Ideas I

EDMUND HUSSERL
1859–1938

Ideas I

Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch

Translated from the German with AI (Claude) and edited

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INTRODUCTION

In 1913 Edmund Husserl, then a professor at Göttingen, opened the first volume of a new yearbook for phenomenology with this book, the first of a planned three. It is his general introduction to "pure phenomenology": a science not of facts but of essences, and not of the world as it is taken for granted but of the consciousness in which any world is given to us.

The book begins with the difference between fact and essence and with Husserl's "principle of all principles", that whatever presents itself in intuition is to be taken as what it gives itself as, but only within the limits in which it is given. He then describes the "natural attitude" in which we all live, believing without question in a world out there, and asks us to suspend that belief, to "bracket" it. What survives this *epoché* is the field of pure consciousness, and the rest of the book maps it: the stream of experience, the pure ego, intentionality, the paired structures of noesis (the act of meaning) and noema (what is meant, just as it is meant), and finally how reason and evidence relate to what is real.

Ideas I became the founding text of phenomenology as a movement, and many of its readers, among them Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, defined themselves by accepting or rejecting it. Its turn to "transcendental" consciousness also divided Husserl's own students, several of whom had hoped for a more realist phenomenology. The prose is dense and technical, with many coined terms, but its examples (a sheet of white paper in the half-dark, an apple tree in blossom) keep it concrete.

Section One: Essence and Knowledge of Essence

Erster Abschnitt: Wesen und Wesenserkenntnis
With the Introduction: fact and essence, eidetic sciences and regional ontologies, and a reply to empiricist and idealist misreadings of "essence".

EINLEITUNG.

[1] Pure phenomenology is the science to which we are here seeking the way. We shall characterize its unique position with respect to all other sciences, and we intend to show that it is the fundamental science of philosophy. It is an essentially new science. By virtue of its distinctive character in principle, it lies far from natural thinking, and for that reason it is only in our own day that it has been pressing toward development. It calls itself a science of "phenomena." Other sciences, long familiar, are also directed at phenomena. Thus one hears psychology described as a science of psychic "appearances" or phenomena, and natural science as a science of physical ones. Likewise, history occasionally speaks of historical phenomena, and the science of culture of cultural phenomena; and similarly for all sciences of realities. However different the sense of the word "phenomenon" may be in such talk, and whatever other meanings it may have, it is certain that phenomenology too is related to all these "phenomena," and in accordance with all these meanings. It is related to them, however, in an entirely different attitude, through which every sense of "phenomenon" that confronts us in the long-familiar sciences is modified in a definite way. Only

as so modified does that sense enter the phenomenological sphere. To understand these modifications—or, to speak more precisely, to carry out the phenomenological attitude, and reflectively to raise its peculiar character, and that of the natural attitudes, to scientific consciousness—this is the first task, and by no means an easy one. We must accomplish it completely if we *want* to gain the ground of phenomenology and assure ourselves scientifically of its peculiar essence.

[2] In the last decade there has been a great deal of talk about phenomenology in German philosophy and psychology. In supposed agreement with the *Logical Investigations*,[1] phenomenology is taken to be a lower level of empirical psychology, a sphere of "immanent" descriptions of psychic lived experiences, descriptions which—this is how the immanence is understood—keep strictly within the bounds of inner experience. My objection to this interpretation[2] has, it seems, done little good; and the accompanying explanations, which sharply delineate at least some of the main points of difference, have not been understood or have been heedlessly pushed aside.[3] Hence, too, the entirely empty rejoinders to my critique of psychological method—empty because they miss the plain sense of my exposition. That critique by no means denied the value of modern psychology and by no means disparaged the experimental work accomplished by eminent men. Rather, it laid bare certain defects of method that are radical in the literal sense of the

1 HUSSERL'S NOTE. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols., 1900 and 1901.

2 HUSSERL'S NOTE. In the article "*Philosophie als strenge* Wissenschaft" ["Philosophy as Rigorous Science"], *Logos*, vol. I, pp. *316–18* (note especially the discussion of the concept of experience, p. 316). Compare the detailed discussion devoted to the relation between phenomenology and descriptive psychology already in my "Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren *1895–99*" ["Report on German Writings in Logic from the Years 1895–99"], *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, vol. X (1903), pp. *397–*400. Today I could not say a word of it differently.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Husserl's programmatic essay, published in 1911 in the first volume of the journal *Logos*.

3 Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* (*Logical Investigations*, 1900–01), the work in which phenomenology first took shape. "Lived experience" renders *Erlebnis*, kept strictly distinct from *Erfahrung* ("experience" of real things).

word; and on their removal, in my opinion, the raising of psychology to a higher level of science and an extraordinary enlargement of its field of work must depend. An occasion will yet arise to say a few words about the needless defenses of psychology against my alleged "attacks." I touch on this dispute here because of the prevailing and highly consequential misinterpretations. I want to stress sharply from the outset that *pure phenomenology*, to which we wish to open up access in what follows—the same phenomenology that made a first breakthrough in the *Logical Investigations*, and whose sense has disclosed itself to me ever more deeply and richly in my continued work over the last decade—*is not psychology*. And I want to stress that it is not accidental demarcations of territory, nor terminologies, but reasons *of principle* that exclude its being counted as part of psychology. However great the methodological significance that phenomenology must claim for psychology, however essential the "foundations" it provides for it, phenomenology (already as a science of ideas) is as little psychology itself as geometry is natural science. Indeed, the difference turns out [3] to be even more radical than in this comparison. Nothing is changed in this by the fact that phenomenology deals with "consciousness," with all kinds of lived experience, with acts and act-correlates. To see this, given the prevailing habits of thought, admittedly requires no small effort. To exclude all our previous habits of thought; to recognize and tear down the intellectual barriers with which they fence in the horizon of our thinking; and then, in full freedom of thought, to grasp the genuine philosophical problems—problems that must be posed completely anew and that only the horizon freed of limits on all sides makes accessible to us: these are hard demands. But nothing less is required. In fact, what makes it so extraordinarily difficult to appropriate the essence of phenomenology, to understand the peculiar sense of its problems and its relation to all other sciences (and in particular to psychology), is that all this requires a new *way* of taking up an *attitude*, one *completely changed* as against the natural attitudes of experience and thought. To learn to move freely

in this attitude, without any relapse into the old attitudes, and to see, distinguish and describe what stands before our eyes, requires, moreover, studies of its own, and laborious ones.

It will be the foremost task of this *first* book to seek out paths by which the excessively great difficulties of penetrating into this new world can be overcome, so to speak, piece by piece. We shall start from the natural standpoint: from the world as it stands over against us, and from consciousness as it presents itself in psychological experience. We shall lay bare the presuppositions essential to that standpoint. We shall then develop a method of "phenomenological reductions." By this method we can remove the barriers to knowledge that belong to the essence of every natural way of investigating, and turn aside the one-sided direction of regard that is proper to it, until we have finally gained the free horizon of "transcendentally" purified phenomena—and with it the field of phenomenology in our own peculiar sense.

Let us draw these preliminary outlines a little more definitely. And let us take psychology as our point of departure, as the prejudices of the time demand, but also as inner affinities in the subject matter itself require.

Psychology is an empirical science. Given the usual meaning of the word "experience," this implies two things:

1. It is a science of *facts*, of matters of fact in David Hume's sense.[4]

2. It is a science of realities. The "phenomena" that it deals with as psychological phenomenology are real [4] occurrences. As such, if they have actual existence, they take their place, together with the real subjects to which they belong, in the one spatiotemporal world as the *omnitudo realitatis* [the totality of reality].

Over against this, *pure or transcendental phenomenology will be established not as a science of facts* but *as a science of essences* (as an "*eidetic*" science): as a science that aims to establish exclusively

4 David Hume (1711–1776), Scottish philosopher, who distinguished "matters of fact" from "relations of ideas."

"knowledge of essences" and *absolutely no "facts"*. The corresponding reduction, which leads over from the psychological phenomenon to the pure "essence"—or, in judging thought, from factual ("empirical") universality to "essential" universality—is the *eidetic reduction*.[5]

Secondly, the phenomena of transcendental phenomenology will be characterized as irreal. Other reductions, the specifically transcendental ones, "purify" the psychological phenomena of what lends them reality and with it a place in the real "world." Our phenomenology is to be a doctrine of the essence not of real phenomena but of transcendentally reduced phenomena.[6]

What all this means in more detail will become clear only in what follows. For the time being it marks out a schematic framework for the introductory series of investigations. I consider only one remark necessary to add here. The reader will notice that above, in the two points marked, the generally customary single division of the sciences into real sciences and ideal sciences (or into empirical and a priori sciences) has been replaced by what appear to be two divisions, corresponding to the two pairs of opposites: fact and essence, real and non-real. This distinction of a twofold opposition, in place of the one between real and ideal, will receive a thorough justification later in the course of our investigations (namely, in the second book). It will become evident that the concept of reality requires a fundamental limitation, by virtue of which a difference must be established between real being and individual being (temporal being pure and simple). The transition to pure essence yields, on the one hand, knowledge of the essence of what is real; on the other hand, with respect to the remaining sphere, knowledge of the essence of what is irreal. It will further become evident that all transcendentally purified "lived experiences" are irrealities, set outside any placement in the "actual world." It is precisely these

5 "Eidetic" derives from Greek *eidos*, "form" or "essence": pertaining to essences rather than to facts.

6 "Irreal": not belonging to the real, spatiotemporal world—which is not the same as "unreal" or fictitious.

irrealities that phenomenology investigates—not, however, as singular particulars, but in their "essence." To what extent, [5] however, transcendental phenomena are accessible to investigation as singular *facts*, and what relation such an investigation of facts might have to the idea of metaphysics—this can only be considered in the concluding series of investigations.

In the *first* book, however, we shall treat not only the general doctrine of the phenomenological reductions, which make transcendentally purified consciousness and its essential correlates visible and accessible to us. We also want to try to gain definite conceptions of the most general structure of this pure consciousness, and, by way of these, of the most general groups of problems, directions of investigation and methods that belong to the new science.

In the *second* book we then treat in detail some particularly significant groups of problems. Their systematic formulation and typical solution are the precondition for bringing real clarity to the difficult relations of phenomenology to the physical natural sciences, to psychology and to the human sciences, and on the other hand also to all the a priori sciences. The phenomenological sketches drawn up in the process also offer welcome means for considerably deepening the understanding of phenomenology gained in the *first* book, and for acquiring an incomparably richer knowledge of its immense spheres of problems.[7]

A *third* and concluding book is devoted to the idea of philosophy. It will awaken the insight that genuine philosophy, whose idea is to realize the idea of absolute knowledge, is rooted in pure phenomenology—and this in so serious a sense that the systematically rigorous grounding and development of this first of all philosophies is the indispensable precondition for every

7 "Human sciences" renders *Geisteswissenschaften* (literally "sciences of spirit"): history, the study of culture, society and the like.

metaphysics and every other philosophy "that will be able to come forward as *science*."[8]

Phenomenology is to be established here as a science of essences—as an "a priori" or, as we also say, eidetic science. It is therefore useful to let all the efforts devoted to phenomenology itself be preceded by a series of fundamental discussions of essence and the science of essences, and by a defense of the original right of knowledge of essences against naturalism.

We conclude these introductory words with a short terminological discussion. As already in the *Logical Investigations* [6] , I avoid as far as possible the expressions *a priori* and *a posteriori*. I do so because of the confusing unclarities and ambiguities that attach to them in general use, and also because of the disreputable philosophical doctrines entwined with them as an evil legacy of the past. They are to be used only in contexts that make them unambiguous, and only as equivalents of other terms placed alongside them, to which we have given clear and univocal meanings—especially where it is a matter of letting historical parallels resonate.

Things are perhaps not quite so bad, as regards misleading ambiguities, with the expressions idea and *ideal*, but on the whole bad enough, as the frequent misinterpretations of my *Logical Investigations* have made me painfully aware. I am also led to change my terminology by the need to keep the highly important *Kantian concept of the Idea* cleanly separate from the general concept of (formal or material) essence. I therefore use, as a foreign word, *eidos*, which is terminologically unworn, and as a German word, "*Wesen*" ["essence"], which is burdened with harmless, though occasionally annoying, equivocations.[9]

I would most gladly have eliminated the badly burdened word "real" as well, if only a suitable substitute had presented itself to me.

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8 An echo of the title of Kant's *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science* (1783).

9 For Kant, Ideas are concepts of reason (such as God, freedom, the world as a whole) to which no object of experience can ever correspond.

In general, I would further remark the following. It is not admissible to choose technical terms that fall entirely outside the framework of the historical language of philosophy. Above all, basic philosophical concepts cannot be fixed by definition through firm concepts that can be identified at any time on the basis of immediately accessible intuitions; rather, their definitive clarification and determination must as a rule be preceded by long investigations. For these reasons, combined ways of speaking are often indispensable: ways of speaking that bring together *several* expressions of ordinary speech used in roughly the same sense, while singling out particular ones as terms. In philosophy one cannot define as one does in mathematics. Any imitation of mathematical procedure in this respect is not only unfruitful but wrong, and has the most harmful consequences. For the rest, the above terminological expressions are to receive their fixed sense in the course of the detailed reflections, through definite demonstrations that are evident in themselves. In this respect—as in general—we must forgo lengthy critical comparisons with the philosophical tradition, if only because of the size of this work. [7] [10]

CHAPTER ONE. FACT AND ESSENCE. § 1. NATURAL COGNITION AND EXPERIENCE

Natural knowledge starts from experience, and its whole field is the world.

Natural knowledge begins with experience and remains within experience. In the theoretical attitude that we call the "*natural*" one, the total horizon of possible investigations is therefore designated with a single word: it is the world. The sciences of this

10 "Evident" and "evidence" render Husserl's *evident*, *Evidenz*: the self-evident givenness of something itself, not "proof."

original[11] attitude are accordingly, all of them, sciences of the world. As long as this attitude is the exclusively dominant one, the concepts "true being," "actual being"—i.e., real being—and, since everything real joins together into the unity of the world, "being in the world" coincide.[12]

To every science there corresponds a domain of objects as the field of its investigations. To all its cognitions—i.e., here, correct statements—there correspond, as the primal sources of the grounding that establishes their legitimacy, certain intuitions in which objects of the domain come to self-givenness and, at least partially, to *originary givenness*. The *giving* intuition of the first, natural sphere of knowledge and of all its sciences is natural experience; and the *originarily* giving experience is *perception*, the word being understood in its ordinary sense.[13]

[1] No stories are being told here. In this talk of originality one neither needs to nor should think of genesis, whether psychological-causal or developmental-historical. What other sense is meant will only later be brought to reflective and scientific clarity. From the outset, however, everyone senses that the priority of empirically concrete knowledge of facts over every other kind—for example, over all mathematical-ideal knowledge—need not have a temporal sense, and is intelligible in a non-temporal one. [8] To have something real originarily given, and to "become aware" of it and *perceive* it in simple intuition, are one and the same. We have originary experience of physical things

11 HUSSERL'S NOTE. How hard it is for psychological researchers in our time to appropriate this simple and quite fundamental insight is shown in exemplary fashion by O. Külpe's strange polemic against my doctrine of categorial intuition, in the work that has just reached me, *Die Realisierung* [*Realization*], vol. I (1912), p. 127. I regret being misunderstood by this excellent scholar. But a critical reply becomes impossible where the misunderstanding is so complete that nothing is left of the sense of one's own statements.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Oswald Külpe (1862–1915), German psychologist and philosopher, leader of the Würzburg school; *Die Realisierung* defends critical realism.

12 The "natural attitude" (*natürliche Einstellung*) is the everyday and scientific stance that simply takes the world as existing; it is examined and suspended later in the book.

13 "Originary" renders *originär*: given in the original, as the thing itself, rather than through memory, image or report.

in "outer perception," but no longer in memory or in anticipatory expectation. We have originary experience of ourselves and of our states of consciousness in so-called inner perception or self-perception, but not of others and of their lived experiences in "empathy." We "see their lived experiences in others" on the basis of the perception of their bodily expressions. This seeing-in of empathy is indeed an intuiting, giving act, but no longer an *originarily* giving one. The other person and his psychic life are indeed conscious as "there themselves," and as there in one with his living body; but, unlike his living body, they are not conscious as originarily given.[14]

The world is the sum total of objects of possible experience and of knowledge through experience—of objects that can be known in correct theoretical thinking on the basis of actual experiences. This is not the place to discuss what the method of the empirical sciences looks like in more detail, and how it grounds its right to go beyond the narrow framework of what is directly given in experience. Sciences of the world, and thus sciences of the natural attitude, are all the so-called *natural sciences* in the narrower and the wider sense: the sciences of *material* nature, but also those of animal beings with their *psychophysical nature*, and hence also physiology, psychology, etc. Likewise, all the so-called[15] *human sciences* belong here: history, the sciences of culture, the sociological disciplines of every kind. We can leave open for the time being whether they are to be placed on the same footing as the natural sciences or set over against them, whether they themselves are to count as natural sciences or as sciences of an essentially new type.

14 "Empathy" renders *Einfühlung*, a term made current by Theodor Lipps; for Husserl it names the experience in which another's psychic life is given.
15 "Actual" (*aktuell*) is used here and throughout in the sense of "being currently enacted," as opposed to merely potential.

§ 2. FACT. INSEPARABILITY OF FACT AND ESSENCE

Every contingent fact could be otherwise, yet it has an essence, an eidos that can be grasped purely.

Empirical sciences are "*sciences of fact*." The founding cognitive acts of experiencing posit the real as *individual*. They posit it as existing in space and time, as something that is at this point in time, has this duration of its own, and has a content of reality that, by its essence, could just as well have been at any other point in time. They posit it, again, as something that is at this place, in this physical shape (or is given in one with something bodily of this shape); whereas the same real thing, considered according to its own essence, could just as well be at any place whatever, with any [9] shape whatever. Likewise it could change, while in fact it remains unchanged, or it could change in a different way from the way it in fact changes. Individual being of every kind is, quite generally speaking, "*contingent*." It is so; according to its essence it could be otherwise. Certain laws of nature may well hold, by virtue of which, if such and such real circumstances are in fact given, such and such determinate consequences must in fact follow. Even so, such laws express only factual regularities, which could themselves run quite differently. And they already presuppose, as belonging from the outset to the *essence* of objects of possible experience, that the objects they regulate are, considered in themselves, contingent.

But the sense of this contingency, which is called factuality, is limited in that it is correlatively related to a *necessity*. This necessity does not signify the mere factual existence of a valid rule for coordinating spatiotemporal facts; it has the character of *essential necessity*, and thereby a relation to *essential universality*. When we said that every fact could be otherwise according to its own essence, we were already expressing that *it belongs to the sense of everything contingent to have precisely an essence, and hence an eidos that can be grasped purely*; and this eidos now stands under *essential truths of various levels of universality*. An indi-

vidual object is not merely an individual as such, a "this-here," something unique. Being constituted in such and such a way "*in itself*," it has its *own character*, its stock of *essential* predicables, which must belong to it (as "a being as it is in itself") if other, secondary, relative determinations are to be able to belong to it. Thus, for example, every tone in and for itself has an essence, and at the top the universal essence tone in general, or rather the acoustic in general—understood purely as the moment that can be seen out of the individual tone (either singly, or through comparison with others as "what is common"). Likewise, every material thing has its own essential kind and, at the top, the universal kind "material thing in general," with time-determination in general, duration in general, figure in general, materiality in general. *Everything belonging to the essence of the individual can also be had by another individual*; and highest universalities of essence, of the sort we have just indicated in the examples, delimit "*regions*" or "*categories*" *of individuals*.

§ 3. SEEING OF ESSENCE AND INDIVIDUAL INTUITION

Individual intuition can be turned into seeing of essence, which gives a new kind of object.

[10] *At first*, "essence" designated what is to be found in the very own being of an individual as its *what*. But every such *what* can be "*put into the idea*." *Experiencing* or *individual intuition* can be transformed into *seeing of essence (ideation)*—a possibility that is itself to be understood not as an empirical possibility but as an essential one. What is seen is then the corresponding *pure* essence or *eidos*, whether it be the highest category or a particularization of it, down to full concretion.

This seeing, which *gives* the essence, possibly *originarily gives* it, can be an *adequate* one, such as we can easily procure for ourselves, e.g., of the essence tone. But it can also be a more or less imperfect, *inadequate* one, and this not only in respect of greater or lesser *clarity* and *distinctness*. It belongs to the peculiar character of certain categories of essence that the essences

belonging to them *can* be given only "*one-sidedly*," "many-sidedly" in succession, and yet never "all-sidedly." Correlatively, then, the individual singularizations corresponding to them can be experienced and represented only in inadequate, "one-sided" empirical intuitions. This holds for every essence relating to *things*, and indeed for all the essential components of extension, or of materiality. Indeed, on closer inspection (the analyses that follow later will make it evident), it holds for *all realities* whatever—though the vague expressions one-sidedness and many-sidedness will then take on definite meanings, and different kinds of inadequacy will become distinguished.

For the time being it suffices to point out that even the spatial shape of the physical thing can in principle be given only in mere one-sided adumbrations. Moreover, even apart from this inadequacy, which persists continually, despite every gain, however far a series of continuous intuitions is carried, every physical property draws us into infinities of experience; every manifold of experience, however widely extended, still leaves open closer and new determinations of the thing; and so *in infinitum* [to infinity].[16]

Whatever the kind of individual intuition, whether adequate or not, it can take the turn into seeing of essence; and the latter, whether correspondingly adequate or not, has the character of a *giving* act. But this implies:

The essence (*eidos*) is a new kind of object. Just as what is given in individual or experiencing [11] intuition is an individual object, so what is given in intuition of essence is a pure essence.

What we have here is not a merely external analogy but a radical commonality. *Seeing of essence, too, is precisely intuition*, just as an eidetic object is precisely an object. The generalization of the correlatively connected concepts "intuition" and "object" is not an arbitrary notion but is compellingly demanded by the nature of the matters themselves.[1] Empirical intuition, specifically experience, is consciousness of an individual object. As

16 "Adumbration" renders *Abschattung*: the way a spatial thing presents itself only through perspectival, "shaded-off" aspects.

intuiting, it "brings the object to givenness"; as perception, it brings it to originary givenness, to the consciousness of grasping the object "originarily," in its "*in-person*" selfhood.[17] Quite similarly, intuition of essence is consciousness of something, of an "object," a something toward which its regard is directed and which is "itself given" in it. But this something can then also be "represented" in other acts, thought vaguely or distinctly, made the subject of true and false predications—just like every "*object*" *in the necessarily wide sense of formal logic*. Every possible object—logically speaking, "*every subject of possible true predications*"—has precisely *its own* ways of coming, prior to all predicative thinking, into a regard that represents it, intuits it, possibly meets it in its "in-person selfhood," and "grasps" it. Seeing of essence is therefore intuition. And if it is seeing in the pregnant sense, and not a mere and perhaps vague presentification, it is an originarily giving intuition, grasping the essence in its "in-person" selfhood.[18] On the other hand, however, it is an intuition of a kind that is, in principle, peculiar to itself and *new*, [12] namely as against the kinds of intuition that belong correlatively to objectivities of other categories, and especially as against intuition in the ordinary narrower sense, i.e., individual intuition.[19]

Certainly, it lies in the peculiar character of intuition of essence that it rests on a main component of individual intuition, namely an appearing, a being-visible of something individual—though admittedly not on any grasping of it, and not on any positing of it as actuality. Certainly, as a consequence, no intuition of essence is possible without the free possibility of turning one's regard to a "corresponding" individual and forming an exemplifying consciousness. Conversely, too, no indi-

17 "In person" renders *leibhaft*, literally "in bodily presence": the object is given as itself, not merely represented.

18 HUSSERL'S NOTE. In the *Log. Inv.* I used to employ the word ideation for originarily giving seeing of essence, and mostly even for adequate seeing of essence. But evidently a freer concept is needed, one that encompasses every consciousness simply and directly directed toward an essence, grasping and positing it—including every "obscure" consciousness, i.e., one that is no longer intuitive.

19 "Objectivity" renders *Gegenständlichkeit*: anything objective in the broad sense—objects, states of affairs, and the like.

vidual intuition is possible without the free possibility of carrying out an ideation and, in it, directing one's regard to the corresponding essences that are exemplified in what is individually visible. But this changes nothing in the fact that *the two kinds of intuition are distinguished in principle*; and in propositions of the kind we have just stated, only their essential relations are made known. To the essential differences between the intuitions correspond the essential relations between "existence" (here evidently in the sense of what exists individually) and "essence," between *fact* and *eidos*. Pursuing such connections, we grasp *with insight* the conceptual essences that belong to these terms and are from now on firmly assigned to them. With that, all the thoughts—partly *mystical* ones—that cling especially to the concepts eidos (idea) and essence remain cleanly excluded.[1][20]

§ 4. SEEING OF ESSENCE AND PHANTASY. KNOWLEDGE OF ESSENCE INDEPENDENT OF ALL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS

Essences can be seen in examples from phantasy, so truths of essence assert nothing about facts.

The *eidos*, the pure *essence*, can be exemplified intuitively in data of experience—data of perception, memory, and so on—but just as well also *in data of mere phantasy*. Accordingly, in order to grasp an essence itself and originarily, we can start from corresponding experiencing intuitions, *but just as well also from intuitions that are not experiencing, that do not grasp existence, but are rather merely imagining*.[21]

Suppose we produce in free phantasy any spatial shapes, melodies, social processes and the like, or feign acts [13] of experiencing, of liking or disliking, of willing and the like. Then, on that basis, through "ideation," we can originarily see manifold pure essences, and possibly even adequately: whether the essences of spatial shape, melody, social process, etc., *in general*,

20 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. my article in *Logos* I, p. 315.

21 "Phantasy" renders *Phantasie*, imagination in the broad sense; the spelling marks it as a technical term, distinct from "fantasy."

or those of shape, melody, etc., of the particular *type* in question. It makes no difference here whether anything of the kind was ever given in actual experience or not. If free fiction, through whatever psychological miracles, were to lead to the imagining of data that are new in principle—e.g., sensory data—which never occurred in any experience and never will, this would change nothing in the originary givenness of the corresponding essences, even though imagined data are never, ever actual data.

Essentially connected with this is the following. *The positing and, first of all, the intuitive grasping of essences does not imply the slightest positing of any individual existence; pure truths of essence do not contain the slightest assertion about facts*. Hence from them *alone* not even the most trivial "truth of fact" can be inferred. All thinking and asserting about facts needs experience for its grounding (insofar as the *essence of the validity* of such thinking *necessarily* demands it). In the same way, thinking about pure essences—unmixed thinking, which does not link facts and essences—needs seeing of essence as its *grounding* basis.

§ 5. JUDGMENTS ABOUT ESSENCES AND JUDGMENTS OF EIDETIC UNIVERSAL VALIDITY

Eidetic judgments may concern individuals, but only as instances of essences, never positing their existence.

But now the following must be noted. Judging about essences and essential states of affairs is not the same as eidetic judging in general, given the breadth we must give to the latter concept. *Eidetic cognition does not* in *all its propositions have essences as "objects-about-which"*. And, closely connected with this: intuition of essence—taken as hitherto—is a consciousness analogous to experience, to the grasping of existence, in which an essence is grasped *as an object*, just as an individual is in experience. But it is not the only consciousness that harbors essences within itself while excluding every *positing of existence*. Essences can be intuitively conscious, and in a certain way even grasped, without their becoming "objects-about-which."

Let us start from judgments. More precisely, it is a matter of the difference between judgments about essences and [14] judgments that, in an indeterminately universal way and unmixed with positings of anything individual, do judge *about the individual, but purely as a singular instance of the essences*, in the mode of the *in general*. Thus in pure geometry we do not, as a rule, judge about the eidos straight line, angle, triangle, conic section and the like, but about straight lines and angles in general or "as such," about individual triangles in general, conic sections in general. Such universal judgments have the character of *essential universality*: of *pure* or, as one also says, "*strict*," *absolutely unconditioned universality*.

For simplicity's sake we assume that we are dealing with "*axioms*," with immediately evident judgments, to which, after all, all other judgments lead back through mediate grounding. Such judgments—provided that, as is here presupposed, they judge in the way indicated about individual singulars—require for their noetic grounding, i.e., for being made insightful, a certain seeing of essence, which (in a *modified* sense) could also be called a grasping of essence. And this seeing too, like the intuition of essence that makes objects of essences, rests on having individual singulars of the essences in view, but not on experience of them. For this too, mere phantasy representations, or rather phantasy-visibilities, suffice: what is visible is conscious as such, it "appears," but it is not grasped as existing. If, for example,[22] we judge in essential universality ("unconditioned," "pure" universality) that "a color in general is different from a tone in general," what has just been said can be confirmed in this case. A singular instance of the essence color and a singular instance of the essence tone are intuitively "represented," and indeed as singular instances of their essence. There is present at once, and in a certain manner, phantasy intuition (without positing of existence) and intuition of essence—the latter, however, not as an intuition that makes the essence into an *object*. But it

22 "Noetic": pertaining to the act of cognition (Greek *noesis*); the term is developed fully later in the book.

belongs to the essence of the situation that we are free at any time to turn to the corresponding objectifying attitude; this is precisely an essential possibility. In accordance with the changed attitude, the judgment too would change; it would then run: The essence (the "genus") color is other than the essence (the genus) tone. And so everywhere.

Conversely, *every judgment about essences can be converted equivalently into an unconditionally universal judgment about singular instances of these essences as such*. In this way *pure judgments of essence* (purely eidetic judgments), *whatever logical form* [15] they may have, *belong together*. What they have in common is that they posit no individual being, even when they judge about the individual—precisely in pure essential universality.

§ 6. SOME BASIC CONCEPTS. UNIVERSALITY AND NECESSITY

Essential universality and essential necessity are correlates; applying them to facts yields eidetic necessity.

The following ideas evidently belong together: eidetic judging; eidetic *judgment* or eidetic proposition; eidetic *truth* (or true proposition); as the correlate of the last-named idea, the eidetic *state of affairs* pure and simple (as that which obtains in eidetic truth); finally, as the correlate of the first-named ideas, the eidetic *state of affairs* in the *modified* sense of what is merely *supposed*, in the sense of what is judged as such, which may obtain or may also not obtain.

Every eidetic particularization and singularization of an eidetically universal state of affairs is called, *insofar* as it is that, an *essential necessity. Essential universality and essential necessity are therefore correlates*. Talk of necessity, however, wavers, following the correlations that belong together: the corresponding judgments too are called necessary. But it is important to observe the distinctions and, above all, not to designate essential universality itself (as is usually done) as necessity. The consciousness of a necessity—more precisely, a judging consciousness in which a state of affairs is conscious as a particularization

of an eidetic universality—is called *apodictic*. The judgment itself, the proposition, is called the *apodictic* (also *apodictically* "necessary") *consequence* of the universal proposition to which it is related. The propositions we have stated about the relations between universality, necessity and apodicticity can also be framed more generally, so that they hold for any spheres whatever and not only for purely eidetic ones. Evidently, however, within the eidetic limitation they acquire a distinctive and especially important sense.

Very important, too, is the combination of eidetic judging about the individual in general with the positing of the existence of something individual. Essential universality is transferred to an individual posited as existing, or to an indeterminately universal sphere of individuals (which receives its thesis as existing). Every "application" of geometrical truths to cases in nature (posited as actual) belongs here. The state of affairs posited as actual is then a *fact* insofar as it is an individual state of affairs of actuality, [16] but it is an *eidetic necessity* insofar as it is a singularization of an essential universality.

One must not confuse the *unrestricted universality of laws of nature* with *essential universality*. The proposition "all physical bodies are heavy" admittedly posits no determinate thing within the whole of nature as existing. Nevertheless, it does not have the unconditioned universality of eidetically universal propositions, since, in accordance with its sense as a law of nature, it still carries with it a positing of existence—namely, that of nature itself, of spatiotemporal actuality: all physical bodies—in nature, all "actual" physical bodies—are heavy. By contrast, the proposition "all material things are extended" has eidetic validity and can be understood as purely eidetic, provided that the thesis of existence carried out on the side of the subject is excluded. It states what is grounded purely in the essence of a material thing and in the essence of extension, and what we can bring to insight as "unconditioned" universal validity. This happens as follows. We bring the essence of the material thing to originary givenness (say, on the basis of a free fiction of such a

thing), in order then, in this giving consciousness, to carry out the steps of thought required by "insight"—by the originary givenness of the essential state of affairs that the proposition explicitly set forth. That something *actual* in space corresponds to such truths is not a mere fact but, as a particularization of essential laws, an *essential necessity*. What is fact here is only the actual thing itself to which the application is made.

§ 7. SCIENCES OF FACT AND SCIENCES OF ESSENCE

Pure sciences of essence, like geometry, rest on seeing of essence rather than on experience.

Between individual object and essence there obtains a connection (itself eidetic), according to which to every individual object there belongs a stock of essence as its essence, just as, conversely, to every essence there correspond possible individuals that would be its factual singularizations. This connection grounds a corresponding interrelation of sciences of facts and sciences of essences. There are *pure sciences of essences*, such as pure logic, pure mathematics, the pure theory of time, the theory of space, the theory of motion, etc. Throughout, in all their steps of thought, they are pure of positings of fact. Or, what amounts to the same, in them *no experience as experience*—i.e., as consciousness that grasps or posits actuality, existence—*can take on the function of grounding*. Where experience functions in them, [17] it does not function as experience. The *geometer* who draws his figures on the board thereby produces factually existing lines on the factually existing board. But no more than his physical producing is his experiencing of what is produced, *qua* experiencing, a grounding for his geometrical seeing of essence and thinking of essence. Hence it makes no difference whether or not he is hallucinating while doing so, or whether, instead of actually drawing, he imagines his lines and constructions into a phantasy world. Quite different is the natural *scientist*. He observes and experiments, i.e., he establishes existence in accordance with experience; *for him experiencing is the grounding*

act, which could never be replaced by mere imagining. This is precisely why science of *facts* and *empirical* science are equivalent concepts. But for the *geometer*, who investigates not actualities but ideal possibilities, not states of affairs of *actuality* but essential states of affairs, it is not experience but *seeing of essence that is the ultimately grounding act*.

So it is in all eidetic sciences. On the essential states of affairs (or eidetic axioms) to be grasped in immediate insight are grounded the mediate ones, which come to givenness in mediately insightful thinking—and indeed according to principles that are throughout immediately insightful. *Every step of mediate grounding is accordingly apodictic and eidetically necessary*. It thus constitutes the essence of purely eidetic science that it proceeds *exclusively eidetically*. From the beginning, and so in all that follows, it brings to knowledge no states of affairs other than those that have eidetic validity: those, therefore, that either can be brought immediately to originary givenness (as immediately grounded in originarily seen essences) or can be "inferred" from such "axiomatic" states of affairs by pure deduction.

Connected with this is the *practical ideal of exact eidetic science*, which only modern mathematics has really taught us how to realize. The ideal is to confer on every eidetic science the highest level of rationality, by reducing all mediate steps of thought to mere subsumptions under the axioms of the eidetic domain in question, assembled systematically once and for all—and, unless it is a matter from the outset of "formal" or "pure" logic itself (in the *widest* sense of *mathesis universalis* [universal mathematics]!), by drawing in, in addition, all the axioms of the latter.[23][24]

[18] And connected with this, in turn, is the *ideal of "mathematization"*. Like the ideal just characterized, it is of great practical significance for knowledge in all the "exact" eidetic disciplines

23 HUSSERL'S NOTE. On the idea of pure logic as *mathesis universalis*, cf. *Log. Inv.*, vol. I, final chapter.

24 *Mathesis universalis*: Leibniz's idea of a universal formal science, which Husserl takes up as the comprehensive idea of pure logic.

whose entire stock of knowledge (as, e.g., in geometry) is contained, with purely deductive necessity, in the universality of a few axioms. This is not the place to go into it.[25]

§ 8. RELATIONS OF DEPENDENCE BETWEEN SCIENCE OF FACT AND SCIENCE OF ESSENCE

Eidetic science borrows nothing from facts, but every science of facts needs eidetic foundations.

From the foregoing it is clear that the sense of eidetic science *excludes in principle any incorporation of the cognitive results of empirical sciences*. The theses of actuality that occur in the immediate findings of these sciences pass, after all, through all the mediate ones. From facts, only facts ever follow.

Now, if all eidetic science is in principle independent of all science of facts, the converse holds, on the other hand, with respect to *science of facts*. There is *no* science of facts that, *fully developed as a science*, could be pure of eidetic cognitions and thus *independent of the eidetic sciences, whether formal or material*. For, *first*, it is self-evident that an empirical science, wherever it carries out mediate groundings of judgments, must proceed in accordance with the *formal* principles treated by formal logic. In general, since like every science it is directed toward objects, it must be bound by the laws that belong to the essence of *objectivity in general*. It thereby enters into relation with the complex of *formal-ontological* disciplines, which, besides formal logic in the narrower sense, encompasses the other disciplines of the formal "*mathesis universalis*" (thus also arithmetic, pure analysis, the theory of manifolds). Added to this, *secondly*, is the fact that every fact includes a *material* stock of essence, and every eidetic truth belonging to the pure essences included in it must yield a law by which the given factual singular, like every possible one in general, is bound.

25 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. on this further below, Part III, ch. 1, § 70.

§ 9. REGION AND REGIONAL EIDETICS

Every empirical science belongs to a region and rests on a corresponding regional ontology.

[19] Every concrete empirical objectivity, with its material essence, takes its place within a *highest* material genus, a "region" of empirical objects. To the pure regional essence there then corresponds a *regional eidetic science* or, as we can also say, a *regional ontology*. We assume here that in the regional essence, or in the various genera composing it, there are grounded cognitions so abundant and so ramified that, with regard to their systematic unfolding, it is worth speaking of a science at all—or of a whole complex of ontological disciplines corresponding to the individual generic components of the region. We shall be able to convince ourselves amply of how far this presupposition is in fact fulfilled. Accordingly, every empirical science that falls within the range of a region will be essentially related to the regional ontological disciplines as well as to the formal ones. We can also express this as follows: *Every science of facts* (empirical science) *has essential theoretical foundations in eidetic ontologies*. For it is quite self-evident (if the assumption made holds) that the rich stock of cognitions relating in a pure, *unconditionally* valid way to all possible objects of the region cannot be without significance for the investigation of the empirical facts. These cognitions belong partly to the empty form of objectivity in general, partly to the eidos of the region, which represents, as it were, a *necessary material form* of all objects of the region.

In this way, for example, all the natural-scientific disciplines have as their counterpart the eidetic science of physical nature in general (the *ontology of nature*), insofar as factual nature has as its counterpart a purely graspable eidos, the "essence" *nature in general*, with an infinite abundance of essential states of affairs included in it. Let us form the idea of a *perfectly rationalized empirical science* of nature, i.e., one that has advanced so far in theorization that everything particular included in it has

been traced back to its most general and most fundamental grounds. Then it is clear that *the realization of this idea is essentially dependent on the development of the corresponding eidetic sciences*. It depends, besides the *formal mathesis*, which is related in [20] the same way to all sciences in general, in particular on the development of the *material-ontological disciplines*, which lay out in rational purity, i.e., eidetically, the essence of nature, and thus also all the essential kinds of natural objectivities as such. And this obviously holds for any region whatever.

From the standpoint of *cognitive practice*, too, it is to be expected from the outset that the more closely an empirical science approaches the "rational" stage, the stage of "*exact*," nomological science—that is, the more fully developed the eidetic disciplines it has at its disposal as foundations, and the more it draws on them for its groundings—the more it will grow in the scope and power of its cognitive-practical achievements.

This is confirmed by the development of the rational natural sciences, the physical sciences. Their great epoch in modern times begins precisely when geometry is suddenly, and on a grand scale, made fruitful for the method of physics. Geometry had already been highly developed in antiquity (essentially in the Platonic school) as a pure eidetics. It becomes clear that it is the *essence* of the material thing to be *res extensa* [an extended thing]. It follows that geometry is *the ontological discipline relating to one essential moment of such thinghood, namely spatial form*. But it further becomes clear that the universal (in our terminology, regional) essence of the thing reaches much further.[26] This shows itself in the fact that the development at the same time takes the direction of building up *a series of new disciplines*, coordinate with geometry and *called to the same function of rationalizing the empirical*. The splendid flowering of the formal and material mathematical sciences springs from this tendency. With passionate zeal these sciences are developed, or newly developed, as purely "rational" sciences (in our sense, as *eidetic*

26 *Res extensa* is Descartes's term for material substance, whose essence he took to be extension.

ontologies). At the beginning of modern times, and for long afterward, this happens not for their own sake but for the sake of the empirical sciences. And they did indeed bear abundantly the hoped-for fruit in the parallel development of the much-admired rational physics.

§ 10. REGION AND CATEGORY. THE ANALYTIC REGION AND ITS CATEGORIES

Formal ontology is the empty form of every region; its basic concepts are the logical categories.

If we place ourselves inside some eidetic science, e.g., the ontology of nature, we find ourselves (and this is, after all, [21] the normal case) directed not toward essences as objects, but toward objects of the essences. In our example these objects are subordinate to the region nature. In doing so, however, we observe that "object" is a title for various formations that nonetheless belong together, e.g., "thing," "property," "relation," "state of affairs," "set," "order," and so on. These are obviously not on a par with one another. Rather, each of them points back to one kind of objectivity that has, so to speak, the privilege of *primal objectivity*, and in relation to it all the others present themselves, in a certain sense, as mere modifications. In our example this privilege naturally belongs to the *thing itself*, as against the thing's property, relation, and so on. But precisely this is a piece of that formal structure without whose clarification both talk of object and talk of region of objects would remain confused. From this clarification, to which we devote the following reflections, the important *concept of category*, which relates to the concept of region, will also emerge of itself.

"Category" is a word that, on the one hand, in the combination "*category of a region*," points back precisely to the region in question, e.g., the region physical nature. On the other hand, it relates the particular *material region* in each case to the form *of region in general*, or, what amounts to the same thing, to the *formal essence object in general* and the "*formal categories*" belonging to it.

First, a remark that is not unimportant. Formal ontology seems at first to stand in line with the material ontologies, inasmuch as the formal essence of an object in general and the regional essences seem to play the same role on both sides. One will therefore be inclined to speak no longer simply of regions, as we have done so far, but rather of material regions, and then to add the "*formal region*" to them. If we adopt this way of speaking, some caution is nonetheless needed. On the one side stand material essences, and these are in a certain sense the "*genuine*" *essences*. On the other side, however, stands something that is indeed eidetic but nevertheless fundamentally different in essence: a *mere form of essence*. It is indeed an *essence*, but a completely *empty* one, an essence that *fits all possible essences in the manner of an empty form*. In its formal universality it has under it all material universalities, even the highest, and through the formal truths belonging to it prescribes *laws* to them. The so-called "*formal region*" is thus, after all, not something [22] coordinate with the material regions (the regions simpliciter). It *is not properly a region at all, but the empty form of region in general*. Instead of having all regions, with all their materially filled particularizations of essence, beside it, it has them rather (even if only *formaliter* [formally]) *under* it. This subordination of the material to the formal is manifested in the fact that *formal ontology contains within itself the forms of all possible ontologies in general* (namely, of all "*genuine*," "material" ontologies). It *prescribes to the material ontologies a formal structure common to them all*, and this includes the structure that we now have to study with regard to the distinction between region and category.

Let us start from formal ontology (always taken as pure logic in its full extension, up to *mathesis universalis*). As we know, it is the eidetic science of the object in general. In its sense, an object is anything whatever, and for it infinitely manifold truths can be established, distributed among the many disciplines of *mathesis*. All of them, however, lead back to a small stock of immediate or "basic" truths, which function as "*axioms*" in the purely logical disciplines. We now define as *logical categories*, or *categories of the*

logical region object-in-general, the *purely logical basic concepts* that occur in these axioms. These are concepts through which the logical essence of object-in-general is determined within the total system of axioms. Put differently, they express the unconditionally necessary and constitutive determinations of an object as such, of a something whatever, insofar as it is to be able to be something at all. In our absolutely exactly delimited sense, the purely logical determines the concept of the "*analytic*" as opposed to the "*synthetic*," the only such concept that is philosophically important (and, to be sure, fundamentally important). For that reason we also call these categories *analytic*.

Examples of logical categories, then, are concepts such as property, relative quality, state of affairs, relation, identity, equality, set (collection), number, whole and part, genus and species, and so on. But the "*categories of meaning*" also belong here: the basic concepts, belonging to the essence of the proposition (*apophansis* [statement]), of various kinds [23] of propositions, members of propositions and propositional forms. According to our definition, they belong here in view of the essential truths that connect "object-in-general" and "*meaning*-in-general" with one another, and connect them, moreover, in such a way that pure truths about meaning can be converted into pure truths about objects. Precisely for this reason "*apophantic logic*," even when it makes assertions exclusively about meanings, nevertheless also belongs to formal ontology in the fully comprehensive sense. All the same, one must set the categories of meaning apart as a group of their own and contrast them with the

remaining categories, which are the *formal object categories* in the *strict* sense.[27][28]

We note further that by categories we can understand, on the one hand, the concepts in the sense of meanings. On the other hand, and still better, we can understand the formal essences themselves that find their expression in these meanings. In the latter sense, for example, the category state of affairs, plurality and the like signifies the formal *eidos* state of affairs in general, plurality in general, and so on. The equivocation is dangerous only as long as one has not learned to separate cleanly what must be separated everywhere here. On the one hand there is meaning, and that which can find expression *through* meaning. On the other there is, again, meaning, and the objectivity that is meant. Terminologically, one can explicitly distinguish between *categorial concepts* (as meanings) and *categorial essences*.

§ 11. SYNTACTIC OBJECTIVITIES AND ULTIMATE SUBSTRATES. SYNTACTIC CATEGORIES

Objects formed by syntactic forms point back to ultimate substrates that contain no such forms.

We now need an important distinction within the domain of objectivities in general. Within the theory of the forms of meanings, it is mirrored in the (purely "grammatical") distinction between "syntactic forms" and "syntactic substrates" or "*stuffs*." This points to a division of the *formal*-ontological categories into

27 HUSSERL'S NOTE. On the division of the logical categories into categories of meaning and formal ontological categories, cf. *Logical Investigations,* vol. I, § 67. The whole Third Investigation of vol. II deals specifically with the categories whole and part.—At that time I did not yet venture to adopt the expression "ontology," which was objectionable for historical reasons. I described this investigation (loc. cit., p. 222 of the first edition) as part of an "*a priori* theory of *objects as such*," which A. von Meinong condensed into the word "theory of objects" [*Gegenstandstheorie*]. By contrast, in keeping with the changed times, I now consider it more correct to bring the old expression "ontology" back into currency.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), Austrian philosopher, set out his "theory of objects" in 1904.

28 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Logical Investigations,* vol. II, Third Investigation, § 11 f.

syntactic categories [24] and *substrate categories*, which is now to be discussed in more detail.

By *syntactic objectivities* we understand those that are derived from other objectivities *by means of "syntactic forms"*. The categories corresponding to these forms we call *syntactic categories*. They include, for example, the categories state of affairs, relation, quality, unity, plurality, number, order, ordinal number, and so on. We can describe the essential situation obtaining here as follows. Every object, insofar as it can be explicated and related to other objects, in short logically determined, takes on various syntactic forms. As correlates of determining thought, objectivities of a higher level are constituted: qualities and objects determined by qualities, relations between any objects whatever, pluralities of unities, members of orders, objects as bearers of determinations by ordinal number, and so on. If the thinking is predicative, there arise, step by step, expressions and the corresponding apophantic meaning-formations. These mirror the syntactic objectivities, in all their articulations and forms, in exactly corresponding syntaxes of meaning. All these "categorial objectivities"[29] can, like objectivities in general, function in turn as substrates of categorial formations, these again likewise, and so on. Conversely, every such formation evidently points back to *ultimate substrates*, to objects of the first or lowest level. These are objects *that are no longer syntactic-categorial formations*, and that contain in themselves nothing more of those ontological forms which are mere correlates of the functions of thinking (ascribing, denying, relating, connecting, counting, etc.). Accordingly, the formal region objectivity-in-general divides into ultimate substrates and syntactic objectivities. The latter we call *syntactic derivatives* of the corresponding substrates, among which, as we shall hear shortly, all "individuals" also belong. When we speak of an individual property, an individual relation and so on, these derived objects are of course

29 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, Sixth Investigation, Section 2, esp. § 46 f.

so called on account of the substrates from which they are derived.

The following should also be noted. One also arrives at the ultimate, syntactically formless substrates from the side of the theory of the forms of meanings. Every proposition and every possible member of a proposition contains, [25] as substrates of its apophantic forms, the so-called "terms." These can be terms in a merely relative sense, that is, they can themselves contain forms in turn (e.g., the plural form, attributions and the like). In any case, however, we come back, and necessarily, to *ultimate terms*, to ultimate substrates that contain in themselves nothing more of syntactic formation.[30]

§ 12. GENUS AND SPECIES

Every essence stands in a scale running from lowest differences up to a highest genus.

We now need a new group of categorial distinctions belonging to the total sphere of essences. Every essence takes its place in a graded series of essences, a graded series of *generality* and *specificity*, whether it is a materially filled essence or an empty (thus purely logical) one. Two limits that never coincide necessarily belong to this series. Descending, we arrive at the *lowest specific differences* or, as we also say, the *eidetic singularities*. Ascending through the essences of species and genera, we arrive at a *highest genus*. Eidetic singularities are essences that necessarily have "more universal" essences above them as their genera. Under them, however, they no longer have particularizations in relation to which they themselves would be species (proximate species, or mediate, higher genera). Likewise, the highest genus is the one that no longer has any genus above it.

30 HUSSERL'S NOTE. The theory of "syntactic forms" and "syntactic stuffs" is very important for the theory of the forms of meanings, that basic part of an "*a priori* grammar." I shall set it out in more detail when I publish the lectures on pure logic that I have given over many years. On "pure" grammar and the general tasks of a theory of the forms of meanings, cf. *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, Fourth Investigation.

In this sense, in the purely logical domain of meanings, meaning in general is a highest genus. Every determinate propositional form, every determinate form of a member of a proposition, is an eidetic singularity; proposition in general is an intermediate genus. Likewise, number in general is a highest genus; two, three and so on are its lowest differences or eidetic singularities. In the materially filled sphere, for example, thing in general, sensuous quality, spatial shape, lived experience in general are highest genera. The essential contents belonging to determinate things, determinate sensuous qualities, spatial shapes, lived experiences as such are eidetic singularities, and materially filled ones at that.

These relations of essence, designated by genus and species (not relations of classes, i.e., of sets), are such that in the [26] particular essence the more universal one is "*contained*," immediately or mediately. This is meant in a definite sense, whose peculiar character can be grasped in eidetic intuition. Precisely for this reason some researchers class the relation of eidetic genus and species to eidetic particularization among the relations of "part" to "whole." "Whole" and "part" here simply have the broadest concept of "what contains" and "what is contained," and the eidetic relation of species is a special case of it. The eidetically singular thus implies all the universalities lying above it. These in their turn lie within one another in stages, the higher always within the lower.

§ 13. GENERALIZATION AND FORMALIZATION

Rising to a higher genus differs in kind from formalizing an essence into an empty logical form.

The relations of generalization and specialization must be sharply distinguished from relations of an essentially different kind. These are the *universalization of something materially filled* into *the purely logical-formal*, or conversely, the *materialization* of something logically formal. In other words: generalization is something totally different from *formalization*, such as plays so

large a role in mathematical analysis, for example. And specialization is something totally different from *deformalization*, from "filling in" a logico-mathematical empty form, or a formal truth.

Accordingly, the standing of an *essence* under the formal universality of a *purely logical* essence must not be confused with the standing of an essence under its higher *genera of essence*. Thus, for example, the essence triangle is subordinate to the highest genus spatial shape, and the essence red to the highest genus sensuous quality. On the other hand, red, triangle, and indeed all essences alike, homogeneous as well as heterogeneous, are subordinate to the categorial title "essence." For all of them, however, this title by no means has the character of a genus of essence; rather, it has that character in regard to *none* of them. To regard "essence" as a genus of materially filled essences would be just as wrong as to misinterpret object in general (the empty something) as a genus for objects of every kind. One would then naturally take it, simply, as the one and only highest genus, the genus of all genera. Rather, one will have to designate all formal-ontological categories as eidetic singularities that have their highest genus in the essence "formal-ontological category in general."

Likewise it is clear that every determinate inference, say one serving physics, is a singular instance of a determinate purely logical [27] form of inference. In the same way, every determinate proposition of physics is a singular instance of a propositional form, and so on. The pure forms, however, are not genera to which the materially filled propositions or inferences belong. They are themselves only lowest differences, namely of the purely logical genera proposition and inference. Like all similar genera, these have as their highest genus simpliciter "meaning in general." The filling in of logical empty forms (and in *mathesis universalis* there is nothing but empty forms) is thus an "operation" totally different from genuine specialization down to the ultimate differentiation. This can be established everywhere. Thus, for example, the transition from space to the "Euclidean

manifold" is not a generalization but a "formal" universalization.

To confirm this radical separation, one must, as in all such cases, go back to the intuition of essence. It teaches us at once that logical form-essences (e.g., the categories) do not "lie" in the materially filled singular instances in the way that universal red lies in the various nuances of red, or "color" in red or blue. It teaches us, too, that they are not "in" them at all in the proper sense. A proper "in" would have to have enough in common with a part-relation in the usual narrow sense to justify talk of *being contained*.

It needs no detailed discussion to point out a further distinction. The *subsumption* of something individual, of a this-here in general, under an essence is likewise not to be confused with the subordination of an essence to its higher species or to a genus. (Subsumption has a different character depending on whether a lowest difference or a genus is in question.)

Likewise we shall merely indicate the shifting talk of *extensions*, which relates in particular to the function of essences in universal judgments; this talk obviously has to be differentiated along with the differences we have discussed. Every essence that is not a lowest difference has an *eidetic extension*, an extension of specificities and ultimately, in any case, of eidetic singularities. Every formal essence, on the other hand, has its formal or "*mathematical*" *extension*. Further, every essence in general has its extension of *individual* singular instances, an ideal totality of possible thisnesses to which it can be related in *eidetically* universal thinking. Talk of *empirical extension* says more. It means the restriction to a *sphere of existence* by virtue of an interwoven positing of existence, which cancels *pure* universality. All this of course carries over from essences to *concepts* as meanings.

§ 14. SUBSTRATE CATEGORIES. THE SUBSTRATE ESSENCE AND THE ΤΟΔΕ ΤΙ

Ultimate substrates divide into materially filled essences and the bare "this-here."

[28] We further note the distinction between "full," "*materially filled*" *substrates*, together with the correspondingly "full," "materially filled" syntactic objectivities, and the *empty substrates*, together with the syntactic objectivities formed from them, the modifications of the empty something. This latter class is by no means itself empty or meager. It is determined as the totality of states of affairs belonging to the content of pure logic as *mathesis universalis*, with all the categorial objectivities out of which these are built. Thus the following all belong here: every state of affairs expressed by any syllogistic or arithmetical axiom or theorem, every form of inference, every numerical number, every formation of numbers, every function of pure analysis, every Euclidean or non-Euclidean manifold well defined within it.

If we now give preference to the class of materially filled objectivities, we arrive at *ultimate materially filled substrates* as the cores of all syntactic formations. To these cores belong the *substrate categories*. They fall under two disjoint main headings: "*materially filled ultimate essence*" and "*this-here*," or pure, syntactically formless individual particular. The term "individual," which suggests itself here, is unsuitable. The word also expresses indivisibility, however that is to be determined, and precisely this must not be taken into the concept; it must rather remain reserved for the special and wholly indispensable concept individual. We therefore adopt the Aristotelian expression *τόδε τι* ["this-here"], which, at least in its literal wording, does not include this sense.[31]

We have contrasted the formless ultimate essence and the this-here. We must now establish the essential connection that

holds between them. It consists in the fact that every this-here has *its* materially filled essential content, which has the character of a substrate-essence that is formless in the sense indicated.

§ 15. INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT OBJECTS. CONCRETUM AND INDIVIDUAL

Dependence among essences defines the abstract, the concrete, and the individual.

We need yet another fundamental distinction, that between *independent* and *dependent objects*. A categorial form, for example, is dependent insofar as it necessarily points back to a substrate whose form it is. Substrate and form depend on each other; they are essences that cannot [29] be thought "without each other." In this broadest sense, then, the purely logical form is dependent. So, for example, is the categorial form object in relation to all object-matters, the category essence in relation to all determinate essences, and the like. Let us disregard these kinds of dependence. Let us instead relate a strict concept of dependence, or independence, to properly contentual connections, to relations of "*being contained*," *being one*, and possibly *being connected*, in a more proper sense.

What especially interests us here is the situation with ultimate substrates and, more narrowly still, with materially filled substrate-essences. For them there are two possibilities: either such an essence founds, together with another, the unity of *one* essence, or it does not. In the former case there result relations of possibly one-sided or mutual dependence, which are to be described more closely. With regard to the eidetic and individual singular items falling under the unified essences, an apodictically necessary consequence follows. Singular items of the one essence cannot exist except as determined by essences that

31 Aristotle uses *tode ti*, "a this," for the individual thing, e.g., in the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*.

have at least a community of genus with the other essence.[32] For example, sensuous quality necessarily points to some difference or other of extendedness. Extendedness in turn is necessarily the extendedness of some quality that is one with it and "covers" it. A moment of "intensification," say of the category intensity, is possible only as immanent in a qualitative content. A content of such a genus, in turn, is unthinkable without some degree of intensification. An appearing, as a lived experience of a certain generic determinacy, is impossible except as the appearing of "something appearing as such," and likewise conversely. And so on.

From this there now result important determinations of the formal-categorial concepts individual, concretum and abstractum. A dependent essence is called an *abstractum*, an absolutely independent one a concretum. A this-here whose materially filled essence is a concretum is called an *individual*.

If we bring the "operation" of generalization under the now extended concept of logical "modification," we can say: the individual is the primal object required by pure logic, the logical absolute to which all logical modifications point back.

[30] A concretum is, of course, an eidetic singularity, since species and genera are dependent in principle. (These expressions usually exclude the lowest differences.) *Eidetic singularities* accordingly divide into abstract and *concrete* ones.

Eidetic singularities contained disjointly in a concretum are necessarily *heterogeneous*. This follows from the formal-ontological law that two eidetic singularities of one and the same genus cannot be combined in the unity of *one* essence. As it is also put: lowest differences of one genus are incompatible with one another. Accordingly, every singularity included in a concretum, considered as a difference, leads to a separate system of species and genera, and hence also to separate highest genera. For example, in the unity of a phenomenal thing the determin-

32 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. the detailed analyses in *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, Third Investigation, especially in the somewhat improved account of the new edition (1913).

ate shape leads to the highest genus spatial shape in general, and the determinate color to visual quality in general. However, lowest differences in the concretum can also overlap instead of being disjoint. Physical properties, for example, presuppose spatial determinations and include them within themselves. In that case the highest genera are not disjoint either.

As a further consequence, the genera divide, in a characteristic and fundamental way, into those that have concreta under them and those that have abstracta under them. For convenience we speak of *concrete* and *abstract genera*, despite the double meaning that the adjectives now take on. For no one could hit on the idea of taking concrete genera themselves for concreta in the original sense. Where precision demands it, however, the cumbersome expressions genera of concreta and genera of abstracta must be used. Examples of concrete genera are real thing, visual phantom (visual shape appearing as sensuously filled), lived experience and the like. By contrast, spatial shape, visual quality and the like are examples of abstract genera.

§ 16. REGION AND CATEGORY IN THE MATERIAL SPHERE. SYNTHETIC COGNITIONS A PRIORI

A region is the highest genus of a concretum; its axioms are the synthetic a priori truths.

With the concepts individual and concretum, the region, the fundamental concept of the theory of science, is also defined strictly "analytically." A region is nothing other than the *total highest generic unity belonging to a concretum*. It is thus the essentially unified connection of the highest [31] genera belonging to the lowest differences within the concretum. The eidetic extension of the region comprises the ideal totality of concretely unified complexes of differences of these genera. The individual extension comprises the ideal totality of possible individuals of such concrete essences.

Every regional essence determines "*synthetic*" *essential truths*, i.e., *truths that are grounded in it as this generic essence and are not mere particularizations of formal-ontological truths*. In these syn-

thetic truths, therefore, the regional concept and its regional subspecies are not freely variable. Replacing the relevant determinate terms by indeterminate ones yields no formal-logical law, as characteristically happens with all "analytic" necessities. The sum of the synthetic truths grounded in the regional essence makes up the content of the regional ontology. The total sum of the *basic* truths among them, the *regional axioms*, delimits and *defines* for us the *sum of the regional categories*. Like concepts in general, these concepts express particularizations of purely logical categories, but they do not merely do that. They are distinguished by the fact that, by virtue of the regional axioms, they express what belongs *peculiarly* to the regional essence. Put differently, they express *in eidetic universality what must belong to an individual object of the region "a priori" and "synthetically."* The application of such (not purely logical) concepts to given individuals is apodictically and unconditionally necessary, and it is, moreover, governed by the regional (synthetic) axioms.

One may wish to preserve the echoes of Kant's critique of reason (despite considerable differences in basic conceptions, which, however, do not rule out an inner kinship). In that case one would have to understand by *synthetic cognitions a priori* the *regional* axioms, and we would have as many irreducible classes of such cognitions as there are regions. The "*synthetic basic concepts*" or *categories* would be the regional basic concepts (essentially related to the determinate region and its synthetic principles). We would then have as many *distinct groups of categories as there are regions* to be distinguished.[33]

In this scheme *formal ontology* stands *outwardly* in line with the regional (the genuinely *material*, "*synthetic*") ontologies. Its regional concept "object" [32] determines (cf. above § 10) the formal system of axioms and thereby the sum of formal ("analytic") categories. Herein there lies, in fact, a justification for

33 Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781; 2nd ed. 1787) treats synthetic a priori cognitions and the categories as its central themes.

treating them in parallel, despite all the essential differences we have stressed.

§ 17. CONCLUSION OF THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pure logic sketches the schema of regions, which also sets the task of classifying the sciences.

Our whole reflection has been purely logical. It moved in no "material" sphere, or, as we equivalently say, in no *determinate* region. It spoke universally of regions and categories, and in keeping with the sense of the definitions built one upon another, this universality was a purely logical one. The point was precisely to sketch *a schema on the basis of pure logic*. It forms *part of the fundamental structure of all possible cognition, or of all objectivities of cognition, that issues from pure logic. According to this schema, individuals must be determinable under "synthetic principles a priori," in accordance with concepts and laws*. Equivalently, *all empirical sciences must be grounded in regional ontologies belonging to them*, and not merely in the pure logic common to all sciences.

At the same time, the *idea of a task* arises from here. Within the sphere of our individual intuitions, it is to determine the *highest genera of concretions*, and in this way to carry out a *division of all intuitable individual being according to regions of being. Each of these regions designates an eidetic and empirical science* (or group of sciences) *that is distinct in principle*, because distinct on the most radical grounds of essence. The radical distinction, moreover, by no means excludes interweaving and partial overlapping. Thus, for example, "material thing" and "soul" are different regions of being, and yet the latter is founded in the former. From this arises the founding of the science of the soul in the science of the living body.

The problem of a radical "classification" of the sciences is in the main the problem of separating the regions. This in turn requires, beforehand, purely logical investigations of the kind conducted here along a few lines. On the other hand, it of course also requires phenomenology, of which we so far know nothing.

CHAPTER TWO. NATURALISTIC MISINTERPRETATIONS. § 18. INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITICAL DISCUSSIONS

Husserl insists that his findings rest on direct intuition, not on any philosophical doctrine.

[33] At the outset we set out general discussions of essence and science of essences, as opposed to fact and science of facts. They dealt with essential foundations for our construction of the idea of a pure phenomenology (which, after all, according to the Introduction, is to become a science of essences). They also dealt with foundations for understanding its position relative to all empirical sciences, and hence also to psychology. But all determinations of principle must be understood in the right sense, and much depends on this. Let it be sharply emphasized: in them we have not lectured from a pregiven philosophical standpoint. We have not used traditional philosophical doctrines, not even universally recognized ones. Instead we have carried out some *demonstrations of principle* in the strictest sense, i.e., we have merely given faithful expression to differences that are given to us directly in *intuition*. We have taken these differences exactly as they give themselves there, without any hypothetical or interpretive exegesis. Nor have we read into them anything that may be suggested to us by traditional theories of ancient and modern times. Findings made in this way are genuine "beginnings." If, like ours, they have a universality relating to the comprehensive regions of being, then they are certainly matters of principle in the philosophical sense and themselves belong to philosophy. But we need not presuppose even this last point. Our reflections so far, like all those still to come, are free of any relation of dependence on so disputed and suspect a "science" as philosophy. In our basic findings we have presupposed nothing, not even the concept of philosophy, and we intend to keep to this from now on as well. The *philosophical epoché* that we propose to practice shall consist, formulated explicitly, in this: *with regard to the doctrinal content of all pregiven philosophy, we completely abstain from judgment, and we carry out all our*

demonstrations within the framework of this abstention. On the other hand, we need not for that reason avoid speaking of philosophy at all (and indeed we cannot avoid it). We may speak of philosophy as a historical fact, of actual philosophical movements that have determined the general scientific convictions of humankind in a good sense, but [34] often also in a bad one. This holds quite especially with regard to the basic points we have discussed.[34]

It is precisely in this respect that we must engage in a dispute with empiricism. We can quite well fight out this dispute within our *epoché*, since the points at issue here can be settled by immediate establishment. Suppose philosophy has any stock at all of foundations that are "of principle" in the genuine sense, foundations that by their essence can be grounded only through immediately giving intuition. Then the decision of a dispute concerning them is independent of all philosophical *science*, of possessing its idea and its supposedly grounded doctrinal content. The situation that forces this dispute upon us is that empiricism denies "ideas," "essences," "cognitions of essences." This is not the place to set out the historical reasons why precisely the triumphant advance of the natural sciences has promoted philosophical empiricism, and why it has made empiricism the prevailing conviction, indeed, among researchers in the experiential sciences, almost the only one. And this has happened however much the natural sciences, as "mathematical" sciences, owe their high scientific level to eidetic foundation. In any case, there lives in these circles, and hence also among psychologists, a hostility to ideas that must ultimately become dangerous to the progress of the experiential sciences themselves. The reason is that this hostility hampers the eidetic foundation of these sciences, which is by no means yet complete. It also hampers the possibly necessary constitution of new sciences of essences indispensable to their progress. As will become clear later, what

34 *Epoché* (Greek *ἐποχή*, "holding back") is the ancient skeptics' term for suspension of judgment. Here it first appears in a restricted use, applied to philosophical doctrines.

has been said applies precisely to phenomenology, which forms the essential eidetic foundation of psychology and of the human sciences. Some discussion in defense of our findings is therefore required.

§ 19. THE EMPIRICIST IDENTIFICATION OF EXPERIENCE AND ORIGINARILY GIVING ACT

Empiricism rightly demands a return to the things themselves but wrongly equates seeing with sense experience.

Empiricist naturalism springs, as we must acknowledge, from highly estimable motives. It is a radicalism of cognitive practice. Against all "idols," against the powers of tradition and superstition, against crude and refined prejudices of every kind, it seeks to [35] assert the right of autonomous reason as the sole authority in questions of truth. To judge rationally or scientifically about things, however, means to be guided by the *things themselves*. It means going back from talk and opinions to the things themselves, questioning them in their self-givenness and setting aside all prejudices alien to them. It is only *another way of expressing* the very same thing, *so the empiricist thinks*, to say that all science must start from *experience* and must ground its mediate cognition in immediate experience. Thus for the empiricist genuine science and experiential science are one and the same.[35] "Ideas," "essences" as opposed to facts: what would these be but scholastic entities, metaphysical ghosts? To have delivered humankind from philosophical specters of this kind is, so the claim goes, precisely the chief merit of modern natural science. All science, on this view, has to do only with experienceable, real actuality. What is not actuality is imagination, and a science built out of imaginings is simply imaginary science. Imaginings will of course be allowed to stand as psychic facts; they belong to psychology. But the previous chapter attempted to show that from imaginings, by way of a so-called

35 The "idols" allude to Francis Bacon's *Novum Organum* (1620), which lists the idols, or deep-rooted illusions, that obstruct knowledge.

seeing of essence grounded on them, new data should flow forth: "eidetic" data, objects that are irreal. That, the empiricist will conclude, is simply "ideological extravagance," a "relapse into scholasticism." Or it is that sort of "speculative construction *a priori*" by which the idealism of the first half of the nineteenth century, alien to natural science, so greatly hampered genuine science.

Yet everything the empiricist says here rests on misunderstandings and prejudices, however well-meant and good the motive that originally guides him. The fundamental error of the empiricist argument lies in identifying, or confusing, two demands. One is the basic demand for a return to the "things themselves." The other is the demand that all cognition be grounded through *experience*. Given his understandable naturalistic restriction of the range of knowable *things*, the empiricist simply takes experience to be the only act that gives things themselves. But *things* are *not* simply *natural things*, and actuality in the ordinary sense is not simply actuality in general. And it is only *to natural actuality* that the originarily giving act we call *experience* relates. To make identifications here and treat them as supposed matters of course means to push unexamined
[36] aside differences that can be given with the clearest insight. The question, then, is on *which* side the prejudices lie. Genuine freedom from prejudice does not demand the rejection of "judgments foreign to experience" as such, but only where the *proper sense* of the judgments demands grounding in experience. Consider the outright *assertion* that all judgments admit of grounding in experience, and indeed even demand it. It is made without first subjecting the essence of judgments, in its fundamentally different kinds, to *study*, and without considering whether this assertion is not ultimately *absurd*. Such an assertion is a "speculative construction *a priori*," and it is none the better for coming, this time, from the empiricist side. Genuine science, and the genuine freedom from prejudice proper to it, demands as the basis of all proofs judgments that are immediately valid as such, judgments that draw their validity directly

from *originarily giving intuitions*. These intuitions, however, are of the kind prescribed by the sense of these judgments, or by *the proper essence of the objects and states of affairs of judgment*. None of what follows can be postulated or decreed from above: the fundamental regions of objects and, correlatively, the regional types of giving intuitions; the corresponding types of judgment; and finally the noetic norms that *demand*, for the grounding of judgments of such types, precisely this kind of intuition and no other. One can only establish all this with insight. That in turn means: exhibit it through originarily giving intuition, and fix it through judgments faithfully fitted to what is given in that intuition. It seems to us that this, and nothing else, is what a truly prejudice-free procedure would look like, one guided purely by the matters themselves.

Immediate "seeing" is the ultimate source of legitimacy for all rational assertions. This means not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but *seeing in general as originarily giving consciousness of whatever kind*. It has this legitimizing function only because, and insofar as, it is originarily giving. Suppose we see an object in full clarity. Suppose that, purely on the basis of the seeing and within the limits of what is actually grasped in seeing, we have carried out explication and conceptual grasping. Suppose we then see (as a new mode of "seeing") what the object is like. Then the faithful expressive statement has its legitimacy. When the question is why it has this legitimacy, to attach no value to "I see it" would be absurd, as we again see with insight. Let us add here, to forestall possible misinterpretations, that this does not exclude the following. Under certain circumstances one seeing may nevertheless [37] conflict with another seeing, and likewise one *legitimate* assertion with another. This does not imply that seeing is no ground of legitimacy, any more than one force's being outweighed by another means that it is no force. But it does say that in a certain category of intuitions (and this applies precisely to sensuously experiencing ones) seeing is by its essence "imperfect." Such seeing can in principle be strengthened or weakened. Consequently, an assertion that has

an immediate and therefore genuine ground of legitimacy in experience may nevertheless have to be given up in the further course of experience. This happens by virtue of a counter-legitimacy that outweighs and cancels it.

§ 20. EMPIRICISM AS SKEPTICISM

Denying insight into essence leaves empiricism unable to justify its own general theses.

So for experience we substitute the more universal "intuition," and in doing so we reject the identification of science in general with experiential science. It is easy to see, moreover, that arguing for this identification and contesting the validity of purely eidetic thinking leads to a skepticism which, as genuine skepticism, cancels itself through absurdity.[36] One need only ask the empiricist about the source of the validity of his universal theses (e.g., "all valid thinking is grounded in experience as the only giving intuition"), and he becomes entangled in demonstrable absurdity. Direct experience, after all, gives only singular particulars and no universalities, so it does not suffice. He cannot appeal to insight into essence, for he denies it. So presumably he appeals to induction, and in general to the complex of mediate modes of inference through which experiential science obtains its universal propositions. Now what about the truth of mediate inferences, we ask, whether they are deductive or inductive? Is this *truth* (indeed, we might even ask, is the truth of a singular judgment) itself something experienceable, and thus ultimately perceivable? And what about the *principles* of the modes of inference that are appealed to in cases of dispute or doubt? Take, for example, the syllogistic principles, the principle of "equality with a third," and so on. The justification of all modes of inference leads back to them here, after all, as to ultimate sources. Are these in turn empirical generalizations, or

36 HUSSERL'S NOTE. On the characteristic concept of skepticism, cf. the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic," *Logical Investigations*, vol. I, § 32.

does such a view not contain within itself the most radical absurdity?

[38] We shall not enter here into lengthy discussions, which would only repeat what has been said elsewhere. But at least this much should have become evident: the basic theses of empiricism would first of all require a more precise exposition, clarification and grounding, and this grounding would itself have to conform to the norms that the theses express. At the same time, however, it is also obvious that there is at least a serious suspicion here that absurdity lies hidden in this reflexive relation. And yet in the empiricist literature hardly a beginning can be found of any seriously executed attempt to create genuine clarity and scientific grounding in these respects. Here as elsewhere, scientific empirical grounding would demand the following: starting from individual cases that are theoretically strictly fixed, and proceeding to universal theses according to strict methods illuminated by *insight* of principle. The empiricists seem to have overlooked that the scientific demands their theses make on all cognition are also addressed to those theses themselves.

They start, as genuine philosophers of a standpoint and in obvious contradiction to their own principle of freedom from prejudice, from unclarified and ungrounded preconceptions. We, by contrast, take our start from what lies before all standpoints. This is the total domain of what is itself given intuitively, prior even to all theorizing thought: everything that one can immediately see and grasp. It is open to anyone who does not let prejudices blind him and keep him from taking whole classes of genuine data into consideration. If "*positivism*" means the absolutely prejudice-free grounding of all sciences on the "positive," i.e., on what can be grasped originarily, then we are the genuine positivists. Indeed, we let *no* authority curtail our right to recognize all kinds of intuition as equally valid sources of legitimacy for cognition, not even the authority of "modern natural science." When natural science really speaks, we listen gladly and as disciples. But it is not always natural science that speaks

when natural scientists speak. It certainly does *not* speak when they talk about "philosophy of nature" and "natural-scientific theory of knowledge." Above all, it does not speak when they would have us believe that general self-evident truths, such as all axioms express (propositions such as that [39] $a + 1 = 1 + a$, that a judgment cannot be colored, that of any two qualitatively different tones one is the lower and the other the higher, that a perception is in itself perception of something, and the like), are expressions of facts of experience. We, on the contrary, recognize with *full insight* that such propositions give explicative expression to data of eidetic intuition. But precisely this makes it clear to us that the "positivists" sometimes confuse the cardinal differences between the kinds of intuition. At other times they do see them in contrast, but, bound by their prejudices, *want* to recognize only a single one of them as valid, or even as existing at all.[37]

§ 21. UNCLARITIES ON THE IDEALIST SIDE

Idealists accept a priori thought but mistake evidence for a mere feeling attached to judgments.

Admittedly, unclarity prevails on the opposing side as well. People there do accept a pure thinking, an "a priori" thinking, and so reject the empiricist thesis. But they do not bring themselves, by reflection, to a clear consciousness that there is such a thing as pure intuiting, as a mode of givenness in which essences are originarily given as objects, just as individual realities are given in experiencing intuition. They do not recognize that *every* judging insight as well—in particular the insight into unconditionally *universal* truths—*falls under the concept of giving intuition, which indeed has manifold differentiations,* above all *differentiations running parallel to the logical categories*.[38] They do speak of evidence. But instead of bringing it, as insight, into

37 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Logical Investigations* I, esp. chs. 4 and 5.
38 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Logical Investigations* II, Sixth Investigation, § 45 ff. Likewise above, § 3.

essential relations with ordinary seeing, they speak of a "*feeling of evidence*," which, as a mystical *index veri* [mark of truth], is supposed to lend the judgment an emotional coloring. Such conceptions are possible only so long as one has not learned to analyze kinds of consciousness by pure seeing and in accordance with their essence, instead of making theories about them from above. These alleged feelings of evidence, of necessity of thought, and whatever else they may be called, are nothing more than *theoretically invented feelings*.[39] Anyone will acknowledge this who has brought some case of evidence to genuinely seeing givenness and compared it with a case of non-evidence of the same judgment-content. One then notices at once that the tacit presupposition of the [40] feeling-laden theory of evidence is fundamentally mistaken—namely, the presupposition that a judging which is the same in the rest of its psychological essence is at one time emotionally colored and at another time uncolored. Rather, the same upper layer, that of the same stating as mere expressing *by way of meaning*, is at one time fitted step by step to a "clearly insightful" intuition of the state of affairs, while at another time a quite different phenomenon functions as the lower layer: a non-intuitive, possibly quite confused and unarticulated consciousness of the state of affairs. With *the same* right, then, one could construe the difference, in the sphere of experience, between a clear and faithful judgment of perception and some vague judgment about the same state of affairs merely as this: that the first is endowed with a "*feeling of clarity*" and the other is not.

39 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Accounts such as, for example, Elsenhans gives in his just-published *Lehrbuch der Psychologie* [Textbook of Psychology], p. 289 ff., are in my opinion psychological fictions without the slightest foundation in the phenomena.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Theodor Elsenhans (1862–1918), German philosopher and psychologist; his *Lehrbuch der Psychologie* appeared in 1912.

§ 22. THE REPROACH OF PLATONIC REALISM. ESSENCE AND CONCEPT

Essences are objects in the logical sense, not psychic products or metaphysical entities.

Particular offense has been taken, again and again, at the fact that we, as "Platonizing realists," set up ideas or essences as objects and ascribe to them, as to other objects, actual (true) being, and also, correlatively, graspability through intuition—no differently than in the case of realities. We shall disregard here that sort of hasty reader, unfortunately very common, who foists onto the author their own concepts, quite foreign to him, and then finds it none too hard to read absurdities out of his expositions.[40] If *object* and *the real*, *actuality* and *real actuality* mean one and the same, then the conception of ideas as objects and as actualities is indeed a perverse "Platonic hypostatization." But if, as was done in the *Logical Investigations*, the two are sharply separated, if object is defined as anything whatever—thus, for example, as the subject of a true (categorical, affirmative) statement—what offense can then remain, unless it be one that stems from obscure prejudices? After all, I did not invent the general concept of object either; I only restored the one demanded by all purely logical propositions, and at the same time pointed out that it is a concept indispensable in principle and therefore also one that determines general scientific discourse. And in precisely this sense [41] the tone-quality e, which is a numerically unique member of the tone series, or the number 2 in the series of cardinal numbers, the figure circle in the ideal world of geometrical formations, any proposition in the "world" of propositions—in short, many kinds of ideal things—are "objects." Blindness to ideas is a kind of psychic blindness: through prejudices one has become incapable of bringing into

40 HUSSERL'S NOTE. The polemic against the *Logical Investigations* and my *Logos* article, even the well-meaning polemic, moves for the most part, unfortunately, on this level.

the field of judgment what one has in one's field of intuition. In truth, everyone sees ideas, "essences," and does so, so to speak, continually; they operate with them in thinking, they also make judgments of essence—only they explain them away from their epistemological standpoint. Evident givens are patient: they let theories talk right over them, but they remain what they are. It is the business of theories to conform to the givens, and the business of theories of knowledge to distinguish the basic kinds of givens and to describe them according to their own essences.[41]

Prejudices make one remarkably easily satisfied in theoretical matters. There can be no essences, and therefore no seeing of essence (ideation) either; so where ordinary talk contradicts this, it must be a matter of "*grammatical hypostatizations*," by which one must certainly not let oneself be driven on to "*metaphysical*" ones. What is actually present can only be real psychic occurrences of "*abstraction*," attached to real experiences or representations. Accordingly, "theories of abstraction" are now zealously constructed, and psychology, so proud of its experience, is here—as *in all intentional spheres* (which surely make up the principal themes of psychology)—enriched with *invented phenomena*, with *psychological analyses that are no analyses*. Ideas or essences, then, so it is said, are "*concepts*," and concepts are "*psychic formations*," "products of abstraction," and as such they certainly play a large role in our thinking. "Essence," "*idea*," or "eidos"—these are only grand "philosophical" names for "sober psychological facts." Dangerous names, because of their metaphysical suggestions.

We answer: Certainly essences are "*concepts*"—if by concepts one understands, as the ambiguous word permits, precisely essences. Only let it be clear that talk of psychic products is then nonsense, and likewise talk of *concept* formation, insofar as it is meant to be understood strictly and properly. Occasionally one reads in a treatise that the series of cardinal numbers is a series

41 "Psychic blindness" (*Seelenblindheit*) was the clinical term of the time for visual agnosia, the inability to recognize what one sees.

of concepts, and then, a little further on: [42] concepts are formations of thought. First, then, the numbers themselves, the essences, were designated as concepts. But, we ask, are not the numbers what they are, whether we "form" them or do not form them? Certainly, I perform my counting; I form my number representations in "one and one." These number representations are now these, and, even if I form them as alike another time, they are different ones. In this sense there are at times no number representations of one and the same number, at times many, arbitrarily many. But precisely in saying this we have (and how could we avoid it?) made a distinction: a number representation is not the number itself, is not the Two, this unique member of the number series, which, like all such members, is a non-temporal being. To designate it as a psychic formation is therefore an absurdity, an offense against the perfectly clear sense of arithmetical discourse—a sense that can at any time be seen with insight to be valid, and that therefore lies prior to all theories. If concepts are psychic formations, then such things as pure numbers are not concepts. But if they are concepts, then concepts are not psychic formations. One therefore *needs* new terms, precisely in order to resolve equivocations as dangerous as these.

§ 23. SPONTANEITY OF IDEATION, ESSENCE AND FICTION

The act of grasping an essence is spontaneous, but the essence itself is not a product of the mind.

But, it will be objected, is it not true and evident after all that concepts—or, if you like, essences—such as red, house, etc., arise through abstraction from individual intuitions? And do we not *construct* concepts arbitrarily out of concepts already formed? So it is a matter of psychological products after all. It is, one may perhaps add, similar to the case of *arbitrary fictions*: the flute-playing centaur that we freely imagine is simply a formation of our representing.—We answer: Certainly "concept formation," and likewise free fiction, takes place spontaneously, and what is

spontaneously produced is, of course, a product of the mind. But as for the flute-playing centaur, it is a representation in the sense in which what is represented is called a representation, but not in the sense in which representation is the name of a psychic lived experience. The centaur itself is of course nothing psychic; it exists neither in the soul nor in consciousness nor anywhere else; it is indeed *nothing*, it is entirely "imagination." More precisely: the lived experience of imagining is an imagining of a centaur. To that extent, admittedly, the "centaur-as-meant," the centaur-as-phantasied, belongs to the lived experience itself. But then one must not confuse this very lived experience of imagining [43] with what is imagined in it as such.[42] So too in spontaneous abstracting it is not the *essence* but the consciousness of it that is something produced. And the situation here is this: a consciousness that *originarily gives* an essence (ideation) is, in itself and necessarily—and evidently by its essence—a spontaneous one, whereas spontaneity is inessential to sensuously giving, experiencing consciousness. The individual object can "appear," can be given to consciousness by way of apprehension, but without any spontaneous "activity" "on" it. Thus no motives can be found—unless they be motives of confusion—that could demand an identification between consciousness of essence and essence itself, and hence the psychologizing of the latter.

Still, placing essence beside fictive consciousness might give rise to misgivings, namely with regard to the "existence" of essences. Is the essence not a fiction, as the skeptics indeed would have it? However, just as placing fiction and perception side by side under the more general concept "intuiting consciousness" does not impair the existence of objects given in perception, so the juxtaposition carried out above does not impair the "existence" of essences. Things can be perceived, remembered, and thereby be given to consciousness as "actual"; or, in modified acts, they can be given to consciousness as

42 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. on this the phenomenological analyses in the later sections of this work.

doubtful, as null (illusory); finally, in a quite different modification, they can be given to consciousness as "merely hovering before us," and as hovering before us *as if* actual, null, and so on. The situation is quite similar with essences, and connected with this is the fact that they too, like other objects, can be meant sometimes correctly, sometimes falsely—as, for example, in false geometrical thinking. But the grasping and intuiting of essence is an act of many forms; in particular, *the seeing of essence is an originarily giving act*, and as such the *analogue of sensuous perceiving* and *not of imagining*.

§ 24. THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL PRINCIPLES

Every originarily giving intuition is a legitimate source of knowledge, within the limits in which it gives itself.

But enough of wrong-headed theories. No conceivable theory can mislead us about the *principle of all principles*: *that every originarily giving intuition is a legitimate source of knowledge*, that *everything that presents itself to us originarily in "intuition" (so to speak, in its bodily actuality) is simply to be accepted as what it gives itself as*, but also only *within the limits* [44] *in which it gives itself there*. For we see, after all, that any theory could itself draw its truth, in turn, only from originary givens. Every statement that does nothing more than give expression to such givens through mere explication and through meanings precisely fitted to them is therefore really, as we said in the introductory words of this chapter, an *absolute beginning*, called in the genuine sense to lay foundations—a *principium* [beginning, principle]. But this holds in particular measure of the general cognitions of essence of this kind, to which the word principle is usually restricted.

In this sense the *natural scientist* is perfectly right to follow the "principle" that, for every assertion concerning facts of nature, one must ask for the experiences that ground it. For that is a principle; it is an assertion drawn immediately from general insight, as we can convince ourselves at any time by bringing the sense of the expressions used in the principle to perfect clar-

ity, and the essences belonging to them to pure givenness. But in the same sense the *investigator of essences*, and anyone who uses and states general propositions, must follow a parallel principle. And there must be such a principle, since even the principle just granted—that all knowledge of facts is to be grounded through experience—is not itself grasped with insight through experience, as indeed no principle and no cognition of essence whatever is.

§ 25. THE POSITIVIST IN PRACTICE AS NATURAL SCIENTIST, THE NATURAL SCIENTIST IN REFLECTION AS POSITIVIST

Scientists reject essences in their philosophy while relying on them constantly in mathematics.

De facto, the positivist rejects cognitions of essence only when he reflects "philosophically" and lets himself be deceived by the sophisms of empiricist philosophers, but not when, as a natural scientist, he thinks and grounds his claims in the normal attitude of natural science. For there he evidently lets himself be guided to a very large extent by insights into essence. As is well known, the purely mathematical disciplines—the material ones such as geometry or phoronomy, the formal (purely logical) ones such as arithmetic, analysis, etc.—are the basic means of theorizing in natural science. That these disciplines do not proceed empirically, that they are not grounded through observations and experiments on experienced figures, motions, etc., is obvious.[43]

Empiricism, to be sure, does not want to see this. But should one take its argument seriously—that there is so [45] little lack of grounding experiences that, on the contrary, infinities of experiences are at our disposal? In the whole experience of all generations of humankind, indeed even of preceding generations of animals, an enormous treasure of geometrical and arithmetical impressions has supposedly accumulated and been integrated

43 Phoronomy: the pure mathematical theory of motion (kinematics), in the older usage of Kant and others.

in the form of habits of apprehension, and our geometrical insights now draw on this fund.—*But* how, then, does one know about these allegedly accumulated treasures, if no one has observed them scientifically and faithfully documented them? Since when have long-forgotten and entirely hypothetical experiences—instead of actual ones whose genuinely experiencing function and scope have been examined with the utmost care—been the grounds of a science, and of the most exact science at that? The physicist observes and experiments, and with good reason is not content with pre-scientific experiences, let alone with instinctive apprehensions and hypotheses about allegedly inherited experiences.

Or should one say, as has in fact been said from other quarters, that we owe our geometrical insights to "*phantasy experience*," that we carry them out as *inductions from phantasy experiments*? But why, runs our counter-question, does the physicist make no use of such wonderful phantasy experience? Surely because experiments in imagination would be imagined experiments, just as figures, motions, sets in phantasy are precisely not actual but imagined ones.

But the most correct course, in the face of all such interpretations, is not to argue on their ground but to point to the proper sense of mathematical assertions. To know, and to know beyond doubt, what a mathematical axiom states, we must turn not to the empiricist philosopher but to the consciousness in which, doing mathematics, we grasp the axiomatic states of affairs with full insight. If we keep purely to this intuition, there is no doubt whatever that the axioms express pure essential connections, without the slightest co-positing of facts of experience. One must not philosophize and psychologize about geometrical thinking and intuiting from outside, instead of vitally performing it and determining its immanent sense on the basis of direct analysis. It may be that we have inherited dispositions to knowledge from the cognitions of past generations; but for the question of the sense and value of our cognitions, the histories of

these inheritances are as irrelevant as the history of our gold is to its intrinsic value.

§ 26. SCIENCES OF THE DOGMATIC AND SCIENCES OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDE

Dogmatic sciences study things directly, leaving the problems of the possibility of knowledge to philosophy.

[46] Natural scientists, then, speak *skeptically* about mathematics and everything eidetic, but *proceed dogmatically* in their eidetic methods. Fortunately for them. Natural science became great by summarily pushing aside the luxuriantly proliferating skepticism of antiquity and *renouncing* any attempt to overcome it. Instead of toiling over the odd puzzle questions of how knowledge of an "external" nature is possible at all, and how all the difficulties that the ancients already found in this possibility might be resolved, it preferred to toil over the question of the right *method* for a knowledge of nature that could actually be carried out and made as perfect as possible—knowledge in the form of exact natural science. But natural science has *half reversed* this turn, by which it gained a clear path for its research *into the matters themselves*, by *once again giving room to skeptical reflections* and *letting skeptical tendencies limit its possibilities of work*. As a result of its surrender to empiricist prejudices, skepticism now remains put out of play only with regard to the *sphere of experience*, but no longer with regard to the *sphere of essence*. For it is not enough for natural science to draw the eidetic into its circle of research merely under the false empiricist flag. Only eidetic disciplines of long standing, made unassailable by customary rights, such as the mathematical ones, will put up with such revaluations; whereas (as we have already indicated) where the founding of new ones is concerned, empiricist prejudices must function as fully effective inhibitions. The *right stance* in the sphere of research that is *dogmatic* in a good sense—that is, *pre-philosophical*—to which all empirical sciences (but not only they) belong, is this: one *fully consciously pushes aside all skepticism together with all "philosophy of nature" and "theory of*

knowledge," and takes objectivities of knowledge where one actually finds them—whatever difficulties an epistemological reflection may *afterward* point out regarding the possibility of such objectivities.

An unavoidable and important division must indeed be made in the realm of scientific research. On one side stand the *sciences of the dogmatic attitude*, turned toward the matters, unconcerned about all epistemological [47] or skeptical problems. They start from the originary givenness of their matters (and in testing their cognitions they return to it again and again), and they ask as what the matters immediately give themselves, and what can be mediately inferred on that basis for these matters and for the matters of the domain in general. On the other side stand the scientific investigations of the epistemological, the *specifically philosophical attitude*. They pursue the skeptical problems of the possibility of knowledge, solve them first in their universality of principle, and then, applying the solutions obtained, draw the consequences for judging the ultimate sense and cognitive value of the results of the dogmatic sciences. At least in *the present situation*, and so long as a highly developed critique of knowledge, matured to perfect rigor and clarity, is lacking altogether, *it is right to seal off the boundaries of dogmatic research against "criticist" lines of questioning*. In other words, it seems right to us at present to take care that epistemological (and, as a rule, skeptical) prejudices—whose right or wrong philosophical science has to decide, but which need not concern the dogmatic investigator—do not inhibit the course of his investigations. But it is precisely the nature of skepticisms to predispose us to unfavorable inhibitions of this kind.

This at the same time marks the peculiar situation on account of which the theory of knowledge becomes necessary as a science of a dimension of its own. However satisfied knowledge may be that is directed purely at the matters and borne by insight, as soon as knowledge turns back reflectively upon itself, the possibility of the validity of all kinds of knowledge—including even intuitions and insights—appears beset with bewilder-

ing unclarities, with almost insoluble difficulties; and this especially in view of the transcendence that objects of knowledge claim over against knowledge. For precisely this reason there are *skepticisms* that assert themselves in defiance of all intuition, all experience and insight, and that, as a further consequence, can also have their effect as *inhibitions* in *the practical conduct of science*. We *exclude* these inhibitions in the form of natural "*dogmatic*" *science* (a term, then, that is here by no means meant to express any disparagement) [48] *by making clear to ourselves only the most general principle of all method, that of the original right of all givens*, and keeping it vividly in mind, while we ignore the substantive and manifold problems of the possibility of the various kinds of knowledge and correlations of knowledge.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION.

Section Two: The Fundamental Phenomenological Outlook

Zweiter Abschnitt: Die phänomenologische Fundamentalbetrachtung
The natural attitude and its suspension, the epoché; pure consciousness as what remains when the world is bracketed; the phenomenological reductions.

ZWEITER ABSCHNITT. DIE PHÄNOMENOLOGISCHE FUNDAMENTALBETRACHTUNG. ERSTES KAPITEL. DIE THESIS DER NATÜRLICHEN EINSTELLUNG UND IHRE AUSSCHALTUNG. § 27. DIE WELT DER NATÜRLICHEN EINSTELLUNG: ICH UND MEINE UMWELT.

We begin our considerations as human beings of natural life, representing, judging, feeling, willing "*in the natural attitude*." What this means we make clear to ourselves in simple meditations, which are best carried out in the first person.

I am conscious of a world, endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having become in time. I am conscious of it: this means, above all, that I find it immediately and intuitively before me; I experience it. Through seeing, touching, hearing, etc., in the various modes of sensuous perception, physical things in some spatial distribution or other are simply there for me, "*on hand*" in the literal or the figurative sense, whether or not I pay particular attention to them and occupy myself with them in contemplating, thinking, feeling, willing. Animal beings too, such as human beings, are immediately there for me. I look up, I see them, I hear them approaching, I take them by the hand; speaking with them, I understand immediately

what they are representing and thinking, what feelings are stirring in them, what they wish or will. They too are on hand as actualities in my field of intuition, even when I do not pay attention to them. But it is not necessary that they, or any other objects, be found precisely in my *field of perception*. Actual objects are there for me as determinate, as more or less familiar, together with those actually perceived, without themselves being perceived, indeed without even being intuitively present. I can let my attention [49] wander from the writing desk I have just seen and noticed, through the unseen parts of the room behind my back, to the veranda, into the garden, to the children in the arbor, etc., to all the objects that I simply "know" to be here and there in my immediately co-conscious surroundings—a knowing that has nothing of conceptual thinking about it, and that changes into a clear intuiting only when attention turns toward it, and even then only partially and for the most part very imperfectly.

But neither is the world that is on hand for me in consciousness at every waking moment exhausted by the domain of what is intuitively *co-present*, clearly or obscurely, distinctly or indistinctly—the domain that forms a constant ring around the actual field of perception. Rather, it reaches, in a fixed order of being, into the unlimited. What is actually perceived, and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (or at least determinate to some extent), is partly pervaded, partly surrounded, by an *obscurely conscious horizon of indeterminate actuality*. I can send rays of the illuminating regard of attention into it, with varying success. Determining presentifications, obscure at first and then coming to life, fetch something out for me; a chain of such memories links together; the circle of determinacy widens further and further, and possibly so far that the connection with the actual field of perception, as the *central* surroundings, is established. In general, however, the result is different: an empty mist of obscure indeterminacy becomes populated with intuitive possibilities or likelihoods, and only the "form" of the world, precisely as "world," is prefigured. The indeterminate

surroundings are, moreover, infinite. The misty horizon, which can never be fully determined, is necessarily there.

As it is with the world in its order of being of spatial presence, which I have been following so far, so it is with the world in its order of being in the succession of time. This world, on hand for me now and evidently in every waking now, has its temporal horizon, infinite in both directions: its known and unknown, immediately living and not living past and future. In the free activity of experiencing, which brings what is on hand to my intuition, I can pursue these connections of the actuality immediately surrounding me. I can change my standpoint in space and time, direct my glances this way and [50] that, forward and backward in time; I can procure for myself ever new perceptions and presentifications, more or less clear and rich in content, or also more or less clear images, in which I make intuitive to myself what is possible and likely within the fixed forms of the spatial and temporal world.

In this way I find myself in waking consciousness at all times, and without ever being able to change it, related to the one and same world, though a world that changes in its content. It is continually "on hand" for me, and I myself am a member of it. Moreover, this world is there for me not as a mere *world of things*, but, with the same immediacy, as a *world of values, a world of goods, a practical world*. Without further ado I find the things before me furnished with value-characteristics as well as with material properties: as beautiful and ugly, as pleasing and displeasing, as agreeable and disagreeable, and the like. Things stand there immediately as objects of use: the "table" with its "books," the "drinking glass," the "vase," the "piano," etc. These value-characteristics and practical characteristics also belong *constitutively to the objects "on hand" as such*, whether or not I turn toward them, and toward objects at all. The same naturally holds not only for the "mere things" but also for the people and animals in my surroundings. They are my "friends" or "enemies," my "servants" or "superiors," "strangers" or "relatives," etc.

§ 28. THE COGITO. MY NATURAL SURROUNDING WORLD AND THE IDEAL SURROUNDING WORLDS

All acts of the Ego relate to the one natural world, which stays there even while I do arithmetic.

It is to this world, the world in which *I find myself and which is at the same time my surrounding world*, that the complexes of my manifoldly changing *spontaneities* of consciousness relate: of investigating contemplation, of explicating and bringing to concepts in description, of comparing and distinguishing, of collecting and counting, of presupposing and inferring—in short, of theorizing consciousness in its various forms and levels. Likewise the manifold acts and states of feeling and willing: liking and disliking, rejoicing and being sad, desiring and shunning, hoping and fearing, deciding and acting. All of these, together with the simple acts of the Ego in which I am conscious of the world as *immediately* on hand in spontaneously turning toward it and grasping it, are encompassed by the single Cartesian expression *cogito* ["I think"]. In natural living-on I live continually in this *fundamental form of all "actual"* [51] *life*, whether or not I state the *cogito* in doing so, whether or not I am "reflectively" directed toward the Ego and the *cogitare* [thinking]. If I am, then a new *cogito* is alive, which for its part is unreflected, and so not objective for me.

I continually find myself as someone who perceives, represents, thinks, feels, desires, etc.; and in doing so I find myself *for the most part* actually related to the actuality constantly surrounding me. For I am not always so related: not every *cogito* in which I live has things, people, or any objects or states of affairs of my surrounding world as its *cogitatum* [what is thought]. Suppose I am occupied with pure numbers and their laws: nothing of the kind is on hand in the surrounding world, this world of real actuality. The world of numbers is likewise there for me, precisely as the field of objects of arithmetical occupation; during such occupation, individual numbers or numerical formations will be at the focus of my regard, surrounded by a partly

determinate, partly indeterminate arithmetical horizon. But evidently this being-there-for-me, like what is there itself, is of a different kind. *The arithmetical world is there for me only when and as long as I am in the arithmetical attitude*. But the *natural* world, the world in the ordinary sense of the word, is *continually there for me* as long as I live on naturally. As long as that is the case, I am "*in the natural attitude*"; indeed, the two mean precisely the same thing. Nothing at all need change in this when, at some point, I appropriate the arithmetical world and other similar "worlds" by adopting the corresponding attitudes. The natural world *then remains "on hand"*; I am, as before, in the natural attitude, *undisturbed in it by the new attitudes*. If my *cogito* moves only in the worlds of these new attitudes, the natural world remains out of consideration; it is a background for my act-consciousness, but it is *not a horizon into which an arithmetical world fits*. The two worlds on hand at the same time are *without connection*, apart from their relation to the Ego, by virtue of which I can freely direct my regard and my acts into the one and into the other.

§ 29. THE "OTHER" EGO-SUBJECTS AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVE NATURAL SURROUNDING WORLD

Other people are experienced as subjects who share one objective world with me.

All that holds of me myself also holds, as I know, for all other human beings whom I find on hand in my surrounding world. [52] Experiencing them as human beings, I understand and accept them as Ego-subjects, as I myself am one, and as related to their natural surrounding world. But this in such a way that I apprehend their surrounding world and mine objectively as one and the same world, which merely comes to consciousness in different ways for all of us. Each has his place from which he sees the things on hand, and accordingly each has different appearances of things. Also, the actual fields of perception, of memory, etc., are different for each, quite apart from the fact that even what is intersubjectively conscious in common within them is con-

scious in different ways, in different modes of apprehension, degrees of clarity, and so on. In all this we come to an understanding with our fellow human beings and together posit an objective spatiotemporal actuality as *the surrounding world that is there for all of us, and to which we ourselves nonetheless belong*.

§ 30. THE GENERAL THESIS OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE

In the natural attitude the world is always taken as existing, whatever doubts arise about particulars.

What we have presented to characterize the givenness of the natural attitude, and thereby to characterize the attitude itself, was a piece of pure description prior to *all "theory."* In these investigations we keep theories—which here means preconceptions of every kind—strictly at arm's length. Theories belong within our sphere only as facts of our surrounding world, not as actual or supposed unities of validity. But we do not now set ourselves the task of continuing the pure description and raising it to a systematically comprehensive characterization, exhausting its breadths and depths, of what is to be found in the natural attitude (let alone in all the attitudes that can be harmoniously interwoven with it). Such a task can and must be fixed—as a scientific one—and it is an extraordinarily important task, although hitherto hardly seen. Here it is not ours. For us, who are striving toward the entrance gate of phenomenology, everything necessary in this direction has already been done. We need only a few quite general characteristics of the natural attitude, which have already emerged in our descriptions, and with a sufficient *fullness of clarity*. It was precisely this fullness of clarity that particularly mattered to us.

Let us bring out once more something of the greatest importance, in the following sentences: I continually find on hand, as what stands over against me, the one spatiotemporal actuality to which I myself belong, as do all other human beings found in it and related to it in the same way. Actuality—the word itself already says so—I find [53] as *existing*, and I *accept it, as it gives itself*

to me, also as existing. No doubting or rejecting of data of the natural world changes anything in the *general thesis of the natural attitude*. "The" world is always there as actuality; at most it is, here or there, "other" than I supposed; this or that is, under the titles "illusion," "hallucination," and the like, to be struck out of it, so to speak—out of it, which, in the sense of the general thesis, is always the existing world. To know it more comprehensively, more reliably, more perfectly in every respect than naive empirical acquaintance is able to, and to solve all the tasks of scientific knowledge that present themselves on its ground—that is the goal of the *sciences of the natural attitude*.

§ 31. RADICAL ALTERATION OF THE NATURAL THESIS. "EXCLUSION," "BRACKETING"

Borrowing from Descartes's attempt at doubt, Husserl introduces putting a thesis out of action, or bracketing.

Instead of remaining in this attitude, we now propose to alter it radically. What matters now is to convince ourselves of the possibility in principle of this alteration.

The general thesis, by virtue of which the real surrounding world is continually given to consciousness not merely by way of apprehension in general but as *existing* "actuality," does not of course consist in a *separate* act, in an articulated judgment about existence. It is, after all, something that persists throughout the whole duration of the attitude, i.e., throughout natural waking life. Whatever is perceived at any time, whatever is presentified clearly or obscurely—in short, everything of the natural world that is given to consciousness through experience and prior to all thinking—bears, in its total unity and in all its articulated salient features, the character "there," "on hand": a character on which an explicit (predicative) judgment of existence, in unison with it, can by essential necessity be founded. If we state that judgment, we nonetheless know that in it we have only made thematic and grasped predicatively what already lay somehow, unthematically, unthought, unpredicated, in the original experi-

encing—or, respectively, lay in what was experienced, as the character of the "*on hand*."

Now we can proceed with the potential, non-explicit thesis exactly as with the explicit thesis of judgment. One such procedure, *possible at any time*, is, for example, the *attempt at universal doubt* that *Descartes* undertook to carry out for a quite different purpose, with the aim of bringing to light an absolutely indubitable sphere of being. We take this as our starting point here, but emphasize [54] at once that the universal attempt at doubt is to serve us only as a *methodological expedient*, in order to bring out certain points that can be evidently brought to light through it, as enclosed in its essence.[1]

The universal attempt at doubt belongs to the realm of our *perfect freedom*: we can *attempt to doubt* anything and everything, however firmly we may be convinced of it, indeed even if we are assured of it in adequate evidence.

Let us consider what lies *in the essence of such an act*. Whoever attempts to doubt attempts to doubt some "being," explicated predicatively as a "That is!" "*It* is so!" and the like. The kind of being does not matter here. Whoever, for example, doubts whether an object whose being he does not *doubt* is constituted thus and so, doubts precisely its being-*so-constituted*. This evidently carries over from doubting to the *attempt to* doubt. It is further clear that we cannot doubt a being and, in the same consciousness (in the unitary form of simultaneity), confer the thesis on the substrate of this being, that is, be conscious of it with the character of the "on hand." Expressed equivalently: we cannot doubt and hold as certain the same matter of being at the same time. It is likewise clear that the *attempt* to doubt something of which we are conscious *as on hand necessarily entails a certain suspension of the thesis*; and precisely this interests us. It is not a transformation of the thesis into the antithesis, of the position into the negation; nor is it a transformation into conjecture, surmise, indecision, or a doubt (in whatever sense of the word):

1 René Descartes (1596–1650), whose methodical doubt is set out in the *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641).

such things, after all, do not belong to the realm of our free choice. It is *rather something quite unique. We do not give up the thesis we have carried out; we change nothing in our conviction,* which remains in itself what it is so long as we do not introduce new motives of judgment—which is precisely what we do not do. And yet it undergoes a modification: while in itself it remains what it is, *we put it, as it were, "out of action,"* we "*exclude it*," we "bracket it." It is still there, like what is bracketed within the brackets, like what is excluded outside the connections of the circuit.[2] We can also say: the thesis is a lived experience, but *we make "no use" of it*—and this is naturally not to be understood as a privation (as when we say of someone unconscious that he makes no [55] use of a thesis). Rather, with this expression, as with all parallel ones, we are dealing with indicative designations of a definite, *unique mode of consciousness*, which is added to the original simple thesis (be it an actual and even predicative *positing* of existence or not) and revalues it in a way that is itself unique. *This revaluation is a matter of our perfect freedom and stands in contrast to all* the *position-takings of thought* that are coordinate with the thesis and incompatible with it in the unity of "simultaneity," as well as to all position-takings in the proper sense of the word generally.

In the attempt at doubt, which attaches to a thesis—and, as we presuppose, to a certain and sustained one—the "exclusion" is carried out in and with a modification of the antithesis, namely with the "*supposition*" *of non-being*, which thus forms part of the basis of the attempt at doubt. In Descartes this predominates so much that one can say his universal attempt at doubt is really an attempt at universal negation. We disregard this here; we are not interested in every analytical component of the attempt at doubt, and therefore not in its exact and fully sufficient analysis either. *We pick out only the phenomenon of "bracketing" or "exclusion,"* which is evidently not bound to the phenomenon of the attempt at doubt, although it is especially easy to detach from it,

2 *Ausschalten*, rendered "exclude," is an electrical image in German: to switch something out of a circuit.

but can also occur *in other interweavings* and no less *on its own*. In relation to every thesis we can, and in full freedom, practice this peculiar *epoché*: *a certain abstention from judgment that is compatible with an unshaken—and possibly unshakable, because evident—conviction of the truth*. The thesis is "put out of action," bracketed; it changes into the modification "bracketed thesis," and the judgment simpliciter into the "*bracketed judgment*."

Naturally, one must not simply identify this consciousness with that of "merely thinking to oneself," for example, that water nymphs are dancing a round dance; for there no exclusion of a living conviction that remains living takes place—although, on the other hand, the close kinship between the one consciousness and the other is obvious. Still less is it a matter of thinking to oneself in the sense of "*assuming*" or *presupposing*, which in the usual equivocal talk can likewise be expressed in the words: "I think to myself (I make the assumption) that it is thus and so."

[56] It should further be noted that nothing prevents us from speaking of *bracketing* also *correlatively*, with regard to an *objectivity to be posited*, of whatever region and category. In this case what is meant is that every *thesis related to this objectivity is to be excluded* and changed into its bracketing modification. Looked at closely, moreover, the image of bracketing fits the sphere of the object better from the outset, just as talk of putting out of action fits the sphere of the act, or of consciousness, better.

§ 32. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPOCHÉ

The general thesis of the natural attitude is put out of action, and with it all sciences of the world.

We could now let the universal "*epoché*," in our sharply defined and new sense, take the place of the Cartesian attempt at universal doubt. But with good reason we *limit* the universality of this *epoché*. For if it were as comprehensive as it can possibly be, then—since every thesis, or every judgment, can be modified in full freedom, and every objectivity that can be judged about can

be bracketed—no domain would remain for unmodified judgments, let alone for a science. But our aim is precisely the discovery of a new scientific domain, and indeed of one that is to be gained precisely *through the method of bracketing*, but then only of a definitely restricted bracketing.

The restriction can be designated in a word.

We put out of action the general thesis belonging to the essence of the natural attitude; we put in brackets whatever it includes in the ontic respect, each and every thing: thus *this whole natural world*, which is continually "there for us," "on hand," and which will always remain there as an "actuality" for consciousness, even if it pleases us to bracket it.

If I do this, as is fully within my freedom, then I do *not negate* this "world," as though I were a sophist; I do *not doubt its existence*, as though I were a skeptic; but I practice the "phenomenological" *epoché*, which *completely shuts me off from any judgment about spatiotemporal existence*.

Thus all the sciences related to this natural world, however firmly they stand for me, however much I admire them, however little I think of raising the slightest objection to them—these I exclude; of their validities I make [57] absolutely no use. Not a single one of the propositions belonging to them, even if they are perfectly evident, do I make my own; none is accepted by me, none gives me a foundation—so long, mark you, as it is understood in the way it presents itself in these sciences, as a truth about actualities of this world. I may accept it only after I have put it in brackets. That is: only in the modifying consciousness of the exclusion of judgment, and thus precisely not in the way it is a proposition in the science—a proposition that claims validity, and whose validity I acknowledge and make use of.

The *epoché* in question here is not to be confused with the one that positivism demands, and which, as we had to convince ourselves, positivism itself violates. It is not now a matter of excluding all the prejudices that cloud the pure impartiality of research. Nor is it a matter of constituting a "*theory-free*," "metaphysics-free" science by tracing all grounding back to what is

immediately found, nor of means for reaching such goals, whose value is not in question. What we demand lies along a different line. The whole world, posited in the natural attitude and actually found in experience, taken completely "free of theory," as the world actually experienced and clearly attesting itself in the nexus of experiences, now counts for nothing with us. It is to be bracketed, unexamined but also uncontested. In the same way, all theories and sciences that relate to this world, however good they may be, and whether grounded positivistically or otherwise, are to meet the same fate.

CHAPTER TWO. CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATURAL ACTUALITY.

§ 33. PRELIMINARY INDICATION OF "PURE" OR "TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS" AS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESIDUE

Husserl announces that consciousness itself survives the exclusion of the world as a new region of being.

We have learned to understand the sense of the phenomenological *epoché*, but by no means what it can accomplish. Above all, it is not clear to what extent the delimitation of the total sphere of the *epoché* given in the foregoing really involves a restriction of its universality. What, then, can *remain, if the whole world, ourselves included, with all our* cogitare, *is excluded*?

[58] Since the reader already knows that the interest governing these meditations is directed toward a new eidetics, he will at first expect that the world as fact does indeed fall under the exclusion, but not the world *as eidos*, nor any other sphere of essence. After all, the exclusion of the world really does not mean the exclusion of, for example, the number series and the arithmetic relating to it.

However, we are not taking this path, and our goal does not lie along its line either. We can also describe that goal as *gaining a new region of being, one not hitherto delimited in its own distinctive character*, which, like every genuine region, is a region of *individual* being. What this means more precisely will be shown by the findings that follow.

We proceed at first by direct exhibition. The being to be exhibited is nothing other than what, for essential reasons, we shall designate as "pure lived experiences," "pure consciousness" with its pure "correlates of consciousness" and, on the other hand, its "pure Ego." We therefore start our consideration from the Ego, from consciousness, from the lived experiences that are given to us in the natural attitude.

I am—I, the actual human being, a real object like others in the natural world. I perform *cogitationes*, "acts of consciousness" in the broader and narrower sense, and these acts, as belonging to this human subject, are occurrences within the same natural actuality. So too are all my other lived experiences, out of whose changing stream the specific Ego-acts light up in so distinctive a way, pass over into one another, link up into syntheses, and are incessantly modified. In the *widest sense*, the expression *consciousness* (then, admittedly, less aptly) embraces all lived experiences as well. We are "in the natural attitude" even in scientific thinking, by habits that are the firmest because they have never been thrown off course; and so we take all these findings of psychological reflection as real occurrences in the world, precisely as lived experiences of animate beings. It is so natural for us to see them only as such that, although we are now already acquainted with the possibility of an altered attitude and are searching for the new domain of objects, we do not notice at all that it is these very spheres of lived experience from which, through the new attitude, the new domain springs. This is connected, of course, with the fact that, instead of keeping our regard turned toward these spheres, we turned it away and *sought* the new objects in the ontological realms of arithmetic, geometry and the like—where, admittedly, nothing genuinely new was to be gained.

[59] We therefore keep our regard firmly fixed on the sphere of consciousness and study what we find immanently in it. First, still without performing the phenomenological exclusions of judgment, we subject this sphere to a systematic essential *analysis*, though by no means an exhaustive one. What we abso-

lutely need is a certain general insight into the essence of *consciousness in general*, and quite particularly also of consciousness insofar as in it, by its very essence, "natural" actuality becomes conscious. We carry these studies as far as is necessary to achieve the insight we are aiming at, namely the insight *that consciousness has in itself a being of its own which, in its absolute own essence, is not affected by the phenomenological exclusion*. It therefore remains over as a "*phenomenological residue*," as a region of being that is in principle unique, and which can in fact become the field of a new science—phenomenology.

Only through this insight will the "phenomenological" *epoché* earn its name. Its fully conscious performance will prove to be the necessary operation that *makes "pure" consciousness, and subsequently the whole phenomenological region, accessible to us*. Precisely by this it will become understandable why this region and the new science correlated with it had to remain unknown. In the natural attitude nothing other than the natural world can be seen. So long as the possibility of the phenomenological attitude had not been recognized, and the method for bringing the objectivities that arise with it to originary grasp had not been developed, the phenomenological world had to remain unknown, indeed scarcely suspected.

To our terminology the following should be added. Important motives grounded in the problems of the theory of knowledge justify our also designating the *"pure"* consciousness, of which so much will be said, as *transcendental consciousness*, and likewise the operation by which it is gained as the *transcendental epoché*. Methodically, this operation will break down into different steps of "exclusion" and "bracketing," and so our method will take on the character of a step-by-step reduction. For this reason we shall speak, and indeed predominantly, of *phenomenological reductions* (or also, in unified fashion with respect to their total unity, of [60] the phenomenological reduction), and hence, from the epistemological point of view, also of transcendental reductions. For the rest, these and all our terms must be understood exclusively in the sense that *our* expositions pre-

scribe for them, and not in any other sense suggested by history or by the reader's terminological habits.

§ 34. THE ESSENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS THEME

Staying for now in the natural attitude, we study the essence of consciousness of something.

We begin with a series of considerations within which we do not trouble ourselves with any phenomenological *epoché*. We are directed in the natural way toward the "external world" and, without leaving the natural attitude, we perform a psychological reflection on our *Ego* and its lived experiencing. We immerse ourselves—just as we would if we had heard nothing of the new kind of attitude—in the *essence of "consciousness of something,"* in which, for example, we are conscious of the existence of material things, living bodies, human beings, of the existence of technical and literary works, and so on. We follow our general principle that every individual occurrence has its essence, which can be grasped in eidetic purity and in this purity must belong to a field of possible eidetic research. Accordingly, the general natural fact "I am," "I think," "I have a world over against me" and the like also has its essential content, and it is exclusively with this content that we now want to occupy ourselves. We therefore perform, by way of example, any singular lived experiences of consciousness whatever, taken as they present themselves in the natural attitude, as real human facts; or we presentify such lived experiences to ourselves in memory or in freely fictive phantasy. On such an exemplary basis, which is presupposed to be perfectly clear, we grasp and fix in adequate ideation the pure essences that interest us. In the process the singular facts, and the facticity of the natural world in general, vanish from our theoretical regard—as they do wherever we carry out purely eidetic research.

We delimit our theme further. Its title was: consciousness, or more distinctly, *lived experience of consciousness in general*, in an extraordinarily broad sense whose exact delimitation, fortu-

nately, does not matter. Something of that kind does not stand at the beginning of analyses of the sort we are carrying out here; it is a late result of great efforts. As our point of departure we take consciousness [61] in a pregnant sense that offers itself first, and which we can most simply designate by the Cartesian *cogito*, the "I think." As is well known, Descartes understood it so broadly that it also embraces every "I perceive, I remember, I phantasy, I judge, feel, desire, will," and thus all Ego-experiences that are in any way similar, in their countless flowing particular formations. The Ego itself—to which they are all related, or which "lives" "in" them in very different ways, being active, passive, spontaneous, receptive, and otherwise "comporting" itself—we leave out of consideration for now, and indeed the Ego in every sense. Later on it will occupy us thoroughly. For now enough remains to give analysis and the grasping of essence something to hold on to. In the course of this we shall soon find ourselves referred to the comprehensive nexuses of lived experience, which compel us to extend the concept of lived experience of consciousness beyond this circle of the specific *cogitationes*.

We consider the lived experiences of consciousness in *the whole fullness of their concreteness*, in which they appear in their concrete nexus—the *stream of lived experience*—and into which they close together by virtue of their own essence. It then becomes evident that every lived experience in the stream that the reflective regard is able to reach has *an essence of its own that can be grasped intuitively*, a "content" that can be considered *in its own distinctiveness, for itself*. What matters to us is to grasp this proper content of the *cogitatio* in its *pure* distinctiveness and to characterize it in general terms, thus excluding everything that does not lie in the *cogitatio* according to what it is in itself. Likewise, we must characterize the *unity of consciousness* that is demanded *purely by what is proper to the cogitationes*, and demanded so necessarily that they cannot be without this unity.

§ 35. THE COGITO AS "ACT." MODIFICATION INTO NON-ACTUALITY

Every act of attention is surrounded by a background of non-actual consciousness.

Let us start from examples. In front of me, in the half-light, lies this white paper. I see it, I touch it. This perceptual seeing and touching of the paper, as the full concrete lived experience of the paper lying here—and indeed of the paper given in precisely these qualities, appearing in precisely this relative unclarity, in this imperfect determinacy, in this orientation toward me—is a *cogitatio*, a lived experience of consciousness. The paper itself, with its objective properties, its extension in space, its objective position in relation to the spatial thing called my [62] living body, is not *cogitatio* but *cogitatum*, not a lived experience of perception but something perceived. Now something perceived can itself very well be a lived experience of consciousness; but it is evident that something like a material thing, for example[3] this paper given in the lived experience of perception, is in principle not a lived experience but a being of a totally different kind.

Before we pursue this further, let us multiply the examples. In perceiving proper, as a noticing, I am turned toward the object, for example the paper; I grasp it as this being here and now. The grasping is a singling out; everything perceived has an experiential background. Around the paper lie books, pencils, an inkwell and so on, in a certain way also "perceived," perceptually there, in the "field of intuition." But while I was turned toward the paper, they lacked any turning toward and grasping, even a merely secondary one. They appeared and yet were not picked out, not posited for themselves. Every perception of a thing thus has a halo of *background intuitions* (or background seeings, if one already includes being-turned-toward in intuiting), and this too is a "*lived experience of consciousness*," or more briefly "consciousness," and indeed consciousness "*of*" all that

3 *Cogitatio* / *cogitatum*: Latin, "act of thinking" / "what is thought."

actually lies in the objective "background" that is seen along with it. It goes without saying, however, that we are not speaking here of what is to be found *objectively* in the objective space that may belong to the seen background, of all the things and thingly occurrences that valid and progressing experience may establish there. We are speaking exclusively of the halo of consciousness that belongs to the essence of a perception performed in the mode of "turning toward the object," and further of what lies in the proper essence of this halo itself. But it lies in this essence that certain modifications of the original lived experience are possible. We designate them as the free turning of the "regard"—not simply and merely of the physical regard, but of the "*mental regard*"—from the paper first looked at to the objects that were already appearing before and so were "implicitly" conscious, and which after the turning of the regard become explicitly conscious objects, "attentively" perceived or noticed incidentally.

Things are conscious not only in perception but also in memories and in presentifications resembling memory, and also in free phantasies. All this happens sometimes in "clear intuition," sometimes without noticeable intuitiveness, in the manner of "obscure" representations; and in this they hover before us in different "characterizations," [63] as actual, possible, fictive and so on. Of these essentially different lived experiences, evidently everything holds that we have set out about lived experiences of perception. We shall not dream of confusing the *objects conscious* in these kinds of consciousness (*for example*, the phantasied water nymphs) with the lived experiences of consciousness themselves, which are consciousness of them. We then recognize again that to the essence of all such lived experiences—always taken in their full concreteness—there belongs that remarkable modification which converts consciousness in the *mode of actual turning-toward* into consciousness in the *mode of non-actuality*, and vice versa. At one time the lived experience is, so to speak, "*explicit*" consciousness of what is objective for it; at another time it is implicit, merely *potential*

consciousness. What is objective can already appear to us, in memory or phantasy just as in perception, while we are not yet "*directed*" *toward it with the mental regard*, not even secondarily, let alone "busied" with it in a special sense.

We establish something similar for any *cogitationes* whatever in the sense of the Cartesian sphere of examples, for all lived experiences of thinking, feeling and willing. The only difference is that, as will emerge (in the next section), the "being directed toward," the "being turned toward," which distinguishes actuality, does not coincide—as it does in the privileged, because simplest, examples of sensuous representations—with the *singling-out* attention to the objects of consciousness. Of all such lived experiences, too, it evidently holds that the actual ones are surrounded by a "halo" of non-actual ones; *the stream of lived experience can never consist of sheer actualities*. It is precisely the actualities which—in the widest generalization, one that must be carried beyond the circle of our examples, and in the contrast drawn with the non-actualities—determine the pregnant sense of the expression "*cogito*," "I have *consciousness* of something," "I perform an act of consciousness." In order to keep this fixed concept sharply distinguished, we shall reserve the Cartesian expressions *cogito* and *cogitationes* exclusively for it, unless we explicitly indicate the modification by an addition such as "non-actual" and the like.

A "*waking Ego*" we can define as one that, within its stream of lived experience, continuously performs consciousness in the specific form of the *cogito*. This of course does not mean that it constantly, or at all, brings these lived experiences to predicative expression, or is able to do so. There are, after all, animal Ego-subjects [64] too. But according to what was said above, it belongs to the essence of the stream of lived experience of a waking Ego that the continuously progressing chain of *cogitationes* is constantly surrounded by a medium of non-actuality, which is always ready to pass over into the mode of actuality, just as, conversely, actuality passes into non-actuality.

§ 36. INTENTIONAL LIVED EXPERIENCE. LIVED EXPERIENCE IN GENERAL

Intentional lived experiences are consciousness of something; other moments, like sensation data, are not.

However thoroughgoing the change that the lived experiences of actual consciousness undergo through the transition into non-actuality, the modified lived experiences still have a significant community of essence with the original ones. In general, it belongs to the essence of every actual *cogito* to be consciousness of something. But in its own way, according to what was set out a moment ago, the *modified cogitatio is likewise consciousness*, and *of the same thing* as the corresponding unmodified one. The general essential property of consciousness is thus preserved in the modification. All lived experiences that have these essential properties in common are also called "*intentional lived experiences*" (acts in the *widest* sense of the *Logical Investigations*); insofar as they are consciousness of something, they are said to be "*intentionally related*" to this something.

It should be carefully noted that we are not speaking here of a relation between *some psychological occurrence—called a lived experience*—and another real existent—called an *object*—or of a *psychological connection* that would take place *in objective actuality* between the one and the other. Rather, we are speaking of lived experiences purely according to their essence, or of pure essences, and of what is "a priori" *included, with unconditional necessity*, in the essences.

That a lived experience is consciousness of something—for example, that a fiction is the fiction of a particular centaur, but also that a perception is the perception of its actual object, a judgment the judgment of its state of affairs, and so on—concerns not the fact of the lived experience in the world, specifically in its factual psychological nexus, but the pure essence grasped in ideation as pure idea. It lies in the essence of the lived experience itself not only that it is consciousness, but also what it is consciousness of, and in what determinate or inde-

terminate sense it is so. Accordingly, it is also included in the essence of non-actual consciousness into what kinds of actual *cogitationes* it can be converted through [65] the modification discussed above, which we designate as "the turning of the attending regard toward what was previously unattended."

By *lived experiences* in the *widest sense* we understand anything and everything to be found in the stream of lived experience: thus not only the intentional lived experiences, the actual and potential *cogitationes*, taken in their full concreteness, but whatever really inherent moments are to be found in this stream and its concrete parts.[4]

For it is easy to see that *not every really inherent moment* in the concrete unity of an intentional lived experience itself has *the fundamental character of intentionality*, that is, the property of being "consciousness of something." This applies, for example, to all *sensation data*, which play so great a role in perceptual intuitions of things. In the lived experience of perceiving this white paper, more precisely in the component of that perception related to the quality whiteness of the paper, we find, by a suitable turning of the regard, the sensation datum white. This white is something that belongs inseparably to the essence of the concrete perception, and belongs to it as a *really inherent* concrete constituent part. As presenting content for the appearing white of the paper, it is the *bearer* of an intentionality, but not itself a consciousness of something. Exactly the same holds of other data of lived experience, for example the so-called *sensuous feelings*. We shall speak of this in more detail later.

§ 37. THE PURE EGO'S "BEING-DIRECTED-TOWARD" IN THE COGITO, AND GRASPING ATTENTION

The Ego's regard in an act differs from grasping its object; valuing is directed at values without grasping them.

Without being able here to go more deeply into a descriptive essential analysis of intentional lived experiences, we single out

some moments that must be borne in mind for what follows. If an intentional lived experience is actual, that is, performed in the manner of the *cogito*, then in it the subject "*directs*" itself toward the intentional object. To the *cogito* itself there belongs a "regard-toward" the object, immanent to the *cogito*, which on the other hand springs forth from the "Ego," and the Ego therefore can never be absent. This Ego-regard toward something is, according to the act, a perceiving regard in perception, a fictioning regard in fiction, a liking regard in liking, a willing regard in willing, and so on. This means, then, that this having-in-view, this having in the mental eye, which belongs to the *essence* of the *cogito*, of the act as such, is not itself in turn an act of its own. In particular, it must not be confused with a perceiving (in however broad a sense) or with any of the other kinds of act [66] akin to perceptions. It is to be noted that the *intentional* Object of a consciousness (taken as its full correlate) by no means signifies the same as the *grasped* Object. We are accustomed to include being-grasped without further ado in the concept of the Object (of the object in general), because as soon as we think of it or say something about it, we have made it into an object in the sense of something grasped. In the widest sense, grasping coincides with attending to something, noticing it, whether by being specifically attentive or by noticing incidentally—at least as these expressions are usually understood. Now with *this attending or grasping* it is *not* a question of *the mode of the cogito in general*, that of actuality, but, looked at more closely, of a *particular mode of act*, which any consciousness, or any act that does not yet have it, can take on. If it does so, its intentional object is not merely conscious in general and within the regard of mental directedness, but is a grasped, noticed object. To a thing, admittedly, we cannot be turned in any other way than the grasping one, and the same holds of all "*simply representable objectivities*": here turning toward (even in fiction) is *eo ipso* [by that very fact] "grasping," "attending." In the act of valuing, however, we are turned

4 "Really inherent" renders Husserl's *reell*: what is an actual component of the lived experience itself, as against *real*, what belongs to the world.

toward the value, in the act of joy toward what is joyful, in the act of love toward the beloved, in acting toward the action, without grasping any of this. Rather, the intentional object—the valuable, the joyful, the beloved, the hoped-for as such, the action as action—becomes a grasped object only in a distinctive "*objectivating*" turn. Being turned valuingly toward a thing does indeed include the grasping of the thing; but it is not the *mere* thing but the *valuable* thing, or the value, that is (as we shall discuss in more detail) *the full intentional correlate of the valuing act*. Thus "being valuingly *turned* toward a thing" does not already mean *having the value as an object*, in the particular sense of the grasped object, as we must have it in order to predicate something of it; and the same holds in all the logical acts that relate to it.

In acts of the kind that valuing acts are, we thus have an *intentional object in a twofold sense*: we must distinguish between the *mere thing* and the *full intentional object*, and correspondingly a *twofold intentio*, a double being-turned-toward. If, in [67] an act of valuing, we are directed toward a thing, the direction toward the thing is an attending to it, a grasping of it; but we are also "directed" toward the value—only not in the grasping manner. Not only the *representing of the thing* but also the *valuing of the thing*, which encompasses that representing, has the mode of *actuality*.

But we must add at once that matters are this simple only in the simple acts of valuing. In general, acts of feeling and will are founded at a higher level, and accordingly the intentional objectivity is multiplied too, as are the ways in which the objects included in the unified total objectivity are turned toward. In any case, however, what the following main proposition states holds good:

In every act a mode of attentiveness holds sway. But *wherever it is not a simple consciousness of a thing*, wherever a further consciousness, one that "takes a position" toward the thing, is founded on such a consciousness, *there thing and full intentional object* (for example, *thing* and "value"), and likewise *attending and having-in-the-mental-regard, come apart*. At the same time, however,

it belongs to the essence of these founded acts that a modification is possible through which their full intentional objects become attended objects and, in this sense, "*represented*" objects; and these are then in their turn capable of serving as substrates for explications, relations, conceptual framings and predications. Thanks to this objectivation, what stands over against us in the natural attitude, and hence *as members of the natural world*, are not mere natural things but values and practical objects of every kind: cities, streets with street lighting, dwellings, furniture, works of art, books, tools and so on.

§ 38. REFLECTIONS ON ACTS. IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT PERCEPTIONS

Immanent perception forms one unity with its object; perception of things is directed at something outside it.

We add further: living in the *cogito*, we are not conscious of the *cogitatio* itself as an intentional object; but it can become one at any time. To its essence belongs the in-principle possibility of a "*reflective*" *turning of the regard*, naturally in the form of a new *cogitatio*, which directs itself toward it in the manner of a simply grasping *cogitatio*. In other words, every *cogitatio* can become the object of a so-called "inner perception," and subsequently the object of a *reflective* valuation, of an approval or disapproval, and so on. The same holds, in a correspondingly modified way, not only of acts that actually occur, in the sense of act-impressions, [68] but also of acts of which we are conscious "in" phantasy, "in" memory, or "in" empathy, when we understand and live through the acts of others after them. We can reflect "in" *memory, empathy* and so on and make the acts conscious "in" them into objects of graspings and of position-taking acts founded on these graspings, in the various possible modifications.

Here we attach the distinction between *transcendent* and *immanent* perceptions, or acts in general. We shall avoid talk of outer and inner perception, which faces serious objections. We give the following explanations.

By *immanently directed acts*, or, more generally, by *immanently related intentional lived experiences*, we understand those to whose *essence* it belongs that *their intentional objects, if they exist at all, belong to the same stream of lived experience as they themselves*. This applies, for example, wherever an act is related to an act (a *cogitatio* to a *cogitatio*) of the same Ego, or likewise an act to a sensuous feeling-datum of the same Ego, and so on. Consciousness and its object form an individual unity produced purely through lived experiences.

Transcendently directed are those intentional lived experiences for which this does *not* hold: for example, all acts directed toward essences, or toward intentional lived experiences of other Egos with other streams of lived experience; likewise all acts directed toward things, toward realities in general, as will yet become apparent.

In the case of an immanently directed perception, or, briefly put, an *immanent perception* (the so-called "inner" perception), *perception and perceived essentially form an unmediated unity, that of a single concrete cogitatio*. Here the perceiving harbors its object within itself in such a way that it can be separated from that object only abstractively, only as something *essentially non-independent*. If the perceived is an intentional lived experience, as when we reflect on a conviction that is alive at this very moment (saying, perhaps: I am convinced that —), then we have an interlocking of two intentional lived experiences, of which at least the higher is non-independent and, moreover, not merely founded in the lower but at the same time intentionally turned toward it.

[69] This kind of *really inherent "inclusion"* (which is, strictly speaking, only a metaphor) is a *distinguishing characteristic of immanent perception and of the position-takings founded in it*; it is lacking in most other cases of the immanent relation of intentional lived experiences. This is so, for example, already with memories of memories. The remembered memory of yesterday does not belong to the present memory as a really inherent component of its concrete unity. According to its *own* full essence,

the present memory could exist even if yesterday's had not in truth been. The latter, however, if it really has been, necessarily belongs, together with the present memory, to the one and the same never-interrupted stream of lived experience, which continuously mediates between the two through manifold concretions of lived experience. Matters are evidently quite different in this respect with transcendent perceptions and the other transcendently related intentional lived experiences. The perception of the thing not only does not contain the thing itself within itself, in its really inherent composition; it is also *outside all essential unity with it*, the thing's existence of course presupposed. *A unity determined purely by the proper essences of the lived experiences themselves is exclusively the unity of the stream of lived experience*; or, what is the same, a lived experience can be combined only with lived experiences into a whole whose total essence encompasses the proper essences of these lived experiences and is founded in them. This proposition will gain further in clarity as we go on, and will acquire its great significance.

§ 39. CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATURAL ACTUALITY. THE VIEW OF THE "NAIVE" HUMAN BEING

Husserl asks how consciousness, with its own essence, can be interwoven with the material world.

All the essential characterizations of lived experience and consciousness that we have gained are, for us, necessary preliminary stages for reaching the goal that constantly guides us, namely, gaining the essence of that *"pure" consciousness* by which the phenomenological field is to be determined. Our considerations were eidetic; but the singular instances of the essences lived experience, stream of lived experience, and so of "consciousness" in every sense, belonged to the natural world as real occurrences. For we have not, after all, abandoned the ground of the natural attitude. Individual consciousness is interwoven with the *natural world* in a *twofold* way: it is the consciousness of some *human being* or *animal*, and it is, at least in a great number [70] of its particularizations, consciousness of this

world. *What does it mean, then, in view of this interweaving with the real world, to say that consciousness has an essence "of its own"*, that together with other consciousness it forms a self-contained *nexus determined purely by these essences of its own*, the nexus of the stream of consciousness? Since we can understand consciousness here in every sense, however broad, one that ultimately coincides with the concept of lived experience, the question concerns the proper essentiality of the stream of lived experience and of all its components. To begin with, to what extent is the material world supposed to be something different in kind in principle, something *excluded* from the *proper essentiality* of *lived experiences*? And if it is that, if over against all consciousness and its proper essentiality it is the "*alien*," the "otherbeing," how can consciousness be *interwoven* with it—with it, and consequently with the whole world alien to consciousness? For one easily convinces oneself that the material world is not just any piece of the natural world but its fundamental stratum, to which all other real being is essentially related. What it still lacks are the souls of human beings and animals; and what is new that these bring in is, in the first instance, their *lived experiencing*, with its conscious relatedness to their surrounding world. And yet *consciousness and thinghood form a connected whole, connected* in the individual psychophysical unities that we call *animalia* [animate beings], and connected at the highest level in the *real unity of the whole world*. Can the unity of a whole be anything other than unified through the proper essence of its parts, which must therefore have some *community of essence* instead of heterogeneity in principle?

To gain clarity, let us seek out the ultimate source from which the general thesis of the world, which I perform in the natural attitude, draws its nourishment: the source that makes it possible for me to find, in the manner of consciousness, an existing world of things over against me, to ascribe to myself a living body in this world, and so to be able to fit myself into it. Evidently this ultimate source is *sensuous experience*. For our purposes, however, it suffices to consider *sensuous perception*, which

among experiencing acts plays, in a certain good sense, the role of a primal experience, from which all other experiencing acts draw a chief part of their grounding force. Every perceiving consciousness has this peculiarity, that it is consciousness of the *in-person self-presence of an individual object*, [71] which for its part is, in the purely logical sense, an individual or a logico-categorial modification of one.[5] In our case of sensuous perception, or more distinctly, the perception of things, the logical individual is the thing; and it suffices to treat the perception of things as representative of all other perceptions (of properties, processes and the like).

Our natural waking Ego-life is a constant perceiving, actual or non-actual. The world of things, and in it our living body, is perceptually there at all times. How, then, are *consciousness itself*, as a *concrete being in itself*, and what is conscious in it, the *perceived being*, as something "*over against*" consciousness and "in and for itself," set apart from each other—and how can they be?

I meditate first as a *naive* human being. I see and grasp the thing itself in its "in-person" character. Admittedly, I am sometimes deceived, and not only regarding the perceived properties but also regarding existence itself. I fall prey to an illusion or a hallucination. The perception is then not "genuine" perception. But if it is genuine—and that means: if it can be "confirmed" in the actual nexus of experience, possibly with the help of correct empirical thinking—then the perceived thing is *actual*, and actually given itself in the perception, and indeed given in person. Considered merely as consciousness, and apart from the living body and the bodily organs, the perceiving then appears as something without any essence of its own, an empty looking of an empty "Ego" at the object itself, which in some remarkable way comes into contact with that Ego.

5 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 15, p. 29.

§ 40. "PRIMARY" AND "SECONDARY" QUALITIES. THE THING GIVEN IN PERSON AS "MERE APPEARANCE" OF THE "PHYSICALLY TRUE"

Physics treats everything perceived as mere appearance of the true thing it determines.

If, as a "naive human being," deceived by sensibility, I have given in to the inclination to spin out such reflections, I now, as a "scientific human being," recall the familiar distinction between *secondary* and *primary qualities*, according to which the specific sense qualities are supposed to be "merely subjective" and only the geometrical-physical qualities "objective." The color of the thing, the sound of the thing, the smell and taste of the thing, and the like—however much they appear "in person" on the thing, as belonging [72] to its essence—are said not to be actual themselves, and not actual as what they appear as there, but mere *signs* for certain primary qualities. But if I call to mind familiar doctrines of physics, I see at once that the meaning of such much-favored propositions cannot be the literal one: as if only the "specifically" sensuous qualities of the perceived thing were really mere appearance. That would amount to saying that the "primary" qualities remaining after their *subtraction* belonged to the thing as it is in objective truth, alongside other such qualities that did not come to appearance. So understood, the old Berkeleyan objection would indeed be right, that extension, this essential core of corporeality and of all primary qualities, is unthinkable without secondary ones. Rather, *the whole essential content of the perceived thing*—that is, the whole thing standing there in person, with all its qualities, including all those that could ever be perceived—*is "mere appearance"*, and the *"true thing" is that of physical science*.[6] When physical science determines the given thing exclusively through concepts such as

6 George Berkeley (1685–1753) argued in *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710) that extension cannot be conceived apart from colors and other sensible qualities.

atoms, ions, energies and so on, and in any case as space-filling processes whose sole characteristics are mathematical expressions, it therefore means something *transcendent to the whole content of the thing standing there in person*. It then cannot even mean the thing as lying in the natural space of the senses; in other words, its physical space cannot be the space of the world of in-person perception, for otherwise it too would fall prey to the Berkeleyan objection.

The "true being" would thus be something determined throughout, and in principle, otherwise than what is given in perception as in-person actuality—which is *given* exclusively with sensuous determinations, among them the determinations of sense-space. The thing properly experienced gives the mere "this," an empty *x*, which becomes the bearer of mathematical determinations and the associated mathematical formulas. And this *x* exists not in perceptual space but in an "objective" space, of which perceptual space is the mere "sign": a Euclidean manifold of three dimensions that can be represented only symbolically.

Let us, then, accept this. Let it be, as is taught here, that what is given in person in all perception is "mere appearance," in principle "merely subjective," and yet no empty semblance. For what is given in perception serves, in the rigorous method of natural [73] science, for the valid determination—one that anyone can carry out and check with insight—of that transcendent being whose *sign* it is. The sensuous content of what is given in perception is indeed always taken to be something other than the true thing as it is in itself; but the *substrate*, the bearer (the empty *x*) of the perceived determinations, is always taken to be what is determined by the exact method in physical predicates. In the reverse direction, accordingly, *every piece of physical knowledge serves as an index for the course of possible experiences, with the sense-things and occurrences involving sense-things to be found in them*. It thus serves for orientation in the world of actual experience, in which we all live and act.

§ 41. THE REALLY INHERENT CONTENT OF PERCEPTION AND ITS TRANSCENDENT OBJECT

The perceived thing is never part of perception, which gives it only through adumbrations.

What, then, with all this presupposed, *belongs to the concrete really inherent composition of perception itself, as cogitatio*? Not the physical thing, as goes without saying—this thoroughly transcendent thing, transcendent in relation to the whole "world of appearances." But however much this world of appearances is called "merely subjective," it *too*, with all its individual things and occurrences, does not belong to the really inherent composition of perception; it is "transcendent" in relation to perception. Let us consider this more closely. We have just now spoken of the transcendence of the thing, but only in passing. What matters now is to gain deeper insight into the way *the transcendent stands in relation to the consciousness* that is conscious of it, and into how this mutual relatedness, which has its riddles, is to be understood.

So let us exclude the whole of physics and the whole domain of theoretical thinking. Let us keep within the framework of simple intuition and the syntheses belonging to it, to which perception belongs. It is then evident that intuition and what is intuited, perception and perceived thing, though related to each other in their essence, are, with necessity in principle, *not one and combined in a really inherent way and by essence*.

Let us start from an example. Constantly seeing this table, walking around it as I do so, changing my position in space in whatever way, I continuously have consciousness of the in-person existence of this one and the same table, and indeed of the [74] same table, which in itself remains wholly unchanged. The perception of the table, however, is a constantly changing one; it is a continuity of changing perceptions. I close my eyes. My other senses are out of relation to the table. Now I have no perception of it. I open my eyes, and I have the perception again. The perception? Let us be more exact. When it returns, it is under no

circumstances individually the same. Only the table is the same, conscious as identical in the synthetic consciousness that connects the new perception with the memory. The perceived thing can be without being perceived, without being even potentially conscious (in the manner of the non-actuality described earlier[7]); and it can be without changing. But the perception itself is what it is in the constant flux of consciousness, and is itself a constant flux: the *perceptual* now continually changes into the adjoining consciousness of the *just-past*, and at the same time a new now lights up, and so on. Like the perceived thing in general, so too anything and everything belonging to it by way of parts, sides and moments is necessarily transcendent to perception, for reasons that are everywhere the same—whether it is called a primary or a secondary quality. The color of the seen thing is in principle not a really inherent moment of the consciousness of color. It appears; but while it appears, the appearance can and must, in experience that attests it, change continuously. The *same* color appears "in" continuous manifolds of *color adumbrations*. Something similar holds for sensuous quality, and likewise for every spatial shape. One and the same shape (given in person as the same) appears continuously again and again "in a different way," in ever different shape adumbrations. This is a necessary state of affairs, and evidently one of more general validity. For it was only for simplicity's sake that we took as our example the case of a thing appearing unchanged in perception. The transfer to any changes whatever is obvious.

With essential necessity, to an *"all-sided" consciousness of experience of the same thing, one that continuously and in unified fashion confirms* itself within itself, there *belongs* a *multiple* system of continuous manifolds of appearances and adumbrations, in which all the objective moments that fall within perception with the [75] character of *in-person self-givenness adumbrate themselves* in determinate *continuities*. Every determination has its system of adumbrations; and for each of them, as for the whole thing, it holds that, for the grasping consciousness that synthetically

7 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 35, esp. p. 63.

unites memory and new perception, it stands there as the same despite an interruption in the course of the continuity of actual perception.

At the same time we now see what actually and indubitably belongs to the really inherent composition of the concrete intentional lived experiences called perceptions of things. The thing is the intentional unity, what is conscious as identical and unitary in the continuously regulated flow of the manifolds of perception passing into one another. These manifolds themselves, meanwhile, always have their *determinate descriptive composition*, which is *essentially* correlated with that unity. To every phase of perception there necessarily belongs, for example, a determinate content of color adumbrations, shape adumbrations and so on. They count among the "*sensation data*," data of a region of their own with determinate genera, which within each such genus join together into concrete unities of lived experience *sui generis* [of their own kind] (the *sensation fields*). Further, in a way not to be described in more detail here, these data are animated by "*apprehensions*" in the concrete unity of perception, and in this animation they exercise the "*presenting function*," or together with it make up what we call the "*appearing of*" color, shape and so on. This, interwoven with still further characters, makes up the really inherent composition of the perception. The perception is consciousness of one and the same thing by virtue of the joining together, grounded in the *essence* of those apprehensions, into a *unity of apprehension*, and again by virtue of the possibility, grounded in the *essence* of different such unities, of *syntheses of identification*.

It must be kept sharply in view that the sensation data which exercise the function of adumbrating color, smoothness, shape, and so on (the function of "exhibition") are, as a matter of principle, entirely distinct from color simpliciter, smoothness simpliciter, shape simpliciter, in short from all kinds of *thingly* moments. The *adumbration, though it bears the same name, is in principle not of the same genus as what is adumbrated*. An adumbration is a lived experience. But a lived experience is possible only

as a lived experience, and not as something spatial. What is adumbrated, however, is in principle possible only as something spatial (it is spatial precisely in its essence), [76] but not possible as a lived experience. In particular, it is also an absurdity to take the shape-adumbration (for instance, that of a triangle) for something spatial and possible in space. Whoever does so confuses it with the adumbrated shape, i.e. the appearing shape. How, further, the various really inherent moments of perception as *cogitatio* (as opposed to the moments of the *cogitatum* that is transcendent to it) are to be distinguished with systematic completeness, and characterized according to their divisions, some of them very difficult to draw, is a theme for large-scale investigations.

§ 42. BEING AS CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEING AS REALITY. THE DIFFERENCE IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE MODES OF INTUITION

Things can only be given through adumbration, whereas a lived experience does not adumbrate itself.

The considerations we have carried out yielded the transcendence of the thing over against its perception and, as a further consequence, over against every consciousness whatever that relates to it. This holds not merely in the sense that the thing is in fact not to be found as a really inherent component of consciousness. Rather, the whole situation is one of eidetic insight: with *absolutely unconditioned* universality, or necessity, a thing cannot be given as really immanent in any possible perception, in any possible consciousness whatever. A fundamentally essential difference thus emerges between being *as lived experience* and being as thing. As a matter of principle, it belongs to the regional essence lived experience (specifically to the regional particularization *cogitatio*) that it is perceivable in immanent perception. To the essence of a spatial thing, however, it belongs that it is not. A deeper analysis teaches that it belongs to the essence of every intuition that gives a thing that, together with what is given as thing, other givens analogous to things can be

grasped with a corresponding turn of regard, in the manner of possibly detachable strata and lower levels in the constitution of what appears as thingly: for example, the *"visual things"* in their various particularizations. If so, then exactly the same holds of them: they are transcendences in principle.

Before we pursue this contrast of immanence and transcendence somewhat further, let the following remark be inserted. If we disregard perception, we find many kinds of intentional lived experiences which by their essence exclude the really inherent immanence of their intentional objects, whatever kind of objects these may otherwise be. This holds, for example, of every presentification: of every memory, of the empathic grasping of another's consciousness, and so on. We must not, of course, confuse this transcendence [77] with the one that occupies us here. To the thing as such, to every reality in the genuine sense that we have yet to clarify and fix, there belongs essentially and quite "in principle"[8] the incapacity to be immanently perceivable, and hence to be found at all within the nexus of lived experience. It is in this sense that the thing itself is called transcendent simpliciter. In this there announces itself precisely the difference in principle between modes of being, the most cardinal difference there is at all: that between *consciousness* and *reality*.

To this contrast between immanence and transcendence there belongs, as has further emerged in our account, a *difference in principle in the mode of givenness*. Immanent and transcendent perception do not differ only, in general terms, in that the intentional object, which stands there with the character of the self in person, is in the one case really immanent in the perceiving and in the other not. They differ rather by a mode of givenness which, in its essential distinctness, carries over *mutatis mutandis* [with the necessary changes] into all the presentifying modifications of perception, into the parallel intu-

8 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Here, as throughout this work, we use the word "in principle" (*prinzipiell*) in a strict sense, with reference to the highest and therefore most radical essential universalities, or essential necessities.

itions of memory and of phantasy. We perceive the thing through its adumbrating itself with respect to all the determinations that, in a given case, *actually* and properly *fall* within the perception. *A lived experience does not adumbrate itself.* It is not an accidental quirk of the thing, or a contingency of our human constitution, that "our" perception can reach the things themselves only through mere adumbrations of them. Rather, it is evident, and to be drawn from the essence of spatial thinghood (even in the widest sense, one that encompasses "visual things"), that being of this kind can in principle be given in perceptions only through adumbration. It is likewise evident from the essence of *cogitationes*, of lived experiences in general, that they exclude anything of the sort. In other words, for what exists within their region, something like "appearing," like exhibiting oneself through adumbration, makes no sense at all. Where there is no spatial being, talk of seeing from different standpoints, in a changing orientation, according to different sides that present themselves in the process, according to different perspectives, appearances, adumbrations, simply makes no sense. On the other hand, it is an essential necessity, to be grasped as such in apodictic insight, that spatial being in general can be perceived by an Ego (by every possible [78] Ego) only in the mode of givenness just described. It can only "appear" in a certain "orientation." With this orientation there are necessarily prefigured systematic possibilities for ever new orientations, to each of which there corresponds in turn a certain "mode of appearance," which we express, say, as givenness from this or that side, and so on. Suppose we understand talk of modes of appearance in the sense of modes of *lived experience* (as is plain from the description just given, it can also have a correlative ontic sense). Then this amounts to the following. It belongs to the essence of peculiarly structured kinds of lived experience, more precisely of peculiarly structured concrete perceptions, that what is intentional in them is conscious as a spatial thing. To their essence belongs the ideal possibility of passing over into determinately ordered continuous manifolds of perception,

which can always be continued further and so are never closed. It then lies in the essential structure of these manifolds that they bring about the unity of a *concordantly giving* consciousness, namely a consciousness of the *one* perceived thing, which appears ever more perfectly, from ever new sides, with ever richer determinations. On the other hand, a spatial thing is nothing other than an intentional unity which can in principle be given only as the unity of such modes of appearance.

§ 43. CLARIFICATION OF AN ERROR IN PRINCIPLE

Even God could not perceive a thing without appearances; perception is not an image or a sign.

It is thus an error in principle to believe that perception (and, in its own way, every other kind of intuition of things) does not reach the thing itself. On this view, the thing is not given to us in itself and in its being-in-itself. To every existent, it is said, there belongs the possibility in principle of intuiting it simply, as what it is, and specifically of perceiving it in an adequate perception, one that gives the self in person without *any mediation by "appearances"*. God, the subject of absolutely perfect knowledge and hence also of every possible adequate perception, would naturally possess that perception of the thing in itself which is denied to us finite beings.

This view, however, is absurd. For it implies that there is no *essential difference* between the transcendent and the immanent; that in the postulated divine intuition a spatial thing would be a really inherent constituent, and so itself a lived experience, belonging along with the rest to the divine stream of consciousness and lived experience. People let themselves be misled by the thought that the transcendence of the thing is that of an *image* or a *sign*. The image theory is often zealously [79] combated and a sign theory substituted for it. But the one, like the other, is not only incorrect but absurd. The spatial thing that we see is, for all its transcendence, something perceived, something given to consciousness in its *"in-person" character*. It is not that an

image or a sign is given in its stead. One must not substitute a consciousness of signs or of images for perceiving.

Between *perception*, on the one hand, and *pictorial-symbolic* or *signitive-symbolic representation*, on the other, there is an unbridgeable essential difference. In these kinds of representation we intuit something in the consciousness that it depicts something else or signitively indicates it. Having the one in our field of intuition, we are directed not to it but, through the medium of a founded apprehending, to the other, to what is depicted or designated. In perception there is no question of anything of the kind, any more than in simple memory or simple phantasy.

In immediately intuiting acts we intuit a "self." No apprehensions of a higher level are built on their apprehensions; so nothing is conscious for which what is intuited could function as a "sign" or "image." And precisely for that reason it is said to be immediately intuited as "itself." In perception, this same self is further characterized in a peculiar way as "in person," as against the modified character "hovering before us," "presentified," in memory or free phantasy.[9] One falls into absurdity if one lumps together, as is usually done, these essentially differently structured modes of representation and, correlatively, the givens that correspond to them: that is, if one confuses simple presentification with symbolization (whether pictorial or significative), and all the more simple perception with both of them. The perception of a thing does not presentify something not present, as though it were a memory or a phantasy. It presents; it grasps a

9 HUSSERL'S NOTE. In my Göttingen lectures (since the summer semester of 1904, in fact) I replaced the inadequate account of the relations between these simple and founded intuitions that I had given in the *Logical Investigations* (still too much determined by the views of the prevailing psychology) with an improved one, and I communicated my further research in detail. This research, incidentally, has in the meantime had an influence in the literature, both in terminology and in substance. I hope to be able to publish it in the next volumes of the *Jahrbuch*, together with other investigations long since made use of in lectures.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* (Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research), edited by Husserl, in whose first volume *Ideas I* appeared in 1913.

self in its presence in person. It does so in accordance with its [80] *own sense*, and to demand anything else of it is precisely to violate its sense. If, moreover, as here, we are dealing with the perception of a thing, then it belongs to its essence to be adumbrating perception. And, correlatively, it belongs to the sense of its intentional object, of the thing as given in it, to be perceivable in principle only through perceptions of this kind, that is, through adumbrating ones.

§ 44. MERELY PHENOMENAL BEING OF THE TRANSCENDENT, ABSOLUTE BEING OF THE IMMANENT

A thing is always given one-sidedly and inadequately; a lived experience is given absolutely.

To the perception of a thing there further belongs a certain *inadequacy*, and this too is an essential necessity. A thing can in principle be given only "one-sidedly." This means not only incompletely, not only imperfectly in some arbitrary sense, but precisely what exhibition through adumbration prescribes. A thing is necessarily given in mere "*modes of appearance*." In this, necessarily, a core of *what is "actually exhibited"* is surrounded, as far as apprehension is concerned, by a *horizon of improper "co-givenness"* and of more or less vague *indeterminacy*. And the sense of this indeterminacy is in turn prefigured by the general sense of what is perceived as a thing, in general and as such, or by the universal essence of the type of perception that we call perception of things. Indeterminacy, after all, necessarily means *determinability of a firmly prescribed style*. It *points ahead* to possible manifolds of perception which, passing continuously into one another, join together into the unity of one perception. In that perception the continuously enduring thing shows, in ever new series of adumbrations, ever new "sides" (or, as it returns to them, the old ones). In the process, the thingly moments that were improperly co-apprehended gradually come to actual exhibition, and so to actual givenness; the indeterminacies become more precisely determined, only then to turn into clear givens themselves. In the opposite direction, of course, what is

clear passes back into what is unclear, what is exhibited into what is not exhibited, and so on. *To be imperfect in this way in infinitum belongs to the ineradicable essence of the correlation thing and perception of things*. If the sense of thing is determined by what is given in the perception of things (and what else could determine that sense?), then it demands such imperfection and refers us necessarily to continuously unified nexuses

[81] of possible perceptions which, starting from any one that has been carried out, extend in infinitely many directions in a *systematically, firmly regulated* manner, and in each direction endlessly, always governed throughout by a unity of sense. In principle there always remains a horizon of determinable indeterminacy, however far we may advance in experience, however great the continua of actual perceptions of the same thing that we may have run through. No God can change anything about that, any more than about the fact that *1* + *2* = *3*, or that any other essential truth holds.

It can already be seen, in general, that transcendent being of whatever genus, understood as being for an Ego, can come to givenness only in a manner analogous to a thing, that is, only through appearances. Otherwise it would be precisely a being that could also become immanent; but what is immanently perceivable is only immanently perceivable. Only if one commits the confusions indicated above and now cleared up can one consider it possible that one and the same thing could be given at one time through appearance, in the form of transcendent perception, and at another time through immanent perception.

But let us first carry the contrast, specifically that between thing and lived experience, through on the other side as well. The *lived experience*, we said, does not exhibit itself. This implies that the perception of a lived experience is a simple seeing of something that is *given* (or can be given) *in perception as something "absolute"*, and not as what is identical across modes of appearance through adumbration. Everything we have set out about the givenness of things loses its sense here, and one must bring this to complete clarity in detail. A lived experience of

feeling does not adumbrate itself. If I look at it, I have something absolute; it has no sides that could exhibit themselves now in one way, now in another. In thinking, I can think true things and false things about it, but what stands there in my seeing regard is absolutely there, with its qualities, its intensity, and so on. A violin tone, by contrast, with its objective identity, is given through adumbration; it has its changing modes of appearance. These differ according to whether I move nearer the violin or farther from it, whether I am in the concert hall itself or am listening through the closed doors, and so on. No mode of appearance can claim to count as the absolutely giving one, although a certain one, as the normal one, has a certain priority within the framework of my practical interests: in the concert hall, at the "right" spot, I hear [82] the tone "itself," as it "really" sounds. Likewise, we say of everything thingly, in visual respects, that it has a normal look. Of the color, the shape, the whole thing, which we see in normal daylight and in the normal orientation to us, we say that this is how the thing really looks, that the color is the real one, and so forth. But this points only to a *kind of secondary objectivation* within the framework of the whole objectivation of the thing, as one can easily convince oneself. For it is clear that if, holding fast exclusively to the "normal" mode of appearance, we were to cut off the remaining manifolds of appearance and the essential relation to them, nothing would be left of the sense of the givenness of things.

We therefore hold fast to this: while it belongs to the essence of givenness through appearances that no appearance gives the matter as something "absolute" instead of in one-sided exhibition, it belongs to the essence of immanent givenness to give precisely something absolute, which cannot exhibit and adumbrate itself in sides at all. It is also evident, after all, that the adumbrating sensation contents themselves, which belong really inherently to the lived experience of perceiving a thing, do indeed function as adumbrations of something else, but are not themselves given, in their turn, through adumbration.

Note also the following difference. A lived experience, too, is not completely perceived, and never is; in its full unity it cannot be adequately grasped. By its essence it is a flow, which we can swim after, directing our reflective regard to it, starting from the now-point, while the stretches lying behind are lost to perception. Only in the form of retention, or in the form of retrospective recollection, do we have a consciousness of what has just flowed past. And finally, my whole stream of lived experience is a unity of lived experience of which a perceptual grasp that fully "swims along" with it is in principle impossible. But *this* incompleteness, or "imperfection," which belongs to the essence of the perception of lived experience, is different in principle from the one that lies in the essence of "transcendent" perception, perception by adumbrating exhibition, by something like appearance.

All the modes of givenness, and the differences between them, that we find in the sphere of perception enter into the *reproductive modifications*, but in a modified way. Presentifications of things presentify through exhibitions, [83] in which the adumbrations themselves, the apprehensions, and so the whole phenomena, are *thoroughly reproductively* modified. Of lived experiences, too, we have reproductions and acts of reproductive intuition, in the manner of presentification and of reflection within presentification. Naturally we find nothing here of reproductive adumbrations.

We now add the following contrast. To the essence of presentifications there belong gradual differences of relative clarity or obscurity. Evidently this difference in perfection, too, has nothing to do with the one relating to givenness through adumbrating appearances. A more or less clear representation does not adumbrate itself through its degree of clarity, not, that is, in the sense decisive for our terminology, according to which a spatial shape, every quality covering it, and so the whole "appearing thing as such" adumbrates itself in manifold ways, whether the representation is clear or obscure. A reproductive representation of a thing has its various possible degrees of clarity, and

does so for each mode of adumbration. One sees that we are dealing with differences that lie in different dimensions. It is also evident that the differences we draw within the sphere of perception itself under the headings of clear and unclear, distinct and indistinct seeing do show a certain analogy with the differences of clarity just discussed, insofar as in both cases it is a matter of gradual increase and decrease in the fullness of givenness of what is represented. But it is evident, too, that these differences also belong to different dimensions.

§ 45. UNPERCEIVED LIVED EXPERIENCE, UNPERCEIVED REALITY

Lived experiences are always ready to be perceived in reflection, while unperceived things lie within a horizon.

If one immerses oneself in these situations, one also understands the following essential difference in the way lived experiences and things stand to one another with regard to their perceivability.

It belongs to the mode of being of lived experience that a regard of seeing perception can be directed quite immediately onto every actual lived experience that is alive as an originary present. This happens in the form of *reflection*. Reflection has the remarkable peculiarity that what it grasps perceptually is characterized in principle as something that not only is and endures within the perceiving regard, but *already was before* this regard turned toward it. "All lived experiences are conscious": with regard specifically to intentional lived experiences, this means that they are not only consciousness [84] of something, and are present as such not only when they themselves are objects of a reflecting consciousness. Rather, they are already there, unreflected, as "background," and are thus in principle *ready to be perceived*, in a sense at first analogous to that in which unnoticed things in our outer visual field are. These things can be ready only insofar as they are already, though unnoticed, conscious in a certain way, and for them that means: if they appear. *Not all* things fulfill this condition: my visual field of attention, which

encompasses everything that appears, is not infinite. On the other hand, the unreflected lived experience, too, must fulfill certain conditions of readiness, though in an entirely different way, one in keeping with its essence. After all, it cannot "appear." In any case, it always fulfills these conditions by the mere manner of its existence, and does so for the Ego to which it belongs, whose pure Ego-regard may be living "in" it. Only because reflection and lived experience have these *essential* peculiarities, merely hinted at here, can we know anything of unreflected lived experiences, and so also of reflections themselves. That the reproductive (and retentional) modifications of lived experiences have the parallel constitution, only correspondingly modified, goes without saying.

Let us carry the contrast further. We see: *it is the mode of being of lived experience* to be *perceivable in principle in the manner of reflection*. The thing, too, is *perceivable* in principle, and in perception it is grasped as a thing of my surrounding world. It belongs to this world even without being perceived, and so even then it is there for the *Ego*. But in general not in such a way that a regard of simple noticing could be directed onto it. The background field, understood as a field of what can simply be looked at, comprises, after all, only a small piece of my surrounding world. The "it is there" means, rather, that from actual perceptions, with the actually appearing background field, possible series of perceptions, *continuously* and concordantly *motivated*, with ever new fields of things (as unnoticed backgrounds), lead onward to those nexuses of perception in which the thing in question would come to appearance and be grasped. In principle nothing essential changes here if, instead of a single Ego, we take a plurality of Egos into account. Only through the relation of possible mutual understanding can my world of experience be identified with that of others and, at the same time, enriched by their surplus of experience. A transcendence that lacked the connection just described, through [85] concordant nexuses of motivation, with my current sphere of actual perception would thus be a completely groundless assumption; a tran-

scendence that lacked such connection *in principle* would be *nonsense*. Such, then, is the presence of what is not actually perceived in the world of things, and it is essentially different from the being of lived experiences, which is conscious in principle.

§ 46. INDUBITABILITY OF IMMANENT PERCEPTION, DUBITABILITY OF TRANSCENDENT PERCEPTION

My lived experience cannot fail to exist once perceived, while any perceived thing might not exist.

Important consequences follow from all this. Every immanent perception necessarily guarantees the existence of its object. If reflective grasping is directed at my lived experience, then I have grasped an absolute self whose existence cannot in principle be negated; that is, the insight that it does not exist is in principle impossible. It would be an absurdity to consider it possible that a lived experience given in this way does *not* in truth exist. The stream of lived experience that is mine, the stream of the one who is thinking, may be uncomprehended to ever so great an extent, unknown in the regions of the stream that have run off and those still to come. Yet as soon as I look toward the flowing life in its actual present and in doing so grasp myself as the pure subject of this life (what that means will occupy us specifically later), I say simply and necessarily: I am, this life is, I live: *cogito*.

To every stream of lived experience and every Ego as such there belongs the possibility in principle of attaining this evidence; each bears within itself the guarantee of its absolute existence as a possibility in principle. But is it not conceivable, one might ask, that an Ego had only phantasies in its stream of lived experience, that this stream consisted of nothing but fictive intuitions? Such an Ego would then find only fictions of *cogitationes*; given the nature of this medium of lived experience, its reflections would be exclusively reflections in imagination.—But that is an obvious absurdity. What hovers before one may be a mere figment; the hovering-before itself, the fictive consciousness, is not itself something fictive. And to its essence, as to that

of every lived experience, belongs the possibility of a reflection that perceives and grasps its absolute existence. There is no absurdity in the possibility that all the consciousness of others, which I posit in empathic experience, does not exist. But my empathizing, and my consciousness in general, is given originarily and absolutely, not only as to its essence but as to its existence. Only for the Ego and the stream of lived experience in relation to themselves does this [86] distinctive situation obtain; only here is there anything like immanent perception, and only here must there be.

By contrast, as we know, it belongs to the essence of the world of things that no perception in its domain, however perfect, gives something absolute. Essentially connected with this is the fact that every experience, however far-reaching, leaves open the possibility that what is given does *not* exist, in spite of the constant consciousness of its presence in person. It holds as an essential law that *the existence of a thing is never one required as necessary by its givenness*, but is always in a certain way *contingent*. This means: it can always happen that the further course of experience compels us to give up what had been posited *with experiential right*. It was, we say afterward, mere illusion, hallucination, merely a coherent dream, and the like. In addition, there is in this sphere of givenness, as a constantly open possibility, something like a change of apprehension, the switching of an appearance into one that cannot be concordantly united with it; and with this an influence of later experiential positings on earlier ones, by which the intentional objects of these earlier positings undergo, so to speak, a transformation after the fact. These are all occurrences that are essentially excluded in the sphere of lived experience. In the absolute sphere, conflict, semblance, being-otherwise have no room. It is a sphere of absolute position.

So it is clear in every respect that everything that is there for me in the world of things is in principle *only presumptive actuality*; whereas *I myself*, for whom it is there (excluding whatever of "me" is to be counted as part of the world of things)—or, more

precisely, my actuality of lived experience—am absolute actuality, given through an unconditioned, simply irrevocable positing.

The thesis of the world, which is a *contingent* one, thus stands over against the thesis of my pure Ego and *Ego-life*, which is a "necessary," absolutely indubitable one. Anything thingly that is given in person can also not exist; no lived experience given in person can also not exist: that is the essential law that defines this necessity and that contingency.

Evidently, however, the necessity of being of the current actual lived experience is not for that reason a pure essential necessity, i.e. not a purely eidetic particularization of an essential law. It is the necessity of a fact, so called because an essential law is involved in the fact, and here indeed in its existence as such. [87] In the essence of a pure *Ego in general* and of a lived experience *in general* there is grounded the ideal possibility of a reflection that has the essential character of an evidently irrevocable *thesis of existence*.

The reflection just carried out also makes it clear that no proofs drawn from the experiential consideration of the world are conceivable that could assure us of the world's existence with absolute certainty. The world is not doubtful in the sense that there were rational motives to be weighed against the tremendous force of concordant experiences. It is doubtful in the sense that a doubt is *conceivable*; and a doubt is conceivable because the possibility of non-being, as a possibility in principle, is never excluded. Any force of experience, however great, can gradually be counterbalanced and outweighed. The absolute being of lived experiences is in no way altered by this; indeed, they always remain presupposed by all of it.

With this our consideration has reached a high point. We have gained the insights we need. In the essential connections that have been disclosed to us, the most important premises are already contained for the conclusions we wish to draw concerning the detachability in principle of the entire natural world from the domain of consciousness, the sphere of being of lived

experiences. In these conclusions, as we shall be able to convince ourselves, a core of Descartes's *Meditations* (which were aimed at quite different goals), a core that simply never came to work itself out purely, finally comes into its own. Admittedly, some supplements, easily supplied as it happens, will still be needed afterward to reach our ultimate goals. For the time being, we draw our consequences within a framework of limited validity.

CHAPTER THREE. THE REGION OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS. § 47. THE NATURAL WORLD AS CORRELATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Things are what they are only as things of possible experience, within motivated nexuses of experience.

Connecting with the results of the last chapter, we undertake the following reflection. The factual course of our human experiences is such that it compels our reason to go beyond the intuitively given things (those of the Cartesian *imaginatio* [imagination]) [88] and to underlay them with a "physical truth." But it could also be otherwise. Not merely in the way it would be if human development had never led, and were never to lead, beyond the prescientific stage, so that the physical world would indeed have its truth but we would know nothing of it. Nor in the sense that the physical world would be a different one, with orders of laws other than those that in fact hold. Rather, it is also conceivable that our intuitive world was the last one, behind which there was no physical world at all; that is, that the things of perception lacked mathematical, physical determinability, that the givens of experience excluded any physics of the kind ours is. The nexuses of experience would then be correspondingly different, and different in type, from what they in fact are, insofar as the experiential motivations that are foundational for forming physical concepts and judgments would fall away. But on the whole, within the framework of the giving *intuitions* that we comprise under the heading "simple experience" (perception, recollection, and so on), "things" could present themselves

to us much as they do now, persisting continuously as intentional unities in manifolds of appearance.[10]

But we can also go further in this direction: in the destruction, in thought, of the objectivity of things, as the correlate of the consciousness of experience, no limits hold us back. Here it must always be borne in mind that what *things are* (the things about which alone we make statements, about whose being or non-being, being-thus or being-otherwise alone we can dispute and rationally decide), they are *as things of experience*. It is experience alone that prescribes their sense to them; and indeed, since we are dealing with factual things, it is actual experience in its determinately ordered nexuses of experience. Suppose, however, that we can subject the kinds of lived experience belonging to experience, and in particular the fundamental lived experience of perceiving things, to *eidetic* consideration, and read off from them essential necessities and essential possibilities (as we evidently can); and that we can accordingly also follow eidetically the essentially possible variations of motivated nexuses of experience. Then the correlate of our factual experience, called "*the actual world*," turns out to be a *special case of manifold possible worlds and non-worlds*. These *in their turn* are nothing other than *correlates of essentially possible variations* of the *idea "experiencing consciousness"*, with more or less ordered nexuses of experience. [89] One must therefore not let oneself be deceived by talk of the transcendence of the thing over against consciousness, or of its "being-in-itself." The genuine concept of the transcendence of what is thingly, which is the measure of all rational statements about transcendence, can after all be drawn from nowhere except from the essential content proper to perception, or to the determinately *structured* nexuses that we call verifying experience. The idea of this transcendence is therefore

10 HUSSERL'S NOTE. This is therefore a *quite exceptional* case of the empirical necessities mentioned at the end of the second paragraph of § 6, p. 13 of this treatise. Compare also the Third Investigation of Volume II in the new edition of the *Logical Investigations*.

the eidetic correlate of the pure idea of this verifying experience.

This holds for every conceivable kind of transcendence that is to be treatable as actuality or as possibility. *An object existing in itself is never one with which consciousness and the Ego of consciousness have nothing to do.* The thing is a thing of the *surrounding world*, even the thing not seen, even the really possible thing, not experienced but experienceable, or perhaps experienceable. *Experienceability never means an empty logical possibility*, but a possibility *motivated* in the nexus of experience. This nexus itself is through and through a nexus of "*motivation*"[11], constantly taking in new motivations and reshaping those already formed. The motivations differ in their content of apprehension or determination: they are richer or less rich, more or less delimited or vague in content, according to whether we are dealing with things already "known" or "completely unknown," still "undiscovered," or, in the case of the thing seen, with what is known of it or what is still unknown. What matters is solely the essential configurations of such nexuses, which in all their possibilities are open to purely eidetic investigation. It lies in the essence that whatever *realiter* [in reality] exists but has not yet been actually experienced can come to givenness, and that this then means that it belongs to the indeterminate but *determinable* horizon of my current actuality of experience. This horizon, however, is the correlate of the components of indeterminacy that essentially attach to the experiences of things themselves, [90] and these components, always essentially, leave open possibilities of fulfillment. These are by no means arbitrary but *prefigured according to their essential type*, motivated. All actual experience

11 HUSSERL'S NOTE. It should be noted that this fundamental phenomenological concept of motivation presented itself to me immediately upon the separation of the purely phenomenological sphere carried out in the *Logical Investigations* (and as a contrast to the concept of causality, which relates to the transcendent sphere of reality). It is a generalization of that concept of motivation according to which we can say, for example, that willing the end motivates willing the means. For the rest, the concept of motivation undergoes, for essential reasons, various shifts; the equivocations that go with them become harmless, and even appear necessary, as soon as the phenomenological situations have been clarified.

points beyond itself to possible experiences, which in turn point to new possible ones, and so *in infinitum*. And all this takes place according to essentially determined kinds and forms of rule bound to *a priori* types.

Every hypothetical assumption of practical life and of empirical science relates to this changeable but always co-posited horizon, through which the thesis of the world receives its essential sense.

§ 48. LOGICAL POSSIBILITY AND MATERIAL ABSURDITY OF A WORLD OUTSIDE OUR WORLD

A reality beyond all possible experience is formally consistent but absurd.

The hypothetical assumption of something real outside this world is, to be sure, "logically" possible; there is evidently no formal contradiction in it. But suppose we ask about the essential conditions of its validity, about the kind of verification required by its sense; suppose we ask about the kind of verification in general that is determined in principle by the thesis of something transcendent, however we may legitimately generalize its essence. Then we recognize that this transcendent would necessarily have to be *experienceable*, and not merely for an Ego conjured up as an empty logical possibility, but for some *actual* Ego, as a verifiable unity of its nexuses of experience. One can see, however (we are admittedly not yet far enough along here to ground this in detail; only the later analyses will supply all the premises for that), that what is knowable for one Ego must *in principle* be knowable for *every* Ego. It may be that *in fact* not every Ego stands, or can stand, in a relation of "empathy," of mutual understanding, with every other, as we, for example, do not with minds that may perhaps live in the most distant stellar worlds. Nevertheless, considered in principle, there exist essential *possibilities of establishing a mutual understanding*, and so also possibilities that the factually separate worlds of experience might join together, through nexuses of actual experience, into a single intersubjective world, the correlate of the unified world

of minds (the universal extension of the human community). If one considers this, the formal-logical possibility of realities outside the world, the *one* spatiotemporal world that is *fixed* by our *actual* [91] experience, proves materially to be an absurdity. If there are worlds, real things, at all, then the experiential motivations constituting them must *be able* to reach into my experience and into that of every Ego, in the manner characterized in general terms above. There are, of course, things and worlds of things that cannot be determinately verified in any *human* experience; but that has merely factual grounds, in the factual limits of this experience.

§ 49. ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE RESIDUE OF THE ANNIHILATION OF THE WORLD

Consciousness would survive the world's annihilation; the world exists only as intended by consciousness.

On the other hand, none of this says that there must be a world at all, or any thing. The existence of a world is the correlate of certain manifolds of experience distinguished by certain essential configurations. But it *cannot* be seen with insight that actual experiences can run their course only in such forms of connection; nothing of the sort can be drawn purely from the essence of perception in general and of the other kinds of experiencing intuition involved. Rather, it is quite conceivable that experience dissolves into semblance through conflict not only in particular instances; and that it is not the case, as it is *de facto*, that every semblance announces a deeper truth and every conflict, in its place, is precisely what more comprehensive nexuses demand for preserving concordance as a whole. It is conceivable that experience teems with conflicts that cannot be resolved, not only for us but in themselves; that experience suddenly proves recalcitrant to the demand that it sustain its positings of things concordantly; that its nexus loses the fixed orders of rule governing adumbrations, apprehensions, appearances—that there is no longer any world. It may be that, even so, crude formations of unity would to some extent come to constitution:

transient resting points for intuitions that would be mere analogues of intuitions of things, because they would be wholly incapable of constituting "conservative realities," enduring unities that "exist in themselves, whether they are perceived or not."

Let us now add the results we arrived at at the end of the last chapter; let us think, that is, of the possibility of non-being that lies in the essence of every thingly transcendence. Then it becomes evident that the being *of consciousness*, of every stream of lived experience whatever, *would indeed necessarily be modified by an annihilation* of the world of things, *but would not be touched in its own existence*. Modified, [92] to be sure. For the annihilation of the world means, correlatively, nothing other than that in every stream of lived experience (the whole stream of an Ego's lived experiences, taken fully, and so as endless in both directions) certain ordered nexuses of experience would be excluded, and accordingly also the nexuses of theorizing reason that orient themselves by them. But this does not imply that other lived experiences and nexuses of lived experience would be excluded. Thus *no real being*, no being that exhibits and verifies itself in consciousness through appearances, is necessary for the being *of consciousness itself* (in the widest sense, that of the stream of lived experience).

Immanent being is therefore indubitably absolute being in the sense that in principle it *nulla "re" indiget ad existendum* [needs no "thing" in order to exist].[12]

On the other hand, the world of transcendent "*res*" [things] is entirely dependent on consciousness, and not on a consciousness logically conjured up, but on actual consciousness.

This has already become clear, in its most general features, from the discussion above (in the preceding section). Something transcendent is given through certain nexuses of experience. It is given directly and with increasing perfection in continua of perception that prove themselves concordant, and in certain methodical forms of thinking grounded on experience. In this

12 Husserl adapts Descartes's definition of substance as that which needs nothing else in order to exist (*Principles of Philosophy* I, 51).

way it comes, more or less mediately, to insightful and ever further progressing theoretical determination. Let us suppose that consciousness, with its *content of lived experience* and its *course*, were actually so constituted in itself that the subject of consciousness, in the free theoretical conduct of experiencing and of thinking about experience, *could* carry out all such nexuses (in which we would also have to take into account the aid of mutual understanding with other Egos and streams of lived experience). Let us suppose further that the corresponding regulations of consciousness actually obtained, that on the side of the courses of consciousness nothing at all was lacking that could in any way be required for the appearance of a unified world and for rational theoretical knowledge of it. We now ask: all this presupposed, is it still conceivable, and not rather absurd, that the corresponding transcendent world does not exist?

We see, then, that consciousness (lived experience) and real being are anything but coordinate kinds of being, dwelling peaceably side by side and occasionally "relating" to one another or "connecting" with one another. Only what is essentially akin, what, the one [93] like the other, has an essence of its own in the same sense, can connect in the true sense and form a whole. Immanent or absolute being and transcendent being are, to be sure, both called "existent" and "object," and each has its objective content of determination. But it is evident that what is called object and objective determination on either side bears the same name only according to the empty logical categories. Between consciousness and reality there yawns a veritable abyss of sense. Here, a being that adumbrates itself, that can never be given absolutely, a merely contingent and relative being; there, a necessary and absolute being, which in principle cannot be given through adumbration and appearance.

Thus it becomes clear that, in spite of all the talk, certainly well founded in its own sense, of a real being of the *human* Ego and its lived experiences of consciousness in the world, and of everything that in any way belongs to it with respect to "psycho-

physical" connections—that in spite of all this, consciousness, considered in its *purity*, must count as a *self-contained nexus of being*, as a nexus of *absolute being*, into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip. It has no spatiotemporal outside and cannot be inside any spatiotemporal nexus; it can undergo causality from no thing and exercise causality on no thing—provided that causality has the normal sense of natural causality, as a relation of dependence between realities.

On the other hand, the whole *spatiotemporal world*, to which human beings and the human Ego count themselves as subordinate individual realities, is, *according to its sense, mere intentional being*. It is therefore a being that has the merely secondary, relative sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being which consciousness posits in its experiences, which in principle is intuitable and determinable only as something identical in motivated manifolds of appearances—but which *beyond* that is a nothing.

§ 50. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE AND PURE CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE FIELD OF PHENOMENOLOGY

By the reduction we lose nothing and gain the whole of absolute being as our field.

Thus the ordinary sense of talk about being is reversed. The being that is first for us is in itself second; that is, it is what it is only in *relation* to the first. This is not as though a blind order of laws had brought it about that the *ordo et connexio rerum* [order and connection of things] must conform to the *ordo et connexio idearum* [order and connection of ideas]. Reality, both the reality of the single thing taken by itself and the reality of the whole world, essentially (in our strict sense) lacks [94] self-sufficiency. It is not something absolute in itself that then binds itself secondarily to something else. Rather, in the absolute sense it is nothing at all; it has no "absolute essence" whatsoever. It has the essentiality of something that in principle is only intentional,

only something one is conscious of, something presented in the manner of consciousness, something appearing.[13]

Let us now turn our thoughts back to the first chapter, to our reflections on the phenomenological reduction. It is now clear that, in contrast to the natural theoretical attitude, whose correlate is the world, a new attitude must indeed be possible. Despite the exclusion of this psychophysical all-embracing nature, that attitude retains something—the whole field of absolute consciousness. Instead, then, of living naively in experience and theoretically investigating what is experienced, transcendent nature, we carry out the "phenomenological reduction." In other words: instead of naively *carrying out* the acts belonging to nature-constituting consciousness, with their transcendent theses, and letting ourselves be determined by the motivations lying in them to ever new transcendent theses—we put all these theses "out of action"; we do not go along with them. We direct our grasping and theoretically inquiring regard to *pure consciousness in its own absolute being*. This, then, is what remains as the *phenomenological residue* we were seeking. It remains even though we have excluded the whole world with all things, living beings, human beings, ourselves included. We have actually lost nothing, but have gained the whole of absolute being, which, rightly understood, harbors all worldly transcendences within itself, "constitutes" them within itself.

Let us make this clear in detail. In the natural attitude we simply *carry out* all the acts through which the world is there for us. We live naively in perceiving and experiencing, in these thetic acts in which unities of things appear to us—and not only appear, but are given in the character of the "on hand," the "*actual*." When we pursue natural science, we carry out acts of thinking ordered according to the logic of experience. In them these actualities, accepted just as they are given, are determined in thought, and in them, on the basis of such directly experienced and determined transcendences, inferences are also

13 An allusion to Spinoza, *Ethics* II, proposition 7: "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things."

drawn to new ones. In the phenomenological attitude we *inhibit*, with universality in principle, the *carrying out* of all such cogitative theses; that is, we "bracket" those that have been carried out, and for the new investigations we "do not go along with" these theses. Instead of living in them, of [95] carrying them out, we carry out acts of *reflection* directed toward them, and we grasp them themselves as the *absolute* being that they are. We now live entirely in such acts of the second level, whose given is the infinite field of absolute lived experiences—the *fundamental field of phenomenology*.

§ 51. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Pure consciousness is not a piece of nature, and the reduction is not a mere abstraction from it.

Anyone, of course, can carry out reflection and bring consciousness within their grasping regard; but that does not yet amount to *phenomenological* reflection, and the consciousness grasped is not yet pure consciousness. Radical considerations of the kind we have carried out are therefore necessary in order to break through to the knowledge that there is, indeed can be, anything like the field of pure consciousness at all—a field that is not a component of nature, and is so far from being one that nature is possible only as an intentional unity motivated in it by immanent connections. They are necessary in order to recognize, further, that such a unity is given, and is to be theoretically investigated, in an attitude wholly different from the one in which the consciousness that "constitutes" this unity—and thus each and every absolute consciousness whatever—is to be investigated. They are necessary so that finally, in view of the philosophical misery in which we toil in vain under the fine name of a worldview grounded in natural science, it may become clear that transcendental research into consciousness cannot mean research into nature, nor presuppose it as a premise, because in its transcendental attitude nature is in principle bracketed. They are necessary in order to recognize that our disregarding the whole

world in the form of phenomenological reduction is something totally different from a mere abstraction from components of more comprehensive connections, whether necessary or factual ones. If lived experiences of consciousness were not thinkable without interweaving with nature, in the way that colors are not thinkable without extension, then we could not regard consciousness as an absolutely peculiar region in its own right, in the sense in which we must. But one must see that by such "abstraction" from nature only something natural is obtained, never transcendentally pure consciousness. And again, the phenomenological reduction does not mean a mere restriction of judgment to a connected piece of the whole of actual being. In all the particular sciences of actuality, theoretical interest is restricted to particular [96] domains of all-embracing actuality; the rest are left out of consideration, insofar as real relations running back and forth do not compel mediating investigations. In this sense mechanics "abstracts" from optical occurrences, and physics in general and in the broadest sense from the psychological. Yet, as every natural scientist knows, no domain of actuality is thereby isolated. The whole world is ultimately a single "nature," and all natural sciences are branches of one natural science. It is fundamentally and essentially otherwise with the domain of lived experiences as absolute essentialities. That domain is firmly closed in itself and yet without boundaries that could separate it from other regions. For whatever would bound it would still have to share a community of essence with it. But it is the totality of absolute being in the definite sense that our analyses have brought out. By its essence it is independent of all worldly, natural being, and it does not need such being for its *existence* either. The existence of a nature cannot condition the existence of consciousness, since nature itself turns out to be a correlate of consciousness; nature is only as constituting itself in regulated connections of consciousness.

REMARK

A principle of order behind the world, such as God, would have to be sought in absolute consciousness.

We note the following here in passing, and let it be said so as not to allow misunderstandings to arise. Suppose the facticity in the given order of the course of consciousness, in its separation into individuals, and the *teleology* immanent in them give well-founded occasion to ask for the ground of precisely this order. Then the *theological principle* that might rationally be supposed cannot, for essential reasons, be assumed *as a transcendence in the sense of the world*; for that, as follows in advance with evidence from what we have established, would be an absurd circle. The ordering principle of the absolute must be found in the absolute itself and in purely absolute consideration. In other words: a mundane God is evidently impossible; and, on the other hand, the immanence of God in absolute consciousness cannot be understood as immanence in the sense of being as lived experience (which would be no less absurd). Hence there must be, in the absolute stream of consciousness and its infinities, ways in which transcendences are made known other than the constitution of thingly realities as unities of concordant appearances. And ultimately there must also be intuitive manifestations to which theoretical thinking could adapt itself, [97] and by rationally following which it could make intelligible the unitary governance of the supposed theological principle. It is then also evident that this governance could not be understood as causal, in the sense of the natural concept of causality, which is tailored to realities and to the functional connections belonging to their particular essence.

But none of this concerns us further here. Our immediate aim is not theology but phenomenology, however much the latter may indirectly mean for the former. The fundamental considerations we have carried out served phenomenology, however,

insofar as they were indispensable for opening up the absolute sphere as the field of research proper to it.

§ 52. SUPPLEMENTS. THE PHYSICAL THING AND THE "UNKNOWN CAUSE OF APPEARANCES"

The physicist's thing is the perceived thing itself, determined by physics, not a hidden cause behind it.

But now to the necessary supplements. We carried out the last series of our reflections chiefly with reference to the thing of sensuous *imaginatio*, and paid no proper attention to the physical thing, for which the sensuously appearing thing (the thing given in perception) is supposed to function as "mere appearance," perhaps even as something "merely subjective." However, it already lies in the sense of our earlier discussions that this mere subjectivity must not (as so often happens) be confused with a subjectivity of lived experience—as if the perceived things in their perceptual qualities, and as if these qualities themselves, were lived experiences. Nor can it be the true opinion of natural scientists (especially if we keep not to their pronouncements but to the sense of their method) that the appearing thing is an illusion or a faulty image of the "true" physical thing. Likewise, the talk of the determinations of appearance being "*signs*" for the true determinations is misleading.[14]

May we now even say, in the sense of the so widespread "realism": what is actually perceived (and what appears in the first sense) is in its turn to be regarded as the appearance, or the instinctive substruction, of something else, something inwardly foreign to it and separate from it? And that, considered theoretically, this latter would have to count as a reality to be assumed hypothetically for the purpose of explaining the course of the lived experiences of appearance—a completely [98] unknown reality, a hidden *cause* of these appearances, to be characterized only indirectly and by analogy through mathematical concepts?

14 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. the discussions of the image theory and the sign theory in § 43, p. 78 ff.

Already on the basis of our general expositions (which will be greatly deepened by our further analyses and will receive constant confirmation), it is clear that theories of this sort are possible only as long as one avoids seriously considering and scientifically fathoming the sense of what is given as a thing, and hence of "thing in general," that lies in the very *essence* of experience—the sense that constitutes the absolute norm of all rational talk about things. Whatever violates this sense is precisely absurd in the strictest meaning of the word,[15] and that undoubtedly holds of all epistemological doctrines of the type described.

It could easily be shown, after all, that if the unknown alleged cause exists at all, it would *in principle* have to be perceivable and experienceable—if not for us, then for other Egos who see better and farther. This is not a matter of an empty, merely logical possibility, but of an essential possibility that is rich in content and valid with this content. It would further have to be shown that the possible perception itself would in turn, and with essential necessity, have to be a perception through appearances, and that we would thus fall into an unavoidable *regressus in infinitum* [infinite regress]. It would also have to be pointed out that an explanation of the processes given in perception by hypothetically assumed causal realities, by unknown thingly entities (as, for example, the explanation of certain planetary perturbations by assuming a new, still unknown planet, Neptune) is something different in principle from an explanation in the sense of a physical determination of the experienced things and by physical means of explanation such as atoms, ions, and the like. And in a similar vein much more could be set out.[16]

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15 HUSSERL'S NOTE. In this work "absurdity" is a logical term and expresses no extralogical evaluation based on feeling. Even the greatest researchers have occasionally fallen into absurdity, and if it is our scientific duty to say so, this will do no harm to our veneration for them.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. "Absurdity" renders Husserl's *Widersinn* (literally "countersense"), a sense that contradicts itself.

16 Neptune was discovered in 1846 at a position predicted from irregularities in the orbit of Uranus.

We cannot enter here into a systematically exhaustive discussion of all such relations. For our purposes it suffices to bring a few main points into clear relief.

[99] As our point of departure we take the easily verified finding that, in the method of physics, the perceived *thing itself* is, always and in principle, *precisely the thing that the physicist investigates and scientifically determines*.

This statement seems to contradict the statements made earlier,[17] in which we tried to determine more closely the sense of the physicists' customary ways of speaking, or the sense of the traditional distinction between primary and secondary qualities. After eliminating obvious misinterpretations, we said that the "thing properly experienced" gives us the "mere this," an "empty x," which becomes the bearer of the exact physical determinations, which themselves do not fall within experience proper. The "physically true" being, then, is "determined in a way different in principle" from the being given "in person" in perception itself. The latter stands there with purely sensuous determinations, which are precisely not physical ones.

Nonetheless the two accounts are quite compatible, and we need not seriously dispute that interpretation of the physical conception. We need only understand it correctly. By no means may we fall into the image and sign theories, wrong in principle, which we considered earlier without special regard to the physical thing and refuted at once in radical generality.[18] An image or sign points to something lying outside it, which could be grasped "itself" by passing over into another mode of representation, that of giving intuition. A sign or image does not, in its own self, "make known" the self that is signified (or depicted). The physical thing, however, is nothing foreign to what appears sensuously and in person; it is something that makes itself known originarily in that, and indeed a priori (for essential reasons that cannot be annulled) only in that. Moreover, the sensuous determining content of the x that functions as bearer of the

17 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above p. 72, § 40.
18 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 43, p. 87.

physical determinations is not a garment foreign to them and concealing them. Rather, only insofar as the x is the subject of the sensuous determinations is it also the subject of the physical ones, which for their part *make themselves known* in the sensuous ones. In principle, according to what has been set out in detail, a thing—and precisely the thing the physicist speaks of—can be given only sensuously, in sensuous "modes of appearance." And what is identical, appearing in the changing continuity of these [100] modes of appearance, is what the physicist subjects to a causal analysis, to an investigation in terms of real connections of necessity, in relation to all experienceable (thus perceived or perceivable) connections that can come into consideration as "circumstances." The thing that the physicist observes, experiments with, constantly sees, takes in hand, puts on the scales, places in the melting furnace: this and no other thing becomes the subject of the physical predicates, such as weight, mass, temperature, electrical resistance, and so on. Likewise, it is the perceived processes and connections themselves that are determined by concepts such as force, acceleration, energy, atom, ion, and so on. The sensuously appearing thing, which has the sensuous shapes, colors, properties of smell and taste, is therefore anything but a sign for something *else*; it is, in a certain sense, a sign for *itself*.

Only this much can be said. The thing appearing with such and such sensuous qualities under the given phenomenal circumstances is, for *the physicist* who has *already carried out the physical determination*, in *general* terms, for such things as a whole in connections of appearance of the relevant kind, an indication of a wealth of causal properties of this same thing. These properties, as such, make themselves known precisely in dependencies of appearance whose types are well known. What makes itself known there is obviously—precisely as making itself known in intentional unities of lived experiences of consciousness—transcendent in principle.

After all this it is clear that *even the higher transcendence of the physical thing does not signify any reaching out beyond the world for*

consciousness, or beyond the world for every Ego functioning as a subject of knowledge (singly or in the nexus of empathy).

Indicated in general terms, the situation is this. On the ground of natural experiencing (or of the natural theses it carries out), physical thinking establishes itself. *Following the motives of reason* that the connections of experience offer it, this thinking is compelled to carry out certain modes of apprehension, certain intentional constructions, as rationally required, and to carry them out for the *theoretical determination* of the sensuously experienced things. Precisely in this way the contrast arises between the thing of simple sensuous *imaginatio* and the thing of physical *intellectio* [understanding]. And on the side of the latter arise all the ideal ontological formations of thought that [101] are expressed in the concepts of physics and draw their sense exclusively—and may draw it only—from the method of natural science.

If, then, experiential-logical reason, under the title of physics, works out an intentional correlate of a higher level—physical nature out of simply appearing nature—it is engaging in mythology to set up this *insightful* datum of reason as an *unknown* world of thing-realities in themselves, supposedly substructed hypothetically for the purpose of the *causal* explanation of appearances. For this datum is after all nothing but the *experiential-logical determination* of the nature that is given in simple intuition.

Absurdly, then, one links sensuous things and physical things by *causality*. In doing so, however, ordinary realism confuses the sensuous appearances—that is, the appearing objects as such (which are themselves already transcendences)—on account of their "mere subjectivity," with the absolute lived experiences of appearing that constitute them, the lived experiences of experiencing consciousness in general. At least in this form the confusion is committed everywhere: one speaks as though objective physics were occupied with explaining the "appearances of things" not in the sense of the appearing things, but in the sense of the constituting *lived experiences* of experiencing conscious-

ness. Causality, which in principle belongs within the nexus of the constituted intentional world and has sense only in it, is now made not merely into a mythical bond between "objective" physical being and the "subjective" being that appears in immediate experience—the "merely subjective" thing of the senses with its "secondary qualities." Through the unjustified transition from the latter to the consciousness that constitutes it, causality is also made into a bond between physical being and absolute consciousness, and specifically the pure lived experiences of experiencing. In doing so, one foists a mythical absolute reality on physical being, while one does not see at all what is truly absolute, pure consciousness as such. One therefore does not notice the absurdity that lies in absolutizing physical nature, this intentional correlate of logically determining thinking. Nor does one notice the absurdity of turning this nature—which determines the directly intuitive world of things according to the logic of experience and is, in this function, completely *known* (so that there is no sense in looking for something behind it)—into an [102] unknown reality that only intimates itself mysteriously. Such a reality could never be grasped *itself*, nor according to any determination of its own; and one now even ascribes to it the role of a causal reality in relation to the courses of subjective appearances and experiencing lived experiences.

No small influence on these misinterpretations is *certainly* exerted by the following circumstance. All categorial unities of thought possess a *sensuous non-intuitiveness*—naturally to a particularly striking degree those formed very mediately—and there is a tendency, useful in the practice of knowledge, to underlay these unities of thought with sensuous images, "models." One gives a false interpretation both to that non-intuitiveness and to this tendency: namely, that what is sensuously non-intuitive is a *symbolic representative* of something hidden, which with a better intellectual organization could be brought to simple sensuous intuition; and that the models serve as intuitive schematic images of this hidden something, so that they would have a function similar to the hypothetical drawings that the

paleontologist sketches of vanished worlds of living things on the basis of meager data. One does not heed the *insightful* sense of the constructive unities of thought *as such*, and overlooks the fact that what is hypothetical here is bound to the sphere of the synthesis of thought. Even a divine physics cannot turn categorial determinations of realities in thought into simply intuitive ones, any more than divine omnipotence can bring it about that someone paints elliptic functions or plays them on the violin.

However much these discussions need deepening, however keenly they may make us feel the need for a full clarification of all the relations involved, what we need for our purposes has become evident to us. In terms of principle, the transcendence of the physical thing is the transcendence of a being that constitutes itself in consciousness and is bound to consciousness; and taking mathematical natural science into account (however many particular enigmas may lie in its knowledge) changes nothing in our results.

It needs no special discussion that everything we have made clear to ourselves regarding natural objectivities as "mere things" must hold for all the *axiological* and *practical* objectivities founded in them—aesthetic objects, cultural formations, and so on. And likewise, finally, for all transcendences whatsoever that constitute themselves in consciousness.

§ 53. ANIMATE BEINGS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness becomes part of nature only through apprehension as the state of a living body.

[103] Another extension of the bounds of our considerations is very important. We have drawn the whole of material nature into the scope of our findings: both nature as it appears sensuously and physical nature, founded in it as a higher level of knowledge. But what about the *animal realities*, human beings and animals? What about them with respect to their souls and *psychic lived experiences*? After all, the full world is not merely physical but

psychophysical. To it—who can deny this?—all the streams of consciousness bound up with animate living bodies are supposed to belong. Thus, *on the one hand, consciousness is supposed to be the absolute* in which everything transcendent, and therefore ultimately the whole psychophysical world, constitutes itself; and, *on the other hand*, consciousness is supposed to be *a subordinate real event within this world*. How do these fit together?

Let us make clear to ourselves how consciousness can, so to speak, enter into the real world—how what is in itself absolute can give up its immanence and take on the character of transcendence. We see at once that it can do this only through a certain participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, and that is obviously the transcendence of material nature. Only through its experiential relation to the living body does consciousness become real human and animal consciousness, and only thereby does it gain a place in the space of nature and in the time of nature—the time that is measured physically. We recall, too, that only through the linking of consciousness and living body into a natural, *empirically* intuitive unity is anything like mutual understanding possible between the animal beings belonging to one world. And only thereby can every knowing subject find the full world before it, with itself and other subjects, and at the same time recognize it as the same surrounding world, belonging in common to itself and all other subjects.

A *peculiar kind of apprehension or experience*, a peculiar kind of "*apperception*," accomplishes the work of this so-called "attachment," this realization of consciousness. Whatever this apperception may consist in, whatever particular kind of verification it may require, this much is quite obvious: consciousness itself, in these apperceptive interweavings, or in this psychophysical relation to what is bodily, loses nothing of its own essence and can take into itself nothing [104] foreign to its essence—which would indeed be absurd. Bodily being is in principle something appearing, something presenting itself through sensuous adumbrations. Consciousness apperceived as natural—the stream of lived experiences that is given as human and animal, and thus

experienced in connection with bodiliness—does not, of course, through this apperception itself become something that appears through adumbration.

And yet it has become something other, a component of nature. In itself it is what it is, of absolute essence. But it is not grasped in this essence, in its flowing thisness; rather, it is "apprehended as something." And in this peculiar apprehension a peculiar *transcendence* constitutes itself. There now appears a *state of consciousness* of an identical *real* Ego-subject, which makes known in it its *individual real properties* and which is now —as this unity of properties making themselves known in states —given to consciousness as one with the appearing living body. In the manner of *appearance*, the psychophysical natural unity, human being or animal, thus constitutes itself as a unity *founded* in the living body, corresponding to the founding of the apperception.

As with every transcending apperception, here too a *twofold attitude* can, as a matter of essence, be carried out. In the *one*, the grasping regard goes to the apperceived object, as it were through the transcending apprehension; in the *other*, it goes reflectively to the pure apprehending consciousness. Accordingly, in our case we have, on the one hand, the *psychological attitude*, in which the naturally focused regard goes to the lived experiences—for example, to a lived experience of joy—as a *state of lived experience* of the human being or animal. On the other hand, we have the *phenomenological attitude*, interwoven with the first as an essential possibility. Reflecting and excluding the transcendent positings, it turns toward absolute, pure consciousness and now finds the apperception of an absolute lived experience as a state. Thus, in the example above, it finds the lived experience of the feeling of joy as an absolute phenomenological datum, but in the medium of an apprehending function that animates it—precisely the function of making known a state of a human Ego-subject connected with the appearing living body. The "pure" lived experience "lies," in a certain sense, in what is psychologically apperceived, in the lived experience as a

human state. With its own essence it takes on the form of a state, and with that the intentional relation to the *human* Ego and to human [105] bodiliness. If the lived experience in question—in our example the feeling of joy—loses this intentional form (and that is surely conceivable), it does undergo a change, but only this one: it is simplified *in pure consciousness,* and it no longer has any natural significance.

§ 54. CONTINUATION. THE TRANSCENDENT PSYCHOLOGICAL LIVED EXPERIENCE CONTINGENT AND RELATIVE, THE TRANSCENDENTAL LIVED EXPERIENCE NECESSARY AND ABSOLUTE

Psychic states are empirical unities; beneath them lies absolute lived experience.

Let us imagine that we carried out natural apperceptions, but constantly invalid ones, which allowed no concordant connections in which unities of experience could constitute themselves for us. In other words, let us imagine, in the sense of the discussions above,[19] that the whole of nature, first of all physical nature, has been "annihilated." Then there would no longer be living bodies, and hence no human beings. I as a human being would no longer be, and still less would there be fellow human beings for me. But my consciousness, however much its stock of lived experiences might be altered, would remain an absolute stream of lived experience with its own essence. If something still remained that allowed the lived experiences to be taken as "states" of a personal Ego, in whose changes identical personal properties made themselves known, then we could dissolve these apprehensions too, discard the intentional forms that constitute them, and reduce to the pure lived experiences. *Psychic states, too*, point back to regulated orders of absolute lived experiences, in which they constitute themselves, in which they take on the intentional form—*transcendent* in its own way—of "*state*."

Certainly a consciousness without a living body is conceivable, and, paradoxical as it sounds, perhaps also a conscious-

ness without a soul, a non-personal consciousness. That is, a stream of lived experience is conceivable in which the intentional unities of experience "living body," "soul," "empirical Ego-subject" did not constitute themselves, and in which all these concepts of experience—and thus also that of *lived experience in the psychological sense* (as the lived experience of a person, of an animal Ego)—would have no foothold and in any case no validity. All empirical unities, and so also psychological lived experiences, are *indices of absolute connections of lived experience* of a distinctive essential formation, besides which still other formations are conceivable. All are, in the same sense, transcendent, merely relative, contingent. One must convince [106] oneself of the following. The matter-of-course way in which every lived experience, one's own and another's, counts in experience as a psychological and psychophysical state of animal subjects—and counts so with full legitimacy—has its limits in the respect indicated. The empirical lived experience is confronted, *as the presupposition of its sense*, by the *absolute* lived experience. And the latter is not a metaphysical construction but something that, through a corresponding change of attitude, can be indubitably exhibited in its absoluteness and given in direct intuition. One must convince oneself that *the psychic in general* in the *sense of psychology*—psychic personalities, psychic properties, lived experiences or states—are *empirical* unities. They are therefore, like realities of every kind and level, mere unities of intentional "constitution": truly existing in their own sense, to be intuited, experienced, and scientifically determined on the basis of experience—and yet "merely intentional" and hence merely "relative." To posit them as existing in the absolute sense is therefore absurd.

19 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 49, p. 91.

§ 55. CONCLUSION. ALL REALITY EXISTING THROUGH "SENSE-GIVING." NO "SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM"

All real unities are unities of sense, which is not to turn the world into illusion.

In a certain way, and with some caution in the use of words, one can also say: "*All real unities are 'unities of sense.'*" Unities of sense presuppose (I stress again: not because we deduce this from some metaphysical postulates or other, but because we can exhibit it by an intuitive, completely indubitable procedure) *sense-giving consciousness*, which for its part is absolute and does not itself exist in turn through sense-giving. If one draws the concept of reality from *natural* realities, from the unities of possible experience, then "universe," "all-embracing nature," amounts indeed to the totality of realities. But to identify it with the totality of *being*, and thereby to absolutize it, is absurd. An *absolute reality is worth exactly as much as a round square*. Reality and world are here precisely titles for certain valid *unities of sense*—namely, unities of "sense" related to certain connections of absolute, pure consciousness which, by their *essence*, give sense precisely in this way and no other and exhibit the validity of that sense.

Anyone who objects, in the face of our discussions, that this amounts to turning the whole world into subjective illusion and throwing oneself into the arms of a "Berkeleyan idealism"—to them we can only [107] reply that they have not grasped the sense of these discussions. Nothing is taken away from the fully valid being of the world, as the totality of realities, any more than anything is taken away from the fully valid geometrical being of the square when one denies (which in this case is admittedly a plain matter of course) that it is round. Real actuality is not "reinterpreted," let alone denied; rather, an absurd interpretation of it—one that therefore contradicts its *own* sense, clarified by insight—is removed. That interpretation stems from a *philosophical* absolutizing of the world which is utterly foreign to the natural way of regarding the world. The natural way of regard-

ing the world is precisely natural: it lives naively in carrying out the general thesis we have described, and so it can never become absurd. Absurdity arises only when one philosophizes and, seeking ultimate information about the sense of the world, fails to notice at all that the world itself has its whole being as a certain "sense," which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field of sense-giving. It arises when, together with this, one fails to notice that this field, this *sphere of being of absolute origins*, is *accessible to investigation by seeing*, with an infinite wealth of insightful cognitions of the highest scientific dignity. This last point, admittedly, we have not yet shown; it will become clear only as these investigations proceed.

Finally, it should be noted that the generality with which the constitution of the natural world in absolute consciousness has been spoken of in the considerations just carried out must not give offense. The scientifically experienced reader will be able to gather from the conceptual precision of the exposition that we have not ventured philosophical notions from on high, but have concentrated, into descriptions phrased in general terms, cognitions carefully obtained on the basis of systematic fundamental work in this field. The need for more detailed discussion and for filling in the gaps left open may be keenly felt, and it ought to be. The further expositions will make considerable contributions to working out the outlines drawn so far in more concrete form. It should be noted, however, that our aim here was not to give a detailed theory of such transcendental constitution and thereby to sketch a new "theory of knowledge" with [108] respect to the spheres of reality. It was only to bring to insight general thoughts that can be helpful for arriving at the idea of transcendentally pure consciousness. What is essential for us is the evidence that the phenomenological reduction, as exclusion of the natural attitude or of its general thesis, is possible; and that after it has been carried out, absolute or transcendentally

pure consciousness remains as a residue, to which it is absurd still to ascribe reality.[20]

CHAPTER FOUR. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTIONS. § 56. THE QUESTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTIONS. NATURAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES

With nature, all natural and human sciences and all cultural formations are excluded.

The exclusion of nature was for us the methodological means of making it possible to turn our regard to transcendentally pure consciousness in general. Now that we have it within our seeing regard, it is still useful to consider, conversely, what in general must remain excluded for the purpose of a pure investigation of consciousness, and whether the necessary exclusion concerns only the sphere of nature. For the phenomenological science that is to be founded, this also means asking *from which sciences* it may *draw* without violating its pure sense, which sciences it may use as pregiven and which not—which, therefore, require "bracketing." It lies in the peculiar essence of phenomenology as a science of "origins" that methodological questions of this sort, which are remote from every naive ("dogmatic") science, must be carefully considered by it.

It is obvious, to begin with, that with the exclusion of the natural world, physical and psychophysical, all individual objectivities that constitute themselves through valuing and practical functions of consciousness are also excluded: all kinds of cultural formations, works of the technical and fine arts, of the sciences (insofar as they come into question not as unities of validity but precisely as cultural facts), aesthetic and practical values of every form. Likewise, of course, actualities of such kinds as state, custom, law, religion. With this, *all natural and human sci-*

20 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Here, temporarily, for the sake of an impressive contrast, I allow myself an extraordinary but in its way permissible extension of the concept of "sense."

ences fall under the exclusion, with their entire stock of knowledge, precisely as sciences that require the natural attitude.

§ 57. THE QUESTION OF EXCLUDING THE PURE EGO

The pure Ego remains in every act as a transcendence within immanence and cannot be excluded.

[109] Difficulties arise at one boundary point. The human being as a natural being and as a person in a personal association, in that of "society," is excluded; likewise every animal being. But what about the *pure Ego*? Has the phenomenological Ego, the Ego that finds things before it, also become a transcendental nothing through the phenomenological reduction? Let us reduce to the stream of pure consciousness. In reflection, every *cogitatio* that is carried out takes on the explicit form *cogito*. Does it lose this form when we practice transcendental reduction?

This much is clear from the outset: after carrying out this reduction, we shall nowhere come upon the pure Ego in the flow of manifold lived experiences that remains as transcendental residue—neither as one lived experience among others, nor as a genuine piece of a lived experience, arising and disappearing again with the lived experience of which it would be a piece. The Ego seems to be there constantly, indeed necessarily, and this constancy is obviously not that of a stupidly persisting lived experience, a fixed idea. Rather, it belongs to every lived experience that comes and flows away; its "regard" goes *through* every actual *cogito* to what is objective. This ray of regard changes with every *cogito*, shooting forth anew with each new one and disappearing with it. The Ego, however, is something identical. At least, considered in principle, every *cogitatio* can change, come and go—even though one may doubt whether each is *necessarily* transient and not merely, as we find it, *factually* transient. In contrast, however, the pure Ego seems to be something *necessary* in principle; and, as something absolutely identical throughout all actual and possible change of lived experiences, it can *in no*

sense count as a really inherent piece or moment of the lived experiences themselves.

In every actual *cogito* it lives itself out in a special sense; but all background lived experiences also belong to it, and it to them. All of them, *as* belonging to the *one* stream of lived experience that is mine, *must* be capable of being converted into actual *cogitationes* or of being immanently drawn into such. In Kant's language: "The '*I think' must be able to accompany all my representations*."[21]

If a pure Ego remains to us as a residue of the phenomenological exclusion of the world and of the empirical subjectivity belonging to it (and then, for each stream of lived experience, one that is in principle [110] different), then with it there presents itself a *peculiar*—not constituted—transcendence, a *transcendence in immanence*. Given the immediately essential role that this transcendence plays in every *cogitatio*, we shall not be permitted to subject it to exclusion, even though for many investigations the questions of the pure Ego can remain *in suspenso* [undecided]. But we mean to count the pure Ego as a phenomenological datum only as far as its essential peculiarity, immediately and evidently ascertainable, and its being given together with pure consciousness extend. All doctrines about it that go beyond this framework, on the other hand, are to fall under the exclusion. We shall, moreover, find occasion to devote a chapter of its own, in the second book of this work, to the difficult questions of the pure Ego, and in doing so also to securing the provisional position-taking we have carried out here.[22]

21 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 131–32.

22 HUSSERL'S NOTE. In the *Logical Investigations* I maintained, on the question of the pure Ego, a skepticism that I could not uphold as my studies progressed. The criticism I directed against Natorp's thoughtful *Einleitung in die Psychologie* [Introduction to Psychology] (II 1, p. 340 f.) is therefore not valid on one main point. (Unfortunately, I have no longer been able to read and take into account the recently published revised version of Natorp's work.)

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Paul Natorp (1854–1924), Neo-Kantian philosopher of the Marburg school; his *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode* (1888) was reworked as *Allgemeine Psychologie* (1912).

§ 58. THE TRANSCENDENCE OF GOD EXCLUDED

The absolute ground suggested by the world's teleology is also bracketed.

Once the natural world has been given up, we come upon yet another transcendence. Unlike the pure Ego, it is not given immediately at one with reduced consciousness, but comes to be known only very mediately, standing, as it were, at the opposite pole from the transcendence of the world. We mean the transcendence of God. The reduction of the natural world to the absolute of consciousness yields *factual* connections of lived experiences of consciousness of certain kinds, with distinctive orders of regularity. In them, as intentional correlate, a world *morphologically ordered* in the sphere of empirical intuition constitutes itself—that is, a world for which there can be classifying and describing sciences. This very world can at the same time, as far as its material lower level is concerned, be determined in the theoretical thinking of the mathematical natural sciences as the "appearance" of a *physical nature* standing under exact laws of nature. Since *the rationality* that the fact realizes is not a rationality that essence demands, there lies in all this a wondrous *teleology*.

[111] Further: the systematic investigation of all the teleologies to be found in the empirical world itself—for example, the factual development of the series of organisms up to the human being, the growth of culture with its treasures of spirit in the development of humanity, and so on—is not settled by the natural-scientific explanations of all such formations from the given factual circumstances and according to the laws of nature. Rather, the passage into pure consciousness by the method of transcendental reduction leads necessarily to the question of the ground for the facticity, which now emerges, of the corresponding constituting consciousness. It is not the fact in general, but the fact as the source of possibilities and actualities of value that increase to infinity, that forces upon us the question of the

ground—a ground which naturally does not have the sense of a *thingly-causal* cause. We pass over what else, on the part of religious consciousness, may lead to the same principle, and do so as a rationally grounding motive. What concerns us here, after merely indicating various groups of such rational grounds for the existence of an extramundane divine "being," is that this being would be transcendent not merely to the world but obviously also to "absolute" consciousness. It would thus be an "*absolute*" *in a totally different sense from the absolute of consciousness*, just as, on the other hand, it would be *something transcendent in a totally different sense* from the transcendent in the sense of the world.

We naturally extend the phenomenological reduction to this Absolute and "transcendent" as well. It is to remain excluded from the new field of research that is to be created, insofar as this is to be a field of pure consciousness itself.

§ 59. THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EIDETIC. EXCLUSION OF PURE LOGIC AS MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS

A purely descriptive phenomenology can bracket formal logic and all of mathematics.

Just as we have tried to exclude individual realities in every sense, so we now try to exclude all other kinds of "transcendences" as well. This concerns the series of "universal" objects, of essences. They too are, after all, in a certain way "transcendent" to pure consciousness: they are not to be found in it as really inherent. However, we cannot exclude transcendences without limit. Transcendental purification cannot mean the exclusion of *all* transcendences, since otherwise a pure consciousness would indeed remain, but no possibility of a science of pure consciousness.

[112] Let us make this clear to ourselves. Let us try excluding the eidetic as far as possible, and hence excluding all eidetic sciences. To every regionally delimitable sphere of individual being, in the widest logical sense, there belongs an ontology: to physical nature, for example, an ontology of nature; to animal-

ity an ontology of animality. All these disciplines, whether already developed or as yet merely postulated, fall to the reduction. Over against the material ontologies stands "formal" ontology (together with the formal logic of the meanings of thought), and to it belongs the quasi-region "object *in general*." If we try to exclude it too, misgivings arise that will at the same time concern the possibility of excluding the eidetic without limit.

The following train of thought forces itself upon us. To every domain of being we must, for the purposes of science, adjoin certain eidetic spheres—not exactly as fields of research, but as repositories of knowledge of essences. The researcher in the domain in question must be permitted to reach into them at any time, wherever the theoretical motives connected with the essential peculiarity of this domain suggest it to him. Above all, every researcher must surely be able to appeal freely to formal logic (or formal ontology). For whatever he investigates, it is always objects; and what holds *formaliter* for objects in general (for properties, states of affairs in general, and the like) is his own concern as well. And however he frames concepts and propositions, draws inferences, and so on, whatever formal logic establishes in formal universality about such meanings and genera of meanings concerns him too, as it concerns every specialist in the same way. So it concerns the phenomenologist as well. Every pure lived experience, too, falls under the logically widest sense of object. Formal logic and ontology, then, we cannot—so it seems—exclude. Nor, for obviously the same reasons, can we exclude general noetics, which states insights into essence concerning the rationality and irrationality of judging thought in general, whose meaning-content is determined only in formal universality.

But if we consider the matter more closely, there emerges, under certain presuppositions, a possibility of putting formal logic, and with it all the disciplines of formal *mathesis* (algebra, number theory, the theory of manifolds, and so on), in "brackets." The presupposition is this: that phenomenology's research into pure consciousness sets itself, and has to set itself, no other

tasks than those of descriptive analysis, [113] which are to be solved in pure intuition. In that case the theory-forms of the mathematical disciplines and all their mediate theorems can be of no use to it. Where the formation of concepts and judgments does not proceed constructively, where no systems of mediate deduction are built, the theory of the forms of deductive systems in general, as we find it in mathematics, cannot function as an instrument of material research.

Now phenomenology is in fact a *purely descriptive* discipline, one that explores the field of transcendentally pure consciousness in pure *intuition*. The logical propositions to which it might ever find occasion to appeal would therefore be nothing but logical axioms, such as the principle of contradiction—and their universal and absolute validity it could make insightful by way of examples in its own data. We can therefore include formal logic and all of *mathesis* in general in the expressly excluding *epoché*, and in this respect be certain of the legitimacy of the norm that we as phenomenologists mean to follow: *to lay claim to nothing but what we can make essentially insightful to ourselves in consciousness itself*, in pure immanence.

In doing so we also bring ourselves to the explicit recognition that a descriptive phenomenology is in principle independent of all those disciplines. With regard to the philosophical use to be made of phenomenology, this finding is not without importance, and it is therefore useful to note it at once on this occasion.

§ 60. THE EXCLUSION OF MATERIAL-EIDETIC DISCIPLINES

All eidetic sciences of transcendent objects are bracketed; only the essences of consciousness remain.

As for the material eidetic spheres, one of them is distinguished for us in such a way that its exclusion obviously cannot be contemplated: the essential sphere of phenomenologically purified consciousness itself. Even if we set ourselves the goal of studying pure consciousness in its singular particularizations—that

is, in the manner of a science of facts, yet not empirical-psychologically (for we move within the charmed circle of the phenomenological exclusion of the world)—we could not do without the a priori of consciousness. A science of facts cannot divest itself of the right to make use of the essential truths that relate to the individual objectivities of *its own* domain. Now, however, as already stated in the Introduction, it is precisely our intention [114] to ground phenomenology itself as an *eidetic* science, as the theory of the essence of transcendentally purified consciousness.

If we do that, it encompasses as its own all "*immanent essences*," i.e., those that are individuated exclusively in the individual occurrences of a stream of consciousness, in any singular lived experiences flowing past. Now it is of fundamental importance to see that *by no means all essences* belong to this sphere. Rather, just as the distinction between *immanent* and *transcendent* objectivities holds for individual objectivities, so it holds for the corresponding *essences*. Thus "thing," "spatial shape," "motion," "color of a thing," and the like, but also "human being," "human sensation," "soul" and "psychic lived experience" (lived experience in the psychological sense), "person," "trait of character," and the like, are transcendent essences. Suppose we want to develop a phenomenology as a *purely descriptive theory of the essence of the immanent formations of consciousness*—of the occurrences that can be grasped in the stream of lived experience within the framework of the phenomenological exclusion. Then nothing transcendently individual belongs within this framework, and hence *none of the "transcendent essences"* belongs to it either. Their logical place would rather be in the theory of the essence of the transcendent objectivities in question.

In its immanence, therefore, phenomenology has to make *no positings of the being of such essences* whatever, no statements about their *validity* or *non-validity*, or about the ideal possibility of objectivities corresponding to them; and it has to establish no *laws of essence* relating to them.

Transcendent-eidetic regions and disciplines can in principle contribute no premises to a phenomenology that really means

to confine itself to the pure region of lived experience. Now it is our *aim* to ground phenomenology in precisely this purity (in accordance with the norm stated a moment ago), and the greatest philosophical interests also hinge on carrying it through, fully consciously, in this purity. We therefore *expressly extend the original reduction* to all transcendent-eidetic domains and the *ontologies* belonging to them.

Thus: just as we exclude actual physical nature and the empirical natural sciences, so too we exclude the eidetic ones, i.e., the sciences that investigate what belongs essentially to the objectivity of physical nature as such. Geometry, phoronomy, [115] the *pure* physics of matter receive their brackets. Likewise, we have excluded all the empirical sciences of animal beings in nature and all the empirical human sciences dealing with personal beings in personal associations, with human beings as subjects of history, as bearers of culture, but also with cultural formations themselves, and so on; so now we also exclude the eidetic sciences corresponding to these objectivities. We do so in advance and in idea; for so far, as everyone knows, these eidetic sciences (e.g., rational psychology, sociology) have arrived at no grounding at all, or at no pure and unobjectionable one.

In view of the philosophical functions that phenomenology is called upon to take over, it is good here again to state expressly that the preceding discussions have at the same time established the *absolute independence of phenomenology* from *the material-eidetic sciences*, as from all others.

The extensions of the phenomenological reduction just given obviously do not have the fundamental significance of the original, simple exclusion of the natural world and of the sciences relating to it. For it is this first reduction that makes it possible at all to turn our regard toward the phenomenological field and to grasp its data. The other reductions, since they presuppose the first, are therefore secondary—but by no means of *lesser* importance on that account.

§ 61. THE METHODOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SYSTEMATIC THEORY OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTIONS

The bracketings guard against confusing essences of consciousness with essences transcendent to it.

For the phenomenological method (and, further, for the method of *transcendental*-philosophical research in general), a systematic theory of all the phenomenological reductions, such as we have tried to sketch here, *is* of great importance. Their explicit "bracketings" have the methodological function of constantly reminding us of two things: that the spheres of being and knowledge in question lie *in principle* outside those which are to be investigated as transcendental-phenomenological spheres; and that every intrusion of premises belonging to those bracketed domains is a sign of an absurd confusion, of a genuine *μετάβασις* [*metabasis*, a shift into another genus]. If the phenomenological domain presented itself as immediately and self-evidently as the domains of the natural attitude of experience,[23]

[116] or if it resulted from a mere transition from this attitude to the eidetic attitude—as, say, the geometrical domain results when we start from what is empirically spatial—then there would be no need of laborious reductions with the difficult considerations that go with them. Nor would there be any need of care in separating the individual steps, were it not for constant temptations to faulty *metabasis*, especially in interpreting the objectivities of the eidetic disciplines. These temptations are so strong that they threaten even someone who, in particular domains, has freed himself from the general misinterpretations.

First in line here is the extraordinarily widespread tendency of our time to *psychologize the eidetic*. Many who call themselves idealists succumb to it too—as indeed the influence of empiricist views on the idealist side is a strong one in general. Someone

23 Metabasis eis allo genos: Aristotle's term for the illegitimate transfer of a proof or concept from one genus, or field of inquiry, into another.

may take ideas, essences, to be "psychic formations." Or, considering the operations of consciousness in which the concepts of color and shape are acquired on the basis of exemplary intuitions of things with thingly colors, shapes, and so on, he may confuse the consciousness of these essences, color and shape, that results in each case with these essences themselves. Such a person ascribes to the flow of consciousness, as a really inherent component, what is in principle transcendent to it. But this is on the one hand a corruption of psychology, since it already affects empirical consciousness, and on the other hand (and this is what concerns us here) a corruption of phenomenology. A great deal therefore depends, if the region we are looking for is really to be found, on creating clarity in this respect. This happens naturally along our path: first in a general justification of the eidetic as such, and then, in connection with the theory of the phenomenological reduction, *specifically* as the exclusion of the eidetic.

Now, admittedly, this exclusion had to be restricted to the eidetics of transcendent individual objectivities in every sense. Here a new fundamental moment comes into consideration. Even once we have freed ourselves from the tendency to psychologize essence and essential states of affairs, it is a new, great step—one that by no means follows so readily along with the first—to recognize the momentous distinction that we have briefly designated as that between *immanent* and *transcendent essences*, and to take it consistently into account everywhere. On the one side stand essences of formations of consciousness itself; on the other, [117] essences of individual occurrences transcendent to consciousness, that is, essences of what merely *announces itself* in formations of consciousness—what, for example, is "constituted" in consciousness through sensory appearances.

For me at least, the second step remained quite difficult even after the first. An attentive reader of the *Logical Investigations* cannot now fail to notice this. There the first step is taken with complete decisiveness: the proper right of the eidetic against its

psychologization is justified at length—very much against the spirit of the time, which reacted so vigorously against "Platonism" and "logicism." As for the second step, however, it is decisively taken in some theories, such as those concerning logical-categorial objectivities and the consciousness that gives them. In other discussions in the same volume, by contrast, the wavering is evident—namely, insofar as the concept of the logical proposition is related now to logical-categorial objectivity and now to the corresponding essence immanent in judging thought. For the beginner in phenomenology it is simply difficult to learn to master, in reflection, the different attitudes of consciousness with their different objective correlates. But this holds for all spheres of essence that do not belong to the immanence of consciousness itself. One must gain this insight not only with regard to formal-logical or ontological essences and essential states of affairs (that is, for essences such as "proposition," "inference," and the like, but also "number," "order," "manifold," and so on), but also with regard to essences taken from the sphere of the natural world (such as "thing," "corporeal shape," "human being," "person," and so on). An index of this insight is the extended phenomenological reduction. The practical consciousness that governs us as a result of this reduction now becomes of great methodological significance. It is the consciousness that, like the sphere of the natural world, all these eidetic spheres too may in principle not count for the phenomenologist as given with respect to their true being; that, to secure the purity of his region of research, they must be bracketed as far as judgment is concerned; that not a single theorem, indeed not even a single axiom, may be taken from any of the relevant sciences and admitted as a premise for phenomenological purposes. It is precisely in this way that we protect ourselves methodically against those confusions which are too deeply rooted in us, as born dogmatists, for us to be able to avoid them otherwise.

§ 62. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANTICIPATIONS. "DOGMATIC" AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE

All bracketed sciences are dogmatic, and phenomenology alone can supply their critique.

[118] I have just used the word "dogmatist." It will become apparent that this is not a merely analogical use of it, but that the echo of epistemology springs from the very essence of the matters themselves. There is good reason to recall here the epistemological opposition between dogmatism and criticism, and to designate all the sciences that fall to the reduction as *dogmatic*.[24] For it can be seen from essential sources that the sciences included are really precisely those, and all those, that *need criticism*—indeed a criticism which they are in principle unable to carry out themselves—and that, on the other hand, the science which has the unique function of carrying out criticism for all the others and at the same time for itself is none other than phenomenology.[25] More precisely: it is the distinguishing peculiarity of phenomenology to encompass, within the range of its eidetic universality, all cognitions and sciences—namely with respect to everything in them that is *immediately insightful*, or at least would have to be if they were genuine cognitions. The sense and legitimacy of all possible immediate starting points and of all immediate steps in possible method fall within its purview. Thus phenomenology contains all the eidetic (hence unconditionally universally valid) cognitions by which the radical problems of "possibility" relating to any given cognitions and sciences are answered. As applied phenomenology, therefore, it carries out on every science that is distinctive in principle the ultimately evaluating criticism, and with it, in particular, the ultimate determination of the sense of the *being* of that science's

24 "Criticism" (Kritizismus): Kant's critical philosophy, which examines the scope and limits of knowledge before making claims about objects, as against dogmatism.

25 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above, § 26, p. 46 f. The sciences called there "specifically philosophical" are then, of course, grounded on phenomenology.

objects and the fundamental clarification of its methodology. So it becomes understandable that phenomenology is, as it were, the secret longing of all modern philosophy. Philosophy already presses toward it in Descartes's wonderfully profound fundamental meditation; then again in the psychologism of the Lockean school. Hume almost sets foot in its domain, but with blinded eyes. And Kant catches sight of it far more—Kant, whose greatest intuitions become fully intelligible to us only once we have worked out for ourselves, to fully conscious clarity, what is peculiar to the phenomenological domain. It then becomes [119] evident to us that Kant's mind's eye rested on this field, although he was not yet able to appropriate it or to recognize it as the field of work of a rigorous science of essences in its own right. Thus, for example, the transcendental deduction in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* already moves, strictly speaking, on phenomenological ground; but Kant misinterprets this ground as psychological and therefore abandons it again himself.

However, in saying this we are anticipating later expositions (those of the third book of this work). Let what has been said here by way of anticipation serve to justify why we designate the complex of sciences that fall to the reduction as dogmatic and set it over against phenomenology, as a science of a completely different dimension. At the same time, and in parallel with this, we contrast the *dogmatic* and the *phenomenological attitude*; the natural attitude is obviously subordinate to the dogmatic attitude as a special case of it.

Remark.

The specifically phenomenological exclusions we have taught are independent of the eidetic exclusion of individual existence. This circumstance suggests the question whether, within the framework of those exclusions, a science of facts about the transcendentally reduced lived experiences might not be possible after all. This question, like every question of possibility in principle, can be decided only on the ground of eidetic phenomenology. It is answered in such a way that it becomes intelligible why any attempt to begin naively with a phenomenological sci-

ence of facts, before the phenomenological theory of essence has been carried out, would be nonsense. For it turns out that, alongside the extra-phenomenological sciences of facts, there cannot be a phenomenological science of facts parallel and coordinate with them. The reason is that the ultimate evaluation of all sciences of facts leads to a unified linkage of the phenomenological nexuses corresponding to all of them—nexuses that are factual and motivated as factual possibilities—and this linked unity is nothing other than the field of the phenomenological science of facts that we found missing. In one principal part, then, this science is the phenomenological conversion of the ordinary sciences of facts, made possible by eidetic phenomenology; and the only question remaining is to what extent something further could be accomplished from there. [120]

Section Three: Method and Problems of Pure Phenomenology

Dritter Abschnitt: Zur Methodik und Problematik der reinen Phänomenologie
Clarity and description, reflection, the stream of experience and the pure ego, intentionality, hyle and form, noesis and noema.

DRITTER ABSCHNITT. ZUR METHODIK UND PROBLEMATIK DER REINEN PHÄNOMENOLOGIE. ERSTES KAPITEL. METHODISCHE VORERWÄGUNGEN. § 63. DIE BESONDERE BEDEUTUNG METHODISCHER ERWÄGUNGEN FÜR DIE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE.

Suppose we observe the norms that the phenomenological reductions prescribe for us: we exclude all transcendences exactly as they demand, and so take lived experiences purely according to their own essence. Then, after everything set out so far, a field of eidetic cognitions opens up to us. Once one has overcome the difficulties of the beginning, it presents itself as infinite in all directions. The manifold of kinds and forms of lived experience, with their really inherent and intentional essential components, is simply inexhaustible; and so accordingly is the manifold of essential connections and apodictically necessary truths founded in them. This infinite field of the a priori of consciousness, then—which has never come into its own in its peculiarity, indeed has never really been seen—is what we must bring under cultivation, drawing from it fruits of full value. But how are we to find the right beginning? Indeed, the beginning is the hardest thing here, and the situation an

unusual one. The new field does not lie spread out before our gaze, with an abundance of salient data, in such a way that we could simply take hold of them and be sure of the possibility of making them objects of a science—let alone sure of the method by which we would have to proceed in doing so.

It is not as it is with the data of the natural attitude, in particular with the objects of nature. Through constant experience and through thousands of years of practice in thinking, these are familiar to us in their manifold peculiarities, elements and laws when, investigating on our own initiative, we try to advance knowledge of them further. There, everything unknown is the horizon of something known. All methodical effort links up with something given, all further development of method with method already on hand. In general it is a matter merely of developing special methods, which fit into the pregiven and fixed style of a proven scientific methodology in general and in their invention take their guidance from this style.

[121] How different it is in phenomenology. Not only is a method needed before any method that determines subject matter—namely, a method for bringing the field of subject matter of transcendentally pure consciousness into our grasping view at all. Not only does this require a laborious turning of regard away from the natural data, which are continually conscious and hence, as it were, interwoven with the newly intended data, so that the danger of confusing the one with the other is always looming. We also lack everything that stands us in good stead in the natural sphere of objects: familiarity through practiced intuition, the benefit of inherited theorizing and of methods proper to the discipline. Naturally, even the methodology that has already been worked out lacks the willing trust that could draw nourishment from manifold successful and proven applications in the recognized sciences and in the practice of life.

Phenomenology, as it newly emerges, must therefore reckon with a basic mood of skepticism. It has not only to develop the method for wresting new kinds of knowledge from new kinds of subject matter; it has to create the most complete clarity about

the sense and validity of that method—a clarity in which it can withstand all serious objections.

In addition—and this is much more important, because it concerns matters of principle—phenomenology must by its essence claim to be "first" philosophy and to provide the means for every critique of reason that is to be carried out. It therefore demands the most complete freedom from presuppositions and, with respect to itself, absolute reflective insight. It is its very essence to realize the most complete clarity about its own essence, and hence also about the principles of its method.[1]

For these reasons, the careful efforts to gain insight into the fundamentals of the method—that is, into what is methodically determinative for the new science right from the beginning and constantly as it proceeds—have a quite different significance for phenomenology than analogous efforts could ever have for other sciences.

§ 64. THE PHENOMENOLOGIST'S EXCLUSION OF HIMSELF

The phenomenologist excludes his own existence in the same way as any other individual existence.

First, let us mention a methodological misgiving that might hamper the very first steps.

We exclude the whole natural world and all transcendent-eidetic spheres, and are supposed thereby to gain a *pure* consciousness. [122] But did we not just say "we" exclude? *Can* we phenomenologists, who are after all members of the natural world ourselves, put *ourselves* out of play?

One soon becomes convinced that this presents no difficulty at all, provided only that we have not shifted the sense of "excluding." We can even calmly go on speaking as we have to speak as natural human beings; for as phenomenologists we are not supposed to stop being natural human beings, or to stop positing ourselves as such, in our speech as well. But as part of

1 "First philosophy": Aristotle's name for the science of the first principles of being, taken up in Descartes's *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641).

the method, for the findings to be entered in the new register of phenomenology that is now to be laid down, we give ourselves the norm of phenomenological reduction. This norm extends to our empirical *existence* as well, and forbids us to enter any proposition that contains, explicitly or implicitly, natural positings of this kind. As far as individual existence is concerned, the phenomenologist proceeds no differently from any eidetic scientist —the geometer, for example. In their scientific treatises geometers not infrequently speak of themselves and their research; but the mathematizing subject does not belong to the eidetic content of the mathematical propositions themselves.

§ 65. PHENOMENOLOGY'S RELATION BACK TO ITSELF

Phenomenology's own methodological reflections are themselves phenomenology.

Again, one might take offense at the following: in the phenomenological attitude we direct our regard to any pure lived experiences whatever in order to investigate them; yet the lived experiences of this research itself, of this attitude and direction of regard, taken in phenomenological purity, are at the same time supposed to belong to the domain of what is to be investigated.

This too is no difficulty. It is exactly the same, after all, in psychology, and likewise in logical noetics. The psychologist's thinking is itself something psychological, the logician's thinking something logical—that is, it itself falls within the scope of logical norms. This relatedness back to itself would be worrying only if knowledge of all other matters in the relevant fields of research depended on phenomenological, psychological and logical knowledge of the particular thinking of the particular thinker—which is a manifestly absurd presupposition.

A certain difficulty does, admittedly, lie in all disciplines that relate back to themselves: the first introduction to them, as [123] well as the first investigative penetration into them, must operate with methodological aids that these disciplines only after-

ward have to shape definitively in scientific form. Without provisional and preparatory consideration of subject matter and method, no project of a new science comes about. But the concepts and other methodological elements with which a beginning psychology, phenomenology, etc., operates in such preparatory work are themselves psychological, phenomenological, etc., and they gain their scientific stamp only in the system of the science once it has been grounded.

In this direction there are evidently no serious misgivings that could hinder the actual carrying out of such sciences, and of phenomenology in particular. And if phenomenology means to be a science *within the framework of mere immediate intuition*, a purely "*descriptive*" science of essence, then the general character of its procedure is pregiven as something entirely self-evident. It has to place occurrences of pure consciousness before its eyes as examples; to bring them to complete clarity; within this clarity, to practice analysis and the grasping of essence on them; to pursue the essential connections that can be seen with insight; to capture what is seen in each case in faithful conceptual expressions, which let their sense be prescribed purely by what is seen, or by what is discerned in general; and so on. Naively practiced, this procedure serves at first only to find one's way around in the new domain, to practice seeing, grasping and analyzing in it in general, and to become a little acquainted with its data. Then scientific reflection takes on the function of a general and logically rigorous grounding of the method: reflection on the essence of the procedure itself, on the essence of the kinds of givenness at play in it, on the essence, achievement and conditions of complete clarity and insight, as well as of completely faithful and fixed conceptual expression, and the like. Consciously followed, the method now assumes the character and rank of scientific method, which in a given case, by applying the rigorously formulated methodological norms, allows one to exercise limiting and correcting criticism. The essential relatedness of phenomenology to itself shows itself here in the following: what is considered and established in

methodological reflection under the headings of clarity, insight, expression and the like itself belongs, in its turn, to the phenomenological domain; all the reflective analyses are phenomenological analyses of essence; and the methodological insights gained are themselves, as regards their being established, subject to the norms that they [124] formulate. In new reflections, therefore, one must be able at any time to convince oneself that the states of affairs stated in the methodological statements can be given in complete clarity, that the concepts used really fit faithfully what is given, and so on.

What has been said obviously holds for all methodological investigations relating to phenomenology, however widely we may extend their scope; and so it is understandable that this entire work, which aims to prepare the way for phenomenology, is itself, in its content, phenomenology through and through.

§ 66. FAITHFUL EXPRESSION OF CLEAR GIVENS. UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS

Words must be fixed to intuitively grasped essences and kept to a single meaning.

Let us at once pursue a little further the most general of the methodological thoughts that emerged in the preceding section. In phenomenology, which aims to be nothing other than a theory of essence within pure intuition, we thus carry out immediate seeings of essence on exemplary data of transcendentally pure consciousness and fix them *conceptually*, or terminologically. The words used may stem from common language; they may be ambiguous, vague in their shifting sense. As soon as they "coincide," in the manner of actual expression, with what is intuitively given, they take on a definite sense as their actual and clear sense *hic et nunc* [here and now]; and from here they can be fixed scientifically.

Merely carrying out the application of the word in faithful adaptation to the intuitively grasped essence does not, after all, accomplish everything—even if what is needed has been fully accomplished on the side of this intuitive grasping. Science is

possible only where the results of thinking can be preserved in the form of knowledge and used for further thinking in the form of a system of statements. These statements are distinct in their logical sense, but can be understood, or actualized in judgment, without clarity of the underlying representations, and thus without insight. Admittedly, science at the same time requires subjective and objective provisions for producing at will (and indeed intersubjectively) the corresponding groundings and actual insights.

To all this there also belongs the requirement that the same words and sentences be unambiguously correlated with certain intuitively graspable essences that make up their fulfilling sense. On the basis of intuition and of well-practiced exemplary individual intuitions, they are [125] thus furnished with distinct and unique meanings (as it were, by crossing out the other meanings that may, under certain circumstances, habitually force themselves upon us). This is done in such a way that in all possible contexts of actual thinking they hold fast to their concepts of thought and lose their capacity to fit other intuitive data with other fulfilling essences. For good reasons, technical terms foreign to the generally current languages are avoided as far as possible. Hence, in the face of the existing ambiguities of ordinary usage, there is a constant need for caution and for frequent re-examination of whether what was fixed in an earlier context is really being applied in the same sense in the new one. But this is not the place to go into these and similar rules in more detail (for example, into those that relate to science as a product of intersubjective collaboration).

§ 67. METHOD OF CLARIFICATION. "NEARNESS" AND "DISTANCE" OF GIVENNESS

Vague lived experiences must be brought to full clarity before their essences can be grasped.

Of greater interest to us are methodological considerations that relate not to expression but to the essences and essential connections that are to be expressed by it and grasped beforehand.

If the investigating regard is directed toward lived experiences, they will in general present themselves in an *emptiness* and *vague distance* that make them unusable for either a singular or an eidetic determination. It would be otherwise if, interested not in the lived experiences themselves but rather in their mode of givenness, we wanted to investigate the essence of emptiness and vagueness itself; these, for their part, come to givenness here not vaguely but in the fullest clarity. But if what is vaguely conscious itself—say, what hovers unclearly before us in memory or phantasy—is to yield its own essences, then what it yields can only be something imperfect; that is, where the *individual intuitions* underlying the grasping of essence are of a low level of clarity, so too are the *graspings of essence*; and correlatively what is *grasped* is "*unclear*" in its sense, it has its blurrings, its external and internal lack of differentiation. It becomes impossible, or possible only roughly, to decide whether what is grasped here and there is the same (or the same essence) or something different. It cannot be established what components really lie in it, and what the components that may already be showing themselves in vague relief, hinting at themselves waveringly, "actually are."

[126] The task, then, is to bring what hovers before us in each case in flowing unclarity, at a greater or lesser distance from intuition, to normal nearness—*to bring it up to complete clarity*—in order to practice on it correspondingly valuable intuitions of essence, in which the intended essences and essential relations come to complete givenness.

The grasping of essence accordingly has its own *levels of clarity*, just as the individual that hovers before us does. But for every essence, as for the moment corresponding to it in the individual, there is, so to speak, an *absolute nearness*, in which its givenness is absolute with respect to this series of levels, i.e., *pure* self-givenness. What is objective is conscious not merely in general as standing "itself" before our regard and as "given," but as a purely given self, wholly and entirely as it *is in itself*. To the extent that a remnant of unclarity still remains, it overshadows

moments in what is given "itself"—moments that therefore do not reach into the circle of light of what is purely given. In the case of *full unclarity*, the opposite pole of full clarity, nothing at all has come to givenness; the consciousness is an "*obscure*" one, one that is no longer *intuiting* at all, one that in the proper sense is no longer "giving" at all. Accordingly we must say:

Giving consciousness in the *pregnant sense* and *intuitive* consciousness, as against *non-intuitive*, *clear* consciousness as against *obscure*: these coincide. Likewise: *levels of givenness*, of *intuitiveness*, of *clarity*. The limit at zero is obscurity; the limit at one is full clarity, intuitiveness, givenness.

Here, however, givenness is not to be understood as originary givenness, and hence not as givenness in perception. We do not identify the "*self-given*" with the "*originarily given*," with what is given "in person." In the sense specifically designated here, "given" and "self-given" are one and the same; the use of the pleonastic expression is only meant to serve us in ruling out *givenness* in the *wider sense*, in which it is ultimately said of everything represented that it is given in the representation (but, say, "in an empty way").

Our determinations furthermore hold, as is readily apparent, *for any intuitions whatever*, or empty representations, and thus also *without restriction as regards objectivities*, although here we are interested only in modes of [127] givenness of lived experiences and their phenomenological (really inherent and intentional) components.

With regard to future analyses, however, it should also be noted that what is most essential in the situation is preserved whether or not the regard of the pure Ego passes through the conscious lived experience in question—to put it more plainly, whether or not the pure Ego *turns toward* a "given" and possibly "*grasps*" it. Thus, for example, "given in perception"—instead of meaning as much as perceived, in the proper and normal sense of grasping the being of this given—can also mean merely "ready for perception." Likewise, "given in phantasy" need not yet mean "grasped in phantasizing"; and so on generally, includ-

ing with respect to all levels of clarity or obscurity. Let us point in advance to the "readiness" that will be discussed in more detail later, but at the same time remark that under the heading of givenness—wherever nothing to the contrary is added or is self-evident from the context—we *include being-grasped*, and, in the case of the givenness of essence, originary being-grasped.

§ 68. GENUINE AND SPURIOUS LEVELS OF CLARITY. THE ESSENCE OF NORMAL CLARIFICATION

Clarification heightens clarity and turns empty representations into intuitive ones.

But our descriptions still need to be carried further. When we speak of levels of givenness or clarity, we must distinguish between genuine graded levels of clarity, to which one may also add *graded levels within obscurity*, and *spurious levels of clarity*, namely *extensive enlargements of the range of clarity*, possibly accompanied by a simultaneous intensive increase in clarity.

A moment that is already given, already actually intuited, can be given in greater or lesser clarity—a tone, for example, or a color. Let us exclude all apprehensions that reach beyond what is intuitively given. Then we are dealing with graded differences that move within the framework in which what is intuitive is really intuitive. Intuitiveness as such admits, under the heading of clarity, of continuous intensity-like differences, which, like intensities, start from zero but close off at the top with a fixed limit. To this limit, one would like to say, the lower levels in a certain way point: intuiting a color in a mode of incomplete clarity, we "mean" the color as it is "in itself," and that is precisely the color given in complete clarity. Nevertheless, one must not be misled by the image of "pointing" [128] —as though one thing were a sign for another. Just as little may one speak here (we recall something remarked once before!) of an exhibition of the clear "in itself" by the unclear: in the way, say, that a thingly property "exhibits itself" in intuition through a moment of sensation, that is, is adumbrated. *The graded differences of clarity are*

differences of a wholly peculiar kind, belonging to the mode of givenness.

Matters are quite different where an apprehension reaching beyond what is intuitively given interweaves empty apprehensions with the actually intuitive apprehension. Here, *quasi*-gradually, more and more of what is emptily represented can become intuitive, or more of what is already intuitive can become emptily represented. *Making clear to oneself* thus consists here in two kinds of processes that combine with each other: *processes* of *making intuitive*, and processes of *heightening the clarity of what is already intuitive*.

With this, however, the *essence of normal clarification* has been described. For the rule is that no pure intuitions are present, and that pure empty representations do not pass over into pure intuitions. Rather, a principal role is played—possibly as intermediate stages—by *impure intuitions*, which bring their objective to intuition in certain sides or moments while merely representing it emptily in others.

§ 69. THE METHOD OF PERFECTLY CLEAR GRASPING OF ESSENCE

Grasping essences clearly proceeds step by step, bringing examples ever nearer.

Completely clear grasping has the advantage that by its essence it permits absolutely indubitable identification and distinction, explication, relating, and so on—hence the "insightful" performance of all "logical" acts. To these also belong the acts *of grasping essence*. As was already said above, the differences of clarity now more closely clarified carry over to the objective correlates of these acts; and, on the other hand, the methodological knowledge we have just gained carries over to the achievement of complete givenness of essence.

In general, then, the method, which is a *basic component of the method of eidetic science in general*, requires a step-by-step procedure. The individual intuitions serving the grasping of essence may already be clear enough to yield an essential universal with

complete clarity—one that, however, does not [129] reach as far as the guiding intention. Clarity is lacking with regard to the more precise determinations of the essences interwoven with it. What is needed, then, is a bringing-nearer of the exemplary particulars, or a fresh procurement of better-suited ones, in which the individual features intended in confusion and obscurity can stand out and then be brought to the clearest givenness.[2]

A bringing-nearer takes place everywhere here even in *the sphere of obscurity*. What is obscurely represented comes nearer to us in its own peculiar way; it finally knocks at the gate of intuition, but it need not on that account pass through it (and perhaps cannot, "by virtue of psychological inhibitions").

It should further be mentioned that *what is given in each case is for the most part surrounded by a halo of indeterminate determinability*. This halo has its own manner of "*unfolding*" bringing-nearer, as it spreads out into series of representations—at first, say, once again in obscurity, then anew in the sphere of givenness—until what is intended enters the sharply illuminated circle of complete givenness.

Attention should also be drawn to the fact that it would surely be *saying too much to claim that all evidence of grasping essence requires full clarity of the underlying particulars in their concreteness*. To grasp the most general differences of essence, such as those between color and tone, between perception and will, it probably suffices to have the examples given at a low level of clarity. It is as though the most general element, the genus (color in general, tone in general), were already fully given in them, but not yet the difference. That is an objectionable way of speaking, but I would not know how to avoid it. Let the reader make the situation present to himself in living intuition.

2 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above, § 44, p. 83.

§ 70. THE ROLE OF PERCEPTION IN THE METHOD OF CLARIFYING ESSENCES. THE PRIVILEGED POSITION OF FREE PHANTASY

Free phantasy, fed by rich observation, is the vital element of eidetic science.

Let us bring out a few more especially important features of the method of grasping essence.

It belongs to the general essence of immediately intuitive grasping of essence that it can be carried out (we have already laid stress on this!) on the basis of *mere presentification* of exemplary particulars. But presentification—phantasy, for example—can, as we have just shown, be so [130] completely clear that it makes possible complete graspings of essence and insights into essence. In general, *originarily giving perception* has its advantages over all kinds of presentification; external perception in particular, of course. This, however, not merely as an experiencing act for establishing existence—which is not in question here—but as a basis for phenomenological findings about essence. External perception has its complete clarity for all objective moments that have really come to givenness in it in the mode of originarity. But it also offers, possibly with the help of reflection turned back upon it, clear and stable particulars for general analyses of essence of a phenomenological kind, and more specifically even for analyses of acts. Anger may evaporate through reflection, may quickly modify its content. Nor is it always ready to hand, as perception is; it cannot be produced at any time by convenient experimental arrangements. To study it reflectively in its originarity means to study an anger that is evaporating—which is by no means insignificant, but is perhaps not what was supposed to be studied. External perception, by contrast, which is so much more accessible, does not "evaporate" through reflection. Its general essence, and the essence of the components and essential correlates that belong to it universally, we can study within the framework of originarity without any special efforts to produce clarity. If it is said that percep-

tions too have their differences of clarity—namely, with regard to cases of perception in the dark, in fog, and so on—we shall not enter here into closer consideration of whether these differences should be put entirely on a par with those discussed earlier. It suffices that perception is not normally befogged, and that clear perception, of the kind required, is at our disposal at any time.[3]

If the advantages of originarity were methodically very important, we would now have to consider where, how and to what extent originarity can be realized in the various kinds of lived experience. We would also have to ask which kinds of lived experience come especially close in this respect to the so highly privileged domain of sensuous perception, and more of the same. But we can disregard all this. There are reasons why, in phenomenology as in all eidetic sciences, presentifications and, more precisely, *free phantasies gain a privileged position over perceptions*. This holds *even in the phenomenology of perception* [131] *itself, though admittedly not in that of sensation data*.

In his investigative thinking the geometer operates incomparably more in phantasy than in perception of the figure or the model. This holds even of the *pure* geometer, that is, the one who renounces algebraic methods. In phantasy, to be sure, he must strive for clear intuitions, an effort from which the drawing and the model relieve him. But in actual drawing and modeling he is bound. In phantasy he has incomparable freedom in the arbitrary reshaping of the fictive figures, in running through continuously modified possible shapes, and thus in producing countless new formations. It is this freedom that first opens up for him access to the vast expanses of essential possibilities, with their infinite horizons of cognitions of essence. The drawings therefore normally follow after the constructions of phantasy and the eidetically pure thinking carried out on their basis. They serve mainly to fix stages of a process already carried out beforehand, and thereby to make it easier to presentify that process again. Even where thinking goes on with an eye to the fig-

3 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 4, p. 121.

ure, the newly attached thought processes are, as regards their sensuous basis, processes of phantasy, whose results fix the new lines on the figure.

For the phenomenologist, who deals with reduced lived experiences and the correlates essentially belonging to them, matters are no different in the most general respects. Phenomenological essential formations, too, are infinitely many. He too can make only limited use of the aid of originary givenness. It is true that all the main types of perceptions and presentifications are freely at his disposal in originary givenness, namely as perceptual exemplifications for a phenomenology of perception, of phantasy, of memory, and so on. Likewise, in the sphere of originarity, he has examples at his command for what is most general in judgments, surmises, feelings and volitions. But of course he does not have them for all possible particular formations, any more than the geometer has drawings and models at his disposal for the infinitely many kinds of solids. In any case, here too the freedom of research into essences necessarily demands operating in phantasy.

On the other hand, of course, it is important (and here again as in geometry, which lately has attached great value, not for nothing, to collections of models and the like [132]) to exercise phantasy abundantly in the perfect clarification required here and in the free reshaping of the givens of phantasy. Before that, however, it is also important to fertilize phantasy through observations in originary intuition that are as rich and as good as possible. This fertilization naturally does not mean that experience as such has a function of grounding validity. Extraordinary profit can be drawn from what history offers. Even more can be drawn from what art offers, and especially poetry. These are, to be sure, figments of the imagination. But in the originality of their new formations, the abundance of their individual features and the seamlessness of their motivation, they tower high above the achievements of our own phantasy. Moreover, thanks to the suggestive power of artistic means of portrayal, they are trans-

posed with particular ease into perfectly clear phantasies when we apprehend them with understanding.

So one can really say, if one loves paradoxical talk, and can say in strict truth, if one understands the ambiguous sense properly, that *"fiction" is the vital element of phenomenology, as of all eidetic science*. Fiction is the source from which the cognition of "eternal truths" draws its nourishment.[4]

§ 71. THE PROBLEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A DESCRIPTIVE EIDETICS OF LIVED EXPERIENCES

Should phenomenology model itself on mathematics or remain a descriptive science?

Repeatedly in what has gone before we have called phenomenology outright a descriptive science. Here again a fundamental methodical question arises, together with a misgiving that holds us back in our eagerness to penetrate the new domain. *Is it right to set phenomenology the goals of mere description?* A *descriptive eidetics*: is that not *something altogether wrong-headed*?

The motives for such questions lie close enough to all of us. Anyone who, in our manner, gropes his way, so to speak, into a new eidetics, asking what investigations are possible here, what starting points to take and what methods to follow, involuntarily looks to the old, highly developed eidetic disciplines. That is, he looks to the mathematical ones, above all geometry and arithmetic. But we notice at once that these disciplines cannot be called on to guide us in our case, and that in them the situation

[1] A sentence that should be particularly well suited to be quoted by naturalists in ridicule of the eidetic mode of cognition. [133] must be essentially different. For anyone who has not yet become acquainted with any piece of genuine phenomenological analysis of essence, there is some danger here of losing faith in the possibility of a phenomenology. The mathematical disciplines are the only ones that can at present effectively represent the idea of a scientific eidetics. So at first the thought

4 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above, § 15, p. 30.

remains remote that there could be eidetic disciplines of yet another kind: non-mathematical ones, fundamentally different in their whole theoretical type from the familiar ones. Suppose, then, that general considerations have won one over to the postulate of a phenomenological eidetics. The attempt to establish something like a mathematics of phenomena fails at once, and that failure may tempt one to abandon the idea of a phenomenology. But that would be all the more wrong.

Let us make clear to ourselves, in the most general terms, *what is peculiar to mathematical disciplines* in *contrast* to *what is peculiar to a doctrine of the essence of lived experiences*. We thereby make clear what goals and methods they really are that are supposed to be, in principle, inappropriate in the sphere of lived experience.

§ 72. CONCRETE, ABSTRACT, "MATHEMATICAL" SCIENCES OF ESSENCE

Geometry deduces everything from axioms because space is a "definite manifold."

We start from the division of essences and sciences of essence into material and formal ones. We can set aside the formal ones, and with them the whole aggregate of formal mathematical disciplines, since phenomenology evidently belongs among the material eidetic sciences. If the analogy can be methodically guiding at all, it will be most effective if we restrict ourselves to material mathematical disciplines such as geometry. We therefore ask, more specifically, whether a phenomenology must, or rather can, be constituted as a *geometry of lived experiences*.

To gain the desired insight here, we must keep in view some important determinations from the general theory of science.[1]

Every theoretical science binds together an ideally closed totality through relation to a domain of knowledge, which is in turn determined by a highest genus. A radical unity

[1] For the further discussion, cf. Chapter 1 of Part I, especially §§ 12, 15 and 16.

134 we attain only by going back to the absolutely highest genus. That is, we must go back to the region

in question and the regional generic components, i.e. to the highest genera that unite in the regional genus and may be founded on one another. The highest concrete genus (the region) is built out of highest genera that are partly disjunct and partly founded in one another (and in this way include one another). This structure corresponds to the way the corresponding concreta are built out of lowest differences that are partly disjunct and partly founded in one another: in the case of the thing, for example, temporal, spatial and material determinateness. To each region there corresponds a regional ontology with a series of regional sciences, each closed in itself and independent, and possibly resting on one another, corresponding precisely to the highest genera that have their unity in the region. Subordinate genera correspond to mere disciplines or so-called theories: to the genus conic section, for example, the discipline of conic sections. Such a discipline understandably has no full independence. In its cognitions and in grounding them, it will naturally have to draw on the entire foundation of cognitions of essence that has its unity in the highest genus.

Depending on whether highest genera are regional (concrete) or merely components of such genera, the *sciences are concrete* or *abstract*. The division evidently corresponds to that between concrete and abstract genera in general.[1] Accordingly, the domain comprises concrete objects in one case, as in the eidetics of nature, and abstract ones in the other, such as spatial shapes, temporal shapes and shapes of motion. All abstract genera are essentially related to concrete genera and ultimately to regional ones. This gives all abstract disciplines and full sciences an essential relation to concrete sciences, the regional ones.

The division of the eidetic sciences, moreover, is paralleled exactly by a division of the empirical sciences. These too are divided according to regions. We have, for example, a physical science of nature, and all the individual natural sciences are really mere disciplines. What gives them unity is the mighty stock not only of eidetic but also of empirical laws that belong to

physical nature in general, prior to any division into spheres of nature. For the rest, different regions can also prove to be linked by empirical regularities, as for instance the region of the physical and that of the psychic.

135 If we now look at the familiar eidetic sciences, we are struck by the fact that they do *not proceed descriptively*. Geometry, for example, does not grasp in individual intuitions the lowest eidetic differences, that is, the countless spatial shapes that can be drawn in space; nor does it describe and classify them, as the descriptive natural sciences do with the empirical formations of nature. Instead, geometry fixes a few kinds of basic formations: the ideas of solid, surface, point, angle and the like, the same ones that play the determining role in the "axioms." With the help of the axioms, i.e. the primitive essential laws, it is then in a position to derive purely deductively all the spatial shapes that "exist" in space, i.e. that are ideally possible, together with all the essential relations belonging to them. It does so in the form of exactly determining concepts, which stand in for essences that in general remain foreign to our intuition. The generic essence of the geometrical domain, or the pure essence of space, is so constituted that geometry can be completely certain of really mastering all possibilities, and mastering them exactly, by its method. In other words, the manifold of spatial formations in general has a remarkable fundamental logical property, for which we introduce the name *"definite" manifold* or *"mathematical manifold in the pregnant sense."*[5]

Such a manifold is characterized as follows. A finite number of concepts and propositions, drawn where necessary from the essence of the domain in question, completely and unambiguously determines the totality of all possible formations of the domain, in the manner of purely analytic necessity. So in principle nothing further remains open in the domain.

We can also put it this way: such a manifold has the distinctive property of being *"mathematically exhaustively definable."* The

"definition" lies in the system of axiomatic concepts and axioms. The "mathematically exhaustive" character lies in the fact that the defining assertions, in relation to the manifold, imply the greatest conceivable prejudgment: nothing remains undetermined.

An equivalent of the concept of a definite manifold also lies in the following propositions:

Every proposition that can be formed from the distinguished axiomatic concepts, in whatever logical forms, is either a [136] pure formal-logical consequence of the axioms or a formal-logical counter-consequence of the same kind, i.e. one that formally contradicts the axioms. In the latter case its contradictory opposite would be a formal-logical consequence of the axioms. *In a mathematically definite manifold the concepts "true" and "formal-logical consequence of the axioms" are equivalent*, and likewise the concepts "false" and "formal-logical counter-consequence of the axioms."

An axiom system that, in a purely analytic way, "exhaustively defines" a manifold in the manner indicated I also call a *definite axiom system*. Every deductive discipline resting on such a system is a *definite discipline*, or a discipline that is *mathematical in the pregnant sense*.

The definitions all remain in force if we let the material particularization of the manifold become wholly indeterminate, that is, if we carry out formalizing generalization. The axiom system is then transformed into a system of axiom forms, the

5 Husserl's term for a manifold completely and unambiguously determined by a finite system of axioms. In a footnote below he links it to Hilbert's "axiom of completeness."

manifold into a manifold form, and the discipline relating to the manifold into a discipline form.[6]

§ 73. APPLICATION TO THE PROBLEM OF PHENOMENOLOGY. DESCRIPTION AND EXACT DETERMINATION

Can the stream of consciousness be treated as a mathematical manifold?

How do matters stand, then, with *phenomenology* in comparison with geometry, taken as the representative of a material mathematics in general? It is clear that phenomenology belongs among the concrete eidetic disciplines. Its extension is made up of *essences of lived experiences*, and these are not abstracta but concreta. As such they have manifold abstract moments. The question now is this: do the highest genera belonging to these abstract moments here too form domains for definite disciplines, for "mathematical" disciplines on the model of [137] geometry? Must we, then, here too look for a definite axiom system and build deductive theories on it? Or, correspondingly, must we here too look for "basic formations"? Must we derive from them all the other essential formations of the domain and their essential determinations constructively, i.e. deductively, by consistently applying the axioms? But it belongs to the essence of such

6 HUSSERL'S NOTE. On this, cf. *Logical Investigations* I², §§ 69 and 70.—The concepts introduced here already served me at the beginning of the 1890s, in the "Investigations into the Theory of the Formal-Mathematical *Disciplines*," which I conceived as a continuation of my *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. I used them chiefly to find a solution *in principle* to the problem of the imaginary (cf. the brief reference in *Logical Investigations* II, p. 250). Since then I have often had occasion, in lectures and seminars, to develop the concepts and theories in question, in part in full detail. In the winter semester of 1900/01 I treated them in a double lecture before the Göttingen "Mathematical Society." Some of these ideas have made their way into the literature without the original source being named. —The close relation of the concept of definiteness to the "axiom of completeness" introduced by D. Hilbert for the foundation of arithmetic will be immediately evident to every mathematician.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (*Philosophy of Arithmetic*, 1891) was Husserl's first book. The planned continuation on formal-mathematical disciplines was never published.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. David Hilbert (1862–1943), Husserl's colleague at Göttingen, added an axiom of completeness to his axiomatization of the real numbers (1900).

deriving, and this too must be noted, that it is a mediate logical determining. Its results, even if they are "drawn" on the figure, in principle cannot be grasped in immediate intuition. We can also frame our question in the following words, turning it at the same time to the correlative side: Is the stream of consciousness a genuine mathematical manifold? Taken in its facticity, is it like physical nature? Physical nature would have to be called a concrete definite manifold, if the ideal that ultimately guides the physicist is valid and is grasped in a rigorous concept.

It is a highly significant problem for the theory of science to become completely clear about all the fundamental questions pertinent here. That is, after fixing the concept of the definite manifold, one must consider the necessary conditions that a materially determined domain has to satisfy if it is to be able to correspond to this idea. One condition for this is the *exactness* of *"concept formation."* This is by no means a matter of our free choice and logical art. As regards the putative axiomatic concepts, which must after all be demonstrable in immediate intuition, it presupposes *exactness in the grasped essences themselves*. But to what extent "exact" essences are to be found in a domain of essences depends entirely on the peculiar nature of the domain. So does the question whether exact essences can even be substructed beneath all essences graspable in actual intuition, and thus beneath all essential components as well.

The problem just touched on is intimately interwoven with fundamental problems that are still unsolved. One is the problem of clarifying in principle the relation between *description*, with its *"descriptive concepts,"* and *unambiguous, exact determination*, with its *"ideal concepts."* In parallel with this, there is the problem of clarifying the still so little understood relation between "descriptive sciences" and explanatory sciences. An attempt in this direction will be presented in the continuation of these investigations. Here we must not hold up the main course of our reflections too long, and we are also not yet sufficiently prepared [138] to treat such questions exhaustively. In what fol-

lows, let it suffice to point to a few points that can be brought home in a general way.

§ 74. DESCRIPTIVE AND EXACT SCIENCES

Vague morphological concepts describe what is seen; exact ideal concepts describe limits never seen.

Let us start our considerations from the contrast between geometry and descriptive natural science. The geometer is not interested in the factual shapes intuitable by the senses, as the descriptive naturalist is. Unlike the latter, he does not form *morphological concepts* of vague types of shape, which are grasped directly on the basis of sensuous intuition and fixed conceptually or terminologically, vague as they are. The vagueness of these concepts, the fact that they have fluid spheres of application, is not a defect to be charged against them. For the sphere of knowledge they serve, they are simply indispensable; or rather, in that sphere they are the only legitimate ones. Suppose the task is to bring the intuitable givens of things, with their intuitively given essential characters, to adequate conceptual expression. Then we must take them precisely as they give themselves. And they give themselves only as fluid; typical essences can be grasped in them only in immediately analyzing intuition of essence. The most perfect geometry, and the most perfect practical mastery of it, cannot help the descriptive naturalist to express (in exact geometrical concepts) precisely what he expresses so simply, intelligibly and wholly adequately with words like "notched," "indented," "lens-shaped," "umbelliform" and the like. These are all concepts that are *essentially, and not accidentally, inexact*, and *therefore* also non-mathematical.

Geometrical concepts are *"ideal" concepts*: they express something that one cannot "see." Their "origin," and with it their content, is essentially different from that of *descriptive concepts*, which express essences taken directly from simple intuition and not "ideals." Exact concepts have their correlates in essences that have the character of *"Ideas" in the Kantian sense*. Over

against these Ideas, or ideal essences, stand the *morphological essences*, as correlates of the descriptive concepts.

One kind of ideation yields ideal essences as *ideal "limits."* These can in principle be found in no sensuous intuition, and morphological essences [139] "approach" them more or less, without ever reaching them. This ideation is something fundamentally different from grasping essence through simple "abstraction," in which a "moment" that has been singled out is raised into the region of essences as something in principle vague, as something typical. The *fixity* and *clean distinguishability* of *generic concepts*, or generic essences, whose extension lies in the fluid, *must not* be *confused* with the *exactness* of *Idea concepts*, and of genera whose extension contains nothing but what is ideal. It must further be seen that *exact* and *purely descriptive sciences* may indeed *combine*, but that they can never stand in for one another. No development of exact science, i.e. science that operates with ideal substructions, can solve the original and legitimate tasks of pure description, however far that development goes.

§ 75. PHENOMENOLOGY AS DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF THE ESSENCE OF PURE LIVED EXPERIENCES

Phenomenology describes essences of lived experience at levels of generality that allow firm concepts.

As for phenomenology, it aims to be a *descriptive* doctrine of the essence of transcendentally pure lived experiences in the phenomenological attitude. Like every descriptive discipline that neither substructs nor idealizes, it has its justification in itself. Whatever in reduced lived experiences can be grasped eidetically in pure intuition, whether as a really inherent component or as an intentional correlate, belongs to phenomenology. For phenomenology this is a great source of absolute cognitions.

But let us look a little more closely at the extent to which genuinely scientific descriptions can be established in the phenomenological field, with its countless eidetic concreta, and at what they are able to achieve.

It lies in the peculiar nature of consciousness in general to be a fluctuation running on in various dimensions. So there can be no question of fixing in conceptually exact terms any eidetic concreta and all the moments that immediately constitute them. Take, for example, a lived experience of the genus "phantasy of a thing," as it is given to us either in *phenomenologically* immanent perception or in some other (always reduced) intuition. Then the phenomenologically singular item (the eidetic singularity) is this phantasy of a thing in the whole fullness of its concretion. It is taken exactly as it flows along in the flow of lived experience, exactly with the determinateness and indeterminateness with which it brings its thing to appearance [140] now from these sides, now from those. It is taken exactly with the distinctness or blurriness, the wavering clarity and intermittent obscurity, and so on, that are peculiar to it. Only the *individuation* does phenomenology drop. But it raises the whole essential content, in the fullness of its concretion, into eidetic consciousness. It takes that content as an ideally identical essence which, like every essence, could be singularized not only *hic et nunc* but in countless exemplars. One sees at once that a conceptual and terminological *fixing* of this or any such fluid *concretum* is out of the question. The same holds for each of its immediate parts and abstract moments, which are no less fluid.

Although there is no question of an unambiguous determination of the *eidetic singularities* in our descriptive sphere, matters are quite different with essences at a *higher level of specificity*. These are accessible to firm distinction, to being held fast as identical and to strict conceptual grasp, and likewise to analysis into their component essences. Accordingly, the tasks of a comprehensive scientific description can meaningfully be set for them.

Thus we describe, and thereby determine in *rigorous* concepts, the generic essence of perception in general, or of subordinate species such as perception of physical thinghood, of animal beings and the like. Likewise we describe the generic essence of memory in general, empathy in general, willing in

general, and so on. Before these, however, come the highest universalities: lived experience in general, *cogitatio* in general. These already make comprehensive descriptions of essence possible. It evidently lies in the nature of generic grasping, analysis and description of essences that achievements at higher levels do not depend on those at lower levels in such a way that, say, a systematic inductive procedure would be methodically required, a stepwise ascent up the ladder of generality.

Let one further consequence be added here. According to what has been set out, deductive theorizings are excluded from phenomenology. *Mediate inferences* are not flatly denied to it. But all its cognitions are meant to be descriptive ones, purely adapted to the immanent sphere. So inferences, and non-intuitive procedures of every kind, have only the methodical significance of leading us toward the matters that a subsequent direct seeing of essence has to bring to givenness. Analogies that force themselves upon us may, before actual intuition, suggest surmises about [141] essential connections, and further inferences may be drawn from these surmises. But in the end, actual seeing of the essential connections must make good on the surmises. As long as this has not happened, we have no phenomenological result.

Admittedly, this does not answer a question that forces itself upon us. In the eidetic domain of reduced phenomena (whether as a whole or in some subdomain), could there not also be an idealizing procedure alongside the descriptive one? Such a procedure would substitute pure and rigorous ideals for the intuitive givens. These ideals could then even serve as basic means for a *mathesis* of lived experiences, as a counterpart to *descriptive* phenomenology.

However much the investigations just carried out had to leave open, they have advanced us considerably, and not only by bringing a series of important problems into our field of vision. It is now completely clear to us that nothing is to be gained for the grounding of phenomenology by analogizing. It is merely a misleading prejudice to think that the methodology of the historically given a priori sciences, which are all *exact* ideal sci-

ences, must as a matter of course serve as the model for every new science, and especially for our transcendental phenomenology. It is as if there could be eidetic sciences of only a single methodical type, that of "exactness." But transcendental phenomenology, as a descriptive science of essence, belongs to a *totally different basic class of eidetic sciences* from the mathematical sciences.

CHAPTER TWO. GENERAL STRUCTURES OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS. § 76. THE THEME OF THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATIONS

Bracketed objects return, as correlates of consciousness, within the scope of phenomenology.

Through the phenomenological reduction, the realm of transcendental consciousness had presented itself to us as the realm of being that is, in a definite sense, "absolute." It is the primal category of being in general (or, in our terms, the primal region). All other regions of being are rooted in it and related to it by their *essence*, and they are therefore all essentially dependent on it. The doctrine of categories must take its start entirely from this most radical of all distinctions of being: being *as consciousness*, and being as "transcendent" being that *"announces itself"* in consciousness. As one comes to see, this distinction can be attained and appreciated in [142] its purity only through the method of phenomenological reduction. The essential relation between *transcendental* and *transcendent* being grounds the relations between phenomenology and all other sciences. We have already touched on these relations repeatedly, but they must be explored more deeply later. It lies in their sense that phenomenology's sphere of authority extends, in a certain remarkable way, over all the other sciences, even though it excludes them. *The exclusion has at the same time the character of a revaluing change of sign*, and *with this change of sign the revalued item takes its place once again within the phenomenological sphere*. Figuratively speaking, what is bracketed is not wiped off the phenomenological slate. It is only bracketed and thereby provided

with an index. With this index, however, it belongs to the main theme of the investigation.

It is absolutely necessary to understand this state of affairs thoroughly, from the various points of view proper to it. It includes, for example, the fact that physical nature is subject to exclusion. Nevertheless, there is a phenomenology of natural-scientific consciousness, on the side of natural-scientific experiencing and thinking, and there is also a phenomenology of nature itself as the correlate of natural-scientific consciousness. Likewise, although psychology and the human sciences are affected by the exclusion, there is a phenomenology of the human being, of his personality, his personal properties and his (human) course of consciousness. There is further a phenomenology of the social spirit, of social formations, of cultural formations, and so on. Everything transcendent, insofar as it comes to givenness in consciousness, is an object of phenomenological investigation not only on the side of *consciousness of* it, e.g. the various modes of consciousness in which it comes to givenness as the same. It is also such an object as what is given and accepted in these givennesses, though this is essentially interwoven with the former side.

In this way there are mighty domains of phenomenological research for which one is quite unprepared when starting from the idea of lived experience. This is especially so if, like all of us, one begins with the psychological attitude and has at first taken over the concept of lived experience from the psychology of our time. Under the influence of inner inhibitions, one will at first be little inclined [143] to recognize these domains as phenomenological at all. For psychology and the human sciences, this inclusion of the bracketed results in quite peculiar and at first confusing situations. To indicate this only in the case of psychology, we note the following. Consciousness, as something given in psychological experience, that is, as human or animal consciousness, is the object of psychology: of empirical psychology in empirical research, and of eidetic psychology in eidetic research. On the other hand, in the modification of bracketing,

the whole world with its psychic individuals and their psychic lived experiences belongs to phenomenology, all of it as the correlate of absolute consciousness. Consciousness thus appears in different modes of apprehension and in different connections, and in different ones within phenomenology itself. Within phenomenology it appears on the one hand as absolute consciousness, and on the other hand, in the correlate, as psychological consciousness, which is now fitted into the natural world. It is revalued in a certain way, and yet it has not lost its own content as consciousness. These connections are difficult, and extraordinarily important. It is because of them, too, that every phenomenological finding about absolute consciousness can be reinterpreted as an eidetic-psychological one (which, strictly considered, is by no means itself phenomenological). Yet the phenomenological way of considering things is the more comprehensive and, being absolute, the more radical. To see all this, and further to bring to fully illuminated clarity the essential relations between pure phenomenology, eidetic and empirical psychology, and the human sciences, is a great concern for the disciplines involved here and for philosophy. In particular, psychology, which is rising so vigorously in our time, can gain the radical grounding it still lacks only if it has far-reaching insights into the essential connections indicated.

The indications just given make us feel how far we still are from understanding phenomenology. We have learned to practice the phenomenological attitude. We have removed a series of confusing methodical misgivings. We have defended the right of pure description. The field of research lies open. But we do not yet know what the *great themes* in it are. More precisely, we do not know *what basic directions of description are prefigured by the most general essential character of lived experiences*. To bring clarity in these respects, we shall attempt in the [144] following chapters to characterize this most general essential character, at least in some especially important features.

With these new considerations we do not really leave the problems of method behind. Even our methodical discussions

so far were determined by the most general insights into the essence of the phenomenological sphere. It goes without saying that a more penetrating knowledge of this sphere, not in its details but in its pervasive universalities, must also furnish us with methodical norms of richer content. All special methods will have to conform to these norms. Method, after all, is nothing that is brought to a domain from outside, or that could be. Formal logic, or noetics, gives not method but the form of possible method. However useful knowledge of form may be in methodological respects, *determinate* method is something else. Taken not in its merely technical particularity but in its general methodical type, it is a norm that springs from the basic regional character of the domain and from its general structures. Grasping this norm in cognition therefore depends essentially on knowing these structures.

§ 77. REFLECTION AS A BASIC PECULIARITY OF THE SPHERE OF LIVED EXPERIENCE. STUDIES IN REFLECTION

Reflection can grasp lived experiences that were already there before it turned to them.

Among the most general essential peculiarities of the pure sphere of lived experience, we treat *reflection* first. We do so because of its *universal* methodological function: the phenomenological method moves entirely in acts of reflection. But skeptical misgivings have been raised about what reflection can accomplish, and thus about the possibility of a phenomenology in general. We would like to dispose of these thoroughly first of all.

We already had to speak of reflection in the preliminary considerations. What we arrived at there, even before we had set foot on phenomenological ground, we can nevertheless take over now while strictly carrying out the phenomenological reduction. Those findings concerned only what belongs to the proper essence of lived experiences. That is, as we know, they concerned what remains to us as a secure possession, only transcendentally purified in the way it is apprehended. We shall first

recapitulate what is already known, and at once try to penetrate more deeply into the matters themselves and into the kind of phenomenological studies that reflection makes possible and requires.[7]

145 Every Ego lives through its lived experiences, and much is included in these, both really inherently and intentionally. That the Ego lives through them does not mean that it has them, and what is included in them, "in view," grasping them in the manner of immanent experience or of some other immanent intuition and representation. Every lived experience that is not in view can, as an ideal possibility, become one that is "viewed." A reflection of the Ego is directed to it, and it now becomes an object for the Ego. The same holds for the Ego's possible regards directed to the components of the lived experience and to its intentionalities (to that *of which* they may be consciousness). Reflections are in turn lived experiences and can as such become substrates of new reflections, and so *in infinitum*, with the generality of principle.

The lived experience actually being lived through at a given moment, as it newly enters the reflecting regard, gives itself as actually lived through, as being "now." But not only that: it also gives itself as having just *been*; and insofar as it was unregarded, it gives itself precisely as such, as having been unreflected. In the natural attitude we take it as a matter of course, without giving it any thought, that lived experiences exist not only when we are turned toward them and grasp them in immanent experience. We take it for granted, too, that they actually were, and were actually lived through by us, when in immanent reflection they are "still conscious" within *retention* ("primary" memory) as having "just" been.[8]

We are further convinced that reflection on the basis of, and "in," *recollection* also informs us about our earlier lived experi-

7 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above, § 38, p. 65 and § 45, p. 83.

8 "Retention" is Husserl's term for the "primary memory" in which a phase that has just elapsed is still held in consciousness. Its forward-directed counterpart, "protention," is introduced in the next paragraph.

ences. These were "at that time" present and immanently perceivable, though not immanently perceived. According to the naive, natural view, precisely the same holds for *fore-memory*, for forward-looking expectation. What comes into question here first is immediate "protention" (as we might call it), the exact counterpart of immediate retention. Then there is fore-memory that presentifies in quite a different way, reproducing in a more proper sense, and this is the counterpart of *recollection*. Thanks to the reflection that is possible "in" fore-memory, what is intuitively expected, what is conscious in the forward look as "coming in the future," has at the same time the meaning of something that will be perceived. In just the same way, what is remembered has the meaning of something that has been perceived. So in fore-memory, too, we can reflect and make ourselves conscious of our own lived experiences, toward which we were not directed in it, as belonging to what is fore-remembered as such. We do this whenever we say [146] that we *will* see what is coming; the reflecting regard has then turned to the "future" lived experience of perception.

All this we make clear to ourselves in the natural attitude, as psychologists, say, and we pursue it into its further connections.

If we now carry out phenomenological reduction, these findings (in their bracketing) are transformed into exemplary cases of essential universalities. We can make these universalities our own and study them systematically within the framework of pure intuition. For example, in living intuition (even if it be imagination) we put ourselves into the performance of some act: say, a joy over a theoretical train of thought that is running its course freely and fruitfully. We carry out all the reductions and see what lies in the pure essence of the phenomenological matters. First, then, there is a being-turned-toward the thoughts as they run their course. We develop the exemplary phenomenon further. While the joyful course goes on, let a reflecting regard turn to the joy. The joy becomes a regarded and immanently perceived lived experience, fluctuating and fading away in such and such a manner in the regard of reflection. The freedom of

the train of thought suffers in the process. It is now conscious in a modified way, and the joyfulness belonging to its progress is essentially affected as well. This too can be ascertained, but to do so we must again carry out new turnings of regard. Let us leave these out of play for now, however, and attend to the following.

The first reflection on the joy finds it as actual and present, *but not as only just beginning*. It stands there as enduring, as already lived through before and simply not taken into view. That is, there is evidently the possibility of following up the past duration and mode of givenness of what gladdens us. We can attend to the earlier stretch of the theoretical train of thought, but also to the regard that was earlier turned toward it. On the other hand, we can attend to the joyful turning toward it and, by contrast, grasp the absence of any regard turned toward the joy in the phenomenon that has run its course. But we also have another possibility. With respect to the joy that has subsequently become an object, we can carry out a reflection on the reflection that objectivates it. In this way we can bring out still more effectively the difference between joy that is *lived through* but not regarded and joy that is *regarded*. We can likewise bring out the modifications that come in through the acts of grasping, explicating and so on, which set in with the turning of regard.

147 All this we can consider in the phenomenological attitude and *eidetically*, whether in higher universality or according to what may turn out to hold essentially for particular kinds of lived experience. The entire stream of lived experience, with its lived experiences lived through in the *mode of unreflected consciousness*, can thus be subjected to *one* scientific study of essence that aims at systematic completeness. This also holds with regard to all possibilities of moments of lived experience *intentionally* included in them. So it holds specifically with regard to the lived experiences that may be conscious in them in modified form, and to *their* intentionalia. We have come to know examples of the latter in the form of the modifications of lived experience that are intentionally included in all presentifica-

tions and can be drawn out through reflections "in" them. Examples are the "having-been-perceived" that lies in every memory, and the "going-to-be-perceived" that lies in every expectation.

The study of the stream of lived experience is itself carried out in manifold reflective acts of peculiar structure. These in turn belong to the stream of lived experience and can, and must, be made objects of phenomenological analyses in corresponding reflections of a higher level. For such analyses are fundamental to a general phenomenology and to the methodological insight that is wholly indispensable to it. Something similar evidently holds for psychology. Vague talk of studying lived experiences in reflection, or in memory, which is what reflection is usually identified with, accomplishes nothing as yet. That is quite apart from many falsehoods that commonly get interwoven with such talk from the start (precisely because serious analysis of essence is lacking). One of these is the claim that there could be no such thing at all as immanent perception and observation.

Let us go into the matters somewhat more closely.

§ 78. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY OF REFLECTIONS ON LIVED EXPERIENCE

Reflection is a modification of consciousness; its immanent perception and retention have their own legitimacy.

According to what has just been set out, reflection is a title for acts in which the stream of lived experience, with all its manifold occurrences (moments of lived experience, intentionalia), becomes graspable and analyzable with evidence. It is, as we can also put it, the title of consciousness's method for the cognition of consciousness in general. But in this very method reflection itself becomes the object of possible studies. Reflection is also the title for kinds of lived experience that essentially belong together, and thus the theme of a main chapter [148] of phenomenology. The task there is to distinguish the various "reflections" and to analyze them completely, in systematic order.

Here we must first make clear to ourselves that *every kind of "reflection"* has the character of a *modification of consciousness*, and indeed of a modification that, in principle, *every consciousness* can undergo.

We speak of modification here insofar as every reflection essentially arises from changes of attitude. Through them a pregiven lived experience, or datum of lived experience (the unreflected one), undergoes a certain transformation: precisely into the mode of reflected consciousness (or of what is reflectively conscious). The pregiven lived experience may itself already have the character of a reflected consciousness of something, so that the modification is of a higher level. But ultimately we come back to absolutely unreflected lived experiences and their really inherent or intentional data. Now, by essential law, every lived experience can be converted into reflective modifications, and in various directions, which we shall come to know more precisely.

The eidetic study of reflections has a fundamental methodological significance for phenomenology, and no less for psychology. This is shown by the fact that all modes of immanent grasping of essence, and on the other hand of immanent experience, fall under the concept of reflection. Take, for example, immanent perception. It is in fact a reflection, insofar as it presupposes a turning of regard from something otherwise conscious to the consciousness of it. Likewise, as we touched on (in the preceding section) when discussing what the natural attitude takes for granted, every memory permits not only a reflective turning of regard to itself but also the peculiar reflection in memory. At first, say, the course of a piece of music is conscious in memory, unreflected, in the mode of the "past." But the possibility of reflecting on its having-been-perceived belongs to the *essence* of something conscious in this way. Likewise, in the case of expectation, of the consciousness that looks forward to what is "coming," there is the essential possibility of diverting the regard from this coming thing to its going-to-be-perceived. These essential connections are why the propositions "I remem-

ber A" and "I have perceived A," and likewise "I look forward to A" and "I will perceive A," are equivalent *a priori* and immediately. But they are only equivalent, for their sense is different.

149 The phenomenological task here is to investigate systematically all the modifications of lived experience that fall under the heading of reflection. They must be studied in connection with all the modifications with which they stand in essential relation and which they presuppose. These latter modifications comprise the totality of essential modifications that every lived experience must undergo in the course of its originary flow. They also comprise the various kinds of alteration that can be thought of as carried out ideally on every lived experience in the manner of "operations."

Every lived experience is in itself a flow of becoming. It is what it is in an *original generation* of an unchangeable essential type: a constant flow of retentions and protentions, mediated by a phase of originarity that is itself flowing, in which the living now of the lived experience becomes conscious in contrast to its *before* and *after*. On the other hand, every lived experience has its parallels in various forms of reproduction, which can be regarded as ideal operative transformations of the original lived experience. Each has its "exactly corresponding" and yet thoroughly modified counterpart in a recollection. It likewise has such a counterpart in a possible fore-memory, in a possible mere phantasy, and again in the iterations of such alterations.

Naturally we think of all the lived experiences placed in parallel as having a common essential content. The parallel experiences are thus supposed to be conscious of the same intentional objectivities, and conscious of them in identical modes of givenness, drawn from the range of all those that can occur in other respects of possible variation.

The modifications under consideration belong to *every* lived experience as ideally possible alterations, and thus designate, as it were, ideal operations that can be thought of as carried out on every one. They can therefore be repeated *in infinitum*, and they can also be carried out on the modified experiences. Conversely,

from every lived experience that is already characterized as such a modification, and is then always characterized as such *in itself*, we are led back to certain primal lived experiences, to "*impressions*," which represent the *absolutely originary* lived experiences in the phenomenological sense. Thus *perceptions of things* are originary lived experiences in relation to all memories, presentifications of phantasy, and so on. They are as originary as concrete lived experiences can be at all. For, looked at closely, in their concreteness they have only [150] one—but also always one, continuously flowing—*absolutely originary phase*: the moment of the living now.

We can relate these modifications primarily to the actual lived experiences that are conscious without reflection. For it can be seen at once that all lived experiences that are reflectively conscious must *eo ipso* share in these primary modifications. As *reflections* on lived experiences, and taken in full concreteness, they are themselves lived experiences conscious without reflection, and as such they take on all the modifications. Now reflection itself is certainly a new kind of universal modification. It is this *directing* of the Ego toward its lived experiences, and, at one with it, the performing of acts of the *cogito* (in particular acts of the lowest, fundamental stratum, that of simple representations), "in" which the Ego directs itself to its *lived experiences*. But precisely the interweaving of reflection with intuitive or empty apprehensions, or rather graspings, means that the study of the reflective modification must necessarily be interwoven with the study of the modifications indicated above.

Only through reflectively experiencing acts do we know anything of the stream of lived experience and of its necessary relatedness to the pure Ego. Only through them do we know that the stream is a field in which *cogitationes* of one and the same pure Ego are freely performed, and that all the lived experiences of the stream are the Ego's own precisely insofar as the Ego can look at them or look "through them" at other things alien to the Ego. We convince ourselves that these experiences retain sense

and legitimacy even as *reduced* experiences. In general essential universality we grasp the *legitimacy* of experiences of this kind in general, just as, in parallel with this, we grasp the legitimacy of *seeings of essence* related to lived experiences in general.

Thus we grasp, for example, the *absolute legitimacy* of immanently *perceiving* reflection, i.e., of immanent perception simpliciter, with respect to what it brings, as it flows along, to actually originary givenness. Likewise we grasp the *absolute legitimacy of immanent retention* with respect to what is conscious in it with the character of the "still" living and the "just" having-been—but, admittedly, only as far as the content of what is so characterized extends. For example, with respect to its having been the perceiving of a tone and not of a color. Likewise we grasp the relative legitimacy of immanent recollection. It extends as far as the content of this memory, considered item by item, shows the genuine character of recollection (which by no means every moment of what is remembered does in general). This is a legitimacy that holds in just the same way for *every* [151] recollection. But admittedly it is merely a "relative" legitimacy, one that can be outweighed, however much it is legitimacy for all that. And so on.

We thus see with the most perfect clarity, and in the consciousness of unconditional validity, several things. It would be absurd to hold that lived experiences are cognitively secured only insofar as they are given in the reflecting consciousness of immanent perception, or even that they are secured only in the actual now of the moment. It would be wrong to doubt the having-been of what is found as "still" conscious when the regard turns back (in immediate retention). And it would be wrong, again, to doubt whether in the end the lived experiences that come into view are not, precisely by that, transformed into something *toto coelo* [utterly] different, and so on. The point here is simply not to let oneself be confused by arguments which, for all their formal precision, have never been measured against the primal sources of validity, those of pure intuition. The point is to remain true to the "principle of all principles": that perfect

clarity is the measure of all truth, and that statements which give faithful expression to what is given to them need not trouble themselves about any arguments, however fine.

§ 79. CRITICAL EXCURSUS. PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF "SELF-OBSERVATION"

Husserl answers H. J. Watt's doubts about reflection by showing that such skepticism refutes itself.

From the preceding accounts one can see that phenomenology is not affected by the methodological skepticism that, in a parallel way, has so often led in empirical psychology to denying, or inappropriately restricting, the value of inner experience. Recently H. J. Watt[9] has nonetheless believed he could maintain this skepticism against phenomenology. He has, *admittedly*, not grasped the peculiar sense of pure phenomenology, which the *Logical Investigations* tried to introduce, and has not seen how the purely phenomenological situation differs from the empirical-psychological one.[10] However related the difficulties on the two sides may be, it nonetheless makes a difference [152] which question is raised. On the one hand there is the question about the scope and the fundamental cognitive value of findings of *existence* that express the givens of our (human) inner experiences—that is, the question of psychological method. On the other hand there is the question of phenomenological method: the question about the fundamental possibility and scope of findings of *essence*, which, on the basis of pure reflection, are to

9 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. the second survey report, "Über die neueren Forschungen in der Gedächtnis- und *Assoziationspsychologie* aus dem Jahre 1905" [On Recent Research in the Psychology of Memory and *Association* from the Year 1905], *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, vol. IX (1907).—H. J. Watt engages exclusively with Th. Lipps. Although my name is not mentioned in this connection, I believe I may regard his criticism as directed against me as well. A large part of his summarizing accounts could just as well be related to my *Logical Investigations* (1900–01) as to the writings of Th. Lipps, which are later in date.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Theodor Lipps (1851–1914), German philosopher and psychologist at Munich, known above all for his theory of empathy.

10 Henry J. Watt (1879–1925), Scottish psychologist associated with the Würzburg school of experimental psychology of thought.

concern lived experiences as such, according to their own essence, free from the apperception of nature. Nevertheless there are inner relations between the two, indeed to a considerable extent congruences. These justify our taking account of Watt's objections, in particular of remarkable statements such as the following:

"One can hardly even venture conjectures about how one arrives at knowledge of immediate lived experiencing. For it is neither knowledge nor an object of knowledge, but something else. One cannot see how a report on the lived experiencing of lived experiencing, even if it is there, gets onto paper. Yet this is, after all, the ultimate question of the basic problem of self-observation. . . . Nowadays this absolute description is called phenomenology."

Reporting on Th. Lipps's[11] accounts, Watt then goes on: "The *known* reality of the objects of self-observation stands opposed to the reality of the present *Ego* and of the present lived experiences of consciousness. This reality is lived through [namely, merely lived through, not 'known,' i.e., reflectively grasped]. It is precisely thereby absolute reality. Now one may be of very different opinions," he then adds on his own account, "about what one can do with this absolute reality. . . . It is probably, after all, only a matter of results of self-observation. But if this is always a retrospective consideration, always a knowing of lived experiences just *had*, taken as objects, how is one to posit states of which one can have no knowledge, which are only conscious? The importance of the whole discussion turns on precisely this, namely on the derivation of the concept of immediate lived experiencing, which is not knowledge. One must be able to observe. Everyone, after all, lives through experiences. Only he does not know it. And if he knew it, how could he know that his lived experiencing really is absolutely as he thinks it is? From whose head may phenomenology spring fully formed into life? [153] Is a phenomenology possible, and in what sense? All these questions press themselves upon us. Perhaps a discussion of the

11 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Op. cit., p. 5.

question of self-observation from the standpoint of experimental psychology will throw new light on the field. For the problem of phenomenology is one that necessarily arises for experimental psychology as well.[12] Perhaps its answer will also be more cautious, since it lacks the zeal of the discoverer of phenomenology. In any case, by its very nature it has to rely more on an inductive method."[13]

A pious faith in the omnipotence of the inductive method speaks from these last lines, a faith Watt would hardly be able to hold to if he reflected on the conditions of the possibility of this method. Given that faith, one is admittedly surprised by his admission "that a functionally analyzing psychology will never be able to explain the fact of knowledge."[14]

Against these statements, which are characteristic of present-day psychology, we would first—precisely insofar as they are meant psychologically—have to bring to bear the above distinction between the psychological and the phenomenological question. In this regard we would have to stress the following. A phenomenological doctrine of essence has as little need to concern itself with the methods by which the phenomenologist might assure himself of the *existence* of the lived experiences that serve as a basis for his phenomenological findings as geometry has to concern itself with how the existence of the figures on the blackboard or of the models in the cabinet is to be methodically secured. Geometry and phenomenology, as sciences of pure essence, know no findings about real existence. It is precisely connected with this that clear fictions offer them bases that are not merely just as good as the givens of actual perception and experience but, to a great extent, better.

Now phenomenology has no findings about existence to make concerning lived experiences—and so no experiences and observations in the natural sense, the sense in which a science of facts must rely on such things. Even so, as a fundamental con-

12 Allusion to the myth of Athena, who sprang fully armed from the head of Zeus.
13 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Op. cit., p. 7.
14 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Op. cit., p. 12.

dition of its possibility, it does make findings of essence about unreflected lived experiences. But it owes these to reflection, more precisely to reflective intuition of essence. Consequently the skeptical [154] doubts regarding self-observation come into consideration for phenomenology as well. They do so insofar as these doubts can readily be extended from immanently experiencing reflection to every reflection whatever.[15]

Indeed, what would become of phenomenology if "one could not see how a report on the lived experiencing of lived experiencing, even if it is there, gets onto paper"? What would become of it if it were permitted to make statements about the essences of "known," reflected lived experiences, but not about the essences of lived experiences simpliciter? What would become of it if "one could hardly even venture conjectures about how one arrives at knowledge of immediate lived experiencing," or rather at knowledge of its essence? It may be that the phenomenologist has no findings about existence to make regarding the lived experiences that hover before him as examples for his ideations. Yet, one might object, in these ideations he sees only ideas of whatever he happens to have before his eyes in the example. As soon as his regard turns toward the lived experience, it only then becomes what it now presents itself to him as; as soon as he turns his regard away, it becomes something else. The essence grasped is only the essence of the reflected lived experience. The opinion that one can gain through reflection absolutely valid cognitions, holding for lived experiences in general, whether reflected or unreflected, is entirely unfounded. "How is one to be able to posit states"—even if only as essential possibilities—"of which one can have no knowledge?"

This evidently concerns every kind of reflection, although in phenomenology each one claims to count as a source of absolute cognitions. In phantasy a thing hovers before me—say, even a centaur. I think I know that it presents itself in certain "modes of appearance," in certain "sensation adumbrations," apprehensions, and the like. I think I have the essential insight here that

15 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above, § 70, p. 129 ff.

such an object can in general be intuited only in modes of appearance of this kind, only by means of such adumbrating functions and whatever else may play a role here. But while I have the centaur in view, I do not have its modes of appearance, its adumbrating data, its apprehensions in view; and in grasping its essence I do not grasp them and their essence. For that, certain reflective turnings of regard are needed, which, however, set the whole lived experience flowing and modify it. And so in the new ideation I have something new before my eyes and may not claim to have obtained essential components of the unreflected lived experience. I may not claim that it [155] belongs to the essence of a thing as such to present itself in "appearances," adumbrating itself, in the manner indicated, through sensation data that in turn undergo apprehensions, and so on.

The difficulty evidently also concerns the analyses of consciousness with respect to the "sense" of intentional lived experiences—with respect to everything that belongs to what is meant, to the intentionally objective as such, to the sense of a statement, and the like. For these too are analyses within reflections of a peculiar direction. Watt himself even goes so far as to say: "Psychology must make clear to itself that self-observation alters the relation to objects of the lived experiences to be described. Perhaps this alteration has a much greater significance than one is inclined to believe."[16] If Watt is right, then in establishing through self-observation that we were just now attending to this book here and still are, we would be asserting too much. That held at most before the reflection. But reflection alters the "lived experience to be described here," the lived experience of attention, and indeed (according to Watt) with respect to its relation to objects.

All genuine skepticism, of whatever kind and direction, betrays itself by a fundamental absurdity: in its arguments it implicitly presupposes, as conditions of the possibility of their validity, precisely what it denies in its theses. One convinces oneself without difficulty that this mark also fits the arguments

16 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Op. cit., p. 12.

under discussion. Whoever so much as says, "I doubt the cognitive significance of reflection," asserts an absurdity. For in making a statement about his doubting he reflects. And to put forward this statement as valid presupposes that reflection really and indubitably (*scilicet* [namely], in the cases at hand) has the cognitive value being doubted: that it does *not* alter the relation to objects, that the unreflected lived experience does *not* lose its essence in passing over into reflection.

Further: in the arguments there is constant talk of reflection as a fact, and of what it brings about or could bring about. With this there is naturally also talk of the "unknown," unreflected lived experiences, again as facts, namely as those out of which the reflected ones arise. Thus a *knowledge* of unreflected lived experiences, among them of unreflected reflections, is constantly presupposed, while at the same time the possibility of such knowledge is called into question. That [156] happens insofar as it is doubted whether one can establish *anything at all* about the content of the unreflected lived experience and about what reflection accomplishes: how far it alters the original lived experience, and whether it does not, so to speak, falsify it into something totally different.

But it is clear that, if this doubt and the possibility posited in it were legitimate, not the slightest legitimate ground would remain for the certainty that there is and can be any unreflected lived experience and any reflection at all. It is further clear that the latter, which was after all the constant presupposition, can only be known through reflection. As immediate knowledge, it can only be grounded through reflective giving intuition. The same holds for the assertion of the actuality or possibility of the modifications that follow upon reflection. But if something of this kind is given through intuition, then it is given in an intuitional content. Hence it is absurd to assert that there is nothing knowable here at all—nothing concerning the content of the unreflected lived experience and the kind of modifications it undergoes.

That suffices to make the absurdity plain. Here as everywhere, skepticism loses its force once we go back from verbal arguments to the intuition of essence, to originarily giving intuition and its very own legitimacy. Admittedly, everything depends on actually performing this intuition and on being able to bring oneself to raise what is in question into the light of genuine essential clarity—or, as the case may be, to take up accounts such as those we attempted in the previous section as intuitively as they were carried out and offered.

The phenomena of reflection are in fact a sphere of pure and, in some cases, perfectly clear givens. It is an *essential insight*, attainable at any time because immediate, that from what is objectively given as such a reflection is *possible* on the giving consciousness and its subject. Such a reflection is possible from the perceived, what is "there" in person, to the perceiving; from the remembered, just as it "hovers before us" as such, as "having been," to the remembering; from the statement, in its unfolding givenness, to the stating, and so on. In this, the perceiving comes to givenness as the perceiving of precisely this perceived, and each consciousness as consciousness of precisely what is in each case conscious. It is evident that something like consciousness and the content of consciousness (in the really inherent or the intentional sense) can be known [157] only through reflections of this kind—and that this holds essentially, and so not for merely contingent reasons, such as merely "for us" and our contingent "psychophysical constitution." Even God, then, is bound to this absolute and insightful necessity, just as he is bound to the insight that $2 + 1 = 1 + 2$. He too could gain cognition of his consciousness and its content only reflectively.[17]

This also implies that reflection cannot be entangled in any antinomical conflict with the ideal of perfect cognition. Every kind of being—we have already had to stress this several times—

17 HUSSERL'S NOTE. We are not by any means carrying the dispute over into the domain of theology here. The idea of God is a necessary limit-concept in epistemological considerations, or rather an indispensable index for the construction of certain limit-concepts which even the philosophizing atheist could not do without.

essentially has its modes of givenness, and thereby its modes of cognitive method. To treat essential peculiarities of these as defects, or even to charge them to "our human" cognition as contingent, factual defects, is an absurdity. A different question, but one likewise to be weighed in essential insight, is that of the possible "scope" of the cognition in question. That is the question of how we are to guard against statements that go beyond what is actually given in each case and can be grasped eidetically. And yet another is the question of *empirical* methodology: how we human beings, say as psychologists, are to proceed under the given psychophysical circumstances in order to lend our human cognitions the highest possible dignity.

For the rest, it must be stressed that our repeated recourse to insight (evidence, or intuition) is, here as everywhere, not a mere phrase. In the sense of the introductory Part, it means going back to what is ultimate in all cognition—exactly as when one speaks of insight in the case of the most primitive logical and arithmetical axioms. But whoever has learned to grasp with insight what is [158] given in the sphere of consciousness can only read with astonishment statements like the one already quoted above: "One can venture no conjectures about how one *arrives* at knowledge of immediate lived experiencing." From this one can only infer how alien immanent essential analysis still is to modern psychology—even though it is the only possible method for

fixing the concepts that *have* to function as determinative in all immanent psychological description.[1][18][19]

In the problems of reflection discussed here, the intimate connection between phenomenology and psychology makes itself particularly felt. Every description of essence relating to kinds of lived experience expresses an unconditionally valid norm for possible empirical existence. In particular, this naturally also concerns all the kinds of lived experience that are themselves constitutive for psychological method, as all modes of inner experience are. Thus [159] phenomenology is the court of appeal for the basic methodological questions of psychology. What it has established in general terms, the psychologist must acknowledge, and where appropriate draw upon, as a condition of the possibility of all his further methodology. Whatever con-

18 HUSSERL'S NOTE. While this is in press, I read in Th. Ziehen's just-published *Erkenntnistheorie auf psychophysiologischer und physikalischer Grundlage* [Theory of Knowledge on a Psychophysiological and Physical Basis] a characteristic remark about that suspect so-called "intuition or evidence . . . which has two main properties. First, it changes from philosopher to philosopher, or from school of philosophers to school of philosophers; and second, it likes to turn up especially when the author happens to be presenting *a very doubtful point of his doctrine*; we are then to be *kept from doubts by a bluff*." As is clear from the context, this criticism concerns the doctrine of "universal objects" or "essences," and of the intuition of essence, carried out in the *Logical Investigations*. Ziehen then continues: "In order to distinguish these supra-empirical concepts from the common rabble of ordinary concepts, people have then often also ascribed to them a special universality, absolute exactness, and so on. I consider all this to be human presumption!" (op. cit., p. 413). No less characteristic of this theory of knowledge is the remark on p. 441, which relates to the intuitive grasp of the Ego (but is probably meant by the author to hold more generally): "I could conceive of only one real authentication for such a primary intuition: the agreement of all sensing and thinking individuals in establishing such an intuition."—That the appeal to "intuition" has quite often been abused is, of course, not to be denied. The only question is whether this abuse of an alleged intuition could be exposed otherwise than through *actual* intuition. In the sphere of experience, too, a great deal of abuse is committed by appealing to experience. Things would be in a bad way if for that reason one wanted to call experience in general a "bluff" and make its "authentication" depend on "the agreement of all sensing and thinking individuals in establishing such 'experience.'" Cf. on this the second chapter of Part One of this work.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Theodor Ziehen (1862–1950), German psychiatrist and philosopher; the book appeared in 1913.

19 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. my essay in *Logos* I, pp. 302–322.

flicts with it is the mark of *fundamental psychological absurdity*, exactly as in the physical sphere every conflict with the truths of geometry and the truths of the ontology of nature in general is the hallmark of *fundamental natural-scientific absurdity*.[20]

A fundamental absurdity of this kind is accordingly expressed in the hope of overcoming the skeptical doubts about the possibility of self-observation through *psychological induction*, by the paths of experimental psychology. The situation is again just as if, in the domain of the cognition of physical nature, one wanted to overcome the parallel skepticism by means of experimental physics—the skepticism, that is, about whether in the end every external perception might not deceive (since in fact each one, taken singly, could deceive). Yet experimental physics presupposes the legitimacy of external perception at every step.

For the rest, what has been said here in general terms is to gain in force through everything that follows, in particular through the clarifications concerning the range of reflective essential insights. The relations touched on here between phenomenology (or rather the eidetic psychology, which is here provisionally not yet distinguished from it and is in any case intimately bound up with it) and empirical-scientific psychology are also, together with all the deep problems belonging to them, to be clarified in the second Book of this work. I am certain that in the not too distant future the following conviction

20 HUSSERL'S NOTE. The two essays by H. Messer and J. Cohn, which likewise reached me while this was in press (in the first volume of the *Jahrbücher der Philosophie*, edited by Frischeisen-Köhler), show once again how little even thorough researchers manage to free themselves from the spell of the prevailing prejudices. For all their sympathy with phenomenological endeavors, they do not manage to grasp the distinctive character of phenomenology as a *doctrine of essence*. Both of them, and Messer in particular (also in his earlier critical remarks in the *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* XXII), have misunderstood the sense of my accounts—so much so that the doctrines attacked there as mine are by no means mine. I hope that the more detailed accounts of the present work will no longer allow misunderstandings of this kind to arise.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. August Messer (1867–1937) and Jonas Cohn (1869–1947), German philosophers; Max Frischeisen-Köhler (1878–1923) edited the *Jahrbücher der Philosophie* (1913).

will be common property: that phenomenology (or eidetic psychology) is the methodologically fundamental science for empirical psychology in the same sense in which the material mathematical disciplines (for example geometry and phoronomy) are fundamental for physics.

The old ontological doctrine that *the cognition of "possibilities" must precede that of actualities* is, in my opinion, a great truth—provided it is rightly understood and put to use in the right way.

§ 80. THE RELATION OF LIVED EXPERIENCES TO THE PURE EGO

Every act issues from a pure Ego that cannot be reduced away but has no content of its own.

Among the universal essential peculiarities of the transcendentally purified domain of lived experience, the first place really belongs to the relation of every lived experience to the "pure" Ego. Every "*cogito*," [160] every act in a distinguished sense, is characterized as an act of the Ego: it proceeds from the Ego, and the Ego actually "lives" in it. We have already spoken of this, and we recall what was set out earlier in a few sentences.

Observing, I perceive something. In the same way, in memory, I am often "busied" with something. Quasi-observing, I follow in fictive phantasy the goings-on in the phantasied world. Or I think things over, I draw inferences; I take back a judgment, perhaps *abstaining* from judgment altogether. I perform a liking or disliking, I am glad or sad, I wish, or I will and act; or else I "abstain" from joy, from the wish, from volition and action. In all such acts I am present, *actually* present. Reflecting, I apprehend myself in them as the human being.

But if I carry out the phenomenological *epoché*, then "I, the human being," like the whole world of the natural thesis, falls under the exclusion, and what remains behind is the pure lived experience of the act with its own essence. But I also see two further things. Apprehending this experience as a human lived experience, quite apart from the thesis of existence, brings in all sorts of things that need not necessarily be there. And on the

other hand, no exclusion can annul the form of the *cogito* and strike out the "pure" subject of the act. "Being directed toward," "being busied with," "taking a position on," "experiencing," "suffering from" *necessarily* harbor in their essence this: that each is precisely something "from the Ego" toward its object or, in the reverse ray of direction, "toward the Ego"—and this Ego is the *pure* Ego; no reduction can touch it.

So far we have spoken of lived experiences of the special type "*cogito*." The remaining lived experiences, which form the general milieu for the actuality of the Ego, admittedly lack the distinctive relatedness to the Ego that we have just discussed. And yet they too have their share in the pure Ego, and the pure Ego in them. They "belong" to it as "its own"; they are its background of consciousness, its field of freedom.

Yet for all these peculiar interweavings with all "its" lived experiences, the experiencing Ego is nothing that could be taken by itself and made into an object of investigation *in its own right*. Apart from its "modes of relation" or "modes of comportment," it is entirely empty of essential components. It has no explicable content whatever; it is in and for itself indescribable: pure Ego and nothing further.

[161] It nonetheless gives occasion for a manifold of important descriptions, namely with regard to the particular ways in which it is the experiencing Ego in the respective kinds or modes of lived experience. In this, despite their necessary relatedness to each other, the *lived experience itself* and the *pure* Ego of the experiencing must always be distinguished. And again: the *purely subjective* element of the *mode of experiencing* must be distinguished from the rest of the content of the lived experience, the content that is, so to speak, *turned away from the Ego*. There is thus a certain, extraordinarily important two-sidedness in the essence of the sphere of lived experience. We can also express it by saying that in lived experiences a *subjectively oriented* side and an *objectively oriented* side are to be distinguished. This way of speaking must not be misunderstood, as if we were teaching that the possible "object" of the lived experi-

ence is something in the lived experience analogous to the pure Ego. The way of speaking will nevertheless justify itself. And we add at once that, at least over considerable stretches, this two-sidedness corresponds to a division of investigations (though not a real separation). Some are oriented toward pure subjectivity, the others toward what belongs to the "constitution" of objectivity for subjectivity. We shall have much to say about the "intentional relation" of lived experiences (or of the pure experiencing Ego) to objects, and about various components of lived experience and "intentional correlates" connected with it. But such things can be investigated and described, analytically or synthetically, in comprehensive investigations without our occupying ourselves in any deeper way with the pure Ego and its modes of participation in them. We must, of course, often touch on the pure Ego, insofar as it is precisely something that is necessarily there with it all.

The meditations that we intend to carry out in the rest of this Part will chiefly concern the objectively oriented side, as the side that first presents itself when we start from the natural attitude. The problems indicated in the introductory § of this Part already point to it.

§ 81. PHENOMENOLOGICAL TIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME

Lived experiences flow in an immeasurable time of their own, with its now, retentions and protentions.

Phenomenological time, as a universal peculiarity of all lived experiences, requires a discussion of its own.

Careful note must be taken of the difference between this *phenomenological time*, this unitary form of all lived experiences in *one* stream of lived experience (that of one pure Ego), and "*objective*," i.e., *cosmic time*.

[162] Through the phenomenological reduction, consciousness has lost not only its apperceptive "attachment" to material reality (which is admittedly an image) and its inclusion, albeit secondary, in space, but also its place in cosmic time. The time that

belongs essentially to lived experience as such has its modes of givenness: the now, the before, the after, and the simultaneity, succession, and so on that are modally determined through them. This time cannot be measured by any position of the sun, by any clock, by any physical means—it cannot be measured at all.

Cosmic time stands to phenomenological time in a way that is, in a certain respect, analogous to the way the "spread" belonging to the immanent *essence* of a concrete sensation content (say a visual one in the field of visual sensation data) stands to objective spatial "extension"—namely, the extension of the physical object that appears and visually "adumbrates" itself in this sensation datum. It would be absurd to bring a sensation moment, such as color or spread, under the same essential genus as the thingly moment that adumbrates itself through it, such as the thing's color and the thing's extension. The same holds for the phenomenologically temporal and the world-temporal. Transcendent time can present itself, by way of appearance, in the lived experience and its moments. But in principle it makes no sense here, as elsewhere, to suppose a pictorial likeness between what presents and what is presented—a likeness which, as likeness, would presuppose sameness of essence.

For the rest, we do not mean to say that the way in which cosmic time manifests itself in phenomenological time is exactly the same as the way in which other, material essential moments of the world present themselves phenomenologically. The self-exhibition of colors and other sensuous qualities of things (in the corresponding sense data of the sense fields) is certainly essentially different in kind; and different again is the self-adumbration of the spatial shapes of things in the forms of spread within the sensation data. But in what was set out above there is commonality throughout.

Time, moreover, as will emerge from the investigations that follow later, is a heading for a completely *self-contained sphere of problems*, and one of exceptional difficulty. It will turn out that our account thus far has, in a certain sense, kept silent about a

whole dimension, and necessarily had to keep silent about it. This was needed to keep unconfused what is at first visible only in the phenomenological attitude and what, without regard [163] to the new dimension, makes up a closed domain of investigation. The transcendental "absolute" that we have laid bare through the reductions is in truth not what is ultimate. It is something that constitutes itself in a certain profound and completely unique sense, and has its primal source in something ultimately and truly absolute.

Fortunately we can leave the enigmas of time-consciousness[21] out of play in our preparatory analyses without endangering their rigor. We merely touch on them in the following sentences:

The essential property that the heading "temporality" expresses for lived experiences in general designates not only something belonging universally to each single lived experience, but a *necessary form binding lived experiences to lived experiences*. Every *actual* lived experience (we carry out this evidence on the basis of the clear intuition of an actuality of lived experience) is necessarily an enduring one. With this duration it takes its place in an endless continuum of durations—a *filled* continuum. It necessarily has a temporal horizon that is infinite on all sides and filled. This means at the same time: it belongs to *one* endless "*stream of lived experience*." Every single lived experience, such as a lived experience of joy, can begin, and it can likewise end and thereby conclude its duration. But the stream of lived experience cannot begin and end. Every lived experience, as temporal being, is a lived experience of its pure Ego. To this there necessarily belongs the possibility (which, as we know, is no empty logical possibility) that the Ego directs its pure Ego-regard to this lived experience and grasps it as actually existing, or as enduring in phenomenological time.

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21 HUSSERL'S NOTE. The author's efforts in this regard, which were long in vain, came essentially to a conclusion in 1905, and their results were communicated in lectures at the University of Göttingen.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. This material was later published as Husserl's *Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (1928), edited by Martin Heidegger.

But again there belongs to the *essence* of the situation the possibility that the Ego directs its regard to the temporal *mode of givenness* and recognizes with evidence (as all of us do in fact attain this evidence, living through in intuition what is described) that no enduring lived experience is possible unless it constitutes itself, in a continuous flow of modes of givenness, as the unity of the process or of the duration. The Ego can further recognize that this mode of givenness of the temporal lived experience is itself in turn a lived experience, albeit of a new kind and dimension. [164] For example, I can first have in pure regard the joy itself, which begins and ends and endures in between; I go along with its temporal phases. But I can also attend to its mode of givenness: to the respective mode of the "now." I can attend to the fact that to this now, and in principle to every now, a new and continually new now attaches in necessary continuity; and that at one with this every actual now changes into a just-now, the just-now again and continuously into ever new just-nows of just-nows, and so on. And so for every newly attached now.

The actual now is necessarily something punctual and remains so: an *abiding form for ever new matter*. The same holds for the continuity of "*just-nows*"; it is a *continuity of forms* of ever new content. This means at the same time: the enduring lived experience of joy is given, in terms of consciousness, in a continuum of consciousness of constant form. One phase is impression, as the limit phase of a continuity of retentions. These retentions, however, do not stand on an equal footing; they are to be related to one another *continuously and intentionally*—a continuous nesting of retentions of retentions. The form continually receives new content. Thus to every impression in which the now of the lived experience is given there continuously "attaches" a new one, corresponding to a continuously new point of the duration. The impression continuously changes into retention, this continuously into modified retention, and so on.

To this, however, must be added the opposite direction of the continuous changes: to the before corresponds the after, to the continuum of retentions a continuum of protentions.

§ 82. CONTINUATION. THE THREEFOLD HORIZON OF LIVED EXPERIENCE, ALSO AS THE HORIZON OF REFLECTION ON LIVED EXPERIENCE

Every now of lived experience has horizons of before, after and simultaneity in one stream.

But we recognize more here as well. *Every* now of lived experience, even that of the initial phase of a newly arising lived experience, necessarily has its *horizon of the before*. In principle, however, this cannot be an empty before, an empty form without content—that would be nonsense. It necessarily has the meaning of a past now, which in this form comprises a past something, a past *lived experience*. Every newly beginning lived experience has necessarily been preceded in time by lived experiences; the past of lived experience is continuously filled. But every now of lived experience also has its necessary *horizon of the after*, and this too is not an empty horizon. Every now of lived experience, even that [165] of the final phase of the duration of a ceasing lived experience, necessarily changes into a new now, and this new now is necessarily a filled one.

One can also put it this way: to the consciousness of the now there is necessarily attached the consciousness of the just-past, and this consciousness is itself in turn a now. *No lived experience can cease without consciousness of ceasing and of having ceased*, and that is a new, filled now. The stream of lived experience is an endless unity, and the form of the stream is a form *necessarily encompassing all the lived experiences of one pure Ego*, with various systems of forms.

We reserve the more detailed elaboration of these insights, and the demonstration of their great metaphysical consequences, for the future accounts we have announced.

The universal peculiarity of lived experiences just treated, as possible givens of reflecting (immanent) perception, is a com-

ponent of a still more comprehensive one. This is expressed in the *essential law* that every lived experience stands in an essentially self-contained nexus of lived experience, not only from the point of view of temporal *succession* but also from that of *simultaneity*. This means that every now of lived experience has a horizon of lived experiences that likewise have the originarity form of the "now." As such they make up the *one horizon of originarity of the pure Ego*, its whole originary now of consciousness.

This horizon enters as a unity into the modes of the past. Every before, as a modified now, implies, for each lived experience we fix our eye on and whose before it is, an endless horizon. This horizon embraces everything that belongs to the same modified now—in short, its horizon of the "simultaneously having-been." The descriptions given just now must therefore be supplemented by a new dimension. Only when we do this do we have the *whole* phenomenological field of time of the pure Ego, which the Ego can traverse from any one of "its" lived experiences along the three dimensions of before, after, and simultaneous. Only then do we have the *whole*, *essentially unitary*, and strictly self-contained *stream* of temporal unities of lived experience.

A pure Ego—and a stream of lived experience that is filled in all three dimensions, essentially coherent in this filling, and demanding itself in the continuity of its contents: these are necessary correlates.

§ 83. GRASPING THE UNITARY STREAM OF LIVED EXPERIENCE AS AN "IDEA"

The whole stream cannot be seen in one regard, but is grasped as an Idea in the Kantian sense.

166 The following stands, by essential law, in relation to this *primal form of consciousness*.

If the pure regard of the Ego, reflecting and indeed perceptually grasping, lights upon some lived experience or other, then there exists the a priori possibility of turning the regard to other

lived experiences, *as far as* this nexus reaches. In principle, however, this *whole* nexus is never something given, or to be given, through a single pure regard. Nonetheless it too can be grasped intuitively in a *certain* way, though in a way different in principle: namely, in the manner of the "*limitlessness in the progression*" *of immanent intuitions*, from the fixed lived experience to new lived experiences of its horizon of lived experience, from the fixing of these to the fixing of their horizons, and so on. Here, however, talk of a *horizon of lived experience* signifies not only the horizon of phenomenological temporality in the dimensions described above, but also differences between modes of givenness of a *new kind*. Accordingly, a lived experience that has become the object of a regard of the Ego, and so has the mode of being looked at, has its horizon of lived experiences that are not looked at. What is grasped in a mode of "attention," and possibly with increasing clarity, has a horizon of background inattention, with relative differences of clarity and obscurity, as well as of prominence and non-prominence. In this are rooted eidetic possibilities: of bringing what is not looked at into the pure regard; of making what is noticed incidentally into what is primarily noticed, what is not prominent into what is prominent, what is obscure into what is clear and ever clearer.[22]

In the continuous progression from grasping to grasping, then, we also grasp in a certain way, as I said, the *stream of lived experience as a unity*. We do not grasp it as we grasp a single lived experience, but in the manner of an Idea in the *Kantian sense*. It is not something posited and asserted at random, but something given with absolute indubitability—in a correspondingly broad sense of the word "givenness." This indubitability, though it too is founded on intuition, has quite a different source from the one that exists for the being of lived experiences, which, that is, come to pure givenness in immanent perception. This is precisely what is peculiar to the ideation that sees a Kantian *Idea*: it does not lose its insightful character just because the adequate

22 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Here, then, "horizon" means the same as the talk of a "halo" and a "background" in § 35, p. 62.

[167] determination of its content—here, of the stream of lived experience—is unattainable. We see at the same time that a series of distinguishable modes of givenness belongs to the stream of lived experience and to its components as such. Their systematic investigation will have to form one of the principal tasks of general phenomenology.

From our considerations we can also draw the eidetically valid and evident proposition that *no concrete lived experience can count as independent in the full sense*. Each one "needs completion" with respect to a nexus that is not arbitrary in its kind and form, but bound.

For example: if we consider some external perception or other—let us say this particular perception of a house—taken in its concrete fullness, then the surroundings of lived experience belong to it as a necessary determining component. But this is admittedly a peculiar component, necessary and yet *extra-essential*: one, namely, whose alteration changes nothing in the lived experience's *own* essential content. *As the determinateness of the surroundings changes, then, the perception itself changes,* while the lowest difference of the genus perception, its inner peculiarity, can be thought of as identical.

That two perceptions essentially identical in this peculiarity should also be identical with respect to the determinateness of their surroundings is impossible in principle: they would then be individually one perception.

At any rate, one can bring this to insight with respect to two perceptions—and so with respect to two lived experiences in general—that belong to *one* stream of lived experience. Every lived experience influences the (bright or dark) halo of the further lived experiences.

A closer consideration would show, moreover, that two *streams of lived experience* (spheres of consciousness for two pure Egos) *with identical essential content are unthinkable*; and also—as can already be seen from what has been said so far—that no *fully determinate* lived experience of the one could ever belong to the other. Only lived experiences of identical inner kind can be

common to them (though not held in common as individually identical), but never two lived experiences that, in addition, have an absolutely like "halo."

§ 84. INTENTIONALITY AS THE MAIN THEME OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Intentionality, being consciousness of something, characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense and the whole stream.

We now pass on to a peculiarity of lived experiences that can be designated outright as the general theme of "objectively" oriented [168] phenomenology: intentionality. It is an essential peculiarity of the sphere of lived experience in general inasmuch as all lived experiences share in intentionality in one way or another. Even so, we cannot say of *every* lived experience, in the same sense, that it has intentionality, in the way that we can say, for instance, of every lived experience that enters the regard of possible reflection as an object—even if it is an abstract moment of a lived experience—that it is temporal. It is intentionality that characterizes *consciousness* in the pregnant sense, and that justifies us in designating the whole stream of lived experience at once as a stream of consciousness and as the unity of *one* consciousness.

In the preparatory analyses of essence in Part Two, concerning consciousness in general, we already had to work out (while still before the entrance gate of phenomenology, and specifically for the purpose of reaching it by the method of reduction) a series of the most general determinations about intentionality in general and about what distinguishes the "act," the "*cogitatio*."[23] We have made use of these since then, and we were entitled to do so, although the original analyses had not yet been carried out under the explicit norm of the phenomenological reduction. For they concerned the pure proper essence of lived experiences; consequently they could not be affected by the exclusion of psychological apperception and of the positing of

23 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 36–38, pp. 64–69.

being. Since the task now is to discuss *intentionality* as *a comprehensive heading for pervasive phenomenological structures*, and to sketch the problems essentially related to these structures (so far as that is possible in a general introduction), we shall recapitulate what was said earlier—but elaborated in the form we need in order to further our present aims, which are directed quite differently.

By intentionality we understood the peculiarity of lived experiences of "being consciousness of something." We first encountered this wonderful peculiarity, to which all the riddles of the theory of reason and of metaphysics lead back, in the explicit *cogito*: a perceiving is a perceiving of something, say of a thing; a judging is a judging of a state of affairs; a valuing, of a value-situation; a wishing, of a wish-situation, and so on. Acting is directed at action, doing at deed, loving at what is loved, rejoicing at what is joyful, and so on. In every actual *cogito* a "regard" radiating from [169] the pure Ego is directed at the "object" of the respective correlate of consciousness, at the thing, the state of affairs and so on, and carries out the highly diverse kinds of consciousness of it. Now, however, phenomenological reflection taught us that this representing, thinking, valuing turning of the Ego toward something is not to be found in every lived experience—this *actual busying-oneself-with-the-correlative-object*, this being-directed-toward-it (or else away from it—and yet with the regard upon it)—even though the lived experience may harbor intentionality within it. Thus it is clear, for example, that the background of objects, from which the object perceived in the manner of the *cogito* stands out by receiving the distinguishing turning of the Ego toward it, really is, as lived, a background of *objects*. That is, while we are now turned toward the pure object in the mode "*cogito*," many objects nonetheless "appear"; they are intuitively "conscious," they flow together into the intuitive unity of a field of conscious objects. It is a *potential field of perception* in the sense that a particular perceiving (a noticing *cogito*) can turn toward anything that appears in this way. But it is not a potential field in the

sense that the sensation adumbrations present in lived experience—for example, the visual ones spread out in the unity of the visual field of sensation—lacked any objective apprehension, and that intuitive appearances of objects were first constituted at all only with the turning of the regard.

Further, lived experiences of the background of actuality belong here, of such kinds as "*stirrings*" *of liking*, stirrings of judgment, stirrings of wish and so on, at various degrees of remoteness in the background—or, as we can also say, of *remoteness from the Ego* and *nearness to the Ego*, since the actual pure Ego living in its respective *cogitationes* is the point of reference. A liking, a wishing, a judging and the like can be *performed* in the specific sense, namely by the Ego, which in this performance is vividly active (or, as in the *performance* of sorrow, actually "*suffers*"). But such modes of consciousness can also already be "*stirring*," emerging in the "background," without being "performed" in this way. By their own essence, these non-actualities are nonetheless already "consciousness of something." Accordingly, we did not include in the essence of intentionality what is specific to the *cogito*, the "regard-upon," or the turning of the Ego toward (which, incidentally, is still to be understood in several senses and investigated phenomenologically);[24] rather, we took [170] this cogitative element to be a particular modality of the universal that we call intentionality.

ON TERMINOLOGY

Husserl explains why phenomenological terms must remain fluid while the science is still beginning.

In the *Logical Investigations* precisely this universal is designated as "act-character," and every concrete lived experience having this character as an "act." The constant misinterpretations that this concept of act has undergone lead me (here, as in my lectures for a number of years now) to delimit the terminology somewhat more cautiously, and no longer to use the expressions

24 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 37, pp. 65 ff.

"act" and "intentional lived experience" as equivalent without precautions. It will emerge in what follows that my original concept of act is quite indispensable, but that it is necessary to take constant account of the modal difference between performed and non-performed acts.

Where no qualifier is added and acts are spoken of simply, only acts proper are to be meant: acts that are, so to speak, actual, performed.

For the rest, it should be remarked quite generally that in phenomenology at its beginnings all concepts, or terms, must in a certain way remain in flux, always on the point of differentiating themselves in step with the advances of the analysis of consciousness and with the recognition of new phenomenological strata within what was at first seen in undivided unity. All the terms chosen have their contextual tendencies; they point to directions of relation of which it often turns out afterward that they do not have their source in only *one* stratum of essence—from which it follows at the same time that the terminology had better be restricted or otherwise modified. Only at a very advanced stage of the development of the science, then, can one count on definitive terminologies. It is misleading and fundamentally wrong to apply the external, formal standards of a logic of terminology to scientific presentations that are only just working their way up, and to demand at the beginning terminologies of a kind in which only the concluding results of great scientific developments are fixed. For the beginning, any expression is good—and in particular any aptly chosen figurative expression—that is capable of directing our regard to a clearly graspable phenomenological occurrence. Clarity does not exclude a certain halo of indeterminacy. Its further determination, or clarification, is precisely the further task, as is, on the other hand, the inner analysis to be carried out through comparisons [171] or through changes of context: the decomposition into components or strata. But there are those who, not content with the intuitive demonstrations offered, demand "definitions" as in the "exact" sciences; or who believe that, with phenomenolo-

gical concepts supposedly established as fixed on the basis of a few crude sample analyses, they can operate freely in a non-intuitive scientific thinking and thereby advance phenomenology. Such people are still such beginners that they have not grasped the essence of phenomenology and the method it requires in principle.

What has been said holds no less for empirically oriented psychological phenomenology, in the sense of a description of psychological phenomena that binds itself to what is immanently essential.

The concept of intentionality, taken in the indeterminate breadth in which we have taken it, is a quite indispensable starting concept and fundamental concept at the beginning of phenomenology. The universal it designates may, before closer investigation, be ever so vague; it may appear in ever so great a multiplicity of essentially different formations; it may be ever so difficult to bring out, in rigorous and clear analysis, what really constitutes the pure essence of intentionality, which components of the concrete formations really bear it within them, and to which it is inwardly foreign. In any case, lived experiences are considered from a definite and highly important point of view when we recognize them as intentional and state of them that they are consciousness of something. In making such a statement, incidentally, it is a matter of indifference to us whether concrete lived experiences or abstract strata of lived experience are in question: for these too can exhibit the peculiarity in question.

§ 85. SENSUOUS HYLE, INTENTIONAL MORPHE

Lived experience divides into sensuous matter and the sense-giving noetic stratum that animates it.

We already intimated above (when we designated the stream of lived experience as a unity of consciousness) that intentionality, apart from its enigmatic forms and levels, also resembles a universal medium that ultimately bears within it all lived experi-

ences, even those that are not themselves characterized as intentional. At the level of consideration to which we are bound until further notice, however, we must distinguish in principle. This level refrains from descending into the dark depths of the ultimate consciousness that constitutes all the temporality of lived experience, and instead accepts lived experiences as they present themselves in immanent reflection, as unitary temporal processes. We must distinguish:

172 1. all the lived experiences that were designated in the *Logical Investigations* as "primary contents";[25]

2. the lived experiences, or moments of lived experience, that bear within them what is specific to intentionality.

To the former belong certain "*sensuous*" lived experiences, unitary as regards their highest genus: "*sensation contents*" such as color data, touch data, sound data and the like. We shall no longer confuse these with the appearing moments of things—coloredness, roughness and so on—which, rather, *present* themselves in lived experience by means of them. Likewise the sensuous sensations of pleasure, pain, tickling and so on, and presumably also sensuous moments of the sphere of the "drives." We find such concrete data of lived experience as components in more comprehensive concrete lived experiences that are intentional as wholes; and indeed in such a way that over those sensuous moments lies a stratum that, as it were, "animates" and *gives sense* (or essentially implies sense-giving)—a stratum through which, out of the *sensuous, which in itself has nothing of intentionality*, the concrete intentional lived experience comes about.

Whether such sensuous lived experiences in the stream of lived experience everywhere and necessarily bear some "animating apprehension" or other (with everything that this in turn demands and makes possible by way of characteristics)—or, as we also say, whether they always stand in *intentional functions*—

25 HUSSERL'S NOTE. *Logical Investigations* II/1, Sixth Investigation, § 58, p. 652; the concept of primary content is, incidentally, already to be found in my *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, 1891, p. 72 and elsewhere.

is not to be decided here. On the other hand, we also leave open for the moment whether the characteristics that essentially establish intentionality can have concreteness without sensuous substrata.

In any case, this remarkable duality and unity of *sensuous hyle and intentional morphe* plays a dominant role in the whole phenomenological domain (in the whole of it—within the level of constituted temporality, to which we must keep throughout). Indeed, these concepts of matter and form positively force themselves upon us when we presentify to ourselves any clear intuitions, or clearly performed valuations, acts of liking, volitions and the like. The intentional lived experiences stand there as unities through sense-giving (in a very broadened sense). Sensory data give themselves as matters for intentional formings, or sense-givings, of various levels, simple ones and peculiarly [173] founded ones, as we shall discuss more closely. How apt these ways of speaking are will be confirmed from yet another side by the doctrine of "correlates."[26] As for the possibilities left open above, they would thus have to be entitled *formless matters* and *matterless forms*.[1]

In terminological respects, let the following be added. The expression "primary content" no longer seems to us sufficiently apt. On the other hand, the expression "sensory lived experience" is unusable for the same concept. The general talk of sensory perceptions, sensory intuitions in general, sensory joy and the like stands in its way, since there not merely hyletic but intentional lived experiences are called sensory. And obviously talk of "mere" or *pure* sensory lived experiences would not improve matters either, because of its new ambiguities. Added to this are the ambiguities proper to the word "sensory," which are preserved in the phenomenological reduction. Apart from the double meaning that emerges in the contrast between "sense-giving" and "sensory"—which, disturbing as it sometimes is, can hardly be avoided any longer—the following should be

26 *Hyle* and *morphe*: Greek for "matter" (stuff) and "form," the Aristotelian pair that Husserl adapts; hence "hyletic."

mentioned. Sensibility in a narrower sense designates the phenomenological residue of what is mediated by the "senses" in normal external perception. After the reduction, an essential kinship shows itself among the relevant "sensory" data of external intuitions, and to it there corresponds a distinctive generic essence, or a fundamental concept of phenomenology. In the wider sense, however—one that is unitary in essence—sensibility also includes the sensory feelings and drives, which have their own generic unity and, on the other hand, presumably also an essential kinship of a general kind with those sensibilities in the narrower sense. All this is apart from the community that is, in addition, expressed by the *functional* concept of hyle. The two together compelled the old transfer of the originally narrower talk of sensibility to the sphere of feeling and will—namely, to the intentional lived experiences in which sensory data of the spheres indicated occur as functioning "matters." In any case, then, we need a new term that expresses the whole group through the unity of function and the contrast with the forming characteristics; and for this we choose the expression *hyletic* or *material data*, or simply *matters*. Where the aim is to recall the old expressions, unavoidable in their way, we say *sensuous*, or also *sensory matters*.

[174] What forms the matters into intentional lived experiences and brings in what is specific to intentionality is precisely the same as what gives talk of consciousness its specific sense—the sense according to which consciousness *eo ipso* points to something of which it is consciousness. Now talk of moments of consciousness, of consciousnesses and all similar formations, and likewise talk of intentional moments, is quite unusable because of manifold equivocations that will emerge clearly later on. We therefore introduce the term *noetic moment* or, more briefly, *noesis*.[27] These noeses make up what is specific to *nous* in the *widest sense* of the word. In all its actual forms of life, *nous* leads us back to *cogitationes* and then to intentional lived experiences

27 *Noesis*: from Greek, "thinking, apprehending" (from *nous*, "mind"); Husserl's term for the sense-giving, act side of a lived experience.

in general, and thus encompasses everything (and essentially only that) which is the *eidetic presupposition of the idea of the norm*. At the same time it is not unwelcome that the word *nous* recalls one of its distinguished meanings, namely precisely "sense"—even though the "sense-giving" carried out in the noetic moments comprises many things, and includes only as a foundation a "sense-giving" that attaches to the pregnant concept of sense.[28]

There would also be good reason to designate this noetic side of lived experiences as the *psychic* side. For in speaking of *ψυχή* [soul] and the psychic, philosophical psychologists directed their regard with a certain preference to what intentionality brings in, while the sensory moments were ascribed to the living body and its sense activities. This old tendency finds its most recent expression in Brentano's division between "psychic" and "physical" phenomena. It is particularly significant because it broke the path for the development of phenomenology—although Brentano himself still remained far from phenomenological ground, and although with his division he did not hit upon the one he was really seeking: namely, the division between the fields of experience of the physical natural sciences and of psychology.[29] What concerns us here in particular is only this. Brentano did not yet find the concept of the material moment—and this was because he did not take account of the fundamental distinction between "physical phenomena" as material moments (sensation data) and "physical phenomena" as the objective moments that appear in the noetic grasping of the former (the thing's color, the thing's shape and the like). On the other hand, however, he characterized the [175] concept of "psychic phenomenon," in one of its delimiting determinations, by the peculiarity of intentionality. In doing so he brought the "psychic," in that distinguished sense which had a certain

28 Greek *nous*, "mind, intellect," can also mean the "sense" or meaning of something.

29 Franz Brentano (1838–1917), Husserl's teacher in Vienna; in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) he characterized psychic phenomena by their intentional relation to an object.

emphasis, though no demarcation, in the historical meaning of the word, into the field of vision of our time.

What speaks against using the word as an equivalent for intentionality, however, is the circumstance that it is undoubtedly not acceptable to designate in the same way the psychic in this sense and the psychic in the sense of the psychological (that is, of what is the peculiar object of psychology). Moreover, with regard to this latter concept we also have an unwelcome double meaning, which has its source in the well-known tendency toward a "psychology without a soul." Connected with this tendency is the fact that, under the heading of the psychic—especially the actually psychic, as opposed to the corresponding "psychic dispositions"—one prefers to think of the lived experiences in the unity of the empirically posited stream of lived experience. Now, however, it is unavoidable to designate the real bearers of this psychic element—animal beings, or[30] their "souls" and their real properties of soul—as psychic too, or as objects of psychology. The "psychology without a soul" confuses, as it would seem to us, the exclusion of the soul-entity in the sense of some nebulous metaphysics of the soul with the exclusion of the soul altogether, that is, of the psychic reality factually given in empirical experience, whose *states* are the lived experiences. This reality is by no means the mere stream of lived experience, bound to the living body and empirically regulated in certain ways, regulations for which the dispositional concepts are mere indices. But be that as it may, the existing ambiguities, and above all the circumstance that the predominant concepts of the psychic are not directed at the specifically intentional, make the word unusable for us.

We shall therefore stay with the word *noetic* and say:

The stream of phenomenological being has a *material* stratum and a noetic stratum.

Phenomenological considerations and analyses that are directed specifically at the material can be called *hyletic-phenomen-*

30 The phrase "psychology without a soul" is associated with Friedrich Albert Lange's *History of Materialism* (1866).

ological, just as, on the other hand, those relating to noetic moments can be called *noetic-phenomenological*. The incomparably more important and richer analyses lie on the side of the noetic.

§ 86. THE FUNCTIONAL PROBLEMS

The greatest problems concern how noeses constitute objective unities in consciousness; hence "transcendental" phenomenology.

[176] But the very greatest problems are the *functional problems*, or those of the "*constitution of the objectivities of consciousness*." They concern the way in which—for example, with regard to nature—noeses, animating the material and interweaving themselves into *manifold-unitary* continua and syntheses, bring about consciousness of something in such a way that objective unity of objectivity can harmoniously "make itself known" and "prove itself" in it, and can be "rationally" determined.

"*Function*" in this sense (totally different from the sense it has in mathematics) is something quite unique, grounded in the pure *essence* of the noeses. Consciousness is precisely consciousness "of" something; it is its essence to harbor within itself "sense," the quintessence, so to speak, of "soul," "spirit," "reason." Consciousness is not a heading for "psychic complexes," for "contents" fused together, for "bundles" or streams of "sensations" which, senseless in themselves, could not yield any "sense" even in any mixture whatever. Rather, it is through and through "consciousness," the source of all reason and unreason, all right and wrong, all reality and fiction, all value and disvalue, all deed and misdeed. Consciousness is thus *toto coelo* [utterly] different from what sensualism alone wants to see: from matter that is in fact senseless in itself, irrational—but, to be sure, accessible to rationalization. What this rationalization means we shall soon learn to understand still better.

The point of view of function is the central one in phenomenology. The investigations radiating from it encompass more or less the whole phenomenological sphere, and ultimately all phe-

nomenological analyses enter its service in some way, as components or subordinate levels. In place of analysis and comparison, description and classification, that cling to single lived experiences, there comes the consideration of particulars from the teleological point of view of their function: that of making synthetic unity possible. The consideration turns to the manifolds of consciousness that are, as it were, *prefigured* essentially in the lived experiences themselves, in their sense-givings, in their noeses in general, and that can, as it were, be drawn out of them: thus, for example, in the sphere of experience and of empirical thinking, to the multiform continua of consciousness and the discrete connections of conscious lived experiences, which are joined within themselves by belonging together in sense—by the consciousness that unitarily encompasses the one and selfsame objective something, appearing now [177] in this way, now in that, giving itself intuitively or determining itself in thought. It seeks to investigate how the selfsame—how objective unities of every kind, not really inherent in consciousness—are "conscious," "meant"; how formations of consciousness of very different and yet essentially required structure belong to the identity of what is meant; and how these formations would have to be described with methodical rigor. And further, it seeks to investigate how—corresponding to the double heading "reason" and "unreason"—unity of objectivity of every objective region and category can and must, by way of consciousness, "confirm" and "disconfirm" itself; how it can and must be determined in the forms of thinking consciousness, be *more closely* determined or determined "otherwise," or be discarded entirely as "null" "semblance." Connected with this are all the distinctions under the trivial and yet so enigmatic headings "actuality" and "semblance," "true" reality, "semblance-reality," "true" values, "semblance-values and disvalues" and so on, whose phenomenological clarification follows on here.

In the most comprehensive universality, then, the task is to investigate how objective unities of every region and category "are constituted in consciousness." The task is to show systemat-

ically how, through their *essence*, all the nexuses of actual and possible consciousness of them are prefigured—precisely as essential possibilities: the simple or founded intuitions intentionally related to them, the formations of thought of lower and higher level, the confused or clear, the expressed or unexpressed, the prescientific and the scientific, up to the highest formations of rigorous theoretical science. All the fundamental kinds of possible consciousness, and the modifications, fusions and syntheses essentially belonging to them, are to be studied systematically in eidetic universality and phenomenological purity, and brought to insight. It must be shown how, through their *own* essence, they prefigure all possibilities of being (and impossibilities of being); how, according to absolutely fixed essential laws, an existing object is the correlate of nexuses of consciousness of quite determinate essential content, just as, conversely, the being of nexuses so constituted is equivalent to an existing object—and all this always with reference to all regions of being and all levels of universality, down to the concreteness of being.

In its purely eidetic attitude, which excludes transcendencies of every kind, phenomenology necessarily arrives, on its own [178] ground of pure consciousness, at this whole complex of *transcendental problems in the specific sense*; and *that is why* it deserves the name *transcendental phenomenology*. On its own ground it must come not to consider lived experiences like arbitrary dead things, like "complexes of content" that merely are but signify nothing, mean nothing—in terms of elements and complex-formations, of classes and subclasses. It must rather take hold of the *set of problems, unique in principle,* that they offer as *intentional lived experiences*, and offer *purely through their eidetic essence*: as "*consciousness-of*."

Pure hyletics is naturally subordinate to the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness. It has, moreover, the character of a self-contained discipline, and as such has its value in itself; on the other hand, from the functional point of view it has significance by supplying possible weft for the intentional fabric, pos-

sible matters for intentional formings. Not only as regards difficulty, but also as regards the rank of its problems from the standpoint of the idea of an absolute knowledge, it obviously stands far below noetic and functional phenomenology (which, incidentally, cannot really be separated).

We now proceed to more detailed treatments in a series of chapters.

REMARK

Husserl distinguishes his terms from Carl Stumpf's "functions" and "appearances".

Stumpf uses the word "function," in the combination "psychic function," in his important Berlin Academy treatises,[31] in contrast to what he calls "appearance." The distinction is meant as a psychological one, and it then coincides with our contrast (only turned toward the psychological) between "acts" and "primary contents." It should be noted that the terms in question have a completely different meaning in our presentations than they have for that esteemed researcher. Superficial readers of the writings on both sides have more than once confused Stumpf's concept of phenomenology (as the doctrine of "appearances") with ours.[32] Stumpf's phenomenology would correspond to what was defined above as hyletics, except that our definition, in its methodical [179] sense, is essentially conditioned by the comprehensive framework of transcendental phenomenology. On the other hand, the idea of hyletics carries over *eo ipso* from phenomenology to the ground of an eidetic psychology, under which, on our view, Stumpf's "phenomenology" would be classed.

31 HUSSERL'S NOTE. C. Stumpf, "Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen" [Appearances and Psychic Functions] (pp. 4 ff.) and "Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften" [On the Classification of the Sciences]: both in the *Abh. d. Kgl. Preuß. Akademie d. Wissensch.* [Treatises of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences] for the year 1906.

32 Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), psychologist and philosopher in Berlin and a pupil of Brentano; Husserl dedicated the *Logical Investigations* to him.

CHAPTER THREE. NOESIS AND NOEMA. § 87. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Consciousness of something seems self-evident, yet describing it purely requires hard eidetic work.

The peculiarity of the intentional lived experience is easy to designate in its universality; we all understand the expression "consciousness of something," especially from arbitrary examples. All the harder is it to grasp purely and correctly the phenomenological essential peculiarities corresponding to it. That this heading circumscribes a large field of laborious findings—and indeed eidetic findings—still seems even today (if we may judge from the literature) to be something foreign to the majority of philosophers and psychologists. For next to nothing is accomplished by saying, and seeing, that every representing relates to something represented, every judging to something judged, and so on. Nor by pointing, in addition, to logic, theory of knowledge and ethics with their many evidences, and then *designating* these as belonging to the essence of intentionality. This is at the same time a very simple way of claiming the phenomenological doctrine of essence as something ancient, as a new name for the old logic and for whatever disciplines may perhaps be placed on a par with it. For unless one has grasped what is peculiar to the transcendental attitude and has really made the purely phenomenological ground one's own, one may well use the word phenomenology, but one does not have the thing. Moreover, the mere change of attitude, or the mere carrying-out of the phenomenological reduction, is by no means sufficient to make something like phenomenology out of pure logic. For how far logical propositions—and in the same way purely ontological, purely ethical and whatever other a priori propositions one may cite here—really express something phenomenological, and to which phenomenological strata this may in each case belong, is by no means obvious. On the contrary, the question harbors the most difficult problems of all, whose sense is naturally hidden from all those who have as yet no inkling of the

decisive fundamental distinctions. In fact (if I may allow myself a judgment from [180] my own experience) it is a long and thorny path that leads from purely logical insights, from insights of the theory of meaning, ontological and noetic insights, and likewise from the customary normative and psychological theory of knowledge, to the grasp of givens that are immanent-psychological in the genuine sense and then phenomenological, and finally to all the essential nexuses that make the transcendental relations intelligible to us a priori. Something similar holds wherever we may begin in order to find the way from insights about objects to the phenomenological insights essentially belonging to them.

So "consciousness of something" is something quite self-evident and yet at the same time highly unintelligible. The labyrinthine wrong paths into which the first reflections lead easily generate a skepticism that negates the whole inconvenient sphere of problems. Not a few bar their own way in simply because they cannot bring themselves to grasp the intentional lived experience—the lived experience of perception, for example—with the essence proper to it as such. Instead of living in the perception, turned toward the perceived in considering and theorizing, they do not manage to direct their regard to the perceiving instead, or to the peculiarities of the *mode of givenness* of the perceived, and to take what offers itself in immanent analysis of essence just as it gives itself. Once one has gained the right attitude and strengthened it through practice—above all, once one has gained the courage to follow the clear givens of essence in radical freedom from prejudice, unconcerned about all current and learned theories—firm results soon emerge, and the same results for all who adopt the same attitude. Firm possibilities emerge: of communicating to others what one has seen oneself, of checking their descriptions, of bringing to light unnoticed admixtures of empty verbal notions, and of making recognizable and eradicating, by measuring them against intuition, errors, which are possible here too, as in every sphere of validity. But now to the matters at hand.

§ 88. REALLY INHERENT AND INTENTIONAL COMPONENTS OF LIVED EXPERIENCE. THE NOEMA

The blossoming apple tree shows that the perceived as such survives bracketing as the noema.

If, as in our present reflections generally, we aim at the most general distinctions—distinctions graspable, so to speak, right at the threshold of phenomenology and determinative for all further methodical procedure—then with regard to [181] intentionality we immediately come upon a quite fundamental one: namely, the distinction between the *components proper* of intentional lived experiences and their *intentional correlates*, or the components of these. We already touched on this distinction in the eidetic preliminary considerations of Part Three.[33] It served us in making clear the proper being of the phenomenological sphere in the transition from the natural attitude to the phenomenological. But that within this sphere itself—that is, within the framework of the transcendental reduction—it gains a radical significance, conditioning the whole set of problems of phenomenology: of that there could be no question there. On the one side, then, we have to distinguish the parts and moments that we find through a *really inherent analysis* of the lived experience, in which we treat the lived experience as an object like any other, asking about its pieces or about the non-independent moments that build it up as really inherent in it. On the other side, however, the intentional lived experience is consciousness of something, and is so by its essence—for example as memory, as judgment, as will and so on; and so we can ask what is to be stated, as a matter of essence, on the side of this "of something."

Every intentional lived experience is, thanks to its noetic moments, precisely a noetic one. It is its essence to harbor within itself something like a "sense," and possibly a manifold sense, and, on the basis of these sense-givings and at one with them, to carry out further accomplishments, which become

33 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 41, pp. 73 ff.

"senseful" precisely through them. Such noetic moments are, for example: directions of the regard of the pure Ego toward the object "meant" by it in virtue of the sense-giving, toward the object that *lies* "in its sense," that it has in mind; further, the grasping of this object, the holding of it fast while the regard has turned to other objects that have entered into the "intending"; likewise the accomplishments of explicating, relating, grasping together, the manifold position-takings of believing, supposing, valuing and so on. All this is to be found in the relevant lived experiences, however differently they may be built and however changeable they may be in themselves. However much this series of exemplary moments points to really inherent components of the lived experiences, it nonetheless also points—namely, through the heading "sense"—to components that are *not really inherent*.

Everywhere, to the manifold data of the really inherent, noetic content there corresponds a manifold of data, demonstrable in genuinely pure intuition, in a correlative "*noematic* [182] *content*," or, for short, in the "*noema*"—terms that we shall use constantly from now on.[34]

Perception, for example, has its noema, at the lowest level its perceptual sense,[35] that is, the *perceived as such*. Likewise the particular memory has its *remembered as such*, precisely as its own, exactly as it is "meant," "conscious" in it; again, judging has the *judged as such*, liking has what is liked as such, and so on. Everywhere the noematic correlate, which is here called "sense" (in a very broadened meaning), is to be taken exactly as it lies immanently in the lived experience of perception, of judgment, of liking and so on—that is, exactly as it is offered to us by that lived experience when we *question purely this lived experience itself*.

34 *Noema*: from Greek, "what is thought"; the intended object taken exactly as it is intended in the lived experience, the correlate of the noesis.

35 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Logical Investigations* II/1, First Investigation, § 14, p. 50, on the fulfilling sense (and in addition Sixth Investigation, § 55, p. 642, on "perceptual sense"); further, for what follows, Fifth Investigation, § 20 f., on the *matter* of an act; likewise Sixth Investigation, § 25 to 29 and elsewhere.

How we understand all this will become fully clear by carrying out an exemplary analysis (which we mean to perform in pure intuition).

Suppose we look with pleasure into a garden, at a blossoming apple tree, at the fresh young green of the lawn, and so on. Obviously the perception and the accompanying pleasure are not what is at the same time perceived and pleasing. In the natural attitude the apple tree is for us something existing in the transcendent actuality of space, and the perception, as well as the pleasure, is a psychic state belonging to us, the real human beings. Between the one real thing and the other—the real human being, or the real perception, and the real apple tree—there obtain real relations. In certain cases, in such a situation of lived experience, it is said that the perception is "mere hallucination," that the perceived, this apple tree before us, does not exist in "actual" reality. Now the real relation that was previously meant as actually obtaining is disrupted. The perception alone is left; there is nothing *actual* there to which it relates.

Now we pass over into the phenomenological attitude. The transcendent world receives its "brackets"; with regard to its actual being we exercise the *epoché*. We now ask what is to be found, as a matter of essence, in the complex of noetic lived experiences of perception and of pleased valuing. Along with the whole physical and psychic [183] world, the actual obtaining of the real relation between perception and perceived is excluded. And yet obviously a relation between perception and perceived (as likewise between liking and what is liked) has remained: a relation that comes to essential givenness in "pure immanence," namely purely on the basis of the phenomenologically reduced lived experience of perception and of liking, just as it fits into the transcendental stream of lived experience. Precisely this situation, the purely phenomenological one, is now to occupy us. It may be that phenomenology also has something to say about hallucinations, illusions and deceptive perceptions in general—perhaps a great deal. But it is evident that here, in the role they played in the natural attitude, they fall under the phe-

nomenological exclusion. Here we have no question to put to the perception, nor to any progressing nexus of perception whatever (as when we contemplate the blossoming tree *ambulando* [while walking about]), of the sort whether anything corresponds to it in "the" actuality. This thetic actuality is, after all, not there for us as far as judgment is concerned. And yet everything remains, so to speak, as it was. The phenomenologically reduced lived experience of perception, too, is perception of "this blossoming apple tree, in this garden, and so on"; and likewise the reduced pleasure is pleasure in this same thing. The tree has not lost the slightest nuance of all the moments, qualities, characteristics *with which it was appearing in this perception, and with which it was "beautiful," "charming"* and the like *"in" this pleasure*.

In our phenomenological attitude we can and must put the question of essence: what is the "*perceived as such*"? What *essential moments* does it *harbor in itself, as this perceptual noema*? We receive the answer in pure devotion to what is essentially *given*; we can describe "what appears as such" faithfully, in perfect evidence. This is only another way of saying: "describing the perception in its noematic respect."

§ 89. NOEMATIC STATEMENTS AND STATEMENTS ABOUT ACTUALITY. THE NOEMA IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SPHERE

The tree simpliciter can burn up; the perceived tree as sense cannot.

It is clear that all *these* descriptive statements, even though they may sound the same as statements about actuality, have undergone a *radical* modification of sense. In the same way what is described, though it gives itself as "exactly the same," is nonetheless something radically [184] different, by virtue, so to speak, of an inverting change of sign. "In" the reduced perception (in the phenomenologically pure lived experience) we find, as belonging ineliminably to its essence, the perceived as such, to be expressed as "material thing," "plant," "*tree*," "*blossoming*" and so on. The *quotation marks* are obviously significant: they

express that change of sign, the corresponding radical modification of the meaning of the words. The *tree simpliciter*, the thing in nature, is anything but this *perceived* tree *as such*, which belongs to the perception as its perceptual sense, and belongs to it inseparably. The tree simpliciter can burn up, dissolve into its chemical elements, and so on. But the sense—the sense of *this* perception, something that necessarily belongs to its essence—cannot burn; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.

Everything that is purely immanent to the lived experience and peculiar to it in its reduced form, everything that cannot be thought away from it as it is in itself and that, in the eidetic attitude, passes *eo ipso* into the eidos, is separated by abysses from all nature and physics, and no less from all psychology. And even this image, being a naturalistic one, is not strong enough to indicate the difference.

The perceptual sense naturally belongs *also* to the phenomenologically unreduced perception (perception in the sense of psychology). Here, then, one can at the same time make clear to oneself how the phenomenological reduction can acquire a useful methodological function for the psychologist. It can serve to fix the noematic sense in sharp distinction from the object simpliciter, and to recognize it as something that belongs inseparably to the psychological essence of the intentional lived experience, which is then apprehended as something real.

On both sides, in the psychological as in the phenomenological attitude, one must keep sharply in view that the "perceived" as sense includes nothing other than what, in the given case, "actually appears" in what appears perceptually (and so nothing may be imputed to it on the basis of indirect knowledge). It includes this, moreover, exactly in the mode, in the manner of givenness, in which it is something one is conscious of in the perception. A *peculiar kind of reflection* can at any time be directed to this sense as it is immanent in the perception, and phenomenological judgment has to conform, in faithful expression, solely to what is grasped in that reflection.

§ 90. THE "NOEMATIC SENSE" AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "IMMANENT" AND "ACTUAL OBJECTS"

Every intentional experience has a sense; the intentional object is not a second, inner object.

185 Like perception, *every* intentional lived experience has its "intentional object," i.e., its objective sense; this is just what makes up the fundamental element of intentionality. To put the same thing in other words: to have sense, or to "have something in mind," is the fundamental character of all consciousness. Consciousness is therefore not merely lived experience in general, but sense-having, "noetic" lived experience.[36]

Admittedly, what stood out as "sense" in our analysis of the example does not exhaust the full noema. Correspondingly, the noetic side of the intentional lived experience does not consist solely of the moment of sense-giving proper, to which the "sense" specifically belongs as its correlate. It will soon become apparent that the full noema consists of a complex of noematic moments, and that within it the specific moment of sense forms only a kind of necessary *core layer*. Further moments are essentially founded in this layer, and only for that reason may we likewise call them moments of sense, though in an extended sense.

But let us stay, for the time being, with what alone has emerged clearly. The intentional lived experience, as we showed, is undoubtedly so constituted that, with the appropriate direction of regard, a "sense" can be drawn from it. The situation that defines this sense for us could not remain hidden. It is the circumstance that the non-existence (or the conviction of the non-existence) of the represented or thought object simpliciter cannot rob the representation in question (and so any intentional lived experience whatever) of what it represents as such, and that a distinction must therefore be made between the two. So conspicuous a difference was bound to leave its mark in

36 German *etwas im Sinne haben* ("to have something in mind") plays on *Sinn*, "sense."

the literature. Indeed, the scholastic distinction between the "*mental*," "*intentional*" or "*immanent*" *object* on the one hand and the *actual object* on the other points back to it. Yet from a first grasp of a difference in consciousness to its correct, phenomenologically pure fixing and its proper evaluation is an enormous step. And precisely this step, decisive for a consistent and fruitful phenomenology, has not been taken. What is decisive lies above all in the absolutely faithful description of what is actually there in phenomenological purity, and in keeping at a distance all interpretations that transcend what is given. Names here already announce interpretations, and often very false ones. Such interpretations betray themselves here in expressions like "mental," [186] "immanent" object, and they are at the very least encouraged by the expression "intentional" object.

It is all too tempting to say: what is given in the lived experience is the intention with its intentional object, which as such belongs inseparably to the intention and thus dwells *really inherently* within it. For the object is and remains, after all, what the intention intends, what it represents, and the like, whether or not the corresponding "actual" object exists in actuality, whether it has meanwhile been destroyed, and so on.

But suppose we attempt to separate the actual object (in the case of outer perception, the perceived thing of nature) and the intentional object in *this* way, placing the latter, as the "immanent" object of perception, really inherently into the lived experience. Then we run into the difficulty that two realities are now supposed to stand over against each other, whereas only one is to be found and only one is possible. It is the thing, the natural object, that I perceive: the tree there in the garden. That and nothing else is the actual object of the perceiving "intention." A second, immanent tree, or even an inner image of the actual tree standing out there before me, is in no way given, and to suppose such a thing hypothetically leads only to absurdity. The likeness, as a really inherent piece of the psychologically real perception, would again be something real, something real that *functioned* as an image for something else. But it could do so only

by virtue of a consciousness of depiction. In such a consciousness something would first have to appear, which would give us a first intentionality. This in turn would have to function, for consciousness, as an "image-object" for something else, and for that a second intentionality, founded in the first, would be necessary. It is no less evident, however, that each one of these modes of consciousness already demands the distinction between immanent and actual object. Each thus contains within itself the very problem that the construction was meant to solve. What is more, the construction, as applied to perception, is open to the objection we discussed earlier:[37] to insert depicting functions into the perception of what is physical means to foist upon it an image-consciousness which, considered descriptively, is constituted in an essentially different way. But the main point here is this. To impute a depicting function to perception, and then consistently to every intentional lived experience, inevitably entails an infinite regress (as is readily seen from our critique).

[1] Cf. above, § 43, p. 78 ff.

187 In the face of such aberrations, we must hold to what is given in the pure lived experience and take it, within the bounds of clarity, exactly as it gives itself. The "actual" object is then to be "bracketed." Let us consider what this means. If we begin as human beings in the natural attitude, the actual object is the thing out there. We see it, we stand before it, we have our eyes directed at it, fixating it. Just as we find it there in space, as what stands over against us, we describe it and make our statements about it. Likewise we take a position toward it in valuing: this thing over against us, which we see in space, pleases us, or it determines us to act; what gives itself there we take hold of, work on, and so on. If we now carry out the phenomenological reduction, every transcendent positing receives its excluding bracket, above all the positing that lies in perception itself. This

37 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Attention is a principal theme of modern psychology. Nowhere does the predominantly sensualistic character of that psychology show itself more conspicuously than in its treatment of this theme, for not even the

bracket passes over to all the founded acts: to every judgment of perception, to the positing of value grounded in it, to the possible value judgment, and so on. This implies the following. We permit ourselves only to consider all these perceptions, judgments, etc. as the essentialities they are in themselves, to describe them, and to establish whatever is evidently given in or about them. But we allow no judgment that makes use of the thesis of the actual thing, or of the whole "transcendent" nature, that *goes along with* it. As *phenomenologists* we abstain from all such positings. We do not, however, throw them away just because we "do not take our stand on their ground," do not go along with them. They are, after all, there; they belong essentially to the phenomenon. Rather, we look at them. Instead of going along with them, we make them into objects; we take them as component parts of the phenomenon, and the thesis of perception, precisely, as a component of perception.

And so, holding to these exclusions in their clear sense, we ask in general what evidently "lies" in the whole "reduced" phenomenon. Well then, this too lies in the perception: that it has its noematic sense, its "perceived as such," "this blossoming tree there in space," understood with the quotation marks. This is precisely the *correlate* that belongs to the essence of the phenomenologically reduced perception. To speak figuratively: the "bracketing" that the perception has undergone prevents any judgment about the perceived actuality (i.e., any judgment that is grounded in the unmodified perception and thus takes its thesis up into itself). But it does not prevent a judgment to the effect that the perception is consciousness [188] of an actuality (whose thesis, however, may not now be "performed" along with it). Nor does it prevent any description of this perceptually appearing "actuality as such," with the particular modes in which it is here consciously given: for example, precisely as perceived, as appearing only "from one side," in this or that orientation, and so on. With meticulous care we must now see to it that we put into the lived experience nothing other than what is

actually included in its essence, and that we "put it in" exactly as it "lies" in it.

§ 91. EXTENSION TO THE WIDEST SPHERE OF INTENTIONALITY

Memory, expectation and phantasy likewise have noemata, differently characterized around a common core.

What has so far been worked out in detail with a preference for perception now actually holds for *all kinds of intentional lived experiences*. In memory, after the reduction, we find the remembered as such; in expectation, the expected as such; in fictive phantasy, the phantasied as such.

A noematic sense "dwells within" each of these lived experiences. However closely related this sense may be in different lived experiences, however much it may even be essentially the same as regards a core stock, it is in any case different in kind in lived experiences of different kinds. Whatever is common in a given case is at the very least differently characterized, and necessarily so. It may in every case be a matter of a blossoming tree, and in every case this tree may appear in such a way that the faithful description of what appears as such must necessarily use the same expressions. But the noematic correlates are nonetheless essentially different for perception, phantasy, pictorial presentification, memory, etc. In one case what appears is characterized as "actuality in person," in another as a fiction, in yet another as a presentification in memory, and so on.

These are characters that we *find* in the perceived, the phantasied, the remembered, etc. as such, in the *perceptual sense*, the *phantasy sense*, the *memory sense*. We find them there as something inseparable, and as *necessarily belonging to these senses in correlation with the respective kinds of noetic lived experiences*.

Where, then, the task is to describe the intentional correlates faithfully and completely, we must include all such characters, which are never accidental but governed by eidetic law, and fix them in rigorous concepts.

[189] We notice from this that within the *full* noema (as indeed we had announced in advance) we must distinguish *essentially different layers*. These group themselves around a central "core," around the pure "*objective sense*": around what in our examples could everywhere be described by purely identical objective expressions, because in the parallel lived experiences of different kinds it could be something identical. We see at the same time that, if we again remove the bracketings performed on the theses, different concepts of *unmodified objectivities* must be distinguishable in parallel, corresponding to the different concepts of sense. Of these, the "object simpliciter" indicates only *one* central concept: namely the identical something that is at one time perceived, at another directly presentified, at a third presented pictorially in a painting, and so on. For the time being, however, let this indication suffice.

Let us look around a little further in the sphere of consciousness and try to become acquainted with the noetic-noematic structures in the principal modes of consciousness. In actually demonstrating them, we shall at the same time assure ourselves, step by step, of the *universal* validity of the fundamental correlation between noesis and noema.

§ 92. ATTENTIONAL CHANGES IN NOETIC AND NOEMATIC RESPECTS

Shifts of attention alter both the experience and its noema without changing the noematic core.

In our preparatory chapters we have already spoken several times of a kind of remarkable changes of consciousness. They intersect with all other kinds of intentional occurrences and thus make up an entirely general structure of consciousness, in a dimension of its own. We speak figuratively of the "mental regard" or "ray of regard" of the pure Ego, of its turnings toward and turnings away. The phenomena belonging here stood out for us in a unified, perfectly clear and distinct way. They play the chief role wherever there is talk of "attention," without being phenomenologically set apart from other phenomena; and,

mixed up with these, they are called modes of attention. For our part, we wish to retain the word and, moreover, to speak of *attentional changes*. But we shall do so exclusively with reference to the occurrences we have distinctly set apart, and to the groups of phenomenal changes belonging together with them, which are still to be described more closely further on.

190 What is involved here is a series of ideally possible changes. They already presuppose a noetic core and characterizing moments of different genera that necessarily pertain to it; they do not of themselves alter the corresponding noematic accomplishments; and yet they represent modifications of the *whole* lived experience, on its noetic as well as its noematic side. The ray of regard of the pure Ego passes now through this noetic layer, now through that one, or (as, e.g., with memories within memories) through this or that level of nesting, now straight ahead, now reflectively. Within the given total field of potential noeses, or of noetic objects, we look now at a whole (the tree, say, which is perceptually present), now at this or that part or moment of it; then again at a thing standing beside it, or at a complex, many-shaped nexus and process. Suddenly we turn our regard toward a memory-object that "occurs" to us. Instead of passing through the perceptual noesis, which, in a continuously unified way though with manifold articulation, constitutes for us the constantly appearing world of things, the regard now passes through a memory noesis into a world of memory. It moves about within this world, wandering, passes over into memories of other levels or into worlds of phantasy, and so on.

For the sake of simplicity, let us stay within *one* intentional layer, the world of perception, which stands there in simple certainty. Let us fix in idea a thing consciously given in perception, or a thingly process, with respect to its noematic content; and let us likewise fix the whole concrete consciousness of it, in the corresponding segment of phenomenological duration, according to its full immanent essence. Then this idea also includes the fixing of the attentional ray in its correspondingly *determinate* wandering. For the ray too is a moment of lived experience. It is

then evident that the fixed lived experience can be altered in ways that we designate precisely by the heading "mere changes in the distribution of attention and its modes." It is clear that in this the *noematic* content of the lived experience remains the same to such an extent that it can now be said in every case: the same objectivity is continually characterized as existing there in person, and it presents itself in the same modes of appearance, the same orientations, the same appearing features; such-and-such a stock of its content is consciously given in the same modes of indeterminate indication and non-intuitive co-presence; and so on. The change, we say, singling out and comparing parallel noematic [191] contents, consists merely in this: that in one case of the comparison this objective moment is "favored," in the other that one; or that one and the same moment is at one time "primarily noticed," at another only secondarily, or only "just barely co-noticed," if not indeed "entirely unnoticed," though still appearing. There are, precisely, different modes that belong specifically to attention as such. Here the group of *modes of actuality* separates itself off from the mode of *non-actuality*: from what we simply call inattention, the mode of, so to speak, dead having-in-consciousness.

On the other hand, it is clear that these modifications are not only modifications of the lived experience itself in its noetic content. They also affect its *noemata*: on the noematic side, without prejudice to the identical noematic core, they represent a genus of characterizations of their own. Attention is customarily compared to an illuminating light. What is noticed in the specific sense is located in the more or less bright cone of light; but it can also move into the penumbra and into full darkness. However inadequate the image may be for distinguishing all the modes to be fixed phenomenologically, it is nonetheless apt insofar as it indicates changes in what appears as such. This change of lighting does not alter what appears as regards its own stock of sense, but brightness and darkness modify its mode of appearance. They are to be found, and to be described, when our regard is directed to the noematic object.

Evidently the modifications in the noema are not of such a kind that mere external appendages are added to something that remains identical. Rather, the concrete noemata change through and through; what is involved are necessary modes of the manner of givenness of what is identical.

On closer inspection, however, the situation is not that the *entire* noematic content attentionally characterized in the given mode (the *attentional core*, so to speak) is something that is kept constant in the face of arbitrary attentional modifications. Rather, viewed from the noetic side, it turns out that certain noeses are conditioned by modes of attention, whether necessarily or as regards their determinate possibility, and in particular by positive attention in the emphatic sense. All "performances of acts," the "actual position-takings"—e.g., the "performance" of a decision resolving a doubt, of a rejection, of a [192] positing of a subject and a predicative positing-upon-it, the performance of a valuing and of a valuing "for the sake of something else," that of a choice, and so on—all this presupposes positive attention to that toward which the Ego takes a position. *But* this does not alter the fact that this function of the wandering regard, which widens and narrows its span, signifies *a peculiar dimension of correlative noetic and noematic* modifications. Their systematic investigation of essence belongs among the basic tasks of general phenomenology.

In their modes of actuality, the attentional formations have in a pre-eminent way the *character* of *subjectivity*. This same character is then acquired by all the functions that are modalized precisely by these modes, or that presuppose them by their very kind. The attending ray gives itself as radiating from the pure Ego and terminating in what is objective, directed toward it or turning away from it. The ray does not separate itself from the Ego but is itself, and remains, an Ego-ray. The "Object" is affected, is the target, is only put into relation to the Ego (and by the Ego itself), but is not itself "subjective." A position-taking that bears the Ego-ray within it is thereby an act of the Ego itself: the Ego does or undergoes, is free or conditioned. The Ego, as we

have also put it, "lives" in such acts. This living does not mean the being of any *contents* whatever in a stream of contents. It means a manifold of describable ways in which the pure Ego, as the "free being" that it is, lives in certain intentional lived experiences that have the general mode of the *cogito*. The expression "as free being," however, means nothing other than such modes of living as freely going out of oneself or going back into oneself, spontaneous doing, experiencing something from the objects, suffering, and so on. What goes on in the stream of lived experience outside the Ego-ray, or outside the *cogito*, is characterized in an essentially different way. It lies outside the actuality of the Ego, and yet, as we have already indicated earlier, it belongs to the Ego insofar as it is the field of potentiality for free acts of the Ego.

So much for the general characterization of the noetic-noematic themes that must be treated with systematic thoroughness in the phenomenology of attention.[1]

§ 93. TRANSITION TO THE NOETIC-NOEMATIC STRUCTURES OF THE HIGHER SPHERE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Founded experiences have founded noemata: no noetic moment without a corresponding noematic moment.

193 In the next series of reflections we shall consider structures of the "higher" sphere of consciousness in which, *in the unity of a concrete lived experience, several noeses are built one upon another*, and in which, accordingly, the *noematic correlates* are likewise *founded*. For *no noetic moment without a noematic moment specifically belonging to it*: so runs the eidetic law that is borne out everywhere.

In the case of noeses of a higher level, too, taken in their concrete completeness, there appears in the noematic content a central core that at first imposes itself predominantly: the "intended objectivity as such," the objectivity in quotation marks, as the phenomenological reduction requires. Here too this central noema must be taken exactly in the modified objective content in which it is precisely noema, something con-

sciously given as such. Afterwards one sees here too that this *new kind of objectivity*—for what is objective, taken in its modified form, itself becomes something objective again under the heading of sense, as it does, e.g., in our scientific investigation of it, albeit something objective of a dignity of its own—has its modes of givenness, its characters, its manifold modes, with which it is consciously given in the full noema of the noetic lived experience in question, or of the kind of lived experience in question. Naturally, here too all distinctions in the noema must again be matched by parallel distinctions in the unmodified objectivity.

essential connection between attention and intentionality—this fundamental fact, that attention in general is nothing other than a basic kind of *intentional* modifications—has, to my knowledge, ever been pointed out before. Since the appearance of the *Logical Investigations* (see the discussions there, II, 2nd Inv., § 22 f., pp. 159–65, and 5th Inv., § 19, p. 385), there has indeed been occasional talk, in a few words, of a connection between attention and "consciousness of objects." But, apart from a few exceptions (I recall the writings of Th. Lipps and A.[38] Pfänder), this has been done in a way that shows no understanding that what is at issue here is the radical and first beginning of the theory of attention, and that further investigation must be carried out within the framework of intentionality, and indeed not straightaway as empirical investigation, but first of all as eidetic.

It is then a further matter for closer phenomenological study to establish what, in the noemata of the varying particularizations [194] of a fixed kind (e.g., perception), is bound by eidetic law precisely through the kind, and what through the differentiating particularizations. But the binding extends throughout: in the sphere of essence there are no accidents; everything is connected by essential relations, and so in particular noesis and noema.

38 Continuation of Husserl's footnote at the end of § 92. Alexander Pfänder (1870–1941), phenomenologist of the Munich circle.

§ 94. NOESIS AND NOEMA IN THE DOMAIN OF JUDGMENT

The judged as such, the "judgment made," is the noema of judging, distinct from judging itself.

Let us consider, as an example from this sphere of founded essences, the predicating judgment. The noema of judging, i.e., of the concrete lived experience of judgment, is the "judged as such." But this is nothing other (or at least, as regards its principal core, nothing other) than what we usually simply call *the judgment*.

In order to grasp the full noema, the judgment must here actually be taken in the full noematic concreteness in which it is consciously given in the concrete judging. The judged must not be confused with the judged-about. Suppose the judging builds itself up on the basis of a perceiving or of some other simply positing representing. Then the noema of the representing enters into the full concreteness of the judging (just as the representing noesis becomes an essential component of the concrete noesis of judgment) and assumes certain forms in it. What is represented (as such) receives the form of the apophantic subject or object, and the like. For simplicity's sake we disregard here the higher layer of verbal "expression." These "objects about which," in particular the subject-objects, are the objects judged about. The whole formed out of them, *the entire judged "what"*, taken moreover exactly with the *characterization* and in the *manner of givenness* in which it is "consciously given" in the lived experience, forms the *full noematic correlate*, the (*most broadly understood*) sense of the lived experience of judgment. Put more pointedly, it is the "sense in the how of its manner of givenness," insofar as this manner of givenness is to be found in it as a character.

Here, however, we must not overlook the phenomenological reduction. If we want to obtain the pure noema of our lived experience of judgment, it requires us to "bracket" the making of the judgment. If we do so, then two things stand over against

each other in phenomenological purity: the full concrete essence of the lived experience of judgment, or, as we now express it, *the judgment-noesis grasped concretely as essence*; and the *judgment-noema* that belongs to it and is necessarily one with it, *i.e.*, the "*judgment made*" *as eidos*, again in phenomenological purity.

[195] The adherents of psychologism will take offense here at every turn; they are not even inclined to distinguish between judging as empirical lived experience and judgment as "idea," as essence. For us this distinction needs no further justification. But even those who accept it will be taken aback. For they are required to acknowledge that this one distinction by no means suffices, and that several ideas must be fixed, which lie on two different sides in the essence of the intentionality of judgment. It must above all be recognized that here, as with all intentional lived experiences, the two sides, noesis and noema, must be distinguished on principle.

Critically, it must be remarked here that the concepts of "*intentional*" and "*epistemic*" *essence*[1] established in the *Logical Investigations* are indeed correct, but are capable of a second interpretation, inasmuch as they can in principle be understood as expressions not only of noetic but also of noematic essences. It must further be remarked that the noetic conception, as it was carried out one-sidedly there, is precisely not the one that comes into consideration for conceiving the purely logical concept of judgment (that is, the concept that pure logic requires in the sense of pure *mathesis*, as opposed to the noetic concept of judgment of normative logical noetics). The difference between *making a judgment* and the *judgment made*, which already asserts itself in ordinary speech, can point to what is right: namely, that the judgment simpliciter, as noema, belongs *correlatively* to the lived experience of judgment.[39]

This, then, would have to be understood as the *judgment*, or the proposition, in the *purely logical sense*. Only, pure logic is not interested in the noema in its full content, but in the noema

39 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Log. Investigations* II/1, 5th Inv., § 21, p. 321 f.

insofar as it is thought of as determined exclusively by a *narrower* essence; the attempted distinction in the *Logical Investigations* mentioned above showed the way to determining this essence more closely. If, starting from a determinate lived experience of judgment, we want to obtain the full noema, then, as was said above, we must take "the" judgment exactly as it is consciously given in precisely this lived experience. In *formal*-logical considerations, by contrast, the identity of "the" judgment extends much further. An evident judgment S is P and "the same" blind judgment are noematically different, but identical as regards a core of sense, and this core alone becomes decisive for formal-logical [196] consideration. The difference is similar to the one already touched on between the noema of a perception and that of a parallel presentification that represents the same object with exactly the same determining content, in the same characterization (as "certainly existing," "doubtfully existing," and the like). The kinds of act are different, and there remains besides a wide scope for phenomenological differences —but the noematic "what" is identical. We add further that the idea of judgment just characterized constitutes the basic concept of formal logic (the discipline of *mathesis universalis* that relates to predicative meanings). Over against it, as its correlate, stands the noetic idea: "the judgment" in a second sense, namely understood as judging in general, in an eidetic general-

ity determined purely by form. This is the basic concept of the formal noetic theory of the legitimacy of judging.[40]

All that we have just set forth also holds for other noetic lived experiences. It holds, for example, as a matter of course, for all those that are essentially akin to judgments as predicative certainties: thus for the corresponding surmises, conjectures, doubts, and also rejections. Here the agreement can go so far that in the noema there appears a content of sense identical throughout, which is merely [197] furnished with different "characterizations." The *same* "S is P," as *noematic core*, can be the "*content*" of a certainty, of a suggesting-itself-as-possible, or of a conjecturing, and so on. In the noema the "S is P" does not stand alone. Rather, as it is there thought out as content, it is something non-independent. It is consciously given in each case in

40 HUSSERL'S NOTE. As regards Bolzano's concept of the "judgment in itself," the "proposition in itself," the expositions of the *Theory of Science* show that Bolzano never attained clarity about the proper sense of his pioneering conception. Bolzano never saw that there are two interpretations possible in principle here, both of which could be designated "judgment in itself": the specific character of the lived experience of judgment (the *noetic* idea) and the *noematic* idea correlative to it. His descriptions and elucidations are ambiguous. What he had in view, as an objectively oriented mathematician, was in any case the noematic concept, although an occasional turn of phrase (cf. op. cit. I, p. 85, the approving quotation from Mehmel's *Denklehre*) seems to speak against this. He had it in view exactly as the arithmetician has number in view: intent on operations with numbers, but not on the phenomenological problems of the relation between number and consciousness of number. Here in the logical sphere, as everywhere, phenomenology was something completely *foreign* to the great logician. This must be clear to anyone who has really studied Bolzano's *Theory of Science*, which has unfortunately become so rare, and who is moreover not inclined to confuse every working out of fundamental eidetic concepts (a phenomenologically naive accomplishment) with a phenomenological one. One would then have to be consistent enough to call every concept-creating mathematician a phenomenologist: a G. Cantor, say, with regard to his brilliant conception of the basic concepts of set theory, and in the end also, by the same token, the unknown creator of the basic concepts of geometry in remote antiquity.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), Bohemian mathematician and logician, author of the *Wissenschaftslehre* (*Theory of Science*, 1837). Gottlieb Ernst August Mehmel (1761–1840), Kantian philosopher at Erlangen, author of a *Denklehre* (theory of thinking).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Georg Cantor (1845–1918), founder of set theory, Husserl's colleague at Halle.

changing characterizations which the full noema cannot do without: it is conscious in the character of "certain," or of "possible," "probable," "*null*," and the like. The modifying quotation marks belong to all these characters, and as correlates they are specifically assigned to the noetic moments of lived experience of holding-possible, holding-probable, holding-null, and the like.

Here, as one sees at the same time, two fundamental concepts of "*content of judgment*" become distinguished, and likewise of content of conjecture, content of question, etc. Not infrequently logicians use the phrase "content of judgment" in such a way that what is evidently meant (though without the much-needed distinction) is the noetic or the noematic-logical concept of judgment, the two concepts we characterized a moment ago. Parallel to them, and of course without ever coinciding with them or with each other, run the corresponding pairs of concepts for conjectures, questions, doubts, etc. Here, however, a second sense of content of judgment emerges: a *content* that the judgment can have identically *in common* with a conjecture (or a conjecturing), with a question (or a questioning), and with other act-noemata or noeses.

§ 95. THE ANALOGOUS DISTINCTIONS IN THE SPHERE OF FEELING AND WILL

Valuing and willing also have layered noemata: the valued as such, the willed as such.

Analogous considerations then hold, as one easily convinces oneself, for the sphere of emotion and will: for lived experiences of liking and disliking, of valuing in every sense, of wishing, deciding, acting. These are all lived experiences that contain several, and often many, intentional layerings, noetic and correspondingly also noematic ones.

Here the layerings, generally speaking, are such that the uppermost layers of the total phenomenon can drop away without the remainder ceasing to be a concretely complete intentional lived experience. Conversely, too, a concrete lived

experience can take on a new total noetic layer; as when, e.g., a non-independent moment of "valuing" is layered upon a concrete representation, or, conversely, drops away again.

[198] When in this way a perceiving, phantasying, judging, or the like founds a layer of valuing that covers it entirely, then in the *founded whole*, designated after its highest level as a concrete lived experience of valuing, we have *different noemata, or senses*. The perceived as such belongs, as sense, specifically to the perceiving; but it enters into the sense of the concrete valuing, founding *its* sense. We must accordingly distinguish, on the one hand, the objects, things, properties, states of affairs that stand there as valuable in the valuing, or the corresponding noemata of the representations, judgments, and the like which found the consciousness of value; on the other hand, the value-objects themselves, the value-states-of-affairs themselves, or the noematic modifications corresponding to them; and then, in general, the complete noemata belonging to the concrete consciousness of value.

By way of elucidation, let it first be remarked that for the sake of greater distinctness we do well (here and in all analogous cases) to introduce distinguishing relative terms. They will keep better apart valuable object and value-object, valuable state of affairs and value-state-of-affairs, valuable property and value-property (which is itself ambiguous once again). We speak of the mere *thing* that is valuable, that has value-character, *valueness*; as opposed to this, of the *concrete value* itself, or the *value-Objectity*. Likewise, in parallel, of the *mere state of affairs*, or the *mere situation*, and the *value-state-of-affairs*, or the *value-situation*, namely where the valuing has a consciousness of a state of affairs as its founding substratum. The value-Objectity implies its thing; it brings in *valueness* as a new objective layer. The value-state-of-affairs harbors within itself the mere state[41] of affairs belonging to it; the value-property, likewise, the thing-property; and beyond that, the valueness.

41 *Objektität* ("Objectity") is Husserl's rare term for the Object as a formation, kept distinct from *Gegenständlichkeit* ("objectivity").

Here too, further, one must distinguish between the value-Objectity simpliciter and *the value-Objectity in quotation marks*, which lies *in the noema*. The perceived as such stands over against the perceiving in a sense that excludes the question of whether what is perceived truly is. Just so, the valued as such stands over against the valuing, again in such a way that the being of the value (of the valued thing and of its truly being valuable) remains out of the question. All actual positings must be excluded in order to grasp the noema. And again it must be carefully noted that the *full sense* of the valuing includes its "what," with the whole fullness in which it is consciously given in the [199] lived experience of valuing in question; and that the value-Objectity in quotation marks is not, without further ado, the full noema.

The distinctions we have made can likewise be carried through in the *sphere of will*.

On the one hand we have the *deciding* that we perform in each case, with all the lived experiences that it demands as its underlying basis and that, taken in concreteness, it includes within itself. Many kinds of noetic moments belong to it. Volitional positings are based on valuing positings, positings of things, and the like. On the other hand we find the *decision* as a peculiar kind of Objectity belonging specifically to the domain of will; and it is evidently an Objectity founded in other noematic Objectities of the same sort. If, as phenomenologists, we exclude all our positings, then there again remains to the phenomenon of will, as a phenomenologically pure intentional lived experience, its "*willed as such*," as a noema proper to *willing*: the "*volitional intent*." It remains exactly as it is "intent" in this willing (in its full essence), and with all that is willed there and all that the willing is "aimed at."[42]

We said "intent" just now. This word forces itself upon us everywhere here, as do the words "sense" and "meaning." To *intending* (*Meinen*) or intending-as (*Vermeinen*) there then corres-

42 *Meinung*, ordinarily "opinion," names here the correlate of *Meinen*, intending or meaning something; see the next paragraph.

ponds the *intent* (*Meinung*); to *meaning-intending* (*Bedeuten*), the *meaning* (*Bedeutung*). However, these words are all burdened with so many equivocations through transference that the greatest caution is called for with regard to them. Not least among these are equivocations that stem from sliding over into these correlative layers, whose scientific separation is to be rigorously carried out. Our considerations are now moving within the widest extension of the essential genus "intentional lived experience." Talk of *intending*, however, is normally restricted to narrower spheres, which at the same time function as substrata of the phenomena of the wider sphere. As a term, therefore, the word (and the expressions akin to it) can come into consideration only for these narrower spheres. For the generalities, our new terms and the accompanying analyses of examples will certainly serve us better.

§ 96. TRANSITION TO THE FURTHER CHAPTERS. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Phenomenology is a beginning science, with no royal road; its method is faithful description.

We have devoted such great care to the general working out of the distinction between noesis (i.e., the concretely complete intentional lived experience, designated with emphasis on its noetic components) [200] and noema, because grasping and mastering it is of the greatest consequence for phenomenology, indeed downright decisive for its proper grounding. At first glance it seems to be a matter of something self-evident: every consciousness is consciousness of something, and the modes of consciousness are very diverse. On closer approach, however, we felt the great difficulties. They concern the understanding of the noema's mode of being, the way in which it is supposed to "lie" in the lived experience, to be "consciously given" in it. They concern quite especially the clean separation between what is supposed to be the affair of the lived experience itself, in the manner of really inherent components, and what is supposed to be the affair of the noema, assigned to the noema as its own. The

correct articulation within the parallel structure of noesis and noema also makes difficulties enough afterwards. We may already have successfully carried out principal parts of the relevant distinctions for representations and judgments, where they first present themselves and for which logic supplies valuable but not remotely sufficient preliminary work. Even then, it takes some effort and self-overcoming not merely to postulate and assert the parallel distinctions for emotional acts, but actually to bring them to clear givenness.

In the context of our meditations, which merely lead the way up, it cannot be our task here to carry out parts of phenomenology systematically. Nonetheless, our aims require us to go into the matters more deeply than hitherto and to sketch the beginnings of such investigations. This is necessary in order to bring the noetic-noematic structures to clarity to the point where their significance for the problems and methods of phenomenology can become intelligible. A substantive idea of the fruitfulness of phenomenology, of the magnitude of its problems, of the manner of its procedure, can be gained only if domain after domain is actually entered and the ranges of problems belonging to them are made visible. But each such domain is actually entered, and becomes perceptible as firm ground to work on, only through carrying out phenomenological separations and clarifications; only with these can the sense of the problems to be solved here become intelligible. Our further analyses and indications of problems are to bind themselves strictly to this style, as in part our analyses so far have already done. However many-sided the materials treated may appear to the newcomer, we nonetheless keep only to restricted spheres. Naturally we give preference to what lies relatively near the entrances to phenomenology, [201] and to what is absolutely necessary in order to be able to follow the main systematic lines that run throughout. *Everything* is difficult; everything requires laborious concentration on the data of the specifically phenomenological intuition of essence. There is no "royal road" into phenomenology, and

hence none into philosophy either.[43] There is only the *one* road that its own essence prescribes.

Finally, let the following remark be permitted. In our presentation, phenomenology presents itself as a *beginning* science. How much of the results of the analyses attempted here is definitive only the future can teach. Certainly much of what we have described will have to be described differently *sub specie aeterni* [under the aspect of eternity]. But one thing we may and must strive for: that at every step we describe faithfully what we actually see from our point of view and after the most serious study. Our procedure is that of an explorer in an unknown part of the world, who carefully describes what presents itself to him along his untrodden paths, which will not always be the shortest. He may be filled with the sure consciousness of bringing to expression what, given the time and circumstances, *had* to be said. And because it is a faithful expression of what has been seen, it will always retain its value, even if new researches will call for new descriptions with many improvements. In the same spirit we wish, in what follows, to be faithful presenters of phenomenological formations, and, for the rest, to preserve the habitus of inner freedom even toward our own descriptions.

On the problems of the noetic-noematic[44]

CHAPTER FOUR. ON THE PROBLEMS OF NOETIC-NOEMATIC STRUCTURES. § 97. HYLETIC AND NOETIC MOMENTS AS REALLY INHERENT, NOEMATIC MOMENTS AS NOT REALLY INHERENT

Sensation colors belong really to the experience; the tree's perceived color belongs only to the noema.

In the previous chapter, when introducing the distinction between the noetic and the noematic, we used the expressions *really inherent* and *intentional analysis*. Let us take this up again here. A phenomenologically pure lived experience has its really

43 An allusion to Euclid's reported reply to King Ptolemy I that there is no royal road to geometry.

44 Running head of the 1913 print, from the title of the following chapter.

inherent components. For simplicity's sake let us restrict ourselves to noetic lived experiences of the lowest level. These are experiences whose intentionality is not complex, not built up of several noetic layers one upon another, as we found to be the case with acts of thought and with acts of emotion and will.

Let us take as an example a sensuous perception: the simple perception of a tree that we have when, just now looking out [202] into the garden, we regard in a unity of consciousness this tree over there. The tree now stands still, then appears moved by the wind. It also presents itself in very different modes of appearance insofar as, during our steady observation, we change our spatial position in relation to it: say, by stepping up to the window, or merely by altering the position of our head or eyes, while perhaps at the same time relaxing our accommodation and then tightening it again, and so on. In this way the unity of *one* perception can comprise within itself a great manifold of modifications. As observers in the natural attitude, we ascribe these now to the actual object as *its* changes, now to a real and actual relation to our real psychophysical subjectivity, and finally to that subjectivity itself. What we must now describe, however, is what of all this remains as phenomenological residue when we reduce to pure immanence, and *what may count as a really inherent component of the pure lived experience*, and what may not. And here we must make fully clear to ourselves the following. The "perceived tree as such" does belong to the essence of the perceptual lived experience in itself, or rather the full noema does, which is not touched by the exclusion of the actuality of the tree itself and of the whole world. On the other hand, however, this noema with its "tree" in quotation marks is *just as little really contained in the perception as the actual tree is*.

What do we find really contained in the perception as a pure lived experience, contained in it in the way that a whole contains its parts, its pieces and its moments that cannot be detached as pieces? We have already on occasion singled out such genuine, really inherent constituents under the headings

of *material* and *noetic* constituents. Let us contrast them with the noematic components.

The color of the tree trunk, taken purely as the color of which we are perceptually conscious, is exactly "the same" as the color we took, before the phenomenological reduction, to be that of the actual tree (at least we did so as natural human beings, before any admixture of knowledge from physics). *This* color, put in brackets, belongs to the noema. But it does not belong as a really inherent component to the perceptual lived experience, although we also find in that experience "something like color": namely, the "sensation color," the hyletic moment of the concrete lived experience, in which the noematic, or "objective," color *is adumbrated*.

Yet one and the same noematic color, of which we are conscious in the continuous unity of a changing perceptual [203] consciousness as identical and unchanged in itself, is adumbrated in a continuous manifold of sensation colors. We see a tree unchanged in its color—in its own color, the tree's—while the positions of our eyes and the relative orientations change in many ways, our gaze wanders ceaselessly over the trunk and the branches, and we at the same time step closer, and so set the perceptual lived experience flowing in various ways. If we carry out reflection on sensation, the reflection directed to the adumbrations, we grasp them as evident givens. With perfect evidence we can, alternating our attitude and the direction of our attention, also relate them to the corresponding objective moments and recognize them as corresponding. In doing so we also see straight off that, for example, any fixed color of the thing and the adumbrational colors belonging to it stand in the relation of *unity* to continuous "manifold."

In carrying out the phenomenological reduction we even gain the general insight into essence that the object tree can appear in a perception *at all* as *objectively* determined in the way it appears there only if the hyletic moments (or, if it is a continuous series of perceptions, the continuous hyletic changes) are precisely these and no others. This implies, then, that every

change in the hyletic content of the perception, if it does not cancel the perceptual consciousness outright, must at least have the result that what appears becomes something objectively *other*: whether in itself, or in the mode of orientation belonging to its appearance, and the like.

With all this it is also absolutely beyond doubt that "*unity*" and "manifold" here belong to *totally different dimensions*. *Everything hyletic* belongs to the concrete lived experience as a *really inherent* component, whereas what "exhibits itself," what "is adumbrated," in that experience as in a manifold belongs to the noema.

The materials, however, are, as we said earlier, "animated" by noetic moments. They undergo (while the Ego is turned not to them but to the object) "apprehensions," "*sense-givings*," which in reflection we grasp precisely in and with the materials. With regard to this it follows at once that not only the hyletic moments (the sensation colors, sensation tones, and so on), but also the apprehensions animating them—thus *both in one*: and so also the appearing of the color, of the tone, and of every [204] quality of the object—belong to the "really inherent" content of the lived experience.

Quite generally, then, the following holds. Perception is in itself perception of *its* object, and to every component that the objectively directed description singles out in the object there corresponds a really inherent component of the perception—but, mark well, only insofar as the description keeps faithfully to the object as it "*stands there*" in *this* perception itself. Moreover, we can designate all these noetic components only by having recourse to the noematic object and its moments; thus by saying, for instance: consciousness—more precisely, perceptual consciousness—of a tree trunk, of the color of the trunk, and so on.

On the other hand, our consideration did show that the really inherent unity of the lived experience, made up of hyletic and noetic components, is totally different from the unity of the noema's components of which we are conscious in it; and differ-

ent again from the unity that joins all those really inherent contents of the lived experience with what comes to consciousness as noema through them and in them. What is "*transcendentally constituted*" *through* the noetic functions on the basis of the material lived experiences is indeed something "given" and, if we faithfully describe in pure intuition the lived experience and what it is noematically conscious of, something *evidently* given. But it belongs to the lived experience in a completely different sense from the experience's really inherent, and therefore proper, constituents.

The designation of the phenomenological reduction, and likewise of the pure sphere of lived experience, as "transcendental" rests precisely on this. In this reduction we find an absolute sphere of materials and noetic forms, to whose determinately structured interweavings there belongs, *by immanent essential necessity*, this marvelous being-conscious of something determinate or determinable, given in such and such a way—something that is, for consciousness itself, an over-against, something in principle other, not really inherent, transcendent. And here is the primal source for the only conceivable solution of the deepest problems of knowledge, those concerning the essence and possibility of objectively valid knowledge of what is transcendent. The "transcendental" reduction exercises *epoché* with regard to actuality. But what it retains of actuality includes the noemata with the noematic unity that lies in them, and with that the way in which the real is conscious, and specifically given, in consciousness itself. The recognition that what is at issue here are throughout *eidetic*, and thus unconditionally necessary, connections [205] opens up a great field for research: that of the essential relations between the noetic and the noematic, between the lived experience of consciousness and the correlate of consciousness. The latter essential heading, however, includes both objectivity for consciousness as such and the forms of the noematic how of being-meant, or of being-given. In our sphere of examples there first arises the general evidence that perception is not an empty having-present of the object, but that (*a pri-*

ori) it belongs to the very essence of perception to have "its" object, and to have it as the unity of a *certain* noematic content. For other perceptions of the "same" object this content is always a different one, yet always one prescribed by essence. Or, conversely, it belongs to the essence of the object in each case, objectively determined in such and such a way, to be noematic precisely in perceptions of such a descriptive kind, and to be able to be so only in them, and so on.

§ 98. THE NOEMA'S MODE OF BEING. THEORY OF THE FORMS OF NOESES AND OF NOEMATA

The noema is a non-independent object whose being consists in being perceived, and has its own theory of forms.

But important supplements are still needed. First of all, careful note must be taken that every transition from a phenomenon into the reflection that analyzes its really inherent content, or into the quite differently constituted reflection that dissects its noema, produces new phenomena. We would fall into errors if we confused the new phenomena, which are in a certain way transformations of the old ones, with the old ones, and ascribed to the former what lies really inherently or noematically in the latter. Thus it is not meant, for example, that the material contents, say the adumbrating color contents, are present in the perceptual lived experience in the same way as they are in the analyzing lived experience. In the perceptual experience, to mention only one point, they were contained as really inherent moments, but they were not perceived in it, not grasped as objects. In the analyzing lived experience, however, they are objects, the targets of noetic functions that were not present before. Although these materials are still invested with their exhibiting functions, these functions too have undergone an essential change (admittedly one of another dimension). This will be discussed later. This difference is obviously of essential importance for phenomenological method.

After this remark we turn our attention to the following points, which belong to our particular theme. First, [206] every

lived experience is so constituted that there exists the possibility in principle of turning one's regard to it and its really inherent components, and likewise, in the opposite direction, to the noema, say to the seen tree as such. What is given in this position of regard is indeed itself, logically speaking, an object, but a thoroughly *non-independent* one. Its *esse* [being] consists exclusively in its "*percipi*" [being perceived]—except that this proposition holds in anything but the Berkeleyan sense, since here the *percipi* does not contain the *esse* as a really inherent component.

This naturally carries over into the eidetic mode of consideration: the eidos of the noema points to the eidos of the noetic consciousness; the two belong together *eidetically*. The intentional as such is what it is as the intentional of a consciousness of *such and such a kind*, a consciousness that is consciousness of it.

Despite this non-independence, however, the noema can be considered by itself, compared with other noemata, investigated with regard to its possible transformations, and so on. One can sketch out a *general and* pure *theory of forms* of *noemata*, over against which there would stand, *correlatively*, a general and no less pure *theory of forms of concrete noetic lived experiences* with their *hyletic* and *specifically noetic* components.

Naturally these two theories of forms would *by no means* relate to each other like *mirror images*, so to speak, or pass over into each other through a mere change of sign—say, in such a way that for every noema N we substituted "consciousness of N." This already follows from what we set out above regarding how the unitary qualities in the *thing-noema* belong together with their hyletic manifolds of adumbration in the possible perceptions of the thing.

It might now seem that the same must also hold with regard to the specifically *noetic* moments. One could point in particular to those moments which bring it about that a complex manifold of hyletic data, say color data, tactile data, and so on, acquires the function of a manifold adumbration of one and the same objective thing. We need only recall that the relation to the objective unity is not unambiguously prescribed in the materi-

als themselves, by their essence. Rather, the same material complex can undergo several apprehensions that leap discretely from one to another, and in accordance with which *different* objectivities become conscious. Does [207] it not already become clear from this that *essential differences* lie *in the animating apprehensions themselves*, as moments of the lived experience, and that these apprehensions are differentiated along with the adumbrations that they follow and through whose animation they constitute "sense"? One might therefore draw the conclusion that there is indeed a *parallelism* between noesis and noema, but such that the formations must be described *on both sides* and in their essential correspondence to each other. The noematic would be the field of unities, the noetic the field of "constituting" manifolds. Consciousness that functionally unites the manifold and at the same time constitutes unity does in fact never show identity where identity of the "object" is given in the noematic correlate. Take, for example, a case where different segments of an enduring perceiving that constitutes the unity of a thing show something identical, this one tree, unchanged in the sense of this perceiving—giving itself now in this orientation, then in that, now from the front, then from the back, at first indistinctly and indeterminately with regard to the visually grasped properties of some spot, then distinctly and determinately, and the like —there the object found in the noema is conscious as something identical in the literal sense, but the consciousness of it is, in the different segments of its immanent duration, something non-identical, something merely joined together, continuously one.

However much that is right has been said in all this, the conclusions drawn are nonetheless not quite correct—just as, in general, the greatest caution is called for in these difficult questions. The parallelisms that obtain here (and there are *several* of them, which get mixed up with one another only too easily) are beset with great difficulties still very much in need of clarification. We must keep carefully in view the difference between concrete noetic lived experiences, the lived experiences

together with their hyletic moments, and the pure noeses, as mere complexes of noetic moments. Again, we must keep distinct the full noema and, for example in the case of perception, the "appearing object *as such*." If we take this "object" and all its objective predicates—the noematic modifications of the predicates of the perceived thing that are posited as actual simpliciter in normal perception—then it and these predicates are, to be sure, unities over against manifolds of constituting lived experiences of consciousness (concrete noeses). But they are also unities of *noematic* manifolds. We recognize [208] this as soon as we bring within the scope of our attention the noematic characterizations of the noematic "object" (and of its "predicates"), which we have so far badly neglected. Thus, for example, the appearing color is certainly a unity over against *noetic* manifolds, and specifically over against manifolds of noetic characters of apprehension. Closer investigation shows, however, that to all the changes of these characters—if not in the "color itself," which appears there continuously, then at least in its changing "mode of givenness," for example in its appearing "orientation to me"—there correspond noematic *parallels*. Thus, quite generally, noetic characterizations are mirrored in noematic "characterizations."

How this is the case will now have to become the theme of comprehensive analyses—and not merely for the sphere of perception, which we have favored here as our example. We shall analyze the various kinds of consciousness with their manifold noetic characters one after another, and examine them thoroughly for their noetic-noematic parallels.

But we must impress upon ourselves in advance that the *parallelism* between the *unity of the object noematically "meant" in such and such a way*, the object in the "sense," and the *constituting formations of consciousness* ("ordo et connexio rerum—ordo et connexio idearum" [the order and connection of things—the order and connection of ideas]) *must not be confused with* the *parallelism* of *noesis and noema*, understood in particular as the par-

allelism of noetic characters and the corresponding noematic ones.

The considerations that now follow concern this latter parallelism.

§ 99. THE NOEMATIC CORE AND ITS CHARACTERS IN THE SPHERE OF PRESENTATIONS AND PRESENTIFICATIONS

Characters such as "originary," "remembered," "in an image" and "sign of" attach to the noematic core.

Our task, then, is to widen considerably the range of what has been shown in the two parallel series of noetic and noematic occurrences, in order to arrive at the full noema and the full noesis. What we have chiefly had in view so far—still without any inkling, to be sure, of what great problems are contained in it—is merely a central core, and not even one that is unambiguously delimited.

Let us first recall the "objective sense" that emerged for us above[45] through comparing noemata of representations of different *kinds* [209] —perceptions, memories, image-representations, and the like. It emerged as something to be described in purely objective expressions, and even in mutually identical ones, in the favorably chosen limiting case where an exactly like object, oriented in the same way and apprehended in the same way in every respect—a tree, for example—exhibits itself perceptually, in memory, in an image, and so on. Over against the identical "appearing tree as such," with the identical "objective" how of its appearing, there remain the differences in *mode of givenness*, which vary from one kind of intuition to another and according to the kind of representation otherwise.[46]

That identical something is conscious in one case *originarily*, in another *in memory*, then again "*in an image*," and so on. But what is thereby designated are *characters of the "appearing tree as*

45 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 91, p. 188 f.

46 "Representation" renders Husserl's *Vorstellung*: in the broad sense, any act that sets something before consciousness, kept distinct from "presentation" (*Gegenwärtigung*).

such", found when we direct our regard to the noematic correlate and not when we direct it to the lived experience and its really inherent content. What is expressed here are *not "modes of consciousness"* in the sense of noetic moments, but *modes* in which *what is conscious gives itself, itself and as such*. As characters of what is, so to speak, "ideal," they are themselves "ideal" and not really inherent.

On closer analysis one notices that the characters named as examples do not belong to *one* series.

On the one hand we have the simple *reproductive* modification, simple presentification, which, remarkably enough, *gives itself in its own essence as a modification of something else*. Presentification points back to perception in its own phenomenological essence. For example, remembering something past implies, as we have already noted earlier, the "having-perceived"; thus in a certain way the "corresponding" perception (perception with the same sense-core) is conscious in the memory, and yet it is not actually contained in it. Memory is, precisely in its own essence, "modification" of perception. *Correlatively*, what is characterized as past gives itself in itself as "having *been* present," thus as a modification of the "present," which, as the unmodified, is precisely the "originary," the "present in person" of perception.

On the other hand, the *imaging* modification belongs to another series of modifications. It presentifies "in" an "*image*." The image, however, can be something that appears originarily, for example the "painted" image (not, say, the thing that is the painting, the thing of which [210] one says, for example, that it hangs on the wall), which we grasp perceptually. But the image can also be something that appears reproductively, as when we have image-representations in memory or in free phantasy.

At the same time one observes that the characters of this new series are not only referred back to those of the first, but also presuppose complexions. The latter holds with regard to the distinction between "image" and "depicted," which belongs noematically to the essence of the consciousness. One also sees

from this that here the noema harbors within itself, in each case, a pair of characters that point to each other, although they belong to different objects of representation as such.

Finally, a closely related yet new type of modifying noematic characters (to which, as everywhere, parallel noetic characters correspond) is offered to us by *sign-representations*, with the analogous contrast of *sign* and *signified*. Here, once again, complexes of representations occur and, as correlates of their peculiar unity as sign-representations, *pairs* of noematically connected characterizations on pairs of noematic objects.

One also notices this: just as the "image" gives itself in itself, in keeping with its sense as an image, as a modification of something that without this modification would stand there as itself, in person or presentified, so too the "sign," in its own way, likewise gives itself as a modification of something.

§ 100. LEVEL-FORMATIONS OF REPRESENTATIONS IN NOESIS AND NOEMA GOVERNED BY EIDETIC LAW

Memories within memories and pictures within pictures nest to any level, as in a Teniers gallery painting.

All the types of modification of representation treated so far are open to ever new level-formation, such that the intentionalities in noesis and noema build upon one another *in levels*, or rather *nest inside one another* in a unique way.

There are *simple presentifications*, simple modifications of perceptions. But there are also *presentifications of the second, third and, by essence,* of *any level whatever*. Memories "in" memories can serve us as an example. Living in memory, we "carry out" a nexus of lived experiences in the mode of presentification. We convince ourselves of this by reflecting "in" the memory (which is itself a presentificational modification [211] of an originary reflecting), and we then find the nexus of lived experiences characterized as "having been lived," in the manner of memory. Among the lived experiences so characterized, whether we reflect on them or not, memories can themselves occur, characterized as "memories that have been lived," and our regard can

be directed through them to what is remembered at the second level. In the secondarily modified nexus of lived experiences, memories can occur yet again, and so on, *idealiter in inf.* [ideally, to infinity].[47]

A mere change of sign (whose peculiar nature we have yet to come to understand) translates all these occurrences into the type *free phantasy*: there result phantasies within phantasies, and so on, at any level of nesting.

Likewise, further, there are *mixtures*. It is not only that every presentification, by its essence, harbors within itself, with regard to its next lower level, presentificational modifications of *perceptions*, which come under the grasping regard through the marvelous reflection within presentification. We can also find, in the unity of one phenomenon of presentification, presentifications of memories, expectations, phantasies, and so on, *alongside* presentifications of perceptions; and the presentifications in question can themselves be of any of these types. And all this at different levels.

The same holds also of the complex types *depictive* representation and *sign-representation*. Let us take an example with very intricate yet easily understood formations of representations out of representations of higher level. A name, by naming, reminds us of the Dresden Gallery and of our last visit there: we wander through the rooms and stand before a painting by Teniers that depicts a picture gallery. If we further suppose, say, that pictures in this latter gallery in turn depicted pictures, which for their part depicted legible inscriptions, and so on, then we can gauge what nesting of representations, and what mediacies with regard to the graspable objectivities, can actually be produced. As examples for *insights into essence*, however, and in particular for insight into the ideal possibility of continuing the nestings at will, we do not need such very complicated cases.[48]

47 HUSSERL'S NOTE. On this distinction, cf. below § 111, p. 226.

48 David Teniers the Younger (1610–1690), Flemish painter known among other things for his pictures of painting galleries crowded with paintings.

§ 101. CHARACTERISTICS OF LEVELS. DIFFERENT KINDS OF "REFLECTION"

Each noematic level carries a level index, and the regard can pass through or stop at any level.

In all such level-formations, which contain iterated presentifica-tional modifications in their articulations, there are obviously constituted [212] *noemata of a corresponding level-formation*. In depictive consciousness of the second level, an "image" is characterized in itself as an image of the second level, as an image of an image. If we remember how yesterday we remembered a lived experience from our youth, then the noema "lived experience from our youth" has in itself a characterization as something remembered at the second level. So it is everywhere:

To every noematic level there belongs a *level characteristic*, as a kind of index by which everything characterized announces itself as belonging to its level—whether, for that matter, it is a primary object or one lying in some reflective direction of regard. For *to every level there belong possible reflections within it*: thus, for example, with regard to the things remembered at the second level of memory, reflections on the perceptions of just these things that belong to the same level (that is, that are presentified at the second level).

Further: every noematic level is "representation" "of" the givens of the following level. But "*representation*" does not mean here a lived experience of representing, and the "of" does not express here the relation of consciousness and object of consciousness. It is, as it were, a *noematic intentionality over against the noetic one*. The noetic intentionality bears the noematic one within itself as its correlate of consciousness, and in a certain way its intentionality runs through the line of the noematic intentionality.

This becomes clearer if we let an attentive regard of the Ego be directed to what is objective for consciousness. This regard then goes *through* the noemata of the sequence of levels—up to the *object of the last level*, through which it does not go, but which

it fixes. But the regard can also wander *from level to level* and, instead of going through them all, be directed fixingly at the givens of each one—and this either in a "*straightforward*" *direction of regard* or in a *reflecting* one.

In the example above: our regard can stay at the level of the Dresden Gallery: "in memory" we stroll about in Dresden and in the gallery. Then, again within the memory, we can live in looking at the pictures, and we now find ourselves in the image-worlds. Then, turned in the image-consciousness of the second level toward the painted picture gallery, we look at the painted pictures in it; or we reflect level by level on the noeses, and so on.

This manifold of possible directions of regard belongs essentially to the manifold of intentionalities that are related to one another and founded one in [213] another. And wherever we find analogous foundings—and in what follows we shall come to know many of quite a different kind—analogous *possibilities of changing reflection* turn out to exist.

There is no need to say how greatly these relationships require more thorough scientific investigation of essence.

§ 102. TRANSITION TO NEW DIMENSIONS OF CHARACTERIZATION

Noematic characters are not really inherent in the experience, and they form fundamentally different genera.

With regard to all the peculiar characterizations that we have encountered in the many-shaped domain of modification by presentification, we obviously *must*, and for the reason already given, distinguish between the noetic and the noematic. The noematic "objects"—the image-object or the depicted object, the object functioning as sign and the object signified, taken in *abstraction* from the characterizations belonging to them, "image of," "depicted," "sign of," "signified"—are evidently unities conscious in the lived experience but transcendent to it. But if this is so, then characters that occur in them in the manner of consciousness, and that are grasped as their peculiarities when

our regard is set upon them, cannot possibly be regarded as really inherent moments of the lived experience. However difficult the problems may be that are involved in how the two stand to each other—what is really inherent content of the lived experience, and what is conscious in it as not really inherent—we must make the distinction everywhere. And we must make it both with regard to the noematic core, the "intentional object as such" (taken in its "objective" mode of givenness), which appears as the bearer in each case of the noematic "characters," and with regard to the characters themselves.

But of such characters, always attached to the noematic core, there are still quite different ones, and the ways in which they belong to it are very diverse. They fall *into fundamentally different genera*, into fundamentally different *dimensions of characterization*, so to speak. Let it be pointed out from the outset that all the characters to be indicated here or already indicated (all of them headings for necessary analytic-descriptive investigations) are *of universal phenomenological scope*. We may treat them at first by giving preference to the relatively most simply built intentional lived experiences, those comprised by a certain fundamental concept of "*representation*," which form necessary [214] foundations for all other intentional lived experiences. Even so, the same basic genera and differences of characters are also found in all these founded experiences, and thus *in all intentional lived experiences* whatever. The situation here is that a noematic core, an "object-noema," is always and necessarily conscious, and it must be characterized in some way or other: namely, according to these or those differences (which for their part exclude one another) from each genus.

§ 103. CHARACTERS OF BELIEF AND CHARACTERS OF BEING

Belief and certainty on the noetic side correspond to "actual" and other characters of being on the noematic side.

If we now look around for new characters, we first notice that with the groups of characters treated above there are combined

the obviously totally different *characters of being*. Noetic characters referring correlatively to modes of being—"*doxic*" characters or *belief-characters*—are, in the case of intuitive representations, for example, the perceptual belief really included in normal perception as its "becoming aware," and, more specifically, say, perceptual certainty. Corresponding to it as noematic correlate on the appearing "object" is the character of being, that of the "*actual*." The same noetic, or noematic, character is shown by the "certain" re-presentification, the "*sure*" memory of every kind: of what has been, of what now is, of what will be in the future (as in fore-remembering expectation). These are acts that "*posit*" being, "*thetic*" acts. In using this expression, however, care must be taken: even though it points to an act, to a position-taking in a particular sense, precisely this is to be left out of consideration.

In the sphere considered so far, what appears perceptually or in memory had the character of what "actually" is, simpliciter—of what "certainly" is, as we also say in contrast to other characters of being. For this character can be modified, possibly transformed on the same phenomenon through actual modifications. The mode of "*certain*" *belief* can pass over into that of mere *suggestion* or *supposition*, or of *question* and *doubt*. Accordingly, what appears (which, with regard to that first dimension of characterizations, is characterized as "originary," "reproductive," and the like) has now taken on the *modalities of being* of the "*possible*," the "*probable*," the "*questionable*," the "*doubtful*."

For example: a perceived object at first stands there as a plain matter of course, in certainty. Suddenly [215] we become doubtful whether we have not fallen victim to a mere "illusion," whether what is seen, heard, and so on is not "mere semblance." Or what appears keeps its certainty of being, but we are uncertain with regard to some complex of properties. The thing "suggests itself" as a human being. Then a counter-suggestion arises: it could be a tree moving, which in the darkness of the woods looks like a moving human being. But now the "weight" of one "possibility" becomes considerably greater; we decide in its

favor, say in such a way that we definitely suppose: "it was a tree after all, at any rate."

In the same way, and far more often still, the modalities of being change in memory—and in such a way that to a large extent they establish themselves and are exchanged purely within the framework of intuitions, or of obscure representations, without the participation of any "thinking" in the specific sense, without *concept* and predicative judgment.

One sees at the same time that the phenomena belonging here suggest many further studies, that many more characters appear here (such as the "*decided*," the "*weights*" of possibilities, and the like), and that in particular the question of the essential foundations of the characters in each case, of the whole structure of noemata and noeses as regulated by eidetic law, calls for deeper investigations.

Here, as elsewhere, it is enough for us to have brought out the *groups of problems*.

§ 104. THE DOXIC MODALITIES AS MODIFICATIONS

Certainty is the primal form, the primal doxa, to which possibility, probability and doubt refer back.

With regard to the series of belief-modalities that particularly concerns us, however, let it also be pointed out that in it, once again, the distinctive, *specifically intentional sense of talk of modification* comes into play, which we made clear to ourselves in analyzing the previous series of noetic, or noematic, characters. In the present series, belief-certainty obviously plays the role of the unmodified, or, as we would have to say here, the "*unmodalized*" *primal form* of the *mode of belief*. Correspondingly in the correlate: the *character of being simpliciter* (the noematic "certainly" or "actually" being) functions as the *primal form of all modalities of being*. In fact, all the characters of being that spring from it, the modalities of being *specifically* so called, have in their own sense a reference back to the primal form. The "possible" means *in itself* as much as "possibly being"; [216] "probable,"

"doubtful," "questionable" mean as much as "probably being," "doubtfully and questionably being." The intentionality of the noeses is mirrored in these noematic relations, and once again we feel driven to speak outright of a "*noematic intentionality*" as the "*parallel*" *of the noetic intentionality*, the one properly so called.

This then carries over to the full "propositions," that is, to the unities of sense-core and character of being.[49]

It is convenient, incidentally, to use the term modality of being for the whole series of these characters of being, and thus to include under it the unmodified "being" as well, wherever it is to be considered *as a member of this series*—somewhat as the arithmetician includes the number one under the name number. In the same sense we generalize the sense of talk of doxic modalities, under which we shall comprise, often moreover with deliberate ambiguity, the noetic and noematic parallels.

Further, in designating unmodalized being as being-certain, attention must be paid to the equivocations of the word "certain"—and not only in the respect that it means now the noetic, now the noematic "being certain." It also serves, for example (and this is very misleading here), to express the correlate of affirmation, the "yes" as the counterpart of "no" and "not." This must be strictly excluded here. The meanings of words constantly shift within the framework of logically immediate equivalence. It is our business, however, to bring out the equivalences everywhere, and to separate sharply the essentially different phenomena that lie behind the equivalent concepts.

Belief-certainty is belief simpliciter, in the pregnant sense. According to our analyses it does indeed have a most remarkable special position within the manifold of acts that are all comprised under the heading of belief—or of "judgment," as is often said, though in a very unsuitable way. We need a term of its own that does justice to this special position and erases every reminder of the usual equation of certainty with the other

49 HUSSERL'S NOTE. More on the concept of "proposition" in our extraordinarily extended sense will be given in Chapter 1 of Part Four, p. 265 ff.

modes of belief. We introduce the term *primal belief* or *primal doxa,* in which the intentional reference back of all "belief-modalities" that we have brought out [217] finds fitting expression. We add that we shall use this last expression, "belief-modality" (or "doxic modality"), for all intentional variations grounded in the essence of the primal doxa, including those still to be brought out in the following analyses.—

The fundamentally false doctrine according to which a genus "belief" (or "judgment") merely differentiates itself into certainty, supposition, and so on, as if this were a series of coordinate species (wherever one may break off the series), just as in the genus sense-quality color, tone, and so on are coordinate species, hardly needs any further criticism from us. Moreover, here as elsewhere, we must refrain from pursuing the consequences of our phenomenological findings.

§ 105. BELIEF-MODALITY AS BELIEF, BEING-MODALITY AS BEING

Every modality can be regarded as something that simply is, and so every experience also functions as belief.

If, with regard to the most remarkable situations described above, we speak of an intentionality with which the secondary modes refer back to the primal doxa, then the sense of this way of speaking requires the possibility of a multiple direction of regard, of a kind that belongs in general to the essence of intentionalities of higher level. This possibility does in fact exist. *On the one hand* we can, living for example in the consciousness of probability (in supposing), look at what is probable; *on the other hand,* however, we can look at the probable itself and as such, that is, at the noematic object in the character that the noesis of supposing has conferred on it. The "object," with its content of sense and with this character of probability, is however *given as being in the second position of regard*: in relation to it, accordingly, the consciousness is simple belief in the unmodified sense. Likewise we can live in the consciousness of possibility (in "suggestion"), or in questioning and doubting, with our regard directed

to what we are there conscious of as possible, questionable, doubtful. But we can also look at the possibilities, questionabilities, doubtfulnesses as such, and possibly, by explicating, grasp and predicate the being-possible, being-questionable, being-doubtful in the sense-object: it is then given as *being* in the unmodified sense.

Thus, quite generally, we shall be able to establish the most remarkable essential peculiarity that every lived experience, in relation to all the noetic moments that are constituted by its noeses on the intentional [218] object "as such," functions as belief-consciousness in the sense of the primal doxa; or, as we can also say:

Every addition of new noetic characters, or every modification of old ones, not only constitutes new noematic characters; with it there are also constituted for consciousness, *eo ipso*, *new objects of being*. To the noematic characters there correspond predicable characters in the sense-object, as actual and not merely noematically modified predicables.

These statements will gain in clarity once we have familiarized ourselves with new noematic spheres.

§ 106. AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION TOGETHER WITH THEIR NOEMATIC CORRELATES

Negation crosses out a positional character; affirmation underlines it.

Yet another new modification that refers back—and one of possibly higher level, by virtue of its essential intentional reference back to belief-modalities of every kind—is *rejection*, together with the *assent* analogous to it; expressed more specifically, *negation* and *affirmation*. Every negation is negation of something, and this something points us back to some belief-modality or other. Noetically, then, negation is "modification" of some "position" or other; that means not of an affirmation, but of a "positing," in the extended sense, of some belief-modality or other.

Its new *noematic* accomplishment is the "*crossing out*" of the corresponding positional character; its specific correlate is the

character of crossing-out, that of the "*not*." Its stroke of negation runs through something positional—more concretely, through a proposition—and it does so by crossing out the proposition's specific *propositional character*, that is, its modality of being. By this very fact this character and the proposition itself stand there as "*modification*" *of something else*. Put differently: through the transformation of the simple consciousness of being into the corresponding consciousness of negation, the simple character "being" turns, in the noema, into the "*not being*."

Analogously, the "possible," "probable," "questionable" turn into the "impossible," "improbable," "unquestionable." And with this the whole noema is modified, the whole "proposition," taken in its concrete noematic fullness.

Just as negation, figuratively speaking, crosses out, so affirmation "*underlines*": it "*confirms*," "*assentingly*," [219] *a position*, instead of cancelling it as negation does. This too yields a series of noematic modifications, in parallel with the modifications of crossing out—which cannot be pursued further here.

So far we have left aside the peculiar feature of the "position-taking" of the pure Ego, which in rejection, here specifically negating rejection, "*directs itself*" *against* what is rejected, the being that is to be crossed out, just as in affirmation it *inclines toward* what is affirmed, directs itself toward it. This descriptive side of the situation, too, must not be overlooked, and it requires analyses of its own.

Likewise, account must again be taken of the fact that, in keeping with the nesting of the intentionalities, different directions of regard are possible in each case. We can live in the negating consciousness, in other words "carry out" the negation: the Ego's regard is then directed to what undergoes crossing out. But we can also direct our regard, as a grasping regard, to what is crossed out as such, to what is *marked with the stroke*: it then stands there as *a new "object"*, and indeed stands there *in the simple doxic primal mode "being"*. The new attitude does not produce the new object of being; even in "carrying out" the rejection, what is rejected is conscious in the character of crossed-

out-ness. But only in the new attitude does the character become a *predicable determination* of the noematic sense-core. The same holds, of course, for affirmation.

In this direction too, then, there lie tasks for phenomenological analysis of essence.

§ 107. ITERATED MODIFICATIONS

Negations, affirmations and modalities can be applied to one another without end.

What we have already made our own from the beginnings of such analysis suffices for us to take at once the following step forward in insight:

Since every negatum and affirmatum is itself an object of being, it can, like everything conscious in a mode of being, be affirmed or negated. *In consequence* of the constitution of being that is carried out anew at every step, there thus results an *ideally infinite chain of iterated modifications*. So at the first level [220] we have the "not-not-being," the "not-impossible"-, "not-unquestionable"-, "not-improbable-being," and so on.[50]

The same holds, as can be seen at once, for all the modifications of being discussed earlier. That something is possible, probable, questionable, and so on can itself in turn be conscious in the mode of possibility, probability, questionableness. To the noetic formations there correspond the noematic formations of being: it is possible that it is possible, that it is probable, questionable; it is probable that it is possible, that it is probable; and so in all complications. To the formations of higher level there then correspond, in their turn, affirmata and negata, which are again modifiable, and so it goes on, ideally speaking, *in infin-*

50 HUSSERL'S NOTE. It would be instructive to rethink A. Reinach's acute treatise "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils" [On the Theory of Negative Judgment] (Münchner Philos. Abhandlungen, 1911) on the basis of the clarifications of the essence of doxic occurrences attempted in the present chapters, and to set its problems in our light.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Adolf Reinach (1883–1917), phenomenologist of the Munich and Göttingen circles and a close associate of Husserl.

itum. These are anything but mere verbal repetitions. One need only recall the theory of probability and its applications, where possibilities and probabilities are constantly weighed, denied, doubted, supposed, questioned, established, and so on.

It must always be borne in mind, however, that talk of modifications here relates, on the one hand, to a possible transformation of the phenomena, thus to a possible actual operation. On the other hand, it relates to the much more interesting essential peculiarity of noeses, or noemata, of pointing back, in their own essence and without any regard to their genesis, to something else, something unmodified. But in both respects we stand on purely phenomenological ground. For talk of transformation and genesis refers here to phenomenological eidetic occurrences and says not the least about empirical lived experiences as natural facts.

§ 108. NOEMATIC CHARACTERS ARE NOT DETERMINATIONS OF "REFLECTION"

Characters like "null" or "possible" are found on the object itself, not by reflecting on acts.

With every new group of noeses and noemata that we have brought to clear consciousness, we must assure ourselves anew of a fundamental cognition that runs so strongly against psychologistic habits of thought: that a real and correct distinction must be drawn between noesis and noema, exactly as faithful description demands. Suppose one has already found one's way into purely immanent description of essence (something that so many who otherwise praise description fail to manage). Suppose one has also agreed to grant every consciousness an intentional object, as something belonging to it and immanently describ [221] able. Even then the temptation is still great to take the noematic characteristics, and quite especially those treated last, *as mere "determinations of reflection."* Recalling the ordinary, narrow concept of reflection, we understand what this means: determinations that accrue to intentional objects because these objects

are related back to *the modes of consciousness* in which they are objects of consciousness at all.

On this view, the negatum, the affirmatum and the like are supposed to arise as follows. In relating reflection on the negating, the "judgment" object is characterized as negated. In reflection on the affirming, it is characterized as affirmed. Likewise, in reflection on the conjecturing, it is characterized as probable, and so throughout. That is mere construction, and its wrongheadedness shows itself already in this: if these predicates really were only relating predicates of reflection, they could be *given* only in actually reflecting on the act side and in relating to it. But evidently they are *not* given through such reflection. We grasp what belongs properly to the correlate directly, with our regard directed at the correlate itself. It is on the appearing object as such that we grasp the negata, the affirmata, the possible and the questionable, and so on. In doing so we in no way look back at the act. Conversely, the noetic predicates that arise through such reflection have anything but the same sense as the noematic predicates in question. Connected with this is the fact that, even from the standpoint of *truth*, non-being is plainly only equivalent to, and not identical with, "being validly negated"; being possible is only equivalent to "being validly held to be possible"; and the like.

Natural speech too, unconfused by any psychological prejudices, bears witness for us here, if we still needed it. Looking into the stereoscope, we say: this appearing pyramid is—nothing, is mere "semblance." What appears, as such, is plainly the subject of the predication. To it (which is a thing-noema but anything but a thing) we ascribe what we find on it as a characteristic: namely, nullity. Here, as everywhere in phenomenology, one must simply have the courage to accept what can actually be seen in the phenomenon just as it gives itself, instead of reinterpreting it, and to describe it honestly. All theories must conform to that.[51]

51 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Logical Investigations* II 1, Sixth Investigation, § 44, pp. 111ff.

§ 109. THE NEUTRALITY MODIFICATION

A unique modification deprives any positing of its force, leaving a mere thought without belief.

222 Among the modifications that relate to the sphere of belief we still have to point out one of the highest importance. It occupies a completely isolated position and so may by no means be put in a series with those discussed above. It relates to positings of belief in a peculiar way. Its peculiarity also emerges only on deeper investigation: it turns out not to belong specifically to the sphere of belief at all, but to be a highly significant *general* modification of consciousness. Both facts justify devoting a more detailed consideration to it at this point. In doing so we shall also have occasion to discuss a kind of genuine belief modification not yet covered, with which the new modification is easily confused: that of assumptions.

We are now concerned with a modification that in a certain way completely cancels every doxic modality to which it is related, completely deprives it of force—but in a totally different sense from negation. Negation, moreover, as we saw, has its positive accomplishment in the negatum, a non-being that is itself in turn a being. This modification crosses nothing out, it "accomplishes" nothing. It is the counterpart, within consciousness, of all accomplishing: its *neutralization*. It is contained in every refraining-from-*accomplishing*, putting-it-*out*-of-action, "bracketing" it, "leaving-it-in-suspense" and then "having" it "*in suspense*," "thinking oneself into" the accomplishing, or "merely thinking" what is accomplished, without "joining in."[52]

This modification has never been brought out scientifically and accordingly has not been fixed terminologically either (wherever people touched on it, they always confused it with other modifications). Ordinary language also lacks an unequi-

52 "Leaving in suspense" renders "dahingestellt sein lassen," literally "letting something stand there undecided"; Husserl plays on this "standing there" in what follows.

vocal name for it. We can therefore approach it only by circumscription and step by step, through eliminations. For all the expressions just assembled as a preliminary indication contain something superfluous in their sense. Each of them also designates a voluntary doing, whereas that is not supposed to matter here at all. So we eliminate it. At any rate, the result of this doing has a peculiar content. That content can be considered in itself, setting aside the fact that it "stems" from the doing (which would of course also be a phenomenological datum). Indeed, it is also possible, and occurs, in the nexus of lived experience without any such voluntary act. So let us exclude from the leaving-in-suspense everything that has to do with the will, and let us also not understand it in the sense of something doubtful [223] or hypothetical. What then remains is a *certain having-in-suspense*, or better still, a having-"there" of something that is not "actually" conscious as standing there. The character of positing has lost its force. The belief is now seriously no belief any more, the conjecturing is not seriously conjecturing, the negating is not seriously negating, and so on. It is "*neutralized*" believing, conjecturing, negating and so forth. Its correlates repeat those of the unmodified lived experiences, but in a radically modified way: what is simply, what is possibly, probably, questionably, likewise what is not, and each of the other negata and affirmata —all this is there for consciousness, but not in the manner of the "actual"; rather as "merely thought," as "mere *thought*." Everything has the modifying "bracket," closely related to the one we spoke of so much earlier, which is so important for preparing the way to phenomenology. Positings simpliciter, the non-neutralized positings, have as their correlate results "propositions," which are all characterized as "what is." Possibility, probability, questionableness, non-being and affirmed being—all this is itself something "that is": namely, characterized as such in the correlate, as what is "meant" in consciousness. The neutralized positings, however, differ essentially in that their *correlates contain nothing positable, nothing actually predicable*.

Neutral consciousness in no respect plays the role of a "belief" for what it is conscious of.

§ 110. NEUTRALIZED CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE JURISDICTION OF REASON. ASSUMING

Neutral experiences are beyond the verdicts of reason; assumptions, by contrast, can be right or wrong.

That we are dealing here with a truly incomparable peculiarity of consciousness is shown by this: the *genuine*, non-neutralized noeses are by their *essence* subject to an *adjudication by reason*, whereas for *the neutralized ones the question of reason and unreason makes no sense*.

Likewise, correlatively, for the noemata. Everything characterized noematically as existing (certain), as possible, likely, questionable, null, and so on, can be so characterized "validly" or "invalidly"; it can "in truth be," be possible, be null, and so on. By contrast, *merely thinking-of "posits" nothing*; it is *not positional consciousness*. The "mere thought" of actualities, possibilities and so on "claims" nothing. It is neither to be acknowledged as correct nor rejected as incorrect.

[224] Admittedly, any mere thinking-of can be converted into an *assuming, a supposing*, and this new modification (like that of thinking-of) is subject to completely free choice. But supposing is again something like positing, and the *supposition* is again a kind of "*proposition*." Only it is a quite peculiar modification of belief-positing, standing over against the main series treated above and off to one side of it. It can enter as a member into the unity of positings that are to be judged rationally (its supposition serving as hypothetical "antecedent" or consequent), and it can thereby itself be subjected to rational evaluation. One cannot say of a thought merely left standing in suspense that it is correct or not; one can say this of a hypothetical supposition. It is a fundamental error to confuse the one with the other, and to overlook the equivocation that lies in talk of mere thinking-of, or of mere thought.

Added to this is the equally misleading equivocation in the word "thinking." Sometimes it is related to the distinctive sphere of explicating, conceiving and expressing thought, to logical thinking in a specific sense. Sometimes it is related to the positional as such, which, as we had it in view just now, does not call for any explicating and conceptual predicating.

All the occurrences discussed are found in the sphere we have so far given preference to: that of mere sensuous intuitions and their modifications into obscure representations.

§ 111. NEUTRALITY MODIFICATION AND PHANTASY

Phantasy is the neutrality modification of positing presentification, as Dürer's engraving illustrates.

But there is yet another dangerous equivocation in the expression "*merely* thinking-of" to be considered; or rather, a very natural confusion must be guarded against, namely that between the *neutrality modification* and *phantasy*. What is confusing here, and truly not easy to disentangle, is this: phantasy itself is indeed a neutrality modification; despite the particularity of its type, it is of universal significance, applicable to all lived experiences; it also plays its part in most forms of thinking-of; and yet it must be distinguished from the general neutrality modification, with its manifold forms that follow all the kinds of positing.

More precisely, *phantasying* in general is the *neutrality modification of "positing" presentification*, and so of memory in the widest conceivable sense.

[225] It should be noted here that in ordinary speech *presentification* (reproduction) and *phantasy* are mixed up. We use the expressions in such a way that, taking account of our analyses, the general word "presentification" carries no indication of whether the positing that belongs to it is genuine or neutralized. Presentifications in general then divide into two groups: *memories* of every kind, and *their neutrality modifications*. That this divi-

sion nevertheless cannot count as a genuine classification will become apparent further on.[53]

On the other hand, every lived experience whatsoever (every one that is, so to speak, actually alive) is a lived experience "that is present." To its essence belongs the possibility of reflecting on it, and in such reflection it is necessarily characterized as certainly and presently *existing*. Accordingly, to every lived experience, as to every individual being of which there is originary consciousness, there corresponds a series of ideally possible memory modifications. To *living through*, as *originary consciousness of the lived experience*, there correspond as possible parallels memories of it, and hence also, as their neutrality modifications, *phantasies*. This holds for every lived experience, however matters may stand with the direction of regard of the pure Ego. The following may serve as illustration:

Whenever we have presentified any objects whatever—let us assume at once that it is a mere phantasy world, and that we are attentively turned toward it—it belongs to the essence of phantasying consciousness that not only this world but at the same time the perceiving that "gives" it is phantasied. We are turned toward the world; toward the "perceiving in phantasy" (that is, the neutrality modification of memory) we are turned only when, as discussed earlier, we "reflect in phantasy." It is, however, of fundamental importance not to confuse two things. The first is *this* modification, ideally possible at any time, which would convert every lived experience, including the phantasying one itself, into the exactly corresponding *mere phantasy*, or, what is *the same*, into *neutralized memory*. The second is the neutrality modification that we can set over against every "*positing*" lived experience. In this respect memory is one quite special positing lived experience. Normal perception is another; yet another is perceptual or [226] reproductive consciousness of possibility, probability, questionableness, the consciousness of doubt, of negation, affirmation, supposition, and so on.

53 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. the demonstrations concerning essence and counter-essence, p. 233.

We can convince ourselves, for example, that the *neutrality modification of normal perception*, which posits in unmodified certainty, *is the neutral consciousness of the image-object*. We find this consciousness as a component when we contemplate, in the normal way, a depictive world presented perceptually. Let us try to make this clear to ourselves. Suppose we are looking at Dürer's engraving *Knight, Death and the Devil*.[54]

Here we distinguish, first, the normal perception whose correlate is the *thing "engraved sheet,"* this sheet in the portfolio.

Second, the perceptual consciousness in which colorless little figures, "knight on horseback," "death" and "devil," appear to us in the black lines. In aesthetic contemplation we are not turned toward these as objects. We are turned toward the realities presented "*in the image*," more precisely, the "*depicted*" realities: the knight of flesh and blood, and so on.

The consciousness of the "image" mediates the depiction and makes it possible. (The "image" here is the little gray figures in which, by virtue of the founded noeses, something else "is depictively presented" through similarity.) This consciousness is now an example of the neutrality modification of perception. This *depicting image-object* stands before us *neither as existing nor as not existing*, nor in any *other modality of positing*. Or rather, it is conscious as existing, but as existing-as-it-were, in the neutrality modification of being.

But the same holds also of the *depicted*, when we behave *purely aesthetically* and in turn take it as a "mere image," without giving it the stamp of being or non-being, of being possible or being likely, and the like. That, as can be seen, means no privation, however, but a modification, namely that of *neutralization*. Only we must not picture it as a transforming operation attached to a prior positing. It can sometimes be that too. But it need not be.

54 Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528) made this celebrated copper engraving in 1513.

§ 112. THE ITERABILITY OF THE PHANTASY MODIFICATION, THE NON-ITERABILITY OF THE NEUTRALITY MODIFICATION

Phantasies can nest within phantasies, but neutralization cannot be repeated.

The radical difference between phantasy, in the sense of neutralizing presentification, and the neutralizing modification [227] in general also shows itself—to bring out sharply this further decisive point of difference—in the following: the *phantasy modification*, as presentification, is *iterable* (there are phantasies of any level: phantasies "in" phantasies), whereas *repeating* the "*operation*" of *neutralization* is *excluded by essence*.

Our claim that iterated reproductive (and depictive) modifications are possible is likely to meet with fairly general opposition. That will change only when practice in genuine phenomenological analysis is more widespread than it is at present. People treat lived experiences as "contents" or as psychic "elements," which, for all the fashionable attacks on atomizing and reifying psychology, are still regarded as a kind of little thing. Accordingly, they believe that the difference between "sensation contents" and corresponding "phantasy contents" can be found only in material features such as "intensity," "fullness" and the like. As long as this is so, things cannot get better.

One would first have to learn to see that what is at issue here is a *difference of consciousness*. The phantasm, therefore, is not a mere anemic sensation datum but, by its essence, phantasy of the corresponding sensation datum. Further, this "of" cannot come in through any thinning out, however extensive, of the intensity, the fullness of content and so on of the sensation datum in question.

Anyone practiced in reflections on consciousness (who has first learned to see the givens of intentionality at all) will simply see the levels of consciousness present in phantasies in phantasies, or in memories in memories or in phantasies. Such a person will then also see what lies in the essential nature of these formations of levels: namely, that *every phantasy of a higher level* can

freely be converted into a *direct phantasy* of what is phantasied mediately in it, whereas this free possibility does *not* obtain in the transition from *phantasy* to the *corresponding perception*. Here, for spontaneity, there is a gulf that the pure Ego can cross only in the essentially new form of realizing action and creation (which also includes voluntary hallucinating).[55]

§ 113. ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL POSITINGS

Positional consciousness contains potential actual positings; neutral consciousness only their shadows.

[228] Our reflections on neutrality modification and positing press toward important continuations. We have used the phrase "positing" consciousness in a wide sense that necessarily needs to be differentiated.

Let us distinguish *actual* and *potential positing*, and let us use as the general heading, which we cannot do without all the same, "*positional consciousness*."

The difference between actuality and potentiality of *positing* is closely related to the differences of actuality between attention and inattention discussed earlier,[56] but by no means coin-

55 HUSSERL'S NOTE. As regards the points of the doctrine of the neutrality modification treated so far, the *Logical Investigations* had already arrived, in the main, at the correct conception, especially where the relation to phantasy is concerned. Cf. loc. cit. the Fifth Investigation, especially in § 39 the contrast between "qualitative" and "imaginative" modification, where the former had the sense of the neutrality modification discussed here.—Meinong's book *Über Annahmen* [*On Assumptions*] (1902) dealt at length with questions closely related to those discussed in the present chapter. I must therefore explain why I could connect only with my old writings and not with his book. In my opinion this book, which here as elsewhere shows such far-reaching overlaps with the parallel sections of the *Logical Investigations* —in subject matter and in theoretical ideas—has brought no real progress beyond my attempts, either in substance or in method. Many motifs of thought on which I still believe I may lay weight are not taken into account there, in particular with regard to the points treated above. The confusions exposed in our last discussions make up nothing less than the main core of Meinong's conception of assumptions.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Meinong's *Über Annahmen* treats assumptions as a class of mental acts between representation and judgment.

56 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 35, pp. 61f., § 37, pp. 65f., § 92, pp. 189ff.

cides with them. When we take the neutrality modification into account, a duality enters into the general distinction between actuality and non-actuality of the Ego's attentional turning toward, or rather an ambiguity enters into the concept of actuality; we must clarify the essence of this ambiguity.

We first encountered the neutrality modification in the contrast between *actual* believing, conjecturing and so on, and the peculiarly modified consciousness of "merely thinking oneself into" a believing, conjecturing and so on. Correlatively speaking, we met it in the contrast between "*actually having before* oneself" what is, what is probably, and so on, or having it actually "*posited*," and *not* actually having it "*posited*," but only in the manner of something "left standing in suspense." From the outset, however, we also indicated how essentially differently *non*-neutral and neutral consciousness behave with respect to the potentiality of positings. From every "actual" consciousness [229] various positings potentially contained in it can be drawn out, and these are then *actual* positings: in everything actually meant thetically there lie actual predicables. A neutral consciousness, however, *contains* no actual "predicables" whatever. Unfolding it through attentional actualities, through turnings toward the various predicates of the objective something of which there is consciousness, yields nothing but neutral acts, or nothing but modified predicates. This differing potentiality in neutral and non-neutral consciousness—this remarkable fact that the general potentiality of attentional turnings splits into a double one—now calls for a deeper investigation.

In the considerations of the paragraph before last it turned out that every actual lived experience, as something presently existing—or, as we can also say, as the temporal unity constituted in phenomenological time-consciousness—in a certain way carries its character of being with it, *similarly to something perceived*. To every actual present of lived experience there corresponds ideally a neutrality modification: namely, a possible phantasy present of lived experience that corresponds to it exactly in content. Every such phantasy lived experience is

characterized not as actually existing in the present, but as "existing in the present as it were." So the situation is indeed quite similar to what we find when we compare the noematic givens of any perception with those of a phantasying (a contemplation in phantasy) that ideally corresponds to it exactly. Everything perceived is characterized as actually present *being*; everything parallel to it that is phantasied, as the same in content, but as "mere phantasy," as being present "as it were." Thus:

Original time-consciousness itself functions like a consciousness of perception and has its counterpart in a corresponding consciousness of phantasy.

This all-encompassing time-consciousness, however, is obviously *not a continuous immanent perceiving* in the *strict* sense, that is, in the sense of an *actually positing* perceiving. Such a perceiving would itself be a lived experience in our sense: something lying in immanent time, enduring in the present, constituted in time-consciousness. In other words, time-consciousness is obviously not a continuous inner reflecting in which lived experiences would become objects *posited* in the specific sense, actually *grasped as existing*.

Among lived experiences there are distinctive ones, called immanent reflections, more specifically immanent perceptions, which are directed at [230] their objects by actually grasping and positing their being. Alongside these there are also among lived experiences perceptions directed at transcendent objects and positing being in the same sense: the so-called external perceptions. *Perception* in the normal sense of the word means not merely that some thing or other *appears to the Ego in its presence in person*, but that the Ego becomes aware of the appearing thing, grasps it as actually existing, posits it. According to what was set out earlier, this actuality of positing existence is neutralized in perceptual image-consciousness. Turned toward the "*image*" (not the depicted), we grasp as our object nothing actual, but precisely an image, a fictum. The "grasping" has the actuality of turning toward, but it is not an actual "grasping." It is mere grasping in the modification of the "*as it were*"; the posit-

ing is not actual positing, but positing modified in the "as it were."

When the mind's regard turns away from the fictum, the attentional actuality of the neutralized positing passes over into potentiality: the image still appears, but is not "*noticed*"; it is not grasped—in the mode of the "as it were." In the essence of this situation and its potentiality there lie possibilities for actual turnings of regard; here, however, these never give rise to actualities of *positing*.

The situation is similar when we compare *actual memories* (not neutral ones, but actually positing ones) with memories in which what is remembered still appears, say because our regard has turned away, but is no longer actually posited. Here the potentiality of *positing* what "still" appears means that attentional actuality gives rise not merely to grasping *cogitationes* in general, but to *cogitationes* that are through and through "actually grasping," actually positing. In the neutrality modification of memories, that is, in mere *phantasies*, we again have the attentional potentialities. Converting them into actualities does yield "acts" (*cogitationes*), but thoroughly neutralized ones, thoroughly doxic positings in the mode of the as-it-were. What is phantasied is conscious not as *actually* present, past or future; it merely "hovers" before us as such, without actuality of positing. A mere turning of regard can no more remove this neutrality than, in other cases, it can produce actuality of positing.

To give a further illustration: every perception has its perceptual background. The thing specifically grasped has its thingly *surroundings*, which appear along with it perceptually but lack particular theses of [231] existence. These surroundings too are "actually existing" surroundings. They are conscious in such a way that—as an essential possibility—regards actually positing being *can* be directed at them. They are, so to speak, a *unity of potential positings*. The same holds of memory with respect to its memory background; or again of perception, or memory, with respect to its halo of retentions and protentions, of backward-looking and forward-looking memories. These press forward in

greater or lesser fullness and with varying degrees of clarity, but are not carried out in the form of actual theses. In all these cases, actualizing the "potential positings" through corresponding turnings of regard (attentional actuality) necessarily leads to ever new actual positings, and this belongs to the essence of these situations. But if we pass over to the parallel neutrality modifications, everything is translated into the modification of the as-it-were, including the "potentiality" itself. The image-object or phantasy object also has (and necessarily has) attentional backgrounds. Here again "background" is a heading for potential turnings toward and "graspings." But here actually turning toward leads, as a matter of principle, not to actual positings, but always only to modified ones.

The same holds—and this is of special interest to us here—for the modal variants of the specific belief theses (the doxic primal theses): for conjectures, surmises, questions and so on, and likewise for negations and affirmations. The correlates of which there is consciousness in them—possibility, probability, nonbeing and the like—*can* undergo doxic positing and, with it, a specific "objectivation." But while we "live" "in" conjecturing, questioning, rejecting, affirming and the like, we perform no doxic primal theses. We do, of course, perform other "*theses*," in the sense of a necessary generalization of the concept: namely *conjecture theses, questionability theses, negation theses* and so on. But at any time we *can* perform the corresponding doxic primal theses. The *ideal possibility* of actualizing the *potential theses* contained in these situations is grounded in the *essence* of the phenomenological situations.[1] Now if actual theses were at issue from the outset, this actualization always leads in turn to actual theses, as ones potentially contained in the initial theses. But if we [232] translate the initial theses into the language of neutrality, the potentiality is translated into that language as well. If we carry out conjectures, questions and the like in mere phantasy, everything set out just now remains in force, only with a changed sign. All the doxic theses and modalities of being that

can be drawn out of the original act, or act-noema, through the possible turnings of attention are now neutralized.[57]

§ 114. MORE ON THE POTENTIALITY OF THE THESIS AND ON THE NEUTRALITY MODIFICATION

All consciousness divides into positional and neutral: original and shadow.

According to the analyses carried out, the difference between non-neutral and neutral consciousness concerns not merely lived experiences of consciousness in the attentional mode of the *cogito*, but also those in the mode of attentional non-actuality. It then shows itself in the twofold way these "backgrounds" of consciousness behave when they are attentionally converted into "foregrounds"—more precisely, when they are converted into attentional actualities, with which the original lived experience passes over into a doxic *cogito*, indeed into a primal doxa. This is obviously possible under all circumstances. For to the essence of every intentional lived experience belongs the possibility of "looking at" its noeses and its noemata, at the noematically constituted objectivities and their predicates—of grasping them positingly in the manner of primal doxa.

The situation, as we can also put it, is this: *the neutrality modification is not a special modification* attached to the *actual* theses, the only ones that really are theses. Rather, it concerns *a fundamentally essential peculiarity of all consciousness whatever*, which expresses itself in its relation to actual primal-doxic positability or non-positability. Hence the need to demonstrate it precisely on the actual primal positings, or on the modification they undergo.

More precisely, what is at issue is the following:

Consciousness in general, of whatever kind and form it may be, *is traversed by a radical division*. First, as we know, there are forms of consciousness in which the pure Ego does not from the outset live as "performing" them, which therefore do not from the out-

57 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 105, p. 217.

set have the form of the "*cogito*." To every such consciousness there belongs the essentially possible modification that converts it into this form. Now within the mode *cogito* there are *two* basic possibilities in the *manner of performing consciousness*; or, to put it differently:

[233] To every *cogito* there belongs an exactly corresponding counterpart, in such a way that its noema has its exactly corresponding counter-noema in the parallel *cogito*.

The relation of the parallel "acts" consists in this: one of the two is an "*actual* act," the *cogito* an "*actual*," "*actually positing*" *cogito*, while the other is a "*shadow*" *of* an act, a *non-genuine cogito*, one that does not "actually" posit. The one actually accomplishes; the other is a mere mirroring of an accomplishment.

To this corresponds the radical difference of the *correlates*: on the one side, the constituted noematic accomplishment, which has the character of unmodified, actual accomplishment; on the other, the "*mere thought*" of the exactly corresponding accomplishment. The actual and the modified correspond to each other ideally with absolute exactness, and yet they are *not of the same essence*. For the modification carries over to the essences: to the *originary essence* corresponds its counter-essence, as a "shadow" of that same essence.

Naturally, one must not read into the figurative talk of shadow, mirroring and image anything of mere illusion, of deceptive opinion or the like; with those, after all, actual acts or positional correlates would be given. There is no need to warn anew against the other, so natural confusion: that of the modification in question with the phantasy modification, which likewise creates for every lived experience—as a present of lived experience in inner time-consciousness—a counterpart, its phantasy image.

Intentional lived experiences are radically divided into two classes, which stand to each other as actuality and forceless mirroring of noematic accomplishing. Here (given our starting

point in the doxic domain) this division shows itself to us in the following *fundamental propositions*:

Every *cogito* is in itself either a doxic primal positing or not. But by virtue of a lawfulness that again belongs to the general basic essence of consciousness as such, every *cogito* can be converted into a doxic primal positing. This can happen in many ways, and in particular such that every "*thetic characteristic*" in the widest sense undergoes conversion into a characteristic of being and thereby takes on the form of a *modality of being in the very widest sense*. By such a thetic characteristic we mean one that is constituted in the noema of this *cogito* as the correlate of a noetic "thesis" (in a correspondingly widest sense) belonging to the *cogito*. In this way the characteristic "probable," which is the noematic correlate of conjecturing—and specifically of the "act-charac [234] teristic," the "thesis" of conjecturing as such—turns into *being probable*. Likewise the noematic characteristic "questionable," this specific correlate of the thesis of questionability, turns into the form of *being questionable*, and the correlate of negation into the form of *non-being*: all of them forms that have, so to speak, taken on the stamp of the actual doxic primal thesis. But this goes further still. We shall find reasons to extend the concept of thesis over all spheres of acts, and so to speak, for example, of theses of liking, theses of wishing, theses of willing, with their noematic correlates "*liked*," "desired," "practically required" and the like. These correlates too take on the form of modalities of being in an extremely extended sense, through the conversion, possible *a priori*, of the act in question into a doxic primal thesis. Thus what is "liked," "desired," "required" and so on becomes predicable; for in the actual positing of primal belief it becomes conscious as *being* liked, *being* desired, and so on.[58] The conversion, however, is—in these examples—to be understood such that it preserves the noema of the original lived experience in its whole essence, apart only from the mode

58 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above the propositions at the end of § 105, pp. 217f.

of givenness, which changes with the conversion in a law-governed way. But this point will still need supplementing.[59]

Now the cases divide radically according to whether the primal doxa in question is an actual one, so to speak an actually believed belief, or else its forceless counterpart, the mere "thinking-of" (of being simpliciter, of being possible, and so on).

What that doxic conversion of the original lived experience in each case yields—whether unfoldings of its noematic contents into *actual* doxic primal positings, or exclusively into primal-doxic *neutralities*—is fixed absolutely in advance by the *essence* of the intentional lived experience in question. From the outset, then, a fixed sum of *potential positings of being* is prefigured in the essence of *every* lived experience of consciousness. Depending on how the consciousness in question is constituted from the outset, this is a field either of possible actual positings or of possible neutral "shadow positings."

And again: *consciousness in general* is so constituted that it is of a double type—original and shadow, *positional* consciousness and *neutral*. The one is characterized by the fact that its doxic potentiality leads to actually positing doxic acts. The other is characterized by the fact that it lets only shadow images of such
235 acts, only neutrality modifications of them, emerge from itself; in other words, that its noematic content contains nothing at all that can be grasped doxically, or, what again amounts to the same, that it contains no actual noema, but only a counter-image of one. Only one doxic positability remains to neutral lived experiences too: the one that belongs to them as data of immanent time-consciousness, which determines them precisely as modified consciousness of a modified noema.

From now on the expressions "*positional*" and "*neutral*" will serve us as terms. Every lived experience, whether or not it has the form of the *cogito*, whether or not it is an act in some particular sense, falls under this opposition. *Positionality*, then, does not mean the presence or performance of an actual position; it expresses only a certain potentiality for performing actually

59 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. further below § 117, p. 244, first paragraph.

positing doxic acts. Yet we include in the concept of positional lived experience the case in which a lived experience is from the outset a performed position. This is all the less objectionable because, by eidetic law, to every performed positing there belongs a multiplicity of potential positings.

As has been confirmed, the difference between *positionality* and *neutrality* does not express a mere peculiarity pertaining to positings of belief. It is not a mere kind of belief modification, as conjecturing, questioning and the like are, or, in other directions, assuming, negating, affirming; it is not, then, an intentional variant of a primal mode, of belief in the strict sense. It is in fact, as we had predicted, a *universal difference of consciousness*. For good reason, however, it appears in the course of our analysis tied to the difference, pointed out specially in the narrow sphere of the doxic *cogito*, between positional (that is, actual, effective) belief and its neutral counterpart (mere "*thinking*-of"). Highly remarkable and deep-lying essential interconnections came to light between the act-characteristics of belief and all other kinds of act-characteristics, and hence all kinds of consciousness whatever.

§ 115. APPLICATIONS. THE EXTENDED CONCEPT OF ACT. PERFORMANCES OF ACTS AND ACT-STIRRINGS

Acts not performed by the Ego, mere act-stirrings, also bear theses and neutrality differences.

It is still important to take some earlier remarks into account.[60] The *cogito* in general is explicit intentionality. [236] The concept of intentional lived experience in general already presupposes the opposition of potentiality and actuality, and indeed in its general meaning. For only in passing over to the explicit *cogito*, and in *reflection* on the non-explicated lived experience and its noetic-noematic contents, can we recognize that such an experience harbors intentionalities, or noemata that are its own. This holds, for example, of the consciousness of the unnoticed but

60 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 84, pp. 168f.

subsequently noticeable background in perception, memory and so on. The explicit intentional lived experience is a "performed" "I think." But this same experience can also, by way of attentional changes, pass over into a "non-performed" one. The lived experience of a performed perception, of a performed judgment, feeling or willing, does not vanish when attention turns "exclusively" to something new—which implies that the Ego "lives" exclusively in a new *cogito*. The earlier *cogito* "dies away," sinks into "darkness," but it still has an existence as a lived experience, even if a modified one. Likewise *cogitationes* surge up in the background of lived experience, sometimes modified as memories or neutrally, sometimes unmodified. For example, a belief, an actual belief, "stirs"; we already believe "before we *know* it." Likewise, in certain circumstances, positings of liking or disliking, desires, even decisions are already alive before we "live" "in" them, before we perform the *cogito* proper, before the Ego "becomes active" in judging, liking, desiring, willing.

The *cogito*, then, does in fact designate (and this is how we introduced the concept from the outset) the *genuine* act of perceiving, judging, liking and so on. On the other hand, in the cases described, the whole structure of the lived experience, with all its theses and noematic characteristics, is the same when it lacks this *actuality*. To that extent we distinguish more clearly between *performed acts* and *non-performed* ones. The latter are either acts that have "lapsed from performance" or *act-stirrings*. We can quite well also use this last word generally for non-performed acts as such. Such act-stirrings are lived through with all their intentionalities, but the Ego does not live in them as "*performing subject*." With this the concept of act is extended in a definite and quite indispensable sense.[61] The performed acts—or, as it is better put in a certain respect (namely, in view of the fact that they are processes), the *act-performances*—make up the

61 "Act-stirrings" renders "Aktregungen": acts that are lived through, with their full intentional structure, but are not (or not yet, or no longer) performed by the Ego.

"*position-takings*" in the *widest sense*. Talk of position-takings in the strict [237] sense, by contrast, refers back to founded acts, of a kind we shall discuss more closely later. Examples are position-takings of hatred, or of the one who hates toward what is hated, which for consciousness is already constituted, in noeses of a lower level, as an existing person or thing. Position-takings of negation or affirmation toward claims to being, and the like, would likewise belong here.

It is now clear that acts in the wider sense carry within themselves the differences of neutrality and positionality exactly as the specific *cogitationes* do. They are already noematically and thetically accomplishing before their conversion into *cogitationes*; only we first get their accomplishments into view through acts in the narrower sense, through *cogitationes*. The positings, or the positings in the mode of the "as it were," are already actually present in them, together with the whole noeses to which these positings belong—assuming the ideal case in which, along with the conversion, they are not also intentionally enriched or otherwise altered. In any case, we can exclude these alterations (and especially the intentional enrichments and new formations that set in within the flow of lived experience immediately after the conversion).

Throughout our discussions under the heading of neutrality, the doxic positings were given preference. Neutrality had its index in potentiality. Everything rested on the fact *that every thetic act-characteristic whatever* (every act-"intention," for example the intention of liking, the valuing or willing intention, the specific characteristic of the positing of liking or of willing) *harbors within its essence a characteristic of the genus doxic thesis, which in certain ways "coincides" with it*. According as the act-intention in question is non-neutralized or neutralized, so too is the doxic thesis contained in it—which was here thought of as *primal thesis*.

This preference for doxic primal theses will be restricted in the further analyses. It will become apparent that the eidetic lawfulness we have brought out requires a more precise determ-

ination. First and more generally, the *doxic modalities* (in the specific sense, which also encompasses assumptions) must count, in place of the doxic primal theses, as the "doxic theses" contained in all theses, or must stand in for them. Within this general preference for doxic modalities as such, however, the doxic primal thesis, certainty of belief, has the quite special preference that these modalities themselves can be converted into theses of belief. So once again [238] all neutrality has its index in doxic potentiality, in the distinctive sense related back to the primal thesis. In this connection the kind of *coincidence* of the doxic in general with the thetic of every kind will be more closely determined.[62]

Now the propositions that were set down straight away in the widest generality (albeit with some desiderata), but made insightful only in special spheres of acts, need a broader basis of justification. After all, we have not yet discussed in detail the parallelism of noesis and noema in all intentional domains. This very main theme of our Part itself presses toward extending the analysis. In carrying out this extension, however, our general statements about the neutrality modification will at the same time be confirmed and supplemented.

§ 116. TRANSITION TO NEW ANALYSES. FOUNDED NOESES AND THEIR NOEMATIC CORRELATES

Feeling, desiring and willing are founded on representations and constitute values as new noematic strata.

So far we have studied a series of general occurrences in the structure of noeses and noemata within a framework that is large and yet very restricted. We have studied them, admittedly, only to a very modest degree: only as far as their definite demarcation required, and as far as our guiding aim required—that of gaining a general and yet contentful idea of the groups of problems that the universal double theme of noesis and noema brings with it. However many complications they drew in, our

62 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. further below pp. 243f.

studies related to a mere lower stratum of the stream of lived experience, to which intentionalities of still relatively simple structure belong. We gave preference (apart from the last, anticipatory considerations) to sensuous intuitions, in particular those of appearing realities, and to the sensuous *representations* that arise from them through obscuring and are, of course, united with them by belonging to a common genus. The latter expression at the same time designated the genus. In doing so, however, we did also take into consideration all the phenomena that belong to them essentially, such as reflective intuitions and representations in general, whose objects are no longer things of sense.[63] Given the way we conducted the investigation, making everything that could tie it to the lower domain felt to be incidental, the universality of the [239] validity of our results forces itself upon us at once, as soon as we widen the framework of inquiry. We then see that all the differences between the central core of sense (which, to be sure, still badly needs further analysis) and the thetic characteristics grouped around it recur. So do all the modifications which—like those of presentification, attention, neutralization—also affect the core of sense in their own ways, while nevertheless leaving it its "identical" element.

We can now proceed in two different directions, both of which lead to intentionalities founded in representations: either toward the noetic *syntheses*, or in the direction that leads us up to new but *founded kinds of positing*.

If we take the latter direction, we come upon the *feeling, desiring, and willing noeses*. At first we take them in their simplest possible form, i.e., free of syntheses at a lower or higher level. They are founded in "representations": in perceptions, memories, sign-representations, and so on. In their structure they show evident differences of founding in successive levels. For the total acts we now everywhere give preference to the positional forms

63 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Delimiting firmly and essentially the widest *concept of representation*, the one that proceeds from the spheres indicated, is naturally an important task for systematic phenomenological research. For all such questions we refer to the publications that have been announced. The findings briefly indicated in the present investigations have been drawn from their theoretical content.

(though this must not exclude neutral lower levels), since what is to be said of them carries over, suitably modified, to the corresponding neutralizations. For example, an aesthetic liking is founded in a neutrality consciousness of perceptual or reproductive content. A joy or a sorrow is founded in a (non-neutralized) belief or a modality of belief, and a willing or a counter-willing likewise, but related to something valued as pleasant, beautiful, and the like; and so on.

What interests us here, before we go into the kinds of this structure at all, is that along with the new noetic moments *new noematic moments* also appear in the correlates. On the one hand, these are new characters that are *analogous to the modes of belief* but at the same time *themselves*, in their new content, admit of doxological positing. On the other hand, *new kinds of "apprehensions"* also combine with the new kinds of moments: *a new sense is constituted, which is founded in the sense of the underlying noesis* while at the same time enclosing it. The new sense brings in a totally new *dimension* of sense. With it, what is constituted is not new determining pieces of the mere "*things*" but [240] *values of the things*, instances of valueness, or rather concrete value-Objectities: beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness; the object of use, the work of art, the machine, the book, the action, the deed, and so on.

For the rest, every full lived experience of the higher level also shows in its full correlate a structure similar to the one we have seen in noeses of the lowest level. *In the noema of the higher level, the valued as such, for instance, is a core of sense, surrounded by new thetic characters.* The "valuable," the "pleasing," the "gladdening," and so on function similarly to the "possible" and the "presumable," or perhaps again like the "null" or the "yes, actually"—although it would be wrong to put them into these series.

Here again the consciousness is, with respect to this new character, a *positional* consciousness: the "valuable" can be posited doxically as being valuable. The "being" that belongs to the "valuable" as *its* characterization can, further, also be thought of as *modalized*, like any "being" or "certain." The consciousness is

then consciousness of *possible value*: the "thing" merely suggests itself as valuable. Or again, it is conscious as *presumably valuable*, or as *not valuable*. This last does not mean the same as "valueless," bad, ugly, and the like; the not-valuable simply expresses the cancellation of the "valuable." All such modifications affect value-consciousness, the valuing noeses, not merely externally but internally, and correspondingly they so affect the noemata. (Cf. p. 243.)

Once again a manifold of deep-reaching changes arises in the form of the attentional modifications. These depend on how, in keeping with the multiplied possibilities of essence, the attentive regard passes. It may pass *through* the various intentional strata to the "thing" and the moments belonging to the thing, which yields a coherent system of modifications that we already know as the lower level. But it may then also pass to the values, to the constituted determinations of the higher level, through the apprehensions that constitute them. It may go, again, to the noemata as such and to their characters, or, in the other reflection, to the noeses. And all this happens in the various specific modes of attending, noticing in passing, not noticing, and the like.

Extremely difficult investigations must be carried out in order to unfold these complicated structures cleanly and bring them to full clarity. We must ask, for example, how "value-apprehensions" are related to thing-apprehensions, how the new noematic characterizations [241] (good, beautiful, etc.) are related to the modalities of belief, how they are systematically ordered in series and kinds, and so forth.

§ 117. FOUNDED THESES AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE THEORY OF THE NEUTRALIZING MODIFICATION. THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF THESIS

Every act is a thesis and hides a doxic thesis, so all acts are potentially objectivating.

We shall now also consider how the new noetic and noematic strata of consciousness are related to neutralization. We related

this modification to doxic positionality. As we can easily convince ourselves, doxic positionality does in fact play, in the strata now brought into relief, the role we assigned to it in advance in the widest sphere of acts and discussed specifically in the sphere of the modalities of judgment. In the consciousness of presuming, the "presumable," the "probable," "lies" positionally enclosed. In the same way the "pleasing" lies in the consciousness of liking, the "gladdening" in the consciousness of joy, and so on. It lies therein, i.e., it is accessible to doxic positing, and it is therefore predicable. Accordingly, every emotional consciousness, with its new kinds of founded emotional noeses, falls under the concept of positional consciousness as we had framed that concept, with reference to doxic positionalities and ultimately to positional certainties.

On closer inspection, however, we shall have to say that relating the neutrality modification to doxic positionality is, in a certain way, a detour after all, important as the insights underlying it are.

Let us first make clear to ourselves that acts of liking (whether performed or not), and likewise emotional and volitional acts of every kind, are precisely "acts," "intentional lived experiences." To each of them belongs the "*intentio*" (intention), the position-taking. To put it differently, they are *positings* in a widest but essentially unitary sense, only not doxic ones. In passing we said above, quite correctly, that act-characters in general are "*theses*": theses in the extended sense, and only in particular cases theses of belief or modalities of these. The essential analogy between the specific noeses of liking and the positings of belief is evident, and so is the analogy of the noeses of wishing, of willing, and so on. In valuing, wishing, and willing, too, something is "posited," apart from the doxic positionality that "lies" in them. This is indeed also the source of all attempts to set the different kinds of consciousness in parallel and of all classifications of them: what people were really classifying were the kinds of positing.

[242] Whatever else may be found in its concrete make-up, it belongs to the essence of every intentional lived experience to have at least one, but as a rule several, "positing characters," "theses," connected by way of founding. In this plurality, one is then necessarily, so to speak, the *archontic* one, uniting all the others in itself and ruling throughout them.[64]

The highest generic unity that binds together all these specific "act-characters," the characters of positing, does not exclude essential and generic differences. Thus emotional positings are akin to doxic ones as positings, but they by no means belong together as closely as all the modalities of belief do.

The generic community of essence of all positing characters gives us *eo ipso* the community of their noematic positing correlates (the "thetic characters in the noematic sense"). If we take the latter together with their further noematic substrata, it also gives us the community of essence of all "propositions." In this, however, are ultimately grounded the analogies, felt at all times, between general logic, general theory of value, and ethics. Pursued to their ultimate depths, these analogies lead to the constitution of general *formal* parallel disciplines: formal logic, formal axiology, and formal practics.[65]

We are thus led back to the *generalized* title "*thesis*," to which we now relate the proposition:

Every consciousness is either actually or potentially "thetic." The earlier concept of *actual positing*, and with it that of *positionality*, thereby undergoes a corresponding extension. This implies that our doctrine of neutralization and of its relation to positionality carries over to the extended concept of thesis. Thus to thetic consciousness in general, whether it is performed or not, belongs the universal modification that we call the neutralizing one, and it belongs to it *directly*, in the following way. On the one side, we characterized positional theses by saying that they either are actual theses or can be converted into actual ones, and that they accordingly have noemata that can "actually" be

64 From Greek *archōn*, "ruler": the governing thesis that dominates the others.
65 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. on this below, Part Four, Chapter 3.

posited, actually positable in the extended sense. Opposed to these are the improper theses, the "as-it-were" theses, the powerless mirrorings. They are incapable of taking into themselves any actually thetic enactments with respect to their noemata, which are precisely [243] neutralized. The difference between neutrality and positionality is a parallel noetic and noematic difference. As it is conceived here, it concerns all sorts of thetic characters directly, without the detour through "positions" in the narrow and alone customary sense of the word, that of the doxic primal positings—even though it is on these alone that the difference can be demonstrated.

This means, however, that giving preference to these special doxic positings has its deep foundation in the matters themselves. According to our analyses, the doxic modalities have the unique prerogative that their positional potentiality extends over the whole sphere of consciousness. Among them the doxic primal thesis, that of belief-certainty, has this prerogative in a particular way. By eidetic law, every thesis, of whatever genus, can be converted into an actual doxic positing, by virtue of the doxic characterizations that belong inseparably to its essence. A positional act posits; but in whatever "quality" it posits, it also posits doxically. Whatever is posited through it in other modes is also posited as being—only not actually. Actuality, however, can be produced as a matter of essence, by way of an "operation" that is possible in principle. Every "proposition," for example every wish-proposition, can therefore be converted into a doxic proposition, and it is then in a certain way both at once: at the same time a doxic proposition and a wish-proposition.

Here, as we had already indicated above, the eidetic lawfulness is in the first place this: *the prerogative of the doxic properly concerns doxic modalities in a general way*. For every emotional lived experience, every valuing, wishing, willing, is in itself characterized either as being-certain or as being-suggested, or as a presuming or doubting valuing, wishing, willing.[66] Here, when our attitude is not directed to the doxic modalities of pos-

66 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above, p. 240.

iting, the value, for example, is precisely not actually posited in its doxic character. The value is conscious in valuing, the pleasing in liking, the gladdening in rejoicing. But sometimes it is conscious in such a way that in valuing we are just not quite "sure." Or the thing merely suggests itself as valuable, as perhaps valuable, while in valuing we do not yet take sides for it. Living in such modifications of valuing consciousness, our attitude need not be directed to the doxic. But it can become so directed—if, say, we are living in the thesis of suggestion and then pass over into the corresponding thesis of belief. Taken predicatively, [244] this thesis now receives the form: "the thing may well be valuable." With a turn to the noetic side and to the valuing Ego, it takes the form: "it suggests itself to me as valuable (perhaps valuable)." The same holds for other modalities.

In all thetic characters there reside, in *this way, doxic modalities*, and, when the mode is that of certainty, doxic primal theses. These *coincide* with the thetic characters in terms of noematic sense. But since this also holds for the doxic modifications, doxic *primal theses* also lie in every act (now no longer in noematic coincidence).

We can accordingly also say: *Every act, or every act-correlate, harbors within itself something "logical," explicitly or implicitly.* It can always be explicated logically. This is possible by virtue of the essential universality with which the noetic stratum of "expressing" can be fitted to everything noetic (or the stratum of expression to everything noematic). Here it is evident that with the transition into the neutrality modification, the expressing itself and what it expresses, as such, are also neutralized.

From all this it follows that all *acts in general*—including *emotional and volitional acts*—are "*objectivating*" acts, *originally "constituting" objects*. They are necessary sources of different regions of being, and hence also of the pertinent ontologies. For example, valuing consciousness constitutes the "axiological" objectivity, which is new as against the mere world of things: a "being" of a new region. It does so inasmuch as the essence of valuing consciousness in general prescribes actual doxic theses

as ideal possibilities. These theses bring into relief objectivities of a new kind of content—values—as "meant" in valuing consciousness. In the emotional act the values are meant emotionally. Through actualization of the doxic content of these acts, they come to be meant doxically, and further to be meant in logically expressed form.

Every act-consciousness that is not performed doxically is in this way *potentially* objectivating; *the doxic cogito alone accomplishes actual objectivation*.

Here lies the deepest of the sources from which the *universality of the logical*, and ultimately that of predicative judgment, is to be clarified (if we add the stratum of expressing in terms of meaning, which has not yet been treated more closely). From here [245] the ultimate ground of the universality of the dominion of logic itself also becomes understandable. As a further consequence, one grasps the possibility, indeed the necessity, of formal and material noetic (or noematic and ontological) disciplines essentially related to emotional and volitional intentionality. We shall take up this theme later, once we have assured ourselves of some supplementary insights.[67]

§ 118. SYNTHESES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. SYNTACTIC FORMS

Articulated syntheses such as collecting, disjoining and relating build acts of higher order.

Let us now turn our attention to the second of the directions indicated above, the forms of *synthetic* consciousness. Manifold ways in which lived experiences are formed through intentional linkage then come into our horizon. As essential possibilities, they belong partly to all intentional lived experiences in general and partly to the peculiarities of particular genera of them. Consciousness and consciousness are not merely bound together in general. They combine into *one* consciousness, whose correlate is a noema, which in turn is founded in the noemata of the combined noeses.

67 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. below, the concluding chapter of Part Four, pp. 303 ff.

We are not aiming here at the *unity of immanent time-consciousness*, although it too must be recalled. It is the all-embracing unity for all lived experiences of one stream of lived experience, and indeed a unity of *consciousness* that connects consciousness with consciousness. If we take any single lived experience, it is constituted, in the continuous "original" time-consciousness, as a unity extended in phenomenological time. With a suitable reflective attitude, we can attend to the way in which the stretches of the lived experience that belong to different segments of its duration are given in consciousness. We can then say that the whole consciousness constituting this unity of duration is continuously composed of segments in which the segments of the lived experience's duration are constituted. The noeses are thus not only combined; they constitute one noesis with *one* noema (the filled duration of the lived experience), which is founded in the noemata of the combined noeses. What holds of a single lived experience holds of the whole stream of lived experience. However alien lived experiences may be to one another in essence, they are all constituted together as one stream of time, as members in the *one* phenomenological time.[68]

[246] However, we have expressly excluded this primal synthesis of original time-consciousness (which is not to be thought of as an active and discrete synthesis), together with the problems belonging to it. We therefore now wish to speak of syntheses not within the framework of this time-*consciousness* but within the framework of *time itself*, the concretely filled phenomenological time. What comes to the same thing, we wish to speak of syntheses of lived experiences simpliciter, taken as we have always taken them so far: as enduring unities, as processes running their course in the stream of lived experience, which itself is nothing other than filled phenomenological time. On the other hand, we also do not go into the *continuous syntheses*, very important as they are, such as belong essentially, for example, to all consciousness that constitutes spatial thinghood. We shall find ample opportunity later to become more closely acquainted

68 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. p. 239.

with these syntheses. We turn our interest rather to *articulated syntheses*. These are the peculiar ways in which discretely separated acts combine into an articulated unity, the unity of a synthetic act of a higher level of order. In the case of a continuous synthesis we do not speak of an "act of higher *order*." Rather, the unity (noetically, as well as noematically and objectively) belongs to the same level of order as what is unified. For the rest, it is easy to see that much of the general account we shall give in what follows applies equally to continuous and to articulated—*polythetic*—syntheses.

Examples of synthetic acts of a higher level are offered in the sphere of the will by *relating willing "for the sake of"* something else. Likewise, in the sphere of *acts of feeling*, they are offered by *relating liking*, by rejoicing "*with regard to*" something else, or, as we also say, *for the sake of* something else. And so with all similar occurrences of acts in the various genera of acts. Evidently all acts *of preferring* also belong here.

We want to subject to closer consideration another group of syntheses, one that is in a certain way universal. It comprises *colligating* (taking together), *disjunctive* (directed to the "this or that"), *explicating*, and *relating* syntheses. In general it comprises the whole series of syntheses that, according to the pure forms of the synthetic objectivities constituted in them, determine the formal-ontological forms. With respect to the structure of the noematic formations, [247] these syntheses are, on the other hand, mirrored in the apophantic *forms of meaning of formal logic* (the logic of propositions, which is oriented through and through toward the noematic).[69][70]

The relation to *formal* ontology and logic already indicates that what is at issue here is an essentially closed group of syntheses. Unconditioned universality of possible application belongs to them with respect to the kinds of lived experiences to

69 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, p. 80 and elsewhere.
70 "Apophantic" (from Greek *apophansis*, "declaration"): concerning declarative statements or judgments; apophantic logic is the logic of statements.

be combined. These lived experiences, for their part, may therefore also be noetic unities of any degree of complexity.

§ 119. CONVERSION OF POLYTHETIC ACTS INTO MONOTHETIC ONES

What is constituted in many rays can become an object in one ray, as in logical nominalization.

First of all, the following is to be noted for all kinds of articulated syntheses, of polythetic acts:

Every synthetically unitary consciousness, however many particular theses and syntheses may be incorporated in it, possesses the total object that belongs to it as a synthetically unitary consciousness. This object is called the total object as against the objects that belong intentionally to the synthetic members of lower or higher level, inasmuch as all of these also contribute to it by way of founding and are incorporated into it. Every distinctive noesis that sets itself off contributes its share to the constitution of the total object, even if it is a non-independent stratum. For example, the moment of valuing is non-independent, since it is necessarily founded in a consciousness of things. Yet it constitutes the objective stratum of value, that of "valueness."

Such new strata also include the specifically synthetic strata of the most universal syntheses of consciousness designated a moment ago. These are all the forms that stem specifically from synthetic consciousness as such: that is, the forms of combination, and the synthetic forms that attach to the members themselves (insofar as they are drawn into the synthesis).

In synthetic consciousness, we said, a synthetic total object is constituted. But in that consciousness it is "objective" in a quite different sense from what is constituted by a simple thesis. Synthetic consciousness, or the pure Ego "in" it, directs *itself in many rays* to what is objective; simply thetic consciousness directs itself in *one* ray. Thus synthetic colligating is a "plural" consciousness: one and one and one are taken together. Likewise, in

a primitive relating consciousness the relation is constituted in a twofold positing. And similarly everywhere. [248]

Synthetic objectivities can by their essence become conscious "originally" *only* synthetically. To every such many-rayed (polythetic) constitution of them there belongs, by eidetic law, a possibility. It is the possibility of *converting what is conscious in many rays into something conscious simply, in one ray*: of *making* what was synthetically constituted in the former, in a *monothetic* act, *"objective" in the specific sense.*

Thus the synthetically constituted collection becomes objective in the distinctive sense. It becomes the object of a simple doxic thesis, in that a simple thesis refers back to the collection that has just been originally constituted, that is, through a peculiar noetic attachment of a thesis to the synthesis. In other words: *plural consciousness can, by its essence, be converted into singular consciousness*, which takes from it the multiplicity as *one* object, as a single item. The multiplicity can now in its turn be linked with other multiplicities and with other objects, be put into relation with them, and so on.

The situation is evidently the same for *disjunctive* consciousness, which is built quite analogously to colligating consciousness, and for its ontic or noematic correlates. Likewise, the *relation* synthetically and originally constituted in *relating* consciousness can be taken out of it in an attached simple thesis and made into an object in the distinctive sense. As such it can be compared with other relations and, in general, used as the subject of predicates.

Here, however, it must be brought to complete evidence that what is simply objectivated and what is synthetically unitary really are the same. It must also be brought to evidence that the subsequent thesis, or taking-out, foists nothing fictitious onto the synthetic consciousness but grasps what that consciousness gives. Evident too, of course, is the essentially different mode of givenness.

In logic this lawfulness manifests itself in the *law of "nominalization."* According to this law, a nominal corresponds to every

proposition and to every partial form distinguishable in a proposition. To the proposition itself, say "S is p," corresponds the *nominal that-clause*, for example in the subject position of new propositions. To the "is p" corresponds the being-p, to the relational form "similar" *similarity*, to the plural form *plurality*, and so on.[71]

249 The concepts that have sprung from "nominalizations," thought of as determined exclusively by the pure forms, form *formal-categorial variations* of the idea of *objectivity in general*. They supply the fundamental conceptual material of formal ontology and, included in it, of all the formal-mathematical disciplines. This proposition is of decisive importance for understanding the relation between formal logic, as logic of the apophansis, and universal formal ontology.

§ 120. POSITIONALITY AND NEUTRALITY IN THE SPHERE OF SYNTHESES

Logical syntheses are positional only if all their underlying theses are positional.

All proper syntheses—and it was these that we constantly had in view—are built on simple theses. The word is understood here in the general sense we fixed above, which comprises all "intentions," all "act-characters." And *they themselves* are theses, theses of a higher level.[72] All our findings concerning actuality and non-actuality, neutrality and positionality, accordingly carry over to syntheses, as needs no elaboration.

Here, on the other hand, a closer investigation would be necessary to establish the various ways in which the positionality and neutrality of the founding theses are related to those of the founded theses.

71 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. the first attempts at this in the *Log. Investigations* II, Fifth Investigation, §§ 34 to 36; further § 49 of the Sixth Investigation; and, on the theory of synthesis in general, the second section of these investigations.

72 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Incidentally, the concept of synthesis has a hardly harmful ambiguity: it designates sometimes the full synthetic phenomenon and sometimes the mere synthetic "act-character," the uppermost thesis of the phenomenon.

In general, and not only for the special founded acts we call syntheses, it is clear that one cannot simply say that a positional thesis of higher level presupposes nothing but positional theses at the lower levels. Thus an actual seeing of essence is a positional and not a neutralized act. It is founded in some consciousness that intuits an example, and that consciousness may very well be a neutral one, a consciousness of phantasy. Something similar holds of an aesthetic liking with regard to the appearing object liked, and of a positional consciousness of depiction with regard to the depicting "image."

If we now consider the group of syntheses that interests us, we recognize at once that in it *every synthesis depends, as to its positional character, on that of the founding noeses*. More precisely, a synthesis is positional [250] (and can only be so) if all the subordinate theses are positional, and neutral if they are not.

A colligating, for example, is either actually a colligating or a colligating in the mode of the "as it were"; it is actually or neutrally thetic. In the one case all the acts related to the individual members of the collection are actual theses; in the other case they are not. The same holds of all the other syntheses of the class that is mirrored in the logical syntaxes. Pure neutrality can never suffice for positional syntheses. It must at least undergo conversion into "suppositions": for instance into hypothetical antecedents or consequents, or into hypothetically assumed nominals such as "the Pseudo-Dionysius," and so forth.[73]

§ 121. THE DOXIC SYNTAXES IN THE SPHERE OF FEELING AND WILL

There is a collective love and an axiological "and," each harboring a parallel doxic form.

Let us now ask how the syntheses of this group come to be expressed in the syntactic forms of declarative propositions, which the logical theory of the forms of propositions develops

73 The unknown author (c. AD 500) of Christian Neoplatonic writings once ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, a convert of St. Paul.

systematically. The answer is obvious. They are, one will say, simply *doxic syntheses*, or, as we also say in recollection of the logico-grammatical syntaxes in which they are stamped: *doxic syntaxes*. These syntaxes belong to the specific essence of doxic acts: the syntaxes of the "and" (or the plural forms), those of the "or," those of relating positing of a predicate on the basis of a positing of a subject, and so on. That "belief" and "judgment" in the logical sense belong closely together (if one does not want outright to identify them), that syntheses of belief find their "expression" in the forms of declarative propositions—this, surely, no one will doubt. Correct as this is, it must nonetheless be seen that the view described does not contain the whole truth. These syntheses of the "and," the "or," the "if" or "because" and "so"—in short, the syntheses that at first present themselves as doxic—are by no means merely doxic.

It is a fundamental fact that such syntheses also belong to the very essence of non-doxic theses, and indeed in the following sense.[74]

251 There is undoubtedly such a thing as collective joy, collective liking, collective willing, and so on. Or, as I usually put it, besides the doxic (the logical) "and" there is also an axiological and a practical "and." The same holds of the "or" and of all syntheses that belong here. For example, the mother who looks lovingly at her flock of children embraces in *one* act of love each child singly and all of them together. The unity of a collective act of love is not a love plus a collective representing in addition to it, even if the latter is coordinated with the love as its necessary substratum. Rather, the loving itself is collective. It is just as many-rayed as the representing that "underlies" it, and possibly the plural judging. We may indeed speak outright of a plural loving, exactly in the sense in which we speak of a plural representing or judging. The syntactic forms enter into the essence of the emotional acts themselves, namely into the thetic stratum spe-

74 HUSSERL'S NOTE. The author came upon this fact (more than a decade ago already) while attempting to realize the ideas of a formal axiology and formal practics as an analogue of formal logic.

cifically peculiar to them. This cannot be carried out here for all syntheses; let the example given suffice as an indication.

Now, however, let us recall the essential kinship, examined above, between doxic theses and theses in general. In every thesis in general a parallel doxic thesis lies hidden, in accordance with what the thesis accomplishes noematically—for example, as this intention of love. The syntaxes belonging to the sphere of the doxic thesis run parallel to those belonging to all other theses: the doxic "and," "or," and so on run parallel to the evaluative and volitional ones. Evidently this parallelism is a special case of the same essential kinship. For synthetic emotional acts—synthetic, that is, with respect to the syntactic forms discussed here—constitute *synthetic emotional objectivities*, which come to explicit objectivation through corresponding doxic acts. The beloved flock of children as an *object* of love is a collective. Turning what was set out above to its correlate, this means not merely a collective of things plus a love, but a *collective of love*. In noetic respect, a ray of love issuing from the Ego divides into a bundle of rays, each of which goes to a single object. Just so, as many *noematic characters of love* are distributed over the collective of love as such as there are objects colligated in each case. And there are just as many positional characters, which combine synthetically into the noematic unity of one positional character.

[252] We see that all these syntactic forms are parallel forms. That is, they belong both to the emotional acts themselves, with their specific emotional components and emotional syntheses, and to the doxic positionalities that run parallel to these acts and are essentially one with them. These positionalities can be drawn out of the emotional acts by suitable turnings of regard toward the respective lower and upper levels. Naturally this carries over from the noetic to the noematic sphere. The axiological *and* essentially harbors a doxic one within it, and every axiological syntactic form of the group considered here harbors a logical one. It is just as every simple noematic correlate includes a "being" or another modality of being and, as its substrate, the

form of the *something* and the other forms that belong to it. It is always a matter of special turnings of regard that are essentially possible, and of thetic or synthetic-doxic procedures included along with them, to shape a new act out of an emotional act. In the emotional act we, so to speak, merely live feelingly, without actualizing the doxic potentialities. In the new act, the emotional objectivity, at first only potential, is transformed into an actual one, explicated doxically and possibly in expressed form. It is possible here, and very common in empirical life, that we look, for example, at several intuited objects, positing them doxically. At the same time we perform a synthetic emotional act: say, a unity of collective liking, or that of an emotional act of selecting, of a preferring liking, of a disliking that sets something aside. Meanwhile we do not at all go on to give the whole phenomenon a doxic turn. But we do so when we make a statement, for example about our liking for the plurality, or for one out of the plurality, about the superiority of the one over the others, and the like.

There is no need to emphasize how important it is to carry out such analyses carefully for knowledge of the essence of axiological and practical objectivities, meanings, and modes of consciousness. They matter, then, for the problems of the "origin" of ethical and aesthetic concepts and cognitions, and of those otherwise essentially akin to them.

It is not really our task here to solve phenomenological problems. Our task is to work out the chief problems of phenomenology scientifically, or to sketch out the directions of investigation connected with them. It must therefore be enough for us to have taken matters this far.

§ 122. MODES OF PERFORMANCE OF ARTICULATED SYNTHESES. "THEME"

Syntheses may be performed step by step, held in grip, or released as the Ego turns elsewhere.

[253] To the realm of theses and syntheses belongs an important group of general modifications. We had best append a brief discussion of them right here, one that merely indicates them.

A synthesis can be *performed* step by step; it comes to be, it arises in *original production*. This originality of becoming in the stream of consciousness is a quite peculiar one. The thesis and the synthesis come to be as the pure *Ego* actually takes the step and each new step. The Ego itself lives in the step and "steps forth" with it. Positing, positing upon something, positing ahead and positing after, and so on, are its *free spontaneity and activity*. It does not live in the theses as a passive being-therein; rather, they are radiations from it as from a primal source of productions. Every thesis begins with a *point of onset*, with a punctual *positing of origin*. This is true of the first thesis as of every further one in the nexus of the synthesis. This onset belongs precisely to the thesis as such, as a remarkable mode of original actuality. It is something like the *fiat* ["let it be done"], like the point of onset of willing and acting.

But one must not confuse the general and the particular. Spontaneous resolving, willed and executive doing, is one act among other acts; its syntheses are particular syntheses among others. But *every* act, of whatever kind, can begin in this *mode of spontaneity of a, so to speak, creative beginning*, in which the pure Ego makes its entrance as subject of spontaneity.

This mode of onset passes over at once, and by an essential necessity, into another mode. For example, perceptual *grasping, seizing* changes immediately and without a break into "*having in one's grip*."

Yet another new modal change follows when the thesis was a mere step toward a synthesis and the pure *Ego* takes a new step. Now, in the continuous unity of synthetic consciousness, the

Ego *still* "*keeps in its grip*" what it just had in its grip. It grasps the new thematic object, or rather it grasps a new member of the total theme as the primary theme. But it still holds the member grasped before, as belonging to the same total theme. For example, in colligating, I do not let go of what I have just grasped perceptually when I turn my grasping regard to the new object. Carrying out a [254] proof, I run through the thoughts of the premises in steps. I give up no synthetic step, and I do not lose from my grip what I have gained. But the mode of actuality has changed essentially with the performance of the new thematic primal actuality.

It is indeed also a matter of obscurations here, but by no means only of them. Rather, the differences we have just tried to describe represent, as against the differences of clarity and unclarity, a completely new dimension, although the two kinds of differences are so closely interwoven.

We note further that these new differences, no less than those of clarity and all other intentional differences, stand under the law of the correlation of noesis and noema. Again, then, noematic modifications of actuality correspond to the noetic ones of the kind in question. That is, the mode of givenness of what is "meant as such" changes in the changes of the thesis, or in the steps of the synthesis. One can exhibit these changes in the noematic content itself in each case and bring them into relief in it as a stratum of their own.

In this way the mode of actuality (speaking noematically, the mode of givenness) necessarily changes according to certain *discrete types*, apart from the *flowing*, continuous changes. Yet something essentially common persists throughout these changes. Noematically, a "what" is preserved as identical sense. On the noetic side, the correlate of this sense is preserved, and further the whole form of articulation into theses and syntheses.

Now, however, a new essential modification arises. The pure Ego can *withdraw* entirely from the theses. It *releases* the thetic correlates *from its grip*; it "*turns to another theme*." What was just

now its theme (theoretical, axiological, etc.), with all its articulations, however much or little they may be obscured, has not vanished from consciousness. It is still conscious, but no longer in the thematic grip.

This holds for isolated theses as well as for members of syntheses. I am just now thinking something over; a whistle from the street distracts me for a moment from my theme (here a theme of thought). There is a moment of turning toward the sound, but at once a return to the old theme. The apprehension of the sound is not extinguished; the whistle is still conscious in a modified way, but no longer in the mind's grip. It does not belong to the theme—nor to a parallel theme either. [255] One notices that this possibility of simultaneous themes and thematic syntheses points to further possible modifications, since such themes may *interpenetrate* and "*disturb*" one another. Indeed the title "*theme*," related to all basic kinds of acts and act-syntheses, constitutes an important theme of phenomenological analyses.

§ 123. CONFUSION AND DISTINCTNESS AS MODES OF PERFORMANCE OF SYNTHETIC ACTS

A thought can surface confusedly as a whole and then be articulated distinctly step by step.

Let us now consider, in addition, modalities of performance that lie, so to speak, in the opposite direction from the privileged mode of actuality welling up from its primal source. A thought, simple or equipped with manifold theses, can emerge as a "*confused*" thought. It then presents itself like a simple representation without any actual-thetic articulation. We remember, say, a proof, a theory, a conversation—it "occurs to us." At first we are not turned toward it at all; it emerges in the background. Then a regard of the Ego is directed to it in a single ray, grasping the noematic objectivity in question in an unarticulated grip. Now a new process can begin: the confused recollection passes into a *distinct* and clear one. Step by step we remember the course of the proof, we produce the theses and syntheses of the proof

"again," we run through the stages of yesterday's conversation again, and the like. Naturally, reproduction of this sort is something inessential here: reproduction in the manner of recollection, of producing *earlier* originary productions anew. We may, for instance, have had a *new* theoretical idea for carrying out a complicated theory. At first we had it in a confused, unitary way; then we unfolded it in freely active steps and converted it into synthetic actualities. Everything indicated here is, of course, to be related in the same way to all kinds of acts.

This important distinction between *confusedness* and *distinctness* plays an important role in the phenomenology of "expressions," which are to be discussed further on, and of expressed representations, judgments, emotional acts, and so on. Think only of the way we usually grasp the synthetic formations, always very complex already, that make up the "thought-content" of whatever we happen to be reading. Then consider what, in understanding what we read, comes to really originary actualization with respect to this so-called intellectual substratum of the expressions.

§ 124. THE NOETIC-NOEMATIC STRATUM OF THE "LOGOS." MEANING-INTENDING AND MEANING

Expression is a stratum that fits every sense and lifts it into the conceptual.

256 Interwoven with all the acts considered so far are the expressive act-strata, those that are "logical" in the specific sense. In them, no less than elsewhere, the parallelism of noesis and noema can be made evident. This parallelism conditions a general and unavoidable ambiguity in our ways of speaking, which makes itself felt wherever the relevant relationships come up for discussion. It naturally does so also in talk of expression and meaning. The ambiguity is dangerous only as long as one does not recognize it as such, or has not separated the parallel structures. Once that has been done, however, we need only take care that in each case it is beyond doubt to which of the structures our statements are meant to refer.

We start from the familiar distinction between the sensuous, so to speak bodily, side of an expression and its non-sensuous, "mental" side. We need not go into a closer discussion of the former, nor into the manner in which the two sides are united. Of course these, too, are titles for phenomenological problems that are not unimportant.

We look exclusively at "meaning-intending" and "meaning." Originally these words relate only to the linguistic sphere, to that of "expressing." But it is almost unavoidable, and at the same time an important step in knowledge, to extend the meaning of these words and to modify it suitably. In this way it comes to apply, in a certain way, to the whole noetic-noematic sphere: that is, to all acts, whether or not these are interwoven with expressive acts.[75] So we too have constantly spoken of "sense" in connection with all intentional lived experiences—a word that is, after all, generally used as equivalent to "meaning." For the sake of clarity, we shall prefer the word meaning for the old concept, particularly in the complex phrase "*logical*" or "*expressive*" *meaning*.[76] We continue to use the word sense in its more comprehensive range.

To start from an example, suppose that an object stands there in perception with a determinate sense, posited monothetically in its [257] determinate fullness. We then carry out an explicating of what is given and a relating positing-in-one of the parts or moments brought into relief: say, according to the schema "This is white." Such a step normally follows quite naturally upon the first, simple perceptual grasp. This process does not require the least bit of "expression." It needs neither expression in the sense of verbal sound nor anything like verbal meaning-intending, which latter can indeed be present here independently of the verbal sound (as when this has been "forgotten"). But if we have

75 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. in this regard *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, pp. 28 f. There a distinction is already drawn between the "psychological description of a phenomenon" and the "statement of its meaning," and a "logical content" is spoken of as opposed to the psychological one.

76 German *Bedeuten* (the act of meaning something) and *Bedeutung* (the meaning meant); the pair follows the noesis–noema parallel.

"*thought*" or *stated* "This is white," a new stratum is there along with it, united with what is "meant as *such*" purely perceptually. In this way everything remembered, everything phantasied, as such, can also be explicated and expressed. Every "meant as such," every intending in the noematic sense (and indeed as noematic core) of any act whatever, *can be expressed through "meanings."* In general, then, we lay down:

Logical meaning is an expression.

The verbal sound can be called an expression only because the meaning belonging to it expresses; the expressing lies originally in the meaning. "Expression" is a remarkable form. It can be adapted to every "sense" (to the noematic core), and it raises that sense into the realm of the "logos," of the *conceptual*, and thereby of the "*general*."

Here the last words are understood in a quite definite meaning, which must be kept distinct from other meanings of these words. In general, what has just been indicated marks out a great theme of phenomenological analyses, analyses that are fundamental for the essential clarification of logical thinking and its correlates. In noetic respects, the heading "expressing" is meant to designate a particular act-stratum. All other acts can be adapted to this stratum in their own way and can fuse with it remarkably, precisely in such a way that every noematic act-sense, and consequently the relation to objectivity lying in it, is "conceptually" stamped in the noematic component of expressing. What we have here is a peculiar intentional medium. By its essence it has the distinctive feature of, so to speak, mirroring every other intentionality according to form and content, of depicting it in its own coloring, and in doing so of imprinting on it its own form of "conceptuality." Yet these ways of speaking of mirroring or depicting, which force themselves upon us, must be taken with caution, since the figurative language that mediates their application could easily mislead.

[258] Extraordinarily difficult problems are bound up with the phenomena belonging under the headings meaning-intending

and meaning.[77] Every science, according to its theoretical content, according to everything in it that is "doctrine" (theorem, proof, theory), is objectivated in the specifically "logical" medium, the medium of expression. Hence, for philosophers and psychologists guided by general logical interests, the problems of expression and meaning are the most immediate ones. They are then also the first problems of all that, as soon as one seriously tries to get to the bottom of them, press on toward phenomenological investigations of essence. From there one is led to the questions of how "expressing" is to be understood in relation to what is "expressed," how expressed lived experiences stand to unexpressed ones, and what the latter undergo when expressing is added to them. One will find oneself referred to their "intentionality," to the sense immanent in them, to "matter" and quality (i.e., the act-character of the thesis). One will be referred to the distinction between this sense and these essential moments, which lie in the pre-expressive, and the meaning of the expressing phenomenon itself together with the moments proper to that meaning, and so on. Present-day literature still shows in many ways how little the great problems indicated here are usually appreciated in their full, deep-lying sense.

The stratum of expression—and this makes up its peculiarity—is not productive, apart from the fact that it lends expression precisely to all other intentional components. Or, if one prefers: *its productivity, its noematic accomplishment, exhausts itself in expressing* and in the form *of the conceptual* that comes in anew with expressing.

Here the expressing stratum is completely one in essence, as regards its thetic character, with the stratum that undergoes expression. In the coincidence it takes the essence of that lower stratum into itself so fully that we call expressed representing simply representing, and expressed believing, supposing and doubting themselves, and as wholes, believing, supposing and doubting. Likewise we call expressed wishing or willing simply

77 HUSSERL'S NOTE. As can be seen from Volume II of the *Logical Investigations*, in which they form a main theme.

wishing and willing. That the difference [259] between positionality and neutrality also passes over into what is expressed is evident, and we have already mentioned it above. The *expressing stratum cannot have a positional or neutral thesis qualified otherwise* than that of *the stratum undergoing expression*, and in the coincidence we find not two theses to be distinguished but only *one thesis*.[78]

The full clarification of the structures that belong here presents considerable difficulties. It is not easy even to recognize that, after abstraction from the sensuous stratum of the verbal sound, there really is still a stratification of the kind we have presupposed here. In every case, then, even in that of a thinking however unclear, empty and merely verbal, there would be a stratum of expressing meaning-intending and a substratum of what is expressed. And understanding the essential connections of these stratifications is harder still. For we must not ask too much of the image of stratification. Expression is not something like a coat of varnish laid over something else, or like a garment drawn over it. It is a mental forming, which exercises new intentional functions on the intentional substratum and correlatively undergoes intentional functions from it. What this new image signifies in turn must be studied in the phenomena themselves and in all their essential modifications. Particularly important is an understanding of the different sorts of "generality" that appear here. On the one hand, there is the generality belonging to every expression and every moment of expression, even to the non-independent "is," "not," "and," "if," etc. On the other hand, there is the generality of "general names" like "human being," in contrast to proper names like "Bruno." And again, there is the generality belonging to an essence that is in itself syntactically formless, as compared with the various generalities of meaning just touched on.

78 HUSSERL'S NOTE. In fact this was the path by which the *Logical Investigations* sought to penetrate into phenomenology. A second path, from the opposite side, namely from the side of experience and sensuous givens, which the author had likewise been pursuing since the early 1890s, did not find full expression in that work.

§ 125. MODES OF PERFORMANCE IN THE LOGICAL-EXPRESSIVE SPHERE AND THE METHOD OF CLARIFICATION

Clarification needs distinctness in the logical stratum and intuition in the stratum it expresses.

Clearly, to clarify the difficulties indicated, special regard must be paid to the differences in modes of actuality treated above:[79] the modalities of act-performance, which concern expressed theses and syntheses as they concern all theses and syntheses. But they do so in a *twofold* way. On the one hand, they concern the stratum of meaning, the specifically logical stratum itself; on the other, the founding substrata.

260 In reading, we can perform each meaning in articulated fashion and in free activity, and in doing so we can synthetically link meanings with meanings in the prescribed way. In this *performance of the acts of meaning* in the *mode of genuine production*, we attain perfect *distinctness of "logical" understanding*.

This distinctness can pass over into confusedness in all the modes described above: the sentence just read sinks into obscurity, loses its living articulation; it ceases to be our *theme, to be still* in our *grasp*.

Such distinctness and confusedness, however, must be distinguished from the distinctness and confusedness that concern the expressed substrata. A distinct understanding of words and sentences (or a distinct, articulated performance of the acts of stating) is compatible with *confusedness of the underlying strata*. This confusedness means not merely unclarity, although it means that too. The substratum can be (and usually is) a confused unity. It does not actually bear its articulation within itself, but owes it to the mere adaptation of the stratum of logical expression, which really is articulated and performed in original actuality.

This has a highly important methodological significance. We become aware that our earlier discussions of the *method of clari-*

79 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 122, p. 253 f.

fication[1] need essential supplementation with regard to statement, which is the vital element of science. What is needed in order to get from confused thinking to genuine and fully explicit cognition, to the distinct and at the same time clear performance of acts of thinking, is now easily indicated. First, all "*logical*" *acts* (those of meaning-intending), insofar as they were still performed in the mode of confusedness, must be brought over into the mode of originary spontaneous actuality; that is, perfect *logical distinctness* must be produced. But then the analogous must also be accomplished in the founding *substratum*: everything unliving must be turned into something living, all confusedness into distinctness, but also everything non-intuitive into something intuitive. Only when we carry out this work in the substratum does the method described earlier come into action, unless incompatibilities that become visible in the substratum make further work superfluous. Here it must be taken into account that the concept of intuition, of clear consciousness, carries over from monothetic to synthetic acts.[80]

261 For the rest, as a deeper analysis shows, what matters is the kind *of evidence* that is to be attained in each case, or the stratum to which that evidence is directed. All evidences relating to *purely logical* relations, to essential connections of noematic *meanings* (thus the evidences we obtain of the fundamental laws of formal logic), require precisely the givenness of meanings, namely the givenness of expressing propositions of the forms prescribed by the meaning-law in question. Because meanings are non-independent, the exemplification of the logical essential formations that mediates the evidence of the law also carries substrata along with it, namely those substrata that undergo logical expression. But *these substrata need not* be *brought to clarity when* a *purely logical insight is at issue*. With corresponding modification, this holds for all applied logical-analytic cognitions.

80 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 67, p. 125.

§ 126. COMPLETENESS AND GENERALITY OF EXPRESSION

Expressions may be incomplete, and by their generality never reflect every particular of what they express.

Further, the difference between *complete* and *incomplete expression* must be emphasized.[1] The unity of what expresses and what is expressed in the phenomenon is indeed that of a certain coincidence, but the upper stratum need not extend expressively over the whole substratum. The expression is complete if it *stamps all the synthetic forms and matters of the substratum conceptually, in terms of meaning*. It is incomplete if it does so only partially: as when, in view of a complex event—say, the arrival of the carriage bringing the long-awaited guests—we call into the house: The carriage! The guests!—Obviously this difference in completeness intersects with that of relative clarity and distinctness.[81]

A totally different incompleteness from the one just discussed is the incompleteness that belongs to the essence of expression as such, namely to its *generality*. The "may" expresses the wish generally, the imperative form the command, the "probably" the supposition, or the supposed as such, and so on. Everything that determines more closely within the unity of the expression is itself in turn expressed generally. It lies in the sense of the generality belonging to the essence of expressing that never can all the particularizations of what is expressed [262] be reflected in the expression. The stratum of meaning-intending is not, and in principle is not, a kind of reduplication of the substratum. Whole dimensions of variability in the substratum do not enter into expressing meaning-intending at all; they, or their correlates, do not "express themselves" at all: so it is with the modifications of relative clarity and distinctness, the attentional modifications, and so on. But even within what the particular sense of talk of expression indicates, there are essential differences,

81 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, 4th Investigation, § 6 ff.

for instance with respect to the way in which synthetic forms and synthetic materials find expression.

Here we must also point to the "non-independence" of all form-meanings and of all "syncategorematic" meanings in general. The isolated "and" or "if," the isolated genitive "of the sky," is understandable, and yet non-independent, in need of completion. The question here is what this need of completion signifies, what it signifies with respect to the two strata and with regard to the possibilities of incomplete meaning-intending.[82][83]

§ 127. EXPRESSION OF JUDGMENTS AND EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONAL NOEMATA

Husserl asks whether every expression, even of wishes and commands, is at bottom doxic.

Clarity must be reached on all these points if one of the oldest and most difficult problems of the sphere of meaning is to be solved. Precisely for want of the requisite phenomenological insights, this problem has remained unsolved until now: the problem of how *stating, as the expression of judging, is related to the expressions of other acts*. We have expressed predications, in which a "That is how it is!" comes to expression. We have expressed suppositions, questions, doubts, expressed wishes, commands, and so on. Linguistically, sentence-forms present themselves here that are in part peculiarly constructed but open to two interpretations: alongside declarative sentences stand interrogative sentences, sentences of supposition, optative sentences, imperative sentences, and so on. The original dispute concerned whether, setting aside the grammatical verbal sound and its historical forms, these are co-ordinate kinds of meaning, or whether all these sentences are not in truth, according to their meaning, declarative sentences. In the latter case, all the act-formations belonging to them—e.g., those of the emotional

82 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. loc. cit., § 5, pp. 296–307.

83 "Syncategorematic" is a term from medieval logic for words such as "and" or "if" that have a meaning only together with other terms.

sphere, which are *in themselves* not acts of judgment—could therefore come to "expression" only by the detour of a judging founded in them.

[263] However, relating the problem entirely to the acts, the noeses, is inadequate. And the constant overlooking of the noemata, toward which our regard is directed precisely in such reflections on meaning, hinders an understanding of the matters at issue. In general, merely in order to press through to correct formulations of the problems here, we need to take account of the various structures we have pointed out. We need the general knowledge of the noetic and noematic correlation as one that runs through all intentional components, through all thetic and synthetic strata. We need, likewise, the separation of the logical stratum of meaning from the substratum it is to express. We need, further, insight into the directions of reflection and directions of modification that are essentially possible here, as elsewhere in the intentional sphere. Specifically, however, we need insight into the ways in which every consciousness can be converted into a consciousness of judgment, into how *states of affairs* of noetic and noematic kind can be drawn out of every consciousness. The *radical problem* to which we are finally led back is, as emerges from the context of this whole last series of problem-analyses, to be formulated as follows:

Is the medium of expressing meaning-intending, this peculiar medium of the logos, a specifically doxic one? In the adaptation of meaning-intending to what is meant, does it not coincide with the doxic element lying in all positionality itself?

Naturally, this would not exclude there being several ways of expressing, say, emotional lived experiences. Only one of them would be the direct one, namely the simple expression of the lived experience (or, for the correlative sense of talk of expression, of its noema) through the immediate adaptation of an articulated expression to the articulated emotional lived experience, the doxic coinciding with the doxic. It would therefore be the *doxic* form inherent in all components of the emotional lived experience that made the expression adaptable to that lived

experience. The expression is an exclusively doxothetic lived experience; the emotional lived experience, as such and in all its members, is multiply thetic, and among these, necessarily, doxothetic as well.

More precisely, this *direct* expression, if it is to be faithful and complete, would belong only to lived experiences that are *doxically non-modalized*. If I am not certain in my wishing, then it is not correct for me to say, in direct adaptation: May S be p. For on the view taken as basis here, all expressing [264] is a doxic act in the pregnant sense, i.e., a certainty of belief.[84] It can therefore express only certainties (e.g., certainties of wishing or of willing). In such cases a faithful expression can only be achieved indirectly, say in the form: "May S perhaps be p." As soon as modalities appear, recourse must be had to the doxic theses that lie, so to speak, hidden in them, with altered thetic matter, in order to obtain an expression that is as well adapted as possible.

If we accept this view as correct, the following would still have to be set out by way of supplement:

There are always *several possibilities of indirect expressions by way of detours*. To the essence of every objectivity as such, whatever acts may constitute it, whether simple ones or multiply and synthetically founded ones, there belong many possibilities of relating explication. Hence every act, e.g., an act of wishing, can be joined by various acts related to it, to its noematic objectivity, to its whole noema: nexuses of subject-theses with predicate-theses set upon them, in which, for instance, what is meant-as-wished in the original act is unfolded in judgments and expressed accordingly. The expression is then directly adapted *not to the original phenomenon*, but to the *predicative phenomenon derived* from it.

Here it must always be noted that *explicative* or *analytic synthesis* (judgment prior to conceptual expression in terms of

84 HUSSERL'S NOTE. One must not say that an expressing expresses a doxic act if, as we do everywhere here, one understands by expressing the meaning-intending itself. But if one relates talk of expressing to the verbal sound, one could very well speak in the manner in question; the sense, however, would then be completely changed.

meaning), then statement or *judgment* in the *ordinary sense*, and finally doxa (belief) are matters to be carefully kept apart. What is called "theory of judgment" is something badly ambiguous. The essential clarification of the idea of doxa is something other than the clarification of statement or of explications.[85] 265

85 HUSSERL'S NOTE. On this whole section compare the concluding chapter of the 6th Investigation, *Logical Investigations* II. One sees that the author has not stood still in the meantime, but also that, despite much that is contestable and immature, the analyses there move in the direction of progress. They have been disputed on several occasions, but without any real engagement with the new motives of thought and formulations of problems that were attempted there.

Section Four: Reason and Actuality

Vierter Abschnitt: Vernunft und Wirklichkeit
Noematic sense and the relation to the object, evidence and insight, and the problems of constitution.

VIERTER ABSCHNITT. VERNUNFT UND WIRKLICHKEIT. ERSTES KAPITEL. DER NOEMATISCHE SINN UND DIE BEZIEHUNG AUF DEN GEGENSTAND. § 128. EINLEITUNG.

The phenomenological wanderings of the last chapter have led us into pretty well all intentional spheres. Everywhere, guided by the radical viewpoint of distinguishing between really inherent and intentional analysis, between noetic and noematic analysis, we came upon structures branching out ever anew. We can no longer close our minds to the insight that this distinction does in fact concern a fundamental structure running through all intentional structures. This structure must therefore form a dominant leitmotif of phenomenological method and determine the course of all investigations relating to the problems of intentionality.

At the same time it is clear that with this distinction, *eo ipso*, a distinction between two radically opposed and yet essentially interrelated regions of being has come into relief. We emphasized earlier that consciousness in general must count as a region of being in its own right. But we then recognized that the essential description of consciousness leads back to that of what is conscious in it, that the correlate of consciousness is inseparable from consciousness and yet not really inherent in it. Thus the noematic separated off as an objectivity belonging to consciousness and yet *peculiar in kind*. We note in this connection:

whereas objects simpliciter (understood in the unmodified sense) fall under fundamentally different highest genera, all object-senses and all noemata taken completely, however different they may otherwise be, are in principle of a single highest genus. But then it also holds that the essences noema and noesis are inseparable from each other: every lowest difference on the noematic side refers back eidetically to lowest differences on the noetic side. This naturally carries over to all formations of genera and species.

Recognizing the essential two-sidedness of intentionality, as noesis and noema, has the consequence that a systematic phenomenology must not aim one-sidedly at a really inherent analysis [266] of lived experiences, and specifically of intentional ones. At the beginning, however, the temptation to do so is very great. The historical and natural route from psychology to phenomenology brings with it that one takes the immanent study of pure lived experiences, the study of their own essence, as a matter of course to be a study of their really inherent components.[1] In truth, great fields of eidetic research open up on both sides; they are constantly related to each other and yet, as it turns out, separate over long stretches. To a large extent, what has been taken for act-analysis, for noetic analysis, has been obtained entirely with one's regard directed to the "meant as such," and so it was noematic structures that were being described.

In our next considerations we want to turn our attention to the general structure of the noema from a point of view that has often been mentioned so far but has not been the guiding one for noematic analysis: the *phenomenological problem of the relation of consciousness to an objectivity* has above all its noematic side. The noema in itself has objective relation, and it has it through the "sense" proper to it. We may then ask how the "sense" of consciousness gets to the "object" that is its own, an

1 HUSSERL'S NOTE. This is still the attitude of the *Logical Investigations*. However considerably the nature of the matters there compels noematic analyses to be carried out, these are still regarded more as indices of the parallel noetic structures; the essential parallelism of the two structures has not yet come to clarity there.

object that can be "the same" in manifold acts of very different noematic content, and how we see this in the sense. If we do, new structures emerge whose extraordinary significance is evident. For if we proceed in this direction, and on the other hand reflect on the parallel noeses, we finally come upon the question of what the "pretension" of consciousness actually to "relate" to something objective, to be "cogent," really signifies, and of how "valid" and "invalid" objective relation are to be clarified phenomenologically in terms of noesis and noema. With this we stand before the great *problems of reason*. To elucidate them on transcendental ground, and to formulate them as *phenomenological* problems, will be our aim in this Part.

§ 129. "CONTENT" AND "OBJECT"; CONTENT AS "SENSE"

Every noema has a content, its sense, through which it relates to its object.

In our analyses so far a universal noematic structure has constantly played its role. It was designated by the separation [267] of a certain noematic "*core*" from the "*characters*" that belong to it in alternation, and with which the noematic concretion appears drawn into the flux of modifications of various kinds. This core had not yet come into its scientific rights. It stood out intuitively, as a unity, and clearly enough that we could refer to it in general terms. Now it is time to consider it more closely and to place it at the center of phenomenological analysis. As soon as one does so, differences of universal significance stand out, running through all genera of acts and guiding large groups of investigations.

We take our start from the customary equivocal talk of the content of consciousness. As content we take the "sense" of which we say that in it or through it consciousness relates to something objective as "its own." As, so to speak, the title and goal of our discussion we take the proposition:

Every noema has a "*content*," namely its "sense," and through it relates to *its object*.

In recent times one often hears it praised as a great advance that the fundamental distinction between act, content and object has at last been achieved. In this combination the three words have by now become slogans, especially since Twardowski's fine treatise.[2] This author's merit in having discussed certain commonly prevailing confusions with acuity and made their errors evident was great and beyond doubt. Nevertheless, it must be said that in clarifying the conceptual essences in question he did not get significantly beyond what was well known to the philosophers of earlier generations (despite their incautious confusions); and this is not to be counted against him as a reproach. A radical advance was simply not possible before a systematic phenomenology of consciousness.[3] Phenomenologically unclarified concepts like "act," "content," "object" of "representations" are of no help to us. What cannot be called an act, and above all, what cannot be called the content of a representation, and representation itself! And what can be so called must itself be known scientifically.

In this respect a first step, and, as it would seem to me, a necessary one, had been attempted through the phenomenological distinguishing of "*matter*" and "quality," through the idea of the "intentional essence" as distinguished from the "cognitive essence." The one-sidedness of the noetic direction of regard in which these distinctions were made and [268] meant is easily overcome by taking account of the noematic parallels. We can thus understand the concepts noematically: the "quality" (judgment-quality, wish-quality, etc.) is nothing other than what we have so far treated as "positing character," "thetic character" in the widest sense. The expression, which stems from contemporary psychology (Brentano's), now seems to me not very apt. Every peculiar thesis has its quality, but it is not itself to be designated as quality. Clearly, the "*matter*," which is in each case the What

2 HUSSERL'S NOTE. K. Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* [On the Doctrine of the Content and Object of Representations], Vienna 1894.
3 Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), Polish philosopher and student of Brentano, whose 1894 treatise distinguished the content from the object of a representation.

that receives its positing characterization from the "quality," now corresponds to the "noematic core."

The task now is the consistent development of this beginning: the deeper clarification and further analysis of these concepts, and their correct carrying through into all noetic-noematic domains. Every genuinely successful advance in this direction must be of exceptional significance for phenomenology. For we are dealing not with specialties standing off to the side, but with essential moments that belong to the central structure of every intentional lived experience.

To come a little closer to the matters themselves, let us take up the following consideration.

The intentional lived experience has, as people usually say, "*relation to something objective*"; but one also says that it *is "consciousness of something*," e.g., consciousness of a blossoming apple tree, the one here in this garden. In view of such examples we will not at first think it necessary to keep the two ways of speaking apart. If we recall our preceding analyses, we find the full noesis related to the full noema as its intentional and full What. But then it is clear that this relation cannot be the one meant when we speak of the relation of consciousness to what is intentionally objective to it. For to every noetic moment, specifically to every thetic-noetic one, there corresponds a moment in the noema; and in the noema the noematic core, characterized by the complex of thetic characters, separates off from that complex. Let us further recall the "regard upon," which under certain circumstances passes through the noesis (through the actual *cogito*) and transforms the specifically thetic moments into rays of the Ego's positing actuality. And let us pay close attention to how this Ego now, with these rays, as grasping being, or as supposing, wishing, etc., "directs" itself toward something objective, how its regard passes through the noematic core. We then become aware that talk of the relation (and specifically the "direction") of consciousness to what is objective to it refers us to an innermost [269] moment of the noema. It is not the core just designated itself, but something

that makes up, so to speak, the necessary central point of the core and functions as the "bearer" of noematic peculiarities belonging specifically to it, namely of the noematically modified properties of the "meant as such."

As soon as we go into this more closely, we become aware that the distinction between "*content*" and "object" is in fact to be made not only for "consciousness," for the intentional lived experience, but also for the *noema taken in itself*. Thus the noema too relates to an object and possesses a "content" "by means of" which it relates to the object; and the object is the same as that of the noesis. So the "parallelism" once again proves itself throughout.

§ 130. DELIMITATION OF THE ESSENCE "NOEMATIC SENSE"

The noematic sense is the object meant exactly as meant, described in modified, quoted terms.

Let us bring these remarkable structures closer. We simplify the consideration by leaving attentional modifications out of account, and further by restricting ourselves to positional acts in whose theses we live. Depending on the sequence of levels of founding, we may live predominantly now in one partial thesis, now in another, while the others are indeed being performed, but in a secondary function. That our analyses do not suffer in the least from such simplifications, as regards the generality of their validity, can be made evident afterwards and without further ado. What concerns us is precisely an essence that is insensitive to such modifications.

So let us put ourselves into a living *cogito*. According to its essence it has, in a distinctive sense, a direction toward an objectivity. In other words, to its noema belongs an "objectivity"—in quotation marks—with a certain noematic stock. This stock unfolds in a description of definite delimitation, namely one that, as a *description of the "meant objective something, just as it is meant," avoids all "subjective" expressions*. Formal-ontological expressions are used here, *such as* "object," "property," "state of

affairs"; material-ontological expressions such as "thing," "figure," "cause"; determinations with material content such as "rough," "hard," "*colored*." All of them have their quotation marks, and thus the noematically modified sense. *Excluded*, on the other hand, from the description of this meant objective something as such are expressions like "perceptually," [270] "in memory," "with clear intuition," "in thought," "given." They belong to another dimension of descriptions: not to the objective something that is conscious, but to the *way in which it is conscious*. By contrast, in the case of an appearing thing-object it would again fall within the framework of the description in question to say: its "front side" is *determined* thus and so as to color, shape, etc.; its "back side" has "a" color, but one "*not more closely determined*"; in this or that respect it is altogether "*undetermined*" whether it is thus or so.

This holds not only for natural objects but quite generally, e.g., for value-objectivities. Their description includes that of the meant "matter" and, in addition, the statement of the predicates of "value," as when we say of the appearing tree, in the sense of our valuing intention, that it is covered with "gloriously" fragrant blossoms. The value-predicates, too, have their quotation marks here: they are not predicates of a value simpliciter, but of a value-noema.

Clearly, this delimits a quite *fixed content in every noema*. Every consciousness has its What, and every consciousness means "its" objective something. It is evident that for every consciousness we must, in principle, be able to carry out such a noematic description of it, "exactly as it is meant." Through explication and conceptual grasp we obtain a closed sum-total of formal or material "*predicates*," predicates determined in their material content or even "undetermined" ("emptily" meant!); and these, in their *modified meaning*, determine the "*content*" of the object-core of the noema in question.

§ 131. THE "OBJECT," THE "DETERMINABLE X IN THE NOEMATIC SENSE"

At the center of every sense stands a pure X, the bearer of its changing predicates.

The predicates, however, are predicates of "*something*," and this "something" also belongs, and evidently inseparably, to the core in question: it is the central point of unity of which we spoke above. It is the point of connection or "bearer" of the predicates, but by no means their unity in the sense in which some complex, some combination of the predicates, would be called a unity. It must necessarily be distinguished from them, although it is not to be placed beside them or separated from them, [271] just as, conversely, they themselves are *its* predicates: unthinkable without it and yet distinguishable from it. We say that in the continuous or synthetic course of consciousness the intentional Object is constantly conscious, but that in this course it gives itself ever anew differently. We say that it is "*the same*," only given in other predicates, with another content of determination; that "it" only shows itself from different sides, the predicates that had remained undetermined having become more closely determined; or that "the" Object has remained unchanged over this stretch of givenness, but that now "it," the identical, changes, gains in beauty through this change, loses in utility value, and so on. If all this is consistently understood as noematic description of what is meant in each case as such, and if this description is carried out, as is always possible, in pure adequation, then the identical intentional "object" evidently separates off from the changing and alterable "predicates." What separates off *as a central noematic moment* is the "*object*," the "Object," the "*identical*," the "determinable subject of its possible predicates"—the pure X *in abstraction from all predicates*. It separ-

ates off from these predicates, or more precisely, from the predicate-noemata.[4]

To the *one* Object we assign manifold modes of consciousness, acts, or act-noemata. Clearly, this is nothing accidental. No Object is thinkable unless manifold intentional lived experiences are also thinkable, connected in continuous or in genuinely synthetic (polythetic) unity, in which "it," the Object, is conscious as identical and yet in noematically different ways: in such a way that the characterized core is changeable, while the "object," the pure subject of the predicates, is precisely identical. It is clear that we can already regard every partial stretch of the immanent duration of an act as an "act," and the total act as a certain concordant unity of the continuously connected acts. We can then say: several act-noemata here everywhere have *different cores*, yet in such a way that they nevertheless *join together into a unity of identity*, a unity in which the "something," the determinable, which lies in every core, is conscious as identical.

But in the same way *separate* acts, such as two perceptions, or a perception and a memory, can join together into a "concordant" unity. By virtue of the peculiar character of this joining, which is evidently not foreign to the essence of the [272] joined acts, the something of the initially *separate cores*, possibly determined one way at one time and another way at another, is now conscious as the same something, or as concordantly the same "object."

Thus in every noema there lies such a pure objective something as a point of unity. At the same time we see how, in noematic respects, two concepts of object are to be distinguished: this pure point of unity, this noematic "*object simpliciter*," and the "*object in the How of its determinations*," including the indeterminacies that in each case "remain open" and are comeant in this mode. Here this "How" is to be taken exactly as what the act in question prescribes, as what thus actually

4 HUSSERL'S NOTE. This emptiness of indeterminacy must not be confused with emptiness of intuition, the emptiness of an obscure representation.

belongs to its noema. The "sense" of which we have repeatedly spoken *is this noematic "object* in the How," with everything that *the description characterized above* is able to find evidently in it and express conceptually.

Note that we have now cautiously said "sense," not "core." For it will turn out that, in order to obtain the actual, concretely complete core of the noema, we must still take into account a dimension of differences that finds no expression in the description characterized above, the description that for us defines the sense. If for the moment we keep purely to what that description grasps, then the "sense" is a fundamental component of the noema. In general it changes from noema to noema; but under certain circumstances it is absolutely alike, and possibly even characterized as "identical"—namely, insofar as the "object in the How of its determinations" stands there on both sides as the same and as to be described absolutely alike. In no noema can the sense be lacking, nor can its necessary center, the point of unity, the pure determinable X. No "sense" without the "*something*," and again, none without "*determining content*." Here it is evident that such things are not first put in by subsequent analysis and description, but that, as a condition of the possibility of evident description and prior to it, they actually lie in the correlate of consciousness.

Through the bearer of sense belonging to the sense (as empty X), and through the *possibility, grounded in the essence of senses, of concordant combination into unities of sense of any level*, not only does every sense have its "object"; different senses also relate to *the same* object, precisely insofar as they [273] can be ordered into unities of sense in which *the determinable* X*s of the unified senses come into coincidence with one another and with the* X *of the total sense of the unity of sense in question*.

What we have set out carries over from monothetic acts to *synthetic* ones, or more distinctly, to polythetic ones. In a thetically articulated consciousness each member has the noematic structure described; each has its X with its "determining content." But in addition, the noema of the synthetic total act has,

with reference to the "archontic"[5] thesis, the synthetic X and *its* determining content. In the performance of the act, the ray of regard of the pure Ego divides into a multiplicity of rays and goes to the Xs that come to synthetic unity. In the nominalizing transformation the synthetic total phenomenon is modified, and in such a way that a ray of actuality goes to the highest synthetic X.

§ 132. THE CORE AS SENSE IN THE MODE OF ITS FULLNESS

The full core is the sense together with its degree of intuitive fullness and clarity.

The sense, as we have determined it, is *not a concrete essence* within the total content of the noema, but a kind of abstract form dwelling in it. For if we hold the sense fixed, that is, the "meant" exactly with the content of determination in which it is meant, then a *second* concept of the "object in the How" clearly results: the object in the *How of its modes of givenness*. If here we disregard attentional modifications and all differences of the kind that the differences in modes of performance are, then—always within the preferred sphere of positionality—the differences in the fullness of clarity come into consideration, which are so decisive for cognition. Something obscurely conscious as such and the same thing clearly conscious are very different with regard to their noematic concretion, just as the whole lived experiences are. But nothing prevents the content of determination with which the obscurely conscious is meant from being absolutely identical with that of the clearly conscious. The descriptions would coincide, and a synthetic consciousness of unity could encompass both sides of consciousness in such a way that it really was a matter of the same thing meant. Accordingly, as the *full core* we shall count precisely the full concretion of the noematic component in question, that is, the sense *in the mode of its fullness*.

5 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 114, p. 242.

§ 133. THE NOEMATIC PROPOSITION. THETIC AND SYNTHETIC PROPOSITIONS. PROPOSITIONS IN THE DOMAIN OF REPRESENTATIONS

Sense plus thetic character forms a "proposition," extended to perceptions, wishes and commands.

274 What would now be needed is a careful carrying out of these distinctions in all domains of acts, together with supplementary consideration of the *thetic moments*, which have a special relation to the sense as something noematic. In the *Logical Investigations* these thetic moments (under the title quality) were taken from the outset into the concept of sense (of the "meaning-essence"), and so within this unity the two components "matter" (sense in the present understanding) and quality were distinguished.[6] It seems more fitting, however, to define the term sense merely as that "matter," and then to designate the unity of sense and thetic character as proposition. We then have *single-membered propositions* (as in perceptions and other thetic intuitions) and many-membered, *synthetic propositions*, such as predicative doxic propositions (judgments), propositions of supposition with predicatively articulated matter, and so on.[7] Further, *propositions of liking, propositions of wishing, propositions of command*, and so on, are single-membered as well as many-membered. The concept of proposition is thereby extended extraordinarily, and perhaps disconcertingly, to be sure; but it remains within the framework of an important essential unity. For it must constantly be kept in view that for us the concepts sense and proposition contain nothing of expression and conceptual meaning, while on the other hand they include under

6 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Loc. cit., 5th Investigation, §§ 20 and 21, pp. 386–396. Cf. also 6th Investigation, § 25, p. 559. The neutral "having-in-suspense" now naturally counts for us not, as it did there, as one "quality" (thesis) alongside other qualities, but as a modification that "mirrors" all qualities, and thus whole acts in general.

7 "Proposition" renders *Satz* (also "sentence," "thesis"), which Husserl here extends from judgments to the unity of sense and thetic character in any act.

themselves all expressed propositions, or propositional meanings.

According to our analyses, these concepts designate an abstract stratum belonging to the full fabric of all noemata. It is of great consequence for our knowledge to obtain this stratum in its all-embracing generality, that is, to see that it really has its place in *all spheres of acts*. In simple *intuitions*, too, the concepts sense and proposition, which belong inseparably to the concept of object, have their necessary application; the particular concepts *intuitional sense* and *intuitional proposition* must necessarily be coined. Thus, e.g., in the domain of outer perception, the object-sense is to be seen out of the perceived object as such, in abstraction from the character of perceivedness, as something that, prior to all explicating and conceiving thinking, [275] lies in this noema: the *thing-sense of this perception*, which differs from perception to perception (even with regard to "the same" thing). If we take this sense fully, with its intuitive *fullness*, a definite and very important concept of *appearance* results. To these senses correspond propositions: intuitional propositions, representational propositions, perceptual propositions, and so on. A phenomenology of outer intuitions, as such, has to do not with objects simpliciter, in the unmodified sense, but with noemata as correlates of noeses. In such a phenomenology, concepts like those brought out here stand at the center of scientific research.

Returning first to the general theme, we now face the further task of systematically distinguishing the basic kinds of senses: simple senses and synthetic ones (namely, those belonging to synthetic acts), senses of the first level and of higher levels. We follow partly the basic kinds of determinations of content, partly the basic forms of synthetic formations, which play their role in the same way in all domains of meaning. In this way we take into account everything that is a priori determinative, as to form and content, for the general structure of senses, whether it is common to all spheres of consciousness or peculiar to spheres closed off by genus. Proceeding thus, we ascend to the

idea of a systematic and universal theory of the forms of senses (meanings). If we also take into consideration the systematic distinction of positing characters, a *systematic typology of propositions* is thereby initiated at the same time.

§ 134. APOPHANTIC THEORY OF FORMS

The theory of the forms of logical propositions finds its place within a general theory of senses.

One principal task here is to sketch a systematic "analytic" *theory of the forms of "logical" meanings*, or of *predicative propositions*, of "judgments" in the sense of formal logic. This theory takes into account only the forms of *analytic* or *predicative synthesis* and leaves undetermined the terms of sense that enter into these forms. Although this task is a special one, it nevertheless has universal scope, because the heading "predicative synthesis" designates a class of operations possible for all possible kinds of sense. These are operations possible everywhere alike: operations of explication and of the relating apprehension of what has been explicated, as a determination of the subject of determination, as a part of the whole, as the relatum of its referent, and so on. With them are interwoven operations of collection, of disjunction, of [276] hypothetical connection. All this comes prior to any statement and to the expressed or "conceptual" grasp that newly appears with it, a grasp that fits itself to all forms and materials as their expression by way of meaning.

We have already touched several times on the idea of this theory of forms. As we have shown, it constitutes the lower level, necessary in principle, of a scientific *mathesis universalis*. Through the results of the present investigations it loses its isolation. It acquires its home within the general theory of the forms of senses as such, conceived as an idea, and its ultimate place of origin in noematic phenomenology.

Let us make this somewhat clearer.

The analytic-syntactic operations, we said, are possible operations for all possible senses or propositions. This holds

whatever determining content the noematic sense in each case may contain within itself "unexplicated"; the noematic sense, after all, is nothing other than the "meant" object as such, in the particular how of its determining content. But this sense can always be explicated, and any of the operations essentially connected with explication ("analysis") can always be carried out. The synthetic forms that arise in this way (echoing the grammatical "syntaxes," we have also called them the syntactic forms) are entirely determinate forms belonging to a fixed system of forms. They can be singled out by abstraction and grasped expressly in concepts. Thus we can, for example, treat analytically what is perceived, as such, in a simple perceptual thesis, in a way indicated by the expressions: "This is black, an inkwell; this black inkwell is not white; is, if white, then not black," and the like. With each step we have a new sense: in place of the original one-membered proposition, a synthetic proposition. In accordance with the law of the expressibility of all primal doxic propositions, it can be brought to expression, or to predicative statement. Within the articulated propositions, each member has its syntactic form, which stems from the analytic synthesis.

Let us suppose that the positings belonging to these forms of sense are *primal doxic positings*: then different forms of judgments in the logical sense (*apophantic propositions*) arise. The aim of determining all these forms a priori, of mastering with systematic completeness the infinitely manifold yet lawfully circumscribed formations of form, marks out for us the idea of a *theory of the forms of apophantic propositions, or syntaxes*.

[277] But the positings, and in particular the synthetic total positing, can also be *doxic modalities*. We conjecture, say, and explicate what we are conscious of in the mode "presumably"; or something stands there as questionable, and in the consciousness of questionableness we explicate what is questionable, and so on. Suppose we bring the noematic correlates of these modalities to expression ("S is presumably p," "Is S p?", and the like). Suppose we do the same for the simple predicative judgment

itself, just as we also express affirmation and negation (for example, "S is not p," "S is p after all," "S is certainly, actually p"). *Then the concept of form is thereby enlarged,* and with it the idea of the theory of the forms of propositions. The form is now[8] determined in several ways: partly by the syntactic forms proper, partly by the doxic modalities. Throughout, a total thesis remains belonging to the total proposition, and enclosed in that total thesis is a doxic thesis. At the same time, every such proposition, together with the conceptual "expression" directly fitted to it, can be converted into a declarative proposition. This conversion takes place through an explication of sense and a predication that turns the modal characteristic into a predicate. The result is a judgment that judges about the modality of a content of such-and-such a form (for example, "It is certain, it is possible, probable, that S is p").

The situation is similar to that of the modalities of judgment in the case of *founded theses,* or senses and propositions, of the sphere of *feeling and will,* with the syntheses specifically belonging to them and the corresponding modes of expression. The aim of the new theories of the forms of propositions, and specifically of synthetic propositions, is then easily indicated.

At the same time one sees that *the theory of the forms of all propositions* is mirrored *in a suitably enlarged theory of the forms of doxic propositions.* This holds if, just as we take the modalities of being into the matter of judgment, we take over the modalities of ought in the same way (if this analogizing way of speaking may be permitted). What this taking-over means hardly needs lengthy discussion, but at most illustration by examples. Instead of "May S be p," we say, for instance: "That S be p—may that be so; it is desirable" (not "desired"); instead of "S ought to be p": "That S be p—that ought to be; it is something that ought to be," and so on.

Phenomenology itself does not see its task in the systematic elaboration of these theories of forms. In them, as one can learn

8 HUSSERL'S NOTE. In the sense of the discussion above, § 127, p. 262 ff., and also § 105 f., p. 217 ff.

from the apophantic theory of forms, the systematic possibilities of all further formations are derived deductively from primitive axiomatic [278] basic formations. The field of phenomenology is the analysis of the a priori that can be exhibited in *immediate* intuition: the fixing of immediately insightful essences and essential connections, and their descriptive cognition within the systematic nexus of all strata in transcendentally pure consciousness. The theorizing logician isolates something in the formal theory of meaning and, by virtue of the one-sided direction of his interest, treats it as something on its own, without heeding or understanding the noematic and noetic connections in which it is phenomenologically interwoven. The phenomenologist takes that same thing in its full context. To trace the phenomenological interweavings of essence *in every direction* is his great task. Every simple axiomatic exhibition of a basic logical concept becomes a heading for phenomenological investigations. Consider what is simply set forth there, in the widest logical generality, as a proposition (judgment-proposition), as a categorical or hypothetical proposition, as an attributive determination, a nominalized adjective or relative, and the like. As soon as it is embedded back into the corresponding noematic connections of essence from which the theorizing regard has lifted it, even this yields difficult and far-reaching groups of problems for pure phenomenology.

§ 135. OBJECT AND CONSCIOUSNESS. TRANSITION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF REASON

Everything real is represented in consciousness by senses, which raises the question of actuality.

Every intentional lived experience has a noema, and in it a sense through which it relates to the object. Conversely, everything we call an *object*—what we talk about, what we have before our eyes as actuality, what we hold to be possible or probable, what we think of however indeterminately—is by that very fact already an object of consciousness. And this means that whatever world and actuality in general may be and be called

must be represented, within the framework of actual and possible consciousness, by corresponding senses or propositions filled with more or less intuitive content. Phenomenology carries out "exclusions": as transcendental phenomenology, it brackets all actual positing of realities and carries out the other bracketings we described earlier. We now understand on a deeper basis the sense and correctness of our earlier thesis that everything phenomenologically excluded nevertheless, with a certain change of sign, [279] belongs within the framework of phenomenology.[9] For the real and ideal actualities that fall under the exclusion are represented in the phenomenological sphere by the total manifolds of senses and propositions corresponding to them.

Thus, for example, every actual thing in nature is represented by all the senses and variously fulfilled propositions in which it is the correlate of possible intentional lived experiences, as a thing determined thus and so and still to be further determined. That is, it is represented by the manifolds of full *cores*, or, what amounts to the same here, of all the possible "subjective modes of appearance" in which it can be noematically constituted as identical. This constitution relates, however, first to an individual consciousness possible by essence, and then also to a possible communal consciousness. By this we mean a plurality, possible by essence, of *conscious* lives and streams of consciousness in communication with one another, for which a thing is to be given and identified intersubjectively as the same objectively actual thing. It must always be borne in mind that all our discussions, including the present ones, are to be understood in the sense of the phenomenological reductions and in eidetic generality.

On the other side, the manifolds of possible noetic occurrences correspond to every thing, and ultimately to the whole world of things with its one space and its one time. These are the possible lived experiences of single individuals and of communal individuals that relate to things. As parallels of the

9 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 46, p. 142.

noematic manifolds considered a moment ago, these lived experiences have, in their very essence, the peculiarity of relating to this world of things according to sense and proposition. In them, then, occur the relevant manifolds of hyletic data, with the associated "apprehensions," thetic act-characters, and so on. In their combined unity, these make up precisely what we call *experiential consciousness* of this thinghood. Over against the unity of the thing stands an infinite ideal manifold of noetic lived experiences. Their essential content is quite determinate and, despite its infinity, can be surveyed, and all of them are at one in being consciousness of "the same." This oneness comes to givenness in the sphere of consciousness itself, in lived experiences that in turn also belong to the group we have delimited here.

For the restriction to experiencing consciousness was meant only by way of example, as was the restriction to the "things" [280] of the "world." However widely we stretch the framework, and at whatever level of generality and particularity we move—right down to the lowest concretions—each and every thing is prescribed by essence. The sphere of lived experience is strictly governed by law in its transcendental essential structure. Every possible essential formation in it, according to noesis and noema, is determined as firmly as every possible figure that can be drawn in space is determined by the essence of space—according to unconditionally valid laws. What is called possibility (eidetic existence) here, on both sides, is therefore absolutely necessary possibility: an absolutely fixed member in an absolutely fixed structure of an eidetic system. The scientific cognition of this system is the goal, that is, its theoretical expression and mastery in a system of concepts and statements of law that spring from pure intuition of essence. Formal ontology and the doctrine of categories linked to it make certain fundamental distinctions: the doctrine of the division of the regions of being and their categories of being, and of the constitution of the material ontologies appropriate to them. As we shall understand in detail as we proceed, all of these distinctions are main headings for

phenomenological investigations. To them there necessarily correspond noetic-noematic connections of essence, which must be capable of systematic description and of determination according to possibilities and necessities.

Let us consider more closely what the connections of essence between object and consciousness characterized in the foregoing reflection mean, or were bound to mean. We then become sensible of an ambiguity, and, pursuing it, we notice that we stand before a great turning point in our investigations. We assign to an object manifolds of "propositions," or of lived experiences of a certain noematic content, and we do so in such a way that, through it, syntheses of identification become possible a priori, by virtue of which the object can and must stand there as the same. The X in the different acts, or act-noemata, furnished with different "determining content," is necessarily intended in consciousness as the same. But *is it actually the same*? And *is the object itself "actual"*? Could it not be non-actual, while the manifold concordant and even intuitively fulfilled propositions—propositions of whatever essential content—nonetheless ran their course in consciousness?

We are not interested in the factualities of consciousness and its courses, but we are interested in the essential problems that would have to be formu [281] lated here. Consciousness, or the subject of consciousness itself, *judges* about actuality, asks about it, conjectures, doubts it, resolves the doubt, and in doing so pronounces "*verdicts of reason*." Must it not be possible, within the essential nexus of transcendental consciousness, and therefore purely phenomenologically, to bring to clarity the essence of this legitimacy and, correlatively, the essence of actuality—as related to all kinds of objects, according to all formal and regional categories?

An ambiguity, then, lay in our talk of the noetic-noematic "constitution" of objectivities, for example of thing-objectivities. In any case, in using it we were chiefly thinking of "actual" objects, of things of the "actual world," or at least of "an" actual world in general. But what then does this "actual" mean for

objects that, in terms of consciousness, are after all given only through senses and propositions? What does it mean for these propositions themselves, for the essential kind of these noemata, or of the parallel noeses? What does it mean for the particular ways in which they are structured as to form and fullness? How is this structure particularized according to the particular regions of objects? The question, then, is how, with phenomenological scientific rigor, we are to describe noetically or noematically all the connections of consciousness that make necessary an object simpliciter (which in ordinary speech always means an *actual* object), precisely in its actuality. In a *wider* sense, however, an object—"whether it is actual or not"—is "constituted" in certain connections of consciousness. These connections bear within themselves a unity that can be seen into, insofar as they essentially carry with them the consciousness of an identical X.

Indeed, what has been set out does not concern merely actualities in some pregnant sense. Questions of actuality are lodged in *all* cognitions as such, including our phenomenological cognitions, which relate to the possible constitution of objects: all of them, after all, have their correlates in "objects" that are meant as "actually existing." Everywhere it can be asked: when is the noematically "meant" identity of the X "actual identity" instead of merely meant identity, and what does this "merely meant" signify in each case?

We must therefore devote new reflections to the problems of actuality and to the correlative problems of the rational consciousness that demonstrates actuality within itself.

[282] When one speaks of objects simpliciter, one normally means actual, truly existing objects of the particular category of being. Whatever one then says about the objects—if one speaks rationally—what is meant and stated in doing so must be capable of being "*grounded*," "*demonstrated*," directly "seen," or *mediately "seen into"*. *In principle*, in the logical sphere, the sphere of statement, *"being true" or "being actual" and "being rationally demonstrable" stand in correlation*; and this holds for all doxic

modalities of being or of positing. It goes without saying that the possibility of rational demonstration under discussion here is understood not as an empirical possibility but as an *ideal* one, as a possibility of essence.

CHAPTER TWO. PHENOMENOLOGY OF REASON. § 136. THE FIRST BASIC FORM OF RATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS: ORIGINARILY GIVING "SEEING"

Rational positing is motivated by originary givenness, whether perceptual or eidetic insight.

If we now ask what rational demonstration means, that is, what *rational consciousness* consists in, then the intuitive presentification of examples, and the beginning of an analysis of essence carried out on them, at once present us with several distinctions:

First, the distinction between positional lived experiences in which what is posited comes *to originary givenness* and those in which it does *not* come to such givenness: that is, between "*perceiving*," "*seeing*" *acts—in the widest sense*—and "*non-perceiving*" acts.

Thus a consciousness of memory—say, of a landscape—is not originarily giving: the landscape is not perceived as it would be if we were actually seeing it. By this we by no means wish to say that the consciousness of memory lacks a legitimacy of its own; it is simply not a "seeing" consciousness. Phenomenology exhibits an analogue of this contrast for *all kinds of positional* lived experiences. We can, for example, predicate "blindly" that $2 + 1 = 1 + 2$, but we can also carry out the same judgment in an insightful manner. Then the state of affairs, the synthetic objectivity corresponding to the synthesis of judgment, is originarily given, grasped in an originary way. It is no longer so once the living performance of the insight is over, for the insight immediately fades into a retentional modification. This modification may indeed have a rational [283] advantage over any other obscure or confused consciousness of the same noematic sense—for example, over a "thoughtless" reproduction of something once

learned and perhaps seen into. Yet it is no longer an originarily giving consciousness.

These differences do not concern the pure sense or proposition. For the sense or proposition is identical in the members of each such pair of examples, and can at any time also be seen, in consciousness, to be identical. The difference concerns *the way in which the mere sense or proposition is fulfilled or unfulfilled sense* and proposition. As a mere abstractum, the sense or proposition requires a plus of supplementary moments in the concretion of the noema of consciousness.

Fullness of sense is not the only thing that matters; the how of fulfillment matters as well. One mode in which the sense is lived is the "*intuitive*" mode, in which we are intuitively conscious of the "meant object as such"; and an especially distinguished case here is the one in which the mode of intuition is precisely the originarily giving one. The sense in the perception of the landscape is perceptually fulfilled: we are conscious of the perceived object, with its colors, shapes, and so on (so far as they "fall within the perception"), in the manner of the "in person." We find similar distinctions in all spheres of acts. The situation is again two-sided, in the sense of the parallelism: noetic and noematic. In the attitude directed to the noema, we find the "in-person" character (as originary fulfilledness) fused with the pure sense, and the sense *with this character now functions as the substratum of the noematic positing character*, or, what amounts to the same here, of the character of being. The parallel holds in the attitude directed to the noesis.

But a specific rational character belongs to the positing character as a *distinction* that accrues to it *essentially if and only if* it is a positing on the basis of a fulfilled, originarily giving sense, and not merely on the basis of some sense or other.

Here, and in every kind of rational consciousness, talk of "belonging" takes on a meaning of its own. For example, the positing *belongs* to every in-person appearing of a thing. It is not merely at one with this appearing in some general way (still less as a mere general fact—which is out of the question here). It is at

one with it in a peculiar way: it is *motivated* by it, and yet again not merely in some general way, but "rationally motivated." This [284] amounts to saying: the positing has its *original legitimizing ground* in the originary givenness. In other modes of givenness the legitimizing ground need not be lacking. What is lacking, however, is the priority of the *original* ground, which plays its distinguished role in the relative assessment of legitimizing grounds.

Likewise, the positing of the essence or essential state of affairs given *originarily* in the *seeing of essence* belongs precisely to its positing matter, the "sense" in its mode of givenness. It is a rational positing, and one originally motivated as *certainty of belief*; it has the specific character of "*insightful*" positing. Suppose the positing is a *blind* one, the word-meanings being carried out on the basis of an act-substratum of which we are only obscurely and confusedly conscious. Then the rational character of insight is necessarily lacking. It is *essentially incompatible* with such a mode of givenness (if one still wants to use this word here) of the state of affairs, or with such noematic furnishing of the core of sense. On the other hand, this does not exclude a secondary rational character, as the example of an imperfect re-presentification of cognitions of essence shows.

Insight, and *evidence* in general, is therefore a quite distinctive occurrence. As to its "core," it is the *unity of a rational positing with what essentially motivates it*, and this whole situation can be understood noetically but also noematically. Talk of motivation fits especially well the relation between the (noetic) positing and the noematic proposition *in its mode of fulfilledness*. The expression "*evident proposition*" is immediately intelligible in its noematic meaning.

The word "evidence" has a double sense: it is applied sometimes to noetic characters or full acts (for example, evidence of judging), sometimes to noematic propositions (for example, an evident logical judgment, an evident declarative proposition). This is one case of the general and necessary ambiguities of expressions that relate to moments of the correlation between

noesis and noema. The phenomenological demonstration of their source renders these ambiguities harmless and even lets us recognize that they are indispensable.

It should also be noted that talk of *fulfillment* has yet another double sense, lying in quite a different direction. In one sense it is *fulfillment of the intention*, as a character that the actual *thesis* takes on through the particular mode of the sense. In the other it is precisely the peculiarity of this mode itself, or [285] the peculiarity of the sense in question, of harboring within itself a *fullness* that rationally motivates.

§ 137. EVIDENCE AND INSIGHT. "ORIGINARY" AND "PURE," ASSERTORIC AND APODICTIC EVIDENCE

Evidence is the general term; insight is reserved for apodictic evidence about essences.

The pairs of examples used above also illustrate a *second* and a *third* essential distinction. What we ordinarily call evidence and *insight (or seeing-into)* is a positional doxic consciousness that is, moreover, adequately giving, a consciousness that "excludes being otherwise." The thesis is motivated in a quite exceptional way by the adequate givenness, and it is, in the highest sense, an act of "reason." The arithmetical example illustrates this for us. In the example of the landscape we do have a seeing, but not evidence in the ordinary pregnant sense of the word, not a "seeing-into." Looking more closely, we notice a *twofold difference* in the contrasted examples. In the one example we are dealing with *essences*, in the other with *something individual*. Secondly, the originary givenness in the eidetic example is *adequate*, while in the example from the sphere of experience it is *inadequate*. Both differences, which may intersect under certain circumstances, will prove significant with respect to the kind of evidence.

As regards the first difference, it is to be established phenomenologically that the so-called "*assertoric*" *seeing of something individual*—for example, the "becoming aware" of a thing or of an individual state of affairs—differs essentially in its rational

character from an "*apodictic*" *seeing, from the seeing-into of an essence or essential state of affairs*. It differs likewise from the modification of this seeing-into that may come about through a mixture of the two: namely, when an insight is applied to something seen assertorically, and in general in the *cognition of the necessity of the being-thus* of a posited single item.

In the ordinary pregnant sense, evidence and insight are understood as synonymous: as apodictic seeing-into. We wish to separate the two words terminologically. We definitely need a more general word, one whose meaning embraces both assertoric seeing and apodictic seeing-into. It must be regarded as a phenomenological cognition of the greatest importance that both really are of *one* essential genus. Taken still more generally, *rational consciousness in general designates a highest genus of thetic modalities* [286] , within which precisely *seeing* (in an extremely enlarged sense), related to originary givenness, constitutes a sharply delimited species. To name the highest genus, one now has a choice: either to extend the meaning of the word "seeing" (as just now, but going much further still), or to extend that of the words "*seeing-into*" and "evidence." Here it may be most fitting to choose the word *evidence* for the most general concept. For every rational thesis characterized by a motivational relation to originarity of givenness, the expression *originary evidence* would then suggest itself. One would further have to distinguish between *assertoric* and *apodictic evidence*, and to leave the word *insight* as the special designation of this *apodicticity*. Following on from this, *pure* insight would have to be contrasted with *impure* insight (for example, cognition of the necessity of something factual whose being itself need not even be evident); and likewise, quite generally, *pure and impure evidence*.

Further distinctions also emerge as one penetrates more deeply in research: distinctions in the motivating substrata that affect the character of evidence. For example, there is the distinction between *purely formal* ("analytic," "logical") and *material* (synthetic a priori) evidence. But here we must not go beyond first outlines.

§ 138. ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE EVIDENCE

Things appear only one-sidedly, so any positing of them can be overturned by further experience.

Let us now take into account the second distinction of evidence indicated above. It is connected with the distinction between adequate and inadequate givenness, and it also gives us occasion to describe a distinctive type of impure evidence. The positing on the basis of the in-person appearance of the *thing* is indeed rational, but the appearance is always only a one-sided, "imperfect" appearance. What stands there as present in person is not merely what actually appears, but simply this thing itself, the whole, in accordance with the total sense—although that sense is only one-sidedly intuitive and, moreover, in many ways indeterminate. Here what actually appears of the thing is by no means to be separated off as a thing on its own. Its correlate of sense forms, within the full sense of the thing, a *non-independent* part, which can have unity and independence of sense only in a whole that *necessarily* harbors within itself empty components and components of indeterminacy.

In principle, something real of the thing kind, a being of such a sense, can appear in a self-contained appearance only "*inadequately*." With this [287] there is essentially connected the fact that *no rational positing resting on such an inadequately giving appearance can be final*, and none can be "insuperable." Taken in isolation, no such positing is equivalent to the simple "The thing is actual"; it is equivalent only to "It is actual—provided that the progress of experience does not bring 'stronger rational motives' that show the original positing to be one 'to be crossed out' in the wider context." Here the positing is rationally motivated only by the appearance (the imperfectly fulfilled perceptual sense) in and for itself, considered in isolation.

The phenomenology of reason in the sphere of kinds of being that in principle can be given only inadequately (of *transcendencies* in the sense of realities) therefore has to study the various

occurrences prescribed a priori in this sphere. It has to bring to clarity how inadequate consciousness of givenness, how one-sided appearing, relates to the continuous progression to ever new appearances that pass continuously over into one another with one and the same determinable X, and what essential possibilities arise here. On the one hand, it has to clarify how a progression of experiences is possible here and is constantly rationally motivated by the continuously preceding rational positings. This is precisely the course of experience in which the empty places of the preceding appearances are filled in, the indeterminacies are more precisely determined, and so on continuously, in the manner of *thoroughly concordant fulfillment with its steadily increasing rational force*. On the other hand, the opposite possibilities are to be clarified: the *cases of fusions or polythetic syntheses of discordance*, of the "*determination otherwise*" of the X that we are constantly conscious of as the same—otherwise than the original sense-giving prescribed. Here it has to be shown how positing components of the earlier course of perception, together with their sense, undergo *crossing out*; how, under certain circumstances, the whole perception so to speak *explodes* and falls apart into "*conflicting apprehensions of things*," into thing-suppositions; how the theses of these suppositions annul one another and are modified in a peculiar way in this annulment; or how one thesis, remaining unmodified, "*conditions*" the crossing out of the "counter-thesis"; and other such occurrences.

[288] More specifically, one must also study the peculiar modifications that the original rational positings undergo when, in the progress of concordant fulfillment, they undergo a *positive phenomenological increase* with respect to their *motivating force*. They then constantly gain in "*weight*": they always and essentially contain weight, but weight that differs *in degree*. Further, the other possibilities must be analyzed: how the weight of positings suffers from "*counter-motives*," how in *doubt* they *hold one another in balance*, how a positing in competition with one of "stronger" weight is *outweighed*, "*given up*," and so on.

In connection with all this, the occurrences in the sense, as the corresponding *positing matter*, must of course be subjected to a comprehensive analysis of essence, since they are essentially determinative for the changes in the positing characters (for example, the occurrences of "conflict" or "contest" among appearances). For here, as everywhere in the phenomenological sphere, there are no accidents, no factualities; everything is motivated in an essentially determinate way.—

In the same way, within the framework of a general phenomenology of noetic and noematic data, the *investigation of the essence of all kinds of immediate acts of reason* would have to be carried out.

To every region and category of purported objects there corresponds, phenomenologically, not only a basic kind of senses or propositions, but also a *basic kind of originarily giving consciousness* of such senses. Belonging to this consciousness is a *basic type of originary evidence*, which is essentially motivated by originary givenness of that kind.

Every such evidence—taking the word in our enlarged sense—is either adequate, in principle no longer capable of being "strengthened" or "weakened," and so without *gradation of weight*; or it is *inadequate*, and therefore *capable of increase and decrease*. Whether this or that kind of evidence is possible in a sphere depends on the generic type of that sphere. It is thus prefigured a priori. To demand the perfection that belongs to evidence in one sphere (for example, the sphere of essential relations) in other spheres that essentially exclude it is absurd.

It should also be noted that the concepts "adequate" and "inadequate" [289] originally relate to the mode of givenness. Precisely by virtue of this connection, we may transfer this original meaning to the essential peculiarities of the rational positings themselves that are founded by those modes of givenness. This is one of those unavoidable equivocations by transference that are harmless as soon as one has recognized them as such and has distinguished, with full awareness, the original from the derived.

§ 139. INTERWEAVINGS OF ALL KINDS OF REASON. THEORETICAL, AXIOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL TRUTH

All modes of reason lead back to primal belief and truth; values and ends have their own evidence.

According to what has been set out so far, a positing, of whatever quality, has its legitimacy as the positing of its sense if it is rational. The rational character is itself precisely the character of rightness, which *belongs* to the positing essentially, and so not as an accidental fact under the accidental circumstances of an Ego factually positing. Correlatively, the proposition too is called legitimate. In rational consciousness it stands there furnished with the noematic character of legitimacy, which again belongs essentially to the proposition as the noematic thesis so qualified and to this matter of sense. More precisely, there "belongs" to the proposition a fullness of such a kind that it in turn grounds the rational distinction of the thesis.

The proposition here has its legitimacy in itself. But it can also be that "*something speaks for*" a proposition: without *itself* being rational, it can nevertheless share in reason. To stay within the doxic sphere, let us recall the peculiar connection of the doxic modalities with the primal doxa: they all refer back to it. If, on the other hand, we consider the rational characters belonging to these modalities, the thought at once suggests itself that they all, however different the matters and motivational situations may otherwise be, refer back, so to speak, to a primal rational character belonging to the domain of primal belief: to the case of originary and ultimately perfect evidence. It becomes apparent that deep-lying connections of essence obtain between these two kinds of referring back.

To indicate only the following: a conjecture can be characterized in itself as rational. If we follow the reference back to the corresponding primal belief that lies in it, and make this belief our own in the form of an "assuming," then "something speaks for" the belief. It is not the belief itself, simpliciter, that is characterized as rational, although it shares in reason. We see that

further distinctions in the theory of reason, and investigations relating [290] to them, are needed here. Connections of essence stand out between the *different* qualities with the rational characters peculiar to them, and indeed *reciprocal* connections; and *ultimately all lines run back to primal belief* and its primal *reason*, or to "*truth*."[10]

Truth is obviously the correlate of the perfect rational character of the primal doxa, of certainty of belief. The expressions "A primal doxic proposition, say a declarative proposition, is true" and "The perfect rational character belongs to the corresponding believing, judging" are equivalent correlates. Naturally, there is no talk here of the fact of a lived experience and of someone judging. Yet it is eidetically self-evident that truth can be actually given only in an actual consciousness of evidence. And this applies, too, to the truth of this self-evident point itself, to the truth of the equivalence indicated a moment ago, and so on. If we lack the primal doxic evidence, that of certainty of belief, then, let us say, for its content of sense "S is p" a doxic modality can be evident, for instance the conjecture "S is presumably p." This modal evidence is obviously equivalent to, and necessarily connected with, a primal doxic evidence of altered sense: namely, with the evidence, or the truth, "That S is p is presumable (probable)." On the other hand, it is also connected with the truth "*Something* speaks for S's being p"; and again with "Something speaks for its being true that S is p," and so on. In all this, connections of essence make themselves known that require phenomenological investigations of origin.

But evidence is by no means a mere heading for such occurrences of reason in the sphere of belief (let alone only in the sphere of predicative judgment). It is a heading for *all thetic spheres*, and in particular also for the significant relations of reason that run *between* them.

This, then, concerns the extremely difficult and far-reaching groups of problems of reason in the sphere of the theses of feeling and will, as well as their interweavings with "theoretical,"

10 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 104, p. 215.

that is, doxic, reason. "Theoretical" or "*doxological truth*," *or evidence*, has its parallel in "*axiological and practical truth, or evidence*." Here the "truths" under the latter headings come to expression [291] and to cognition in doxological truths, namely in specifically logical (apophantic) truths.[11] It need not be said that, for the treatment of these problems, investigations of the kind we attempted to begin above must be fundamental. These concern the essential relations that connect the doxic theses with all other kinds of positing, those of feeling and will, and again the relations that lead all doxic modalities back to the primal doxa. Precisely in this way it can also be made intelligible, on ultimate grounds, why certainty of belief, and accordingly truth, plays such a predominant role in all reason. This role, incidentally, also makes it self-evident that, as regards their solution, the problems of reason in the doxic sphere must precede those of axiological and practical reason.[12]

§ 140. CONFIRMATION. LEGITIMACY WITHOUT EVIDENCE. EQUIVALENCE OF POSITIONAL AND NEUTRAL INSIGHT

Non-evident acts can be confirmed by evident ones; motivated possibility differs from empty possibility.

Further studies are required concerning the problems presented by the *combinations of "coincidence"* that can, by their essence, be established *between acts of the same sense and proposition but of different rational value* (to name only one distinguished case). For example, an evident act and a non-evident one can come into coincidence. In the transition from the non-evident act to the evident one, the evident act takes on the character of

11 HUSSERL'S NOTE. "Cognition" is mostly a name for logical truth, designated from the standpoint of the subject as the correlate of its evident judging; but it is also a name for any kind of evident judging itself, and finally for every doxic act of reason.

12 HUSSERL'S NOTE. A first advance in this direction was made by Brentano's brilliant work *Vom Ursprung der sittlichen Erkenntnis* [On the Origin of Ethical Knowledge] (1889), a work to which I feel myself most deeply indebted.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Known in English as *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*.

what demonstrates, the non-evident act that of what is demonstrated. The insightful positing of the one functions as "confirming" the non-insightful positing of the other. The "proposition" is *corroborated*, or also "confirmed"; the imperfect mode of givenness changes into the perfect one. What this process looks like, and what it can look like, is prescribed by the essence of the kinds of positing in question, or by the essence of the particular propositions in their perfect fulfillment. For every genus of propositions, the forms of corroboration possible in principle must be clarified phenomenologically.

If the positing is not irrational, then possibilities motivated by its essence can be read off from it, showing that and how it could be converted into an actual rational positing that corroborates it. One must see that not every imperfect evidence prescribes here a course of fulfillment that terminates in a *corresponding* [292] originary evidence, one of the same sense. On the contrary, certain kinds of evidence exclude in principle such a, so to speak, originary corroboration. This holds, for example, of recollection, and in a certain way of every memory whatever. It holds just as essentially of empathy, to which we shall assign a basic kind of evidence in the next book (and which we shall examine more closely there). At any rate, very important phenomenological themes are thereby indicated.

It should further be noted that the motivated possibility spoken of above is sharply distinguished from empty possibility.[13] It is determinately motivated by what the proposition, fulfilled as it is given, includes within itself. It is an empty possibility that this desk here has ten legs on its underside, now unseen, instead of the four it actually has. For the particular perception I am just now carrying out, by contrast, this number four is a motivated possibility. For every perception whatever, it is motivated that the perceptual "circumstances" *can* change in certain ways, and that "as a result" the perception can pass over in corresponding ways into series of perceptions. These are series of a

13 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above § 138, p. 287 f.

determinate kind, prescribed by the sense of my perception; they fulfill it and confirm its positing.

Moreover, with regard to the "empty" or "mere" possibility of demonstration, two further cases must be distinguished. Either the *possibility coincides with actuality*, in such a way that seeing into the possibility *eo ipso* brings with it the *originary* consciousness of givenness and rational consciousness; or else this is not the case. The latter holds in the example just used. Actual *experience*, and not merely running through "possible" perceptions in presentification, furnishes an actual *demonstration of positings that are directed to something real*, for instance of positings of the existence of natural processes. By contrast,

[1] This is one of the most essential equivocations of the word "possibility," to which still others are added (formal-logical possibility, mathematical-formal freedom from contradiction). It is of fundamental importance that the possibility which plays its role in the theory of probabilities has motivated possibilities as its correlates; and hence that the consciousness of possibility (the being-suggested), of which we spoke in the doctrine of doxic modalities as a parallel to the consciousness of conjecture, has them as its correlates too. A probability is never built up out of unmotivated possibilities; only motivated ones have "weights," and so on. [293] in every case of a *positing of essence*, or of a proposition of essence, the *intuitive presentification of its perfect fulfillment is equivalent to the fulfillment itself*. In the same way, a priori, the intuitive presentification, indeed the mere phantasy, of an essential connection and insight into that connection are "equivalent": the one passes over into the other through a mere change of attitude, and the possibility of this reciprocal conversion is not accidental but necessary by essence.

§ 141. IMMEDIATE AND MEDIATE RATIONAL POSITING. MEDIATE EVIDENCE

Memory has a relative legitimacy borrowed from perception; mediate evidence rests on chains of evident steps.

As is well known, all mediate grounding leads back to immediate grounding. With regard to all domains of objects and the positings relating to them, the primal *source of all legitimacy* lies in immediate evidence and, more narrowly, in *originary evidence*, or in the originary givenness that motivates it. But one can draw on this source indirectly in various ways. From it the rational value of a positing that has no evidence in itself can be derived, or, if the positing is immediate, can be strengthened and confirmed.

Let us consider the latter case. Let us indicate by means of an example the difficult problems that concern the *relation of non-evident immediate rational positings to originary evidence* (in our sense, which relates to originarity of givenness).

In a *certain* way, every clear *memory* has original, immediate legitimacy. Considered in and for itself, it "weighs" something, whether much or little; it has a "weight." But its legitimacy is only relative and imperfect. With regard to what it presentifies, say something past, there lies in it a relation to the actual present. It posits the past and necessarily co-posits a horizon, even if in a vague, obscure, indeterminate way. Brought to clarity and thetic distinctness, this horizon would have to be capable of being explicated in a nexus of thetically performed memories that would terminate *in actual perceptions, in the actual hic et nunc* [here and now]. The same holds for every kind of memory in our *widest* sense, which relates to all modes of time.

Such propositions unmistakably express essential insights. They point to the essential connections whose [294] demonstration would clarify the sense and the manner of the verification of which every memory is capable and which it "needs." With every advance from memory to memory into the clarifying nexus of memories, whose final end reaches into the present of

perception, the memory is corroborated. The corroboration is, in a certain sense, mutual. The weights of the memories are functionally dependent on one another. Each memory in the nexus has a force that grows as the nexus expands, a greater force than it would have in a narrower nexus or in isolation. But once the explication has been carried through to the *actual now*, *something of the light of perception and of its evidence radiates back over the whole series*.

One could even say that *the rationality of memory, its character of legitimacy, springs in secret* from the *force of perception*, which is at work through all confusion and obscurity, even if that perception is "out of *performance*."

In any case, however, such verification is *needed*, so that it may come clearly to light what it is that actually bears the mediated reflection of the legitimacy of perception. Memory has its *own kind of inadequacy*. What is not remembered can blend with what is "actually remembered," or different memories can interpenetrate and pass themselves off as the unity of one memory. When their horizon is then unfolded and actualized, the corresponding series of memories separate, and indeed in such a way that the unitary memory image "explodes" and breaks apart into a plurality of mutually incompatible memory intuitions. Here one would have to describe occurrences similar to those we have occasionally indicated for perceptions (in a manner that evidently admits of wide generalization).

Let all this serve as an exemplary indication of large and important groups of problems concerning the *corroboration and "verification" of immediate rational positings* (and also as an illustration of the division of rational positings into pure and impure, unmixed and mixed). Above all, however, we grasp here *one* sense in which the proposition holds that all mediate rational positing, and in further consequence all predicative and conceptual rational knowledge, leads back to *evidence*. Properly [295] understood, only originary evidence is the "original" source of legitimacy. The rational positing of memory, for

example, and so that of all reproductive acts, empathy among them, is not original and is in certain ways "derived."[1]

But one can also draw from the source of originary givenness in entirely different forms.

One such form has already been touched on in passing: the weakening of rational values in the continuous transition from living evidence to non-evidence. Now, however, let us point to an essentially different group of cases, in which a proposition is related *mediately* to immediately evident grounds within a *synthetic nexus that is evident at every step*. A new general type of rational positing thereby arises, phenomenologically of a different rational character from immediate evidence. So here too we have a kind of derived, "*mediate evidence*": the kind that the expression is usually meant to designate exclusively. By its essence, this derived character of evidence can occur only in the final member of a nexus of positings that starts from immediate evidences, runs its course in various forms, and is borne in all its further steps by evidences— evidences that are in part immediate, in part already derived; in part insightful, in part not insightful, originary or non-originary. A new field of the phenomenological theory of reason is thereby marked out. The task here, in both noetic and noematic respects, is to study the general as well as the special essential occurrences of *reason* in *mediate grounding and legitimating* of every kind and form and in all thetic spheres. It is to trace the various principles of such legitimation back to their phenomenological origins (principles which are, for example, of essentially different kinds according to whether the objectivities in question are immanent or transcendent, to be given adequately or inadequately), and to make them "intelligible" from those origins, with due regard to all the phenomenological strata involved.

§ 142. RATIONAL THESIS AND BEING

A truly existing object corresponds to the idea of a consciousness giving it originarily and adequately.

The general essential understanding of reason is the aim of the groups of investigations just indicated: reason in the very widest sense, extended to *all kinds of positing*, the axiological and practical included. With that understanding, the general clarification of the essential correlations that connect the idea of *true being* with [296] the ideas of truth, reason, and consciousness must *eo ipso* have been attained.

A general insight soon emerges here. It is not only "truly existing object" and "object to be rationally posited" that are equivalent correlates, but also "truly existing object" and "object to be posited in an original, perfect rational thesis." To this rational thesis the object would not be given incompletely, not merely "one-sidedly." The sense underlying it as its matter would leave nothing "open" for the determinable X on any side prefigured by the apprehension: no determinability that was not already a fixed determinateness, no sense that was not fully determined and closed. Since the rational thesis is supposed to be an original one, it must have its rational ground in the *originary givenness* of what is determined in the full sense. The X is not only meant in full determinateness but is originarily given in precisely this determinateness. The equivalence indicated now states:

In principle (in the *a priori* of unconditioned essential universality), to every *"truly existing" object* there corresponds the *idea of a possible consciousness* in which the object itself can be grasped *originarily* and, moreover, in a *perfectly adequate* manner. Conversely, if this possibility is guaranteed, the object is *eo ipso* truly existing.

The following is of particular importance here. The essence of every category of apprehension (which is the correlate of every category of object) determinately prefigures which forma-

tions of concrete, perfect or imperfect apprehensions of objects of that category are possible. Again, for every imperfect apprehension it is essentially prefigured how it is to be perfected, how its sense is to be completed and fulfilled by intuition, and how the intuition is to be further enriched.

Every category of object (or every region and every category in our narrower, pregnant sense) is a universal essence that can itself, in principle, be brought to adequate givenness. *In its adequate givenness* it *prescribes an insightful general rule* for every particular object that becomes conscious in manifolds of concrete lived experiences (these lived experiences here naturally to be taken not as individual singularities but as essences, as lowest concreta). It prescribes the rule for the way in which an object falling under it could be brought, as regards sense and mode of givenness, to full [297] determinateness, to adequate originary givenness: through which isolated or continuously progressing nexuses of consciousness, and through which concrete essential make-up of these nexuses. How much lies in these brief statements will become intelligible in the more detailed discussions of the final chapter (from § 149 on). Here a brief exemplary indication must suffice. The unseen determinations of a thing are, like determinations of things in general, necessarily spatial; this we know with apodictic evidence. That yields a lawful rule for the possible ways of spatially completing the unseen sides of the appearing thing, a rule which, fully unfolded, is called pure geometry. Further determinations of the thing are temporal, are material. To them belong new rules for possible (hence not arbitrary) completions of sense, and in further consequence for possible thetic intuitions, or appearances. What essential content these can have, under what norms their matters and their possible noematic (or noetic) characters of apprehension stand: this too is prescribed *a priori*.

§ 143. ADEQUATE GIVENNESS OF A THING AS AN IDEA IN THE KANTIAN SENSE

Perfect givenness of a thing is prefigured as an Idea: an endless but rule-governed continuum of appearances.

But before we build on this, an addition is needed to remove the appearance of a contradiction with our earlier account (p. 286). There are, we said, objects that in principle can appear only inadequately (and so can also be perceived only inadequately). However, the restrictive qualification we made must not be overlooked. We said: inadequately perceivable *in a closed appearance*. There are objects—and all transcendent objects, all "*realities*" encompassed by the heading nature or world, belong here—that cannot be given in complete determinateness and in equally complete intuitiveness in any closed consciousness.

But as an "idea" (in the Kantian sense) *perfect givenness is nevertheless prefigured*. It is prefigured as a system, absolutely determined in its essential type, of endless processes of continuous appearing; or, as the field of these processes, as an *a priori* determined *continuum of appearances* with different but determinate dimensions, pervaded throughout by a fixed essential lawfulness.

This continuum is more precisely determined as infinite on all sides, consisting in all its phases of appearances of the same determinable X. [298] It is so ordered in its coherence and so determined as to its essential content that any *line* of it whatever, when continuously run through, yields a harmonious nexus of appearances (which itself is to be designated a unity of mobile appearance). In this nexus the one and selfsame X, given throughout, is determined continuously and harmoniously "more closely" and never "otherwise."

Now, by virtue of the all-sided infinity of the continuum, a closed unity of running-through, and so a finite act that is merely in motion, is not conceivable (that would yield an absurd finite infinity). Nevertheless, the idea of this continuum, and the idea of the perfect givenness prefigured by it, lie before us *with*

insight: with insight just as an "idea" can be insightfully seen, designating by its essence its *own type of insight*.

The idea of an essentially motivated infinity is not itself an infinity. The insight that this infinity cannot in principle be given does not exclude, but rather demands, the insightful givenness of the idea of this infinity.

§ 144. ACTUALITY AND ORIGINARILY GIVING CONSCIOUSNESS: CONCLUDING DETERMINATIONS

True being equals adequate givenness, either finite for immanent being or as an Idea for transcendent being.

It remains the case, then, that the eidos *true*-being is correlatively equivalent to the eidos adequately-given-being and *evidently*-positable-being, but this either in the sense of finite givenness or of givenness in the form of an idea. In the one case the being is "immanent" being, being as a closed lived experience or as a noematic correlate of lived experience. In the other case it is transcendent being, that is, being whose "transcendence" lies precisely in the infinity of the noematic correlate that it demands as its matter of being.

Where a giving intuition is *adequate* and *immanent*, it is not, to be sure, sense and object that coincide, but originarily fulfilled sense and object do. The object is precisely what is grasped and posited in the adequate intuition as an originary self: insightfully by virtue of the originarity, absolutely insightfully by virtue of the completeness of the sense and of its complete originary fulfillment.

Where the giving intuition is a *transcending* one, what is objective cannot come to adequate givenness. What can be given is only the idea of such an objective something, or of its sense and its "cognitive essence," and with it an *a priori* rule for the infinities, lawful as they are, of inadequate experiences.

[299] On the basis of the experiences carried out at any given time and of this rule (or of the manifold system of rules it includes), it cannot, of course, be unequivocally inferred how the further course of experience must unfold. On the contrary,

infinitely many possibilities remain open, though they are prefigured as to their type by the very rich content of the *a priori* regulation. The rule-system of geometry determines with absolute fixity all the possible shapes of motion that could complete the portion of motion observed here and now; but it singles out not a single actual course of motion of what is actually moving. How empirical thinking grounded in experience helps us further here; how something like the scientific determination of things becomes possible, things as unities posited in experience that nonetheless include infinite ambiguities; how, within the thesis of nature, the goal of unequivocal determination can be reached in accordance with the idea of the natural object, the natural process, and so on (an idea which, as the idea of something individually unique, is fully determined): all this belongs to a new stratum of research. It belongs to the phenomenology of specifically experiencing reason, and in particular of physical, psychological, and in general natural-scientific reason. This phenomenology traces the ontological and noetic rules that belong to empirical science as such back to their phenomenological sources. That means, however, that it seeks out and eidetically investigates the phenomenological strata, noetic and noematic, in which the content of these rules is embedded.

§ 145. CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EVIDENCE

Evidence is no mystical feeling attached to judgments but a mode of positing grounded in givenness.

From the reflections carried out it is clear that *the phenomenology of reason, noetics in a pregnant sense*, thoroughly presupposes general phenomenology; for it aims to subject to intuitive investigation not consciousness in general but rational consciousness. That—in the realm of positionality[14]—*thetic conscious-*

14 HUSSERL'S NOTE. All thetic occurrences carry over into the sphere of phantasy and neutrality "mirrored" and "powerless"; so too do all occurrences of reason. Neutral theses cannot be confirmed, but they can be "quasi"-confirmed; they are not evident but "as it were" evident, and so on.

ness of every genus stands under norms is itself a phenomenological fact. The norms are nothing other than essential laws relating to certain noetic-noematic nexuses [300] that must be strictly analyzed and described as to their kind and form. Naturally, "*unreason*," as the negative counterpart of reason, must also be taken into account everywhere, just as the phenomenology of evidence includes that of its counterpart, *absurdity*. The *general theory of the essence of evidence*, with its analyses bearing on the most general essential distinctions, forms a relatively small, though fundamental, part of the phenomenology of reason. What was briefly urged at the beginning of this book[15] against the perverse interpretations of evidence is thereby confirmed; and the reflections just carried out already suffice for seeing this completely.

Evidence is in fact not some index of consciousness attached to a judgment (and usually one speaks of evidence only in connection with a judgment) that calls out to us like a mystical voice from a better world: Here is the truth! As if such a voice had anything to say to us free spirits, and did not have to show its title of legitimacy. We no longer need to contend with skepticisms or to weigh doubts of the old type, which no index theory or feeling theory of evidence can overcome: whether a lying spirit (the Cartesian fiction) or a fatal change in the factual course of the world might not bring it about that precisely every false judgment was furnished with this index, this feeling of necessity of thought, of a transcendent ought, and the like.[16] If we approach the study of the relevant phenomena themselves, and do so within the framework of the phenomenological reduction, we recognize with the fullest clarity what is at issue here. It is a peculiar mode of positing (thus anything but a content somehow appended to the act, an addition of any kind whatever), which belongs to eidetically determined essential constitutions of the noema (for example, the mode "original

15 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. above, Chapter 2 of Part One, esp. § 21, p. 39 f.
16 The "Cartesian fiction" is the deceiving spirit (*genius malignus*) of Descartes' First Meditation (1641).

insightfulness" belongs to the noematic character "originarily giving seeing of essence"). We then further recognize that essential laws, again, govern the relation of those positional acts that lack this distinctive constitution to those that have it. We recognize, for example, that there is such a thing as consciousness of "*fulfillment of the intention*," of justification and corroboration specifically related to the thetic characters, just as there are the [301] corresponding *counter-characters* of *delegitimation* and *invalidation*. In further consequence we recognize that the logical principles demand a deep phenomenological clarification, and that the principle of contradiction, for example, leads us back to essential connections of possible verification and possible invalidation (or rational crossing-out).[17] In general, we gain the insight that everywhere here we are dealing not with contingent facts but with eidetic occurrences that stand in their eidetic nexus, and that therefore what obtains in the eidos functions as an absolutely insurmountable norm for the fact. In this phenomenological chapter we also make clear to ourselves that not every positional lived experience (for example, any lived experience of judging whatever) can become evident in the same way, and in particular that not every one can become immediately evident. Further, we make clear that all modes of rational positing, all types of immediate or mediate evidence, are rooted in

17 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Logical Investigations* II, 6th Investigation, § 34, p. 583 ff.—Regrettably, W. *Wundt* judges quite differently here, as he does about phenomenology as a whole. Research that does not go in the slightest beyond the sphere of purely intuitive givens he interprets as "scholasticism." He describes the distinction between the sense-giving and the sense-fulfilling act (*Kleine Schriften* I, p. 613) as a "formal schema chosen" by us, and the result of the analyses, he says, is the "most primitive" "repetition of words": "Evidence is evidence, abstraction is abstraction." He introduces the conclusion of his critique with words that I will take the liberty of quoting as well: "Husserl's grounding of a new logic, oriented more theoretically than practically, ends in each of its conceptual analyses, insofar as these have any positive content, with the assurance that really A = A, and that it is nothing else" (loc. cit., pp. 613–614).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), founder of experimental psychology at Leipzig; his critique of Husserl appeared in his *Kleine Schriften* (Shorter Writings), vol. I (1910).

phenomenological nexuses in which the fundamentally different regions of objects are laid out noetically-noematically.[18]

It is especially important to study systematically, as to their phenomenological constitution, the continuous unifications of identity and the synthetic identifications in all domains. First—and this is the first thing needful—we must come to know the inner make-up of intentional lived experiences in all their general structures, the parallelism of these structures, and the stratifications in the noema, such as sense, subject of the sense, thetic characters, fullness. Once we have done so, the task in all synthetic unifications is to make completely clear how in them there take place not merely combinations of acts in general, but combination into the unity of *one* act. In particular, how identifying unifications are possible; how the determinable X in each case comes to coincide; how [302] the determinations of sense and their empty places, that is, here, their moments of indeterminacy, behave in this; likewise how the fullnesses behave, and how, with this, the forms of corroboration, of legitimation, of progressive knowledge at lower and higher levels of consciousness come to clarity and analytic insight.

These studies of reason, however, and all parallel ones, are carried out in the "transcendental," the phenomenological, attitude. No judgment made there is a natural judgment that would presuppose the thesis of natural actuality as its background. That is so even where we are pursuing the phenomenology of the consciousness of actuality, of knowledge of nature, of the seeing of values and insight into values related to nature. Everywhere we trace the formations of the noeses and noemata; we sketch a systematic and eidetic morphology; everywhere we bring out essential necessities and essential possibilities. The latter we bring out as necessary possibilities, that is, forms of unification of compatibility that are prescribed in the essences

18 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Logical Investigations* II, 6th Investigation, § 39, p. 594 ff., esp. p. 598. In general, the whole 6th Investigation offers phenomenological groundwork for the treatment of the problems of reason discussed in the present chapter.

and circumscribed by essential laws. "Object" is for us everywhere a heading for essential nexuses of consciousness. It appears first as the noematic X, as the subject of sense of various essential types of senses and propositions. It appears further under the heading "actual object," and is then a heading for certain eidetically considered nexuses of reason in which the X, unitary in them as regards its sense, receives its rational positing.

The expressions "possible object," "probable object," "doubtful object," and so on, are headings of just this sort, for determinate groups of formations of consciousness that belong together "teleologically," groups that are eidetically circumscribed and are to be fixed through the investigation of essences. Again and again the nexuses here are different, and must be strictly described in their difference. Thus it is easy to see, for example, that the *possibility* of the X determined thus and so is legitimated not only by originary givenness of this X in its sense content, and so by showing its actuality, but also that mere reproductively founded presumptions can mutually corroborate one another when they combine harmoniously. Likewise, it is easy to see that *doubtfulness* is legitimated in phenomena of conflict between modalized intuitions of a certain descriptive kind, and so on. Connected with this are the investigations in the theory of reason that relate to the distinction between mere things, values, and practical objectivities, and that trace the formations of consciousness constituted for them. Thus phenomenology really does encompass the whole [303] natural world and all the ideal worlds that it excludes. It encompasses them as "world-sense," through the essential lawfulnesses that connect the sense of objects, and noema in general, with the closed system of noeses; and in particular through the essential nexuses governed by laws of reason, whose correlate is "actual object." This "actual object" therefore represents, in its turn, an index in each case for quite determinate systems of teleologically unitary formations of consciousness.

Our meditations on the problems of a phenomenology of reason have so far moved at a level of generality that did not allow the essential ramifications of the problems, and their connections with the formal and regional ontologies, to stand out. In this respect we must try to come closer. Only then will the full sense of the phenomenological eidetics of reason, and the whole wealth of its problems, be disclosed to us.

CHAPTER THREE. LEVELS OF GENERALITY IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE THEORY OF REASON. § 146. THE MOST GENERAL PROBLEMS

The problems of reason are first treated at the highest level of generality, under intentionality.

Let us go back to the sources of the problems of reason and follow them, as systematically as possible, into their ramifications.

The heading for problems that encompasses the whole of phenomenology is intentionality. It expresses precisely the fundamental property of consciousness; all phenomenological problems, even the hyletic ones, fall under it. Phenomenology thus begins with problems of intentionality, but at first in generality and without drawing into its circle the questions of the actual (true) being of what is conscious in consciousness. It is left out of consideration that positional consciousness with its thetic characters can be designated, in the most general sense, a "supposing," and as such necessarily stands under the rational opposition of validity and invalidity. We were able to approach these problems in the last chapters, with regard to the main structures of consciousness that had in the meantime become intelligible to us. Since what was at issue were eidetic beginnings, we naturally carried out the analyses in the greatest possible generality. In all eidetic spheres the systematic path leads from higher to lower generality, even if the analysis that tracks things down starts from something particular. We [304] spoke of reason and rational thesis in general, of originary and derived, of adequate and inadequate evidence, of insight into essence and individual evidence, and the like. The descriptions we

sketched already presupposed a large phenomenological basis, a whole series of difficult distinctions that we had worked out in the chapters on the most general structures of consciousness. Without the concepts of sense, proposition, and fulfilled proposition (cognitive essence, in the language of the *Logical Investigations*), it is simply impossible even to approach the radical formulation of any problem in the theory of reason. These concepts in turn presupposed others, together with the essential divisions corresponding to them: the differences between positionality and neutrality, between the thetic characters and their matters, the setting apart of the peculiar essential modifications that do not enter into the eidos proposition, such as the attentional modifications, and so on. At the same time we emphasize that the essential descriptions of the last chapter are to count as mere beginnings, so that the extent of the analyses needed in the most general stratum of the theory of reason, the stratum we are speaking of here, may not be underestimated. Here, as everywhere, we merely carried out our methodical intention. For each fundamentally new stratum that was to be depicted as a field of phenomenological research, we meant to work out enough firm ground to make sure of it, to formulate its initial and basic problems, and to cast free glances over the horizon of problems surrounding it.

§ 147. BRANCHINGS OF THE PROBLEMS. FORMAL LOGIC, AXIOLOGY AND PRACTICS

Formal logic, axiology and practics state conditions of possible validity rooted in pure forms.

The general phenomenology of reason branches out when we take into account further structural differences that are determinative for the characters of reason: the differences according to basic kinds of theses, the differences between simple and founded theses, and, crossing these, the differences between single-membered theses and syntheses. Main groups of problems of reason (problems of evidence) relate to the main genera of theses and to the matters of positing that these essentially

require. In first place, naturally, stand the primal doxa and the doxic modalities, with the modalities of being corresponding to them.

In pursuing such aims of the theory of reason, one necessarily arrives at the *problems of clarifying, in terms of the theory of reason,* [305] *formal logic* and the disciplines parallel to it, which *I have called formal axiology* and practics.

Let us first refer to the earlier discussions[19] of the pure theories of the forms of propositions, and in particular of *synthetic* propositions, related to the predicative doxic synthesis; as well as to the synthetic forms belonging to the doxic modalities, and further to the acts of feeling and will. (Thus, for example, the forms of preference, those of valuing and willing for the sake of something else, the forms of the axiological "and" and "or.") In these theories of forms, synthetic propositions are spoken of noematically as to their pure form, without any question of rational validity or invalidity. They therefore do not yet belong to the stratum of the theory of reason.

But as soon as we raise this question, and indeed for propositions in general insofar as they are thought of as determined exclusively by the pure forms, we find ourselves in formal logic and in the formal parallel disciplines named above. By their essence these are built upon the corresponding theories of forms as their lower levels. *In the synthetic forms*—which, as forms of theses, or of propositions of the respective category of propositions, evidently presuppose a great deal but leave it undetermined in its particularity—*lie a priori conditions of possible validity, which are expressed in the essential laws of the disciplines in question*.

Specifically, in the pure forms of the *predicative* (analytic) synthesis lie *a priori* conditions of the possibility of *doxic rational certainty*, or, noematically speaking, of *possible truth*. Formal logic in the narrowest sense brings them out objectively: *formal apophantics* (the formal logic of "judgments"), which thus has its foundation in the theory of the forms of these "judgments."

19 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 119, p. 247 f.

Something similar holds for the syntheses belonging to the sphere of feeling and will and for their noematic correlates, hence for their kinds of synthetic *propositions*. Their systematic theory of forms must in turn provide the substructure on which the formal theories of validity are built. For in the pure synthetic *forms* of these spheres (as, for example, in the nexuses of ends and means) there really do lie *conditions of the possibility of axiological and*

[1] Cf. § 133 f., pp. 273–278. [306] *practical "truth."* Here, by virtue of the objectivation that takes place, for example, in acts of feeling too, all axiological and practical *rationality* converts, in the way intelligible to us, into doxic rationality; noematically into *truth*, objectively into *actuality*. We speak of true or actual ends, means, preferences, and so on.

All these nexuses are, of course, the subject of distinct and highly important phenomenological investigations. Even the manner in which the formal disciplines have just been characterized is phenomenological and presupposes much from our analyses. The researcher in *pure logic* treated "dogmatically" grasps the apophantic forms abstractively ("proposition in general" or "judgment"; categorical, hypothetical, conjunctive, disjunctive judgment, and so on) and fixes axioms of formal truth for them. Of analytic synthesis, of *noetic*-noematic essential relations, of how the essences he has singled out and conceptually fixed are placed within the essential complexes of pure consciousness, he knows nothing. He investigates in isolation what can be fully understood only within this full essential nexus. Only phenomenology, by going back to the sources of intuition in transcendentally purified consciousness, makes clear to us what really lies in our speaking now of formal conditions of truth, now of formal conditions of knowledge. In general, it enlightens us about the *essences* and *essential relations* that belong to the concepts of knowledge, evidence, truth, being (object, state of affairs, and so on). It teaches us to understand the construction of judging and of the judgment; the way in which the structure of the noema is determinative for knowledge; how the

"proposition" plays its special role in this; and again the various possibilities of its cognitive "fullness." It shows which modes of fulfillment are essential conditions for the rational character of evidence, which kinds of evidence are in question in each case, and so on. In particular, it enables us to understand that the *a priori truths of logic* concern essential connections between the *possibility of intuitive fulfillment* of the proposition (through which the corresponding state of affairs comes to synthetic intuition) and the *pure synthetic form* of the proposition (the purely logical form); and that this possibility is at the same time a condition of possible validity.

It also shows that, looked at closely, two things must be distinguished here, corresponding to the correlation of noesis and noema. [307] In formal apophantics (for example, in syllogistics) the talk is of judgments, as noematic propositions, and of their formal "*truth*." The attitude is thoroughly noematic. In *formal apophantic noetics*, on the other hand, the attitude is noetic. The talk is of the rationality, the correctness, of judging; *norms* of this correctness are stated, and indeed with reference to the forms of propositions. For example: one cannot hold a contradiction to be true; whoever judges in accordance with the premise-forms of the valid modes of inference "must" draw conclusions of the corresponding forms; and so on. In the phenomenological nexus these parallels become intelligible without further ado. The occurrences that concern judging, the noesis, and likewise those essentially corresponding to them in the noema, the apophansis, are investigated precisely in their necessary relation to one another and in the full interweaving of consciousness.

The same naturally holds of the other formal disciplines as regards the parallelism of noetic and noematic regulations.

§ 148. PROBLEMS OF FORMAL ONTOLOGY IN THE THEORY OF REASON

Every formal-logical law converts into a formal-ontological one; set theory arises through nominalization.

From these disciplines a turn leads us to the corresponding ontologies. Phenomenologically, the connection is already given by the universally possible turnings of regard that can be carried out within every act; and the components that these turnings bring into view are interwoven with one another by manifold essential laws. The primary attitude is the one directed toward what is objective; noematic reflection leads to the noematic components, noetic reflection to the noetic ones. From these components the disciplines that interest us here abstractively single out pure forms: formal apophantics, noematic forms; the parallel noetics, noetic forms. Just as these forms are linked with one another, so both are linked by essential laws with ontic forms, which can be grasped by turning the regard back to ontic components.

Every formal-logical law can be converted into an equivalent formal-ontological one. Instead of judgments, one now judges about states of affairs; instead of members of judgments (for example, nominal meanings), about objects; instead of predicate meanings, about characteristics; and so on. The talk is also no longer of the truth, the validity, of judgment-propositions, but of the obtaining of states of affairs, the being of objects, and so on.

[308] Obviously, the phenomenological content of this conversion, too, is to be clarified by going back to the phenomenological content of the relevant concepts.

Formal ontology, moreover, goes very far beyond the sphere of such mere conversions of formal apophantic truths. Large disciplines accrue to it through those "nominalizations" of which we spoke earlier.[1] In plural judging, the plural appears as a plural thesis. Through the nominalizing turn it becomes the object "set," and so the basic concept of *set theory* arises. In set theory one judges about sets as objects that have their own

peculiar kinds of properties, relations, and so on. The same holds for the concepts of relation, number, and so on, as basic concepts of *mathematical disciplines*. Again we must say, as with the mere theories of the forms of propositions, that it is not the task of phenomenology to develop these disciplines, that is, to do mathematics, syllogistics, and so on. Only the axioms interest it, and their conceptual content, as headings for phenomenological analyses.

What has been said carries over of itself to formal *axiology and practics*, and to the formal ontologies that, as theoretical desiderata, are to be coordinated with them: the formal ontologies of values (in a very extended sense), of goods—in short, of all the ontic spheres that are correlates of the consciousness of feeling and will.

One notices that *the concept of "formal ontology" has expanded in these considerations*. Values, practical objectivities, fall under the formal heading "object," "something in general." From the standpoint of universal analytic ontology, therefore, they are materially determined objects, and the "formal" ontologies of values and practical objectivities that belong to them are material disciplines. On the other hand, the analogies grounded in the parallelism of the thetic genera (belief, or modality of belief; valuing; willing) and of the syntheses and syntactic formations specifically coordinated with them have their force. So effective is this force that Kant actually designates the relation between willing the end and willing the means as "analytic,"[20] and in doing so, [309] to be sure, confuses analogy with identity. What is properly analytic, what belongs to the predicative synthesis of doxa, must not be confused with its formal analogue, which is related to the syntheses of the theses of feeling and will. Deeplying and important problems of the phenomenology of reason

20 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (H 417): "Whoever wills the end wills ... also the means indispensably necessary to it that is in his power. *This* proposition is, as far as *willing is concerned, analytic*."

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Kant's *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785); the passage is from its second section, on hypothetical imperatives.

are bound up with the radical clarification of these analogies and parallels.

§ 149. THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGIONAL ONTOLOGIES IN THE THEORY OF REASON. THE PROBLEM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION

Each region, such as the material thing, guides investigation of how its objects are constituted.

Having discussed the problems of the theory of reason that the formal disciplines pose for us, we would now have to make the transition to the *material* disciplines, and first of all to the *regional ontologies*.

Every region of objects is constituted in consciousness. An object determined by the regional genus has as such, insofar as it is actual, its *a priori* prefigured ways of being perceivable, of being representable in general, clearly or obscurely, of being thinkable, of being capable of legitimation. As regards what founds rationality, then, we come back again to the senses, propositions, cognitive essences. But now we come back not to the mere forms; since we have in view the material generality of the regional and categorial essence, we come back to propositions whose content of determination is taken in its *regional* determinateness. *Each region here offers the guiding thread for its own closed group of investigations.*

Let us take, say, the region material thing as our guiding thread. If we rightly understand what this guidance means, we thereby grasp at the same time a general problem that is decisive for a large and relatively self-contained phenomenological discipline: *the problem of the general "constitution" of the objectivities of the region thing* in *transcendental consciousness*, or, more briefly, "of the phenomenological constitution of the thing in general." Together with this we also come to know the method of investigation coordinated with this guiding problem. Exactly the same then holds for every region and for every discipline relating to its phenomenological constitution.

What is at issue is the following. The idea of the thing (to stay with this region) is, when we now speak of it, represented in consciousness by the conceptual thought "thing," with a certain noematic content. To every noema there essentially corresponds [310] an ideally closed group of possible noemata, which have their unity in being capable of a synthetic unification through coincidence. If the noema is, as here, a harmonious one, the group also contains intuitive and in particular originarily giving noemata. In these, all the differently constituted noemata of the group are fulfilled in identifying coincidence; and in the case of positionality they draw from them confirmation, fullness of rational force.

We therefore start from the verbal, perhaps quite obscure representation "thing," just as we happen to have it. Freely we produce intuitive representations of the same "thing"-in-general and make the vague sense of the word clear to ourselves. Since what is at issue is a "general representation," we must proceed by way of examples. We produce arbitrary phantasy intuitions of things, say free intuitions of winged horses, white ravens, mountains of gold, and the like. These too would, after all, be things, and representations of them therefore serve as examples just as well as representations of things of actual experience. Performing ideation on them, we grasp with intuitive clarity the essence "thing" as the subject of generally circumscribed noematic determinations.

Now it must be noted (recalling what was established earlier) that here the essence "thing" is indeed originarily given, but that this givenness cannot in principle be an adequate one. We can bring the noema, or the thing-sense, to adequate givenness. But the manifold thing-senses, even taken in their fullness, do not contain the regional essence "thing" as an originarily intuitive content immanent in them, any more than the manifold senses related to one and the same individual thing contain the individual essence of this thing. In other words, whether it is a matter of the essence of an individual thing or of the regional essence thing in general, in no case does a single intuition of a

thing, or a finitely closed continuity or collection of intuitions of things, suffice to obtain *adequately* the essence sought in the whole fullness of its essential determinations. Any one of them, however, suffices for an inadequate seeing of essence. Compared with an empty grasping of essence, such as can be set up on the exemplary basis of an obscure representation, it has at any rate the great advantage of having given the essence originarily.[21]

311 This holds for all levels of essential generality, from the individual essence all the way up to the region thing.

Now, however, it is a general insight into essence that every *imperfect givenness* (every inadequately giving noema) *harbors within itself a rule for the ideal possibility of its perfection*. The appearance of a centaur that I now have gives the essence of the centaur only "one-sidedly." It belongs to the essence of this appearance that I can follow up the various sides of the thing, and, freely phantasying, determine for myself and make intuitive what at first remained undetermined and open. In the course of this process of phantasy, which makes what is phantasied ever more perfectly intuitive and determines it ever more closely, we are to a large extent free. We can, after all, intuitively ascribe to the phantasied centaur, at will, properties and changes of properties that determine it more closely. But *we are not completely free*, if we are to proceed in the sense of a *harmonious* course of intuition, in which the determinable subject is identically the same and can always remain harmoniously determinable. We are bound, for example, by a lawful space as a framework that the idea of a possible thing in general firmly prescribes for us. However arbitrarily we may deform what is phantasied, spatial shapes pass over again into spatial shapes.

Now what, phenomenologically, does this talk of rule or law mean? What is implied in the fact that the inadequately given *region "thing" prescribes rules for the course of possible intuitions*—which obviously means the same as possible perceptions?

The answer is this. To the essence of such a thing-noema there belong, and with absolute insight, ideal possibilities of the "*limitlessness in progression*"[22] *of harmonious intuitions*, and indeed in directions prefigured in a typically determined way (hence also parallel limitlessnesses in the continuous concatenations of the corresponding noeses). We recall here the earlier discussions of how the general "idea" thing in general is obtained with insight; they remain valid for every lower level of generality, down to the lowest concretion of the individually determined thing. The thing's transcendence is expressed in those limitlessnesses in the progression of the intuitions of it. Again and again the intuitions are to be carried over into continua of intuition [312], and the pregiven continua are to be extended. No perception of the thing is ultimately closed; there always remains room for new perceptions that would determine indeterminacies more closely and fulfill what is unfulfilled. With every step forward, the content of determination of the thing-noema, which continuously belongs to the same thing X, is enriched. It is an insight into essence that every perception and every manifold of perceptions is capable of being extended, and that the process is therefore an endless one. Accordingly, no intuitive grasp of the essence of the thing can be so complete that a further perception could not add something noematically new to it.

On the other hand, we do grasp the idea "thing" with evidence and adequately. We grasp it in the *free* process of running through, in the consciousness of the limitlessness of the progression of harmonious intuitions. We thus first grasp the unfulfilled idea of the thing, and of this individual thing, as something that is "given as far as" the harmonious intuition "reaches," but that remains determinable "*in infinitum*." The

21 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. § 143, p. 297.

22 HUSSERL'S NOTE. Cf. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, the 5th argument on space (A 25).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. In the first edition (1781) of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant's fifth argument holds that space is represented as an infinite given magnitude, owing to the limitlessness in the progression of intuition.

"and so on" is an insightful and absolutely indispensable moment in the thing-noema.

On the basis of the exemplary consciousness of this limitlessness, we further grasp the "idea" of the determinate directions of infinity, and indeed for each of the directions of the intuitive flow that we run through. Again, we grasp *the regional "idea" of the thing in general* as that of the identical something that persists through determinate infinities of flow *of such a kind*, and that makes itself known in the pertinent, more determinately constituted infinite series of noemata.

Like the thing, every *property* belonging to its essential content, and above all every *constitutive "form,"* is then an idea; and this holds from regional generality down to the lowest particularity. In more detail:

In its ideal essence, the thing is given as *res temporalis* [temporal thing], in the *necessary "form" of time*. Intuitive "ideation" (which here, as the seeing of an "idea," deserves its name quite especially) teaches us to know the thing as necessarily enduring, as in principle endlessly extendable with respect to its duration. We grasp in "*pure intuition*" the "idea" of temporality and of all the essential moments included in it (for this ideation is the phenomenologically clarified concept of Kant's pure intuition).[23]

According to its idea, the thing is, further, *res extensa* [extended thing]. In spatial respects, for example, it is capable of infinitely manifold 313 transformations of shape. With shape and change of shape held fixed as identical, it is also capable of infinitely manifold changes of position; it is "movable" *in infinitum*. We grasp the "idea" *of space* and the ideas subordinate to it.

Finally, the thing is *res materialis* [material thing]. It is a *substantial* unity, and as such a unity of *causalities*, and in terms of possibility a unity of infinitely multiform ones. With these specifically real properties, too, we come up against ideas. Thus all the components of the idea of a thing are themselves ideas; *each implies the "and so on"* of "infinite" possibilities.

23 In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1787), Kant treats space and time as the forms of pure intuition.

What we are setting out here is not "*theory*," not "metaphysics." It is a matter of essential necessities. They are irremovably included in the thing-noema and, correlatively, in the thing-giving consciousness, and they can be grasped with complete insight and investigated systematically.

§ 150. CONTINUATION. THE REGION THING AS A TRANSCENDENTAL GUIDING THREAD

The idea of the thing prescribes rules to infinite series of appearances, even for God.

We have now made intelligible, in the most general terms, the infinities that the intuition of a thing as such (in respect of noesis and noema) harbors within itself. Or, as we can also say, we have made intelligible the idea of the thing and the dimensions of infinity it harbors. We shall therefore soon be able to understand, too, in what sense *the region thing* can serve *as a guiding thread* for phenomenological investigations.

When we intuit an individual thing, following in intuition its movements, its approaches and recedings, its turnings and rotations, its changes of form and quality, its modes of causal behavior, we *carry out* continua of intuiting. These overlap in such-and-such ways and join together into a consciousness of unity. Our regard is directed throughout at the identical, at the X of the sense (or of the positional or neutralized proposition), at the one and selfsame thing that changes, turns, and so on. The same holds when, in *free* intuition, we pursue the endlessly possible modifications along the various basic directions, conscious of the limitlessness in the progression of this process of intuiting. And it holds again when we pass over to the attitude of ideation and bring, say, the regional idea of the thing to clarity. In doing so we proceed as the geometer does in the freedom and purity of his geometrical intuition.

In all this, however, we know nothing of the processes of intuition themselves or of the essences and essential [314] infinities belonging to them. We know nothing of their matters and noetic moments, nothing of their noematic contents, nothing of the

strata that can be distinguished on either side and grasped eidetically. What we actually live through (or, in the phantasy modification, are conscious of unreflectively), we do not *see*. What is needed, then, is a change of attitude. We need the various hyletic, noetic and noematic "reflections" (all rightly so called, because they are deflections from the original, "straight" direction of regard toward the X). It is these reflections that now open up for us a large, internally coherent field of research, or rather a powerful set of problems falling under the idea of the thing region.

For the question arises:

How are the noeses and noemata that belong to the unity of the intuitively representing consciousness of a thing to be described systematically?

If we keep to the noematic sphere, the question is:

What do the manifold positing intuitions, the "*intuitional propositions*," look like, in which an "actual" thing comes to givenness and intuitively demonstrates its *actuality* in originary *experience*?

Or, to abstract from the doxic thesis: what do the mere *appearances*, understood noematically, look like? Considered in themselves and purely eidetically, they bring to appearance one and the same thing, the "thing" that is in each case wholly determinate and that belongs to this manifold of intuitions or appearances as its *necessary* correlate. Phenomenology, as a matter of principle, does not stop at vague talk or obscure generalities. It demands clarification, analysis and description that are systematically determinate and that penetrate into the essential connections and down to their ultimate attainable particularizations: it demands work that settles matters.

The regional idea of the thing, its identical X with the determining sense-content, posited as existing, *prescribes rules to manifolds of appearances*. That is to say, these are not manifolds of just any kind that come together by chance. This is clear already from the fact that they have in themselves, purely essentially, a relation to the thing, the determinate thing. The idea of the

region prescribes quite determinate series of appearances: determinately ordered, progressing *in infinitum*, and firmly closed when taken as an ideal totality. It prescribes a determinate internal organization of their courses. This organization is connected, essentially and in a way that can be investigated, with the partial ideas that are delineated in general terms as components of the regional [315] idea of the thing. It turns out, for example, as one piece of this organization, that the unity of a mere *res extensa* is conceivable without the unity that the idea of *res materialis* prescribes as a norm, although no *res materialis* is conceivable that would not be *res extensa*. For it turns out (always in eidetic-phenomenological intuition) that every appearance of a thing necessarily harbors within itself a stratum that we call the *thing-schema*. This is the spatial shape filled merely with "sensuous" qualities, without any determination of "substantiality" and "causality" (that is, understood in quotation marks, as noematically modified). Even the associated idea of a *mere res extensa* is a heading for an abundance of phenomenological problems.

We who are phenomenologically naive take certain things for mere facts. A spatial thing always appears "to us human beings" in a certain "orientation": in the visual field, for example, it is oriented as to above and below, right and left, near and far. We can see a thing only at a certain "depth," a certain "distance." All the changing distances at which it can be seen are related to a center of all depth orientations, a center that is invisible but well known to us as an ideal limit point, and that we "localize" in the head. All these supposed factualities, and hence contingencies of spatial intuition that are alien to "*true, objective*" space, prove to be essential necessities, down to minor empirical particularities. It turns out, then, that something like a spatial thing can be intuited not only by us human beings but also by God, as the ideal representative of absolute knowledge, only through appearances. In these it is given, and must be given, "perspectivally," changing in manifold but determinate ways, and thereby in changing "orientations."

The task now is not only to ground this as a general claim but to follow it through in all its particular configurations. Take the problem of the "*origin of the representation of space*," whose deepest, phenomenological sense has never been grasped. It reduces to the phenomenological essential analysis of all the noematic (or noetic) phenomena in which space exhibits itself intuitively and in which the spatial "constitutes" itself as the unity of the appearances, of the descriptive modes of exhibition.

Here the *problem of constitution* clearly means nothing other than the following. The regulated series of appearances that *necessarily* belong together in the unity of something appearing can be surveyed intuitively and grasped theoretically, despite [316] their infinities (which can be mastered unambiguously precisely in the determinate "and so on"). They can be analyzed and described in their *eidetic* peculiarity. And *the law-governed accomplishment of the correlation between the determinate appearing thing as a unity and the determinate infinite manifolds of appearances* can be fully seen into and thus stripped of all its riddles.

This holds for the unity that lies in the *res extensa* (and also in the *res temporalis*). It holds no less for the higher, founded unities indicated by the expression *material thing*, that is, *substantial-causal* thing. All these unities are constituted in "manifolds" at the level of experiencing intuition. Everywhere the essential connections on both sides must be completely elucidated, through all their strata: in respect of sense and fullness of sense, of thetic functions, and so on. In the end, perfect insight must emerge into what *represents the idea of the actual thing in phenomenologically pure consciousness*, and into how the actual thing is the absolutely necessary correlate of a noetic-noematic nexus investigated in its structure and described in its essence.

§ 151. STRATA OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONSTITUTION OF THE THING. SUPPLEMENTS

Thing-constitution rises from sensuous schemata to the substantial-causal thing and the intersubjective thing.

These investigations are essentially determined by the various *levels and strata of the constitution of the thing* within the *framework of originarily experiencing consciousness*. Each level, and each stratum within a level, is characterized by the fact that it *constitutes a unity of its own*. This unity is in turn a *necessary intermediate link* in the full constitution of the thing.

Take, for example, the level of simply perceptual constitution of the thing, whose correlate is the sense-thing furnished with sensuous qualities. Here we are referring to a single stream of consciousness, to the possible perceptions of a single perceiving Ego-subject. We find here a variety of strata of unity, the *sensuous schemata*, the "*visual things*" of higher and lower order. These must be fully brought out in this order and studied in their noetic-noematic constitution, both singly and in their interconnection. At the top of the strata of this level stands the *substantial-causal thing*. It is already a reality in the specific sense, but it is still [317] constitutively bound to one experiencing subject and to that subject's ideal manifolds of perception.

The *next higher level* is then the *intersubjectively identical thing*, a constitutive unity of a higher order. Its constitution is related to an open plurality of subjects who stand in a relation of "mutual understanding." The intersubjective world is the correlate of intersubjective experience, that is, of experience *mediated by "empathy"*. We are thus referred to the manifold unities of sense-things already constituted individually by the many subjects. Further, we are referred to the corresponding manifolds of perception, which belong, then, to different Ego-subjects and streams of consciousness. Above all, however, we are referred to what is new in empathy, and to the question of how empathy plays a constituting role in "objective" experience and gives unity to those separate manifolds.

All these investigations must be carried out with the completeness and all-sidedness that the essence of the matters demands. In keeping with our introductory purpose, we considered above only a first, basic system of constituting manifolds of appearance, namely the one in which one and the same thing constantly appears concordantly. In the limitless progression along all the systematic lines, the perceptions come to pure coincidence, and the theses constantly undergo corroboration. Here there is only further determination, never different determination. A determination of the thing may have come to be posited in the preceding course of experience (within this ideally closed system). No such determination undergoes "crossing out" and "replacement" by other determinations of the same category of property, a category formally prescribed by the regional essence. There are no disturbances of concordance and no occurrences in which a disturbance is evened out again, let alone that "explosion" of concordance through which the posited thing is crossed out entirely. Yet these contrary cases must be taken into account phenomenologically no less, since they too play, or can play, their role in the context of the possible constitution of an experiential actuality. The path of factual knowledge, as of ideally possible knowledge, leads through errors. This is so even at the lowest level of knowledge, that of the intuitive grasping of actuality. Consider the courses of perception in which partial breaks in concordance occur and in which concordance can be maintained only through "corrections." These must be characterized systematically in respect of their [318] noetic and noematic essential components: the changes of apprehension, the peculiar thetic occurrences, the revaluations and devaluations of what was previously apprehended, for example as "semblance" or "illusion," the passing over into a "conflict" that remains unresolved for stretches, and so on. As against the continuous synthesis of concordance, the syntheses of conflict, of reinterpretation and different determination, and whatever else they may be called, must receive their due. For a

phenomenology of "true actuality," the *phenomenology of "null semblance"* is also quite indispensable.

§ 152. EXTENSION OF THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL CONSTITUTION TO OTHER REGIONS

Persons, communities, values and cultural formations such as state and church need their own constitutive phenomenology.

It is readily seen that what has been said here by way of example about the constitution of the material thing must carry over, in respect of both problem and method, to *all regions of objects*. What has been said concerns constitution in the system of manifolds of the experience that lies before all "thinking." In place of "sensuous perceptions," there now naturally step the kinds of originarily giving acts essentially assigned to the regions in question. Phenomenological analysis must first bring these out and investigate them.

Very difficult problems attach to the *interwovenness of the different regions*. These entail interweavings in the constituting formations of consciousness. The thing is nothing isolated over against the experiencing subject, as has already become noticeable from the above indications about the intersubjective constitution of the "objective" world of things. But this experiencing subject is itself constituted in experience as something real, as a *human being* or animal, just as the *intersubjective communities* are constituted as animal communities.

Although these communities are essentially founded in psychic realities, which are in turn founded in physical ones, they prove to be new kinds of *objectivities of a higher order*. In general, it turns out that there are many kinds of objectivities that defy all psychologistic and naturalistic reinterpretations. Such are all kinds of *value-objects* and *practical* objects, and all the concrete cultural formations that determine our actual life as hard actualities, for example the *state, law, custom, church,* and so on. All these objectivities must be described just as they come to givenness, according to their basic kinds and in their

hierarchical orders; [319] and *the problems of constitution* must be posed and solved for them.

Their constitution quite naturally leads back also to that of spatial things and of psychic subjects: they are, after all, founded in such realities. As the lowest level, material reality ultimately underlies all other realities, and so *the phenomenology of material nature* certainly holds *a distinguished position*. But viewed without prejudice and traced back phenomenologically to their sources, the founded unities are precisely founded, and of a *new kind*. What is new that is constituted with them can never, as the intuition of essence teaches, be reduced to mere sums of other realities. So in fact *each distinctive type of such actualities brings with it its own constitutive phenomenology*, and thereby a *new concrete theory of reason*. Everywhere the task is, in principle, the same. We must bring to knowledge, at all levels and in all strata, the complete system of formations of consciousness that constitute the originary givenness of all such objectivities, and thereby make intelligible the equivalent in consciousness of the kind of "actuality" in question. There are many misunderstandings, and they readily suggest themselves, concerning the correlation of being and consciousness (for example, that all actuality "dissolves into the psychic"). Everything that is to be said here in accordance with truth in order to rule them out can be said only on the basis of the essential connections of the constitutive groups, as grasped in the phenomenological attitude and in the light of intuition.

§ 153. THE FULL EXTENSION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. ORGANIZATION OF THE INVESTIGATIONS

A complete phenomenology of reason and constitution would coincide with phenomenology as a whole.

A discussion kept as general as has alone been possible so far cannot give any adequate idea of the enormous extent of the investigations just recognized as possible and required. For that we would need, at least for the main types of actualities, pieces of investigation actually carried out. We would need, that is, a

procedure like the one we followed for the problems of the general structures of consciousness. In the next book, however, we shall discuss the disputed questions that so occupy the present, concerning the mutual relationship of the great groups of sciences designated by the headings [320] natural science, psychology and the human sciences, and especially concerning their relationship to phenomenology. This will give us occasion, at the same time, to bring the problems of constitution within more tangible reach.[24] This much, however, will already have become clear here: these are genuinely serious problems, and fields of investigation open up that concern *everything that is, in the genuine sense, a matter of principle in all sciences with material content*. For what is "of principle" is nothing other than what groups itself around the regional ideas by way of basic concepts and basic cognitions. It is what finds, or would have to find, its systematic unfolding in corresponding regional ontologies.

What has been said carries over from the material sphere to the formal sphere and to the *ontological disciplines* belonging to it, and thus to all principles and sciences of principles whatsoever, provided we suitably extend the idea of constitution. To be sure, the framework of constitutive research is thereby extended so far that it can ultimately encompass the whole of phenomenology.

This will force itself upon us of its own accord if we make the following supplementary considerations:

In the first instance, the problems of the constitution of objects are related to the manifolds of possible *originarily giving* consciousness. For things, for example, they are related to the totality of *possible experiences,* indeed of possible perceptions, of one and the same thing. To this is joined the supplementary consideration of the reproductive positional kinds of consciousness and the investigation of their constitutive accomplishment of reason, or, what comes to the same thing, of their accomplishment for simply intuiting knowledge. Likewise, we must con-

24 The "next book" is *Ideas II*, which Husserl did not publish; it appeared posthumously in 1952.

sider obscurely representing (but simple) consciousness and the problems of reason and actuality relating to it. In short, we are moving at first in the *mere sphere of "representation"*.

Bound up with this, however, are the corresponding investigations relating to the accomplishments of the *higher* sphere, the so-called "*understanding*" or "*reason*" *sphere* in the narrower sense. This sphere has its explicating, relating and other "logical" (and then also axiological and practical) syntheses, its "conceptual" operations, its statements, its new, mediate forms of grounding. Objectivities that were first given in *monothetic acts*, say in mere experiences (or that were thought of, in the idea, as given), can thus be subjected to the play of *synthetic operations*. Through these operations one can constitute synthetic [321] objectivities of ever higher levels. They contain several theses in the unity of the total thesis, and several matters, articulated into members, in the unity of their total matter. One can colligate, and "form" collectives (sets) of various hierarchical orders (sets of sets). One can "single out" or "set off" "parts" from the "whole," properties and predicates from their subject. One can "bring" objects "into relation" with objects, "making" this one the referent and that one the relatum, at will; and so on. One can carry out such syntheses "actually," "properly," that is, in *synthetic originarity*. Then the synthetic objectivity has, as regards its synthetic form, the character of something originarily given (for example, of the actually given collection, subjection, relation, and so on). And it has the full character of originarity if the theses have it, that is, if the thetic act-characters are originarily motivated as rational. One can also draw on free phantasies and bring what is originarily given and what is quasi-given into relation. Or one can carry out the syntheses entirely in the modification, turn what is thus conscious into a "supposition," "form" hypotheses, *derive* "consequences" from them. Or again, one can carry out comparisons and distinctions, subject the likenesses or differences given in them to synthetic operations in turn, combine all this with ideations, with positings or suppositions of essences, and so on *in infinitum*.

Underlying the operations are acts of lower or higher levels of objectivation, partly intuitive, partly non-intuitive, possibly quite confused. In the case of obscurity or confusion, one can set out to clarify the synthetic "formations" and raise the question of their possibility, of their redemption by "synthetic intuition." Or one can raise the question of their "actuality," of their redeemability through explicit and originarily giving synthetic acts, possibly by way of mediate "inferences" or "*proofs*." Phenomenologically, all these types of synthesis must be investigated in correlation with the synthetic objectivities "constituted" in them. The various modes of givenness must be elucidated, together with their significance for the "actual being" of such objectivities, or for their *truly* being possible, for their actually being probable; and so on through all the questions of reason and truth, or of actuality. So *here*, too, we have *"problems of constitution"*.

Now the logical syntheses are indeed grounded on lowest theses with simple matters (senses). But they are grounded in such a way that the [322] essential lawfulnesses of the synthetic level, and in particular the laws of reason, are independent of the particular matters of the synthetic members, within a very wide, determinately delimited "formal" sphere. It is precisely this that makes possible a general and *formal logic*, which abstracts from the "matter" of logical cognition and thinks it in indeterminate, freely variable generality (as "anything whatever"). Accordingly, *the investigations relating to constitution also divide*. On the one hand are those that attach to the *formal* basic concepts and take only these as "guiding threads" for the problems of reason, or rather for the problems of actuality and truth. On the other hand are those described just now, which attach to the *regional* basic concepts, and first of all to the concept of the *region itself*, asking how an individual of such a region comes to givenness. With the *regional categories* and the investigations they prescribe, *the particular determination that synthetic form undergoes through regional matter* receives its due. So, likewise, does the influence that the *particular bindings* (such

as find their expression in the regional axioms) *exert on regional actuality*.

What has been set out obviously carries over to all spheres of acts and objects. It thus carries over also to *the objectivities for whose constitution acts of feeling, with their specific theses and matters, must* a priori *be responsible*. How they are responsible must again be elucidated in respect of form and of material particularity; this is the great task, scarcely suspected, let alone tackled, of the corresponding constitutive phenomenology.

This also makes evident the intimate relation of the constitutive phenomenologies to the *a priori* ontologies, and ultimately to all eidetic disciplines (we exclude phenomenology itself here). The *hierarchy of formal and material doctrines of essence* in a certain way prescribes the *hierarchy of constitutive phenomenologies*. It determines their levels of generality and gives them their "*guiding threads*" in the ontological and material-eidetic basic concepts and basic principles. For example, basic concepts of the ontology of nature, such as time, space, matter, and their immediate derivatives, are indices of strata of the consciousness that constitutes material thinghood. Likewise, the associated basic principles are indices of essential [323] connections in and between the strata. The phenomenological elucidation of the purely logical then makes it intelligible that, and why, all the *mediate* propositions of the pure theory of time, of geometry, and so of all ontological disciplines, are also indices of essential lawfulnesses of transcendental consciousness and its constituting manifolds.

It must be expressly noted, however, that these connections between constitutive phenomenologies and the corresponding formal and material ontologies involve nothing of *a grounding of the former by the latter. The phenomenologist does not judge ontologically* when he recognizes an ontological concept or proposition as an index of constitutive essential connections. Nor does he when he sees in it a guiding thread for intuitive demonstrations that carry their legitimacy and validity purely within themselves. This general finding will be borne out for us later in more

thorough discussions, which the importance of this state of affairs does indeed require.

An all-round solution of the problems of constitution, one that took equal account of the noetic and the noematic strata of consciousness, would obviously be equivalent to a complete phenomenology of reason in all its formal and material configurations. It would cover the anomalous (negatively rational) configurations as well as the normal (positively rational) ones. Beyond this, however, it forces itself upon us that so complete a phenomenology of reason would coincide with phenomenology as a whole. A systematic execution of all the descriptions of consciousness required by the overall heading "constitution of objects" would have to comprise within itself all descriptions of consciousness whatsoever.