Leviathan

THOMAS HOBBES

1588–1679

Leviathan

The 1651 text

Rendered into modern English with AI (Claude) and edited



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Leviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)

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INTRODUCTION

Thomas Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* in exile in Paris, during the English Civil War, and published it in 1651. It is the founding work of modern political philosophy.

Hobbes begins from human nature: we are equal enough that anyone can kill anyone, and driven by fear and the desire for power. Without a government to keep us all in awe, we would live in a "war of every man against every man," in which life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." The way out is a covenant in which each of us hands our right of self-government to a sovereign — the great Leviathan, "that mortal god."

The second half, less often read, argues that religion and the Church must be subject to the sovereign too, and attacks the "kingdom of darkness": the misuse of Scripture, superstition and scholastic philosophy.

The right-hand column is Hobbes in modern English: the same arguments and famous lines, in sentences a reader today can move through easily. The left-hand column is the 1651 first edition.

Part I: Of Man

Human nature: sense, imagination, speech, reason, the passions, power, religion, the state of nature and the laws of nature.

THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY

Hobbes dedicates the book to Francis Godolphin in memory of his brother Sidney.

Ded.1 Honored Sir,

Ded.2 Your most worthy brother, Mr. Sidney Godolphin, when he was alive, was pleased to think my studies worth something, and besides that to oblige me, as you know, with real tokens of his good opinion—great in themselves, and all the greater for the worthiness of the man. For there is no virtue that disposes a man either to the service of God or to the service of his country, to civil society or to private friendship, that did not plainly appear in his dealings with others—not acquired out of necessity, or put on for the occasion, but inherent, and shining in the generous constitution of his nature. Therefore, in honor and gratitude to him, and with devotion to yourself, I humbly dedicate to you this discourse of mine on the commonwealth.[1] I do not know how the world will receive it, or how it may reflect on those who seem to favor it. For on a road crowded with those who fight, on one side for too much liberty and on the other for too much authority, it is hard to pass between the points of both unwounded. And yet, it seems to me, an effort to advance the

1 Sidney Godolphin (1610–1643), poet and royalist member of Parliament, killed in the Civil War; he left Hobbes a legacy of £200.

civil power ought not to be condemned by the civil power; nor should private men, by condemning it, declare that they think that power too great. Besides, I am not speaking of the men but, in the abstract, of the seat of power—like those simple and impartial creatures in the Roman Capitol who with their noise defended those within it, not because they were who they were, but because they were there. I offend no one, I think, except those outside, or such people inside (if there are any) as favor them. What may perhaps give most offense are certain texts of Holy Scripture, which I have cited for purposes other than those for which others usually cite them. But I have done it with due submission, and also (given my subject) out of necessity; for those texts are the outworks of the enemy, from which they attack the civil power.[2] If in spite of this you find my work generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself by saying that I am a man who loves his own opinions and thinks everything he says is true; that I honored your brother, and honor you, and have presumed on that to take the title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,

Ded.3 Sir, your most humble and most obedient servant, Thomas Hobbes. Paris, April 15/25, 1651.[3]

INTRODUCTION

The commonwealth is an artificial man; to understand it, begin by reading mankind in yourself.

Intro.1 Nature (the art by which God has made and governs the world) is imitated by the art of man, in this as in many other things: that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing that life is only a motion of limbs, whose beginning is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels, as a watch does) have

2 The sacred geese of Juno on the Capitol, whose cackling woke the defenders when the Gauls attempted a night assault (c. 390 BC), as told by Livy.

3 The double date gives the day in the Old Style (Julian) calendar still used in England and the New Style (Gregorian) calendar used in France.

an artificial life? For what is the heart but a spring; and the nerves but so many strings; and the joints but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, as the maker intended? Art goes further still, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a *commonwealth*, or *state* (in Latin, *civitas*), which is only an artificial man—though of greater stature and strength than the natural one, for whose protection and defense it was intended. In it, the sovereignty is an artificial soul, giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judgment and execution are artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which every joint and member, fastened to the seat of sovereignty, is moved to perform its duty) are the nerves, which do the same in the natural body;[4] the wealth and riches of all the particular members are its strength; *salus populi* (the people's safety) is its business; counselors, by whom everything it needs to know is suggested to it, are its memory; equity and laws are an artificial reason and will; concord is its health; sedition, its sickness; and civil war, its death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants by which the parts of this body politic were first made, put together, and united resemble that *fiat*, the "Let us make man," pronounced by God at the Creation.[5]

Intro.2 To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider

Intro.3 First, its matter and its maker, both of which are man. Second, how, and by what covenants, it is made; what the rights and just power or authority of a sovereign are; and what it is that preserves it and dissolves it. Third, what a Christian commonwealth is. Lastly, what the kingdom of darkness is.

Intro.4 Concerning the first, there is a saying much misused of late: that wisdom is acquired not by reading books but by reading men. As a result, those persons who for the most part can

4 Leviathan is the great sea monster of the Book of Job (chapters 40–41), described there as "king over all the children of pride."

5 Genesis 1:26. "Salus populi suprema lex esto" ("the safety of the people shall be the supreme law") is from Cicero, *De Legibus* 3.8.

give no other proof of being wise take great delight in showing what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable criticism of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying, not understood of late, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains: *Nosce teipsum*, "Read thyself." It was not meant, as it is now used, to excuse the barbarous conduct of men in power toward their inferiors, or to encourage men of low rank to behave insolently toward their betters. It was meant to teach us that, because the thoughts and passions of one man are similar to the thoughts and passions of another, whoever looks into himself and considers what he does when he thinks, opines, reasons, hopes, fears, and so on, and on what grounds, will thereby read and know what the thoughts and passions of all other men are on similar occasions.[6] I say the similarity of the passions, which are the same in all men—desire, fear, hope—not the similarity of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped for, and so on. For these vary so much with individual constitution and particular upbringing, and are so easily kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confused as they are by dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him who searches hearts.[7] And though we sometimes discover men's designs from their actions, to do it without comparing them with our own, and without distinguishing all the circumstances that may alter the case, is to decipher without a key, and to be deceived for the most part—by too much trust or by too much distrust, according as the reader is himself a good or an evil man.

Intro.5 But however perfectly one man reads another by his actions, it serves him only with his acquaintances, who are few. He who is to govern a whole nation must read in himself not this or that particular man, but mankind. This is hard to do, harder than learning any language or science; yet once I have set down

6 "Know thyself," the ancient maxim inscribed at the temple of Apollo at Delphi; Hobbes renders it "read thyself" to answer the saying about reading men.
7 God; compare Jeremiah 17:10, "I the Lord search the heart."

my own reading in an orderly and clear way, the only work left for anyone else will be to consider whether he does not find the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admits no other demonstration.

CHAPTER 1: OF SENSE

All thoughts begin in sense, which is motion pressed on our organs by external bodies.

1.1 Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterward in train, or in their dependence on one another. Singly, each of them is a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body outside us, which is commonly called an object. This object works on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body, and by working in different ways produces different appearances.

1.2 The origin of them all is what we call *sense*. For there is no conception in a man's mind that has not first, wholly or in parts, been produced in the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that origin.

1.3 To know the natural cause of sense is not very necessary for the business now at hand, and I have written about it at length elsewhere. Nevertheless, to fill out each part of my present method, I will briefly set it out here.[8]

1.4 The cause of sense is the external body, or object, which presses on the organ proper to each sense—either immediately, as in taste and touch, or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling. This pressure, carried inward by means of the nerves and other strings and membranes of the body to the brain and heart, causes there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavor of the heart to deliver itself. And because this endeavor is outward, it seems to be some matter outside us.[9]

8 Chiefly in *The Elements of Law* (circulated 1640) and the optical and physical treatises Hobbes wrote in the 1640s; the full account later appeared in *De Corpore* (1655).
9 "Endeavor" (Latin conatus) is Hobbes's technical term for the small, invisible beginnings of motion within a body.

And this seeming, or fancy, is what men call sense. To the eye it consists in a light, or color with shape; to the ear, in a sound; to the nostril, in an odor; to the tongue and palate, in a taste; and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All these qualities, called sensible, are in the object that causes them nothing but so many different motions of the matter, by which it presses on our organs in different ways. Nor are they anything else in us who are pressed but various motions (for motion produces nothing but motion). But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking as dreaming. And just as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye makes us imagine a light, and pressing the ear produces a din, so the bodies we see or hear produce the same by their strong, though unobserved, action. For if those colors and sounds were in the bodies or objects that cause them, they could not be separated from them, as we see they are by mirrors and lenses, and in echoes by reflection—where we know the thing we see is in one place, and its appearance in another. And though at a certain distance the real object itself seems clothed in the fancy it produces in us, still the object is one thing, and the image or fancy is another. So sense in all cases is nothing but original fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure—that is, by the motion—of external things on our eyes, ears, and other organs designed for it.

1.5 But the schools of philosophy throughout all the universities of Christendom, relying on certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine. For the cause of vision, they say that the thing seen sends out on every side a visible *species*—in English, a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen—and the receiving of this into the eye is seeing. And for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard sends out an audible *species*, that is, an audible aspect, or audible being seen, which entering the ear makes hearing. Indeed, for the cause of understanding too, they say that the thing understood sends out an intelligible *species*, that is, an intelligible being seen, which coming into the understand-

ing makes us understand.[10] I do not say this out of disapproval of the use of universities. But because I am to speak later of their role in a commonwealth, I must show you along the way, whenever the occasion arises, what things in them ought to be reformed—among which the frequency of meaningless speech is one.

CHAPTER 2: OF IMAGINATION

Imagination is decaying sense; memory, experience, dreams, and apparitions are explained from it.

2.1 That when a thing lies still, it will lie still forever unless something else moves it, is a truth no one doubts. But that when a thing is in motion, it will remain in motion eternally unless something else stops it, is not so readily agreed to, even though the reason is the same (namely, that nothing can change itself). For men measure not only other men but all other things by themselves; and because they find themselves subject to pain and weariness after motion, they think everything else grows weary of motion and seeks rest of its own accord—hardly considering whether that desire for rest they find in themselves may not consist in some other motion. This is why the Schools say that heavy bodies fall downward out of an appetite for rest, and to preserve their nature in the place most proper to them—absurdly attributing appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their preservation (which is more than man has), to inanimate things.

2.2 When a body is once in motion, it moves eternally (unless something else hinders it); and whatever hinders it cannot extinguish the motion entirely in an instant, but only over time and by degrees. And just as we see in water that, though the wind stops, the waves do not stop rolling for a long time afterward, so it is with the motion made in the internal parts of a man when he sees, dreams, and so on. For after the object is

10 The scholastic theory of *species*: images or forms emitted by objects and received by the senses and intellect, developed from Aristotle's *De Anima*.

removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is what the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing; and they apply the same word, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which means appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another. *Imagination*, therefore, is nothing but decaying sense, and is found in men and many other living creatures, sleeping as well as waking.

2.3 The decay of sense in men who are awake is not the decay of the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it, in the way that the light of the sun obscures the light of the stars—stars that exercise their power of being visible no less by day than by night. But because among the many strokes our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies only the predominant one is perceived, the light of the sun, being predominant, keeps us from being affected by the action of the stars. And when any object is removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remains, other objects more present succeed it and work on us, so that the imagination of the past is obscured and made weak, as a man's voice is in the noise of the day. From this it follows that the longer the time since the sight or sense of any object, the weaker the imagination. For the continual change of a man's body in time destroys the parts that were moved in sense; so that distance of time and distance of place have one and the same effect on us. For just as at a great distance of place what we look at appears dim, without distinction of its smaller parts, and voices grow weak and inarticulate, so after a great distance of time our imagination of the past is weak: we lose (for example) many particular streets of the cities we have seen, and many particular circumstances of actions. When we want to express the thing itself—I mean the fancy itself—we call this decaying sense imagination, as I said before. But when we want to express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. So imagination and memory are only one thing, which for different considerations has different names.

2.4 Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience. Again, imagination is only of those things that have previously been perceived by sense, either all at once or in parts at several times. The first (which is imagining the whole object as it was presented to the sense) is simple imagination, as when someone imagines a man or a horse he has seen before. The other is compound, as when from the sight of a man at one time and of a horse at another we conceive in our mind a centaur. So when a man compounds the image of his own person with the image of another man's actions—as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander (which often happens to those much taken with reading romances)—it is a compound imagination, and properly only a fiction of the mind. There are also other imaginations that arise in men (even awake) from a strong impression made in sense. From gazing at the sun, for instance, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes long afterward; and from being long and intensely focused on geometrical figures, a man will in the dark (though awake) have images of lines and angles before his eyes. This kind of fancy has no particular name, being something that does not commonly come up in men's conversation.

DREAMS, APPARITIONS, AND SUPERSTITION

Dreams come from inward disturbances; failing to tell them from sense feeds belief in ghosts.

2.5 The imaginations of those who sleep are what we call dreams. And these too (like all other imaginations) have been in the senses before, either wholly or in pieces. And because in sleep the brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so numbed as not to be easily moved by the action of external objects, no imagination—and therefore no dream—can occur in sleep except what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of a man's body; and these inward parts, because of their connection with the brain and other organs, keep those organs in motion when they are disordered. By this means the

imaginations previously made there appear as if a man were awake—except that, since the organs of sense are now numbed and there is no new object that can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must be clearer, in this silence of sense, than our waking thoughts are. And this is why it is hard, and thought by many to be impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my part, I consider that in dreams I do not often or consistently think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions that I do when awake, nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts when dreaming as at other times; and that when awake I often notice the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts. So I am well satisfied that, when I am awake, I know I am not dreaming—though when I dream, I think myself awake.

2.6 And seeing that dreams are caused by the disorder of some of the inward parts of the body, different disorders must cause different dreams. That is why lying cold breeds dreams of fear, and raises the thought and image of some fearful object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the brain, being reciprocal). And just as anger causes heat in some parts of the body when we are awake, so when we sleep, the overheating of the same parts causes anger, and raises up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same way, just as natural affection, when we are awake, causes desire, and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body, so too much heat in those parts while we sleep raises in the brain an imagination of some affection shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations: the motion when we are awake begins at one end, and when we dream, at the other.

2.7 It is hardest to tell a man's dream from his waking thoughts when by some accident we do not notice that we have slept. This easily happens to a man full of fearful thoughts, whose conscience is much troubled, and who sleeps without the circumstances of going to bed or taking off his clothes, as one who nods off in a chair. For someone who takes pains and deliberately lays

himself down to sleep, if any strange and extravagant fancy comes to him, can hardly think it anything other than a dream. We read of Marcus Brutus (who owed his life to Julius Caesar, was also his favorite, and nevertheless murdered him) how at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearful apparition, which historians commonly relate as a vision; but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge it to have been only a short dream.[11] For sitting in his tent, brooding and troubled by the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, dozing in the cold, to dream of what frightened him most. And as that fear by degrees woke him, it must also have made the apparition vanish by degrees. And having no assurance that he had slept, he could have no reason to think it a dream, or anything but a vision. And this is no very rare occurrence. For even those who are perfectly awake, if they are timid and superstitious, filled with frightening tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to similar fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in churchyards—whereas it is either only their fancy, or else the trickery of persons who make use of such superstitious fear to go about disguised at night to places they would not want to be known to frequent.

2.8 From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams and other strong fancies from vision and sense arose the greater part of the religion of the Gentiles in times past, who worshipped satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and the like; and nowadays the opinion that ignorant people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. As for witches, I do not think their witchcraft is any real power; but I do think they are justly punished for the false belief they have that they can do such harm, joined with their intention to do it if they can—their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science. And as for fairies and walking ghosts, the belief in them has, I think, been deliberately taught, or left unrefuted, to keep up the credit of

11 Plutarch's *Life of Brutus* tells of the apparition, which called itself Brutus's "evil genius." Caesar had pardoned Brutus after the battle of Pharsalus; Brutus fell at Philippi (42 BC) against Octavian (later Augustus) and Mark Antony.

exorcism, crosses, holy water, and other such inventions of spiritual men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that God can make unnatural apparitions. But that he does it so often that men need to fear such things more than they fear a halt or change in the course of nature—which he can also halt and change—is no point of Christian faith.[12] But evil men, on the pretext that God can do anything, are bold enough to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue. It is the part of a wise man to believe them no further than right reason makes what they say appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it prognostications from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things that depend on it, by which crafty, ambitious persons abuse simple people, men would be much better fitted than they are for civil obedience.

2.9 And this ought to be the work of the Schools; but instead they nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what imagination or the senses are) they teach what they have received. Some say that imaginations arise of themselves and have no cause; others, that they arise most commonly from the will, and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God and evil thoughts by the devil; or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the devil. Some say the senses receive the *species* of things and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment—like handing things from one to another, with many words, making nothing understood.

2.10 The imagination that is raised in a man (or any other creature endowed with the faculty of imagining) by words or other voluntary signs is what we generally call understanding, and it is common to man and beast. For a dog will by habit understand the call or the scolding of his master, and so will many other beasts. The understanding that is peculiar to man is the understanding not only of another's will, but of his conceptions and thoughts, through the sequence and combination of

12 Hobbes's "ghostly" means spiritual, i.e., of the clergy; so throughout.

the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech. And of this kind of understanding I will speak later.

CHAPTER 3: OF THE TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS

Thoughts follow one another unguided or guided by desire; prudence is foresight drawn from experience.

3.1 By the consequence, or *train*, of thoughts I mean that succession of one thought after another which is called mental discourse (to distinguish it from discourse in words).

3.2 When a man thinks about anything whatever, his next thought is not quite as random as it seems. Not every thought follows every other thought indifferently. But just as we have no imagination of which we have not previously had sense, wholly or in parts, so we have no transition from one imagination to another of which we never had the like before in our senses. The reason for this is as follows. All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the senses. And those motions that immediately followed one another in sense continue together after sense as well—so that when the first comes again to take place and predominate, the second follows it, by the coherence of the matter moved, in the way that water on a flat table is drawn whichever way any part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense one and the same thing perceived is followed sometimes by one thing and sometimes by another, it comes about in time that when we imagine anything, there is no certainty what we will imagine next. Only this is certain: it will be something that followed it before, at one time or another.

3.3 This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and inconstant. In it there is no passionate thought to govern and direct the thoughts that follow toward itself, as the end and aim of some desire or other passion. In this case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem unrelated to one another, as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men who are not only without company but also

without any concern. Even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony—like the sound a lute out of tune would make for anyone, or a lute in tune for someone who could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind a man may often perceive its course, and the dependence of one thought on another. For in a discussion of our present civil war, what could seem more irrelevant than to ask (as someone did) what the value of a Roman penny was? Yet the connection was obvious enough to me. For the thought of the war brought in the thought of the handing over of the King to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of the handing over of Christ; and that in turn the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason. From there that malicious question followed easily—and all this in a moment of time, for thought is quick.[13]

3.4 The second sort is more constant, being regulated by some desire and design. For the impression made by things we desire or fear is strong and lasting, or (if it stops for a while) quick to return—so strong, sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire arises the thought of some means we have seen produce something like what we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that means; and so on continually, until we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the end, by the strength of its impression, often comes to mind, if our thoughts begin to wander they are quickly brought back into the way. Observing this led one of the seven wise men to give men this precept, now worn out: *Respice finem*—that is to say, in all your actions look often at what you want to have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts on the way to attaining it.[14]

3.5 The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds. One is when, imagining an effect, we seek the causes or means that

13 In 1647 the Scottish army handed Charles I over to the English Parliament on payment of arrears. Judas's betrayal of Jesus for thirty pieces of silver: Matthew 26:14–16.

14 "Look to the end." The saying was attributed to Solon of Athens, one of the Seven Sages of Greece.

produce it; and this is common to man and beast. The other is when, imagining anything whatever, we seek all the possible effects it can produce—that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it once we have it. Of this I have never seen any sign except in man alone; for this is a curiosity hardly found in the nature of any living creature that has no passions but sensual ones, such as hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but seeking, or the faculty of invention, which the Latins call *sagacitas* and *solertia*: a hunting out of the causes of some effect, present or past, or of the effects of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man looks for what he has lost; and from the place and time where he misses it, his mind runs back from place to place and time to time to find where and when he had it—that is to say, to find some definite, limited time and place in which to begin a method of searching. Then from there his thoughts run over the same places and times to find what action or other occasion might have made him lose it. This we call remembrance, or calling to mind; the Latins call it *reminiscentia*, as it were a re-counting of our former actions.

3.6 Sometimes a man knows a definite place within whose bounds he has to search; and then his thoughts run over all its parts, in the same way as one would sweep a room to find a jewel, or as a spaniel ranges a field until he picks up a scent, or as a man might run through the alphabet to find a rhyme.

3.7 Sometimes a man wants to know the outcome of an action; and then he thinks of some similar past action and its consequences one after another, supposing that like outcomes will follow like actions. So a man who foresees what will become of a criminal goes over what he has seen follow similar crimes before, with this order of thoughts: the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. This kind of thought is called foresight, and prudence, or providence, and sometimes wisdom —though such conjecture, because of the difficulty of observing all the circumstances, is very fallible. But this is certain: the more experience of things past one man has than another, the

more prudent he is, and the less often his expectations fail him. The present alone has any being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only; but things to come have no being at all, the future being only a fiction of the mind, applying the consequences of past actions to present ones. This is done with most certainty by the one who has the most experience—but not with certainty enough. And though it is called prudence when the outcome answers our expectation, yet in its own nature it is only presumption. For foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him alone, and supernaturally, comes prophecy. The best prophet, naturally speaking, is the best guesser; and the best guesser is the one most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at, for he has the most signs to guess by.

3.8 A sign is the antecedent event of the consequent, and conversely the consequent of the antecedent, when similar sequences have been observed before; and the more often they have been observed, the less uncertain the sign. Therefore the one who has the most experience in any kind of business has the most signs by which to guess at the future, and is consequently the most prudent—so much more prudent than someone new to that kind of business that no advantage of natural and quick wit can equal him, though perhaps many young men think the opposite.

3.9 Nevertheless, it is not prudence that distinguishes man from beast. There are beasts that at a year old observe more, and pursue what is for their good more prudently, than a child can at ten.

3.10 Just as prudence is a presumption about the future drawn from experience of the past, so there is a presumption about things past taken from other things that are also (not future but) past. For someone who has seen by what courses and stages a flourishing state first fell into civil war and then into ruin will, on seeing the ruins of any other state, guess that a similar war and similar courses took place there too. But this conjecture has

almost the same uncertainty as conjecture about the future, both being grounded only on experience.

3.11 There is no other act of man's mind that I can remember that is naturally planted in him, so as to need nothing else for its exercise but to be born a man and live with the use of his five senses. Those other faculties I will speak of shortly, which seem proper to man alone, are acquired and increased by study and industry—and in most men learned by instruction and discipline—and all proceed from the invention of words and speech. For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though with the help of speech and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.

3.12 Whatever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, or conceive infinite speed, infinite time, infinite force, or infinite power. When we say anything is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named, having no conception of the thing but only of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power are inconceivable) but so that we may honor him. Also, because whatever we conceive (as I said before) has first been perceived by sense, either all at once or in parts, a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense. No man, therefore, can conceive anything without conceiving it in some place, endowed with some definite magnitude, and divisible into parts. Nor can he conceive that anything is all in this place and all in another place at the same time, or that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once. For none of these things ever have happened, or can happen, to sense; they are absurd

speeches, taken on credit (without any meaning at all) from deceived philosophers and deceived, or deceiving, Schoolmen.[15]

CHAPTER 4: OF SPEECH

Speech records and communicates thoughts through names; truth and error belong to speech, not things.

4.1 The invention of printing, ingenious as it is, is no great matter compared with the invention of letters. But who first found the use of letters is not known. The man who first brought them into Greece, people say, was Cadmus, son of Agenor, king of Phoenicia. It was a profitable invention for preserving the memory of past time, and for connecting mankind, dispersed into so many distant regions of the earth. It was also a difficult one, proceeding from watchful observation of the various motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech, so as to make as many different characters to remember them by.[16] But the most noble and profitable invention of all was that of *speech*, consisting of names or appellations and their connection. By it men record their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them to one another for mutual benefit and conversation. Without it there would have been among men neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, any more than among lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was God himself, who instructed Adam how to name the creatures he presented to his sight; for Scripture goes no further on this matter.[17] But this was enough to lead him to add more names as experience and use of the creatures gave him occasion, and to join them together by degrees in such a way as to make himself understood. And so, over time, he might acquire as much language as he had found use for—though not as copious as an

15 The Schoolmen are the scholastics, the university philosophers and theologians of the medieval Aristotelian tradition; "the Schools" are their universities and teaching.
16 Herodotus (*Histories* 5.58) says the Phoenicians who came with Cadmus brought the alphabet to Greece.
17 Genesis 2:19–20.

orator or philosopher needs. For I do not find anything in Scripture from which it can be gathered, directly or by implication, that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colors, sounds, fancies, and relations—much less the names of words and speech, such as general, special, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive, all of which are useful—and least of all entity, intentionality, quiddity, and other meaningless words of the Schools.

4.2 But all this language, acquired and enlarged by Adam and his descendants, was lost again at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God every man was struck, for his rebellion, with forgetfulness of his former language. And being thereby forced to disperse into various parts of the world, the diversity of tongues that now exists must have proceeded from them by degrees, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in the course of time it grew everywhere more copious.[18]

4.3 The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal discourse, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words—and that for two advantages. One is the recording of the sequences of our thoughts, which, being apt to slip out of our memory and put us to new labor, can be recalled again by the words they were marked with. So the first use of names is to serve as marks, or notes, of remembrance. The other is, when many people use the same words, to signify to one another (by their connection and order) what they conceive or think about each matter, and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called signs. The special uses of speech are these. First, to record what by thinking we find to be the cause of anything, present or past, and what we find that present or past things may produce or bring about—which, in sum, is the acquiring of arts. Second, to show others the knowledge we have attained—that is, to counsel and teach one another. Third, to make known to others our wills and purposes, so that we may have one another's mutual help. Fourth,

18 Genesis 11:1–9.

to please and delight ourselves and others by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

4.4 To these uses there are also four corresponding abuses. First, when men record their thoughts wrongly, through the inconstancy of the meaning of their words—by which they record as their conceptions what they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Second, when they use words metaphorically—that is, in a sense other than the one they are designed for—and thereby deceive others. Third, when by words they declare something to be their will which is not. Fourth, when they use them to wound one another. For seeing that nature has armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to wound an enemy, it is simply an abuse of speech to wound him with the tongue—unless it is someone we are obliged to govern; and then it is not wounding, but correcting and reforming.

4.5 The way in which speech serves to remember the sequence of causes and effects consists in the imposing of names and the connecting of them.

4.6 Of names, some are proper, and belong singly to one thing only, such as Peter, John, this man, this tree; and some are common to many things, such as man, horse, tree. Each of these, though only one name, is nevertheless the name of various particular things; and with respect to all of them together it is called a universal—there being nothing in the world universal but names, for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.

4.7 One universal name is given to many things because of their likeness in some quality or other accident. And whereas a proper name brings to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.

4.8 Of universal names, some are of greater extent and some of lesser, the larger including the less large. And some again are of equal extent, each including the other reciprocally. For example, the name "body" has a broader meaning than the word "man," and includes it; and the names "man" and "rational" are of equal

extent, each including the other. But here we must note that a name is not always understood, as it is in grammar, to be one single word. Sometimes it is many words together, by circumlocution. For all these words, "he that in his actions observes the laws of his country," make only one name, equivalent to this one word: "just."

4.9 By imposing names, some of broader and some of narrower meaning, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of names. For example, a man who has no use of speech at all (such as one born and remaining completely deaf and unable to speak) may set a triangle before his eyes, and beside it two right angles (such as the corners of a square), and by thinking it over he may compare them and find that the three angles of that triangle are equal to the two right angles standing beside it. But if he is shown another triangle, different in shape from the first, he cannot know without fresh labor whether its three angles are also equal to the same. But the man who has the use of words observes that this equality followed, not from the length of the sides, nor from any other particular feature of his triangle, but only from this: that the sides were straight and the angles three, and that this was all for which he called it a triangle. He will then boldly conclude universally that such equality of angles holds in all triangles whatever, and record his discovery in these general terms: "Every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles." And so the consequence found in one particular case comes to be recorded and remembered as a universal rule. It frees our mental reckoning from time and place, it spares us all labor of the mind except the first, and it makes what was found true here and now to be true in all times and places.

4.10 But the use of words in recording our thoughts is nowhere so evident as in counting. A person with a severe intellectual disability who could never learn the order of the number words by heart, such as "one," "two," and "three," may notice every stroke of the clock and nod to it, or say "one, one, one," but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems there was a time

when those names of number were not in use, and men were obliged to use the fingers of one or both hands for the things they wanted to keep count of. That, it seems, is why our number words now go only up to ten in every nation, and in some only to five, and then begin again. And someone who can count to ten, if he recites the numbers out of order, will get lost and not know when he has finished. Much less will he be able to add and subtract and perform all the other operations of arithmetic. So without words there is no possibility of reckoning numbers, much less magnitudes, speeds, forces, and other things whose reckoning is necessary to the survival or the well-being of mankind.

4.11 When two names are joined together into a consequence or affirmation, like this, "A man is a living creature," or this, "If he is a man, he is a living creature," then if the latter name, "living creature," signifies everything the former name, "man," signifies, the affirmation or consequence is true; otherwise it is false. For true and false are attributes of speech, not of things. And where there is no speech, there is neither truth nor falsehood. There may be error, as when we expect what will not happen, or suspect what has not happened; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.

4.12 Seeing, then, that truth consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man who seeks precise truth needs to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly. Otherwise he will find himself entangled in words, like a bird in lime-twigs: the more he struggles, the more he is stuck. And therefore in geometry (which is the only science it has so far pleased God to bestow on mankind), men begin by settling the meanings of their words. These settled meanings they call definitions, and they place them at the beginning of their reckoning.[19]

4.13 This shows how necessary it is for anyone who aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of earlier authors,

19 Lime-twigs were twigs smeared with birdlime, a sticky substance used to trap birds.

and either to correct them where they are carelessly set down, or to make his own. For errors in definitions multiply as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities. At last they see these absurdities but cannot escape them without reckoning anew from the beginning, where the foundation of their errors lies. Hence those who trust in books do like those who add many little sums into a larger one without considering whether the little sums were correctly added. Finding the error plain at last, and not suspecting their first grounds, they do not know how to get themselves clear. Instead they spend their time fluttering over their books, like birds that come in by the chimney and, finding themselves shut in a room, flutter at the false light of a glass window, lacking the wit to consider which way they came in. So the first use of speech lies in the right definition of names, and that use is the acquisition of science. And the first abuse lies in wrong definitions, or none. From it come all false and senseless doctrines, which make those who take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own thinking, as far below the condition of ignorant men as men endowed with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance lies in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err. And as men grow rich in abundance of language, so they become either wiser or madder than ordinary. Nor is it possible for any man without letters to become either outstandingly wise, or (unless his memory is damaged by disease or a poor constitution of his organs) outstandingly foolish. For words are wise men's counters: they only reckon with them. But they are the money of fools, who value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatever, if he is only a man.[20]

20 Counters were tokens used for calculating, of no value in themselves. "Thomas" is Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), the leading scholastic theologian.

KINDS OF NAMES AND THEIR ABUSE

Names are sorted into four kinds, and meaningless or contradictory names are exposed.

4.14 Whatever can enter into an account or be considered in one, and be added together to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder, is subject to names. The Romans called accounts of money *rationes*, and accounting *ratiocinatio*; and what we call "items" in bills or account books they called *nomina*, that is, "names." And from this, it seems, they extended the word *ratio* to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have only one word, *logos*, for both speech and reason. Not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but that there was no reasoning without speech. And they called the act of reasoning syllogism, which means summing up the consequences of one statement with another. And because the same things may enter into an account on account of different accidents, their names are variously twisted and varied to show that difference. This variety of names may be reduced to four general heads.

4.15 First, a thing may enter into an account as matter or body, as with "living," "sensible," "rational," "hot," "cold," "moved," "at rest." With all these names the word "matter" or "body" is understood, since all such are names of matter.

4.16 Second, it may enter into an account, or be considered, for some accident or quality we conceive to be in it, such as being moved, being so long, being hot. Then, from the name of the thing itself, by a little change or twisting, we make a name for the accident we are considering: for "living" we put "life" into the account; for "moved," "motion"; for "hot," "heat"; for "long," "length"; and so on. All such names are the names of the accidents and properties by which one matter or body is distinguished from another. These are called abstract names, because they are separated (not from matter, but) from the account of matter.

4.17 Third, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies by which we make such distinctions. When anything is seen by us, we do not reckon the thing itself but the sight, the color, the idea of it in the imagination. And when anything is heard, we do not reckon the thing, but only the hearing or sound, which is our imagination or conception of it by the ear. Such are names of imaginations.

4.18 Fourth, we bring into account, consider, and give names to names themselves, and to speeches. For "general," "universal," "special," "equivocal" are names of names. And "affirmation," "interrogation," "command," "narration," "syllogism," "sermon," "oration," and many others are names of speeches. And this is the whole variety of positive names. These are used to mark something that exists in nature, or that may be invented by the mind of man: bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or, of bodies, the properties that are, or may be imagined to be; or words and speech.

4.19 There are also other names, called negative. These are signs showing that a word is not the name of the thing in question, such as the words "nothing," "no man," "infinite," "unteachable," "three minus four," and the like. They are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting reckoning, and they call to mind our past thoughts, though they are not names of anything, because they make us refuse to accept names that are not rightly used.

4.20 All other names are only meaningless sounds, and these are of two sorts. One is when they are new, and their meaning has not been explained by definition. Of these, a great many have been coined by the Schoolmen and by muddled philosophers.

4.21 The other is when men make one name out of two names whose meanings are contradictory and inconsistent, like the name "incorporeal body," or (which is the same thing) "incorporeal substance," and a great many more. For whenever an affirmation is false, the two names it is composed of, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it

is a false affirmation to say "a quadrangle is round," then the phrase "round quadrangle" signifies nothing; it is a mere sound. Likewise, if it is false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, then the words "in-poured virtue" and "in-blown virtue" are as absurd and meaningless as "round quadrangle." And so you will hardly meet a senseless, meaningless word that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Savior called by the name *parole*, but often by the name *verbe*; yet *verbe* and *parole* differ in nothing except that one is Latin and the other French.[21]

4.22 When a man, on hearing any speech, has the thoughts that the words of that speech and their connection were designed and established to signify, then he is said to understand it, understanding being nothing but conception caused by speech. And therefore if speech is peculiar to man (as, for all I know, it is), then understanding is peculiar to him too. And therefore there can be no understanding of absurd and false affirmations, if they are universal, though many think they understand them when they are only repeating the words under their breath, or conning them over in their minds.

4.23 What kinds of speech signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man's mind, and their use and abuse, I shall discuss when I have discussed the passions.

4.24 The names of things that affect us, that is, that please and displease us, are of inconstant meaning in men's ordinary talk, because not all men are affected alike by the same thing, nor the same man at all times. For seeing that all names are given to signify our conceptions, and all our feelings are only conceptions, when we conceive the same things differently we can hardly avoid naming them differently. For though the nature of what we conceive is the same, the differences in how we receive it, owing to different bodily constitutions and prejudices of opinion, give everything a tinge of our different passions. So in reas-

21 "In-poured" and "in-blown" translate the scholastic terms infused and inspired virtue. French Bibles call Christ "the Word" (John 1:1) *le Verbe*, from Latin *verbum*, rather than the everyday French *parole*.

oning a man must beware of words that, besides signifying what we imagine of their nature, also signify the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker. Such are the names of virtues and vices. For one man calls wisdom what another calls fear; one calls cruelty what another calls justice; one prodigality what another magnanimity; one gravity what another stupidity, and so on. And therefore such names can never be true grounds for any reasoning. Nor can metaphors and figures of speech; but these are less dangerous, because they openly declare their inconstancy, which the others do not.

CHAPTER 5: OF REASON AND SCIENCE

Reason is reckoning with names; absurdity comes from bad definitions; science is knowledge of consequences.

5.1 When a man reasons, he does nothing else but conceive a total sum from the addition of parts, or conceive a remainder from the subtraction of one sum from another. If it is done in words, this is conceiving the consequence from the names of all the parts to the name of the whole, or from the names of the whole and one part to the name of the other part. And though in some things (as in numbers) men name other operations besides adding and subtracting, such as multiplying and dividing, these are the same. For multiplication is only adding together equal things, and division only subtracting one thing as often as we can. These operations do not belong to numbers only, but to all kinds of things that can be added together and taken one from another. For as arithmeticians teach how to add and subtract in numbers, so geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and plane), angles, proportions, times, degrees of speed, force, power, and the like. Logicians teach the same in consequences of words: adding together two names to make an affirmation, two affirmations to make a syllogism, and many syllogisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, or conclusion, of a syllogism they subtract one proposition to find the other. Writers on politics add together agreements to find men's

duties, and lawyers add laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in whatever matter there is room for addition and subtraction, there is also room for reason; and where these have no place, reason has nothing at all to do.

5.2 From all this we may define (that is, determine) what is meant by the word "reason" when we count it among the faculties of the mind. For *reason,* in this sense, is nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) the consequences of general names agreed upon for marking and signifying our thoughts. I say marking them when we reckon by ourselves, and signifying when we demonstrate our reckonings to other men or prove them to their satisfaction.

5.3 And as in arithmetic unpracticed men must err, and even professors may often err and add up wrongly, so also in any other subject of reasoning the ablest, most attentive, and most practiced men may deceive themselves and draw false conclusions. Not that reason itself is not always right reason, just as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art. But no one man's reason, nor the reason of any number of men, makes the certainty, any more than an account is correctly added up because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, when there is a dispute over an account, the parties must by their own agreement set up, as right reason, the reason of some arbitrator or judge whose verdict they will both abide by; otherwise their dispute must either come to blows or remain undecided, for lack of a right reason established by nature. And so it is in all debates of whatever kind. And when men who think themselves wiser than everyone else clamor and demand right reason as judge, yet seek nothing but that things be decided by no one's reason but their own, it is as intolerable in human society as it is in cards, after trump has been turned, to use as trump on every occasion whichever suit one has most of in one's hand. For those who want each of their passions, as it comes to hold sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and

that in their own disputes, do nothing else. They betray their lack of right reason by the very claim they lay to it.

5.4 The use and purpose of reason is not to find the sum and truth of one or a few consequences remote from the first definitions and settled meanings of names, but to begin with these and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the final conclusion without certainty of all the affirmations and negations on which it was grounded and from which it was inferred. Consider the head of a household who, in going over the accounts, adds up the totals of all the bills of expense into one sum, without regarding how each bill was added up by those who submitted it, or what it is he is paying for. He gains no more than if he approved the whole account in a lump, trusting to the skill and honesty of each accountant. So also in reasoning about all other things: whoever takes up conclusions on trust from authors, and does not derive them from the first items in every reckoning (which are the meanings of names settled by definitions), wastes his labor. He does not know anything; he only believes.

5.5 A man may reckon without the use of words, which can be done in particular things, as when, on seeing some one thing, we guess what is likely to have preceded it or is likely to follow it. If what he thought likely to follow does not follow, or what he thought likely to have preceded it did not precede it, this is called *error*, to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we reason in words of general meaning and arrive at a general inference that is false, though it is commonly called error, it is really an *absurdity*, or senseless speech. For error is only a deception in presuming that something is past or to come; though it was not past or was not to come, still no impossibility in it could be discovered. But when we make a general assertion, unless it is a true one, its possibility is inconceivable. And words by which we conceive nothing but the sound are those we call absurd, meaningless, and nonsense. And so if a man should talk to me of a "round quadrangle," or "accidents of bread in cheese," or "immaterial substances," or of

"a free subject," "a free will," or anything free except free from being hindered by opposition, I would not say he was in error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd.[22]

5.6 I said before (in the second chapter) that man excels all other animals in this faculty: that when he conceives anything whatever, he is apt to inquire into its consequences and what effects he can produce with it. And now I add this further degree of the same excellence: that by words he can reduce the consequences he finds to general rules, called theorems or aphorisms. That is, he can reason, or reckon, not only in numbers but in all other things of which one may be added to or subtracted from another.

5.7 But this privilege is offset by another, namely the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject but man alone. And of men, those who profess philosophy are the most subject to it of all. For what Cicero says of them somewhere is very true: that there is nothing so absurd that it may not be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is plain. For not one of them begins his reasoning from the definitions or explanations of the names he is to use. That is a method used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.[23]

5.8 The first cause of absurd conclusions I attribute to lack of method: they do not begin their reasoning from definitions, that is, from settled meanings of their words. It is as if they could do accounts without knowing the value of the number words "one," "two," and "three."

5.9 And since all bodies enter into an account under different considerations (which I mentioned in the previous chapter), and these considerations are named differently, various absurdities

22 "Accidents of bread" alludes to the doctrine of transubstantiation, in which the qualities ("accidents") of the bread remain in the Eucharist while its substance becomes Christ's body.

23 Cicero, *On Divination* 2.119.

come from confusing their names and joining them unfittingly into assertions. And therefore:

5.10 The second cause of absurd assertions I attribute to giving names of bodies to accidents, or names of accidents to bodies. This is what they do who say that faith is infused or inspired, when nothing can be poured or breathed into anything but body; or that extension is body; or that phantasms are spirits; and so on.

5.11 The third I attribute to giving the names of the accidents of bodies outside us to the accidents of our own bodies, as they do who say that the color is in the body, the sound is in the air, and so on.

5.12 The fourth, to giving the names of bodies to names or speeches, as they do who say that there are universal things, that a living creature is a genus, or a general thing, and so on.

5.13 The fifth, to giving the names of accidents to names and speeches, as they do who say that the nature of a thing is its definition, that a man's command is his will, and the like.

5.14 The sixth, to using metaphors, figures of speech, and other rhetorical devices instead of proper words. For though it is legitimate in ordinary speech to say, for example, "the road goes or leads here or there," or "the proverb says this or that" (whereas roads cannot go, nor proverbs speak), yet in reckoning and seeking the truth such expressions are not to be allowed.

5.15 The seventh, to names that signify nothing but are picked up and learned by rote from the Schools, such as "hypostatical," "transubstantiate," "consubstantiate," "eternal-now," and similar jargon of the Schoolmen.

5.16 For anyone who can avoid these things, it is not easy to fall into any absurdity, except through the length of an account, in which he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid as both to make a mistake in geometry and to persist in it when someone else points out his error to him?

5.17 This shows that reason is not, like sense and memory, born with us, nor gained by experience alone, as prudence is, but

attained by industry: first in the apt imposing of names, and second by acquiring a good and orderly method of proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connecting one of them to another, and so to syllogisms, which are the connections of one assertion to another, until we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of the names belonging to the subject at hand. And that is what men call *science*. And whereas sense and memory are only knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable, science is the knowledge of consequences, and of the dependence of one fact on another. By it, from what we can do at present, we know how to do something else when we wish, or something similar at another time. For when we see how anything comes about, from what causes and in what manner, then when similar causes come into our power we see how to make them produce similar effects.

5.18 Children, therefore, are not endowed with reason at all until they have acquired the use of speech, but are called reasonable creatures because of the evident possibility of their having the use of reason in time to come. And most men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in counting to some degree, get little use from it in ordinary life. There they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations toward various ends, but especially according to good or bad fortune and one another's errors. For as for science, or certain rules for their actions, they are so far from it that they do not know what it is. Geometry they have thought to be conjuring. And as for the other sciences, those who have not been taught their beginnings and made some progress in them, so as to see how they are acquired and produced, are in this respect like children who, having no idea of how babies are conceived, are made to believe by the women that their brothers and sisters were not born but found in the garden.

5.19 Yet those who have no science are in a better and nobler condition with their natural prudence than men who, by bad reasoning, or by trusting those who reason wrongly, fall into

false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes and rules does not lead men so far astray as relying on false rules, and taking as causes of what they aim at things that are not its causes, but rather causes of the contrary.

5.20 To conclude: the light of human minds is clear words, but first trimmed and purged of ambiguity by exact definitions. Reason is the pace; the growth of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end. And on the other hand, metaphors and senseless and ambiguous words are like will-o'-the-wisps, and reasoning with them is wandering among countless absurdities; and their end is contention and sedition, or contempt.[24]

5.21 As much experience is prudence, so much science is sapience. For though we usually have one name, wisdom, for them both, the Romans always distinguished between *prudentia* and *sapientia*, attributing the former to experience and the latter to science. But to make the difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endowed with an excellent natural skill and dexterity in handling his weapons, and another who has added to that dexterity an acquired science of where he can strike or be struck by his adversary in every possible posture or guard. The ability of the first would be to the ability of the second as prudence is to sapience: both useful, but the second infallible. But those who trust only to the authority of books, and follow the blind blindly, are like a man who, trusting to the false rules of a fencing master, rashly takes on an adversary who either kills or disgraces him.

5.22 Of the signs of science, some are certain and infallible, some uncertain. They are certain when someone who claims the science of anything can teach it, that is, demonstrate its truth clearly to another. They are uncertain when only some particular events bear out his claim, and on many occasions turn out as he says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain, because it is impossible to observe by experience, and remember, all the

24 *Ignes fatui* ("foolish fires"), will-o'-the-wisps: marsh lights said to lead travelers astray. "Snuffed" in the original refers to trimming a candle's wick so it burns clear.

circumstances that may alter the outcome. But in any business where a man has no infallible science to proceed by, to abandon his own natural judgment and be guided by general maxims read in authors, which are subject to many exceptions, is a sign of folly, and is generally scorned under the name of pedantry. And even of those men who love to show off their reading in politics and history in the councils of the commonwealth, very few do so in their household affairs, where their own particular interest is concerned. They have prudence enough for their private affairs; but in public they care more for the reputation of their own wit than for the success of someone else's business.

CHAPTER 6: OF THE PASSIONS

Endeavor, appetite, and aversion are defined, and the simple passions are named.

6.1 There are in animals two sorts of motion peculiar to them. One is called vital motion. It begins at conception and continues without interruption through their whole life: such are the circulation of the blood, the pulse, breathing, digestion, nutrition, and excretion. These motions need no help from the imagination. The other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion: such as walking, speaking, and moving any of our limbs in the way first imagined in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and inner parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, and so on, and that imagination is only the remains of the same motion, lingering after sense, has already been said in the first and second chapters. And because walking, speaking, and the like voluntary motions always depend on a prior thought of where, which way, and what, it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although untrained people do not think there is any motion at all where the thing moved is invisible, or where the space it moves through is too short to be sensed, that does not prevent such motions from existing. For however small a space may be, anything moved over a larger space, of which

that small one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called *endeavor*.

6.2 This endeavor, when it is toward something that causes it, is called *appetite* or *desire*, the latter being the general name, and the former often restricted to mean the desire for food, namely hunger and thirst. And when the endeavor is away from something, it is generally called *aversion*. We have these words, appetite and aversion, from the Latin, and both of them signify motions, one of approaching, the other of withdrawing. So do the Greek words for the same, *hormē* and *aphormē*. For nature itself often presses on men truths that they later stumble over when they look for something beyond nature. For the Schools find no actual motion at all in the mere appetite to go or move. But since they must acknowledge some motion, they call it metaphorical motion, which is only an absurd expression. For though words may be called metaphorical, bodies and motions cannot.

6.3 What men desire they are also said to *love*, and they are said to *hate* the things for which they have aversion. So desire and love are the same thing, except that by desire we always signify the absence of the object, and by love most commonly its presence. So also by aversion we signify the absence of the object, and by hate its presence.

6.4 Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men, such as the appetite for food, and the appetite for excretion and relief (which may also, and more properly, be called aversions, from something they feel in their bodies), and a few other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites for particular things, come from experience and from trying their effects on ourselves or other men. For of things we do not know at all, or believe do not exist, we can have no further desire than to taste and try them. But we have aversion not only to things we know have hurt us, but also to things we do not know whether they will hurt us or not.

6.5 Things we neither desire nor hate we are said to contemn: *contempt* being nothing but an immobility or stubbornness of the heart in resisting the action of certain things. It arises either because the heart is already moved otherwise, by other, more powerful objects, or from lack of experience of them.

6.6 And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual change, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause the same appetites and aversions in him. Much less can all men agree in desiring almost any one and the same object.

6.7 But whatever is the object of any man's appetite or desire is what he for his part calls good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words, good, evil, and contemptible, are always used in relation to the person who uses them. There is nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves. The rule is taken from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth), or (in a commonwealth) from the person who represents it, or from an arbitrator or judge whom men who disagree set up by consent, making his verdict the rule.

6.8 The Latin language has two words whose meanings come close to those of good and evil, but are not precisely the same: *pulchrum* and *turpe*. The former signifies what promises good by some visible signs, and the latter what promises evil. But in our language we have no names so general to express them. Instead of *pulchrum* we say, of some things, "fair"; of others, "beautiful," or "handsome," or "gallant," or "honorable," or "comely," or "amiable"; and for *turpe*, "foul," "deformed," "ugly," "base," "nauseous," and the like, as the subject requires. All these words, in their proper places, signify nothing but the look or countenance that promises good and evil. So there are three kinds of good: good in the promise, that is, *pulchrum*; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called *jucundum*, delightful; and good as the means, which is called *utile*, profitable. And there are as many kinds of evil. For evil in the promise is what they call *turpe*; evil

in effect and end is *molestum*, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in the means is *inutile*, unprofitable, harmful.

6.9 In sense, what is really within us is (as I have said before) only motion, caused by the action of external objects; but in appearance it is, to the sight, light and color; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, smell; and so on. So when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion or endeavor, which consists in appetite toward, or aversion from, the object causing the motion. But the appearance or sense of that motion is what we call either *delight* or *trouble of mind*.

6.10 This motion, which is called appetite, and in its appearance delight and pleasure, seems to be a strengthening of vital motion and a help to it. And therefore things that caused delight were not improperly called *jucunda* (from *juvando*), from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, *molesta*, offensive, from hindering and troubling the vital motion.

6.11 Pleasure (or delight), therefore, is the appearance or sense of good; and molestation or displeasure, the appearance or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love is accompanied by some delight, more or less; and all hatred and aversion by more or less displeasure and offense.

6.12 Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present, and these may be called pleasures of sense. (The word "sensual," as it is used only by those who condemn them, has no place until there are laws.) Of this kind are all takings-in and dischargings of the body, and also everything pleasant to the sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. Others arise from the expectation that comes from foreseeing the end or consequence of things, whether those things please or displease the senses. And these are pleasures of the mind of the one who draws those consequences, and are generally called *joy*. In the same way, some displeasures are in the sense, and are called *pain*; others are in the expectation of consequences, and are called *grief*.

6.13 These simple passions, called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, are given various names under various

considerations. First, when they succeed one another, they are named differently according to men's opinion of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Second, from the object loved or hated. Third, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourth, from the alteration or succession itself.

A CATALOG OF THE PASSIONS

Hobbes defines dozens of passions, from hope and fear to laughter, pity, and envy.

6.14 For appetite with an opinion of attaining is called *hope*.

6.15 The same, without such opinion: *despair*.

6.16 Aversion with an opinion of hurt from the object: *fear*.

6.17 The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance: *courage*.

6.18 Sudden courage: *anger*.

6.19 Constant hope: *confidence* in ourselves.

6.20 Constant despair: *diffidence* of ourselves.

6.21 Anger at great hurt done to another, when we conceive it to have been done by injury: *indignation*.

6.22 Desire of good to another: *benevolence*, *goodwill*, *charity*. If toward people generally: *good nature*.

6.23 Desire of riches: *covetousness*. The name is always used as a term of blame, because men competing for riches are displeased when others get them; yet the desire in itself deserves blame or approval according to the means by which those riches are sought.

6.24 Desire of office or precedence: *ambition*. This name, too, is used in the worse sense, for the reason just given.

6.25 Desire of things that contribute only a little to our ends, and fear of things that are only a small hindrance: *pusillanimity*.

6.26 Contempt of small helps and hindrances: *magnanimity*.

6.27 Magnanimity in the face of death or wounds: *valor*, *fortitude*.

6.28 Magnanimity in the use of riches: *liberality*.

6.29 Pusillanimity in the same: *wretchedness*, *miserliness*, or *parsimony*, depending on whether it is disliked or liked.

6.30 Love of persons for the sake of their company: *kindness*.

6.31 Love of persons for pleasing the senses only: *natural lust*.

6.32 Love of the same, acquired by rumination, that is, by imagining past pleasure: *luxury*.

6.33 Love of one person in particular, with the desire to be loved by that person in particular: *the passion of love*. The same, with fear that the love is not returned: *jealousy*.

6.34 Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some deed of his own: *revengefulness*.

6.35 Desire to know why and how: *curiosity*. It is found in no living creature but man, so that man is distinguished from the other animals not only by his reason but also by this unique passion. In animals, the appetite for food and the other pleasures of sense are so dominant that they crowd out any concern for knowing causes. Curiosity is a lust of the mind which, by a persistent delight in the continual and tireless generation of knowledge, surpasses the brief intensity of any carnal pleasure.

6.36 Fear of invisible power, invented by the mind or imagined from tales publicly permitted: *religion*; from tales not permitted: *superstition*. And when the power imagined truly is as we imagine it: *true religion*.

6.37 Fear without any grasp of why or of what: *panic terror*, so called from the fables that make Pan its author. In truth, though, whoever feels this fear always has, at first, some grasp of the cause, while the rest run away by example, each supposing his fellow knows why. And so this passion happens to no one except in a crowd or multitude of people.[25]

6.38 Joy at grasping something new: *admiration*. It is proper to man, because it excites the appetite for knowing the cause.

6.39 Joy arising from imagining a man's own power and ability is the exultation of mind called *glorying*. If it is grounded on the experience of his own past actions, it is the same as confidence.

25 Pan: the Greek god of the wild, whose sudden appearances were said to cause the terror named after him, "panic."

But if it is grounded on the flattery of others, or merely supposed by himself for the delight of its consequences, it is called *vainglory*. The name fits, because a well-grounded confidence leads to action, whereas merely supposing one has power does not, and is therefore rightly called vain.

6.40 Grief arising from the belief that one lacks power is called *dejection* of mind.

6.41 The vainglory that consists in imagining or supposing abilities in ourselves that we know we do not have is found most often in young men. It is nourished by histories or fictions of gallant heroes, and is often corrected by age and employment.

6.42 *Sudden glory* is the passion that produces those grimaces called *laughter*. It is caused either by some sudden act of one's own that pleases one, or by noticing some deformity in another, by comparison with which one suddenly applauds oneself. It occurs most in those who are aware of having the fewest abilities, who are forced to keep themselves in their own good graces by noticing the imperfections of others. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of pusillanimity. For one of the proper works of great minds is to help others and free them from scorn, and to compare themselves only with the most able.

6.43 On the other hand, *sudden dejection* is the passion that causes *weeping*. It is caused by accidents that suddenly take away some strong hope or some prop of one's power, and those most subject to it are the ones who rely chiefly on external help, such as women and children. So some weep for the loss of friends, others for their unkindness, others for the sudden halt that reconciliation puts to their thoughts of revenge. But in all cases both laughter and weeping are sudden motions, and custom takes both away. For no one laughs at old jokes, or weeps over an old calamity.

6.44 Grief at the discovery of some lack of ability is *shame*, the passion that reveals itself in *blushing*. It consists in the awareness of something dishonorable. In young men it is a sign of the love of a good reputation, and is commendable. In old men it is a

sign of the same, but, because it comes too late, it is not commendable.

6.45 Contempt for a good reputation is called *impudence*.

6.46 Grief at the calamity of another is *pity*. It arises from imagining that a similar calamity may befall oneself, and so it is also called *compassion*, and, in the phrase of our own day, *fellow feeling*. Therefore, for a calamity that comes from great wickedness, the best people feel the least pity; and for the same calamity, those feel least pity who think themselves least exposed to it.

6.47 Contempt for, or little feeling for, the calamity of others is what men call *cruelty*. It proceeds from confidence in the security of one's own fortune. For I do not think it possible that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms without some further end of his own.

6.48 Grief at a competitor's success in wealth, honor, or some other good, if joined with an endeavor to strengthen our own abilities to equal or surpass him, is called *emulation*. But joined with an endeavor to supplant or hinder the competitor, it is *envy*.

DELIBERATION AND THE WILL

Deliberation is alternating appetite and aversion; the will is the last appetite; felicity is continual success.

6.49 In the human mind, appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, about one and the same thing sometimes arise by turns. Various good and bad consequences of doing or not doing the thing proposed come into our thoughts one after another, so that sometimes we have an appetite for it, sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope of being able to do it, sometimes despair of it or fear of attempting it. The whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes, and fears, continuing until the thing is either done or thought impossible, is what we call *deliberation*.

6.50 So there is no deliberation about things past, because they manifestly cannot be changed; nor about things known or thought to be impossible, because men know or think such

deliberation is pointless. But we may deliberate about impossible things that we think possible, not knowing it is pointless. And it is called deliberation because it puts an end to the liberty we had of doing or not doing according to our own appetite or aversion.

6.51 This alternating succession of appetites, aversions, hopes, and fears is found no less in other living creatures than in man, and therefore beasts deliberate too.

6.52 Every deliberation is said to *end* when the thing deliberated about is either done or thought impossible, because until then we keep the liberty of doing or not doing it according to our appetite or aversion.

6.53 In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion, immediately attached to the action or to its omission, is what we call the *will*: the act (not the faculty) of willing. And animals that have deliberation must necessarily have will as well. The definition of the will commonly given by the Schools, that it is a *rational appetite*, is not good. For if it were, there could be no voluntary act against reason, since a *voluntary act* is one that proceeds from the will and nothing else. But if, instead of a rational appetite, we say an appetite resulting from a preceding deliberation, then the definition is the same as the one I have given here. *The will*, therefore, *is the last appetite in deliberating*. It is true that in ordinary speech we say a man once had a will to do something that he nevertheless refrained from doing. But that is properly only an inclination, which makes no action voluntary, because the action does not depend on it but on the last inclination or appetite. For if the intervening appetites made an action voluntary, then by the same reasoning all the intervening aversions would make the same action involuntary, and so one and the same action would be both voluntary and involuntary.

6.54 From this it is clear that not only actions that begin from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites for the thing proposed, but also those that begin from aversion, or from fear of the consequences that follow from not doing it, are *voluntary actions*.

6.55 The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed are partly the same as, and partly different from, those by which we express our thoughts. First, in general, all passions may be expressed *indicatively*, as in "I love," "I fear," "I rejoice," "I deliberate," "I will," "I command." But some of them have particular expressions of their own. These are nevertheless not affirmations, except when they serve to draw other inferences besides that of the passion they come from. Deliberation is expressed *subjunctively*, a form of speech proper for signifying suppositions and their consequences, as in "If this is done, then this will follow." It does not differ from the language of reasoning, except that reasoning is in general words, while deliberation is mostly about particulars. The language of desire and aversion is *imperative*, as in "Do this," "Don't do that." When the party addressed is obliged to do or refrain, this is *command*; otherwise it is *prayer*, or else *counsel*. The language of vainglory, indignation, pity, and revengefulness is *optative*. But the desire to know has an expression of its own, called *interrogative*, as in "What is it?" "When will it be?" "How is it done?" and "Why so?" Other language of the passions I find none. For cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like do not signify as speech, but as the actions of a tongue grown used to them.

6.56 These forms of speech, I say, are expressions or voluntary signs of our passions, but they are not reliable signs, since they may be used at will, whether or not those who use them have such passions. The best signs of passions actually present are in the face, the movements of the body, actions, and the ends or aims we otherwise know the man to have.

6.57 In deliberation, the appetites and aversions are raised by foreseeing the good and bad consequences and results of the action we are deliberating about. So whether its effect is good or bad depends on foreseeing a long chain of consequences, which very seldom anyone can see to the end. But so far as a man can see, if the good in those consequences is greater than the evil, the whole chain is what writers call *apparent* or *seeming good*. And conversely, when the evil exceeds the good, the whole is

apparent or *seeming evil*. So whoever has, by experience or reason, the widest and surest view of consequences deliberates best for himself, and is able, when he wishes, to give the best counsel to others.

6.58 Continual success in obtaining the things a man desires from time to time, that is to say, continual prospering, is what men call *felicity*; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of mind while we live here, because life itself is nothing but motion, and can never be without desire, or without fear, any more than without sense. What kind of felicity God has ordained for those who devoutly honor him, a man will know no sooner than he enjoys it. These are joys as incomprehensible now as the Schoolmen's phrase *beatific vision* is unintelligible.[26]

6.59 The form of speech by which men signify their opinion of the goodness of anything is *praise*. That by which they signify its power and greatness is *magnifying*. And that by which they signify their opinion of a man's felicity the Greeks called *makarismos*, for which we have no name in our language. And this is enough to have said about the *passions* for the present purpose.[27]

CHAPTER 7: OF THE ENDS OF DISCOURSE

Discourse ends in judgment or doubt, science or opinion; belief and faith rest on persons.

7.1 Every discourse governed by the desire for knowledge comes at last to an *end*, either by attaining it or by giving up. And wherever the chain of discourse is interrupted, there is an end for that time.

7.2 If the discourse is merely mental, it consists of thoughts, alternating, that the thing will be and will not be, or that it has been and has not been. So wherever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you leave him in a presumption that *it will be* or

26 The "beatific vision": in scholastic theology, the direct sight of God enjoyed by the blessed in heaven.

27 *Makarismos*: Greek for pronouncing someone blessed or happy.

it will not be, or that *it has been* or *has not been*. All of this is *opinion*. And what alternating appetite is in deliberating about good and evil, alternating opinion is in inquiring into the truth of the past and the future. And just as the last appetite in deliberation is called the *will*, so the last opinion in the search for the truth of past and future is called the *judgment*, or the *resolute* and *final sentence* of the one who is reasoning. And as the whole chain of alternating appetites on a question of good or bad is called *deliberation*, so the whole chain of alternating opinions on a question of true or false is called *doubt*.

7.3 No discourse whatever can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or future. For knowledge of fact is originally sense, and ever after memory. And knowledge of consequence, which I said earlier is called science, is not absolute but conditional. No one can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be, which is to know absolutely; but only that if this is, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be, which is to know conditionally. And even then it is not the consequence of one thing from another, but of one name of a thing from another name of the same thing.

7.4 And therefore, when discourse is put into speech, beginning with definitions of words, and proceeding by connecting these into general affirmations, and these again into syllogisms, the end or final sum is called the conclusion. And the thought in the mind it signifies is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called *science*. But if the first ground of such discourse is not definitions, or if the definitions are not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again *opinion*: opinion, that is, of the truth of something said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words that cannot possibly be understood. When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are said to be *conscious* of it to one another, which is as much as to say that they know it together. And because such men are the fittest witnesses of each other's deeds, or of a third person's, it was and always will be considered a very evil act for anyone to speak

against his *conscience*, or to corrupt or force another to do so. So much so that the plea of conscience has been listened to very carefully in all ages. Later, men used the same word metaphorically for knowledge of their own secret deeds and secret thoughts; and so it is said rhetorically that conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men passionately in love with their own new opinions (however absurd) and stubbornly bent on maintaining them gave those opinions, too, that revered name of conscience, as if they wanted it to seem unlawful to change them or speak against them. And so they claim to know they are true, when at most they know only that they think so.

7.5 When a man's discourse does not begin from definitions, it begins either from some other reflection of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it begins from something said by another person, whose ability to know the truth and whose honesty in not deceiving he does not doubt. Then the discourse concerns not so much the thing as the person, and the resolution is called *belief* and *faith*: *faith in* the man; *belief* both *of* the man and *of* the truth of what he says. So in belief there are two opinions: one of what the man says, the other of his virtue. To *have faith in*, or *trust*, or *believe a man* all mean the same thing: an opinion of the man's truthfulness. But to *believe what is said* means only an opinion of the truth of the statement. We should note, though, that the phrase *I believe in*, like the Latin *credo in* and the Greek *pisteuo eis*, is never used except in the writings of theologians. In other writings, these are replaced by *I believe him; I trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him*; in Latin, *credo illi; fido illi*; and in Greek, *pisteuo auto*. And this peculiarity in the Church's use of the word has given rise to many disputes about the proper object of Christian faith.[28]

7.6 But *believing in*, as the phrase is used in the Creed, means not trust in the person, but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians but men of every kind believe in God in the sense of holding as true everything they hear him say, whether they understand it or not. That is all the

28 The 1651 text prints "Pisteuo Anto," a misprint for *pisteuo auto*.

faith and trust that can possibly be had in any person whatever. But they do not all believe the doctrine of the Creed.

7.7 From this we may infer that when we believe some statement, whatever it is, to be true on arguments drawn not from the thing itself or from the principles of natural reason, but from the authority and good opinion we have of the one who said it, then the speaker, the person we believe in or trust and whose word we take, is the object of our faith, and the honor done in believing is done to him alone. And consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the Church, whose word we take and accept. And those who believe what a prophet tells them in the name of God take the prophet's word, honor him, and trust and believe in him concerning the truth of what he reports, whether he is a true prophet or a false one. And the same holds for all other history. For if I did not believe everything historians have written of the glorious deeds of Alexander or Caesar, I do not think the ghost of Alexander or Caesar would have any just cause to be offended, or anyone else but the historian. If Livy says the gods once made a cow speak, and we do not believe it, it is not God we distrust in this, but Livy. So it is evident that whatever we believe for no other reason than one drawn from the authority of men and their writings alone, whether or not they are sent from God, is faith in men only.[29]

CHAPTER 8: OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES AND THEIR DEFECTS

Wit, fancy, judgment, and prudence are defined, and their differences traced to the passions.

8.1 Virtue in general, in every kind of subject, is something valued for its eminence, and it consists in comparison. For if all things were equal in all men, nothing would be prized. And by

29 Livy (59 BC–AD 17), Roman historian, whose history repeatedly records a cow speaking among the prodigies of a year.

intellectual virtues are always meant those abilities of the mind that men praise, value, and wish to have in themselves. They commonly go under the name of a *good wit*, though the same word *wit* is also used to distinguish one particular ability from the rest.

8.2 These virtues are of two sorts: *natural* and *acquired*. By natural I do not mean what a man has from birth, for that is nothing but sense, in which men differ so little from one another, and from brute animals, that it is not to be counted among the virtues. I mean the wit that is gained by use and experience alone, without method, cultivation, or instruction. This *natural wit* consists chiefly in two things: *quickness of imagining* (that is, swift succession of one thought to another), and *steady direction* toward some approved end. On the other hand, a slow imagination makes the defect or fault of mind commonly called *dullness*, stupidity, and sometimes other names that signify slowness of motion or difficulty in being moved.

8.3 This difference in quickness is caused by differences in men's passions: some love and dislike one thing, others another. And so some men's thoughts run one way, some another, and they hold on to and notice differently the things that pass through their imagination. Now in this succession of men's thoughts, there is nothing to notice in the things they think about except in what ways they are *like one another*, or in what ways *unlike*, or *what they serve for*, or *how they serve that purpose*. Those who notice their similarities, when these are such as others rarely notice, are said to have a *good wit*, which in this context means a *good fancy*. But those who notice their differences and dissimilarities, which is called *distinguishing*, *discerning*, and *judging* between one thing and another, when such discerning is not easy, are said to have *good judgment*. And particularly in matters of conversation and business, where times, places, and persons must be discerned, this virtue is called *discretion*. The first, fancy, is not praised as a virtue without the help of judgment; but the second, judgment and discretion, is praised for itself, without the help of fancy. Besides discretion about times,

places, and persons, which a good fancy needs, it also requires frequently applying one's thoughts to their end, that is, to some use to be made of them. When this is done, whoever has this virtue will easily be supplied with comparisons that will please, not only by illustrating his discourse and adorning it with new and apt metaphors, but also by the rarity of their invention. But without steadiness and direction toward some end, a great fancy is a kind of madness. It is the kind found in those who, starting any discussion, are snatched from their purpose by everything that comes into their thoughts, into so many and such long digressions and parentheses that they lose themselves completely. I know no particular name for this kind of folly. But its cause is sometimes lack of experience, by which something seems new and rare to a man that does not seem so to others; sometimes pusillanimity, by which something seems great to him that others think a trifle. And whatever is new or great, and so thought worth telling, draws a man little by little away from the intended path of his discourse.

8.4 In a good poem, whether epic or dramatic, and also in sonnets, epigrams, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are required. But fancy must be the more prominent, because such works please by their extravagance, though they ought not to displease by indiscretion.

8.5 In a good history, judgment must be prominent, because its goodness consists in its method, in its truth, and in the choice of the actions most profitable to know. Fancy has no place in it except in adorning the style.

8.6 In speeches of praise and in invectives, fancy is predominant, because the aim is not truth but to honor or dishonor, which is done by noble or by vile comparisons. Judgment merely suggests what circumstances make an action praiseworthy or blameworthy.

8.7 In exhortations and pleadings, judgment or fancy is most needed according to whether truth or disguise best serves the purpose at hand.

8.8 In demonstration, in counsel, and in every rigorous search for truth, judgment does everything, except that sometimes the understanding needs to be opened by some apt comparison, and to that extent fancy is of use. But metaphors are in this case completely excluded. For since they openly profess deceit, to admit them into counsel or reasoning would be manifest folly.

8.9 And in any discourse whatever, if a lack of discretion is apparent, then however extravagant the fancy, the whole discourse will be taken as a sign of lack of wit. But it never will be when the discretion is evident, however ordinary the fancy.

8.10 The secret thoughts of a man range over all things, holy, profane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame or blame. Spoken discourse cannot do this, beyond what judgment approves with respect to time, place, and persons. An anatomist or a physician may speak or write his judgment of unclean things, because the aim is not to please but to benefit. But for another man to write his extravagant and amusing fancies about the same things is as if someone who had been tumbled in the dirt should come and present himself before good company. And it is the lack of discretion that makes the difference. Again, when the mind is openly at leisure, and in familiar company, a man may play with the sounds and double meanings of words, often with flashes of extraordinary fancy. But in a sermon, or in public, or before strangers or those we ought to revere, any jingling of words will be counted folly; and the difference lies only in the lack of discretion. So where wit is lacking, it is not fancy that is lacking, but discretion. Judgment without fancy, therefore, is wit; but fancy without judgment is not.

8.11 When the thoughts of a man who has some design in hand run over a multitude of things and notice how they contribute to that design, or what design they might contribute to, and if his observations are of a kind that are not easy or usual, this wit of his is called *prudence*. It depends on much experience, and on memory of similar things and their consequences in the past. In this men do not differ as much as in their fancies and judgments, because the experience of men of equal age is not very

unequal in quantity; it lies in different occasions, each man having his own private designs. To govern a family well and to govern a kingdom well are not different degrees of prudence, but different sorts of business, just as drawing a picture in miniature, or life-size, or larger than life, are not different degrees of art. A plain farmer is more prudent in the affairs of his own house than a Privy Councillor in the affairs of another man.[30]

8.12 If to prudence you add the use of unjust or dishonest means, such as fear or need usually prompts men to, you have that crooked wisdom called *craft*, which is a sign of pusillanimity; for magnanimity is contempt for unjust or dishonest helps. And what the Romans call *versutia* (translated into English as *shifting*) consists in putting off a present danger or inconvenience by taking on a greater one, as when a man robs one person to pay another. It is only a shorter-sighted craft, and is called *versutia* from *versura*, which means borrowing money at interest to pay the interest now due.

8.13 As for *acquired wit* (I mean acquired by method and instruction), there is none but reason, which is grounded on the right use of speech and produces the sciences. But I have already spoken of reason and science in the fifth and sixth chapters.

8.14 The causes of this difference in wits lie in the passions; and the difference in passions comes partly from differences in bodily constitution, and partly from differences in education. For if the difference came from the temper of the brain and the organs of sense, whether external or internal, there would be no less difference among men in their sight, hearing, or other senses than in their fancies and discretion. It comes, therefore, from the passions, which differ not only because of differences in men's constitutions, but also because of differences in their customs and education.

8.15 The passions that most of all cause differences of wit are chiefly the greater or lesser desire for power, for riches, for

30 Privy Councillor: a member of the monarch's Privy Council, the English Crown's chief advisory body.

knowledge, and for honor. All of these may be reduced to the first, the desire for power. For riches, knowledge, and honor are only different sorts of power.

8.16 And so a man who has no great passion for any of these things, but is, as men say, indifferent, may be good to the extent of never giving offense, yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. For thoughts are to desires as scouts and spies, ranging abroad to find the way to the things desired; all steadiness of the mind's motion, and all its quickness, comes from there.

MADNESS

Madness is excessive passion; Hobbes rejects possession by spirits and ends with the absurdities of the Schoolmen.

For as to have no desire is to be dead, so to have weak passions is dullness; to have passions indifferently for everything is *giddiness* and distraction; and to have stronger and more vehement passions for anything than are ordinarily seen in others is what men call *madness*.

8.17 Of madness there are almost as many kinds as there are passions. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion comes from a bad constitution of the bodily organs, or from harm done to them; and sometimes the damage and disorder of the organs is caused by the vehemence or long continuance of the passion. But in both cases the madness is of one and the same nature.

8.18 The passion whose violence or persistence produces madness is either great vainglory, commonly called pride and self-conceit, or great dejection of mind.

8.19 Pride subjects a man to anger, and the excess of anger is the madness called *rage* and *fury*. And so it comes about that an excessive desire for revenge, when it becomes habitual, damages the organs and becomes rage. Excessive love, with jealousy, also becomes rage. An excessive opinion of a man's own self, as divinely inspired, or for wisdom, learning, beauty, and the like,

becomes distraction and giddiness; the same, joined with envy, becomes rage. And a vehement opinion of the truth of anything, when others contradict it, becomes rage.

8.20 Dejection subjects a man to groundless fears. This is a madness commonly called *melancholy*, which also shows itself in various ways: in haunting lonely places and graves, in superstitious behavior, and in fearing, some one particular thing, some another. In sum, all passions that produce strange and unusual behavior are called by the general name of madness. As for the several kinds of madness, anyone who would take the trouble could enroll a legion of them. And if the excesses are madness, there is no doubt that the passions themselves, when they tend to evil, are degrees of the same thing.

8.21 For example: in those who are possessed by the belief that they are inspired, the effect of folly is not always visible in any one person through some very extravagant action arising from that passion. But when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what greater proof of madness can there be than to shout at, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will shout at, fight against, and destroy those by whom they have been protected and kept safe from injury all their lives. And if this is madness in the multitude, it is the same in every individual. For in the middle of the sea, though a man hears no sound from the part of the water next to him, he is still quite sure that this part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea as any other part of the same quantity. In the same way, though we perceive no great unrest in one or two men, we may be quite sure that their individual passions are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation. And if nothing else betrayed their madness, their very claiming such inspiration for themselves is proof enough. Suppose some man in Bedlam should entertain you with sober conversation, and as you take your leave you ask who he is, so that you might repay his civility another time, and he tells you he is God the Father. I

think you need expect no extravagant action as proof of his madness.[31]

8.22 This belief in inspiration, commonly called the "private spirit," very often begins with some lucky discovery of an error generally held by others. Not knowing, or not remembering, by what process of reasoning they arrived at so singular a truth (as they think it, though many times it is an untruth they have stumbled on), they at once admire themselves as being in the special grace of God Almighty, who has revealed it to them supernaturally by his Spirit.

8.23 Again, that madness is nothing else but passion showing itself too much can be gathered from the effects of wine, which are the same as those of a bad disposition of the organs. For the variety of behavior in men who have drunk too much is the same as that of people who are mentally ill: some of them raging, others loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but each according to his own dominant passions. For the effect of the wine is only to remove dissimulation, and to take away their sight of how ugly their passions are. For I believe that the most sober men, when they walk alone without any care or employment for the mind, would be unwilling to have the vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time seen in public. That is a confession that passions without guidance are, for the most part, mere madness.

8.24 There have been two opinions in the world, in both ancient and later ages, about the cause of madness. Some derived it from the passions. Others derived it from demons or spirits, either good or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in the strange and uncouth ways that people who are mentally ill tend to move. The first group therefore called such men mentally ill. But the second group called them sometimes demoniacs (that is, possessed by spirits), sometimes *energumeni* (that is, agitated or

31 Bedlam: the Hospital of St. Mary of Bethlehem in London, London's hospital for people with mental illness.

moved by spirits). And now in Italy they are called not only *pazzi* (mentally ill) but also *spiritati* (men possessed).

8.25 There was once a great gathering of people in Abdera, a city of the Greeks, for the performance of the tragedy *Andromeda*, on an extremely hot day. Many of the spectators fell into fevers, and from the heat and the tragedy together this befell them: they did nothing but recite iambic verses with the names of Perseus and Andromeda in them. This, together with the fever, was cured by the coming of winter. And this madness was thought to come from the passion imprinted on them by the tragedy. Likewise a fit of madness once reigned in another Greek city, which seized only the young maidens and caused many of them to hang themselves.[32] Most people at the time thought this was an act of the devil. But one man suspected that their contempt of life might come from some passion of the mind. Supposing that they did not also hold their honor in contempt, he advised the magistrates to strip those who hanged themselves in this way and leave them hanging naked. The story says this cured that madness. But on the other side, these same Greeks often attributed madness to the workings of the Eumenides, or Furies, and sometimes to Ceres, Phoebus, and other gods. So much did men attribute to phantasms as to think them living bodies made of air, and generally to call them spirits. And as the Romans held the same opinion as the Greeks on this, so did the Jews. For they called people who were mentally ill prophets or (according to whether they thought the spirits good or bad) demoniacs. Some of them called both prophets and demoniacs mentally ill, and some called the same man both demoniac and mentally ill. For the Gentiles this is no wonder, because with them diseases and health, vices and virtues, and many natural occurrences were named and worshipped as demons. So by "demon" a man was to understand sometimes a fever as well as a devil. But for the Jews to hold such an opinion is somewhat

32 The Abdera story is told by Lucian (*How to Write History* 1); the tragedy was Euripides' *Andromeda*. The epidemic among the maidens of Miletus is told by Plutarch (*On the Bravery of Women*).

strange. For neither Moses nor Abraham claimed to prophesy by being possessed by a spirit, but from the voice of God, or by a vision or dream. Nor is there anything in his Law, moral or ceremonial, that taught them there was any such enthusiasm or any possession. When God is said (Numbers 11:25) to take from the spirit that was in Moses and give it to the seventy elders, the Spirit of God (taking it as the substance of God) is not divided. By the Spirit of God in man, the Scriptures mean a man's spirit inclined to godliness. And where it is said (Exodus 28:3),[33] "whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron," what is meant is not a spirit put into them that can make garments, but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the same sense, the spirit of a man, when it produces unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and likewise with other spirits—not always, but whenever the virtue or vice so named is extraordinary and eminent. Nor did the other prophets of the Old Testament claim enthusiasm, or that God spoke in them; rather he spoke to them by voice, vision, or dream. And "the burden of the Lord" was not possession but command. How then could the Jews fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason but the one common to all men: namely, the lack of curiosity to search out natural causes, and their placing felicity in acquiring the gross pleasures of the senses and the things that most immediately lead to them. For those who see any strange and unusual ability or defect in a man's mind can hardly think it natural unless they also see from what cause it probably comes. And if it is not natural, they must think it supernatural—and then what can it be, but that either God or the devil is in him? And so it came about, when our Savior (Mark 3:21) was surrounded by the multitude, that those of his household suspected he was mad and went out to restrain him; but the scribes said he had Beelzebub, and that it was by him that he cast out devils—as if the more gravely ill of two mentally ill men had overawed the lesser. And so too (John 10:20) some said, "He has a devil, and is mad," while others, taking him

33 "Enthusiasm" here in its older sense: being filled with or possessed by a god.

for a prophet, said, "These are not the words of one who has a devil." So in the Old Testament, the man who came to anoint Jehu (2 Kings 9:11) was a prophet, but some of the company asked Jehu, "Why did this mentally ill man come to you?" So, in sum, it is plain that whoever behaved in an extraordinary manner was thought by the Jews to be possessed by either a good or an evil spirit—except by the Sadducees, who erred so far in the other direction as not to believe there were any spirits at all (which is very near to outright atheism). And this perhaps provoked others all the more to call such men demoniacs rather than mentally ill.

8.26 But why, then, does our Savior go about curing them as if they were possessed, and not as if they were mad? To this I can give no other kind of answer than the one given to those who urge Scripture in the same way against the opinion that the Earth moves. Scripture was written to show men the kingdom of God and to prepare their minds to become his obedient subjects, leaving the world and its philosophy to the disputation of men, for the exercise of their natural reason. Whether the Earth's motion or the Sun's makes day and night, or whether the extravagant actions of men come from passion or from the devil (so long as we do not worship him), it is all one as far as our obedience and subjection to God Almighty are concerned—and that is the thing for which Scripture was written. As for our Savior speaking to the disease as to a person, that is the usual phrasing of all who cure by words alone, as Christ did (and as enchanters claim to do, whether they speak to a devil or not). For is not Christ also said (Matthew 8:26) to have rebuked the winds? Is he not also said (Luke 4:39) to rebuke a fever? Yet this does not show that a fever is a devil. And where many of those devils are said to confess Christ, there is no need to interpret those passages otherwise than that those mentally ill men confessed him. And where our Savior (Matthew 12:43) speaks of an unclean spirit that, having gone out of a man, wanders through dry places seeking rest and finding none, and then returns into the same man with seven other spirits worse than itself—that is

plainly a parable. It alludes to a man who, after a little effort to be rid of his lusts, is overcome by their strength and becomes seven times worse than he was. So I see nothing at all in Scripture that requires us to believe that demoniacs were anything other than mentally ill.

8.27 There is yet another fault in the discourse of some men, which may also be counted among the sorts of madness: namely, that abuse of words I spoke of earlier, in the fifth chapter, under the name of absurdity. That is when men speak words that, put together, have no meaning at all. Some fall into this by misunderstanding words they have received and repeat by rote; others from an intention to deceive by obscurity. And this happens only to those who deal in questions about incomprehensible matters, like the Schoolmen, or in questions of abstruse philosophy. Ordinary people seldom speak meaninglessly, and are therefore regarded as unlearned by those other distinguished persons. But to be certain that their words have nothing corresponding to them in the mind, some examples would be needed. If anyone wants them, let him take up a Schoolman and see whether he can translate any one chapter on some difficult point—the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ, transubstantiation, free will, and so on—into any of the modern languages so as to make it intelligible, or into any tolerable Latin, such as was familiar to those who lived when Latin was the common tongue. What is the meaning of these words: "The first cause does not necessarily inflow anything into the second, by force of the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work"? They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of the first book of Suárez, *Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God*. When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or do they not intend to make others so?[34] And in particular, in the question of transubstantiation: when they say that after certain words are spoken, the whiteness, roundness, magnitude, quality, corruptibility—all of

34 Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), Spanish Jesuit theologian, the leading scholastic philosopher of his age; the treatise is in his *Opuscula theologica* (1599).

which are incorporeal—and so on, go out of the wafer into the body of our blessed Savior, do they not make those -nesses, -tudes, and -ties into so many spirits possessing his body? For by spirits they always mean things that, though incorporeal, can nevertheless move from one place to another. So this kind of absurdity may rightly be counted among the many sorts of madness. And all the time that, guided by clear thoughts of their worldly desires, they refrain from disputing or writing in this way are nothing but lucid intervals. And that is enough about the intellectual virtues and defects.

CHAPTER 9: OF THE SEVERAL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is of fact or of consequence, and the sciences are laid out in a table.

9.1 There are two kinds of *knowledge*. One is knowledge of fact; the other is knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation from another. The first is nothing but sense and memory, and is absolute knowledge, as when we see a fact being done, or remember it done; and this is the knowledge required in a witness. The second is called science, and is conditional, as when we know that if the figure shown is a circle, then any straight line through the center will divide it into two equal parts. And this is the knowledge required in a philosopher—that is, in anyone who claims to reason.

9.2 The record of knowledge of fact is called history, of which there are two sorts. One is called natural history: the history of those facts, or effects of nature, that do not depend on man's will, such as the histories of metals, plants, animals, regions, and the like. The other is civil history: the history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths.

9.3 The records of science are the books that contain the demonstrations of the consequences of one affirmation from another, and are commonly called books of philosophy. There are many sorts of them, according to the diversity of their sub-

ject matter, and they may be divided in the way I have divided them in the following table.

9.4 SCIENCE, that is, knowledge of consequences, which is also called PHILOSOPHY.
Consequences from the accidents of natural bodies, which is called NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.
Consequences from the accidents common to all natural bodies, which are quantity and motion.
Consequences from quantity and motion indeterminate, which, being the principles or first foundation of philosophy, is called *philosophia prima*.
PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA.
Consequences from motion and quantity determined.
Consequences from quantity and motion determined
By figure ...
Mathematics,
GEOMETRY.
ARITHMETIC
By number ...
Mathematics,
GEOMETRY.[35]

35 Hobbes's table is a branching chart; the entries here follow the order of the printed text, with "/" marking the divisions. *Philosophia prima*: "first philosophy."

/ ARITHMETIC
Consequences from the motion and quantity of bodies in particular.
Consequences from the motion and quantity of the great parts of the world, such as the Earth and the stars,
Cosmography,
ASTRONOMY.
GEOGRAPHY.
Consequences from the motion of particular kinds and shapes of body,
Mechanics,
Science of ENGINEERS.
ARCHITECTURE
NAVIGATION.
Doctrine of weight,
PHYSICS, or consequences from qualities.
Consequences from the qualities of transient bodies, such as sometimes appear and sometimes vanish ...
METEOROLOGY
Consequences from the qualities of permanent bodies.
Consequences from the qualities of the stars.
Consequences from the light of the stars.

Out of this and the motion of the sun is made the science of ... SCIOGRAPHY.
Consequences from the influence of the stars ... ASTROLOGY.
Consequences from the qualities of the liquid bodies that fill the space between the stars, such as the air, or ethereal substance.
Consequences from the qualities of terrestrial bodies.
Consequences from the parts of the earth that are without sense,
Consequences from the qualities of minerals, such as stones, metals, etc.
Consequences from the qualities of vegetables.
Consequences from the qualities of animals.
Consequences from the qualities of animals in general
Consequences from vision ... OPTICS.
Consequences from sounds ... MUSIC.[36]

/ Consequences from the rest of the senses.
Consequences from the qualities of men in particular
Consequences from the passions of men ... ETHICS.
Consequences from speech,
In magnifying, vilifying, etc. ... POETRY.
In persuading ... RHETORIC
In reasoning ... LOGIC.
In contracting ... The science of JUST and UNJUST.
Consequences from the accidents of political bodies, which is called POLITICS, and CIVIL PHILOSOPHY.
1. Of consequences from the institution of COMMONWEALTHS to the rights and duties of the body politic, or sovereign.
2. Of consequences from the same to the duty and right of the subjects.

36 Sciography: the science of shadows, as used in making sundials.

9.5 Place this table between folios 40 and 41.[37]

CHAPTER 10: OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOR, AND WORTHINESS

Power is present means to future good; a man's worth is his price, set by others.

10.1 The *power* of a man (to take it universally) is his present means to obtain some future apparent good. And it is either original or instrumental.

10.2 Natural power is the eminence of the faculties of body or mind: such as extraordinary strength, good looks, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Instrumental powers are those that, acquired by these or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: such as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God that men call good luck. For the nature of power is in this respect like fame, increasing as it goes; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, the faster they move.

10.3 The greatest of human powers is the one compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent in one person, natural or civil, who has the use of all their powers depending on his will—such as the power of a commonwealth; or depending on the wills of each individual—such as the power of a faction, or of several factions in league. Therefore to have servants is power; to have friends is power: for they are strengths united.

10.4 Also, riches joined with liberality are power, because they procure friends and servants. Without liberality, not so; because in that case riches do not defend men, but expose them to envy, as a prey.

10.5 A reputation for power is power, because it draws to it the adherence of those who need protection.

10.6 So is a reputation for love of one's country (called popularity), for the same reason.

37 An instruction to the bookbinder of the 1651 edition, where the table was printed as a fold-out sheet.

10.7 Also, any quality that makes a man loved or feared by many, or a reputation for such a quality, is power, because it is a means of having the assistance and service of many.

10.8 Success is power, because it creates a reputation for wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either fear him or rely on him.

10.9 Affability in men already in power is an increase of power, because it gains love.

10.10 A reputation for prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power, because we entrust the government of ourselves more willingly to prudent men than to others.

10.11 Nobility is power—not everywhere, but only in those commonwealths where it has privileges; for its power consists in such privileges.

10.12 Eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence.

10.13 Good looks are power, because being a promise of good, they recommend men to the favor of women and strangers.

10.14 The sciences are small power, because they are not eminent, and therefore not acknowledged in any man. Nor do they exist at all except in a few, and in those only concerning a few things. For science is of such a nature that none can understand that it exists except those who have attained a good measure of it.

10.15 Arts of public use, such as fortification and the making of engines and other instruments of war, are power, because they contribute to defense and victory. And though their true mother is science—namely, mathematics—yet because they are brought to light by the hand of the craftsman, they are regarded as his offspring (the midwife passing with ordinary people for the mother).

10.16 The value, or *worth*, of a man is, as with all other things, his price—that is, as much as would be given for the use of his power. And therefore it is not absolute, but depends on the need and judgment of another. An able leader of soldiers is of great price in time of war, present or imminent, but not so in peace. A learned and incorruptible judge is worth much in time of peace,

but not so much in war. And as with other things, so with men: not the seller but the buyer determines the price. For let a man (as most men do) rate himself at the highest value he can; yet his true value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

HONORING AND DISHONORING

Hobbes lists the ways of honoring and dishonoring, and what is honorable or dishonorable.

10.17 The manifestation of the value we set on one another is what is commonly called honoring and dishonoring. To value a man at a high rate is to honor him; at a low rate, to dishonor him. But high and low, in this case, are to be understood by comparison with the rate each man sets on himself.

10.18 The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth, is what men commonly call *dignity*. And this valuation of him by the commonwealth is expressed through offices of command, judicature, and public employment, or through names and titles introduced to distinguish such value.

10.19 To pray to another for aid of any kind is to *honor* him, because it is a sign that we believe he has power to help; and the more difficult the aid, the greater the honor.

10.20 To obey is to honor, because no one obeys those whom they think have no power to help or hurt them. And consequently, to disobey is to dishonor.

10.21 To give a man great gifts is to honor him, because it is buying protection and acknowledging power. To give little gifts is to dishonor, because it is only alms, and signifies a belief that he needs small help.

10.22 To be diligent in promoting another's good, and also to flatter, is to honor, as a sign that we seek his protection or aid. To neglect is to dishonor.

10.23 To give way or yield place to another in anything of advantage is to honor, being a confession of greater power. To arrogate is to dishonor.

10.24 To show any sign of love or fear of another is to honor, for both to love and to fear is to value. To hold in contempt, or to love or fear less than he expects, is to dishonor, for it is undervaluing.

10.25 To praise, extol, or call happy is to honor, because nothing but goodness, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pity is to dishonor.

10.26 To speak to another with consideration, and to appear before him with decency and humility, is to honor him, as signs of fear of offending. To speak to him rashly, or to do anything before him obscenely, sloppily, or impudently, is to dishonor.

10.27 To believe, to trust, to rely on another is to honor him, a sign of our opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust or disbelieve is to dishonor.

10.28 To listen to a man's advice, or to his talk of any kind, is to honor, as a sign that we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or walk out, or talk meanwhile is to dishonor.

10.29 To do to another the things he takes for signs of honor, or that the law or custom makes so, is to honor, because in approving the honor done by others, one acknowledges the power that others acknowledge. To refuse to do them is to dishonor.

10.30 To agree with someone in opinion is to honor, as a sign of approving his judgment and wisdom. To dissent is to dishonor, and a reproach of error, and (if the dissent is in many things) of folly.

10.31 To imitate is to honor, for it is to approve strongly. To imitate one's enemy is to dishonor.

10.32 To honor those whom another honors is to honor him, as a sign of approval of his judgment. To honor his enemies is to dishonor him.

10.33 To employ someone in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to honor, as a sign of our opinion of his wisdom or other power. To deny employment in such cases to those who seek it is to dishonor.

10.34 All these ways of honoring are natural, and hold within commonwealths as well as outside them. But in common-

wealths, where he or they who have the supreme authority can make whatever they please stand for signs of honor, there are other honors.

10.35 A sovereign honors a subject with whatever title, office, employment, or action he himself wants taken as a sign of his will to honor him.

10.36 The king of Persia honored Mordecai when he ordered that he be led through the streets in the king's garment, on one of the king's horses, with a crown on his head, and a prince going before him proclaiming, "Thus shall it be done to the man whom the king will honor." And yet another king of Persia, or the same one at another time, when someone asked, in return for some great service, to wear one of the king's robes, gave him leave to do so—but with this addition, that he should wear it as the king's fool. And then it was dishonor.[38] So the fountain of civil honor is in the person of the commonwealth, and depends on the will of the sovereign. It is therefore temporary, and is called civil honor—such as magistracies, offices, titles, and in some places painted coats of arms and escutcheons. And men honor those who have them as having so many signs of favor in the commonwealth, and that favor is power.

10.37 Honorable is whatever possession, action, or quality is a proof and sign of power.

10.38 And therefore to be honored, loved, or feared by many is honorable, as proofs of power. To be honored by few or none is dishonorable.

10.39 Dominion and victory are honorable, because they are acquired by power; and servitude, out of need or fear, is dishonorable.

10.40 Good fortune (if lasting) is honorable, as a sign of the favor of God. Ill fortune and losses are dishonorable. Riches are honorable, for they are power. Poverty is dishonorable. Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, and confidence are honorable,

38 Mordecai: Esther 6:6–11. The second story is told of Artaxerxes by Plutarch (*Life of Artaxerxes*).

for they come from the consciousness of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, and diffidence are dishonorable.

10.41 Timely resolution, or determining what one is to do, is honorable, as being contempt of small difficulties and dangers. And irresolution is dishonorable, as a sign of valuing little obstacles and little advantages too much. For when a man has weighed things as long as time permits and does not resolve, the difference in weight is only small; and therefore if he does not resolve, he overvalues little things, which is pusillanimity.

10.42 All actions and speeches that come, or seem to come, from much experience, science, discretion, or wit are honorable, for all these are powers. Actions or words that come from error, ignorance, or folly are dishonorable.

10.43 Gravity, so far as it seems to come from a mind occupied with something else, is honorable, because occupation is a sign of power. But if it seems to come from a purpose to appear grave, it is dishonorable. For the gravity of the first is like the steadiness of a ship laden with merchandise; but that of the second, like the steadiness of a ship ballasted with sand and other trash.

10.44 To be conspicuous—that is, to be known—for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good is honorable, as a sign of the power for which one is conspicuous. On the contrary, obscurity is dishonorable.

10.45 To be descended from conspicuous parents is honorable, because such people more easily obtain the aid and friends of their ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage is dishonorable.

10.46 Actions arising from equity, joined with loss, are honorable, as signs of magnanimity; for magnanimity is a sign of power. On the contrary, craft, shifting, and neglect of equity are dishonorable.

10.47 Covetousness of great riches and ambition for great honors are honorable, as signs of power to obtain them. Covetousness and ambition for little gains or promotions are dishonorable.

10.48 Nor does it alter the case of honor whether an action (so long as it is great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power) is just or unjust; for honor consists only in the opinion of power. Therefore the ancient heathen did not think they dishonored the gods, but rather greatly honored them, when they brought them into their poems committing rapes, thefts, and other great but unjust or unclean acts. So much so that nothing is so celebrated in Jupiter as his adulteries, nor in Mercury as his frauds and thefts. Of Mercury's praises in a hymn of Homer, the greatest is this: that being born in the morning, he had invented music by noon, and before night had stolen away the cattle of Apollo from his herdsmen.[39]

10.49 Also among men, until great commonwealths were established, it was thought no dishonor to be a pirate or a highway robber, but rather a lawful trade—not only among the Greeks, but among all other nations as well, as is plain from the histories of ancient times. And at this day, in this part of the world, private duels are, and always will be, honorable, though unlawful, until such time as honor is ordained for those who refuse the challenge, and disgrace for those who make it. For duels are also often the effects of courage, and the ground of courage is always strength or skill, which are power. Yet for the most part they are the effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of dishonor in one or both of the combatants, who, committed by their rashness, are driven into the lists to avoid disgrace.

COATS OF ARMS AND TITLES OF HONOR

Heraldry and titles such as duke, count, and baron are traced to their origins.

10.50 Escutcheons and hereditary coats of arms are honorable where they carry some eminent privileges, and otherwise not; for their power consists either in such privileges, or in riches, or in something else that is equally honored in other men. This kind of honor, commonly called gentry, has come down from

39 The *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (Mercury).

the ancient Germans. No such thing was ever known where German customs were unknown, and it is nowhere in use now where Germans have not lived. The ancient Greek commanders, when they went to war, had their shields painted with whatever devices they pleased, so that an unpainted shield was a sign of poverty and of a common soldier. But they did not pass them on by inheritance. The Romans passed on the marks of their families, but these were the images of their ancestors, not their devices. Among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and America there is not, and never was, any such thing. The Germans alone had that custom, and from them it has spread into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers they either aided the Romans or made their own conquests in these western parts of the world.

10.51 For Germany, like all other countries in their beginnings, was anciently divided among an infinite number of petty lords, or masters of families, who were continually at war with one another. Chiefly so that they might be recognized by their followers when they were covered in armor, and partly for ornament, those masters or lords both painted their armor, or their escutcheon or coat, with the picture of some beast or other thing, and also put some prominent and visible mark on the crest of their helmets. This ornament, both of the arms and of the crest, descended by inheritance to their children: to the eldest unaltered, and to the rest with some mark of difference, as the old master—in Dutch, the *Here-alt*—thought fit. But when many such families joined together to make a greater monarchy, this duty of the herald, to distinguish escutcheons, was made into a separate private office. And the descendants of these lords are the great and ancient gentry, who for the most part bear living creatures noted for courage and plunder, or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars, palisades, and other emblems of war, since nothing was then held in honor but military virtue.[40] Afterward, not only kings but popular commonwealths gave

40 Hobbes derives "herald" from a supposed Dutch (i.e., German) *Here-alt*, "old master."

various kinds of escutcheons to those who went out to war or returned from it, as encouragement or as a reward for their service. An observant reader may find all this in those ancient histories, Greek and Latin, that mention the German nation and its customs in their times.

10.52 Titles of honor, such as duke, count, marquis, and baron, are honorable, as signifying the value set on those who hold them by the sovereign power of the commonwealth. In old times these titles were titles of office and command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans and French. Dukes, in Latin *duces*, were generals in war; counts, *comites*, were those who kept the general company out of friendship and were left to govern and defend places that had been conquered and pacified; marquises, *marchiones*, were counts who governed the marches, or borders, of the empire. These titles of duke, count, and marquis came into the empire about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customs of the German militia. But baron seems to have been a title of the Gauls, and signifies a great man—such as were the king's or prince's men whom they employed in war about their persons. It seems to be derived from *vir*, to *ber* and *bar*, which meant the same in the language of the Gauls as *vir* in Latin; and from there to *bero* and *baro*, so that such men were called *berones*, and later *barones*, and (in Spanish) *varones*. But anyone who wants to know the origin of titles of honor in more detail may find it, as I have found this, in Mr. Selden's most excellent treatise on that subject. In the course of time, owing to troubles and for reasons of good and peaceable government, these offices of honor were turned into mere titles, serving for the most part to mark the precedence, place, and rank of subjects in the commonwealth. Men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and barons of places where they had neither possession nor command, and other titles too were devised for the same purpose.[41]

10.53 *Worthiness* is something different from the worth or value of a man, and also from his merit or desert. It consists in a par-

ticular power or ability for that of which he is said to be worthy; and this particular ability is usually called *fitness*, or aptitude.

10.54 For the man most worthy to be a commander, a judge, or to hold any other charge is the one best equipped with the qualities required to carry it out well; and the man most worthy of riches is the one who has the qualities most needed to use them well. Even if any of these qualities is lacking, a man may nevertheless be a worthy man and valuable for something else. Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment and yet be unable to claim any right to have it before another; and therefore he cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For merit presupposes a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise. I shall say more about this later, when I speak of contracts.

CHAPTER 11: OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS

All men restlessly desire power after power; the passions and ignorance incline them to war or peace.

11.1 By *manners* I do not mean here decency of behavior—how one man should greet another, or how a man should rinse his mouth or pick his teeth in company, and other such points of the "small morals." I mean those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity. To that end we must consider that the felicity of this life does not consist in the repose of a mind that is satisfied. For there is no such *finis ultimus* (ultimate aim) or *summum bonum* (greatest good) as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man whose desires are at an end live any more than one whose senses and imaginations have come to a standstill. Felicity is a continual progress of desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still only the way to the latter. The cause of this is that the object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to secure forever the way to his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclina-

41 John Selden (1584–1654), English jurist and scholar, author of *Titles of Honor* (1614).

tions of all men tend not only to obtaining but also to securing a contented life. They differ only in the way—which arises partly from the diversity of passions in different men, and partly from differences in the knowledge or opinion each one has of the causes that produce the effect desired.

11.2 So in the first place, I put forward as a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intense delight than he has already attained, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but that he cannot secure the power and means to live well that he has now without acquiring more. Hence it is that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their efforts to securing it at home by laws or abroad by wars. And when that is done, a new desire follows: in some, for fame from new conquest; in others, for ease and sensual pleasure; in others, for admiration, or for being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind.

11.3 Competition for riches, honor, command, or other power inclines men to contention, enmity, and war, because the way for one competitor to attain his desire is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other. In particular, competition for praise inclines men to a reverence for antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead, and they ascribe more than is due to the dead so that they may obscure the glory of the living.

11.4 Desire of ease and sensual delight disposes men to obey a common power, because by such desires a man gives up the protection he might hope for from his own industry and labor. Fear of death and wounds disposes men the same way, and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy and hardy men who are not content with their present condition, and also all men who are ambitious for military command, are inclined to keep the causes of war alive and to stir up trouble and sedition. For there is no military honor except by war, and no hope of mending a bad hand like causing a new shuffle.

11.5 Desire of knowledge and of the arts of peace inclines men to obey a common power. For such desire contains a desire for leisure, and consequently for protection from some power other than their own.

11.6 Desire of praise disposes men to praiseworthy actions, such as please those whose judgment they value; for when we hold men in contempt, we hold their praises in contempt too. Desire of fame after death does the same. And though after death there is no sense of the praise given us on earth—those joys being either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of heaven or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell—yet such fame is not vain. For men take a present delight in it, from foreseeing it and the benefit that may come of it to their descendants. Though they do not see this now, they imagine it; and anything that is pleasure to the senses is also pleasure to the imagination.

11.7 To have received from someone we consider our equal greater benefits than we can hope to repay disposes us to pretended love but really to secret hatred. It puts a man in the position of a desperate debtor who, avoiding the sight of his creditor, silently wishes him somewhere he might never see him again. For benefits oblige, and obligation is bondage; and an obligation that cannot be repaid is perpetual bondage, which is hateful when owed to an equal. But to have received benefits from someone we acknowledge as our superior inclines us to love, because the obligation is no new lowering of ourselves; and cheerful acceptance (which men call gratitude) is such an honor done to the benefactor that it is generally taken as repayment. Also, to receive benefits, even from an equal or an inferior, disposes us to love as long as there is hope of repaying them. For in the receiver's intention the obligation is one of mutual aid and service; and from this comes a rivalry over who shall outdo the other in benefits—the most noble and profitable contest possible, in which the victor is pleased with his victory and the other is revenged by admitting it.

11.8 To have done a man more harm than one can, or is willing to, make amends for inclines the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect either revenge or forgiveness, and both are hateful.

11.9 Fear of oppression disposes a man to strike first, or to seek aid from others in association. For there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.

11.10 Men who distrust their own cleverness are better disposed for victory in tumult and sedition than those who think themselves wise or crafty. For the latter love to deliberate, while the former, fearing to be outmaneuvered, strike first. And in sedition, since men are always on the verge of battle, to hold together and use every advantage of force is a better stratagem than any that can come from subtlety of wit.

11.11 Vainglorious men who, without any real awareness in themselves of great ability, delight in imagining themselves gallant men, are inclined only to show and not to action. For when danger or difficulty appears, they expect nothing but to have their inadequacy exposed.

11.12 Vainglorious men who estimate their ability by the flattery of others, or by the good fortune of some earlier action, without any sure ground of hope in a true knowledge of themselves, are inclined to rush into engagements, and to retreat if they can when danger or difficulty approaches. For not seeing the way to safety, they would rather risk their honor, which can be patched up with an excuse, than their lives, for which no patch is enough.

11.13 Men who have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matters of government are disposed to ambition, because without public employment in council or magistracy the honor of their wisdom is lost. And therefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition, for eloquence seems like wisdom, both to themselves and to others.

11.14 Pusillanimity disposes men to irresolution, and consequently to losing the occasions and best opportunities for action. For when men have deliberated until the time for action

approaches, if it is not then clear what is best to do, that is a sign the motives one way and the other do not differ much. So not to decide then is to lose the occasion by weighing trifles—which is pusillanimity.

11.15 Frugality, though a virtue in poor men, makes a man unfit to achieve actions that require the strength of many men at once. For it weakens their effort, which must be nourished and kept vigorous by reward.

11.16 Eloquence together with flattery disposes men to trust those who have them, because the former is seeming wisdom and the latter seeming kindness. Add military reputation to them, and it disposes men to attach themselves and submit to those who have them. The first two assure them against danger from the man himself; the last assures them against danger from others.

11.17 Lack of science—that is, ignorance of causes—disposes, or rather compels, a man to rely on the advice and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concerns must, if they do not rely on their own opinion, rely on the opinion of someone else whom they think wiser than themselves and see no reason to suspect of deceiving them.

11.18 Ignorance of the meaning of words, which is lack of understanding, disposes men to take on trust not only the truth they do not know, but also the errors—and, what is more, the nonsense—of those they trust. For neither error nor nonsense can be detected without a perfect understanding of words.

11.19 From the same cause it comes about that men give different names to one and the same thing according to their own differing passions. Those who approve of a private opinion call it opinion, but those who dislike it call it heresy—and yet heresy means no more than private opinion, only with a stronger tinge of anger.

11.20 From the same cause, too, it comes about that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men and many actions of one multitude—for example, between the one action of all the senators of Rome in

killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of senators in killing Caesar. They are therefore disposed to take for the action of the people what is really a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, perhaps led by the persuasion of one.[42]

11.21 Ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice disposes a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions. He comes to think unjust whatever it has been the custom to punish, and just whatever he can produce an example of going unpunished and approved—or, as the lawyers who use only this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent. He is like little children, who have no other rule of good and bad manners than the correction they receive from their parents and teachers, except that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not. For having grown strong and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason and from reason to custom as it suits them, departing from custom when their interest requires it and setting themselves against reason whenever reason is against them. This is why the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and by the sword, whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not: in that subject men do not care what the truth is, since it crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust. For I do not doubt that if it had been contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men who have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine would have been, if not disputed, then suppressed by the burning of all books of geometry, as far as the one it concerned was able.

11.22 Ignorance of remote causes disposes men to attribute all events to the immediate and instrumental causes, for these are the only causes they perceive. Hence it happens everywhere that men who are aggrieved by payments to the public vent their anger on the publicans—that is, the tax farmers, collectors, and other officers of the public revenue—and attach themselves

42 In 63 BC the Senate decreed action against Lucius Sergius Catilina's conspiracy; Julius Caesar was assassinated by a group of senators in 44 BC.

to those who find fault with the public government. And so, once they have committed themselves beyond hope of justification, they also turn on the supreme authority, for fear of punishment or shame at receiving a pardon.

11.23 Ignorance of natural causes disposes a man to credulity, so that he often believes impossible things. For such people know nothing to the contrary—for all they know, these things may be true—being unable to detect the impossibility. And credulity, because men love to be listened to in company, disposes them to lying. So ignorance itself, without malice, can make a man both believe lies and tell them, and sometimes also invent them.

11.24 Anxiety about the future disposes men to inquire into the causes of things, because knowing them makes men better able to arrange the present to their best advantage.

11.25 Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from considering the effect to seek the cause, and then the cause of that cause, until of necessity he must at last come to this thought: that there is some cause which has no prior cause, but is eternal—and this is what men call God. So it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined by it to believe there is one eternal God, though men cannot have any idea of him in their minds that corresponds to his nature. For just as a man born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by it, may easily conceive and be sure that there is something there which men call fire and which is the cause of the heat he feels, but cannot imagine what it is like or have an idea of it in his mind such as those who see it have—so also, from the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive that there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet have no idea or image of him in his mind.

11.26 And those who make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things are still inclined—from the fear that comes from their very ignorance of what it is that has the power to do them much good or harm—to suppose and invent for themselves

various kinds of invisible powers. They stand in awe of their own imaginations, call on them in times of distress, and also thank them when they expect good success, making the creatures of their own fancy their gods. By this means it has come about that, from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created innumerable sorts of gods in the world. And this fear of invisible things is the natural seed of what each person calls religion in himself, and superstition in those who worship or fear that power differently from the way he does.

11.27 This seed of religion has been noticed by many; and some of those who noticed it have been inclined by it to nourish, dress, and shape it into laws, and to add to it any opinion of their own invention about the causes of future events by which they thought they would best be able to govern others and make the greatest use of their own powers.

CHAPTER 12: OF RELIGION

Religion grows from anxiety, ignorance of causes, and fear of invisible powers.

12.1 Since there are no signs or fruits of religion except in man alone, there is no reason to doubt that the seed of religion is also only in man, and consists in some peculiar quality—or at least in some eminent degree of it—not to be found in other living creatures.

12.2 First, it is peculiar to the nature of man to be inquisitive about the causes of the events he sees—some more, some less, but all men enough to be curious in searching for the causes of their own good and bad fortune.

12.3 Second, on seeing anything that has a beginning, to think also that it had a cause, which determined it to begin when it did rather than sooner or later.

12.4 Third, whereas beasts have no other felicity than enjoying their daily food, ease, and lusts—having little or no foresight of the time to come, for lack of observing and remembering the order, sequence, and dependence of the things they see—man

observes how one event has been produced by another, and remembers in them what came before and what followed. And when he cannot be sure of the true causes of things (for the causes of good and bad fortune are for the most part invisible), he supposes causes for them—either such as his own fancy suggests, or on the authority of other men whom he thinks to be his friends and wiser than himself.

12.5 The first two produce anxiety. For being sure that there are causes of all things that have happened so far or will happen hereafter, a man who is continually striving to secure himself against the evil he fears and to obtain the good he desires cannot help being in perpetual concern about the time to come. So every man, especially those who are overly provident, is in a state like that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus (whose name, interpreted, means "the prudent man") was bound to Mount Caucasus, a place with a wide view, where an eagle feeding on his liver devoured in the day as much as was restored in the night: so the man who looks too far ahead, in his care for the future, has his heart gnawed all day long by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity, and has no rest or pause from his anxiety except in sleep.[43]

12.6 This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in its ignorance of causes, as if in the dark, must necessarily have some object. And therefore, when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to blame for their good or bad fortune except some invisible power or agent. It was perhaps in this sense that some of the old poets said that the gods were first created by human fear—which, said of the gods (that is, the many gods of the Gentiles), is very true.[44] But the acknowledgment of one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies and their various powers and operations than from fear

43 In Greek myth Prometheus ("forethought") stole fire for mankind and was chained on the Caucasus by Zeus as punishment.

44 The line "fear first made gods in the world" (*primus in orbe deos fecit timor*) is from the Roman poet Statius (*Thebaid* 3.661).

of what was to befall them in the time to come. For anyone who, from any effect he sees come about, reasons to its next and immediate cause, and from there to the cause of that cause, and plunges deep into the pursuit of causes, will at last come to this: that there must be (as even the heathen philosophers admitted) one first mover—that is, a first and eternal cause of all things, which is what men mean by the name of God. And all this without any thought of their fortune, concern for which both inclines men to fear and hinders them from searching for the causes of other things, and so gives occasion for inventing as many gods as there are men to invent them.[45]

12.7 As for the matter or substance of the invisible agents so imagined, men could not by natural reasoning arrive at any other notion than that it was the same as that of the soul of man; and that the soul of man was of the same substance as what appears in a dream to someone asleep, or in a mirror to someone awake. Men, not knowing that such apparitions are nothing but creatures of the fancy, think them real and external substances, and therefore call them ghosts—as the Latins called them *imagines* and *umbrae*—and thought them spirits, that is, thin airy bodies. And they thought the invisible agents they feared were like them, except that they appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter any man's mind by nature. For though men may put together words of contradictory meaning, like "spirit" and "incorporeal," they can never have an imagination of anything corresponding to them. And therefore men who by their own meditation arrive at the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God prefer to confess that he is incomprehensible and above their understanding, rather than define his nature as "incorporeal spirit" and then confess their definition to be unintelligible. Or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically, with the intention of making the divine nature understood, but piously, to honor him with attributes

45 The "first mover" (unmoved mover) is Aristotle's argument in *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* XII.

whose meanings are as remote as possible from the grossness of visible bodies.

12.8 Next, as to the way in which they think these invisible agents brought about their effects—that is, what immediate causes they used in bringing things to pass—men who do not know what it is that we call causing (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guess by than observing and remembering what they have seen precede a similar effect at some other time or times, without seeing any dependence or connection at all between the earlier and the later event. And therefore from similar things past they expect similar things to come, and superstitiously hope for good or bad luck from things that have no part at all in causing it. So the Athenians, for their war at Lepanto, demanded another Phormio; the Pompeian faction, for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done the like on various occasions since.[46] In the same way they attribute their fortune to a bystander, to a lucky or unlucky place, or to words spoken—especially if the name of God is among them—as in charming and conjuring (the liturgy of witches), to the point of believing that such words have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or anything into anything.

12.9 Third, as for the worship that men naturally offer to invisible powers, it can be nothing other than such expressions of reverence as they would use toward men: gifts, petitions, thanks, bodily submission, respectful addresses, sober behavior, premeditated words, and swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises) by invoking them. Beyond that, reason suggests nothing, but leaves them either to stop there or, for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

12.10 Lastly, as to how these invisible powers declare to men the things that will come to pass hereafter—especially concerning their good or bad fortune in general, or good or bad success

46 Phormio won Athenian naval victories off Naupactus (Lepanto) in 429 BC; in 46 BC the Pompeians in Africa made Metellus Scipio their commander, trusting in the name of the Scipios who had conquered Carthage.

in any particular undertaking—men are by nature at a loss. Except that, being used to conjecturing about the future from the past, they are very apt not only to take chance things, after one or two occurrences, as omens of the same occurrence ever after, but also to believe similar omens from other men of whom they have once formed a good opinion.

12.11 And in these four things—belief in ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion toward what men fear, and taking chance things for omens—consists the natural seed of religion. Owing to the different fancies, judgments, and passions of different men, it has grown into ceremonies so different that those used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another.

12.12 For these seeds have been cultivated by two sorts of men. One sort have nourished and ordered them according to their own invention; the other have done it by God's commandment and direction. But both sorts have done it with the purpose of making the men who relied on them more apt for obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society. So the religion of the first sort is a part of human politics, and teaches part of the duty that earthly kings require of their subjects. And the religion of the second sort is divine politics, and contains precepts for those who have given themselves up as subjects in the Kingdom of God. Of the first sort were all the founders of commonwealths and the lawgivers of the Gentiles. Of the second sort were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed Savior, through whom the laws of the Kingdom of God have come down to us.

THE RELIGION OF THE GENTILES

Pagan lawgivers shaped the seeds of religion into gods, rites, and oracles to secure obedience.

12.13 As for that part of religion which consists in opinions about the nature of invisible powers, there is almost nothing with a name that has not been regarded among the Gentiles, in one place or another, as a god or devil, or imagined by their poets to be animated, inhabited, or possessed by some spirit or other.

12.14 The unformed matter of the world was a god, by the name of Chaos.

12.15 The heaven, the ocean, the planets, fire, the earth, the winds were so many gods.

12.16 Men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, an onion, a leek—deified. Besides this, they filled almost every place with spirits called daemons: the plains with Pan and Panises, or satyrs; the woods with fauns and nymphs; the sea with tritons and other nymphs; every river and spring with a ghost of its name and with nymphs; every house with its *lares*, or household spirits; every man with his *genius*; hell with ghosts and spiritual officers, such as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and at night, every place with *larvae*, *lemures*, ghosts of dead men, and a whole kingdom of fairies and bugbears. They have also ascribed divinity to, and built temples to, mere accidents and qualities, such as time, night, day, peace, concord, love, strife, virtue, honor, health, rust, fever, and the like. When they prayed for or against these, they prayed to them, as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, letting fall or withholding the good or evil for or against which they prayed. They also invoked their own wit, under the name of the Muses; their own ignorance, under the name of Fortune; their own lust, under the name of Cupid; their own rage, under the name of the Furies; their own private parts, under the name of Priapus; and attributed their nocturnal emissions to incubi and succubi. So there was nothing that a poet could introduce as a person in his poem that they did not make either a god or a devil.

12.17 The same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground of religion—men's ignorance of causes, and so their readiness to attribute their fortune to causes on which it plainly did not depend at all—took the opportunity to thrust on their ignorance, in place of second causes, a kind of second-rank, ministering gods. They ascribed the cause of fertility to Venus, the cause of the arts to Apollo, of subtlety and craft to Mercury, of tempests and storms to Aeolus, and of

other effects to other gods; so that among the heathen there was almost as great a variety of gods as of occupations.

12.18 And to the worship that men naturally thought fit to be used toward their gods—namely offerings, prayers, thanks, and the rest named before—the same lawgivers of the Gentiles added their images, both in painting and sculpture. They did this so that the more ignorant sort (that is, most people, the generality of the people), thinking that the gods these were made to represent were really contained and as it were housed within them, might stand in all the more fear of them. And they endowed them with lands, houses, officers, and revenues, set apart from all other human uses— that is, consecrated and made holy to those idols of theirs—as well as caverns, groves, woods, mountains, and whole islands. And they attributed to them not only shapes—some of men, some of beasts, some of monsters—but also the faculties and passions of men and beasts: sense, speech, sex, lust, generation (and this not only by mating with one another to propagate the race of gods, but also by mating with men and women to beget hybrid gods who were only lodgers in heaven, such as Bacchus, Hercules, and others); and besides these, anger, revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions that come from them, such as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomy, and any vice that may be taken as an effect of power or a cause of pleasure—all such vices as among men are held to be against law rather than against honor.

12.19 Lastly, to foreknowledge of the time to come—which naturally is only conjecture based on experience of the past, and supernaturally is divine revelation—the same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, partly on pretended experience and partly on pretended revelation, added innumerable other superstitious ways of divination. They made men believe they would find their fortunes sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous oracles—answers made ambiguous by design, so as to cover the outcome either way, or absurd from the intoxicating vapor of the place, which is very common in sulfurous caverns. Some-

times in the leaves of the Sibyls, of whose prophecies (like those, perhaps, of Nostradamus—for the fragments now surviving seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books held in repute in the time of the Roman republic. Sometimes in the meaningless utterances of people who were mentally ill, supposed to be possessed by a divine spirit, which possession they called enthusiasm; and these kinds of foretelling events were counted theomancy, or prophecy.[47] Sometimes in the aspect of the stars at their birth, which was called horoscopy and considered part of judicial astrology. Sometimes in their own hopes and fears, called thumomancy, or presage. Sometimes in the predictions of witches who claimed to converse with the dead, which is called necromancy, conjuring, and witchcraft, and is nothing but trickery and conspiring fraud. Sometimes in the chance flight or feeding of birds, called augury. Sometimes in the entrails of a sacrificed beast, which was haruspicy. Sometimes in dreams. Sometimes in the croaking of ravens or the chattering of birds. Sometimes in the features of the face, which was called metoposcopy; or by palmistry in the lines of the hand; or in chance words, called *omina*. Sometimes in monsters or unusual occurrences—eclipses, comets, rare meteors, earthquakes, floods, strange births, and the like—which they called *portenta* and *ostenta*, because they thought them to portend or foreshow some great calamity to come. Sometimes in mere lottery, such as heads or tails, counting holes in a sieve, dipping into verses of Homer and Virgil, and innumerable other such vain notions.[48] So easily are men drawn to believe anything from those who have gained credit with them and can, with gentleness and dexterity, take hold of their fear and ignorance.

12.20 And therefore the first founders and lawgivers of commonwealths among the Gentiles, whose only aims were to keep

47 The Sibylline Books were consulted by the Roman state in emergencies; Nostradamus (1503–1566) was a French astrologer famous for his verse prophecies.
48 "Dipping" into Homer or Virgil means opening the book at random and taking the first verse as an oracle (*sortes Homericae*, *sortes Virgilianae*).

the people in obedience and peace, have everywhere taken care, first, to imprint in their minds a belief that the precepts they gave concerning religion should not be thought to come from their own devising, but from the dictates of some god or other spirit—or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals—so that their laws might be more easily accepted. So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he instituted among the Romans from the nymph Egeria; the first king and founder of the kingdom of Peru pretended that he and his wife were children of the Sun; and Muhammad, to set up his new religion, pretended to have conversations with the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove.[49] Second, they have taken care to make it believed that the same things that were forbidden by the laws were displeasing to the gods. Third, they prescribed ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and festivals by which people were to believe the anger of the gods might be appeased; and they taught that failure in war, great epidemics of sickness, earthquakes, and each man's private misery came from the anger of the gods, and their anger from neglect of their worship, or from forgetting or mistaking some point of the required ceremonies. And though among the ancient Romans men were not forbidden to deny what the poets write about the pains and pleasures after this life—which several men of great authority and gravity in that state openly ridiculed in their speeches—yet that belief was always more encouraged than its contrary.

12.21 By these and other such institutions they obtained what served their end (which was the peace of the commonwealth): that the common people, laying the blame for their misfortunes on neglect of or error in their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were less apt to mutiny against their governors. And being entertained with the pomp and amusement of festivals and public games made in honor of the gods, they needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent,

49 Numa was the legendary second king of Rome; the Peruvian founder is Manco Cápac of the Inca. The dove story about Muhammad was a Christian polemical legend, not Muslim tradition, which names the angel Gabriel.

grumbling, and agitation against the state. And therefore the Romans, who had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, had no scruple about tolerating any religion whatever in the city of Rome itself, unless it had something in it that could not be reconciled with their civil government. Nor do we read that any religion was forbidden there except that of the Jews, who (being the special Kingdom of God) thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state whatever. And so you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy.

12.22 But where God himself planted religion by supernatural revelation, there he also made for himself a special kingdom, and gave laws not only of behavior toward himself but also toward one another. And so in the Kingdom of God, policy and civil laws are a part of religion, and therefore the distinction between temporal and spiritual dominion has no place there. It is true that God is King of all the earth; yet he may be King of a special, chosen nation. For there is no more inconsistency in this than in the general commander of the whole army also having a particular regiment or company of his own. God is King of all the earth by his power; but of his chosen people he is King by covenant. But I have assigned another place in the following discourse to speak more fully of the Kingdom of God, both by nature and by covenant.

HOW RELIGIONS DECLINE

Religions fail when their priests lose the reputation of wisdom, sincerity, and love.

12.23 From the way religion is propagated, it is not hard to understand the causes of its dissolution back into its first seeds or principles. These are only a belief in a deity and in invisible and supernatural powers, which can never be so abolished from human nature that new religions cannot spring up from them again through the cultivation of men who are held in repute for that purpose.

12.24 For all formed religion is founded at first on the faith that a multitude has in some one person, whom they believe to be not only a wise man, who labors to secure their happiness, but also a holy man, to whom God himself deigns to declare his will supernaturally. It follows necessarily that when those who govern religion come to have their wisdom, their sincerity, or their love suspected, or when they are unable to show any probable sign of divine revelation, the religion they want to uphold must be suspected too—and (without the fear of the civil sword) contradicted and rejected.

12.25 What takes away the reputation of wisdom in someone who founds a religion, or adds to one already founded, is requiring belief in contradictions. Both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true, and so to require belief in them is a proof of ignorance. It exposes the author in that, and discredits him in everything else he puts forward as supernatural revelation. A man may indeed have revelation of many things above natural reason, but of nothing against it.

12.26 What takes away the reputation of sincerity is doing or saying things that appear to be signs that what they require other men to believe, they do not believe themselves. All such doings and sayings are therefore called scandalous, because they are stumbling blocks that make men fall on the way of religion: such as injustice, cruelty, profaneness, avarice, and luxury. For who can believe that a man who habitually does things that spring from any of these roots believes there is any such invisible power to be feared as the one he frightens other men with for lesser faults?[50]

12.27 What takes away the reputation of love is being found out in private aims: as when the belief they require of others leads, or seems to lead, to the acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or secure pleasure for themselves alone, or chiefly for themselves. For whatever men reap benefit from themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.

12.28 Lastly, the testimony men can give of a divine calling can be nothing but the working of miracles, or true prophecy (which is also a miracle), or extraordinary felicity. And therefore, when points are added to those points of religion received from men who did such miracles, by people who do not prove their calling by some miracle, those additions win no greater belief than the custom and laws of the places where people are brought up have instilled in them. For as in natural things men of judgment require natural signs and arguments, so in supernatural things they require supernatural signs (which are miracles) before they consent inwardly, from their hearts.

12.29 All these causes of the weakening of men's faith appear plainly in the following examples. First, we have the example of the children of Israel. When Moses, who had proved his calling to them by miracles and by leading them happily out of Egypt, was absent for only forty days, they revolted from the worship of the true God he had commended to them, set up a golden calf as their god, and relapsed into the idolatry of the Egyptians, from whom they had so lately been delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and the generation that had seen the great works of God in Israel were dead, another generation arose and served Baal. So when miracles failed, faith failed too.[51]

12.30 Again, when the sons of Samuel, whom their father had appointed judges in Beersheba, took bribes and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused to have God as their king any longer, except in the way he was king of other peoples, and cried out to Samuel to choose them a king like the other nations. So when justice failed, faith failed too—so far that they deposed their God from reigning over them.[52]

12.31 And when the Christian religion was being planted, the oracles fell silent in every part of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians increased wonderfully every day and in every place through the preaching of the apostles and evangel-

50 "Scandalous" comes from the Greek *skandalon,* a stumbling block or snare.
51 Exodus 32 (the golden calf); Judges 2:7–11 (the generation that served Baal).
52 1 Samuel 8.

ists. A great part of that success may reasonably be attributed to the contempt into which the priests of the Gentiles at that time had brought themselves by their impurity, their avarice, and their double-dealing between princes. The religion of the Church of Rome, too, was abolished in England and many other parts of Christendom partly for the same cause—since the failing of virtue in the pastors makes faith fail in the people—and partly because the Schoolmen brought the philosophy and doctrine of Aristotle into religion. From this arose so many contradictions and absurdities that the clergy got a reputation for both ignorance and fraudulent intent, and people were inclined to revolt from them: either against the will of their own princes, as in France and Holland, or with their will, as in England.

12.32 Lastly, among the points the Church of Rome declared necessary for salvation, there are so many plainly to the advantage of the pope, and of his spiritual subjects living in the territories of other Christian princes, that were it not for the mutual rivalry of those princes, they could exclude all foreign authority without war or trouble, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who does not see whose benefit it serves to have it believed that a king does not have his authority from Christ unless a bishop crowns him? That a king, if he is a priest, cannot marry? That whether a prince was born in lawful marriage or not must be judged by authority from Rome? That subjects may be freed from their allegiance if the court of Rome judges the king a heretic? That a king (like Childeric of France) may be deposed by a pope (like Pope Zachary) for no cause, and his kingdom given to one of his subjects? That the clergy and the members of religious orders, in whatever country, shall be exempt from their king's jurisdiction in criminal cases?[53] Or who does not see whose profit is served by the fees for private masses and the payments for purgatory, along with other signs of private interest—enough to deaden the liveliest faith, if (as I

53 Childeric III, last Merovingian king of the Franks, was deposed in 751 with the approval of Pope Zachary, and Pepin the Short took the throne. "Regulars" are clergy living under a monastic rule.

said) the civil magistrate and custom did not sustain it more than any opinion people have of the holiness, wisdom, or honesty of their teachers? So I may attribute all the changes of religion in the world to one and the same cause: unpleasing priests—and not only among Catholics, but even in the church that has most presumed to be reformed.

CHAPTER 13: OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND

Equal men without a common power fall into a war of every man against every man.

13.1 Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind that, though one man is sometimes found plainly stronger in body or quicker of mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable that one man can claim for himself any benefit that another may not claim as well as he. For as to strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret plotting or by alliance with others who are in the same danger as himself.

13.2 And as to the faculties of the mind, I find an even greater equality among men than that of strength—setting aside the arts grounded on words, and especially that skill of proceeding by general and infallible rules called science, which very few have, and they in only a few things, since it is not a native faculty we are born with, nor one acquired (like prudence) while we are attending to something else. For prudence is nothing but experience, which equal time bestows equally on all men in the things they equally apply themselves to. What may perhaps make such equality incredible is only a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost everyone thinks he has in greater measure than the common people—that is, than everyone but himself and a few others whom he approves, whether for their fame or for agreeing with him. For such is the nature of men that, however many others they may acknowledge to be wittier, or more eloquent, or more learned, they will hardly believe that many are

as wise as themselves; for they see their own wit close at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proves rather that men are equal on that point than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share.

13.3 From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in attaining our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and on the way to their end (which is chiefly their own preservation, and sometimes only their pleasure) they endeavor to destroy or subdue one another. And so it comes about that where an invader has nothing more to fear than one other man's single power, if one man plants, sows, builds, or possesses a convenient place, others may probably be expected to come prepared with united forces to dispossess him and deprive him not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader in turn is in the same danger from another.

13.4 And from this mistrust of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation: that is, by force or cunning, to master the persons of as many men as he can, until he sees no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own preservation requires, and is generally allowed. Also, because there are some who take pleasure in contemplating their own power in acts of conquest, which they pursue further than their security requires, others, who would otherwise be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, would not be able to survive for long by standing only on the defensive, if they did not increase their power by invasion.[54] And consequently, since such an increase of dominion over men is necessary to a man's preservation, it ought to be allowed him.

13.5 Again, men take no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man expects his companion to

54 "Diffidence" in Hobbes means distrust or mistrust, not shyness.

value him at the same rate he sets on himself; and at every sign of contempt or undervaluing, he naturally endeavors, as far as he dares (which, among those who have no common power to keep them quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater valuation from those who scorn him by doing them harm, and from others by the example.

13.6 So in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; second, diffidence; third, glory.

13.7 The first makes men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles—a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervaluing, whether aimed directly at their persons or reflected on their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

13.8 From this it is clear that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in the condition called war—and such a war as is of every man against every man. For *war* consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a stretch of time during which the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known. So the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lies not in a shower or two of rain, but in a tendency toward it over many days together, so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition to it during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is *peace*.

13.9 Whatever follows from a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, follows also from the time when men live without any other security than what their own strength and their own ingenuity supply them with. In such a condition there is no place for industry, because its fruit is uncertain; and consequently no cultivation of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the goods that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments for moving and removing things that

require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no reckoning of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, what is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

13.10 It may seem strange to someone who has not weighed these things well that nature should thus set men apart and make them apt to invade and destroy one another. And so, not trusting this inference drawn from the passions, he may perhaps want to have it confirmed by experience. Let him consider, then, that when he takes a journey he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied; when he goes to sleep he locks his doors; even in his own house he locks his chests—and this when he knows there are laws, and armed public officers, to avenge any injury done to him. What opinion does he have of his fellow subjects when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants when he locks his chests? Does he not accuse mankind as much by his actions as I do by my words? But neither of us accuses man's nature in this. The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. Nor are the actions that proceed from those passions, until men know a law that forbids them. That they cannot know until laws are made; and no law can be made until they have agreed on the person who is to make it.

13.11 It may perhaps be thought that there never was such a time, or such a condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over the whole world. But there are many places where people live so now. For the Indigenous peoples in many places of America have no government at all, except the government of small families, whose concord depends on natural desire; and they live at this day in that brutish manner I described above. However that may be, it can be seen what manner of life there would be where there was no common power to fear, from the manner of life into which men who have previously lived under a peaceful government tend to degenerate in a civil war.[55]

55 Hobbes wrote in the aftermath of the English Civil Wars (1642–1651).

13.12 But even if there had never been any time when individual men were in a condition of war against one another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independence, are in continual jealousy, and in the state and posture of gladiators, with their weapons pointed and their eyes fixed on one another—that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns on the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies on their neighbors—which is a posture of war. But because by this they uphold the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it the misery that accompanies the liberty of individual men.

13.13 To this war of every man against every man, this also follows: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place there. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where there is no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are, in war, the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are not faculties of either the body or the mind. If they were, they might be in a man who was alone in the world, just as his senses and passions are. They are qualities that belong to men in society, not in solitude. It follows also from the same condition that there is no property, no dominion, no distinct mine and yours; but only that is every man's that he can get, and for as long as he can keep it. And so much for the miserable condition in which man is actually placed by mere nature—though with a possibility of coming out of it, which lies partly in the passions and partly in his reason.

13.14 The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope of obtaining them by their industry. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, on which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are what are otherwise called the laws of nature, which I shall speak of more particularly in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 14: OF THE FIRST AND SECOND LAWS OF NATURE, AND OF CONTRACTS

The right of nature, the first two laws of nature, and how rights are laid down.

14.1 The *right of nature*, which writers commonly call *jus naturale*, is the liberty each man has to use his own power as he himself wills, for the preservation of his own nature—that is to say, of his own life—and consequently of doing anything that, in his own judgment and reason, he conceives to be the fittest means to that end.

14.2 By *liberty* is understood, according to the proper meaning of the word, the absence of external impediments. These impediments may often take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left to him as his judgment and reason dictate.

14.3 A *law of nature* (*lex naturalis*) is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do what is destructive of his life, or takes away the means of preserving it, and to omit what he thinks may best preserve it. For though those who speak of this subject tend to confuse *jus* and *lex*, *right* and *law*, they ought to be distinguished. *Right* consists in liberty to do or to refrain, whereas *law* determines and binds to one of them. So law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

14.4 And the condition of man (as was shown in the preceding chapter) is a condition of war of everyone against everyone, in which case everyone is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not help him in preserving his life against his enemies. It follows that in such a condition every man has a right to everything—even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to everything endures, there can be no security for any man (however strong or wise he may be) of living out the time that nature ordinarily allows men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule, of reason: that every man ought to endeavor

peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all the helps and advantages of war. The first branch of this rule contains the first and fundamental law of nature, which is to seek peace, and follow it. The second contains the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can, to defend ourselves.[56]

14.5 From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace, is derived this second law: that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far as he thinks it necessary for peace and for the defense of himself, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with as much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holds this right of doing anything he likes, so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his; for that would be to expose himself as prey (which no man is bound to do) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel: "Whatever you require that others should do to you, do that to them." And that law of all men: *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*—"What you would not have done to you, do not do to another."[57]

14.6 To lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another from the benefit of his own right to the same thing. For he who renounces or passes away his right does not give any other man a right he did not have before, since there is nothing to which every man did not have a right by nature. He only stands out of the other's way, so that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him—though not without hindrance from anyone else. So the effect that comes to one man from another man's giving up of his right is only so much reduction of the obstacles to the use of his own original right.

56 "Seek peace, and pursue it": Psalm 34:14, quoted in 1 Peter 3:11.
57 Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:31. The Latin maxim is the negative form of the Golden Rule, a proverb found in classical and early Christian writers.

14.7 Right is laid aside either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it to another. By simply *renouncing*, when he does not care to whom the benefit of it goes. By *transferring*, when he intends the benefit of it for some particular person or persons. And when a man has abandoned or granted away his right in either way, he is said to be *obliged*, or *bound*, not to hinder those to whom that right is granted or abandoned from the benefit of it; and he ought—it is his *duty*—not to make void that voluntary act of his own; and such hindrance is *injustice* and *injury*, as being *sine jure*, "without right," since the right was renounced or transferred before. So injury or injustice, in the controversies of the world, is something like what in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For as it is called an absurdity there to contradict what one maintained at the beginning, so in the world it is called injustice and injury voluntarily to undo what one had voluntarily done from the beginning. The way a man either simply renounces or transfers his right is by a declaration or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs, that he does so renounce or transfer it, or has so renounced or transferred it, to the one who accepts it. And these signs are either words only, or actions only, or (as most often happens) both words and actions. And these are the *bonds* by which men are bound and obliged: bonds that have their strength not from their own nature (for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word), but from fear of some evil consequence of breaking them.

14.8 Whenever a man transfers or renounces his right, it is either in consideration of some right transferred to himself in return, or for some other good he hopes for by it. For it is a voluntary act, and of every man's voluntary acts the object is some good to himself. And therefore there are some rights that no man can be understood, by any words or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. First, a man cannot lay down the right of resisting those who assault him by force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim by it at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, chains, and imprison-

ment: both because no benefit follows from such submission, as there does from the submission of allowing another to be wounded or imprisoned, and also because a man cannot tell, when he sees men proceeding against him with violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly, the motive and end for which this renouncing and transferring of right is introduced is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man, by words or other signs, seems to strip himself of the very end for which those signs were intended, he is not to be understood as meaning it, or as if it were his will, but as having been ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

CONTRACTS, COVENANTS, AND GIFTS

Hobbes distinguishes contract, covenant, and free gift, and explains which covenants bind and which are void.

14.9 The mutual transferring of right is what men call *contract*.

14.10 There is a difference between transferring the right to a thing and transferring, or handing over—that is, delivering—the thing itself. For the thing may be delivered together with the transfer of the right, as in buying and selling with ready money, or in exchanging goods or lands; or it may be delivered some time later.

14.11 Again, one of the contracting parties may deliver the thing contracted for on his side and leave the other to perform his part at some fixed time afterward, trusting him in the meantime; and then the contract on his part is called a *pact*, or *covenant*. Or both parties may contract now to perform later. In these cases, when the one who is to perform in the future is trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith, and the failure to perform (if it is voluntary) violation of faith.

14.12 When the transferring of right is not mutual, but one of the parties transfers in the hope of gaining friendship or service from another or from his friends; or in the hope of gaining a

reputation for charity or magnanimity; or to relieve his mind of the pain of compassion; or in the hope of reward in heaven—this is not contract, but *gift*, *free gift*, *grace*, words that all mean one and the same thing.

14.13 Signs of contract are either express or by inference. Express signs are words spoken with an understanding of what they mean. Such words are either of the present or past tense—as, "I give," "I grant," "I have given," "I have granted," "I will that this be yours"—or of the future, as, "I will give," "I will grant." These words of the future are called *promise*.

14.14 Signs by inference are sometimes the consequence of words, sometimes of silence, sometimes of actions, sometimes of refraining from an action. And in general a sign by inference of any contract is whatever sufficiently shows the will of the contracting party.

14.15 Words alone, if they are of the future and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a free gift, and therefore not binding. For if they are of the future, as, "Tomorrow I will give," they are a sign that I have not yet given, and consequently that my right is not transferred but remains until I transfer it by some other act. But if the words are of the present or past, as, "I have given," or "I give, to be delivered tomorrow," then my right for tomorrow is given away today—and that by virtue of the words, even if there were no other evidence of my will. And there is a great difference in the meaning of these words: *Volo hoc tuum esse cras* and *Cras dabo*—that is, between "I will that this be yours tomorrow" and "I will give it to you tomorrow." For the words "I will" in the first form of speech signify a present act of the will, but in the second they signify a promise of a future act of the will. And therefore the first words, being of the present, transfer a future right; the second, being of the future, transfer nothing. But if there are other signs of the will to transfer a right besides words, then, even though the gift is free, the right may be understood to pass by words of the future. For example, if a man offers a prize to whoever comes first to the end of a race, the gift is free; and though the words are of the future, the right

passes. For if he did not want his words to be so understood, he should not have let the runners run.

14.16 In contracts, the right passes not only where the words are of the present or past, but also where they are of the future. For all contract is a mutual transfer or exchange of right; and so he who only promises, because he has already received the benefit for which he promises, is to be understood as intending the right to pass. For unless he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that reason, in buying and selling and other acts of contract, a promise is equivalent to a covenant, and therefore binding.

14.17 He who performs first in the case of a contract is said to *merit* what he is to receive by the other's performance, and he has it as due. Also, when a prize is offered to many, to be given only to the one who wins, or money is thrown among many, to be enjoyed by those who catch it, then though this is a free gift, yet so to win or so to catch is to merit, and to have it as *due*. For the right is transferred in the offering of the prize and in the throwing down of the money, though to whom it goes is not determined except by the outcome of the contest. But there is this difference between these two sorts of merit. In contract, I merit by virtue of my own power and the other party's need; but in this case of free gift, I am enabled to merit only by the kindness of the giver. In contract, I merit at the other party's hands that he should part with his right; in this case of gift, I do not merit that the giver should part with his right, but that, once he has parted with it, it should be mine rather than another's. And this I take to be the meaning of the Schoolmen's distinction between *meritum congrui* and *meritum condigni*. For God Almighty has promised Paradise to those men (blindfolded by carnal desires) who can walk through this world according to the precepts and limits he has prescribed. They say that he who walks so shall merit Paradise *ex congruo*. But because no man can claim a right to it by his own righteousness, or any other

power in himself, but only by the free grace of God,[58] they say that no man can merit Paradise *ex condigno*. This, I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction. But because disputers do not agree on the meaning of their own technical terms any longer than it serves their turn, I will not affirm anything about their meaning. Only this I say: when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he who wins merits it, and may claim the prize as due.

14.18 If a covenant is made in which neither party performs at once, but they trust one another, then in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every man against every man), upon any reasonable suspicion it is void. But if there is a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void. For he who performs first has no assurance that the other will perform afterward, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions without the fear of some coercive power—which, in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal and are judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he who performs first only betrays himself to his enemy, contrary to the right (which he can never abandon) of defending his life and his means of living.

14.19 But in a civil state, where there is a power set up to restrain those who would otherwise break their faith, that fear is no longer reasonable; and for that reason, he who by the covenant is to perform first is obliged to do so.

14.20 The cause of fear that makes such a covenant invalid must always be something that arises after the covenant is made, such as some new fact or other sign of the will not to perform; otherwise it cannot make the covenant void. For what could not hinder a man from promising ought not to be admitted as a hindrance to performing.

14.21 He who transfers any right transfers the means of enjoying it, as far as lies in his power. So he who sells land is under-

stood to transfer the grass and whatever grows on it; nor can he who sells a mill divert the stream that drives it. And those who give a man the right of government as sovereign are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers, and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice.

14.22 To make covenants with brute beasts is impossible. Since they do not understand our speech, they do not understand or accept any transfer of right, nor can they transfer any right to another; and without mutual acceptance there is no covenant.

14.23 To make a covenant with God is impossible, except through the mediation of those to whom God speaks, either by supernatural revelation or through his lieutenants who govern under him and in his name. For otherwise we do not know whether our covenants are accepted or not. And therefore those who vow anything contrary to any law of nature vow in vain, since it would be unjust to pay such a vow. And if the thing is commanded by the law of nature, it is not the vow but the law that binds them.

14.24 The matter, or subject, of a covenant is always something that falls under deliberation (for to covenant is an act of the will—that is to say, an act, and the last act, of deliberation); and so it is always understood to be something to come, and something judged possible for the one who covenants to perform.

14.25 And therefore to promise what is known to be impossible is no covenant. But if something proves impossible afterward that was thought possible before, the covenant is valid and binds—not to the thing itself, but to its value; or, if that also is impossible, to the sincere endeavor of performing as much as is possible, for no man can be obliged to more.

14.26 Men are freed from their covenants in two ways: by performing, or by being forgiven. For performance is the natural end of obligation, and forgiveness the restoring of liberty, being a transferring back of the right in which the obligation consisted.

58 Scholastic theology distinguished merit "of congruity" (fitting reward, granted out of God's liberality) from merit "of condignity" (reward strictly owed in justice).

14.27 Covenants entered into out of fear, in the condition of mere nature, are binding. For example, if I covenant to pay an enemy a ransom, or service, for my life, I am bound by it. For it is a contract in which one party receives the benefit of life and the other is to receive money or service for it; and consequently, where no other law forbids the performance (as none does in the condition of mere nature), the covenant is valid. Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it. And if a weaker prince makes a disadvantageous peace with a stronger one out of fear, he is bound to keep it—unless (as was said before) some new and just cause of fear arises to renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I am forced to buy myself free from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it until the civil law discharges me. For whatever I may lawfully do without obligation, I may lawfully covenant to do out of fear; and what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

14.28 An earlier covenant makes a later one void. For a man who has passed away his right to one man today does not have it to pass to another tomorrow; and therefore the later promise passes no right, but is null.

14.29 A covenant not to defend myself from force by force is always void. For (as I showed before) no man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment—the avoiding of which is the only end of laying down any right—and therefore the promise not to resist force transfers no right in any covenant, nor is it binding. For though a man may covenant like this—"Unless I do such and such, kill me"—he cannot covenant like this: "Unless I do such and such, I will not resist you when you come to kill me." For man by nature chooses the lesser evil, which is the danger of death in resisting, rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And all men grant this to be true, in that they lead criminals to execution and to prison with armed men, even though those criminals have consented to the law by which they are condemned.

14.30 A covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation; and in the civil state, accusation is followed by punishment, which, being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is true of accusing those whose condemnation would bring a man into misery, such as a father, a wife, or a benefactor. For the testimony of such an accuser, if not willingly given, is presumed to be corrupted by nature, and therefore is not to be accepted; and where a man's testimony is not to be believed, he is not bound to give it. Also, accusations made under torture are not to be counted as testimony. For torture is to be used only as a means of conjecture and a light in the further examination and search for truth; and what is confessed in that case tends to the relief of the one tortured, not to the informing of the torturers. It therefore ought not to be given the credit of sufficient testimony; for whether he frees himself by true or false accusation, he does it by the right of preserving his own life.

OATHS

Fear is what holds men to covenants; an oath adds nothing to the obligation.

14.31 The force of words being (as I have noted before) too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants, there are in man's nature only two conceivable helps to strengthen it. These are either a fear of the consequences of breaking their word, or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it. The latter is a generosity too rarely found to be relied on, especially in those who pursue wealth, command, or sensual pleasure, who are the greatest part of mankind. The passion to be reckoned on is fear, which has two very general objects: one, the power of invisible spirits; the other, the power of those men they would offend by breaking faith. Of these two, though the former is the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear. The fear of the former is, in every man, his own religion, which

has a place in the nature of man before civil society. The latter does not—at least not a place large enough to keep men to their promises—because in the condition of mere nature, inequality of power is not discerned except by the outcome of battle. So before the time of civil society, or when it is interrupted by war, there is nothing that can strengthen a covenant of peace, once agreed on, against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, except the fear of that invisible power that each of them worships as God and fears as an avenger of their treachery. All that can be done, therefore, between two men not subject to civil power is for each to make the other swear by the God he fears. This swearing, or *oath*, is a form of speech added to a promise, by which the one who promises signifies that unless he performs, he renounces the mercy of his God, or calls on him for vengeance on himself. Such was the heathen form: "Let Jupiter kill me otherwise, as I kill this beast." So is our form: "I shall do thus and thus, so help me God." And this is done with the rites and ceremonies each one uses in his own religion, so that the fear of breaking faith may be the greater.[59]

14.32 From this it appears that an oath taken in any form or rite other than the swearer's own is in vain, and no oath at all; and that there is no swearing by anything the swearer does not think to be God. For though men have sometimes sworn by their kings, out of fear or flattery, they meant it to be understood that they attributed divine honor to them. It appears too that swearing by God unnecessarily is nothing but profaning his name; and that swearing by other things, as men do in ordinary talk, is not swearing at all, but an impious custom, picked up from too much vehemence in talking.

14.33 It appears also that the oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God as much without the oath as with it. If unlawful, it does not bind at all, even though it is confirmed with an oath.

59 The Roman formula accompanied the sacrifice of an animal when a treaty was sworn (Livy 1.24).

CHAPTER 15: OF OTHER LAWS OF NATURE

The third law, keeping covenants, is the origin of justice; further laws of nature follow.

15.1 From that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another those rights which, if retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there follows a third, which is this: that men perform their covenants made. Without this, covenants are in vain and nothing but empty words; and since the right of all men to all things remains, we are still in the condition of war.

15.2 In this law of nature lies the fountain and origin of *justice*. For where no covenant has gone before, no right has been transferred, and every man has a right to everything; consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust. And the definition of *injustice* is nothing other than the nonperformance of covenant. Whatever is not unjust is just.

15.3 But covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of nonperformance on either side, are invalid (as was said in the previous chapter). So although the origin of justice is the making of covenants, there can actually be no injustice until the cause of that fear is taken away. And while men are in the natural condition of war, that cannot be done. Therefore, before the names of just and unjust can have any place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to perform their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect from breaking them; and to make good the property that men acquire by mutual contract, in recompense for the universal right they abandon. And no such power exists before a commonwealth is set up. This can also be gathered from the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools. They say that "justice is the constant will to give every man his own." Therefore, where there is no *own*—that is, no property—there is no injustice. And where no coercive power has been set up—that is, where there is no commonwealth—there is no property, all men having a right

to all things. Therefore where there is no commonwealth, nothing is unjust.[60] So the nature of justice consists in keeping valid covenants. But the validity of covenants begins only with the establishment of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them; and it is then, too, that property begins.

THE FOOL'S OBJECTION

Hobbes answers the fool who says that breaking covenants can sometimes be reasonable.

15.4 The fool has said in his heart that there is no such thing as justice—and sometimes he says it with his tongue as well. He seriously argues that, since every man's preservation and contentment are committed to his own care, there could be no reason why every man might not do whatever he thought led to them; and so also that to make or not make, keep or not keep, covenants was not against reason, when it led to one's benefit.[61] He does not deny that there are covenants, that they are sometimes broken and sometimes kept, and that breaking them may be called injustice and keeping them justice. What he questions is whether injustice—setting aside the fear of God (for the same fool has said in his heart there is no God)—may not sometimes be consistent with that reason which dictates to every man his own good. And particularly when it leads to a benefit that would put a man in a position to disregard not only the blame and abuse of other men, but also their power. The Kingdom of God is taken by violence; but what if it could be taken by unjust violence?[62] Would it be against reason to take it that way, when it is impossible to come to any harm by it? And if it is not against reason, it is not against justice—or else justice is not to be approved as good. From reasoning like this, successful wicked-

60 The definition goes back to the Roman jurist Ulpian, as given in Justinian's *Institutes* 1.1.

61 Hobbes adapts Psalm 14:1 (and 53:1): "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God."

62 "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force" (Matthew 11:12).

ness has come to be called virtue. And some who in all other things have condemned breaking faith have nevertheless allowed it when it is done to win a kingdom. And the heathens, who believed that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, nevertheless believed that same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice. This is somewhat like a point of law in Coke's *Commentaries on Littleton*, where he says that if the rightful heir to the crown is attainted of treason, the crown shall still descend to him, and *eo instante* (at that very instant) the attainder shall be void. From such instances a man will be very apt to infer that when the heir apparent of a kingdom kills the one in possession, even his own father, you may call it injustice or any other name you like, yet it can never be against reason. For all the voluntary actions of men aim at their own benefit, and the actions most reasonable are those that do most to achieve their ends.[63] This plausible reasoning is nevertheless false.

15.5 For the question is not about mutual promises where there is no security of performance on either side—as when no civil power has been set up over the parties promising—for such promises are not covenants. The question is about cases where either one of the parties has already performed, or there is a power to make him perform: is it then against reason, that is, against his benefit, for the other party to perform or not? And I say it is not against reason. To make this plain, we must consider, first, that when a man does something which, as far as can be foreseen and calculated, tends to his own destruction, then even if some accident he could not have expected turns it to his benefit, such events do not make it a reasonable or wise thing to have done. Second, in a condition of war, where every man is an enemy to every man for want of a common power to keep them all in awe, no man can hope to defend himself from destruction by his own strength or wit without the help of allies; and in such

63 Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634), the great English jurist, whose *First Institute* (1628) is a commentary on Sir Thomas Littleton's fifteenth-century treatise on land tenure. To be "attainted" of treason was to lose one's civil rights and the right to inherit or pass on property.

an alliance every one expects the same protection as any other. Therefore he who declares that he thinks it reasonable to deceive those who help him can reasonably expect no other means of safety than what his own single power can provide. He, then, who breaks his covenant, and so declares that he thinks he may reasonably do so, cannot be received into any society that unites for peace and defense, except by the error of those who receive him. Nor, once received, can he be kept in it once they see the danger of their error. And these are errors a man cannot reasonably count on as the means of his security. So if he is left out or cast out of society, he perishes; and if he lives in society, it is by other men's errors, which he could neither foresee nor count on—and therefore against the reason of his own preservation. And so all men who do not contribute to his destruction spare him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

15.6 As for the example of gaining the secure and everlasting felicity of heaven by any means whatever, it is frivolous. There is only one imaginable way, and that is not breaking covenant but keeping it.

15.7 And as for the other example, attaining sovereignty by rebellion: it is plain that even if it succeeds, the attempt is against reason. For success cannot reasonably be expected—rather the contrary—and by gaining sovereignty in this way, others are taught to gain it the same way. Justice, therefore—that is, the keeping of covenant—is a rule of reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and consequently a law of nature.

15.8 Some go further. They will not have the law of nature be those rules that lead to the preservation of man's life on earth, but rather to the attaining of eternal felicity after death—to which they think breaking covenant may lead, and so be just and reasonable. (Such are those who think it a meritorious work to kill, or depose, or rebel against the sovereign power set over them by their own consent.) But there is no natural knowledge of man's state after death, still less of the reward to be given then

for breaking faith—only a belief grounded on other men's saying that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those who knew others who knew it supernaturally. So breaking faith cannot be called a precept of reason, or of nature.

15.9 Others, who accept the keeping of faith as a law of nature, nevertheless make an exception for certain persons—such as heretics, and those who are in the habit of not performing their covenants to others. This too is against reason. For if any fault in a man is enough to release us from a covenant we have made with him, the same fault should in reason have been enough to prevent our making it.

15.10 The names *just* and *unjust* mean one thing when they are attributed to men and another when they are attributed to actions. Attributed to men, they mean the conformity or nonconformity of their manners to reason. Attributed to actions, they mean the conformity or nonconformity to reason not of manners, or way of life, but of particular actions. A just man, therefore, is one who takes all the care he can that his actions may all be just; and an unjust man is one who neglects to. In our language such men are more often called *righteous* and *unrighteous* than just and unjust, though the meaning is the same. So a righteous man does not lose that title through one or a few unjust actions that come from sudden passion or from mistaking things or persons. Nor does an unrighteous man lose his character for things he does, or refrains from doing, out of fear, because his will is shaped not by justice but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. What gives human actions the flavor of justice is a certain nobleness or gallantry of courage (rarely found), by which a man scorns to owe the contentment of his life to fraud or breach of promise. This justice of manners is what is meant when justice is called a virtue and injustice a vice.

15.11 But the justice of actions makes men not *just* but *guiltless*; and the injustice of actions (which is also called injury) gives them only the name of *guilty*.

15.12 Again, the injustice of manners is the disposition or aptitude to do injury. It is injustice before it proceeds to action,

and without supposing any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action (that is, injury) supposes an individual person injured—namely, the one to whom the covenant was made. And so the injury is often received by one man while the damage falls on another. For example, when a master commands his servant to give money to a stranger, if it is not done, the injury is done to the master, whom the servant had previously covenanted to obey; but the damage falls on the stranger, to whom he had no obligation, and whom he therefore could not injure. So also in commonwealths, private men may forgive one another their debts, but not robberies or other acts of violence by which they are harmed. For withholding a debt is an injury to themselves; but robbery and violence are injuries to the person of the commonwealth.

15.13 Whatever is done to a man in accordance with his own will, made known to the doer, is no injury to him. For if the doer has not given away his original right to do as he pleases by some previous covenant, there is no breach of covenant, and therefore no injury done. And if he has, then the other's will to have it done, once made known, is a release from that covenant; and so again there is no injury done him.

15.14 Writers divide the justice of actions into *commutative* and *distributive*. The former, they say, consists in arithmetical proportion, the latter in geometrical proportion. Commutative justice they therefore place in equality of value in the things contracted for; distributive justice in the distribution of equal benefit to men of equal merit—as if it were injustice to sell for more than we buy, or to give a man more than he merits. But the value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contracting parties; and therefore the just value is whatever they are content to give.[64] And merit is not due by justice but is rewarded by grace alone—except merit by covenant, where performance on one side merits performance on the other, and which falls under commutative, not distributive, justice. So this distinction, in the sense in which it is usually explained, is not

64 The distinction comes from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book V.

right. Properly speaking, commutative justice is the justice of a contractor—that is, the performance of covenant in buying and selling, hiring and letting out for hire, lending and borrowing, exchanging, bartering, and other acts of contract.

15.15 And distributive justice is the justice of an arbitrator—that is, the act of defining what is just. If he performs the trust placed in him by those who made him arbitrator, he is said to distribute to every man his own. This is indeed just distribution, and may be called (though improperly) distributive justice—but more properly equity, which is also a law of nature, as will be shown in due place.

THE REMAINING LAWS OF NATURE

Gratitude, accommodation, pardon, equality, equity, and the other laws of nature are set out.

15.16 As justice depends on a previous covenant, so *gratitude* depends on previous grace—that is, a previous free gift. It is the fourth law of nature, which may be stated in this form: that a man who receives benefit from another out of mere grace endeavor that he who gives it have no reasonable cause to regret his good will. For no man gives except with the intention of some good to himself, because a gift is voluntary, and in all voluntary acts the object for every man is his own good. If men see that they will be frustrated in this, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of mutual help, nor of reconciliation of one man to another. They will therefore remain in the condition of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature, which commands men to seek peace. The breach of this law is called *ingratitude*, and it has the same relation to grace that injustice has to obligation by covenant.

15.17 A fifth law of nature is *complaisance*—that is, that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. To understand this, we may consider that in men's aptness for society there is a diversity of nature, arising from their diversity of affections, not

unlike what we see in stones brought together to build an edifice. For a stone that, by the roughness and irregularity of its shape, takes more room from the others than it fills itself, and that, being hard, cannot easily be made smooth, and so hinders the building, is thrown away by the builders as useless and troublesome. So too a man who, by roughness of nature, will strive to keep things that are superfluous to himself and necessary to others, and who cannot be corrected because of the stubbornness of his passions, is to be left out or cast out of society as a burden to it. For every man is supposed, not only by right but also by necessity of nature, to endeavor all he can to obtain what is necessary for his preservation. So he who sets himself against this for the sake of superfluous things is guilty of the war that follows from it, and therefore does what is contrary to the fundamental law of nature, which commands to seek peace. Those who observe this law may be called *sociable* (the Latins call them *commodi*); the contrary, *stubborn, unsociable, perverse, intractable*.

15.18 A sixth law of nature is this: that on security for the future, a man ought to pardon the past offenses of those who repent and desire it. For *pardon* is nothing but the granting of peace. Granted to those who persist in their hostility, it is not peace but fear; yet refused to those who give security for the future, it is a sign of aversion to peace, and therefore contrary to the law of nature.

15.19 A seventh is, that in revenges (that is, returning evil for evil) men look not at the greatness of the past evil, but at the greatness of the good to follow. By this we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other purpose than the correction of the offender or the direction of others. This law follows from the one before it, which commands pardon on security for the future. Besides, revenge without regard to example and future benefit is a triumph or glorying in another's hurt that tends to no end (for the end is always something to come). And glorying to no end is vainglory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason tends to bring on war, which is against the law of nature. It is commonly called *cruelty*.

15.20 And because all signs of hatred or contempt provoke men to fight—so much so that most men would rather risk their lives than not be revenged—we may set down in eighth place, as a law of nature, this precept: that no man by deed, word, look, or gesture declare hatred or contempt of another. The breach of this law is commonly called *contumely*.

15.21 The question of who is the better man has no place in the condition of mere nature, where (as has been shown before) all men are equal. The inequality that now exists has been introduced by civil laws. I know that Aristotle, in the first book of his *Politics*, makes it a foundation of his doctrine that by nature some men are more worthy to command—meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be on account of his philosophy—and others to serve—meaning those who had strong bodies but were not philosophers as he was. As if master and servant were introduced not by men's consent but by difference of intelligence! This is not only against reason but also against experience.[65] For there are very few so foolish that they would not rather govern themselves than be governed by others. Nor, when those who are wise in their own opinion contend by force with those who distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost ever, win. If nature, then, has made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged. Or if nature has made men unequal, then still, because men who think themselves equal will not enter into conditions of peace except on equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And therefore, as the ninth law of nature, I set down this: that every man acknowledge every other as his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is *pride*.

15.22 On this law depends another: that on entering into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. As it is necessary for all men who seek peace to lay down certain rights of nature—that is, not to have liberty to do all they please—so it is necessary for man's life to retain some: such as the right to govern their own bodies, to enjoy air, water, motion,

65 Aristotle, *Politics* I, on those who are "by nature" fit to rule and to be ruled.

ways to go from place to place, and all other things without which a man cannot live, or cannot live well. If in this case, when making peace, men require for themselves what they would not have granted to others, they act contrary to the preceding law, which commands the acknowledgment of natural equality, and so also against the law of nature. Those who observe this law are those we call *modest*, and those who break it *arrogant*. The Greeks call the violation of this law *pleonexia*—that is, a desire for more than one's share.

15.23 Also, if a man is trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature that he deal equally between them. For without that, men's controversies cannot be settled except by war. He, therefore, who is partial in judgment does all he can to deter men from using judges and arbitrators, and so (against the fundamental law of nature) is the cause of war.

15.24 The observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man of what in reason belongs to him, is called *equity*, and (as I said before) distributive justice. Its violation is called *respect of persons*, or *prosopolepsia*.[66]

15.25 And from this follows another law: that things which cannot be divided be enjoyed in common, if that can be done; and, if the quantity of the thing permits, without limit; otherwise in proportion to the number of those who have a right to it. For otherwise the distribution is unequal and contrary to equity.

15.26 But there are some things that can be neither divided nor enjoyed in common. Then the law of nature, which prescribes equity, requires that the entire right—or else, making the use alternate, the first possession—be decided by lot. For equal distribution is part of the law of nature, and no other means of equal distribution can be imagined.

15.27 There are two sorts of *lots*, *arbitrary* and *natural*. Arbitrary is the one agreed on by the competitors. Natural is either *primogeniture* (which the Greeks call *kleronomia*, meaning *given by lot*) or *first seizure*.

66 *Prosopolepsia*: Greek, "favoritism," literally "receiving the face"; the New Testament word for God's being "no respecter of persons" (Acts 10:34; Romans 2:11).

15.28 Therefore things that can neither be enjoyed in common nor divided ought to be awarded to the first possessor—and in some cases to the firstborn, as acquired by lot.

15.29 It is also a law of nature that all men who mediate peace be allowed safe conduct. For the law that commands peace as the *end* commands intercession as the *means*; and the means to intercession is safe conduct.

15.30 However willing men may be to observe these laws, questions may nevertheless arise concerning a man's action: first, whether it was done or not; second (if done), whether it was against the law or not. The former is called a question *of fact*, the latter a question *of right*. Therefore, unless the parties to the question mutually covenant to abide by the sentence of another, they are as far from peace as ever. This other, to whose sentence they submit, is called an *arbitrator*. And so it is a law of nature that those who are in controversy submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator.

15.31 And since every man is presumed to do everything with a view to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause. And even if he were ever so fit, equity allows each party equal benefit, so if one is admitted as judge, the other must be admitted too. And so the controversy—that is, the cause of war—remains, against the law of nature.

15.32 For the same reason, no man ought to be accepted as arbitrator in any cause if greater profit, or honor, or pleasure evidently comes to him from the victory of one party than of the other. For he has taken a bribe—an unavoidable bribe, but a bribe—and no man can be obliged to trust him. And so, again, the controversy and the condition of war remain, contrary to the law of nature.

15.33 And in a controversy of *fact*, since the judge is to give no more credit to one party than to the other, he must (if there are no other proofs) give credit to a third, or to a third and fourth, or more. Otherwise the question is left undecided and left to force, contrary to the law of nature.

THE LAWS OF NATURE AS MORAL PHILOSOPHY

The laws are summed up in one rule, bind in conscience, and are the true moral philosophy.

15.34 These are the laws of nature that dictate peace as a means to the preservation of men in multitudes, and which concern only the doctrine of civil society. There are other things that tend to the destruction of individual men, such as drunkenness and all the other kinds of intemperance. These may therefore also be counted among the things the law of nature has forbidden; but they need not be mentioned, and are not relevant enough to this place.

15.35 This may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature to be noticed by all men, most of whom are too busy getting food and the rest too careless to understand. Yet, to leave all men without excuse, the laws have been summed up in one easy rule, intelligible even to the humblest capacity: "Do not do to another what you would not have done to yourself." This shows him that all he has to do in learning the laws of nature is this: when he weighs other men's actions against his own and they seem too heavy, he should put them in the other pan of the balance and his own in their place, so that his own passions and self-love add nothing to the weight. Then there is none of these laws of nature that will not seem to him very reasonable.

15.36 The laws of nature oblige *in foro interno*—that is, they bind us to desire that they take effect. But *in foro externo*—that is, to putting them into action—they do not always oblige. For a man who was modest and tractable, and performed everything he promised, at a time and place where no one else would do so, would only make himself a prey to others and bring about his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature, which tend to nature's preservation. And again, a man who has sufficient security that others will observe the same laws toward him, yet does not observe them himself, seeks not peace but

war, and consequently the destruction of his nature by violence.[67]

15.37 And any laws that bind *in foro interno* may be broken not only by a deed contrary to the law, but also by a deed in keeping with it, if a man thinks it contrary. For though his action in this case accords with the law, his purpose was against it; and where the obligation is *in foro interno*, that is a breach.

15.38 The laws of nature are immutable and eternal. For injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, respect of persons, and the rest can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life and peace destroy it.

15.39 These same laws, because they oblige only to a desire and endeavor—I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavor—are easy to observe. For since they require nothing but endeavor, he who endeavors to perform them fulfills them; and he who fulfills the law is just.

15.40 And the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is *good* and *evil* in the conversation and society of mankind. *Good* and *evil* are names that signify our appetites and aversions, which differ in men of different temperaments, customs, and doctrines. And different men differ not only in their judgment of the senses—of what is pleasant and unpleasant to taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight—but also of what is agreeable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of ordinary life. Indeed, the same man at different times differs from himself: at one time he praises—that is, calls good—what at another time he disparages and calls evil. From this arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore, so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war), private appetite is the measure of good and evil. Consequently all men agree on this: that peace is good, and therefore also that the way or means of peace—which (as I have shown before) are *justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy*, and the rest of the laws of

67 *In foro interno ... in foro externo*: Latin, "in the inner court" (of conscience) and "in the outer court" (of action).

nature—are good; that is to say, *moral virtues*; and their contrary *vices*, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature is the true moral philosophy. But the writers on moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices, do not see in what their goodness consists, nor that they come to be praised as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living. So they place them in a mean between passions—as if not the cause but the degree of daring made fortitude, or not the cause but the quantity of a gift made liberality.[68]

15.41 Men are accustomed to call these dictates of reason laws, but improperly. For they are only conclusions, or theorems, concerning what leads to the preservation and defense of themselves; whereas law, properly, is the word of him who by right has command over others. Yet if we consider the same theorems as delivered in the word of God, who by right commands all things, then they are properly called laws.

CHAPTER 16: OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED

A person is natural or artificial; actors act by the authority of authors.

16.1 A *person* is he *whose words or actions are considered either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to which they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.*

16.2 When they are considered as his own, he is called a *natural person*. When they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, he is a *feigned* or *artificial person*.

16.3 The word *person* is Latin. In its place the Greeks have *prosopon*, which means the *face*, just as *persona* in Latin means the *disguise* or *outward appearance* of a man counterfeited on the stage—and sometimes, more particularly, the part of it that disguises the face, such as a mask or visor. From the stage it has

68 Aimed at Aristotle's doctrine that each virtue is a mean between two extremes (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book II).

been transferred to anyone who represents speech and action, in law courts as well as theaters. So a *person* is the same as an *actor*, both on the stage and in ordinary conversation; and to *personate* is to *act* or *represent* oneself or another. He who acts another is said to bear his person, or to act in his name. (It is in this sense that Cicero uses it when he says, *Unus sustineo tres personas: mei, adversarii, et judicis*—"I bear three persons: my own, my adversary's, and the judge's.") And on different occasions he is called by different names: a *representer* or *representative*, a *lieutenant*, a *vicar*, an *attorney*, a *deputy*, a *procurator*, an *actor*, and the like.[69]

16.4 Of artificial persons, some have their words and actions *owned* by those whom they represent. The person is then the *actor*, and he who owns his words and actions is the *author*; in this case the actor acts by authority. For what is called an *owner* when we speak of goods and possessions—in Latin *dominus*, in Greek *kurios*—is called an author when we speak of actions. And as the right of possession is called dominion, so the right of doing any action is called *authority*. So by authority is always understood a right of doing some act; and *done by authority* means done by commission or license from him whose right it is.

16.5 It follows from this that when the actor makes a covenant by authority, he binds the author by it, no less than if the author had made it himself, and subjects him no less to all its consequences. Therefore everything said earlier (chapter 14) about the nature of covenants between man and man in their natural capacity is also true when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators who have authority from them—as far as their commission extends, but no further.

16.6 And therefore whoever makes a covenant with the actor or representer without knowing what authority he has does so at his own risk. For no man is obliged by a covenant of which he is

69 Cicero, *De Oratore* 2.102, where the orator describes preparing a case by playing each part in turn.

not the author; nor, consequently, by a covenant made against or beyond the authority he gave.

16.7 When the actor does something against the law of nature by command of the author, then if he is obliged by an earlier covenant to obey him, it is not he but the author who breaks the law of nature. For though the action is against the law of nature, it is not his. On the contrary, to refuse to do it is against the law of nature that forbids breach of covenant.

16.8 And he who makes a covenant with the author through the mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority the actor has but only taking his word, is no longer obliged if that authority is not made plain to him on demand. For the covenant made with the author is not valid without his counter-assurance. But if the one who so covenants knew beforehand that he was to expect no other assurance than the actor's word, then the covenant is valid, because in this case the actor makes himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident the covenant obliges the author, not the actor, so when the authority is feigned it obliges the actor only, there being no author but himself.

16.9 There are few things that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things, such as a church, a hospital, or a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But inanimate things cannot be authors, and so cannot give authority to their actors. Yet the actors may have authority to provide for their upkeep, given them by those who are the owners or governors of those things. And therefore such things cannot be personated before there is some state of civil government.

16.10 Likewise children, people with severe intellectual disabilities, and people who are mentally ill, having no use of reason, may be personated by guardians or curators. But (during that time) they can be authors of no action done by those guardians —except insofar as, when they recover the use of reason, they judge the action reasonable. Yet during the incapacity, he who has the right of governing them may give authority to the guard-

ian. But this again has no place except in a civil state, because before such a state there is no dominion over persons.

16.11 An idol, or mere figment of the brain, may be personated, as the gods of the heathens were. They were personated by officers appointed by the state, and held possessions and other goods and rights that men from time to time dedicated and consecrated to them. But idols cannot be authors, for an idol is nothing. The authority came from the state; and therefore, before civil government was introduced, the gods of the heathens could not be personated.

16.12 The true God may be personated. So he was: first, by Moses, who governed the Israelites (who were not his people but God's) not in his own name, with *Hoc dicit Moses* ("Thus says Moses"), but in God's name, with *Hoc dicit Dominus* ("Thus says the Lord"). Second, by the Son of Man, his own Son, our blessed Savior Jesus Christ, who came to bring the Jews back and to draw all nations into his Father's kingdom—not as of himself, but as sent by his Father. And third, by the Holy Spirit, or Comforter, speaking and working in the apostles; and this Holy Spirit was a Comforter who came not of himself, but was sent by, and proceeded from, them both.

HOW A MULTITUDE BECOMES ONE PERSON

A multitude becomes one person when one representative acts with each member's consent.

16.13 A multitude of men are made *one* person when they are represented by one man, or one person, provided it is done with the consent of every one of that multitude individually. For it is the *unity* of the representer, not the *unity* of the represented, that makes the person *one*. And it is the representer who bears the person, and only one person. Unity cannot be understood in a multitude in any other way.

16.14 And because the multitude is naturally not *one* but *many*, they cannot be understood as one author but as many authors of everything their representative says or does in their name.

Every man gives their common representer authority from himself individually, and owns all the actions the representer does, if they give him authority without limit. Otherwise, when they limit him in what and how far he shall represent them, none of them owns more than what they commissioned him to act.

16.15 And if the representative consists of many men, the voice of the greater number must be considered as the voice of them all. For if (for example) the smaller number pronounces in the affirmative and the greater in the negative, there will be more than enough negatives to cancel the affirmatives; and so the excess of negatives, standing uncontradicted, is the only voice the representative has.

16.16 And a representative of an even number, especially when the number is not large, so that the opposing voices are often equal, is for that reason often mute and incapable of action. Yet in some cases opposing voices equal in number may decide a question. In condemning or acquitting, for instance, an equality of votes acquits by the very fact that it does not condemn; but it does not, conversely, condemn by the fact that it does not acquit. For when a case is heard, not to condemn is to acquit; but to say, on the contrary, that not acquitting is condemning, is not true. It is the same in deliberating whether to execute something at once or to postpone it to another time. For when the voices are equal, not decreeing execution is a decree of postponement.

16.17 Or if the number is odd—three or more (men or assemblies)—and each one of them has, by a negative vote, authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative votes of the rest, this number is no representative. For through the diversity of men's opinions and interests it often becomes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute person, unfit for many things and in particular for governing a multitude, especially in time of war.

16.18 There are two sorts of authors. The first is simply so called; I defined him earlier as one who owns the action of another simply. The second is one who owns an action or coven-

ant of another conditionally—that is, he undertakes to do it if the other does not do it at or before a certain time. These conditional authors are generally called *sureties*—in Latin *fidejussores* and *sponsores*; and in particular, for debt, *praedes*; and for appearance before a judge or magistrate, *vades*.

Part II: Of Commonwealth

How the state is made by covenant, the rights of the sovereign, liberty of subjects, law, crime and punishment, and what weakens a commonwealth.

CHAPTER 17: OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMONWEALTH

Men leave the state of war by covenanting to give all their power to one sovereign person.

17.1 The final cause, end, or purpose of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others) in introducing that restraint upon themselves in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life as a result. That is to say, it is to get themselves out of that miserable condition of war which, as has been shown, necessarily follows from the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and to tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants and the observance of the laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.

17.2 For the laws of nature (such as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to), of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, which carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which everyone keeps when he has the will to keep them, when he can do so safely), if there is no power set up, or none great enough

for our security, every man will—and lawfully may—rely on his own strength and skill as a safeguard against all other men. And in all places where men have lived in small families, robbing and plundering one another has been a trade. So far from being thought against the law of nature, the greater the plunder they gained, the greater was their honor. And in this men observed no other laws but the laws of honor: that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving men their lives and their farming tools. And as small families did then, so now do cities and kingdoms, which are only greater families. For their own security they enlarge their dominions on every pretext of danger, and of fear of invasion or of assistance that may be given to invaders. They try as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbors, by open force and by secret arts—justly, for want of any other safeguard—and they are remembered for it with honor in later ages.

17.3 Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men that gives them this security. For in small numbers, small additions on one side or the other make the advantage of strength so great as to be enough to carry the victory, and so they encourage invasion. The multitude large enough to be trusted for our security is not fixed by any definite number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear. It is sufficient when the enemy's advantage is not so visibly and conspicuously decisive for the outcome of a war as to move him to attempt it.

17.4 And however great a multitude there may be, if their actions are directed by their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can expect from it no defense or protection, either against a common enemy or against the injuries they do one another. For being divided in opinion about the best use and application of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another, and by mutual opposition reduce their strength to nothing. As a result they are easily subdued, not only by a very few who agree together; but also, when there is no common enemy, they make war on each other for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to agree in observing justice and the other laws of nature without a

common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same. And then there would be no civil government or commonwealth at all, nor any need of one, because there would be peace without subjection.

17.5 Nor is it enough, for the security that men desire should last all their lives, that they be governed and directed by one judgment for a limited time, as in one battle or one war. For though they win a victory against a foreign enemy by their united effort, afterward—when either they have no common enemy, or the one whom some hold to be an enemy is held by others to be a friend—they must, through the difference of their interests, break apart and fall again into a war among themselves.

17.6 It is true that certain living creatures, such as bees and ants, live sociably with one another (and are therefore counted by Aristotle among political creatures). Yet they have no other direction than their particular judgments and appetites, nor any speech by which one of them can signify to another what he thinks useful for the common benefit. So someone may perhaps want to know why mankind cannot do the same. To this I answer:[1]

17.7 First, that men are continually competing for honor and dignity, which these creatures are not. Consequently there arise among men, on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war; but among these creatures, not so.

17.8 Second, that among these creatures the common good does not differ from the private; and being inclined by nature to their private good, they procure the common benefit by it. But man, whose joy consists in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what stands above the rest.

17.9 Third, that these creatures, not having the use of reason as man does, do not see, or think they see, any fault in the management of their common business. Among men, by contrast, there are very many who think themselves wiser, and better able to

1 Aristotle, *History of Animals* I.1 and *Politics* I.2, classes bees, ants and cranes with humans as "political" animals.

govern the public than the rest. These strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that, and so bring the public into disorder and civil war.

17.10 Fourth, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice in making their desires and other feelings known to one another, lack that art of words by which some men can represent to others what is good in the likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of good, and can enlarge or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil—discontenting men and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

17.11 Fifth, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury and damage. Therefore, as long as they are at ease, they are not offended with their fellows. Man, however, is most troublesome when he is most at ease; for it is then that he loves to show his wisdom and to control the actions of those who govern the commonwealth.

17.12 Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant only, which is artificial. And so it is no wonder if something else is required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting: namely, a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit.

THE GENERATION OF THE LEVIATHAN

Each man authorizes one man or assembly to bear his person; the multitude so united is a commonwealth.

17.13 The only way to set up such a common power—one able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and so to secure them that by their own industry and the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly—is to confer all their power and strength on one man, or on one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, to one will. That is as much as to say: to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and for everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be the author

of whatever he who so bears their person shall do, or cause to be done, in those things that concern the common peace and safety; and in this to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord. It is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such a way as if every man should say to every man: "I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition: that you give up your right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner." This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a *commonwealth*, in Latin *civitas*. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that *mortal god* to which we owe, under the *immortal God*, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he has the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that by the terror of it he is enabled to shape the wills of them all toward peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad.[2] And in him consists the essence of the commonwealth, which, to define it, is *one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants with one another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end that he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defense*.

17.14 And he who carries this person is called *sovereign*, and is said to have *sovereign power*; and everyone else is his *subject*.

17.15 This sovereign power is attained in two ways. One is by natural force: as when a man makes his children submit themselves and their children to his government, since he is able to destroy them if they refuse; or when by war he subdues his enemies to his will, granting them their lives on that condition. The other is when men agree among themselves to submit voluntarily to some man, or assembly of men, trusting to be protected by him against all others. This latter may be called a political

2 Hobbes's "to performe the wills of them all" has often been read as "to forme," i.e. to shape; the modernization follows that reading.

commonwealth, or a commonwealth by *institution*; and the former a commonwealth by *acquisition*. And first I shall speak of a commonwealth by institution.

CHAPTER 18: OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION

From the covenant that institutes a commonwealth follow the sovereign's rights, which no subject can revoke.

18.1 A *commonwealth* is said to be *instituted* when a *multitude* of men agree and *covenant, every one with every one*, that to whatever *man* or *assembly of men* the majority shall give the *right* to *present* the person of them all (that is to say, to be their *representative*), every one—he who *voted for it* as well as he who *voted against it*—shall *authorize* all the actions and judgments of that man, or assembly of men, in the same way as if they were his own, in order to live peaceably among themselves and be protected against other men.

18.2 From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the *rights* and *faculties* of him, or them, on whom sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.

18.3 First, because they covenant, it is to be understood that they are not obliged by any earlier covenant to anything inconsistent with this one. Consequently, those who have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant among themselves to be obedient to anyone else, in anything whatever, without his permission. And therefore those who are subjects of a monarch cannot, without his leave, cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor can they transfer their person from him who bears it to another man or another assembly of men. For they are bound, every man to every man, to own, and be reputed author of, all that he who is already their sovereign shall do and judge fit to be done. So if any one man dissents, all the rest would break the covenant they made with that man, which is injustice. And every man has also given the sovereignty

to him who bears their person; so if they depose him, they take from him what is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he who attempts to depose his sovereign is killed or punished by him for the attempt, he is the author of his own punishment, since by the institution he is author of all his sovereign shall do. And because it is injustice for a man to do anything for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is on that ground also unjust. And whereas some men have pleaded, as grounds for disobeying their sovereign, a new covenant made not with men but with God, this also is unjust. For there is no covenant with God except through the mediation of somebody who represents God's person; and no one does that but God's lieutenant, who holds the sovereignty under God. But this pretense of a covenant with God is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders' own consciences, that it is the act not only of an unjust disposition but also of a vile and unmanly one.[3]

18.4 Second, because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to the one they make sovereign by a covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can be no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign. Consequently none of his subjects can be freed from his subjection on any pretense of forfeiture. That he who is made sovereign makes no covenant with his subjects beforehand is plain. For either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant, or he must make a separate covenant with every man. With the whole as one party it is impossible, because as yet they are not one person. And if he makes as many separate covenants as there are men, those covenants become void once he has the sovereignty. For whatever act any one of them can allege as a breach of them is the act both of himself and of all the rest, because it is done in the person, and by the right, of every one of them in particular. Besides, if one or more of them allege a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at his institution,

3 Hobbes has in mind the Scottish National Covenant (1638) and the Solemn League and Covenant (1643), by which opponents of Charles I bound themselves before God.

and others—or one other of his subjects, or he himself alone—maintain there was no such breach, there is in this case no judge to decide the controversy. It returns therefore to the sword again, and every man recovers the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It is therefore futile to grant sovereignty by way of a prior covenant. The opinion that any monarch receives his power by covenant—that is to say, on condition—comes from failing to understand this easy truth: that covenants, being but words and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, except what they have from the public sword—that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men, that has the sovereignty, whose actions are vouched for by them all and performed by the strength of them all united in him. But when an assembly of men is made sovereign, no one imagines that any such covenant took place at the institution. For no one is so dull as to say, for example, that the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold the sovereignty on such-and-such conditions, which, if not performed, would allow the Romans lawfully to depose the Roman people. That men do not see the reasoning to be the same in a monarchy as in a popular government comes from the ambition of some, who are kinder to the government of an assembly, in which they may hope to take part, than to monarchy, which they despair of enjoying.

18.5 Third, because the majority has by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he who dissented must now consent with the rest—that is, be content to avow all the actions the sovereign shall do—or else be justly destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered the congregation of those who were assembled, he sufficiently declared by that his will (and therefore tacitly covenanted) to abide by what the majority should ordain. And so if he refuses to abide by it, or protests against any of their decrees, he acts contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he is of the congregation or not, and whether his consent is asked or not, he must either submit to their decrees or be

left in the condition of war he was in before, in which he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatever.

18.6 Fourth, because every subject is by this institution the author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted, it follows that whatever the sovereign does can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be accused of injustice by any of them. For he who does anything by authority from another does no injury by it to the one by whose authority he acts. But by this institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sovereign does. Consequently, he who complains of injury from his sovereign complains of something of which he himself is the author, and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself—no, nor even himself of injury, because to do injury to oneself is impossible. It is true that those who have sovereign power may commit iniquity, but not injustice, or injury in the proper sense.

18.7 Fifth, and following from what was said last, no man who has sovereign power can justly be put to death, or punished in any other way, by his subjects. For since every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign, he would be punishing another for actions committed by himself.

18.8 And because the end of this institution is the peace and defense of them all, and whoever has a right to the end has a right to the means, it belongs by right to whatever man or assembly has the sovereignty to be judge both of the means of peace and defense and of whatever hinders and disturbs them; and to do whatever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for preserving peace and security by preventing discord at home and hostility from abroad, and, when peace and security are lost, for recovering them. And therefore,

18.9 Sixth, it belongs to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are hostile to peace and what are conducive to it; and consequently on what occasions, how far, and in what, men are to be trusted in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they are published. For the actions of men proceed from their opinions,

and in the good government of opinions consists the good government of men's actions, for the sake of their peace and concord. And though in matters of doctrine nothing ought to be regarded but the truth, this is not inconsistent with regulating doctrine with a view to peace. For doctrine contrary to peace can no more be true than peace and concord can be against the law of nature. It is true that in a commonwealth where, through the negligence or lack of skill of governors and teachers, false doctrines have in time come to be generally received, the contrary truths may be generally offensive. Yet the most sudden and rough bustling-in of a new truth that can be never breaks the peace, but only sometimes awakens the war. For men who are so loosely governed that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are still at war. Their condition is not peace but only a cessation of arms for fear of one another, and they live, as it were, continually within the precincts of battle. It belongs therefore to him who has the sovereign power to be judge, or to appoint all judges, of opinions and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace, so as to prevent discord and civil war.

18.10 Seventh, there belongs to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules by which every man may know what goods he may enjoy and what actions he may do without being molested by any of his fellow subjects. And this is what men call *propriety*, or property. For before the constitution of sovereign power (as has already been shown) all men had a right to all things, which necessarily causes war. And therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace and depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, for the sake of the public peace. These rules of propriety (or *meum* and *tuum*, mine and yours), and of *good, evil, lawful*, and *unlawful* in the actions of subjects, are the civil laws—that is to say, the laws of each particular commonwealth. The name "civil law" is now, however, restricted to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome, which, being the head of a great part of the world, had laws that were at that time the civil law in these parts.

18.11 Eighth, there belongs to the sovereignty the right of judicature: that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies that may arise concerning law, whether civil or natural, or concerning fact. For without the decision of controversies there is no protection of one subject against the injuries of another; the laws concerning *meum* and *tuum* are in vain; and every man retains, from the natural and necessary appetite for his own preservation, the right of protecting himself by his private strength —which is the condition of war, and contrary to the end for which every commonwealth is instituted.

18.12 Ninth, there belongs to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths: that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that purpose; and of levying money on the subjects to cover the expenses. For the power by which the people are to be defended consists in their armies, and the strength of an army in the union of their strength under one command. And the sovereign instituted therefore has that command, because the command of the *militia*, without any other institution, makes whoever has it sovereign. And therefore, whoever is made general of an army, he who has the sovereign power is always generalissimo.

18.13 Tenth, there belongs to the sovereignty the choosing of all counselors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, both in peace and in war. For since the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and defense, he is understood to have power to use such means as he shall think most fit for discharging it.

18.14 Eleventh, to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding every subject with riches or honor, and of punishing him with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with disgrace, according to the law he has previously made; or, if no law has been made, according to what he shall judge most conducive to encouraging men to serve the commonwealth, or to deterring them from doing it disservice.

18.15 Lastly, consider what value men are naturally apt to set on themselves, what respect they look for from others, and how little they value other men—from which there continually arise among them rivalry, quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destruction of one another and the weakening of their strength against a common enemy. Given this, it is necessary that there be laws of honor, and a public valuation of the worth of those men who have deserved, or are able to deserve, well of the commonwealth; and that there be force in the hands of someone or other to put those laws into execution. But it has already been shown that not only the whole *militia*, or forces of the commonwealth, but also the judicature of all controversies belongs to the sovereignty. To the sovereign therefore it belongs also to give titles of honor; to appoint what order of place and dignity each man shall hold; and to appoint what signs of respect they shall give to one another in public or private meetings.

SOVEREIGNTY CANNOT BE DIVIDED

These rights are inseparable, and dividing them led England into civil war.

18.16 These are the rights that make up the essence of sovereignty, and they are the marks by which a man may discern in what man or assembly of men the sovereign power is placed and resides. For these are incommunicable and inseparable. The power to coin money; to dispose of the estates and persons of infant heirs; to have first right of purchase in markets; and all other statutory prerogatives may be transferred by the sovereign, and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained. But if he transfers the *militia*, he retains the judicature in vain, for want of means to execute the laws. Or if he grants away the power of raising money, the *militia* is in vain. Or if he gives away the government of doctrines, men will be frightened into rebellion by the fear of spirits. And so if we consider any one of these rights, we shall at once see that holding all the rest will have no effect in preserving peace and justice, the end for which all com-

monwealths are instituted. And this division is what is meant by the saying, *a kingdom divided against itself cannot stand*. For unless this division comes first, division into opposing armies can never happen.[4] If there had not first been an opinion received by the greater part of England that these powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people would never have been divided and fallen into this civil war—first between those who disagreed in politics, and afterward between the dissenters about liberty of religion. These have so instructed men on this point of sovereign right that there are few now in England who do not see that these rights are inseparable. And so they will be generally acknowledged at the next return of peace, and will continue to be until their miseries are forgotten—and no longer, unless the common people are better taught than they have been so far.[5]

18.17 And because they are essential and inseparable rights, it necessarily follows that in whatever words any of them may seem to be granted away, the grant is void if the sovereign power itself is not renounced in direct terms, and the name of sovereign is still given by the grantees to him who grants them. For when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the sovereignty, all is restored, as inseparably attached to it.

18.18 This great authority being indivisible, and inseparably attached to the sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of those who say of sovereign kings that, though they are *singulis majores*, of greater power than each one of their subjects, they are *universis minores*, of less power than all of them together. For if by "all together" they do not mean the collective body as one person, then "all together" and "every one" signify the same thing, and the saying is absurd. But if by "all together" they understand them as one person (which person the sovereign bears), then the power of all together is the same as the sovereign's power, and so again the saying is absurd. They see this absurdity well enough when the sovereignty is in an assembly

4 Matthew 12:25; Mark 3:24; Luke 11:17.

5 "This civil war": the English Civil Wars (1642–51), still unsettled as Hobbes wrote.

of the people; but in a monarch they do not see it. And yet the power of sovereignty is the same in whomever it is placed.

18.19 And as the power, so also the honor of the sovereign ought to be greater than that of any or all of the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honor. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are his creations. As in the presence of the master the servants are equal, and without any honor at all, so are the subjects in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine, some more and some less, when they are out of his sight, yet in his presence they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the sun.

18.20 But someone may object here that the condition of subjects is very miserable, since they are exposed to the lusts and other irregular passions of him or them who have so unlimited a power in their hands. And commonly those who live under a monarch think it the fault of monarchy, and those who live under the government of a democracy or other sovereign assembly attribute all the trouble to that form of commonwealth —whereas the power in all forms, if they are complete enough to protect them, is the same. They do not consider that the condition of man can never be without some inconvenience or other, and that the greatest that can possibly befall the people in general under any form of government is scarcely felt in comparison with the miseries and horrible calamities that accompany a civil war, or that lawless condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws and a coercive power to tie their hands from plunder and revenge. Nor do they consider that the greatest pressure from sovereign governors comes not from any delight or profit they can expect from the damage or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor their own strength and glory consists, but from the stubbornness of the subjects themselves, who, contributing unwillingly to their own defense, make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace, so that they may have the means, on any emergency or sudden need, to resist their enemies or take advantage of them. For all men are by nature provided with notable magnifying

glasses (that is, their passions and self-love), through which every little payment appears a great grievance; but they lack those telescopes (namely moral and civil science) to see from afar the miseries that hang over them, which cannot be avoided without such payments.

CHAPTER 19: OF THE KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY INSTITUTION, AND OF SUCCESSION

There are only three kinds of commonwealth: monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy.

19.1 The difference between commonwealths consists in the difference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man or in an assembly of more than one; and because into that assembly either every man has the right to enter, or not everyone but certain men distinguished from the rest; it is plain that there can be only three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative must be one man or more; and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or of only a part. When the representative is one man, the commonwealth is a *monarchy*; when it is an assembly of all who will come together, it is a *democracy*, or popular commonwealth; when it is an assembly of a part only, it is called an *aristocracy*. There can be no other kind of commonwealth. For either one, or more, or all must have the sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire.

19.2 There are other names of government in the histories and books of politics, such as *tyranny* and *oligarchy*. But they are not the names of other forms of government; they are the names of the same forms when disliked. For those who are discontented under *monarchy* call it *tyranny*; and those who are displeased with *aristocracy* call it *oligarchy*. So also those who find themselves aggrieved under a *democracy* call it *anarchy* (which means lack of government). And yet I think no one believes that lack of government is some new kind of government. Nor, by the same reasoning, ought they to believe that the government is of one

kind when they like it and of another when they dislike it or are oppressed by the governors.

19.3 It is plain that men who are in absolute liberty may, if they please, give authority to one man to represent every one of them, just as they may give such authority to any assembly of men whatever. Consequently they may, if they think good, subject themselves to a monarch as absolutely as to any other representative. Therefore, where a sovereign power has already been set up, there can be no other representative of the same people except for certain particular purposes, limited by the sovereign. For that would be to set up two sovereigns, and to have every man's person represented by two actors, who by opposing one another must necessarily divide that power which (if men will live in peace) is indivisible, and so reduce the multitude to the condition of war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And therefore, just as it would be absurd to think that a sovereign assembly, inviting the people of its dominion to send up their deputies with power to make known their advice or desires, should on that account hold those deputies, rather than itself, to be the absolute representative of the people, so it is absurd also to think the same in a monarchy. And I do not know how so plain a truth should of late have been so little observed: that in a monarchy, he who held the sovereignty by a descent of six hundred years, who alone was called sovereign, who had the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects, and who was unquestionably taken by them for their King, was nevertheless never considered their representative—that name passing without contradiction as the title of those men who, at his command, were sent up by the people to carry their petitions and give him their advice (if he permitted it).[6] This may serve as a warning to those who are the true and absolute representative of a people to instruct men in the nature of that office, and to take heed how they admit any other general

6 The King is Charles I; the men "sent up by the people" are members of the House of Commons, whom Parliament's party called the people's representatives.

representation on any occasion whatever, if they mean to discharge the trust committed to them.

MONARCHY COMPARED WITH ASSEMBLIES

Hobbes argues that monarchy best unites public and private interest and gives the steadiest counsel.

19.4 The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth consists not in a difference of power, but in a difference of convenience, or fitness to produce the peace and security of the people, for which end they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe, first, that whoever bears the person of the people, or is one of the assembly that bears it, also bears his own natural person. And though he is careful in his political person to promote the common interest, he is no less careful, or more so, to promote the private good of himself, his family, kindred, and friends. And for the most part, if the public interest happens to cross the private, he prefers the private; for the passions of men are commonly more powerful than their reason. From this it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there the public is most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is the same as the public. The riches, power, and honor of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich or glorious or secure whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want or dissension to maintain a war against their enemies. Whereas in a democracy or aristocracy, public prosperity contributes less to the private fortune of someone who is corrupt or ambitious than a perfidious piece of advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war often does.

19.5 Second, that a monarch takes counsel from whom, when, and where he pleases; and consequently he may hear the opinion of men versed in the matter he is deliberating about, of whatever rank or quality, as long before the time of action and with as much secrecy as he wishes. But when a sovereign

assembly needs counsel, none are admitted but those who have a right to it from the beginning. For the most part these are men who have been more versed in acquiring wealth than knowledge, and who are to give their advice in long speeches, which may and commonly do excite men to action, but do not guide them in it. For the *understanding* is never enlightened by the flame of the passions, but dazzled. Nor is there any place or time in which an assembly can receive counsel in secrecy, because of its own numbers.

19.6 Third, that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no inconstancy but that of human nature; but in assemblies, besides that of nature, there arises an inconstancy from their number. For the absence of a few who would have kept a resolution, once taken, firm (which may happen through overconfidence, negligence, or private obstacles), or the diligent attendance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes today all that was concluded yesterday.

19.7 Fourth, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself out of envy or interest; but an assembly may, and to such a pitch as may produce a civil war.

19.8 Fifth, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience: that any subject may, by the power of one man, be deprived of all he possesses in order to enrich a favorite or flatterer. This, I confess, is a great and unavoidable inconvenience. But the same may just as well happen where the sovereign power is in an assembly. For their power is the same; and they are as subject to evil counsel, and to being seduced by orators, as a monarch is by flatterers; and, becoming one another's flatterers, they serve one another's covetousness and ambition by turns. And whereas the favorites of monarchs are few, and have no one else to advance but their own kindred, the favorites of an assembly are many, and their kindred much more numerous than any monarch's. Besides, there is no favorite of a monarch who cannot help his friends as well as hurt his enemies. But orators—that is to say, the favorites of sovereign assemblies—though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse requires

less eloquence than to excuse (such is man's nature), and condemnation looks more like justice than acquittal.

19.9 Sixth, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or on one who cannot distinguish between good and evil. The inconvenience consists in this: that the use of his power must be in the hands of another man, or of some assembly of men, who are to govern by his right and in his name, as guardians and protectors of his person and authority. But to say there is inconvenience in putting the use of the sovereign power into the hands of a man or an assembly of men is to say that all government is more inconvenient than confusion and civil war. And therefore all the danger that can be alleged must arise from the contention of those who may become competitors for an office of such great honor and profit. To show that this inconvenience does not proceed from the form of government we call monarchy, we are to consider that the preceding monarch has appointed who shall have the guardianship of his infant successor, either expressly by will, or tacitly by not overruling the custom received in that case. And then such inconvenience, if it happens, is to be attributed not to the monarchy but to the ambition and injustice of the subjects—which is the same in all kinds of government where the people are not well instructed in their duty and in the rights of sovereignty. Or else the preceding monarch has made no arrangement at all for such guardianship. And then the law of nature has provided this sufficient rule: that the guardianship shall be in him who has by nature the most interest in preserving the infant's authority, and to whom the least benefit can come from his death or diminishment. For since every man by nature seeks his own benefit and advancement, to put an infant into the power of those who can advance themselves by his destruction or harm is not guardianship but treachery. So, sufficient provision having been made against all just quarrels about government under a child, if any contention arises that disturbs the public peace, it is to be attributed not to the form of monarchy but to the ambition of subjects and their ignorance of

their duty. On the other side, there is no great commonwealth whose sovereignty is in a great assembly that is not, with respect to consultations of peace and war and the making of laws, in the same condition as if the government were in a child. For as a child lacks the judgment to dissent from the counsel given him, and so is compelled to take the advice of those, or the one, to whom he is committed, so an assembly lacks the liberty to dissent from the counsel of the majority, be it good or bad. And as a child needs a tutor or protector to preserve his person and authority, so also in great commonwealths the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, has need of *custodes libertatis*, guardians of liberty—that is, of dictators, or protectors of their authority, who amount to temporary monarchs, to whom they may commit for a time the entire exercise of their power. And at the end of that time such assemblies have more often been deprived of it than infant kings have been by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors.[7]

19.10 The kinds of sovereignty, as I have now shown, are only three: monarchy, where one man holds it; democracy, where the general assembly of subjects holds it; and aristocracy, where it lies in an assembly of certain persons nominated or otherwise distinguished from the rest. Yet anyone who considers the particular commonwealths that have existed, and exist now, in the world will perhaps not easily reduce them to three, and may be inclined to think there are other forms, arising from these mixed together. Take, for example, elective kingdoms, where kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for a time; or kingdoms in which the king has a limited power. Most writers nevertheless call these governments monarchy. Likewise, if a popular or aristocratic commonwealth conquers an enemy's country and governs it through a president, procurator, or other magistrate, this may at first sight seem to be a democratic or aristocratic government. But it is not so. For elective kings are not sovereigns but ministers of the sovereign; limited kings are

7 The Roman Republic appointed a dictator with full power for up to six months in emergencies.

not sovereigns but ministers of those who have the sovereign power; and provinces subject to the democracy or aristocracy of another commonwealth are governed not democratically or aristocratically, but monarchically.

19.11 First, consider an elective king whose power is limited to his lifetime, as it is in many parts of Christendom today, or to certain years or months, as the dictator's power was among the Romans. If he has the right to appoint his successor, he is no longer elective but hereditary. But if he has no power to choose his successor, then either there is some other known man or assembly that may elect a new one after his death, or else the commonwealth dies and dissolves with him, and returns to the condition of war.[8] If it is known who has the power to confer the sovereignty after his death, then it is also known that the sovereignty was in them before. For no one has the right to give what he has no right to possess and keep for himself, if he thinks fit. But if there is no one who can confer the sovereignty after the death of the man first elected, then he has the power—indeed, he is obliged by the law of nature—to provide for a successor, so as to keep those who had trusted him with the government from relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war. Consequently, when he was elected, he was an absolute sovereign.

19.12 Second, a king whose power is limited is not superior to the one or ones who have the power to limit it; and one who is not superior is not supreme—that is, not sovereign. The sovereignty therefore always lay in the assembly that had the right to limit him, and consequently the government was not monarchy but either democracy or aristocracy. So it was in ancient Sparta, where the kings had the privilege of leading the armies, but the sovereignty lay with the ephors.[9]

19.13 Third, the Roman people formerly governed the land of Judea (for example) through a governor. Judea was not therefore

8 Hobbes probably has in mind the elected monarchies of the Holy Roman Empire and Poland.

9 The ephors were five magistrates elected annually at Sparta who oversaw and could check the city's two kings.

a democracy, since its people were not governed by any assembly that any of them had the right to enter; nor an aristocracy, since they were not governed by any assembly that anyone could enter by their election. They were governed by one person, which, though with respect to the people of Rome it was an assembly of the people, or democracy, was a monarch with respect to the people of Judea, who had no right at all to take part in the government. For where a people is governed by an assembly chosen by themselves from among their own number, the government is called a democracy or an aristocracy. But when they are governed by an assembly not of their own choosing, it is a monarchy—not of one man over another man, but of one people over another people.

THE RIGHT OF SUCCESSION

Succession, the commonwealth's artificial eternity, must be decided by the present sovereign.

19.14 In all these forms of government the material is mortal: not only monarchs but whole assemblies die. So for the preservation of peace among men, just as provision was made for an artificial man, provision must also be made for an artificial eternity of life. Without it, people governed by an assembly would return to the condition of war in every generation, and those governed by one man as soon as their ruler died. This artificial eternity is what men call the right of succession.

19.15 No form of government is perfect where the disposal of the succession does not lie with the present sovereign. For if it lies with some other particular man or private assembly, it lies with a subject, and the sovereign may take it over at his pleasure; so the right is in fact his own. And if it lies with no particular man but is left to a new choice, then the commonwealth is dissolved, and the right belongs to whoever can seize it—contrary to the intention of those who instituted the commonwealth for their perpetual, not temporary, security.

19.16 In a democracy the whole assembly cannot fail unless the multitude to be governed fails. So in that form of government questions about the right of succession have no place at all.

19.17 In an aristocracy, when any member of the assembly dies, the election of another in his place belongs to the assembly, as the sovereign, to which belongs the choice of all counselors and officers. For what the representative does as actor, every one of the subjects does as author. And although the sovereign assembly may give others the power to elect new members to fill its ranks, the election is still made by its authority, and by the same authority it may be revoked when the public good requires it.

19.18 The greatest difficulty about the right of succession is in monarchy. The difficulty arises because at first sight it is not obvious who is to appoint the successor, nor, often, whom he has appointed. Both cases call for more exact reasoning than most people are accustomed to use. As to the question of who shall appoint the successor of a monarch who holds sovereign authority—that is, who shall determine the right of inheritance (for elective kings and princes do not own the sovereign power but only have the use of it)—we must consider that either the one in possession has the right to dispose of the succession, or else that right returns to the dissolved multitude. For the death of one who owns the sovereign power leaves the multitude without any sovereign at all—that is, without any representative in whom they could be united and be capable of doing any single action. They are therefore incapable of electing any new monarch. Every man has an equal right to submit himself to whoever he thinks best able to protect him, or, if he can, to protect himself with his own sword. That is a return to confusion and to the condition of a war of every man against every man, contrary to the purpose for which monarchy was first instituted. It is evident, therefore, that by the institution of monarchy the choice of the successor is always left to the judgment and will of the present holder.

19.19 As for the question (which sometimes arises) of whom the reigning monarch has designated to succeed to and inherit his power, it is settled by his express words and testament, or by other sufficient tacit signs.

19.20 By express words or testament, when he declares it during his lifetime, by word of mouth or in writing, as the first emperors of Rome declared who were to be their heirs. For the word "heir" does not in itself mean a man's children or nearest relatives, but whoever a man declares in any way that he wants to succeed him in his estate. If, then, a monarch declares expressly, by word or in writing, that a certain man shall be his heir, that man is invested with the right to be monarch immediately upon his predecessor's death.

19.21 But where there is no testament or express words, other natural signs of his will are to be followed, one of which is custom. So where the custom is that the next of kin succeeds without qualification, the next of kin has the right to the succession; for if the will of the one in possession had been otherwise, he could easily have declared so during his lifetime. Likewise, where the custom is that the nearest male relative succeeds, the right of succession lies with the nearest male relative, for the same reason. And it would be the same if the custom were to prefer the female. For whatever custom a man could control with a word, and does not, is a natural sign that he wants that custom to stand.

19.22 But where neither custom nor testament has gone before, it is to be understood, first, that the monarch wills that the government remain monarchical, since he has approved that government in himself. Second, that a child of his own, male or female, be preferred to anyone else, since men are presumed to be more inclined by nature to advance their own children than the children of other men; and among their own, a male rather than a female, because men are naturally fitter than women for acts of labor and danger. Third, where his own line fails, a brother rather than a stranger; and so on, always the nearer in blood rather than the more remote. For it is always presumed

that the nearer in kinship is the nearer in affection; and it is evident that a man always receives, by reflection, the most honor from the greatness of his nearest kin.

19.23 But if a monarch may lawfully dispose of the succession by words of contract or by testament, some may object that there is a great inconvenience: he may sell or give his right of governing to a foreigner. Because foreigners (that is, men not used to living under the same government or speaking the same language) commonly undervalue one another, this may turn to the oppression of his subjects. That is indeed a great inconvenience. But it does not follow necessarily from being subject to a foreigner's government; it comes from the lack of skill of rulers who are ignorant of the true rules of politics. That is why the Romans, when they had subdued many nations, made their government easier to swallow by removing that grievance as far as they thought necessary. They gave sometimes whole nations, and sometimes the leading men of every nation they conquered, not only the privileges but also the name of Romans, and took many of them into the Senate and into offices of responsibility, even in the city of Rome itself. This was what our most wise King James aimed at in trying to bring about the union of his two realms of England and Scotland. Had he achieved it, it would in all likelihood have prevented the civil wars that make both those kingdoms miserable at present.[10] It is therefore no injury to the people for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will, even though, through the fault of many princes, it has sometimes proved inconvenient. A further argument for its lawfulness is this: whatever inconvenience can come from giving a kingdom to a foreigner can also come from marrying foreigners in such a way that the right of succession may descend to them; yet everyone considers this lawful.

10 James VI of Scotland became James I of England in 1603 and pressed for a full political union of the two kingdoms, which Parliament rejected; Hobbes was writing during the aftermath of the civil wars of the 1640s.

CHAPTER 20: OF PATERNAL AND DESPOTIC DOMINION

Sovereignty acquired by force rests on consent given out of fear and carries the same rights.

20.1 A *commonwealth by acquisition* is one where the sovereign power is acquired by force. It is acquired by force when men, one by one or many together by a majority of votes, for fear of death or chains, authorize all the actions of the man or assembly that has their lives and liberty in its power.

20.2 This kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differs from sovereignty by institution in only one respect: men who choose their sovereign do so out of fear of one another, not of the one they institute; but in this case they subject themselves to the one they are afraid of. In both cases they do it out of fear. This should be noted by those who hold that all covenants arising from fear of death or violence are void. If that were true, no man in any kind of commonwealth could be obliged to obey. It is true that in a commonwealth once instituted or acquired, promises that arise from fear of death or violence are not covenants and do not bind when the thing promised is contrary to the laws. But the reason is not that the promise was made out of fear; it is that the one who promises has no right in the thing promised. Also, when he could lawfully perform and does not, what releases him is not the invalidity of the covenant but the sentence of the sovereign. Otherwise, whenever a man lawfully promises, he unlawfully breaks his promise. But when the sovereign, who is the actor, acquits him, then he is acquitted by the one who extorted the promise, as the author of that release.

20.3 But the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both. The sovereign's power cannot be transferred to another without his consent. He cannot forfeit it. He cannot be accused of injury by any of his subjects. He cannot be punished by them. He is judge of what is necessary for peace, and judge of doctrines. He is the sole legislator, and supreme judge of controversies, and of the times and occasions of war and peace. It

belongs to him to choose magistrates, counselors, commanders, and all other officers and ministers, and to determine rewards and punishments, honor and rank. The reasons for all this are the same as those given in the previous chapter for the same rights and consequences of sovereignty by institution.

20.4 Dominion is acquired in two ways: by generation and by conquest. The right of dominion by generation is the one that a parent has over his children, and it is called *paternal*. It is not derived from generation, as if the parent had dominion over his child because he begot him, but from the child's consent, either express or declared by other sufficient evidence. For as to generation, God has ordained a helper for man, and there are always two who are equally parents. Dominion over the child should therefore belong equally to both, and he should be equally subject to both—which is impossible, for no man can obey two masters.[11] Some have attributed the dominion to the man alone, as being of the more excellent sex; but they miscalculate. For there is not always such a difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman that the right can be determined without war. In commonwealths this dispute is decided by the civil law, and for the most part (but not always) the judgment is in favor of the father, because for the most part commonwealths have been founded by the fathers, not by the mothers, of families. But the question here concerns the state of mere nature, where there are supposed to be no laws of marriage and no laws for the education of children, but only the law of nature and the natural inclination of the sexes to one another and to their children. In this condition of mere nature, either the parents settle dominion over the child between themselves by contract, or they do not settle it at all. If they settle it, the right passes according to the contract. We find in history that the Amazons contracted with the men of neighboring countries, to whom they resorted for offspring, that the male children should be

11 "A helper": Genesis 2:18; "no man can obey two masters": Matthew 6:24.

sent back but the female ones stay with them; so the dominion over the females was in the mother.[12]

20.5 If there is no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no marriage laws, it cannot be known who the father is unless the mother declares it; so the right of dominion over the child depends on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, since the infant is first in the mother's power, so that she may either nourish it or abandon it, if she nourishes it, it owes its life to the mother, and is therefore obliged to obey her rather than anyone else; and consequently dominion over it is hers. But if she abandons it, and someone else finds and nourishes it, the dominion is in the one who nourishes it. For it ought to obey the one by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life is the end for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to the one in whose power it is to save or destroy him.

20.6 If the mother is the father's subject, the child is in the father's power. And if the father is the mother's subject (as when a sovereign queen marries one of her subjects), the child is subject to the mother, because the father is also her subject.

20.7 If a man and a woman who are monarchs of two different kingdoms have a child, and make a contract about who shall have dominion over him, the right of dominion passes by the contract. If they make no contract, the dominion follows the dominion of the place where he resides. For the sovereign of each country has dominion over all who reside in it.

20.8 Whoever has dominion over the child also has dominion over the child's children, and over their children's children. For whoever has dominion over a man's person has dominion over all that is his; without that, dominion would be only a title, without effect.

12 The Amazons were a legendary nation of women warriors described by Herodotus, Strabo, and other ancient writers.

20.9 The right of succession to paternal dominion proceeds in the same way as the right of succession to monarchy, which I have already discussed sufficiently in the previous chapter.

20.10 Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is what some writers call *despotic*, from the Greek *despotes*, which means a lord or master; it is the dominion of the master over his servant. This dominion is acquired by the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the immediate stroke of death, covenants—either in express words or by other sufficient signs of the will—that so long as his life and the liberty of his body are allowed him, the victor shall have the use of them at his pleasure. Only after such a covenant is made is the vanquished a *servant*, and not before. For by the word "servant" (whether it is derived from *servire*, to serve, or from *servare*, to save, which I leave to the grammarians to dispute) is not meant a captive who is kept in prison or chains until the owner of the man who took him, or who bought him from the one who did, decides what to do with him. (For such men, commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all, but may break their chains or the prison, and kill their master or carry him away captive, justly.) A servant is one who, having been taken, is allowed bodily liberty, and, on his promise not to run away or do violence to his master, is trusted by him.

20.11 It is therefore not the victory that gives the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered—that is to say, beaten, and taken or put to flight—but because he comes in and submits to the victor. Nor is the victor obliged, by an enemy's surrender without a promise of life, to spare him for thus yielding at discretion; this obliges the victor no longer than he, at his own discretion, thinks fit.

20.12 What men do when they ask for "quarter," as it is now called (which the Greeks called *zogria*, taking alive), is to escape the present fury of the victor by submission, and to bargain for their life with ransom or service. So the one who is given quarter does not have his life granted, but only deferred until

further deliberation; for it is not a surrender on condition of life, but at discretion. Only when the victor has trusted him with his bodily liberty is his life secure and his service owed. For slaves who work in prisons or fetters do it not from duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their taskmasters.

20.13 The master of the servant is also master of all that the servant has, and may demand the use of it—that is, of his goods, his labor, his servants, and his children—as often as he thinks fit. For the servant holds his life from his master by the covenant of obedience, that is, of owning and authorizing whatever the master does. And if the master, when the servant refuses, kills him, or puts him in chains, or otherwise punishes him for his disobedience, the servant is himself the author of it, and cannot accuse him of injury.

20.14 In sum, the rights and consequences of both paternal and despotic dominion are exactly the same as those of a sovereign by institution, and for the same reasons, which are set down in the previous chapter. Suppose, then, a man is monarch of several nations, holding sovereignty over one by the institution of the people assembled, and over another by conquest—that is, by the submission of each individual to avoid death or chains. For him to demand more of one nation than of the other on the ground of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an act of ignorance of the rights of sovereignty. For the sovereign is absolute over both alike; otherwise there is no sovereignty at all, and so every man may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.

20.15 From this it appears that a great family, if it is not part of some commonwealth, is in itself, as far as the rights of sovereignty go, a little monarchy—whether that family consists of a man and his children, or of a man and his servants, or of a man and his children and servants together—in which the father or master is the sovereign. But a family is still not properly a commonwealth unless it has such power, by its own numbers or by other advantages, that it cannot be subdued without the risk of war. For where a number of men are clearly too weak to defend

themselves even when united, each may use his own reason in time of danger to save his own life, either by flight or by submission to the enemy, as he thinks best—just as a very small company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may throw down their arms and ask for quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And this will be enough concerning what I find, by reflection and deduction, about sovereign rights from the nature, needs, and designs of men in setting up commonwealths and placing themselves under monarchs or assemblies entrusted with power enough for their protection.

WHAT SCRIPTURE TEACHES ON SOVEREIGN POWER

Passages from Moses, Samuel, Solomon, Paul, and Christ are cited for the sovereign's absolute power.

20.16 Let us now consider what Scripture teaches on the same point. The children of Israel say this to Moses: "You speak to us, and we will hear you; but do not let God speak to us, lest we die." This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the right of kings, God himself, by the mouth of Samuel, says: "This shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you.[13] He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots, and to gather in his harvest, and to make his engines of war and the instruments of his chariots; and he shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his cooks and bakers. He shall take your fields, your vineyards, and your olive yards, and give them to his servants. He shall take the tithe of your grain and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber and to his other servants. He shall take your menservants and your maidservants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his business. He shall take the tithe of your flocks; and you shall be his servants." This is absolute power, summed up in the last words, "you shall be his servants." Again, when the people heard what power their king was to have, they still consented to it, and said: "We will be as all other

13 Exodus 20:19; 1 Samuel 8:11–17.

nations, and our king shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars." Here the right that sovereigns have both to the militia and to all judicature is confirmed—which contains as absolute a power as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, King Solomon's prayer to God was this:[14] "Give your servant understanding, to judge your people, and to discern between good and evil." It belongs therefore to the sovereign to be judge, and to prescribe the rules for discerning good and evil; these rules are laws, and therefore the legislative power is in him. Saul sought David's life; yet when it was in David's power to kill Saul, and his servants would have done it, David forbade them, saying, "God forbid I should do such an act against my lord, the anointed of God." On the obedience of servants, St. Paul says, "Servants, obey your masters in all things," and, "Children, obey your parents in all things." There is simple obedience in those who are subject to paternal or despotic dominion.[15] Again: "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat, and therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do." There again is simple obedience. And St. Paul: "Warn them that they subject themselves to princes, and to those that are in authority, and obey them." This obedience is also simple. Finally, our Savior himself acknowledges that men ought to pay the taxes that kings impose, when he says, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesar's"; and he paid such taxes himself.[16] He also acknowledges that the king's word is sufficient to take anything from any subject when there is need, and that the king is judge of that need. For he himself, as King of the Jews, commanded his disciples to take the donkey and the donkey's colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying: "Go into the village opposite you, and you will find a she-donkey tied, and her colt with her; untie them, and bring them to me.[17] And if anyone asks you what you mean by it, say that the Lord has need of them; and they will let them

14 "We will be as all other nations": 1 Samuel 8:19–20.
15 1 Kings 3:9; 1 Samuel 24:6; Colossians 3:20, 22.
16 Matthew 23:2–3; Titus 3:1; Matthew 22:21 (and 17:24–27 for the tax Jesus paid).
17 Matthew 21:2–3.

go." They will not ask whether his need is a sufficient title, or whether he is judge of that need, but will accept the will of the Lord.

20.17 To these passages may be added that of Genesis: "You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." And verse 11: "Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten of the tree of which I commanded you not to eat?" The knowing or judging of good and evil was forbidden under the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a test of Adam's obedience. The Devil, to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it they would be as gods, knowing good and evil. And when they had both eaten, they did indeed take upon themselves God's office, which is the judging of good and evil; but they acquired no new ability to distinguish rightly between them.[18] And where it is said that, having eaten, they saw that they were naked, no one has interpreted that passage as if they had previously been blind and could not see their own skins. The meaning is plain: it was then that they first judged their nakedness (in which it was God's will to create them) to be indecent, and by being ashamed they tacitly passed judgment on God himself. And so God says, "Have you eaten, etc.," as if to say: do you, who owe me obedience, take it upon yourself to judge my commandments? By this it is clearly, though allegorically, signified that the commands of those who have the right to command are not to be criticized or disputed by their subjects.

20.18 So it appears plainly, to my understanding, both from reason and from Scripture, that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular and aristocratic commonwealths, is as great as men can possibly be imagined to make it. And though men may imagine many evil consequences of so unlimited a power, the consequences of lacking it—which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor—are much worse. The condition of man in this life will never be without inconveniences; but no

18 Genesis 3:5 and 3:11.

great inconvenience happens in any commonwealth except what proceeds from the subjects' disobedience and breach of those covenants from which the commonwealth has its being. And whoever, thinking the sovereign power too great, seeks to make it less must subject himself to the power that can limit it—that is to say, to a greater one.

20.19 The greatest objection is the one from practice: people ask where and when such power has been acknowledged by subjects. But one may ask them in return when or where there has been a kingdom long free from sedition and civil war. In those nations whose commonwealths have been long-lived, and were not destroyed except by foreign war, the subjects never disputed the sovereign power. But in any case, an argument drawn from the practice of men who have not sifted things to the bottom, nor weighed the causes and nature of commonwealths with exact reason, and who suffer daily the miseries that come from their ignorance of these things, is invalid. For even if men everywhere in the world laid the foundations of their houses on sand, it could not be inferred from that that this is how it ought to be done. The skill of making and maintaining commonwealths consists in certain rules, as arithmetic and geometry do, not (as tennis does) in practice alone. And these are rules that poor men have not had the leisure to discover, and men who have had the leisure have so far lacked the curiosity or the method to find out.

CHAPTER 21: OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS

Liberty properly means the absence of external impediments and is consistent with fear and necessity.

21.1 *Liberty*, or *freedom*, means (properly) the absence of opposition—by opposition I mean external impediments to motion—and it may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational ones. For whatever is so tied or surrounded that it cannot move except within a certain space, that space being determined by the opposition of some external

body, we say has not the liberty to go further. So of all living creatures while they are imprisoned or restrained by walls or chains, and of water while it is held in by banks or vessels (which otherwise would spread out into a larger space), we usually say that they are not at liberty to move in the way they would without those external impediments. But when the impediment to motion lies in the constitution of the thing itself, we do not usually say it lacks the liberty, but the power, to move —as when a stone lies still, or a man is confined to his bed by sickness.

21.2 According to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a *free man* is one who, in those things he is able to do by his strength and wit, is not hindered from doing what he has a will to do. But when the words "free" and "liberty" are applied to anything but bodies, they are misused; for what is not subject to motion is not subject to impediment. So when it is said (for example) that the way is free, no liberty of the way is meant, but of those who walk along it without being stopped. And when we say a gift is free, no liberty of the gift is meant, but of the giver, who was not bound by any law or covenant to give it. So when we speak freely, it is not the liberty of the voice or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law has obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Finally, from the use of the phrase "free will," no liberty of the will, desire, or inclination can be inferred, but only the liberty of the man, which consists in this: that he finds nothing to stop him in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.

21.3 Fear and liberty are consistent. When a man throws his goods into the sea for fear the ship will sink, he nevertheless does it very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will; it is therefore the action of one who was free. So too a man sometimes pays his debt only for fear of prison; yet because nobody prevented him from keeping the money, it was the action of a man at liberty. And in general, all the actions that men do in commonwealths for fear of the law are actions the doers had the liberty to leave undone.

21.4 Liberty and necessity are consistent. Water has not only the liberty but the necessity of flowing down the channel; and so it is with the actions men do voluntarily. Because they proceed from their will, they proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of man's will, and every desire and inclination, proceeds from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes), they proceed from necessity. So to anyone who could see the connection of those causes, the necessity of all men's voluntary actions would be evident. And therefore God, who sees and disposes all things, sees also that man's liberty in doing what he wills is accompanied by the necessity of doing what God wills, no more and no less. For though men may do many things that God does not command, and of which he is therefore not the author, they can have no passion or appetite for anything of which God's will is not the cause. And if his will did not guarantee the necessity of man's will, and consequently of everything that depends on man's will, the liberty of men would be a contradiction of, and an impediment to, the omnipotence and liberty of God. This will suffice (for the matter in hand) about that natural liberty which alone is properly called liberty.

CIVIL LAWS AS ARTIFICIAL CHAINS

The liberty of subjects lies only in what the laws pass over in silence.

21.5 But just as men, to attain peace and thereby preserve themselves, have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth, so they have also made artificial chains, called civil laws. By mutual covenants they themselves have fastened these chains at one end to the lips of the man or assembly to whom they have given the sovereign power, and at the other end to their own ears. These bonds, weak in their own nature, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty, of breaking them.

21.6 It is only in relation to these bonds that I am now to speak of the liberty of subjects. For since there is no commonwealth in the world in which enough rules have been laid down to regulate all the actions and words of men (that being impossible), it follows necessarily that in all kinds of actions the laws pass over in silence, men have the liberty to do whatever their own reason suggests as most profitable to themselves. For if we take liberty in its proper sense, as bodily liberty—that is, freedom from chains and prison—it would be quite absurd for men to clamor as they do for the liberty they so plainly enjoy. Again, if we take liberty to mean exemption from laws, it is no less absurd for men to demand, as they do, that liberty by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet, absurd as it is, this is what they demand—not knowing that the laws have no power to protect them without a sword in the hands of a man, or men, to have those laws carried out. The liberty of a subject, therefore, lies only in those things that the sovereign has passed over in regulating their actions: such as the liberty to buy and sell and otherwise make contracts with one another; to choose their own home, their own diet, their own way of life; to bring up their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.

21.7 We are not to understand, however, that by such liberty the sovereign power of life and death is either abolished or limited. For it has already been shown that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on any pretext whatever, can properly be called injustice or injury, because every subject is the author of every act the sovereign does. So the sovereign never lacks the right to anything, except insofar as he himself is the subject of God, and bound by that to observe the laws of nature. And therefore it can, and often does, happen in commonwealths that a subject is put to death by command of the sovereign power, and yet neither does the other wrong. So it was when Jephthah caused his daughter to be sacrificed: in this and similar cases, the one who dies had the liberty to do the action for which he is nevertheless put to death without injury. And the same holds for a sovereign prince who puts an innocent subject

to death.[19] For though the action is against the law of nature, as being contrary to equity (as was David's killing of Uriah), yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased had been given to David by Uriah himself; and yet to God, because David was God's subject and forbidden all iniquity by the law of nature.[20] David himself clearly confirmed this distinction when he repented of the deed, saying, "Against you only have I sinned." In the same way, when the people of Athens banished the most powerful man in their commonwealth for ten years, they thought they committed no injustice; and yet they never asked what crime he had committed, but what harm he might do. Indeed, they ordered the banishment of they knew not whom: each citizen brought to the marketplace an oyster shell with the name written on it of the man he wanted banished, and without actually accusing him, they sometimes banished an Aristides for his reputation for justice, and sometimes a scurrilous jester like Hyperbolus, to make a joke of it.[21] And yet one cannot say that the sovereign people of Athens lacked the right to banish them, or that an Athenian lacked the liberty to joke, or to be just.

21.8 The liberty so often and so honorably mentioned in the histories and philosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans, and in the writings and conversation of those who have received all their political learning from them, is not the liberty of individual men but the liberty of the commonwealth. It is the same liberty that every man would have if there were no civil laws and no commonwealth at all. And its effects are the same too. For among men without a master there is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor; no inheritance to pass on to the son or to expect from the father; no ownership of goods or lands; no

19 Judges 11:30–40: Jephthah vowed to sacrifice whatever first came out of his house to meet him if he returned victorious, and it was his daughter.
20 2 Samuel 11: David had Uriah the Hittite sent to his death in battle so that he could take Uriah's wife, Bathsheba.
21 Psalm 51:4. The Athenian practice is ostracism (from ostrakon, a potsherd); Aristides "the Just" was ostracized in 482 BC, and Hyperbolus around 416 BC, after which the practice fell out of use.

security; but a full and absolute liberty in every individual man. So too among states and commonwealths that are not dependent on one another, every commonwealth (not every man) has an absolute liberty to do what it judges—that is, what the man or assembly that represents it judges—most conducive to its benefit. But along with this, they live in a condition of perpetual war, on the brink of battle, with their frontiers armed and cannons aimed at their neighbors all around. The Athenians and Romans were free—that is, free commonwealths. Not that any individual had the liberty to resist his own representative, but that their representative had the liberty to resist or invade other peoples. On the towers of the city of Lucca the word LIBERTAS is written in great letters to this day; yet no one can infer from this that an individual has more liberty, or immunity from service to the commonwealth, there than in Constantinople. Whether a commonwealth is monarchical or popular, the freedom is still the same.[22]

21.9 But it is easy for men to be deceived by the attractive name of liberty, and, for lack of judgment to tell the difference, to mistake for their private inheritance and birthright what is the right of the public only. And when the same error is confirmed by the authority of men renowned for their writings on the subject, it is no wonder if it produces sedition and changes of government. In these western parts of the world we are made to take our opinions about the institution and rights of commonwealths from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romans, who, living under popular states, did not derive those rights from the principles of nature, but copied them into their books from the practice of their own commonwealths, which were popular—just as grammarians describe the rules of language from the practice of their time, or the rules of poetry from the poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught (to keep them from wanting to change their government) that they were free men, and that all who lived under monarchy were slaves,

22 Lucca, in Tuscany, was a small independent republic; Constantinople, capital of the Ottoman Empire, stood for absolute monarchy.

Aristotle writes in his Politics (book 6, chapter 2): "In a democracy liberty is to be presupposed; for it is commonly held that no man is free under any other government." And like Aristotle, Cicero and other writers based their civil doctrine on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate monarchy first by those who, having deposed their sovereign, shared the sovereignty of Rome among themselves, and afterward by their successors.[23] And from reading these Greek and Latin authors, men have from childhood acquired a habit (under a false show of liberty) of favoring tumults and of licentiously controlling the actions of their sovereigns, and then of controlling those controllers, with the shedding of so much blood that I think I may truly say nothing was ever so dearly bought as these western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues.

THE TRUE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS

Subjects keep the rights they could not give away, above all the right to defend their own lives.

21.10 To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject—that is, what are the things which, though commanded by the sovereign, he may nevertheless refuse to do without injustice—we must consider what rights we pass away when we make a commonwealth. Or, which is the same thing, what liberty we deny ourselves by owning all the actions (without exception) of the man or assembly we make our sovereign. For both our obligation and our liberty consist in the act of our submission, and so they must be inferred by arguments taken from it. There is no obligation on any man that does not arise from some act of his own, for all men are equally free by nature. Such arguments must be drawn either from the express words, "I authorize all his actions," or from the intention of the one who submits himself to that power (and his intention is to be understood by the end for which he submits). So the obligation and

23 Aristotle, Politics VI.2 (1317a40–b2). The deposed sovereign is Tarquin the Proud, the last king of Rome, expelled around 509 BC.

liberty of the subject must be derived either from those words (or others equivalent), or else from the end for which sovereignty was instituted: namely, the peace of the subjects among themselves, and their defense against a common enemy.

21.11 First, then: sovereignty by institution comes about through the covenant of every one with every one; and sovereignty by acquisition, through the covenants of the vanquished to the victor, or of the child to the parent. It is therefore obvious that every subject has liberty in all those things the right to which cannot be transferred by covenant. I have shown before, in chapter 14, that covenants not to defend one's own body are void. Therefore,

21.12 If the sovereign commands a man (even one justly condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those who attack him; or to abstain from food, air, medicine, or anything else without which he cannot live—that man nevertheless has the liberty to disobey.

21.13 If a man is questioned by the sovereign, or by his authority, about a crime he himself has committed, he is not bound to confess it without an assurance of pardon. For, as I showed in the same chapter, no man can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself.

21.14 Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words: "I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions." In this there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty. For by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. It is one thing to say, "Kill me, or my fellow, if you please"; another to say, "I will kill myself, or my fellow." It follows, therefore,

21.15 that no man is bound by the words themselves either to kill himself or to kill any other man. Consequently, the obligation a man may sometimes have, at the sovereign's command, to carry out some dangerous or dishonorable task depends not on the words of our submission but on the intention, which is to be understood by its end. When, therefore, our refusal to obey

defeats the end for which sovereignty was ordained, there is no liberty to refuse. Otherwise there is.

21.16 On this ground, a man commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice, though his sovereign has right enough to punish his refusal with death—as when he substitutes a capable soldier in his place, for in that case he does not desert the service of the commonwealth. Allowance must also be made for natural timidity, not only in women (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected), but also in men of feminine courage. When armies fight, there is running away on one side or both; yet when men do it not out of treachery but out of fear, they are not judged to act unjustly, but dishonorably. For the same reason, avoiding battle is not injustice but cowardice. But a man who enlists as a soldier, or takes enlistment money, takes away the excuse of a timid nature. He is obliged not only to go into battle but also not to run from it without his captain's leave. And when the defense of the commonwealth requires the help of all who are able to bear arms at once, every one is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the commonwealth, which they lack the resolve or the courage to preserve, was in vain.[24]

21.17 No man has the liberty to resist the sword of the commonwealth in defense of another man, guilty or innocent, because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protecting us, and so destroys the very essence of government. But suppose a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expects death. Do they not then have the liberty to join together, and assist and defend one another? Certainly they have. For they are only defending their lives, which the guilty man may do as well as the innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty. Their bearing arms afterward, even if it is to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act; and if it is only to defend their persons, it is

24 "Imprest money": the advance paid to a man on enlisting, which bound him to service.

not unjust at all. But an offer of pardon takes away the plea of self-defense from those to whom it is offered, and makes their persisting in assisting or defending the rest unlawful.

21.18 As for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, the subject has the liberty to act or to refrain, at his own discretion. And so such liberty is greater in some places and less in others, greater at some times and less at others, according to what those who hold the sovereignty think most convenient. For example, there was a time when a man in England might enter his own land by force (and dispossess those who wrongfully held it). But in later times that liberty of forcible entry was taken away by a statute made (by the king) in Parliament.[25] And in some places of the world men have the liberty of many wives; in other places such liberty is not allowed.

21.19 If a subject has a dispute with his sovereign—about a debt, or the right of possession of lands or goods, or some service required of him, or some penalty, bodily or financial, grounded on a prior law—he has the same liberty to sue for his right as if it were against a fellow subject, and before such judges as the sovereign appoints. For since the sovereign makes his demand by force of a prior law, and not by virtue of his power, he thereby declares that he requires no more than shall appear to be due by that law. The suit, therefore, is not contrary to the will of the sovereign, and so the subject has the liberty to demand a hearing of his case, and a sentence according to that law. But if the sovereign demands or takes anything on the strength of his power, there is in that case no action at law. For everything he does by virtue of his power is done by the authority of every subject; and consequently whoever brings an action against the sovereign brings it against himself.

21.20 If a monarch or sovereign assembly grants a liberty to all or any of his subjects, and while that grant stands he is unable to provide for their safety, the grant is void—unless he directly

25 The Statute of Forcible Entry of 1381 (5 Richard II), which made it an offense to enter land by force even when one had a right to it.

renounces the sovereignty or transfers it to another. For he could have renounced or transferred it openly and in plain terms, if that had been his will, and he did not. So it must be understood that this was not his will, but that the grant came from ignorance of the conflict between such a liberty and the sovereign power. Therefore the sovereignty is still retained, and with it all the powers necessary to exercise it: the power of war and peace, of judicature, of appointing officers and counselors, of levying money, and the rest named in chapter 18.

21.21 The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long as, and no longer than, the power by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when no one else can protect them, can be given up by no covenant. Sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth; once it has departed from the body, the members no longer receive their motion from it. The end of obedience is protection; and wherever a man sees it, whether in his own sword or in another's, nature applies his obedience to it, and his endeavor to maintain it. And though sovereignty, in the intention of those who make it, is immortal, yet by its own nature it is not only subject to violent death by foreign war; through the ignorance and passions of men it also carries in it, from its very institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by internal discord.

21.22 If a subject is taken prisoner in war, or his person or his means of living are in the hands of the enemy, and he is given his life and bodily liberty on condition of being subject to the victor, he has the liberty to accept the condition. Having accepted it, he is the subject of the one who took him, because he had no other way to preserve himself. The case is the same if he is detained on the same terms in a foreign country. But if a man is held in prison or in chains, or is not trusted with the liberty of his body, he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection. He may therefore, if he can, make his escape by any means whatever.

21.23 If a monarch relinquishes the sovereignty, both for himself and for his heirs, his subjects return to the absolute liberty

of nature. For though nature may declare who his sons are and who his nearest kin, it depends on his own will (as was said in the previous chapter) who shall be his heir. If, then, he will have no heir, there is no sovereignty and no subjection. The case is the same if he dies without known kindred and without declaring his heir. For then no heir can be known, and consequently no subjection is due.

21.24 If the sovereign banishes his subject, then during the banishment he is not a subject. But one who is sent on a mission, or has leave to travel, is still a subject—though by contract between sovereigns, not by virtue of the covenant of subjection. For whoever enters another's dominion is subject to all its laws, unless he has a privilege through the friendship of the sovereigns, or by special license.

21.25 If a monarch defeated in war makes himself subject to the victor, his subjects are released from their former obligation and become obliged to the victor. But if he is held prisoner, or does not have the liberty of his own body, he is not understood to have given away the right of sovereignty. His subjects are therefore obliged to obey the magistrates previously placed over them, who govern not in their own name but in his. For since his right remains, the only question is one of administration—that is, of magistrates and officers; and if he has no means of naming them, he is presumed to approve those he himself appointed before.

CHAPTER 22: OF SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL AND PRIVATE

Hobbes classifies the lawful and unlawful groups of men within a commonwealth.

22.1 Having spoken of the generation, form, and power of a commonwealth, I am next in order to speak of its parts. And first of systems, which resemble the similar parts, or muscles, of a natural body. By *systems* I mean any number of men joined in one interest or one business. Of these, some are *regular* and some *irregular*. Regular systems are those in which one man, or

assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole number. All others are irregular.[26]

22.2 Of regular systems, some are absolute and independent, subject to none but their own representative: such are only commonwealths, of which I have already spoken in the last five chapters. Others are dependent—that is, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which every one of them, and their representative too, is subject.

22.3 Of subordinate systems, some are political and some private. Political systems (otherwise called bodies politic and persons in law) are those made by authority from the sovereign power of the commonwealth. Private systems are those constituted by subjects among themselves, or by authority from a foreigner. For no authority derived from a foreign power is public within the dominion of another; there it is private.

22.4 Of private systems, some are lawful and some unlawful. Lawful are those allowed by the commonwealth; all others are unlawful. Irregular systems are those which, having no representative, consist only in a gathering of people. If these are not forbidden by the commonwealth, nor formed with an evil design (such as crowds of people at markets or shows, or for any other harmless end), they are lawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the number is considerable) unknown, they are unlawful.

22.5 In bodies politic, the power of the representative is always limited, and what sets its limits is the sovereign power. For unlimited power is absolute sovereignty. And in every commonwealth the sovereign is the absolute representative of all the subjects; therefore no one else can be representative of any part of them except so far as he gives leave. To give leave to a body politic of subjects to have an absolute representative for all intents and purposes would be to abandon the government of so much of the commonwealth, and to divide the dominion, con-

26 "Similar parts": in older anatomy, tissues of uniform substance throughout (flesh, muscle), as opposed to "organic" parts, the organs; Hobbes takes up the "organical" parts in chapter 23.

trary to their peace and defense. The sovereign cannot be understood to do that by any grant that does not plainly and directly release them from their subjection. For the implications of words are not signs of his will when other implications are signs of the contrary; they are rather signs of error and miscalculation, to which all mankind is too prone.

22.6 The bounds of the power given to the representative of a body politic are to be learned from two things. One is their writ, or letters from the sovereign; the other is the law of the commonwealth.

22.7 For in the institution or acquisition of an independent commonwealth no writing is needed, because the power of the representative there has no bounds other than those set by the unwritten law of nature. But in subordinate bodies so many different limitations are necessary, concerning their business, times, and places, that they could neither be remembered without letters, nor be known unless those letters are patent—so that they may be read to them—and also sealed or attested with the seals or other permanent signs of the sovereign authority.[27]

22.8 And because such limitation is not always easy, or perhaps even possible, to describe in writing, the ordinary laws common to all subjects must determine what the representative may lawfully do in all cases where the letters themselves are silent. And therefore:

22.9 In a body politic, if the representative is one man, whatever he does in the person of the body that is not warranted by his letters or by the laws is his own act, and not the act of the body, or of any member of it besides himself. For beyond what his letters or the laws allow, he represents no one's person but his own. But what he does in accordance with them is the act of every one. For every one is author of the act of the sovereign, because he is their unlimited representative; and the act of one who does not depart from the sovereign's letters is the act of the sovereign; and therefore every member of the body is its author.

27 "Letters patent": open (Latin patens) documents issued by the sovereign, as for a charter of incorporation, meant to be shown and read publicly.

22.10 But if the representative is an assembly, whatever that assembly decrees that is not warranted by their letters or the laws is the act of the assembly, or body politic, and the act of every one by whose vote the decree was made. But it is not the act of any man who was present and voted against it, nor of any man absent, unless he voted for it by proxy. It is the act of the assembly because it was voted by the majority. And if it is a crime, the assembly may be punished as far as it is capable of punishment: by dissolution, or by forfeiture of their letters (which, for such artificial and fictitious bodies, is capital), or (if the assembly has a common fund in which none of the innocent members has any property) by a fine. For nature has exempted all bodies politic from bodily punishment. But those who did not give their vote are innocent, because the assembly cannot represent any man in things not warranted by their letters, and so such men are not involved in the votes of the rest.

22.11 If the person of the body politic lies in one man, and he borrows money from an outsider—that is, from someone not of the same body (for no letters need limit borrowing, since limiting lending is left to men's own inclinations)—the debt is the representative's. For if he had authority from his letters to make the members pay what he borrows, he would by consequence have sovereignty over them. And then the grant would either be void, as proceeding from error—common to human nature—and so an insufficient sign of the grantor's will; or, if the grantor stands by it, the representative is sovereign, and falls outside the present question, which concerns only subordinate bodies. No member, therefore, is obliged to pay a debt so borrowed, but only the representative himself. For the lender, being a stranger to the letters and to the terms of the body, takes as his debtors only those who are bound; and since the representative can bind himself and no one else, the lender has him alone as debtor. He must therefore pay him out of the common fund (if there is one), or (if there is none) out of his own estate.

22.12 If he comes into debt by contract or by fine, the case is the same.

22.13 But when the representative is an assembly and the debt is owed to an outsider, all those, and only those, are responsible for the debt who voted for the borrowing, or for the contract that made it due, or for the act for which the fine was imposed. For every one of them, in voting, bound himself to payment. Whoever is author of the borrowing is obliged to pay, even the whole debt—though when it is paid by any one of them, he is discharged.

22.14 But if the debt is owed to one of the assembly, only the assembly is obliged to pay it, out of their common fund (if they have one). For he has liberty of vote: if he votes that the money shall be borrowed, he votes that it shall be repaid. If he votes that it shall not be borrowed, or is absent, then, because in lending he votes for the borrowing, he contradicts his former vote and is bound by the later one. He becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but only from the common treasury. If that fails, he has no remedy and no complaint except against himself: knowing the acts of the assembly and their means to pay, and under no compulsion, he nevertheless lent his money through his own folly.

22.15 It is plain from this that in bodies politic that are subordinate and subject to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only lawful but expedient for a particular man to protest openly against the decrees of the representative assembly, and have his dissent registered, or take witnesses to it. Otherwise he may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be held responsible for crimes committed, by other men. But in a sovereign assembly that liberty is taken away: both because whoever protests there denies their sovereignty, and because whatever is commanded by the sovereign power is, as far as the subject is concerned (though not always in the sight of God), justified by the command. For every subject is the author of such a command.

22.16 The variety of bodies politic is almost infinite. They are distinguished not only by the different affairs for which they are constituted, in which there is an indescribable diversity, but

also by times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. As for their affairs, some are ordained for government. First, the government of a province may be committed to an assembly of men in which all resolutions depend on the votes of the majority; this assembly is then a body politic, and its power is limited by commission. The word "province" signifies a charge, or care of business, which the one whose business it is commits to another man to administer for him and under him. And so, when one commonwealth contains several countries that have laws distinct from one another, or lie far apart, and the administration of government is committed to various persons, those countries where the sovereign does not reside, but governs by commission, are called provinces. But of the government of a province by an assembly residing in the province itself there are few examples.[28] The Romans, who had sovereignty over many provinces, always governed them by presidents and praetors, not by assemblies, as they governed the city of Rome and the adjacent territories. In the same way, when colonies were sent from England to plant Virginia and the Somers Islands, though their government here was committed to assemblies in London, those assemblies never committed the government under them to any assembly there, but sent one governor to each plantation.[29] For though every man, where he can be present, naturally desires to take part in government, yet where men cannot be present they are also naturally inclined to commit the government of their common interest to a monarchical rather than a popular form. This is evident too in men with great private estates: when they are unwilling to take the trouble of managing the business that belongs to them, they choose to trust one servant rather than an assembly of their friends or servants. But however it may be in fact, we may suppose the government of a province or colony committed to an assembly. And when it is,

28 Latin provincia originally meant an official's assigned charge or sphere of duty.
29 The Virginia Company and the Somers Isles (Bermuda) Company were chartered in London; each governed its colony through an appointed governor. (Virginia had in fact had an elected assembly since 1619.)

what I have to say here is this: whatever debt that assembly contracts, or whatever unlawful act it decrees, is the act only of those who assented, and not of any who dissented or were absent, for the reasons given before. Also, an assembly residing outside the bounds of the colony it governs cannot exercise any power over the persons or goods of anyone of the colony, to seize them for debt or other obligation, in any place outside the colony itself. It has no jurisdiction or authority elsewhere, but is left to whatever remedy the law of that place allows. And though the assembly has the right to impose a fine on any of its members who break the laws it makes, it has no right to enforce it outside the colony itself. And what is said here of the rights of an assembly for the government of a province or colony applies also to an assembly for the government of a town, a university, a college, a church, or any other government over the persons of men.

22.17 And generally, in all bodies politic, if any particular member believes himself injured by the body itself, the hearing of his case belongs to the sovereign, and to those the sovereign has appointed as judges in such cases, or shall appoint for that particular case—not to the body itself. For in this case the whole body is his fellow subject. In a sovereign assembly it is otherwise: there, if the sovereign is not judge, even in his own cause, there can be no judge at all.

COMPANIES OF MERCHANTS AND OTHER BODIES

Trading corporations, assemblies of deputies, families, leagues, and crowds are examined in turn.

22.18 In a body politic for the good ordering of foreign trade, the most suitable representative is an assembly of all the members—that is, one in which everyone who invests his money may be present at all the deliberations and resolutions of the body, if he wishes. To prove this, we must consider the end for which merchants, who may buy and sell, export and import their merchandise at their own discretion, nevertheless bind themselves

together in one corporation. It is true that there are few merchants who, with the goods they buy at home, can freight a ship to export them, or with what they buy abroad, bring one home. So they need to join together in one society, in which every man may either share in the profit in proportion to his investment, or take his own goods and sell what he exports or imports at whatever prices he thinks fit. But this is no body politic, since there is no common representative to bind them to any law other than that common to all other subjects. The end of their incorporating is to make their profit greater, which is done in two ways: by sole buying and sole selling, both at home and abroad. So to grant a company of merchants the status of a corporation, or body politic, is to grant them a double monopoly: one to be the sole buyers, the other to be the sole sellers. For when a company is incorporated for some particular foreign country, only they export the commodities saleable in that country—which is sole buying at home and sole selling abroad. For at home there is only one buyer, and abroad only one seller; both of which profit the merchant, because in this way they buy at home at lower rates and sell abroad at higher ones. And abroad there is only one buyer of foreign merchandise, and only one seller of it at home; both of which again profit the investors.

22.19 Of this double monopoly, one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to foreigners. For at home, by their sole exportation, they set whatever price they please on the farm produce and handiwork of the people; and by their sole importation, whatever price they please on all the foreign commodities the people need. Both are bad for the people. On the other hand, by being the sole sellers of native commodities abroad, and the sole buyers of foreign commodities on the spot, they raise the price of the former and lower the price of the latter, to the disadvantage of the foreigner. For where only one sells, the merchandise is dearer; and where only one buys, it is cheaper. Such corporations, therefore, are nothing other than monopolies—though they would be very profitable for a commonwealth if, bound together in one body in foreign markets,

they were free at home, every man to buy and sell at whatever price he could.

22.20 The end of these bodies of merchants, then, is not a common benefit to the whole body (which in this case has no common fund except what is deducted from the individual investments for building, buying, provisioning, and manning ships), but the particular profit of each investor. So it is reasonable that everyone should know how his own money is used—that is, that everyone should belong to the assembly that has power to direct it, and should know its accounts. And therefore the representative of such a body must be an assembly at whose consultations every member of the body may be present, if he wishes.

22.21 If a body politic of merchants contracts a debt to an outsider by the act of its representative assembly, every member is individually liable for the whole. For an outsider can take no notice of their private laws, but regards them as so many individual men, each obliged for the whole payment, until payment by one discharges all the rest. But if the debt is owed to one of the company, the creditor is debtor to himself for the whole, and therefore cannot demand his debt except from the common fund, if there is one.

22.22 If the commonwealth imposes a tax on the body, it is understood to be laid on every member in proportion to his particular investment in the company. For in this case there is no common fund other than what is made up of their particular investments.

22.23 If a fine is laid on the body for some unlawful act, only those are liable by whose votes the act was decreed, or with whose help it was carried out. For in none of the rest is there any crime other than belonging to the body; and that, if it is a crime, is not his, because the body was ordained by the authority of the commonwealth.

22.24 If one of the members is in debt to the body, he may be sued by the body. But his goods cannot be seized, nor his person imprisoned, by the authority of the body, but only by the authority of the commonwealth. For if they could do it by their

own authority, they could by their own authority give judgment that the debt is due—which is as much as to be judge in their own cause.

22.25 Those bodies made for the government of men, or for trade, are either perpetual or for a time prescribed in writing. But there are also bodies whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their business. For example, a sovereign monarch or sovereign assembly may think fit to command the towns and other parts of their territory to send him their deputies, to inform him of the condition and needs of the subjects, or to advise with him on making good laws, or for any other reason, as with one person representing the whole country. Such deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned to them, are there and at that time a body politic representing every subject of that dominion. But this holds only for such matters as are put to them by the man or assembly that summoned them by the sovereign authority; and when it is declared that nothing more will be put before them or debated by them, the body is dissolved. For if they were the absolute representative of the people, it would be the sovereign assembly; and so there would be two sovereign assemblies, or two sovereigns, over the same people, which is inconsistent with their peace. And so, where there is once a sovereignty, there can be no absolute representation of the people except by it. As for the limits of how far such a body shall represent the whole people, they are set out in the writing by which they were summoned. For the people cannot choose their deputies for any other purpose than is expressed in the writing directed to them from their sovereign.

22.26 Private bodies that are regular and lawful are those constituted without letters or other written authority, apart from the laws common to all other subjects. And because they are united in one representative person, they are held to be regular. Such are all families, in which the father or master governs the whole family. For he binds his children and servants as far as the law permits, though not further, since none of them are bound to obey in actions the law has forbidden. In all other

actions, while they are under domestic government, they are subject to their fathers and masters as to their immediate sovereigns. For since the father and master were absolute sovereigns in their own families before the institution of the commonwealth, they lose afterward no more of their authority than the law of the commonwealth takes from them.

22.27 Private bodies that are regular but unlawful are those that unite themselves into one representative person without any public authority at all. Such are the organized bands of beggars, thieves, and Roma, formed the better to order their trade of begging and stealing; and the corporations of men who, by authority from some foreign person, unite themselves in another's dominion for the easier spreading of doctrines, and to form a party against the power of the commonwealth.[30]

22.28 Irregular systems—which are by nature only leagues, or sometimes mere gatherings of people, with no union for any particular purpose, arising not from any obligation of one to another but only from a likeness of wills and inclinations—become lawful or unlawful according to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of each particular man's purpose in them. And his purpose is to be understood from the occasion.

22.29 Leagues of subjects (because leagues are commonly made for mutual defense) are for the most part unnecessary in a commonwealth, which is nothing more than a league of all the subjects together; and they smack of unlawful designs. For that reason they are unlawful, and commonly go by the name of factions or conspiracies. For a league, being a connection of men by covenants, is valid only so long as no just cause of distrust arises, if no power is given to any one man or assembly (as in the condition of mere nature) to compel them to perform. And therefore leagues between commonwealths, over which no human power is established to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful but also profitable for as long as they last. But leagues of the subjects of one and the same commonwealth,

30 The second group chiefly means Catholic organizations answering to the Pope, such as the Jesuits.

where every one may obtain his right by means of the sovereign power, are unnecessary for maintaining peace and justice, and (if their design is evil, or unknown to the commonwealth) unlawful. For every uniting of strength by private men is unjust if for an evil purpose; and if for an unknown purpose, dangerous to the public and unjustly concealed.

22.30 If the sovereign power lies in a large assembly, and a number of men who are part of the assembly consult apart, without authority, to contrive the guidance of the rest, this is a faction, or unlawful conspiracy, since it is a fraudulent manipulation of the assembly for their particular interest. But if someone whose private interest is to be debated and judged in the assembly makes as many friends as he can, in him it is no injustice, because in this case he is no part of the assembly. And even if he hires such friends with money, it is still not injustice (unless there is an express law against it). For sometimes, men's ways being what they are, justice cannot be had without money; and every man may think his own cause just until it has been heard and judged.

22.31 In every commonwealth, if a private man maintains more servants than the management of his estate and the lawful employment he has for them require, it is faction, and unlawful. For having the protection of the commonwealth, he has no need of the defense of private force. And though in nations not thoroughly civilized several large families have lived in continual hostility and attacked one another with private force, it is evident enough that either they acted unjustly or else they had no commonwealth.

22.32 And like factions of kindred, so also factions over the government of religion, such as Papists, Protestants, and so on, or over the state, such as the patricians and plebeians of old in Rome, and the aristocrats and democrats of old in Greece, are unjust. They are contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and take the sword out of the sovereign's hand.

22.33 A gathering of people is an irregular system, whose lawfulness or unlawfulness depends on the occasion and on the

number of those assembled. If the occasion is lawful and evident, the gathering is lawful, as with the usual meeting of people at church, or at a public show, in the usual numbers. For if the numbers are extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently anyone who cannot give a particular and good account of his being among them is to be judged aware of an unlawful and riotous design. It may be lawful for a thousand men to join in a petition to be delivered to a judge or magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a riotous assembly, because one or two are all that is needed for that purpose. But in cases like these, it is not a set number that makes the assembly unlawful, but a number greater than the officers on hand are able to suppress and bring to justice.

22.34 When an unusual number of men assemble against a man whom they accuse, the assembly is an unlawful riot, because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus, where Demetrius and a great number of other men brought two of Paul's companions before the magistrate, crying out with one voice, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians"—which was their way of demanding justice against them for teaching the people doctrine that was against their religion and their trade.[31] The occasion here, considering the laws of that people, was just; yet their assembly was judged unlawful, and the magistrate rebuked them for it in these words: "If Demetrius and the other workmen can accuse any man of anything, there are courts and deputies; let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in a lawfully called assembly. For we are in danger of being accused for this day's sedition, because there is no cause by which anyone can give any reason for this gathering of people." There he calls an assembly for which men can give no just account a sedition, and one they could not answer for.[32] And this is all I shall say about systems

31 Acts 19:23–41. Demetrius was a silversmith who made shrines of Diana (Artemis); the two companions were Gaius and Aristarchus.

32 The speaker is the town clerk of Ephesus (Acts 19:35–40).

and assemblies of people. They may be compared, as I said, to the similar parts of the human body: the lawful ones to the muscles; the unlawful ones to wens, boils, and abscesses, bred by the unnatural confluence of evil humors.

CHAPTER 23: OF THE PUBLIC MINISTERS OF SOVEREIGN POWER

Officials who act in the sovereign's name are compared to the organs of a body.

23.1 In the last chapter I spoke of the similar parts of a commonwealth; in this one I shall speak of its organic parts, which are public ministers.

23.2 A *public minister* is one who is employed by the sovereign (whether a monarch or an assembly) in any affairs, with authority to represent the person of the commonwealth in that employment. Now every man or assembly that has sovereignty represents two persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two capacities, one natural and the other political. A monarch bears the person not only of the commonwealth but also of a man; and a sovereign assembly bears the person not only of the commonwealth but also of the assembly. Those who serve them in their natural capacity are not public ministers; only those who serve them in the administration of public business are. And so neither ushers, nor sergeants, nor other officers who wait on the assembly for no other purpose than the convenience of the men assembled, in an aristocracy or democracy, are public ministers; nor, in a monarchy, are stewards, chamberlains, cofferers, or any other officers of the monarch's household.[33]

23.3 Of public ministers, some are entrusted with a general administration, either of the whole dominion or of a part of it. The whole administration may be entrusted, for example, to a protector or regent, to whom the predecessor of an infant king may commit the entire administration of his kingdom during

33 A cofferer was an officer of the royal household who kept its accounts and paid its expenses.

the king's minority. In that case every subject is obliged to obey, so far as the ordinances he makes and the commands he gives are in the king's name and not inconsistent with the king's sovereign power. A part, or province, may be entrusted when either a monarch or a sovereign assembly gives the general charge of it to a governor, lieutenant, prefect, or viceroy. In this case too, everyone in that province is obliged by everything he does in the sovereign's name that is not incompatible with the sovereign's right. For such protectors, viceroys, and governors have no right but what depends on the sovereign's will; and no commission that can be given them can be interpreted as a declaration of the will to transfer sovereignty, without express and clear words to that purpose. This kind of public minister resembles the nerves and tendons that move the various limbs of a natural body.

23.4 Others have a special administration, that is, charge of some special business, either at home or abroad. At home, first, for the economy of a commonwealth: those who have authority concerning the *treasury*—tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or any public revenue whatever—to collect, receive, or pay it out, or to take the accounts of it, are public ministers. They are ministers, because they serve the representative person and can do nothing against his command or without his authority; public, because they serve him in his political capacity.

23.5 Second, those who have authority concerning the *militia*—to have custody of arms, forts, and ports; to levy, pay, or lead soldiers; or to provide anything necessary for the use of war, either by land or sea—are public ministers. But a soldier without a command, though he fights for the commonwealth, does not for that reason represent its person, because there is no one to whom he represents it. For everyone who has a command represents it only to those whom he commands.

23.6 Those also who have authority to teach the people their duty to the sovereign power, or to enable others to teach it, and to instruct them in the knowledge of what is just and unjust, so as to make them more apt to live in godliness and in peace

among themselves and to resist the public enemy, are public ministers. They are ministers, in that they do it not by their own authority but by another's; and public, because they do it (or should do it) by no authority but the sovereign's. Only the monarch or the sovereign assembly has authority immediately from God to teach and instruct the people; and no one but the sovereign receives his power simply *Dei gratia*, that is, by the favor of no one but God. All others receive theirs by the favor and providence of God and of their sovereigns—as in a monarchy, *Dei gratia et regis*, or *Dei providentia et voluntate regis*.[34]

23.7 Those also to whom jurisdiction is given are public ministers. For in their seats of justice they represent the person of the sovereign, and their sentence is his sentence; for (as has been declared before) all judicature is essentially annexed to sovereignty, and therefore all other judges are only ministers of him or them that have the sovereign power. And as controversies are of two sorts, namely of *fact* and of *law*, so are judgments, some of fact and some of law; and consequently in the same controversy there may be two judges, one of fact and another of law.

23.8 In both of these kinds of controversy, a controversy may arise between the party judged and the judge. Since both are subjects of the sovereign, it ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by the consent of both, for no man can be judge in his own cause. But the sovereign is already agreed on as judge by both of them, and so he is either to hear the case and decide it himself, or to appoint as judge someone they both agree on. This agreement is understood to be made between them in various ways. First, if the defendant is allowed to object to any of his judges whose interest makes him suspect them (for as to the plaintiff, he has already chosen his own judge), then those he does not object to are judges he himself agrees on. Second, if he appeals to any other judge, he can appeal no further, for his appeal is his choice. Third, if he appeals to the sovereign him-

34 *Dei gratia*: "by the grace of God," the formula in royal titles. The others mean "by the grace of God and of the king" and "by the providence of God and the will of the king."

self, and the sovereign gives sentence, either in person or by delegates whom the parties agree on, that sentence is final; for the defendant is judged by his own judges, that is to say, by himself.

23.9 Considering these properties of just and rational judicature, I cannot refrain from remarking on the excellent constitution of the courts of justice established in England, both for common pleas and for public pleas. By common pleas I mean those in which both plaintiff and defendant are subjects; by public pleas (which are also called pleas of the Crown), those in which the plaintiff is the sovereign. For since there were two orders of men, one the Lords and the other the Commons, the Lords had this privilege: to have none but lords as judges in all capital crimes, and as many of them as chose to be present. Since this was always acknowledged as a privilege granted in their favor, their judges were none but those they had themselves desired. And in all controversies every subject (as also the Lords, in civil controversies) had as judges men of the county where the matter in controversy lay. He might make his objections against them, until at last twelve men were agreed on to whom no objection was made, and he was judged by those twelve. So, having his own judges, the party could allege nothing why the sentence should not be final. These public persons, who have authority from the sovereign power either to instruct or to judge the people, are members of the commonwealth that may fitly be compared to the organs of the voice in a natural body.

23.10 Public ministers also include all those who have authority from the sovereign to secure the execution of judgments given; to publish the sovereign's commands; to suppress riots; to arrest and imprison criminals; and to do other acts tending to the preservation of the peace. For every act they do by such authority is the act of the commonwealth, and their service corresponds to that of the hands in a natural body.

23.11 Public ministers abroad are those who represent the person of their own sovereign to foreign states. Such are ambassad-

ors, messengers, agents, and heralds, sent by public authority and on public business.

23.12 But those who are sent by the authority only of some private party in a troubled state, even if they are received, are neither public nor private ministers of the commonwealth, because none of their actions has the commonwealth as its author. Likewise an ambassador sent from a prince to congratulate, to offer condolences, or to attend a ceremony, though the authority is public, is a private person, because the business is private and belongs to the prince in his natural capacity. Also, if a man is sent into another country to explore its counsels and strength secretly, then though both the authority and the business are public, he is only a private minister, because there is no one to take notice of any person in him but his own. Yet he is a minister of the commonwealth, and may be compared to an eye in the natural body. And those who are appointed to receive the petitions or other information of the people, and are as it were the public ear, are public ministers, and represent their sovereign in that office.

23.13 Neither a counselor nor a council of state—if we consider it as having no authority of judicature or command, but only of giving advice to the sovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not—is a public person. For the advice is addressed to the sovereign only, whose person cannot be represented to him by another in his own presence. But a body of counselors is never without some other authority, either of judicature or of direct administration. In a monarchy they represent the monarch in delivering his commands to the public ministers. In a democracy the council, or senate, proposes the result of its deliberations to the people as a council; but when it appoints judges, or hears cases, or gives audience to ambassadors, it does so in the character of a minister of the people. And in an aristocracy the council of state is the sovereign assembly itself, and gives counsel to no one but themselves.

CHAPTER 24: OF THE NUTRITION AND PROCREATION OF A COMMONWEALTH

The commonwealth's goods, property, money, and colonies are compared to a body's food, blood, and offspring.

24.1 The *nutrition* of a commonwealth consists in the *plenty* and *distribution* of *materials* conducive to life; in *concoction*, or *preparation*; and (when concocted) in the *conveyance* of it, by suitable channels, to public use.[35]

24.2 As for plenty of matter, it is something limited by nature to those commodities which God usually either gives freely to mankind, or sells to them for labor, from land and sea, the two breasts of our common mother.

24.3 For the matter of this nourishment, consisting of animals, vegetables, and minerals, God has freely laid before us, in or near the face of the earth, so that nothing more is needed than the labor and industry of receiving it. So plenty depends (next to God's favor) merely on the labor and industry of men.

24.4 This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly *native* and partly *foreign*: native, what is to be had within the territory of the commonwealth; foreign, what is imported from outside. And because there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth (unless it is of very vast extent) that produces all things needed for the maintenance and motion of the whole body, and few that do not produce something more than necessary, the surplus commodities to be had within cease to be surplus, and supply these wants at home by the importation of what may be had abroad, whether by exchange, by just war, or by labor. For a man's labor is also a commodity exchangeable for benefit, like anything else. And there have been commonwealths that, having no more territory than served them to live on, have nevertheless not only maintained but also increased their power, partly by the labor of trading from one place to

35 "Concoction" was the old physiological term for digestion; Hobbes continues his comparison of the commonwealth to a living body.

another, and partly by selling manufactures whose materials were brought in from other places.

24.5 The distribution of the materials of this nourishment is the constitution of *mine*, *yours*, and *his*—that is, in one word, *property*. In every kind of commonwealth it belongs to the sovereign power. For where there is no commonwealth there is (as has already been shown) a perpetual war of every man against his neighbor; and therefore everything belongs to whoever gets it and keeps it by force—which is neither *property* nor *community*, but *uncertainty*. This is so evident that even Cicero (a passionate defender of liberty), in a public pleading, attributes all property to the civil law. "Let the civil law," he says, "be once abandoned, or only negligently guarded (not to say oppressed), and there is nothing that any man can be sure of receiving from his ancestor or leaving to his children." And again:[36] "Take away the civil law, and no man knows what is his own and what is another man's." Seeing, then, that the introduction of *property* is an effect of the commonwealth, which can do nothing except by the person that represents it, it is the act of the sovereign alone, and consists in the laws, which no one can make who does not have the sovereign power. The ancients understood this well: they called what we call law *nomos* (that is, *distribution*), and defined justice as *distributing* to every man *his own*.[37]

24.6 In this distribution the first law is for the division of the land itself. In it the sovereign assigns every man a portion according to what he, and not any subject or any number of subjects, judges agreeable to equity and the common good. The children of Israel were a commonwealth in the wilderness, but lacked the commodities of the earth until they were masters of the Promised Land. That land was afterward divided among them, not at their own discretion, but at the discretion of Eleazar the priest and Joshua their general. There were twelve tribes, and they made them thirteen by subdividing the tribe of Joseph; yet they made only twelve portions of the land, and

36 Cicero, *Pro Caecina* 70–75.

37 Greek *nomos*, "law," is related to *nemein*, "to distribute."

ordained no land for the tribe of Levi, but assigned them a tenth part of all the produce. That division was therefore arbitrary.[38] And though a people coming into possession of a land by war do not always exterminate the ancient inhabitants (as the Jews did), but leave many, or most, or all of them their estates, it is plain that they hold them afterward as by the victors' distribution—just as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conqueror.

24.7 From this we may gather that the property a subject has in his lands consists in a right to exclude all other subjects from using them, and not to exclude their sovereign, whether an assembly or a monarch. For seeing that the sovereign—that is, the commonwealth, whose person he represents—is understood to do nothing except with a view to the common peace and security, this distribution of lands is to be understood as done with a view to the same. Consequently, any distribution he makes to the prejudice of that peace is contrary to the will of every subject who committed his peace and safety to the sovereign's discretion and conscience, and therefore, by the will of every one of them, is to be considered void. It is true that a sovereign monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain many things in pursuit of their passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust and of the law of nature. But this is not enough to authorize any subject either to make war on their sovereign, or even to accuse him of injustice, or to speak ill of him in any way; because they have authorized all his actions, and in bestowing the sovereign power made them their own. But in what cases the commands of sovereigns are contrary to equity and the law of nature is to be considered later, in another place.

24.8 In the distribution of land, the commonwealth itself may be conceived to have a portion, and to possess and improve it by its representative; and such a portion may be conceived as made large enough to sustain the whole expense required for the common peace and defense. This would be very true, if there could

38 Joshua 14:1–4; Numbers 18:21–24.

be any representative conceived free from human passions and infirmities. But the nature of men being what it is, setting aside public land, or any fixed revenue, for the commonwealth is useless. It tends to the dissolution of government, and to the condition of mere nature and war, as soon as ever the sovereign power falls into the hands of a monarch or an assembly that is either too careless of money or too reckless in committing the public stock to a long or costly war. Commonwealths can endure no diet. For since their expense is limited not by their own appetite but by external accidents and the appetites of their neighbors, the public riches cannot be limited by any limits other than those that emergencies require. And whereas in England the Conqueror reserved various lands for his own use (besides forests and chases, either for his recreation or for the preservation of woods), and reserved various services on the land he gave his subjects, it seems they were reserved for his maintenance not in his public but in his natural capacity. For he and his successors nevertheless laid arbitrary taxes on all the subjects' land when they judged it necessary.[39] Or if those public lands and services were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the commonwealth, that was contrary to the purpose of the institution, since they were (as the taxes that followed showed) insufficient, and (as the recent small revenue of the Crown shows) subject to alienation and diminution. It is therefore useless to assign a portion to the commonwealth, which may sell it or give it away, and does sell it and give it away when its representative does so.

24.9 As with the distribution of lands at home, so also it belongs to the sovereign to assign in what places, and in what commodities, the subject shall trade abroad. For if it belonged to private persons to use their own discretion in this, some of them would be drawn by gain to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the commonwealth, and to hurt it themselves by importing things that please men's appetites but are nevertheless harmful, or at least unprofitable, to them. And therefore it belongs to the

39 A chase was unenclosed land reserved for hunting.

commonwealth (that is, to the sovereign only) to approve or disapprove both the places and the matter of foreign trade.

24.10 Further, it is not enough for the sustenance of a commonwealth that every man has property in a portion of land, or in a few commodities, or a natural property in some useful art; and there is no art in the world that is not necessary to the being, or at least the well-being, of almost every individual man. It is therefore necessary that men distribute what they can spare, and transfer their property in it to one another, by exchange and mutual contract. And therefore it belongs to the commonwealth (that is to say, to the sovereign) to appoint in what manner all kinds of contract between subjects (such as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and hiring) are to be made, and by what words and signs they shall be understood as valid. And as for the matter and distribution of nourishment to the various members of the commonwealth, this much (considering the plan of the whole work) is sufficient.

24.11 By *concoction* I understand the reducing of all commodities that are not consumed at once, but reserved for nourishment in time to come, to something of equal value, and at the same time so portable as not to hinder men's movement from place to place—so that a man may have, in whatever place, such nourishment as the place affords. And this is nothing else but gold, silver, and money. For gold and silver, being (as it happens) highly valued in almost every country in the world, are a convenient measure of the value of all other things between nations; and money (of whatever material it is coined by the sovereign of a commonwealth) is a sufficient measure of the value of all other things between the subjects of that commonwealth. By means of these measures, all commodities, movable and immovable, are made to accompany a man to every place he goes, within and outside the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passes from man to man within the commonwealth, and goes round, nourishing every part of it as it passes. So this concoction is, as it were, the sanguification of the commonwealth. For natural blood is made in the same way from the fruits of the earth, and,

circulating, nourishes every member of the human body along the way.[40]

24.12 And because silver and gold have their value from the material itself, they have, first, this privilege: that their value cannot be altered by the power of one commonwealth, or of a few, since they are a common measure of the commodities of all places. But base money may easily be raised or lowered in value. Second, they have the privilege of making commonwealths move, and stretch out their arms when need be into foreign countries, and supply with provisions not only private subjects who travel but whole armies. But coinage that is valued not for its material but for the stamp of the place, being unable to endure a change of air, has its effect at home only; and there it is also subject to changes in the laws, and so to having its value diminished, often to the harm of those who hold it.

24.13 The channels and ways by which it is conveyed to public use are of two sorts: one that conveys it to the public coffers, the other that pays it out again for public payments. Of the first sort are collectors, receivers, and treasurers; of the second, the treasurers again, and the officers appointed to pay the various public or private ministers. And in this too the artificial man keeps its resemblance to the natural man, whose veins receive the blood from the various parts of the body and carry it to the heart, where it is made vital, and the heart sends it out again through the arteries to enliven all the members and enable them to move.

24.14 The *procreation*, or children, of a commonwealth are what we call *plantations*, or *colonies*: numbers of men sent out from the commonwealth under a leader or governor to inhabit a foreign country, either formerly empty of inhabitants or emptied of them then by war. And when a colony is settled, either they are a commonwealth of their own, discharged from subjection to the sovereign that sent them (as has been done by many commonwealths of ancient times)—in which case the common-

40 Sanguification: the making of blood. Hobbes draws on William Harvey's account of the circulation of the blood (1628).

wealth from which they went was called their metropolis, or mother, and requires no more of them than fathers require of the children whom they emancipate and free from their household government, which is honor and friendship—or else they remain united to their metropolis, as the colonies of the people of Rome were, and then they are not commonwealths themselves, but provinces and parts of the commonwealth that sent them.[41] So the right of colonies (apart from honor and alliance with their metropolis) depends wholly on the license, or letters, by which their sovereign authorized them to plant.

CHAPTER 25: OF COUNSEL

Counsel is distinguished from command and exhortation, and the marks of a good counselor are set out.

25.1 How misleading it is to judge the nature of things by the ordinary and inconstant use of words appears in nothing more than in the confusion of counsels and commands, which arises from the imperative manner of speaking in both, and on many other occasions besides. For the words "Do this" are the words not only of one who commands, but also of one who gives counsel, and of one who exhorts. And yet there are few who do not see that these are very different things, or who cannot distinguish between them when they perceive who is speaking, to whom the speech is directed, and on what occasion. But finding those phrases in men's writings, and being unable or unwilling to consider the circumstances, they sometimes mistake the precepts of counselors for the precepts of those who command, and sometimes the reverse, according as it best agrees with the conclusions they want to draw or the actions they approve. To avoid these mistakes, and to give the terms commanding, counseling, and exhorting their proper and distinct meanings, I define them as follows.

25.2 *Command* is where a man says "Do this" or "Do not do this," without expecting any other reason than the will of the one who

41 *Metropolis*: Greek for "mother city."

says it. From this it plainly follows that one who commands claims thereby his own benefit. For the reason for his command is his own will only, and the proper object of every man's will is some good to himself.

25.3 *Counsel* is where a man says "Do this" or "Do not do this," and deduces his reasons from the benefit that comes by it to the one he says it to. And from this it is evident that one who gives counsel claims only (whatever he intends) the good of the one to whom he gives it.

25.4 Therefore one great difference between counsel and command is that command is directed to a man's own benefit, and counsel to the benefit of another man. And from this arises another difference: a man may be obliged to do what he is commanded, as when he has covenanted to obey; but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counseled, because the harm of not following it is his own. Or if he should covenant to follow it, then the counsel is turned into the nature of a command. A third difference between them is that no man can claim a right to be another man's counselor, because he is not supposed to claim any benefit by it to himself. To demand a right to counsel another shows a will to learn his designs, or to gain some other good for oneself—which (as I said before) is the proper object of every man's will.

25.5 This also belongs to the nature of counsel: whatever it is, one who asks for it cannot in equity accuse or punish it. For to ask counsel of another is to permit him to give such counsel as he thinks best. Consequently one who gives counsel to his sovereign (whether a monarch or an assembly) when it asks for it cannot in equity be punished for it, whether it agrees with the opinion of the majority or not, so long as it is to the proposition under debate. For if the sense of the assembly can be known before the debate is ended, they should neither ask for nor take any further counsel; for the sense of the assembly is the resolution of the debate and the end of all deliberation. And in general, one who asks for counsel is its author, and therefore cannot punish it; and what the sovereign cannot do, no one else can.

But if one subject gives counsel to another to do anything contrary to the laws, whether that counsel comes from evil intention or only from ignorance, it is punishable by the commonwealth; because ignorance of the law is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject.

25.6 *Exhortation* and *dehortation* are counsel accompanied by signs, in the one who gives it, of a vehement desire to have it followed; or, to put it more briefly, *counsel vehemently pressed*. For one who exhorts does not deduce the consequences of what he advises and bind himself to the rigor of true reasoning, but encourages the one he counsels to action, just as one who dehorts deters him from it. And therefore in deducing their reasons they have regard in their speeches to the common passions and opinions of men, and make use of similes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory, to persuade their hearers of the usefulness, honor, or justice of following their advice.[42]

25.7 From this it may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation are directed to the good of the one who gives the counsel, not of the one who asks for it, which is contrary to the duty of a counselor, who (by the definition of counsel) ought to regard not his own benefit but that of the one he advises. And that he directs his counsel to his own benefit is plain enough from the long and vehement urging, or from the artful giving of it; which, since it was not required of him and so proceeds from his own motives, is directed principally to his own benefit, and only incidentally, or not at all, to the good of the one counseled.

25.8 Second, that exhortation and dehortation have a use only where a man is to speak to a multitude. For when speech is addressed to one person, he can interrupt the speaker and examine his reasons more rigorously than can be done in a multitude, who are too many to enter into dispute and dialogue with a speaker addressing them all alike at once.

25.9 Third, that those who exhort and dehort where they are asked to give counsel are corrupt counselors, bribed as it were

by their own interest. For however good the counsel they give, the one who gives it is no more a good counselor than one who gives a just sentence for a reward is a just judge. But where a man may lawfully command, as a father in his family or a leader in an army, his exhortations and dehortations are not only lawful but also necessary and praiseworthy. But then they are no longer counsels but commands. And when commands are for carrying out hard labor, sometimes necessity, and always humanity, requires that they be sweetened in the delivery by encouragement, and in the tone and phrasing of counsel rather than in the harsher language of command.

25.10 We may take examples of the difference between command and counsel from the forms of speech that express them in Holy Scripture. "Have no other gods but me; make yourself no graven image; do not take God's name in vain; keep the Sabbath holy; honor your parents; do not kill; do not steal," and so on, are commands, because the reason for which we are to obey them is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, "Sell all you have, give it to the poor, and follow me," are counsel, because the reason for which we are to do so is drawn from our own benefit, which is this: that we shall have "treasure in heaven." These words, "Go into the village opposite you, and you will find a donkey tied, and her colt; untie her and bring her to me," are a command, for the reason for their doing it is drawn from the will of their Master. But these words, "Repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus," are counsel, because the reason why we should do so tends not to any benefit of God Almighty, who will still be King in whatever way we rebel, but to our own, who have no other means of avoiding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.[43]

25.11 As the difference between counsel and command has now been deduced from the nature of counsel, which consists in

42 "Dehortation" (now rare) is urging someone not to do something—the opposite of exhortation.

43 Matthew 19:21; Matthew 21:2; Acts 2:38.

deducing the benefit or harm that may come to the one counseled from the necessary or probable consequences of the action proposed, so the differences between *apt* and *inept* counselors may be derived from the same. For experience is only the memory of the consequences of similar actions observed before, and counsel only the speech by which that experience is made known to another; so the virtues and defects of counsel are the same as the intellectual virtues and defects. And to the person of a commonwealth, his counselors serve in the place of memory and mental discourse. But joined with this resemblance of the commonwealth to a natural man there is one dissimilarity of great importance. A natural man receives his experience from the natural objects of sense, which work on him without passion or interest of their own; whereas those who give counsel to the representative person of a commonwealth may have, and often have, their own particular ends and passions, which make their counsels always suspect, and many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down as the first condition of a good counselor: "That his ends and interest be not inconsistent with the ends and interest of the one he counsels."

25.12 Second, because the office of a counselor, when an action comes under deliberation, is to make its consequences plain, in such a way that the one counseled may be truly and clearly informed, he ought to propose his advice in such a form of speech as may make the truth most clearly appear—that is, with reasoning as firm, language as meaningful and proper, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore "rash and unevident inferences" (such as are drawn only from examples or the authority of books, and are not arguments about what is good or evil, but witnesses of fact or of opinion), "obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions, and also all metaphorical speeches tending to stir up passion" (because such reasoning and such expressions are useful only to deceive, or to lead the one we counsel toward ends other than his own), "are repugnant to the office of a counselor."

25.13 Third, because the ability to counsel comes from experience and long study, and no man is presumed to have experience in all the things that must be known for the administration of a great commonwealth, "no man is presumed to be a good counselor except in such business as he has not only been much versed in, but has also much meditated on and considered." For seeing that the business of a commonwealth is to preserve the people in peace at home and defend them against foreign invasion, we shall find that it requires great knowledge of the disposition of mankind, of the rights of government, and of the nature of equity, law, justice, and honor, which cannot be attained without study; and of the strength, resources, and places both of their own country and of their neighbors; as well as of the inclinations and designs of all nations that may in any way trouble them. And this is not attained without much experience. Of these things, not only the whole sum but every one of the particulars requires the age and observation of a mature man, and more than ordinary study. The wit required for counsel, as I have said before (chapter 8), is judgment. And the differences between men in that respect come from different education, some to one kind of study or business and others to another. When there are infallible rules for doing something (as the rules of geometry for machines and buildings), all the experience in the world cannot equal the counsel of one who has learned or discovered the rule. And when there is no such rule, the one who has the most experience in that particular kind of business has the best judgment in it, and is the best counselor.

25.14 Fourth, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth in business that concerns another commonwealth, "it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligence reports and letters" that come from there, "and with all the records of treaties and other transactions of state" between them; which no one can be, except those whom the representative thinks fit. From this we may see that those who are not called to counsel can have no good counsel to thrust forward in such cases.

25.15 Fifth, supposing the number of counselors equal, a man is better counseled by hearing them separately than in an assembly, and that for many reasons. First, in hearing them separately you have the advice of every man; but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with "Aye" or "No," or with their hands or feet, moved not by their own sense but by the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing, by contradiction, some who have spoken or the whole assembly, or for fear of appearing slower of understanding than those who have applauded the contrary opinion. Second, in an assembly of many there cannot help but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the public; and their interests make them passionate, and passion makes them eloquent, and eloquence draws others into the same advice. For the passions of men, which separately are moderate, like the heat of one firebrand, are in an assembly like many brands that set one another alight (especially when they fan one another with speeches), to the point of setting the commonwealth on fire, under pretense of counseling it. Third, in hearing every man separately, one may examine (when there is need) the truth or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent interruptions and objections. This cannot be done in an assembly, where (on every difficult question) a man is more stunned and dazzled by the variety of talk about it than informed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many called together for advice in which there are not some who have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and learned in politics too, and who give their advice with care not for the business proposed but for the applause of their motley speeches, made of the diverse colored threads, or scraps, of authors. This is an impertinence at least, which takes up the time of serious consultation, and is easily avoided in the private way of counseling separately. Fourth, in deliberations that ought to be kept secret (of which there are many occasions in public business), the counsels of many, especially in assemblies, are dangerous. And therefore great assemblies are forced

to commit such affairs to smaller numbers, and to those persons who are most experienced and in whose loyalty they have most confidence.

25.16 To conclude: who is there that so far approves of taking counsel from a great assembly of counselors that he would wish for, or accept, their pains when it is a question of marrying his children, disposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private estate—especially if there are among them some who do not wish him to prosper? A man who does his business with the help of many prudent counselors, each consulted separately in his own field, does it best, like one who uses able partners at tennis, placed in their proper positions. The next best is one who uses his own judgment only, like one who has no partner at all. But one who is carried to and fro about his business by a formal council, which cannot move except by a majority of concurring opinions, and whose execution is commonly delayed (out of envy or interest) by the dissenting part, does it worst of all. He is like one who is carried to the ball, though by good players, in a wheelbarrow or some other frame, heavy in itself and slowed down further by the discordant judgments and efforts of those who push it—and all the more so, the more there are who set their hands to it, and most of all when there are one or more among them who want him to lose. And though it is true that many eyes see more than one, this is not to be understood of many counselors, but only when the final resolution lies in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing from different angles, and are apt to look askance toward their private benefit, those who do not want to miss their mark, though they look about with two eyes, still never aim with more than one. And therefore no great popular commonwealth was ever kept up except by a foreign enemy that united them, or by the reputation of some one eminent man among them, or by the secret counsel of a few, or by the mutual fear of equal factions—and not by the open consultations of the assembly. And as for very small commonwealths, whether popular or monarchical,

no human wisdom can uphold them longer than the jealousy of their powerful neighbors lasts.

CHAPTER 26: OF CIVIL LAWS

Civil law is defined as the sovereign's command to subjects distinguishing right and wrong.

26.1 By *civil laws* I understand the laws that men are bound to observe because they are members, not of this or that commonwealth in particular, but of a commonwealth. For knowledge of particular laws belongs to those who make a profession of studying the laws of their various countries; but knowledge of civil law in general belongs to any man. The ancient law of Rome was called their *civil law*, from the word *civitas*, which means a commonwealth. And those countries that were once under the Roman Empire and governed by that law, and still retain such part of it as they think fit, call that part the civil law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws. But that is not what I intend to speak of here, my purpose being to show not what is law here and there, but what law is—as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and various others have done without professing the study of law.

26.2 And first, it is plain that law in general is not counsel but command; and not a command of any man to any man, but only of one whose command is addressed to someone already obliged to obey him. And as for civil law, it adds only the name of the person commanding, which is *persona civitatis*, the person of the commonwealth.

26.3 Having considered this, I define civil law in this manner. *Civil law* is, to every subject, those rules which the commonwealth has commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of its will, to make use of for distinguishing right and wrong; that is to say, what is contrary to the rule and what is not contrary to it.

26.4 In this definition there is nothing that is not evident at first sight. For everyone sees that some laws are addressed to all sub-

jects in general, some to particular provinces, some to particular occupations, and some to particular men; and are therefore laws to each of those to whom the command is directed, and to no one else. Also, that laws are the rules of just and unjust, nothing being considered unjust that is not contrary to some law. Likewise, that no one can make laws but the commonwealth, because our subjection is to the commonwealth only. And that commands are to be signified by sufficient signs, because otherwise a man does not know how to obey them. And therefore whatever can be deduced from this definition by necessary consequence ought to be acknowledged as true. Now I deduce from it what follows.

26.5 1. The legislator in all commonwealths is only the sovereign, whether one man, as in a monarchy, or one assembly of men, as in a democracy or aristocracy. For the legislator is the one who makes the law. And only the commonwealth prescribes and commands the observance of those rules which we call law; therefore the commonwealth is the legislator. But the commonwealth is no person, and has no capacity to do anything except by its representative (that is, the sovereign); and therefore the sovereign is the sole legislator. For the same reason, no one can repeal a law once made but the sovereign; because a law is not repealed except by another law that forbids it to be put into execution.

26.6 2. The sovereign of a commonwealth, whether an assembly or one man, is not subject to the civil laws. Since he has power to make and repeal laws, he may, when he pleases, free himself from that subjection by repealing the laws that trouble him and making new ones; and consequently he was free before. For he is free who can be free when he will. Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself, because he who can bind can release; and therefore he who is bound to himself only is not bound.

26.7 3. When long use obtains the authority of a law, it is not the length of time that gives the authority, but the will of the sovereign signified by his silence (for silence is sometimes an argu-

ment of consent); and it is law no longer than the sovereign remains silent about it. And therefore if the sovereign has a question of right grounded not on his present will but on laws formerly made, the length of time does his right no harm; the question is to be judged by equity. For many unjust actions and unjust sentences go unchecked for longer than any man can remember. And our lawyers count no customs as law except those that are reasonable, and hold that evil customs are to be abolished. But the judgment of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongs to the one who makes the law, which is the sovereign assembly or monarch.

26.8 4. The law of nature and the civil law contain each other and are of equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and the other moral virtues that depend on these, are in the condition of mere nature (as I said before at the end of chapter 15) not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience. Once a commonwealth is settled, they are actually laws, and not before, since they are then the commands of the commonwealth, and therefore also civil laws; for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obey them. For in the disputes of private men, to declare what is equity, what is justice, and what is moral virtue, and to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and of punishments ordained for those who break them; and these ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of nature, then, is a part of the civil law in every commonwealth in the world. Reciprocally, the civil law is also a part of the dictates of nature. For justice—that is, the performance of covenants, and giving every man his own—is a dictate of the law of nature. But every subject in a commonwealth has covenanted to obey the civil law: either with one another, as when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the representative itself one by one, when, subdued by the sword, they promise obedience in order to receive their lives. And therefore obedience to the civil law is also part of the law of nature. Civil and natural law are not different kinds of law, but different parts

of law: the written part is called civil, the unwritten part natural. But the right of nature—that is, the natural liberty of man—may be abridged and restrained by the civil law. Indeed, the end of making laws is nothing but such restraint, without which there cannot possibly be any peace. And law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particular men in such a way that they might not hurt but assist one another, and join together against a common enemy.

26.9 5. If the sovereign of one commonwealth subdues a people who have lived under other written laws, and afterward governs them by the same laws by which they were governed before, those laws are nevertheless the civil laws of the victor, and not of the vanquished commonwealth. For the legislator is not the one by whose authority the laws were first made, but the one by whose authority they now continue to be laws. And therefore where there are various provinces within the dominion of a commonwealth, and in those provinces a diversity of laws, commonly called the customs of each province, we are not to understand that these customs have their force only from length of time. Rather, they were anciently laws written, or otherwise made known, as the constitutions and statutes of their sovereigns; and they are laws now, not by virtue of prescription of time, but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an unwritten law is generally observed in all the provinces of a dominion, and no iniquity appears in its use, that law can be nothing but a law of nature, equally binding on all mankind.

26.10 6. Seeing, then, that all laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and force from the will of the commonwealth—that is, from the will of the representative, which in a monarchy is the monarch, and in other commonwealths the sovereign assembly—one may wonder where such opinions come from as are found in the books of eminent lawyers in various commonwealths, which directly or by consequence make the legislative power depend on private men or subordinate judges. For example, "that the common law has no controller but Parliament." This is true only where a parliament has the sovereign

power, and cannot be assembled or dissolved except at its own discretion. For if anyone else has a right to dissolve them, he also has a right to control them, and consequently to control their controlling. And if there is no such right, then the controller of laws is not *Parlamentum* but *Rex in Parlamento*. And where a parliament is sovereign, if it should assemble ever so many or ever so wise men from the countries subject to it, for whatever cause, no one will believe that such an assembly has thereby acquired a legislative power.[44] Also, "that the two arms of a commonwealth are force and justice, the first of which is in the King, the other deposited in the hands of Parliament." As if a commonwealth could exist in which the force was in any hand that justice did not have the authority to command and govern.

26.11 7. That law can never be against reason, our lawyers agree; and that the law is not the letter (that is, every construction of it) but what accords with the intention of the legislator. And this is true. But the question is whose reason it is that shall be received as law. It is not meant of any private reason, for then there would be as much contradiction in the laws as there is in the Schools; nor yet (as Sir Edward Coke makes it) "an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience" (as his was).[45] For it is possible that long study may increase and confirm erroneous judgments; and where men build on false foundations, the more they build, the greater the ruin. And the reasonings and conclusions of those who study and observe with equal time and diligence are, and must remain, at odds. Therefore it is not that *juris prudentia*, or wisdom of subordinate judges, but the reason of this our artificial man, the commonwealth, and his command, that makes law. And since the commonwealth is in its representative but one person, contradiction cannot easily arise in the laws; and when it does, the same reason is able to remove it by interpretation or alteration. In all courts of justice, the sovereign (who is the person of the commonwealth) is the one who judges. The subordin-

44 *Parlamentum*: Parliament; *Rex in Parlamento*: the King in Parliament.
45 From Coke's commentary on Littleton (1628).

ate judge ought to have regard to the reason that moved his sovereign to make the law, so that his sentence may accord with it; it is then his sovereign's sentence. Otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.

HOW LAWS ARE MADE KNOWN

Laws bind only those who can know them, and must bear sufficient signs of the sovereign's authority.

26.12 8. From the fact that the law is a command, and that a command consists in the declaration or manifestation of the will of the one who commands, by voice, writing, or some other sufficient evidence of it, we may understand that the command of the commonwealth is law only to those who have the means to take notice of it. Over people with severe intellectual disabilities, children, or people who are mentally ill there is no law, any more than over brute beasts; nor can they be called just or unjust, because they never had the power to make any covenant or to understand its consequences, and consequently never took it upon themselves to authorize the actions of any sovereign, as those must do who make a commonwealth for themselves. And just as those from whom nature or accident has taken away the knowledge of all laws in general are excused, so also is every man from whom some accident, not arising from his own fault, has taken away the means of knowing any particular law: he is excused if he does not observe it, and, properly speaking, that law is no law to him. It is therefore necessary to consider at this point what evidence and signs are sufficient for knowing what the law is—that is, what the will of the sovereign is, in monarchies as well as in other forms of government.

26.13 First, if it is a law that obliges all the subjects without exception, and it is not written or otherwise published in places where they may take notice of it, it is a law of nature. For whatever men are to recognize as law, not on other men's word but each from his own reason, must be such as agrees with the reason of all men; and no law can be that except the law of

nature. The laws of nature therefore need no publishing or proclamation, since they are contained in this one sentence, approved by all the world: "Do not do to another what you think unreasonable to be done by another to yourself."

26.14 Second, if it is a law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man, and it is not written or published by word, then it too is a law of nature, and is known by the same evidence and signs that distinguish those in that condition from other subjects. For any law that is not written, or in some way published by the one who makes it law, can be known in no way but by the reason of the one who is to obey it; and it is therefore a law not only civil but natural. For example, if the sovereign employs a public minister without written instructions on what to do, the minister is obliged to take the dictates of reason as his instructions. If the sovereign makes a judge, the judge is to recognize that his sentence ought to accord with the reason of his sovereign, which is always understood to be equity, and he is bound to it by the law of nature. If he makes an ambassador, the ambassador is (in everything not contained in his written instructions) to take as his instruction whatever reason dictates as most conducive to his sovereign's interest. And so with all other ministers of the sovereignty, public and private. All these instructions of natural reason may be comprehended under one name, *fidelity*, which is a branch of natural justice.

26.15 The law of nature excepted, it belongs to the essence of all other laws that they be made known to every man who is to be obliged to obey them, by word, or writing, or some other act known to come from the sovereign authority. For the will of another cannot be understood except by his own word or act, or by conjecture drawn from his aims and purpose; and in the person of the commonwealth these are always to be supposed consistent with equity and reason. And in ancient times, before letters were in common use, the laws were often put into verse, so that the unlearned people, taking pleasure in singing or reciting them, might more easily keep them in memory. For the same reason Solomon advises a man to bind the Ten Commandments

on his ten fingers. And of the law that Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of the covenant, he tells them to teach it to their children by talking of it both at home and on the road, when going to bed and when rising from bed; to write it on the posts and doors of their houses; and to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to hear it read.[46]

26.16 Nor is it enough that the law be written and published; there must also be manifest signs that it comes from the will of the sovereign. For private men, when they have, or think they have, force enough to secure their unjust designs and carry them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish as laws whatever they please, without or against the legislative authority. What is required, therefore, is not only a declaration of the law but also sufficient signs of its author and authority. The author, or legislator, is supposed in every commonwealth to be evident, because he is the sovereign, who, having been constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed to be sufficiently known by every one. Men are for the most part so ignorant and careless that, once the memory of the first constitution of their commonwealth has worn away, they do not consider by whose power they are defended against their enemies, have their industry protected, and are given redress when injury is done them. Yet because no man who does consider it can doubt it, no excuse can be drawn from ignorance of where the sovereignty lies. And it is a dictate of natural reason, and consequently an evident law of nature, that no man ought to weaken that power whose protection he has himself demanded, or knowingly received, against others. Therefore no man can doubt who is sovereign, except by his own fault (whatever evil men may suggest). The difficulty lies in the evidence of the authority derived from him. That difficulty is removed by knowledge of the public registers, public councils, public ministers, and public seals, by which all laws are sufficiently verified—verified, I say, not authorized. For the verification is only the testimony and

46 Proverbs 7:3; Deuteronomy 6:7–9, 11:19–20, and 31:12.

record, not the authority of the law, which consists in the command of the sovereign alone.

26.17 If, therefore, a man has a question of injury depending on the law of nature—that is, on common equity—the sentence of the judge who by commission has authority to hear such cases is a sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individual case. For though the advice of one who professes the study of the law is useful for avoiding contention, it is still only advice. It is the judge who must tell men what the law is, after hearing the controversy.

26.18 But when the question is of an injury or crime under a written law, every man may, if he will, be sufficiently informed —by consulting the registers himself or through others— whether it is an injury or not, before he does the injury or commits the crime. Indeed, he ought to do so. For when a man doubts whether the act he is about to do is just or unjust, and may inform himself if he will, the doing of it is unlawful. In the same way, a man who supposes himself injured in a case settled by the written law, which he may see and consider himself or through others, acts unjustly if he complains before he consults the law, and betrays a disposition to vex other men rather than to claim his own right.

26.19 If the question is of obedience to a public officer, to have seen his commission with the public seal and heard it read, or to have had the means of being informed of it had one wished, is a sufficient verification of his authority. For every man is obliged to do his best to inform himself of all the written laws that may concern his own future actions.

THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

Laws need authorized interpreters, and judges must apply equity rather than follow precedent blindly.

26.20 The legislator being known, and the laws sufficiently published, either in writing or by the light of nature, one more very material circumstance is still needed to make them binding. For

the nature of the law consists not in the letter but in the intent or meaning—that is, in the authentic interpretation of the law, which is the sense of the legislator. And therefore the interpretation of all laws depends on the sovereign authority, and the interpreters can be none but those whom the sovereign (to whom alone the subject owes obedience) appoints. For otherwise, by the craft of an interpreter, the law may be made to bear a sense contrary to the sovereign's, and in this way the interpreter becomes the legislator.

26.21 All laws, written and unwritten, need interpretation. The unwritten law of nature is easy for those who use their natural reason without partiality and passion, and it therefore leaves those who violate it without excuse. Yet since there are very few, perhaps none, who are not in some cases blinded by self-love or some other passion, it has now become of all laws the most obscure, and consequently has the greatest need of able interpreters. Written laws, if they are short, are easily misinterpreted because a word or two can have various meanings; if long, they are more obscure because many words can have various meanings. So no written law, whether expressed in few or many words, can be well understood without a perfect understanding of the final causes for which the law was made; and the knowledge of those final causes lies with the legislator. For him, therefore, there can be no knot in the law that cannot be untied: either by finding out the ends and undoing it by them, or else by making whatever ends he will by the legislative power (as Alexander did with his sword to the Gordian knot), which no other interpreter can do.

26.22 The interpretation of the laws of nature in a commonwealth does not depend on the books of moral philosophy. The authority of writers, without the authority of the commonwealth, does not make their opinions law, however true they may be. What I have written in this treatise about the moral virtues, and about their necessity for procuring and maintaining peace, though it is evident truth, is not for that reason immediately law. It is law because in all commonwealths in the world it

is part of the civil law. For though it is naturally reasonable, it is by the sovereign power that it is law. Otherwise it would be a great error to call the laws of nature unwritten law, when we see so many volumes published about them, and in them so many contradictions of one another and of themselves.

26.23 The interpretation of the law of nature is the sentence of the judge appointed by the sovereign authority to hear and determine the controversies that depend on it, and it consists in applying the law to the present case. For in the act of judging, the judge does no more than consider whether the demand of the party is consistent with natural reason and equity; and the sentence he gives is therefore the interpretation of the law of nature. That interpretation is authentic, not because it is his private sentence, but because he gives it by the authority of the sovereign, by which it becomes the sovereign's sentence, which is law for that time to the parties pleading.

26.24 But because there is no judge, subordinate or sovereign, who may not err in a judgment of equity, if afterward, in another similar case, he finds it more consistent with equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do so. No man's error becomes his own law, or obliges him to persist in it. Nor, for the same reason, does it become a law to other judges, even though they are sworn to follow it. For though a wrong sentence given by the authority of the sovereign, if he knows and allows it, constitutes a new law in the case of mutable laws, for cases in which every little circumstance is the same, yet in immutable laws, such as the laws of nature, such sentences are no laws to the same or other judges in similar cases ever after. Princes succeed one another; one judge passes and another comes; indeed, heaven and earth shall pass, but not one tittle of the law of nature shall pass, for it is the eternal law of God.[47] Therefore all the sentences of previous judges that have ever been cannot together make a law contrary to natural equity. Nor can any examples of former judges warrant an unreasonable sentence, or relieve the present judge of the trouble of studying what is

47 Echoing Matthew 5:18.

equity (in the case he is to judge) from the principles of his own natural reason. For example, it is against the law of nature "to punish the innocent"; and the innocent is he who clears himself in court and is acknowledged as innocent by the judge. Now suppose a man is accused of a capital crime and, seeing the power and malice of some enemy and the frequent corruption and partiality of judges, runs away for fear of the outcome; afterward he is caught and brought to a legal trial, makes it sufficiently clear that he was not guilty of the crime, and is acquitted of it, yet is nevertheless condemned to lose his goods. This is a manifest condemnation of the innocent. I say, therefore, that there is no place in the world where this can be an interpretation of a law of nature, or be made a law by the sentences of previous judges who had done the same. For he who judged it first judged unjustly, and no injustice can be a pattern of judgment for succeeding judges. A written law may forbid innocent men to flee, and they may be punished for fleeing. But that fleeing for fear of injury should be taken as a presumption of guilt, after a man has already been acquitted of the crime in court, is contrary to the nature of a presumption, which has no place once judgment has been given. Yet this is set down by a great lawyer as the common law of England:[48] "If a man," he says, "that is innocent be accused of felony, and for fear flees for the same, although he judicially acquits himself of the felony, yet if it be found that he fled for the felony, he shall, notwithstanding his innocence, forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to the forfeiture of them, the law will admit no proof against the presumption in law grounded upon his flight." Here you see an innocent man, judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his innocence (when no written law forbade him to flee), after his acquittal, upon a presumption in law, condemned to lose all the goods he has. If the law grounded on his flight a presumption of the fact (which was capital), the sentence ought to have been capital. If the presumption was not of the fact, then for what ought he to lose his goods? This, therefore, is no law of England;

48 The "great lawyer" is Coke, in his commentary on Littleton (1628).

nor is the condemnation grounded on a presumption of law, but on the presumption of the judges. It is also against law to say that no proof shall be admitted against a presumption of law. For all judges, sovereign and subordinate, who refuse to hear proof refuse to do justice. Even if the sentence is just, the judges who condemn without hearing the proofs offered are unjust judges, and their presumption is only prejudice, which no man ought to bring with him to the seat of justice, whatever previous judgments or examples he claims to follow. There are other things of this kind in which men's judgments have been perverted by trusting to precedents; but this is enough to show that though the sentence of the judge is a law to the party pleading, it is no law to any judge who succeeds him in that office.

26.25 In the same way, when the question is the meaning of written laws, the interpreter of them is not the one who writes a commentary on them. For commentaries are commonly more open to quibbling than the text, and therefore need other commentaries, and so there will be no end to such interpretation. And therefore, unless there is an interpreter authorized by the sovereign from whom the subordinate judges are not to depart, the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges, just as in cases of the unwritten law. Their sentences are to be taken as laws in that particular case by those who plead, but not as binding other judges to give like judgments in like cases. For a judge may err in interpreting even written laws; but no error of a subordinate judge can change the law, which is the general sentence of the sovereign.

26.26 In written laws, men commonly distinguish between the letter and the sentence of the law. If by the letter is meant whatever can be gathered from the bare words, the distinction is well made. For the meanings of almost all words, either in themselves or in their metaphorical use, are ambiguous, and may be drawn in argument to make many senses; but there is only one sense of the law. But if by the letter is meant the literal sense, then the letter and the sentence, or intention, of the law are one and the same. For the literal sense is what the legislator inten-

ded to be signified by the letter of the law. Now the intention of the legislator is always supposed to be equity, for it would be a great insult for a judge to think otherwise of the sovereign. He ought therefore, if the words of the law do not fully authorize a reasonable sentence, to supply it from the law of nature; or, if the case is difficult, to suspend judgment until he has received fuller authority. For example, a written law ordains that a man who is thrust out of his house by force shall be restored by force. It happens that a man through negligence leaves his house empty and on returning is kept out by force, a case for which no special law has been made. It is evident that this case is contained in the same law, for otherwise he has no remedy at all, which must be supposed to be against the intention of the legislator. Again, the words of the law command the judge to judge according to the evidence. A man is falsely accused of an act that the judge himself saw done by another, and not by the accused. In this case the letter of the law is not to be followed to the condemnation of the innocent; nor is the judge to give sentence against the evidence of the witnesses, because the letter of the law is to the contrary. Instead, he is to get the sovereign to make someone else judge, and himself a witness. So the inconvenience that follows from the bare words of a written law may lead him to the intention of the law, and so help him interpret it better; though no inconvenience can warrant a sentence against the law. For every judge of right and wrong is not a judge of what is convenient or inconvenient to the commonwealth.

26.27 The abilities required in a good interpreter of the law—that is, in a good judge—are not the same as those of an advocate, namely the study of the laws. For just as a judge ought to take notice of the facts from no one but the witnesses, so he ought to take notice of the law from nothing but the statutes and constitutions of the sovereign, cited in the pleading or declared to him by those who have authority from the sovereign power to declare them. He need not worry beforehand about what he shall judge, for what he is to say concerning the facts will be given him by the witnesses, and what he is to say on points of

law by those who show it in their pleadings and interpret it with authority on the spot. The Lords of Parliament in England were judges, and the most difficult cases have been heard and decided by them; yet few of them were deeply versed in the study of the laws, and fewer had made it their profession. And though they consulted lawyers who were appointed to be present for that purpose, they alone had the authority to give sentence. In the same way, in ordinary trials of right, twelve men of the common people are the judges, and give sentence not only on the fact but on the right. They pronounce simply for the plaintiff or for the defendant—that is, they are judges not only of the fact but also of the right. And in a question of crime they determine not only whether it was done or not, but also whether it is *murder, homicide, felony, assault,* and the like, which are determinations of law. But because they are not supposed to know the law of themselves, there is one who has authority to inform them of it in the particular case they are to judge. Yet if they do not judge according to what he tells them, they are not thereby subject to any penalty, unless it is shown that they did it against their consciences or had been corrupted by bribes.

26.28 The things that make a good judge, or good interpreter of the laws, are these. First, *a right understanding* of that principal law of nature called *equity,* which depends not on reading other men's writings but on the goodness of a man's own natural reason and meditation, and is therefore presumed to be found most in those who have had the most leisure and the most inclination to meditate on it. Second, *contempt of unnecessary riches* and preferments. Third, *to be able in judgment to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love,* and *compassion*. Fourth and last, *patience to hear, diligent attention in hearing, and memory to retain, digest, and apply what he has heard.*

THE KINDS OF LAW

Hobbes surveys the divisions of law: Roman sources, natural and positive, human and divine, fundamental.

26.29 The distinction and division of the laws has been made in various ways, according to the different methods of those who have written about them. For it is a thing that depends not on nature but on the aim of the writer, and serves each man's own method. In the *Institutes* of Justinian we find seven sorts of civil laws. 1. The *edicts*, *constitutions*, and *epistles of the prince*, that is, of the emperor, because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these are the proclamations of the kings of England.[49]

26.30 2. *The decrees of the whole people of Rome* (including the Senate), when they were put to the question by the *Senate*. These were laws at first by virtue of the sovereign power residing in the people; and those of them the emperors did not repeal remained laws by imperial authority. For all laws that bind are understood to be laws by the authority of the one who has power to repeal them. Somewhat like these laws are the Acts of Parliament in England.

26.31 3. *The decrees of the common people* (excluding the Senate), when they were put to the question by the *tribune* of the people. Those of them the emperors did not repeal remained laws by imperial authority. Like these were the orders of the House of Commons in England.

26.32 4. *Senatus consulta*, the *orders of the Senate*: because when the people of Rome grew so numerous that it was inconvenient to assemble them, the emperor thought it fit that men should consult the Senate instead of the people. These bear some resemblance to the acts of the Council.

26.33 5. *The edicts of praetors*, and (in some cases) of the *aediles*, such as the chief justices in the courts of England.

26.34 6. *Responsa prudentum*: the sentences and opinions of those lawyers to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret

the law and to answer those who sought their advice on points of law. The judges were obliged by the emperor's constitutions to observe these answers in giving judgment. They would be like the reports of cases judged, if other judges were bound by the law of England to observe them. For the judges of the common law of England are not properly judges but *juris consulti*, legal advisers, whose advice on points of law the judges—who are either the Lords or twelve men of the country—are to ask.

26.35 7. Also *unwritten customs* (which in their own nature are an imitation of law), by the tacit consent of the emperor, are true laws, provided they are not contrary to the law of nature.

26.36 Another division of laws is into *natural* and *positive*. *Natural* laws are those that have been laws from all eternity, and are called not only natural but also *moral* laws. They consist in the moral virtues, such as justice, equity, and all habits of mind that conduce to peace and charity, of which I have already spoken in chapters 14 and 15.

26.37 *Positive* laws are those that have not been laws from eternity, but have been made laws by the will of those who have had sovereign power over others; and they are either written, or made known to men by some other evidence of the will of their legislator.

26.38 Again, of positive laws some are *human*, some *divine*; and of human positive laws some are *distributive*, some *penal*. *Distributive* laws are those that determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to every man what it is by which he acquires and holds property in lands or goods, and a right or liberty of action; and these speak to all the subjects. *Penal* laws are those that declare what penalty shall be inflicted on those who violate the law; and these speak to the ministers and officers appointed to carry them out. For though everyone ought to be informed beforehand of the punishments ordained for transgressing, the command is nevertheless not addressed to the offender (who cannot be supposed to punish himself faithfully) but to the pub-

49 The *Institutes*, a textbook of Roman law compiled under the Emperor Justinian (AD 533).

lic ministers appointed to see the penalty carried out. And these penal laws are for the most part written together with the distributive laws, and are sometimes called judgments. For all laws are general judgments, or sentences, of the legislator; just as every particular judgment is a law to him whose case is judged.

26.39 *Divine positive laws* (for natural laws, being eternal and universal, are all divine) are those which, being commandments of God—not from all eternity, nor addressed universally to all men, but only to a certain people or to certain persons—are declared to be such by those whom God has authorized to declare them. But this authority of a man to declare what these positive laws of God are—how can it be known? God may command a man in a supernatural way to deliver laws to other men. But because it is of the essence of law that the one who is to be obliged be assured of the authority of the one who declares it, and we cannot naturally know that this authority comes from God, the questions are: *How can a man without supernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the one who declares it?* and *How can he be bound to obey those laws?* As to the first question—how a man can be assured of another's revelation without a revelation made particularly to himself—it is evidently impossible. For though a man may be induced to believe in such a revelation by the miracles he sees the other do, or by seeing the extraordinary sanctity of his life, or the extraordinary wisdom or extraordinary felicity of his actions, all of which are marks of God's extraordinary favor, still they are not certain evidence of a special revelation. Miracles are marvelous works; but what is marvelous to one may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason that another has had a supernatural revelation of God's will; he can only have a belief—each person a firmer or a weaker belief, as the signs of it appear greater or lesser.

26.40 But the second question, how he can be bound to obey them, is not so hard. For if the law declared is not against the

law of nature (which is undoubtedly God's law), and he undertakes to obey it, he is bound by his own act—bound, I say, to obey it, but not bound to believe it. For men's belief and inward thoughts are not subject to commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary or extraordinary. Faith in supernatural law is not a fulfilling of it, but only an assenting to it; and it is not a duty that we render to God, but a gift that God freely gives to whom he pleases. Likewise, unbelief is not a breach of any of his laws, but a rejection of them all, except the natural laws. But what I say will be made still clearer by the examples and testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The covenant God made with Abraham (in a supernatural manner) was this: "This is the covenant which you shall keep, between me and you and your offspring after you."[50] Abraham's offspring did not have this revelation, nor were they yet in existence; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey whatever Abraham should declare to them as God's law. They could not be so except by virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents, who (if they are subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have sovereign power over their children and servants. Again, where God says to Abraham, "In you shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; for I know you will command your children and your household after you to keep the way of the Lord, and to do righteousness and judgment," it is plain that the obedience of his family, who had no revelation, depended on their prior obligation to obey their sovereign. At Mount Sinai, Moses alone went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach on pain of death; yet they were bound to obey all that Moses declared to them as God's law.[51] On what ground, except this submission of their own: "You speak to us, and we will hear you; but do not let God speak to us, lest we die"? By these two passages it sufficiently appears that in a commonwealth, a subject who has no certain and assured revelation made particularly to himself concerning the will of God is to obey the com-

50 Genesis 17:10.
51 Genesis 18:18–19; Exodus 19:12.

mand of the commonwealth as such. For if men were at liberty to take as God's commandments their own dreams and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men, scarcely two men would agree on what God's commandment is; and yet, in deference to those, every man would despise the commandments of the commonwealth.[52] I conclude, therefore, that in all things not contrary to the moral law (that is, to the law of nature), all subjects are bound to obey as divine law whatever is declared to be so by the laws of the commonwealth. This is also evident to any man's reason. For whatever is not against the law of nature may be made law in the name of those who have the sovereign power; and there is no reason why men should be less obliged by it when it is put forward in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to claim other commandments of God than those declared to be such by the commonwealth. Christian states punish those who revolt from the Christian religion, and all other states punish those who set up any religion they forbid. For in whatever is not regulated by the commonwealth, it is equity (which is the law of nature, and therefore an eternal law of God) that every man equally enjoy his liberty.

26.41 There is also another distinction of laws, into *fundamental* and *not fundamental*; but I could never find in any author what a fundamental law means. Nevertheless, one may very reasonably distinguish laws in that way.

26.42 For a fundamental law in every commonwealth is one which, if it is taken away, the commonwealth fails and is utterly dissolved, like a building whose foundation is destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is one by which subjects are bound to uphold whatever power is given to the sovereign, whether a monarch or a sovereign assembly, without which the commonwealth cannot stand: such as the power of war and peace, of judicature, of the choice of officers, and of doing whatever he thinks necessary for the public good. Not fundamental is a law whose repeal does not bring with it the dissolution of the com-

52 Exodus 20:19.

monwealth, such as the laws concerning controversies between subject and subject. So much for the division of laws.

26.43 I find the words *lex civilis* and *jus civile*—that is, civil *law* and civil *right*—used indiscriminately for the same thing, even in the most learned authors; yet this ought not to be so. For *right* is *liberty*, namely the liberty that the civil law leaves us; but *civil law* is an *obligation*, and takes from us the liberty that the law of nature gave us. Nature gave every man a right to secure himself by his own strength, and to attack a suspected neighbor by way of prevention; but the civil law takes away that liberty in all cases where the protection of the law can safely be waited for. So *lex* and *jus* are as different as *obligation* and *liberty*.

26.44 Likewise *laws* and *charters* are taken indiscriminately for the same thing. Yet charters are gifts of the sovereign, and not laws but exemptions from law. The phrasing of a law is *jubeo, injungo*: "I command" and "I enjoin." The phrasing of a charter is *dedi, concessi*: "I have given," "I have granted." But what is given or granted to a man is not forced on him by a law. A law may be made to bind all the subjects of a commonwealth; a liberty, or charter, is only to one man, or to some one part of the people. For to say that all the people of a commonwealth have liberty in any case whatever is to say that in that case no law has been made, or else that, having been made, it is now repealed.

CHAPTER 27: OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS

A crime is a sin against the civil law, committed by deed or word.

27.1 A *sin* is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator; for such contempt is a breach of all his laws at once. And therefore it may consist not only in the *commission* of an act, or in speaking words the laws forbid, or in the *omission* of what the law commands, but also in the *intention*, or purpose, to transgress. For the purpose to break the law is some degree of contempt of the one whose office it is to see it carried out. To be delighted merely in imagining oneself possessed of another man's goods, servants, or wife, without any intention of

taking them from him by force or fraud, is no breach of the law that says, "You shall not covet." Nor is the pleasure a man may take in imagining or dreaming of the death of someone from whose life he expects nothing but harm and displeasure a sin; the sin is resolving to put into execution some act that tends toward it. For to be pleased by the fiction of something that would please a man if it were real is a passion so inherent in the nature both of man and of every other living creature that to make it a sin would be to make it a sin to be a man. Considering this has made me think those too severe, both to themselves and to others, who maintain that the first motions of the mind (even when checked by the fear of God) are sins. But I confess it is safer to err on that side than on the other.

27.2 A *crime* is a sin consisting in committing (by deed or word) what the law forbids, or in omitting what it has commanded. So every crime is a sin, but not every sin is a crime. To intend to steal or kill is a sin, even if it never appears in word or deed, for God, who sees the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge. But until it appears by something done or said, from which a human judge can infer the intention, it does not bear the name of crime. The Greeks observed this distinction in the words *hamartēma* and *enklēma* or *aitia*. The first (translated "sin") signifies any swerving whatever from the law; but the other two (translated "crime") signify only the sin of which one man may accuse another. But of intentions that never appear by any outward act, there is no room for human accusation. In the same way the Latins, by *peccatum*, which is "sin," signify every kind of deviation from the law; but by *crimen* (a word they derive from *cerno*, which means "to perceive") they mean only such sins as can be made to appear before a judge, and which are therefore not mere intentions.

27.3 From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, we may infer, first, that where law ceases, sin ceases. But because the law of nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude, arrogance, and all acts contrary to any moral virtue can never cease to be sin. Second, that when the civil law ceases,

crimes cease. For when no law remains but that of nature, there is no place for accusation: every man is his own judge, accused only by his own conscience and cleared by the uprightness of his own intention. So when his intention is right, his act is no sin; if otherwise, his act is a sin, but not a crime. Third, that when the sovereign power ceases, crime also ceases. For where there is no such power, there is no protection to be had from the law, and so everyone may protect himself by his own power. No man, in instituting sovereign power, can be supposed to have given away the right of preserving his own body, for whose safety all sovereignty was ordained. But this is to be understood only of those who have not themselves contributed to taking away the power that protected them; for that was a crime from the beginning.

THE SOURCES OF CRIME

Crimes arise from ignorance, false reasoning, and passions such as vainglory, anger, hatred, and fear.

27.4 The source of every crime is some defect of the understanding, some error in reasoning, or some sudden force of the passions. Defect in the understanding is *ignorance*; in reasoning, *erroneous opinion*. Ignorance, in turn, is of three sorts: of the *law*, of the *sovereign*, and of the *penalty*. Ignorance of the law of nature excuses no man, because everyone who has attained the use of reason is supposed to know that he ought not to do to another what he would not have done to himself. Therefore, wherever a man may come, if he does anything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man comes here from the Indies and persuades people here to take up a new religion, or teaches them anything that tends to disobedience of the laws of this country, then however firmly he is persuaded of the truth of what he teaches, he commits a crime and may justly be punished for it. This is not only because his doctrine is false, but also because he does what he would not approve in another—namely, that someone going from here should try to alter the religion there.

But ignorance of the civil law will excuse a man in a foreign country until it is declared to him, because until then no civil law is binding.

27.5 In the same way, if the civil law of a man's own country is not declared clearly enough that he could know it if he wished, and the action is not against the law of nature, ignorance is a good excuse. In other cases ignorance of the civil law does not excuse.

27.6 Ignorance of the sovereign power in the place where a man ordinarily lives does not excuse him, because he ought to take notice of the power by which he has been protected there.

27.7 Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuses no man. A law without the fear of a penalty to follow would not be a law but empty words; so in breaking the law he undergoes the penalty even though he does not know what it is. For whoever voluntarily does any action accepts all its known consequences, and punishment is a known consequence of violating the laws in every commonwealth. If the punishment is already fixed by the law, he is subject to that; if not, he is subject to arbitrary punishment. For it is reasonable that he who does injury with no limit but his own will should suffer punishment with no limit but the will of the one whose law is thereby violated.

27.8 But when a penalty is either attached to the crime in the law itself, or has usually been inflicted in similar cases, the offender is excused from any greater penalty. For a punishment known in advance, if it is not great enough to deter men from the action, is an invitation to it. When men compare the benefit of their injustice with the harm of their punishment, they choose, by necessity of nature, what appears best for themselves. So when they are punished more than the law had previously set, or more than others were punished for the same crime, it is the law that tempted and deceived them.

27.9 No law made after an act is done can make that act a crime. For if the act is against the law of nature, the law existed before the act; and a positive law cannot be known before it is made,

and therefore cannot be binding. But when the law forbidding an act is made before the act is done, the one who does it is liable to the penalty ordained afterward, provided no lesser penalty was made known beforehand, either in writing or by example—for the reason given just above.

27.10 From defect in reasoning (that is, from error), men are prone to break the laws in three ways. First, by assuming false principles. Men have observed how, in all places and in all ages, unjust actions have been authorized by the force and victories of those who committed them; and how, while powerful men break through the cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort, and those who have failed in their enterprises, have been regarded as the only criminals. On that basis they have taken as principles and grounds of their reasoning "that justice is only an empty word; that whatever a man can get by his own industry and risk is his own; that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust; that examples from former times are good arguments for doing the same again"—and many more of that kind. Grant these, and no act in itself can be a crime; it must be made one (not by the law, but) by the success of those who commit it, and the same act will be virtuous or vicious as fortune pleases. What Marius makes a crime, Sulla will make meritorious, and Caesar (the same laws still standing) will turn into a crime again, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of the commonwealth.[53]

27.11 Second, by false teachers, who either misinterpret the law of nature, making it conflict with the civil law, or teach as laws doctrines of their own, or traditions from former times, that are inconsistent with the duty of a subject.

27.12 Third, by erroneous inferences from true principles. This commonly happens to men who are hasty and rash in drawing conclusions and deciding what to do: men who have a high opinion of their own understanding and believe that matters of this kind need not time and study, but only ordinary experience and good natural wit—which no man thinks himself short of. Yet

53 Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla, rival Roman generals whose civil wars (88–82 BC) each outlawed the other's party.

the knowledge of right and wrong, which is no less difficult, no one will claim without great and long study. And none of these defects in reasoning can excuse a crime (though some may extenuate it) in any man who claims to manage his own private business—much less in those who undertake a public office. For they lay claim to the very reason whose absence they would make the ground of their excuse.

27.13 Of the passions that most often cause crime, one is vainglory, a foolish overrating of one's own worth—as if differences of worth were an effect of wit, or riches, or blood, or some other natural quality, and did not depend on the will of those who hold sovereign authority. From this comes a presumption that the punishments ordained by the laws, and extended generally to all subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them with the same rigor as on poor, obscure, and simple people, included under the name of "the common people."

27.14 So it commonly happens that those who value themselves by the greatness of their wealth venture on crimes in the hope of escaping punishment by corrupting public justice, or obtaining pardon for money or other rewards.

27.15 And that those who have many powerful kin, and popular men who have gained a reputation among the multitude, take courage to break the laws from a hope of overpowering those whose office it is to enforce them.

27.16 And that those who have a high and false opinion of their own wisdom take it upon themselves to criticize the actions, and call in question the authority, of those who govern, and so to unsettle the laws by their public talk that nothing shall be a crime except what their own designs require to be one. The same men also tend to be prone to all crimes that consist in cunning and in deceiving their neighbors, because they think their designs too subtle to be detected. These, I say, are effects of a false presumption of their own wisdom. For of those who first set in motion the disturbance of a commonwealth (which can never happen without a civil war), very few live long enough to see their new designs established. The benefit of their crimes

goes to posterity, and to those who would least have wished it—which shows they were not as wise as they thought. And those who deceive in the hope of not being observed commonly deceive themselves (the darkness in which they believe they lie hidden being nothing but their own blindness), and are no wiser than children who think everything is hidden when they cover their own eyes.

27.17 And in general all vainglorious men (unless they are also timid) are subject to anger, being more prone than others to take the ordinary freedom of conversation for contempt. And there are few crimes that anger cannot produce.

27.18 As for the passions of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness, the crimes they are apt to produce are so obvious to every man's experience and understanding that nothing need be said of them—except that they are weaknesses so bound up with the nature both of man and of all other living creatures that their effects cannot be prevented except by an extraordinary use of reason, or by constant severity in punishing them. For in the things men hate they find a continual and unavoidable vexation, so that either a man's patience must be everlasting, or he must find relief by removing the power of what vexes him. The first is difficult; the second is often impossible without some violation of the law. Ambition and covetousness are also passions that press on us perpetually, whereas reason is not perpetually present to resist them; and so whenever the hope of impunity appears, their effects follow. As for lust, what it lacks in duration it has in intensity, which is enough to outweigh the fear of any light or uncertain punishment.

27.19 Of all the passions, the one that inclines men least to break the laws is fear. Indeed (setting aside some generous natures), it is the only thing that makes men keep them when there is a prospect of profit or pleasure in breaking them. And yet in many cases a crime may be committed through fear.

27.20 For not every fear justifies the action it produces—only the fear of physical harm, which we call *bodily fear*, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered except by that

action. A man is assaulted and fears present death, from which he sees no escape except by wounding his attacker. If he wounds him fatally, this is no crime, because no man is supposed, at the making of a commonwealth, to have given up the defense of his life or limbs where the law cannot arrive in time to help him. But to kill a man because I may infer from his actions or threats that he will kill me when he can (seeing I have time and means to ask the sovereign power for protection) is a crime. Again, a man receives insulting words, or some small injuries (for which the lawmakers assigned no punishment, nor thought them worth the notice of a man who has the use of reason), and is afraid that unless he takes revenge he will fall into contempt and consequently be exposed to similar injuries from others. To avoid this he breaks the law, and protects himself for the future by the terror of his private revenge. This is a crime. For the hurt is not bodily but imaginary, and (though in this corner of the world it has been made keenly felt by a custom begun not many years ago among young and vain men) so slight that a gallant man, one who is sure of his own courage, cannot take notice of it.[54] Also, a man may fear spirits, either through his own superstition or through giving too much credit to others who tell him of strange dreams and visions, and so be made to believe that they will hurt him for doing or not doing various things which it is nonetheless against the laws to do or leave undone. What is done or left undone in this way is not excused by this fear, but is a crime. For (as I showed earlier, in the second chapter) dreams are naturally nothing but the images that remain in sleep from the impressions our senses received while we were awake; and when men are for any reason not sure that they have slept, these seem to be real visions. So he who presumes to break the law on the strength of his own or another's dream or supposed vision, or of any other fancy about the power of invisible spirits than the commonwealth permits, abandons the law of nature—which is a sure offense—and follows the imaginings of his own or another private man's brain. He can never know whether they

54 Hobbes means the fashion for dueling over points of honor.

mean anything or nothing, nor whether the one who tells his dream is telling the truth or lying. If every private man were allowed to do this (as all must be by the law of nature, if any one is), no law could be made to hold, and every commonwealth would be dissolved.

EXCUSES AND DEGREES OF CRIME

Some circumstances excuse a crime entirely; others lessen or aggravate it.

27.21 From these different sources of crimes it is already clear that all crimes are not (as the Stoics of ancient times maintained) of the same alloy. There is room not only for *excuse*, by which what seemed a crime is shown to be none at all, but also for *extenuation*, by which a crime that seemed great is made less. For though all crimes equally deserve the name of injustice—just as every deviation from a straight line is equally crookedness, as the Stoics rightly observed—it does not follow that all crimes are equally unjust, any more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked. The Stoics, not observing this, held it as great a crime to kill a hen against the law as to kill one's father.

27.22 What totally excuses an act, and takes from it the nature of a crime, can only be something that at the same time takes away the obligation of the law. For an act once committed against the law, if the one who committed it is bound by the law, can be nothing other than a crime.

27.23 Lack of means to know the law totally excuses, for a law that a man has no means of learning is not binding. But lack of diligence in inquiring shall not be counted as lack of means. Nor shall any man who claims reason enough to govern his own affairs be supposed to lack means of knowing the laws of nature, since they are known by the very reason he claims. Only children and people who are mentally ill are excused from offenses against the natural law.

27.24 When a man is a captive or in the power of the enemy (and he is in the enemy's power when his person, or his means

of living, is), if it is through no fault of his own, the obligation of the law ceases. For he must obey the enemy or die, and so such obedience is no crime; no man is obliged (when the protection of the law fails) not to protect himself by the best means he can.

27.25 If a man is compelled by the terror of present death to do an act against the law, he is totally excused, because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And even supposing such a law were binding, a man would reason thus: "If I don't do it, I die now; if I do it, I die later; so by doing it I gain time to live." Nature therefore compels him to the act.

27.26 When a man is without food or some other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himself any other way than by some act against the law—as if in a great famine he takes by force or by stealth food that he cannot obtain for money or by charity, or in defense of his life snatches away another man's sword—he is totally excused, for the reason just given.

27.27 Again, acts done against the law by the authority of another are, by that authority, excused as against the author, because no man ought to accuse his own act in another who is only his instrument. But the act is not thereby excused as against a third person who is injured by it, because in the violation of the law both the author and the actor are criminals. From this it follows that when the man or assembly that has the sovereign power commands a man to do something contrary to a former law, doing it is totally excused. For the sovereign ought not to condemn it himself, since he is the author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the sovereign cannot justly be punished by anyone else. Besides, when the sovereign commands something to be done against his own former law, the command, as regards that particular act, is a repeal of the law.

27.28 If the man or assembly that has the sovereign power renounces any right essential to sovereignty, so that the subject acquires some liberty inconsistent with the sovereign power—that is, with the very being of a commonwealth—then if the subject refuses to obey a command in anything contrary to the liberty granted, this is nonetheless a sin, and contrary to the

duty of a subject. For he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with sovereignty, since it was set up by his own consent and for his own defense, and to understand that any liberty inconsistent with it was granted through ignorance of its harmful consequences. But if he not only disobeys, but also resists a public officer in carrying the command out, then it is a crime, because he could have had redress (without any breach of the peace) by making a complaint.

27.29 The degrees of crime are taken on several scales. They are measured, first, by the malignity of the source or cause; second, by the contagion of the example; third, by the harm of the effect; and fourth, by the concurrence of times, places, and persons.

27.30 The same act against the law, if it proceeds from a presumption of strength, riches, or friends to resist those who are to enforce the law, is a greater crime than if it proceeds from the hope of not being discovered, or of escaping by flight. For a presumption of impunity by force is a root from which springs, at all times and under all temptations, contempt of all laws; whereas in the second case, the apprehension of danger that makes a man flee renders him more obedient in the future. A crime committed knowing it to be one is greater than the same crime arising from a mistaken belief that it is lawful. For he who commits it against his own conscience relies on his force, or some other power, which encourages him to commit it again; but he who does it by error conforms to the law once the error is shown to him.

27.31 He whose error comes from the authority of a teacher or an interpreter of the law publicly authorized is not so much at fault as he whose error comes from stubbornly following his own principles and reasoning. For what is taught by one who teaches by public authority, the commonwealth teaches; it has the look of law until the same authority overrules it. And in all crimes that do not involve a denial of the sovereign power, and are not against an evident law, it excuses totally. Whereas he who bases his actions on his private judgment ought to stand or fall according to its rightness or error.

27.32 The same act, if it has been consistently punished in other men, is a greater crime than if there have been many previous examples of impunity. For those examples are so many hopes of impunity given by the sovereign himself. And because he who gives a man such a hope and presumption of mercy as encourages him to offend has his share in the offense, he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole of it.

27.33 A crime arising from sudden passion is not as great as one arising from long premeditation. In the first case there is room for extenuation in the common weakness of human nature; but he who acts with premeditation has taken care and cast his eye on the law, on the punishment, and on the consequences to human society—all of which, in committing the crime, he has despised and put after his own appetite. But no suddenness of passion is enough for a total excuse. For all the time between first knowing the law and committing the act shall be counted as time for deliberation, because he ought, by reflecting on the law, to correct the irregularity of his passions.

27.34 Where the law is publicly and diligently read and interpreted before all the people, an act done against it is a greater crime than where men are left without such instruction, to inquire into it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their work, and to be informed by private men. For in this case part of the fault is put down to common weakness; but in the former there is evident negligence, which is not without some contempt of the sovereign power.

27.35 Acts that the law expressly condemns, but the lawmaker tacitly approves by other clear signs of his will, are lesser crimes than the same acts condemned both by the law and by the lawmaker. For since the will of the lawmaker is a law, in this case there appear to be two contradictory laws. This would totally excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the sovereign's approval by other indications than those expressed by his command. But because punishments follow not only from transgressing his law but also from observing it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and so cannot reasonably impute the whole

crime to the offender. For example, the law condemns duels, and the punishment is made capital. On the other hand, he who refuses a duel is subject to contempt and scorn without remedy, and is sometimes thought by the sovereign himself unworthy of any command or promotion in war. If on that account he accepts a duel, then, considering that all men lawfully try to win the good opinion of those who have the sovereign power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished, since part of the fault may be laid on the punisher. I say this not from any wish for freedom of private revenge, or any other kind of disobedience, but out of concern that governors should not indirectly countenance anything they directly forbid. The examples of princes, to those who see them, are and always have been more powerful in governing their actions than the laws themselves. And though it is our duty to do not what they do but what they say, that duty will never be performed until it pleases God to give men an extraordinary and supernatural grace to follow that precept.[55]

27.36 Again, if we compare crimes by the harm of their effects: first, the same act, when it damages many, is greater than when it hurts few. And so, when an act hurts not only in the present but also (by example) in the future, it is a greater crime than if it hurt only in the present; for the former is a fertile crime that multiplies to the hurt of many, while the latter is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the commonwealth is a greater fault in an authorized preacher than in a private person. So also is living profanely or unchastely, or doing any irreligious act whatever. Likewise, for a professor of the law to maintain any point, or do any act, that tends to weaken the sovereign power is a greater crime than for another man. And in a man with such a reputation for wisdom that his counsels are followed or his actions imitated by many, an act against the law is a greater crime than the same act in another. For such men not only commit crime but teach it as law to

55 Echoing Matthew 23:3: "do and observe whatever they tell you, but not the works they do."

everyone else. And in general all crimes are made greater by the scandal they give—that is, by becoming stumbling blocks to the weak, who look not so much at the path they are on as at the light that other men carry before them.

27.37 Also, acts of hostility against the present state of the commonwealth are greater crimes than the same acts done to private men, for the damage extends to everyone. Such are betraying the strongholds or revealing the secrets of the commonwealth to an enemy; also all attempts against the representative of the commonwealth, whether a monarch or an assembly; and all efforts, by word or deed, to diminish its authority, either at present or in the succession. The Latins understand these crimes by *crimina laesae majestatis*, and they consist in a design or act contrary to a fundamental law.[56]

27.38 Likewise, crimes that make judgments ineffective are greater than injuries done to one or a few persons. To take money to give a false judgment or false testimony is a greater crime than to cheat a man of the same or a greater sum in some other way. For not only is the man who loses by such judgments wronged; all judgments are made useless, and occasion is given for force and private revenge.

27.39 Also, robbery and embezzlement of the public treasury or revenues is a greater crime than robbing or defrauding a private man, because to rob the public is to rob many at once.

27.40 Also, counterfeiting a public office, or counterfeiting public seals or the public coinage, is a greater crime than impersonating a private man or counterfeiting his seal, because the fraud extends to the damage of many.

27.41 Of acts against the law done to private men, the greater crime is the one where the damage, in the common opinion of men, is most keenly felt. And therefore

27.42 to kill against the law is a greater crime than any other injury that leaves life intact;

27.43 and to kill with torture, greater than simply to kill;

56 Latin, "crimes of injured majesty": treason.

27.44 and mutilation of a limb, greater than despoiling a man of his goods;

27.45 and despoiling a man of his goods by terror of death or wounds, greater than by stealing them secretly;

27.46 and by stealing them secretly, greater than by consent obtained through fraud;

27.47 and the violation of chastity by force, greater than by seduction;

27.48 and of a married woman, greater than of an unmarried woman.

27.49 For all these things are commonly valued so, though some men feel the same offense more and some less. But the law regards not the particular but the general inclination of mankind.

27.50 And so the offense men take at insults in words or gestures, when these produce no harm other than the present hurt of the one reproached, has been disregarded in the laws of the Greeks, the Romans, and other commonwealths both ancient and modern. They supposed that the true cause of such hurt lies not in the insult (which takes no hold on men conscious of their own virtue) but in the faintheartedness of the one who is offended by it.

27.51 Also, a crime against a private man is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. To kill one's parent is a greater crime than to kill another, for a parent ought to have the honor of a sovereign (though he has surrendered his power to the civil law), because he had it originally by nature. And to rob a poor man is a greater crime than to rob a rich man, because to the poor it is a more keenly felt loss.

27.52 And a crime committed at a time or in a place set apart for worship is greater than if committed at another time or place, for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the law.

27.53 Many other cases of aggravation and extenuation might be added. But from those I have set down, anyone can see how to take the measure of any other crime put before him.

27.54 Lastly, because in almost all crimes an injury is done not only to some private men but also to the commonwealth, the same crime is called a public crime when the accusation is in the name of the commonwealth, and a private crime when it is in the name of a private man. The corresponding pleas are called public (*judicia publica*, pleas of the Crown) or private pleas. So in an accusation of murder, if the accuser is a private man, the plea is a private plea; if the accuser is the sovereign, the plea is a public plea.

CHAPTER 28: OF PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS

Punishment is harm inflicted by public authority to make men more willing to obey.

28.1 A *punishment* is an evil inflicted by public authority on one who has done or omitted what that same authority judges to be a transgression of the law, to the end that men's wills may thereby be better disposed to obedience.

28.2 Before I infer anything from this definition, there is a question of great importance to be answered: by what door did the right or authority to punish, in any case, come in? For by what has been said before, no man is supposed to be bound by covenant not to resist violence, and consequently it cannot be supposed that he gave anyone a right to lay violent hands on his person. In making a commonwealth, every man gives away the right of defending another, but not of defending himself. He also binds himself to assist the sovereign in punishing another, but not in punishing himself. But to covenant to assist the sovereign in doing hurt to another, unless the one who so covenants has a right to do it himself, is not to give the sovereign a right to punish. It is clear, therefore, that the right the commonwealth (that is, he or they who represent it) has to punish is not grounded on any concession or gift of the subjects. But I have also shown earlier that before the institution of a commonwealth every man had a right to everything, and to do whatever he thought necessary for his own preservation—subduing, hurting, or killing any

man to that end. And this is the foundation of the right of punishing that is exercised in every commonwealth. For the subjects did not give the sovereign that right. They only, in laying down their own rights, strengthened him to use his own as he should think fit for the preservation of them all. So it was not given to him but left to him, and to him alone; and (apart from the limits set him by natural law) as entire as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of everyone against his neighbor.

28.3 From the definition of punishment I infer, first, that neither private revenge nor injuries done by private men can properly be called punishment, because they do not proceed from public authority.

28.4 Second, that to be neglected and passed over for public favor is not a punishment, because no new evil is thereby inflicted on anyone; he is only left in the condition he was in before.

28.5 Third, that evil inflicted by public authority without a prior public condemnation is not to be called punishment but a hostile act, because the act for which a man is punished ought first to be judged by public authority to be a transgression of the law.

28.6 Fourth, that evil inflicted by usurped power, and by judges without authority from the sovereign, is not punishment but an act of hostility, because the acts of usurped power do not have the condemned person as their author, and so are not acts of public authority.

28.7 Fifth, that all evil inflicted without the intention or possibility of disposing the offender, or (by his example) other men, to obey the laws is not punishment but an act of hostility, because without such an end no hurt done falls under that name.

28.8 Sixth, certain actions have various harmful consequences attached to them by nature—as when a man attacking another is himself killed or wounded, or falls sick by doing some unlawful act. Such hurt, though with respect to God, who is the author of nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and so to be a divine punishment, is not included in the name of punishment with

respect to men, because it is not inflicted by the authority of man.

28.9 Seventh, if the harm inflicted is less than the benefit or satisfaction that naturally follows the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition. It is rather the price, or the ransom, of a crime than its punishment. For it is the nature of punishment to have as its end the disposing of men to obey the law; and if the harm is less than the benefit of the transgression, it does not attain that end, but works the contrary effect.

28.10 Eighth, if a punishment is fixed and prescribed in the law itself, and after the crime is committed a greater punishment is inflicted, the excess is not punishment but an act of hostility. For since the aim of punishment is not revenge but terror, and the terror of a great unknown punishment is taken away by the declaration of a lesser one, the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment. But where no punishment at all is fixed by the law, whatever is inflicted has the nature of punishment. For he who sets about violating a law in which no penalty is fixed expects an indeterminate—that is, an arbitrary—punishment.

28.11 Ninth, harm inflicted for an act done before there was a law forbidding it is not punishment but an act of hostility. For before the law there is no transgression of the law; but punishment presupposes an act judged to have been a transgression of the law. Therefore harm inflicted before the law was made is not punishment but an act of hostility.

28.12 Tenth, hurt inflicted on the representative of the commonwealth is not punishment but an act of hostility, because it is of the nature of punishment to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority of the representative alone.

28.13 Lastly, harm inflicted on a declared enemy does not fall under the name of punishment. Such people were either never subject to the law, and so cannot transgress it; or, having been subject to it and declaring that they are so no longer, they by consequence deny that they can transgress it. So all the harms that can be done to them must be taken as acts of hostility. And in declared hostility, all infliction of evil is lawful. From this it

follows that if a subject, by deed or word, knowingly and deliberately denies the authority of the representative of the commonwealth, he may lawfully be made to suffer whatever the representative wills, whatever penalty has previously been ordained for treason. For in denying subjection he denies the punishment the law has ordained, and therefore suffers as an enemy of the commonwealth—that is, according to the will of the representative. For the punishments set down in the law are for subjects, not for enemies; and such enemies are those who, having become subjects by their own act, deliberately revolt and deny the sovereign power.

THE KINDS OF PUNISHMENT AND REWARD

Punishment may be corporal, pecuniary, ignominy, imprisonment, or exile; reward is gift or wages.

28.14 The first and most general division of punishments is into *divine* and *human*. Of the former I shall have occasion to speak hereafter, in a more convenient place.

28.15 *Human* punishments are those inflicted by the command of man. They are either *corporal*, or *pecuniary*, or *ignominy*, or *imprisonment*, or *exile*, or a mixture of these.

28.16 *Corporal punishment* is punishment inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of the one who inflicts it: such as lashes, or wounds, or deprivation of bodily pleasures that were lawfully enjoyed before.

28.17 Of these, some are *capital*, some *less than capital*. Capital punishment is the infliction of death, either simply or with torment. Less than capital are lashes, wounds, chains, and any other bodily pain not mortal in its own nature. For if death does not follow the infliction of a punishment by the intention of the one who inflicts it, the punishment is not to be counted capital, even though the harm proves mortal by some accident that could not be foreseen. In that case death is not inflicted, but hastened.

28.18 *Pecuniary punishment* consists not only in being deprived of a sum of money, but also of lands, or any other goods that are usually bought and sold for money. If the law that ordains such a punishment is made with the design of gathering money from those who transgress it, it is not properly a punishment. It is the price of a privilege, and of exemption from the law—a law that does not absolutely forbid the act, but forbids it only to those who are not able to pay the money. The exception is where the law is natural, or part of religion. In that case the payment is not an exemption from the law, but a transgression of it. Thus where a law exacts a fine from those who take the name of God in vain, paying the fine is not the price of a dispensation to swear, but the punishment for transgressing a law that admits no dispensation. In the same way, if the law imposes a sum of money to be paid to the person who has been injured, this is only compensation for the hurt done him. It extinguishes the injured party's accusation, not the offender's crime.

28.19 *Ignominy* is the infliction of an evil that the commonwealth has made dishonorable, or the deprivation of a good that the commonwealth has made honorable. For some things are honorable by nature, such as the effects of courage, magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body and mind. Others are made honorable by the commonwealth, such as badges, titles, offices, or any other special mark of the sovereign's favor. The former (though they may fail through nature or accident) cannot be taken away by a law, and therefore losing them is not a punishment. But the latter may be taken away by the public authority that made them honorable, and such losses are properly punishments: for example, stripping condemned men of their badges, titles, and offices, or declaring them incapable of holding such things in future.

28.20 *Imprisonment* is when a man is deprived of liberty by public authority. It may serve two different ends: one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the infliction of pain on a man condemned. The former is not punishment, because no man is supposed to be punished before he has had a judicial

hearing and been declared guilty. And therefore any hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds or restraint before his case is heard, over and above what is necessary to secure his custody, is against the law of nature. But the latter is punishment, because it is an evil, inflicted by public authority, for something that the same authority has judged a transgression of the law. Under this word "imprisonment" I include all restraint of motion caused by an external obstacle. It may be a house, which is called by the general name of a prison; or an island, as when men are said to be confined to one; or a place where men are set to work, as in ancient times men were condemned to the quarries, and in these times to the galleys; or it may be a chain, or any other such impediment.

28.21 *Exile* (banishment) is when a man is condemned for a crime to leave the dominion of the commonwealth, or some part of it, and not to return, either for a fixed time or forever. In its own nature, without other circumstances, it does not seem to be a punishment, but rather an escape, or a public command to avoid punishment by flight. And Cicero says that no such punishment was ever ordained in the city of Rome, but calls it a refuge for men in danger.[57] For if a banished man is nevertheless allowed to enjoy his goods and the revenue of his lands, the mere change of air is no punishment. Nor does it serve the benefit of the commonwealth for which all punishments are ordained (that is, forming men's wills to observe the law); often it does the commonwealth harm. For a banished man is a lawful enemy of the commonwealth that banished him, since he is no longer a member of it. But if he is also deprived of his lands or goods, then the punishment lies not in the exile; it is to be counted among pecuniary punishments.

28.22 All punishments of innocent subjects, whether great or small, are against the law of nature. For punishment is only for transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. It is therefore a violation, first, of the law of nature that forbids all men, in their revenges, to look at any-

57 Cicero, *Pro Caecina* 100.

thing but some future good: for no good can come to the commonwealth from punishing the innocent. Second, it violates the law that forbids ingratitude. For since all sovereign power was originally given by the consent of each of the subjects, so that they would be protected by it as long as they are obedient, punishing the innocent is returning evil for good. And third, it violates the law that commands equity, that is to say, an equal distribution of justice, which is not observed in punishing the innocent.

28.23 But inflicting any evil whatever on an innocent man who is not a subject, if it is for the benefit of the commonwealth and violates no prior covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For all men who are not subjects are either enemies, or else have ceased to be enemies by some previous covenants. And against enemies whom the commonwealth judges capable of doing it harm, it is lawful by the original right of nature to make war. In war the sword does not judge, nor does the victor distinguish guilty from innocent as to the time past, nor show mercy except insofar as it serves the good of his own people. It is on this ground, too, that in the case of subjects who deliberately deny the authority of the established commonwealth, vengeance is lawfully extended not only to the fathers but also to the third and fourth generation, not yet in existence and consequently innocent of the act for which they are afflicted. For the nature of this offense consists in renouncing subjection, which is a relapse into the condition of war, commonly called rebellion. Those who offend in this way suffer not as subjects but as enemies. For *rebellion* is only war renewed.[58]

28.24 *Reward* is either by *gift* or by *contract*. When it is by contract, it is called *salary* and *wages*, which is a benefit due for service performed or promised. When it is by gift, it is a benefit proceeding from the *grace* of those who bestow it, to encourage or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the sovereign of a commonwealth appoints a salary to some public office, the person who receives it is bound in justice to perform

58 "The third and fourth generation" echoes Exodus 20:5.

his office. Otherwise, he is bound only in honor, to gratitude and to an effort to repay. For though men have no lawful remedy when they are commanded to leave their private business to serve the public without reward or salary, they are not bound to do so by the law of nature, nor by the institution of the commonwealth, unless the service cannot be done any other way. For it is supposed that the sovereign may make use of all their means, so that even the most common soldier may demand the wages of his service in war as a debt.

28.25 The benefits a sovereign bestows on a subject out of fear of some power and ability he has to hurt the commonwealth are not properly rewards. They are not salaries, because in this case no contract is supposed, every man being already obliged not to do the commonwealth a disservice. Nor are they graces, because they are extorted by fear, which ought not to affect the sovereign power. They are rather sacrifices, which the sovereign (considered in his natural person, and not in the person of the commonwealth) makes to appease the discontent of someone he thinks more powerful than himself. And they encourage not obedience, but on the contrary the continuance and increase of further extortion.

28.26 Some salaries are fixed, and come from the public treasury; others are uncertain and incidental, arising from the exercise of the office for which the salary is ordained. The latter is in some cases harmful to the commonwealth, as in the case of the courts. For where the profit of the judges and officers of a court of justice arises from the number of cases brought before them, two inconveniences must follow. One is the fostering of lawsuits, for the more suits, the greater the profit. The other depends on that: contention about jurisdiction, with each court drawing to itself as many cases as it can. But in executive offices these inconveniences do not arise, because their business cannot be increased by any effort of their own. And this much will suffice on the nature of punishment and reward, which are, as it were, the nerves and tendons that move the limbs and joints of a commonwealth.

28.27 So far I have set forth the nature of man (whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government), together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to Leviathan. I took that comparison from the last two verses of the forty-first chapter of Job, where God, having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calls him the king of the proud. "There is nothing on earth," he says, "to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid.[59] He sees every high thing below him, and is king of all the children of pride." But because he is mortal and subject to decay, like all other earthly creatures, and because there is something in heaven (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought to obey, I shall speak in the chapters that follow of his diseases and the causes of his mortality, and of what laws of nature he is bound to obey.

CHAPTER 29: OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN OR TEND TO DISSOLVE A COMMONWEALTH

Commonwealths die from internal diseases: defective institution and seditious doctrines.

29.1 Though nothing that mortals make can be immortal, yet if men had the use of the reason they claim to have, their commonwealths might at least be secured from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of their institution they are designed to live as long as mankind, or as the laws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence but by internal disorder, the fault is not in men as they are the *matter* of commonwealths, but as they are their *makers* and orderers. For men at last grow weary of irregular jostling and hacking at one another, and desire with all their hearts to fit themselves together into one firm and lasting edifice. But they lack both the art of making fit laws to square their actions by, and the humility and patience to let the rough and cumbersome points of their

59 Job 41:33–34.

present greatness be taken off. So without the help of a very able architect they cannot be put together into anything but a flimsy, rickety building—one that will hardly last out their own time, and must surely fall upon the heads of their posterity.

29.2 Among the *infirmities* of a commonwealth, therefore, I will count first those that arise from an imperfect institution, and resemble the diseases of a natural body that proceed from a defective conception.

29.3 One of these is this: *that a man, to obtain a kingdom, is sometimes content with less power than the peace and defense of the commonwealth necessarily require*. As a result, when the exercise of the power he laid aside has to be resumed for the public safety, it looks like an unjust act. This disposes great numbers of men (when occasion offers) to rebel—in the same way as the bodies of children begotten by diseased parents are liable either to an early death, or to purge the ill quality derived from their faulty conception by breaking out in boils and scabs. And when kings deny themselves some such necessary power, it is not always (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what the office they undertake requires. Often it is in the hope of recovering it again when they please. In this they reason badly, because those who would hold them to their promises will be supported against them by foreign commonwealths, which, for the good of their own subjects, let few opportunities slip to *weaken* the state of their neighbors. So Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, was supported by the Pope against Henry II, the subjection of churchmen to the commonwealth having been waived by William the Conqueror at his accession, when he took an oath not to infringe the liberty of the Church. And so the barons—whose power had been increased by William Rufus, to a degree inconsistent with the sovereign power, in order to have their help in transferring the succession from his elder brother to himself—

were supported by the French in their rebellion against King John.[60]

29.4 Nor does this happen only in monarchy. For the title of the ancient Roman commonwealth was *The Senate and People of Rome*, and neither the Senate nor the people claimed the whole power. This first caused the seditions of Tiberius Gracchus, Gaius Gracchus, Lucius Saturninus, and others; and afterward the wars between the Senate and the people under Marius and Sulla, and again under Pompey and Caesar, until their democracy was extinguished and monarchy set up.

29.5 The people of Athens bound themselves from only one action: that no man, on pain of death, should propose renewing the war for the island of Salamis. And yet if Solon had not had it given out that he was mad, and then, with the gestures and dress of someone out of his mind, proposed it in verse to the people who flocked around him, they would have had an enemy perpetually at the ready, even at the gates of their city. Such damage, or such shifts, are all commonwealths driven to whose power is limited even a little.[61]

THE DISEASES OF SEDITIOUS DOCTRINE

Private judgment of good and evil, divided sovereignty, and similar opinions poison the commonwealth.

29.6 In the second place, I note the *diseases* of a commonwealth that come from the poison of seditious doctrines. One of these is *that every private man is judge of good and evil actions*. This is true in the condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws, and also under civil government in cases the law has not determined. But otherwise it is plain that the measure of good and evil actions is the civil law, and the judge is the legislator, who is always the representative of the commonwealth. From

60 Becket quarreled with Henry II over the jurisdiction of church courts and was murdered in 1170. William Rufus (William II) took the English crown in 1087 over his elder brother Robert. In 1216 the rebel barons invited the French prince Louis to invade England against King John.

61 The story is told in Plutarch's *Life of Solon* (8).

this false doctrine men are disposed to debate with themselves and dispute the commands of the commonwealth, and then to obey or disobey them as they think fit in their private judgments. By this the commonwealth is distracted and *weakened*.

29.7 Another doctrine repugnant to civil society is that *whatever a man does against his conscience is sin*. It depends on the presumption of making oneself judge of good and evil. For a man's conscience and his judgment are the same thing, and like the judgment, the conscience may be mistaken. Therefore, though someone who is subject to no civil law sins in everything he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason, it is not so with someone who lives in a commonwealth. For the law is the public conscience, by which he has already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise, given the diversity of private consciences, which are only private opinions, the commonwealth must be distracted, and no man would dare obey the sovereign power any further than seemed good in his own eyes.

29.8 It has also been commonly taught *that faith and holiness are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion*. Grant this, and I do not see why any man should give a reason for his faith; or why every Christian should not also be a prophet; or why any man should take the law of his country, rather than his own inspiration, as the rule of his action. And so we fall again into the fault of taking it upon ourselves to judge of good and evil, or of making judges of it those private men who claim to be supernaturally inspired—to the dissolution of all civil government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents that bring us into the presence of those who speak to us. These accidents are all contrived by God Almighty, and yet they are not supernatural; they are only unobservable, because of the great number of them that combine in every effect. Faith and holiness are indeed not very common. But they are not miracles. They are brought about by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, by which

God works them in his elect, at such time as he thinks fit.[62] And these three opinions, pernicious to peace and government, have in this part of the world come chiefly from the tongues and pens of unlearned divines, who, joining the words of Holy Scripture together otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do all they can to make men think that holiness and natural reason cannot stand together.

29.9 A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth, is this: *that he who has the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws*. It is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because such laws are divine and cannot be abrogated by any man or commonwealth. But to the laws that the sovereign himself—that is, the commonwealth—makes, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be subject to the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to himself; and that is not subjection, but freedom from the laws. Because this error sets the laws above the sovereign, it also sets a judge above him, and a power to punish him. That is to make a new sovereign; and again, for the same reason, a third to punish the second; and so on continually without end, to the confusion and dissolution of the commonwealth.

29.10 A fifth doctrine that tends to the dissolution of a commonwealth is *that every private man has an absolute property in his goods, such as excludes the right of the sovereign*. Every man does indeed have a property that excludes the right of every other subject. And he has it only from the sovereign power; without its protection every other man would have an equal right to the same thing. But if the right of the sovereign is also excluded, he cannot perform the office they have put him in, which is to defend them both from foreign enemies and from the injuries of one another. And consequently there is no longer a commonwealth.

29.11 And if the property of subjects does not exclude the sovereign representative's right to their goods, much less does it

62 "Faith comes by hearing": Romans 10:17.

exclude his right to their offices of judicature or execution, in which they represent the sovereign himself.

29.12 There is a sixth doctrine, plainly and directly against the essence of a commonwealth, and it is this: *that the sovereign power may be divided*. For what is dividing the power of a commonwealth but dissolving it? Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines men are chiefly indebted to some of those who, making the law their profession, try to make it depend on their own learning, and not on the legislative power.

29.13 And as false doctrine does, so also the example of a different government in a neighboring nation often disposes men to alter the form already settled. So the people of the Jews were stirred up to reject God, and to call on the prophet Samuel for a king like the other nations. So too the lesser cities of Greece were continually disturbed by the seditions of aristocratic and democratic factions, one part of almost every commonwealth wanting to imitate the Spartans, the other the Athenians.[63] And I have no doubt that many men were glad to see the late troubles in England out of imitation of the Low Countries, supposing that nothing more was needed to grow rich than to change the form of their government, as the Dutch had done.[64] For man's nature is in its constitution inclined of itself to desire novelty. So when men are provoked to it by having neighbors who have grown rich by it too, it is almost impossible for them not to welcome those who urge them to change, and to love the first beginnings, though they are grieved by the continuing disorder—like hot-blooded people who, having caught the itch, tear themselves with their own nails until they can bear the smart no longer.

29.14 As for rebellion against monarchy in particular, one of its most frequent causes is the reading of the books of politics and histories of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Young men, and all others unprovided with the antidote of solid reason, receive

63 1 Samuel 8.

64 "The late troubles" are the English Civil Wars of the 1640s. The Dutch Republic, prosperous after throwing off Spanish rule, had no king.

from them a strong and delightful impression of the great exploits of war achieved by the commanders of their armies, and with it a pleasing idea of everything else they did. They imagine that their great prosperity came not from the rivalry of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular form of government—not considering the frequent seditions and civil wars produced by the imperfection of their constitution. From reading such books, I say, men have undertaken to kill their kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books and discourses on politics, make it lawful and praiseworthy for any man to do so, provided that before he does it he calls the king a tyrant. For they do not say that *regicide*, that is, killing a king, is lawful, but *tyrannicide*, that is, killing a tyrant. From the same books, those who live under a monarch form the opinion that the subjects in a popular commonwealth enjoy liberty, but that in a monarchy they are all slaves. I say that those who live under a monarchy form this opinion—not those who live under a popular government, for they find no such thing. In sum, I cannot imagine how anything could be more damaging to a monarchy than allowing such books to be publicly read without at once applying such correctives from discreet teachers as are fit to take away their venom. This venom I do not hesitate to compare to the bite of a rabid dog, which produces a disease the physicians call *hydrophobia*, or *fear of water*. For the one who is bitten has a continual torment of thirst, and yet abhors water, and is in a state as if the poison were trying to turn him into a dog. So when a monarchy has once been bitten to the quick by those democratic writers who continually snarl at that form of state, it needs nothing more than a strong monarch; and yet, when they have one, out of a certain *tyrannophobia*, or fear of being strongly governed, they abhor him.

29.15 As there have been doctors who hold that there are three souls in a man, so there are also those who think there may be more souls (that is, more sovereigns) than one in a commonwealth. They set up a *supremacy* against the *sovereignty*, *canons* against *laws*, and a *spiritual authority* against the *civil*. They work

on men's minds with words and distinctions that in themselves signify nothing, but betray by their obscurity that there walks in the dark (invisibly, as some think) another kingdom—a kingdom of fairies, as it were.[65] Now it is plain that the civil power and the power of the commonwealth are the same thing, and that supremacy, and the power of making canons and granting licenses, imply a commonwealth. It follows that where one is sovereign and another supreme, where one can make laws and another make canons, there must be two commonwealths of one and the same subjects—which is a kingdom divided against itself, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the meaningless distinction between *temporal* and *spiritual*, they are still two kingdoms, and every subject is subject to two masters.[66] For since the spiritual power claims the right to declare what is sin, it claims by consequence to declare what is law (sin being nothing but the transgression of the law). And the civil power also claims to declare what is law. So every subject must obey two masters, who both want their commands observed as law—which is impossible. Or if it is only one kingdom, then either the *civil* power, which is the power of the commonwealth, must be subordinate to the *spiritual*, and then there is no sovereignty but the spiritual; or the *spiritual* must be subordinate to the *temporal*, and then there is no *supremacy* but the temporal. When these two powers oppose one another, therefore, the commonwealth cannot help being in great danger of civil war and dissolution. For the *civil* authority, being more visible and standing in the clearer light of natural reason, cannot fail at all times to draw to itself a very considerable part of the people. And the *spiritual*, though it stands in the darkness of scholastic distinctions and hard words, yet because the fear of darkness and ghosts is greater than other fears, cannot lack a party large enough to trouble, and sometimes to destroy, a commonwealth.

65 The "three souls" are the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls of Aristotelian scholastic teaching.

66 "A kingdom divided against itself … cannot stand": Mark 3:24; "two masters": Matthew 6:24. "Faculties" were church licenses and dispensations.

And this is a disease that may not unfitly be compared to epilepsy, or the falling sickness (which the Jews took to be a kind of possession by spirits), in the natural body. For in this disease there is an unnatural spirit, or wind, in the head that obstructs the roots of the nerves and, moving them violently, takes away the motion they should naturally have from the power of the soul in the brain. It thereby causes violent and irregular motions (which men call convulsions) in the parts, so that someone seized with it falls down, sometimes into water and sometimes into fire, like a man deprived of his senses; so also in the body politic, when the spiritual power moves the members of a commonwealth by the terror of punishments and hope of rewards (which are its nerves) otherwise than they ought to be moved by the civil power (which is the soul of the commonwealth), and suffocates their understanding with strange and hard words, it must thereby distract the people, and either overwhelm the commonwealth with oppression or cast it into the fire of a civil war.

29.16 Sometimes, too, in a purely civil government there is more than one soul. For example, the power of levying money (which is the nutritive faculty) has depended on a general assembly; the power of conduct and command (which is the motive faculty) on one man; and the power of making laws (which is the rational faculty) on the chance consent not only of those two, but also of a third. This endangers the commonwealth, sometimes for lack of consent to good laws, but most often for lack of the nourishment necessary to life and motion.[67] For although few perceive that such a government is not government but the division of the commonwealth into three factions, and they call it mixed monarchy, the truth is that it is not one independent commonwealth but three independent factions, and not one representative person but three. In the Kingdom of God there may be three independent persons without breach of unity in the God who reigns. But where men reign, who are subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the

67 Hobbes has in view the English constitution of king, Lords, and Commons.

king bears the person of the people, and the general assembly also bears the person of the people, and another assembly bears the person of a part of the people, they are not one person nor one sovereign, but three persons and three sovereigns.

29.17 To what disease in the natural body of man I may exactly compare this irregularity of a commonwealth, I do not know. But I have seen a man who had another man growing out of his side, with a head, arms, chest, and stomach of his own. If he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.[68]

LESSER DISEASES OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Shortage of money, monopolies, popular subjects, and overgrown towns are compared to bodily ailments.

29.18 So far I have named the diseases of a commonwealth that carry the greatest and most immediate danger. There are others, not so great, which are nevertheless worth noting. First, the difficulty of raising money for the necessary uses of the commonwealth, especially when war is approaching. This difficulty arises from the opinion every subject has of a property in his lands and goods that excludes the sovereign's right to use them. As a result, the sovereign power, which foresees the necessities and dangers of the commonwealth, finds the flow of money to the public treasury obstructed by the tenacity of the people. Where it ought to extend itself to meet and prevent such dangers at their beginnings, it contracts itself as long as it can. When it can do so no longer, it struggles with the people by legal stratagems to obtain small sums. These not being enough, the sovereign is forced at last either to open the way violently for immediate supply, or to perish. And being often driven to these extremities, he at last brings the people to their proper temper, or else the commonwealth must perish. So we may compare this distemper very aptly to an ague. In an ague the fleshy parts are

68 Probably Lazarus Colloredo, a Genoese man with a parasitic twin, who was exhibited in England and Europe in the 1630s and 1640s.

congealed or obstructed by venomous matter, and the veins, which by their natural course empty themselves into the heart, are not supplied from the arteries as they ought to be. From this there follows first a cold contraction and trembling of the limbs; and afterward a hot and strong effort of the heart to force a passage for the blood. Before it can do that, it contents itself with the small refreshment of things that cool it for a time, until (if nature is strong enough) it at last breaks the resistance of the obstructed parts and dissipates the venom into sweat—or (if nature is too weak) the patient dies.[69]

29.19 Again, there is sometimes in a commonwealth a disease resembling pleurisy. That is when the treasure of the commonwealth, flowing out of its proper course, is gathered together in too great abundance in one or a few private men, by monopolies or by farming out the public revenues—in the same way as the blood in a pleurisy, getting into the membrane of the chest, breeds an inflammation there, accompanied by fever and painful stitches.[70]

29.20 Also, the popularity of a powerful subject (unless the commonwealth has very good security for his loyalty) is a dangerous disease. For the people, who should receive their motion from the authority of the sovereign, are drawn away by the flattery and reputation of an ambitious man from their obedience to the laws, to follow a man whose virtues and designs they know nothing of. And this is commonly more dangerous in a popular government than in a monarchy, because an army is of such great force and numbers that it may easily be made to believe that it is the people. It was by this means that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the people against the Senate, having won the affections of his army for himself, made himself master of both Senate and people. And this proceeding of popular and ambitious men is plain rebellion, and may be likened to the effects of witchcraft.

69 An ague is a fever with fits of chills and sweating, such as malaria.
70 "Farming" the revenues meant selling private contractors the right to collect a tax in return for a fixed payment.

29.21 Another infirmity of a commonwealth is the immoderate size of a town, when it is able to supply from within its own bounds the numbers and expense of a great army. So too the great number of corporations, which are like many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater one, like worms in the entrails of a natural man. To these may be added the liberty of disputing against absolute power by those who claim political wisdom. Though they are bred for the most part in the dregs of the people, yet, animated by false doctrines, they are perpetually meddling with the fundamental laws, to the annoyance of the commonwealth—like the little worms that physicians call *ascarides*.[71]

29.22 We may further add the insatiable appetite, or *bulimia*, for enlarging dominion, with the incurable wounds often received from the enemy as a result; and the wens of ununited conquests, which are often a burden, and are lost with less danger than they are kept; as also the lethargy of ease, and the consumption of riot and vain expense.[72]

29.23 Lastly, when in a war (foreign or internal) the enemy wins a final victory, so that the forces of the commonwealth no longer keep the field and there is no further protection of subjects in their loyalty, then the commonwealth is *dissolved*, and every man is at liberty to protect himself by whatever courses his own discretion suggests to him. For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the commonwealth. When it expires, the members are governed by it no more than the corpse of a man is governed by his departed (though immortal) soul. For though the right of a sovereign monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another, the obligation of the members can. For he who lacks protection may seek it anywhere; and when he has it, he is obliged (without fraudulent pretense of having submitted out of fear) to protect his protection as long as he is able. But when the power of an assembly is once suppressed, its right per-

71 *Ascarides*: intestinal roundworms or pinworms.
72 A wen is a growth or cyst on the body; "consumption" is a wasting disease.

ishes utterly, because the assembly itself is extinct; and consequently there is no possibility for the sovereignty to re-enter.

CHAPTER 30: OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN REPRESENTATIVE

The sovereign's duty is the safety of the people, secured by teaching and good laws.

30.1 The *office* of the sovereign (whether a monarch or an assembly) consists in the end for which he was entrusted with the sovereign power, namely securing *the safety of the people*. To this he is obliged by the law of nature, and he must render an account of it to God, the author of that law, and to no one but him. But by safety here is meant not bare preservation, but also all the other contentments of life that every man shall acquire for himself by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth.

30.2 And this is meant to be done not by care applied to individuals, beyond protecting them from injuries when they complain, but by a general providence, consisting in public instruction, both of doctrine and of example, and in the making and executing of good laws, to which individual persons may apply their own cases.

30.3 If the essential rights of sovereignty (specified before in chapter 18) are taken away, the commonwealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returns into the condition and calamity of a war with every other man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life. Therefore it is the office of the sovereign to maintain those rights entire. And consequently it is against his duty, first, to transfer any of them to another, or to lay any of them aside. For whoever abandons the means abandons the ends. And a sovereign abandons the means when he acknowledges himself subject to the civil laws; or renounces the power of supreme judicature; or of making war or peace by his own authority; or of judging the necessities of the commonwealth; or of levying money and soldiers when, and as much as, he in his own conscience judges necessary; or of appointing officers and

ministers both of war and of peace; or of appointing teachers, and examining what doctrines agree with, or are contrary to, the defense, peace, and good of the people. Second, it is against his duty to let the people be ignorant or misinformed of the grounds and reasons of those essential rights of his. For then men are easily seduced and drawn to resist him when the commonwealth requires their use and exercise.

30.4 And the grounds of these rights need all the more to be taught diligently and truly, because they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment. For a civil law that forbids rebellion (and all resistance to the essential rights of sovereignty is rebellion) is not, as a civil law, any obligation. It binds only by virtue of the law of nature that forbids breaking faith. If men do not know that natural obligation, they cannot know the right of any law the sovereign makes. And as for the punishment, they take it only for an act of hostility, which, when they think they have strength enough, they will try to avoid by acts of hostility.

30.5 I have heard some say that justice is only a word, without substance, and that whatever a man can acquire for himself by force or cunning (not only in the condition of war, but also in a commonwealth) is his own, which I have already shown to be false. So too there are those who maintain that there are no grounds or principles of reason to sustain the essential rights that make sovereignty absolute. For if there were, they say, they would have been found out in some place or other; whereas we see that there has not yet been any commonwealth where those rights have been acknowledged or claimed. In this they argue as badly as if the Indigenous peoples of America were to deny that there are any grounds or principles of reason for building a house to last as long as its materials, because they had never yet seen one so well built. Time and industry produce new knowledge every day. And the art of building well is derived from principles of reason observed by industrious men who had long studied the nature of materials and the various effects of shape and proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to

build. In the same way, long after men have begun to constitute commonwealths, imperfect and apt to relapse into disorder, principles of reason may be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution everlasting (except against external violence). And such are the principles I have set forth in this discourse. Whether they come to the sight of those who have power to make use of them or not, or are neglected by them or not, concerns my own particular interest very little at this day. But supposing these principles of mine are not such principles of reason, I am still sure that they are principles drawn from the authority of Scripture, as I shall make clear when I come to speak of the Kingdom of God (administered by Moses) over the Jews, his peculiar people by covenant.[73]

30.6 But they say again that, though the principles are right, common people do not have the capacity to be made to understand them. I should be glad if the rich and powerful subjects of a kingdom, or those who are reckoned the most learned, were no more incapable than they. But all men know that the obstacles to this kind of doctrine come not so much from the difficulty of the matter as from the interest of those who are to learn it. Powerful men can hardly digest anything that sets up a power to bridle their passions; and learned men, anything that exposes their errors and so lessens their authority. Whereas the minds of the common people, unless they are tainted by dependence on the powerful, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatever public authority shall imprint on them. Shall whole nations be brought to acquiesce in the great mysteries of the Christian religion, which are above reason, and millions of men be made to believe that the same body may be in innumerable places at one and the same time, which is against reason; and shall men not be able, by their teaching and preaching, protected by the law, to make generally accepted something so agreeable to reason

73 "Peculiar people": God's own special possession (Deuteronomy 14:2).

that any unprejudiced man needs only to hear it to learn it?[74] I conclude, therefore, that in instructing the people in the essential rights of sovereignty (which are the natural and fundamental laws), there is no difficulty (while a sovereign has his power entire) except what comes from his own fault, or the fault of those he trusts in the administration of the commonwealth. And consequently it is his duty to have them so instructed—and not only his duty, but also his benefit and his security against the danger that may come to himself, in his natural person, from rebellion.

WHAT THE PEOPLE ARE TO BE TAUGHT

Their duties to the sovereign are to be taught, following the pattern of the Ten Commandments.

30.7 And (to come down to particulars) the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in neighboring nations more than with their own, nor to desire change, whatever present prosperity they see in nations governed differently from them. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an aristocratic or democratic assembly comes not from aristocracy or from democracy, but from the obedience and concord of the subjects. Nor do the people flourish in a monarchy because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away the obedience (and consequently the concord) of the people in any kind of state, and they will not only fail to flourish but in a short time be dissolved. And those who set out, by disobedience, to do no more than reform the commonwealth will find that they destroy it by doing so—like the foolish daughters of Peleus in the fable, who, wanting to renew the youth of their decrepit father, on the advice of Medea cut him in pieces and boiled him together with

74 The "same body ... in innumerable places" is the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, the body of Christ present in the Eucharist wherever Mass is said.

strange herbs, but did not make a new man of him.[75] This desire for change is like breaking the first of God's commandments. For there God says, *Non habebis deos alienos*: you shall not have the gods of other nations. And in another place he says of *kings* that they are *gods*.[76]

30.8 Second, they are to be taught that they ought not to be carried away by admiration for the virtue of any of their fellow subjects, however high he stands or however conspicuously he shines in the commonwealth, nor of any assembly (except the sovereign assembly), so as to give them any obedience or honor that belongs to the sovereign alone, whom they represent in their particular stations. Nor are they to receive any influence from them except what is conveyed through them from the sovereign authority. For a sovereign cannot be imagined to love his people as he ought if he is not jealous of them, but allows them to be seduced from their loyalty by the flattery of popular men—as they often have been, not only secretly but openly, to the point of proclaiming marriage with them *in facie Ecclesiae* by preachers, and by publishing it in the open streets. This may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the Ten Commandments.[77]

30.9 Third, following from this, they ought to be told how great a fault it is to speak evil of the sovereign representative (whether one man or an assembly of men), or to argue and dispute his power, or to use his name irreverently in any way, by which he may be brought into contempt with his people and their obedience—in which the safety of the commonwealth consists—slackened. The third commandment points to this doctrine by analogy.

30.10 Fourth, people cannot be taught this, nor remember it once taught, nor after a single generation so much as know in

75 In the myth the father was Pelias, not Peleus; Medea tricked his daughters into killing him (Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 7).

76 The first commandment: Exodus 20:3. Kings as "gods": Psalm 82:6 and Exodus 22:28, where the Hebrew *elohim* can mean rulers or judges.

whom the sovereign power is placed, unless some fixed times are set apart from their ordinary labor in which they may attend those appointed to instruct them. It is therefore necessary that such times be set, in which they may assemble together and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Sovereign of sovereigns) hear their duties told them, hear the positive laws that generally concern them all read and explained, and be reminded of the authority that makes them laws. To this end the Jews had a Sabbath every seventh day, on which the Law was read and explained. In its solemn observance they were reminded that their King was God; that having created the world in six days, he rested on the seventh; and, by their resting on it from their labor, that their King was the God who redeemed them from their servile and painful labor in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoiced in God, to take joy also in themselves through lawful recreation. So the first table of the Commandments is spent entirely in setting down the sum of God's absolute power—not only as God, but as King of the Jews in particular, by covenant. It may therefore give light to those on whom sovereign power has been conferred by the consent of men, so that they see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects.

30.11 And because the first instruction of children depends on the care of their parents, it is necessary that children be obedient to them while they are under their tutelage; and not only that, but also that afterward (as gratitude requires) they acknowledge the benefit of their upbringing by outward signs of honor. To this end they are to be taught that originally every man's father was also his sovereign lord, with power of life and death over him; and that when fathers of families resigned that absolute power by instituting a commonwealth, it was never intended that they should lose the honor due to them for bringing up their children. For giving up that right was not necessary to the

77 *In facie Ecclesiae*: "in the face of the Church," the formula for a marriage solemnized publicly in church. The second commandment forbids idols and names God a jealous God (Exodus 20:4–5).

institution of sovereign power. Nor would there be any reason why a man should want to have children, or take the trouble to feed and instruct them, if he were afterward to have no more benefit from them than from other men. And this agrees with the fifth commandment.

30.12 Again, every sovereign ought to have justice taught. Since justice consists in taking from no man what is his, this is as much as to say that he ought to have men taught not to deprive their neighbors, by violence or fraud, of anything that is theirs by the sovereign authority. Of the things a man owns, those dearest to him are his own life and limbs; next, in most men, those that concern married love; and after them, riches and the means of living. Therefore the people are to be taught to abstain from violence to one another's persons by private revenge, from violating the honor of marriage, and from forcible robbery and fraudulent theft of one another's goods. For the same purpose it is also necessary that they be shown the evil consequences of false judgment through the corruption of either judges or witnesses, by which the distinction of property is taken away and justice becomes of no effect. All these things are implied in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandments.

30.13 Lastly, they are to be taught that not only unjust deeds, but the designs and intentions to do them (even if accidentally prevented), are injustice, which consists in the depravity of the will as well as in the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth commandment and the sum of the second table, which is all reduced to this one commandment of mutual charity: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself"—just as the sum of the first table is reduced to the love of God, whom they had then newly received as their King.[78]

30.14 As for the means and channels by which the people may receive this instruction, we must look into how so many opinions contrary to the peace of mankind, resting on weak and false principles, have nevertheless been so deeply rooted in

78 Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 22:37–40 pairs it with the love of God as the summary of the Law.

them. I mean those I specified in the preceding chapter: that men are to judge what is lawful and unlawful not by the law itself but by their own consciences, that is, by their own private judgments; that subjects sin in obeying the commands of the commonwealth unless they have first judged them lawful themselves; that their property in their riches is such as to exclude the dominion the commonwealth has over it; that it is lawful for subjects to kill those they call tyrants; that the sovereign power may be divided; and the like. These come to be instilled into the people in the following way. Those whom necessity or greed keeps intent on their trades and labor, and, on the other side, those whom abundance or laziness carries off after their sensual pleasures (these two sorts of men make up the greater part of mankind), are diverted from the deep reflection that learning the truth necessarily requires—not only in matters of natural justice but in all other sciences. So they receive their notions of their duty chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from those of their neighbors or acquaintances who, having a ready and plausible way of talking, seem wiser and better learned in cases of law and conscience than themselves. And the divines, and others who make a show of learning, get their knowledge from the universities and the schools of law, or from books published by men eminent in those schools and universities. It is therefore evident that the instruction of the people depends wholly on the right teaching of young men in the universities. But (someone may say) are the universities of England not learned enough already to do that? Or are you going to undertake to teach the universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first I do not hesitate to answer that until toward the end of the reign of Henry VIII, the power of the Pope was always upheld against the power of the commonwealth, principally by the universities; and that the doctrines maintained against the sovereign power of the King by so many preachers, and by so many lawyers and others who were educated there, are sufficient evidence that, though the universities were not the authors of those false doc-

trines, they did not know how to plant the true ones.[79] For amid such a contradiction of opinions, it is quite certain that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and it is no wonder if they still retain a taste of that subtle liquor, hostile to the civil authority, with which they were first seasoned. But as to the second question, it is neither fitting nor necessary for me to say yes or no. For anyone who sees what I am doing can easily perceive what I think.

EQUAL JUSTICE AND EQUAL TAXES

Justice and taxes must fall equally on rich and poor, and the helpless must be provided for.

30.15 The safety of the people further requires, from the one or ones who hold the sovereign power, that justice be administered equally to all ranks of people: that is, that the rich and mighty as well as poor and obscure persons may have redress for the injuries done to them, so that the great may have no greater hope of impunity when they do violence, dishonor, or any injury to those of lower rank than when one of these does the like to one of them. For in this consists equity, to which, as a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as much subject as the lowest of his people. All breaches of the law are offenses against the commonwealth, but some are also against private persons. Those that concern the commonwealth alone may be pardoned without breach of equity, for every man may pardon what is done against himself, at his own discretion. But an offense against a private man cannot in equity be pardoned without the consent of the injured party, or reasonable compensation.

30.16 The inequality of subjects proceeds from the acts of sovereign power, and therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign—that is, in a court of justice—than the inequality between kings and their subjects has in the presence of the King of kings. The honor of great persons is to be valued for their

79 Henry VIII broke with Rome in the 1530s, making himself Supreme Head of the Church of England.

beneficence and the help they give to men of lower rank, or not at all. And the violence, oppression, and injuries they commit are not lessened but aggravated by the greatness of their persons, because they have the least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality toward the great proceed in this way. Impunity breeds insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred, an endeavor to pull down all oppressive and contemptuous greatness, even at the cost of ruining the commonwealth.

30.17 To equal justice belongs also the equal imposition of taxes. Their equality depends not on equality of wealth but on the equality of the debt every man owes to the commonwealth for his defense. It is not enough for a man to labor to maintain his life; he must also fight, if need be, to secure his labor. People must either do as the Jews did when they rebuilt the Temple after their return from captivity—build with one hand and hold the sword in the other—or else hire others to fight for them.[80] For the taxes laid on the people by the sovereign power are nothing but the wages due to those who hold the public sword, to defend private men in the exercise of their various trades and callings. Since, then, the benefit everyone receives from it is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor and rich, the debt a poor man owes those who defend his life is the same as a rich man owes for the defense of his—except that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own persons but for many more. This considered, equality of taxation consists in the equality of what is consumed rather than of the riches of those who consume it. For what reason is there that someone who labors much and, saving the fruits of his labor, consumes little, should be charged more than someone who, living idly, earns little and spends all he gets—since the one has no more protection from the commonwealth than the other? But when taxes are laid on the things men consume, every man pays equally for what he uses; nor is the commonwealth defrauded by the extravagant waste of private men.

30.18 And since many men, through unavoidable accident, become unable to support themselves by their labor, they ought not to be left to the charity of private persons, but to be provided for by the laws of the commonwealth, as far as the necessities of nature require. For as it is uncharitable in any man to neglect the helpless, so it is in the sovereign of a commonwealth to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity.

30.19 But for those who have strong bodies, the case is different: they are to be made to work. And to remove the excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be laws that encourage every kind of skill, such as navigation, agriculture, fishing, and every kind of manufacture that requires labor. If the multitude of poor yet strong people keeps increasing, they are to be moved into countries not sufficiently inhabited. There, however, they are not to exterminate those they find, but to make them live closer together and not roam over a great deal of ground to snatch what they find, but to tend each little plot with skill and labor, so that it gives them their sustenance in due season. And when all the world is overburdened with inhabitants, the last remedy of all is war, which provides for every man, by victory or death.

GOOD LAWS, PUNISHMENTS, AND COUNSELORS

Good laws are needful and clear; punishments, rewards, and counsel must serve the public good.

30.20 To the care of the sovereign belongs the making of good laws. But what is a good law? By a good law I do not mean a just law, for no law can be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done by such power is warranted and owned by every one of the people; and what every man wills to be so, no man can say is unjust. It is with the laws of a commonwealth as with the rules of a game: whatever the players all agree on is injustice to none of them. A good law is one that is

80 Nehemiah 4:17.

needful for the *good of the people*, and at the same time *perspicuous*, that is, clear.

30.21 For the use of laws (which are only authorized rules) is not to restrain the people from all voluntary actions, but to direct them and keep them in such a course as not to hurt themselves by their own headlong desires, rashness, or indiscretion—just as hedges are set not to stop travelers but to keep them on the road. And therefore a law that is not needful, lacking the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be thought good when it is for the benefit of the sovereign even though it is not necessary for the people, but it is not so. For the good of the sovereign and of the people cannot be separated. It is a weak sovereign who has weak subjects, and a weak people whose sovereign lacks power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws but traps for money. Where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, they are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, they are insufficient to defend the people.

30.22 Perspicuity consists not so much in the words of the law itself as in a declaration of the causes and motives for which it was made. That is what shows us the meaning of the legislator; and once the meaning of the legislator is known, the law is more easily understood in few words than in many. For all words are subject to ambiguity, and so multiplying words in the body of the law multiplies ambiguity. Besides, it seems to imply (through too much diligence) that whoever can evade the words is outside the reach of the law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary lawsuits. For when I consider how short the laws of ancient times were, and how they grew gradually longer and longer, I seem to see a contest between those who draft the law and those who plead it—the former trying to hem in the latter, and the latter trying to slip out of their restrictions—and the pleaders have won. It therefore belongs to the office of a legislator (who in every commonwealth is the supreme representative, whether one man or an assembly) to make clear the reason why the law was made, and to make the body of the law itself as

short as possible, but in terms as proper and meaningful as possible.

30.23 It also belongs to the office of the sovereign to apply punishments and rewards rightly. And since the end of punishment is not revenge and the venting of anger, but correction—either of the offender or of others by his example—the severest punishments are to be inflicted for the crimes that are most dangerous to the public: such as those that proceed from malice toward the established government; those that spring from contempt of justice; those that provoke indignation in the multitude; and those that, left unpunished, seem authorized, as when they are committed by the sons, servants, or favorites of men in authority. For indignation carries men not only against the actors and authors of injustice, but against all power that is likely to protect them—as in the case of Tarquin, when for the insolent act of one of his sons he was driven out of Rome and the monarchy itself was dissolved.[81] But for crimes of infirmity—such as those that proceed from great provocation, great fear, great need, or from ignorance of whether the deed is a great crime or not—there is often room for leniency without harm to the commonwealth; and leniency, where there is room for it, is required by the law of nature. It is the punishment of the leaders and teachers in a disturbance, not of the poor misled people, that can profit the commonwealth by its example. To be severe to the people is to punish an ignorance that may in large part be charged to the sovereign, whose fault it was that they were not better instructed.

30.24 In the same way, it belongs to the office and duty of the sovereign always to apply his rewards so that benefit to the commonwealth may arise from them. In this lies their use and end, and it is achieved when those who have served the commonwealth well are rewarded, at as little expense to the common treasury as possible, so well that others are encouraged by it both to serve it as faithfully as they can and to study the skills by

81 Tarquinius Superbus, last king of Rome, was expelled (traditionally 509 BC) after his son Sextus raped Lucretia; Rome then became a republic.

which they may be able to do it better. To buy off a popular, ambitious subject with money or promotion, so that he will keep quiet and stop making bad impressions on the minds of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward (which is ordained not for disservice but for service past). Nor is it a sign of gratitude, but of fear; nor does it tend to the benefit but to the damage of the public. It is a struggle with ambition like that of Hercules with the monster Hydra, which had many heads, and for every one that was cut off, three grew back. For in the same way, when the stubbornness of one popular man is overcome with a reward, many more arise (by the example) who do the same mischief in hope of the same benefit; and like every kind of manufacture, malice too increases by being salable. And though a civil war may sometimes be put off by such means, the danger keeps growing, and the public ruin becomes more certain. It is therefore against the duty of the sovereign, to whom the public safety is committed, to reward those who aspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of their country, rather than to oppose the beginnings of such men at a little danger than later, after a longer time, at a greater one.

30.25 Another business of the sovereign is to choose good counselors—I mean those whose advice he is to take in the government of the commonwealth. For this word counsel, *consilium*, corrupted from *considium*, has a broad meaning, and includes all assemblies of men who sit together, not only to deliberate what is to be done in the future, but also to judge of past facts and of the law for the present. I take it here only in the first sense. And in this sense there is no choice of counsel either in a democracy or an aristocracy, because the persons counseling are members of the person counseled.[82] The choice of counselors is therefore proper to monarchy. In it, the sovereign who does not try to choose those who are most able in every kind does not perform his office as he ought. The most able counselors are those who have the least hope of benefit from giving

82 *Considium*, from *considere* ("to sit together"), is Hobbes's etymology; *consilium* is usually derived otherwise.

bad counsel, and the most knowledge of the things that lead to the peace and defense of the commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who expects benefit from public troubles. But the signs that lead to a just suspicion are the soothing of the people in their unreasonable or irremediable grievances by men whose estates are not sufficient to meet their accustomed expenses—and these can easily be observed by anyone whom it concerns to know it. But to know who has the most knowledge of public affairs is harder still; and those who know them need them a great deal less. For to know who knows the rules of almost any art is to have a large part of the knowledge of that art, because no man can be sure of the truth of another's rules unless he has first been taught to understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any art are long practice in it and constant good results from it. Good counsel does not come by lot or by inheritance. There is therefore no more reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble in matters of state than in laying out the dimensions of a fortress—unless we think that the study of politics needs no method (as the study of geometry does), but only watching from the sidelines; which is not so. For politics is the harder study of the two. In these parts of Europe it has been taken to be the right of certain persons to have a place in the highest council of state by inheritance. This derives from the conquests of the ancient Germans, in which many absolute lords joined together to conquer other nations and would not enter the confederacy without such privileges as might in time to come be marks of difference between their descendants and the descendants of their subjects. These privileges, being inconsistent with the sovereign power, they may seem to keep by the favor of the sovereign; but if they contend for them as their right, they must gradually let them go, and have at last no more honor than naturally attaches to their abilities.

30.26 And however able the counselors in any business may be, the benefit of their counsel is greater when each gives his advice and his reasons for it separately than when they do so in an assembly by way of speeches, and when they have thought

beforehand than when they speak on the spur of the moment. This is both because they have more time to survey the consequences of action, and because they are less likely to be carried into contradiction through envy, rivalry, or other passions arising from difference of opinion.

30.27 The best counsel in things that concern not other nations, but only the ease and benefit the subjects may enjoy through laws that look only inward, is to be taken from the general reports and complaints of the people of each province. They are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore to be diligently attended to when they demand nothing that detracts from the essential rights of sovereignty. For without those essential rights (as I have often said before), the commonwealth cannot subsist at all.

30.28 A commander in chief of an army, if he is not popular, will not be loved or feared by his army as he ought to be, and consequently cannot perform that office successfully. He must therefore be industrious, brave, affable, generous, and fortunate, so that he may win a reputation both for competence and for loving his soldiers. This is popularity. It breeds in the soldiers both the desire and the courage to recommend themselves to his favor, and it protects the general's severity in punishing (when need is) mutinous or negligent soldiers. But this love of soldiers, unless there is some security for the commander's loyalty, is a dangerous thing to sovereign power—especially when that power is in the hands of an assembly that is not popular. It therefore concerns the safety of the people that those to whom the sovereign commits his armies be both good commanders and faithful subjects.

30.29 But when the sovereign himself is popular—that is, revered and loved by his people—there is no danger at all from the popularity of a subject. For soldiers are never so generally unjust as to side with their captain against their sovereign, even though they love him, when they love not only the sovereign's person but also his cause. And therefore those who have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful sovereign by violence

have always been put to the trouble of devising titles for themselves before they could settle in his place, to save the people from the shame of accepting them. To have a known right to sovereign power is so popular a quality that the one who has it needs nothing more, on his own part, to turn the hearts of his subjects to him, than that they see him able to govern his own household absolutely; nor, on the part of his enemies, anything more than the disbanding of their armies. For the greatest and most active part of mankind has never yet been well content with the present.

30.30 Concerning the duties of one sovereign to another, which are comprehended in the law commonly called the *law of nations*, I need say nothing here, because the law of nations and the law of nature are the same thing. And every sovereign has the same right in procuring the safety of his people that any particular man can have in procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law that dictates to men who have no civil government what they ought to do and what to avoid in regard to one another dictates the same to commonwealths—that is, to the consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies. For there is no court of natural justice except in the conscience alone, where not man but God reigns. His laws (those of them that oblige all mankind) are *natural* with respect to God as the Author of nature, and *laws* with respect to the same God as King of kings. But of the Kingdom of God, as King of kings and also as King of a particular people, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.

CHAPTER 31: OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE

To know what the laws of God are, Hobbes considers God's natural kingdom.

31.1 That the condition of mere nature—that is, of absolute liberty, such as belongs to those who are neither sovereigns nor subjects—is anarchy and the condition of war; that the precepts by which men are guided to avoid that condition are the laws of

nature; that a commonwealth without sovereign power is only a word without substance, and cannot stand; that subjects owe sovereigns simple obedience in all things in which their obedience is not contrary to the laws of God—all this I have sufficiently proved in what I have already written. All that is lacking for a complete knowledge of civil duty is to know what those laws of God are. For without that, a man does not know, when the civil power commands him to do anything, whether it is contrary to the law of God or not. And so he either offends the Divine Majesty by too much civil obedience, or, through fear of offending God, transgresses the commandments of the commonwealth. To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know what the divine laws are. And since the knowledge of all law depends on the knowledge of the sovereign power, I shall say something in what follows of the Kingdom of God.

31.2 "The Lord is King; let the earth rejoice," says the Psalmist. And again: "The Lord is King, though the nations be angry; he sits between the cherubim, though the earth be moved." Whether men will or not, they must always be subject to the divine power. By denying the existence or the providence of God, men may shake off their ease, but not their yoke. But to call this power of God, which extends not only to man but also to beasts, plants, and inanimate bodies, by the name of kingdom is only a metaphorical use of the word.[83] For only he is properly said to reign who governs his subjects by his word, by promising rewards to those who obey it, and by threatening punishment to those who do not. The subjects in the Kingdom of God, therefore, are not inanimate bodies or irrational creatures, because they understand no precepts as his. Nor are they atheists, or those who do not believe that God has any care for the actions of mankind, because they acknowledge no word as his, nor have hope of his rewards or fear of his threats. Those, therefore, who believe there is a God who governs the world and has given precepts and set forth rewards and punishments for man-

83 Psalms 97:1 and 99:1.

kind are God's subjects; all the rest are to be understood as enemies.

31.3 To rule by words requires that such words be clearly made known; otherwise they are no laws. For a sufficient and clear promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of ignorance, belongs to the nature of laws. In human laws this is of only one kind: proclamation, or promulgation by the voice of man. But God declares his laws in three ways: by the dictates of *natural reason*, by *revelation*, and by the *voice* of some *man* to whom, by the working of miracles, he procures credit with the rest. From this arises a threefold word of God—*rational*, *sensible*, and *prophetic*—to which corresponds a threefold hearing: *right reason*, *supernatural sense*, and *faith*. As for supernatural sense, which consists in revelation or inspiration, no universal laws have been given in that way, because God speaks in that manner only to particular persons, and to different men different things.

31.4 From the difference between the other two kinds of God's word, *rational* and *prophetic*, a twofold kingdom may be attributed to God, *natural* and *prophetic*. In the natural kingdom he governs as many of mankind as acknowledge his providence, by the natural dictates of right reason. In the prophetic kingdom, having chosen one particular nation (the Jews) for his subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not only by natural reason but by positive laws, which he gave them through the mouths of his holy prophets. I intend to speak of the natural Kingdom of God in this chapter.

31.5 The right of nature by which God reigns over men, and punishes those who break his laws, is to be derived not from his creating them—as if he required obedience as gratitude for his benefits—but from his *irresistible power*. I have shown earlier how sovereign right arises from covenant. To show how the same right may arise from nature requires no more than showing in what case it is never taken away. Since all men by nature had a right to all things, each of them had a right to reign over all the rest. But because this right could not be obtained by force, it concerned the safety of everyone to lay that right aside

and set up men (with sovereign authority) by common consent to rule and defend them. Whereas if there had been any man of irresistible power, there would have been no reason why he should not by that power have ruled and defended both himself and them at his own discretion. To those whose power is irresistible, therefore, dominion over all men belongs naturally, by their excellence of power; and consequently it is from that power that the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongs naturally to God Almighty—not as Creator and gracious, but as omnipotent. And though punishment is due only for sin, because that word means affliction for sin, yet the right of afflicting is not always derived from men's sin, but from God's power.

31.6 This question, *why evil men often prosper and good men suffer adversity*, was much disputed by the ancients, and is the same as ours: *by what right God dispenses the prosperities and adversities of this life*. It is so difficult that it has shaken the faith in divine providence not only of ordinary people but of philosophers and, what is more, of the saints. "How good," says David, "is the God of Israel to those who are upright in heart; and yet my feet had almost gone, my steps had well-nigh slipped; for I was grieved at the wicked, when I saw the ungodly in such prosperity." And Job —how earnestly he remonstrates with God over the many afflictions he suffered despite his righteousness! In Job's case, this question is decided by God himself, not by arguments drawn from Job's sin, but from his own power.[84] For whereas Job's friends argued from his affliction to his sin, and he defended himself by the consciousness of his innocence, God himself takes up the matter. Having justified the affliction by arguments drawn from his power, such as "Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?" and the like, he both approved Job's innocence and rebuked the erroneous doctrine of his friends.[85] In agreement with this doctrine is the saying of our Savior about the man who was born blind, in these words: "Neither has this

84 Psalm 73:1–3.
85 Job 38:4; God's rebuke of the friends is at Job 42:7.

man sinned, nor his parents; but that the works of God should be made manifest in him." And though it is said that "death entered into the world by sin" (meaning that if Adam had never sinned he would never have died—that is, never have suffered any separation of his soul from his body), it does not follow that God could not justly have afflicted him even if he had not sinned, just as he afflicts other living creatures that cannot sin.[86]

NATURAL WORSHIP OF GOD

Reason teaches which attributes and acts of worship honor God.

31.7 Having spoken of the right of God's sovereignty as grounded on nature alone, we must next consider what the divine laws, or dictates of natural reason, are. These laws concern either the natural duties of one man to another, or the honor naturally due to our Divine Sovereign. The first are the same laws of nature I have already discussed in chapters 14 and 15 of this treatise: namely, equity, justice, mercy, humility, and the rest of the moral virtues. It remains, therefore, to consider what precepts are dictated to men by their natural reason alone, without any other word of God, concerning the honor and worship of the Divine Majesty.

31.8 Honor consists in the inward thought and opinion of another's power and goodness; and therefore to honor God is to think as highly of his power and goodness as is possible. And the outward signs of that opinion appearing in men's words and actions are called *worship*, which is one part of what the Latins understand by the word *cultus*. For *cultus* properly and consistently means the labor a man bestows on anything with the aim of getting benefit from it. Now the things we get benefit from are either subject to us, so that the profit they yield follows the labor we bestow on them as a natural effect; or else they are not subject to us, but respond to our labor according to their own wills. In the first sense, the labor bestowed on the earth is called *culture*, and the education of children a *culture* of their minds. In

86 John 9:3; Romans 5:12.

the second sense, where men's wills are to be worked to our purpose not by force but by pleasing them, it means the same as courting—that is, winning favor by good offices: by praise, by acknowledging their power, and by whatever is pleasing to those from whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly *worship*: in which sense *Publicola* is understood to mean a worshipper of the people, and *cultus Dei* the worship of God.[87]

31.9 From inward honor, consisting in the opinion of power and goodness, arise three passions: *love*, which has reference to goodness, and *hope* and *fear*, which relate to power. And there are three parts of outward worship: *praise*, *magnifying*, and *blessing*. The subject of praise is goodness; the subject of magnifying and blessing is power, and its effect, felicity. Praise and magnifying are signified by both words and actions: by words, when we say a man is good or great; by actions, when we thank him for his bounty and obey his power. The opinion of another's happiness can be expressed only by words.

31.10 Some signs of honor (both in attributes and in actions) are so by nature: among attributes, *good*, *just*, *generous*, and the like; and among actions, *prayers*, *thanks*, and *obedience*. Others are so by the institution or custom of men, and at some times and places are honorable, at others dishonorable, at others indifferent—such as the gestures used in greeting, prayer, and thanksgiving, which differ in different times and places. The former is *natural* worship, the latter *arbitrary* worship.

31.11 Arbitrary worship has two varieties, for sometimes it is *commanded* and sometimes *voluntary* worship. It is commanded when it is such as the one worshipped requires; free, when it is such as the worshipper thinks fit. When it is commanded, the worship consists not in the words or gestures but in the obedience. But when it is free, the worship consists in the opinion of the beholders. For if the words or actions by which we intend honor seem ridiculous to them and tend toward insult, they are no worship, because they are no signs of honor; and they are no

87 Publius Valerius Publicola, one of the first consuls of the Roman Republic; his surname was taken to mean "one who courts the people."

signs of honor because a sign is not a sign to the one who gives it, but to the one to whom it is made—that is, to the spectator.

31.12 Again, there is *public* and *private* worship. Public worship is what a commonwealth performs as one person. Private worship is what a private person displays. Public worship, with respect to the whole commonwealth, is free; but with respect to particular men it is not. Private worship is free in secret; but in the sight of the multitude it is never without some restraint, either from the laws or from men's opinion, which is contrary to the nature of liberty.

31.13 The end of worship among men is power. For when a man sees another worshipped, he supposes him powerful and is the readier to obey him, which makes his power greater. But God has no ends. The worship we give him proceeds from our duty, and is directed, according to our capacity, by those rules of honor that reason dictates the weak should observe toward more powerful men, in hope of benefit, for fear of harm, or in thankfulness for good already received from them.

31.14 So that we may know what worship of God the light of nature teaches us, I will begin with his attributes. Here, first, it is evident that we ought to attribute *existence* to him. For no man can have the will to honor what he thinks has no being.

31.15 Second, those philosophers who said the world, or the soul of the world, was God spoke unworthily of him and denied his existence. For by God is understood the cause of the world; and to say the world is God is to say it has no cause—that is, that there is no God.[88]

31.16 Third, to say the world was not created but eternal (since what is eternal has no cause) is to deny there is a God.

31.17 Fourth, those who, attributing ease to God (as they think), take from him the care of mankind, take from him his honor. For that takes away men's love and fear of him, which is the root of honor.[89]

31.18 Fifth, in things that signify greatness and power, to say he is *finite* is not to honor him. For it is not a sign of the will to

88 Chiefly the Stoics, who identified God with the world or its animating soul.

honor God to attribute less to him than we can; and finite is less than we can, because to what is finite it is easy to add more.

31.19 Therefore to attribute *figure*, or shape, to him is not honor, for all figure is finite;

31.20 nor to say that we conceive or imagine him, or have an *idea* of him in our mind, for whatever we conceive is finite;

31.21 nor to attribute to him *parts* or *totality*, which are attributes only of finite things;

31.22 nor to say he is in this or that *place*, for whatever is in a place is bounded and finite;

31.23 nor that he is *moved* or *rests*, for both these attributes ascribe place to him;

31.24 nor that there are more gods than one, because that implies they are all finite, for there cannot be more than one infinite;

31.25 nor to ascribe to him (except metaphorically, meaning not the passion but the effect) passions that partake of grief, such as *repentance*, *anger*, *mercy*; or of want, such as *appetite*, *hope*, *desire*; or any passive faculty. For passion is power limited by something else.

31.26 And therefore when we ascribe a *will* to God, it is not to be understood like that of man, as a *rational appetite*, but as the power by which he brings about everything.

31.27 Likewise when we attribute to him *sight* and other acts of sense, and also *knowledge* and *understanding*—which in us are nothing else but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things that press on the organic parts of a man's body. For there is no such thing in God; and since these things depend on natural causes, they cannot be attributed to him.

31.28 Whoever will attribute to God nothing but what is warranted by natural reason must use either negative attributes, such as *infinite, eternal, incomprehensible*; or superlatives, such as *most high, most great*, and the like; or indefinite ones, such as *good, just, holy, creator*. And he must use them in such a sense as not to declare what God is (for that would be to confine him within the

89 Aimed at the Epicureans, whose gods live at ease, untroubled by human affairs.

limits of our imagination), but how much we admire him and how ready we would be to obey him. That is a sign of humility, and of a will to honor him as much as we can. For there is only one name to signify our conception of his nature, and that is I AM; and only one name for his relation to us, and that is *God*, in which are contained Father, King, and Lord.[90]

31.29 Concerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most general precept of reason that they be signs of the intention to honor God. Such are, first, *prayers*. For it was not the carvers, when they made images, who were thought to make them gods, but the people who *prayed* to them.

31.30 Second, *thanksgiving*, which differs from prayer in divine worship only in that prayers come before the benefit and thanks come after it. The aim of both is to acknowledge God as the author of all benefits, past as well as future.

31.31 Third, *gifts*—that is to say, *sacrifices* and *offerings* (if they are of the best)—are signs of honor, for they are thanksgivings.

31.32 Fourth, *not to swear by anyone but God* is naturally a sign of honor. For it is a confession that God alone knows the heart, and that no man's wit or strength can protect a man against God's vengeance on the perjured.

31.33 Fifth, it is a part of rational worship to speak of God with consideration, for it argues a fear of him, and fear is a confession of his power. From this it follows that the name of God is not to be used rashly and to no purpose, for that is the same as using it in vain. And it is to no purpose unless it is by way of an oath, and by order of the commonwealth, to make judgments certain; or between commonwealths, to avoid war. It follows also that disputing about God's nature is contrary to his honor. For it is supposed that in this natural Kingdom of God there is no other way to know anything but by natural reason—that is, from the principles of natural science. And these are so far from teaching us anything about God's nature that they cannot teach us our own nature, or the nature of the smallest living creature. And therefore, when men dispute about the attributes of God

90 "I AM": the name God gives Moses at the burning bush, Exodus 3:14.

from the principles of natural reason, they only dishonor him. For in the attributes we give to God we are not to consider the signification of philosophical truth, but the signification of a pious intention to do him the greatest honor we are able. From the lack of this consideration have come the volumes of disputation about the nature of God that tend not to his honor but to the honor of our own wits and learning, and are nothing but thoughtless and vain abuses of his sacred name.

31.34 Sixth, in *prayers, thanksgivings, offerings,* and *sacrifices,* it is a dictate of natural reason that each be the best of its kind and the most expressive of honor. For example, prayers and thanksgivings should be made in words and phrases that are not hasty, nor frivolous, nor vulgar, but beautiful and well composed; otherwise we do not do God as much honor as we can. And so the heathens acted absurdly in worshiping images as gods; but their doing it in verse, and with music, both of voices and of instruments, was reasonable. Also, that the beasts they offered in sacrifice, the gifts they offered, and their actions in worship were full of submission and commemorated benefits received—this was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honor him.

31.35 Seventh, reason directs us to worship God not only in secret but also, and especially, in public and in the sight of men. For without that, what is most acceptable in honoring—the bringing of others to honor him—is lost.

31.36 Lastly, obedience to his laws (that is, in this case, to the laws of nature) is the greatest worship of all. For as obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice, so also to make light of his commandments is the greatest of all insults. And these are the laws of that divine worship which natural reason dictates to private men.[91]

31.37 But since a commonwealth is only one person, it ought also to offer God only one worship. It does this when it commands that worship to be offered publicly by private men. And this is public worship, whose property is to be *uniform*; for

91 "To obey is better than sacrifice": 1 Samuel 15:22.

actions done differently by different men cannot be said to be a public worship. And therefore, where many kinds of worship are allowed, proceeding from the different religions of private men, it cannot be said that there is any public worship, or that the commonwealth is of any religion at all.

31.38 Words (and consequently the attributes of God) have their signification by the agreement and institution of men. So those attributes are to be held signs of honor that men intend shall be so; and whatever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no law but reason, may be done by the will of the commonwealth through civil laws. And since a commonwealth has no will, and makes no laws, except those made by the will of him or them that have the sovereign power, it follows that the attributes which the sovereign ordains as signs of honor in the worship of God ought to be taken and used as such by private men in their public worship.

31.39 But not all actions are signs by institution. Some are naturally signs of honor, and others of insult. The latter (those which men are ashamed to do in the sight of those they revere) cannot be made a part of divine worship by human power; nor can the former (such as decent, modest, humble behavior) ever be separated from it. But there are an infinite number of actions and gestures of an indifferent nature; and whichever of them the commonwealth ordains to be used publicly and universally as signs of honor, and as part of God's worship, are to be taken and used as such by the subjects. And what is said in Scripture, "It is better to obey God than men," has its place in the Kingdom of God by covenant, not by nature.[92]

NATURAL PUNISHMENTS

Hobbes ends with natural punishments and his hope that a sovereign will read this book.

31.40 Having thus spoken briefly of the natural Kingdom of God and his natural laws, I will add to this chapter only a short

92 Acts 5:29.

account of his natural punishments. There is no action of man in this life that is not the beginning of so long a chain of consequences that no human foresight is high enough to give a man a view of its end. And in this chain both pleasing and unpleasing events are linked together, in such a way that he who will do anything for his pleasure must bind himself to suffer all the pains attached to it. And these pains are the natural punishments of those actions which are the beginning of more harm than good. And so it comes about that intemperance is naturally punished with diseases; rashness, with mishaps; injustice, with the violence of enemies; pride, with ruin; cowardice, with oppression; negligent government by princes, with rebellion; and rebellion, with slaughter. For since punishments follow on the breach of laws, natural punishments must follow naturally on the breach of the laws of nature, and therefore follow them as their natural, not arbitrary, effects.

31.41 So much, then, concerning the constitution, nature, and right of sovereigns, and concerning the duty of subjects, derived from the principles of natural reason. And now, considering how different this doctrine is from the practice of the greater part of the world—especially of these western parts, which have received their moral learning from Rome and Athens—and how much depth of moral philosophy is required in those who administer the sovereign power, I am close to believing this labor of mine as useless as Plato's *Republic*. For he too is of the opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of states, and changes of government by civil war, ever to be removed until sovereigns are philosophers.[93] But when I consider again that the science of natural justice is the only science necessary for sovereigns and their principal ministers; that they need not be burdened with the mathematical sciences (as Plato burdens them) beyond encouraging men to study them by good laws; and that neither Plato nor any other philosopher up to now has set in order, and sufficiently or even probably proved, all the

93 Plato, *Republic* V, 473c–d: there will be no end of troubles for cities until philosophers become kings or kings philosophers.

theorems of moral doctrine, from which men may learn both how to govern and how to obey—then I recover some hope that at one time or another this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign who will consider it himself (for it is short, and I think clear), without the help of any interested or envious interpreter; and who, by the exercise of entire sovereignty in protecting the public teaching of it, will convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice.

Part III: Of a Christian Commonwealth

How Scripture, prophecy, the kingdom of God and church power fit within civil sovereignty.

CHAPTER 32: OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITICS

Hobbes turns from natural reason to prophecy, and asks how anyone can know that God has spoken.

32.1 Up to this point I have derived the rights of sovereign power and the duty of subjects from the principles of nature only—such as experience has found true, or consent (concerning the use of words) has made so. That is to say, I have derived them from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from definitions, universally agreed on, of such words as are essential to all political reasoning. But in what I am to handle next, which is the nature and rights of a *Christian commonwealth*, much depends on supernatural revelations of the will of God. The ground of my discourse must therefore be not only the natural word of God but also the prophetic.

32.2 Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses and experience, nor (what is the undoubted word of God) our natural reason. For they are the talents he has put into our hands to trade with until the coming again of our blessed Savior; and therefore they are not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion. For though there are many things in God's word above reason—that is to say, which cannot be either demonstrated or refuted by natural reason—yet there is nothing con-

trary to it. When it seems so, the fault lies either in our unskillful interpretation or in erroneous reasoning.[1]

32.3 Therefore, when anything written there is too hard for us to examine, we are told to make our understanding captive to the words, and not to labor at sifting out a philosophical truth by logic from mysteries that are not comprehensible and do not fall under any rule of natural science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion as with wholesome pills for the sick: swallowed whole, they have the power to cure; but chewed, they are for the most part thrown up again without effect.[2]

32.4 But by the captivity of our understanding is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man, but of the will to obedience, where obedience is due. For sense, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change. They are always, and necessarily, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest to us; and therefore they are not effects of our will, but our will is an effect of them. We make our understanding and reason captive, then, when we refrain from contradiction; when we speak as we are commanded (by lawful authority); and when we live accordingly. In sum, this is trust and faith placed in the one who speaks, even though the mind is incapable of forming any notion at all from the words spoken.

32.5 When God speaks to man, it must be either immediately or through the mediation of another man, to whom he had previously spoken immediately himself. How God speaks to a man immediately may be understood well enough by those to whom he has so spoken; but how another should understand it is hard, if not impossible, to know. For if a man claims to me that God has spoken to him supernaturally and immediately, and I doubt it, I cannot easily see what argument he can produce to oblige me to believe it. It is true that if he is my sovereign, he may

1 The parable of the talents: the servant who hid his master's money "laid up in a napkin" is condemned (Luke 19:20; compare Matthew 25:14–30).

2 "Bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ": 2 Corinthians 10:5.

oblige me to obedience, so that I do not declare by act or word that I do not believe him; but not to think otherwise than my reason persuades me. But if someone who has no such authority over me makes the same claim, there is nothing that requires either belief or obedience.

32.6 For to say that God has spoken to him in Holy Scripture is not to say that God has spoken to him immediately, but through the mediation of the prophets, or the apostles, or the Church, in the same way as he speaks to all other Christians. To say that God has spoken to him in a dream is no more than to say that he dreamed God spoke to him. That has no force to win belief from any man who knows that dreams are for the most part natural and may proceed from earlier thoughts—and dreams like that one from self-conceit, foolish arrogance, and a false opinion of one's own godliness or other virtue, by which a man thinks he has deserved the favor of extraordinary revelation. To say he has seen a vision or heard a voice is to say that he has dreamed between sleeping and waking; for in that way a man often naturally takes his dream for a vision, not having noticed that he was dozing. To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration is to say that he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can give no natural and sufficient reason. So that although God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration, yet he obliges no man to believe that he has done so to someone who claims it—who, being a man, may err, and (what is more) may lie.

32.7 How then can someone to whom God has never revealed his will immediately (except by way of natural reason) know when he is to obey, or not to obey, God's word as delivered by one who says he is a prophet? Of the four hundred prophets whom the king of Israel asked for counsel about the war he made against Ramoth-gilead, only Micaiah was a true one. The prophet who was sent to prophesy against the altar set up by Jeroboam—though a true prophet, and shown by two miracles done in his presence to be a prophet sent from God—was never-

theless deceived by another, old prophet, who persuaded him, as if from the mouth of God, to eat and drink with him.[3]

TWO MARKS OF A TRUE PROPHET

A true prophet must both work miracles and teach only the established religion; since miracles have ceased, Scripture suffices.

If one prophet deceives another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God by any other way than that of reason? To this I answer from Holy Scripture that there are two marks by which, together and not separately, a true prophet is to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the other is not teaching any religion other than the one already established. Separately, I say, neither of these is sufficient. "If a prophet rise among you, or a dreamer of dreams, and shall claim to do a miracle, and the miracle comes to pass; if he says, Let us follow strange gods, which you have not known, you shall not listen to him, etc. But that prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he has spoken to you to revolt from the Lord your God." In these words two things are to be observed. First, that God will not have miracles alone serve as arguments to approve a prophet's calling, but (as it says in the third verse) as a test of the constancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of the Egyptian sorcerers, though not as great as those of Moses, were still great miracles.[4] Second, that however great the miracle may be, if it tends to stir up revolt against the king, or against him who governs by the king's authority, then the one who does the miracle is to be considered only as sent to make trial of their allegiance. For these words, *revolt from the Lord your God,* are in this place equivalent to *revolt from your king.* For they had made God their king by covenant at the foot of Mount Sinai; and he ruled them only through Moses, for Moses alone spoke with God and from time to time declared God's commandments to the people.

3 Micaiah: 1 Kings 22; the prophet from Judah and the old prophet of Bethel: 1 Kings 13.

4 Deuteronomy 13:1–5; the Egyptian magicians: Exodus 7–8.

In the same way, after our Savior Christ had made his disciples acknowledge him as the *Messiah* (that is to say, as God's anointed, whom the nation of the Jews daily expected as their king, but refused when he came), he did not fail to warn them of the danger of miracles. "There shall arise," he says, "false Christs, and false prophets, and shall do great wonders and miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very elect." From this it appears that false prophets may have the power of miracles; yet we are not to take their doctrine for God's word.[5] St. Paul says further to the Galatians that *if he himself, or an angel from heaven, preach another gospel to them than the one he had preached, let him be accursed.* That gospel was that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the king they had received is, by the consequence of these words, accursed by St. Paul. For his speech is addressed to those who by his preaching had already received Jesus as the *Christ,* that is to say, as King of the Jews.[6]

32.8 And as miracles without the preaching of the doctrine God has established, so the preaching of true doctrine without the doing of miracles is an insufficient argument of immediate revelation. For if a man who does not teach false doctrine should claim to be a prophet without showing any miracle, he is not to be regarded any the more for his claim, as is evident from Deuteronomy 18:21–22: "If you say in your heart, How shall we know that the word" (of the prophet) "is not the one the Lord has spoken? When the prophet has spoken in the name of the Lord something that does not come to pass, that is the word which the Lord has not spoken; the prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart; do not fear him." But here a man may ask again: when the prophet has foretold a thing, how shall we know whether it will come to pass or not? For he may foretell it as something to happen after a certain long time, longer than a man's lifetime; or indefinitely, that it will come to pass at some time or other. In that case this mark of a prophet is useless; and

5 Matthew 24:24.
6 Galatians 1:8.

therefore the miracles that oblige us to believe a prophet ought to be confirmed by an immediate event, or one not long delayed. So it is plain that the teaching of the religion God has established, and the showing of a present miracle, joined together, were the only marks by which Scripture would have a true prophet—that is to say, immediate revelation—acknowledged; neither of them alone being sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he says.

32.9 Since miracles have now ceased, therefore, we have no sign left by which to acknowledge the claimed revelations or inspirations of any private man; nor any obligation to listen to any doctrine further than it conforms to the Holy Scriptures. Since the time of our Savior these take the place of all other prophecy and sufficiently make up for its lack; and from them, by wise and learned interpretation and careful reasoning, all the rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and to man may easily be deduced, without enthusiasm or supernatural inspiration. And it is this Scripture from which I am to take the principles of my discourse concerning the rights of those who are the supreme governors on earth of Christian commonwealths, and the duty of Christian subjects toward their sovereigns. To that end, I shall speak in the next chapter of the books, writers, scope, and authority of the Bible.

CHAPTER 33: OF THE BOOKS OF SCRIPTURE

Only books established by the sovereign are canonical; Hobbes examines who wrote the Old Testament books and when.

33.1 By the books of *Holy Scripture* are understood those which ought to be the *canon,* that is to say, the rules of Christian life. And because all rules of life which men are bound in conscience to observe are laws, the question of Scripture is the question of what is law throughout all Christendom, both natural and civil. For though Scripture does not determine what laws every Christian king shall make in his own dominions, it does determine what laws he shall not make. Since, therefore, I have already

proved that sovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators, only those books are canonical—that is, law—in every nation which are established as such by the sovereign authority. It is true that God is the sovereign of all sovereigns, and therefore when he speaks to any subject he ought to be obeyed, whatever any earthly potentate commands to the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of *when* God has spoken, and *what* he has said. To subjects who have no supernatural revelation, this cannot be known except by that natural reason which guided them, for the sake of obtaining peace and justice, to obey the authority of their several commonwealths—that is to say, of their lawful sovereigns. According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no books of the Old Testament to be Holy Scripture except those which the authority of the Church of England has commanded to be acknowledged as such. What books these are is well enough known without a list of them here. They are the same ones acknowledged by St. Jerome, who holds the rest—namely, the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobit, the first and second of Maccabees (though he had seen the first in Hebrew), and the third and fourth of Esdras—to be *Apocrypha.* Of the canonical books, Josephus, a learned Jew who wrote in the time of the Emperor Domitian, counts *twenty-two,* making the number agree with the Hebrew alphabet.[7] St. Jerome does the same, though they count them in a different way. For Josephus numbers *five* books of Moses, *thirteen* of prophets who wrote the history of their own times (how this agrees with the prophets' writings contained in the Bible we shall see later), and *four* of hymns and moral precepts. But St. Jerome counts *five* books of Moses, *eight* of prophets, and *nine* of other holy writings, which he calls *Hagiographa.* The Septuagint—who were seventy learned men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy, king of Egypt, to translate the Jewish law from Hebrew into Greek—have left us no other books as Holy Scrip-

7 Josephus, *Against Apion* I.8. The canon of the Church of England was set by the Thirty-Nine Articles (1563/1571), Article VI.

ture in the Greek tongue than the same ones that are received in the Church of England.[8]

33.2 As for the books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged as canon by all Christian churches, and by all sects of Christians that admit any books at all as canonical.

33.3 Who the original writers of the several books of Holy Scripture were has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other history (which is the only proof of matter of fact); nor can it be by any arguments of natural reason, for reason serves only to establish the truth not of fact but of consequence. The light that must guide us in this question, therefore, must be the one held out to us by the books themselves. And this light, though it does not show us the writer of every book, is still useful for giving us knowledge of the time in which they were written.

33.4 And first, as for the *Pentateuch,* it is not argument enough that they were written by Moses that they are called the five books of Moses; any more than these titles—the Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, the Book of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings—are sufficient arguments to prove that they were written by Joshua, by the judges, by Ruth, and by the kings. For in the titles of books the subject is indicated as often as the writer. *The History of Livy* denotes the writer; but *The History of Scanderbeg* is named from its subject. We read in the last chapter of Deuteronomy, verse[9] 6, concerning the tomb of Moses, *that no man knows of his tomb to this day*—that is, to the day on which those words were written. It is therefore plain that those words were written after his burial. For it would be a strange interpretation to say that Moses spoke of his own tomb (even by prophecy) as not found to that day, when he was still living. But it may perhaps be argued that only the last chapter, not the whole *Pentateuch,* was written by some other man, and the rest not. Let

8 The Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible made at Alexandria in the third century BC, is named for the seventy (or seventy-two) translators of the legend in the Letter of Aristeas.

9 Scanderbeg (George Kastrioti, 1405–68), the Albanian leader against the Ottomans, subject of several popular histories.

us therefore consider what we find in the Book of Genesis, chapter 12, verse 6: *And Abraham passed through the land to the place of Shechem, to the plain of Moreh; and the Canaanite was then in the land.* These must be the words of someone who wrote when the Canaanite was not in the land, and consequently not of Moses, who died before he came into it. Likewise, in Numbers 21:14 the writer cites another, more ancient book, entitled *The Book of the Wars of the Lord,* in which were recorded the acts of Moses at the Red Sea and at the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident that the five books of Moses were written after his time, though how long after is not so plain.

33.5 But though Moses did not compile those books entirely, and in the form we have them, yet he wrote everything he is said there to have written. For example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as it seems, in the eleventh chapter of Deuteronomy and the following chapters to the twenty-seventh, and which was also commanded to be written on stones at their entry into the land of Canaan. This too Moses himself wrote, and delivered to the priests and elders of Israel, to be read every seventh year to all Israel at their assembling for the Feast of Tabernacles.[10] And this is the law of which God commanded that their kings (once they had established that form of government) should take a copy from the priests and Levites; and which Moses commanded the priests and Levites to lay in the side of the ark; and the same which, having been lost, was found again a long time afterward by Hilkiah and sent to King Josiah, who had it read to the people and renewed the covenant between God and them.[11]

33.6 That the Book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua may be gathered from many places in the book itself. Joshua had set up twelve stones in the middle of the Jordan as a monument of their crossing, and of them the writer says, *They are there to this day;* for *to this day* is a phrase that signifies a time past, beyond the memory of man. In the same way,

10 Deuteronomy 27:2–8; 31:9–11.
11 Deuteronomy 17:18; 31:26; 2 Kings 22–23.

on the Lord's saying that he had rolled away from the people the reproach of Egypt, the writer says, *The place is called Gilgal to this day*—which would have been improper to say in the time of Joshua.[12] So also the name of the Valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the camp, the writer says *remains to this day;* which must therefore have been written long after the time of Joshua. There are many other arguments of this kind, such as Joshua 8:29; 13:13; 14:14; 15:63.[13]

33.7 The same is plain from similar arguments in the Book of Judges, 1:21, 26; 6:24; 10:4; 15:19; 17:6, and Ruth 1:1; but especially Judges 18:30, where it is said that *Jonathan and his sons were priests to the tribe of Dan until the day of the captivity of the land.*

33.8 That the books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there are similar arguments: 1 Samuel 5:5; 7:13, 15; 27:6; and 30:25, where, after David had judged that those who guarded the supplies should have an equal share of the spoils with those who fought, the writer says, *He made it a statute and an ordinance to Israel to this day.* Again, when David (displeased that the Lord had struck down Uzzah for putting out his hand to steady the ark) called the place Perez-uzzah, the writer says it is called so *to this day.* The time of the writing of that book must therefore be long after the time of the event—that is, long after the time of David.[14]

33.9 As for the two books of Kings and the two books of Chronicles, there are the places that mention monuments which, the writer says, remained until his own day, such as 1 Kings 9:13; 9:21; 10:12; 12:19; 2 Kings 2:22; 8:22; 10:27; 14:7; 16:6; 17:23; 17:34; 17:41; 1 Chronicles 4:41; 5:26. But besides these, it is sufficient argument that they were written after the captivity in Babylon that their history is continued up to that time. For the facts recorded are always older than the record, and much older than books that mention and cite the record, as these books do in various places, referring the reader to the Chronicles of the

12 Joshua 4:9; 5:9. "Gilgal" sounds like the Hebrew for "roll."
13 Joshua 7:26.
14 2 Samuel 6:6–8.

Kings of Judah, the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel, the books of the prophet Samuel, of the prophet Nathan, and of the prophet Ahijah; to the vision of Iddo; and to the books of the prophet Shemaiah and of the prophet Iddo.[15]

33.10 The books of Ezra and Nehemiah were certainly written after their return from captivity, because they contain their return, the rebuilding of the walls and houses of Jerusalem, the renewal of the covenant, and the ordering of their polity.[16]

33.11 The history of Queen Esther is of the time of the captivity; and therefore the writer must have been of the same time, or later.

33.12 The Book of Job has no mark in it of the time in which it was written. And though it appears sufficiently (Ezekiel 14:14 and James 5:11) that Job was not a fictitious person, yet the book itself seems to be not a history but a treatise on a question much disputed in ancient times: *why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good men have been afflicted.* And this is the more probable because from the beginning to the third verse of the third chapter, where Job's complaint begins, the Hebrew is (as St. Jerome testifies) in prose; from there to the sixth verse of the last chapter it is in hexameter verse; and the rest of that chapter is prose again. So the dispute is all in verse, and the prose is added only as a preface at the beginning and an epilogue at the end. But verse is not the usual style of those who are themselves in great pain, like Job, or of those who come to comfort them, like his friends; it was, however, frequent in ancient times in philosophy, especially moral philosophy.

33.13 The Psalms were written for the most part by David, for the use of the choir. To these are added some songs of Moses and of other holy men, and some from after the return from the captivity, such as the 137th and the 126th. From this it is plain that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now has, after the return of the Jews from Babylon.

15 Hobbes's "Iehdo" and "Addo" are both Iddo the seer (2 Chronicles 9:29; 12:15); "Serveiah" is Shemaiah.

16 Hobbes's "Esdras" here is the Book of Ezra.

33.14 The *Proverbs,* being a collection of wise and godly sayings, partly of Solomon, partly of Agur the son of Jakeh, and partly of the mother of King Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by Solomon rather than by Agur or the mother of Lemuel. And though the sayings are theirs, the collecting or compiling of them into this one book was the work of some other godly man who lived after them all.[17]

33.15 The books of Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs have nothing that was not Solomon's, except perhaps the titles or inscriptions. For *The words of the Preacher, the son of David, king in Jerusalem,* and *The Song of Songs, which is Solomon's,* seem to have been added for the sake of distinction at the time when the books of Scripture were gathered into one body of the law, so that not only the doctrine but also the authors might be preserved.

33.16 Of the prophets, the most ancient are Zephaniah, Jonah, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah, who lived in the time of Amaziah and Azariah (also called Uzziah), kings of Judah. But the Book of Jonah is not properly a record of his prophecy (which is contained in these few words, *Forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed*), but a history or narrative of his stubbornness and his disputing of God's commandments; so there is little probability that he was its author, since he is its subject. But the Book of Amos is his prophecy.[18]

33.17 Jeremiah, Obadiah, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophesied in the time of Josiah.

33.18 Ezekiel, Daniel, Haggai, and Zechariah prophesied during the captivity.

33.19 When Joel and Malachi prophesied is not evident from their writings. But considering the inscriptions, or titles, of their books, it is plain enough that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament was set out in the form we have it after the return of the Jews from their captivity in Babylon, and before the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, who had it translated into Greek by sev-

17 Proverbs 30:1; 31:1.
18 Jonah 3:4.

enty men sent to him from Judea for that purpose.[19] And if the books of the *Apocrypha* (which are recommended to us by the Church, not as canonical but as profitable books for our instruction) may be believed on this point, the Scripture was set out in the form we have it by Esdras, as may appear from what he himself says in the second book, chapter 14, verses 21, 22, etc., where, speaking to God, he says: Your law is burned; therefore no man knows the things which you have done, or the works that are to begin.[20] But if I have found grace before you, send down the Holy Spirit into me, and I shall write all that has been done in the world since the beginning, which were written in your law, that men may find your path, and that those who will live in the latter days may live. *And verse 45:* And it came to pass, when the forty days were fulfilled, that the Highest spoke, saying, The first that you have written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, that you may deliver them only to such as are wise among the people. And so much concerning the time of the writing of the books of the Old Testament.

THE NEW TESTAMENT AND THE CANON

The New Testament writers were early, but the Church's collection of their books came later.

33.20 The writers of the New Testament all lived within less than a generation after Christ's ascension, and all of them had seen our Savior or been his disciples, except St. Paul and St. Luke; and consequently whatever was written by them is as ancient as the time of the apostles. But the time at which the books of the New Testament were received and acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing is not quite so ancient. For just as the books of the Old Testament come down to us from no earlier time than that of Ezra, who by the direction of God's Spirit recovered them

19 Ptolemy II Philadelphus, king of Egypt 283–246 BC.
20 2 Esdras 14:21–22, 45–46 (in the Apocrypha of the English Bible). Esdras is the Greek form of Ezra.

when they were lost, so those of the New Testament—of which the copies were not many, nor could all easily be in any one private man's hands—cannot be traced to an earlier time than the one in which the governors of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to us as the writings of those apostles and disciples under whose names they go. The first list of all the books, both of the Old and New Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, supposed to have been collected by Clement, the first (after St.[21] Peter) bishop of Rome. But because that is only supposed, and questioned by many, the Council of Laodicea is the first we know of that recommended the Bible to the Christian churches of that time as the writings of the prophets and apostles; and this council was held in the year 364 after Christ. At that time ambition had so far prevailed on the great doctors of the Church that they no longer regarded emperors, even Christian ones, as the shepherds of the people, but as sheep, and emperors who were not Christian as wolves. They tried to pass off their doctrine not as counsel and information, as preachers, but as laws, as absolute governors; and they thought such frauds as tended to make the people more obedient to Christian doctrine to be pious. Yet I am persuaded that they did not on that account falsify the Scriptures, though the copies of the books of the New Testament were in the hands of the clergy only. For if they had intended to do so, they would surely have made them more favorable to their power over Christian princes and civil sovereignty than they are. I see no reason, therefore, to doubt that the Old and New Testaments as we have them now are the true records of those things which were done and said by the prophets and apostles. And so perhaps are some of those books which are called Apocrypha, and left out of the canon not for any disagreement of doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews who were not perfect in the Greek tongue. For

21 The *Apostolic Canons,* a collection of church rules actually compiled in the fourth century, whose last canon lists the books of Scripture.

the seventy interpreters who turned the Bible into Greek were all Hebrews; and we have extant the works of Philo and Josephus, both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek. But it is not the writer but the authority of the Church that makes a book canonical. And although these books were written by different men, it is plain that the writers were all endowed with one and the same Spirit, in that they work together toward one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the rights of the Kingdom of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For the Book of Genesis traces the genealogy of God's people from the creation of the world to the going into Egypt. The other four books of Moses contain the election of God as their king, and the laws he prescribed for their government. The books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the time of Saul, describe the acts of God's people until the time they cast off God's yoke and called for a king, after the manner of their neighboring nations. The rest of the history of the Old Testament traces the succession of the line of David to the captivity; out of this line was to spring the restorer of the Kingdom of God, our blessed Savior, God the Son, whose coming was foretold in the books of the prophets. After him the evangelists write his life and actions, and his claim to the kingdom while he lived on earth. And lastly the Acts and Epistles of the apostles declare the coming of God the Holy Spirit, and the authority he left with them and their successors, for the direction of the Jews and for the invitation of the Gentiles. In sum, the histories and prophecies of the Old Testament, and the gospels and epistles of the New Testament, have had one and the same aim: to convert men to the obedience of God—first, in Moses and the priests; second, in the man Christ; and third, in the apostles and the successors to apostolic power. For these three at different times represented the person of God: Moses and his successors, the high priests and kings of Judah, in the Old Testament; Christ himself, in the time he lived on earth; and the apostles and their successors, from the day of Pentecost (when the Holy Spirit descended on them) to this day.

BY WHAT AUTHORITY SCRIPTURE IS LAW

The real question is not how we know Scripture is God's word but who makes it law.

33.21 It is a question much disputed among the various sects of the Christian religion, *From where do the Scriptures derive their authority?* The question is also sometimes put in other terms, such as, *How do we know them to be the word of God?* or, *Why do we believe them to be so?* And the difficulty of resolving it arises chiefly from the impropriety of the words in which the question itself is framed. For it is believed on all sides that the first and original *author* of them is God; and consequently that is not the question in dispute. Again, it is plain that no one can *know* they are God's word (though all true Christians believe it) except those to whom God himself has revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly raised about our *knowledge* of it. Lastly, when the question is put about our *belief,* then because some are moved to believe for one reason and others for other reasons, no one general answer can be given for them all. The question truly stated is, *By what authority are they made law?*

33.22 Insofar as they do not differ from the laws of nature, there is no doubt that they are the law of God, and carry their authority with them, legible to all men who have the use of natural reason. But this is no authority other than that of all other moral doctrine consonant with reason, whose dictates are laws not *made* but *eternal.*

33.23 If they are made law by God himself, they are of the nature of written law, which is law only to those to whom God has published it so sufficiently that no man can excuse himself by saying he did not know it was his.

33.24 He to whom God has not supernaturally revealed that they are his, or that those who published them were sent by him, is therefore not obliged to obey them by any authority except that of him whose commands already have the force of laws—that is to say, by no authority other than that of the com-

monwealth, residing in the sovereign, who alone has the legislative power. Again, if it is not the legislative authority of the commonwealth that gives them the force of laws, it must be some other authority derived from God, either private or public. If private, it obliges only the one to whom in particular God has been pleased to reveal it. For if every man were obliged to take as God's law whatever particular men, on the pretext of private inspiration or revelation, might force on him—among so many men who, out of pride and ignorance, take their own dreams, extravagant fancies, and madness for testimonies of God's Spirit, or who out of ambition claim such divine testimonies falsely and against their own consciences—it would be impossible for any divine law to be acknowledged. If public, it is the authority of the *commonwealth* or of the *Church.* But the Church, if it is one person, is the same thing as a commonwealth of Christians: called a *commonwealth* because it consists of men united in one person, their sovereign; and a *Church* because it consists of Christian men united in one Christian sovereign. But if the Church is not one person, then it has no authority at all. It can neither command nor perform any action at all; it is not capable of having any power or right to anything; and it has no will, reason, or voice, for all these qualities are personal. Now if the whole number of Christians is not contained in one commonwealth, they are not one person; nor is there a universal Church that has any authority over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made laws by the universal Church. Or if it is one commonwealth, then all Christian monarchs and states are private persons, liable to be judged, deposed, and punished by a universal sovereign of all Christendom. So the question of the authority of the Scriptures comes down to this: *whether Christian kings, and the sovereign assemblies in Christian commonwealths, are absolute in their own territories, immediately under God; or subject to one vicar of Christ, constituted by the universal Church, to be judged, condemned, deposed, and put to death as he shall think expedient or necessary for the common good.*

33.25 This question cannot be resolved without a more particular consideration of the Kingdom of God. From that consideration we must also judge of the authority to interpret Scripture. For whoever has a lawful power over any writing, to make it law, also has the power to approve or disapprove the interpretation of it.

CHAPTER 34: OF SPIRIT, ANGEL, AND INSPIRATION

Hobbes defines body and spirit and argues that 'incorporeal substance' is a contradiction in terms.

34.1 The foundation of all true reasoning is the constant signification of words. In the doctrine that follows, that signification depends not (as in natural science) on the will of the writer, nor (as in common conversation) on ordinary usage, but on the sense words carry in Scripture. Before I go any further, then, I must determine from the Bible the meaning of those words whose ambiguity might make what I am to infer from them obscure or disputable. I will begin with the words *body* and *spirit*, which in the language of the Schools are called substances, *corporeal* and *incorporeal*.

34.2 The word *body*, in its most general sense, signifies that which fills or occupies some certain room or imagined place. It does not depend on the imagination, but is a real part of what we call the *universe*. For since the universe is the aggregate of all bodies, there is no real part of it that is not also body, and nothing is properly a body that is not also part of the universe, that aggregate of all bodies. Because bodies are subject to change—that is, to a variety of appearances to the senses of living creatures—the same thing is also called *substance*, that is, *subject* to various accidents: sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still, and to seem to our senses sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometimes of one color, smell, taste, or sound, sometimes of another. This diversity of seeming (produced by the diversity in the way bodies act on the organs of our senses) we attribute to alterations in the bodies that act on us, and we call these altera-

tions the *accidents* of those bodies. In this sense of the word, *substance* and *body* signify the same thing. So "incorporeal substance" consists of words that destroy each other when they are joined together, as if a man should say "an incorporeal body."

34.3 But in the sense of common people, not the whole universe is called body, but only those parts of it they can detect by the sense of touch, as resisting their force, or by the sense of sight, as blocking their view of what lies beyond. So in the common language of men, air and airy substances are not usually taken for bodies. Instead, whenever men feel their effects, they are called *wind*, or *breath*, or (because the Latin word for these is *spiritus*) *spirits*—as when people call that airy substance which gives life and motion to the body of any living creature its *vital* and *animal spirits*. But as for those idols of the brain which represent bodies to us where there are none, as in a mirror, in a dream, or to a disordered brain awake, they are (as the Apostle says of all idols in general) nothing. Nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to be; and in the brain itself nothing but a tumult, arising either from the action of objects or from the disorderly agitation of the organs of our senses.[22] Men who are occupied with other things than searching into their causes do not know by themselves what to call these images. So they may easily be persuaded by those whose knowledge they greatly revere—some to call them *bodies*, and think them made of air compacted by a supernatural power, because the eye judges them to be corporeal; and some to call them *spirits*, because the sense of touch finds nothing in the place where they appear to resist their fingers. So the proper signification of *spirit* in common speech is either a subtle, fluid, invisible body, or a ghost, or some other idol or phantasm of the imagination. But there are many metaphorical meanings. Sometimes the word is taken for a disposition or inclination of the mind: as when we call a disposition to contradict what other people say "a spirit of contradiction"; a disposition to uncleanness, "an unclean spirit"; perverseness, "a contrary spirit"; sullenness, "a mute spirit"; and an

22 "An idol is nothing in the world" (1 Corinthians 8:4).

inclination to godliness and God's service, "the Spirit of God." Sometimes it is taken for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind: as when great wisdom is called "the spirit of wisdom," and people with mental illness are said to be "possessed by a spirit."

34.4 I find no other meaning of *spirit* anywhere. Where none of these can satisfy the sense of the word in Scripture, the passage lies beyond human understanding, and our faith in it consists not in our opinion but in our submission—as in all the places where God is said to be a Spirit, or where by "the Spirit of God" is meant God himself. For the nature of God is incomprehensible: that is, we understand nothing of *what he is*, but only *that he is*. So the attributes we give him are not meant to tell one another what he is, nor to signify our opinion of his nature, but our desire to honor him with the names we conceive to be most honorable among ourselves.

34.5 Genesis 1:2: "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." If by "the Spirit of God" is meant God himself here, then motion is attributed to God, and consequently place—which are intelligible only of bodies, not of incorporeal substances. The passage is then above our understanding, which can conceive nothing moved that does not change place or that has no dimension; and whatever has dimension is body. But the meaning of those words is best understood from the similar passage in Genesis 8:1. There, when the earth was covered with waters, as in the beginning, God, intending to abate them and uncover the dry land again, uses similar words: "I will bring my Spirit upon the earth, and the waters shall be diminished." In this passage *spirit* means a wind (that is, air or spirit in motion), which might be called the Spirit of God, as in the earlier passage, because it was God's work.

34.6 In Genesis 41:38, Pharaoh calls the wisdom of Joseph "the Spirit of God." For after Joseph had advised him to look for a wise and discreet man and set him over the land of Egypt, he says: "Can we find such a man as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God?" And in Exodus 28:3: "You shall speak" (says God) "to all

that are wise-hearted, whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom, to make Aaron garments, to consecrate him." Here extraordinary understanding, even though only in making garments, is called the Spirit of God, because it is the *gift* of God. The same is found again in Exodus 31:3–6 and 35:31, and in Isaiah 11:2–3, where the prophet, speaking of the Messiah, says, "The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, and the spirit of the fear of the Lord." Here what is plainly meant is not so many ghosts, but so many eminent *graces* that God would give him.

34.7 In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary zeal and courage in the defense of God's people is called the Spirit of God: as when it stirred Othniel, Gideon, Jephthah, and Samson to deliver them from servitude (Judges 3:10; 6:34; 11:29; 13:25; 14:6, 19). And of Saul, when he heard of the insolence of the Ammonites toward the men of Jabesh-gilead, it is said (1 Samuel 11:6) that "the Spirit of God came upon Saul, and his anger" (or, as the Latin has it, *his fury*) "was kindled greatly." It is not probable that a ghost is meant here, but an extraordinary *zeal* to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites. In the same way, the Spirit of God that came upon Saul when he was among the prophets who praised God in songs and music (1 Samuel 19:20) is to be understood not as a ghost, but as an unexpected and sudden *zeal* to join them in their devotion.

34.8 The false prophet Zedekiah says to Micaiah (1 Kings 22:24), "Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to you?" This cannot be understood of a ghost. For Micaiah had declared the outcome of the battle before the kings of Israel and Judah as from a *vision*, not as from a spirit speaking in him.

34.9 In the same way it appears in the books of the Prophets that, though they spoke by the Spirit of God—that is, by a special grace of prediction—their knowledge of the future came not from a ghost within them, but from some supernatural *dream* or *vision*.

34.10 Genesis 2:7 says, "God made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils (*spiraculum vitae*) the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." There the breath of life breathed in by God signifies no more than that God gave him life. And "as long as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils" (Job 27:3) is no more than to say "as long as I live." So in Ezekiel 1:20, "the spirit of life was in the wheels" is equivalent to "the wheels were alive." And in Ezekiel 2:2,[23] "the spirit entered into me, and set me on my feet" means "I recovered my vital strength," not that any ghost or incorporeal substance entered into and possessed his body.

34.11 In Numbers 11:17, God says: "I will take of the spirit which is upon you, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear the burden of the people with you"—that is, upon the seventy elders. Two of the seventy are then said to have prophesied in the camp. Some complained of them, and Joshua wanted Moses to forbid them, which Moses would not do. From this it appears that Joshua did not know they had received authority to do so, and that they prophesied according to the mind of Moses—that is, by a spirit, or *authority*, subordinate to his own.

34.12 In the same sense we read (Deuteronomy 34:9) that "Joshua was full of the spirit of wisdom, because Moses had laid his hands upon him": that is, because he was *ordained* by Moses to carry on the work Moses himself had begun (namely, bringing God's people into the promised land) but, prevented by death, could not finish.

34.13 In the same sense it is said (Romans 8:9), "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his"—meaning not the ghost of Christ, but a *submission* to his doctrine. Likewise (1 John 4:2): "Hereby you shall know the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God." What is meant is the spirit of sincere Christianity, or *submission* to that main article of Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ, which cannot be interpreted as a ghost.

34.14 Likewise these words (Luke 4:1), "And Jesus, full of the Holy Ghost" (expressed in Matthew 4:1 and Mark 1:12 as "of the Holy Spirit"), may be understood as *zeal* to do the work for which he was sent by God the Father. But to interpret it as a ghost is to say that God himself (for so our Savior was) was filled with God—which is very improper and meaningless.[24] How we came to translate *spirits* by the word *ghosts*, which signifies nothing either in heaven or on earth but the imaginary inhabitants of man's brain, I do not examine. But this I say: the word *spirit* in the text signifies no such thing, but either, properly, a real *substance*, or, metaphorically, some extraordinary *ability* or *affection* of the mind or of the body.

34.15 When the disciples of Christ saw him walking on the sea (Matthew 14:26 and Mark 6:49), they supposed him to be a spirit, meaning an airy *body*, and not a phantasm. For it is said that they all saw him, which cannot be understood of delusions of the brain (which are not common to many at once, as visible bodies are, but singular, because fancies differ), but only of bodies. The same holds where he was taken for a spirit by the same apostles (Luke 24:37); and also (Acts 12:15) when St.[25] Peter was delivered out of prison, and it would not be believed. When the maid said he was at the door, they said it was his *angel*. By this must be meant a corporeal substance; or else we must say that the disciples themselves followed the common opinion of both Jews and Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not imaginary but real, and did not need the fancy of man for their existence. These the Jews called spirits and angels, good or bad, as the Greeks called the same things *daemons*. And some such apparitions may be real and substantial—that is, subtle bodies, which God can form by the same power by which he formed all things, and use as ministers and messengers (that is, angels) to declare his will and carry it out, when he pleases, in an

23 Hobbes's text cites "Ezek. 2. 30"; the verse is Ezekiel 2:2.
24 Hobbes quotes the English Bible's "Holy Ghost" here because his argument turns on the difference between "spirit" and "ghost."
25 Hobbes's text prints "Luke 24. 3, 7"; the verse is Luke 24:37.

extraordinary and supernatural way. But when he has formed them in this way, they are substances endowed with dimensions. They take up room and can be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to bodies. So they are not *incorporeal* ghosts—that is, ghosts that are in *no place*, that is, that are *nowhere*, that is, that seem to be *something* and are *nothing*. But if "corporeal" is taken in the most popular way, for such substances as are perceptible by our external senses, then an incorporeal substance is not imaginary but real: namely, a thin, invisible substance which nevertheless has the same dimensions as grosser bodies.

ANGELS

In Scripture angels are messengers or supernatural images signifying God's presence, not incorporeal substances.

34.16 The name *angel* signifies, in general, a *messenger*, and most often a *messenger of God*. And by a messenger of God is signified anything that makes known his extraordinary presence—that is, the extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a dream or vision.

34.17 Concerning the creation of angels, nothing is delivered in the Scriptures. That they are spirits is often repeated. But by the name of spirit is signified, both in Scripture and in common speech, among both Jews and Gentiles, sometimes thin bodies, such as the air, the wind, and the vital and animal spirits of living creatures; and sometimes the images that rise in the fancy in dreams and visions. These are not real substances, and last no longer than the dream or vision they appear in. Yet such apparitions, though they are not real substances but accidents of the brain, are not improperly called God's messengers—that is, his *angels*—when God raises them supernaturally to signify his will.

34.18 The Gentiles commonly took the imagery of the brain for things really subsisting outside them and not dependent on the fancy, and out of these they framed their opinions of *daemons*, good and evil—which, because they seemed to subsist really, they called *substances*, and because they could not feel them

with their hands, *incorporeal*. In the same way, and on the same grounds, the Jews (except the sect of the Sadducees), without anything in the Old Testament that compelled them to it, generally held the opinion that those apparitions (which God was pleased at times to produce in the fancy of men for his own service, and therefore called his *angels*) were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God. Those they thought were good to them, they regarded as the *angels of God*; and those they thought would hurt them, they called *evil angels*, or evil spirits—such as the spirit of Python, and the spirits of people who were mentally ill or mentally disturbed, and of people with epilepsy. For they regarded those troubled with such diseases as *demoniacs*.[26]

34.19 But if we consider the places in the Old Testament where angels are mentioned, we shall find that in most of them nothing else can be understood by the word *angel* but some image raised (supernaturally) in the fancy, to signify the presence of God in the execution of some supernatural work. So in the rest, where their nature is not stated, it may be understood in the same way.

34.20 For we read in Genesis 16 that the same apparition is called not only an angel but God. What is called the angel of the Lord in verse 7 says to Hagar in verse 10, "I will multiply your seed exceedingly"—that is, it speaks in the person of God. Nor was this apparition a figure in the fancy, but a voice. From this it is plain that *angel* there signifies nothing but God himself, who caused Hagar supernaturally to perceive a voice from heaven—or rather, nothing but a supernatural voice testifying to God's special presence there. Why then may not the angels that appeared to Lot—who are called *men* in Genesis 19:13, and to whom Lot, though they were two, speaks (verse 18) as if to only one, and to that one as God (for the words are, "Lot said unto them, Oh not so, my Lord")—be understood as images of men supernaturally formed in the fancy, just as before "angel" was

26 The spirit of Python: the spirit of divination of the slave girl at Philippi (Acts 16:16), named after the serpent slain by Apollo at Delphi.

understood as an imagined voice? When the angel called to Abraham out of heaven to stay his hand from slaying Isaac (Genesis 22:11), there was no apparition, but a voice. It was nevertheless called, properly enough, a messenger or angel of God, because it declared God's will supernaturally; and this spares us the labor of supposing any permanent ghosts. The angels that Jacob saw on the ladder of heaven (Genesis 28:12) were a vision in his sleep—therefore only fancy and a dream. Yet being supernatural, and signs of God's special presence, those apparitions are not improperly called angels. The same is to be understood in Genesis 31:11, where Jacob says, "The angel of the Lord appeared to me in my sleep." For an apparition made to a man in his sleep is what everyone calls a dream, whether the dream is natural or supernatural. And what Jacob there calls an angel was God himself, for the same angel says (verse 13), "I am the God of Bethel."

34.21 Also (Exodus 14:9) the angel that went before the army of Israel to the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is (verse 19) the Lord himself. He appeared not in the form of a beautiful man, but by day in the form of a *pillar of cloud*, and by night in the form of a *pillar of fire*. And yet this pillar was the whole apparition and angel promised to Moses (Exodus 14:9) as the army's guide. For this pillar of cloud is said to have come down and stood at the door of the tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.[27]

34.22 There you see motion and speech, which are commonly attributed to angels, attributed to a cloud, because the cloud served as a sign of God's presence. It was no less an angel than if it had had the form of a man, or of a child of the greatest beauty, or had wings, as angels are usually painted, to the false instruction of common people. For it is not their shape but their use that makes them angels; and their use is to signify God's presence in supernatural operations. As when Moses (Exodus 33:14) had asked God to go along with the camp (as he had always done

27 Hobbes's citations: the pillars of cloud and fire are in Exodus 13:21–22 and 14:19–24; the pillar at the tabernacle door, Exodus 33:9.

before the making of the golden calf), God did not answer "I will go," nor "I will send an angel in my place," but "My presence shall go with you."

34.23 To mention all the places in the Old Testament where the name of angel is found would take too long. So, to take them all in at once, I say this: there is no text in that part of the Old Testament which the Church of England holds to be canonical from which we can conclude that there is, or has been created, any permanent thing (understood by the name of *spirit* or *angel*) that has no quantity, and that cannot be divided by the understanding—that is, considered in parts, so that one part may be in one place and the next part in the place next to it—in short, anything that is not corporeal (taking body for that which is something, or somewhere). But in every place the sense will bear the interpretation of angel as messenger: as John the Baptist is called an angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as (by the same analogy) the dove and the tongues of fire, in that they were signs of God's special presence, might also be called angels.[28] Though we find the names of two angels in Daniel, Gabriel and Michael, it is clear from the text itself (Daniel 12:1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an angel but as a prince. And Gabriel (like the similar apparitions made to other holy men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernatural phantasm, by which it seemed to Daniel in his dream that two saints were talking, and one of them said to the other, "Gabriel, make this man understand the vision." For God does not need to distinguish his celestial servants by names, which are useful only to the short memories of mortals. Nor is there any place in the New Testament from which it can be proved that angels (except where the word stands for men whom God has made the messengers and ministers of his word or works) are things permanent and also incorporeal. That they are permanent may be gathered from the words of our Savior himself (Matthew 25:41), where he says it shall be said to the wicked on the last day, "Go, you cursed, into

28 Malachi 3:1, "my messenger" (Hebrew *mal'akh*, also "angel"), applied to John the Baptist in Matthew 11:10, and "the messenger of the covenant."

everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels." This passage clearly establishes the permanence of evil angels (unless we may think that the Devil and his angels can be understood as the Church's adversaries and their ministers). But then it contradicts their immateriality, because everlasting fire is no punishment to substances that cannot suffer, as all incorporeal things are. So angels are not proved by it to be incorporeal. In the same way, where St. Paul says (1 Corinthians 6:3), "Know you not that we shall judge the angels?" and 2 Peter 2:4, "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down into hell," and Jude 6, "And the angels that kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he has reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the last day"—though these prove the permanence of the angelic nature, they also confirm its materiality. And Matthew 22:30: "In the resurrection men neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven." But in the resurrection men shall be permanent, and not incorporeal; so, therefore, are the angels.

34.24 There are various other places from which the same conclusion may be drawn. To men who understand the meaning of the words *substance* and *incorporeal*—taking incorporeal not for a subtle body but for *not body*—they imply a contradiction. So to say that an angel or spirit is (in that sense) an incorporeal substance is in effect to say that there is no angel or spirit at all. Considering, then, the meaning of the word *angel* in the Old Testament, and the nature of the dreams and visions that come to men in the ordinary course of nature, I was inclined to the opinion that angels were nothing but supernatural apparitions of the fancy, raised by the special and extraordinary operation of God to make his presence and commandments known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the many places of the New Testament, and our Savior's own words, in texts where there is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have wrung from my feeble reason an acknowledgment and belief that there are also angels that are substantial and permanent. But to believe that they are in no place—that is, nowhere, that is,

nothing—as those who would have them incorporeal say (though indirectly), cannot be proved from Scripture.

INSPIRATION

Inspiration in Scripture is a metaphor for God's gifts, not spirits poured into men.

34.25 On the meaning of the word *spirit* depends that of the word *inspiration*. It must either be taken properly, and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man of some thin, subtle air or wind, as a man fills a bladder with his breath; or, if spirits are not corporeal but exist only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a phantasm—which is improper to say, and impossible, for phantasms are not something, but only seem to be. The word is therefore used in Scripture only metaphorically. As in Genesis 2:7, where it is said that God *inspired* into man the breath of life, no more is meant than that God gave him vital motion. For we are not to think that God first made a living breath and then blew it into Adam after he was made, whether that breath was real or only seeming; but only, as it is said in Acts 17:25, that "he gave him life and breath"—that is, made him a living creature. And where it is said (2 Timothy 3:16) "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God"—speaking there of the Scripture of the Old Testament—it is an easy metaphor, signifying that God inclined the spirit or mind of those writers to write what would be useful in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing men in the way of righteous living. But where St. Peter (2 Peter 1:21) says that "prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit," by the Holy Spirit is meant the voice of God in a supernatural dream or vision, which is not *inspiration*. Nor, when our Savior breathed on his disciples and said, "Receive the Holy Spirit," was that breath the Spirit; it was a sign of the spiritual graces he gave them. And though it is said of many, and of our Savior himself, that he was full of the Holy Spirit, that fullness is not to be understood as an *infusion* of the substance of God, but as an

accumulation of his gifts, such as the gift of holiness of life, of tongues, and the like—whether attained supernaturally or by study and industry, for in all cases they are the gifts of God. So likewise where God says (Joel 2:28), "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions," we are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his Spirit were like water, subject to effusion or infusion, but as if God had promised to give them prophetic dreams and visions. For to use the word *infused* in its proper sense when speaking of the graces of God is an abuse of it. Those graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried here and there and poured into men as into barrels.

34.26 In the same way, to take *inspiration* in the proper sense, or to say that good spirits entered into men to make them prophesy, or evil spirits into those who became frenzied, mentally ill, or epileptic, is not to take the word in the sense of Scripture. For spirit there is taken for the power of God, working by causes unknown to us. So too (Acts 2:2) the wind that is said there to fill the house where the apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost is not to be understood as the Holy Spirit, which is the Deity itself, but as an external sign of God's special working on their hearts, to produce in them the inward graces and holy virtues he thought necessary for carrying out their apostleship.

CHAPTER 35: OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD, HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT

The Kingdom of God is a real civil kingdom, founded by covenant with Abraham and renewed at Sinai.

35.1 In the writings of divines, and especially in sermons and devotional treatises, the *Kingdom of God* is most commonly taken for eternal felicity after this life, in the highest heaven, which they also call the Kingdom of Glory; and sometimes for sanctification (the pledge of that felicity), which they call the Kingdom of Grace. But it is never taken for the monarchy—that is, the sov-

ereign power of God over subjects acquired by their own consent—which is the proper meaning of kingdom.

35.2 On the contrary, I find that the *Kingdom of God* signifies, in most places of Scripture, a *kingdom properly so called*, established in a special way by the votes of the people of Israel, in which they chose God for their king by a covenant made with him, upon God's promising them possession of the land of Canaan. Only seldom is it used metaphorically, and then it is taken for *dominion over sin* (and only in the New Testament), because every subject shall have such a dominion in the Kingdom of God, without prejudice to the sovereign.

35.3 From the very creation, God not only reigned over all men *naturally*, by his might, but also had *special* subjects, whom he commanded by a voice, as one man speaks to another. In this way he *reigned* over Adam and commanded him to abstain from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. When Adam did not obey, but tasted of it, and took it upon himself to be as God, judging between good and evil not by his Creator's command but by his own sense, his punishment was to be deprived of the state of eternal life in which God had first created him. And afterward God punished Adam's descendants for their vices with a universal flood—all but eight persons. In these eight consisted the Kingdom of God at that time.

35.4 After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham and (Genesis 17:7–8) to make a covenant with him in these words: "I will establish my covenant between me and you and your seed after you in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to you and to your seed after you. And I will give to you, and to your seed after you, the land in which you are a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession." In this covenant *Abraham promises, for himself and his descendants, to obey as God the Lord who spoke to him; and God on his part promises Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession.* And as a memorial and token of this covenant, he ordains (verse 11) the *sacrament of circumcision*. This is what is called the *Old Covenant*, or *Testament*. It contains a contract between God and Abraham,

by which Abraham obliges himself and his descendants in a special way to be subject to God's positive law; for he was already obliged to the moral law, as by an oath of allegiance. And though the name of *king* is not yet given to God, nor of *kingdom* to Abraham and his seed, the thing is the same: namely, an institution by agreement of God's special sovereignty over the seed of Abraham. When this same covenant was renewed by Moses at Mount Sinai, it is expressly called a special *Kingdom of God* over the Jews. And it is of Abraham (not of Moses) that St. Paul says (Romans 4:11) that he is "the father of the faithful"—that is, of those who are loyal and do not violate the allegiance sworn to God, at first by circumcision and later, in the *New Covenant*, by baptism.

35.5 This covenant was renewed by Moses at the foot of Mount Sinai (Exodus 19:5), where the Lord commands Moses to speak to the people in this way: "If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then you shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the earth is mine; and you shall be to me a priestly kingdom, and a holy nation." For "a peculiar people" the Vulgate has *peculium de cunctis populis*; the English translation made at the beginning of the reign of King James has "a peculiar treasure unto me above all nations"; and the Geneva French has "the most precious jewel of all nations." But the truest translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St.[29] Paul himself (Titus 2:14), where he says, alluding to that passage, that our blessed Savior "gave himself for us, that he might purify us to himself, a peculiar" (that is, an extraordinary) "people." For the word in the Greek is *periousios*, which is commonly contrasted with the word *epiousios*. And as the latter signifies *ordinary*, *everyday*, or (as in the Lord's Prayer) *of daily use*, so the former signifies what is *surplus*, *stored up*, and *enjoyed in a special way*, which the Latins call *peculium*. This meaning of the passage is confirmed by the reason God gives for it, which follows immediately when he adds, "For all the earth is mine"—as if he should say, "All the nations of the

29 *Peculium de cunctis populis*: "a special possession out of all peoples." The Vulgate is the Latin Bible of St. Jerome; the English is the King James Version (1611).

world are mine; but you are not mine in that way, but in a *special way*. For they are all mine by reason of my power; but you shall be mine by your own consent and covenant." This is an addition to his ordinary title over all nations.

35.6 The same is confirmed again in express words in the same text: "You shall be to me a priestly kingdom, and a holy nation." The Vulgate has *Regnum sacerdotale*, with which agrees the translation of that passage in 1 Peter 2:9, *Sacerdotium regale*, "a royal priesthood." So does the institution itself, by which no one might enter the *Sanctum Sanctorum*—that is, no one might inquire God's will directly of God himself—except the high priest alone. The English translation mentioned before, following the Geneva Bible, has "a kingdom of priests." This either means the succession of one high priest after another, or else it does not agree with St.[30] Peter, nor with the exercise of the high priesthood. For there was never anyone but the high priest alone who was to inform the people of God's will, nor was any convocation of priests ever allowed to enter the *Sanctum Sanctorum*.

35.7 Again, the title of a *holy nation* confirms the same. For *holy* signifies what is God's by special, not by general, right. All the earth (as the text says) is God's; but not all the earth is called holy—only what is set apart for his special service, as the nation of the Jews was. It is therefore plain enough from this one passage that by the *Kingdom of God* is properly meant a commonwealth, instituted (by the consent of those who were to be subject to it) for their civil government and the regulation of their behavior—not only toward God their king, but also toward one another in matters of justice, and toward other nations in both peace and war. This was properly a kingdom, in which God was king, and the high priest was to be (after the death of Moses) his sole viceroy, or lieutenant.

35.8 But there are many other places that clearly prove the same. First, in 1 Samuel 8:7, when the elders of Israel (aggrieved at the corruption of Samuel's sons) demanded a king, Samuel

30 *Sanctum Sanctorum*: the Holy of Holies, the innermost sanctuary of the tabernacle and Temple.

was displeased and prayed to the Lord; and the Lord answered him, "Listen to the voice of the people, for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them." From this it is evident that God himself was then their king, and that Samuel did not command the people, but only passed on to them what God from time to time appointed him to.

35.9 Again, in 1 Samuel 12:12, Samuel says to the people, "When you saw that Nahash, king of the children of Ammon, came against you, you said to me, 'No, but a king shall reign over us,' when the Lord your God was your king." It is plain that God was their king, and governed the civil state of their commonwealth.

35.10 And after the Israelites had rejected God, the prophets foretold his restoration. So Isaiah 24:23: "Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem"—where he speaks expressly of his reign in Zion and Jerusalem, that is, on earth. And Micah 4:7: "And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion." This Mount Zion is in Jerusalem, on earth. And Ezekiel 20:33: "As I live, says the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched-out arm, and with fury poured out, I will rule over you"; and (verse 37) "I will cause you to pass under the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the covenant"—that is, I will reign over you, and make you keep that covenant which you made with me by Moses, and broke in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your election of another king.

35.11 And in the New Testament the angel Gabriel says of our Savior (Luke 1:32–33), "He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High, and the Lord shall give him the throne of his father David; and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end." This too is a kingdom on earth. For claiming it he was put to death as an enemy of Caesar; the title on his cross was "Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews"; he was crowned in mockery with a crown of thorns; and for proclaiming him it is said of the disciples (Acts 17:7) "that they all acted contrary to the decrees of Caesar, say-

ing there was another king, one Jesus." The Kingdom of God, therefore, is a real, not a metaphorical, kingdom, and is taken so not only in the Old Testament but in the New. When we say, "For yours is the kingdom, the power, and the glory," it is to be understood of God's kingdom by virtue of our covenant, not by the right of God's power; for that kind of kingdom God always has. So it would be superfluous to say in our prayer "Your kingdom come," unless it meant the restoration by Christ of that Kingdom of God which had been interrupted by the revolt of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Nor would it have been proper to say, "The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand," or to pray, "Your kingdom come," if it had still continued.

35.12 There are so many other places that confirm this interpretation that it would be a wonder it is not more widely noticed —except that it gives Christian kings too much light to see their right of ecclesiastical government. This has been noticed: so instead of "a priestly kingdom" they translate "a kingdom of priests." They might as well translate "a royal priesthood" (as it is in St. Peter) as "a priesthood of kings." And where, for "a peculiar people," they put "a precious jewel" or "treasure," one might as well call a general's own special regiment or company the general's precious jewel, or his treasure.

35.13 In short, the Kingdom of God is a civil kingdom. It consisted, first, in the obligation of the people of Israel to the laws which Moses was to bring them from Mount Sinai, and which afterward the high priest for the time being was to deliver to them from before the cherubim in the *Sanctum Sanctorum*. This kingdom, having been cast off in the election of Saul, the prophets foretold would be restored by Christ. Its restoration we pray for daily when we say in the Lord's Prayer, "Your kingdom come"; its right we acknowledge when we add, "For yours is the kingdom, the power, and the glory, for ever and ever, Amen"; its proclaiming was the preaching of the apostles; and men are prepared for it by the teachers of the Gospel. To embrace that Gospel (that is, to promise obedience to God's government) is to be in the *Kingdom of Grace*, because God has *gratis* (freely) given to

such people the power to be the subjects (that is, the children) of God hereafter, when Christ shall come in majesty to judge the world and actually govern his own people—which is called *the Kingdom of Glory*. If the Kingdom of God (also called the Kingdom of Heaven, from the gloriousness and wonderful height of that throne) were not a kingdom which God exercised on earth by his lieutenants, or vicars, who deliver his commandments to the people, there would not have been so much contention and war over who it is by whom God speaks to us. Nor would many priests have troubled themselves with spiritual jurisdiction, nor any king have denied it to them.

HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT

'Holy' means God's by special right, like 'public' in human kingdoms; sacraments are oaths of allegiance.

35.14 From this literal interpretation of the *Kingdom of God* arises also the true interpretation of the word *holy*. For it is a word which in God's kingdom answers to what men in their kingdoms usually call *public*, or *the king's*.

35.15 The king of any country is the *public* person, or representative, of all his own subjects. And God, the King of Israel, was the *Holy One* of Israel. The nation that is subject to one earthly sovereign is the nation of that sovereign—that is, of the public person. So the Jews, who were God's nation, were called (Exodus 19:6) "a holy nation." For by *holy* is always understood either God himself or what is God's as his property; just as by *public* is always meant either the person of the commonwealth itself, or something so belonging to the commonwealth that no private person can claim any property in it.

35.16 Therefore the Sabbath (God's day) is a *holy day*; the Temple (God's house), *a holy house*; sacrifices, tithes, and offerings (God's tribute), *holy duties*; priests, prophets, and anointed kings under Christ (God's ministers), *holy men*; the heavenly ministering spirits (God's messengers), *holy angels*; and so on. And wherever the word *holy* is taken properly, something is always signified of

property acquired by consent. In saying "Hallowed be your name," we only pray to God for grace to keep the first commandment, to "have no other gods but him." Mankind is God's nation as his property; but only the Jews were a *holy nation*. Why, except that they became his property by covenant?

35.17 And the word *profane* is usually taken in Scripture as the same as *common*; consequently their opposites, *holy* and *proper*, must also be the same in the Kingdom of God. But figuratively, those men also are called holy who lived such godly lives that it was as if they had forsaken all worldly designs and wholly devoted and given themselves to God. In the proper sense, what is made holy by God's appropriating or setting it apart for his own use is said to be *sanctified* by God, as the seventh day is in the fourth commandment; and as the elect in the New Testament were said to be *sanctified* when they were endowed with the spirit of godliness. And what is made holy by the dedication of men and given to God, to be used only in his public service, is also called *sacred*, and is said to be *consecrated*: such as temples and other houses of public prayer and their utensils, priests and ministers, sacrificial victims, offerings, and the external matter of sacraments.

35.18 There are degrees of holiness. For of the things set apart for the service of God, some may be set apart again for a nearer and more special service. The whole nation of the Israelites was a people holy to God; yet among the Israelites the tribe of Levi was a holy tribe; among the Levites the priests were holier still; and among the priests the high priest was the most holy. So the land of Judea was the Holy Land; but the Holy City, where God was to be worshipped, was holier; and again, the Temple holier than the city, and the *Sanctum Sanctorum* holier than the rest of the Temple.

35.19 A *sacrament* is a separation of some visible thing from common use, and its consecration to God's service, as a sign either of our admission into the Kingdom of God, to be of the number of his special people, or of a commemoration of that admission. In the Old Testament the sign of admission was *cir-*

cumcision; in the New Testament, *baptism*. The commemoration of it in the Old Testament was the *eating* of the *Passover lamb* (at a certain time each year), by which they were reminded of the night on which they were delivered from their bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebration of the *Lord's Supper*, by which we are reminded of our deliverance from the bondage of sin by our blessed Savior's death on the cross. The sacraments of *admission* are to be used only once, because only one admission is needed. But because we need to be often reminded of our deliverance and of our allegiance, the sacraments of *commemoration* need to be repeated. These are the principal sacraments, and are, as it were, the solemn oaths we make of our allegiance. There are also other consecrations that may be called sacraments, insofar as the word implies only consecration to God's service. But insofar as it implies an oath or promise of allegiance to God, there were no others in the Old Testament but *circumcision* and the *Passover*, and there are no others in the New Testament but *baptism* and the *Lord's Supper*.

CHAPTER 36: OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS

Hobbes distinguishes the senses in which Scripture speaks of the Word of God.

36.1 When the *Word* of God, or of man, is mentioned, it does not signify a part of speech, such as grammarians call a noun or a verb, or any simple sound without a context of other words to give it meaning. It signifies a complete speech or discourse, by which the speaker *affirms, denies, commands, promises, threatens, wishes,* or *asks.* In this sense it is not *vocabulum,* which signifies a *word,* but *sermo* (in Greek *logos*): that is, some *speech, discourse,* or *saying.*

36.2 Again, when we say the *Word* of God, or of man, it may sometimes be understood of the speaker, as the words that God has spoken, or that a man has spoken. In this sense, when we say "the Gospel of St. Matthew," we understand St. Matthew to be its writer. And sometimes it is understood of the subject. In this

sense, when we read in the Bible, "The words of the days of the kings of Israel," or "of Judah," it means that the acts done in those days were the subject of those words. And in the Greek of Scripture, which keeps many Hebraisms, "the Word of God" often means not what is spoken by God, but what is spoken concerning God and his government: that is to say, the doctrine of religion. So it is all one to say *logos theou* and *theologia*—that is, the doctrine we usually call *divinity.* This is clear from the following passages. Acts 13:46: "Then Paul and Barnabas grew bold, and said, It was necessary that the word of God should first have been spoken to you; but seeing you put it from you, and judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles." What is here called the Word of God was the doctrine of the Christian religion, as is evident from what comes before. And in Acts 5:20, where an angel says to the apostles, "Go, stand and speak in the Temple all the words of this life," "the words of this life" means the doctrine of the Gospel. This is evident from what they did in the Temple, as described in the last verse of the same chapter: "Daily in the Temple, and in every house, they did not cease to teach and preach Jesus Christ." In this place it is plain that Jesus Christ was the subject of this "word of life"—or, what is the same thing, the subject of the "words of this life eternal" that our Savior offered them. So in Acts 15:7 the Word of God is called "the word of the Gospel," because it contains the doctrine of the kingdom of Christ. And the same Word (Romans 10:8–9) is called "the word of faith": that is, as is there expressed, the doctrine of Christ come and raised from the dead. Also Matthew 13:19: "When anyone hears the word of the kingdom"—that is, the doctrine of the kingdom taught by Christ. Again, the same Word is said (Acts 12:24) "to grow and multiply." This is easy to understand of the doctrine of the Gospel, but hard and strange to understand of the voice or speech of God. In the same sense, the "doctrine of devils" does not signify the words of any devil, but the doctrine of the heathen concerning *demons,* and those phantasms they worshipped as gods.[31]

31 The phrase is from 1 Timothy 4:1.

36.3 Considering these two meanings of the *Word of God* as it is taken in Scripture, it is plain that in the latter sense (where it is taken for the doctrine of the Christian religion) the whole of Scripture is the Word of God, but not in the former sense. For example, though the words "I am the Lord your God," and so on to the end of the Ten Commandments, were spoken by God to Moses, the preface "God spoke these words and said" is to be understood as the words of the one who wrote the sacred history. The *Word of God,* taken for what he has spoken, is understood sometimes *properly,* sometimes *metaphorically. Properly,* as the words he has spoken to his prophets. *Metaphorically,* for his wisdom, power, and eternal decree in making the world. In this sense those *fiats*—"Let there be light," "Let there be a firmament," "Let us make man," and so on (Genesis 1)—are the Word of God. And in the same sense it is said (John 1:3), "All things were made by it, and without it was nothing made that was made"; and (Hebrews 1:3), "He upholds all things by the word of his power"—that is, by the power of his Word; that is, by his power. And (Hebrews 11:3)[32] "The worlds were framed by the word of God"; and many other places to the same effect. So also among the Latins, the name *fate* (*fatum*), which properly signifies "the word spoken," is taken in the same sense.[33]

36.4 Secondly, it is taken for the effect of his Word: that is to say, for the thing itself that is affirmed, commanded, threatened, or promised by his Word. So in Psalm 105:19, Joseph is said to have been kept in prison "until his word came"—that is, until what he had foretold to Pharaoh's butler (Genesis 40:13) about his being restored to his office had come to pass. For there "his word came" means that the thing itself had come to pass. So also (1 Kings 18:36) Elijah says to God, "I have done all these your words," instead of "I have done all these things at your word," or command. And in Jeremiah 17:15, "Where is the word of the Lord?" is put for "Where is the evil he threatened?" And in Ezekiel 12:28, "None of my words shall be delayed any longer":

32 *Fiat* is Latin for "let it be made," the Vulgate's word in Genesis 1.
33 Latin *fatum* comes from *fari,* "to speak."

by *words* are meant those *things* which God promised to his people. And in the New Testament (Matthew 24:35), "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away": that is, there is nothing I have promised or foretold that shall not come to pass. And it is in this sense that St. John the Evangelist—and, I think, St. John only—calls our Savior himself, as in the flesh, "the Word of God," as in John 1:14: "The Word was made flesh"; that is to say, the word or promise that Christ would come into the world, "who in the beginning was with God." That is to say, it was in the purpose of God the Father to send God the Son into the world, to enlighten men in the way of eternal life; but this was not put into execution, and actually made flesh, until then. So our Savior is there called "the Word" not because he was the promise, but because he was the thing promised. Those who take occasion from this place to call him commonly the *Verb* of God only make the text more obscure.[34] They might as well call him the Noun of God. For by *verb,* as by *noun,* men understand nothing but a part of speech—a sound, a noise—that neither affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promises, nor is any substance, bodily or spiritual. So it cannot be said to be either God or man, whereas our Savior is both. And this *Word,* which St. John in his Gospel says was with God, is called in his First Epistle (verse 1) "the Word of life," and (verse 2) "the eternal life, which was with the Father." So he can be called the *Word* in no other sense than the one in which he is called eternal life: that is, "he who has procured eternal life for us" by his coming in the flesh. So also in Revelation 19:13, the apostle, speaking of Christ clothed in a garment dipped in blood, says his name is "the Word of God." This is to be understood as if he had said his name was "He who came according to the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to his word and promises delivered by the prophets." So there is nothing here of the incarnation of a word, but of the incarnation of God the Son, who is therefore called "the Word" because his incarnation was

34 Latin *verbum* ("word") is the Vulgate's term in John 1; Hobbes objects to rendering it "Verb."

the fulfillment of the promise—in the same way that the Holy Spirit is called "the Promise."

36.5 There are also places in Scripture where the *Word of God* signifies words that agree with reason and equity, though sometimes spoken by someone who was neither a prophet nor a holy man. For Pharaoh Necho was an idolater; yet his words to the good King Josiah—advising him by messengers not to oppose him on his march against Carchemish—are said to have come from the mouth of God; and Josiah, not heeding them, was killed in the battle. This can be read in 2 Chronicles 35:21–23. It is true that as the same history is told in the First Book of Esdras, it was not Pharaoh but Jeremiah who spoke these words to Josiah from the mouth of the Lord. But we are to give credit to the canonical Scripture, whatever is written in the Apocrypha.[35]

36.6 The *Word of God* is also to be taken for the dictates of reason and equity when Scripture says it is written in man's heart, as in Psalm 36:31, Jeremiah 31:33, Deuteronomy 30:11 and 14, and many other similar places.[36]

WHAT A PROPHET IS

A prophet may be God's spokesman, a foreteller, or a speaker of incoherent words; God spoke through dreams and visions.

36.7 The name *prophet* in Scripture signifies sometimes *prolocutor* —that is, one who speaks from God to man, or from man to God —and sometimes *predictor,* a foreteller of things to come; and sometimes one who speaks incoherently, as people do when their minds are disordered. It is most often used in the sense of speaking from God to the people. So Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others were prophets. And in this sense the high priest was a prophet, for he alone went into the *Sanctum Sanctorum* to inquire of God, and was to declare his answer to the people. So when Caiaphas said it was expedient that one man should die for the people, St. John says (chapter 11, verse

35 1 Esdras 1:28 (Apocrypha).
36 Hobbes gives the Vulgate numbering; the verse is Psalm 37:31 in modern Bibles.

51), "He did not say this of himself, but being high priest that year, he prophesied that one man should die for the nation." Also those who taught the people in Christian congregations are said to prophesy (1 Corinthians 14:3). It is in a similar sense that God says to Moses concerning Aaron (Exodus 4:16), "He shall be your spokesman to the people; and he shall be to you as a mouth, and you shall be to him as God." What is here "spokesman" is (in chapter 7, verse 1) rendered "prophet": "See," says God, "I have made you a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron your brother shall be your prophet." In the sense of speaking from man to God, Abraham is called a prophet (Genesis 20:7), where God speaks to Abimelech in a dream in this way: "Now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a prophet, and shall pray for you." From this we may also gather that the name of prophet may, not improperly, be given to those in Christian churches who are called to say public prayers for the congregation. In the same sense, the prophets who came down from the high place (or hill of God) with a psaltery, a tambourine, a pipe, and a harp (1 Samuel 10:5–6 and verse 10), with Saul among them, are said to prophesy, in that they praised God publicly in that way. In a similar sense Miriam is called a prophetess (Exodus 15:20). So also it is to be taken in 1 Corinthians 11:4–5, where St. Paul says, "Every man who prays or prophesies with his head covered," and so on, "and every woman who prays or prophesies with her head uncovered." For prophecy in that place signifies no more than praising God in psalms and holy songs, which women might do in the church, though it was not lawful for them to speak to the congregation. And it is in this sense that the heathen poets who composed hymns and other kinds of poems in honor of their gods were called *vates* (prophets). This is well enough known to everyone versed in the books of the Gentiles, and is evident from Titus 1:12, where St. Paul says of the Cretans that a prophet of their own said they were liars. Not that St.[37] Paul took their poets for prophets; but he acknowledges that the

37 The line is attributed to the Cretan poet Epimenides.

word "prophet" was commonly used to mean those who celebrated the honor of God in verse.

36.8 When prophecy means prediction, or foretelling future contingencies, then not only were those prophets who were God's spokesmen and foretold to others the things God had foretold to them, but so were all those impostors who claim, with the help of familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination from past events and false causes, to foretell similar events in time to come. Of these (as I have already shown in Chapter 12 of this book) there are many kinds. With the common sort of men they gain a greater reputation for prophecy by one chance event that can be twisted to their purpose than they can lose again by any number of failures. Prophecy is not an art, nor (when it is taken for prediction) a permanent vocation, but an extraordinary and temporary employment from God, most often of good men, but sometimes also of the wicked. The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit and by it to have raised a phantasm of Samuel and foretold Saul's death, was not for that reason a prophetess. For she had no knowledge by which she could raise such a phantasm; nor does it appear that God commanded it to be raised. He only guided that imposture to be a means of Saul's terror and discouragement, and consequently of the defeat in which he fell.[38] As for incoherent speech, among the Gentiles it was taken for one kind of prophecy, because the prophets of their oracles, intoxicated by a spirit or vapor from the cave of the Pythian oracle at Delphi, were for the time really mad, and spoke like people who are mentally ill. A sense could be made of their loose words to fit any event, in the same way that all bodies are said to be made of *materia prima.* In Scripture I find it taken this way too (1 Samuel 18:10), in these words: "And the evil spirit came upon Saul, and he prophesied in the midst of the house."[39]

36.9 And although the word *prophet* has so many meanings in Scripture, the most frequent is the one in which it is taken for

38 1 Samuel 28.

39 *Materia prima,* "prime matter": in Scholastic philosophy, the formless matter that can take on any form.

someone to whom God speaks directly what the prophet is to say from him to some other man, or to the people. And here a question may be asked: in what manner does God speak to such a prophet? Can it properly be said (some may ask) that God has voice and language, when it cannot properly be said that he has a tongue or other organs, as a man has? The prophet David argues thus: "Shall he who made the eye not see?[40] or he who made the ear not hear?" But this may be said not (as usual) to signify God's nature, but to signify our intention to honor him. For *to see* and *to hear* are honorable attributes, and may be given to God to declare (as far as our capacity can conceive it) his almighty power. But if it were taken in the strict and proper sense, one might argue from his making all the other parts of man's body that he also had the same use of them that we have. Many of these would be so unseemly that it would be the greatest insult in the world to ascribe them to him. Therefore we are to interpret God's speaking to men directly as whatever way it is by which God makes them understand his will. And the ways he does this are many, and are to be sought only in Holy Scripture. There, though it is often said that God spoke to this or that person without declaring in what manner, there are also many places that give the signs by which they were to recognize his presence and command; and by these we may understand how he spoke to many of the rest.

36.10 In what manner God spoke to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah is not stated; nor how he spoke to Abraham, until he came out of his own country to Shechem in the land of Canaan. Then (Genesis 12:7) God is said to have *appeared* to him. So there is one way in which God made his presence manifest: by an *apparition,* or *vision.* And again (Genesis 15:1), the word of the Lord came to Abraham in a vision; that is to say, something appeared as a sign of God's presence, as God's messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham (Genesis 18:1) by an apparition of three angels; and to Abimelech in a dream (Genesis 20:3); to Lot by an apparition of two angels (Gen-

40 Psalm 94:9.

esis 19:1); and to Hagar by the apparition of one angel (Genesis 21:17); and to Abraham again by the apparition of a voice from heaven (Genesis 22:11); and to Isaac in the night, that is, in his sleep or by a dream (Genesis 26:24); and to Jacob in a dream (Genesis 18:12)—that is to say, in the words of the text, "Jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder," and so on—and in a vision of angels (Genesis 32:1). And to Moses (Exodus 3:2)[41] in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush. And after the time of Moses, wherever the Old Testament states how God spoke directly to man, he always spoke by a vision or a dream—as to Gideon, Samuel, Elijah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the prophets. And so he often did in the New Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the Evangelist in the Revelation.

36.11 Only to Moses did he speak in a more extraordinary manner, on Mount Sinai and in the Tabernacle; and to the high priest in the Tabernacle and in the *Sanctum Sanctorum* of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the high priests, were prophets of a more eminent place and degree in God's favor. And God himself declares in express words that to other prophets he spoke in dreams and visions, but to his servant Moses in the way a man speaks to his friend. The words are these (Numbers 12:6–8): "If there is a prophet among you, I the Lord will make myself known to him in a vision, and will speak to him in a dream. My servant Moses is not so, who is faithful in all my house. With him I will speak mouth to mouth, plainly, and not in dark speeches; and he shall behold the likeness of the Lord." And (Exodus 33:11), "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend." And yet this speaking of God to Moses was through the mediation of an angel or angels, as appears expressly in Acts 7:35 and 53, and Galatians 3:19. It was therefore a vision, though a clearer vision than was given to other prophets. And in agreement with this, where God says (Deuteronomy 13:1), "If there arises among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams," the latter phrase is only an interpretation of the

41 Jacob's ladder is Genesis 28:12 in modern Bibles.

former. And (Joel 2:28), "Your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions": where again the word *prophesy* is explained by *dream* and *vision.* And it was in the same way that God spoke to Solomon, promising him wisdom, riches, and honor; for the text says (1 Kings 3:15), "And Solomon awoke, and behold, it was a dream." So in general the extraordinary prophets of the Old Testament took notice of the Word of God in no other way than from their dreams or visions: that is to say, from the imaginations they had in their sleep or in an ecstasy. In every true prophet these imaginations were supernatural; but in false prophets they were either natural or feigned.

36.12 These same prophets were nevertheless said to speak by the Spirit, as in Zechariah 7:12, where the prophet, speaking of the Jews, says, "They made their hearts as hard as adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of hosts has sent in his Spirit by the former prophets." From this it is plain that speaking by the *Spirit,* or by *inspiration,* was not a particular manner of God's speaking, different from vision. For those who were said to speak by the Spirit were extraordinary prophets, who for every new message had to have a particular commission—or, what is the same thing, a new dream or vision.

36.13 Of the prophets in the Old Testament who were prophets by a perpetual calling, some were *supreme* and some *subordinate.* The supreme were, first, Moses; and after him the high priests, each for his time, as long as the priesthood was royal. And after the people of the Jews had rejected God, so that he should no longer reign over them, those kings who submitted themselves to God's government were also his chief prophets, and the high priest's office became ministerial. When God was to be consulted, the priests put on the holy vestments and inquired of the Lord as the king commanded them, and they were deprived of their office when the king thought fit. For King Saul (1 Samuel 13:9) commanded the burnt offering to be brought; and (1 Samuel 14:18) he commands the priest to bring the ark near him, and (verse 19) again to let it alone, because he saw an advantage

over his enemies. And in the same chapter Saul asks counsel of God. Likewise King David, after his anointing, though before he had possession of the kingdom, is said to "inquire of the Lord" (1 Samuel 23:2) whether he should fight against the Philistines at Keilah; and (verse 10) David commands the priest to bring him the ephod, to inquire whether he should stay in Keilah or not. And King Solomon (1 Kings 2:27) took the priesthood from Abiathar and gave it (verse 35) to Zadok. Therefore Moses, and the high priests, and the pious kings, who inquired of God on all extraordinary occasions how they were to conduct themselves or what outcome they would have, were all sovereign prophets. But in what manner God spoke to them is not clear. To say that when Moses went up to God on Mount Sinai it was a dream or vision, such as other prophets had, contradicts the distinction God made between Moses and other prophets (Numbers 12:6–8). To say God spoke or appeared as he is in his own nature is to deny his infinity, invisibility, and incomprehensibility. To say he spoke by inspiration, or infusion of the Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifies the Deity, is to make Moses equal with Christ, in whom alone the Godhead dwells bodily (as St. Paul says, Colossians 2:9). And lastly, to say he spoke by the Holy Spirit, as that signifies the graces or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing supernatural to him. For God disposes men to piety, justice, mercy, truth, faith, and every kind of virtue, both moral and intellectual, by teaching, by example, and by various natural and ordinary occasions.

36.14 And just as these ways cannot be applied to God in his speaking to Moses on Mount Sinai, so they cannot be applied to him in his speaking to the high priests from the mercy seat. Therefore the manner in which God spoke to those sovereign prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it was to inquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New Testament there was no sovereign prophet but our Savior, who was both God who spoke and the prophet to whom he spoke.

36.15 As for subordinate prophets of perpetual calling, I find no place that proves God spoke to them supernaturally, but only in

the way he naturally inclines all other Christian men to piety, to belief, to righteousness, and to other virtues. And this way, though it consists in temperament, instruction, education, and the occasions and inducements men have to Christian virtues, is truly attributed to the operation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit (which in our language we call the Holy Ghost). For there is no good inclination that is not of the operation of God. But these operations are not always supernatural. When a prophet is said to speak in the Spirit, or by the Spirit of God, therefore, we are to understand no more than that he speaks according to God's will, as declared by the supreme prophet. For the most common meaning of the word *spirit* is a man's intention, mind, or disposition.

36.16 In the time of Moses there were seventy men besides himself who *prophesied* in the camp of the Israelites. In what manner God spoke to them is declared in Numbers 11:25: "The Lord came down in a cloud and spoke to Moses, and took of the spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy elders. And it came to pass that when the spirit rested upon them, they prophesied, and did not cease." From this it is plain, first, that their prophesying to the people was subservient and subordinate to the prophesying of Moses. For God took of the spirit of Moses to put upon them, so that they prophesied as Moses wanted them to; otherwise they would not have been allowed to prophesy at all. For (verse 27) a complaint was made against them to Moses, and Joshua wanted Moses to forbid them. He did not, but said to Joshua, "Do not be jealous on my behalf." Secondly, it is plain that the Spirit of God in that place signifies nothing but the mind and disposition to obey and assist Moses in the administration of the government. For if it meant that they had the substantial Spirit of God—that is, the divine nature—breathed into them, then they had it in no less a manner than Christ himself, in whom alone the Spirit of God dwelt bodily. It is meant, therefore, of the gift and grace of God that guided them to cooperate with Moses, from whom their spirit was derived. And it appears (verse 16) that they were men whom Moses himself was to

appoint as elders and officers of the people. For the words are, "Gather to me seventy men, whom you know to be elders and officers of the people," where "you know" is the same as "you appoint," or "have appointed to be such." For we are told earlier (Exodus 18) that Moses, following the advice of Jethro his father-in-law, appointed judges and officers over the people, such as feared God. And of these were those seventy whom God, by putting Moses' spirit upon them, inclined to help Moses in the administration of the kingdom. And in this sense the Spirit of God is said (1 Samuel 16:13–14) to have come upon David immediately upon his anointing, and to have left Saul—God giving his graces to the one he chose to govern his people, and taking them away from the one he rejected. So by the Spirit is meant inclination to God's service, and not any supernatural revelation.

36.17 God also spoke many times by the outcome of lots, which were ordered by those he had put in authority over his people. So we read that by the lots Saul caused to be drawn (1 Samuel 14:43), God made known the fault Jonathan had committed in eating a honeycomb, contrary to the oath the people had taken. And (Joshua 18:10) God divided the land of Canaan among the Israelites by "the lots that Joshua cast before the Lord in Shiloh." It seems to have been in the same way that God uncovered the crime of Achan (Joshua 7:16 and following). And these are the ways in which God declared his will in the Old Testament.

36.18 He used all these ways in the New Testament as well. To the Virgin Mary, by a vision of an angel; to Joseph, in a dream; to Paul, on the road to Damascus, in a vision of our Savior; and to Peter, in the vision of a sheet let down from heaven with various sorts of flesh, of clean and unclean animals, and in prison by a vision of an angel; and to all the apostles and writers of the New Testament, by the graces of his Spirit; and to the apostles again, at the choosing of Matthias in place of Judas Iscariot, by lot.

JUDGING PROPHETS

False prophets outnumber true ones, so every man must use reason, and the sovereign is the chief prophet.

36.19 All prophecy, then, presupposes a vision or dream (which two, when they are natural, are the same), or some special gift of God so rarely observed in mankind as to be marveled at where it is observed. And such gifts, as well as the most extraordinary dreams and visions, may proceed from God not only by his supernatural and direct operation, but also by his natural operation and through secondary causes. So there is need of reason and judgment to discern between natural and supernatural gifts, and between natural and supernatural visions or dreams. And consequently men need to be very circumspect and wary in obeying the voice of a man who claims to be a prophet and requires us to obey God in the way that he, in God's name, tells us is the way to happiness. For he who claims to teach men the way to so great a felicity claims to govern them: that is to say, to rule and reign over them. This is something all men naturally desire, and it therefore deserves to be suspected of ambition and imposture. Consequently it ought to be examined and tested by every man before he yields them obedience—unless he has already yielded it to them in the institution of a commonwealth, as when the prophet is the civil sovereign, or is authorized by the civil sovereign. And if this examination of prophets and spirits were not allowed to every one of the people, there would have been no point in setting out the marks by which every man might distinguish between those they ought to follow and those they ought not. Such marks are set out, therefore (Deuteronomy 13:1 and following), to know a prophet by, and (1 John 4:1 and following) to know a spirit by. And seeing there is so much prophesying in the Old Testament, and so much preaching in the New Testament against prophets, and ordinarily so much greater a number of false prophets than true ones, everyone is to beware of obeying their directions at his own peril. And first, that there

were many more false prophets than true ones appears from this: when Ahab consulted four hundred prophets (1 Kings 12), they were all false impostors except one, Micaiah. And a little before the time of the Captivity, the prophets were generally liars. "The prophets," says the Lord through Jeremiah (chapter 14, verse 14), "prophesy lies in my name. I did not send them, nor have I commanded them, nor spoken to them. They prophesy to you a false vision, a thing of nothing, and the deceit of their heart." So much so that God commanded the people by the mouth of the prophet Jeremiah (23:16) not to obey them:[42] "Thus says the Lord of hosts: Do not listen to the words of the prophets who prophesy to you. They make you vain; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord."

36.20 In the time of the Old Testament, then, there were such quarrels among the visionary prophets—one contending with another and asking, "When did the Spirit leave me, to go to you?", as between Micaiah and the rest of the four hundred—and such giving each other the lie (as in Jeremiah 14:14); and there are such controversies in the New Testament today among the spiritual prophets. Every man therefore was then, and is now, bound to make use of his natural reason, to apply to all prophecy those rules which God has given us to discern the true from the false. Of these rules in the Old Testament, one was a doctrine conforming to what Moses, the sovereign prophet, had taught them; and the other was the miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to pass, as I have already shown from Deuteronomy 13:1 and following. And in the New Testament there was only one mark, and that was the preaching of this doctrine: *that Jesus is the Christ*—that is, the King of the Jews promised in the Old Testament. Whoever denied that article was a false prophet, whatever miracles he might seem to work; and whoever taught it was a true prophet. For St. John (First Epistle, 4:2 and following), speaking expressly of the means of examining spirits, whether they are of God or not, after telling them that false prophets would arise, says this: "By this you know the

42 Hobbes's "1 Kings 12" is a slip; the episode is 1 Kings 22.

Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God." That is, he is approved and allowed as a prophet of God—not that he is a godly man, or one of the elect, because he confesses, professes, or preaches Jesus to be the Christ, but because he is an acknowledged prophet. For God sometimes speaks through prophets whose persons he has not accepted, as he did through Balaam, and as he foretold Saul's death to him through the witch of Endor. Again, in the next verse: "Every spirit that does not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is not of Christ; and this is the spirit of Antichrist." So the rule is complete on both sides: he is a true prophet who preaches that the Messiah has already come in the person of Jesus; and he is a false one who denies that he has come and looks for him in some future impostor who will falsely take that honor upon himself—the one the apostle there properly calls Antichrist. Every man therefore ought to consider who is the sovereign prophet: that is to say, who is God's vicegerent on earth, and has, next under God, the authority of governing Christian men. He ought to observe as a rule the doctrine which that sovereign, in the name of God, has commanded to be taught, and by it to examine and test the truth of the doctrines that pretended prophets, with miracles or without, shall at any time put forward. And if they find a doctrine contrary to that rule, they should do as those did who came to Moses and complained that some were prophesying in the camp whose authority to do so they doubted: leave it to the sovereign, as they left it to Moses, to uphold or forbid them as he sees cause. If he disavows them, they should no longer obey their voice; if he approves them, they should obey them as men to whom God has given a part of the spirit of their sovereign. For when Christian men do not take their Christian sovereign for God's prophet, they must either take their own dreams for the prophecy they mean to be governed by, and the swelling of their own hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must let themselves be led by some foreign prince, or by some of their fellow subjects who can bewitch them into rebellion by slandering the government, with no

other miracle to confirm their calling than, sometimes, an extraordinary success and impunity. And by this means, destroying all laws, both divine and human, they reduce all order, government, and society to the original chaos of violence and civil war.

CHAPTER 37: OF MIRACLES AND THEIR USE

A miracle is a work of God, beyond nature, done to show his elect that a messenger is sent.

37.1 By *miracles* are signified the marvelous works of God; and so they are also called *wonders.* And because they are for the most part done to signify his command on occasions when, without them, men are apt to doubt (following their own private natural reasoning) what he has commanded and what not, they are commonly called in Holy Scripture *signs*—in the same sense in which the Latins call them *ostenta* and *portenta,* from showing and signifying beforehand what the Almighty is about to bring to pass.

37.2 To understand what a miracle is, therefore, we must first understand what works men wonder at and call marvelous. There are only two things that make men wonder at any event. One is if it is strange: that is, such that its like has never, or very rarely, been produced. The other is if, when it has been produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by natural means, but only by the direct hand of God. But when we see some possible natural cause of it, however rarely the like has been done; or if the like has often been done, however impossible it is to imagine a natural means for it, we no longer wonder at it or consider it a miracle.

37.3 Therefore, if a horse or a cow were to speak, it would be a miracle, because the thing is strange and its natural cause hard to imagine. So also would it be to see a strange deviation of nature in the production of some new shape of living creature. But when a man or other animal begets its like, though we know no more how this is done than how the other would be, still,

because it is usual, it is no miracle. In the same way, if a man is transformed into a stone or into a pillar, it is a miracle, because it is strange. But if a piece of wood is changed in that way, it is no miracle, because we see it often. And yet we know no more by what operation of God the one is brought to pass than the other.[43]

37.4 The first rainbow ever seen in the world was a miracle, because it was the first, and consequently strange; and it served as a sign from God, placed in heaven, to assure his people that there would be no more universal destruction of the world by water. But today, because rainbows are frequent, they are not miracles, either to those who know their natural causes or to those who do not. Again, there are many rare works produced by human art; yet when we know they are done, since we thereby also know the means by which they are done, we do not count them miracles, because they are wrought not by the direct hand of God but by human industry.

37.5 Furthermore, since admiration and wonder follow from the knowledge and experience men are endowed with, some more, some less, it follows that the same thing may be a miracle to one person and not to another. And hence it is that ignorant and superstitious men make great wonders of works which other men, knowing they proceed from nature (which is not the direct but the ordinary work of God), do not marvel at at all. So eclipses of the sun and moon have been taken for supernatural works by the common people, when there were nevertheless others who could have foretold, from their natural causes, the very hour they would arrive. Or when a man, through collusion and secret information, learns of the private actions of an ignorant, unwary man and then tells him what he has done in the past, it seems to him a miraculous thing. But among wise and cautious men such miracles cannot easily be done.

37.6 Again, it belongs to the nature of a miracle that it is wrought to procure credit for God's messengers, ministers, and prophets, so that men may know they are called, sent, and

43 Hobbes is thinking of Lot's wife (Genesis 19:26) and of petrified wood.

employed by God, and may thereby be better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though the creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living creatures in the universal Flood, were marvelous works, they are not usually called miracles, because they were not done to procure credit for any prophet or other minister of God. For however marvelous any work may be, the wonder lies not in the fact that it could be done—since men naturally believe the Almighty can do all things—but in the fact that he does it at the prayer or word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt by the hand of Moses were properly miracles, because they were done with the intention of making the people of Israel believe that Moses came to them not out of any design of his own interest, but as sent from God. Therefore, after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites from Egyptian bondage, and he said, "They will not believe me, but will say, The Lord has not appeared to you," God gave him power to turn the rod he had in his hand into a serpent, and back again into a rod; and by putting his hand into his bosom to make it leprous, and by taking it out again to make it whole—to make the children of Israel believe (as verse 5 says) that the God of their fathers had appeared to him. And if that were not enough, he gave him power to turn their waters into blood.[44] And when he had done these miracles before the people, it is said (verse 41) that "they believed him." Nevertheless, for fear of Pharaoh, they did not yet dare to obey him. Therefore the other works done to plague Pharaoh and the Egyptians all tended to make the Israelites believe in Moses, and were properly miracles. In the same way, if we consider all the miracles done by the hand of Moses and all the rest of the prophets until the Captivity, and those of our Savior and his apostles afterward, we shall find that their purpose was always to create or confirm the belief that they came not of their own motion but were sent by God.[45] We may further observe in Scripture that the purpose of miracles was to create belief not universally in all men, elect

44 Exodus 4:1–9.

45 The verse is Exodus 4:31.

and reprobate, but in the elect only: that is to say, in those God had determined should become his subjects. For those miraculous plagues of Egypt did not have as their purpose the conversion of Pharaoh. God had told Moses beforehand that he would harden Pharaoh's heart so that he would not let the people go; and when at last he did let them go, it was not the miracles that persuaded him, but the plagues that forced him to it. So also it is written of our Savior (Matthew 13:58) that he did not work many miracles in his own country, because of their unbelief; and in Mark 6:5, instead of "he did not work many," it says "he could work none." This was not because he lacked the power—to say that would be blasphemy against God. Nor was it because the purpose of miracles was not to convert unbelieving men to Christ—for the purpose of all the miracles of Moses, of the prophets, of our Savior, and of his apostles was to add men to the Church. It was because the purpose of their miracles was to add to the Church not all men, but those who were to be saved: that is to say, those whom God had elected. Since our Savior was sent from his Father, therefore, he could not use his power in the conversion of those whom his Father had rejected. Those who, expounding this place in St. Mark, say that the words "he could not" are put for "he would not," do so without any precedent in the Greek language. (In Greek "would not" is sometimes put for "could not," in inanimate things that have no will; but "could not" for "would not," never.) And they thereby lay a stumbling block before weak Christians, as if Christ could do no miracles except among the credulous.

37.7 From what I have set down here about the nature and use of a miracle, we may define it thus: *A miracle is a work of God (other than his operation by way of nature, ordained in the Creation), done to make manifest to his elect the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation.*

37.8 And from this definition we may infer, first, that in all miracles the work done is not the effect of any power in the prophet, because it is the effect of the direct hand of God. That is

to say, God has done it without using the prophet in it as a subordinate cause.

37.9 Secondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit can do a miracle. For it must be done either by virtue of some natural knowledge, or by incantation, that is, by virtue of words. If the enchanters do it by their own independent power, there is some power that does not proceed from God, which all men deny. And if they do it by power given to them, then the work is not from the direct hand of God, but natural, and consequently no miracle.

ENCHANTMENT AND IMPOSTURE

Apparent wonders by enchantment are deceptions of the spectator; the sovereign judges whether a miracle is real.

37.10 There are some texts of Scripture that seem to attribute the power of working wonders (equal to some of the direct miracles wrought by God himself) to certain arts of magic and incantation. For example, we read that after the rod of Moses, cast on the ground, became a serpent, "the magicians of Egypt did the same with their enchantments"; and that after Moses had turned the waters of the Egyptian streams, rivers, ponds, and pools into blood, "the magicians of Egypt did so likewise with their enchantments"; and that after Moses had by the power of God brought frogs upon the land, "the magicians also did so with their enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt." Will a man not be apt to attribute miracles to enchantments—that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of words—and think this very well proved from these and other such places?[46] And yet there is no place in Scripture that tells us what an enchantment is. If, therefore, enchantment is not, as many think, a working of strange effects by spells and words, but imposture and delusion wrought by ordinary means—so far from supernatural that the impostors need not so much as the study of natural causes to do it, but only the ordinary ignorance,

46 Exodus 7:11–12, 7:22, and 8:7.

stupidity, and superstition of mankind—then those texts that seem to support the power of magic, witchcraft, and enchantment must necessarily have another sense than the one they seem to bear at first sight.

37.11 For it is evident enough that words have no effect except on those who understand them; and then they have no other effect than to signify the intentions or passions of those who speak, and thereby produce hope, fear, or other passions or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore, when a rod seems to be a serpent, or water blood, or any other miracle seems to be done by enchantment, then, if it is not for the edification of God's people, it is not the rod, nor the water, nor anything else that is enchanted—that is to say, worked upon by the words—but the spectator. So the whole miracle consists in this: that the enchanter has deceived a man. And that is no miracle, but a very easy thing to do.

37.12 For such is the ignorance and proneness to error of all men generally, but especially of those who have little knowledge of natural causes and of the nature and interests of men, that they can be deceived by innumerable easy tricks. What reputation for miraculous power might a man have gained, before it was known that there was a science of the course of the stars, if he had told the people, "At this hour, or on this day, the sun shall be darkened"? A juggler, by handling his cups and other trinkets, would, if it were not now commonly practiced, be thought to do his wonders at least by the power of the Devil.[47] A man who has practiced speaking by drawing in his breath (men of this kind were called in ancient times *ventriloqui*), and so making the weakness of his voice seem to come not from the weak impulse of the organs of speech but from a distance, is able to make a great many people believe it is a voice from heaven, whatever he pleases to tell them. And for a crafty man who has looked into the secrets and intimate confessions that one man ordinarily makes to another about his past actions and adventures, it is no hard matter to tell them back to him; and yet

47 A juggler in Hobbes's day was a performer of sleight of hand.

there are many who by such means obtain the reputation of being conjurors. But it would be too long a business to list the various sorts of men whom the Greeks called *thaumaturgi,* that is to say, workers of wonderful things; and yet these do everything they do by their own individual dexterity. But if we look at the impostures wrought by collusion, there is nothing so impossible to be done that it is impossible to be believed. For two men conspiring—one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm—will deceive many; but many conspiring—one to seem lame, another to cure him in this way, and all the rest to bear witness—will deceive many more.

37.13 Given this tendency of mankind to give too hasty belief to pretended miracles, there can be no better caution—nor, I think, any other—than the one God prescribed, first through Moses (as I said in the preceding chapter), at the beginning of chapter 13 and the end of chapter 18 of Deuteronomy: that we take no one for a prophet who teaches any religion other than the one established by God's lieutenant (who at that time was Moses), nor anyone (even if he teaches the same religion) whose prediction we do not see come to pass. So before we give credit to a pretended miracle or prophet, we must consult Moses in his time, Aaron and his successors in theirs, and in all times the sovereign governor of God's people, next under God himself—that is, the head of the Church—as to what doctrine he has established. And when that is done, as for the thing they claim to be a miracle, we must both see it done and use every possible means to consider whether it is really done; and not only that, but whether it is such that no man could do the like by his natural power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God. In this too we must have recourse to God's lieutenant, to whom we have submitted our private judgments in all doubtful cases. For example, suppose a man claims that after certain words are spoken over a piece of bread, God has at once made it not bread but a god, or a man, or both—and yet it still looks as much like bread as it ever did. There is no reason for anyone to think it really done, nor consequently to fear him, until he inquires of

God, through his vicar or lieutenant, whether it is done or not. If the lieutenant says no, then what Moses says follows (Deuteronomy 18:22): "He has spoken it presumptuously; you shall not fear him." If he says it is done, then the man is not to contradict it. So also, if we do not see a miracle but only hear it reported, we are to consult the lawful Church—that is, its lawful head—as to how far we are to give credit to those who report it. And this is chiefly the case of men who in these days live under Christian sovereigns. For in these times I do not know a single man who ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm or at the word or prayer of a man, that someone endowed with even a moderate degree of reason would think supernatural. And the question is no longer whether what we see done is a miracle, or whether the miracle we hear or read of was a real work and not the act of a tongue or a pen, but in plain terms whether the report is true or a lie. In this question none of us is to make our own private reason or conscience the judge, but the public reason—that is, the reason of God's supreme lieutenant. And indeed we have already made him judge, if we have given him a sovereign power to do all that is necessary for our peace and defense. A private man always has the liberty (because thought is free) to believe or not believe in his heart the acts that have been given out as miracles, according as he sees what benefit may come, through men's belief, to those who claim or support them, and so to conjecture whether they are miracles or lies. But when it comes to the confession of that faith, private reason must submit to public reason—that is to say, to God's lieutenant. But who this lieutenant of God and head of the Church is will be considered in its proper place hereafter.

CHAPTER 38: OF ETERNAL LIFE, HELL, SALVATION, AND REDEMPTION

Rewards and punishments beyond death matter for civil peace; eternal life will be on earth after the resurrection.

38.1 The maintenance of civil society depends on justice, and justice on the power of life and death, and on other lesser

rewards and punishments, residing in those who hold the sovereignty of the commonwealth. So a commonwealth cannot possibly stand where anyone other than the sovereign has the power of giving greater rewards than life and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now, since *eternal life* is a greater reward than *the present life*, and *eternal torment* a greater punishment than *natural death*, it is well worth the careful consideration of all men who wish (by obeying authority) to avoid the calamities of confusion and civil war: what is meant in Holy Scripture by *eternal life* and *eternal torment*; for what offenses, and against whom committed, men are to be *eternally tormented*; and for what actions they are to obtain *eternal life*.

38.2 First, we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life that, had he not broken God's commandment, he would have enjoyed it everlastingly in the Paradise of Eden. For the *tree of life* was there, and he was allowed to eat of it for as long as he refrained from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which was not allowed him. And therefore, as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, "lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live forever." From this it seems to me that Adam, if he had not sinned, would have had eternal life on earth, and that mortality entered upon him and his posterity by his first sin. (In this, as in all questions whose determination depends on the Scriptures, I nevertheless submit to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the commonwealth whose subject I am.) Not that actual death entered then, for then Adam could never have had children; whereas he lived long afterward and saw a numerous posterity before he died. But where it is said, "In the day that you eat of it, you shall surely die," it must be meant of his mortality and the certainty of his death. Since, then, eternal life was lost by Adam's forfeit in committing sin, whoever was to cancel that forfeit was thereby to recover that life again. Now Jesus Christ has made satisfaction for the sins of all who believe in him, and has therefore recovered for all believers that *eternal life* which was lost by the sin of Adam. And it is in this sense that the comparison of St.

Paul holds (Romans 5:18–19): "As by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life." This is delivered again, more plainly, in these words (1 Corinthians 15:21–22): "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

38.3 As to the place where men are to enjoy the eternal life that Christ has obtained for them, the texts just cited seem to put it on earth. For if, as in Adam all die—that is, have forfeited Paradise and eternal life on earth—even so in Christ all shall be made alive, then all men shall be made to live on earth; otherwise the comparison would not be apt. With this the Psalmist seems to agree (Psalm 133:3): "Upon Zion God commanded the blessing, even life for evermore"; for Zion is in Jerusalem, on earth. So too does St. John (Revelation 2:7): "To him that overcomes I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God." This was the tree of Adam's eternal life; but his life was to have been on earth. The same seems to be confirmed again by St. John (Revelation 21:2), where he says, "I John saw the holy city, New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband"; and again in verse 10, to the same effect. It is as if he said that the New Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, would at the second coming of Christ come down from heaven to God's people, and not that they would go up to it from earth. And this differs in nothing from what the two men in white clothing (that is, the two angels) said to the apostles who were watching Christ ascend (Acts 1:11): "This same Jesus, who is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come as you have seen him go up into heaven." That sounds as if they had said he would come down to govern them, under his Father, eternally here, and not take them up to govern them in heaven. It is consistent with the restoration of the Kingdom of God instituted under Moses, which was a political government of the Jews on earth. Again, that saying of our Savior (Matthew 22:30), "that in the resurrection they neither

marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven," is a description of an eternal life resembling, in the point of marriage, the one we lost in Adam. For since Adam and Eve, if they had not sinned, would have lived on earth eternally in their own individual persons, it is evident that they would not have gone on procreating their kind continually. For if immortals had reproduced as mankind does now, in a short time the earth would not have been able to give them room to stand on. The Jews who asked our Savior whose wife the woman who had married many brothers would be in the resurrection did not know what the consequences of eternal life were. And therefore our Savior reminds them of this consequence of immortality: that there will be no generation, and consequently no marriage, any more than there is marriage or generation among the angels. The comparison between the eternal life that Adam lost and the one our Savior has recovered by his victory over death also holds in this: just as Adam lost eternal life by his sin and yet lived for a time afterward, so the faithful Christian has recovered eternal life by Christ's passion, though he dies a natural death and remains dead for a time—namely, until the resurrection. For as death is reckoned from Adam's condemnation, not from its execution, so life is reckoned from the absolution, not from the resurrection, of those who are elected in Christ.

38.4 That the place where men are to live eternally after the resurrection is the heavens—meaning by heaven those parts of the world most remote from the earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars in another, higher heaven called the *Coelum Empyreum* (of which there is no mention in Scripture and no ground in reason)—is not easily drawn from any text that I can find.[48] By the Kingdom of Heaven is meant the kingdom of the King who dwells in heaven; and his kingdom was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the prophets, his lieutenants—first Moses, and after him Eleazar and the sovereign priests—until in the days of Samuel they rebelled and wanted a mortal man for

48 The Empyrean, in medieval cosmology the highest heaven beyond the spheres of the stars, the dwelling of God and the blessed.

their king, in the manner of other nations. And when our Savior Christ, by the preaching of his ministers, has persuaded the Jews to return and called the Gentiles to his obedience, then there will be a new Kingdom of Heaven, because our King will then be God, whose *throne* is heaven—without any necessity evident in Scripture that man shall ascend to his happiness any higher than God's *footstool*, the earth. On the contrary, we find it written (John 3:13) that "no man has ascended into heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man, who is in heaven." Here I observe in passing that these words are not, like those that go just before them, the words of our Savior, but of St. John himself; for Christ was then not in heaven but on earth. The like is said of David (Acts 2:34), where St. Peter, to prove the ascension of Christ, uses the words of the Psalmist (Psalm 16:10), "You will not leave my soul in hell, nor allow your Holy One to see corruption," and says they were spoken not of David but of Christ; and to prove it he adds this reason: "For David has not ascended into heaven." But to this a man may easily answer that, though their bodies were not to ascend until the general Day of Judgment, their souls were in heaven as soon as they had departed from their bodies. This also seems to be confirmed by the words of our Savior (Luke 20:37–38), who, proving the resurrection from the words of Moses, says: "That the dead are raised, even Moses showed at the bush, when he calls the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for all live to him." But if these words are to be understood only of the immortality of the soul, they do not prove at all what our Savior meant to prove, which was the resurrection of the body—that is to say, the immortality of the man. Therefore our Savior means that those patriarchs were immortal, not by a property following from the essence and nature of mankind, but by the will of God, who was pleased of his mere grace to bestow *eternal life* on the faithful. And though at that time the patriarchs and many other faithful men were *dead*, yet, as the text says, they *lived to God*; that is, they were written in the Book of Life with those who were

absolved of their sins and ordained to eternal life at the resurrection. That the soul of man is in its own nature eternal, and a living creature independent of the body, or that any mere man is immortal otherwise than by the resurrection on the last day (except Enoch and Elijah), is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole fourteenth chapter of Job, which is the speech not of his friends but of Job himself, is a complaint of this mortality of nature, and yet no contradiction of the immortality at the resurrection. "There is hope of a tree," he says (verse 7),[49] "if it is cast down, though its root grows old and its stock dies in the ground, yet when it scents water it will bud and bring forth boughs like a plant. But man dies and wastes away; yes, man gives up the ghost, and where is he?" And (verse 12): "Man lies down and does not rise, till the heavens are no more." But when is it that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter tells us that it is at the general resurrection. For in his Second Epistle, chapter 3, verse 7, he says that "the heavens and the earth that are now are reserved for fire against the Day of Judgment and the perdition of ungodly men"; and (verse 12) "looking for and hastening to the coming of God, when the heavens shall be on fire and shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat. Nevertheless we, according to the promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, in which righteousness dwells." Therefore, where Job says man does not rise till the heavens are no more, it is the same as if he had said that immortal life (and in Scripture soul and life usually signify the same thing) does not begin in man until the resurrection and the Day of Judgment, and has for its cause not his specific nature and generation, but the promise. For St. Peter does not say, "We look for new heavens and a new earth" from nature, but from promise.

38.5 Lastly, it has already been proved from various evident passages of Scripture, in chapter 35 of this book, that the Kingdom of God is a civil commonwealth, where God himself is sov-

49 Hobbes writes "Enos," but he evidently means Enoch, who "was not, for God took him" (Genesis 5:24); Elijah ("Elias") was taken up into heaven in a whirlwind (2 Kings 2:11).

ereign by virtue first of the *old* covenant and since of the *new*, in which he reigns by his vicar or lieutenant. The same passages therefore also prove that after our Savior comes again in his majesty and glory to reign actually and eternally, the Kingdom of God is to be on earth. But because this doctrine (though proved from passages of Scripture neither few nor obscure) will appear a novelty to most men, I only propose it. I maintain nothing in this or in any other paradox of religion, but await the end of that dispute of the sword, not yet decided among my countrymen, concerning the authority by which all sorts of doctrine are to be approved or rejected—the authority whose commands, both spoken and written (whatever the opinions of private men), must be obeyed by all who mean to be protected by its laws.[50] For the points of doctrine concerning the Kingdom of God have so great an influence on the kingdom of man that they are not to be determined except by those who, under God, have the sovereign power.

HELL AND ITS TORMENTS

Scripture's places of damnation are metaphors; the wicked suffer a second death rather than eternal life in torment.

38.6 Like the Kingdom of God and eternal life, God's enemies too, and their torments after judgment, appear from Scripture to have their place on earth. The place where all men who were either buried or swallowed up by the earth remain until the resurrection is usually called in Scripture by words that signify *underground*. The Latins generally render these *Infernus* and *Inferi*, and the Greeks *Hades*—that is, a place where men cannot see. It includes the grave as well as any other deeper place. But the place of the damned after the resurrection is not fixed in either the Old or the New Testament by any mark of location, but only by the company: namely, that it shall be where such wicked men were as God in former times destroyed from the face of the earth in an extraordinary and miraculous manner.

50 Hobbes was writing in 1650–51, at the end of the English Civil Wars.

For example, they are said to be *in Inferno*, in *Tartarus*, or in the bottomless pit, because Korah, Dathan, and Abiram were swallowed up alive into the earth.[51] Not that the writers of Scripture would have us believe that there could be, in the globe of the earth—which is not only finite but also (compared with the height of the stars) of no considerable size—a pit without a bottom, that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their *demonology* (that is, their doctrine concerning *demons*), and the Romans after them, called *Tartarus*. Of it Virgil says:

38.7 "Twice as far it gapes, sheer down, and stretches under the shades, / as the upward gaze to the heavenly Olympus of the sky"—[52]

38.8 for that is something the proportion of the earth to the heavens cannot allow. But they would have us believe the damned are there, indefinitely: wherever those men are on whom God inflicted that exemplary punishment.

38.9 Again, the mighty men of the earth who lived in the time of Noah, before the flood (whom the Greeks called *heroes* and Scripture *giants*, and whom both say were begotten by the union of the children of God with the children of men), were destroyed for their wicked lives by the general deluge. So the place of the damned is also sometimes marked out by the company of those dead giants, as in Proverbs 21:16: "The man that wanders out of the way of understanding shall remain in the congregation of the giants"; and Job 26:5: "Behold, the giants groan under water, and those that dwell with them." Here the place of the damned is under the water. And Isaiah 14:9: "Hell is troubled how to meet you" (that is, the king of Babylon) "and will displace the giants for you." And here again the place of the damned (if the sense is literal) is to be under water.

38.10 Third, because the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were consumed with fire and brimstone for their wickedness by the extraordinary wrath of God, and the country around them was made, along with them, into a stinking lake of pitch, the place of

51 Numbers 16:31–33.

52 Virgil, *Aeneid* 6.578–579 (Hobbes quotes the Latin, *Bis patet in praeceps* ...).

the damned is sometimes expressed by fire and a fiery lake, as in Revelation 21:8: "But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and fornicators, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake that burns with fire and brimstone, which is the second death." So it is evident that hellfire, which is expressed here by a metaphor taken from the real fire of Sodom, does not signify any definite kind or place of torment, but is to be taken indefinitely, for destruction—as it is in chapter 20, at the fourteenth verse, where it is said that "Death and Hell were cast into the lake of fire": that is, were abolished and destroyed—as if after the Day of Judgment there shall be no more dying, and no more going into hell; that is, no more going to *Hades* (from which word perhaps our word *hell* is derived), which is the same as no more dying.[53]

38.11 Fourth, from the plague of darkness inflicted on the Egyptians, of which it is written (Exodus 10:23), "They saw not one another, neither did any man rise from his place for three days; but all the children of Israel had light in their dwellings," the place of the wicked after judgment is called *utter darkness*, or (as it is in the original) *darkness outside*. So it is expressed in Matthew 22:13, where the king commands his servants "to bind hand and foot the man who did not have on a wedding garment, and to cast him out," *eis to skotos to exōteron*—into *external darkness*, or *darkness outside*. Though this is translated *utter darkness*, it signifies not *how great* that darkness is to be, but *where*: namely, *outside the dwelling* of God's elect.[54]

38.12 Lastly, there was a place near Jerusalem called the *Valley of the Children of Hinnom*. In one part of it, called *Tophet*, the Jews had committed the most grievous idolatry, sacrificing their children to the idol Moloch. There also God had afflicted his enemies with most grievous punishments, and there Josiah had burned the priests of Moloch on their own altars, as appears at

53 The guess is wrong: "hell" comes from an Old English word meaning a hidden or covered place.

54 "Utter" in the King James Version meant "outer"; Hobbes's point is that the phrase marks a place, not a degree.

length in 2 Kings 23. The place afterward served to receive the filth and garbage carried there out of the city, and fires used to be made there from time to time to purify the air and take away the stench of carrion. From this abominable place the Jews ever afterward used to call the place of the damned by the name of *Gehenna*, or the *Valley of Hinnom*. And this *Gehenna* is the word now usually translated *hell*; and from the fires burning there from time to time we have the notion of *everlasting* and *unquenchable fire*.

38.13 Now, since no one interprets Scripture to mean that after the Day of Judgment the wicked are all to be eternally punished in the Valley of Hinnom; or that they shall rise again so as to be forever after under ground or under water; or that after the resurrection they shall no longer see one another or stir from one place to another—it follows, it seems to me, quite necessarily, that what is said in this way about hellfire is spoken metaphorically. There is therefore a proper sense to be inquired after (for every metaphor has some real ground that may be expressed in proper words), both of the *place* of *hell* and of the nature of *hellish torments* and *tormentors*.

38.14 First, as for the tormentors, their nature and properties are exactly and properly conveyed by their names: *the Enemy*, or *Satan*; *the Accuser*, or *Diabolus*; *the Destroyer*, or *Abaddon*. These meaningful names—*Satan*, *Devil*, *Abaddon*—do not set before us any individual person, as proper names do, but only an office or quality. They are therefore appellatives (common nouns), which ought not to have been left untranslated, as they are in the Latin and modern Bibles; for that makes them seem to be the proper names of *demons*, and men are the more easily seduced into believing the doctrine of devils, which at that time was the religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses and of Christ.

38.15 And because by the *Enemy*, the *Accuser*, and the *Destroyer* is meant the enemy of those who will be in the Kingdom of God, it follows that if the Kingdom of God after the resurrection is on earth (as I have shown from Scripture in the preceding chapter that it seems to be), the Enemy and his kingdom must be on

earth also. For so it was also in the time before the Jews had deposed God. God's kingdom was in Palestine, and the nations round about were the kingdoms of the Enemy; and consequently by *Satan* is meant any earthly enemy of the Church.

38.16 The torments of hell are expressed sometimes by *weeping and gnashing of teeth*, as in Matthew 8:12; sometimes by *the worm of conscience*, as in Isaiah 66:24 and Mark 9:44, 46, 48; sometimes by *fire*, as in the passage just cited, "where the worm does not die, and the fire is not quenched," and in many other places; sometimes by *shame and contempt*, as in Daniel 12:2: "And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." All these passages metaphorically designate a grief and discontent of mind at the sight of that eternal felicity in others which they themselves have lost through their own unbelief and disobedience. And because such felicity in others is not felt except by comparison with their own actual miseries, it follows that they are to suffer such bodily pains and calamities as befall those who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but also have as their enemy the eternal King of the saints, God Almighty. And among these bodily pains is also to be reckoned, for every one of the wicked, a second death. For though Scripture is clear for a universal resurrection, we do not read that eternal life is promised to any of the reprobate. For St. Paul (1 Corinthians 15:42–43), answering the question of what bodies men shall rise again with, says that "the body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power." Glory and power cannot be applied to the bodies of the wicked. Nor can the name of *second death* be applied to those who can never die more than once. And although in metaphorical speech a calamitous everlasting life may be called an everlasting death, it cannot well be understood as a *second death*. The fire prepared for the wicked is an everlasting fire: that is to say, the state in which no one can be without torture, both of body and of mind, after the resurrection, shall endure forever; and in that sense

the fire shall be unquenchable and the torments everlasting. But it cannot be inferred from this that whoever is cast into that fire, or tormented with those torments, shall endure and resist them in such a way as to be eternally burned and tortured, and yet never be destroyed or die. And though there are many passages that affirm everlasting fire and torments (into which men may be cast one after another, in succession, forever), I find none that affirms there shall be an eternal life in them for any individual person—but on the contrary, an everlasting death, which is the second death: "For after Death and the Grave have delivered up the dead who were in them, and every man is judged according to his works, Death and the Grave shall also be cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death." By this it is evident that there is to be a second death of everyone who is condemned on the Day of Judgment, after which he shall die no more.[55]

SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION

Salvation will be on earth at Jerusalem; redemption is the ransom God chose to accept, not an equivalent payment.

38.17 The joys of eternal life are all comprehended in Scripture under the name of *salvation*, or *being saved*. To be saved is to be made secure, either relatively, against particular evils, or absolutely, against all evil, including want, sickness, and death itself. And because man was created in an immortal condition, not subject to corruption, and consequently not subject to anything that tends to the dissolution of his nature, and fell from that happiness by the sin of Adam, it follows that to be *saved* from sin is to be saved from all the evil and calamities that sin has brought upon us. And therefore in Holy Scripture remission of sin and salvation from death and misery are the same thing. This appears from the words of our Savior, who, having cured a man sick of the palsy by saying (Matthew 9:2), "Son, be of good cheer; your sins are forgiven you," and knowing that the scribes

55 Revelation 20:13–14, paraphrased.

took it for blasphemy that a man should claim to forgive sins, asked them (verse 5) "whether it was easier to say, Your sins are forgiven you, or, Arise and walk." He signified by this that, as to saving the sick man, it was all one to say "Your sins are forgiven" and "Arise and walk," and that he used that form of speech only to show that he had power to forgive sins. And it is evident to reason besides that, since death and misery were the punishments of sin, the discharge of sin must also be a discharge from death and misery: that is to say, absolute salvation, such as the faithful are to enjoy after the Day of Judgment by the power and favor of Jesus Christ, who for that reason is called our *Savior*.

38.18 Concerning particular salvations—such as are meant in 1 Samuel 14:39, "as the Lord lives, who saves Israel," that is, from their enemies of the time; and 2 Samuel 22:4, "You are my savior; you save me from violence"; and 2 Kings 13:5, "God gave the Israelites a savior, and so they were delivered from the hand of the Assyrians"; and the like—I need say nothing, since there is neither difficulty nor interest to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind.

38.19 But concerning the general salvation, because it must be in the Kingdom of Heaven, there is great difficulty about the place. On one side, from the word *kingdom* (which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetual security against enemies and want), it seems that this salvation should be on earth. For salvation sets before us a glorious reign of our King by conquest, not a safety by escape. And therefore where we look for salvation we must look also for triumph; and before triumph, for victory; and before victory, for battle—which can hardly be supposed to take place in heaven. But however good this reason may be, I will not rely on it without very evident passages of Scripture. The state of salvation is described at length in Isaiah 33:20–24:

38.20 "Look upon Zion, the city of our solemn feasts; your eyes shall see Jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down; not one of its stakes shall ever be removed, nor shall any of its cords be broken.

38.21 But there the glorious Lord will be to us a place of broad rivers and streams, on which no galley with oars shall go, nor shall any gallant ship pass by.

38.22 For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king; he will save us.

38.23 Your tackle is loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast; they could not spread the sail. Then is the prey of a great spoil divided; the lame take the prey.

38.24 And the inhabitant shall not say, I am sick; the people who dwell in it shall be forgiven their iniquity."

38.25 In these words we have the place from which salvation is to proceed, "Jerusalem, a quiet habitation"; its eternity, "a tabernacle that shall not be taken down," etc.; its Savior, "the Lord, their judge, their lawgiver, their king; he will save us"; the salvation, "the Lord shall be to them as a broad moat of swift waters," etc.; the condition of their enemies, "their tackle is loose, their masts weak; the lame shall take the spoil of them"; the condition of the saved, "The inhabitant shall not say, I am sick"; and lastly, all this is comprehended in forgiveness of sin, "The people who dwell in it shall be forgiven their iniquity." By this it is evident that salvation shall be on earth, then, when God shall reign in Jerusalem (at the second coming of Christ); and that from Jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of the Gentiles who shall be received into God's kingdom—as is also declared more expressly by the same prophet, chapter 65, verses 20–21: "And they" (that is, the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) "shall bring all your brethren for an offering to the Lord out of all nations, on horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and on mules, and on swift beasts, to my holy mountain Jerusalem, says the Lord, as the children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the Lord.[56] And I will also take of them for priests and for Levites, says the Lord." By this it is evident that the chief seat of God's kingdom (which is the place from which the salvation of us who were Gentiles shall proceed) shall be Jerusalem. The same is also confirmed by our Savior in his conversation with

56 The passage is Isaiah 66:20–21; Hobbes's "65" is a slip.

the woman of Samaria about the place of God's worship, to whom he says (John 4:22) that the Samaritans worshipped they knew not what, but the Jews worship what they know: "For salvation is of the Jews" (*ex Iudaeis*, that is, begins with the Jews). It is as if he said: you worship God, but do not know by whom he will save you, as we do, who know it shall be by one of the tribe of Judah—a Jew, not a Samaritan. And so the woman answered him, not irrelevantly, "We know that the Messiah shall come." So what our Savior says, "Salvation is from the Jews," is the same as what Paul says (Romans 1:16–17): "The gospel is the power of God to salvation for everyone who believes: to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For in it the righteousness of God is revealed from faith to faith"—from the faith of the Jew to the faith of the Gentile. In the same sense the prophet Joel, describing the Day of Judgment (Joel 2:30–31)—that God would "show wonders in heaven and in earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke; the sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the great and terrible day of the Lord comes"—adds in verse 32, "And it shall come to pass that whoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved. For in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be salvation." And Obadiah, verse 17, says the same: "Upon Mount Zion shall be deliverance, and there shall be holiness, and the house of Jacob shall possess their possessions"—that is, the possessions of the *heathen*, which he describes more particularly in the following verses as the *mount of Esau*, the *land of the Philistines*, the *fields of Ephraim*, of *Samaria*, *Gilead*, and the *cities of the south*; and he concludes with these words: "The kingdom shall be the Lord's." All these passages argue for salvation, and the Kingdom of God (after the Day of Judgment), being on earth. On the other side, I have not found any text from which any ascension of the saints into heaven can probably be drawn—that is, into any *Coelum Empyreum* or other ethereal region—except that it is called the Kingdom of Heaven. It may have that name because God, who was King of the Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses by angels from heaven; and after their revolt sent his Son from heaven to bring

them back to their obedience; and will send him from there again to rule both them and all other faithful men from the Day of Judgment everlastingly. Or it may be because the throne of this our great King is in heaven, whereas the earth is only his footstool. But that God's subjects should have any place as high as his throne, or higher than his footstool, does not seem suited to the dignity of a king; nor can I find any evident text for it in Holy Scripture.

38.26 From what has been said of the Kingdom of God and of salvation, it is not hard to interpret what is meant by the *world to come*. Three worlds are mentioned in Scripture: the *old world*, the *present world*, and the *world to come*. Of the first St. Peter speaks: "If God spared not the old world, but saved Noah the eighth person, a preacher of righteousness, bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly," etc. So the *first world* was from Adam to the general flood. Of the present world our Savior speaks (John 18:36):[57] "My kingdom is not of this world." For he came only to teach men the way of salvation, and to renew the kingdom of his Father by his doctrine. Of the world to come St. Peter speaks: "Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth." This is the *world* in which Christ, coming down from heaven in the clouds with great power and glory, shall send his angels and gather together his elect from the four winds and from the uttermost parts of the earth, and from then on reign over them (under his Father) everlastingly.

38.27 The *salvation* of a sinner presupposes a prior *redemption*. For whoever is once guilty of sin is liable to its penalty, and must pay (or someone else for him) whatever ransom the one who is offended, and has him in his power, shall require. And since the person offended is Almighty God, in whose power all things are, such ransom as God has been pleased to require is to be paid before salvation can be obtained. By this ransom is not meant a satisfaction for sin equivalent to the offense, which no sinner can ever make for himself, nor any righteous man for

57 2 Peter 2:5.

another. A man may make amends for the damage he does to another by restitution or compensation, but sin cannot be taken away by compensation, for that would make the liberty to sin a thing for sale. But sins may be pardoned to the repentant, either *gratis* or upon such penalty as God is pleased to accept. What God usually accepted in the Old Testament was some sacrifice or offering. To forgive sin is not an act of injustice, even though the punishment has been threatened. Even among men, though a promise of good binds the one who promises, threats—that is, promises of evil—do not bind them; much less shall they bind God, who is infinitely more merciful than men. Our Savior Christ, therefore, in order to *redeem* us, did not make satisfaction for the sins of men in the sense that his death, by its own virtue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with eternal death. Rather, at his first coming he made that sacrifice and offering of himself which God was pleased to require for the salvation, at his second coming, of those who in the meantime should repent and believe in him. And though this act of our *redemption* is not always called in Scripture a *sacrifice* and *offering*, but sometimes a *price*, yet by *price* we are not to understand anything by whose value he could claim a right to a pardon for us from his offended Father, but the price that God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand.

CHAPTER 39: OF THE WORD 'CHURCH'

A church that can act is a company of Christians united in one sovereign, the same as a Christian commonwealth.

39.1 The word *church* (*ecclesia*) signifies various things in the books of Holy Scripture. Sometimes (though not often) it is taken for *God's house*, that is, a temple in which Christians assemble to perform holy duties publicly, as in 1 Corinthians 14:34: "Let your women keep silent in the churches." But this is put metaphorically for the congregation assembled there, and it has since been used for the building itself, to distinguish the temples of Christians from those of idolaters. The Temple of Jerusalem was *God's*

house and the house of prayer; and so any building dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ is *Christ's house*. That is why the Greek Fathers call it *Kyriakē*, *the Lord's house*; and from this, in our language, it came to be called *kirk* and *church*.

39.2 *Church* (when not taken for a house) signifies the same as *ecclesia* signified in the Greek commonwealths: a congregation, or assembly of citizens, called out to hear the magistrate speak to them. In the Roman commonwealth this was called a *concio*, and the one who spoke was called *ecclesiastes* and *concionator*. When they were called out by lawful authority, it was *ecclesia legitima*, a *lawful church*, *ennomos ecclesia*. But when they were stirred up by tumultuous and seditious clamor, it was a confused church, *ecclesia synkechymenē*.[58]

39.3 It is also sometimes taken for the men who have the right to be of the congregation, though not actually assembled—that is, for the whole multitude of Christians, however widely dispersed—as in Acts 8:3, where it is said that "Saul made havoc of the church." And in this sense Christ is said to be head of the Church. Sometimes it is taken for a certain part of Christians, as in Colossians 4:15: "Salute the church that is in his house." Sometimes also for the elect only, as in Ephesians 5:27: "a glorious church, without spot or wrinkle, holy and without blemish," which is meant of the *Church triumphant*, or *Church to come*. Sometimes it is taken for an assembled congregation of those who profess Christianity, whether their profession is true or counterfeit, as it is understood in Matthew 18:17, where it is said, "Tell it to the church; and if he neglects to hear the church, let him be to you as a Gentile or a publican."[59]

39.4 And it is in this last sense only that the *Church* can be taken for one person: that is, that it can be said to have power to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to do any other action whatever. For without authority from a lawful congregation, whatever act is done in a gathering of people is the particular act of each of those who were present and gave

58 The phrases come from Acts 19:39 and 19:32, the riot at Ephesus.
59 A publican was a tax collector under Roman rule.

their help in performing it, and not the act of them all together, as of one body—much less the act of those who were absent, or who, though present, did not want it done. In this sense I define a *church* to be *a company of men professing the Christian religion, united in the person of one sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble*. And because in all commonwealths an assembly without warrant from the civil sovereign is unlawful, a church assembled in any commonwealth that has forbidden it to assemble is also an unlawful assembly.

39.5 It follows also that there is on earth no such universal Church as all Christians are bound to obey, because there is no power on earth to which all other commonwealths are subject. There are Christians in the dominions of various princes and states, but every one of them is subject to the commonwealth of which he is himself a member, and consequently cannot be subject to the commands of any other person. And therefore a Church, of the kind that is capable of commanding, judging, absolving, condemning, or doing any other act, is the same thing as a civil commonwealth consisting of Christian men. It is called a *civil state* because its subjects are *men*, and a *Church* because its subjects are *Christians*. *Temporal* and *spiritual* government are only two words brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their *lawful sovereign*. It is true that the bodies of the faithful, after the Resurrection, will be not only spiritual but eternal; but in this life they are gross and corruptible. There is therefore no other government in this life, either of state or of religion, but temporal; nor is the teaching of any doctrine lawful for any subject when the governor of both the state and the religion forbids it to be taught. And that governor must be one; otherwise there must follow faction and civil war in the commonwealth, between the *Church* and the *State*, between *spiritualists* and *temporalists*, between the *sword of justice* and the *shield of faith*, and (what is more) in every Christian man's own breast, between the *Christian* and the *man*. The doctors of the Church are called pastors; so also are civil sovereigns.

But if pastors are not subordinate one to another, so that there may be one chief pastor, men will be taught contrary doctrines, of which both may be false, and one must be. Who that one chief pastor is according to the law of nature has already been shown: namely, the civil sovereign. And to whom the Scripture has assigned that office we shall see in the chapters that follow.

CHAPTER 40: OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN ABRAHAM, MOSES, THE HIGH PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH

From Abraham onward, whoever was sovereign among God's people also held supreme authority in religion.

40.1 The father of the faithful, and the first in the Kingdom of God by covenant, was Abraham. For it was with him that the covenant was first made. In it he obliged himself, and his descendants after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of God: not only those he could discern by the light of nature (such as moral laws), but also those that God should deliver to him in a special manner, by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law, they were already obliged, and did not need to be contracted with by the promise of the land of Canaan.[60] Nor was there any contract that could add to or strengthen the obligation by which they, and all other men, were naturally bound to obey God Almighty. And therefore the covenant Abraham made with God was to take as the commandment of God whatever was commanded him in the name of God in a dream or vision, and to deliver it to his family and make them observe it.

40.2 In this contract of God with Abraham we may observe three points of important consequence for the government of God's people. First, that at the making of this covenant God spoke only to Abraham, and therefore did not contract with any of his family or descendants, except insofar as their wills (which make the essence of all covenants) were, before the contract, included in the will of Abraham. Abraham was therefore sup-

60 Romans 4:11–16 calls Abraham the father of all who believe; the covenant is in Genesis 17.

posed to have had a lawful power to make them perform all that he covenanted for them. In accordance with this (Genesis 18:18–19) God says, "All the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him, for I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord." From this may be concluded the first point: that those to whom God has not spoken directly are to receive the positive commandments of God from their sovereign, as the family and descendants of Abraham did from Abraham, their father, their lord, and their civil sovereign. And consequently, in every commonwealth, those who have no supernatural revelation to the contrary ought to obey the laws of their own sovereign in the external acts and profession of religion. As for the inward *thought* and *belief* of men, which human governors can take no notice of (for God alone knows the heart), these are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will and the power of God; and consequently they do not fall under obligation.

40.3 From this follows another point: that it was not unlawful for Abraham to punish any of his subjects who claimed a private vision, or spirit, or other revelation from God in support of a doctrine Abraham had forbidden, or who followed or adhered to any such pretender. And consequently it is lawful now for the sovereign to punish any man who sets his private spirit against the laws. For the sovereign holds the same place in the commonwealth that Abraham held in his own family.

40.4 From the same covenant there arises a third point: that as no one but Abraham in his family, so no one but the sovereign in a Christian commonwealth, can take notice of what is or is not the Word of God. For God spoke only to Abraham, and he alone was able to know what God said and to interpret it to his family. And therefore those who hold the place of Abraham in a commonwealth are the only interpreters of what God has spoken.

40.5 The same covenant was renewed with Isaac, and afterward with Jacob, but then no more until the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians and arrived at the foot of Mount Sinai. There it

was renewed by Moses (as I said before, in chapter 35) in such a way that from that time forward they became the peculiar Kingdom of God. Moses was God's lieutenant for his own lifetime, and the succession to that office was settled on Aaron and his heirs after him, to be to God a priestly kingdom forever.[61]

40.6 By this constitution a kingdom is acquired for God. But since Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites as a successor to the right of Abraham (he could not claim it by inheritance), it does not yet appear that the people were obliged to take him for God's lieutenant any longer than they believed that God spoke to him. And therefore his authority (despite the covenant they made with God) still depended merely on the opinion they had of his holiness, of the reality of his conferences with God, and of the truth of his miracles. If that opinion changed, they were no longer obliged to take anything as the law of God that he put before them in God's name. We must therefore consider what other ground there was for their obligation to obey him. For it could not be the commandment of God that obliged them, because God did not speak to them directly, but through the mediation of Moses himself. And our Savior says of himself, "If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true"; much less, if Moses bears witness of himself (especially in a claim of kingly power over God's people), ought his testimony to be accepted. His authority, therefore, like the authority of all other princes, must be grounded on the consent of the people and their promise to obey him. And so it was. For "the people (Exodus 20:18–19),[62] when they saw the thunderings and the lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet, and the mountain smoking, moved back and stood far off. And they said to Moses, 'You speak with us, and we will hear; but do not let God speak with us, lest we die.'" Here was their promise of obedience; and by this they obliged themselves to obey whatever he should deliver to them as the commandment of God.

61 "Peculiar" in the older sense: God's own special possession (Exodus 19:5–6, "a kingdom of priests").
62 John 5:31.

40.7 And although the covenant constitutes a priestly kingdom, that is to say, a kingdom hereditary to Aaron, this is to be understood of the succession after Moses was dead. For whoever orders and establishes the polity, as first founder of a commonwealth (whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy), must necessarily have sovereign power over the people all the while he is doing it. And that Moses had that power throughout his own time is plainly affirmed in the Scripture. First, in the text just cited, because the people promised obedience not to Aaron but to him. Secondly (Exodus 24:1–2), "And God said to Moses, 'Come up to the Lord, you and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come near the Lord, but they shall not come near, nor shall the people go up with him.'" From this it is plain that Moses, who alone was called up to God (and not Aaron, nor the other priests, nor the seventy elders, nor the people, who were forbidden to come up), was the only one who represented to the Israelites the person of God; that is to say, he was their sole sovereign under God. And though it is said afterward (verse 9), "Then Moses went up, and Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and under his feet there was as it were a paved work of sapphire stone," and so on, yet this was not until after Moses had been with God before and had brought to the people the words God had spoken to him. He alone went on the people's business. The others, as the nobles of his retinue, were admitted, for honor, to that special grace which was not allowed to the people: namely (as appears in the verse after), to see God and live. "God did not lay his hand on them; they saw God, and ate and drank" (that is, they lived); but they did not carry any commandment from him to the people. Again, it is said everywhere, "The Lord spoke to Moses," on all other occasions of government and also in the ordering of the ceremonies of religion, contained in chapters 25 through 31 of Exodus and throughout Leviticus; to Aaron seldom. The calf that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the question of Aaron's authority, raised by his and Miriam's mutiny against Moses, was

judged by God himself in Moses' favor (Numbers 12).[63] So also in the question between Moses and the people as to who had the right of governing the people. When Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly "gathered themselves together" (Numbers 16:3) "against Moses and against Aaron, and said to them, 'You take too much upon yourselves, seeing all the congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is among them; why do you lift yourselves up above the congregation of the Lord?'", God caused the earth to swallow Korah, Dathan, and Abiram alive, with their wives and children, and consumed those two hundred and fifty princes with fire. Therefore neither Aaron, nor the people, nor any aristocracy of the chief princes of the people, but Moses alone had, next under God, the sovereignty over the Israelites; and that not only in matters of civil polity but also of religion. For Moses alone spoke with God, and therefore he alone could tell the people what God required of them. No man, on pain of death, might be so presumptuous as to approach the mountain where God talked with Moses. "You shall set bounds," says the Lord (Exodus 19:12), "for the people all around, and say, 'Take heed to yourselves that you do not go up into the mountain or touch its border; whoever touches the mountain shall surely be put to death.'" And again (verse 21): "Go down, warn the people, lest they break through to the Lord to gaze." From this we may conclude that whoever holds the place of Moses in a Christian commonwealth is the sole messenger of God and interpreter of his commandments. And accordingly, no one ought, in interpreting the Scripture, to go further than the bounds set by their respective sovereigns. For the Scriptures, since God now speaks in them, are the Mount Sinai, and its bounds are the laws of those who represent God's person on earth. To look upon them, and in them to behold the wondrous works of God and learn to fear him, is allowed. But to interpret them—that is, to pry into what God says to the one he appoints to govern under him, and to make themselves judges of whether he governs as God com-

63 The golden calf: Exodus 32:20.

mands him or not—is to transgress the bounds God has set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.

40.8 There was no prophet in the time of Moses, nor anyone claiming the Spirit of God, except those whom Moses had approved and authorized. For in his time there were only seventy men who are said to have prophesied by the Spirit of God, and these were all of Moses' choosing. Concerning them God said to Moses (Numbers 11:16), "Gather to me seventy of the elders of Israel, whom you know to be the elders of the people." To these God imparted his Spirit; but it was not a different spirit from that of Moses, for it is said (verse 25), "God came down in a cloud, and took of the Spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the seventy elders." But as I have shown before (chapter 36), by *spirit* is understood the *mind*; so the sense of the passage is simply this: that God endowed them with a mind conformable and subordinate to that of Moses, so that they might prophesy—that is to say, speak to the people in God's name in such a way as to advance (as ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as agreed with Moses' doctrine. For they were only ministers. And when two of them prophesied in the camp, it was thought a new and unlawful thing; and, as it says in verses 27 and 28 of the same chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to forbid them, not knowing that it was by Moses' spirit that they prophesied. By this it is evident that no subject ought to lay claim to prophecy, or to the Spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by the one whom God has set in the place of Moses.

THE HIGH PRIESTS, THE JUDGES, AND THE KINGS

Sovereignty passed from Moses to the high priest and then to the kings, who governed religion too.

40.9 When Aaron was dead, and after him Moses too, the kingdom, being a priestly kingdom, descended by virtue of the covenant to Aaron's son, Eleazar the high priest. And God declared him (next under himself) sovereign at the same time that he

appointed Joshua general of their army. For God says expressly concerning Joshua (Numbers 27:21), "He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him before the Lord; at his word they shall go out, and at his word they shall come in, both he and all the children of Israel with him." Therefore the supreme power of making war and peace was in the priest. The supreme power of judicature also belonged to the high priest. For the Book of the Law was in their keeping, and the priests and Levites alone were the subordinate judges in civil cases, as appears in Deuteronomy 17:8–10. And as for the manner of God's worship, there was never any doubt that the high priest, until the time of Saul, had the supreme authority. Therefore the civil and ecclesiastical power were both joined together in one and the same person, the high priest; and they ought to be so in whoever governs by divine right, that is, by authority directly from God.

40.10 After the death of Joshua, until the time of Saul, the Book of Judges frequently notes of the period between that "in those days there was no king in Israel," and sometimes adds that "every man did what was right in his own eyes." By this we are to understand that where it says "there was no king," it means "there was no sovereign power" in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the act and exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua and Eleazar, "there arose another generation" (Judges 2:10–11)[64] "that did not know the Lord, nor the works he had done for Israel, but did evil in the sight of the Lord, and served the Baals." And the Jews had the quality St. Paul notes, of "looking for a sign," not only before they would submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission. Yet signs and miracles had as their end to produce faith, not to keep men from violating it once they have given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of nature. But if we consider not the exercise but the right of governing, the sovereign power was still in the high priest.[65] Therefore

64 Judges 17:6, 18:1, 19:1, 21:25.
65 1 Corinthians 1:22: "the Jews require a sign."

whatever obedience was given to any of the judges (who were men chosen by God in an extraordinary way to save his rebellious subjects from the hands of the enemy), it cannot be turned into an argument against the right the high priest had to the sovereign power in all matters, both of polity and of religion. Neither the judges nor Samuel himself had an ordinary calling to the government, but an extraordinary one; and they were obeyed by the Israelites not out of duty, but out of reverence for their favor with God, which appeared in their wisdom, courage, or felicity. Up to this point, therefore, the right of regulating both polity and religion was inseparable.

40.11 The judges were succeeded by kings. And whereas before all authority, both in religion and in polity, was in the high priest, now it was all in the king. For the sovereignty over the people—which had belonged before to God, not only by virtue of his divine power but also by a particular pact of the Israelites, and next under him to the high priest as his vicegerent on earth—was cast off by the people, with the consent of God himself. For when they said to Samuel (1 Samuel 8:5), "Make us a king to judge us, like all the nations," they signified that they would no longer be governed by the commands laid on them by the priest in the name of God, but by one who would command them in the same manner as all other nations were commanded. And consequently, in stripping the high priest of royal authority, they deposed that peculiar government of God. And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (verse 7), "Listen to the voice of the people in all that they say to you; for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them." Having therefore rejected God, in whose right the priests governed, the priests had no authority left except what the king was pleased to allow them, which was more or less according as the kings were good or evil. And as for the government of civil affairs, it is evident that it was all in the hands of the king. For in the same chapter, verse 20, they say they will be like all the nations: that their king shall be their judge, and go before them, and fight their battles; that is, he shall have the whole authority,

both in peace and in war. In this is contained also the ordering of religion. For there was no other Word of God at that time by which to regulate religion but the Law of Moses, which was their civil law. Besides, we read (1 Kings 2:27) that Solomon "thrust out Abiathar from being priest before the Lord." He therefore had authority over the high priest, as over any other subject, which is a great mark of supremacy in religion. And we also read (1 Kings 8) that he dedicated the Temple, that he blessed the people, and that he himself in person made that excellent prayer used in the consecration of all churches and houses of prayer; which is another great mark of supremacy in religion. Again, we read (2 Kings 22) that when there was a question concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple, it was not decided by the high priest; instead Josiah sent both him and others to inquire about it of Huldah the prophetess; which is another mark of supremacy in religion. Lastly, we read (1 Chronicles 26:30) that David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, officers of Israel on the west side, "in all the business of the Lord, and in the service of the king." Likewise (verse 32) that he made other Hebronites "rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half tribe of Manasseh" (these were the rest of Israel, who lived beyond the Jordan) "for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the king." Is this not full power, both *temporal* and *spiritual*, as those who would divide it call them? To conclude: from the first institution of God's Kingdom until the Captivity, the supremacy in religion was in the same hand as the civil sovereignty; and the priest's office, after the election of Saul, was not magisterial but ministerial.[66]

40.12 Although government in both polity and religion was joined, first in the high priests and afterward in the kings, as far as the right was concerned, yet it appears from the same sacred history that the people did not understand it. There was among them a great part, and probably the greatest part, who gave sufficient credit to the fame of Moses, or to the conversations between God and the priests, only so long as they saw great mir-

66 The Captivity: the Babylonian exile of the Jews (586–538 BC).

acles, or (what is equivalent to a miracle) great abilities or great felicity in the enterprises of their governors. They took occasion, as often as their governors displeased them, to change the government or revolt from their obedience at their pleasure, blaming sometimes the polity, sometimes the religion. And from this came, from time to time, the civil troubles, divisions, and calamities of the nation. For example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the next generation, which had not seen the wonders of God but was left to its own weak reason, not knowing itself obliged by the covenant of a priestly kingdom, paid no more regard to the commandment of the priest, or to any law of Moses, but every man did what was right in his own eyes. In civil affairs they obeyed such men as they thought, from time to time, able to deliver them from the neighboring nations that oppressed them. And they consulted not with God (as they ought to have done) but with such men or women as they guessed to be prophets by their predictions of things to come. And though they had an idol in their chapel, yet if they had a Levite for their chaplain, they reckoned they were worshipping the God of Israel.[67]

40.13 And afterward, when they demanded a king after the manner of the nations, it was still not with any design to depart from the worship of God their King. Rather, despairing of the justice of Samuel's sons, they wanted a king to judge them in civil actions—but not so that they would allow their king to change the religion they thought had been commended to them by Moses. So they always kept in reserve a pretext, either of justice or of religion, to discharge themselves of their obedience whenever they had hope of prevailing. Samuel was displeased with the people for desiring a king (for God was already their King, and Samuel had only an authority under him). Yet when Saul did not follow his counsel in destroying Agag as God had commanded, Samuel anointed another king, namely David, to take the succession from Saul's heirs. Rehoboam was no idolater; but when the people thought him an oppressor, that

67 Micah's shrine and hired Levite: Judges 17–18.

civil pretext carried ten tribes away from him to Jeroboam, an idolater.[68] And generally, through the whole history of the kings, of Judah as well as of Israel, there were prophets who continually checked the kings for transgressing the religion, and sometimes also for errors of state. Jehoshaphat, for instance, was reproved by the prophet Jehu for aiding the king of Israel against the Syrians, and Hezekiah by Isaiah for showing his treasures to the ambassadors of Babylon. From all this it appears that, though the power both of state and of religion was in the kings, none of them was unchecked in the use of it, except those who were in favor because of their own natural abilities or felicities.[69] So no argument can be drawn from the practice of those times that the right of supremacy in religion was not in the kings—unless we place it in the prophets, and conclude that because Hezekiah, praying to the Lord before the cherubim, was not answered from there or then, but afterward by the prophet Isaiah, Isaiah was therefore supreme head of the Church; or that because Josiah consulted Huldah the prophetess about the Book of the Law, therefore neither he nor the high priest, but Huldah the prophetess, had the supreme authority in matters of religion. Which I think is not the opinion of any doctor.

40.14 During the Captivity the Jews had no commonwealth at all. And after their return, though they renewed their covenant with God, no promise of obedience was made either to Ezra or to anyone else. And soon afterward they became subjects of the Greeks, from whose customs and demonology, and from the doctrine of the Kabbalists, their religion became much corrupted. So nothing can be gathered from their confusion, in both state and religion, concerning the supremacy in either.[70] And therefore, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, we may conclude that whoever had the sovereignty of the commonwealth among the Jews also had the supreme authority in matters of

68 1 Samuel 15–16 (Agag, and the anointing of David); 1 Kings 12 (the division of the kingdom).

69 2 Chronicles 19:2; 2 Kings 20:12–19 (Isaiah 39).

70 Ezra led the renewal of the covenant after the return from Babylon (Nehemiah 8–10).

God's external worship, and represented God's person—that is, the person of God the Father, though he was not called by the name of Father until he sent into the world his Son Jesus Christ to redeem mankind from their sins and bring them into his everlasting Kingdom, to be saved forevermore. Of this we are to speak in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 41: OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOR

Christ's office has three parts: redeemer, teacher, and king in the world to come.

41.1 We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the *office* of the *Messiah*. The first is that of a *Redeemer*, or *Savior*. The second is that of a *pastor*, *counselor*, or *teacher*—that is, of a prophet sent from God to convert those whom God has elected to salvation. The third is that of a *king*, an *eternal king*, but under his Father, as Moses and the high priests were in their respective times. And to these three parts correspond three times. For our redemption he worked at his first coming, by the sacrifice in which he offered himself up for our sins upon the cross. Our conversion he worked partly then, in his own person, and partly works now by his ministers, and will continue to work until his coming again. And after his coming again will begin his glorious reign over his elect, which is to last eternally.

41.2 To the *office* of a *Redeemer*—that is, of one who pays the ransom of sin (which ransom is death)—it belongs that he was sacrificed, and thereby bore upon his own head, and carried away from us, our iniquities, in the manner God had required. Not that the death of one man, even one without sin, can satisfy for the offenses of all men in the rigor of justice; but it can in the mercy of God, who ordained such sacrifices for sin as he was pleased in his mercy to accept. In the Old Law (as we may read in Leviticus 16) the Lord required that once every year an atonement be made for the sins of all Israel, both priests and others. To do this, Aaron alone was to sacrifice a young bull for himself and the priests; and for the rest of the people he was to receive

from them two young goats, one of which he was to *sacrifice*. As for the other, which was the *scapegoat*, he was to lay his hands on its head and, by a confession of the iniquities of the people, lay them all on that head; and then, by some suitable man, have the goat led into the wilderness, there to *escape* and carry away with it the iniquities of the people. As the sacrifice of the one goat was a sufficient (because an acceptable) price for the ransom of all Israel, so the death of the Messiah is a sufficient price for the sins of all mankind, because nothing more was required. Our Savior Christ's sufferings seem to be prefigured here as clearly as in the offering of Isaac, or in any other type of him in the Old Testament. He was both the sacrificed goat and the scapegoat. "He was oppressed, and he was afflicted" (Isaiah 53:7); "he opened not his mouth; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before its shearers is silent, so he opened not his mouth." Here he is the *sacrificed goat*.[71] "He has borne our griefs" (verse 4) "and carried our sorrows"; and again (verse 6), "the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all." And so he is the *scapegoat*. "He was cut off from the land of the living" (verse 8) "for the transgression of my people": there again he is the *sacrificed goat*. And again (verse 11), "he shall bear their sins": he is the *scapegoat*. Thus the Lamb of God is equivalent to both those goats: sacrificed, in that he died; and escaping, in his resurrection, being raised at the appointed time by his Father and removed from the dwelling place of men in his ascension.

41.3 Since, therefore, he who *redeems* has no title to the *thing redeemed* before *the redemption* and ransom are paid, and this ransom was the death of the Redeemer, it is evident that our Savior (as man) was not king of those he redeemed before he suffered death—that is, during the time he lived bodily on the earth. I say he was not then king in present, by virtue of the pact the faithful make with him in baptism. Nevertheless, by renewing their pact with God in baptism, they were obliged to obey him as king (under his Father) whenever he should be pleased

71 A "type" is an Old Testament person or event read as prefiguring Christ; the offering of Isaac is in Genesis 22.

to take the kingdom upon him. In accordance with this, our Savior himself says expressly (John 18:36), "My kingdom is not of this world." Now, since the Scripture mentions only two worlds —this one that exists now and will remain until the Day of Judgment (which is therefore also called *the last day*), and the one that will be after the Day of Judgment, when there will be a new heaven and a new earth—the kingdom of Christ is not to begin until the general resurrection. And that is what our Savior says (Matthew 16:27): "The Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father with his angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works." To reward every man according to his works is to execute the office of a king; and this is not to happen until he comes in the glory of his Father with his angels. When our Savior says (Matthew 23:2–3), "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; therefore whatever they bid you do, observe and do," he declares plainly that he ascribes kingly power, for that time, not to himself but to them. And so he does also where he says (Luke 12:14), "Who made me a judge or divider over you?" And (John 12:47), "I came not to judge the world, but to save the world." And yet our Savior came into this world so that he might be a king and a judge in the world to come. For he was the Messiah—that is, the Christ, the anointed priest and the sovereign prophet of God—that is to say, he was to have all the power that was in Moses the prophet, in the high priests who succeeded Moses, and in the kings who succeeded the priests. And St. John says expressly (chapter 5, verse 22), "The Father judges no man, but has committed all judgment to the Son." And this does not conflict with that other passage, "I came not to judge the world": for the one is spoken of the present world, the other of the world to come. So also where it is said of the second coming of Christ (Matthew 19:28), "You who have followed me, in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory, you also shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel."

41.4 If, then, Christ while he was on earth had no kingdom in this world, what was the purpose of his first coming? It was to

restore to God, by a new covenant, the kingdom that had been his by the old covenant and had been cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. To do this, he was to preach to them that he was the *Messiah*, that is, the king promised to them by the prophets; to offer himself in sacrifice for the sins of those who by faith should submit themselves to it; and, in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience those among the Gentiles who should believe in him. So there are two parts of our Savior's office during his time on earth: one, to proclaim himself the Christ; the other, by teaching and by working miracles, to persuade and prepare men to live in such a way as to be worthy of the immortality believers were to enjoy when he should come in majesty to take possession of his Father's kingdom. And that is why he himself often calls the time of his preaching the *regeneration*. This is not properly a kingdom, and so not a warrant to deny obedience to the magistrates of that time (for he commanded obedience to those who then sat in Moses' chair, and the paying of tribute to Caesar); it is only a pledge of the Kingdom of God that was to come, given to those to whom God had given the grace to be his disciples and to believe in him. For this reason the godly are said to be already in the *Kingdom of Grace*, as naturalized citizens of that heavenly kingdom.

41.5 Up to this point, therefore, nothing was done or taught by Christ that tended to diminish the civil right of the Jews or of Caesar. For as regards the commonwealth that then existed among the Jews, both those who ruled among them and those who were governed all expected the Messiah and the Kingdom of God; which they could not have done if their laws had forbidden him, when he came, to manifest and declare himself. Since, therefore, he did nothing but try by preaching and miracles to prove himself that Messiah, he did nothing in this against their laws. The kingdom he claimed was to be in another world. He taught all men in the meantime to obey those who sat in Moses' seat; he allowed them to give Caesar his tribute; and he refused to take upon himself the role of judge. How then could his words

or actions be seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their civil government as it then was? But God, having determined on his sacrifice for bringing his elect back to their former covenanted obedience, made use of their malice and ingratitude as the means by which he would bring it about. Nor was it contrary to the laws of Caesar. For though Pilate himself (to gratify the Jews) delivered him to be crucified, before he did so he pronounced openly that he found no fault in him. And as the title of his condemnation he put, not what the Jews demanded, "that he claimed to be King," but simply "that he was King of the Jews"; and despite their clamor he refused to change it, saying, "What I have written, I have written."[72]

CHRIST AS KING

Christ's kingdom begins at the resurrection and is exercised under his Father, like Moses; hence the persons of God.

41.6 As for the third part of his office, which was to be *king*, I have already shown that his kingdom was not to begin until the Resurrection. But then he will be king, not only as God—in which sense he is king already, and always will be, of all the earth, by virtue of his omnipotence—but also, in a special way, of his own elect, by virtue of the pact they make with him in their baptism. And that is why our Savior says (Matthew 19:28) that his apostles shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, "when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory"; by which he signified that he would reign then in his human nature. And (Matthew 16:27): "The Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works." We may read the same in Mark 13:26 and 14:62, and, more expressly as to the time, in Luke 22:29–30: "I appoint to you a kingdom, as my Father has appointed to me, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." By this it is evident that the kingdom of Christ

72 John 18:38, 19:19–22.

appointed to him by his Father is not to be before the Son of Man comes in glory and makes his apostles judges of the twelve tribes of Israel. But someone may ask here: since there is no marriage in the Kingdom of Heaven, will men then eat and drink? What eating, then, is meant in this place? This is explained by our Savior (John 6:27) where he says, "Labor not for the food that perishes, but for the food that endures to everlasting life, which the Son of Man shall give you." So by eating at Christ's table is meant eating of the Tree of Life; that is to say, the enjoyment of immortality in the Kingdom of the Son of Man. By these passages, and many more, it is evident that our Savior's kingdom is to be exercised by him in his human nature.

41.7 Again, he is to be king then only as subordinate to God the Father, or as his vicegerent, as Moses was in the wilderness, and as the high priests were before the reign of Saul, and as the kings were after it. For it is one of the prophecies concerning Christ that he should be like Moses in office: "I will raise up for them a prophet," says the Lord (Deuteronomy 18:18), "from among their brethren, like you, and will put my words in his mouth." And this likeness to Moses is also apparent in the actions of our Savior himself while he lived on earth. For as Moses chose twelve princes of the tribes to govern under him, so our Savior chose twelve apostles, who shall sit on twelve thrones and judge the twelve tribes of Israel. And as Moses authorized seventy elders to receive the Spirit of God and to prophesy to the people—that is (as I have said before), to speak to them in the name of God—so our Savior also ordained seventy disciples to preach his kingdom and salvation to all nations. And as, when a complaint was made to Moses against those of the seventy who prophesied in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it as being subservient in this to his government, so also our Savior, when St.[73] John complained to him of a certain man who cast out devils in his name, justified him in it, saying (Luke 9:50), "Do not forbid him; for he who is not against us is for us."

41.8 Again, our Savior resembled Moses in the institution of *sacraments*, both of *admission* into the Kingdom of God and of *commemoration* of his deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition. The children of Israel had as the sacrament of their reception into the Kingdom of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of *circumcision*; this rite, having been omitted in the wilderness, was restored as soon as they came into the Promised Land. So also the Jews, before the coming of our Savior, had a rite of *baptizing*, that is, of washing with water all those Gentiles who embraced the God of Israel. This rite St.[74] John the Baptist used in receiving all who gave their names to the Christ, whom he preached as already come into the world; and our Savior instituted the same as a sacrament to be taken by all who believed in him. From what cause the rite of baptism first arose is not formally stated in the Scripture. But it may probably be thought an imitation of the law of Moses concerning leprosy, in which a person with leprosy was ordered to be kept out of the camp of Israel for a certain time; after which, being judged clean by the priest, he was admitted into the camp after a solemn washing.[75] And this may therefore be a type of the washing in baptism, in which men who are cleansed of the leprosy of sin by faith are received into the Church with the solemnity of baptism. There is another conjecture, drawn from the ceremonies of the Gentiles in a certain case that rarely happens. When a man who was thought dead happened to recover, other men had scruples about associating with him, as they would about associating with a ghost, unless he was received again into the number of men by washing—as newborn children were washed from the uncleanness of their birth, which was a kind of new birth. This ceremony of the Greeks may quite probably have crept into the religion of the Jews at the time when Judea was under the dominion of Alexander and the Greeks who succeeded him. But since it is not likely that our Savior would

73 Numbers 1:4–16 (the twelve princes); Luke 10:1 (the seventy disciples).
74 Joshua 5:2–9 (circumcision restored).
75 Leviticus 13–14.

countenance a heathen rite, it is most likely that baptism came from the legal ceremony of washing after leprosy. And as for the other sacrament, eating the *Passover lamb*, it is manifestly imitated in the sacrament of the *Lord's Supper*, in which the breaking of the bread and the pouring out of the wine keep in memory our deliverance from the misery of sin by Christ's Passion, as the eating of the Passover lamb kept in memory the deliverance of the Jews out of bondage in Egypt. Since, therefore, the authority of Moses was only subordinate, and he only a lieutenant to God, it follows that Christ, whose authority as man was to be like that of Moses, was no more than subordinate to the authority of his Father. The same is signified more expressly by his teaching us to pray, "Our Father … your kingdom come," and "For yours is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory"; and by its being said that "he shall come in the glory of his Father"; and by what St. Paul says (1 Corinthians 15:24), "then comes the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father"; and by many other very express passages.

41.9 Our Savior, therefore, both in teaching and in reigning, represents (as Moses did) the person of God; and God, from that time forward but not before, is called the Father. And being still one and the same substance, he is one person as represented by Moses, and another person as represented by his Son the Christ. For since *person* is relative to a *representer*, it follows that where there is a plurality of representers there is a plurality of persons, though of one and the same substance.[76]

CHAPTER 42: OF ECCLESIASTICAL POWER

Before kings were converted, church power lay with the apostles and those they ordained by laying on of hands.

42.1 To understand *ecclesiastical power*—what it is, and in whom it lies—we must divide the time since the Ascension of our Savior into two parts: one before the conversion of kings and of men

76 Hobbes applies his definition of a person from chapter 16: one whose words or actions are represented by another.

endowed with sovereign civil power, the other after their conversion. For it was long after the Ascension before any king or civil sovereign embraced and publicly permitted the teaching of the Christian religion.

42.2 And for the time in between, it is evident that *ecclesiastical power* was in the apostles; and after them in those whom they ordained to preach the Gospel, to convert men to Christianity, and to direct the converted in the way of salvation; and after these the power was handed on again to others ordained by them. This was done by the laying on of hands on those who were ordained, which signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those they ordained ministers of God to advance his kingdom. So the laying on of hands was nothing else but the seal of their commission to preach Christ and teach his doctrine; and the giving of the Holy Spirit by that ceremony of the laying on of hands was an imitation of what Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony with his minister Joshua, as we read in Deuteronomy 34:9: "And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom, for Moses had laid his hands on him." Our Savior therefore, between his Resurrection and Ascension, gave his Spirit to the apostles: first by "breathing on them, and saying" (John 20:22), "Receive the Holy Spirit"; and after his Ascension (Acts 2:2–3) by sending down on them "a mighty wind, and cloven tongues of fire," and not by the laying on of hands—just as God did not lay his hands on Moses either. And his apostles afterward transmitted the same Spirit by the laying on of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So it is evident from this in whom ecclesiastical power continually remained in those first times, when there was no Christian commonwealth: namely, in those who received it from the apostles by the successive laying on of hands.

42.3 Here we have the person of God borne now for the third time. For as Moses and the high priests were God's representative in the Old Testament, and our Savior himself as man during his time on earth, so the Holy Spirit—that is to say, the apostles and their successors in the office of preaching and teaching,

who had received the Holy Spirit—have represented him ever since. But a person (as I have shown before, in chapter 13) is he who is represented, as often as he is represented. And therefore God, who has been represented (that is, personated) three times, may properly enough be said to be three persons—though neither the word *person* nor *Trinity* is ascribed to him in the Bible. St.[77] John indeed says (1 John 5:7), "There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one." But this does not disagree with, and indeed fits well with, three persons in the proper meaning of person, which is that which is represented by another. For so God the Father, as represented by Moses, is one person; as represented by his Son, another person; and as represented by the apostles, and by the doctors who taught by authority derived from them, a third person; and yet every person here is the person of one and the same God. But someone may ask here what it was that these three bore witness to. St.[78] John therefore tells us (verse 11) that they bear witness that "God has given us eternal life in his Son." Again, if it is asked where that testimony appears, the answer is easy. For he has testified it by the miracles he worked: first by Moses; secondly, by his Son himself; and lastly by his apostles, who had received the Holy Spirit. All of these, in their times, represented the person of God, and either prophesied or preached Jesus Christ. And as for the apostles, it was the mark of apostleship, in the twelve first and great apostles, to bear witness to his Resurrection, as appears expressly in Acts 1:21–22, where St. Peter, when a new apostle was to be chosen in place of Judas Iscariot, uses these words: "Of these men who have accompanied us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day he was taken up from us, one must be ordained to be a witness with us of his Resurrection." These

77 Hobbes's "chapter 13" is a slip for chapter 16. His identification of the Persons of the Trinity with their human representatives was among the most controversial claims of the book, and he revised it in the Latin edition of 1668.

78 This verse (the "Johannine Comma") is absent from the earliest Greek manuscripts and is omitted from most modern Bibles.

words interpret the *bearing of witness* mentioned by St. John. In the same place another trinity of witnesses, on earth, is mentioned. For (verse 8) he says, "There are three that bear witness on earth, the Spirit, and the water, and the blood; and these three agree in one": that is to say, the graces of God's Spirit and the two sacraments, baptism and the Lord's Supper, which all agree in one testimony, to assure the consciences of believers of eternal life. Of this testimony he says (verse 10), "He who believes in the Son of Man has the witness in himself." In this trinity on earth, the unity is not of the thing: for the Spirit, the water, and the blood are not the same substance, though they give the same testimony. But in the Trinity of heaven, the persons are the persons of one and the same God, though represented at three different times and on three different occasions. To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this: that God, who is always one and the same, was the person represented by Moses, the person represented by his Son incarnate, and the person represented by the apostles. As represented by the apostles, the Holy Spirit by whom they spoke is God. As represented by his Son (who was God and man), the Son is that God. As represented by Moses and the high priests, the Father—that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ—is that God. From this we may gather the reason why the names *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Spirit*, in the sense of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament. For they are persons; that is, they take their names from representing, which could not happen until various men had represented God's person in ruling, or in directing, under him.

42.4 Thus we see how ecclesiastical power was left by our Savior to the apostles, and how, so that they might exercise that power better, they were endowed with the Holy Spirit—which is therefore sometimes called in the New Testament *Paracletus*, meaning an *assister*, or one called on for help, though it is commonly translated *Comforter*. Let us now consider the power itself: what it was, and over whom.

A POWER TO PERSUADE, NOT COMMAND

Christ left his ministers no coercive power; they are schoolmasters, and must obey the civil sovereign.

42.5 Cardinal Bellarmine, in his third general controversy, has handled a great many questions concerning the ecclesiastical power of the Pope of Rome. He begins with this one: whether it ought to be monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical. All these sorts of power are sovereign and coercive.[79] Now if it should appear that our Savior left them no coercive power, but only a power to proclaim the kingdom of Christ and to persuade men to submit to it; and, by precepts and good counsel, to teach those who have submitted what they must do to be received into the Kingdom of God when it comes; and that the apostles and other ministers of the Gospel are our schoolmasters and not our commanders, and their precepts not laws but wholesome counsels—then that whole dispute would be in vain.

42.6 I have already shown (in the last chapter) that the kingdom of Christ is not of this world. Therefore his ministers, unless they are kings, cannot require obedience in his name either. For if the supreme King does not have his regal power in this world, by what authority can obedience be required to his officers? "As my Father sent me," says our Savior, "so I send you." But our Savior was sent to persuade the Jews to return to, and to invite the Gentiles to receive, the kingdom of his Father—not to reign in majesty, not even as his Father's lieutenant, until the Day of Judgment.[80]

42.7 The time between the Ascension and the general resurrection is called not a reigning but a regeneration—that is, a preparation of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ at the Day of Judgment. This appears from the words of our Savior

79 Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621), Jesuit cardinal and the leading Catholic controversialist of his day; the third "general controversy" of his *Disputationes* (1586–93) concerns the Supreme Pontiff.
80 John 20:21.

(Matthew 19:28): "You who have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve thrones"; and of St. Paul (Ephesians 6:15): "Having your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace."

42.8 And our Savior compares it to fishing—that is, to winning men to obedience not by coercion and punishment, but by persuasion. That is why he did not tell his apostles he would make them so many Nimrods, "hunters of men," but "fishers of men." It is compared also to leaven, to the sowing of seed, and to the multiplication of a grain of mustard seed. All of these exclude compulsion, and consequently there can be no actual reigning in that time. The work of Christ's ministers is evangelization—that is, a proclamation of Christ and a preparation for his second coming, as the evangelization of John the Baptist was a preparation for his first coming.[81]

42.9 Again, the office of Christ's ministers in this world is to make men believe and have faith in Christ. But faith has no relation to, and no dependence at all on, compulsion or command, but only on the certainty or probability of arguments drawn from reason, or from something men already believe. Therefore the ministers of Christ in this world have no power, by that title, to punish any man for not believing or for contradicting what they say. They have, I say, no power by that title of Christ's ministers to punish such people; but if they have sovereign civil power by political institution, then they may indeed lawfully punish any contradiction of their laws whatsoever. And St. Paul says in express words, of himself and the other preachers of the Gospel at that time, "We have no dominion over your faith, but are helpers of your joy."[82]

42.10 Another argument that the ministers of Christ in this present world have no right of commanding may be drawn from the lawful authority that Christ has left to all princes, Christians

81 Nimrod, "a mighty hunter before the Lord" (Genesis 10:9), was traditionally the first tyrant. "Fishers of men": Matthew 4:19.
82 2 Corinthians 1:24.

and unbelievers alike. St. Paul says (Colossians 3:20), "Children, obey your parents in all things, for this is well pleasing to the Lord"; and in verse 22, "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, as fearing the Lord." This is spoken to those whose masters were unbelievers, and yet they are told to obey them "in all things." And again, concerning obedience to princes, exhorting us (Romans 13:1–6) "to be subject to the higher powers," he says "that all power is ordained of God," and "that we ought to be subject to them, not only for" fear of incurring their "wrath, but also for conscience' sake." And St. Peter (1 Peter 2:13–15): "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king, as supreme, or to governors, as to those that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of those that do well; for so is the will of God." And again St. Paul: (Titus 3:1) "Put men in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, and to obey magistrates." These princes and powers of whom St. Peter and St. Paul speak here were all unbelievers. Much more, therefore, are we to obey those Christians whom God has ordained to have sovereign power over us. How then can we be obliged to obey any minister of Christ if he should command us to do anything contrary to the command of the king, or of another sovereign representative of the commonwealth of which we are members and by which we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest that Christ has not left his ministers in this world any authority to command other men, unless they are also endowed with civil authority.

PROFESSION UNDER COMPULSION, AND MARTYRS

An outward act commanded by the sovereign is his, not the subject's; true martyrs are witnesses of the resurrection.

42.11 But what (someone may object) if a king, or a senate, or another sovereign person forbids us to believe in Christ? To this I answer that such forbidding has no effect, because belief and

unbelief never follow men's commands. Faith is a gift of God, which man can neither give nor take away by promise of rewards or threats of torture. And if it is further asked, "What if we are commanded by our lawful prince to say with our tongue that we do not believe—must we obey such a command?" Profession with the tongue is only an external thing, and no more than any other gesture by which we signify our obedience. In it a Christian who holds the faith of Christ firmly in his heart has the same liberty that the prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was converted in his heart to the God of Israel, for he says (2 Kings 5:17–18), "Your servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering nor sacrifice to other gods, but to the Lord." "In this thing may the Lord pardon your servant: that when my master goes into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leans on my hand, and I bow myself in the house of Rimmon—when I bow myself in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon your servant in this thing." The prophet approved this, and told him, "Go in peace." Here Naaman believed in his heart; but by bowing before the idol Rimmon he denied the true God in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips. But then what shall we answer to our Savior's saying, "Whoever denies me before men, I will deny him before my Father who is in heaven"? This we may say: whatever a subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to do in obedience to his sovereign, and does not do in accordance with his own mind but in accordance with the laws of his country, that action is not his but his sovereign's. Nor is it he who in this case denies Christ before men, but his governor and the law of his country.[83] If anyone accuses this doctrine of being repugnant to true and unfeigned Christianity, I ask him this. Suppose there were a subject in some Christian commonwealth who was inwardly, in his heart, of the Muslim religion, and his sovereign commanded him, on pain of death, to be present at the divine service of the Christian Church. Does he think that Muslim is obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than obey that command of his lawful prince?

83 Matthew 10:33.

If he says the man ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizes all private men to disobey their princes in maintenance of their religion, true or false. If he says the man ought to be obedient, then he allows himself what he denies to another—contrary to the words of our Savior, "Whatever you would have men do to you, do that to them," and contrary to the law of nature (which is the unquestionable, everlasting law of God), "Do not do to another what you would not have him do to you."

42.12 But what then shall we say of all those martyrs we read of in the history of the Church—that they needlessly threw away their lives? To answer this, we must distinguish among the persons who have been put to death for that cause. Some of them had received a calling to preach and profess the kingdom of Christ openly; others had no such calling, and nothing more was required of them than their own faith. The former sort, if they were put to death for bearing witness to this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true martyrs. For a *martyr* is (to give the true definition of the word) a witness of the resurrection of Jesus the Messiah—which no one can be except those who conversed with him on earth and saw him after he had risen. For a witness must have seen what he testifies to, or else his testimony is not good. And that none but such can properly be called martyrs of Christ is manifest from the words of St. Peter: (Acts 1:21–22) "Of these men who have accompanied us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day that he was taken up from us, one must be ordained to be a martyr" (that is, a witness) "with us of his resurrection." Here we may observe that he who is to be a witness of the truth of the resurrection of Christ—that is to say, of the truth of this fundamental article of the Christian religion, that Jesus was the Christ—must be some disciple who conversed with him and saw him before and after his resurrection, and consequently must be one of his original disciples. Those who were not can witness no more than that their predecessors said it. They are therefore only witnesses of other

men's testimony, and are but second martyrs, or martyrs of Christ's witnesses.

42.13 He who, to maintain every doctrine that he himself draws out of the history of our Savior's life and of the Acts or Epistles of the apostles, or that he believes on the authority of a private man, will oppose the laws and authority of the civil state, is very far from being a martyr of Christ, or a martyr of his martyrs. There is only one article for which to die merits so honorable a name, and that article is this: that "Jesus is the Christ"—that is to say, he who has redeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation and eternal life in his glorious kingdom. To die for every tenet that serves the ambition or profit of the clergy is not required. Nor is it the death of the witness but the testimony itself that makes the martyr: for the word signifies nothing else but the man who bears witness, whether he is put to death for his testimony or not.

42.14 Also, he who is not sent to preach this fundamental article, but takes it on himself by his own private authority, is not obliged to suffer death for that cause, even though he is a witness, and consequently a martyr—either a primary martyr of Christ, or a secondary one of his apostles, disciples, or their successors. For since he was not called to it, it is not required at his hands; nor ought he to complain if he loses the reward he expects from those who never set him to work. No one therefore can be a martyr, of either the first or the second degree, who does not have a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh—that is to say, no one but those who are sent to convert unbelievers. For no man is a witness to someone who already believes and therefore needs no witness, but only to those who deny, or doubt, or have not heard. Christ sent his apostles and his seventy disciples with authority to preach; he did not send all who believed. And he sent them to unbelievers: "I send you," he says, "as sheep among wolves"—not as sheep to other sheep.[84]

84 Matthew 10:16.

THE APOSTLES' COMMISSION

The apostles were sent to proclaim, teach, baptize, and forgive sins, but not to rule.

42.15 Lastly, none of the points of their commission, as they are expressly set down in the Gospel, contains any authority over the congregation.

42.16 We have, first (Matthew 10), that the twelve apostles were sent "to the lost sheep of the house of Israel," and commanded to preach "that the Kingdom of God was at hand." Now preaching, in the original, is the act that a crier, herald, or other officer performs publicly in proclaiming a king. But a crier has no right to command anyone. And (Luke 10:2) the seventy disciples are sent out as "laborers," not as lords "of the harvest," and are told (verse 9) to say, "The Kingdom of God has come near to you." By kingdom here is meant not the Kingdom of Grace but the Kingdom of Glory, for they are told to proclaim it (verse 11) to those cities that will not receive them, as a threat that it will be more tolerable on that day for Sodom than for such a city. And (Matthew 20:28) our Savior tells his disciples, who were seeking priority of place, that their office was to minister, even as the Son of man came not to be ministered to, but to minister. Preachers therefore have not magisterial but ministerial power. "Be not called masters," says our Savior (Matthew 23:10), "for one is your Master, even Christ."

42.17 Another point of their commission is to "teach all nations," as in Matthew 28:19, or, as in St. Mark 16:15, "Go into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature." Teaching and preaching, therefore, are the same thing. For those who proclaim the coming of a king must also make known by what right he comes, if they mean men to submit to him—as St. Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica, when "for three Sabbath days he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus is Christ." But to teach from the Old

Testament that Jesus was Christ (that is to say, King) and risen from the dead is not to say that men, after they believe it, are bound to obey those who tell them so, against the laws and commands of their sovereigns. It is to say that they will act wisely to await the coming of Christ hereafter in patience and faith, with obedience to their present magistrates.[85]

42.18 Another point of their commission is to "baptize, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." What is baptism? Dipping into water. But what is it to dip a man into water in the name of anything? The meaning of these words of baptism is this. He who is baptized is dipped or washed as a sign of becoming a new man and a loyal subject to that God whose person was represented in old times by Moses and the high priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus Christ, his Son, God and man, who has redeemed us and shall in his human nature represent his Father's person in his eternal kingdom after the resurrection; and as a sign of acknowledging the doctrine of the apostles—who, assisted by the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, were left as guides to bring us into that kingdom—to be the only and sure way to it. This is our promise in baptism. And the authority of earthly sovereigns is not to be put down until the Day of Judgment, as St. Paul expressly affirms (1 Corinthians 15:22–24), where he says, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." "But every man in his own order: Christ the firstfruits; afterward they that are Christ's, at his coming. Then comes the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power." It is manifest, then, that in baptism we do not set up over ourselves another authority by which our external actions are to be governed in this life, but promise to take the doctrine of the apostles as our direction on the way to eternal life.

85 Acts 17:2–3.

THE POWER OF THE KEYS AND EXCOMMUNICATION

Forgiving sins follows from baptizing; excommunication without civil power is only shunning, and cannot touch sovereigns.

42.19 The power of *remission and retention of sins*, also called the power of *loosing and binding*, and sometimes *the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven*, is a consequence of the authority to baptize or to refuse baptism. For baptism is the sacrament of allegiance of those who are to be received into the Kingdom of God—that is to say, into eternal life; that is to say, to remission of sin. For as eternal life was lost by the committing of men's sins, so it is recovered by the remitting of them. The end of baptism is remission of sins; and therefore St. Peter, when those who were converted by his sermon on the day of Pentecost asked what they were to do, advised them to "repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus, for the remission of sins." And therefore, since to baptize is to declare the reception of men into God's kingdom, and to refuse to baptize is to declare their exclusion, it follows that the power to declare them cast out of it, or retained in it, was given to the same apostles and to their substitutes and successors. And therefore, after our Savior had breathed on them, saying (John 20:22), "Receive the Holy Spirit," he adds in the next verse, "Whosesoever sins you remit, they are remitted to them; and whosesoever sins you retain, they are retained." By these words is granted an authority to forgive or retain sins not simply and absolutely, as God forgives or retains them, who knows the heart of man and the truth of his penitence and conversion, but conditionally, to the penitent. And if the person absolved has only a feigned repentance, this forgiveness or absolution is thereby made void, without any other act or sentence of the one who absolves, and has no effect at all toward salvation, but on the contrary aggravates his sin. Therefore the apostles and their successors are to go only by the outward marks of repentance. If these appear, they have no authority to deny absolution; if they do not appear, they have no authority to absolve. The same is to

be observed in baptism as well: for the apostles had no power to deny baptism to a converted Jew or Gentile, nor to grant it to the unrepentant. But since no man can discern the truth of another man's repentance any further than by external marks taken from his words and actions, which are subject to hypocrisy, another question will arise: who is appointed judge of those marks? And this question is decided by our Savior himself: "If your brother," he says, "shall trespass against you, go and tell him his fault between you and him alone; if he shall hear you, you have gained your brother. But if he will not hear you, then take with you one or two more."[86] "And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it to the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican." From this it is manifest that the judgment concerning the truth of repentance belonged not to any one man but to the Church—that is, to the assembly of the faithful, or to those who have authority to be their representative. But besides the judgment, the pronouncing of sentence is also necessary. This always belonged to the apostle, or some pastor of the Church, as spokesman; and our Savior speaks of this in verse 18: "Whatsoever you shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." And the practice of St. Paul was in keeping with this (1 Corinthians 5:3–5), where he says, "For I verily, as absent in body but present in spirit, have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that has so done this deed: in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when you are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such a one to Satan"—that is to say, to cast him out of the Church as a man whose sins are not forgiven. Paul here pronounces the sentence; but the assembly was first to hear the case (for St. Paul was absent), and consequently to condemn him. But in the same chapter (1 Corinthians 5:11–12) the judgment in such a case is attributed more expressly to the assembly: "But now I have written to you not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornic-

86 Matthew 18:15–17.

ator, etc.—with such a one, no, not to eat. For what have I to do to judge them that are outside?" "Do not you judge them that are within?" The sentence by which a man was put out of the Church, therefore, was pronounced by the apostle or pastor; but the judgment concerning the merit of the case lay with the Church—that is to say (as things stood before the conversion of kings and of men who had sovereign authority in the commonwealth), the assembly of the Christians living in the same city: as in Corinth, the assembly of the Christians of Corinth.

42.20 This part of the power of the keys, by which men were thrust out of the Kingdom of God, is what is called *excommunication*. To *excommunicate* is, in the original, *aposunagogon poiein*, "to cast out of the synagogue"—that is, out of the place of divine service. The word is drawn from the custom of the Jews of casting out of their synagogues those whom they thought contagious in manners or doctrine, as people with leprosy were separated by the law of Moses from the congregation of Israel until the priest pronounced them clean.

42.21 The use and effect of excommunication, while it was not yet strengthened by the civil power, was no more than this: those who were not excommunicated were to avoid the company of those who were. It was not enough to regard them as heathens who had never been Christians; for with such people they might eat and drink, which with excommunicated persons they might not do. This appears from the words of St. Paul (1 Corinthians 5:9–10 and following), where he tells them he had formerly forbidden them "to keep company with fornicators"; but (because that could not be done without going out of the world) he restricts it to such fornicators and otherwise vicious persons as were of the brethren. "With such a one," he says, they ought not to keep company, "no, not to eat." And this is no more than what our Savior says: (Matthew 18:17) "Let him be to you as a heathen and as a publican." For publicans (the word signifies tax farmers and collectors of the revenue of the commonwealth) were so hated and detested by the Jews who had to pay it that among them "publican" and "sinner" were taken for the same

thing. So much so that when our Savior accepted the invitation of Zacchaeus, a publican, it was held against him as a crime, even though it was in order to convert him. And therefore, when our Savior added "publican" to "heathen," he forbade them to eat with an excommunicated man.

42.22 As for keeping them out of their synagogues or places of assembly, they had no power to do that except the power of the owner of the place, whether he was Christian or heathen. And because all places are by right in the dominion of the commonwealth, the excommunicated man, as well as the man who was never baptized, might enter them by commission from the civil magistrate—as Paul before his conversion entered their synagogues at Damascus to arrest Christians, men and women, and carry them bound to Jerusalem, by commission from the high priest.

42.23 From this it appears that for a Christian who became an apostate, in a place where the civil power persecuted the Church or did not assist it, excommunication carried in it neither damage in this world nor terror. Not terror, because of their unbelief; nor damage, because by it they returned into the favor of the world, and in the world to come would be in no worse condition than those who had never believed. The damage fell rather on the Church, by provoking those it cast out to vent their malice more freely.

42.24 Excommunication therefore had its effect only on those who believed that Jesus Christ was to come again in glory to reign over and to judge both the living and the dead, and would therefore refuse entrance into his kingdom to those whose sins were retained—that is, to those excommunicated by the Church. And that is why St. Paul calls excommunication a delivery of the excommunicated person to Satan. For outside the kingdom of Christ, all other kingdoms after the Judgment are comprehended in the kingdom of Satan. This is what the faithful stood in fear of, as long as they stood excommunicated—that is to say, in a state in which their sins were not forgiven. From this we may understand that excommunication, in the time when the Chris-

tian religion was not authorized by the civil power, was used only for the correction of manners, not of errors in opinion. For it is a punishment that no one could feel except those who believed in and expected the coming again of our Savior to judge the world; and those who so believed needed no other opinion, but only uprightness of life, to be saved.

42.25 There lies excommunication for injustice, as in Matthew 18: if your brother offends you, tell him privately; then with witnesses; lastly, tell the Church; and then if he does not obey, "Let him be to you as a heathen and a publican." And there lies excommunication for a scandalous life, as in (1 Corinthians 5:11): "If any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such a one you are not to eat." But to excommunicate a man who held this foundation, that Jesus was the Christ, for difference of opinion on other points by which that foundation was not destroyed —for that there appears no authority in the Scripture, and no example among the apostles. There is indeed a text in St. Paul (Titus 3:10) that seems to say the contrary. "A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject." For a *heretic* is one who, being a member of the Church, nevertheless teaches some private opinion that the Church has forbidden; and St. Paul advises Titus to "reject" such a one after the first and second admonition. But to "reject," in this place, is not to excommunicate the man, but to give up admonishing him, to let him alone, to stop disputing with him, as one who is to be convinced only by himself. The same apostle says (2 Timothy 2:23), "Foolish and unlearned questions avoid." The word "avoid" in this place and "reject" in the former are the same in the original, *paraitou*; but foolish questions may be set aside without excommunication. And again (Titus 3:9), "Avoid foolish questions," where the original *periistaso* ("set them aside") is equivalent to the former word "reject." There is no other passage that can even plausibly be drawn on to support casting faithful men, who believed the foundation, out of the Church only for some particular superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a

good and pious conscience. On the contrary, all such passages as command avoiding such disputes are written as a lesson to pastors (such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make new articles of faith by settling every small controversy, which obliges men to a needless burden of conscience, or provokes them to break the union of the Church. The apostles themselves observed this lesson well. St. Peter and St. Paul, though their controversy was great (as we may read in Galatians 2:11), did not cast one another out of the Church. Nevertheless, even in the apostles' times there were other pastors who did not observe it—such as Diotrephes (3 John 9 and following), who cast out of the Church those whom St. John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of the pride he took in preeminence. So early had vainglory and ambition found their way into the Church of Christ.

42.26 For a man to be liable to excommunication, many conditions are required. First, he must be a member of some community—that is to say, of some lawful assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church—that has power to judge the cause for which he is to be excommunicated. For where there is no community, there can be no excommunication; and where there is no power to judge, there can be no power to give sentence.

42.27 From this it follows that one Church cannot be excommunicated by another. For either they have equal power to excommunicate each other—in which case excommunication is not discipline, nor an act of authority, but schism and the dissolution of charity—or one is so subordinate to the other that they both have but one voice, and then they are but one Church, and the part excommunicated is no longer a Church but a loose number of individual persons.

42.28 And because the sentence of excommunication carries an instruction not to keep company with, or even eat with, the person excommunicated, if a sovereign prince or assembly is excommunicated, the sentence has no effect. For all subjects are bound by the law of nature to be in the company and presence of their own sovereign when he requires it. Nor can they lawfully expel him from any place in his own dominion, whether

profane or holy, nor go out of his dominion without his leave—much less refuse to eat with him, if he calls them to that honor. And as for other princes and states, because they are not parts of one and the same congregation, they need no other sentence to keep them from keeping company with the excommunicated state. For the very institution, as it unites many men into one community, so it separates one community from another. So excommunication is not needed for keeping kings and states apart, and it has no further effect than is in the nature of policy itself—unless it is to incite princes to make war on one another.

42.29 Nor is the excommunication of a Christian subject who obeys the laws of his own sovereign, whether Christian or heathen, of any effect. For if he believes that Jesus is the Christ, "he has the Spirit of God" (1 John 4:1), "and God dwells in him, and he in God" (1 John 4:15). But he who has the Spirit of God, he who dwells in God, he in whom God dwells, can receive no harm from the excommunication of men. Therefore he who believes Jesus to be the Christ is free from all the dangers threatened to excommunicated persons. He who does not believe it is no Christian.[87] Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not liable to excommunication; nor is a professed Christian either, until his hypocrisy appears in his manners—that is, until his behavior is contrary to the law of his sovereign, which is the rule of manners, and to which Christ and his apostles have commanded us to be subject. For the Church cannot judge of manners except by external actions, and those actions can never be unlawful except when they are against the law of the commonwealth.

42.30 If a man's father, or mother, or master is excommunicated, the children are still not forbidden to keep them company or to eat with them. For that would (for the most part) oblige them not to eat at all, for lack of means to get food, and would authorize them to disobey their parents and masters, contrary to the precept of the apostles.

42.31 In sum, the power of excommunication cannot be extended further than the end for which the apostles and pastors of the Church have their commission from our Savior—which is not to rule by command and coercion, but by teaching and directing men in the way of salvation in the world to come. And as a master in any science may abandon his student when he obstinately neglects the practice of his rules, but may not accuse him of injustice, because he was never bound to obey him, so a teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his disciples who obstinately continue in an unchristian life, but he cannot say they do him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him. For to a teacher who complains in this way may be applied God's answer to Samuel in a similar case: "They have not rejected you, but me." Excommunication, therefore, when it lacks the assistance of the civil power—as it does when a Christian state or prince is excommunicated by a foreign authority—is without effect, and consequently ought to be without terror.[88] The name *Fulmen Excommunicationis* (that is, "the thunderbolt of excommunication") came from a fancy of the Bishop of Rome, who first used it, that he was King of Kings—as the heathen made Jupiter king of the gods, and gave him in their poems and pictures a thunderbolt with which to subdue and punish the giants who dared to deny his power. This fancy was grounded on two errors. One is that the kingdom of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Savior's own words, "My kingdom is not of this world." The other is that he is Christ's vicar not only over his own subjects but over all the Christians of the world—for which there is no ground in Scripture, and the contrary shall be proved in its due place.

87 Hobbes cites 1 John 4:1; the thought is closest to 1 John 4:2 and 5:1.
88 1 Samuel 8:7.

WHO INTERPRETS SCRIPTURE

In the apostles' time every convert judged the Scriptures for himself, since no one had authority to command.

42.32 St. Paul, coming to Thessalonica, where there was a synagogue of the Jews (Acts 17:2–3), "as his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ." The Scriptures mentioned here were the Scriptures of the Jews—that is, the Old Testament. The men to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ and risen again from the dead were also Jews, and already believed that those Scriptures were the word of God. Upon this (as it says in verse 4) some of them believed, and (as it says in verse 5) some did not believe. What was the reason why, when they all believed the Scripture, they did not all believe alike, but some approved and others disapproved the interpretation of St. Paul who cited it, and each interpreted it for himself? It was this: St. Paul came to them without any legal commission, in the manner of one who would not command but persuade. That he must necessarily do either by miracles, as Moses did with the Israelites in Egypt, so that they might see his authority in God's works; or by reasoning from the already received Scripture, so that they might see the truth of his doctrine in God's word. But whoever persuades by reasoning from written principles makes the one he speaks to the judge both of the meaning of those principles and of the force of his inferences from them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were not, who else was the judge of what St. Paul alleged out of Scripture? If St. Paul, what need had he to quote any passages to prove his doctrine? It would have been enough to say, "I find it so in Scripture—that is to say, in your laws, of which I am the interpreter, as sent by Christ." There could therefore be no interpreter of the Scripture to whose interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica were bound to abide. Everyone might

believe or not believe, according as the allegations seemed to him agreeable or not agreeable to the meaning of the passages alleged. And generally, in all cases in the world, he who offers any proof makes the one to whom he addresses his speech the judge of his proof. As for the Jews in particular, they were bound by express words (Deuteronomy 17) to receive the determination of all hard questions from the priests and judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to be understood of the Jews who were not yet converted.

42.33 For the conversion of the Gentiles there was no use in alleging the Scriptures, which they did not believe. The apostles therefore labored by reason to refute their idolatry, and, that done, to persuade them to the faith of Christ by their testimony of his life and resurrection. So there could not yet be any controversy about the authority to interpret Scripture, since no man was obliged, while he remained an unbeliever, to follow any man's interpretation of any Scripture except his sovereign's interpretation of the laws of his country.

42.34 Let us now consider the conversion itself, and see what there was in it that could be the cause of such an obligation. Men were converted to nothing other than belief in what the apostles preached. And the apostles preached nothing but that Jesus was the Christ—that is to say, the King who was to save them and reign over them eternally in the world to come—and consequently that he was not dead but risen again from the dead, and gone up into heaven, and would come again one day to judge the world (which would also rise again to be judged) and reward every man according to his works. None of them preached that he himself, or any other apostle, was such an interpreter of the Scripture that all who became Christians ought to take his interpretation for law. For to interpret the laws is part of the administration of a present kingdom, which the apostles did not have. They prayed then, as all other pastors have ever since, "Your kingdom come," and exhorted their converts to obey their princes, who were then heathens. The New Testament was not yet published in one body. Each of the evan-

gelists was the interpreter of his own Gospel, and each apostle of his own epistle. And of the Old Testament, our Savior himself says to the Jews (John 5:39), "Search the Scriptures; for in them you think you have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me." If he had not meant them to interpret the Scriptures, he would not have told them to take from there the proof of his being the Christ. He would either have interpreted them himself, or referred them to the interpretation of the priests.

42.35 When a difficulty arose, the apostles and elders of the Church assembled together and determined what should be preached and taught, and how they should interpret the Scriptures to the people; but they did not take from the people the liberty to read and interpret them for themselves. The apostles sent various letters to the churches, and other writings for their instruction, which would have been in vain if they had not allowed them to interpret—that is, to consider the meaning of—them. And as it was in the apostles' time, so it must be until there should be pastors who could authorize an interpreter whose interpretation would generally be abided by. But that could not be until kings were pastors, or pastors kings.

HOW SCRIPTURE BECAME LAW

Scripture has been law only where the civil sovereign made it so, from Moses to Christian kings.

42.36 There are two senses in which a writing may be said to be *canonical*. For *canon* signifies a *rule*; and a rule is a precept by which a man is guided and directed in any action whatever. Such precepts, even when given by a teacher to his disciple, or a counselor to his friend, without power to compel him to observe them, are nevertheless canons, because they are rules. But when they are given by one whom the receiver is bound to obey, then those canons are not only rules but laws. The question here, therefore, is about the power to make the Scriptures (which are the rules of Christian faith) laws.

42.37 The part of Scripture that was law first was the Ten Commandments, written on two tables of stone, delivered by God himself to Moses, and made known by Moses to the people. Before that time there was no written law of God. Not yet having chosen any people to be his peculiar kingdom, he had given men no law but the law of nature—that is to say, the precepts of natural reason, written in every man's own heart. Of these two tables, the first contains the law of sovereignty: 1. That they should not obey or honor the gods of other nations, in these words: *Non habebis Deos alienos coram me*—that is, "You shall not have for gods the gods that other nations worship, but only me." By this they were forbidden to obey or honor as their king and governor any other God than him who spoke to them then by Moses, and afterward by the high priest. 2. That they "should not make any image to represent him"—that is to say, they were not to choose for themselves, either in heaven or on earth, any representative of their own fancying, but to obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that office. 3. That "they should not take the name of God in vain"—that is, they should not speak rashly of their King, nor dispute his right, nor the commissions of Moses and Aaron, his lieutenants. 4. That "they should every seventh day abstain from their ordinary labor," and spend that time in doing him public honor. The second table contains the duty of one man toward another, as "to honor parents; not to kill; not to commit adultery; not to steal; not to corrupt judgment by false witness"; and finally, "not so much as to plan in their heart the doing of any injury to one another." The question now is: who was it that gave these written tables the binding force of laws? There is no doubt that they were made laws by God himself. But a law does not oblige, and is not law, to anyone except those who acknowledge it to be the act of the sovereign. How then could the people of Israel, who were forbidden to approach the mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged to obey all those laws that Moses put before them? Some of them were indeed laws of nature, as the whole second table was, and were therefore to be acknowledged as God's laws not

by the Israelites alone but by all people. But of those that were peculiar to the Israelites, such as those of the first table, the question remains—except that they had bound themselves, immediately after these laws were put before them, to obey Moses, in these words (Exodus 20:19): "Speak to us yourself, and we will hear you; but let not God speak to us, lest we die." It was therefore only Moses then, and after him the high priest, whom God declared (through Moses) should administer this his peculiar kingdom, who had on earth the power to make this short scripture of the Decalogue law in the commonwealth of Israel. But Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding high priests were the civil sovereigns. So far, therefore, the canonizing or making of Scripture into law belonged to the civil sovereign.

42.38 The judicial law—that is to say, the laws that God prescribed to the magistrates of Israel as the rule for their administration of justice, and for the sentences or judgments they should pronounce in pleas between man and man—and the Levitical law—that is to say, the rule that God prescribed concerning the rites and ceremonies of the priests and Levites—were all delivered to them by Moses only. Therefore they too became laws by virtue of the same promise of obedience to Moses. Whether these laws were then written, or not written but dictated to the people by Moses by word of mouth (after his forty days with God on the mountain), is not stated in the text. But they were all positive laws, equivalent to Holy Scripture, and made canonical by Moses, the civil sovereign.

42.39 After the Israelites had come into the plains of Moab opposite Jericho, ready to enter the land of promise, Moses added various other laws to the former ones. These are therefore called *Deuteronomy*, that is, *second laws*. And they are (as it is written in Deuteronomy 29:1) "the words of a covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel, besides the covenant which he made with them in Horeb." For having explained those former laws at the beginning of the book of Deuteronomy, he adds others, which begin at chapter 12 and continue to the end of chapter 26 of the same book. This law

(Deuteronomy 27:1) they were commanded to write on great stones plastered over, when they crossed the Jordan. This law was also written by Moses himself in a book, and delivered into the hands of "the priests, and the elders of Israel" (Deuteronomy 31:9), and commanded (verse 26) "to be put in the side of the ark"—for in the ark itself there was nothing but the Ten Commandments. This was the law of which Moses (Deuteronomy 17:18) commanded the kings of Israel to keep a copy. And this is the law which, having been lost for a long time, was found again in the Temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority received as the law of God. But Moses at its writing, and Josiah at its recovery, both had the civil sovereignty. So far, therefore, the power of making Scripture canonical was in the civil sovereign.

42.40 Apart from this Book of the Law, no other book was received among the Jews as the law of God from the time of Moses until after the Captivity. For the prophets (except a few) lived during the Captivity itself, and the rest lived only a little before it. And their prophecies were so far from being generally received as laws that the prophets themselves were persecuted, partly by false prophets and partly by the kings whom those false prophets had led astray. And this very book, which Josiah confirmed as the law of God, was lost in the Captivity and the sack of the city of Jerusalem, together with all the history of the works of God, as appears from this passage (2 Esdras 14:21): "Your law is burned; therefore no one knows the things that are done by you, or the works that shall begin." And before the Captivity, between the time when the Law was lost and the time of Josiah, when it was found again, they had no written word of God, but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of those whom each of them considered prophets. (When it was lost is not mentioned in the Scripture, but it may probably be thought to have been in the time of Rehoboam, when Shishak king of Egypt plundered the Temple.)[89]

42.41 From this we may infer that the Scriptures of the Old Testament which we have today were not canonical, nor a law to the

89 Shishak's plundering of the Temple is told in 1 Kings 14:25–26.

Jews, until the renewal of their covenant with God at their return from the Captivity, and the restoration of their commonwealth under Ezra. But from that time on they were accounted the law of the Jews, and as such were translated into Greek by seventy elders of Judea, placed in the library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved as the word of God. Now since Ezra was the high priest, and the high priest was their civil sovereign, it is manifest that the Scriptures were never made laws except by the sovereign civil power.

42.42 From the writings of the Fathers who lived before the Christian religion was received and authorized by the Emperor Constantine, we may find that the books we now have of the New Testament were held by the Christians of that time to be the dictates of the Holy Spirit, and consequently the canon, or rule of faith. (A few held otherwise; in respect of their small number, the rest were called the Catholic Church, and the others heretics.) Such was the reverence and esteem they had for their teachers—as in general the reverence that disciples bear their first masters, in every kind of doctrine they receive from them, is not small. There is therefore no doubt that when St. Paul wrote to the churches he had converted, or any other apostle or disciple of Christ wrote to those who had then embraced Christ, they received those writings as the true Christian doctrine. But in that time, when it was not the power and authority of the teacher but the faith of the hearer that caused them to receive it, it was not the apostles who made their own writings canonical, but every convert made them so for himself.

42.43 But the question here is not what any Christian made a law or canon for himself (which he might reject again by the same right by which he received it), but what was made a canon for them in such a way that they could not, without injustice, do anything contrary to it. That the New Testament should be canonical in this sense—that is to say, a law—in any place where the law of the commonwealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a law. For a law (as has already been shown) is the command of that man or assembly to whom we have given sov-

ereign authority to make such rules for the direction of our actions as he thinks fit, and to punish us when we do anything contrary to them. When, therefore, any other man offers us other rules, which the sovereign ruler has not prescribed, they are only counsel and advice. Whether that advice is good or bad, the one who is counseled may refuse to follow it without injustice; and when it is contrary to laws already established, he cannot follow it without injustice, however good he thinks it to be. I say he cannot follow it in this case in his actions, nor in his discourse with other men—though he may without blame believe his private teachers, and wish he had the liberty to practice their advice, and that it were publicly received as law. For inward faith is by its own nature invisible, and consequently exempt from all human jurisdiction; whereas the words and actions that proceed from it, when they are breaches of our civil obedience, are injustice before both God and man. Since, then, our Savior has denied that his kingdom is of this world, and has said that he came not to judge the world but to save it, he has not subjected us to any laws other than those of the commonwealth. That is, he has subjected the Jews to the law of Moses (which he says, in Matthew 5:17, he came not to destroy but to fulfill), other nations to the laws of their several sovereigns, and all men to the laws of nature. Both he himself and his apostles have in their teaching recommended the keeping of these laws to us as a necessary condition of being admitted by him, on the last day, into his eternal kingdom, in which there will be protection and everlasting life. Since, then, our Savior and his apostles left us not new laws to bind us in this world, but new doctrine to prepare us for the next, the books of the New Testament, which contain that doctrine, were not binding canons—that is, laws—until obedience to them was commanded by those to whom God had given power on earth to be legislators. Until then they were only good and safe advice for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take or refuse at his own peril, without injustice.

42.44 Again, the commission our Savior Christ gave his apostles and disciples was to proclaim his kingdom (not present, but) to come; to teach all nations; to baptize those who believed; to enter the houses of those who received them, and where they were not received, to shake off the dust of their feet against them—but not to call down fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compel them to obedience by the sword. In all this there is nothing of power, but only of persuasion. He sent them out as sheep among wolves, not as kings to their subjects. They had no commission to make laws, but to obey laws already made and to teach obedience to them. Consequently they could not make their writings binding canons without the help of the sovereign civil power. And therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is law only where the lawful civil power has made it so. And there, too, the king or sovereign makes it a law to himself, by which he subjects himself not to the doctor or apostle who converted him, but to God himself and his Son Jesus Christ, as directly as the apostles themselves did.

42.45 What may seem to give the New Testament the force of law, for those who had embraced Christian doctrine in times and places of persecution, is the decrees they made among themselves in their synods. For we read (Acts 15:28) the style in which the council of the apostles, the elders, and the whole Church spoke: "It seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things," and so on. This is a style that signifies a power to lay a burden on those who had received their doctrine. Now *to lay a burden on another* seems the same as *to oblige*; and therefore the acts of that council were laws to the Christians of that time. Nevertheless, they were no more laws than are these other precepts: "Repent"; "Be baptized"; "Keep the commandments"; "Believe the gospel"; "Come unto me"; "Sell all that you have"; "Give it to the poor"; and "Follow me." These are not commands but invitations, callings of men to Christianity, like the one in Isaiah 55:1: "Ho, everyone who thirsts, come to the waters; come, and buy wine and milk without money." For first, the apostles' power was no

other than our Savior's: to invite men to embrace the Kingdom of God, which they themselves acknowledged to be a kingdom (not present, but) to come; and those who have no kingdom can make no laws. And secondly, if their acts of council were laws, they could not be disobeyed without sin. But we nowhere read that those who did not receive the doctrine of Christ sinned in that; only that they died in their sins—that is, that their sins against the laws to which they owed obedience were not pardoned. And those laws were the laws of nature and the civil laws of the state, to which every Christian had submitted himself by pact. And therefore by the burden the apostles might lay on those they had converted, we are to understand not laws, but conditions offered to those who sought salvation. These they might accept or refuse at their own peril, without committing a new sin—though not without the danger of being condemned and shut out of the Kingdom of God for their past sins. And therefore St. John does not say of unbelievers that the wrath of God shall *come* upon them, but that "the wrath of God *remains* upon them"; and not that they shall be condemned, but that "they are condemned *already*." Nor can it be conceived that the benefit of faith is *the remission of sins,* unless we conceive at the same time that the harm of unbelief is *the retention of those same sins*.[90]

42.46 But (someone may ask) what purpose was there in the apostles, and the other pastors of the Church after their time, meeting together to agree on what doctrine should be taught, both of faith and of morals, if no one was obliged to observe their decrees? The answer may be that the apostles and elders of that council were obliged, by their very entrance into it, to teach the doctrine concluded there and decreed to be taught, so far as no previous law to which they owed obedience was to the contrary—but not that all other Christians were obliged to observe what they taught. For though they might deliberate about what each of them should teach, they could not deliberate about what others should do, unless their assembly had had a legislative

90 John 3:36 and 3:18.

power, which no one could have except civil sovereigns. For though God is the sovereign of all the world, we are not bound to take as his law whatever every man proposes in his name; nor anything contrary to the civil law, which God has expressly commanded us to obey.

42.47 Since, then, the acts of the council of the apostles were not laws at that time but counsels, still less are the acts of any other doctors or councils since then laws, if they assembled without the authority of the civil sovereign. And consequently the books of the New Testament, though they are the most perfect rules of Christian doctrine, could not be made laws by any authority other than that of kings or sovereign assemblies.

42.48 The first council that made the Scriptures we now have into a canon is not extant. For the collection of the Canons of the Apostles attributed to Clement, the first bishop of Rome after St. Peter, is open to question. Though the canonical books are listed there, the words *Sint vobis omnibus Clericis & Laicis Libri venerandi, &c.* ("Let these be venerable books for all of you, clergy and laity") contain a distinction between clergy and laity that was not in use so near to St. Peter's time. The first council for settling the canonical Scripture that is extant is that of Laodicea, whose fifty-ninth canon forbids the reading of any books other than these in the churches. This is a mandate addressed not to every Christian, but only to those who had authority to read anything publicly in the church—that is, to clergy only.

OFFICES IN THE EARLY CHURCH

Apostles, elders, and deacons were chosen by congregations, not appointed by any bishop.

42.49 Of the ecclesiastical officers in the time of the apostles, some were magisterial and some ministerial. The magisterial offices were preaching the gospel of the Kingdom of God to unbelievers, administering the sacraments and divine service, and teaching the rules of faith and morals to those who were converted. The ministerial office was that of deacons—that is, of those

appointed to administer the worldly necessities of the Church at the time when they lived on a common fund of money, raised from the voluntary contributions of the faithful.

42.50 Among the magisterial officers, the first and chief were the apostles. At first there were only twelve of them, chosen and appointed by our Savior himself. Their office was not only to preach, teach, and baptize, but also to be martyrs—witnesses of our Savior's Resurrection. This testimony was the specific and essential mark by which apostleship was distinguished from other ecclesiastical office. For an apostle had to have either seen our Savior after his Resurrection, or conversed with him before it and seen his works and the other proofs of his divinity, by which they might be taken as sufficient witnesses. And therefore at the election of a new apostle in place of Judas Iscariot, St.[91] Peter says (Acts 1:21–22), "Of these men who have accompanied us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day that he was taken up from us, one *must* be ordained to be a *witness* with us of his Resurrection." By this word *must* is implied a necessary property of an apostle: to have accompanied the first and principal apostles in the time when our Savior showed himself in the flesh.

42.51 The first apostle not appointed by Christ during his time on earth was Matthias, who was chosen in this way. About 120 Christians were gathered together in Jerusalem (Acts 1:15). They put forward two, Joseph called Justus, and Matthias (verse 23), and had lots drawn; "and (verse 26) the lot fell on Matthias, and he was numbered with the apostles." So here we see that the ordination of this apostle was the act of the congregation, and not of St. Peter, nor of the eleven, except as members of the assembly.

42.52 After him no other apostle was ever ordained except Paul and Barnabas, which was done in this way, as we read in Acts 13:1–3: "There were in the church at Antioch certain prophets and teachers: Barnabas, and Simeon called Niger, and Lucius of

91 Greek *martys* means "witness."

Cyrene, and Manaen, who had been brought up with Herod the tetrarch, and Saul. As they ministered to the Lord and fasted, the Holy Spirit said, 'Set apart for me Barnabas and Saul for the work to which I have called them.' And when they had fasted and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away."

42.53 From this it is manifest that though they were called by the Holy Spirit, their calling was declared to them, and their mission authorized, by the particular church of Antioch. That this calling of theirs was to the apostleship is apparent from the fact that both of them are called apostles (Acts 14:14). And that they were apostles by virtue of this act of the church of Antioch, St. Paul declares plainly (Romans 1:1) by using the word the Holy Spirit used at his calling. For he styles himself "an apostle, set apart for the gospel of God," alluding to the words of the Holy Spirit, "Set apart for me Barnabas and Saul," and so on. But since the work of an apostle was to be a witness of the Resurrection of Christ, someone may ask here how St. Paul, who did not converse with our Savior before his Passion, could know that he had risen. The answer is easy: our Savior himself appeared to him from heaven, on the road to Damascus, after his Ascension, "and chose him as a vessel to bear his name before the Gentiles, and kings, and the children of Israel." Consequently, having seen the Lord after his Passion, he was a competent witness of his Resurrection. And as for Barnabas, he was a disciple before the Passion. It is therefore evident that Paul and Barnabas were apostles, and yet were chosen and authorized not by the first apostles alone, but by the church of Antioch—just as Matthias was chosen and authorized by the church of Jerusalem.[92]

42.54 *Bishop*, a word formed in our language from the Greek *episkopos*, signifies an overseer or superintendent of any business, and particularly a pastor or shepherd. From there it was taken by metaphor—not only among the Jews, who were originally shepherds, but also among the heathen—to signify the office of a king, or of any other ruler or guide of people, whether he ruled by laws or by doctrine. And so the apostles were the first Chris-

92 Acts 9:15.

tian bishops, instituted by Christ himself; in this sense the apostleship of Judas is called "his bishopric" (Acts 1:20). And afterward, when elders were appointed in the Christian churches with the charge of guiding Christ's flock by their doctrine and advice, these elders were also called bishops. Timothy was an elder (the word *elder* in the New Testament is a name of office as well as of age), yet he was also a bishop. And bishops were then content with the title of elders. Indeed, St. John himself, the apostle whom our Lord loved, begins his Second Epistle with these words: "The elder to the elect lady." From this it is evident that *bishop*, *pastor*, *elder*, and *doctor*—that is to say, *teacher*—were only so many different names for the same office in the time of the apostles. For there was then no government by coercion, but only by doctrine and persuasion. The Kingdom of God was yet to come, in a new world. So there could be no authority to compel in any church until the commonwealth had embraced the Christian faith; and consequently there was no difference of authority, though there was a difference of employments.

42.55 Besides these magisterial employments in the Church—namely apostles, bishops, elders, pastors, and doctors, whose calling was to proclaim Christ to the Jews and to unbelievers, and to direct and teach those who believed—we read of no others in the New Testament. For the names *evangelists* and *prophets* do not signify any office, but various gifts by which various men were useful to the Church. Evangelists were useful by writing the life and acts of our Savior: such were the apostles St. Matthew and St. John, the disciples St. Mark and St. Luke, and whoever else wrote on that subject (as St. Thomas and St. Barnabas are said to have done, though the Church has not received the books that have gone under their names). Prophets were useful by the gift of interpreting the Old Testament, and sometimes by declaring their special revelations to the Church. For neither these gifts, nor the gift of tongues, nor the gift of casting out devils or of curing other diseases, nor anything else made a man an

officer in the Church, except only a due calling and election to the charge of teaching.

42.56 The apostles Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas were not made by our Savior himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the assembly of Christians—Matthias by the church of Jerusalem, and Paul and Barnabas by the church of Antioch. In the same way the *presbyters* and *pastors* in other cities were elected by the churches of those cities. As proof of this, let us first consider how St. Paul proceeded in the ordination of presbyters in the cities where he had converted men to the Christian faith, immediately after he and Barnabas had received their apostleship. We read (Acts 14:23) that "they ordained elders in every church." At first sight this may be taken as an argument that they themselves chose the elders and gave them their authority. But if we consider the original text, it will be manifest that the elders were authorized and chosen by the assembly of the Christians of each city.[93] For the words there are *cheirotonēsantes autois presbyterous kat' ekklēsian*, that is, "when they had ordained them elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation." Now it is well enough known that in all those cities the manner of choosing magistrates and officers was by a majority of votes. And because the ordinary way of distinguishing affirmative votes from negative ones was by the holding up of hands, to ordain an officer in any of those cities was nothing more than to bring the people together to elect him by a majority of votes—whether by a majority of raised hands, or of voices, or of balls, beans, or small stones, of which every man cast one into a vessel marked for the affirmative or the negative. For different cities had different customs on that point. It was therefore the assembly that elected its own elders. The apostles were only presidents of the assembly: they called it together for the election, pronounced the men elected, and gave them the benediction that is now called consecration. And for this reason those who presided over the assemblies—as the elders did in the

93 The 1651 text reads "Acts 4. 23"; Hobbes means Acts 14:23, which he cites correctly a few lines below.

absence of the apostles—were called *proestōtes*, and in Latin *antistites*. These words signify the principal person of the assembly, whose office was to count the votes and declare from them who was chosen, and, where the votes were equal, to decide the matter in question by adding his own. This is the office of a president in a council. And since all the churches had their presbyters ordained in the same way, where the word is *constitute*—as in Titus 1:5, *hina katastēsēs kata polin presbyterous*, "For this reason I left you in Crete, that you should constitute elders in every city"—we are to understand the same thing: namely, that he should call the faithful together and ordain them presbyters by a majority of votes. It would have been strange if, in a town where men had perhaps never seen a magistrate chosen in any other way than by an assembly, the townspeople, on becoming Christians, should even have thought of any other way of electing their teachers and guides—that is to say, their presbyters (otherwise called bishops)—than this one by majority vote, which St. Paul indicates (Acts 14:23) in the word *cheirotonēsantes*. Nor was there ever any choosing of bishops, before the emperors found it necessary to regulate them in order to keep the peace among them, except by the assemblies of the Christians in each town.

42.57 The same is also confirmed by the continual practice, even to this day, in the election of the bishops of Rome. For if the bishop of any place had had the right to choose another to succeed him in the pastoral office in some city when he left it to plant the same office elsewhere, he would much more have had the right to appoint his successor in the place where he last resided and died. And we do not find that any bishop of Rome ever appointed his successor. For they were chosen by the people for a long time, as we may see from the sedition raised over the election between Damasus and Ursinus. Ammianus Marcellinus says it was so great that Juventius the prefect, unable to keep the peace between them, was forced to leave the city, and that more than a hundred men were found dead on that occasion in the church itself. And though the bishops of

Rome were afterward chosen first by the whole clergy of Rome, and later by the cardinals, none was ever appointed to the succession by his predecessor.[94] If, then, they claimed no right to appoint their own successors, I think I may reasonably conclude that they had no right to appoint the successors of other bishops without receiving some new power. And no one could take that power from the Church to bestow on them except someone who had lawful authority not only to teach the Church but to command it—which no one could do but the civil sovereign.

42.58 The word *minister*, in the original *diakonos*, signifies one who voluntarily does another man's business. He differs from a servant only in this: servants are bound by their condition to do what they are commanded, whereas ministers are bound only by their undertaking, and therefore to no more than they have undertaken. So both those who teach the word of God and those who administer the worldly affairs of the Church are ministers—but they are ministers of different persons. For the pastors of the Church, called "the ministers of the word" (Acts 6:4), are ministers of Christ, whose word it is. But the ministry of a *deacon*, which is called (Acts 6:2) "serving tables," is a service done to the church or congregation. So neither any one man nor the whole church could ever say of their pastor that he was their minister. But of a deacon the whole congregation might properly say that he was their minister—whether the charge he undertook was to serve tables, or to distribute maintenance to the Christians when they lived in each city on a common fund or on collections, as in the first times, or to take care of the house of prayer, or of the revenue, or of other worldly business of the Church.

42.59 For their employment as deacons was to serve the congregation, though on occasion they did not fail to preach the gospel and uphold the doctrine of Christ, each according to his gifts, as St. Stephen did—and both to preach and to baptize, as Philip did. For the Philip who preached the gospel in Samaria

94 The disputed papal election of 366; Ammianus Marcellinus (fourth-century Roman historian), *History* 27.3. The 1651 text spells the rival "Vrsicinus."

(Acts 8:5) and baptized the eunuch (verse 38) was Philip the deacon, not Philip the apostle. For it is manifest (verse 1) that when Philip preached in Samaria, the apostles were in Jerusalem, and (verse 14) "when they heard that Samaria had received the word of God, sent Peter and John to them." By the laying on of their hands, those who had been baptized (Acts 8:15–17) received the Holy Spirit, which they had not received before by Philip's baptism. For in order to confer the Holy Spirit it was necessary that their baptism be administered, or confirmed, by a minister of the word, not by a minister of the church. And therefore, to confirm the baptism of those whom Philip the deacon had baptized, the apostles sent Peter and John from their own number, from Jerusalem to Samaria. These conferred on those who before had only been baptized the graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit, which at that time accompanied all true believers. What those signs were may be understood from what St. Mark says (Mark 16:17–18): "These signs shall follow those who believe in my name: they shall cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover." This Philip could not give; but the apostles could, and (as appears from this passage) actually did, to every man who truly believed and was baptized by a minister of Christ himself. Either Christ's ministers in this age cannot confer that power, or else there are very few true believers, or Christ has very few ministers.

42.60 That the first deacons were chosen not by the apostles but by a congregation of the disciples—that is, of Christian men of all sorts—is manifest from Acts 6. There we read that after the number of disciples had multiplied, the *Twelve* called them together and, having told them that it was not fit for the apostles to leave the word of God and serve tables, said to them (Acts 6:3): "Brothers, look out from among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Spirit and of wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business." Here it is manifest that though the apostles declared them elected, the congregation chose them.

This is said still more expressly in verse 5, where it is written that "the saying pleased the whole multitude, and they chose seven," and so on.

THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CLERGY

Tithes were a civil revenue under Moses; early Christian pastors lived on voluntary gifts.

42.61 Under the Old Testament, only the tribe of Levi was eligible for the priesthood and the other lower offices of the Church. The land was divided among the other tribes (Levi excepted), which, by the subdivision of the tribe of Joseph into Ephraim and Manasseh, were still twelve. Certain cities were assigned to the tribe of Levi to live in, with the surrounding pastures for their cattle; but for their portion they were to have the tenth of the produce of their brothers' land. Again, the priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together with part of the offerings and sacrifices. For God had said to Aaron (Numbers 18:20): "You shall have no inheritance in their land, nor shall you have any portion among them; I am your portion and your inheritance among the children of Israel." For since God was then king, and had appointed the tribe of Levi to be his public ministers, he allowed them for their maintenance the public revenue—that is to say, the part God had reserved to himself, which was tithes and offerings. And that is what is meant where God says, "I am your inheritance." And therefore the name *clergy*, from *klēros*, which signifies lot or inheritance, might not unfittingly be given to the Levites—not because they were heirs of the Kingdom of God more than others, but because God's inheritance was their maintenance. Now since in this time God himself was their king, and Moses, Aaron, and the high priests who followed were his lieutenants, it is manifest that the right of tithes and offerings was established by the civil power.

42.62 After they rejected God by demanding a king, they still enjoyed the same revenue; but their right to it derived from the fact that the kings never took it from them. For the public rev-

enue was at the disposal of the one who was the public person, and that (until the Captivity) was the king. And again, after the return from the Captivity, they paid their tithes to the priest as before. Up to this point, therefore, Church revenues were determined by the civil sovereign.

42.63 Of the maintenance of our Savior and his apostles, we read only that they had a purse (which was carried by Judas Iscariot); that those apostles who were fishermen sometimes practiced their trade; and that when our Savior sent the twelve apostles to preach, he forbade them "to carry gold, and silver, and brass in their purses, for the workman is worthy of his hire." From this it is probable that their ordinary maintenance was not unsuited to their employment. For their employment (verse 8) was "freely to give, because they had freely received"; and their maintenance was the *free gift* of those who believed the good tidings they carried about, of the coming of the Messiah their Savior.[95] To this we may add what was contributed out of gratitude by those whom our Savior had healed of diseases. Among these are mentioned (Luke 8:2–3) "certain women who had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities: Mary Magdalene, out of whom went seven devils; and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward; and Susanna, and many others, who ministered to him from their substance."

42.64 After our Savior's Ascension, the Christians of every city lived in common on the money made from the sale of their lands and possessions, which they laid at the feet of the apostles out of goodwill, not out of duty. For St. Peter says to Ananias (Acts 5:4), "While the land remained, was it not yours? And after it was sold, was it not in your power?" This shows that Ananias did not need to have saved his land or his money by lying, since he was not bound to contribute anything at all unless he pleased. And as in the time of the apostles, so all the time afterward, until after Constantine the Great, we shall find that the maintenance of the bishops and pastors of the Christian Church was nothing but the voluntary contribution of those who had

95 Matthew 10:8–10.

embraced their doctrine. There was as yet no mention of tithes. But such was the affection of Christians for their pastors in the time of Constantine and his sons that, as Ammianus Marcellinus says (describing the sedition of Damasus and Ursinus over the bishopric), it was worth their contending for: for the bishops of those times, through the liberality of their flock, and especially of wealthy matrons, lived splendidly, were carried in coaches, and were sumptuous in their food and dress.

42.65 But here someone may ask whether the pastor was then bound to live on voluntary contributions, as on alms. For St. Paul says (1 Corinthians 9:7), "Who goes to war at his own expense? Or who tends a flock and does not eat of the milk of the flock?" And again (verse 13), "Do you not know that those who minister about holy things live off the things of the Temple, and those who serve at the altar share with the altar?"—that is to say, have part of what is offered at the altar for their maintenance? And then he concludes (verse 14), "Even so the Lord has appointed that those who preach the gospel should live by the gospel." From this passage it may indeed be inferred that the pastors of the Church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not that the pastors were to determine either the amount or the kind of their own allowance, and be (as it were) their own carvers. Their allowance must therefore have been determined either by the gratitude and liberality of each particular member of their flock, or by the whole congregation. It could not be by the whole congregation, because its acts were not then laws. Therefore the maintenance of pastors, before emperors and civil sovereigns had made laws to settle it, was nothing but benevolence. Those who served at the altar lived on what was offered. So the pastors too may take what their flock offers them, but not exact what is not offered. In what court should they sue for it, when they had no tribunals? Or if they had arbitrators among themselves, who would carry out their judgments, when they had no power to arm their officers? It follows, therefore, that no fixed maintenance could be assigned to any pastors of the Church except by the whole congregation, and then only when its decrees had the

force not only of *canons* but also of *laws*—and such laws could be made only by emperors, kings, or other civil sovereigns. The right of tithes in the law of Moses could not be applied to the ministers of the gospel of that time, because Moses and the high priests were the civil sovereigns of the people under God, whose kingdom among the Jews was present; whereas the Kingdom of God through Christ is yet to come.

42.66 So far it has been shown: what the pastors of the Church are; what the points of their commission are (namely, that they were to preach, to teach, to baptize, and to preside in their several congregations); what ecclesiastical censure is—namely, excommunication, which, in places where Christianity was forbidden by the civil laws, meant Christians putting themselves out of the company of the excommunicated, and where Christianity was commanded by the civil law, meant putting the excommunicated out of the congregations of Christians; who elected the pastors and ministers of the Church (the congregation); who consecrated and blessed them (the pastor); and what their due revenue was (nothing but their own possessions, their own labor, and the voluntary contributions of devout and grateful Christians).

THE CHRISTIAN SOVEREIGN AS SUPREME PASTOR

Christian sovereigns are supreme pastors, and all other pastors teach and consecrate by their authority.

We are now to consider what office in the Church belongs to those persons who, being civil sovereigns, have also embraced the Christian faith.

42.67 And first, we must remember that the right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace, and fit to be taught to the subjects, is in every commonwealth inseparably attached to the sovereign civil power, whether that power is in one man or in one assembly of men (as has already been proved in chapter 18). For it is evident to the dullest understanding that men's actions derive from the opinions they have of the good or evil that will

come back to them from those actions. Consequently, men who have once taken up the opinion that their obedience to the sovereign power will hurt them more than their disobedience will disobey the laws, and so overthrow the commonwealth and bring in confusion and civil war—for the avoiding of which all civil government was ordained. And therefore in all the commonwealths of the heathen the sovereigns have had the name of shepherds of the people, because no subject could lawfully teach the people except by their permission and authority.[96]

42.68 This right of the heathen kings cannot be thought to have been taken from them by their conversion to the faith of Christ. He never ordained that kings, for believing in him, should be deposed—that is, subjected to anyone but himself—or (what amounts to the same thing) be deprived of the power necessary for keeping peace among their subjects and for defending them against foreign enemies. And therefore Christian kings are still the supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain whatever pastors they please to teach the Church—that is, to teach the people committed to their charge.

42.69 Again, suppose the right of choosing pastors lies (as it did before the conversion of kings) in the Church, for so it was in the time of the apostles themselves, as has already been shown in this chapter. Even so, the right will be in the civil sovereign who is a Christian. For insofar as he is a Christian, he allows the teaching; and insofar as he is the sovereign (which is as much as to say, the Church by representation), the teachers he elects are elected by the Church. And when an assembly of Christians chooses its pastor in a Christian commonwealth, it is the sovereign who elects him, because it is done by his authority—in the same way that, when a town chooses its mayor, it is the act of the one who has the sovereign power. For every act done is the act of the one without whose consent it is invalid. And therefore whatever examples may be drawn from history of the election of pastors by the people or by the clergy, they are no arguments

96 Homer's epithet for kings, *poimēn laōn*, "shepherd of the people."

against the right of any civil sovereign, because those who elected them did it by his authority.

42.70 Since, then, in every Christian commonwealth the civil sovereign is the supreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is committed, and consequently all other pastors are made, and have power to teach and to perform all other pastoral offices, by his authority, it follows also that all other pastors derive from the civil sovereign their right of teaching, preaching, and the other functions belonging to that office, and that they are only his ministers. In the same way the magistrates of towns, the judges in courts of justice, and the commanders of armies are all only ministers of the one who is magistrate of the whole commonwealth, judge of all causes, and commander of the whole militia—which is always the civil sovereign. And the reason for this is not that those who teach, but that those who are to learn, are his subjects. For suppose that a Christian king commits the authority of ordaining pastors in his dominions to another king (as various Christian kings allow that power to the Pope). He does not thereby set up a pastor over himself, nor a sovereign pastor over his people. For that would be to deprive himself of the civil power, which depends on men's opinion of their duty to him and on their fear of punishment in another world, and so would also depend on the skill and loyalty of doctors—who are no less subject than any other sort of men, not only to ambition, but also to ignorance. So where a foreigner has authority to appoint teachers, it is given to him by the sovereign in whose dominions he teaches. Christian doctors are our schoolmasters in Christianity; but kings are fathers of families, and may accept schoolmasters for their subjects on the recommendation of a foreigner, but not on his command—especially when bad teaching by those schoolmasters will bring great and manifest profit to the one who recommends them. Nor can kings be obliged to keep them longer than serves the public good, the care of which remains their charge as long as they retain any other essential right of sovereignty.

42.71 If, therefore, someone should ask a pastor, in the exercise of his office, what the chief priests and elders of the people asked our Savior (Matthew 21:23), "By what authority do you do these things, and who gave you this authority?", he can give no other just answer than that he does it by the authority of the commonwealth, given him by the king or assembly that represents it. All pastors except the supreme one carry out their charges by right of—that is, by the authority of—the civil sovereign: that is, *jure civili*. But the king, and every other sovereign, carries out his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority from God: that is to say, *in God's right*, or *jure divino*. And therefore no one but kings can put into their titles, as a mark of their submission to God alone, *Dei gratia Rex*, etc. ("King by the grace of God"). Bishops ought to say at the beginning of their mandates, "By the favor of the King's Majesty, Bishop of such a diocese," or, as civil ministers, "In His Majesty's name." For in saying *Divina providentia* ("by divine providence"), which is the same as *Dei gratia*, though disguised, they deny having received their authority from the civil state, and slyly slip off the collar of their civil subjection, contrary to the unity and defense of the commonwealth.

42.72 But if every Christian sovereign is the supreme pastor of his own subjects, it seems that he also has the authority not only to preach (which perhaps no one will deny), but also to baptize, to administer the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, and to consecrate both temples and pastors to God's service. This most men deny: partly because sovereigns do not usually do it, and partly because the administration of sacraments and the consecration of persons and places to holy uses requires the laying on of the hands of such men as have been ordained to the same ministry by the same laying on of hands, in succession from the time of the apostles. As proof, then, that Christian kings have power to baptize and to consecrate, I must give a reason both why they do not usually do it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of the laying on of hands, they are made capable of doing it when they wish.

42.73 There is no doubt that any king, if he were skilled in the sciences, might by the same right of his office lecture on them himself, by which he authorizes others to lecture on them in the universities. Nevertheless, because the care of the whole business of the commonwealth takes up all his time, it would not be convenient for him to apply himself in person to that particular task. A king may also, if he pleases, sit in judgment to hear and determine all kinds of cases, as well as give others authority to do it in his name. But the charge that lies on him of command and government obliges him to be continually at the helm, and to commit the ministerial offices to others under him. In the same way our Savior (who surely had power to baptize) baptized no one himself, but sent his apostles and disciples to baptize. So also St. Paul, because he had to preach in many widely separated places, baptized few: among all the Corinthians he baptized only Crispus, Gaius, and Stephanas; and the reason was that his principal charge was to preach.[97] From this it is manifest that the greater charge (such as the government of the Church) excuses one from the lesser. The reason why Christian kings do not usually baptize is therefore evident; and it is the same reason why at this day few are baptized by bishops, and fewer by the Pope.

42.74 And as to the laying on of hands, whether it is needed to authorize a king to baptize and consecrate, we may consider it this way.

42.75 The laying on of hands was a most ancient public ceremony among the Jews, by which the person or other thing intended in a man's prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration, condemnation, or other speech was designated and made certain. So Jacob, in blessing the children of Joseph (Genesis 48:14), "laid his right hand on Ephraim the younger, and his left hand on Manasseh the firstborn." And he did this *deliberately* (though they were presented to him by Joseph in such a way that he was forced to cross his arms to do it), to designate the one for whom he intended the greater blessing. So also in the sacrifice of the burnt

97 1 Corinthians 1:14–17. Hobbes spells the names "Cajus" and "Stephanus."

offering, Aaron is commanded (Exodus 29:10) "to lay his hands on the head of the bullock," and (verse 15) "to lay his hand on the head of the ram." The same is said again in Leviticus 1:4 and 8:14. Likewise Moses, when he ordained Joshua to be captain of the Israelites—that is, consecrated him to God's service—"laid his hands upon him, and gave him his charge" (Numbers 27:23), designating and making certain whom they were to obey in war. And in the consecration of the Levites (Numbers 8:10), God commanded that "the children of Israel should put their hands upon the Levites." And in the condemnation of the man who had blasphemed the Lord (Leviticus 24:14), God commanded that "all who heard him should lay their hands on his head, and that all the congregation should stone him." And why should only those who heard him lay their hands on him, rather than a priest, a Levite, or some other minister of justice, unless it was that no one else could designate and show to the eyes of the congregation who it was that had blasphemed and ought to die? And to designate a man, or any other thing, by the hand to the eye is less subject to mistake than to do it to the ear by a name.

42.76 And this ceremony was so carefully observed that in blessing the whole congregation at once, which cannot be done by laying on of hands, "Aaron nevertheless lifted up his hand toward the people when he blessed them" (Leviticus 9:22). We also read of a similar ceremony in the consecration of temples among the heathen: the priest laid his hands on some post of the temple the whole time he was uttering the words of consecration. So natural is it, in matters of God's public service, to designate any individual thing by the hand, to assure the eyes, rather than by words, to inform the ear.

42.77 This ceremony was therefore not new in our Savior's time. For Jairus, whose daughter was sick (Mark 5:23), begged our Savior (not to heal her, but) "to lay his hands on her, that she might be healed." And (Matthew 19:13) "they brought to him little children, that he should put his hands on them and pray."

42.78 According to this ancient rite, the apostles and presbyters, and the presbytery itself, laid hands on those whom they

ordained pastors, and at the same time prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Spirit. And they did this not only once, but sometimes more often, when a new occasion arose. But the purpose was always the same: namely, an exact and religious designation of the person ordained, either to the pastoral charge in general or to a particular mission. So (Acts 6:6) "the apostles prayed, and laid their hands" on the seven deacons. This was done not to give them the Holy Spirit (for they were full of the Holy Spirit before they were chosen, as appears just before, in verse 3), but to designate them for that office. And after Philip the deacon had converted certain persons in Samaria, Peter and John went down (Acts 8:17) "and laid their hands on them, and they received the Holy Spirit." And not only an apostle but a presbyter had this power. For St. Paul advises Timothy (1 Timothy 5:22), "Lay hands suddenly on no man"—that is, designate no man rashly for the office of a pastor. We read in 1 Timothy 4:14 that the whole presbytery laid their hands on Timothy; but this is to be understood to mean that some did it by appointment of the presbytery—most likely their *proestōs*, or presiding officer, who may have been St. Paul himself. For in his Second Epistle to Timothy (2 Timothy 1:6) he says to him, "Stir up the gift of God which is in you by the laying on of my hands." Note here, by the way, that by the Holy Spirit is meant not the third person of the Trinity, but the gifts necessary to the pastoral office. We read also that St. Paul had hands laid on him twice: once by Ananias at Damascus (Acts 9:17–18), at the time of his baptism, and again at Antioch (Acts 13:3), when he was first sent out to preach. The use of this ceremony in the ordination of pastors, then, was to designate the person to whom they gave such power. But if there had then been any Christian who already had the power of teaching, baptizing him—that is, making him a Christian—would have given him no new power, but would only have caused him to preach true doctrine, that is, to use his power rightly. In that case the laying on of hands would have been unnecessary; baptism itself would have been sufficient. But every sovereign, before Christianity, had the power of teach-

ing and of ordaining teachers. Christianity therefore gave them no new right, but only directed them in the way of teaching truth. Consequently they needed no laying on of hands (besides what is done in baptism) to authorize them to exercise any part of the pastoral function—as, namely, to baptize and to consecrate. And in the Old Testament, though only the priest had the right to consecrate during the time when the sovereignty was in the high priest, it was not so when the sovereignty was in the king. For we read (1 Kings 8) that Solomon blessed the people, consecrated the Temple, and pronounced that public prayer which is now the pattern for the consecration of all Christian churches and chapels. From this it appears that he had not only the right of ecclesiastical government, but also the right of exercising ecclesiastical functions.

42.79 From this consolidation of political and ecclesiastical right in Christian sovereigns, it is evident that they have every kind of power over their subjects that can be given to man for the government of men's external actions, both in policy and in religion. They may make such laws as they themselves judge fittest for the government of their own subjects, both as they are the commonwealth and as they are the Church: for State and Church are the same men.

42.80 If they please, therefore, they may (as many Christian kings now do) commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the Pope. But then the Pope is, on that point, subordinate to them, and exercises that charge in another's dominion *jure civili*, by the right of the civil sovereign, not *jure divino*, by God's right. He may therefore be discharged of that office whenever the sovereign, for the good of his subjects, thinks it necessary. They may also, if they please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an assembly of pastors, and give them whatever power over the Church, or one over another, they think most convenient, and whatever titles of honor they wish, such as bishops, archbishops, priests, or presbyters. And they may make such laws for their maintenance, by tithes or otherwise, as they please—provided they do it out of a

sincere conscience, of which God alone is the judge. It is the civil sovereign who is to appoint judges and interpreters of the canonical Scriptures, for it is he who makes them laws. It is he also who gives force to excommunications, which would be held in contempt without such laws and punishments as may humble obstinate libertines and bring them back into union with the rest of the Church. In sum, he has the supreme power in all causes, ecclesiastical as well as civil, so far as concerns actions and words; for only these are known and can be accused, and of what cannot be accused there is no judge at all but God, who knows the heart. And these rights belong to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies. For those who are the representatives of a Christian people are representatives of the Church, since a Church and a commonwealth of Christian people are the same thing.

BELLARMINE ANSWERED: PETER AND THE PAPACY

Hobbes answers Bellarmine's first three books on the Pope, Peter's primacy, and Antichrist.

42.81 What I have said here and in other places of this book seems clear enough to establish the supreme ecclesiastical power of Christian sovereigns. Yet the Pope of Rome's claim to that power universally has been maintained chiefly, and I think as strongly as is possible, by Cardinal Bellarmine in his controversy *De Summo Pontifice*. I have therefore thought it necessary to examine, as briefly as I can, the grounds and strength of his discourse.

42.82 Of the five books he has written on this subject, the first contains three questions. The first is which is simply the best government—*monarchy*, *aristocracy*, or *democracy*—and he concludes for none of them, but for a government mixed of all three. The second is which of these is the best government of the Church, and he concludes for the mixed, but one that partakes most of monarchy. The third is whether, in this mixed monarchy, St. Peter held the place of monarch. Concerning his first

conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved (in chapter 18) that all governments that men are bound to obey are simple and absolute. In monarchy there is only one man supreme, and all other men who have any kind of power in the state have it by his commission, during his pleasure, and exercise it in his name. In aristocracy and democracy there is only one supreme assembly, with the same power that in monarchy belongs to the monarch; and this is not a mixed but an absolute sovereignty. And which of the three sorts is best is not to be disputed where any one of them is already established. The present one ought always to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best, because it is against both the law of nature and the divine positive law to do anything tending to its subversion. Besides, it makes no difference to the power of any pastor (unless he has the civil sovereignty) what kind of government is best. For their calling is not to govern men by command, but to teach them and persuade them by arguments, and to leave it to them to consider whether they will embrace or reject the doctrine taught. Monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy mark out for us three sorts of sovereigns, not of pastors—or, as we may say, three sorts of masters of families, not three sorts of schoolmasters for their children.

42.83 And therefore the second conclusion, concerning the best form of government of the Church, has nothing to do with the question of the Pope's power outside his own dominions. For in all other commonwealths his power (if he has any at all) is only that of the schoolmaster, and not that of the master of the family.

42.84 For the third conclusion, that St. Peter was monarch of the Church, he brings as his chief argument the passage in St. Matthew (16:18–19): "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church," etc. "And I will give you the keys of heaven; whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." Rightly considered, this passage proves no more than that the Church of Christ has for its foundation one single article: namely, the one that Peter professed in the name of all the apostles, which gave

our Savior occasion to speak the words cited here. To understand this clearly, we must consider that our Savior preached—by himself, by John the Baptist, and by his apostles—nothing but this article of faith, *that he was the Christ*; all other articles require faith only insofar as they are founded on that one. John began first (Matthew 3:2), preaching only this: "The Kingdom of God is at hand." Then our Savior himself (Matthew 4:17) preached the same. And when he gave his twelve apostles their commission (Matthew 10:7), there is no mention of preaching any article but that. This was the fundamental article, the foundation of the Church's faith. Afterward, when the apostles had returned to him, he asked them all (Matthew 16:13), not Peter only, who men said he was; and they answered that "some said he was John the Baptist, some Elijah, and others Jeremiah, or one of the prophets." Then (verse 15) he asked them all again (not Peter only), "But who do you say that I am?" Therefore St. Peter answered (for them all), "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God." This, as I said, is the foundation of the faith of the whole Church, and from it our Savior takes occasion to say, "Upon this stone I will build my Church." By this it is manifest that by the foundation stone of the Church was meant the fundamental article of the Church's faith. But why then (some will object) does our Savior insert the words "You are Peter"? If the original of this text had been strictly translated, the reason would easily have appeared. We must therefore consider that the apostle Simon was surnamed *Stone* (which is the meaning of the Syriac word *Cephas* and of the Greek word *Petrus*). Our Savior, therefore, after the confession of that fundamental article, alluding to his name, said (as it would be in English): You are *Stone*, and upon this stone I will build my Church. That is as much as to say: this article, that *I am the Christ*, is the foundation of all the faith I require in those who are to be members of my Church. Nor is such an allusion to a name anything unusual in common speech. But it would have been a strange and obscure way of speaking if our Savior, intending to build his Church on the person of St. Peter, had said, "You are a stone, and upon this

stone I will build my Church," when it would have been so obvious, and free of ambiguity, to say, "I will build my Church on you"—and there would still have been the same allusion to his name.

42.85 As for the words that follow, "I will give you the keys of heaven," etc., this is no more than what our Savior also gave to all the rest of his disciples (Matthew 18:18): "Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." But however this is interpreted, there is no doubt that the power granted here belongs to all supreme pastors, as all Christian civil sovereigns are in their own dominions. So much so that if St. Peter, or our Savior himself, had converted any of them to believe in him and acknowledge his kingdom, then, since his kingdom is not of this world, he would have left the supreme care of converting his subjects to that sovereign alone; or else he must have deprived him of the sovereignty, to which the right of teaching is inseparably attached. So much in refutation of his first book, in which he would prove St. Peter to have been the universal monarch of the Church, that is to say, of all the Christians in the world.

42.86 The second book has two conclusions: one, that St. Peter was bishop of Rome and died there; the other, that the popes of Rome are his successors. Both have been disputed by others. But supposing them true, still, if by "bishop of Rome" is meant either the monarch of the Church or its supreme pastor, then not Silvester but Constantine (who was the first Christian emperor) was that bishop. And like Constantine, all other Christian emperors were by right supreme bishops of the Roman Empire—I say of the Roman Empire, not of all Christendom. For other Christian sovereigns had the same right in their several territories, as an office essentially inherent in their sovereignty.[98] This will serve as an answer to his second book.

42.87 In the third book he deals with the question whether the Pope is Antichrist. For my part, I see no argument that proves he

98 Silvester I was bishop of Rome (314–335) under Constantine the Great (emperor 306–337).

is, in the sense in which Scripture uses the name. Nor will I take any argument from the character of Antichrist to contradict the authority he exercises, or has formerly exercised, in the dominions of any other prince or state.

42.88 It is evident that the prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the Jews expected, a Messiah, that is, a Christ, who would re-establish among them the Kingdom of God, which they had rejected in the time of Samuel when they demanded a king in the manner of other nations. This expectation of theirs made them vulnerable to the imposture of all who had both the ambition to try to gain the kingdom and the art to deceive the people by counterfeit miracles, by a hypocritical life, or by plausible speeches and doctrine. Our Savior and his apostles therefore warned men beforehand of false prophets and false Christs. False Christs are those who claim to be the *Christ* but are not. They are properly called *Antichrists*, in the same sense in which, when a schism happens in the Church through the election of two popes, each calls the other *Antipapa*, or the false pope. And therefore Antichrist, in the proper meaning of the word, has two essential marks: one, that he denies Jesus to be the Christ; the other, that he professes himself to be the Christ. The first mark is set down by St. John in his first epistle: (1 John 4:3) "Every spirit that does not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is not of God; and this is the spirit of Antichrist." The other mark is expressed in the words of our Savior (Matthew 24:5), "Many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ," and again, "If any man shall say to you, Look, here is Christ, there is Christ, do not believe it." And therefore Antichrist must be a false Christ, that is, one of those who shall claim to be Christ. And from these two marks, to deny Jesus to be the Christ and to affirm himself to be the Christ, it follows that he must also be an adversary of Jesus, the true Christ, which is another usual meaning of the word Antichrist. But of these many Antichrists there is one special one, *ho Antichristos*, *the* Antichrist, or Antichrist definitely, as one certain person—not indefinitely *an* Antichrist. Now since the Pope of Rome neither claims to be the Christ him-

self nor denies Jesus to be the Christ, I do not see how he can be called Antichrist. For by that word is meant not one who falsely claims to be *His* lieutenant or vicar general, but one who claims to be *He*. There is also a mark given of the time of this special Antichrist, as (Matthew 24:15) when that abominable destroyer spoken of by Daniel shall stand in the holy place, and there shall be such tribulation as there has not been since the beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again—so great that if it were to last long (verse 22), "no flesh could be saved; but for the elect's sake those days shall be shortened" (made fewer). But that tribulation has not yet come. For it is to be followed immediately (verse 29) by a darkening of the sun and moon, a falling of the stars, a shaking of the heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Savior in the clouds. And therefore *the* Antichrist has not yet come, whereas many popes have both come and gone. It is true that the Pope, in taking it upon himself to give laws to all Christian kings and nations, usurps a kingdom in this world, which Christ did not take upon himself. But he does it not *as* Christ but *for* Christ, and in that there is nothing of *the* Antichrist.

BELLARMINE ANSWERED: INFALLIBILITY AND PAPAL LAW

The texts Bellarmine cites give the Pope neither infallibility nor power to make laws outside his dominions.

42.89 In the fourth book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme judge in all questions of faith and morals (which is as much as to be the absolute monarch of all Christians in the world), he brings three propositions. The first, that his judgments are infallible. The second, that he can make real laws and punish those who do not observe them. The third, that our Savior conferred all ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the Pope of Rome.

42.90 For the infallibility of his judgments he cites the Scriptures, and first Luke 22:31–32: "Simon, Simon, Satan has desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for you, that your faith fail not; and when you are converted, strengthen your brethren." According to Bellarmine's exposi-

tion, Christ here gave Simon Peter two privileges: one, that neither his faith nor the faith of any of his successors should fail; the other, that neither he nor any of his successors should ever define any point of faith or morals erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former pope. This is a strange and very much strained interpretation. But whoever reads that chapter attentively will find that there is no place in all of Scripture that tells more against the Pope's authority than this very passage. The priests and scribes were seeking to kill our Savior at the Passover, and Judas was resolved to betray him. When the day of killing the Passover lamb had come, our Savior celebrated it with his apostles, saying he would do so no more until the Kingdom of God had come, and at the same time told them that one of them was to betray him. At this they asked one another which of them it would be; and at the same time (seeing that the next Passover their master celebrated would be when he was king) they fell into a dispute over who should then be the greatest. Our Savior therefore told them that the kings of the nations have dominion over their subjects, and are called by a name that (in Hebrew) signifies "bountiful"; but I cannot be so to you—you must strive to serve one another. I ordain you a kingdom, but it is such as my Father has ordained me: a kingdom that I am now to purchase with my blood, and not to possess until my second coming. Then you shall eat and drink at my table and sit on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And then, addressing himself to St. Peter, he says: "Simon, Simon," Satan seeks, by suggesting a present dominion, to weaken your faith in the future one; but I have prayed for you, that your faith shall not fail. You therefore (note this), being converted, and understanding my kingdom as of another world, confirm the same faith in your brethren. To this St. Peter answered (as one who no longer expected any authority in this world), "Lord, I am ready to go with you, not only to prison, but to death." From this it is manifest that St. Peter not only was given no jurisdiction in this world, but was charged to teach all the other apostles that they too should have none. And as for the infallibility of St. Peter's

final judgment in matters of faith, no more can be attributed to it from this text than that Peter should continue to believe this point: namely, that Christ would come again and possess the kingdom at the Day of Judgment. And this was not given by this text to all his successors, for we see that they claim the kingdom in the world that now is.

42.91 The second passage is Matthew 16: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." By this (as I have already shown in this chapter) nothing more is proved than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the confession of Peter that gave occasion to that speech—namely, that "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God."

42.92 The third text is John 21:16–17, "Feed my sheep," which contains nothing more than a commission to teach. And if we grant that the rest of the apostles are included under the name *sheep*, then it is the supreme power of teaching. But it was only for the time when there were no Christian sovereigns already possessed of that supremacy. And I have already proved that Christian sovereigns are the supreme pastors in their own dominions, instituted to that office by virtue of their baptism, even without any other laying on of hands. For such laying on of hands, being a ceremony for designating the person, is needless when he is already designated to the power of teaching whatever doctrine he will by his institution to an absolute power over his subjects. For, as I have proved before, sovereigns are supreme teachers (in general) by their office, and therefore oblige themselves (by their baptism) to teach the doctrine of Christ. And when they allow others to teach their people, they do it at the peril of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the heads of families that God will require an account of the instruction of his children and servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hired hand, that God says (Genesis 18:19) "I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord, and do justice and judgment."

42.93 The fourth passage is Exodus 28:30: "You shall put in the breastplate of judgment the Urim and the Thummim." This, he says, is rendered by the Septuagint as *dēlōsin kai alētheian*, that is, *evidence* and *truth*. And from this he concludes that God had given evidence and truth (which is almost infallibility) to the high priest. But whether it was evidence and truth itself that was given, or only an admonition to the priest to strive to inform himself clearly and give judgment uprightly, still, in being given to the high priest, it was given to the civil sovereign. For that is what the high priest was, next under God, in the commonwealth of Israel. So this is an argument for evidence and truth—that is, for the ecclesiastical supremacy of civil sovereigns over their own subjects—against the pretended power of the Pope. These are all the texts he brings for the infallibility of the Pope's judgment in matters of faith.

42.94 For the infallibility of his judgment concerning morals he brings one text, John 16:13: "When the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth." Here (he says) *all truth* means at least *all truth necessary to salvation*. But with this qualification he attributes no more infallibility to the Pope than to any man who professes Christianity and is not to be damned. For if any man errs on any point where not erring is necessary to salvation, it is impossible for him to be saved, since only that is necessary to salvation without which it is impossible to be saved. What these points are I shall set out from Scripture in the following chapter. Here I say no more than this: even if it were granted that the Pope could not possibly teach any error at all, that would not entitle him to any jurisdiction in the dominions of another prince—unless we are also to say that a man is obliged in conscience to employ the best workman on every occasion, even when he has previously promised his work to another.

42.95 Besides the texts, he argues from reason, thus: if the Pope could err in necessary matters, then Christ has not sufficiently provided for the Church's salvation, since he has commanded her to follow the Pope's directions. But this reasoning is invalid unless he shows when and where Christ commanded that, or

took any notice of a pope at all. Indeed, even granting that whatever was given to St. Peter was given to the Pope, still, since there is no command in Scripture to any man to obey St. Peter, no man who obeys him can be just when his commands are contrary to those of his lawful sovereign.

42.96 Lastly, it has not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope himself, that he is the civil sovereign of all the Christians in the world; and therefore not all Christians are bound to acknowledge his jurisdiction in matters of morals. For civil sovereignty and supreme judicature in controversies of morals are the same thing. And the makers of civil laws are not only declarers but also makers of the justice and injustice of actions, since there is nothing in men's conduct that makes it righteous or unrighteous except its conformity with the law of the sovereign. And therefore, when the Pope claims supremacy in controversies of morals, he teaches men to disobey the civil sovereign. This is an erroneous doctrine, contrary to the many precepts of our Savior and his apostles delivered to us in Scripture.

42.97 To prove that the Pope has power to make laws, he cites many passages. First, Deuteronomy 17:12: "The man that will act presumptuously, and will not listen to the priest (who stands to minister there before the Lord your God) or to the judge, that man shall die, and you shall put away the evil from Israel." In answer to this we must remember that the high priest (next and immediately under God) was the civil sovereign, and that all judges were to be appointed by him. The words cited therefore amount to this: "The man that will presume to disobey the civil sovereign for the time being, or any of his officers in the execution of their duties, that man shall die," etc. This is clearly for the civil sovereignty, against the universal power of the Pope.

42.98 Second, he cites Matthew 16, "Whatever you shall bind," etc., and interprets it as the kind of *binding* attributed (Matthew 23:4) to the scribes and Pharisees: "They bind heavy burdens, grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders." By this, he says, is meant the making of laws, and he concludes from it that the Pope can make laws. But this too tells only for the legis-

lative power of civil sovereigns. For the scribes and Pharisees sat in Moses' seat, and Moses, next under God, was sovereign of the people of Israel. And therefore our Savior commanded the people to do all that they should say, but not all that they should do. That is, to obey their laws, but not to follow their example.

42.99 The third passage is John 21:16, "Feed my sheep," which is not a power to make laws but a command to teach. Making laws belongs to the lord of the family, who at his own discretion chooses his chaplain, as he also chooses a schoolmaster to teach his children.

42.100 The fourth passage, John 20:21, is against him. The words are, "As my Father has sent me, so I send you." But our Savior was sent to redeem (by his death) those who would believe, and by his own preaching and that of his apostles to prepare them for their entrance into his kingdom. That kingdom, he himself says, is not of this world; and he has taught us to pray for its coming hereafter, though he refused (Acts 1:6–7) to tell his apostles when it would come. And in it, when it comes, the twelve apostles shall sit on twelve thrones (each perhaps as high as St. Peter's) to judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Since, then, God the Father did not send our Savior to make laws in this present world, we may conclude from the text that neither did our Savior send St. Peter to make laws here, but to persuade men to expect his second coming with steadfast faith; and in the meantime, if they are subjects, to obey their princes; and if they are princes, both to believe it themselves and to do their best to make their subjects do the same—which is the office of a bishop. Therefore this passage tells most strongly for joining the ecclesiastical supremacy to the civil sovereignty, contrary to what Cardinal Bellarmine cites it for.

42.101 The fifth passage is Acts 15:28: "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things: that you abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Here he takes the phrase *laying of burdens* to mean legislative power. But who is there that, reading this text, can

say that this language of the apostles may not as properly be used in giving counsel as in making laws? The language of a law is "We command"; but "We think good" is the ordinary language of those who only give advice. And those who give advice do lay a burden, though a conditional one—that is, if those to whom they give it wish to attain their ends. Such is the burden of abstaining from things strangled and from blood: not absolute, but in case they wish not to err. I have shown before (chapter 25) that law is distinguished from counsel in this: the reason of a law is taken from the design and benefit of the one who prescribes it, but the reason of a counsel from the design and benefit of the one to whom the counsel is given. But here the apostles aim only at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely their salvation, not at their own benefit; for having done their part, they will have their reward whether they are obeyed or not. And therefore the acts of this council were not laws but counsels.

42.102 The sixth passage is Romans 13: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God." This is meant, he says, not only of secular but also of ecclesiastical princes. To this I answer, first, that there are no ecclesiastical princes except those who are also civil sovereigns, and their principalities do not exceed the bounds of their civil sovereignty. Beyond those bounds, though they may be received as doctors, they cannot be acknowledged as princes. For if the apostle had meant that we should be subject both to our own princes and also to the Pope, he would have taught us a doctrine that Christ himself has told us is impossible, namely, "to serve two masters." And though the apostle says in another place, "I write these things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpness, according to the power which the Lord has given me," this does not mean that he claimed a power to put any of them to death, imprison, banish, whip, or fine them, which are punishments. He claimed only the power to excommunicate, which (without the civil power) is nothing more than leaving their company and having no more to do with them than with a heathen or a publican. On many occasions this might be a

greater pain to the one who excommunicates than to the one excommunicated.[99]

42.103 The seventh passage is 1 Corinthians 4:21: "Shall I come to you with a rod, or in love and the spirit of gentleness?" But here again it is not the power of a magistrate to punish offenders that is meant by a rod, but only the power of excommunication. This is not in its own nature a punishment, but only a denouncing of the punishment that Christ will inflict when he is in possession of his kingdom, at the Day of Judgment. Nor even then will it properly be a punishment, as on a subject who has broken the law, but a revenge, as on an enemy or a rebel who denies our Savior's right to the kingdom. And therefore this does not prove the legislative power of any bishop who does not also have the civil power.

42.104 The eighth passage is 1 Timothy 3:2: "A bishop must be the husband of one wife, vigilant, sober," etc., which he says was a law. I thought that no one could make a law in the Church but the monarch of the Church, St. Peter. But suppose this precept was made by the authority of St. Peter; still I see no reason to call it a law rather than advice, since Timothy was not a subject but a disciple of St.[100] Paul, and the flock under Timothy's charge were not his subjects in a kingdom but his scholars in the school of Christ. If all the precepts he gives Timothy are laws, why is this not also a law: "Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for your health's sake"? And why are not the precepts of good physicians so many laws? It is not the imperative manner of speaking, but absolute subjection to a person, that makes his precepts laws.

42.105 In the same way, the ninth passage, 1 Timothy 5:19, "Against an elder receive not an accusation, except before two or three witnesses," is a wise precept, but not a law.

42.106 The tenth passage is Luke 10:16: "He that hears you hears me; and he that despises you despises me." And there is no doubt that whoever despises the counsel of those sent by Christ

99 Matthew 6:24; 2 Corinthians 13:10.

100 Hobbes's text cites "Timothy 3. 2"; the verse is 1 Timothy 3:2.

despises the counsel of Christ himself. But who are those now sent by Christ, if not those ordained pastors by lawful authority? And who are lawfully ordained, if not those ordained by the sovereign pastor? And who is ordained by the sovereign pastor in a Christian commonwealth, if not by the authority of its sovereign? It follows from this passage, therefore, that whoever hears his sovereign, being a Christian, hears Christ; and whoever despises the doctrine that his king, being a Christian, authorizes, despises the doctrine of Christ (which is not what Bellarmine intends to prove here, but the contrary). But all this has nothing to do with law. Indeed, a Christian king, as pastor and teacher of his subjects, does not thereby make his doctrines laws. He cannot oblige men to believe. As a civil sovereign, though, he may make laws suited to his doctrine, which may oblige men to certain actions—sometimes to actions they would not otherwise do, and which he ought not to command. Yet when they are commanded, they are laws; and the external actions done in obedience to them, without inward approval, are the actions of the sovereign and not of the subject, who in that case is only an instrument, without any motion of his own at all—because God has commanded that they be obeyed.

42.107 The eleventh is every passage where the apostle, giving counsel, uses some word by which men usually signify command, or calls the following of his counsel by the name of obedience. So they cite 1 Corinthians 11:2: "I commend you for keeping my precepts as I delivered them to you." The Greek is, "I commend you for keeping the things I delivered to you, as I delivered them." This is far from signifying that they were laws, or anything but good counsel. And so with 1 Thessalonians 4:2, "You know what commandments we gave you," where the Greek words are *paraggelias edokamen*, equivalent to *paredokamen*, "what we delivered to you," as in the passage cited just before. This does not prove the traditions of the apostles to be anything more than counsels, even though, as is said in verse 8, "he that despises them despises not man but God." For our Savior himself came not to judge, that is, to be king in this world, but to

sacrifice himself for sinners and to leave doctors in his Church to lead men to Christ, not to drive them. He never accepts forced actions (which is all that law produces), but the inward conversion of the heart, which is the work not of laws but of counsel and doctrine.

42.108 And so with 2 Thessalonians 3:14: "If any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may be ashamed." From the word *obey* he would infer that this epistle was a law to the Thessalonians. The epistles of the emperors were indeed laws. If, therefore, the epistle of St. Paul was also a law, they had to obey two masters. But the word *obey*, as it is in the Greek, *hypakouei*, signifies *listening to* or *putting into practice* not only what is commanded by one who has the right to punish, but also what is delivered by way of counsel for our good. And therefore St. Paul does not bid them kill the one who disobeys, nor beat, imprison, or fine him, all of which legislators may do, but avoid his company, that he may be ashamed. From this it is evident that it was not the authority of an apostle but his reputation among the faithful that the Christians stood in awe of.

42.109 The last passage is Hebrews 13:17: "Obey your leaders, and submit yourselves to them, for they watch over your souls, as those who must give account." Here too obedience means following their counsel. For the reason for our obedience is drawn not from the will and command of our pastors, but from our own benefit, since it is the salvation of our souls they watch for, and not the exaltation of their own power and authority. If it were meant here that all they teach were laws, then not only the Pope but every pastor in his parish would have legislative power. Again, those who are bound to obey their pastors have no power to examine their commands. What then shall we say to St. John, who bids us (1 John 4:1) "not to believe every spirit, but to test the spirits, whether they are of God, because many false prophets have gone out into the world"? It is therefore manifest that we may dispute the doctrine of our pastors, but no man can dispute a law. The commands of civil sovereigns are

granted on all sides to be laws. If anyone besides the sovereign can make a law, all commonwealth, and consequently all peace and justice, must cease—which is contrary to all laws, both divine and human. Nothing, therefore, can be drawn from these or any other passages of Scripture to prove that the decrees of the Pope are laws where he does not also have the civil sovereignty.

42.110 The last point he would prove is this: "that our Savior Christ has committed ecclesiastical jurisdiction immediately to none but the Pope." Here he deals not with the question of supremacy between the Pope and Christian kings, but between the Pope and other bishops. And first, he says it is agreed that the jurisdiction of bishops is, at least in general, *de jure divino*, that is, by the right of God. For this he cites St. Paul (Ephesians 4:11), where he says that Christ, after his ascension into heaven, "gave gifts to men: some apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors, and some teachers." And from this he infers that they do indeed have their jurisdiction by God's right, but he will not grant that they have it immediately from God; rather, it is derived through the Pope. But if a man may be said to have his jurisdiction *de jure divino*, and yet not immediately, what lawful jurisdiction, even merely civil, is there in a Christian commonwealth that is not also *de jure divino*? For Christian kings have their civil power immediately from God, and the magistrates under them exercise their several charges by virtue of the king's commission. So what they do is no less *de jure divino mediato* than what the bishops do by virtue of the Pope's ordination.[101] All lawful power is from God: immediately in the supreme governor, and mediately in those who have authority under him. So either he must grant that every constable in the state holds his office by the right of God, or he must not hold that any bishop holds his so, apart from the Pope himself.

42.111 But this whole dispute—whether Christ left jurisdiction to the Pope only, or to other bishops also—if considered outside

those places where the Pope has the civil sovereignty, is a quarrel *de lana caprina*, about goat's wool. For none of them (where they are not sovereigns) has any jurisdiction at all. Jurisdiction is the power of hearing and deciding cases between man and man. It can belong to no one but him who has the power to prescribe the rules of right and wrong, that is, to make laws, and with the sword of justice to compel men to obey his decisions, pronounced either by himself or by the judges he appoints for the purpose. And this no one can lawfully do but the civil sovereign.[102]

42.112 Therefore, when he cites the sixth chapter of Luke, that our Savior called his disciples together and chose twelve of them whom he named apostles, he proves that Christ chose them (all except Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas) and gave them power and command to preach, but not to judge cases between man and man. For that is a power he refused to take upon himself, saying, "Who made me a judge or a divider over you?" and in another place, "My kingdom is not of this world." But whoever does not have the power to hear and decide cases between man and man cannot be said to have any jurisdiction at all. And yet this does not prevent our Savior from having given them power to preach and baptize in all parts of the world, provided they were not forbidden by their own lawful sovereign. For Christ himself and his apostles have, in various places, expressly commanded us to be obedient in all things to our own sovereigns.

42.113 The arguments by which he would prove that bishops receive their jurisdiction from the Pope are all in vain, since the Pope himself has no jurisdiction in the dominions of other princes. Yet because they prove, on the contrary, that all bishops receive their jurisdiction, when they have it, from their civil sovereigns, I will not omit reciting them.

42.114 The first is from Numbers 11. Moses, being unable to bear alone the whole burden of administering the affairs of the

101 *De jure divino mediato*: by divine right, but mediately, that is, through an intermediary.

people of Israel, was commanded by God to choose seventy elders, and God took part of the spirit of Moses to put it upon those seventy elders. By this is understood not that God weakened the spirit of Moses, for that would not have eased him at all, but that they all had their authority from him. In this he interprets the passage truly and fairly. But since Moses had the entire sovereignty in the commonwealth of the Jews, it is manifest that what is signified is that they had their authority from the civil sovereign. And therefore that passage proves that bishops in every Christian commonwealth have their authority from the civil sovereign—and from the Pope only in his own territories, not in the territories of any other state.

42.115 The second argument is from the nature of monarchy, in which all authority is in one man, and in others by derivation from him; and the government of the Church, he says, is monarchical. This too tells for Christian monarchs. For they are really monarchs of their own people, that is, of their own Church (for the Church is the same thing as a Christian people); whereas the power of the Pope, even if he were St. Peter, is not monarchy, nor has it anything *archical* or *cratical* about it, but only *didactical*. For God accepts not a forced but a willing obedience.[103]

42.116 The third is that the see of St. Peter is called by St. Cyprian the *head*, the *source*, the *root*, the *sun*, from which the authority of bishops is derived. But by the law of nature (which is a better principle of right and wrong than the word of any doctor who is only a man), the civil sovereign in every commonwealth is the *head*, the *source*, the *root*, and the *sun* from which all jurisdiction is derived. And therefore the jurisdiction of bishops is derived from the civil sovereign.[104]

42.117 The fourth is taken from the inequality of their jurisdictions. For if God (he says) had given it to them immediately, he

102 A proverbial phrase (Horace, *Epistles* 1.18.15) for a dispute over nothing.
103 Hobbes's coinages from the Greek: *archē*, rule; *kratos*, power; *didaskein*, to teach.
104 Cyprian (d. 258), bishop of Carthage and martyr, author of *On the Unity of the Church*.

would have given equality of jurisdiction as well as of order. But we see that some are bishops of only one town, some of a hundred towns, and some of many whole provinces; and these differences were not determined by the command of God. Their jurisdiction, therefore, is not from God but from man, and one has a greater, another a lesser, as it pleases the prince of the Church. This argument would have served his purpose if he had first proved that the Pope had a universal jurisdiction over all Christians. But that has not been proved; and it is notoriously known that the Pope's large jurisdiction was given him by those who had it, that is, by the emperors of Rome (for the patriarch of Constantinople, on the same title—namely, being bishop of the capital city of the empire and seat of the emperor—claimed to be his equal). It follows that all other bishops have their jurisdiction from the sovereigns of the place where they exercise it. And as for that reason they do not have their authority *de jure divino*, so neither does the Pope have his *de jure divino*, except only where he is also the civil sovereign.

42.118 His fifth argument is this: "If bishops have their jurisdiction immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can do nothing contrary to God's ordinance." This inference is good and well proved. "But" (he says) "the Pope can do this, and has done it." This also is granted, provided he does it in his own dominions, or in the dominions of any other prince who has given him that power—but not universally, by right of the papacy. For that power belongs to every Christian sovereign within the bounds of his own empire, and is inseparable from the sovereignty. Before the people of Israel had (by God's commandment to Samuel) set a king over themselves in the manner of other nations, the high priest had the civil government, and no one but he could appoint or depose a lesser priest. But that power was afterward in the king, as may be proved by this same argument of Bellarmine. For if the priest (whether the high priest or any other) had his jurisdiction immediately from God, then the king could not take it from him, "for he could do nothing contrary to God's ordinance." But it is certain that King

Solomon (1 Kings 2:26) deprived Abiathar the high priest of his office, and put Zadok (verse 35) in his place. Kings therefore may in like manner ordain and deprive bishops as they think fit, for the good government of their subjects.

42.119 His sixth argument is this: if bishops have their jurisdiction *de jure divino* (that is, immediately from God), those who maintain it should bring some word of God to prove it; but they can bring none. The argument is good, and so I have nothing to say against it. But it is no less good an argument to prove that the Pope himself has no jurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince.

42.120 Lastly, he brings as an argument the testimony of two popes, Innocent and Leo. And I do not doubt that he might, with as good reason, have cited the testimonies of almost all the popes since St. Peter. For considering the love of power naturally implanted in mankind, whoever was made pope would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Nevertheless, in doing so they would only do as Innocent and Leo did: bear witness of themselves. And therefore their witness would not be good.[105]

BELLARMINE ANSWERED: THE POPE'S INDIRECT POWER

The Pope's claimed indirect power over princes is real power, and Bellarmine's arguments for it fail.

42.121 In the fifth book he has four conclusions. The first is, "That the Pope is not lord of all the world." The second, "That the Pope is not lord of all the Christian world." The third, "That the Pope (outside his own territory) has no temporal jurisdiction *directly*." These three conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is, "That the Pope has (in the dominions of other princes) the supreme temporal power *indirectly*." This is denied—unless by "indirectly" he means that he has gotten it by indirect means, in which case that too is granted. But I understand that when he says he has it "indirectly," he means that such temporal jurisdiction belongs to him by right, but that this right is only a con-

105 Pope Innocent I (401–417) and Pope Leo I (440–461).

sequence of his pastoral authority, which he could not exercise unless he had the other along with it. And therefore the supreme civil power is necessarily annexed to the pastoral power (which he calls spiritual), and by this he has a right to change kingdoms, giving them to one and taking them from another, whenever he thinks it conduces to the salvation of souls.

42.122 Before I come to consider the arguments by which he would prove this doctrine, it will not be amiss to lay open its consequences, so that princes and states that hold the civil sovereignty in their several commonwealths may consider whether it is convenient for them, and conducive to the good of their subjects (for whom they are to give an account on the Day of Judgment), to admit it.

42.123 When it is said that the Pope does not have the supreme civil power *directly* in the territories of other states, we are to understand that he does not claim it as other civil sovereigns do, from the original submission to it of those who are to be governed. For it is evident, and has already been sufficiently demonstrated in this treatise, that the right of all sovereigns is derived originally from the consent of every one of those who are to be governed—whether those who choose him do so for their common defense against an enemy, as when they agree among themselves to appoint a man or an assembly of men to protect them, or whether they do it to save their lives, by submission to a conquering enemy. Therefore, when the Pope disclaims the supreme civil power over other states *directly*, he denies no more than that his right comes to him by that way. He does not for all that cease to claim it another way: that is, without the consent of those who are to be governed, by a right given him by God (which he calls *indirectly*) at his assumption to the papacy. But by whatever way he claims it, the power is the same. And (if it is granted to be his right) he may depose princes and states as often as it is for the salvation of souls—that is, as often as he pleases, for he also claims the sole power to judge whether it is for the salvation of men's souls or not. And this is

the doctrine not only that Bellarmine here, and many other doctors, teach in their sermons and books, but also that some councils have decreed, and that the popes, when the occasion has served them, have put into practice accordingly. For the Fourth Lateran Council, held under Pope Innocent III, (in the third chapter,[106] *De haereticis*) has this canon: "If a king, at the Pope's admonition, does not purge his kingdom of heretics, and, being excommunicated for this, does not make satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of their obedience." And the practice of it has been seen on various occasions: as in the deposing of Chilperic, King of France; in the transfer of the Roman Empire to Charlemagne; in the oppression of John, King of England; in transferring the kingdom of Navarre; and in recent years, in the League against Henry III of France; and in many more instances. I think there are few princes who do not consider this unjust and inconvenient. But I wish they would all resolve to be either kings or subjects.[107] No man can serve two masters. They ought therefore to ease their subjects, either by holding the reins of government wholly in their own hands, or by delivering them wholly into the hands of the Pope, so that men who are willing to be obedient may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of temporal and spiritual power is nothing but words. Power is as really divided, and as dangerously for all purposes, by sharing it with another *indirect* power as with a *direct* one. But now to come to his arguments.

42.124 The first is this: "The civil power is subject to the spiritual. Therefore he who has the supreme spiritual power has the right to command temporal princes, and to dispose of their temporal affairs in order to the spiritual." As for the distinction of temporal and spiritual, let us consider in what sense it may intelligibly be said that the temporal or civil power is subject to

106 The Fourth Lateran Council met in 1215.

107 "Chilperic": Hobbes means Childeric III (see chapter 12). Leo III crowned Charlemagne emperor in 800; Innocent III laid England under interdict until King John submitted in 1213; Julius II's excommunication of the king of Navarre (1512) opened the way for Ferdinand of Aragon's conquest; and Sixtus V excommunicated Henry III of France in 1589, in support of the Catholic League.

the spiritual. There are only two ways in which those words can be made to make sense. For when we say that one power is subject to another power, the meaning is either that he who has the one is subject to him who has the other, or that the one power is to the other as the means to the end. For we cannot understand one power to have power over another power, or one power to have right or command over another. For subjection, command, right, and power are accidents not of powers but of persons. One power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a saddler is to the art of a rider. If, then, it is granted that civil government is ordained as a means to bring us to a spiritual felicity, it still does not follow that if a king has the civil power and the Pope the spiritual, the king is therefore bound to obey the Pope—any more than every saddler is bound to obey every rider. Therefore, as the subjection of the practitioner cannot be inferred from the subordination of an art, so the subjection of the governor cannot be inferred from the subordination of a government. When, therefore, he says that the civil power is subject to the spiritual, his meaning is that the civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual sovereign. And the argument stands thus: "The civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual; therefore the spiritual prince may command temporal princes." Here the conclusion is the same as the premise he should have proved. But to prove it he first brings this reason: "Kings and popes, clergy and laity, make up only one commonwealth, that is to say, only one Church. And in all bodies the members depend on one another. But spiritual things do not depend on temporal things. Therefore temporal things depend on spiritual ones, and are therefore subject to them." In this argument there are two gross errors. One is that all Christian kings, popes, clergy, and all other Christian men make up only one commonwealth. For it is evident that France is one commonwealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, and so on. And these consist of Christians, and so they are also several bodies of Christians, that is to say, several churches. And their several sovereigns represent them, by which they are capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering, as

a natural man is. No general or universal Church is so capable until it has a representative, which it does not have on earth. For if it had one, there is no doubt that all Christendom would be one commonwealth, whose sovereign would be that representative, in things both spiritual and temporal. And to make himself this representative, the Pope lacks three things that our Savior has not given him: to *command*, to *judge*, and to *punish*, other than (by excommunication) to shun those who will not learn from him. For even if the Pope were Christ's only vicar, he still cannot exercise his government until our Savior's second coming. And then, too, it is not the Pope but St. Peter himself, with the other apostles, who are to be judges of the world.

42.125 The other error in this first argument of his is his saying that the members of every commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend on one another. It is true they cohere together; but they depend only on the sovereign, who is the soul of the commonwealth. When the sovereign fails, the commonwealth is dissolved into civil war, no one man so much as cohering to another for want of a common dependence on a known sovereign—just as the members of the natural body dissolve into earth for want of a soul to hold them together. Therefore there is nothing in this comparison from which to infer a dependence of the laity on the clergy, or of the temporal officers on the spiritual, but only of both on the civil sovereign—who ought indeed to direct his civil commands to the salvation of souls, but is not therefore subject to anyone but God himself. And so you see the labored fallacy of the first argument, meant to deceive such men as do not distinguish between the subordination of actions in the way to the end and the subjection of persons to one another in the administration of the means. For to every end, the means are determined by nature, or supernaturally by God himself. But the power to make men use the means is in every nation resigned to the civil sovereign (by the law of nature, which forbids men to violate the faith they have given).

42.126 His second argument is this: "Every commonwealth (because it is supposed to be perfect and sufficient in itself) may

command any other commonwealth not subject to it, and force it to change the administration of its government—indeed, depose its prince and set another in his place—if it cannot otherwise defend itself against the injuries he is setting out to do it. Much more may a spiritual commonwealth command a temporal one to change the administration of its government, and depose princes and institute others, when it cannot otherwise defend the spiritual good."

42.127 That a commonwealth, to defend itself against injuries, may lawfully do all that he has said here is very true, and has already been sufficiently demonstrated in what has gone before. And if it were also true that there is now in this world a spiritual commonwealth distinct from a civil commonwealth, then its prince might, upon injury done him, or for want of assurance that injury will not be done him in time to come, repair and secure himself by war—which, in sum, is deposing, killing, or subduing, or doing any act of hostility. But by the same reason, it would be no less lawful for a civil sovereign, upon like injuries done or feared, to make war on the spiritual sovereign—which I believe is more than Cardinal Bellarmine would have inferred from his own proposition.

42.128 But there is no spiritual commonwealth in this world. For it is the same thing as the kingdom of Christ, which he himself says is not of this world, but shall be in the next world, at the resurrection, when those who have lived justly and believed that he was the Christ shall (though they died *natural* bodies) rise *spiritual* bodies. And it is then that our Savior shall judge the world, and conquer his adversaries, and make a spiritual commonwealth. In the meantime, since there are no men on earth whose bodies are spiritual, there can be no spiritual commonwealth among men who are still in the flesh—unless we call preachers, who have a commission to teach and to prepare men for their reception into the kingdom of Christ at the resurrection, a commonwealth, which I have already proved it is not.

42.129 The third argument is this: "It is not lawful for Christians to tolerate an unbelieving or heretical king, if he tries to draw

them to his heresy or unbelief. But to judge whether a king draws his subjects to heresy or not belongs to the Pope. Therefore the Pope has the right to determine whether the prince is to be deposed or not."

42.130 To this I answer that both these assertions are false. For Christians (or men of whatever religion), if they do not tolerate their king, whatever law he makes, even one concerning religion, violate their faith, contrary to the divine law, both *natural* and *positive*. Nor is there any judge of heresy among subjects but their own civil sovereign. For *heresy is nothing else but a private opinion, obstinately maintained, contrary to the opinion that the public person* (that is to say, the representative of the commonwealth) *has commanded to be taught.* By this it is evident that an opinion publicly appointed to be taught cannot be heresy, nor can the sovereign princes who authorize such opinions be heretics. For heretics are none but private men who stubbornly defend some doctrine prohibited by their lawful sovereigns.

42.131 But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate unbelieving or heretical kings, he cites a passage in Deuteronomy 17, where God forbids the Jews, when they set a king over themselves, to choose a foreigner; and from this he infers that it is unlawful for a Christian to choose a king who is not a Christian. And it is true that he who is a Christian—that is, he who has already obliged himself to receive our Savior as his king when he comes—will tempt God too much in choosing for king in this world one whom he knows will try, both by terror and by persuasion, to make him violate his faith. But, he says, it is the same danger to choose one who is not a Christian for king as not to depose him once he is chosen. To this I say that the question is not about the danger of not deposing him, but about the justice of deposing him. To choose him may in some cases be unjust; but to depose him once he is chosen is in no case just. For it is always a violation of faith, and consequently against the law of nature, which is the eternal law of God. Nor do we read that any such doctrine was accounted Christian in the time of the apostles, nor in the time of the Roman emperors, until the

popes had the civil sovereignty of Rome. But to this he has replied that the Christians of old did not depose Nero, or Diocletian, or Julian, or Valens the Arian, only because they lacked temporal forces. Perhaps so. But did our Savior—who for the asking might have had twelve legions of immortal, invulnerable angels to assist him—lack forces to depose Caesar, or at least Pilate, who unjustly, without finding fault in him, delivered him to the Jews to be crucified? Or if the apostles lacked temporal forces to depose Nero, was it therefore necessary for them, in their epistles to the newly made Christians, to teach them (as they did) to obey the powers set over them (of which Nero at that time was one), and that they ought to obey them not for fear of their wrath but for conscience' sake? Shall we say that they not only obeyed but also taught what they did not mean, for want of strength? It is not, therefore, for want of strength, but for conscience' sake, that Christians are to tolerate their heathen princes, or princes who authorize the teaching of an error (for I cannot call anyone a heretic whose doctrine is the public doctrine). And whereas, in support of the Pope's temporal power, he further alleges that St. Paul (1 Corinthians 6) appointed judges under the heathen princes of those times, judges not ordained by those princes, this is not true. For St. Paul only advises them to take some of their brethren as arbitrators to settle their differences, rather than to go to law with one another before the heathen judges. That is a wholesome precept, full of charity, and fit to be practiced even in the best Christian commonwealths. And as for the danger that may arise to religion from subjects tolerating a heathen or an erring prince, it is a point of which a subject is no competent judge. Or if he is, the Pope's temporal subjects may also judge of the Pope's doctrine. For every Christian prince, as I have proved before, is no less the supreme pastor of his own subjects than the Pope is of his.

42.132 The fourth argument is taken from the baptism of kings, in which, in order to be made Christians, they submit their scepters to Christ and promise to keep and defend the Christian faith. This is true; for Christian kings are no more than Christ's

subjects. But for all that, they may be the Pope's fellows; for they are supreme pastors of their own subjects, and the Pope is no more than king and pastor, even in Rome itself.

42.133 The fifth argument is drawn from the words our Savior spoke, "Feed my sheep," by which, he says, all the power necessary for a pastor was given: such as the power to chase away wolves, which are heretics; the power to shut up rams if they are mad or butt the other sheep with their horns, which are evil (though Christian) kings; and the power to give the flock suitable food. From this he infers that St. Peter was given these three powers by Christ. To this I answer that the last of these powers is no more than the power, or rather the command, to teach. As for the first, which is to chase away wolves, that is, heretics, the passage he quotes is Matthew 7:15: "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves." But heretics are not false prophets, or prophets at all. Nor (granting that heretics are the wolves meant there) were the apostles commanded to kill them, or, if they were kings, to depose them, but to beware of them, flee, and avoid them. Nor was it to St. Peter, nor to any of the apostles, but to the multitude of the Jews who followed him onto the mountain—men for the most part not yet converted—that he gave this counsel, to beware of false prophets. If, therefore, it confers a power of chasing away kings, it was given not only to private men but to men who were not Christians at all. And as to the power of separating and shutting up furious rams (by which he means Christian kings who refuse to submit themselves to the Roman pastor), our Savior himself refused to take that power upon him in this world, but advised letting the wheat and the tares grow up together until the Day of Judgment. Much less did he give it to St. Peter, or can St. Peter give it to the popes. St. Peter and all other pastors are bidden to regard those Christians who disobey the Church—that is, who disobey the Christian sovereign—as heathens and publicans. Since, then, men claim for the Pope no authority over heathen princes, they ought to claim none over those who are to be regarded as heathens.

42.134 But from the power to teach alone, he also infers a coercive power in the Pope over kings. The pastor, he says, must give his flock suitable food; therefore the Pope may, and ought to, compel kings to do their duty. From this it follows that the Pope, as pastor of Christian men, is King of Kings—which all Christian kings ought indeed either to confess, or else they ought to take upon themselves the supreme pastoral charge, every one in his own dominion.

42.135 His sixth and last argument is from examples. To this I answer, first, that examples prove nothing; and second, that the examples he cites do not make so much as a probability of right. The act of Jehoiada in killing Athaliah (2 Kings 11) was either by the authority of King Joash, or it was a horrible crime in the high priest, who (ever after the election of King Saul) was a mere subject. The act of St. Ambrose in excommunicating the Emperor Theodosius (if it is true that he did so) was a capital crime. And as for the popes Gregory I, Gregory II, Zachary, and Leo III, their judgments are void, as given in their own cause; and the acts they did in conformity with this doctrine are the greatest crimes (especially that of Zachary) that human nature is capable of. And so much for *ecclesiastical power*. I would have been briefer on it, and forborne to examine these arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been his as a private man, and not as the champion of the papacy against all other Christian princes and states.

CHAPTER 43: OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR ENTRY INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN

Obedience to God and to the sovereign conflict only if we misjudge what salvation requires.

43.1 The most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war in Christian commonwealths has for a long time come from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying both God and man at once when their commandments are contrary to each other. It is evident enough that when a man receives two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is God's, he ought to obey

that one and not the other, even if the other is the command of his lawful sovereign (whether a monarch or a sovereign assembly) or the command of his father. The difficulty therefore consists in this: that men, when they are commanded in the name of God, do not know in various cases whether the command is from God, or whether the one who commands is only abusing God's name for some private ends of his own. For as there were in the Church of the Jews many false prophets who sought reputation with the people by feigned dreams and visions, so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ false teachers who seek reputation with the people by fantastical and false doctrines, and by such reputation (as is the nature of ambition) to govern them for their private benefit.

43.2 But this difficulty of obeying both God and the civil sovereign on earth is of no importance to those who can distinguish between what is *necessary* and what is not *necessary* for their *reception* into the *Kingdom of God*. For if the command of the civil sovereign is such that it may be obeyed without the forfeiture of eternal life, then not to obey it is unjust, and the precept of the apostle applies: "Servants, obey your masters in all things," and, "Children, obey your parents in all things"; and the precept of our Savior: "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; therefore all that they tell you, observe and do." But if the command is such that it cannot be obeyed without being damned to eternal death, then it would be madness to obey it, and the counsel of our Savior applies:[108] "Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul" (Matthew 10:28). All men, therefore, who would avoid both the punishments to be inflicted in this world for disobedience to their earthly sovereign and those to be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to God, need to be taught to distinguish well between what is and what is not necessary to eternal salvation.

43.3 *All that is necessary to salvation* is contained in two virtues: *faith in Christ* and *obedience to laws*. The latter, if it were perfect, would be enough for us. But because we are all guilty of dis-

108 Colossians 3:22 and 3:20; Matthew 23:2–3.

obedience to God's law—not only originally in Adam, but also actually by our own transgressions—what is now required of us is not only *obedience* for the rest of our time, but also a *remission* of sins for the time past. And that remission is the reward of our faith in Christ. That nothing else is necessarily required for salvation is evident from this: that the Kingdom of Heaven is shut to none but sinners, that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the law; and not even to them, if they repent and believe all the articles of Christian faith necessary to salvation.

43.4 The obedience God requires of us—God, who in all our actions accepts the will for the deed—is a serious effort to obey him; and it is also called by all such names as signify that effort. And so obedience is sometimes called by the names *charity* and *love*, because they imply a will to obey; and our Savior himself makes our love of God, and of one another, a fulfilling of the whole law. Sometimes it is called by the name of *righteousness*, for righteousness is only the will to give to everyone his own, that is to say, the will to obey the laws. And sometimes by the name of *repentance*, because to repent implies a turning away from sin, which is the same as the return of the will to obedience. Whoever, therefore, sincerely desires to fulfill the commandments of God, or truly repents of his transgressions, or loves God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself, has all the obedience necessary for his reception into the Kingdom of God. For if God were to require perfect innocence, no flesh could be saved.

43.5 But what commandments are those that God has given us? Are all those laws that were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses the commandments of God? If they are, why are Christians not taught to obey them? If they are not, what others are, besides the law of nature? For our Savior Christ has not given us new laws, but counsel to observe those we are subject to, that is to say, the laws of nature and the laws of our several sovereigns. Nor did he make any new law for the Jews in his Sermon on the Mount, but only expounded the laws of Moses, to which they were already subject. The laws of God, therefore, are none but

the laws of nature, of which the principal one is that we should not violate our faith—that is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns, whom we set up over us by mutual pact with one another. And this law of God, which commands obedience to the civil law, commands by consequence obedience to all the precepts of the Bible. The Bible (as I proved in the preceding chapter) is law only where the civil sovereign has made it so, and in other places only counsel, which a man may, at his own peril, refuse to obey without injustice.

FAITH: WHOM WE BELIEVE, AND WHY

Christians believe the Scripture because their lawful teachers tell them so; faith is God's gift through hearing.

43.6 Knowing now what obedience is necessary to salvation, and to whom it is due, we are next to consider, concerning faith, whom we believe and why, and what the articles or points are that must necessarily be believed by those who shall be saved. And first, as for the person whom we believe: because it is impossible to believe any person before we know what he says, he must be one whom we have heard speak. The person, therefore, whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and the prophets believed was God himself, who spoke to them supernaturally; and the person whom the apostles and disciples who conversed with Christ believed was our Savior himself. But of those to whom neither God the Father nor our Savior ever spoke, it cannot be said that the person they believed was God. They believed the apostles, and after them the pastors and doctors of the Church, who recommended to their faith the history of the Old and New Testaments. So the faith of Christians ever since our Savior's time has had for its foundation, first, the reputation of their pastors, and afterward the authority of those who caused the Old and New Testaments to be received as the rule of faith—which none could do but Christian sovereigns. They are therefore the supreme pastors, and the only persons whom Christians now hear speak from God, except those to whom God

speaks supernaturally in these days. But because there are many false prophets "gone out into the world," other men are to test such spirits, as St. John advises us (1 John 4:1), "whether they are of God or not." And therefore, since the examination of doctrines belongs to the supreme pastor, the person whom all those who have no special revelation are to believe is (in every commonwealth) the supreme pastor, that is to say, the civil sovereign.

43.7 The causes why men believe any Christian doctrine are various. For faith is the gift of God, and he works it in each individual man by such ways as seem good to him. The most ordinary immediate cause of our belief concerning any point of Christian faith is that we believe the Bible to be the Word of God. But why we believe the Bible to be the Word of God is much disputed, as all questions must be that are not well stated. For they do not make the question "Why do we believe it?" but "How do we know it?"—as if *believing* and *knowing* were all one. And so, while one side grounds its knowledge on the infallibility of the Church, and the other on the testimony of the private spirit, neither side proves what it claims. For how shall a man know the infallibility of the Church except by first knowing the infallibility of Scripture? Or how shall a man know that his own private spirit is anything other than a belief grounded on the authority and arguments of his teachers, or on a presumption of his own gifts? Besides, there is nothing in Scripture from which the infallibility of the Church can be inferred—much less that of any particular church, and least of all the infallibility of any particular man.

43.8 It is evident, therefore, that Christian men do not know, but only believe, the Scripture to be the Word of God; and that the means of making them believe, which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according to the way of nature, that is to say, from their teachers. It is the doctrine of St. Paul concerning Christian faith in general: "Faith comes by hearing" (Romans 10:17)—that is, by hearing our lawful pastors. He also says in the same chapter (Romans 10:14–15), "How shall they

believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach, unless they are sent?" From this it is evident that the ordinary cause of believing that the Scriptures are the Word of God is the same as the cause of believing all the other articles of our faith: namely, the hearing of those who are allowed and appointed by the law to teach us, as our parents in their houses and our pastors in the churches. This is also made more evident by experience. For what other cause can be assigned why, in Christian commonwealths, all men either believe, or at least profess, the Scripture to be the Word of God, and in other commonwealths scarcely anyone does, except that in Christian commonwealths they are taught it from their infancy, and in other places they are taught otherwise?

43.9 But if teaching is the cause of faith, why do not all believe? It is certain, therefore, that faith is the gift of God, and he gives it to whom he will. Nevertheless, because he gives it to those to whom he gives it by means of teachers, the immediate cause of faith is hearing. In a school where many are taught, and some profit and others do not, the cause of learning in those who profit is the master; yet it cannot be inferred from this that learning is not the gift of God. All good things proceed from God; yet not all who have them can say they are inspired. For that implies a supernatural gift and the immediate hand of God; and he who claims that claims to be a prophet, and is subject to the examination of the Church.

43.10 But whether men *know*, or *believe*, or *grant* the Scriptures to be the Word of God, if I show from those passages of them that are free of obscurity what articles of faith are necessary, and alone necessary, for salvation, those men must necessarily *know*, *believe*, or *grant* the same.

THE ONE NECESSARY ARTICLE

The only article necessary to salvation is that Jesus is the Christ; Hobbes gives five proofs.

43.11 The only article of faith (the *unum necessarium*) that Scripture makes simply necessary to salvation is this: that *Jesus is the Christ*. By the name *Christ* is understood the King whom God had promised beforehand, by the prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world, to reign under himself eternally (over the Jews and over those of other nations who should believe in him), and to give them that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam. When I have proved this from Scripture, I will further show when, and in what sense, some other articles may also be called *necessary*.[109]

43.12 As proof that belief in this article, "Jesus is the Christ," is all the faith required for salvation, my first argument shall be from the purpose of the evangelists, which was, by describing the life of our Savior, to establish that one article, "Jesus is the Christ." The sum of St. Matthew's Gospel is this: that Jesus was of the line of David, and born of a virgin, which are the marks of the true Christ; that the Magi came to worship him as King of the Jews; that Herod for the same reason sought to kill him; that John the Baptist proclaimed him; that he preached, himself and through his apostles, that he was that King; that he taught the law not as a scribe but as a man of authority; that he cured diseases by his word alone, and did many other miracles that the Christ had been foretold to do; that he was hailed as king when he entered Jerusalem; that he warned them to beware of all others who should claim to be Christ; that he was taken, accused, and put to death for saying he was king; and that the charge for which he was condemned, written on the cross, was "Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews." All of this tends to no other end than this: that men should believe that Jesus is the Christ. Such, therefore, was the purpose of St. Matthew's Gospel. But the pur-

109 *Unum necessarium*: "the one thing needful" (Luke 10:42).

pose of all the evangelists (as may be seen by reading them) was the same. Therefore the purpose of the whole Gospel was the establishing of that one article. And St. John expressly makes it his conclusion (John 20:31): "These things are written that you may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God."

43.13 My second argument is taken from the subject of the sermons of the apostles, both while our Savior lived on earth and after his ascension. The apostles, in our Savior's time, were sent (Luke 9:2) to preach the Kingdom of God. For neither there nor in Matthew 10:7 does he give them any commission other than this: "As you go, preach, saying, The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand"—that is, that Jesus is the Messiah, the Christ, the King who was to come. That their preaching after his ascension was also the same is evident from what St. Luke says in Acts 17:6: "They dragged Jason and certain brethren before the rulers of the city, crying, These men who have turned the world upside down have come here too, and Jason has received them. And they all act contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying that there is another king, one Jesus." And it is evident from the second and third verses of the same chapter (Acts 17:2–3), where it is said that St. Paul, "as his custom was, went in to them, and on three Sabbath days reasoned with them from the Scriptures, explaining and demonstrating that the Christ had to suffer and rise again from the dead, and that this Jesus, whom I preach to you, is the Christ."

43.14 The third argument is from those passages of Scripture by which all the faith required for salvation is declared to be easy. For if an inward assent of the mind to all the doctrines concerning Christian faith now taught (most of which are disputed) were necessary to salvation, there would be nothing in the world so hard as to be a Christian. The thief on the cross, though repenting, could not have been saved for saying, "Lord, remember me when you come into your kingdom," by which he testified belief in no other article but this: that Jesus was the King. Nor could it be said (as it is in Matthew 11:30) that "Christ's yoke is easy, and his burden light"; nor that "little children believe in

him," as it is in Matthew 18:6. Nor could St. Paul have said (1 Corinthians 1:21), "It pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save those who believe." Nor could St. Paul himself have been saved—much less have become so great a doctor of the Church so suddenly—who never perhaps thought of transubstantiation, or purgatory, or many other articles now forced upon us.

43.15 The fourth argument is taken from passages that are explicit and admit of no controversy of interpretation. First, John 5:39: "Search the Scriptures, for in them you think you have eternal life; and they are what testify of me." Our Savior here speaks only of the Scriptures of the Old Testament; for the Jews at that time could not search the Scriptures of the New Testament, which had not been written. But the Old Testament contains nothing of Christ except the marks by which men might know him when he came: such as that he should descend from David, be born at Bethlehem and of a virgin, do great miracles, and the like. Therefore to believe that this Jesus was he was sufficient for eternal life; but what is more than sufficient is not necessary, and consequently no other article is required. Again, John 11:26: "Whoever lives and believes in me shall not die eternally." Therefore to believe in Christ is faith sufficient for eternal life, and consequently no more faith than that is necessary. But to believe in Jesus and to believe that Jesus is the Christ are all one, as appears in the verses immediately following. For when our Savior (verse 26) had said to Martha, "Do you believe this?" she answers (John 11:27), "Yes, Lord, I believe that you are the Christ, the Son of God, who was to come into the world." Therefore this article alone is faith sufficient for eternal life, and what is more than sufficient is not necessary. Third, John 20:31: "These things are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life through his name." There, to believe that Jesus is the Christ is faith sufficient to obtain life, and therefore no other article is necessary. Fourth, 1 John 4:2: "Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God." And 1 John 5:1: "Whoever believes that Jesus is the Christ is born of God." And

verse 5: "Who is he who overcomes the world, but he who believes that Jesus is the Son of God?" Fifth, Acts 8:36–37: "See," says the eunuch, "here is water; what hinders me from being baptized? And Philip said, If you believe with all your heart, you may. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." Therefore belief in this article, "Jesus is the Christ," is sufficient for baptism, that is to say, for our reception into the Kingdom of God, and consequently is the only thing necessary. And generally, in all places where our Savior says to anyone, "Your faith has saved you," the reason he says it is some confession that, directly or by consequence, implies a belief that Jesus is the Christ.

43.16 The last argument is from the passages where this article is made the foundation of faith; for he who holds to the foundation shall be saved. These passages are, first, Matthew 24:23: "If anyone says to you, Look, here is the Christ, or there, do not believe it. For false christs and false prophets will arise, and will show great signs and wonders," and so on. Here we see that this article, "Jesus is the Christ," must be held even if someone who teaches the contrary should do great miracles. The second passage is Galatians 1:8: "Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel to you than the one we have preached to you, let him be accursed." But the gospel that Paul and the other apostles preached was only this article, that Jesus is the Christ. Therefore, for the sake of belief in this article, we are to reject the authority of an angel from heaven—much more that of any mortal man, if he teaches the contrary. This, therefore, is the fundamental article of Christian faith. A third passage is 1 John 4:1–2: "Beloved, do not believe every spirit. By this you shall know the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God." From this it is evident that this article is the measure and rule by which to evaluate and examine all other articles, and is therefore the only fundamental one. A fourth is Matthew 16:18, where, after St. Peter had professed this article, saying to our Savior, "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God," our Savior answered, "You are Peter,

and upon this rock I will build my church." From this I infer that this article is the one on which all the other doctrines of the Church are built, as on their foundation. A fifth is 1 Corinthians 3:11–15: "No one can lay any other foundation than the one that is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if anyone builds on this foundation with gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, each one's work will be made evident; for the Day will declare it, because it will be revealed by fire, and the fire will test each one's work, of what sort it is. If anyone's work that he has built on it endures, he will receive a reward. If anyone's work is burned, he will suffer loss; but he himself will be saved, yet so as by fire." These words are partly plain and easy to understand, and partly allegorical and difficult. From what is plain, it may be inferred that pastors who teach this foundation, that Jesus is the Christ, may nevertheless be saved, even though they draw false consequences from it (which all men are sometimes liable to do); and much more, that those may be saved who, being not pastors but hearers, believe what their lawful pastors teach them. Therefore belief in this article is sufficient; and consequently there is no other article of faith necessarily required for salvation.

43.17 Now as for the part that is allegorical, such as "the fire shall test each one's work," and "they shall be saved, but so as by fire" or "through fire" (for the original is *dia puros*), it makes nothing against the conclusion I have drawn from the other words, which are plain. Nevertheless, because an argument has been taken from this passage to prove the fire of purgatory, I will also offer you here my conjecture concerning the meaning of this testing of doctrines, and saving of men as by fire. The apostle here seems to allude to the words of the prophet Zechariah, who, speaking of the restoration of the Kingdom of God, says this (Zechariah 13:8–9): "Two parts in it shall be cut off and die, but the third shall be left in it. And I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined, and will test them as gold is tested; they shall call on the name of the Lord, and I will hear them." The Day of Judgment is the

day of the restoration of the Kingdom of God; and it is on that day that St. Peter tells us there will be the conflagration of the world, in which the wicked shall perish; but the remnant whom God will save shall pass through that fire unhurt, and be tested in it and refined from their idolatry (as silver and gold are refined from their dross by the fire), and be made to call on the name of the true God. Alluding to this, St.[110] Paul here says that "the Day" (that is, the Day of Judgment, the great day of our Savior's coming to restore the Kingdom of God in Israel) shall test every man's doctrine, by judging which are gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble. And then those who have built false consequences on the true foundation shall see their doctrines condemned; nevertheless they themselves shall be saved, and pass unhurt through this universal fire, and live eternally, to call on the name of the true and only God. In this sense there is nothing that does not agree with the rest of Holy Scripture, nor any glimpse of the fire of purgatory.

43.18 But someone may ask here whether it is not as necessary to salvation to believe that God is omnipotent and the creator of the world, that Jesus Christ is risen, and that all other men will rise again from the dead at the last day, as it is to believe that "Jesus is the Christ." I answer that it is; and so are many more articles. But they are such as are contained in this one, and may be deduced from it with more or less difficulty. For who does not see that those who believe Jesus to be the Son of the God of Israel, and that the Israelites had for their God the omnipotent creator of all things, thereby also believe that God is the omnipotent creator of all things? Or how can a man believe that Jesus is the King who will reign eternally unless he also believes him risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot exercise the office of a king. In sum, whoever holds this foundation, "Jesus is the Christ," holds expressly everything he sees rightly deduced from it, and implicitly everything that follows from it, even if he lacks the skill to discern the consequence. And therefore it still holds good that belief in this one article is sufficient faith to

110 2 Peter 3:7–13.

obtain remission of sins for the *penitent*, and consequently to bring them into the Kingdom of Heaven.

FAITH AND OBEDIENCE TOGETHER

Repentance and belief that Jesus is the Christ suffice, so obeying a Christian or unbelieving sovereign never endangers salvation.

43.19 Now that I have shown that all the obedience required to salvation consists in the will to obey the law of God, that is, in repentance, and that all the faith required to it is comprehended in the belief of this article, "Jesus is the Christ," I will further cite those places of the Gospel which prove that everything necessary to salvation is contained in these two joined together. The men to whom St. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost, just after our Savior's Ascension, asked him and the rest of the apostles, "Brothers, what shall we do?" (Acts 2:37). To them St. Peter answered (in the next verse), "Repent, and be baptized every one of you for the remission of sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit." Therefore repentance and baptism—that is, believing that "Jesus is the Christ"—is all that is necessary to salvation. Again, when our Savior was asked by a certain ruler, "What shall I do to inherit eternal life?" (Luke 18:18), he answered (Luke 18:20), "You know the commandments: Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Honor your father and your mother." When the ruler said he had kept them, our Savior added, "Sell all you have, give it to the poor, and come and follow me." This was as much as to say, "Rely on me, who am the King." Therefore to fulfill the law, and to believe that Jesus is the King, is all that is required to bring a man to eternal life. Thirdly, St. Paul says (Romans 1:17), "The just shall live by faith"—not everyone, but the *just*. Therefore *faith* and *justice* (that is, the *will to be just*, or *repentance*) are all that is necessary to eternal life. And our Savior preached, saying, "The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand: repent, and believe the gospel" (Mark 1:15)—that is, the good news that the

Christ had come. Therefore to repent, and to believe that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is required to salvation.

43.20 Since, then, it is necessary that faith and obedience (implied in the word repentance) both concur in our salvation, the question of which of the two we are justified by is pointlessly disputed. Nevertheless it will not be pointless to make plain in what way each of them contributes to it, and in what sense it is said that we are justified by the one and by the other. First, if by righteousness is understood the justice of the works themselves, no man can be saved; for there is no one who has not transgressed the law of God. And therefore when we are said to be justified by works, it is to be understood of the will, which God always accepts for the work itself, in good men as well as in evil. It is in this sense only that a man is called *just* or *unjust*, and that his justice justifies him—that is, gives him the title of *just* in God's acceptance, and makes him capable of *living by his faith*, which before he was not. So justice justifies in the sense in which to *justify* is the same as to *call a man just*, and not in the sense of fully satisfying the law, whereby punishment of his sins would be unjust.

43.21 But a man is also said to be justified when his plea, though insufficient in itself, is accepted: as when we plead our will, our effort to fulfill the law, and our repentance for our failings, and God accepts this for the performance itself. And because God accepts the will for the deed only in the faithful, it is faith that makes good our plea; and in this sense faith alone justifies. So *faith* and *obedience* are both necessary to salvation, yet each of them is said to justify in a different sense.

43.22 Having thus shown what is necessary to salvation, it is not hard to reconcile our obedience to God with our obedience to the civil sovereign, who is either Christian or an unbeliever. If he is a Christian, he allows belief in this article, "Jesus is the Christ," and in all the articles contained in it or deduced from it by evident consequence—which is all the faith necessary to salvation. And because he is a sovereign, he requires obedience to all his own laws, that is, to all the civil laws, in which all the laws

of nature, that is, all the laws of God, are also contained. For besides the laws of nature and the laws of the Church, which are part of the civil law (for the church that can make laws is the commonwealth), there are no other divine laws. Whoever obeys his Christian sovereign, therefore, is not thereby hindered either from believing or from obeying God. But suppose a Christian king should draw some false consequences from this foundation, "Jesus is the Christ"—that is, build on it some superstructures of hay or stubble—and command that they be taught. Yet since St. Paul says that he shall be saved, much more shall the one be saved who teaches them at his command, and still more the one who does not teach but only believes his lawful teacher. And if a subject is forbidden by the civil sovereign to profess some of those opinions of his, on what just ground can he disobey? Christian kings may err in deducing a consequence; but who shall judge? Shall a private man judge, when the question concerns his own obedience? Or shall anyone judge but the one appointed to it by the Church, that is, by the civil sovereign who represents it? Or if the Pope or an apostle judges, may he not err in deducing a consequence? Did not one of the two, St. Peter or St. Paul, err in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his face? There can therefore be no contradiction between the laws of God and the laws of a Christian commonwealth.[111]

43.23 And when the civil sovereign is an unbeliever, every one of his own subjects who resists him sins against the laws of God (for such are the laws of nature), and rejects the counsel of the apostles, which admonishes all Christians to obey their princes, and all children and servants to obey their parents and masters in all things. As for their *faith*, it is internal and invisible. They have the license that Naaman had, and need not put themselves in danger for it. But if they do, they ought to expect their reward in heaven, and not complain of their lawful sovereign, much less make war on him.[112] For anyone who is not glad of any just

111 Galatians 2:11.
112 Romans 13:1; Titus 3:1; Colossians 3:20, 22.

occasion of martyrdom does not have the faith he professes, but only pretends to it, to give some color to his own defiance. But what unbelieving king is so unreasonable that, knowing he has a subject who waits for the second coming of Christ after the present world has been burned, and intends then to obey him (which is what believing that Jesus is the Christ means), and who in the meantime thinks himself bound to obey the laws of that unbelieving king (as all Christians are obliged in conscience to do)—would put such a subject to death, or persecute him?

43.24 And this much will suffice concerning the Kingdom of God and ecclesiastical policy. In it I claim to advance no position of my own, but only to show what consequences seem to me deducible from the principles of Christian politics (which are the Holy Scriptures), in confirmation of the power of civil sovereigns and the duty of their subjects. In citing Scripture I have tried to avoid texts of obscure or disputed interpretation, and to cite none except in the sense that is most plain and agreeable to the harmony and purpose of the whole Bible, which was written for the re-establishment of the Kingdom of God in Christ. For it is not the bare words but the purpose of the writer that gives the true light by which any writing is to be interpreted. Those who insist on single texts without considering the main design can derive nothing clearly from them; rather, by throwing atoms of Scripture like dust before men's eyes, they make everything more obscure than it is—an ordinary trick of those who seek not the truth but their own advantage.

Part IV: Of the Kingdom of Darkness

Errors of misread Scripture, demonology, vain philosophy and fabulous traditions, who profits from them, and a review and conclusion.

CHAPTER 44: OF SPIRITUAL DARKNESS FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

Hobbes defines the kingdom of darkness as a confederacy of deceivers and names its four sources.

44.1 Besides these sovereign powers, *divine* and *human*, which I have discussed so far, Scripture mentions another power: that of "the rulers of the darkness of this world," "the kingdom of Satan," and "the principality of Beelzebub over demons"—that is, over phantasms that appear in the air. For this reason Satan is also called "the prince of the power of the air," and (because he rules in the darkness of this world) "the prince of this world." Accordingly, those under his dominion, as opposed to the faithful (who are "the children of light"), are called "the children of darkness." For since Beelzebub is prince of phantasms, the inhabitants of his dominion of air and darkness, the children of darkness and these demons, phantasms, or spirits of illusion signify allegorically the same thing.[1] This considered, the kingdom of darkness, as it is set forth in these and other places of Scripture, is nothing else but *a confederacy of deceivers who, to obtain dominion over men in this present world, try by dark and erro-*

1 Ephesians 6:12; Matthew 12:26–27; Matthew 9:34; Ephesians 2:2; John 12:31; 1 Thessalonians 5:5.

neous doctrines to extinguish in them the light both of nature and of the Gospel, and so to unfit them for the Kingdom of God to come.

44.2 Men who have been wholly deprived from birth of the light of the bodily eye have no idea at all of any such light; and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light than he has at some time perceived by his outward senses. So it is also with the light of the Gospel and the light of the understanding: no man can conceive that there is any greater degree of it than what he has already attained. And so it happens that men have no other means of recognizing their own darkness except by reasoning from the unforeseen mishaps that befall them along their way. The darkest part of the kingdom of Satan is what lies outside the Church of God, that is, among those who do not believe in Jesus Christ. But we cannot therefore say that the Church enjoys (like the land of Goshen) all the light necessary for performing the work God has enjoined on us. Otherwise, where does it come from that in Christendom there has been, almost from the time of the apostles, such jostling of one another out of their places, by both foreign and civil war?[2] Such stumbling at every little roughness in their own fortune, and at every little eminence in that of other men? And such diversity of ways in running to the same goal, *felicity*—if it is not night among us, or at least a mist? We are therefore still in the dark.

44.3 The enemy has been here in the night of our natural ignorance, and sown the tares of spiritual errors. He has done this, first, by abusing and putting out the light of the Scriptures: for we err, not knowing the Scriptures. Secondly, by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets, that is, their fabulous doctrine concerning demons, which are only idols or phantasms of the brain, with no real nature of their own distinct from human fancy—such as dead men's ghosts, and fairies, and other matter of old wives' tales. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture various relics of the religion, and much of the vain and erroneous philo-

2 In the plague of darkness on Egypt, "all the children of Israel had light in their dwellings" in Goshen (Exodus 10:23).

sophy, of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle.[3] Fourthly, by mingling with both of these false or uncertain traditions, and invented or uncertain history. And so we come to err, "giving heed to seducing spirits," and to the demonology of those "who speak lies in hypocrisy" (or, as it is in the original, "of those who play the part of liars") "with a seared conscience," that is, contrary to their own knowledge (1 Timothy 4:1–2). Concerning the first of these, the seducing of men by abuse of Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this chapter.

MISTAKING THE CHURCH FOR THE KINGDOM OF GOD

The claim that the present Church is God's kingdom supports papal power, clergy, tithes and canon law.

44.4 The greatest and chief abuse of Scripture, to which almost all the rest are either consequent or subservient, is the twisting of it to prove that the Kingdom of God, mentioned so often in Scripture, is the present Church, or the multitude of Christians now living, or who, being dead, are to rise again at the last day. Yet the Kingdom of God was first instituted by the ministry of Moses, over the Jews only, who were therefore called his peculiar people; and it ceased afterward, at the election of Saul, when they refused to be governed by God any more and demanded a king after the manner of the nations—to which God himself consented, as I have proved more at length before, in Chapter 35.[4] After that time there was no other Kingdom of God in the world, by any pact or otherwise, than that he ever was, is, and shall be King of all men and all creatures, as governing according to his will by his infinite power. Nevertheless, he promised by his prophets to restore this government of his to them again, when the time he has appointed for it in his secret counsel is fully come, and when they turn to him by repentance and amendment of life. And not only that: he also invited the Gentiles to

3 The parable of the tares sown by the enemy at night (Matthew 13:24–30); "You err, not knowing the Scriptures" (Matthew 22:29).
4 1 Samuel 8:5–7.

come in and enjoy the happiness of his reign, on the same conditions of conversion and repentance; and he promised also to send his Son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by his doctrine to receive him at his second coming. Since that second coming has not yet happened, the Kingdom of God has not yet come, and we are not now under any other kings by pact but our civil sovereigns—except only that Christians are already in the kingdom of grace, inasmuch as they already have the promise of being received at his coming again.

44.5 Following from this error, that the present Church is Christ's kingdom, there would have to be some one man or assembly through whose mouth our Savior (now in heaven) speaks and gives law, and which represents his person to all Christians—or various men or various assemblies that do the same for various parts of Christendom. This regal power under Christ is claimed universally by the Pope, and in particular commonwealths by assemblies of the local pastors (whereas Scripture gives it to none but civil sovereigns). It has come to be so passionately disputed that it puts out the light of nature, and causes so great a darkness in men's understanding that they do not see to whom they have pledged their obedience.

44.6 Following from this claim of the Pope to be Vicar General of Christ in the present Church (which is supposed to be that kingdom of his to which we are directed in the Gospel) is the doctrine that a Christian king must receive his crown from a bishop—as if it were from that ceremony that he derives the clause *Dei gratia* ("by the grace of God") in his title, and as if he were made king by the favor of God only when crowned by the authority of God's universal vicegerent on earth. So too the doctrine that every bishop, whoever his sovereign may be, takes at his consecration an oath of absolute obedience to the Pope. Following from the same is the doctrine of the Fourth Lateran Council, held under Pope Innocent III (chapter 3, *De haereticis*): *that if a king, at the Pope's admonition, does not purge his kingdom of heresies, and, being excommunicated for this, does not give satisfac-*

tion within a year, his subjects are absolved from the bond of their obedience. Here by heresies are understood all opinions which the Church of Rome has forbidden to be maintained. And by this means, whenever there is any conflict between the political designs of the Pope and those of other Christian princes—as there very often is—such a mist arises among their subjects that they cannot tell a stranger who thrusts himself into the throne of their lawful prince from the one they had themselves placed there. In this darkness of mind they are made to fight one another, without distinguishing their enemies from their friends, under the leadership of another man's ambition.

44.7 From the same opinion, that the present Church is the Kingdom of God, it follows that pastors, deacons, and all other ministers of the Church take to themselves the name of *clergy*, giving other Christians the name of *laity*, that is, simply *people*. For clergy signifies those whose maintenance is that revenue which God, having reserved it to himself during his reign over the Israelites, assigned as an inheritance to the tribe of Levi (who were to be his public ministers, and had no portion of land set out for them to live on, as their brethren had).[5] The Pope, therefore (pretending that the present Church is, like the realm of Israel, the Kingdom of God), claiming for himself and his subordinate ministers the like revenue as the inheritance of God, found the name of clergy suitable to that claim. Hence it is that tithes and other tributes paid to the Levites as God's right among the Israelites have long been demanded and taken from Christians by churchmen *jure divino*, that is, by divine right. By this means the people everywhere were bound to a double tribute, one to the state and another to the clergy. The one to the clergy, being a tenth of their revenue, is double what a king of Athens (and one counted a tyrant) exacted of his subjects to defray all public charges; for he demanded no more than the twentieth part, and yet amply maintained the commonwealth with it. And

5 From Greek *klēros*, a lot or inheritance: "the Lord is his inheritance" (Deuteronomy 10:9; 18:2).

in the kingdom of the Jews, during the priestly reign of God, the tithes and offerings were the whole public revenue.[6]

44.8 From the same mistaking of the present Church for the Kingdom of God came the distinction between the *civil* and the *canon* laws: the civil law being the acts of *sovereigns* in their own dominions, and the canon law the acts of the *Pope* in those same dominions. These canons were at first only canons, that is, *rules proposed*, and were only voluntarily received by Christian princes until the transfer of the Empire to Charlemagne. But afterward, as the power of the Pope increased, they became *rules commanded*, and the emperors themselves (to avoid greater mischiefs into which the blinded people might be led) were forced to let them pass for laws.

44.9 Hence it is that in all dominions where the Pope's ecclesiastical power is fully received, Jews, Muslims, and pagans are tolerated in their religion by the Roman Church, so far as they do not offend against the civil power in the practice and profession of it; whereas for a Christian, even a foreigner, not to be of the Roman religion is a capital crime, because the Pope claims that all Christians are his subjects. For otherwise it would be as much against the law of nations to persecute a Christian foreigner for professing the religion of his own country as to persecute an unbeliever—or rather more so, inasmuch as those who are not against Christ are with him.[7]

44.10 From the same it comes that in every Christian state there are certain men who are exempt, by ecclesiastical liberty, from the taxes and from the courts of the civil state. Such are the secular clergy, besides the monks and friars, who in many places are so large a proportion of the common people that, if need were, an army could be raised out of them alone, sufficient for any war the Church militant might employ them in, against their own or other princes.

6 The Pisistratids, who ruled Athens in the sixth century BC, taxed the Athenians only a twentieth of their produce (Thucydides 6.54).

7 "He that is not against us is for us" (Mark 9:40; Luke 9:50).

CONSECRATION TURNED INTO CONJURATION

The Mass and baptism are said to use charms and exorcisms instead of true consecration.

44.11 A second general abuse of Scripture is the turning of consecration into conjuration, or enchantment. To *consecrate*, in Scripture, is to offer, give, or dedicate a man or any other thing to God, in pious and decent language and gesture, by separating it from common use—that is, to sanctify it, or make it God's, to be used only by those whom God has appointed to be his public ministers (as I have already proved at length in Chapter 35). It thereby changes not the thing consecrated, but only its use, from being profane and common to being holy and set apart for God's service. But when by such words the nature or quality of the thing itself is claimed to be changed, it is not consecration, but either an extraordinary work of God or a vain and impious conjuration. And since (given how often a change of nature is claimed in their consecrations) it cannot be regarded as an extraordinary work, it is nothing other than a *conjuration* or *incantation*, by which they would have men believe in an alteration of nature that does not exist, contrary to the testimony of their sight and of all the rest of their senses. For example, when the priest, instead of consecrating bread and wine to God's special service in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper (which is only a separation of it from common use, to signify—that is, to remind men of—their redemption by the Passion of Christ, whose body was broken and blood shed upon the cross for our transgressions), claims that by saying our Savior's words, "This is my body" and "This is my blood," the nature of bread is no longer there, but his very body—even though nothing appears to the sight or other senses of the receiver that did not appear before the consecration. The Egyptian conjurers who are said to have turned their rods into serpents and the water into blood are thought only to have deluded the senses of the spectators by a false show of things, yet they are regarded as enchanters. But

what should we have thought of them if nothing like a serpent had appeared in their rods, and nothing like blood, nor like anything but water, in the enchanted water, and they had nonetheless insisted to the king's face that these were serpents that looked like rods, and blood that seemed to be water? That would have been both enchantment and lying.[8] And yet in this daily act of the priest they do the very same thing: they turn the holy words into a kind of charm, which produces nothing new to the senses; yet they insist to our faces that it has turned the bread into a man—no, more, into a God—and require men to worship it as if it were our Savior himself present, God and man, and thereby to commit most gross idolatry. For if it is enough to excuse it from idolatry to say that it is no longer bread but God, why should the same excuse not serve the Egyptians, if they had had the face to say that the leeks and onions they worshipped were not really leeks and onions, but a divinity under their *species*, or likeness? The words "This is my body" are equivalent to "This signifies, or represents, my body," and it is an ordinary figure of speech. To take it literally is an abuse; and even taken so, it cannot extend any further than to the bread which Christ himself consecrated with his own hands.[9] For he never said that whatever bread any priest whatever should say "This is my body," or "This is Christ's body" over, would at once be transubstantiated. Nor did the Church of Rome establish this transubstantiation until the time of Innocent III, which was not more than five hundred years ago, when the power of the popes was at its height, and the darkness of the time had grown so great that men did not discern the bread that was given them to eat—especially when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the cross, as if they would have men believe it was transubstantiated not only into the body of Christ but also into the wood of his cross, and that they ate both together in the sacrament.

44.12 The like incantation, instead of consecration, is used also in the sacrament of baptism. There the abuse of God's name in

8 Exodus 7:11–12, 22.

each separate Person and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the cross at each name, makes up the charm. First, when they make the holy water, the priest says, "I conjure you, creature of water, in the name of God the Father Almighty, and in the name of Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, and in the power of the Holy Spirit, that you become conjured water, to drive away all the powers of the enemy, and to root out and supplant the enemy," and so on. And the same in the blessing of the salt to be mixed with it: "That you become conjured salt, that all phantasms and knavery of the devil's fraud may fly and depart from the place where you are sprinkled, and every unclean spirit be conjured by him who shall come to judge the living and the dead." The same in the blessing of the oil: "That all the power of the enemy, all the host of the devil, all assaults and phantasms of Satan, may be driven away by this creature of oil." And the infant who is to be baptized is subjected to many charms. First, at the church door the priest blows three times in the child's face and says, "Go out of him, unclean spirit, and give place to the Holy Spirit the Comforter"—as if all children, until blown on by the priest, were possessed by demons. Again, before the child enters the church, he says as before, "I conjure you, etc., to go out and depart from this servant of God." And the same exorcism is repeated once more before the child is baptized. These and some other incantations are what are used instead of blessings and consecrations in administering the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper; and in them everything that serves those holy uses (except the unhallowed spittle of the priest) has some set form of exorcism.

44.13 Nor are the other rites—of marriage, of extreme unction, of visitation of the sick, of consecrating churches and churchyards, and the like—free of charms, inasmuch as they use enchanted oil and water, with the abuse of the cross and of the holy words of David, *Asperges me, Domine, hyssopo* ("Sprinkle me,

9 The Roman satirist Juvenal mocks the Egyptians for holding leeks and onions sacred (Satires 15.9–11).

Lord, with hyssop"), as things effective to drive away phantasms and imaginary spirits.[10]

ETERNAL LIFE AND EVERLASTING DEATH

Belief in a naturally immortal soul opens the way to eternal torment, purgatory and ghosts.

44.14 Another general error comes from the misinterpretation of the words *eternal life*, *everlasting death*, and *the second death*. We read plainly in Holy Scripture that God created Adam in a state of living forever, which was conditional—that is, if he did not disobey his commandment—and was not essential to human nature but a consequence of the virtue of the Tree of Life, of which he was free to eat as long as he had not sinned; that he was thrust out of Paradise after he had sinned, lest he should eat of it and live forever; and that Christ's Passion is a discharge from sin for all who believe in him;[11] and consequently a restoration of eternal life to all the faithful, and to them only. Yet the doctrine now is, and has long been, quite otherwise: namely, that every man has eternity of life by nature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal. So the flaming sword at the entrance of Paradise, though it keeps a man from coming to the Tree of Life, does not keep him from the immortality which God took from him for his sin, nor makes him need the sacrifice of Christ to recover it. Consequently not only the faithful and righteous, but also the wicked and the heathen, shall enjoy eternal life without any death at all—much less a second and everlasting death. To remedy this, it is said that by *second* and *everlasting death* is meant a second and everlasting life, but in torments—a figure of speech never used except in this very case.

44.15 All this doctrine is founded only on some of the more obscure places of the New Testament; which nevertheless, considering the whole purpose of Scripture, are clear enough in a different sense, and are unnecessary to the Christian faith. For

10 Psalm 51:7 (50:9 in the Vulgate).
11 Genesis 2:9, 16–17; 3:22–24.

suppose that when a man dies nothing remains of him but his carcass: cannot God, who by his word raised lifeless dust and clay into a living creature, just as easily raise a dead carcass to life again and keep him alive forever, or make him die again, by another word? The *soul* in Scripture always signifies either the life or the living creature; and the body and soul jointly, the *living body*. On the fifth day of the Creation, God said, Let the waters bring forth *reptile animae viventis*, the creeping thing that has in it a living soul; the English translates it "that has life." And again, God created whales, *et omnem animam viventem*, which in the English is "every living creature." And likewise of man: God made him of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, *et factus est homo in animam viventem*, that is, "and man became a living creature." And after Noah came out of the ark, God says he will no more smite *omnem animam viventem*, that is, "every living creature." And Deuteronomy 12:23: "Do not eat the blood, for the blood is the soul," that is, "the life." From these places, if by *soul* were meant an *incorporeal substance* with an existence separate from the body, the same might as well be inferred of any other living creature as of man. But that the souls of the faithful remain in their bodies from the Resurrection to all eternity, not by their own nature but by God's special grace, I have already, I think, sufficiently proved from the Scriptures in Chapter 38. And as for the places in the New Testament where it is said that someone shall be cast body and soul into hellfire, this means no more than body and life—that is, they shall be cast alive into the perpetual fire of Gehenna.

44.16 This is the window that lets in the dark doctrine, first, of eternal torments; and afterward of purgatory, and consequently of the walking abroad of the ghosts of the dead, especially in places that are consecrated, solitary, or dark; and so to the pretenses of exorcism and conjuring of phantasms; as also to the invocation of the dead; and to the doctrine of indulgences, that is, of exemption for a time or forever from the fire of purgatory, in which these incorporeal substances are claimed to be cleansed by burning and made fit for heaven. For before the

time of our Savior, men were generally possessed, by contagion from the demonology of the Greeks, with the opinion that the souls of men were substances distinct from their bodies; and therefore that when the body was dead, the soul of every man, godly or wicked, must subsist somewhere by virtue of its own nature, without acknowledging in this any supernatural gift of God. So the Doctors of the Church doubted for a long time what place the souls were to stay in until they should be reunited with their bodies at the Resurrection. For a while they supposed they lay under the altars; but afterward the Church of Rome found it more profitable to build for them this place of purgatory—which in this later age has been demolished by some other churches.[12]

ANSWERING THE TEXTS FOR A PRESENT KINGDOM

Texts cited for a Kingdom of God already on earth, and for exorcised consecrations, are examined.

44.17 Let us now consider which texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these three general errors I have touched on here. As for those which Cardinal Bellarmine has cited for the present Kingdom of God administered by the Pope (and none make a better show of proof), I have already answered them, and made it evident that the Kingdom of God instituted by Moses ended with the election of Saul; after which time the priest never deposed any king by his own authority. What the high priest did to Athaliah was not done in his own right, but in the right of the young king Joash, her son. But Solomon in his own right deposed the high priest Abiathar and set up another in his place. The most difficult place to answer, of all those that can be brought to prove that the Kingdom of God by Christ is already in this world, is cited not by Bellarmine, nor by any other of the Church of Rome, but by Beza, who will have it begin from the

12 Revelation 6:9: "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God."

Resurrection of Christ.[13] But whether he means by this to entitle the presbytery to the supreme ecclesiastical power in the commonwealth of Geneva (and consequently every presbytery in every other commonwealth), or princes and other civil sovereigns, I do not know. For the presbytery has claimed the power to excommunicate their own kings, and to be the supreme moderators in religion wherever they have that form of church government, no less than the Pope claims it universally.

44.18 The words are, "Truly I say to you, there are some of those standing here who shall not taste death until they have seen the Kingdom of God come with power" (Mark 9:1). These words, if taken grammatically, make it certain either that some of the men who stood by Christ at that time are still alive, or else that the Kingdom of God must now be in this present world. And then there is another place, more difficult. For when the apostles, after our Savior's Resurrection and immediately before his Ascension, asked our Savior, "Will you at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" (Acts 1:6), he answered them, "It is not for you to know the times and the seasons, which the Father has put in his own power. But you shall receive power when the Holy Spirit comes upon you, and you shall be my witnesses (martyrs) both in Jerusalem and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and to the uttermost part of the earth." This is as much as to say, "My kingdom has not yet come, nor shall you know beforehand when it will come; for it shall come like a thief in the night. But I will send you the Holy Spirit, and by him you shall have power to bear witness to all the world (by your preaching) of my Resurrection, and the works I have done, and the doctrine I have taught, so that they may believe in me and expect eternal life at my coming again." How does this agree with the coming of Christ's kingdom at the Resurrection? And St. Paul says, "They turned from idols to serve the living and true God, and to wait

13 Athaliah was overthrown by the priest Jehoiada (2 Kings 11); Hobbes calls Joash her son, though he was her grandson. Abiathar: 1 Kings 2:26–27, 35. Theodore Beza (1519–1605), Calvin's successor at Geneva, whose annotated Greek New Testament was widely used by Protestant scholars.

for his Son from heaven" (1 Thessalonians 1:9–10). To wait for his Son from heaven is to wait for his coming to be King in power, which would not have been necessary if his kingdom had then been present. Again, if the Kingdom of God began at the Resurrection (as Beza would have it in his comment on that place, Mark 9:1), what reason is there for Christians ever since the Resurrection to say in their prayers, "Thy kingdom come"? It is therefore evident that the words of St. Mark are not to be interpreted so. "There are some of those standing here," says our Savior, "who shall not taste death until they have seen the Kingdom of God come in power." If, then, this kingdom was to come at the Resurrection of Christ, why is it said *some of them* rather than *all*? For they all lived until after Christ was risen.

44.19 But let those who require an exact interpretation of this text first interpret the similar words of our Savior to St. Peter concerning St. John: "If I will that he remain until I come, what is that to you?" (John 21:22). On these words was grounded a report that he would not die. Yet the truth of that report was neither confirmed as well grounded nor refuted as ill grounded on those words, but left as a saying not understood. The same difficulty is also in the place in St. Mark. And if it is lawful to guess at their meaning from what immediately follows, both here and in St. Luke, where the same is repeated, it is not improbable to say that they refer to the Transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following, where it is said that "after six days Jesus takes with him Peter, and James, and John" (not all, but some of his disciples) "and leads them up into a high mountain apart by themselves, and he was transfigured before them. And his clothing became shining, exceedingly white as snow, such as no fuller on earth can whiten them. And there appeared to them Elijah with Moses, and they were talking with Jesus," etc. (Mark 9:2–4). So they saw Christ in glory and majesty, as he is to come—so that "they were very much afraid." And thus our Savior's promise was fulfilled by way of *vision*. For that it was a vision may probably be inferred from St. Luke, who recounts the same story and says that Peter and those

with him were heavy with sleep (Luke 9:28, 32); but most certainly from Matthew 17:9, where the same is related again; for our Savior charged them, saying, "Tell no one the vision until the Son of Man is risen from the dead." However it may be, no argument can be drawn from it to prove that the Kingdom of God begins before the Day of Judgment.

44.20 As for some other texts used to prove the Pope's power over civil sovereigns (besides those of Bellarmine): for instance, that the two swords which Christ and his apostles had among them were the spiritual and the temporal sword, which they say St.[14] Peter was given by Christ; and that of the two great lights, the greater signifies the Pope and the lesser the king. One might as well infer from the first verse of the Bible that by heaven is meant the Pope and by earth the king. This is not arguing from Scripture, but a wanton insulting of princes, which came into fashion after the popes had grown so secure in their greatness as to despise all Christian kings—treading on the necks of emperors, and mocking both them and the Scripture in the words of the ninety-first Psalm: "You shall tread upon the lion and the adder; the young lion and the dragon you shall trample under your feet."[15]

44.21 As for the rites of consecration, though they depend for the most part on the discretion and judgment of the governors of the Church, and not on the Scriptures, those governors are still bound to such direction as the nature of the action itself requires: that the ceremonies, words, and gestures be both decent and meaningful, or at least suited to the action. When Moses consecrated the tabernacle, the altar, and the vessels belonging to them (Exodus 40), he anointed them with the oil which God had commanded to be made for that purpose, and they were holy. Nothing was exorcised to drive away phantasms. The same Moses (the civil sovereign of Israel), when he consec-

14 "Lord, behold, here are two swords" (Luke 22:38)—the basis of the medieval "two swords" doctrine, stated in Boniface VIII's bull *Unam sanctam* (1302).

15 The two lights: Genesis 1:16, applied to pope and emperor by Innocent III. The verse is Psalm 91:13; Pope Alexander III is said to have recited it while setting his foot on the neck of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa at Venice in 1177.

rated Aaron (the high priest) and his sons, washed them with water (not exorcised water), put their garments on them, and anointed them with oil; and they were sanctified to minister to the Lord in the priest's office. This was a simple and decent cleansing and adorning of them before he presented them to God to be his servants. When King Solomon (the civil sovereign of Israel) consecrated the Temple he had built,[16] he stood before all the congregation of Israel (1 Kings 8); and having blessed them, he gave thanks to God for putting it into his father's heart to build it, and for giving himself the grace to accomplish it. Then he prayed to him, first, to accept that house, though it was not suited to his infinite greatness, and to hear the prayers of his servants who should pray in it, or (if they were absent) toward it. And lastly he offered a sacrifice of peace offerings, and the house was dedicated.[17] Here there was no procession—the king stood still in his first place; no exorcised water; no *Asperges me*, nor any other irrelevant application of words spoken on another occasion; but a decent and rational speech, and such as was most suited to the occasion of making God a present of his newly built house.

44.22 We do not read that St. John exorcised the water of the Jordan, nor Philip the water of the river in which he baptized the eunuch, nor that any pastor in the time of the apostles took his spittle, put it to the nose of the person to be baptized, and said *In odorem suavitatis*, that is, "for a sweet savor to the Lord." In this, neither the ceremony of spittle, for its uncleanness, nor the application of that Scripture, for its levity, can be justified by any human authority.[18]

16 Leviticus 8:6–12; Exodus 29:4–9.
17 Hobbes cites "2 Kings 8"; the passage is 1 Kings 8.
18 Philip and the Ethiopian eunuch: Acts 8:36–38.

TEXTS FOR THE SOUL'S NATURAL IMMORTALITY

Passages seeming to prove that souls, including the wicked's, live forever are read otherwise.

44.23 To prove that the soul separated from the body lives eternally—not only the souls of the elect, by special grace and by the restoration of the eternal life which Adam lost by sin and our Savior restored to the faithful by the sacrifice of himself, but also the souls of the reprobate, as a property naturally consequent on the essence of mankind, without any other grace of God than what is given universally to all mankind—there are various places which at first sight seem to serve the purpose well enough. But when I compare them with what I cited earlier (Chapter 38) from the fourteenth chapter of Job, they seem to me much more open to a different interpretation than the words of Job.[19]

44.24 First, there are the words of Solomon, "Then shall the dust return to the dust as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it" (Ecclesiastes 12:7). This may well enough bear (if there is no other text directly against it) this interpretation: that God only knows, and man does not, what becomes of a man's spirit when he dies. And the same Solomon, in the same book, delivers the same judgment in the sense I have given it (Ecclesiastes 3:20–21). His words are, "All go" (man and beast) "to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knows that the spirit of man goes upward, and that the spirit of the beast goes downward to the earth?" That is, no one knows but God. Nor is it an unusual phrase to say of things we do not understand, "God knows what," and "God knows where." The text in Genesis 5:24, "Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took him," is expounded in Hebrews 11:5: "He was taken up, so that he should not die, and was not found, because God

19 Job 14:7–14: "So man lieth down, and riseth not: till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake."

had taken him up.[20] For before he was taken up, he had this testimony, that he pleased God." This, making as much for the immortality of the body as of the soul, proves that this taking up was peculiar to those who please God, not common to them with the wicked, and depended on grace, not on nature. But on the other hand, what interpretation shall we give, other than the literal sense, of the words of Solomon, "That which befalls the sons of men befalls beasts; even one thing befalls them: as the one dies, so does the other; yes, they all have one breath" (one spirit), "so that a man has no preeminence above a beast; for all is vanity" (Ecclesiastes 3:19)? In the literal sense, there is here no natural immortality of the soul—nor yet any conflict with the eternal life which the elect shall enjoy by grace. And (Ecclesiastes 4:3): "Better is he who has not yet been than both of them," that is, than those who live or have lived. If the souls of all who have lived were immortal, this would be a hard saying; for then to have an immortal soul would be worse than to have no soul at all. And again (Ecclesiastes 9:5), "The living know that they shall die, but the dead know nothing"—that is, naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.

44.25 Another place which seems to support a natural immortality of the soul is where our Savior says that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living. But this is spoken of the promise of God and of their certainty of rising again, not of a life then actual. It is in the same sense that God said to Adam that on the day he ate of the forbidden fruit he would certainly die: from that time on he was a dead man by sentence, but not by execution until almost a thousand years later. So Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were alive by promise when Christ spoke, but will not be actually alive until the Resurrection.[21] And the story of Dives and Lazarus makes nothing against this, if we take it (as it is) for a parable.[22]

44.26 But there are other places in the New Testament where immortality seems to be attributed directly to the wicked. For it

20 Hobbes cites "Heb. 13. 5"; the verse is Hebrews 11:5.

21 Matthew 22:32; Luke 20:37–38. Adam lived 930 years (Genesis 5:5).

is evident that they will all rise to judgment. And it is said besides, in many places, that they will go into "everlasting fire," "everlasting torments," "everlasting punishments," and that "the worm of conscience never dies." All this is comprehended in the phrase "everlasting death," which is ordinarily interpreted as "everlasting life in torments." And yet I can find nowhere that any man will live in torments everlastingly. Also, it seems hard to say that God—who is the Father of mercies; who does in heaven and earth all that he will; who has the hearts of all men at his disposal; who works in men both to do and to will; and without whose free gift a man has neither inclination to good nor repentance of evil—should punish men's transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture that men can imagine, and more. We must therefore consider what is meant by "everlasting fire" and other similar phrases of Scripture.

44.27 I have already shown that the Kingdom of God by Christ begins at the day of judgment, and that on that day the faithful will rise again with glorious and spiritual bodies and be his subjects in that kingdom of his, which will be eternal. They will neither marry nor be given in marriage, nor eat and drink as they did in their natural bodies, but will live forever in their individual persons, without the eternity of the species that comes by generation. The reprobate also will rise again, to receive punishment for their sins. And those of the elect who are alive in their earthly bodies on that day will have their bodies suddenly changed and made spiritual and immortal. But there is no passage of Scripture to prove that the bodies of the reprobate, who make up the kingdom of Satan, will also be glorious or spiritual bodies; or that they will be like the angels of God, neither eating, nor drinking, nor begetting; or that their life will be eternal in their individual persons, as the life of every faithful man is, or as the life of Adam would have been if he had not sinned—except only these passages concerning eternal torments, which may be interpreted otherwise.

22 Luke 16:19–31; "Dives" is Latin for "rich man."

44.28 From this it may be inferred that, as the elect after the resurrection will be restored to the state Adam was in before he sinned, so the reprobate will be in the state that Adam and his posterity were in after the sin was committed—except that God promised a Redeemer to Adam, and to those of his seed who would trust in him and repent, but not to those who would die in their sins, as the reprobate do.

44.29 These things considered, the texts that mention "eternal fire," "eternal torments," or "the worm that never dies" do not contradict the doctrine of a second and everlasting death, in the proper and natural sense of the word *death*. The fire or torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna, Tophet, or wherever it may be, may continue forever, and there may never be a lack of wicked men to be tormented in them—though not every one, nor any one, eternally. For the wicked, being left in the state they were in after Adam's sin, may at the resurrection live as they did before: marry and give in marriage, and have gross and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now have. Consequently they may beget children perpetually after the resurrection, as they did before; for there is no passage of Scripture to the contrary. For St. Paul, speaking of the resurrection (1 Corinthians 15), understands it only of the resurrection to eternal life, and not of the resurrection to punishment. And of the first he says that the body is "sown in corruption, raised in incorruption; sown in dishonor, raised in honor; sown in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body." No such thing can be said of the bodies of those who rise to punishment. So also our Savior, when he speaks of the nature of man after the resurrection, means the resurrection to eternal life, not to punishment. The text is Luke 20:34–36, a fertile text: "The children of this world marry and are given in marriage; but those who will be counted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage. Nor can they die any more; for they are equal to the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection." The children of this world, who are in the state Adam left them in,

will marry and be given in marriage; that is, they will decay and beget successors, which is an immortality of the species but not of the persons of men. They are not worthy to be counted among those who will obtain the next world and an absolute resurrection from the dead. They are given only a short time there, as lodgers in that world, and only so as to receive the punishment they deserve for their obstinacy. The elect are the only children of the resurrection; that is to say, the sole heirs of eternal life. They alone can die no more. It is they who are equal to the angels and who are the children of God, and not the reprobate. For the reprobate there remains, after the resurrection, a second and eternal death. Between that resurrection and their second and eternal death there is only a time of punishment and torment; and it will last, by a succession of sinners into it, as long as the human species endures by propagation—which is eternally.

BELLARMINE'S TEXTS FOR PURGATORY

Hobbes answers, one by one, the Scripture passages Bellarmine alleges for purgatory.

44.30 Upon this doctrine of the natural eternity of separated souls is founded (as I said) the doctrine of purgatory. For if we suppose eternal life by grace only, there is no life but the life of the body, and no immortality until the resurrection. The texts for purgatory that Bellarmine alleges out of the canonical Scripture of the Old Testament are, first, the fasting of David for Saul and Jonathan, mentioned in 2 Samuel 1:12; and again,[23] for the death of Abner (2 Samuel 3:35). This fasting of David, he says, was to obtain something for them at God's hands after their death; because after David had fasted to procure the recovery of his own child, as soon as he knew it was dead he called for food. Since, then, the soul has an existence separate from the body, and nothing can be obtained by men's fasting for souls that are

23 Hobbes cites "2 Kings," following the older numbering in which 1 and 2 Samuel were the first two books of Kings.

already either in heaven or in hell, it follows that there are some souls of dead men that are neither in heaven nor in hell. And therefore they must be in some third place, which must be purgatory. And so, with hard straining, he has wrested those passages into a proof of purgatory. Yet it is manifest that when the ceremonies of mourning and fasting are used for the death of men whose life was of no profit to the mourners, they are used to honor those persons; and when they are used for the death of those whose life benefited the mourners, they proceed from the mourners' own particular loss. And so David honored Saul and Abner with his fasting, and at the death of his own child comforted himself again by taking his ordinary food.

44.31 In the other passages he alleges from the Old Testament there is not so much as any show or color of proof. He brings in every text containing the word "anger," or "fire," or "burning," or "purging," or "cleansing," if any of the Fathers has merely applied it rhetorically in a sermon to the doctrine of purgatory, already believed. Take the first verse of Psalm 38: "O Lord, rebuke me not in your wrath, nor chasten me in your hot displeasure." What would this have to do with purgatory, if Augustine had not applied the "wrath" to the fire of hell and the "displeasure" to that of purgatory? And what has purgatory to do with that verse of Psalm 66,[24] "We went through fire and water, and you brought us out into a moist place" (Psalm 66:12), and other similar texts—with which the doctors of those times meant to adorn or extend their sermons or commentaries—dragged to their purposes by force of wit?

44.32 But he alleges other passages of the New Testament that are not so easy to answer. First, Matthew 12:32: "Whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man, it will be forgiven him; but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him, either in this world or in the world to come." Here he would have purgatory be the world to come, in which some sins may be forgiven that were not forgiven in this world—notwithstanding that it is manifest there are only three worlds: one from the

24 Hobbes gives the Latin (Vulgate) number, Psalm 37.

Creation to the Flood, which was destroyed by water and is called in Scripture "the old world"; another from the Flood to the day of judgment, which is "the present world" and will be destroyed by fire; and the third, which will last from the day of judgment forward, everlasting, and is called "the world to come," and in which, all agree, there will be no purgatory. And therefore the world to come and purgatory are inconsistent. What, then, can be the meaning of those words of our Savior? I confess they are very hard to reconcile with all the doctrines now unanimously received. Nor is it any shame to confess that the depth of the Scripture is too great to be sounded by the shortness of human understanding. Nevertheless, I may propose to the consideration of more learned divines such things as the text itself suggests. And first, since to speak against the Holy Spirit, as the third Person of the Trinity, is to speak against the Church, in which the Holy Spirit resides, it seems that the comparison is made between the leniency of our Savior in bearing with offenses done to him while he himself taught the world—that is, when he was on earth—and the severity of the pastors after him against those who would deny their authority, which was from the Holy Spirit. It is as if he said: You who deny my power—indeed, you who will crucify me—will be pardoned by me as often as you turn to me in repentance; but if you deny the power of those who will teach you hereafter by virtue of the Holy Spirit, they will be inexorable and will not forgive you, but will persecute you in this world and leave you without absolution (even though you turn to me, unless you turn also to them) to the punishments, as far as lies in them, of the world to come. And so the words may be taken as a prophecy or prediction concerning the times, as they have long been in the Christian Church. Or, if this is not the meaning (for I am not dogmatic in such difficult passages), perhaps there may be room left after the resurrection for the repentance of some sinners. And there is also another passage that seems to agree with this. For consider the words of St. Paul (1 Corinthians 15:29): "What shall they do who are baptized for the dead, if the dead do not rise at all? Why

then are they baptized for the dead?" From these a man may probably infer, as some have done, that in St. Paul's time there was a custom of receiving baptism for the dead (as men who now believe act as sureties and undertakers for the faith of infants, who are not capable of believing), in order to undertake for the persons of their deceased friends that they would be ready to obey and receive our Savior as their King at his coming again. And then the forgiveness of sins in the world to come has no need of a purgatory. But in both these interpretations there is so much paradox that I do not trust them; I propose them to those who are thoroughly versed in the Scripture, to inquire whether there is not some clearer passage that contradicts them. Only of this much do I see evident Scripture to persuade me: that there is neither the word nor the thing of purgatory, in this or any other text; nor anything that can prove the necessity of a place for the soul without the body—neither for the soul of Lazarus during the four days he was dead, nor for the souls of those whom the Roman Church claims are now tormented in purgatory. For God, who could give life to a piece of clay, has the same power to give life again to a dead man, and to renew his lifeless and rotten carcass into a glorious, spiritual, and immortal body.

44.33 Another passage is 1 Corinthians 3, where it is said that those who built stubble, hay, and so on, upon the true foundation will see their work perish, but "they themselves will be saved, yet as through fire." This fire he would have be the fire of purgatory. The words, as I have said before, are an allusion to those of Zechariah, where he says (Zechariah 13:9), "I will bring the third part through the fire, and refine them as silver is refined, and will test them as gold is tested." This is spoken of the coming of the Messiah in power and glory; that is, at the day of judgment and the conflagration of the present world, in which the elect will not be consumed but refined. That is, they will lay aside their erroneous doctrines and traditions, having them, as it were, singed off, and will afterward call upon the name of the true God. In the same way the Apostle says of those

who hold this foundation, that Jesus is the Christ, and build upon it some other doctrines that are erroneous, that they will not be consumed in the fire that renews the world, but will pass through it to salvation—but in such a way as to see and give up their former errors. The builders are the pastors; the foundation, that Jesus is the Christ; the stubble and hay, false consequences drawn from it through ignorance or frailty; the gold, silver, and precious stones, their true doctrines; and their refining or purging, the giving up of their errors. In all this there is no color at all for the burning of incorporeal souls—that is to say, souls incapable of suffering.

44.34 A third passage is the one in 1 Corinthians 15, mentioned before, concerning baptism for the dead. From it he concludes, first, that prayers for the dead are not unprofitable, and from that, that there is a fire of purgatory; but neither conclusion rightly. For of the many interpretations of the word "baptism," he approves this one first: that by baptism is meant (metaphorically) a baptism of penance, and that men are baptized in this sense when they fast, and pray, and give alms. And so baptism for the dead and prayer for the dead are the same thing. But this is a metaphor of which there is no example, either in the Scripture or in any other use of language; and it is also out of harmony with the tenor and scope of the Scripture. The word "baptism" is used (Mark 10:38 and Luke 12:50) for being dipped in one's own blood, as Christ was upon the cross, and as most of the apostles were, for bearing witness to him. But it is hard to say that prayer, fasting, and alms have any likeness to dipping. The same word is used also in Matthew 3:11 (which seems to tell somewhat in favor of purgatory) for a purging with fire. But it is evident that the fire and purging mentioned there are the same that the prophet Zechariah speaks of (Zechariah 13:9): "I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them," and so on. And St. Peter after him (1 Peter 1:7): "That the trial of your faith, which is much more precious than that of gold that perishes, though it is tested with fire, might be found to praise and honor and glory at the appearing of Jesus Christ." And St. Paul (1

Corinthians 3:13): "The fire will test every man's work, of what sort it is." But St. Peter and St. Paul speak of the fire that will come at the second appearing of Christ, and the prophet Zechariah of the day of judgment. And therefore this passage of St. Matthew may be interpreted of the same; and then there will be no necessity for the fire of purgatory.

44.35 Another interpretation of baptism for the dead is the one I mentioned before, which he ranks second in probability. And from it also he infers the usefulness of prayer for the dead. For if after the resurrection those who have not heard of Christ, or have not believed in him, may be received into Christ's kingdom, it is not in vain for their friends to pray for them after their death, until they have risen. But grant that God, at the prayers of the faithful, may convert to himself some of those who have not heard Christ preached, and consequently cannot have rejected Christ; and grant that men's charity on that point cannot be blamed. Still this concludes nothing for purgatory. For to rise from death to life is one thing; to rise from purgatory to life is another, since that is a rising from life to life, from a life in torments to a life in joy.

44.36 A fourth passage is Matthew 5:25–26: "Agree with your adversary quickly, while you are on the way with him, lest at any time the adversary deliver you to the judge, and the judge deliver you to the officer, and you be thrown into prison. Truly I say to you, you will by no means come out of there until you have paid the last penny." In this allegory the offender is the sinner; both the adversary and the judge are God; the way is this life; the prison is the grave; the officer, death. From it the sinner will not rise again to eternal life, but to a second death, until he has paid the last penny, or Christ pays it for him by his Passion—which is a full ransom for every kind of sin, lesser sins as well as greater crimes, both being made equally pardonable by the Passion of Christ.

44.37 The fifth passage is Matthew 5:22: "Whoever is angry with his brother without a cause will be liable to judgment. And whoever says to his brother, 'Raca,' will be liable to the council. But

whoever says, 'You fool,' will be liable to hell fire." From these words he infers three sorts of sins and three sorts of punishments; and that none of those sins but the last will be punished with hell fire; and consequently that after this life there is punishment of lesser sins in purgatory. For this inference there is no color in any interpretation of these words yet given. Will there be, after this life, a distinction of courts of justice, as there was among the Jews in our Savior's time, to hear and determine different sorts of crimes—such as the judges and the council? Will not all judicature belong to Christ and his apostles? To understand this text, therefore, we must not consider it by itself, but together with the words before and after it. In this chapter our Savior interprets the law of Moses, which the Jews thought was fulfilled so long as they had not transgressed its grammatical sense, however much they had transgressed against the intent or meaning of the legislator. So whereas they thought the sixth commandment was not broken except by killing a man, nor the seventh except when a man lay with a woman not his wife, our Savior tells them that a man's inward anger against his brother, if it is without just cause, is homicide. You have heard (he says) the law of Moses, "You shall not kill," and that "Whoever kills will be condemned before the judges," or before the session of the Seventy. But I say to you, to be angry with one's brother without cause, or to say to him "Raca" or "fool," is homicide, and will be punished with hell fire at the day of judgment and the session of Christ and his apostles; so that those words were not used to distinguish between different crimes, different courts of justice, and different punishments. They were used to censure the distinction between sin and sin, which the Jews drew not from the difference of the will in obeying God, but from the difference of their temporal courts of justice; and to show them that he who had the will to hurt his brother, even though the effect appears only in reviling, or not at all, will be cast into hell fire by the judges and by the session—which at the day of judgment will be the same court, not different ones. This considered,

I cannot imagine what can be drawn from this text to maintain purgatory.

44.38 The sixth passage is Luke 16:9: "Make friends for yourselves by means of the unrighteous mammon, so that when you fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings." This he alleges to prove the invocation of departed saints. But the sense is plain: that with our riches we should make friends of the poor, and so obtain their prayers while they live. "He who gives to the poor lends to the Lord."

44.39 The seventh is Luke 23:42: "Lord, remember me when you come into your kingdom." Therefore, he says, there is remission of sins after this life. But the inference is not good. Our Savior forgave him then, and at his coming again in glory he will remember to raise him again to eternal life.

44.40 The eighth is Acts 2:24, where St. Peter says of Christ "that God had raised him up, and loosed the pains of death, because it was not possible that he should be held by it." This he interprets as a descent of Christ into purgatory, to release some souls there from their torments. Yet it is manifest that it was Christ who was loosed. It was he who could not be held by death or the grave, and not the souls in purgatory. But if what Beza says in his notes on this passage is well observed, there is no one who will not see that instead of "pains" it should be "bonds"; and then there is no further reason to look for purgatory in this text.

CHAPTER 45: OF DEMONOLOGY AND OTHER RELICS OF THE RELIGION OF THE GENTILES

Mistaking the images of sight and dreams for real beings produced the pagan doctrine of daemons.

45.1 The impression made on the organs of sight by luminous bodies—either in one direct line, or in many lines reflected from opaque bodies or refracted in passing through transparent ones—produces, in living creatures in whom God has placed such organs, an imagination of the object from which the impression proceeds. This imagination is called *sight*, and it seems to be not a mere imagination but the body itself outside us. It is the same

as when a man presses his eye violently: a light appears to him outside and in front of him, which no one perceives but himself, because there is in fact no such thing outside him, but only a motion in the interior organs, pressing outward by resistance, that makes him think so. And the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the object that caused it is removed, is what we call *imagination* and *memory*, and (in sleep, and sometimes in a great disorder of the organs through sickness or violence) a *dream*. Of these things I have already spoken briefly, in the second and third chapters.

45.2 This nature of sight was never discovered by the ancient claimants to natural knowledge, much less by those who do not consider things so remote from their present use as that knowledge is. So it was hard for men to conceive of those images in the fancy and in the sense otherwise than as things really outside us. Some—because these images vanish away, they know not where or how—will have them be absolutely incorporeal, that is to say immaterial: forms without matter, color and shape without any colored or shaped body; and they say these can put on airy bodies, like a garment, to make themselves visible to our bodily eyes when they wish. Others say they are bodies and living creatures, but made of air or some other more subtle and ethereal matter, which is condensed when they wish to be seen. But both agree on one general name for them: *daemons*. As if the dead of whom they dreamed were inhabitants not of their own brain but of the air, or of heaven, or hell; not phantasms, but ghosts. There is just as much reason in this as if one should say he saw his own ghost in a mirror, or the ghosts of the stars in a river; or should call the ordinary appearance of the sun, about a foot across, the *daemon* or ghost of that great sun that illuminates the whole visible world. And by that means they have feared them, as things of an unknown—that is, an unlimited—power to do them good or harm. This in turn gave the governors of the heathen commonwealths occasion to regulate this fear of theirs by establishing that *demonology* (in which the poets, as principal priests of the heathen religion, were especially

employed or revered), for the sake of the public peace and the obedience of subjects necessary to it; and to make some of the daemons good and others evil—the one as a spur to observance of the laws, the other as reins to hold men back from violating them.

45.3 What kind of things they were to which they gave the name of *daemons* appears partly in the genealogy of their gods written by Hesiod, one of the most ancient poets of the Greeks, and partly in other histories, a few of which I noted earlier, in chapter 12 of this discourse.[25]

45.4 The Greeks, by their colonies and conquests, spread their language and writings into Asia, Egypt, and Italy, and with them, by necessary consequence, their *demonology*, or (as St. Paul calls it) their "doctrines of devils." And by that means the contagion passed also to the Jews, both of Judea and of Alexandria and the other places into which they were dispersed. But the Jews did not, as the Greeks did, give the name *daemon* to spirits both good and evil, but to the evil only. To the good daemons they gave the name of the Spirit of God, and they regarded those whose bodies these entered as prophets. In sum, every singularity, if good, they attributed to the Spirit of God; and if evil, to some *daemon*—but a *kakodaimon*, an evil daemon, that is, a devil. And therefore they called "demoniacs," that is, "possessed by the devil," those we call mentally ill or mentally disturbed, or those who had epilepsy, or who said anything that they, for want of understanding, thought absurd. So also of a person unclean to a notorious degree they used to say he had an unclean spirit; of a man who could not speak, that he had a mute devil; and of John the Baptist, because of the singularity of his fasting, that he had a devil (Matthew 11:18); and of our Savior, because he said that whoever keeps his sayings should not see death *in aeternum*, forever: "Now we know that you have a devil; Abraham is dead, and the prophets are dead." And again, because he said (John 7:20) that they were seeking to kill him, the people answered, "You have a devil; who is seeking to kill

25 Hesiod's *Theogony* (c. 700 BC), a poem on the origins and descent of the gods.

you?" By this it is manifest that the Jews had the same opinions concerning phantasms: namely, that they were not phantasms—that is, idols of the brain—but real things, independent of the fancy.

WHY CHRIST DID NOT DENY POSSESSION

Hobbes explains Scripture's language of devils and possession without incorporeal spirits.

45.5 If this doctrine is not true, why (some may say) did our Savior not contradict it and teach the contrary? Indeed, why does he on various occasions use forms of speech that seem to confirm it? To this I answer, first, that where Christ says, "A spirit does not have flesh and bones," though he shows that there are spirits, he does not deny that they are bodies. And where St. Paul says, "We shall rise spiritual bodies," he acknowledges the nature of spirits, but as bodily spirits—which is not difficult to understand. For air and many other things are bodies, though not flesh and bone, or any other gross body that can be discerned by the eye. But when our Savior speaks to the devil and commands him to go out of a man, if by the devil is meant a disease, such as frenzy or lunacy, or a corporeal spirit, is not the speech improper? Can diseases hear? Or can there be a corporeal spirit in a body of flesh and bone that is already full of vital and animal spirits? Are there not, therefore, spirits that neither have bodies nor are mere imaginations? To the first I answer that addressing our Savior's command to the madness or lunacy he cures is no more improper than was his rebuking of the fever, or of the wind and sea, for these do not hear either; or than was the command of God to the light, to the firmament, to the sun and stars, when he commanded them to be, for they could not hear before they had any being. But those speeches are not improper, because they signify the power of God's word. No more, therefore, is it improper to command madness or lunacy (under the name of devils, by which they were then commonly understood) to depart out of a man's body. To the second, concerning their

being incorporeal, I have not yet noticed any passage of Scripture from which it can be gathered that any man was ever possessed by any corporeal spirit other than his own, by which his body is naturally moved.

45.6 Our Savior, immediately after the Holy Spirit descended upon him in the form of a dove, is said by St. Matthew (Matthew 4:1) to have been "led up by the Spirit into the wilderness"; and the same is told in Luke 4:1 in these words: "Jesus, being full of the Holy Spirit, was led in the Spirit into the wilderness." By this it is evident that by "Spirit" there is meant the Holy Spirit. This cannot be interpreted as a possession; for Christ and the Holy Spirit are one and the same substance, and that is no possession of one substance or body by another. And whereas in the verses following he is said "to have been taken up by the devil into the holy city, and set upon a pinnacle of the Temple," shall we conclude from this that he was possessed by the devil, or carried there by force? And again, he was "carried from there by the devil into an exceedingly high mountain, who showed him from there all the kingdoms of the world." Here we are not to believe that he was either possessed or forced by the devil, nor that any mountain is high enough (in the literal sense) to show him one whole hemisphere. What, then, can be the meaning of this passage, other than that he went into the wilderness of his own accord, and that this carrying of him up and down, from the wilderness to the city and from there to a mountain, was a vision? In keeping with this is also the phrase of St. Luke, that he was led into the wilderness not *by* but *in* the Spirit; whereas concerning his being taken up to the mountain and to the pinnacle of the Temple, he speaks as St. Matthew does. This suits the nature of a vision.

45.7 Again, where St. Luke says of Judas Iscariot that "Satan entered into him, and thereupon he went and conferred with the chief priests and captains how he might betray Christ to them," it may be answered that by the entering of Satan (that is, the Enemy) into him is meant the hostile and traitorous intention of selling his Lord and Master. For just as by the Holy Spirit

Scripture frequently means the graces and good inclinations given by the Holy Spirit, so by the entering of Satan may be understood the wicked thoughts and designs of the adversaries of Christ and his disciples. For as it is hard to say that the devil had entered into Judas before he had any such hostile design, so it is beside the point to say that he was first Christ's enemy in his heart and that the devil entered into him afterward. Therefore the entering of Satan and his wicked purpose were one and the same thing.

45.8 But if there is no immaterial spirit, nor any possession of men's bodies by any corporeal spirit, it may again be asked why our Savior and his apostles did not teach the people so, and in such clear words that they could no longer doubt it. But questions such as these are more curious than necessary for a Christian's salvation. Men may as well ask why Christ, who could have given all men faith, piety, and every kind of moral virtue, gave it to some only and not to all; and why he left the search for natural causes and sciences to the natural reason and industry of men, and did not reveal it supernaturally to all, or to any; and many other such questions. For these, nevertheless, probable and pious reasons may be alleged. For just as God, when he brought the Israelites into the Promised Land, did not secure them there by subduing all the nations around them, but left many of them as thorns in their sides, to awaken their piety and industry from time to time, so our Savior, in leading us toward his heavenly kingdom, did not destroy all the difficulties of natural questions, but left them to exercise our industry and reason; the scope of his preaching being only to show us this plain and direct way to salvation, namely, belief in this article: "that he was the Christ, the Son of the living God, sent into the world to sacrifice himself for our sins, and at his coming again to reign gloriously over his elect and to save them from their enemies eternally." To this, the opinion of possession by spirits or phantasms is no impediment on the way, though to some it is an occasion of going out of the way and following their own inventions. If we require of the Scripture an account of every

question that may be raised to trouble us in performing God's commands, we may as well complain of Moses for not having set down the time of the creation of such spirits, as well as of the creation of the earth and sea, and of men and beasts. To conclude: I find in Scripture that there are angels and spirits, good and evil; but not that they are incorporeal, as are the apparitions men see in the dark, or in a dream or vision, which the Latins call *spectra* and took for daemons. And I find that there are corporeal spirits (though subtle and invisible); but not that any man's body was possessed or inhabited by them. And I find that the bodies of the saints will be such—namely, spiritual bodies, as St. Paul calls them.

45.9 Nevertheless, the contrary doctrine, namely that there are incorporeal spirits, has so far prevailed in the Church that the use of exorcism (that is to say, the ejection of devils by conjuration) is built upon it; and though rarely and faintly practiced, it is not yet entirely given up. That in the early Church there were many demoniacs and few people who were mentally ill, or who had other such singular diseases, whereas in these times we hear of and see many who are mentally ill and few demoniacs, proceeds from a change not of nature but of names. But how it comes about that the apostles formerly, and after them for a time the pastors of the Church, cured those singular diseases, which they are not now seen to do; and likewise why it is not now in the power of every true believer to do all that the faithful did then—that is to say, as we read in Mark 16:17–18, "in Christ's name to cast out devils, to speak with new tongues, to take up serpents, to drink deadly poison without taking harm, and to cure the sick by the laying on of their hands," and all this with no other words than "in the name of Jesus"—is another question. And it is probable that those extraordinary gifts were given to the Church for no longer than men trusted wholly in Christ and looked for their felicity only in his kingdom to come; and consequently that when they sought authority and riches, and trusted to their own cunning for a kingdom of this world, these supernatural gifts of God were taken from them again.

WORSHIP AND IMAGES

Hobbes defines worship, civil and divine, and what an image or idol is.

45.10 Another relic of the religion of the Gentiles is the worship of images, which was neither instituted by Moses in the Old Testament nor by Christ in the New, nor yet brought in from the Gentiles, but left among them after they had given their names to Christ. Before our Savior preached, it was the general religion of the Gentiles to worship as gods those appearances that remain in the brain from the impression of external bodies upon the organs of their senses. These are commonly called *ideas*, *idols*, *phantasms*, *conceits*, as being representations of the external bodies that cause them; and they have no more reality in them than there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a dream. And this is the reason why St. Paul says, "We know that an idol is nothing": not that he thought that an image of metal, stone, or wood was nothing, but that the thing they honored or feared in the image, and held for a god, was a mere figment, without place, habitation, motion, or existence except in the motions of the brain. And the worship of these with divine honor is what the Scripture calls idolatry and rebellion against God. For God was King of the Jews, and his lieutenant was first Moses and afterward the high priest. If the people had been permitted to worship and pray to images (which are representations of their own fancies), they would have had no further dependence on the true God, of whom there can be no likeness, nor on his chief ministers, Moses and the high priests. Instead every man would have governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter overthrow of the commonwealth and their own destruction for want of union. And therefore the first law of God was that "they should not take as gods *alienos deos*, that is, the gods of other nations, but only that true God who deigned to speak with Moses, and by him to give them laws and directions for their peace and for their salvation from their enemies." And the

second was that "they should not make for themselves any image of their own invention to worship." For it is the same deposing of a king to submit to another king, whether he is set up by a neighboring nation or by ourselves.

45.11 The passages of Scripture alleged to countenance setting up images in order to worship them, or setting them up at all in the places where God is worshiped, are these. First, two examples: one of the cherubim over the Ark of God, the other of the bronze serpent. Second, some texts in which we are commanded to worship certain creatures for their relation to God, as to worship his footstool. And last, some other texts that authorize a religious honoring of holy things. But before I examine the force of those passages to prove what is claimed, I must first explain what is to be understood by *worshiping*, and what by *images* and *idols*.

45.12 I have already shown in chapter 20 of this discourse that to honor is to value highly the power of any person, and that such value is measured by comparing him with others. But because there is nothing to be compared with God in power, we do not honor him but dishonor him by any value less than infinite. And thus honor is properly, by its own nature, secret and internal, in the heart. But the inward thoughts of men, which appear outwardly in their words and actions, are the signs of our honoring, and these go by the name of *worship*, in Latin *cultus*.[26] Therefore to pray to, to swear by, to obey, to be diligent and dutiful in serving—in sum, all words and actions that betoken fear of offending or desire to please—is *worship*, whether those words and actions are sincere or feigned. And because they appear as signs of honoring, they are ordinarily also called *honor*.

45.13 The worship we show to those we consider to be only men, such as kings and men in authority, is *civil worship*. But the worship we show to that which we think to be God, whatever the words, ceremonies, gestures, or other actions may be, is *divine worship*. To fall prostrate before a king, in one who thinks him

26 Hobbes's account of honor is in fact in chapter 10.

only a man, is only civil worship; and he who merely takes off his hat in church, because he thinks it the house of God, worships with divine worship. Those who seek the distinction between divine and civil worship not in the intention of the worshiper but in the words *douleia* and *latreia* deceive themselves. For there are two sorts of servants. One sort is those who are absolutely in the power of their masters, such as slaves taken in war and their offspring, whose bodies are not in their own power (their lives depending on the will of their masters, so that they forfeit them at the least disobedience), and who are bought and sold like beasts. These were called *douloi*, that is, properly, slaves, and their service *douleia*. The other sort is those who serve voluntarily (for hire, or in hope of benefit from their masters); these are called *thetes*, that is, domestic servants, to whose service the masters have no further right than is contained in the covenants made between them. These two kinds of servants have this much in common: their labor is assigned to them by another. And the word *latris* is the general name for both, signifying one who works for another, whether as a slave or as a voluntary servant. So *latreia* signifies all service generally, but *douleia* the service of bondmen only, and the condition of slavery. And both are used in Scripture interchangeably to signify our service of God: *douleia* because we are God's slaves, *latreia* because we serve him. And in every kind of service is contained not only obedience but also worship; that is, such actions, gestures, and words as signify honor.

45.14 An *image* (in the strictest sense of the word) is the resemblance of something visible. In this sense the fantastic forms, apparitions, or seemings of visible bodies to the sight are the only images: such as the appearance of a man or other thing in water, by reflection or refraction, or of the sun or stars by direct vision in the air. These are nothing real in the things seen, nor in the place where they seem to be; nor are their sizes and shapes the same as those of the object, but changeable by variations in the organs of sight, or by lenses. And they are often present in our imagination and in our dreams when the object is absent, or

changed into other colors and shapes, as things that depend only on the fancy. And these are the images that are originally and most properly called *ideas* and *idols*, from the language of the Greeks, in which the word *eido* signifies "to see." They are also called *phantasms*, which in the same language means "apparitions." And it is from these images that one of the faculties of man's nature is called the *imagination*. From this it is manifest that there neither is nor can be any image made of a thing invisible.

45.15 It is also evident that there can be no image of a thing infinite. For all the images and phantasms that are made by the impression of visible things have shape, and shape is a quantity determined in every direction. And therefore there can be no image of God, nor of the soul of man, nor of spirits, but only of visible bodies: that is, bodies that have light in themselves, or are lit by such bodies.

45.16 And whereas a man can imagine shapes he never saw, making up a figure out of the parts of different creatures, as the poets make their centaurs, chimeras, and other monsters never seen, so he can also give matter to those shapes and make them in wood, clay, or metal. And these are also called images, not for their resemblance to any corporeal thing, but for their resemblance to some fantastic inhabitants of the maker's brain. But between these idols as they are originally in the brain, and as they are painted, carved, molded, or cast in matter, there is a likeness of the one to the other, for which the material body made by art may be said to be the image of the fantastic idol made by nature.

45.17 But in a broader use of the word, *image* also includes any representation of one thing by another. So an earthly sovereign may be called the image of God, and an inferior magistrate the image of an earthly sovereign. And often in the idolatry of the Gentiles little regard was paid to the likeness of their material idol to the idol in their fancy, and yet it was called its image. For an unhewn stone has been set up for Neptune, and various other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their

gods. And at this day we see many images of the Virgin Mary and other saints, unlike one another and corresponding to no one man's fancy; and yet they serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for, which was no more than to represent, by the names only, the persons mentioned in the history, to whom every man applies a mental image of his own making, or none at all. And thus an image in the broadest sense is either the resemblance or the representation of some visible thing, or both together, as happens for the most part.

45.18 But in Scripture the name *idol* is extended still further, to signify also the sun, or a star, or any other creature, visible or invisible, when they are worshipped as gods.

WHAT IDOLATRY IS

Which outward acts toward images, places and persons are idolatry, and which are scandalous worship.

45.19 Having shown what *worship* is, and what an *image* is, I will now put them together and examine what that *idolatry* is which is forbidden in the Second Commandment and in other places of Scripture.

45.20 To worship an image is voluntarily to perform those external acts which are signs of honoring either the matter of the image (wood, stone, metal, or some other visible creature), or the phantasm of the brain which the matter was formed and shaped to resemble or represent, or both together, as one animate body composed of the matter and the phantasm, like a body and soul.

45.21 To uncover one's head before a man of power and authority, or before the throne of a prince, or in such other places as he appoints for that purpose in his absence, is to worship that man or prince with civil worship. It is a sign of honoring not the chair or the place but the person, and it is not idolatry. But if the one who does it were to suppose that the soul of the prince was in the chair, or were to present a petition to the chair, it would be divine worship, and idolatry.

45.22 To pray to a king for things he is able to do for us, even if we prostrate ourselves before him, is only civil worship, because we acknowledge no power in him but human power. But voluntarily to pray to him for fair weather, or for anything that only God can do for us, is divine worship, and idolatry. On the other hand, if a king compels a man to it by the terror of death or some other great bodily punishment, it is not idolatry. For the worship which the sovereign commands to be done to himself by the terror of his laws is not a sign that the one who obeys him inwardly honors him as a god, but that he wants to save himself from death or from a miserable life. And what is not a sign of inward honor is no worship, and therefore no idolatry. Nor can it be said that the one who does it gives scandal, or lays any stumbling block before his brother. For however wise or learned the man who worships in that manner may be, another man cannot argue from it that he approves of it, but only that he does it out of fear, and that it is not his act but the act of his sovereign.

45.23 To worship God in some particular place, or turning one's face toward an image or a definite place, is not to worship or honor the place or image. It is to acknowledge it holy—that is, to acknowledge the image or the place to be set apart from common use. For that is the meaning of the word *holy*: it implies no new quality in the place or image, but only a new relation, by being appropriated to God. It is therefore not idolatry, any more than it was idolatry to worship God before the bronze serpent; or for the Jews, when they were out of their own country, to turn their faces toward the Temple of Jerusalem when they prayed; or for Moses to take off his shoes when he was before the burning bush, on ground belonging to Mount Sinai, a place God had chosen to appear in and to give his laws to the people of Israel, and which was therefore holy ground, not by any inherent sanctity but by being set apart for God's use; or for Christians to worship in churches, which have been solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose by the authority of the king or other true representative of the Church. But to worship God as animating or

inhabiting such an image or place—that is, an infinite substance in a finite place—is idolatry. For such finite gods are only idols of the brain, nothing real, and in Scripture they are commonly called by the names of *vanity*, *lies*, and *nothing*. Likewise, to worship God, not as animating or present in the place or image, but in order to be reminded of him or of some of his works, is idolatry if the place or image is dedicated or set up by private authority, and not by the authority of those who are our sovereign pastors. For the commandment is, "You shall not make for yourself any graven image." God commanded Moses to set up the bronze serpent; Moses did not make it for himself, so it was not against the commandment. But the making of the golden calf by Aaron and the people was idolatry, being done without authority from God. It was idolatry not only because they took it for God, but also because they made it for a religious use without warrant either from God their sovereign or from Moses, who was his lieutenant.

45.24 The Gentiles worshipped as gods Jupiter and others who, when living, were perhaps men who had done great and glorious deeds; and as children of God they worshipped various men and women whom they supposed to have been begotten between an immortal deity and a mortal. This was idolatry, because they made them gods for themselves, with no authority from God, either in his eternal law of reason or in his positive and revealed will. But though our Savior was a man whom we also believe to be God immortal and the Son of God, this is no idolatry, because we do not build that belief on our own fancy or judgment, but on the word of God revealed in the Scriptures. As for the adoration of the Eucharist: if Christ's words "This is my body" signify "that he himself and the seeming bread in his hand—and not only that, but all the seeming morsels of bread that have ever since been, or at any time hereafter shall be, consecrated by priests—are so many bodies of Christ, and yet all of them only one body," then it is no idolatry, because it is authorized by our Savior. But if that text does not signify this (and there is no other that can be cited for it), then, being a worship

of human institution, it is idolatry. For it is not enough to say that God can transubstantiate the bread into Christ's body. The Gentiles also held God to be omnipotent, and on that ground could just as well excuse their idolatry, by claiming, as others do, a transubstantiation of their wood and stone into God Almighty.

45.25 There are some who claim that divine inspiration is a supernatural entering of the Holy Spirit into a man, and not an acquiring of God's graces by teaching and study. I think they are caught in a very dangerous dilemma. For if they do not worship the men whom they believe to be so inspired, they fall into impiety, by not adoring God's supernatural presence. And if they do worship them, they commit idolatry, for the apostles would never allow themselves to be worshipped in that way. The safest course, therefore, is to believe that by the descent of the dove upon the apostles, by Christ's breathing on them when he gave them the Holy Spirit, and by the giving of it through the laying on of hands, we are to understand the signs which God has been pleased to use, or to ordain to be used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to preach his kingdom, and in their conduct, so that it might not be scandalous but edifying to others.

45.26 Besides the idolatrous worship of images there is also a scandalous worship of them, which is also a sin, but not idolatry. For *idolatry* is worship by signs of an inward and real honor, whereas *scandalous worship* is only seeming worship. It may sometimes be joined with an inward and heartfelt detestation both of the image and of the fantastical *demon* or idol to which it is dedicated, and may proceed only from fear of death or other grievous punishment. It is nevertheless a sin in those who worship in this way, if they are men whose actions others look to as lights to guide them by; because those who follow their ways cannot help stumbling and falling in the way of religion. The example of those we pay no regard to, by contrast, does not work on us at all, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution, and so is no cause of our falling.

45.27 If, therefore, a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or anyone else whose knowledge is highly thought of, does outward honor to an idol out of fear, then unless he makes his fear and unwillingness as evident as the worship, he gives scandal to his brother by seeming to approve of idolatry. For his brother, reasoning from the action of his teacher, or of the man whose knowledge he greatly esteems, concludes that it is lawful in itself. And this scandal is a sin, and a *scandal given*. But if someone who is no pastor, and has no eminent reputation for knowledge of Christian doctrine, does the same, and another follows him, this is no scandal given, for the other had no reason to follow such an example. It is rather a pretense of scandal, which he takes up on his own account as an excuse before men. For if an unlearned man in the power of an idolatrous king or state is commanded on pain of death to worship before an idol, and he detests the idol in his heart, he does well—though if he had the fortitude to suffer death rather than worship it, he would do better. But if a pastor, who as Christ's messenger has undertaken to teach Christ's doctrine to all nations, were to do the same, it would be not only a sinful scandal with respect to other Christians' consciences, but a treacherous desertion of his charge.

45.28 The sum of what I have said so far about the worship of images is this. Whoever worships in an image, or in any creature, either its matter, or some fancy of his own which he thinks dwells in it, or both together, or believes that such things hear his prayers or see his devotions without ears or eyes, commits idolatry. Whoever counterfeits such worship for fear of punishment commits a sin, if he is a man whose example has power among his brethren. But whoever worships the Creator of the world before such an image, or in such a place, as he has not made or chosen for himself but taken from the commandment of God's word, does not commit idolatry—as the Jews did not in worshipping God before the cherubim, and before the bronze serpent for a time, and in or toward the Temple of Jerusalem, which was also only for a time.

PAGAN RELICS IN THE CHURCH OF ROME

Image worship, canonization, the title of pontifex, processions and holy water are traced to paganism.

45.29 Now as for the worship of saints, and images, and relics, and other things practiced today in the Church of Rome, I say they are not permitted by the word of God, nor were they brought into the Church of Rome from the doctrine taught there. They were partly left in it at the first conversion of the Gentiles, and afterward countenanced, confirmed, and augmented by the bishops of Rome.

45.30 As for the proofs cited from Scripture—namely, those examples of images that God appointed to be set up—they were not set up for the people or anyone to worship, but so that they would worship God himself before them, as before the cherubim over the Ark, and the bronze serpent. For we do not read that the priest or anyone else worshipped the cherubim. On the contrary, we read (2 Kings 18:4) that Hezekiah broke in pieces the bronze serpent that Moses had set up, because the people burned incense to it. Besides, those examples are not given for us to imitate, so that we too should set up images under pretense of worshipping God before them. For the words of the Second Commandment, "You shall not make for yourself any graven image," etc., distinguish between the images God commanded to be set up and those we set up for ourselves. And therefore the argument from the cherubim or the bronze serpent to images of man's devising, and from worship commanded by God to the self-chosen worship of men, is not good. This also must be considered: just as Hezekiah broke the bronze serpent in pieces because the Jews worshipped it, so that they would do so no more, so Christian sovereigns ought to break down the images their subjects have been accustomed to worship, so that there may be no further occasion for such idolatry. For today, where images are worshipped, the ignorant people really do believe there is a divine power in the images. They are told by their pas-

tors that some of them have spoken, and have bled, and that miracles have been done by them; and they take these as done by the saint, whom they think either is the image itself or is in it. When the Israelites worshipped the calf, they thought they were worshipping the God who brought them out of Egypt; and yet it was idolatry, because they thought the calf either was that God or had him in its belly. Some may think it impossible for people to be so stupid as to think the image is God, or a saint, or to worship it on that understanding. But Scripture makes the contrary plain: when the golden calf was made, the people said, "These are your gods, O Israel," and the images of Laban are called his gods.[27] And we see by daily experience in all sorts of people that men who care about nothing but their food and ease are content to believe any absurdity rather than trouble themselves to examine it, holding their faith as if by an entail that cannot be alienated except by an express new law.[28]

45.31 But they infer from certain other passages that it is lawful to paint angels, and even God himself: from God's walking in the garden, from Jacob's seeing God at the top of the ladder, and from other visions and dreams. But visions and dreams, whether natural or supernatural, are only phantasms; and whoever paints an image of any of them makes an image not of God but of his own phantasm, which is making an idol. I do not say that drawing a picture from one's fancy is a sin. But once it is drawn, to hold it to be a representation of God is against the Second Commandment, and it can be of no use except for worship. And the same may be said of images of angels and of dead men, except as monuments of friends or of men worthy of remembrance. For such a use of an image is not worship of the image, but civil honoring of the person—not one who is, but one who was. But when it is done to the image we make of a saint, for no other reason than that we think he hears our prayers and is pleased with the honor we do him, though he is dead and

27 Exodus 32:4; Genesis 31:30.

28 An entail is a legal settlement of property that prevents it from being sold or given away outside the line of heirs.

without sense, we attribute to him more than human power, and therefore it is idolatry.

45.32 There is, then, no authority, either in the law of Moses or in the Gospel, for the religious worship of images or other representations of God which men set up for themselves, or for the worship of the image of any creature in heaven, or on earth, or under the earth. And Christian kings, who are living representatives of God, are not to be worshipped by their subjects by any act that signifies a greater esteem of their power than the nature of mortal man is capable of. So it cannot be supposed that the religious worship now in use was brought into the Church by misunderstanding of the Scripture. It remains, therefore, that it was left in the Church by failing to destroy the images themselves at the conversion of the Gentiles who worshipped them.

45.33 The cause of this was the immoderate esteem and high prices set on their workmanship. This made their owners, though converted from worshipping them religiously as demons, as they had done, keep them still in their houses, on the pretense of doing it in honor of Christ, the Virgin Mary, the apostles, and other pastors of the primitive Church. For it was easy, by giving them new names, to make an image of the Virgin Mary and her Son, our Savior, out of what had perhaps before been called an image of Venus and Cupid; and in the same way to make a Barnabas out of a Jupiter, a Paul out of a Mercury, and the like.[29] And as worldly ambition crept by degrees into the pastors, it drew them to try to please the newly made Christians, and also to like this kind of honor, which they too might hope for after their death, as well as those who had already gained it. So the worship of the images of Christ and his apostles grew more and more idolatrous—except that some time after Constantine, various emperors, bishops, and general councils noticed its unlawfulness and opposed it, but too late, or too weakly.

45.34 The canonizing of saints is another relic of paganism. It is neither a misunderstanding of Scripture nor a new invention of

the Roman Church, but a custom as old as the commonwealth of Rome itself. The first person ever canonized at Rome was Romulus, on the report of Julius Proculus, who swore before the Senate that he had spoken with him after his death, and had been assured by him that he dwelt in heaven, was called Quirinus there, and would look with favor on the state of their new city. Thereupon the Senate gave public testimony of his sanctity. Julius Caesar, and other emperors after him, had the like testimony; that is, they were canonized as saints. For *canonization* is now defined by such testimony, and it is the same as the *apotheosis* of the heathen.

45.35 It is also from the Roman heathen that the popes have received the name and power of *pontifex maximus*. This was the title of the man who, in the ancient commonwealth of Rome, had the supreme authority under the Senate and people to regulate all ceremonies and doctrines concerning their religion. When Augustus Caesar changed the state into a monarchy, he took for himself no more than this office and that of tribune of the people—that is to say, the supreme power in both state and religion—and the emperors who succeeded him enjoyed the same.[30] But in the time of the emperor Constantine, who was the first to profess and authorize the Christian religion, it was consistent with his profession to have religion regulated, under his authority, by the bishop of Rome. It does not appear, though, that they had the title of *pontifex* so soon; rather, later bishops seem to have taken it on themselves, to lend countenance to the power they exercised over the bishops of the Roman provinces. For it was not any privilege of St. Peter, but the privilege of the city of Rome, which the emperors were always willing to uphold, that gave them such authority over other bishops. This can be plainly seen from the fact that the bishop of Constantinople, when the emperor made that city the seat of the

29 At Lystra the crowd took Barnabas for Jupiter (Zeus) and Paul for Mercury (Hermes) (Acts 14:12).

30 *Pontifex maximus*: "chief priest," head of the college of pontiffs in Roman state religion.

empire, claimed to be equal to the bishop of Rome—though in the end, not without contention, the Pope prevailed and became the *pontifex maximus*. But he was so only by right of the emperor, and not beyond the bounds of the empire, nor anywhere after the emperor had lost his power in Rome—even though it was the Pope himself who took his power from him. From this we may observe in passing that there is no room for the superiority of the Pope over other bishops, except in the territories where he is himself the civil sovereign, and where the emperor, having sovereign civil power, has expressly chosen the Pope as the chief pastor, under himself, of his Christian subjects.

45.36 The carrying of images about in procession is another relic of the religion of the Greeks and Romans. For they too carried their idols from place to place in a kind of chariot specially dedicated to that use, which the Latins called *thensa* and *vehiculum deorum*; and the image was placed in a frame or shrine which they called *ferculum*. What they called *pompa* is the same as what is now called *procession*. Accordingly, among the divine honors the Senate gave to Julius Caesar, one was that in the pomp (or procession) at the Circus games he should have *thensam et ferculum*, a sacred chariot and a shrine—which amounted to being carried up and down like a god. Just so, today, the popes are carried under a canopy by Swiss Guards.[31]

45.37 To these processions also belonged the carrying of burning torches and candles before the images of the gods, among both Greeks and Romans. For later the emperors of Rome received the same honor. We read of Caligula that on his accession to the empire he was carried from Misenum to Rome through a throng of people, the roads lined with altars, beasts for sacrifice, and burning torches; and of Caracalla, that he was received into Alexandria with incense, strewing of flowers, and *dadouchiai*, that is, torches—for the *dadouchoi* were those among the Greeks who carried lighted torches in the processions of their gods. And in the course of time the devout but ignorant

31 *Vehiculum deorum*: "the carriage of the gods."

people many times honored their bishops with the same pomp of wax candles, and constantly honored the images of our Savior and the saints in the same way, in the church itself. And that is how the use of wax candles came in; it was also established by some of the ancient councils.

45.38 The heathen also had their *aqua lustralis*, that is to say, *holy water*. The Church of Rome also imitates them in its holy days. They had their Bacchanalia, and we have our wakes corresponding to them; they their Saturnalia, and we our carnivals and the Shrove Tuesday liberty of servants; they their procession of Priapus, we our fetching in, setting up, and dancing around maypoles—and dancing is one kind of worship; they had their procession called Ambarvalia, and we our procession about the fields in Rogation week. Nor do I think these are all the ceremonies left in the Church from the first conversion of the Gentiles;[32] but they are all I can call to mind at present. And if anyone were to look carefully at what the histories report about the religious rites of the Greeks and Romans, I do not doubt he could find many more of these old empty bottles of paganism, which the doctors of the Roman Church, through negligence or ambition, have filled again with the new wine of Christianity—which will not fail in time to break them.[33]

CHAPTER 46: OF DARKNESS FROM VAIN PHILOSOPHY AND FABULOUS TRADITIONS

Hobbes defines philosophy and excludes experience, error, revelation and book learning from it.

46.1 By philosophy is understood *the knowledge acquired by reasoning from the manner of the generation of anything to its properties, or from the properties to some possible way of its generation, in order to be able to produce, as far as matter and human force permit, such effects as human life requires*. So the geometer, from the construc-

32 Wakes were annual English parish festivals. Rogation week, before Ascension Day, was marked by processions beating the parish bounds and blessing the crops; the Roman Ambarvalia likewise purified the fields.

33 Echoing Matthew 9:17: new wine put into old wineskins bursts them.

tion of figures, discovers many of their properties by reasoning, and from the properties new ways of constructing them, in order to be able to measure land and water, and for countless other uses. So the astronomer, from the rising, setting, and motion of the sun and stars in different parts of the heavens, discovers the causes of day and night and of the different seasons of the year, by which he keeps an account of time. And the same holds for other sciences.

46.2 By this definition it is evident that we are not to count as any part of philosophy that original knowledge called experience, in which prudence consists. For it is not attained by reasoning, but is found in brute beasts as well as in man. It is only a memory of sequences of events in times past, in which the omission of any little circumstance that alters the effect frustrates the expectation of even the most prudent. Whereas nothing is produced by right reasoning but general, eternal, and immutable truth.

46.3 Nor, therefore, are we to give that name to any false conclusions. For whoever reasons rightly in words he understands can never conclude an error.

46.4 Nor to what anyone knows by supernatural revelation, because it is not acquired by reasoning.

46.5 Nor to what is gained by reasoning from the authority of books, because that is not reasoning from the cause to the effect, or from the effect to the cause; and it is not knowledge, but faith.

THE ORIGINS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCHOOLS

Philosophy grew from leisure in great commonwealths; the Greek and Jewish schools taught little of use.

46.6 Since the faculty of reasoning follows from the use of speech, it was impossible that there should not have been some general truths discovered by reasoning almost as old as language itself. The Indigenous peoples of America are not without some good moral maxims; they also have a little arithmetic, to add and divide numbers that are not too large. But they are not therefore

philosophers. For just as there were plants of grain and grapes, in small quantities, scattered in the fields and woods before men knew their value, or used them for food, or planted them separately in fields and vineyards—during which time men fed on acorns and drank water—so too there have been various true, general, and profitable speculations from the beginning, as the natural plants of human reason. But at first they were few in number. Men lived on crude experience. There was no method—that is to say, no sowing or planting of knowledge by itself, apart from the weeds and common plants of error and conjecture. And since the cause of this was the lack of leisure from procuring the necessities of life and defending themselves against their neighbors, it could not be otherwise until great commonwealths were set up. Leisure is the mother of philosophy, and commonwealth the mother of peace and leisure. Where great and flourishing cities first arose, there the study of philosophy first arose. The Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the priests of Chaldea and Egypt are counted the most ancient philosophers, and those countries were the most ancient of kingdoms. Philosophy had not arisen among the Greeks and other peoples of the West, whose commonwealths (perhaps no greater than Lucca or Geneva) never had peace except when their fears of one another were equal, nor the leisure to observe anything but one another.[34] At length, when war had united many of these lesser Greek cities into fewer and larger ones, seven men from various parts of Greece began to gain the reputation of being wise—some for moral and political maxims, and others for the learning of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, which was astronomy and geometry. But we do not yet hear of any schools of philosophy.[35]

46.7 After the Athenians, by defeating the Persian armies, had gained command of the sea, and with it of all the islands and coastal cities of the Archipelago, in Asia as well as Europe, and

34 The Gymnosophists ("naked sages") were Indian ascetic philosophers known to the Greeks.

35 The Seven Sages of Greece, among them Thales and Solon.

had grown wealthy, those who had no employment either at home or abroad had little else to occupy themselves with but either (as St. Luke says, Acts 17:21) "telling and hearing news," or discoursing publicly on philosophy to the youth of the city. Every master took some place for that purpose. Plato took certain public walks called the Academia, after one Academus; Aristotle the walk of the temple of Pan, called the Lyceum; others the Stoa, or covered walk, where merchants' goods were landed; others other places, where they spent their leisure teaching or disputing their opinions; and some any place at all where they could gather the youth of the city to hear them talk. This is also what Carneades did at Rome when he was ambassador there, which led Cato to advise the Senate to send him away quickly, for fear of corrupting the manners of the young men who delighted to hear him say (as they thought) fine things.[36]

46.8 This is why the place where any of them taught and disputed was called *schola*, which in their language means leisure, and their disputations *diatribae*, that is to say, *passing the time*. The philosophers themselves also took the names of their sects, some of them from these schools. For those who followed Plato's doctrine were called Academics; the followers of Aristotle Peripatetics, from the walk he taught in; and those Zeno taught Stoics, from the Stoa—as if we were to name men after Moorfields, St. Paul's, and the Exchange, because they often meet there to chatter and loiter.[37]

46.9 Nevertheless, men were so taken with this custom that in time it spread over all Europe and most of Africa, so that there were schools publicly established and maintained for lectures and disputations in almost every commonwealth.

46.10 There were also schools in ancient times, both before and after the time of our Savior, among the Jews; but they were

36 Carneades, head of Plato's Academy, came to Rome on an Athenian embassy in 155 BC; Cato the Elder urged his swift dismissal.

37 Moorfields, St. Paul's Cathedral, and the Royal Exchange were common London places for idling and talk.

schools of their law. For though they were called *synagogues*, that is to say, congregations of the people, yet since the law was read, expounded, and disputed in them every Sabbath day, they differed from public schools in name only, not in nature. They existed not only in Jerusalem but in every city of the Gentiles where Jews lived. There was such a school at Damascus, which Paul entered in order to persecute. There were others at Antioch, Iconium, and Thessalonica, which he entered in order to dispute. Such too was the synagogue of the Freedmen, Cyrenians, Alexandrians, Cilicians, and those of Asia—that is to say, the school of the Freedmen and of Jews who were foreigners in Jerusalem. And it was of this school that those were who disputed with St. Stephen (Acts 6:9).[38]

46.11 But what has been the usefulness of those schools? What science is there today that has been acquired by their readings and disputings? What we have of geometry, which is the mother of all natural science, we do not owe to the schools. Plato, the best philosopher of the Greeks, forbade entrance to his school to all who were not already geometers to some degree. There were many who studied that science to the great advantage of mankind; but there is no mention of their schools, nor was there any sect of geometers, nor did they then go under the name of philosophers. The natural philosophy of those schools was more a dream than a science, and was set out in senseless and meaningless language. This cannot be avoided by those who try to teach philosophy without first having attained great knowledge of geometry. For nature works by motion, whose ways and degrees cannot be known without knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines and figures. Their moral philosophy is only a description of their own passions. For the rule of manners, outside civil government, is the law of nature; and within it, the civil law, which determines what is *honest* and *dishonest*, what is *just* and *unjust*, and in general what is *good* and *evil*. They, by contrast, make the rules of *good* and *bad* by their own *liking* and

38 Hobbes's "Libertines" are freed slaves (Latin *libertini*); modern Bibles translate "Freedmen."

disliking. By this means, amid so great a diversity of tastes, nothing is generally agreed on, but everyone does (as far as he dares) whatever seems good in his own eyes, to the subversion of the commonwealth. Their logic, which ought to be the method of reasoning, is nothing but verbal quibbles, and contrivances for puzzling anyone who tries to test them. In short, there is nothing so absurd that some of the old philosophers have not maintained it, as Cicero says, who was one of them. And I believe that scarcely anything can be said more absurdly in natural philosophy than what is now called Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; nor anything more contrary to government than much of what he said in his *Politics*; nor anything more ignorant than a great part of his *Ethics*.

46.12 The school of the Jews was originally a school of the law of Moses, who commanded (Deuteronomy 31:10) that at the end of every seventh year, at the Feast of Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, so that they might hear and learn it. Therefore the reading of the law every Sabbath day (which was the practice after the Captivity) ought to have had no other purpose than to acquaint the people with the commandments they were to obey, and to expound to them the writings of the prophets. But it is plain from our Savior's many rebukes of them that they corrupted the text of the law with their false commentaries and vain traditions, and understood the prophets so little that they acknowledged neither Christ nor the works he did, which the prophets had prophesied. So by their lectures and disputations in their synagogues they turned the doctrine of their law into a fantastical kind of philosophy about the incomprehensible nature of God and of spirits. They compounded it out of the vain philosophy and theology of the Greeks, mixed with their own fancies drawn from the more obscure passages of Scripture, those most easily twisted to their purpose, and from the fabulous traditions of their ancestors.

THE UNIVERSITIES AND SEPARATED ESSENCES

Aristotle's metaphysics in the universities produced the doctrine of essences separated from bodies.

46.13 What is now called a *university* is a joining together and incorporation, under one government, of many public schools in one and the same town or city. In it the principal schools were established for the three professions: Roman religion, Roman law, and the art of medicine. The study of philosophy has no place there except as a handmaid to the Roman religion. And since only the authority of Aristotle has currency there, that study is not properly philosophy (whose nature does not depend on authors) but Aristotelity. As for geometry, until very recently it had no place there at all, since it serves nothing but rigorous truth. And if any man had, by the ingenuity of his own nature, attained any degree of perfection in it, he was commonly thought a magician, and his art diabolical.

46.14 Now, to come down to the particular tenets of vain philosophy, which came into the universities and from there into the Church, partly from Aristotle and partly from blindness of understanding, I will first consider their principles. There is a certain *philosophia prima* on which all other philosophy ought to depend. It consists chiefly in rightly limiting the meanings of those appellations, or names, that are the most universal of all. These limitations serve to avoid ambiguity and equivocation in reasoning, and are commonly called definitions—such as the definitions of body, time, place, matter, form, essence, subject, substance, accident, power, act, finite, infinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, passion, and various others necessary for explaining a man's conceptions of the nature and generation of bodies. The explication (that is, the settling of the meaning) of these and similar terms is commonly called *metaphysics* in the Schools, as being a part of the philosophy of Aristotle that bears that title. But there it is in another sense: there it means *books written or placed after his natural philosophy*, while the Schools

take them for *books of supernatural philosophy*; for the word *metaphysics* will bear both senses. And indeed what is written there is for the most part so far from being possible to understand, and so contrary to natural reason, that anyone who thinks there is anything to be understood by it must think it supernatural.

46.15 From these metaphysics, mixed with Scripture to make School divinity, we are told that there are in the world certain essences separated from bodies, which they call *abstract essences* and *substantial forms*. To interpret this *jargon* requires somewhat more than ordinary attention here. I also ask pardon of those who are not used to this kind of discourse for addressing myself to those who are. The world (I mean not only the earth, which gives those who love it the name of *worldly men*, but the *universe*, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, body, and has the dimensions of magnitude, namely length, breadth, and depth. Every part of body is likewise body and has the same dimensions. Consequently every part of the universe is body, and what is not body is no part of the universe. And because the universe is all, what is no part of it is *nothing*, and consequently *nowhere*. It does not follow from this that spirits are *nothing*. For they have dimensions, and are therefore really *bodies*—though in common speech that name is given only to bodies that are visible or tangible, that is, that have some degree of opacity. Spirits, however, they call incorporeal, which is a more honorable name, and may therefore more piously be attributed to God himself. In him we consider not which attribute best expresses his nature, which is incomprehensible, but which best expresses our desire to honor him.

46.16 Now, to know on what grounds they say there are *abstract essences* or *substantial forms*, we must consider what those words properly signify. The use of words is to register for ourselves, and to make manifest to others, the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. Of these words, some are names of the things conceived, such as the names of all sorts of bodies that work on the senses and leave an impression in the imagination. Others are names of the imaginations themselves, that is to say, of the ideas

or mental images we have of all the things we see or remember. And others again are names of names, or of different sorts of speech: thus *universal*, *plural*, *singular* are names of names; and *definition*, *affirmation*, *negation*, *true*, *false*, *syllogism*, *interrogation*, *promise*, *covenant* are names of certain forms of speech. Others serve to show the consequence or repugnance of one name to another. When someone says, "A man is a body," he means that the name *body* necessarily follows from the name *man*, as being only different names of the same thing, *man*; and this consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word *is*. And as we use the verb *is*, so the Latins use their verb *est*, and the Greeks their *esti*, through all its inflections. Whether all the other nations of the world have a word in their various languages that corresponds to it or not, I cannot tell. But I am sure they have no need of it. For placing two names in order could serve to signify their consequence, if that were the custom (for it is custom that gives words their force), just as well as the words *is*, or *be*, or *are*, and the like.

46.17 And if there were a language without any verb corresponding to *est*, or *is*, or *be*, the men who used it would be not a bit less capable of inferring, concluding, and every kind of reasoning than the Greeks and Latins were. But what then would become of these terms *entity*, *essence*, *essential*, *essentiality*, which are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applied as they most commonly are? They are therefore not names of things, but signs by which we make known that we conceive the consequence of one name or attribute to another. When we say, "A man is a living body," we do not mean that the *man* is one thing, the *living body* another, and the *is*, or *being*, a third; but that the *man* and the *living body* are the same thing. For the consequence "If he is a man, he is a living body" is a true consequence, signified by that word *is*. Therefore *to be a body*, *to walk*, *to be speaking*, *to live*, *to see*, and similar infinitives, and also *corporeity*, *walking*, *speaking*, *life*, *sight*, and the like, which signify just the same, are the names of *nothing*, as I have explained more fully elsewhere.

46.18 But what is the point (someone may say) of such subtlety in a work of this kind, where I aim at nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of government and obedience? The point is this: that men may no longer let themselves be deceived by those who, with this doctrine of *separated essences*, built on the vain philosophy of Aristotle, would frighten them from obeying the laws of their country with empty names—as men frighten birds from the grain with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is on this ground that they say that when a man is dead and buried, his soul (that is, his life) can walk separated from his body, and is seen at night among the graves. On the same ground they say that the shape, color, and taste of a piece of bread have a being there, where they say there is no bread. And on the same ground they say that faith, wisdom, and other virtues are sometimes *poured* into a man and sometimes *blown* into him from heaven—as if the virtuous and their virtues could be separated—and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependence of subjects on the sovereign power of their country. For who will make any effort to obey the laws if he expects obedience to be poured or blown into him? Or who will not obey a priest who can make God, rather than his sovereign—indeed, rather than God himself? Or who that is afraid of ghosts will not show great respect to those who can make the holy water that drives them away from him? And this will suffice as an example of the errors brought into the Church from the *entities* and *essences* of Aristotle—which perhaps he knew to be false philosophy, but wrote as something consistent with and supporting their religion, fearing the fate of Socrates.

46.19 Having once fallen into this error of *separated essences*, they are necessarily entangled in many other absurdities that follow from it. For since they will have these forms be real, they are obliged to assign them *some place*. But because they hold them to be incorporeal, without any dimension of quantity, and everyone knows that place is dimension and can be filled only by what is corporeal, they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction: that they are not indeed anywhere *circumscriptive*

but *definitive*. These terms, being mere words and in this case meaningless, pass only in Latin, so that their emptiness may be concealed.[39] For the circumscription of a thing is nothing but the determination, or defining, of its place; so both terms of the distinction are the same. And in particular, of the essence of a man, which (they say) is his soul, they affirm that all of it is in his little finger, and all of it in every other part of his body, however small; and yet that there is no more soul in the whole body than in any one of those parts. Can anyone think that God is served by such absurdities? And yet all this must be believed by those who will believe in the existence of an incorporeal soul, separated from the body.

46.20 And when they come to explain how an incorporeal substance can be capable of pain, and be tormented in the fire of hell or purgatory, they have nothing at all to answer except that it cannot be known how fire can burn souls.

46.21 Again, since motion is change of place, and incorporeal substances are not capable of place, they are hard put to make it seem possible how a soul can go from here, without the body, to heaven, hell, or purgatory; and how the ghosts of men (and, I may add, of the clothes they appear in) can walk at night in churches, churchyards, and other burial places. I do not know what they can answer to this, unless they say they walk *definitive*, not *circumscriptive*, or *spiritually*, not *temporally*; for such egregious distinctions apply equally well to any difficulty whatever.

46.22 As for the meaning of *eternity*, they will not have it be an endless succession of time. For then they could not give a reason why God's will and preordaining of things to come should not come before his foreknowledge of them, as the efficient cause comes before the effect, or the agent before the action—nor for many other of their bold opinions about the incomprehensible nature of God. Instead they will teach us that eternity is the

39 The Schoolmen held that a body is in a place "circumscriptively" (bounded by it, part for part), while a spirit is in a place only "definitively" (confined to it without being measured by it).

standing still of the present time, a *nunc-stans* (as the Schools call it), which neither they nor anyone else understands, any more than they would a *hic-stans* for an infinite greatness of place.[40]

46.23 Again: when men divide a body in thought by numbering its parts, in numbering those parts they also number the parts of the place it filled. So in making many parts we must also make many places for those parts, and no one can conceive in his mind more or fewer parts than there are places for them. Yet they would have us believe that, by the almighty power of God, one body may be in many places at one and the same time, and many bodies in one place at one and the same time—as if it were an acknowledgment of the divine power to say that what is, is not, or that what has been, has not been. And these are only a small part of the incongruities they are driven to by disputing philosophically, instead of admiring and adoring the divine and incomprehensible nature. God's attributes cannot signify what he is; they ought to signify our desire to honor him with the best names we can think of. But those who venture to reason about his nature from these attributes of honor lose their understanding in the very first attempt, and fall from one difficulty into another, without end and without number. It is like a man ignorant of the ceremonies of court who comes into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speaking to: he stumbles as he enters, and to save himself from falling lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak he lets fall his hat; and with one blunder after another he betrays his bewilderment and his rustic manners.

ERRORS OF SCHOLASTIC PHYSICS

The Schools explain gravity, sense, will and other effects with empty words.

46.24 Then for *physics*—that is, the knowledge of the subordinate and secondary causes of natural events—they give no causes at all, only empty words. If you want to know why some kinds of

40 *Nunc-stans*: "standing now"; *hic-stans*: "standing here."

bodies naturally sink down toward the earth and others naturally move away from it, the Schools will tell you, out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink are *heavy*, and that it is this heaviness that makes them descend. But if you ask what they mean by *heaviness*, they will define it as an endeavor to go to the center of the earth. So the cause why things sink downward is an endeavor to be below—which is as much as to say that bodies descend or ascend because they do. Or they will tell you that the center of the earth is the place of rest and preservation for heavy things, and therefore they endeavor to be there. As if stones and metals had a desire, or could discern the place they would like to be, as man does; or loved rest, as man does not; or as if a piece of glass were less safe in the window than falling into the street.

46.25 If we want to know why the same body seems larger at one time than at another, without anything added to it, they say that when it seems smaller it is *condensed*, and when larger, *rarefied*. What are *condensed* and *rarefied*? Condensed is when there is less quantity in the very same matter than before; rarefied, when there is more. As if there could be matter that did not have some determinate quantity—when quantity is nothing else but the determination of matter, that is to say, of body, by which we say one body is greater or smaller than another by so much or so much. Or as if a body were made without any quantity at all, and more or less were afterward put into it, according as the body was meant to be more or less dense.

46.26 For the cause of the soul of man, they say *Creatur infundendo* and *Creando infunditur*: that is, "It is created by being poured in," and "It is poured in by being created."

46.27 For the cause of sense, they give an omnipresence of *species*, that is, of the *shows* or *appearances* of objects. When these are appearances to the eye, they are *sight*; to the ear, *hearing*; to the palate, *taste*; to the nostril, *smell*; and to the rest of the body, *feeling*.

46.28 For the cause of the will to do any particular action, which is called *volitio*, they assign the faculty—that is, the general capa-

city men have to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another—which is called *voluntas*. They make the *power* the cause of the *act*: as if one were to assign as the cause of men's good or evil acts their ability to do them.

46.29 And on many occasions they give their own ignorance, disguised in other words, as the cause of natural events. So when they say that fortune is the cause of contingent things—that is, of things they know no cause for. And so when they attribute many effects to *occult qualities*—that is, qualities not known to them, and therefore (as they think) to no one else—and to *sympathy*, *antipathy*, *antiperistasis*, *specific qualities*, and other such terms, which signify neither the agent that produces the effects nor the operation by which they are produced.[41]

46.30 If such *metaphysics* and *physics* as this are not *vain philosophy*, there never was any, and St. Paul had no need to warn us to avoid it.[42]

ERRORS OF MORAL AND CIVIL PHILOSOPHY

Private measures of good, clerical celibacy, the hatred of tyranny and inquisition into consciences are attacked.

46.31 And their moral and civil philosophy has the same absurdities, or greater. If a man does an unjust action, that is, an action contrary to the law, God, they say, is the first cause of the law, and also the first cause of that action and of all other actions; but no cause at all of the injustice, which is the nonconformity of the action to the law. This is vain philosophy. One might as well say that one man makes both a straight line and a crooked one, and another man makes their disagreement. And such is the philosophy of all men who settle on their conclusions before they know their premises, pretending to comprehend what is incomprehensible, and turning attributes of honor into attrib-

41 *Antiperistasis*: the scholastic notion that a quality is intensified by being surrounded by its contrary (for example, that cold around a body makes its heat stronger).

42 Colossians 2:8: "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit."

utes of nature. This distinction was made to uphold the doctrine of free will—that is, of a will of man not subject to the will of God.

46.32 Aristotle and other pagan philosophers define good and evil by the appetite of men. That is well enough so long as we consider men as each governed by his own law. For in the condition of men who have no other law but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good and evil actions. But in a commonwealth this measure is false. The measure is not the appetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of the state. And yet this doctrine is still practiced. Men judge the goodness or wickedness of their own actions, of other men's, and of the actions of the commonwealth itself, by their own passions. No one calls anything good or evil except what is so in his own eyes, without any regard at all to the public laws—except only monks and friars, who are bound by vow to that simple obedience to their superior to which every subject ought to think himself bound by the law of nature to the civil sovereign. And this private measure of good is a doctrine not only vain but also pernicious to the public state.

46.33 It is also vain and false philosophy to say that the act of marriage is contrary to chastity or continence, and so to make marriage a moral vice—as they do who allege chastity and continence as the ground for denying marriage to the clergy. For they admit it is no more than an ordinance of the Church, which requires of those in holy orders who continually attend the altar and administer the Eucharist a continual abstinence from women, under the name of continual chastity, continence, and purity. So they call the lawful use of wives a want of chastity and continence, and thus make marriage a sin, or at least a thing so impure and unclean as to make a man unfit for the altar. If the law was made because the use of wives is incontinence and contrary to chastity, then all marriage is vice. If it was made because it is a thing too impure and unclean for a man consecrated to God, then much more should the other natural, neces-

sary, daily functions that all men perform make men unworthy to be priests, because they are more unclean.

46.34 But the secret foundation of this prohibition of the marriage of priests is not likely to have been laid so lightly as on such errors in moral philosophy; nor yet on the preference of the single life to the state of matrimony, which came from the wisdom of St. Paul, who saw how inconvenient it was for those who, in those times of persecution, were preachers of the Gospel and forced to flee from one country to another, to be burdened with the care of wife and children. It was laid rather on the design of the popes and priests of later times to make themselves the clergy—that is to say, the sole heirs of the Kingdom of God in this world. For this it was necessary to take from them the use of marriage, because our Savior says that at the coming of his kingdom the children of God "shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, but shall be as the angels in heaven"—that is to say, spiritual.[43] Since, then, they had taken on themselves the name of spiritual, it would have been an inconsistency to allow themselves (when there was no need) the possession of wives.

46.35 From Aristotle's civil philosophy they have learned to call every kind of commonwealth except the popular one (such as the state of Athens was at that time) *tyranny*. The Athenians called all kings tyrants, and they called the aristocracy of the thirty governors set up there by the Spartans who conquered them "the Thirty Tyrants." They have learned too to call the condition of the people under democracy *liberty*. A *tyrant* originally signified simply a *monarch*, and nothing more. But afterward, when that kind of government had been abolished in most parts of Greece, the name began to signify not only what it had before, but along with it the hatred that the popular states bore toward it—just as the name of king became odious in Rome after the kings were deposed. For it is natural to all men to conceive some great fault to be signified in any name that is given in spite, and

43 Matthew 22:30; St. Paul's preference for the single life is in 1 Corinthians 7.

to a great enemy.[44] And when the same men are displeased with those who administer a democracy or an aristocracy, they need not look far for insulting names to express their anger in; they readily call the one *anarchy* and the other *oligarchy*, or *the tyranny of a few*. And what offends the people is nothing else than that they are governed, not as each of them would himself wish, but as the public representative—be it one man or an assembly of men—thinks fit; that is, by an arbitrary government. For this they give their superiors evil names, never knowing (until perhaps a little after a civil war) that without such arbitrary government such war must be perpetual, and that it is men and arms, not words and promises, that make the force and power of the laws.

46.36 And therefore this is another error of Aristotle's *Politics*: that in a well-ordered commonwealth not men should govern, but the laws. What man with his natural senses, even if he can neither read nor write, does not find himself governed by those he fears and believes can kill or hurt him if he does not obey? Or who believes the law can hurt him—that is, words and paper, without the hands and swords of men? And this is one of the pernicious errors. For such errors lead men, as often as they dislike their governors, to side with those who call them tyrants, and to think it lawful to make war against them. And yet they are often fostered from the pulpit by the clergy.

46.37 There is another error in their civil philosophy (which they never learned from Aristotle, or Cicero, or any other of the pagans): extending the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the very thoughts and consciences of men, by examination and *inquisition* into what they hold, even though their speech and actions conform. By this men are either punished for answering truthfully what they think, or forced to answer an untruth for fear of punishment. It is true that the civil magistrate, intending to employ a minister in the charge of teaching, may ask him whether he is content to preach such and

44 The Thirty Tyrants ruled Athens in 404–403 BC after its defeat by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War.

such doctrines, and if he refuses, may deny him the employment. But to force him to accuse himself of opinions, when his actions are not forbidden by law, is against the law of nature—and especially so for those who teach that a man shall be damned to eternal and extreme torments if he dies in a false opinion concerning an article of the Christian faith. For who is there who, knowing there is so great a danger in an error, is not compelled by the natural care of himself to risk his soul on his own judgment, rather than on that of any other man who is unconcerned in his damnation?

46.38 That a private man, without the authority of the commonwealth—that is to say, without permission from its representative—may interpret the law by his own spirit is another error in politics, but not one drawn from Aristotle or any other of the pagan philosophers. For none of them denies that the power of making laws includes also the power of explaining them when there is need. And are not the Scriptures, in all places where they are law, made law by the authority of the commonwealth, and consequently a part of the civil law?

46.39 Of the same kind is it when anyone but the sovereign restrains in any man a power that the commonwealth has not restrained—as those do who reserve the preaching of the Gospel to one particular order of men, where the laws have left it free. If the state gives me leave to preach or teach—that is, if it does not forbid me—no one can forbid me. If I find myself among the idol-worshipping peoples of America, shall I, a Christian, though not in orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ until I have received orders from Rome? Or when I have preached, shall I not answer their doubts and expound the Scriptures to them—that is, shall I not teach? Someone may say that for this, as also for administering the sacraments to them, the necessity will be counted a sufficient commission. That is true. But this is true also: whatever a dispensation is due for on account of necessity, for that same thing no dispensation is needed when there is no law forbidding it. Therefore to deny these functions to those to whom the civil sovereign has not denied them is to

take away a lawful liberty, which is contrary to the doctrine of civil government.

46.40 More examples of vain philosophy brought into religion by the doctors of school divinity might be given, but others may, if they please, observe them for themselves. I shall only add this: that the writings of the school divines are for the most part nothing but meaningless strings of strange and barbarous words, or of words used otherwise than in the common use of the Latin tongue—such as would baffle Cicero, and Varro, and all the grammarians of ancient Rome.[45] If anyone wants to see this proved, let him (as I have said once before) see whether he can translate any school divine into any of the modern languages, such as French, English, or any other rich language. For what cannot be made intelligible in most of these is not intelligible in the Latin. This meaninglessness of language, though I cannot mark it down as false philosophy, has nevertheless the property not only of hiding the truth, but also of making men think they have it, so that they give up further search.

FALSE HISTORY AND SUPPRESSED TRUTH

Legends of miracles and ghosts are dismissed, and churchmen's punishment of true philosophy is condemned.

46.41 Lastly, as for the errors brought in from false or uncertain history: what is all the legend of fictitious miracles in the lives of the saints, and all the histories of apparitions and ghosts cited by the doctors of the Roman Church to support their doctrines of hell and purgatory, the power of exorcism, and other doctrines that have no warrant in either reason or Scripture—as also all those traditions they call the unwritten Word of God—but old wives' tales? Some of these, indeed, they find scattered in the writings of the ancient Fathers. But those Fathers were men who might too easily believe false reports. And producing their opinions as testimony for the truth of what they believed has no

45 Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BC), the most learned Roman scholar of Latin language and antiquities.

other force with those who, following the counsel of St. John, (1 John 4:1) test the spirits, than—in everything that concerns the power of the Roman Church (whose abuse the Fathers either did not suspect or profited from)—to discredit their testimony, on account of their too hasty belief of reports. The most sincere men, without great knowledge of natural causes (as the Fathers were), are commonly the most subject to that. For naturally the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes. Pope Gregory and St. Bernard have something about apparitions of ghosts who said they were in purgatory, and so has our Bede—but nowhere, I believe, except by report from others.[46] But if they, or anyone else, relate such stories from their own knowledge, they will not thereby confirm such vain reports the more, but only reveal their own weakness, or fraud.

46.42 Together with the introduction of false philosophy we may also consider the suppression of true philosophy, by men who are competent judges of the truth neither by lawful authority nor by sufficient study. Our own voyages make it plain, and all men learned in human sciences now acknowledge, that there are antipodes. And every day it appears more and more that years and days are determined by motions of the earth. Nevertheless, men who in their writings have merely supposed such a doctrine, as an occasion to set out the reasons for and against it, have been punished for it by ecclesiastical authority. But what reason is there for that? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they are true.[47] Then let the truth first be examined by competent judges, or refuted by those who claim to know the contrary. Is it because they are contrary to the established religion? Then let them be silenced by the laws of those to whom their teachers are subject—that is, by the

46 "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God" (1 John 4:1). Pope Gregory I ("the Great," d. 604), in his *Dialogues*; St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153); the Venerable Bede (d. 735), English historian.

47 Antipodes: people living on the opposite side of the globe, whose existence some Church authorities had denied. The punishment alludes chiefly to Galileo, condemned by the Roman Inquisition in 1633 for his *Dialogue* on the Copernican system.

civil laws. For disobedience may lawfully be punished in those who teach even true philosophy against the laws. Is it because they tend to disorder in government, by encouraging rebellion or sedition? Then let them be silenced, and their teachers punished, by virtue of the power of him to whom the care of public peace is committed, which is the civil authority. For whatever power churchmen take upon themselves in their own right (in any place where they are subject to the state), though they call it God's right, is nothing but usurpation.

CHAPTER 47: OF THE BENEFIT THAT PROCEEDS FROM SUCH DARKNESS, AND TO WHOM IT ACCRUES

Asking cui bono, Hobbes finds the papacy and Presbyterian clergy profit from these doctrines.

47.1 Cicero makes honorable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe judge among the Romans, for a custom he had in criminal cases, when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient, of asking the accusers *cui bono*—that is to say, what profit, honor, or other satisfaction the accused had obtained or expected from the deed. For among presumptions there is none that so plainly reveals the author as the *benefit* of the action. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine who they may be who have for so long possessed the people in this part of Christendom with these doctrines, contrary to the peaceable societies of mankind.[48]

47.2 And first, to this error—*that the present Church now militant on earth is the Kingdom of God* (that is, the Kingdom of Glory, or the Land of Promise; not the Kingdom of Grace, which is only a promise of the land)—these worldly benefits are attached. First, that the pastors and teachers of the Church are entitled by it, as God's public ministers, to a right of governing the Church; and consequently (because the Church and the commonwealth are the same persons) to be rulers and governors of the common-

48 Lucius Cassius Longinus Ravilla, praised by Cicero in *Pro Roscio Amerino*. *Cui bono*: "to whose benefit?"

wealth. It is by this title that the Pope prevailed on the subjects of all Christian princes to believe that to disobey him was to disobey Christ himself, and, in all disputes between him and other princes, to abandon their lawful sovereigns, bewitched by the words *spiritual power*—which is in effect a universal monarchy over all Christendom. For although the popes were first invested with the right of being supreme teachers of Christian doctrine by and under Christian emperors, within the limits of the Roman Empire (as they themselves acknowledge), under the title of *pontifex maximus*, who was an officer subject to the civil state, yet after the empire was divided and dissolved it was not hard to impose on the people already subject to them another title, namely the right of St. Peter. They did so not only to keep their pretended power whole, but also to extend it over the same Christian provinces, though these were no longer united in the empire of Rome. This benefit of a universal monarchy (considering men's desire to rule) is sufficient presumption that the popes who laid claim to it, and for a long time enjoyed it, were the authors of the doctrine by which it was obtained: namely, that the Church now on earth is the Kingdom of Christ. For once that is granted, it must be understood that Christ has some lieutenant among us, by whom we are to be told what his commandments are.

47.3 After certain churches had renounced this universal power of the Pope, one would reasonably expect the civil sovereigns in all those churches to have recovered as much of it as had been their own right and in their own hands before they unwisely let it go. And in England this was in effect the case—except that those through whom the kings administered the government of religion, by maintaining that their office was held by God's right, seemed to usurp, if not a supremacy, at least an independence of the civil power. And they only *seemed* to usurp it, inasmuch as they acknowledged a right in the king to deprive them of the exercise of their functions at his pleasure.

47.4 But in those places where the Presbytery took over that office, though many other doctrines of the Church of Rome were

forbidden to be taught, this doctrine was still kept: that the Kingdom of Christ has already come, and that it began at the resurrection of our Savior. But *cui bono*? What profit did they expect from it? The same that the popes expected: to have a sovereign power over the people. For what is it for men to excommunicate their lawful king, but to keep him from every place of God's public worship in his own kingdom, and to resist him by force when he by force tries to correct them? Or what is it to excommunicate any person without authority from the civil sovereign, but to take from him his lawful liberty—that is, to usurp an unlawful power over their brethren? The authors, therefore, of this darkness in religion are the Roman and the Presbyterian clergy.

47.5 Under this head I also place all the doctrines that serve them to keep possession of this spiritual sovereignty once it is gained. First, that *the Pope in his public capacity cannot err*. For who is there that, believing this to be true, will not readily obey him in whatever he commands?

47.6 Second, that all other bishops, in whatever commonwealth, have their right neither immediately from God nor mediately from their civil sovereigns, but from the Pope. By this doctrine there come to be in every Christian commonwealth many powerful men (for bishops are such) who depend on the Pope and owe him obedience, though he is a foreign prince. By this means he is able (as he has done many times) to stir up a civil war against any state that does not submit to being governed according to his pleasure and interest.

47.7 Third, the exemption of these, and of all other priests, and of all monks and friars, from the power of the civil laws. For by this means there is a great part of every commonwealth that enjoys the benefit of the laws and is protected by the power of the civil state, yet pays no part of the public expense, and is not liable, as other subjects are, to the penalties due to its crimes. Consequently they stand in fear of no one but the Pope, and adhere to him alone, to uphold his universal monarchy.

47.8 Fourth, giving their priests (who in the New Testament are no more than presbyters, that is, elders) the name of *sacerdotes*, that is, sacrificers—which was the title of the civil sovereign and his public ministers among the Jews while God was their king. Also, making the Lord's Supper a sacrifice serves to make the people believe that the Pope has the same power over all Christians that Moses and Aaron had over the Jews—that is to say, all power, both civil and ecclesiastical, as the high priest then had.

47.9 Fifth, teaching that matrimony is a sacrament gives the clergy the judging of the lawfulness of marriages, and thereby of which children are legitimate, and consequently of the right of succession to hereditary kingdoms.

47.10 Sixth, the denial of marriage to priests serves to secure this power of the Pope over kings. For if a king is a priest, he cannot marry and pass his kingdom on to his descendants; if he is not a priest, then the Pope claims this ecclesiastical authority over him and over his people.

47.11 Seventh, from auricular confession they obtain, for the security of their power, better intelligence of the designs of princes and great persons in the civil state than these can have of the designs of the ecclesiastical state.[49]

47.12 Eighth, by the canonization of saints and the declaring of who are martyrs, they secure their power: for they lead simple men into obstinacy against the laws and commands of their civil sovereigns, even to death, if by the Pope's excommunication those sovereigns are declared heretics or enemies to the Church—that is (as they interpret it), to the Pope.

47.13 Ninth, they secure the same by the power they ascribe to every priest of making Christ, and by the power of ordaining penance, and of remitting and retaining sins.

47.14 Tenth, by the doctrine of purgatory, of justification by external works, and of indulgences, the clergy is enriched.

47.15 Eleventh, by their demonology, and the use of exorcism, and other things belonging to it, they keep (or think they keep) the people more in awe of their power.

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49 Auricular confession: private confession of sins spoken into the priest's ear.

47.16 Lastly, the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, and the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the Schoolmen, taught in the universities (which have all been founded and regulated by the Pope's authority), serve them to keep these errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the *ignis fatuus* of vain philosophy for the light of the Gospel.[50]

47.17 To these, if they were not enough, might be added others of their dark doctrines, whose profit plainly goes toward setting up an unlawful power over the lawful sovereigns of Christian people, or toward sustaining it once it is set up, or toward the worldly riches, honor, and authority of those who sustain it. And therefore by the aforesaid rule of *cui bono*, we may justly declare the authors of all this spiritual darkness to be the Pope and the Roman clergy, and besides them all those who try to settle in men's minds this erroneous doctrine: that the Church now on earth is that Kingdom of God mentioned in the Old and New Testament.

47.18 But the emperors and other Christian sovereigns under whose government these errors, and similar encroachments of churchmen on their office, first crept in—to the disturbance of their possessions and of the tranquility of their subjects—though they suffered it for want of foresight of what would follow and of insight into the designs of their teachers, may nevertheless be counted accessories to their own injury and the public harm. For without their authority no seditious doctrine could at first have been publicly preached. I say they might have prevented it at the beginning. But once the people were possessed by those spiritual men, there was no human remedy that anyone could devise. And as for the remedies that God should provide—who never fails in his own good time to destroy all the schemes of men against the truth—we must wait on his good pleasure. He often allows the prosperity of his enemies, together with their ambition, to grow to such a height that its very viol-

50 *Ignis fatuus*: "foolish fire," the will-o'-the-wisp, a marsh light that leads travelers astray.

ence opens the eyes which the caution of their predecessors had sealed up before, and makes men let go of everything by grasping too much—as Peter's net was broken by the struggling of too great a multitude of fish. Whereas the impatience of those who try to resist such encroachment before their subjects' eyes are opened only increases the power they resist.[51] I do not therefore blame the Emperor Frederick for holding the stirrup for our countryman Pope Adrian. For such was the disposition of his subjects then that, if he had not done it, he was not likely to have succeeded to the empire. But I blame those who in the beginning, when their power was whole, by allowing such doctrines to be forged in the universities of their own dominions, have held the stirrup for all the succeeding popes, while they mounted into the thrones of all Christian sovereigns, to ride and tire out both them and their people at their pleasure.[52]

THE KNOTS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POWER UNTIED

Church power was tied in three knots and has been untied in England in reverse order.

47.19 But as the inventions of men are woven, so also are they unraveled: the way is the same, but the order is reversed. The web begins at the first elements of power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and the other virtues of the apostles, whom the people they converted obeyed out of reverence, not by obligation. Their consciences were free, and their words and actions were subject to no one but the civil power. Afterward, as the flocks of Christ increased, the presbyters assembled to consider what they should teach, and so bound themselves to teach nothing against the decrees of their assemblies. They made it thought that the people were thereby bound to follow their doctrine; and when the people refused, they refused to keep com-

51 Luke 5:6.

52 Frederick I Barbarossa, who in 1155 performed the customary service of holding the stirrup for Pope Adrian IV (Nicholas Breakspear), the only English pope, before his imperial coronation.

pany with them (this was then called excommunication), not as unbelievers but as disobedient. And this was the first knot upon their liberty. And as the number of presbyters increased, the presbyters of the chief city or province got themselves an authority over the parish presbyters, and took for themselves the name of bishops. And this was a second knot on Christian liberty. Lastly, the Bishop of Rome, on account of the imperial city, took on himself an authority over all the other bishops of the empire—partly by the will of the emperors themselves and by the title of *pontifex maximus*, and at last, when the emperors had grown weak, by the privileges of St. Peter. This was the third and last knot, and the whole *synthesis* and *construction* of the papal power.

47.20 And therefore the *analysis*, or *resolution*, goes the same way, but begins with the knot that was tied last, as we may see in the dissolution of the extra-political church government in England. First, the power of the popes was dissolved entirely by Queen Elizabeth; and the bishops, who before had exercised their functions by right of the Pope, afterward exercised them by right of the queen and her successors—though by keeping the phrase *jure divino* they were thought to claim them by immediate right from God. And so the first knot was untied.[53] After this, the Presbyterians lately in England obtained the abolition of episcopacy; and so the second knot was undone. And almost at the same time the power was taken from the Presbyterians as well. And so we are brought back to the independency of the primitive Christians, to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he likes best. Which, if it is without contention, and without measuring the doctrine of Christ by our affection for the person of his minister (the fault the Apostle rebuked in the Corinthians), is perhaps the best:[54] first, because there ought to be no power over the consciences of men but that of the Word

53 *Jure divino*: "by divine right."

54 1 Corinthians 1:12 and 3:4–6. Episcopacy was abolished by Parliament in 1646; the Presbyterian establishment lost its power after the army's purge of Parliament in 1648.

itself, working faith in each one, not always according to the purpose of those who plant and water, but of God himself, who gives the increase; and second, because it is unreasonable for those who teach that there is such danger in every little error to require a man endowed with reason of his own to follow the reason of any other man, or the majority vote of many other men. That is little better than staking his salvation on the toss of a coin.[55] Nor ought those teachers to be displeased at this loss of their ancient authority. For no one should know better than they that power is preserved by the same virtues by which it is acquired—that is to say, by wisdom, humility, clarity of doctrine, and sincerity of conduct; and not by suppressing the natural sciences and the morality of natural reason; nor by obscure language; nor by claiming more knowledge than they show; nor by pious frauds; nor by such other faults as in the pastors of God's Church are not only faults but also scandals, apt to make men stumble one time or another into the suppression of their authority.

THE PAPACY AND THE KINGDOM OF FAIRIES

The papacy is compared point by point to the fairies of English folk tales.

47.21 But after this doctrine—*that the Church now militant is the Kingdom of God spoken of in the Old and New Testament*—was received in the world, the ambition and canvassing for the offices belonging to it, and especially for that great office of being Christ's lieutenant, and the pomp of those who obtained the principal public posts in it, became by degrees so evident that the clergy lost the inward reverence due to the pastoral office. So much so that the wisest of those who had any power in the civil state needed nothing but the authority of their princes to refuse them any further obedience. For from the time that the Bishop of Rome had got himself acknowledged as universal

55 "I have planted, Apollos watered; but God gave the increase" (1 Corinthians 3:6). Hobbes's phrase is "at cross and pile," heads or tails.

bishop, on the pretense of succession to St. Peter, their whole hierarchy, or kingdom of darkness, may not unfitly be compared to the kingdom of fairies—that is, to the old wives' tales in England about ghosts and spirits and the tricks they play in the night. And if a man considers the origin of this great ecclesiastical dominion, he will easily see that the papacy is nothing other than the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof. For so did the papacy start up suddenly out of the ruins of that pagan power.

47.22 The language, too, which they use both in the churches and in their public acts, is Latin, which is not commonly used by any nation now in the world. What is it but the ghost of the old Roman language?

47.23 The fairies, in whatever nation they live, have only one universal king, whom some of our poets call King Oberon; but Scripture calls him Beelzebub, prince of demons. The churchmen likewise, in whosever dominions they are found, acknowledge only one universal king, the Pope.[56]

47.24 The churchmen are *spiritual* men and *ghostly* fathers. The fairies are *spirits* and *ghosts*. Fairies and ghosts inhabit darkness, solitudes, and graves. The churchmen walk in obscurity of doctrine, in monasteries, churches, and churchyards.[57]

47.25 The churchmen have their cathedral churches, which, in whatever town they are built, have the power, by virtue of holy water and certain charms called exorcisms, to make those towns cities, that is to say, seats of empire. The fairies also have their enchanted castles, and certain gigantic ghosts that lord it over the regions round about them.

47.26 The fairies cannot be seized and brought to answer for the harm they do. So too the churchmen vanish away from the tribunals of civil justice.

47.27 The churchmen take from young men the use of reason, by certain charms compounded of metaphysics, and miracles, and traditions, and abused Scripture, so that they are good for

56 Oberon is king of the fairies in Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.
57 Hobbes plays on "ghostly father," the usual name for a priest as confessor.

nothing but to carry out what they are commanded. The fairies likewise are said to take young children out of their cradles and change them into children with intellectual disabilities, whom common people therefore call *elves*, and who are apt to mischief.[58]

47.28 In what shop or workshop the fairies make their enchantment, the old wives have not determined. But the workshops of the clergy are well enough known to be the universities, which received their discipline from papal authority.

47.29 When the fairies are displeased with anyone, they are said to send their elves to pinch them. The churchmen, when they are displeased with any civil state, likewise make their elves—that is, superstitious, enchanted subjects—pinch their princes by preaching sedition; or make one prince, enchanted with promises, pinch another.

47.30 The fairies do not marry; but there are among them *incubi*, who have intercourse with flesh and blood. The priests also do not marry.[59]

47.31 The churchmen take the cream of the land, by donations from ignorant men who stand in awe of them, and by tithes. So too in the tale of the fairies, they get into the dairies and feast on the cream, which they skim from the milk.

47.32 What kind of money is current in the kingdom of the fairies is not recorded in the story. But the churchmen accept the same money we do in their receipts, though when they have to make any payment, it is in canonizations, indulgences, and Masses.

47.33 To this and similar resemblances between the papacy and the kingdom of fairies may be added this: that as the fairies have no existence except in the fancies of ignorant people, arising from the traditions of old wives or old poets, so the spiritual power of the Pope (outside the bounds of his own civil dominion) consists only in the fear that deluded people have of his

58 The folk belief in "changelings": fairies were said to steal a child and leave one of their own in its place.
59 *Incubi*: demons believed to lie with sleeping women.

excommunications, on hearing of false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations of Scripture.

47.34 It was not, therefore, a very difficult matter for Henry VIII by his exorcism, nor for Queen Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who knows that this spirit of Rome, now gone out and walking by missions through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, which yield him little fruit, may not return—or rather an assembly of spirits worse than he enter in and inhabit this clean-swept house, and make the end of it worse than the beginning? For it is not the Roman clergy only that claims the Kingdom of God to be of this world, and thereby to have a power in it distinct from that of the civil state.[60] And this is all I intended to say concerning the doctrine of politics. When I have reviewed it, I shall willingly submit it to the judgment of my country.

A REVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Hobbes answers the objection that the faculties needed for civil duty cannot coexist in one person.

R&C.1 From the conflict of some of the natural faculties of the mind with one another, as also of one passion with another, and from their bearing on social life, an argument has been drawn to infer that it is impossible for any one man to be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of civil duty. Severity of judgment, they say, makes men censorious and unready to pardon the errors and weaknesses of other men; and on the other side, quickness of fancy makes the thoughts less steady than is necessary to discern exactly between right and wrong. Again, in all deliberations and in all pleadings the faculty of solid reasoning is necessary, for without it men's resolutions are rash and their sentences unjust. And yet if there is not powerful eloquence, which wins attention and consent, the effect of reason will be small. But these are contrary faculties: the former is grounded on prin-

60 Matthew 12:43–45: the unclean spirit that returns with seven worse spirits to the house it finds "empty, swept, and garnished."

ciples of truth; the other on opinions already received, whether true or false, and on the passions and interests of men, which are various and changeable.

R&C.2 And among the passions, *courage* (by which I mean the contempt of wounds and violent death) inclines men to private revenge, and sometimes to try to unsettle the public peace; while *timidity* often disposes them to desert the public defense. Both of these, they say, cannot exist together in the same person.

R&C.3 And considering how contrary men's opinions and manners are in general, it is, they say, impossible to maintain a constant civil friendship with all those with whom the business of the world compels us to deal—business that consists almost entirely in a perpetual contention for honor, riches, and authority.

R&C.4 To this I answer that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities. For by education and discipline they may be reconciled, and sometimes are. Judgment and fancy may both have a place in the same man, but by turns, as the end he aims at requires. Just as the Israelites in Egypt were sometimes tied to their labor of making bricks, and at other times ranged abroad to gather straw, so the judgment may sometimes be fixed on one particular consideration, and the fancy at another time go wandering about the world. So too reason and eloquence (though perhaps not in the natural sciences, yet in the moral) may stand very well together.[61] For wherever there is room to adorn and advance error, there is much more room to adorn and advance truth, if men have it to adorn. Nor is there any conflict between fearing the laws and not fearing a public enemy, nor between abstaining from injury and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such inconsistency between human nature and civil duties as some think. I have known clearness of judgment and breadth of fancy, strength of reason and graceful speech, courage for war and fear of the laws, all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honored

61 Exodus 5:6–12.

friend Mr. Sidney Godolphin, who, hating no one and hated by no one, was unfortunately killed at the beginning of the late civil war, in the public quarrel, by an unseen and undiscerning hand.

CONQUEST AND THE DUTY TO THE PROTECTOR

A new law of nature, and when a subject may submit to a conqueror.

R&C.5 To the laws of nature set out in Chapter 15, I would have this one added: "That every man is bound by nature, as far as he is able, to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace." For he who claims a right of nature to preserve his own body cannot claim a right of nature to destroy the one by whose strength he is preserved; that is a plain contradiction of himself. And though this law may be derived by consequence from some of those already mentioned there, the times require that it be driven home and remembered.

R&C.6 I find from various English books lately printed that the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men at what point in time a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror, or what conquest is, or how it comes about that it obliges men to obey his laws. For their further satisfaction on these matters, therefore, I say that the point in time at which a man becomes subject to a conqueror is the point at which, having liberty to submit to him, he consents, either by express words or by some other sufficient sign, to be his subject. When a man has the liberty to submit, I have shown before, at the end of Chapter 21: namely, that for one who has no obligation to his former sovereign other than that of an ordinary subject, it is when the means of his life lie within the guards and garrisons of the enemy. For it is then that he no longer has protection from his sovereign, but is protected by the opposing party in return for his contribution. Since such contribution is everywhere considered lawful, as something unavoidable (even though it is an assistance to the enemy), a total submission, which is only an assistance to the enemy, cannot be considered unlawful. Besides, if one considers that those

who submit assist the enemy with only part of their estates, whereas those who refuse assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their submission or settlement an assistance; it is rather a detriment to the enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation of a subject, has taken on himself the new obligation of a soldier, then he does not have the liberty to submit to a new power as long as the old one keeps the field and gives him the means of subsistence, either in its armies or its garrisons. For in this case he cannot complain of lacking protection and the means to live as a soldier. But when that too fails, a soldier also may seek protection wherever he has the most hope of finding it, and may lawfully submit himself to his new master. So much for the time when he may lawfully do it, if he will. If, then, he does it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true subject. For a contract lawfully made cannot lawfully be broken.

R&C.7 From this a man may also understand when men may be said to be conquered, and in what the nature of conquest and the right of a conqueror consist; for this submission implies them all. Conquest is not the victory itself, but the acquisition, by victory, of a right over the persons of men. So he who is killed is overcome, but not conquered. He who is captured and put in prison or chains is not conquered, though overcome; for he is still an enemy, and may save himself if he can. But he who, on a promise of obedience, is granted his life and liberty is then conquered and a subject—and not before. The Romans used to say that their general had *pacified* such-and-such a province, which is to say in English, *conquered* it; and that a country was *pacified* by victory when its people had promised *imperata facere*, that is, "to do what the Roman people commanded them." This was to be conquered. But this promise may be either express or tacit: express, by promise; tacit, by other signs. For example, a man who has not been called on to make such an express promise (perhaps because his power is not significant) is nevertheless understood to submit himself to the government if he lives openly under its protection. But if he lives there secretly, he is liable to anything that may be done to a spy and enemy of the

state. I do not say he commits any injustice (for acts of open hostility do not bear that name), but that he may justly be put to death. Likewise, if a man is outside his country when it is conquered, he is not conquered, nor a subject; but if on his return he submits to the government, he is bound to obey it. So *conquest* (to define it) is the acquiring of the right of sovereignty by victory. That right is acquired through the people's submission, by which they contract with the victor, promising obedience in exchange for life and liberty.

R&C.8 In Chapter 29 I set down, as one of the causes of the dissolution of commonwealths, their imperfect generation, which consists in the lack of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power. For want of it, the civil sovereign is forced to handle the sword of justice inconstantly, as if it were too hot for him to hold. One reason for this (which I did not mention there) is that they will all justify the war by which their power was first gained, and on which (as they think) their right depends, rather than on possession. As if, for example, the right of the kings of England depended on the goodness of the cause of William the Conqueror, and on their lineal and most direct descent from him—by which reasoning there would perhaps be no bond of subjects' obedience to their sovereign anywhere in the world today. In needlessly trying to justify themselves this way, they justify every successful rebellion that ambition may at any time raise against them and their successors. Therefore I set down, as one of the most effective seeds of the death of any state, that conquerors require not only the submission of men's future actions to them, but also approval of all their past actions—when there is scarcely a commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.

R&C.9 And since the name "tyranny" signifies nothing more nor less than the name "sovereignty," whether it is in one man or many, except that those who use the former word are understood to be angry with those they call tyrants, I think that tolerating a professed hatred of tyranny is tolerating hatred of commonwealth in general—another evil seed, not much different

from the former. For to justify the cause of a conqueror, it is for the most part necessary to disparage the cause of the conquered; but neither is necessary for the obligation of the conquered. So much I have thought fit to say on reviewing the first and second parts of this discourse.

EXECUTIONS AND THE RIGHT OF ZEAL

Hobbes shows that capital punishment among the Israelites never rested on private zeal.

R&C.10 In Chapter 35 I showed sufficiently from Scripture that in the commonwealth of the Jews, God himself was made the sovereign by a pact with the people, who were therefore called his *peculiar people*, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God reigned not by their consent but by his own power. I showed too that in this kingdom Moses was God's lieutenant on earth, and that it was he who told them by what laws God had appointed them to be ruled. But I omitted to set down who were the officers appointed to carry out sentences, especially capital punishments, not thinking it then a matter needing as much consideration as I have since found it does. We know that generally, in all commonwealths, the execution of corporal punishments was either assigned to the guards or other soldiers of the sovereign power, or given to those in whom poverty, contempt of honor, and hardness of heart combined to make them seek such an office. But among the Israelites it was a positive law of God their sovereign that whoever was convicted of a capital crime should be stoned to death by the people, and that the witnesses should cast the first stone, and after the witnesses the rest of the people. This was a law that designated who were to be the executioners, but not that anyone should throw a stone at the man before conviction and sentence, where the congregation was the judge. The witnesses were nevertheless to be heard before they proceeded to execution, unless the deed was committed in the presence of the congregation itself, or in sight of the lawful judges; for then no witnesses were needed other

than the judges themselves. Nevertheless, this manner of proceeding, not being thoroughly understood, has given rise to a dangerous opinion: that any man may, in some cases, kill another by a right of zeal—as if the executions carried out on offenders in the Kingdom of God in ancient times proceeded not from the sovereign's command but from the authority of private zeal. If we consider the texts that seem to favor it, the truth is quite the contrary.

R&C.11 First, where the Levites fell upon the people who had made and worshipped the golden calf, and killed three thousand of them, it was by the command of Moses, from the mouth of God, as is plain from Exodus 32:27. And when the son of an Israelite woman had blasphemed God, those who heard it did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who put him in custody until God should pass sentence on him, as appears from Leviticus 24:11–12. Again,[62] (Numbers 25:6–7) when Phinehas killed Zimri and Cozbi, it was not by right of private zeal. Their crime was committed in the sight of the assembly; no witness was needed; the law was known; and he was the heir apparent to the sovereignty. And, which is the principal point, the lawfulness of his act depended entirely on a subsequent ratification by Moses, which he had no reason to doubt. And this presumption of a future ratification is sometimes necessary to the safety of a commonwealth. In a sudden rebellion, for instance, any man who can suppress it by his own power in the region where it begins may lawfully do so without express law or commission, and see to having it ratified or pardoned while it is being done or after it is done. Also, in Numbers 35:30 it is expressly said, "Whoever kills the murderer shall kill him on the word of witnesses." But witnesses presuppose a formal court of justice, and so condemn that claim of *jus zelotarum*, the right of zealots. The law of Moses concerning one who entices others to idolatry (that is, in the Kingdom of God, to a renouncing of their allegiance) (Deuteronomy 13:8) forbids concealing him, and commands the accuser to have him put to death and to cast the first stone at

62 Hobbes's text reads "Levit. 25. 11, 12"; the passage is Leviticus 24:10–16.

him—but not to kill him before he is condemned. And in Deuteronomy 17:4–6 the process against idolatry is set down exactly. For God there speaks to the people as judge, and commands them, when a man is accused of idolatry, to inquire diligently into the deed and, finding it true, then to stone him; but still the hand of the witness throws the first stone. This is not private zeal, but public condemnation. In the same way, when a father has a rebellious son, the law is (Deuteronomy 21:18–21) that he shall bring him before the judges of the town, and all the people of the town shall stone him. Lastly, it was on the pretext of these laws that St. Stephen was stoned, and not on a pretext of private zeal; for before he was carried off to execution, he had pleaded his cause before the high priest. There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance executions by private zeal—which, being often only a conjunction of ignorance and passion, is contrary to both the justice and the peace of a commonwealth.[63]

R&C.12 In Chapter 36 I said that it is not declared in what manner God spoke supernaturally to Moses. Not that he did not speak to him sometimes by dreams and visions, and by a supernatural voice, as to other prophets. For the manner in which he spoke to him from the mercy seat is expressly set down (Numbers 7:89) in these words: "From that time forward, when Moses entered into the tabernacle of the congregation to speak with God, he heard a voice that spoke to him from above the mercy seat, which is over the ark of the testimony; from between the cherubim he spoke to him." But it is not declared in what the preeminence of God's manner of speaking to Moses consisted, over his speaking to other prophets—such as Samuel and Abraham, to whom he also spoke by a voice (that is, by vision)—unless the difference lies in the clearness of the vision. For "face to face" and "mouth to mouth" cannot be understood literally of the infinity and incomprehensibility of the divine nature.[64]

63 Acts 6:8–7:60.

64 "Mouth to mouth" is Numbers 12:8; "face to face," Exodus 33:11.

DEFENSE OF THE WHOLE DOCTRINE

Hobbes defends his principles, his new doctrines and his refusal to quote the ancients.

R&C.13 As to the whole doctrine, I do not yet see but that its principles are true and proper, and its reasoning solid. For I ground the civil right of sovereigns, and both the duty and the liberty of subjects, on the known natural inclinations of mankind and on the articles of the law of nature, of which no man who claims even enough reason to govern his own household ought to be ignorant. And as for the ecclesiastical power of those same sovereigns, I ground it on texts that are both evident in themselves and consistent with the scope of the whole Scripture. I am therefore persuaded that whoever reads it with the sole purpose of being informed will be informed by it. But those who, by writing, or public speech, or their prominent actions, have already committed themselves to maintaining contrary opinions will not be so easily satisfied. For in such cases it is natural for men, at one and the same time, to go on reading and to lose their attention in searching for objections to what they read before. And in a time when men's interests have changed, there cannot fail to be very many such objections, since much of the doctrine that serves to establish a new government must necessarily be contrary to what contributed to the dissolution of the old.

R&C.14 In the part that treats of a Christian commonwealth there are some new doctrines which, in a state where the contrary had already been fully settled, it might be a fault for a subject to publish without leave, as a usurpation of the place of a teacher. But at this time, when men call not only for peace but also for truth, to offer such doctrines as I think true, and as plainly tend to peace and loyalty, to the consideration of those who are still deliberating is no more than offering new wine to be put into new casks, so that both may be preserved together. And I suppose that at such a time, when novelty can breed no trouble or disorder in a state, men are not generally so much

inclined to revere antiquity as to prefer ancient errors to new and well-proven truth.

R&C.15 There is nothing I distrust more than my style of expression—which nevertheless, apart from the misprints of the press, I am confident is not obscure. That I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators, and philosophers, contrary to the custom of recent times (whether I have done well or ill in it), proceeds from my judgment, grounded on many reasons. First, all truth of doctrine depends either on *reason* or on *Scripture*, both of which lend credit to many writers but never receive it from any. Secondly, the matters in question are not of *fact* but of *right*, where there is no place for witnesses. There is scarcely any of those old writers who does not sometimes contradict both himself and others, which makes their testimony insufficient. Fourthly, opinions taken solely on the credit of antiquity are not intrinsically the judgment of those who cite them, but words that pass (like yawning) from mouth to mouth. Fifthly, men often, with a fraudulent design, stud their corrupt doctrine with the cloves of other men's wit. Sixthly, I do not find that the ancients they cite thought it an ornament to do the same with those who wrote before them. Seventhly, it is a sign of indigestion when Greek and Latin sentences come up again unchewed and, as they usually do, unchanged. Lastly, though I revere those men of ancient times who either wrote the truth clearly or set us on a better way to find it out for ourselves, yet to antiquity itself I think nothing is due. For if we are to revere age, the present is the oldest. If it is the antiquity of the writer we revere, I am not sure that those to whom such honor is generally given were older when they wrote than I am who am writing. But if it is well considered, the praise of ancient authors proceeds not from reverence for the dead, but from the competition and mutual envy of the living.

R&C.16 To conclude: there is nothing in this whole discourse, nor in what I wrote before on the same subject in Latin, so far as I can see, contrary either to the word of God or to good morals, or tending to the disturbance of the public tranquility. I there-

fore think it may profitably be printed, and more profitably taught in the universities, if those to whom the judgment of such things belongs think so too.[65] For since the universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from which the preachers and the gentry draw such water as they find there and sprinkle it (both from the pulpit and in their conversation) upon the people, great care certainly ought to be taken to keep it pure, both from the venom of heathen political writers and from the incantations of deceiving spirits. By that means most men, knowing their duties, will be less liable to serve the ambition of a few discontented persons in their designs against the state, and less aggrieved by the contributions necessary for their peace and defense; and the governors themselves will have less cause to maintain, at the common expense, any larger army than is necessary to secure the public liberty against the invasions and encroachments of foreign enemies.

R&C.17 And so I have brought to an end my discourse of civil and ecclesiastical government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, written without partiality, without application to particular persons, and with no other design than to set before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience, which the condition of human nature and the divine laws (both natural and positive) require to be inviolably observed. And though, in the revolution of states, there can be no very favorable constellation for truths of this nature to be born under (since they meet an angry look from those who dissolve an old government, and see only the backs of those who erect a new one), yet I cannot think this will be condemned at this time, either by the public judge of doctrine or by anyone who desires the continuance of public peace. In this hope I return to my interrupted speculation on natural bodies, in which (if God gives me health to finish it) I hope the novelty will please as much as, in the doctrine of this artificial body, it usu-

65 The Latin work is *De Cive* (1642).

ally offends.[66] For such truth as opposes no man's profit or pleasure is welcome to all men.

66 Hobbes's projected work on natural bodies appeared as *De Corpore* (1655).