to Dilthey.[8]

77.2 The picture of Dilthey still widespread in many quarters today is this: the "sensitive" interpreter of intellectual history, and of literary history in particular, who "also" strives to delimit

8 The correspondence between Wilhelm Dilthey and Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg (1835–1897), covering 1877–1897, was published in 1923; the page references that follow are to that edition.

the natural sciences from the human sciences, in doing so assigns a distinctive role to the history of these sciences and likewise to "psychology," and lets the whole blur into a relativistic "philosophy of life." For a superficial view this sketch is "correct." But the "substance" escapes it. It covers over more than it reveals.

77.3 Schematically, Dilthey's research can be divided into three domains: studies on the theory of the human sciences and their delimitation from the natural sciences; research into the history of the sciences of the human being, of society and of the state; efforts toward a psychology in which the "whole fact of the human being" is to be presented. Investigations in the theory of science, in the history of science, and in hermeneutical psychology constantly permeate and overlap one another. Where one direction of view predominates, the others are already motive and means as well. What looks like ambivalence and uncertain, haphazard "trying things out" is the elementary restlessness toward the one goal: to bring "life" to philosophical understanding, and to secure for this understanding a hermeneutical foundation from "life itself." Everything is centered in "psychology," which is to understand "life" in its historical nexus of development and effects—as the *way* in which the human being *is*, as the possible *object* of the human sciences, and *at the same time* as the *root* of these sciences. Hermeneutics is the self-clarification of this understanding, and only in a derivative form the methodology of historiography.

77.4 True, out of regard for contemporary discussions that pushed his own researches into the foundations of the human sciences one-sidedly into the field of the theory of science, Dilthey often oriented his publications in this direction. But the "logic of the human sciences" is no more central for him than his "psychology" is aimed "merely" at improving the positive science of the psychical.

77.5 Dilthey's ownmost philosophical tendency in his exchange with his friend Count Yorck is expressed unambiguously by the latter on one occasion, when he points to "*our common interest in*

understanding historicality" [emphasis added]. The appropriation of Dilthey's researches, which are only now becoming accessible in their full extent, requires the continuity and concreteness of a confrontation in principle. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the problems that moved him, and of how they moved him. Instead, some central ideas of Count *Yorck* are to receive a preliminary characterization through a selection of characteristic passages from the letters.

77.6 *Yorck's* tendency, alive in his exchange with *Dilthey*'s way of posing questions and with his work, shows itself precisely in his stance on the tasks of the foundational discipline, analytic psychology. He writes of Dilthey's Academy paper "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology" (1894): "Self-reflection as the primary means of knowledge, analysis as the primary procedure of knowledge, are firmly established. From here propositions are formulated which are verified by one's own findings. There is no advance to a critical dissolution, an explanation and thereby an inner refutation of constructive psychology and its assumptions." (*Correspondence*, p. 177.) "... the abstention from critical dissolution = demonstration of psychological provenance in detail and in incisive execution is connected, in my opinion, with the concept and the position that you assign to epistemology." (p. 177.) "Only an epistemology gives the *explanation* of the inapplicability—the fact has been established and made clear. It has to give an account of the adequacy of the scientific methods; it has to ground the doctrine of method, instead of the methods being taken, as they are now, from the individual domains—haphazardly, I must say." (p. 179 f.)

77.7 In this demand of Yorck's—it is fundamentally the demand for a logic that goes ahead of the sciences and guides them, as Plato's and Aristotle's logic did—lies enclosed the task of working out, positively and radically, the different categorial structure of the being that is nature and of the being that *is* history (Dasein). Y. finds that D.'s investigations "*place too little emphasis on the generic difference between the ontic and the historical.*" (p. 191) [emphasis added]. "In particular, the procedure of compar-

ison is claimed as the method of the human sciences. Here I part company with you … Comparison is always aesthetic, always clings to the shape. Windelband assigns shapes to history. Your concept of type is a thoroughly inner one. There it is a matter of characters, not of shapes.[9] For the former, history is a series of images, of individual shapes—an aesthetic demand. For the natural scientist, alongside science, only aesthetic enjoyment remains, as a kind of human sedative. Your concept of history, after all, is that of a nexus of forces, of units of force, to which the category 'shape' should be applicable only in a transferred sense." (p. 193.)

77.8 From his sure instinct for the "difference between the ontic and the historical," Y. recognizes how strongly traditional historical research still keeps to "purely ocular determinations" (p. 192), which aim at what is bodily and has shape.

77.9 "Ranke is a great ocular, for whom what has vanished cannot become *actualities*.... Ranke's whole manner also explains his restriction of historical material to the political. Only this is the dramatic." (p. 60.) "The modifications that the course of time has brought seem to me inessential, and here I may well value things differently. For instance, I regard the so-called historical school as a mere side current within the same riverbed, representing only one term of an old, pervasive opposition. The name has something deceptive about it. *That school was not a historical one at all* [emphasis added], but an antiquarian one, constructing aesthetically, while the great dominant movement was that of mechanical construction. Hence what it contributed methodologically to the method of rationality was only a feeling for the whole." (p. 68 f.)[10]

77.10 "The genuine philologist, who has a concept of history as of a cabinet of antiquities. Where there is no palpability—where only a living psychic transposition leads—the gentlemen do not

9 Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915), Neo-Kantian philosopher who distinguished the "nomothetic" natural sciences from the "idiographic" historical sciences.
10 The Historical School: the early nineteenth-century German movement in jurisprudence and historical scholarship associated with Savigny, Niebuhr, and others.

get there. At heart they are natural scientists, and they become skeptics all the more because experiment is lacking. One must keep entirely away from all the odds and ends such as how often Plato was in Magna Graecia or Syracuse. No liveliness hangs on that. This external manner, which I have now examined critically, ends up at a great question mark and has come to grief on the great realities of Homer, Plato, the New Testament. Everything really real becomes a phantom when it is regarded as a 'thing in itself,' when it is not lived through." (p. 61.) "The 'scientists' stand before the powers of the age much as the most refined French society stood before the revolutionary movement of that time. Here as there, formalism, the cult of form. Determinations of relations the last word of wisdom. Such a direction of thought naturally has its history—not yet written, I think. The groundlessness of thinking and of belief in such thinking—epistemologically considered, a metaphysical comportment—is a historical product." (p. 39.) "The wave-oscillations called forth by the eccentric principle that ushered in a new age more than four hundred years ago seem to me to have become extremely wide and flat; knowledge seems to have advanced to the point of canceling itself, and man to have been removed so far from himself that he no longer catches sight of himself. 'Modern man,' that is, man since the Renaissance, is ready to be buried." (p. 83.) By contrast: "All truly living historiography, and not merely historiography that shimmers with life, is critique." (p. 19.) "But knowledge of history is for the best part knowledge of the hidden sources." (p. 109.) "With history it is like this: what makes a spectacle and catches the eye is not the main thing. The nerves are invisible, just as the essential in general is invisible. And just as it is said, 'If you were still, you would be strong,' so the variant is true as well: if you are still, you will hear, that is, understand." (p. 26.) "And then I enjoy the quiet soliloquy and the converse with the spirit of history. It did not appear to Faust in his cell, nor to Master Goethe either.[11]

11 "If you were still, you would be strong" echoes Isaiah 30:15 in Luther's translation.

They would not have drawn back from it in fright, however grave and stirring the apparition may be. For it is brotherly and akin in another, deeper sense than the inhabitants of bush and field. The effort resembles Jacob's wrestling—a sure gain for the wrestler himself. But that is what matters first of all." (p. 133.)[12]

77.11 Yorck gains his clear insight into the basic character of history as "virtuality" from knowing the character of Being of human Dasein itself—thus precisely not in the manner of the theory of science, from the object of historical study: "That the entire psycho-physical given *is* not [Being = presence-at-hand of nature. Author's note.] but lives is the germinal point of historicality. And a self-reflection that is directed not to an abstract I but to the fullness of my self will find me historically determined, just as physics recognizes me as cosmically determined. Just as I am nature, so am I history ..." (p. 71.) And Yorck, who saw through all spurious "determinations of relations" and "groundless" relativisms, does not hesitate to draw the ultimate consequence from the insight into Dasein's historicality. "On the other hand, however, given the inner historicality of self-consciousness, a systematics separated from historiography is methodologically inadequate. Just as physiology cannot abstract from physics, so philosophy—precisely if it is critical—cannot abstract from historicality. Self-comportment and historicality are like breathing and air pressure—and—this may sound somewhat paradoxical—the non-historicizing of philosophizing seems to me, methodologically speaking, a metaphysical residue." (p. 69.) "Because philosophizing is living, therefore—don't be alarmed—there is in my opinion a philosophy of history—if only someone could write it!—Certainly not as it has been conceived and attempted up to now, against which you have irrefutably declared yourself. The previous way of posing the question was indeed a false one, even an impossible one, but it is not the only one. Therefore, further, there is no real philosophizing that would not be historical. The separation between

12 Allusions to Goethe's *Faust*, Part One, where Faust recoils from the Earth Spirit he has conjured in his study, and to Jacob's wrestling at Peniel (Genesis 32).

systematic philosophy and historiographical presentation is wrong in its essence." (p. 251.) "Being able to become practical is, to be sure, the actual legitimating ground of all science. But mathematical practice is not the only one. The practical aim of our standpoint is pedagogical, in the widest and deepest sense of the word. It is the soul of all true philosophy and the truth of Plato and Aristotle." (p. 42 f.) "You know what I think of the possibility of ethics as a science. Nonetheless it can always be done somewhat better. For whom, really, are such books? Registers upon registers! The only noteworthy thing is the drive to get from physics to ethics." (p. 73.) "If one grasps philosophy as a manifestation of life, not as the expectoration of a groundless thinking—groundless in appearance because the gaze is diverted from the ground of consciousness—then the task is as intricate and laborious to accomplish as it is meager in its result. Freedom from prejudice is the presupposition, and even this is hard to attain." (p. 250.)

77.12 That Yorck himself set out to gain a categorial grip on the historical, as against the ontic (the ocular), and to raise "life" into the appropriate scientific understanding, becomes clear from his reference to the kind of difficulty such investigations face: the aesthetic-mechanistic way of thinking "finds verbal expression more easily—explicable given the broad provenance of words from ocularity—than an analysis that goes back behind intuition.... Whatever, on the other hand, penetrates to the ground of livingness is withdrawn from exoteric presentation; hence all terminology is not generally intelligible, is symbolic and unavoidable. From the particular kind of philosophical thinking follows the particularity of its linguistic expression." (p. 70 f.) "But you know my fondness for the paradoxical, which I justify by saying that paradox is a mark of truth, that the communis opinio [common opinion] is surely nowhere in the truth, being an elementary precipitate of generalizing half-understanding, related to the truth as the sulfurous vapor that the lightning leaves behind is related to the lightning. Truth is never an element. It would be a task of state pedagogy to break down

elementary public opinion and, as far as possible, to make the individuality of seeing and viewing possible through education. Then, instead of a so-called public conscience—this radical externalization—individual consciences, that is, consciences, would again become powerful." (p. 249 f.)

77.13 The interest in understanding historicality brings itself before the task of working out the "generic difference between the ontic and the historical." With this, the *fundamental goal* of the "philosophy of life" is fixed. Nonetheless, the way the question is posed needs a radicalization *in principle*. How else is historicality, in its difference from the ontic, to be grasped philosophically and conceived "categorially," unless "the ontic" and "the historical" alike are brought into a *more primordial unity* of the possible respect in which they can be compared and distinguished? But that is possible only if the insight arises: 1. The question of historicality is an *ontological* question about the constitution of Being of historical beings; 2. the question of the ontic is the *ontological* question about the constitution of Being of beings that are not of Dasein's kind, of what is present-at-hand in the widest sense; 3. the ontic is only *one* domain of beings. The idea of Being encompasses "the ontic" *and* "the historical." *It* is what must let itself be "generically differentiated."

77.14 It is no accident that Yorck calls beings that are not historical simply the ontic. This is only the reflection of the unbroken dominance of traditional ontology, which, stemming from the *ancient* way of posing the question of Being, holds the ontological problematic fast in a narrowing in principle. The problem of the difference between the ontic and the historical can be worked out as a research problem only if it has *first secured its clue* through the fundamental-ontological clarification of the question of the meaning of Being in general. Thus it becomes clear in what sense the preparatory existential-temporal analytic of Dasein is resolved to cultivate the spirit of Count *Yorck* in order to serve the work of *Dilthey*.

Division Two, Chapter VI: Temporality and Within-Time-ness as the Origin of the Ordinary Concept of Time

Zweiter Abschnitt. Sechstes Kapitel: Zeitlichkeit und Innerzeitigkeit als Ursprung des vulgären Zeitbegriffes §§78–83

§ 78. THE INCOMPLETENESS OF THE FOREGOING TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF DASEIN

Dasein's everyday reckoning with time and the ordinary concept of time still need interpretation.

78.1 To demonstrate that and how temporality constitutes the Being of Dasein, it was shown that historicality, as the constitution of Being of existence, is "at bottom" temporality. The interpretation of the temporal character of history was carried out without regard to the "fact" that all happening runs its course "in time." In the course of the existential-temporal analysis of historicality, the everyday understanding of Dasein, which factically knows all history only as "within-time" happening, was given no say. If the existential analytic is to make Dasein ontologically transparent precisely in its facticity, then the factical "ontic-temporal" interpretation of history must also *explicitly* be given back its due. The time "in which" beings are encountered calls all the more necessarily for a *fundamental* analysis, since besides history, natural processes too are determined "by time." More elementary, however, than the circumstance that the "time factor" occurs in the *sciences* of history and nature is the fact that Dasein, already before all thematic

research, "reckons with time" and orients itself *by it*. And here again what remains decisive is *that* "reckoning" of Dasein "with its time" which lies prior to all use of measuring equipment tailored to the determination of time. The former precedes the latter and thus first makes something like the use of clocks possible at all.

78.2 Existing factically, Dasein in each case "has time" or "has none." It "takes time for itself" or "cannot allow itself any time." Why does Dasein "take time," and why can it "lose" it? Where does it take time from? How is this time related to Dasein's temporality?

78.3 Factical Dasein takes time into account without understanding temporality existentially. The elementary comportment of reckoning with time needs to be clarified before we ask what it means to say that a being is "in time." Every comportment of Dasein is to be interpreted from its Being, that is, from temporality. We must show how Dasein *as* temporality temporalizes a comportment that comports itself toward time in *such* a way that it takes time into account. The characterization of temporality given so far is therefore not only incomplete in general, inasmuch as not all the dimensions of the phenomenon were attended to; it has a gap in principle, because something like world-time, in the strict sense of the existential-temporal concept of world, belongs to temporality itself. How this is possible and why it is necessary is to be made understandable. In this way the "time" known in the ordinary way, "in which" beings occur, and together with it the within-time-ness of these beings, will be illuminated.

78.4 Everyday Dasein, which takes time for itself, initially comes across time in what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, encountered within the world. It understands the time thus "experienced" within the horizon of the understanding of Being closest to it, that is, as itself something somehow present-at-hand. How and why the ordinary concept of time comes to be formed requires a clarification drawn from the temporally founded constitution of Being of Dasein as concerned with time. The

ordinary concept of time owes its origin to a leveling off of primordial time. Demonstrating this origin of the ordinary concept of time will serve to justify the interpretation of temporality carried out earlier as *primordial time*.

78.5 In the formation of the ordinary concept of time there shows itself a remarkable wavering as to whether a "subjective" or an "objective" character should be ascribed to time. Where one takes it as being in itself, it is nevertheless assigned preeminently to the "soul." And where it has the character of "consciousness," it still functions "objectively." In *Hegel's* interpretation of time, both possibilities are brought to a certain sublation. *Hegel* tries to determine the connection between "time" and "spirit" in order to make intelligible from this why spirit, as history, "falls into time." In its *result*, the foregoing interpretation of the temporality of Dasein and of the belonging of world-time to it seems to agree with *Hegel*. But because the present analysis of time differs from *Hegel* fundamentally, already in its point of departure, and is oriented, in its aim, that is,[1] in its fundamental-ontological intention, precisely *in opposition* to him, a brief account of Hegel's conception of the relation between time and spirit can serve to clarify indirectly, and to bring to a provisional close, the existential-ontological interpretation of the temporality of Dasein, of world-time, and of the origin of the ordinary concept of time.

78.6 The question whether and how a "Being" belongs to time, why and in what sense we call it "in being," can be answered only when it has been shown to what extent temporality itself, in the whole of its temporalizing, makes possible something like an understanding of Being and the addressing of beings. The chapter is accordingly divided as follows: the temporality of Dasein and concern with time (§ 79); time concerned with and within-time-ness (§ 80); within-time-ness and the genesis of the ordinary concept of time (§ 81); the existential-ontological connection of temporality, Dasein, and world-time set off against

1 *Aufhebung* ("sublation") is Hegel's term for a cancelling that at the same time preserves and lifts up.

Hegel's conception of the relation between time and spirit (§ 82); the existential-temporal analytic of Dasein and the fundamental-ontological question of the meaning of Being in general (§ 83).

§ 79. DASEIN'S TEMPORALITY AND CONCERN WITH TIME

Everyday talk of "now," "then," and "back then" reveals time as datable, spanned, and public.

79.1 Dasein exists as a being for which, in its Being, this Being itself is what *matters*. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its potentiality-for-Being *before* any mere and subsequent observation of itself. In projection it is revealed as thrown. Thrown, left to the "world," it falls prey to it in concern. As care, that is, existing in the unity of the falling thrown projection, this being is disclosed as the "there." Being with Others, it maintains itself in an average interpretedness that is articulated in discourse and expressed in language. Being-in-the-world has always already expressed *itself*, and *as Being alongside* beings encountered within the world, it constantly expresses *itself* in addressing and discussing what is concerned with. Circumspective, understanding concern is grounded in temporality, specifically in the mode of awaiting-retaining making present. As concernful calculating, planning, providing for, and preventing, it is always already saying, whether audibly or not: *"then"*—this is to happen; *"before that"*—that is to be dealt with; *"now"*—what failed or escaped us *"back then"* is to be made up.

79.2 In the "then," concern expresses itself as awaiting; in the "back then," as retaining; and in the "now," as making present. The "then" usually harbors, unexpressed, the "not yet now"; that is, it is spoken in an awaiting-retaining or awaiting-forgetting making present. The "back then" harbors within it the "no longer now." With it, retaining expresses itself as awaiting making present. The "then" and the "back then" are understood along with it in view of a "now"; that is, making present has a peculiar weight. It does, to be sure, always temporalize itself in

unity with awaiting and retaining, even though these may be modified into an unawaiting forgetting—the mode in which temporality entangles itself in the present, which, in making present, says predominantly "now-now." What concern awaits as the next thing is addressed in the "right away"; what has initially been made available, or lost, in the "just now." The horizon of the retaining that expresses itself in the "back then" is the *"earlier"*; that for the "thens" is the *"later on"* ("in future"); that for the "nows" is the *"today."*

79.3 But every "then" is *as such* a "then, when..."; every "back then" a "back then, when..."; every "now" a "now that...." We call this seemingly self-evident relational structure of the "now," "back then," and "then" *datability*. In this we must still disregard entirely whether the dating is factically carried out with regard to a calendar "date." Even without such "dates," the "now," "then," and "back then" are dated more or less determinately. If determinacy of dating is lacking, that does not mean that the structure of datability is missing or is contingent.

79.4 *What is it to which such datability essentially belongs, and in what is it grounded?* But could a more superfluous question be asked than this? With the "now that..." we surely mean, "as everyone knows," a "point in time." The "now" is time. Undeniably we understand the "now—that," "then—when," "back then—when"; in a certain way we also understand that they are connected with "time." That such things mean "time" itself, how this is possible, and what "time" means—none of this is already grasped as well with the "natural" understanding of the "now," and so on. Indeed, is it self-evident, then, that we "understand without further ado" and "naturally" utter something like "now," "then," and "back then"? Where, then, do we get these "now—that..."? Have we found anything of the kind among innerworldly beings, among what is present-at-hand? Evidently not. Was it ever found at all in the first place? Have we ever set out to look for it and establish it? We have it at our disposal "at any time" without ever having explicitly taken it over, and we constantly make use of it, though not always by voicing it. The most

trivial remark tossed off in everyday life, for example "it's cold," also means a "now that...." Why does Dasein, in addressing what is concerned with, also express a "now that...," "then, when...," "back then, when...," though usually without voicing it? Because the interpretive addressing of... also expresses *itself*—that is, the circumspectively understanding *Being alongside* the ready-to-hand, which lets this be encountered by uncovering it—and because this addressing and discussing, which also interprets *itself*, is grounded in a *making present* and is possible only as such.

79.5 Awaiting-retaining making present interprets *itself*. And this in turn is possible only because—ecstatically open in itself—it is always already disclosed to itself and can be articulated in understanding-discursive interpretation. *Because temporality constitutes, ecstatic-horizonally, the clearedness of the "there," it is primordially always already interpretable in the "there," and thus known.* The making present that interprets itself—that is, what is interpreted as expressed in the "now"—we call "time." This merely makes known that temporality, recognizable as ecstatically open, is in the first instance and for the most part known only in this interpretedness of concern. The "immediate" intelligibility and recognizability of time does not, however, rule out that both primordial temporality as such and the origin of expressed time, which temporalizes itself in it, remain unrecognized and ungrasped.

79.6 That the structure of datability belongs essentially to what is interpreted with the "now," "then," and "back then" becomes the most elementary proof that what is interpreted stems from the temporality that interprets itself. In saying "now," we always already understand as well, without also saying it, a "—*that* this and that...." Why so? Because the "now" interprets a *making present of* beings. In the "now that..." lies the *ecstatic* character of the present. The *datability* of the "now," "then," and "back then" is the *reflection* of the *ecstatic* constitution of temporality and is *therefore* essential for expressed time itself. The structure of datability of the "now," "then," and "back then" is evidence that

these, *springing from the stock of temporality, are themselves time*. The interpretive expressing of the "now," "then," and "back then" is the most primordial *indication of time*. And because in the *ecstatic* unity of temporality—which is understood unthematically with datability and, as such, without being recognized—Dasein is always already disclosed to itself as Being-in-the-world, and innerworldly beings are uncovered together with this, interpreted time in each case also already has a dating drawn from the beings encountered in the disclosedness of the "there": now that—the door is banging; now that—I'm missing the book; and the like.

79.7 On the basis of the same origin in *ecstatic* temporality, the horizons belonging to the "now," "then," and "back then" also have the character of datability, as "today, when...," "later on, when...," and "earlier, when...."

79.8 If awaiting interprets itself understandingly in the "then," and in doing so, as making present, understands what it awaits from its "now," then the "and not yet now" already lies in the "indication" of the "then." Awaiting that makes present understands the "until then." Interpretation articulates this "until then"—namely, that it "has its time"—as the *meanwhile*, which likewise has a relation of datability. This relation comes to expression in the "during which...." Concern can in turn articulate the "during" itself, awaitingly, through further "then"-indications. The "until then" is divided up by a number of "from then —till then," which, however, are "embraced" in advance in the awaiting projection of the primary "then." With the awaiting, making-present understanding of the "during," the "enduring" is articulated. This lasting is in turn the time revealed in temporality's interpreting of *itself*, time which is thus in each case understood unthematically in concern as a "span." Awaiting-retaining making present "interprets" a *spanned* "during" only because in doing so it is disclosed to *itself* as the ecstatic *stretchedness* of historical temporality, even though it is not recognized as such. Here, however, a further peculiarity of "indicated" time shows itself. Not only is the "during" spanned; every "now," "then," and

"back then," with the structure of datability, has in each case a spannedness of varying extent: "now": during the break, at the meal, in the evening, in summer; "then": at breakfast, on the climb, and the like.

79.9 Awaiting-retaining-making-present concern "allows itself" time in one way or another and, in concern, indicates this time to itself, even without any, and before all, specifically calculating determination of time. Here time dates itself, in the particular mode of concernful allowing-oneself-time, from what is just then concerned with in the environment and disclosed in attuned understanding, from what one is busy with "all day long." To the degree that Dasein, awaiting, is absorbed in what it is concerned with and, not awaiting itself, forgets itself, the time it "allows" itself also remains *covered over* by this way of "allowing." Precisely in everyday concernful "just living along," Dasein never understands itself as running along a continuously enduring succession of pure "nows." On account of this covering-over, the time Dasein allows itself has, as it were, holes in it. Often we can no longer piece a "day" together when we come back to the time "used up." Yet this failure of time full of holes to hang together is not a fragmentation but a mode of temporality, which is always already disclosed and ecstatically *stretched*. The way in which the time "allowed" "passes," and the manner in which concern more or less explicitly indicates it to itself, can be adequately explicated phenomenally only if, on the one hand, the theoretical "representation" of a continuous flow of nows is kept at bay, and, on the other, it is grasped that the possible ways in which Dasein gives and allows itself time are to be determined primarily from *how, in keeping with its existence in each case, it "has" its time.*

79.10 Earlier, owned and unowned existing were characterized with regard to the modes of the temporalizing of temporality that founds them. According to this, the irresoluteness of unowned existence temporalizes itself in the mode of an unawaiting-forgetting making present. The irresolute understand themselves from the nearest events and ac-cidents

encountered in such making present and pressing in on them in changing succession. Busily losing *themselves* in what they are concerned with, the irresolute *lose their time* in it. Hence the talk characteristic of them: "I have no time." Just as those who exist in an unowned way constantly lose time and never "have" any, so it remains the distinction of the temporality of owned existence that in resoluteness it never loses time and "always has time." For the temporality of resoluteness has, with regard to its present, the character of the *moment of vision*. The moment of vision's owned making present of the situation does not itself take the lead but is *held* in the future that has been. Existence in the moment of vision temporalizes itself as a stretchedness that is whole in the manner of fate, in the sense of the owned, historical *constancy* of the self. Existence that is temporal in this way "constantly" has its time *for* what the situation demands of it. But resoluteness discloses the "there" in this way only as situation. That is why what is disclosed can never be encountered by the resolute in such a way that they could irresolutely lose their time on it.

79.11 *Factically thrown Dasein can "take" time for itself and lose it only because, as ecstatically stretched temporality, with the disclosedness of the "there" grounded in that temporality, it has been allotted a "time."*

79.12 As disclosed, Dasein factically exists in the manner of *Being-with* Others. It maintains itself in a public, average intelligibility. The "now that..." and "then, when..." interpreted and expressed in everyday Being-with-one-another are understood in principle, even though they are unambiguously dated only within certain limits. In "closest" Being-with-one-another, several people can say *"now"* "together," each dating the "now" said differently: now that this or that is happening. The "now" expressed is said by each in the publicness of Being-with-one-another-in-the-world. The interpreted, expressed time of each Dasein is therefore as such, on the basis of its ecstatic Being-in-the-world, in each case also already *made public*. Now, insofar as everyday concern understands itself from the "world" it is con-

cerned with, it knows the "time" it takes for itself *not as its own*; rather, in concern it *makes use of* the time that "there is," the time *one* reckons with. But the publicness of "time" is all the more insistent the more factical Dasein is *explicitly concerned with* time by expressly taking it into account.

§ 80. TIME CONCERNED WITH AND WITHIN-TIME-NESS

Time-reckoning, the sun, and clocks make time public as world-time, "in which" beings are encountered.

80.1 Up to now the task was only to understand how Dasein, grounded in temporality, is concerned with time in existing, and how time, in interpretive concern, is made public for Being-in-the-world. In this, it remained entirely undetermined in what sense expressed public time *"is,"* whether it can be addressed as *in being* at all. Before any decision as to whether public time is "merely subjective after all," or "objectively real," or neither of the two, the phenomenal character of public time must first be determined more sharply.

80.2 The making public of time does not happen subsequently and occasionally. Rather, because Dasein, as ecstatic-temporal, *is* always already disclosed, and understanding interpretation belongs to existence, time has also already made itself public in concern. One orients oneself *by it*, so that it must somehow be there to be found for everyone.

80.3 Although concern with time can be carried out in the way characterized above, by dating from environmental events, this nevertheless always already happens, at bottom, within the horizon of a concern with time that we know as astronomical and calendrical *time-reckoning*. Such reckoning does not occur by chance; it has its existential-ontological necessity in the basic constitution of Dasein as care. Because Dasein essentially exists as thrown and falling, it interprets its time in concern by way of a time-reckoning. *In time-reckoning* the "proper" *making public* of time temporalizes itself, so that it must be said: *Dasein's thrownness is the ground for the fact that "there is" time publicly.* To secure

the possible intelligibility of the demonstration that public time originates in factical temporality, we first had to characterize time as interpreted in the temporality of concern in general, if only to make clear that the essence of concern with time does *not* lie in applying numerical determinations in dating. Accordingly, what is existential-ontologically decisive about *time-reckoning* must not be seen in the quantification of time either, but must be grasped more primordially from the temporality of the Dasein that reckons with time.

80.4 "Public time" proves to be *the* time "in which" what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand within the world is encountered. This requires us to call these beings, which are not of Dasein's kind, *within-time*. The interpretation of within-timeness provides a more primordial insight into the essence of "public time" and at the same time makes it possible to delimit its "Being."

80.5 The Being of Dasein is care. This being exists as thrown, falling. Left to the "world" uncovered with its factical "there," and dependent on it in concern, Dasein awaits its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world in such a way that it "reckons" *with* and *on* that with which, for the sake of this potentiality-for-Being, it ultimately has a distinctive *involvement*. Everyday *circumspective* Being-in-the-world needs the *possibility of sight*, that is, brightness, in order to be able to deal concernfully with what is ready-to-hand within what is present-at-hand. With the factical disclosedness of its world, nature is uncovered for Dasein. In its thrownness, Dasein is exposed to the alternation of day and night. Day, with its brightness, gives possible sight; night takes it away.

80.6 Awaiting the possibility of sight in circumspective concern, and understanding itself from its day's work, Dasein gives itself its time with the "then, when day breaks." The "then" concerned with is dated from what stands in the closest environmental nexus of involvements with the coming of light: the rising of the sun. Then, when the sun rises, it is *time to*.... Dasein thus dates the time it must take for itself from what, in the hori-

zon of its being left to the world, is encountered within the world as something with which there is a distinctive involvement for circumspective potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Concern makes use of the "being-ready-to-hand" of the sun, which dispenses light and warmth. The sun dates the time interpreted in concern. From this dating arises the "most natural" measure of time, the day. And because the temporality of Dasein, which must take its time for itself, is finite, its days are also already numbered. The "while it is day" gives concernful awaiting the possibility of determining in advance the "thens" of what is to be concerned with, that is, of dividing up the day. The division is in turn carried out with regard to what dates time: the wandering sun. Like its rising, its setting and noon are distinctive "places" that the heavenly body occupies. Dasein, thrown into the world and giving itself time in temporalizing, takes into account its regularly recurring passage. On the basis of the dating interpretation of time prefigured by thrownness into the "there," Dasein's happening is a *day-to-day* happening.

80.7 This dating, carried out from the heavenly body that dispenses light and warmth and from its distinctive "places" in the sky, is an indication of time that can be carried out, in Being-with-one-another "under the same sky," by "everyone" at any time and in the same way—within certain limits, initially, in agreement. What does the dating is available in the environment and yet not confined to the world of equipment concerned with in each case. Rather, in this world environmental nature and the public environment are always already uncovered along with it. On this public dating, in which everyone indicates their time to themselves, everyone can at the same time "reckon"; it uses a publicly available *measure*. This dating reckons with time in the sense of a *measuring of time*, which accordingly needs a timepiece, that is, a clock. This implies: *with the temporality of Dasein—thrown, left to the "world," giving itself time—something like a "clock" is also already uncovered, that is, something ready-to-hand that, in its regular recurrence, has become accessible in awaiting making present.* Thrown Being alongside the ready-to-hand is groun-

ded in temporality. Temporality is the ground of the clock. As the condition of the possibility of the factical necessity of the clock, temporality at the same time conditions its uncoverability; for only the awaiting-retaining making present of the sun's course, which is encountered with the uncoveredness of inner-worldly beings, makes possible—and, as self-interpreting, at the same time demands—dating from what is publicly ready-to-hand in the environment.

80.8 The "natural" clock, always already uncovered with the factical thrownness of Dasein grounded in temporality, first motivates and at the same time makes possible the production and use of still handier clocks—in such a way, indeed, that these "artificial" clocks must be "adjusted" to the "natural" one if they in their turn are to make accessible the time primarily uncovered in the natural clock.

80.9 Before we characterize the main features of the formation of time-reckoning and the use of clocks in their existential-ontological meaning, the time concerned with in the measuring of time should initially be characterized more completely. If measuring time first "properly" makes public the time concerned with, then public time must become phenomenally accessible, unveiled, as we pursue how what is dated shows itself in such "calculating" dating.

80.10 The dating of the "then" that interprets itself in concernful awaiting includes this: then, when day breaks, it is *time for* the day's work. The time interpreted in concern is always already understood as time for.... Each particular "now that this and that..." is *as such* in each case *appropriate* or *inappropriate*. The "now"—and so every mode of interpreted time—is not only a "now that..."; as this essentially datable something, it is at the same time essentially determined by the structure of appropriateness or inappropriateness. Interpreted time has from the outset the character of "time for..." or of "the wrong time for...." The awaiting-retaining making present of concern understands time in relation to a what-for, which in turn is ultimately made fast in a for-the-sake-of-which of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. With

this in-order-to relation, time made public reveals *the* structure we earlier came to know as *significance*. Significance constitutes the worldhood of the world. As time-for..., time made public essentially has the character of world. We therefore call the time that makes itself public in the temporalizing of temporality *world-time*. And we do so not, say, because it is *present-at-hand* as an *innerworldly* being—which it can never be—but because it belongs *to the world* in the existential-ontologically interpreted sense. How the essential relations of the structure of the world, for example the *"in-order-to,"* are connected with public time, for example the "then, when," on the basis of the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality, must be shown in what follows. At any rate, only now can time concerned with be characterized completely in its structure: it is datable, spanned, public, and, as so structured, belongs to the world itself. Every "now" expressed naturally in everyday life, for example, has this structure and is understood as such, although unthematically and preconceptually, in Dasein's concernful allowing-itself-time.

80.11 In the disclosedness of the natural clock, which belongs to Dasein existing as thrown and falling, there lies at the same time a distinctive *making public* of time concerned with, one that factical Dasein has always already carried out, and which is further heightened and consolidated in the perfecting of time-reckoning and the refinement of the use of clocks. The historical development of time-reckoning and of the use of clocks is not to be presented here historiographically in its possible variations. Rather, let us ask existential-ontologically: what mode of the temporalizing of Dasein's temporality becomes manifest in the *direction* in which time-reckoning and the use of clocks have developed? Answering this question must give rise to a more primordial understanding of the fact that *measuring time*—that is, at the same time, the explicit making public of time concerned with—is grounded *in the temporality* of Dasein, and indeed in a quite specific temporalizing of it.

80.12 If we compare "primitive" Dasein, which we took as the basis for the analysis of "natural" time-reckoning, with

"advanced" Dasein, it turns out that for the latter the day and the presence of sunlight no longer have a preeminent function, since this Dasein has the "advantage" of being able to turn night into day as well. Likewise, it no longer needs an explicit, immediate glance at the sun and its position in order to fix the time. Making and using measuring equipment of its own allows one to read the time directly from a clock produced specially for the purpose. The what-o'clock is the "how-much-time." Even though it may remain covered over in any particular reading of the time, the use of clock-equipment too is grounded in the temporality of Dasein—because the clock, in the sense of making possible a public time-reckoning, must be regulated by the "natural" clock—the temporality which, with the disclosedness of the "there," first makes possible a dating of the time concerned with. The understanding of the *natural* clock, which develops with the progressive uncovering of *nature*, gives directions for new possibilities of measuring time, relatively independent of the day and of explicit observation of the sky in each case.

80.13 In a certain way, however, even "primitive" Dasein already makes itself independent of reading time directly from the sky, insofar as it does not ascertain the sun's position in the sky but measures the shadow cast by a being available at any time. This can initially happen in the simplest form of the ancient "farmer's clock." In the shadow that constantly accompanies everyone, the sun is encountered with regard to its changing presence at the various places. The differing lengths of the shadow during the day can be paced out "at any time." Even though individuals' body lengths and foot lengths differ, the *ratio* between the two remains constant within certain limits of accuracy. The public determination of time for a concernful appointment, for example, then takes the form: "When the shadow is so many feet long, then let us meet over there." Here, in Being-with-one-another within the narrower limits of a closest environment, it is tacitly presupposed that the latitude of the "location" where the shadow is paced out is the same. Dasein

does not even need to carry this clock around with it; in a certain way it is the clock itself.

80.14 The public sundial, on which a line of shadow moves along a numbered track opposite to the course of the sun, needs no further description. But why do we find something like time at the spot the shadow occupies on the dial in each case? Neither the shadow nor the divided track is time itself, and neither is their spatial relation to each other. Where, then, is the time that we read off directly in this way from the "sundial," but also from any pocket watch?

80.15 What does reading the time mean? "Looking at the clock" surely cannot mean only observing the ready-to-hand equipment in its change and following the positions of the hand. In using the clock to ascertain what o'clock it is, *we say*, explicitly or not: *now* it is such-and-such o'clock, *now* it is time to..., or there is still time..., namely *now*, until.... Looking-at-the-clock is grounded in, and guided by, a taking-time-for-oneself. What already showed itself in the most elementary time-reckoning becomes clearer here: orienting oneself *by time* while looking at the clock is essentially a *saying-now*. This is so "self-evident" that we do not notice it at all, and still less know explicitly that in doing so the now is always already understood and *interpreted* in its full structural makeup of datability, spannedness, publicness, and worldhood.

80.16 Saying-now, however, is the discursive articulation of a *making present* that temporalizes itself in unity with a retaining awaiting. The dating carried out in the use of clocks proves to be a distinctive making present of something present-at-hand. The dating does not simply refer to something present-at-hand; the referring itself has the character of *measuring*. The numerical measure can, to be sure, be read off immediately. But this implies that the standard of measure is understood as contained in a stretch to be measured; that is, how often it is *present* in that stretch is determined. Measuring is constituted temporally in the making present of the present standard in the present stretch. The unchangingness that lies in the idea of a standard

means that it must be present-at-hand, in its permanence, at any time for everyone. *Measuring* dating of time concerned with interprets this time by looking, in making present, to something present-at-hand, which becomes accessible as standard and as what is measured only in a distinctive making present. Because in measuring dating the making present of what is present has a special priority, the measuring reading of time from the clock also expresses itself, in an emphatic sense, with the now. In *measuring time*, therefore, a *making public* of time is carried out according to which time is encountered in each case and at any time for everyone as "now and now and now." This time, "universally" accessible on clocks, is thus found, as it were, as a *multiplicity of nows present-at-hand*, without the measuring of time being directed thematically at time as such.

80.17 Because the temporality of factical Being-in-the-world primordially makes possible the disclosure of space, and spatial Dasein has in each case assigned itself a here in keeping with Dasein from an uncovered "over there," the time concerned with in Dasein's temporality is, with regard to its datability, in each case bound to a location of Dasein. It is not time that is tied to a location; rather, temporality is the condition of the possibility for dating's being able to bind itself to the spatial-local in such a way that this is binding as a measure for everyone. Time is not first coupled with space; rather, the "space" supposedly to be coupled with it is encountered only on the basis of the temporality that is concerned with time. In accordance with the founding of the clock and of time-reckoning in the *temporality* of Dasein, which constitutes this being as historical, it can be shown to what extent the use of clocks is itself ontologically historical, and every clock as such "has a history."

80.18 Time made public in the measuring of time by no means becomes space through being dated from spatial relations of measure. Nor is what is existential-ontologically essential about *measuring time* to be sought in the fact that the dated "time" is determined numerically from *spatial stretches* and a spatial thing's change of *location*. Rather, what is ontologically decisive

lies in the specific *making present* that makes measurement possible. Dating from what is "spatially" present-at-hand is so far from being a spatialization of time that this supposed spatialization means nothing other than making present, in its presence, the being that is present-at-hand for everyone in every now. In the measuring of time, which by essential necessity says now, what is measured as such is, as it were, forgotten over the obtaining of the measure, so that nothing is to be found apart from stretch and number.

80.19 The less time Dasein, concerned with time, has to lose, the more "precious" time becomes, and the *handier* the clock must be as well. Not only should it be possible to indicate time "more exactly"; the determining of time itself should take up as little time as possible and yet at the same time agree with the time-indications of Others.

80.20 Up to now the task was only to point out in general the "connection" between the use of clocks and the temporality that takes time for itself. Just as the concrete analysis of fully developed astronomical time-reckoning belongs within the existential-ontological interpretation of the uncovering of nature, so too the foundation of calendrical-historiographical "chronology" can be laid bare only within the range of tasks of the existential analysis of historiographical knowing.

80.21 The measuring of time carries out a pronounced making public of time, so that only by this route does what we commonly call "time" become known. In concern, every thing is assigned "its time." It "has" it, and, like every innerworldly being, can "have" it only because it is "in time" at all. The time "within which" innerworldly beings are encountered we know as world-time. On the basis of the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality, to which it belongs, world-time has *the same* transcendence as the world. With the disclosedness of world, world-time is made public, so that all temporally concernful Being alongside *innerworldly* beings circumspectively understands these beings as encountered "in time."

80.22 The time "in which" what is present-at-hand moves and rests is *not "objective,"* if by that is meant the Being-present-at-hand-in-itself of beings encountered within the world. But *just as little* is time *"subjective,"* if by this we understand Being-present-at-hand and occurring in a "subject." *World-time is "more objective" than any possible object, because, as the condition of the possibility of innerworldly beings, it is always already, ecstatic-horizonally, "objected" with the disclosedness of world.* Contrary to *Kant's* opinion, therefore, world-time is found *just as immediately* in the physical as in the psychical, and not first there by way of a detour through the latter. In the first instance, "time" shows itself precisely in the heavens, that is, where one finds it in naturally orienting oneself *by it*, so that "time" is even identified with the heavens.[2]

80.23 *But world-time is also "more subjective" than any possible subject, because, in the well-understood sense of care as the Being of the factically existing self, it is what first helps make this Being possible.* "Time" is present-at-hand neither in the "subject" nor in the "object," neither "inside" nor "outside," and it "is" *"earlier"* than any subjectivity and objectivity, because it represents the condition of the possibility even of this "earlier." Does it, then, have a "Being" at all? And if not, is it then a phantom, or is it "more in being" than any possible being? The investigation that proceeds further in the direction of such questions[3] will run up against the same "limit" that already arose in the preliminary discussion of the connection between truth and Being. However these questions may be answered in what follows—or indeed first primordially posed—what we must initially understand is that temporality, as ecstatic-horizonal, temporalizes something like

2 "Objected" renders Heidegger's Latinizing *objiciert*, from *obicere*, "to throw before or against," the root of "object."

3 At this point the German column carries, mid-word ("Unter-…suchung"), a displaced footnote with references on ancient time-reckoning (G. Bilfinger, *Die antiken Stundenangaben* and *Der bürgerliche Tag*, both 1888; H. Diels, *Antike Technik*, 2nd ed. 1920, "Die antike Uhr") and on later chronology (F. Rühl, *Chronologie des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit*, 1897). As elsewhere in this edition, Heidegger's footnotes are not translated.

world-time, which constitutes a within-time-ness of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. But these beings can then never be called "temporal" in the strict sense. Like every being not of Dasein's kind, they are non-temporal, whether they really occur, come into being and pass away, or subsist "ideally."

80.24 If, then, world-time belongs to the temporalizing of temporality, it can neither be volatilized "subjectivistically" nor "reified" in a bad "objectification." Both are avoided out of clear insight, and not merely on the basis of an uncertain wavering between the two possibilities, only if we can understand how everyday Dasein, from its closest understanding of time, grasps "time" theoretically, and to what extent this concept of time and its dominance block its possibility of understanding what is meant in it from primordial time, that is, *as temporality*. Everyday concern, which gives itself time, finds "time" in innerworldly beings encountered "in time." Therefore the elucidation of the genesis of the ordinary concept of time must take its point of departure from within-time-ness.

§ 81. WITHIN-TIME-NESS AND THE GENESIS OF THE ORDINARY CONCEPT OF TIME

The ordinary concept of time as an endless sequence of nows arises by leveling off world-time.

81.1 How does something like "time" show itself in the first instance for everyday, circumspective concern? In which concernful dealings that use equipment does it become *explicitly* accessible? With the disclosedness of the world, time has been made public. With the uncoveredness of innerworldly beings that belongs to the disclosedness of the world, time is also always already concerned with, insofar as Dasein, reckoning with *itself*, calculates time. If this is so, then the comportment in which "one" explicitly orients oneself *by time* lies in the use of clocks. Its existential-temporal meaning proves to be a making present of the moving hand. The *following* of the positions of the hand, which makes present, *counts*. This making present temporalizes itself in the ecstatic unity of a retaining that awaits. To

retain the "back then" *in making present* means: in saying-now, to be open for the horizon of the earlier, that is, of the now-no-longer. To *await* the "then" *in making present* means: in saying-now, to be open for the horizon of the later, that is, of the now-not-yet. *What shows itself in such making present is time.* How, then, does the definition of the *time* run that is manifest within the horizon of the circumspective, concernful use of clocks, a use that takes its time? *Time is what is counted, showing itself in the following of the moving hand that makes present and counts, in such a way that the making present temporalizes itself in ecstatic unity with the retaining and awaiting that are horizonally open according to the earlier and the later.* But this is nothing other than the existential-ontological interpretation of the definition of time that *Aristotle* gives: *τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον*.[4] "For this is time: what is counted in the motion encountered within the horizon of the earlier and the later." However strange this definition may seem at first glance, it is just as "self-evident" and genuinely drawn once the existential-ontological horizon from which *Aristotle* took it has been delimited. For Aristotle the origin of the time thus manifest does not become a problem. His interpretation of time moves, rather, in the direction of the "natural" understanding of Being. But because this understanding itself, and the Being understood in it, are made a problem in principle by the present investigation, the *Aristotelian* analysis of time can be interpreted thematically only *after* the question of Being has been resolved—and in such a way, indeed, that it gains a fundamental importance for the positive appropriation of the critically delimited way in which ancient ontology in general posed its questions.

81.2 All subsequent discussion of the concept of time holds *in principle* to the *Aristotelian* definition; that is, it makes time its theme in the way time shows itself in circumspective concern. Time is what is "counted," that is, what is expressed—and meant, although unthematically—in making present the *moving* hand

4 Aristotle, *Physics* IV, 11, 219b1–2; Heidegger translates the sentence himself immediately afterward.

(or shadow). In making present what is in motion in its motion, one says: "now here, now here, and so on." What is counted are the nows. And these show themselves "in every now" as "right-away-no-longer..." and "just-not-yet-now." The world-time that is "sighted" in this way in the use of clocks we call *now-time*.

81.3 The more "naturally" the concern that gives itself time reckons with time, the less it dwells on expressed time as such; instead it is lost in the equipment concerned with, which in each case has its time. The more "naturally" concern determines and gives the time—that is, the less it is thematically directed toward time as such—the more the Being alongside what is concerned with, a Being that makes present and falls, says without further ado, whether aloud or not: now, then, back then. And so for the ordinary understanding of time, time shows itself as a sequence of nows that are constantly "present-at-hand," at once passing away and arriving. Time is understood as a succession, as a "flow" of nows, as the "course of time." *What lies in this interpretation of the world-time that is concerned with?*

81.4 We get the answer if we go back to the *full* essential structure of world-time and compare with it what the ordinary understanding of time is familiar with. *Datability* was brought out as the first essential moment of the time concerned with. It is grounded in the ecstatic constitution of temporality. The "now" is essentially now-when.... The datable now that is understood in concern, although not grasped as such, is in each case an appropriate or an inappropriate one. *Significance* belongs to the structure of the now. That is why we called the time concerned with *world*-time. In the ordinary interpretation of time as a sequence of nows, both datability and significance are *missing*. The characterization of time as pure succession does *not* let either structure "come to light." The ordinary interpretation of time *covers them over*. The ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality, in which the datability and significance of the now are grounded, is *leveled off* by this covering-over. The nows are, as it were, clipped of these relations, and, clipped in this way, they

merely line up one after another in order to make up the succession.

81.5 This leveling covering-over of world-time, which the ordinary understanding of time carries out, is not accidental. Rather, precisely *because* the everyday interpretation of time keeps solely to the line of sight of concernful common sense, and understands only what "shows itself" within its horizon, these structures must escape it. What is counted in concernful measurement of time, the now, is co-understood in concern with what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. Now insofar as *this* concern with time comes back to the co-understood time itself and "considers" it, it sees the nows—which are, after all, also "there" in some way—within the horizon of the understanding of Being by which this concern itself is constantly guided. The *nows* are therefore in a certain way also *co-present-at-hand*: that is, beings are encountered, *and so too* is the now. Although it is not said explicitly that the nows are present-at-hand like things, they are nevertheless "seen" ontologically within the horizon of the idea of presence-at-hand. The nows *pass away*, and those that have passed away make up the past. The nows *arrive*, and those that are to arrive delimit the "future." The ordinary interpretation of world-time as now-time simply does not have at its disposal the horizon for making something like world, significance, or datability accessible to itself. These structures necessarily remain covered over—all the more so because the ordinary interpretation of time further entrenches this covering-over through the way in which it develops its characterization of time conceptually.

81.6 The sequence of nows is taken as something present-at-hand in some way; for it itself moves "into time." We say: *in* every now it is now, *in* every now it is also already disappearing. In *every* now the now is now, and is therefore constantly present *as the same*, however much in each now another may be arriving and disappearing. As *this* changing thing, it nonetheless at the same time shows the constant presence of itself; and so, with this line of sight on time as a sequence of nows arising and

passing away, even *Plato* had to call time the image of eternity: *εἰκὼ δ' ἐπενόει κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν* [He thought of making a moving image of eternity; and, as he set the heavens in order, he made, of the eternity that abides in unity, an everlasting image moving according to number—this which we have named time].[5]

81.7 The sequence of nows is uninterrupted and without gaps. However "far" we press on in "dividing" the now, it is always still now. One sees the continuity of time within the horizon of something present-at-hand that cannot be dissolved. In the ontological orientation toward something constantly present-at-hand, one pursues the problem of the continuity of time, or else one leaves the aporia standing. In the process the specific structure of world-time, since it is *spanned* together with the ecstatically founded datability, must remain *covered over*. The spannedness of time is not understood on the basis of the horizonal *stretchedness* of the ecstatic unity of temporality, which has made itself public in concern with time. That in every now, however momentary, it is *always already* now must be conceived on the basis of what is *still* "earlier," from which every now stems: on the basis of the ecstatic stretchedness of temporality, which is alien to every continuity of something present-at-hand, but which for its part is the condition of the possibility of access to something continuous that is present-at-hand.

81.8 The main thesis of the ordinary interpretation of time—that time is "infinite"—reveals most penetratingly the leveling off and covering-over of world-time, and thus of temporality in general, that lie in such an interpretation. Time presents itself in the first instance as an uninterrupted succession of nows. Every now is also already a just-now or a right-away. If the characterization of time holds primarily and exclusively *to this sequence*, then in principle no beginning and no end can be found in it as

5 Plato, *Timaeus* 37d.

such. Every last now is, *as a now*, in each case always *already* a right-away-no-longer, and so time in the sense of the no-longer-now, of the past; every first now is in each case a just-not-yet, and so time in the sense of the not-yet-now, of the "future." Time is therefore endless "in both directions." This thesis about time becomes possible only on the basis of an orientation *toward a free-floating in-itself of a present-at-hand course of nows*, whereby the full phenomenon of the now, as regards datability, world-hood, spannedness, and the locality that belongs to Dasein, is covered over and has sunk to an unrecognizable fragment. If, looking toward presence-at-hand and non-presence-at-hand, "one thinks" the sequence of nows "through to the end," an end can never be found. From the fact that *this thinking* of time through to the end *must* in each case always still *think* time, one infers that time *is* infinite.

81.9 But in what is this leveling off of world-time and this covering-over of temporality grounded? In the Being of Dasein itself, which we have interpreted, in a preparatory way, as *care*. Thrown and falling, Dasein is in the first instance and for the most part lost in what it is concerned with. In this lostness, however, Dasein's covering flight in the face of its owned existence, which was characterized as anticipatory resoluteness, makes itself known. In concernful flight lies flight *in the face of* death, that is, a looking away *from* the end of Being-in-the-world. This looking away from... is in itself a mode of the ecstatically *futural* Being *toward* the end. The unowned temporality of falling, everyday Dasein, as such a looking away from finitude, must fail to recognize owned futurality and thus temporality in general. And if the ordinary understanding of Dasein is indeed guided by the they, only then can the self-forgetful "representation" of the "infinity" of public time become entrenched. The they never dies, because it *cannot* die, since death is in each case mine and is understood existentielly in an owned way only in anticipatory resoluteness. The they, which never dies and misunderstands Being-toward-the-end, nevertheless gives the flight in the face of death a characteristic interpretation. Until the end "there is

always still time." Here a having-time in the sense of being-able-to-lose makes itself known: "now just this first, then that, and only this one more thing, and then..." Here it is by no means the finitude of time that is understood; on the contrary, concern is out to snatch as much as possible of the time that is still coming and "goes on." Publicly, time is something that everyone takes and can take. The leveled-off sequence of nows remains completely unrecognizable as regards its provenance from the temporality of the individual Dasein in everyday Being-with-one-another. And how could it affect "time" in its course in the least, if a human being who is present-at-hand "in time" no longer exists? Time goes on, just as it already "was" when a human being "entered life." One knows only public time, which, leveled off, belongs to everyone—and that means to no one.

81.10 But just as, even in evading death, death follows the one who flees, who, in turning away, must nevertheless see it precisely then, so too the merely elapsing, harmless, infinite sequence of nows nevertheless lays itself "over" Dasein with a curious enigmatic quality. Why do we say that time *passes away*, and do not say with *equal* emphasis that it arises? With regard to the pure sequence of nows, after all, both can be said with the same right. In talk of time's *passing away*, Dasein in the end understands more about time than it would like to admit; that is, the *temporality* in which world-time temporalizes itself is, for all the covering-over, *not completely closed off*. Talk of time's passing away gives expression to the "experience" that time cannot be held on to. This "experience" is in turn possible only on the basis of a wanting to hold on to time. In this lies an unowned *awaiting* of the "moments," an awaiting that also already *forgets* those that are slipping away. The *awaiting* of unowned existence, which makes present and forgets, is the condition of the possibility of the ordinary experience of time's passing away. Because Dasein is futural in its ahead-of-itself, in awaiting it must understand the sequence of nows as one that *slips away and passes away*. *Dasein knows fleeting time from its "fleeting" knowledge of its death.* In the emphatic talk of time's passing away lies the public

reflection of the *finite futurality* of the temporality of Dasein. And because death can remain covered over even in the talk of time's passing away, time shows itself as a passing away "in itself."

81.11 But even in this pure sequence of nows, passing away in itself, primordial time reveals itself through all the leveling off and covering-over. The ordinary interpretation determines the flow of time as an *irreversible* succession. Why can time not be reversed? In itself—and precisely when one looks exclusively at the flow of nows—there is no seeing why the sequence of nows should not for once set in again in the reverse direction. The impossibility of reversal has its ground in the provenance of public time from temporality, whose temporalizing, primarily futural, "goes" ecstatically toward its end, in such a way that it already "is" toward its end.

81.12 The ordinary characterization of time as an endless, passing, irreversible sequence of nows springs from the temporality of falling Dasein. *The ordinary representation of time has its natural right.* It belongs to Dasein's everyday way of Being and to the understanding of Being that prevails in the first instance. That is why, in the first instance and for the most part, *history* too is understood *publicly as* a happening *within time*. This interpretation of time loses its exclusive and preeminent right only if it claims to convey the "true" concept of time and to be able to prescribe the only possible horizon for the interpretation of time. Rather, it has turned out that only on the basis of the temporality of Dasein and its temporalizing does it become intelligible *why and how world-time belongs to it*. The interpretation of the full structure of world-time, drawn from temporality, first provides the guideline for "seeing" the covering-over that lies in the ordinary concept of time at all, and for assessing the leveling off of the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality. But the orientation toward the temporality of Dasein at the same time makes it possible to demonstrate the provenance and the factical necessity of this leveling covering-over, and to examine

the ordinary theses about time as to the ground of their legitimacy.

81.13 *Conversely*, however, temporality remains *inaccessible* within the horizon of the ordinary understanding of time. But now-time must not only be oriented primarily toward temporality in the order of possible interpretation; it itself first temporalizes itself in the unowned temporality of Dasein. Because of this, it is justified, with regard to the derivation of now-time from temporality, to address temporality as *primordial time*.

81.14 Ecstatic-horizonal temporality temporalizes itself *primarily* out of the *future*. The ordinary understanding of time, by contrast, sees the basic phenomenon of time in the *now*—and indeed in the pure now, clipped in its full structure, which is called the "present." From this one can gather that it must remain hopeless in principle to clarify, let alone derive, the ecstatic-horizonal phenomenon of the *moment of vision*, which belongs to owned temporality, *from this now*. Correspondingly, the future understood ecstatically—the datable, significant "then"—does not coincide with the ordinary concept of the "future" in the sense of the pure nows that have not yet arrived and are only now arriving. Just as little do ecstatic having-been—the datable, significant "back then"—and the concept of the past in the sense of the pure nows that have passed away coincide. The now is not pregnant with the not-yet-now; rather, the present springs from the future in the primordial ecstatic unity of the temporalizing of temporality.

81.15 Although the ordinary experience of time knows, in the first instance and for the most part, only "world-time," it nevertheless also always gives it at the same time a *distinctive* relation to "soul" and "spirit." And it does so even where an explicit and primary orientation of philosophical questioning toward the "subject" is still remote. Two characteristic pieces of evidence may suffice. *Aristotle* says: *εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πέφυκεν ἀριθμεῖν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς μὴ οὔσης*... [But if nothing other than soul, and the mind of the soul, is by nature fitted to count, it is impossible for there to be time if there is no

soul...]. And *Augustine* writes: inde mihi visum est, nihil esse aliud tempus quam distentionem; sed cuius rei nescio; et mirum si non ipsius animi [hence it seemed to me that time is nothing other than a distension—but of what, I do not know; and it would be surprising if it were not of the mind itself]. So the interpretation of Dasein as temporality, too, does not in principle lie outside the horizon of the ordinary concept of time.[6] And *Hegel* already made the explicit attempt to bring out the connection between time as ordinarily understood and spirit, whereas in *Kant* time is indeed "subjective," but stands unconnected "alongside" the "I think." *Hegel's* explicit grounding of the connection between time and spirit is suited to clarify indirectly the foregoing interpretation of Dasein as temporality and the demonstration that world-time originates from it.

§ 82. THE EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL CONNECTION OF TEMPORALITY, DASEIN, AND WORLD-TIME SET OFF AGAINST HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN TIME AND SPIRIT

Hegel's account of time and spirit is set against the interpretation of Dasein as temporality.

82.1 History, which is essentially the history of spirit, runs its course "in time." Thus "the development of history falls into time." *Hegel*, however, is not content to set down the within-time-ness of spirit as a fact; he tries to understand the *possibility* of spirit's falling into time, which is "the nonsensuous sensuous." Time must be able, as it were, to take spirit in. And spirit in turn must be akin to time and its essence. Two things are therefore to be discussed: 1. How does *Hegel* delimit the essence of time? 2. What belongs to the essence of spirit that makes it possible for spirit to "fall into time"? The answer to these two questions serves solely to *clarify* the foregoing interpretation of Dasein as temporality by way of contrast.[7] It makes no claim to

6 Aristotle, *Physics* IV, 14, 223a25–26; Augustine, *Confessions* XI, 26.

7 The first quotation is from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of world history (the introduction published as *Reason in History*).

an even relatively complete treatment of the problems that necessarily resonate along with it, precisely in *Hegel*—all the less so as it does not occur to it to "criticize" Hegel. Contrasting the idea of temporality that has been set out with *Hegel's* concept of time suggests itself above all because *Hegel's* concept of time is the most radical, and too little noticed, conceptual formulation of the ordinary understanding of time.

A) HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF TIME

Hegel defines time as negation of the negation and intuited becoming, grounded in the now.

82.2 The "systematic place" at which a philosophical interpretation of time is carried out can count as a criterion of the basic conception of time that guides it. The first thematically detailed interpretation of the ordinary understanding of time that has been handed down is found in *Aristotle's Physics*, that is, in the context of an ontology of *nature*. "Time" stands together with "place" and "motion." True to the tradition, *Hegel's* analysis of time has its place in the second part of his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, which bears the title: Philosophy of Nature. The first division treats mechanics. Its first section is devoted to the discussion of "space and time." They are the "abstract outside-one-another."

82.3 Although *Hegel* puts space and time together, this does not happen merely by way of an external juxtaposition: space "and also time." "Philosophy combats this 'also.'" The transition from space to time does not mean that the paragraphs treating them are joined one to the other; rather, "space itself passes over." Space "is" time; that is, time is the "truth" of space. If space is *thought* dialectically in *what it is*, then, according to *Hegel*, this Being of space reveals itself as time. How must space be thought?

82.4 Space is "the unmediated indifference of nature's Being-outside-itself." That is to say: space is the abstract multiplicity of the points distinguishable in it. Space is not interrupted by

these; but neither does it arise through them, let alone by way of their being joined together. Space, differentiated by the distinguishable points, which are themselves space, remains for its part undifferentiated. The differences are themselves of the character of what they differentiate. Nevertheless, insofar as the point differentiates anything at all in space, it is the *negation* of space—but in such a way that, as this negation (a point is, after all, space), it itself remains in space. The point does not lift itself out of space as something other than space. Space is the undifferentiated outside-one-another of the manifold of points. Space, however, is not a point, but, as *Hegel* says, "punctuality." On this is grounded the proposition in which *Hegel* thinks space in its truth, that is, as time:[8]

82.5 "The negativity which, as a point, relates itself to space and develops its determinations in it as line and plane, is, however, in the sphere of Being-outside-itself just as much for itself, positing its determinations therein, yet at the same time as in the sphere of Being-outside-itself, while appearing indifferent to the tranquil side-by-side. Posited thus for itself, it is time."

82.6 If space is represented, that is, intuited immediately in the indifferent subsistence of its differences, then the negations are, as it were, simply given. But this representing does not yet grasp space in its Being. That is possible only in thinking, as the synthesis that has gone through thesis and antithesis and sublates them. Space is *thought*, and so grasped in its Being, only when the negations do not simply remain subsisting in their indifference but are sublated, that is, are themselves negated. In the negation of the negation (that is, of punctuality) the point posits itself *for itself* and thereby steps out of the indifference of subsistence. As what is posited for itself, it distinguishes itself from this one and that one; it is *no longer* this one and *not yet* that one. In positing itself for itself, it posits the succession in which it stands, the sphere of Being-outside-itself, which is now the sphere of the negated negation. The sublation of punctuality as

8 "Punctuality" (*Punktualität*) here means the character of being made up of points, not being on time.

indifference means no longer remaining lying in the "paralyzed tranquility" of space. The point "asserts itself" over against all the other points. According to *Hegel*, this negation of the negation as punctuality is time. If this discussion is to have any demonstrable meaning at all, nothing else can be meant than this: the positing-itself-for-itself of every point is a now-here, now-here, and so on. Every point, posited for itself, "is" a now-point. "In time, then, the point has actuality." *That by which* the point, as this one here, can in each case posit itself for itself is in each case a now. The condition of the *possibility* of the point's positing-itself-for-itself is the now. This condition of possibility makes up the *Being* of the point, and Being is at the same time being-thought. Because, accordingly, the pure thinking of punctuality, that is, of space, in each case "thinks" the now and the Being-outside-itself of the nows, space "is" *time*. How is time itself determined?

82.7 "Time, as the negative unity of Being-outside-itself, is likewise something utterly abstract, ideal: it is the Being that, in that it is, is not, and in that it is not, is—intuited becoming; that is, the differences, which are indeed utterly momentary, immediately sublating themselves, are determined as external, yet as external to themselves." For this interpretation, time reveals itself as "intuited becoming." According to *Hegel*, this means passing over from Being to nothing, or from nothing to Being. Becoming is both arising and passing away. Being "passes over," or else non-Being does. What does this mean with regard to time? The Being of time is the now; but insofar as every now, being "now," is also already *no* longer, or in each case, being now, was before *not* yet, it can also be taken as non-Being. Time is *"intuited"* becoming, that is, the transition that is not thought but simply presents itself in the sequence of nows. If the essence of time is determined as "intuited becoming," then this makes manifest that time is understood primarily on the basis of the now—and indeed in the way in which the now is found by pure intuiting.

82.8 No elaborate discussion is needed to make clear that with his interpretation of time *Hegel* moves entirely in the direction of the ordinary understanding of time. *Hegel's* characterization of time on the basis of the now presupposes that the now remains covered over and leveled off in its full structure, so that it can be intuited as something present-at-hand, albeit "ideally" present-at-hand.

82.9 That *Hegel* carries out the interpretation of time on the basis of the primary orientation toward the leveled-off now is borne out by the following sentences: "The now has a tremendous right—it 'is' nothing but the individual now; but this excluding thing, in its self-assertion, is dissolved, melted away, scattered to dust, as I utter it." "In nature, moreover, where time is now, it does not come to a *'subsisting'* difference between those dimensions" (past and future). "In the positive sense of time one can therefore say: only the present is, the before and after are not; but the concrete present is the result of the past and is pregnant with the future. The true present is thus eternity."

82.10 If *Hegel* calls time "intuited becoming," then neither arising nor passing away has priority in it. Nevertheless he occasionally characterizes time as the "abstraction of consuming," and so brings the ordinary experience and interpretation of time to its most radical formula. On the other hand, *Hegel* is consistent enough not to grant, in the definition of time proper, any priority to consuming and passing away, such as is, after all, rightly held onto in the everyday experience of time. For *Hegel* would be as little able to ground this priority dialectically as he could the "circumstance," introduced by him as self-evident, that it is precisely in the point's positing-itself-for-itself that the now emerges. And so, in characterizing time as becoming, *Hegel* also understands becoming in an "abstract" sense that lies even beyond the representation of the "flow" of time. The most appropriate expression of the *Hegelian* conception of time therefore lies in the determination of time as *negation of the negation* (that is, of punctuality). Here the sequence of nows is formalized in the most extreme sense and leveled off beyond all possibility

of being surpassed. Only on the basis of this formal-dialectical concept of time is *Hegel* able to establish a connection between time and spirit.

B) HEGEL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TIME AND SPIRIT

Hegel lets spirit fall into time because both share the formal structure of negating the negation.

82.11 How is spirit itself understood, such that it can be said to befit it, in its actualization, to fall into time, determined as negation of the negation? The essence of spirit is the *concept*. By this *Hegel* understands not the intuited universal of a genus as the form of something thought, but the form of thinking that thinks itself: the conceiving *of oneself—as grasping* the not-I. Insofar as grasping the *not-I* is a differentiating, there lies in the pure concept, as the grasping of *this* differentiating, a differentiating of the difference. That is why *Hegel* can determine the essence of spirit formally-apophantically as negation of the negation. This "absolute negativity" gives the logically formalized interpretation of *Descartes'* cogito me cogitare rem [I think that I think a thing], in which he sees the essence of conscientia [consciousness].

82.12 The concept is thus the self-conceiving conceivedness of the self, as which the self properly is as it can be, that is, *free*. "The *I* is the pure concept itself, which as concept has come into *existence*." "But the I is, *first*, this pure unity relating itself to itself —and this not immediately, but in that it abstracts from all determinateness and content and goes back into the freedom of unlimited equality with itself." Thus the I is *"universality,"* but *just as* immediately "individuality."[9]

82.13 This negating of the negation is at once the "absolutely restless" in spirit and its *self-revelation*, which belongs to its essence. The "progressing" of spirit actualizing itself in history carries within itself "a principle of exclusion." This exclusion,

9 Hegel's word here is *Dasein*, his term for determinate existence.

however, does not become a detachment from what is excluded, but its *overcoming*. The self-liberation that overcomes and at the same time endures characterizes the freedom of spirit. "Progress" therefore never means a merely quantitative more; it is essentially qualitative, and indeed of the quality of spirit. The "progressing" is known and knows itself in its goal. In every step of its "progress," spirit has to overcome "itself" as the truly hostile obstacle to its purpose. The goal of the development of spirit is "to reach its own concept." The development itself is "a hard, infinite struggle against itself."

82.14 Because the restlessness of the development of *spirit* bringing itself to its concept is the *negation of the negation*, it remains in keeping with spirit, in actualizing itself, to fall "into *time*" as the immediate *negation of the negation*. For "time is the *concept* itself that *is there* and represents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; that is why spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it does not *grasp* its pure concept, that is, does not annul time. Time is the *external*, intuited pure self, *not grasped* by the self, the concept merely intuited." Thus spirit necessarily appears in time *according to its essence*. "World-history, therefore, is in general the unfolding of spirit in time, just as in space the idea unfolds itself as nature." The "excluding" that belongs to the movement of development harbors within itself a relation to non-Being. That is time, understood on the basis of the self-asserting now.

82.15 Time is "abstract" negativity. As "intuited becoming," it is the differentiated self-differentiating that is immediately to be found, the "existent," that is, present-at-hand, concept. As something present-at-hand, and thus external to spirit, time has no power over the concept; rather, the concept "is the power of time."

82.16 *Hegel* shows the possibility of the historical actualization of spirit "in time" by going back to *the sameness of the formal structure of spirit and time as negation of the negation*. The emptiest formal-ontological and formal-apophantic abstraction, into which spirit and time are externalized, makes it possible to

establish a kinship between the two. But because time is at the same time still conceived in the sense of world-time utterly leveled off, and its provenance thus remains completely covered over, it simply stands over against spirit as something present-at-hand. That is why spirit *must first fall* "into time." What this "falling," and the "actualization" of spirit—which has power over time and properly "is" outside it—even mean ontologically remains obscure. Just as little as *Hegel* illuminates the origin of leveled-off time, so completely does he leave unexamined the question whether the essential constitution of spirit *as* negating the negation is possible at all other than on the basis of primordial temporality.

82.17 Whether *Hegel's* interpretation of time and spirit and of their connection is justified, and rests on ontologically primordial foundations at all, cannot be discussed yet. *That* the formal-dialectical "construction" of the connection between spirit and time can be ventured *at all*, however, reveals a primordial kinship between the two. *Hegel's* "construction" draws its impetus from the effort and the struggle to conceive the "concretion" of spirit. This is attested by the following sentence from the final chapter of his *Phenomenology of Spirit*: "Time therefore appears as the fate and the necessity of spirit that is not complete within itself—the necessity of enriching the share that self-consciousness has in consciousness, of setting in motion the *immediacy of the in-itself*—the form in which substance is in consciousness—or, conversely, taking the in-itself as the *inward*, of realizing and revealing what is at first only *inward*, that is, of vindicating it for the certainty of itself."

82.18 The foregoing existential analytic of Dasein, by contrast, starts from the "concretion" of factically thrown existence itself, in order to unveil temporality as what primordially makes that existence possible. "Spirit" does not first fall into time; it *exists as* the primordial *temporalizing* of temporality. Temporality temporalizes world-time, within whose horizon "history" can "appear" as a happening within time. "Spirit" does not fall *into* time; rather, factical existence, as falling, "falls" *out of* primor-

dial, owned temporality. But this "falling" itself has its existential possibility in a mode of temporality's temporalizing that belongs to temporality.

§ 83. THE EXISTENTIAL-TEMPORAL ANALYTIC OF DASEIN AND THE FUNDAMENTAL-ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING IN GENERAL

The work closes by asking whether time reveals itself as the horizon of Being.

83.1 The task of the preceding considerations was to interpret the *primordial whole* of factical Dasein existential-ontologically *on the basis of its ground*, with regard to the possibilities of existing in an owned and in an unowned way. *Temporality* revealed itself as this ground, and thus as the meaning of the Being of care. What the *preparatory* existential analytic of Dasein made available *before* temporality was laid bare has therefore now been *taken back* into the primordial structure of Dasein's wholeness of Being, temporality. The structures that were earlier only "pointed out" have received their "grounding" from the analyzed possibilities of the temporalizing of primordial time. Nevertheless, the exposition of Dasein's constitution of Being remains only *one way*. The *goal* is the working out of the question of Being in general. The *thematic* analytic of existence for its part first needs the light of the idea of Being in general, clarified beforehand. This holds all the more if the principle stated in the introduction is held onto as the standard for every philosophical investigation: philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, proceeding from the hermeneutics of Dasein, which, as an analytic of *existence*, has secured the end of the guiding thread of all philosophical questioning at the place from which such questioning *springs* and to which it *rebounds*. Admittedly, this thesis too must not count as a dogma, but as the formulation of the fundamental problem, which is still "veiled": can ontology be grounded *ontologically*, or does it need an *ontic* foundation for this too, and *which* being must take on the function of founding?

83.2 Something that appears as evident as the difference between the Being of existing Dasein and the Being of beings not of the kind of Dasein (reality, for example) is still only the *starting point* of the ontological problematic, and nothing with which philosophy may rest content. That ancient ontology works with "thing-concepts," and that there is the danger of "reifying consciousness," has long been known. But what does reification mean? Where does it arise from? Why is Being "conceived" "in the first instance" precisely on the basis of the present-at-hand, *and not* on the basis of the ready-to-hand, which after all lies *still closer*? *Why* does this reification keep coming to dominate again and again? How is the Being of "consciousness" *positively* structured, so that reification remains inappropriate to it? Is the "difference" between "consciousness" and "thing" sufficient at all for a primordial unfolding of the ontological problematic? Do the answers to these questions lie along the way? And can the answer even be *sought* as long as the *question* of the meaning of Being in general remains unposed and unclarified?

83.3 The origin and possibility of the "idea" of Being in general can never be investigated with the means of formal-logical "abstraction," that is, not without a secure horizon for question and answer. What matters is to seek, and to *go*, a *way* toward the clarification of the fundamental ontological question. Whether it is the *only* way, or the *right* one at all, can be decided only *once it has been traveled*. The *dispute* over the interpretation of Being cannot be settled, *because it has not even been kindled yet*. And in the end it cannot be "started out of nowhere"; kindling the dispute already requires preparation. It is toward this alone that the present investigation is *on the way*. Where does it stand?

83.4 Something like "Being" is disclosed in the understanding of Being, which belongs, as understanding, to existing Dasein. The prior, though unconceptual, disclosedness of Being makes it possible for Dasein, as existing Being-in-the-world, to comport itself *toward beings*, toward those encountered within the world as well as toward itself as existing. *How is disclosive understanding*

of Being possible at all in the manner of Dasein? Can the question win its answer by going back to the *primordial constitution of Being* of the Dasein that understands Being? The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein's wholeness is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial way in which ecstatic temporality itself temporalizes must make the ecstatic projection of Being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Does a way lead from primordial *time* to the meaning of *Being*? Does *time* itself reveal itself as the horizon of *Being*?