Critique of the Power of Judgment

IMMANUEL KANT
1724–1804

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Kritik der Urteilskraft

Translated from the German with AI (Claude) and edited

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Critique of the Power of Judgment · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

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INTRODUCTION

The *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790) is Kant's third critique, written to bridge the two he had already published: the world of nature, known through the understanding, and the world of freedom, governed by the moral law. The bridge, he argues, is judgment, our capacity to think the particular under the universal, and in particular our tendency to see nature as if it were purposive, fitted to our minds.

The first half is the founding text of modern aesthetics. A judgment of taste, Kant argues, is disinterested and yet claims everyone's agreement: the beautiful is "that which, without a concept, pleases universally," a "purposiveness without a purpose." He analyzes the sublime, in which the vastness or power of nature overwhelms the senses and so reveals the power of reason within us, then turns to fine art and genius, "the innate mental disposition through which nature gives the rule to art," and ends by calling the beautiful "the symbol of the morally good."

The second half examines teleology, the judgment of living things as organized wholes whose parts exist for one another. No mechanical science, Kant insists, will ever explain them: there will never be "a Newton who could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass." From there he asks what the final purpose of nature could be, and answers: the human being as a moral agent, which leads him to a moral argument for the existence of God.

Preface

Why reason needs a critique of judgment, the missing middle term between understanding and reason.

167 The faculty of cognition from principles *a priori* can be called *pure reason,* and the investigation of its possibility and limits in general can be called the Critique of Pure Reason. This holds even though by this faculty one understands only reason in its theoretical use, as was also done in the first work under that title, which did not yet undertake to investigate its faculty as practical reason according to its special principles.[1] That critique, then, is concerned solely with our faculty of cognizing things *a priori*. It therefore occupies itself only with the *cognitive faculty*, to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and of the faculty of desire. Among the cognitive faculties, it deals with the *understanding* according to its principles *a priori,* to the exclusion of the *power of judgment* and of *reason* (faculties that likewise belong to theoretical cognition). For it turns out, as the investigation proceeds, that no cognitive faculty other than the understanding can furnish constitutive principles of cognition *a priori*.[2] The critique, then, sifts all these faculties according to the share that each of the others might claim to have, from its own root, in the outright possession of cognition. It leaves nothing but what the *understanding* prescribes *a priori* as law for nature, as the sum total of appearances (whose form is likewise given *a priori*). All other pure concepts it relegates to

1 The "first work" is the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781; second edition 1787).
2 "Power of judgment" renders *Urteilskraft*, the faculty of judging, as distinct from a single judgment (*Urteil*).

the ideas. These exceed the reach of our theoretical cognitive faculty, yet they are by no means useless or dispensable; rather, they serve as regulative principles. On the one hand, they hold back the worrying presumptions of the understanding, as if (because it is able to specify [168] *a priori* the conditions of the possibility of all things that it can cognize) it had thereby also confined the possibility of all things whatever within these bounds. On the other hand, they guide the understanding itself in its consideration of nature according to a principle of completeness, even though it can never attain that completeness, and in this way they promote the final aim of all cognition.

It was thus really the *understanding* that was to be placed in secure and sole possession, against all other claimants, by the critique generally so named, the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The understanding has its own domain, and indeed in the *cognitive faculty*, insofar as it contains constitutive principles of cognition *a priori*. In the same way, *reason*, which contains constitutive principles *a priori* nowhere except with regard to the *faculty of desire*, has had its possession assigned to it in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.[3]

DOES JUDGMENT HAVE A PRINCIPLE OF ITS OWN?

Kant asks whether the power of judgment, between understanding and reason, gives a priori rules to feeling.

Now, the *power of judgment* forms, in the order of our cognitive faculties, a middle term between the understanding and reason. Does it too have principles *a priori* of its own? Are these constitutive or merely regulative (and so prove that it has no domain of its own)? And does it give the rule *a priori* to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as the middle term between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire (just as the understanding prescribes laws *a priori* to the former, and reason to the latter)? These are the questions with which the present *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is concerned.

3 Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* appeared in 1788.

A critique of pure reason, i.e., of our faculty of judging according to principles *a priori*, would be incomplete if the critique of the power of judgment—which, as a cognitive faculty, also lays claim to such principles in its own right—were not treated as a special part of it. This is so even though, in a system of pure philosophy, its principles may not form a special part between the theoretical and the practical, but can, when necessary, be attached as occasion arises to either of the two. For if such a system is ever to come about under the general name of metaphysics (and to accomplish it completely is possible, and of the utmost importance for the use of reason in every respect), then the critique must first have explored the ground for this edifice down to the depth at which the first foundation of the faculty of principles independent of experience lies. Otherwise some part of the building would sink, and that would inevitably bring about the collapse of the whole.

169 From the nature of the power of judgment, however, one can easily gather that great difficulties must attend the discovery of a principle peculiar to it. (Its correct use is so necessary and so universally required that by the name of sound understanding nothing but precisely this faculty is meant.) It must contain some such principle *a priori* within itself, since otherwise it would not, as a special cognitive faculty, be exposed even to the most ordinary critique. And yet this principle must not be derived from concepts *a priori*; for these belong to the understanding, and the power of judgment is concerned only with their application. The power of judgment must therefore itself supply a concept through which, strictly speaking, no thing is cognized, but which serves only as a rule for the power of judgment itself. It is not, however, an objective rule to which it could adapt its judgment, since for that yet another power of judgment would be required, in order to be able to tell whether or not the case falls under the rule.

This perplexity about a principle (whether subjective or objective) arises chiefly in those appraisals that are called aesthetic, which concern the beautiful and the sublime in nature or

in art. And yet the critical investigation of a principle of the power of judgment in them is the most important part of a critique of this faculty. For although by themselves they contribute nothing at all to the cognition of things, they nonetheless belong to the cognitive faculty alone. They prove an immediate relation of this faculty to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure according to some principle *a priori*, without confusing it with what can be a determining ground of the faculty of desire, since the latter has its principles *a priori* in concepts of reason. —Consider, however, the logical appraisal of nature. There, experience exhibits a lawfulness in things that the understanding's universal concept of the sensible is no longer adequate to understand or explain; and the power of judgment can take from itself a principle of the relation of the natural thing to the uncognizable supersensible, and must also use it only with a view to itself, for the cognition of nature. In that case such a principle *a priori* can and must indeed be applied to the *cognition* of the beings of the world, and at the same time it opens up prospects that are advantageous for practical reason: but it has no immediate relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. It is precisely this relation that is the enigmatic element in the principle of the power of judgment, and it makes a special division in the critique necessary [170] for this faculty. For the logical appraisal according to concepts (from which no immediate inference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure can ever be drawn) could at most have been appended to the theoretical part of philosophy, together with a critical limitation of it.

A TRANSCENDENTAL, NOT A PRACTICAL, INQUIRY

The book is not meant to cultivate taste; Kant closes his critical work and turns to doctrine.

The investigation of the faculty of taste, as the aesthetic power of judgment, is undertaken here not for the formation and cultivation of taste (for this will go its way in the future, as it has until now, even without any such inquiries), but merely with a

transcendental aim. So, I flatter myself, it will be judged leniently with regard to its deficiency for that former purpose. As for the latter aim, however, it must be prepared for the strictest examination. But even there, I hope, the great difficulty of solving a problem that nature has made so tangled may serve to excuse some not entirely avoidable obscurity in its solution—provided only that it has been shown clearly enough that the principle has been correctly stated. This holds even supposing that the way of deriving the phenomenon of the power of judgment from it does not have all the distinctness that one can rightly demand elsewhere, namely from a cognition according to concepts; this distinctness I believe I have in fact achieved in the second part of this work.[4]

With this, then, I bring my entire critical undertaking to a close. I shall proceed without delay to the doctrinal one, in order, if possible, to wrest from my advancing years the time still somewhat favorable for it. It goes without saying that there will be no special part in it for the power of judgment, since with respect to this faculty critique takes the place of theory. Rather, following the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and of pure philosophy into the same parts, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals will make up that undertaking.[5]

4 The second part is the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.
5 Kant was sixty-six in 1790; his *Metaphysics of Morals* appeared in 1797.

Introduction

Nature and freedom, and judgment as the bridge between them: the principle of the purposiveness of nature.

I VON DER EINTHEILUNG DER PHILOSOPHIE.

171 Philosophy, insofar as it contains principles of the rational cognition of things through concepts (not merely, like logic, principles of the form of thinking in general, without distinction of objects), is usually divided into *theoretical* and *practical*; and in so dividing it one proceeds quite correctly. But in that case the concepts that assign their object to the principles of this rational cognition must also be specifically different. Otherwise they would not justify a division, which always presupposes an opposition between the principles of the rational cognition belonging to the different parts of a science.

There are, however, only two kinds of concepts that admit of as many different principles of the possibility of their objects: namely, the *concepts of nature* and the *concept of freedom*. The former make possible a *theoretical* cognition according to principles *a priori*. The latter, with respect to such cognition, already carries with it in its very concept only a negative principle (that of mere opposition), whereas for the determination of the will it establishes expansive principles, which are for that reason called practical. Philosophy is therefore rightly divided into two parts quite different in their principles: the theoretical, as *philosophy of nature*, and the practical, as *moral philosophy* (for that is the name given to the practical legislation of reason according to the concept of freedom). Up to now, however, these expressions have been greatly misused in dividing the different prin-

ciples, and with them philosophy itself. For the practical according to concepts of nature was taken to be the same as the practical according to the concept of freedom; and so, [172] under the same names of theoretical and practical philosophy, a division was made by which (since both parts could have the same principles) nothing was in fact divided.

The will, as a faculty of desire, is namely one of the many natural causes in the world: the one that acts according to concepts. And everything that is represented as possible (or necessary) through a will is called practically possible (or necessary), in distinction from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect, where the cause is determined to causality not through concepts (but, as in lifeless matter, through mechanism, and in animals through instinct).—Now, with regard to the practical, it is left undetermined here whether the concept that gives the rule to the causality of the will is a concept of nature or a concept of freedom.

This last distinction, however, is essential. For if the concept determining the causality is a concept of nature, then the principles are *technically* practical; but if it is a concept of freedom, then they are *morally practical*. And since in the division of a rational science everything depends on that difference between objects whose cognition requires different principles, the former will belong to theoretical philosophy (as doctrine of nature), while the latter alone will make up the second part, namely practical philosophy (as doctrine of morals).

All technically practical rules (i.e., those of art and skill in general, or also of prudence, as a skill in influencing people and their wills), insofar as their principles rest on concepts, must be counted only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy. For they concern only the possibility of things according to concepts of nature. To this belong not only the means for it that are to be found in nature, but even the will itself (as a faculty of desire, and hence a natural faculty), insofar as it can be determined by incentives of nature in conformity with those rules. Yet practical rules of this kind are not called laws (as physical rules are, say),

but only precepts. The reason is that the will stands not only under the concept of nature but also under the concept of freedom. In relation to the latter, its principles are called laws, and these, together with their consequences, alone make up the second part of philosophy, namely the practical part.

The solution of the problems of pure geometry does not belong to [173] a special part of it, nor does surveying deserve the name of a practical geometry, as a second part of geometry in general distinguished from pure geometry. Just so—and even less—may the mechanical or chemical art of experiments or of observations be counted as a practical part of the doctrine of nature. Nor, finally, may household, agricultural, and political economy, the art of social conduct, the precepts of dietetics, not even the general doctrine of happiness, indeed not even the taming of the inclinations and the curbing of the affects for the sake of happiness, be counted as practical philosophy—let alone that these latter should make up the second part of philosophy in general; for all of them contain only rules of skill, which are therefore only technically practical, for producing an effect that is possible according to natural concepts of causes and effects. Since these concepts belong to theoretical philosophy, they are subject to those precepts as mere corollaries of it (of natural science); and so these disciplines can claim no place in a special philosophy called practical. By contrast, the morally practical precepts, which are grounded entirely on the concept of freedom, with complete exclusion of determining grounds of the will drawn from nature, constitute a quite special kind of precepts. Like the rules that nature obeys, they too are called laws without qualification; but unlike those, they rest not on sensible conditions but on a supersensible principle. And alongside the theoretical part of philosophy they demand, entirely for themselves, another part under the name of practical philosophy.

One sees from this that a body of practical precepts given by philosophy does not form a special part of it, set alongside the theoretical part, simply because they are practical. For that they could be even if their principles were taken entirely from the

theoretical cognition of nature (as technically practical rules). They form such a part, rather, because and when their principle is not borrowed at all from the concept of nature, which is always sensibly conditioned, and hence rests on the supersensible, which the concept of freedom alone makes knowable through formal laws—and when they are therefore morally practical, i.e., not merely precepts and rules for this or that purpose, but laws, without prior reference to ends and aims.

II. THE DOMAIN OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL

Concepts have fields, territories and domains; understanding and reason legislate over one territory of experience.

174 As far as concepts *a priori* have their application, so far extends the use of our cognitive faculty according to principles, and with it philosophy.

The sum total of all objects to which those concepts are related, in order, where possible, to bring about a cognition of them, can be divided according to the varying adequacy or inadequacy of our faculties for this purpose.

Concepts, insofar as they are related to objects, regardless of whether a cognition of these is possible or not, have their field, which is determined merely by the relation that their object has to our cognitive faculty in general.—The part of this field within which cognition is possible for us is a territory (*territorium*) for these concepts and for the cognitive faculty they require. The part of the territory over which these concepts legislate is the domain (*ditio*) of these concepts and of the cognitive faculties that belong to them. Empirical concepts, then, do have their territory in nature, as the sum total of all objects of the senses, but no domain (only their residence, *domicilium*). For although they are generated lawfully, they are not legislative; the rules grounded on them are empirical, and hence contingent.[1]

1 Kant's metaphor is juridical: within a field (*Feld*) lies a territory (*Boden*), part of which may be a domain (*Gebiet*), a sphere of jurisdiction where concepts give law; a *domicilium* is mere residence.

Our cognitive faculty as a whole has two domains, that of the concepts of nature and that of the concept of freedom; for through both it is legislative *a priori*. Philosophy, accordingly, is also divided into theoretical and practical. But the territory on which its domain is established and its legislation is *exercised* is always only the sum total of the objects of all possible experience, insofar as these are taken for nothing more than mere appearances; for otherwise no legislation of the understanding with respect to them could be conceived.

Legislation through concepts of nature takes place through the understanding and is theoretical. Legislation through the concept of freedom takes place from reason and is merely practical. Only in the practical can reason be legislative. With regard to theoretical cognition (of nature), it can only (as acquainted with laws by means of the understanding) [175] draw consequences from given laws through inferences, and these consequences always remain within nature. Conversely, however, where rules are practical, reason is not for that reason at once *legislative*, since the rules can also be technically practical.

Understanding and reason thus have two different legislations on one and the same territory of experience, without either being permitted to encroach on the other. For the concept of nature has as little influence on legislation through the concept of freedom as the latter disturbs the legislation of nature.—The *Critique of Pure Reason* proved that it is possible at least to think, without contradiction, the coexistence of both legislations and of the faculties belonging to them in the same subject; it did so by annihilating the objections against this through exposing the dialectical illusion in them.

These two different domains unceasingly limit each other—not in their legislation, to be sure, but in their effects in the sensible world. Why, then, do they not form *one*? The reason is this. The concept of nature does represent its objects in intuition, but not as things in themselves, only as mere appearances. The concept of freedom, by contrast, does represent in its object a thing in itself, but not in intuition. Hence neither of them can

furnish a theoretical cognition of its object (or even of the thinking subject) as a thing in itself. That would be the supersensible, whose idea we must indeed place at the basis of the possibility of all those objects of experience, but which we can never raise and extend into a cognition.

There is, then, an unbounded but also inaccessible field for our cognitive faculty as a whole, namely the field of the supersensible. In it we find no territory for ourselves, and so on it we can have no domain for theoretical cognition, either for the concepts of the understanding or for those of reason. It is a field that we must indeed occupy with ideas, for the sake of the theoretical as well as the practical use of reason. But to these ideas, in relation to the laws arising from the concept of freedom, we can give no reality other than practical reality; and so our theoretical cognition is not in the least extended thereby to the supersensible.

THE GULF BETWEEN NATURE AND FREEDOM

Freedom ought to affect the sensible world, so nature must be thinkable as fitting its ends.

Now, an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, [176] as the supersensible, so that no transition is possible from the former to the latter (that is, by means of the theoretical use of reason), just as if they were so many different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second. And yet the second *is to* have an influence on the first: the concept of freedom is to make the end set by its laws actual in the sensible world. Nature must consequently also be capable of being thought in such a way that the lawfulness of its form at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be realized in it according to laws of freedom.[2] —So there must after all be a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible that lies at the basis of nature with what the concept of freedom contains practically.

2 The "gulf fixed" echoes Luke 16:26.

The concept of this ground attains a cognition of it neither theoretically nor practically, and so has no domain of its own; nevertheless, it makes possible the transition from the way of thinking according to the principles of the one to the way of thinking according to the principles of the other.

III. JUDGMENT AS THE LINK BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY

Judgment mediates between understanding and reason, as pleasure mediates between cognition and desire.

The critique of the cognitive faculties with regard to what they can achieve *a priori* has, strictly speaking, no domain with respect to objects, because it is not a doctrine. It has only to investigate whether and how, given the nature of our faculties, a doctrine is possible through them. Its field extends to all their presumptions, in order to confine them within the bounds of their legitimacy. But what cannot enter into the division of philosophy may yet enter, as a principal part, into the critique of the pure cognitive faculty in general—namely, if it contains principles that by themselves are fit neither for theoretical nor for practical use.

The concepts of nature, which contain the ground of all theoretical cognition *a priori*, rested on the legislation of the understanding. The concept of freedom, which contained the ground of all sensibly unconditioned practical precepts *a priori*, rested on the legislation of reason. Both faculties, then, can be applied in their logical form to principles of whatever origin; but beyond this, each has its own legislation [177] as to content, above which there is no other (*a priori*), and which therefore justifies the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical.

Yet in the family of the higher cognitive faculties there is still a middle term between the understanding and reason. This is the *power of judgment*. We have cause to suppose, by analogy, that it too may contain *a priori*, if not a legislation of its own, then at least a principle of its own for seeking laws—perhaps a merely subjective one. Even if no field of objects belonged to

this principle as its domain, it can still have some territory, and a certain character of that territory, for which precisely this principle alone might hold.

To this, however, there is added (judging by analogy) a further ground for connecting the power of judgment with another order of our powers of representation, one that seems to be of even greater importance than its kinship with the family of cognitive faculties. For all faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to three, which cannot be further derived from a common ground: the *cognitive faculty*, the *feeling of pleasure and dis-*

pleasure, and the *faculty of desire*[3]. [178] For the cognitive faculty, the understanding alone is legislative, when that faculty is related

3 KANT'S NOTE. It is useful to attempt a transcendental definition of concepts that one uses as empirical principles, when one has cause to suspect that they are related to the pure cognitive faculty *a priori*—on account of this very relation. Such a definition proceeds through pure categories, insofar as these alone already sufficiently indicate how the concept in question differs from others. In this one follows the example of the mathematician, who leaves the empirical data of his problem undetermined and brings only their relation, in their pure synthesis, under the concepts of pure arithmetic, thereby generalizing its solution.—I have been reproached for a similar procedure (*Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 16 [9] of the Preface), and my definition of the faculty of desire as the *faculty of being, through one's representations, the cause of the actuality of the objects of these representations* has been criticized, on the ground that mere *wishes* are also desires, and yet everyone accepts that they cannot produce the object of their wishes through these alone. — But this proves nothing more than that there are also desires in human beings through which they are in contradiction with themselves. In such desires, they work toward producing the object through their representation *alone*, and yet can expect no success from it. For they are aware that their mechanical powers (if I may so call the non-psychological ones), which would have to be determined by that representation in order to bring about the object (and hence mediately), are either insufficient or are even directed at something impossible: for example, to undo what has been done (*O mihi praeteritos*, etc. ["Oh, if only the years gone by were given back to me ..."]), or, in impatient waiting, to be able to annihilate the interval before the longed-for moment. —In such fanciful desires we are aware that our representations are insufficient (or even unfit) to be the *cause* of their objects. Nevertheless, the relation of these representations as cause, and hence the representation of their *causality*, is contained in every *wish*; and it becomes especially visible when the wish is an affect, namely *longing*. For such longings, by expanding the heart and making it languid and so exhausting one's strength, prove that the powers are repeatedly strained by representations, but that at the thought of the impossibility they let the mind sink back, again and again, into exhaustion. Even prayers for the averting of great and, as far as one can see, unavoidable evils, and many superstitious means for attaining ends that are naturally impossible, prove the causal relation of representations to their objects—a relation that cannot be kept from striving toward the effect even by the consciousness of its insufficiency to produce it.—But why the propensity to desires consciously known to be empty has been placed in our nature is an anthropological-teleological question. It seems that if we were not to be determined to apply our powers until we had assured ourselves that our faculty was adequate to producing an object, those powers would for the most part remain unused. For as a rule we first come to know our powers only by trying them out. This deception in empty wishes is thus only the consequence of a beneficent arrangement in our nature.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Virgil, *Aeneid* 8.560: "O mihi praeteritos referat si Iuppiter annos" ("Oh, if Jupiter would give me back the years gone by"), the aged Evander lamenting his lost youth.

to nature as a faculty of *theoretical cognition* (as must also happen if it is considered by itself, without being mixed with the faculty of desire). Only with respect to nature (as appearance) is it possible for us to give laws through concepts of nature *a priori*, which are really pure concepts of the understanding.—For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty according to the concept of freedom, reason alone (in which alone this concept has a place) is legislative *a priori*.—Now between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire lies the feeling of pleasure, just as the power of judgment lies between the understanding and reason. It is therefore to be supposed, at least provisionally, that the power of judgment likewise contains a principle *a priori* of its own. Pleasure or displeasure is necessarily bound up with the faculty of desire (whether, as in the lower faculty, it precedes the principle of that faculty, or, as in the [179] higher, it only follows from the determination of that faculty by the moral law). So it is also to be supposed that the power of judgment will likewise bring about a transition from the pure cognitive faculty, i.e., from the domain of the concepts of nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from the understanding to reason.

Philosophy can be divided into only two principal parts, the theoretical and the practical; and everything we might have to say about the power of judgment's own principles would have to be counted in it as belonging to the theoretical part, i.e., to rational cognition according to concepts of nature. Even so, the critique of pure reason, which must settle all this before that system is undertaken, for the sake of its possibility, consists of three parts: the critique of the pure understanding, of the pure power of judgment, and of pure reason. These faculties are called pure because they are legislative *a priori*.

IV. JUDGMENT AS A FACULTY LEGISLATING *a priori*

Determining judgment subsumes under given laws; reflecting judgment must find the universal for a given particular.

The power of judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment that subsumes the particular under it is *determining* (even when, as transcendental power of judgment, it specifies *a priori* the conditions under which alone subsumption under that universal is possible). If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely *reflecting*.

The determining power of judgment, under universal transcendental laws given by the understanding, is merely subsuming. The law is marked out for it *a priori*, and so it has no need to devise a law for itself in order to be able to subordinate the particular in nature to the universal. —But the forms of nature are so manifold—there are, as it were, so many modifications of the universal transcendental concepts of nature, left undetermined by those laws that the pure understanding gives *a priori*, since these laws concern only the possibility of a nature in general (as object of the senses)—that there must nonetheless also be [180] laws for them. As empirical laws, these may indeed be contingent as far as *our* understanding can see. Yet if they are to be called laws (as the concept of a nature also requires), they must be regarded as necessary on the basis of a principle of the unity of the manifold, even if that principle is unknown to us. —The reflecting power of judgment, whose task is to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, therefore needs a principle that it cannot borrow from experience. For this principle is meant to ground precisely the unity of all empirical principles under principles that are likewise empirical but higher, and hence the possibility of their systematic subordination to one another. Such a transcendental principle, then, the reflecting

power of judgment can only give itself as a law. It cannot take it from elsewhere (for then it would be the determining power of judgment), nor can it prescribe it to nature. For reflection on the laws of nature conforms to nature, whereas nature does not conform to the conditions according to which we strive to acquire a concept of it that is, as far as nature is concerned, entirely contingent.

Now this principle can be none other than the following. Universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature (though only according to the universal concept of it as nature). The particular empirical laws, therefore, with regard to what those universal laws leave undetermined in them, must be considered according to such a unity as they would have if an understanding (though not ours) had likewise given them for the sake of our cognitive faculties, in order to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature. This is not to say that such an understanding must actually be assumed in this way (for it is only the reflecting power of judgment for which this idea serves as a principle—for reflecting, not for determining). Rather, this faculty thereby gives a law only to itself, and not to nature.

The concept of an object, insofar as it at the same time contains the ground of the actuality of this object, is called an *end*; and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is possible only according to ends is called the *purposiveness* of its form. Hence the principle of the power of judgment with regard to the form of things of nature under empirical laws in general is the *purposiveness of nature* in its manifoldness. That is, through this concept nature is represented [181] as if an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws.[4]

The purposiveness of nature is therefore a special concept *a priori*, which has its origin solely in the reflecting power of judgment. For we cannot attribute to the products of nature any-

4 "Purposiveness" renders Zweckmäßigkeit, literally "conformity to an end (*Zweck*)," the central concept of the work.

thing like a relation of nature in them to ends; we can only use this concept to reflect on them with regard to the connection of appearances in nature that is given according to empirical laws. This concept is also quite distinct from practical purposiveness (of human art or of morals), although it is thought by analogy with it.

V. FORMAL PURPOSIVENESS AS A TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLE

Judgment presupposes that nature's empirical laws form a system graspable by our understanding.

A transcendental principle is one through which the universal condition *a priori* is represented under which alone things can become objects of our cognition in general. By contrast, a principle is called metaphysical if it represents the condition *a priori* under which alone objects whose concept must be given empirically can be further determined *a priori*. Thus the principle of the cognition of bodies as substances, and as changeable substances, is transcendental if it says that their change must have a cause; but it is metaphysical if it says that their change must have an *external* cause. For in the first case the body may be thought only through ontological predicates (pure concepts of the understanding), e.g. as substance, in order to cognize the proposition *a priori*. In the second case, however, the empirical concept of a body (as a movable thing in space) must be laid at the basis of this proposition; but once this is done, it can be seen completely *a priori* that the latter predicate (motion only through an external cause) belongs to the body.—Thus, as I shall show shortly, the principle of the purposiveness of nature (in the manifoldness of its empirical laws) is a transcendental principle. For the concept of the objects, insofar as they are thought as standing under this principle, is only the pure concept of objects of possible empirical cognition [182] in general, and contains nothing empirical. On the other hand, the principle of practical purposiveness, which must be thought in the idea of the *determination* of a free *will*, would be a metaphysical prin-

ciple, because the concept of a faculty of desire as a will must, after all, be given empirically (it does not belong among the transcendental predicates). Both principles, however, are nonetheless not empirical but principles *a priori*. For no further experience is needed to connect the predicate with the empirical concept of the subject of their judgments; this connection can be seen completely *a priori*.

That the concept of a purposiveness of nature belongs among the transcendental principles can be seen sufficiently from the maxims of the power of judgment that are laid *a priori* at the basis of the investigation of nature. These maxims nonetheless concern nothing but the possibility of experience, and hence of the cognition of nature—not merely as nature in general, but as nature determined by a manifold of particular laws.—As sayings of metaphysical wisdom, they turn up often enough in the course of this science, though only in scattered fashion, in connection with a number of rules whose necessity cannot be demonstrated from concepts. "Nature takes the shortest route (*lex parsimoniae* [the law of parsimony]); nevertheless, it makes no leap, either in the sequence of its changes or in the juxtaposition of specifically different forms (*lex continui in natura* [the law of continuity in nature]); its great manifoldness in empirical laws is nonetheless unity under a few principles (*principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda* [principles are not to be multiplied beyond necessity])"; and so on.[5]

But if one thinks of specifying the origin of these principles and attempts to do so by the psychological route, this is entirely contrary to their sense. For they say not what happens, i.e., according to what rule our cognitive powers actually conduct their play and how judgments are actually made, but how one ought to judge; and this logical, objective necessity does not emerge if the principles are merely empirical. Hence the purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties and their use, which evidently shines forth from these principles, is a tran-

5 Traditional maxims of natural philosophy: the law of continuity is associated with Leibniz, and the last maxim is a version of "Ockham's razor."

scendental principle of judgments. It therefore also requires a transcendental deduction, by means of which the ground for judging in this way must be sought in the *a priori* sources of cognition.

In the grounds of the possibility of an experience [183] we do, of course, first find something necessary: namely, the universal laws without which nature in general (as object of the senses) cannot be thought at all. These rest on the categories, applied to the formal conditions of all intuition possible for us, insofar as it too is given *a priori*. Under these laws the power of judgment is determining, for it has nothing to do but subsume under given laws. For example, the understanding says: all change has its cause (a universal law of nature). The transcendental power of judgment then has nothing further to do than to specify *a priori* the condition of subsumption under the concept of the understanding put before it: and that is the succession of the determinations of one and the same thing. Now for nature in general (as object of possible experience), that law is cognized as absolutely necessary. But the objects of empirical cognition are, apart from that formal condition of time, determined—or, as far as one can judge *a priori*, determinable—in many other ways as well. Thus specifically different natures, over and above what they have in common as belonging to nature in general, can still be causes in infinitely various ways. And each of these kinds must (according to the concept of a cause in general) have its rule, which is a law and hence carries necessity with it—even though, given the constitution and limits of our cognitive faculties, we do not see this necessity at all. So with regard to nature's merely empirical laws, we must think in nature a possibility of infinitely various empirical laws that are nonetheless contingent for our insight (cannot be cognized *a priori*). And with respect to them we judge the unity of nature according to empirical laws, and the possibility of the unity of experience (as a system according to empirical laws), to be contingent. Yet such a unity must necessarily be presupposed and assumed, since otherwise there would be no thoroughgoing connection of

empirical cognitions into a whole of experience. For the universal laws of nature do furnish such a connection among things with respect to their genus, as things of nature in general, but not specifically, as such and such particular natural beings. The power of judgment must therefore, for its own use, assume it as a principle *a priori* that what is contingent for human insight in the particular (empirical) laws of nature nevertheless contains a lawful unity—one that we cannot fathom, but that is still [184] thinkable—in the combination of their manifold into an experience possible in itself. Consider, then, the lawful unity in a combination that we cognize as conforming to a necessary aim (a need of the understanding), yet at the same time as contingent in itself: such unity is represented as purposiveness of the objects (here, of nature). Consequently, the power of judgment, which with regard to things under possible (yet to be discovered) empirical laws is merely reflecting, must think of nature with respect to those laws according to a *principle of purposiveness* for our cognitive faculty; and this principle is then expressed in the maxims of the power of judgment given above. This transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a concept of nature nor a concept of freedom. For it attributes nothing at all to the object (nature), but only represents the sole way in which we must proceed in reflecting on the objects of nature with a view to a thoroughly interconnected experience. It is consequently a subjective principle (maxim) of the power of judgment. That is also why, when we come upon such a systematic unity under merely empirical laws, we are delighted (really, relieved of a need), just as if it were a happy accident favoring our aim—even though we necessarily had to assume that there is such a unity, without being able to see into it or prove it.

To convince oneself of the correctness of this deduction of the concept before us, and of the necessity of assuming it as a transcendental principle of cognition, one need only consider the magnitude of the task: to make a connected experience out of given perceptions of a nature that may contain an infinite mani-

fold of empirical laws—a task that lies *a priori* in our understanding. The understanding is indeed in possession *a priori* of universal laws of nature, without which nature could not be an object of experience at all. But in addition it also needs a certain order of nature in its particular rules, which can become known to it only empirically and which, with respect to the understanding, are contingent. These rules, without which there would be no progress from the general analogy of a possible experience in general to the particular, the understanding must think of as laws (i.e., as necessary), since otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature—even though it does not cognize their necessity and could never see into it. So although the understanding can determine nothing *a priori* with respect to these [185] (objects), it must nevertheless, in order to pursue these so-called empirical laws, lay at the basis of all reflection on them a principle *a priori*: namely, that according to these laws a cognizable order of nature is possible. Such a principle is expressed by the following propositions: that there is in nature a subordination of genera and species that we can grasp; that the genera in turn approach one another according to a common principle, so that a transition from one to another, and thereby to a higher genus, is possible; that although at first it seems unavoidable to our understanding to have to assume as many different kinds of causality as there are specific differences among the effects of nature, these may nonetheless stand under a small number of principles, which it is our business to search out; and so on. This harmony of nature with our cognitive faculty is presupposed *a priori* by the power of judgment for the sake of its reflection on nature according to nature's empirical laws. The understanding at the same time recognizes this harmony objectively as contingent, and only the power of judgment attributes it to nature as transcendental purposiveness (in relation to the subject's cognitive faculty). For without presupposing it, we would have no order of nature according to empirical laws, and hence no guiding thread for an experience to be conducted with these laws in all their manifoldness, nor for the investigation of them.

For it is quite conceivable that, despite all the uniformity of natural things under the universal laws without which the form of empirical cognition in general could not occur at all, the specific diversity of the empirical laws of nature, together with their effects, might still be so great that our understanding could not discover in it any order it could grasp. It could not divide nature's products into genera and species, so as to use the principles by which one product is explained and understood for explaining and grasping another as well. Nor could it make a coherent experience out of material so confused for us (properly speaking, only infinitely manifold and not suited to our capacity to grasp it).

THE LAW OF THE SPECIFICATION OF NATURE

Judgment gives this law to itself, not to nature: a heautonomy, not an autonomy.

The power of judgment, then, also contains within itself an *a priori* principle for the possibility of nature, but only in a subjective respect. Through this principle it prescribes a law not to nature (as autonomy) but to itself (as heautonomy) [186] for its reflection on nature. This law could be called the *law of the specification of nature* with respect to its empirical laws. The power of judgment does not cognize this law *a priori* in nature. Rather, it assumes it for the sake of an order of nature that our understanding can cognize, in the division it makes of nature's universal laws when it seeks to subordinate a manifold of particular laws to them. So when it is said that nature specifies its universal laws according to the principle of purposiveness for our cognitive faculty, that is,[6] in suitability to the human understanding in its necessary task of finding the universal for the particular that perception offers it, and of finding, in turn, connection in the unity of a principle for what is diverse (though universal for each species), then one is neither prescribing a law to nature

6 "Heautonomy" is Kant's coinage (from Greek *heauton*, "oneself"): a law that a faculty gives to itself rather than to its objects.

nor learning one from it through observation (although that principle can be confirmed by observation). For it is a principle not of the determining but merely of the reflecting power of judgment. All that is meant is this: however nature may be arranged with regard to its universal laws, we must investigate its empirical laws entirely in accordance with that principle and the maxims grounded on it. Only insofar as that principle holds can we make headway in using our understanding in experience and acquire cognition.

VI. PLEASURE AND THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE

Discovering that nature's laws fit our understanding brings pleasure, once noticed and later forgotten.

This agreement of nature, in the manifold of its particular laws, with our need to find universal principles for them must, as far as we can see, be judged contingent. Yet it must also be judged indispensable for the needs of our understanding, and hence as a purposiveness through which nature agrees with our aim, though only with our aim directed at cognition. The universal laws of the understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature, are just as necessary to nature (although they arise from spontaneity) as the laws of motion of matter. Their generation presupposes no aim with regard to our cognitive faculties, since it is only through these laws that we first [187] obtain a concept of what cognition of things (of nature) is, and they necessarily belong to nature as object of our cognition in general. But that the order of nature according to its particular laws is actually suited to our capacity to grasp it, despite a manifoldness and heterogeneity that may at least possibly exceed that capacity, is, as far as we can see, contingent. Discovering this order is a task of the understanding, pursued with a view to one of its necessary ends, namely to bring unity of principles into nature. The power of judgment must then attribute this end to nature, since the understanding cannot prescribe any law to nature on this point.

The attainment of every aim is bound up with the feeling of pleasure. If the condition of that attainment is an *a priori* representation, as here a principle for the reflecting power of judgment in general, then the feeling of pleasure is also determined by an *a priori* ground valid for everyone. It is determined merely by the relation of the object to the cognitive faculty, without the concept of purposiveness here taking the least account of the faculty of desire. The concept is thus entirely distinct from any practical purposiveness of nature.

Indeed, we find in ourselves not the slightest effect on the feeling of pleasure from the coincidence of perceptions with laws in accordance with the universal concepts of nature (the categories), nor could we, because here the understanding proceeds unintentionally and necessarily, according to its own nature. On the other hand, the discovery that two or more heterogeneous empirical laws of nature can be united under a principle encompassing both is the ground of a very noticeable pleasure. It is often even the ground of admiration, and of an admiration that does not cease even when we are already sufficiently familiar with its object. It is true that we no longer feel any noticeable pleasure in the graspability of nature and in the unity of its division into genera and species. Yet this unity alone makes possible the empirical concepts through which we cognize nature according to its particular laws. That pleasure was certainly there in its time. Only because the most common experience would be impossible without it has it gradually merged with mere cognition and ceased to be specially noticed. —What is required, then, is something that, in our judging of nature, draws our attention to its purposiveness for our understanding: an effort to bring heterogeneous laws of nature, where possible, under higher ones, though these are still always empirical. This is required [188] if, when the effort succeeds, we are to feel pleasure in this accord of nature with our cognitive faculty, an accord we regard as merely contingent. By contrast, we would be thoroughly displeased by a representation of nature that told us in advance that, with the slightest investigation bey-

ond the most common experience, we would run into a heterogeneity of its laws that made it impossible for our understanding to unite its particular laws under universal empirical ones. For this conflicts with the principle of the subjectively purposive specification of nature in its genera, and with our reflecting power of judgment in the aim proper to it.

Yet this presupposition of the power of judgment is so indeterminate about how far that ideal purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculty should extend that we are content even if we are told that a deeper or wider knowledge of nature through observation must eventually run into a multiplicity of laws that no human understanding can trace back to one principle. We would, however, rather hear others give us hope. The hope is this: the better we came to know nature inwardly, or the more we could compare it with outer members as yet unknown to us, the simpler we would find it in its principles, and the more consistent despite the apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws, the further our experience advanced. For it is a command of our power of judgment to proceed according to the principle of nature's suitability to our cognitive faculty as far as that principle reaches, without settling whether it has limits anywhere or not (since the power of judgment that gives us this rule is not a determining one). We can indeed determine limits with respect to the rational use of our cognitive faculties, but in the empirical field no determination of limits is possible.

VII. THE AESTHETIC REPRESENTATION OF PURPOSIVENESS

Pleasure in the mere form of an object shows its fit with our faculties: the object is beautiful.

What is merely subjective in the representation of an object, that is, what constitutes its relation to the subject and not to the object, is its aesthetic character. What in it serves, or can be used, for the determination [189] of the object (for cognition) is its logical validity. In the cognition of an object of the senses both relations occur together. In the sensory representation of things

outside me, the quality of space in which we intuit them is what is merely subjective in my representation of them (so that what they may be as objects in themselves remains undecided). Because of this relation, the object is also thought merely as appearance. Yet space, despite its merely subjective quality, is nonetheless a component of the cognition of things as appearances. *Sensation* (here, outer sensation) likewise expresses what is merely subjective in our representations of things outside us. Properly speaking, it expresses what is material (real) in them (through which something existing is given), just as space expresses the mere *a priori* form of the possibility of intuiting them. And yet sensation too is used for the cognition of objects outside us.

But the subjective element in a representation *that cannot become a component of cognition at all* is the *pleasure* or *displeasure* connected with it. Through it I cognize nothing in the object of the representation, although it may well be the effect of some cognition. Now the purposiveness of a thing, insofar as it is represented in perception, is also not a property of the object itself (for such a property cannot be perceived), although it can be inferred from a cognition of things. Consider, then, the purposiveness that precedes the cognition of an object and is immediately connected with its representation, even when we do not want to use that representation for a cognition. That purposiveness is the subjective element in the representation that cannot become a component of cognition at all. So in that case the object is called purposive only because its representation is immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure, and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of purposiveness.—The only question is whether there is any such representation of purposiveness at all.

Suppose pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension (*apprehensio*) of the form of an object of intuition, without that form being related to a concept for a determinate cognition. Then the representation is related not to the object but solely to the subject. The pleasure can express nothing but the object's

suitability to the cognitive faculties in play in the reflecting power of judgment [190] , insofar as they are in play there, and thus merely a subjective, formal purposiveness of the object. For that apprehension of forms into the imagination can never take place without the reflecting power of judgment at least comparing them, even unintentionally, with its faculty of relating intuitions to concepts.[7] Now if, in this comparison, a given representation unintentionally brings the imagination (as the faculty of *a priori* intuitions) into accord with the understanding (as the faculty of concepts), and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as purposive for the reflecting power of judgment. Such a judgment is an aesthetic judgment on the purposiveness of the object. It is not grounded on any available concept of the object, and it does not provide one. Suppose the form of an object (not what is material in its representation, as sensation) is judged, in mere reflection on it (without regard to any concept to be acquired from it), to be the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an object. Then this pleasure is also judged to be necessarily connected with its representation, and so not merely for the subject who apprehends this form but for everyone who judges at all. The object is then called beautiful. The faculty of judging through such a pleasure (and hence also with universal validity) is called taste. For the ground of the pleasure is placed merely in the form of the object for reflection in general. It is therefore placed in no sensation of the object, and also without relation to any concept that would contain some aim. So the only thing with which the representation of the object agrees in reflection is the lawfulness in the empirical use of the power of judgment in general (the unity of imagination with understanding) in the subject. The conditions of this reflection are universally valid *a priori*. And since this agreement of the object with the subject's faculties is contingent, it produces the representation of a purpos-

7 Latin, "apprehension, grasping": Kant's term for the taking up of what is given in intuition.

iveness of the object with respect to the subject's cognitive faculties.

Here, then, is a pleasure that, like all pleasure or displeasure not produced by the concept of freedom (that is, by the antecedent determination of the higher faculty of desire through pure reason), can never be seen from concepts to be necessarily connected with the representation of an object. It must always be recognized as connected with that representation only through [191] reflected perception. Consequently, like all empirical judgments, it can announce no objective necessity and can lay no claim to *a priori* validity. But the judgment of taste, too, claims only to hold for everyone, like every other empirical judgment, and this is always possible despite its inner contingency. What is strange and anomalous lies only in this: it is not an empirical concept but a feeling of pleasure (hence no concept at all) that the judgment of taste requires of everyone and connects with the representation of the object, just as if it were a predicate bound up with the cognition of the object.

A singular judgment of experience rightly demands that everyone else must find the matter the same way. Take, for example, the judgment of someone who perceives a movable drop of water inside a rock crystal. He has made this judgment according to the universal conditions of the determining power of judgment, under the laws of a possible experience in general. In the same way, someone who feels pleasure in mere reflection on the form of an object, without regard to a concept, rightly lays claim to everyone's assent, although his judgment is empirical and singular. For the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflecting judgments. This condition is the purposive agreement of an object (whether a product of nature or of art) with the relation among the cognitive faculties required for every empirical cognition, namely imagination and understanding. In the judgment of taste, then, the pleasure does depend on an empirical representation and cannot be connected *a priori* with any concept. One cannot determine *a priori* which object will accord with taste and which

will not; one has to try it. But the pleasure is the determining ground of this judgment only because one is conscious that it rests merely on reflection and on the universal, though only subjective, conditions under which reflection agrees with the cognition of objects in general. It is for these conditions that the form of the object is purposive.

That is why judgments of taste, as regards their possibility, are also subject to a critique, since this possibility presupposes an *a priori* principle. This is so even though the principle is neither a cognitive principle [192] for the understanding nor a practical one for the will, and so is not *a priori* determining at all.

The receptivity to a pleasure arising from reflection on the forms of things (of nature as well as of art) indicates a purposiveness in two directions. It indicates a purposiveness of objects in relation to the reflecting power of judgment in the subject, in accordance with the concept of nature. Conversely, it also indicates a purposiveness of the subject with respect to objects, as regards their form and even their formlessness, in accordance with the concept of freedom. This is how it comes about that the aesthetic judgment is related not only, as a judgment of taste, to the beautiful, but also, as arising from a feeling of spirit, to the *sublime*. And so the critique of the aesthetic power of judgment must fall into two main parts corresponding to these.

VIII. THE LOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF PURPOSIVENESS

Objective purposiveness, as in natural ends, is judged by understanding and reason, not by feeling.

Purposiveness can be represented in an object given in experience in two ways. It can be represented on a merely subjective ground: as the agreement of the object's form, in the *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) of it prior to any concept, with the cognitive faculties, so as to unite the intuition with concepts for a cognition in general. Or it can be represented on an objective ground: as the agreement of the object's form with the possibility of the

thing itself, according to a concept of the thing that precedes it and contains the ground of this form. We have seen that the representation of purposiveness of the first kind rests on the immediate pleasure in the form of the object in mere reflection on it. Purposiveness of the second kind relates the form of the object not to the subject's cognitive faculties in apprehending that form, but to a determinate cognition of the object under a given concept. Its representation therefore has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things, but with the understanding in judging them. When the concept of an object is given, the task of the power of judgment in using it for cognition consists in *presentation* (*exhibitio*), that is,[8] in placing beside the concept an intuition corresponding to it. This may be done by our own imagination, as in art, [193] when we realize a preconceived concept of an object that is an end for us. Or it may be done by nature in its technique (as in organized bodies), when we lay our concept of an end at the basis of our judging of nature's product. In that case what is represented is not merely a *purposiveness* of nature in the form of the thing; rather, this product of nature is represented as a *natural end*. —Our concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms according to empirical laws is not a concept of the object at all. It is only a principle by which the power of judgment procures concepts for itself amid nature's excessive multiplicity (so as to be able to orient itself in it). Nevertheless, we thereby attribute to nature, as it were, a regard for our cognitive faculty, on the analogy of an end. So we can regard *natural beauty* as the *presentation* of the concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, and *natural ends* as the presentation of the concept of a real (objective) purposiveness. We judge the former through taste (aesthetically, by means of the feeling of pleasure), the latter through understanding and reason (logically, according to concepts).

8 Latin, "display, exhibition": Kant's gloss on *Darstellung*, the placing of an intuition beside a concept.

AESTHETIC AND TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

The work divides accordingly; only aesthetic judgment rests on a principle wholly a priori.

On this rests the division of the critique of the power of judgment into the critique of the *aesthetic* and that of the *teleological* power of judgment. By the former is meant the faculty of judging formal purposiveness (otherwise also called subjective) through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. By the latter is meant the faculty of judging the real (objective) purposiveness of nature through understanding and reason.

In a critique of the power of judgment, the part that contains the aesthetic power of judgment belongs to it essentially. For this alone contains a principle that the power of judgment lays entirely *a priori* at the basis of its reflection on nature. This is the principle of a formal purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculty according to nature's particular (empirical) laws, without which the understanding could not find its way in nature. By contrast, no *a priori* ground can be given, nor is it even evident as possible from the concept of a nature as object of experience, whether in general or in particular, that there must be objective ends of nature, that is, things that are possible only as natural ends. Instead, it is only the power of judgment that contains the rule for making use of the concept of ends on behalf of reason in cases that occur (with certain products). It does so without containing an *a priori* principle for this within itself, and only after that transcendental [194] principle has already prepared the understanding to apply the concept of an end (at least as regards form) to nature.

But consider the transcendental principle of representing a purposiveness of nature, in subjective relation to our cognitive faculty, in the form of a thing, as a principle for judging it. This principle leaves it wholly undetermined where and in which cases I am to judge something as a product according to a principle of purposiveness, rather than merely according to univer-

sal laws of nature. It leaves it to the *aesthetic* power of judgment to settle, in taste, whether the product (its form) is suited to our cognitive faculties, insofar as the aesthetic power of judgment decides this not through agreement with concepts but through feeling. By contrast, the power of judgment used teleologically specifies determinately the conditions under which something (for example, an organized body) is to be judged according to the idea of an end of nature. But it cannot adduce any principle, from the concept of nature as object of experience, that would entitle it to ascribe to nature *a priori* a relation to ends. It cannot even adduce one for assuming such a relation indeterminately from actual experience of such products. The reason is that many particular experiences must be undertaken and considered under the unity of their principle before an objective purposiveness in a certain object can be cognized even empirically.—The aesthetic power of judgment is therefore a special faculty of judging things according to a rule, but not according to concepts. The teleological power of judgment is not a special faculty. It is only the reflecting power of judgment in general, insofar as it proceeds, as everywhere in theoretical cognition, according to concepts, but with respect to certain objects of nature according to special principles, namely those of a merely reflecting power of judgment that does not determine objects. So in its application it belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy. And because of its special principles, which are not determining as they must be in a doctrine, it must also constitute a special part of the critique. The aesthetic power of judgment, on the other hand, contributes nothing to the cognition of its objects. It must therefore be counted *only* as part of the critique of the judging subject and of its cognitive faculties, insofar as these are capable of *a priori* principles, whatever their use (theoretical or practical) may otherwise be. This critique is the propaedeutic to all philosophy.

IX. JUDGMENT UNITES THE LEGISLATIONS OF UNDERSTANDING AND REASON

The concept of nature's purposiveness makes the transition from the domain of nature to that of freedom.

[195] The understanding is *a priori* legislative for nature, as object of the senses, for a theoretical cognition of nature in a possible experience. Reason is *a priori* legislative for freedom and its own causality, as the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditionally practical cognition. The domain of the concept of nature under the one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely cut off from any mutual influence they might have on each other by themselves (each according to its fundamental laws). They are cut off by the great gulf that separates the supersensible from appearances. The concept of freedom determines nothing with respect to the theoretical cognition of nature, and the concept of nature likewise determines nothing with respect to the practical laws of freedom. To that extent it is not possible to throw a bridge from one domain to the other. The determining grounds of causality according to the concept of freedom (and the practical rule it contains) are not to be found in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject. Yet the converse is possible (not with respect to the cognition of nature, to be sure, but with respect to the consequences of the supersensible for the sensible). It is already contained in the concept of a causality through freedom, whose *effect* is to take place in the world in accordance with its formal laws. Admittedly, the word *cause,* when used of the supersensible, signifies only the *ground* for determining the causality of natural things to produce an effect in accordance with their own natural laws, and yet at the same time in harmony with the formal principle of the laws of reason. How this is possible cannot be understood, but the objection that it involves a supposed contradiction can be sufficiently

refuted[9]. —The effect according to the concept of freedom is the
[196] final end, which (or whose appearance in the sensible world) ought to exist. For this, the condition of its possibility in nature (in the nature of the subject as a sensible being, namely as a human being) is presupposed. What presupposes this condition *a priori*, and without regard to the practical, is the power of judgment. In the concept of a *purposiveness* of nature, the power of judgment provides the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom. This concept makes possible the transition from the pure theoretical to the pure practical, from lawfulness according to the former to the final end according to the latter. For through it we cognize the possibility of the final end, which can become actual only in nature and in harmony with nature's laws.

Through the possibility of its *a priori* laws for nature, the understanding proves that we cognize nature only as appearance. It thereby also points to a supersensible substrate of nature, but leaves this substrate entirely *undetermined*. Through its *a priori* principle for judging nature according to nature's possible particular laws, the power of judgment gives this supersensible substrate (in us as well as outside us) *determinability through the intellectual faculty*. Reason, however, gives this same substrate *determination* through its *a priori* practical law. And so the power of judgment makes possible the transition from the

9 KANT'S NOTE. One of the various supposed contradictions in this complete distinction between natural causality and causality through freedom is the following objection. When I speak of *hindrances* that nature places in the way of causality according to laws of freedom (moral laws), or of nature's *furthering* that causality, I am, it is said, conceding to nature an *influence* on freedom. But if one is only willing to understand what has been said, the misinterpretation is very easily avoided. The resistance or furthering is not between nature and freedom, but between nature as appearance and the *effects* of freedom as appearances in the sensible world. And even the causality of freedom (of pure and practical reason) is the causality of a natural cause subordinated to freedom (the subject considered as a human being, hence as appearance). The ground of this natural cause's *determination* is contained in the intelligible, which is thought under freedom, in a way that is otherwise inexplicable (just like that which constitutes the supersensible substrate of nature).

domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.

Consider the faculties of the soul in general, insofar as they are regarded as higher faculties, that is, as containing an autonomy. For the *cognitive faculty* (the theoretical faculty of cognizing nature), it is the understanding that contains the *constitutive* principles *a priori*. For the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, it is the power of judgment, independently of concepts and sensations that relate to the determination of the faculty of desire [197] and could thereby be immediately practical. For the *faculty of desire*, it is reason, which is practical without the mediation of any pleasure, wherever that pleasure may come from. As the higher faculty, reason determines for the faculty of desire the final end, which at the same time brings with it pure intellectual satisfaction in the object. —The concept of a purposiveness of nature that belongs to the power of judgment is still one of the concepts of nature, but only as a regulative principle of the cognitive faculty. This is so even though the aesthetic judgment on certain objects (of nature or of art) that occasions this concept is a constitutive principle with respect to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, whose harmony contains the ground of this pleasure, makes that concept fit to mediate the connection of the domain of the concept of nature with the concept of freedom in its consequences, since this harmony at the same time promotes the mind's receptivity to moral feeling.—The following table may make it easier to survey all the higher faculties in their systematic unity[10].

10 KANT'S NOTE. Some have found it suspicious that my divisions in pure philosophy almost always turn out to be threefold. But this lies in the nature of the case. If a division is to be made *a priori*, it will be either *analytic*, according to the principle of contradiction, and then it is always twofold (*quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A* [every being is either A or not-A]). Or it will be *synthetic*. If in this case it is to be carried out from *concepts a priori* (and not, as in mathematics, from the intuition corresponding *a priori* to the concept), then the division must necessarily be a trichotomy. This follows from what is required for synthetic unity in general, namely (1) a condition, (2) something conditioned, and (3) the concept that arises from the union of the conditioned with its condition.

TABLE OF THE HIGHER FACULTIES

Cognition, feeling and desire are matched with understanding, judgment and reason, and with nature, art and freedom.

[198] *All the faculties of the mind*: cognitive faculties, principles *a priori*, application to

Cognitive faculty: understanding, lawfulness, nature

Feeling of pleasure and displeasure: power of judgment, purposiveness, art

Faculty of desire: reason, final end, freedom.

DIVISION OF THE WHOLE WORK

Part One covers aesthetic judgment, beautiful and sublime; Part Two covers teleological judgment.

[199] Part One. Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment. First Section. Analytic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment. Book One. Analytic of the Beautiful. Book Two. Analytic of the Sublime. Second Section. Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.

Part Two. Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment. First Division. Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment. Second Division. Dialectic of the Teleological Power of Judgment. Appendix. Doctrine of Method of the Teleological Power of Judgment.

Analytic of the Beautiful

The four moments of the judgment of taste: disinterested, universal, purposive without a purpose, necessary.

ERSTES MOMENT DES GESCHMACKSURTHEILS* DER QUALITÄT NACH. § 1. DAS GESCHMACKSURTHEIL IST ÄSTHETISCH.

[203] To decide whether or not something is beautiful, we do not relate the representation to the object by means of the understanding, for cognition. Instead, we relate it by means of the imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding) to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The judgment of taste is therefore not a cognitive judgment, and hence not logical but aesthetic. By "aesthetic" is meant a judgment whose determining ground can be *no other* than *subjective*. Every relation of representations, even that of sensations, can be objective (and then it signifies what is real in an empirical representation). The one exception is the relation to [204] the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Through it nothing at all in the object is designated; in it, rather, the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation.

* The definition of taste laid down here as the basis is that taste is the faculty of judging the beautiful. But what is required in order to call an object beautiful must be discovered by analyzing judgments of taste. I have sought out the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection by following the guidance of the logical functions of judging (for a judgment of taste still always contains a relation to the understanding). I have considered those of quality first, because the aesthetic judgment on the beautiful takes these into account first.

To grasp a regular, purposive building with one's cognitive faculty (whether in a distinct or a confused way of representing) is something quite different from being conscious of this representation with the sensation of satisfaction. In the latter case the representation is related entirely to the subject, and indeed to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This feeling grounds an entirely special faculty of discriminating and judging. That faculty contributes nothing to cognition; it merely holds the given representation in the subject up against the whole faculty of representations, of which the mind becomes conscious in the feeling of its state. Given representations in a judgment can be empirical (and hence aesthetic). But the judgment made by means of them is logical if in the judgment they are related solely to the object. Conversely, even if the given representations were rational but were related in a judgment solely to the subject (its feeling), they are to that extent always aesthetic.

§ 2. SATISFACTION IN THE BEAUTIFUL IS WITHOUT ANY INTEREST

Whether something is beautiful does not depend on caring whether the thing exists.

The satisfaction that we connect with the representation of the existence of an object is called interest. Such satisfaction therefore always relates at the same time to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or at least as necessarily connected with its determining ground. But when the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to know whether we, or anyone else, care in the least about the existence of the thing, or even could care about it. We want to know how we judge it in mere contemplation (intuition or reflection). Suppose someone asks me whether I find the palace I see before me beautiful. I may well say that I do not care for things of that sort, made merely to be gaped at. Or I may say, like that Iroquois *sachem*, that nothing in Paris pleased me more than the cookshops. I can also rail, in true *Rousseauian* fashion, against the

vanity of the great, who squander the sweat of the people on such superfluous things. Finally, I can [205] easily convince myself that if I were on an uninhabited island with no hope of ever returning among people, and could conjure up such a splendid building by a mere wish, I would not even take that much trouble over it if I already had a hut comfortable enough for me.[1] All this may be granted and approved, but it is not what is at issue now. We want to know only whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied in me by satisfaction, however indifferent I may be to the existence of the object of this representation. It is easy to see that what matters, if I am to say that the object is *beautiful* and to prove that I have taste, is what I make of this representation in myself, not the respect in which I depend on the object's existence. Everyone must admit that a judgment about beauty in which the least interest is mingled is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste. To play the judge in matters of taste, one must not be in the least biased in favor of the existence of the thing, but must be wholly indifferent in this respect.

We cannot better elucidate this proposition, which is of exceptional importance, than by contrasting the pure, disinterested[2] satisfaction in the judgment of taste with satisfaction that is connected with interest. This holds especially if we can at the same time be certain that there are no more kinds of interest than those about to be named.

1 A *sachem* is a chief among some Native North American peoples; the anecdote circulated in eighteenth-century travel writing. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) attacked luxury and the arts as corrupting in his *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts* (1750).

2 KANT'S NOTE. A judgment about an object of satisfaction can be entirely *disinterested* and yet very *interesting*. That is, it is not grounded on any interest, but it produces an interest; all pure moral judgments are of this kind. Judgments of taste, however, do not in themselves establish any interest at all either. Only in society does it become *interesting* to have taste, and the reason for this will be indicated later.

§ 3. SATISFACTION IN THE AGREEABLE INVOLVES INTEREST

The agreeable pleases the senses and arouses desire; it gratifies rather than merely pleases.

The agreeable is that which pleases the senses in sensation. Here, now, is at once an opportunity to censure a very common confusion between the two meanings the word "sensation" can have, and to draw attention to it. All satisfaction (so it is said or thought) is itself sensation (of a pleasure). Hence [206] everything that pleases is, precisely in pleasing, agreeable (and, according to its various degrees or its relations to other agreeable sensations, *graceful*, *lovely*, *delightful*, *gladdening*, and so on). But if this is conceded, then impressions of the senses, which determine inclination, principles of reason, which determine the will, and mere reflected forms of intuition, which determine the power of judgment, are all entirely the same as far as their effect on the feeling of pleasure is concerned. For this effect would be the agreeableness in the sensation of one's state. And since in the end all the exercise of our faculties must aim at the practical and unite in it as in its goal, one could expect of them no other estimate of things and their worth than one consisting in the gratification they promise. How they attain it would in the end not matter at all. Since only the choice of means could make a difference here, people could well accuse one another of folly and lack of understanding, but never of baseness and malice. For they would all, each according to his own way of seeing things, be running toward a single goal, which for everyone is gratification.

When a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation, the expression means something quite different from what it means when I call the representation of a thing (through the senses, as a receptivity belonging to the cognitive faculty) sensation. In the latter case the representation is related to the object; in the former it is related solely to the sub-

ject and serves for no cognition at all, not even for that by which the subject *cognizes* itself.

In the explanation above, however, we understand by the word "sensation" an objective representation of the senses. So as not always to risk being misinterpreted, we shall call what must always remain merely subjective, and can by no means constitute a representation of an object, by the otherwise customary name of feeling. The green color of meadows belongs to *objective* sensation, as the perception of an object of sense. Its agreeableness, however, belongs to *subjective* sensation, through which no object is represented: that is, to feeling, through which the object is regarded as an object of satisfaction (which is not a cognition of it).

Now, my judgment about an object by which I declare it [207] agreeable expresses an interest in it. This is already clear from the fact that the judgment, through sensation, arouses a desire for objects of that kind. The satisfaction therefore presupposes not the mere judgment about the object, but the relation of its existence to my state, insofar as that state is affected by such an object. That is why we say of the agreeable not merely that it *pleases* but that it *gratifies*. What I give it is not mere approval; inclination is produced by it. And what is agreeable in the liveliest way involves so little judgment about the character of the object that those who are always out only for enjoyment (for that is the word used to denote the intensity of gratification) gladly excuse themselves from all judging.

§ 4. SATISFACTION IN THE GOOD INVOLVES INTEREST

The good pleases through a concept of an end, whether as useful or as good in itself.

Good is that which pleases by means of reason, through the mere concept. We call some things *good for something* (the useful), which please only as means. Others we call *good in themselves*, which please for their own sake. Both always contain the concept of an end, and hence the relation of reason to (at least

possible) willing. They therefore contain a satisfaction in the *existence* of an object or of an action, that is, some interest or other.

To find something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is supposed to be, that is, have a concept of it. To find beauty in something, I do not need this. Flowers, free designs, lines interlaced without any aim under the name of foliage ornament: these signify nothing, depend on no determinate concept, and yet please. The satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on reflection on an object, a reflection that leads to some concept or other (it is undetermined which). This also distinguishes it from the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation.

It is true that in many cases the agreeable seems to be the same as the good. Thus people will commonly say that all gratification (especially lasting gratification) is good in itself, which amounts roughly to saying that being lastingly agreeable and being good are the same. But one soon notices that this is merely a faulty substitution of words, since the concepts properly attached to these expressions can by no means [208] be exchanged for one another. The agreeable, which as such represents the object solely in relation to sense, must first be brought under principles of reason through the concept of an end before it can be called good, as an object of the will. When I call what gratifies also *good*, this is an entirely different relation to satisfaction. This can be seen from the fact that with the good the question always arises whether it is merely mediately good or immediately good (whether useful or good in itself). With the agreeable, by contrast, this question cannot arise at all, since the word always signifies something that pleases immediately. (The same holds for what I call beautiful.)

Even in the most ordinary speech we distinguish the agreeable from the good. Of a dish whose taste is heightened by spices and other additions we say without hesitation that it is agreeable, while admitting at the same time that it is not good. It immediately *appeals* to the senses, but considered mediately,

that is, through reason, which looks ahead to the consequences, it displeases. Even in judging health we can still notice this distinction. Health is immediately agreeable to everyone who has it (at least negatively, that is, as the absence of all bodily pain). But to say that it is good, one must further direct it through reason toward ends: namely, one must regard it as a condition that makes us fit for all our tasks. With regard to happiness, finally, everyone believes that the greatest sum of the agreeable things in life (in number as well as in duration) may be called a true good, indeed even the highest good. But reason resists this too. Agreeableness is enjoyment. If everything were aimed at enjoyment alone, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means that procure it for us, whether we obtained it passively, from the generosity of nature, or through our own activity and our own doing. Take a human being who lives merely *to enjoy* (and who is ever so busy to that end). Suppose he were even as helpful as possible, as a means, to others who are likewise all out only for enjoyment, because through sympathy he shared in all their gratification. Reason will never be persuaded that such a person's existence has a worth in itself. Only through what he does without regard to enjoyment, in full freedom and independently of what nature could also procure for him passively, does he give his being, as the existence of a person, [209] an absolute worth. And happiness, with the whole abundance of its agreeableness, is far from being an unconditioned good[3].

Despite all this difference between the agreeable and the good, the two agree in one respect: they are always bound up with an interest in their object. This holds not only of the agreeable (§ 3) and of the mediately good (the useful), which pleases as a means to some agreeableness or other. It also holds of what is good absolutely and in every respect, namely the moral good, which carries with it the highest interest. For the good is the

3 KANT'S NOTE. An obligation to enjoy is an obvious absurdity. The same must therefore hold of any alleged obligation to actions whose sole aim is enjoyment, however spiritually that enjoyment may be conceived (or dressed up), even if it were a mystical, so-called heavenly enjoyment.

object of the will (i.e., of a faculty of desire determined by reason). But to will something and to take satisfaction in its existence, i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical.

§ 5. THREE KINDS OF SATISFACTION COMPARED

Of the agreeable, the beautiful and the good, only satisfaction in the beautiful is free.

The agreeable and the good both have a relation to the faculty of desire, and to that extent both carry a satisfaction with them: the agreeable a pathologically conditioned satisfaction (conditioned by stimuli, *stimulos*), the good a pure practical one. This satisfaction is determined not merely by the representation of the object but at the same time by the represented connection of the subject with the object's existence. What pleases is not merely the object but also its existence. The judgment of taste, by contrast, is merely *contemplative*. It is a judgment that is indifferent to the existence of an object and merely holds the object's character up to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Nor is this contemplation itself directed at concepts; for the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (neither a theoretical nor a practical one), and so it is neither *grounded* on concepts nor *aimed* at them.

The agreeable, the beautiful and the good therefore designate three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, in [210] relation to which we distinguish objects, or ways of representing them, from one another. The expressions appropriate to each, by which we designate our liking for them, are not the same either. What *gratifies* someone is called *agreeable* to him; what merely *pleases* him, *beautiful*; what is *esteemed* or *approved* by him, i.e., that in which he places an objective value, *good*. Agreeableness holds for non-rational animals too. Beauty holds only for human beings, i.e., for animal yet rational beings, and not merely as rational (as spirits, for example, are) but as at the same time animal. The good, however, holds for every rational being in general. This proposition

can receive its complete justification and explanation only later on. One can say that, of all three kinds of satisfaction, the satisfaction of taste in the beautiful is the one and only disinterested and *free* satisfaction; for no interest, neither that of the senses nor that of reason, extorts our approval. One could therefore say that satisfaction, in the three cases named, relates to *inclination*, to *favor* or to *respect*. For *favor* is the only free satisfaction. An object of inclination, and an object that a law of reason imposes on us to desire, leave us no freedom to make anything whatever into an object of pleasure for ourselves. All interest either presupposes a need or produces one; and as the determining ground of approval, it no longer leaves the judgment about the object free.

As regards the interest of inclination in the case of the agreeable, everyone says: hunger is the best cook, and to people with a healthy appetite anything at all that is edible tastes good. Such a satisfaction, then, shows no choice according to taste. Only when the need has been satisfied can one tell who among many has taste and who does not. In the same way there are manners (*conduite*) without virtue, politeness without goodwill, propriety without integrity, and so on. For where the moral law speaks, there is objectively no further free choice as to what is to be done. And showing taste in one's conduct (or in judging the conduct of others) is something quite different from expressing one's moral way of thinking. The moral way of thinking contains a command and produces a need, whereas moral taste merely plays with the objects of satisfaction without becoming attached to any one of them.

DEFINITION OF THE BEAUTIFUL FROM THE FIRST MOMENT

Taste judges by a satisfaction without any interest; its object is called beautiful.

211 *Taste* is the faculty of judging an object or a way of representing it through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction *without any interest*. The object of such a satisfaction is called *beautiful*.

SECOND MOMENT: QUANTITY. § 6. THE BEAUTIFUL PLEASES UNIVERSALLY WITHOUT CONCEPTS

A disinterested satisfaction must be expected of everyone, as if beauty were a property of the thing.

This definition of the beautiful can be derived from the previous definition of it as an object of satisfaction without any interest. For if someone is conscious that his satisfaction in something is, for his own part, without any interest, he cannot judge it otherwise than as containing a ground of satisfaction for everyone. The satisfaction is not grounded on any inclination of the subject (nor on any other deliberate interest); the person judging feels completely *free* with regard to the satisfaction he devotes to the object. So he cannot discover any private conditions, peculiar to him as a subject alone, as grounds of the satisfaction. He must therefore regard it as grounded in what he can presuppose in everyone else as well. Consequently he must believe that he has grounds for expecting a similar satisfaction of everyone. He will therefore speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a property of the object and the judgment were logical (constituting a cognition of the object through concepts of it), although the judgment is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation of the representation of the object to the subject. He does so because the judgment does resemble a logical judgment in this respect: its validity for everyone can be presupposed. But this universality cannot arise from concepts either. For there is no transition from concepts to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (except in pure practical laws; but these carry an interest with them, and no such interest is bound up with the pure judgment of taste [212]). Consequently, the judgment of taste, together with the consciousness that it is detached from all interest, must carry with it a claim to validity for everyone, yet without a universality that rests on objects; that is, it must be bound up with a claim to subjective universality.

§ 7. THE BEAUTIFUL COMPARED WITH THE AGREEABLE AND THE GOOD

Everyone has his own taste in the agreeable, but calling something beautiful demands everyone's agreement.

As regards the *agreeable*, everyone is content to acknowledge that his judgment, which he grounds on a private feeling and by which he says of an object that it pleases him, is restricted to his own person. So if he says, "Canary wine is agreeable," he is quite happy for someone else to correct the expression and remind him that he ought to say, "It is agreeable to me." And this holds not only for the taste of the tongue, the palate and the throat, but also for whatever may be agreeable to anyone's eyes and ears. To one person the color violet is soft and lovely, to another dead and lifeless. One person loves the sound of wind instruments, another that of string instruments. To quarrel about this with the aim of condemning as incorrect another person's judgment that differs from ours, as though the two were logically opposed, would be folly. With regard to the agreeable, then, the principle holds: *everyone has his own taste* (the taste of the senses).

With the beautiful it is quite otherwise. It would be ridiculous (precisely the reverse of the case above) if someone who prided himself on his taste thought he could justify himself by saying: this object (the building we are looking at, the dress that person is wearing, the concert we are hearing, the poem put forward for judgment) is beautiful *for me*. For he must not call it *beautiful* if it merely pleases him. Many things may have charm and agreeableness for him; nobody cares about that. But if he declares something beautiful, then he expects the very same satisfaction of others. He judges not merely for himself but for everyone, and then speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. He therefore says: the *thing* is beautiful. And he does not count on others agreeing with his judgment of satisfaction [213] because he has repeatedly found them in agreement with his own; rather, he *demands* it of them. He reproaches them if they

judge otherwise and denies that they have taste, though he still requires that they ought to have it. To that extent one cannot say: everyone has his own particular taste. That would amount to saying: there is no taste at all, i.e., no aesthetic judgment that could lay rightful claim to everyone's assent.

Even with regard to the agreeable, however, one finds that people can reach unanimity in judging it. In view of this one denies taste to some and grants it to others, not as a sense organ but as a faculty of judging with regard to the agreeable in general. Thus of someone who knows how to entertain his guests with agreeable things (enjoyments for all the senses) so that they are all pleased, one says: he has taste. But here the universality is taken only comparatively. There are only *general* rules here (as all empirical rules are), not *universal* ones; and it is universal rules that the judgment of taste about the beautiful undertakes or lays claim to. The judgment about the host is a judgment with reference to sociability, insofar as sociability rests on empirical rules. With regard to the good, judgments do also rightly lay claim to validity for everyone. But the good is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction only *through a concept*, which is the case neither with the agreeable nor with the beautiful.

§ 8. THE UNIVERSALITY OF TASTE IS ONLY SUBJECTIVE

A judgment of taste speaks with a universal voice, though it rests on no concept of the object.

This particular determination of the universality of an aesthetic judgment, which is found in a judgment of taste, is a remarkable fact—not for the logician, to be sure, but certainly for the transcendental philosopher. Discovering its origin calls for no small effort on his part. In return, however, it brings to light a property of our cognitive faculty that would have remained unknown without this analysis.

First, one must become fully convinced of the following. Through the [214] judgment of taste (about the beautiful) one

imputes the satisfaction in an object to *everyone*, yet without grounding it on a concept (for then it would be the good). And this claim to universal validity belongs so essentially to a judgment by which we declare something *beautiful* that, without thinking of it, it would never occur to anyone to use this expression. Instead, everything that pleases without a concept would be counted as agreeable. With regard to the agreeable one lets everyone have his own mind, and no one expects others to agree with his judgment of taste—which is just what always happens in the judgment of taste about beauty. I can call the first the taste of sense and the second the taste of reflection, insofar as the first makes merely private judgments and the second judgments that are supposedly commonly valid (public). Both, however, make aesthetic (not practical) judgments about an object, merely with regard to the relation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Now here is something strange. In the case of the taste of sense, experience not only shows that its judgment (of pleasure or displeasure in something) is not universally valid; everyone is also, of his own accord, modest enough not to impute this agreement to others (even though a very widespread unanimity is in fact often found in these judgments too). The taste of reflection, as experience teaches, also has its claim to the universal validity of its judgment (about the beautiful) for everyone rejected often enough. And yet it can find it possible (as it actually does) to represent judgments that could demand this agreement universally, and it does in fact expect this agreement of everyone for each of its judgments of taste. Nor do those who judge quarrel over whether such a claim is possible; they merely fail to agree, in particular cases, about the correct application of this faculty.

Here it must first be noted that a universality that does not rest on concepts of the object (even merely empirical ones) is not logical at all but aesthetic. That is, it contains no objective quantity of the judgment but only a subjective one. For this I also use the expression *common validity*, which designates the validity not of a representation's relation to the cognitive faculty

but of its relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure for every subject. (One can, however, also use the same expression for the logical quantity of the judgment, [215] provided one adds *objective* universal validity, to distinguish it from the merely subjective kind, which is always aesthetic.)

Now an *objectively universally valid* judgment is always subjectively so as well: if the judgment holds for everything contained under a given concept, it also holds for everyone who represents an object through this concept. But from a *subjective universal validity*, i.e., an aesthetic one that rests on no concept, one cannot infer logical universal validity, because judgments of that kind do not bear on the object at all. For this very reason, however, the aesthetic universality ascribed to a judgment must also be of a special kind. It does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the *object*, considered in its whole logical sphere, and yet it extends that very predicate over the whole sphere *of those who judge*.

As regards logical quantity, all judgments of taste are *singular* judgments. For since I must hold the object directly up to my feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and yet not by means of concepts, these judgments cannot have the quantity of objectively commonly valid judgments. Still, if the singular representation of the object of a judgment of taste is turned into a concept by comparison, according to the conditions that determine such a judgment, a logically universal judgment can result from it. For example, I declare the rose I am looking at beautiful by a judgment of taste. By contrast, the judgment that arises from comparing many singular ones—roses in general are beautiful—is now asserted not merely as an aesthetic judgment but as a logical judgment grounded on an aesthetic one. Now the judgment "The rose is agreeable (in its smell)" is also aesthetic and singular, but it is not a judgment of taste; it is a judgment of sense. It differs from the former in this: the judgment of taste carries with it an *aesthetic quantity* of universality, i.e., of validity for everyone, which cannot be found in a judgment about the agreeable. Only judgments about the good, although they too

determine the satisfaction in an object, have logical and not merely aesthetic universality; for they hold of the object, as cognitions of it, and therefore for everyone.

If one judges objects merely according to concepts, all representation of beauty is lost. So there can be no rule by which anyone could be compelled to acknowledge something as beautiful. Whether [216] a dress, a house or a flower is beautiful—on this question one refuses to have one's judgment talked into anything by reasons or principles. One wants to submit the object to one's own eyes, as though one's satisfaction depended on sensation. And yet, if one then calls the object beautiful, one believes one has a universal voice on one's side and lays claim to everyone's concurrence, whereas any private sensation would be decisive only for the observer alone and his own satisfaction.

Here we can see that in the judgment of taste nothing is postulated except such a *universal voice* with regard to satisfaction without the mediation of concepts—and hence the *possibility* of an aesthetic judgment that could at the same time be regarded as valid for everyone. The judgment of taste does not itself *postulate* everyone's agreement (only a logically universal judgment can do that, because it can adduce reasons). It merely *imputes* this agreement to everyone, as a case of the rule, a case for which it expects confirmation not from concepts but from the concurrence of others. The universal voice is therefore only an idea (what it rests on is not yet investigated here). Whether someone who believes he is making a judgment of taste is in fact judging in accordance with this idea may be uncertain. But by using the expression "beauty" he announces that he is relating his judgment to that idea, and hence that it is meant to be a judgment of taste. For his own part, he can become certain of this through the mere consciousness of having separated everything that belongs to the agreeable and the good from the satisfaction that remains to him. That is all for which he promises himself everyone's assent—a claim to which, under these conditions, he would indeed be entitled, if only he did not often offend against them and so make an erroneous judgment of taste.

§ 9. DOES THE PLEASURE PRECEDE THE JUDGING, OR THE JUDGING THE PLEASURE?

The judging comes first: the pleasure is felt in the free play of imagination and understanding.

The solution of this problem is the key to the critique of taste and therefore deserves our full attention.

If the pleasure in the given object came first, and only its [217] universal communicability were to be attributed to the representation of the object in the judgment of taste, such a procedure would contradict itself. For pleasure of that kind would be nothing but mere agreeableness in sensation, and so by its nature could have only private validity, since it would depend immediately on the representation through which the object *is given*.

It is therefore the universal capacity of the state of mind in the given representation to be communicated that must lie at the basis of the judgment of taste, as its subjective condition, and must have the pleasure in the object as its consequence. But nothing can be universally communicated except cognition, and representation insofar as it belongs to cognition. For only to that extent is representation objective, and only thereby does it have a universal point of reference with which everyone's power of representation is compelled to agree. Now suppose the determining ground of the judgment about this universal communicability of the representation is to be thought of merely subjectively, that is, without a concept of the object. Then it can be nothing other than the state of mind found in the relation of the powers of representation to one another, insofar as they relate a given representation to *cognition in general*.

The cognitive powers set in play by this representation are here in a free play, because no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. So the state of mind in this representation must be that of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation, in a given representation, toward a cognition in general. Now a representation through which an object is given requires, if cognition is to come of it at all, *ima-*

gination for putting together the manifold of intuition, and *understanding* for the unity of the concept that unifies the representations. This state of a *free play* of the cognitive faculties, in a representation through which an object is given, must be universally communicable. For cognition, as the determination of the object with which given representations (in whatever subject) are to agree, is the only kind of representation that holds for everyone.

The subjective universal communicability of the way of representing in a judgment of taste is supposed to obtain without presupposing a determinate concept. It can therefore be nothing other than the state of mind in the [218] free play of the imagination and the understanding (insofar as they agree with each other, as is required for a *cognition in general*). For we are conscious that this subjective relation, suited to cognition in general, must hold for everyone, and consequently be universally communicable, just as much as any determinate cognition, which after all always rests on that relation as its subjective condition.

This merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, precedes the pleasure in the object and is the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. And the universal subjective validity of the satisfaction that we connect with the representation of the object we call beautiful is grounded solely on that universality of the subjective conditions for judging objects.

That being able to communicate one's state of mind, even if only with regard to the cognitive faculties, carries a pleasure with it could easily be shown (empirically and psychologically) from the natural human propensity to sociability. But that is not enough for our purpose. When we call something beautiful, we expect everyone else, in the judgment of taste, to feel the pleasure we feel, as necessary—as though it were to be regarded as a property of the object determined in it according to concepts—although beauty, taken without relation to the feeling of the subject, is nothing by itself. But we must postpone the discussion of

this question until we have answered another: whether and how aesthetic judgments *a priori* are possible.

For now we are still concerned with the lesser question: in what way do we become conscious, in the judgment of taste, of a reciprocal subjective agreement of the cognitive powers with one another? Is it aesthetically, through mere inner sense and sensation, or intellectually, through the consciousness of the intentional activity by which we set them in play?

If the given representation that occasions the judgment of taste were a concept, uniting understanding and imagination in the judging of the object into a cognition of the object, then the consciousness of this relation would be intellectual (as in the objective schematism of the power of judgment, which the Critique deals with). But then the judgment would not be made in relation to pleasure and displeasure [219] either, and so would not be a judgment of taste. Now the judgment of taste determines the object with regard to satisfaction and the predicate of beauty independently of concepts. So that subjective unity of the relation can make itself known only through sensation.[4] The enlivening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate, yet harmonious thanks to the occasion provided by the given representation—namely the activity that belongs to a cognition in general—is the sensation whose universal communicability the judgment of taste postulates. An objective relation can, of course, only be thought; but insofar as it is subjective in its conditions, it can still be felt in its effect on the mind. And in the case of a relation that has no concept at its basis (such as the relation of the powers of representation to a cognitive faculty in general), no consciousness of it is possible except through sensation of its effect. This effect consists in the facilitated play of the two powers of mind (imagination and understanding), enlivened by their mutual agreement. A representation that, as singular and without comparison with others, nevertheless agrees with the conditions of universality

4 The *Critique of Pure Reason*, in its chapter on the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding.

that make up the business of the understanding in general brings the cognitive faculties into the proportioned attunement that we require for all cognition. We therefore also regard this attunement as valid for everyone who is destined to judge through understanding and the senses in combination (for every human being).

THIRD MOMENT: RELATION. § 10. ON PURPOSIVENESS IN GENERAL

The second moment yields: the beautiful is that which, without a concept, pleases universally.

Suppose one wants to explain what an end is according to its transcendental determinations (without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling of pleasure [220]). Then an end is the object of a concept insofar as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a *concept* with regard to its *object* is purposiveness (*forma finalis*). Wherever, then, not merely the cognition of an object but the object itself (its form or existence), as an effect, is thought of as possible only through a concept of that effect, there one thinks of an end. The representation of the effect is here the determining ground of its cause and precedes the cause.[5] The consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the subject, as tending to *keep* the subject in that state, can here designate in general what is called pleasure. Displeasure, by contrast, is the representation that contains the ground for determining the state of the representations to its own opposite (for holding them back or getting rid of them).

The faculty of desire, insofar as it can be determined only through concepts, i.e., to act in accordance with the representation of an end, would be the will. But an object, a state of mind or even an action is also called purposive even if its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end. It

5 *forma finalis*: Latin, "final form," i.e., form as determined by an end.

is called so merely because we can explain and comprehend its possibility only insofar as we assume as its ground a causality according to ends, i.e., a will that would have arranged it in this way according to the representation of a certain rule. Purposiveness can therefore be without a purpose, insofar as we do not place the causes of this form in a will, yet can make the explanation of its possibility comprehensible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will. Now we do not always need to have insight through reason into what we observe (with respect to its possibility). So we can at least observe a purposiveness as to form, even without basing it on an end (as the matter of the *nexus finalis*), and can notice it in objects, though only by means of reflection.[6]

§ 11. TASTE RESTS ONLY ON THE FORM OF PURPOSIVENESS

Neither subjective nor objective ends ground the judgment of taste, only purposiveness without a purpose.

221 Every end, if it is regarded as the ground of satisfaction, always carries with it an interest, as the determining ground of the judgment about the object of pleasure. So no subjective end can lie at the basis of the judgment of taste. But neither can any representation of an objective end, i.e., of the possibility of the object itself according to principles of connection by ends, and hence no concept of the good, determine the judgment of taste. For it is an aesthetic judgment and not a cognitive one. It is therefore concerned with no *concept* of the character of the object and of its inner or outer possibility through this or that cause, but merely with the relation of the powers of representation to one another, insofar as they are determined by a representation.

Now this relation, in the determination of an object as beautiful, is bound up with the feeling of a pleasure that the judgment of taste at the same time declares valid for everyone. Consequently, an agreeableness accompanying the representation

6 *nexus finalis*: Latin, "final connection," the connection of means and ends.

can no more contain the determining ground than can the representation of the object's perfection and the concept of the good. Therefore nothing but the subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object without any purpose (whether objective or subjective)—hence the mere form of purposiveness in the representation through which an object is *given* to us, insofar as we are conscious of it—can constitute the satisfaction that we judge, without a concept, to be universally communicable, and so the determining ground of the judgment of taste.

§ 12. THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE RESTS ON *a priori* GROUNDS

The pleasure is the consciousness of the formal purposiveness in the play of our cognitive powers.

To establish *a priori* the connection of the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure, as an effect, with some representation (sensation or concept) as its cause is absolutely impossible. For that would be a causal relation, which (among objects of experience) can only [222] ever be cognized *a posteriori* and by means of experience itself. It is true that in the *Critique of Practical Reason* we actually did derive the feeling of respect *a priori* from universal moral concepts (as a special and peculiar modification of this feeling, which will not properly coincide with either the pleasure or the displeasure we get from empirical objects). But there we were also able to cross the bounds of experience and call upon a causality that rested on a supersensible property of the subject, namely freedom.[7] Yet even there, strictly speaking, we did not derive this *feeling* from the idea of the moral as its cause; only the determination of the will was derived from it. But the state of mind of a will determined by anything whatever is in itself already a feeling of pleasure and identical with it; so it does not follow from it as an effect. That would have to be assumed only if the concept of the moral, as a good, preceded the determina-

7 The feeling of respect is derived in the chapter on the incentives of pure practical reason.

tion of the will by the law; for then it would be vain to try to derive the pleasure bound up with the concept from the concept as a mere cognition.

The case is similar with the pleasure in aesthetic judgment, except that here it is merely contemplative and produces no interest in the object, whereas in moral judgment it is practical. The consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers, in a representation through which an object is given, is the pleasure itself. For in an aesthetic judgment this consciousness contains a determining ground of the subject's activity with regard to enlivening its cognitive powers. It thus contains an inner causality (which is purposive) with regard to cognition in general, but without being restricted to a determinate cognition—and hence a mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a representation. Nor is this pleasure practical in any way, whether like the pleasure that arises from the pathological ground of agreeableness or like the pleasure that arises from the intellectual ground of the represented good. Yet it does have a causality in it, namely that of *maintaining*, without any further aim, the state of the representation itself and the occupation of the cognitive powers. We *linger* over the contemplation of the beautiful, because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself. This is analogous to (but not the same as) the lingering that occurs when a charm in the representation of the object repeatedly arouses our attention, and in which the mind is passive.

§ 13. PURE TASTE IS INDEPENDENT OF CHARM AND EMOTION

Taste that needs charms and emotions for its satisfaction is still barbaric.

[223] All interest spoils the judgment of taste and robs it of its impartiality, especially if, unlike the interest of reason, it does not place purposiveness before the feeling of pleasure but grounds purposiveness on that feeling. The latter always happens in an aesthetic judgment about something insofar as it

gratifies or pains. Hence judgments affected in this way can lay either no claim at all to a universally valid satisfaction, or a claim that is weaker the more sensations of this kind are among the determining grounds of taste. Taste is always still barbaric where it needs an admixture of *charms* and *emotions* for its satisfaction, or even makes them the standard of its approval.

Yet charms are often not only counted in with beauty (which really ought to concern form alone) as a contribution to universal aesthetic satisfaction; they are even passed off as beauties in their own right, so that the matter of satisfaction is passed off as its form. This is a misunderstanding which, like many others that still always have something true at their basis, can be removed by carefully determining these concepts.

A judgment of taste on which charm and emotion have no influence (even though they can be combined with the satisfaction in the beautiful), and which therefore has merely the purposiveness of form as its determining ground, is a *pure judgment of taste*.

§ 14. EXAMPLES

Pure colors and tones, drawing and composition, ornament and finery show what belongs to form.

Aesthetic judgments, just like theoretical (logical) ones, can be divided into empirical and pure. The former are those that assert agreeableness or disagreeableness of an object or of its way of being represented; the latter, those that assert beauty of it. The former are judgments of sense (material aesthetic judgments); the latter (as formal) are alone judgments of taste proper.

[224] A judgment of taste, then, is pure only insofar as no merely empirical satisfaction is mixed into its determining ground. But this always happens when charm or emotion has a share in the judgment by which something is to be declared beautiful.

Here again a number of objections arise, which in the end make charm appear not merely a necessary ingredient of beauty

but even sufficient by itself for something to be called beautiful. A mere color, for example the green of a lawn, or a mere tone (as distinct from sound and noise), such as that of a violin, is declared by most people to be beautiful in itself. Yet both seem to have merely the matter of representations, namely sensation alone, at their basis, and would therefore deserve to be called only agreeable. But one will notice at the same time that the sensations of color and of tone consider themselves entitled to count as beautiful only insofar as they are pure. This is a determination that already concerns form. It is also the only thing about these representations that can be universally communicated with certainty. For the quality of the sensations themselves cannot be assumed to agree in all subjects, and it can hardly be assumed that everyone judges alike the agreeableness of one color in preference to another, or of the tone of one musical instrument over that of another.

Suppose one assumes, with *Euler*, that colors are beats (*pulsus*) of the ether following one another at equal intervals, just as tones are beats of the air set vibrating by sound. Suppose further—and this is the main point—that the mind perceives not merely, through sense, their effect in enlivening the organ, but also, through reflection, the regular play of the impressions (and hence the form in the combination of different representations), which I do not doubt at all. Then color and tone would not be mere sensations but already a formal determination of the unity of a manifold of sensations, and could then also be counted as beauties in their own right.[8]

The purity of a simple kind of sensation, however, means that its uniformity is not disturbed or interrupted by any sensation of a foreign kind. Purity belongs merely to form, because here one can abstract from the quality of that kind of sensation (whether it represents a color, and which one, or a tone, and which one). Hence all simple colors, insofar as they are pure, are considered beautiful. Mixed colors do not have this 225 advant-

8 Leonhard Euler (1707–1783), Swiss mathematician, proposed a wave theory of light in his *Nova theoria lucis et colorum* (1746). *pulsus*: Latin, "beats, pulses."

age, precisely because, not being simple, they give us no standard for judging whether they should be called pure or impure.

As for the beauty attributed to an object on account of its form, and the supposition that it could even be enhanced by charm: this is a common error, and one very damaging to genuine, uncorrupted, thorough taste. Charms can, admittedly, be added to beauty as well, in order to interest the mind through the representation of the object beyond the dry satisfaction, and so to serve to recommend taste and its cultivation, especially while taste is still crude and untrained. But they really do impair the judgment of taste if they draw attention to themselves as grounds for judging beauty. For far from contributing to beauty, they must rather be admitted with indulgence, as strangers, and only insofar as they do not disturb that beautiful form, while taste is still weak and untrained.

In painting, sculpture and indeed all the visual arts, and in architecture and landscape gardening insofar as they are fine arts, *drawing* is what is essential. In drawing, it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases through its form that constitutes the ground of everything designed for taste. The colors that illuminate the outline belong to charm. They can indeed make the object itself vivid for sensation, but they cannot make it worth contemplating and beautiful. Rather, they are for the most part very much restricted by what beautiful form requires, and even where charm is admitted, it is form alone that ennobles them.

All form of objects of the senses (both of the outer senses and, mediately, of inner sense) is either *shape* or *play*. In the latter case it is either play of shapes (in space: mime and dance) or mere play of sensations (in time). The *charm* of colors, or of the agreeable tones of an instrument, may be added; but *drawing* in the former case and composition in the latter constitute the proper object of the pure judgment of taste. The purity of colors and of tones, or also their variety and contrast, seems to contribute to beauty. But this does not mean that, because they are agreeable in themselves, they supply as it were an addition of

the same kind to the satisfaction in form. It means rather that they make the form more precisely, more determinately and more completely [226] intuitable, and moreover enliven the representation through their charm, by awakening and sustaining attention to the object itself.

Even what are called *ornaments* (*parerga*)—that is, what does not belong to the whole representation of the object intrinsically, as a component, but only extrinsically, as an addition, and which increases the satisfaction of taste—do this only through their form: frames of paintings, for example, or draperies on statues, or colonnades around magnificent buildings. But if the ornament does not itself consist in beautiful form, if, like a gilt frame, it is attached merely to recommend the painting for approval through its charm, then it is called *finery* and impairs genuine beauty.[9]

Emotion—a sensation in which agreeableness is produced only by means of a momentary inhibition of the vital force followed by a stronger outpouring of it—does not belong to beauty at all. Sublimity (with which the feeling of emotion is bound up), however, requires a different standard of judging from the one taste takes as its basis. And so a pure judgment of taste has neither charm nor emotion—in a word, no sensation, as the matter of the aesthetic judgment—as its determining ground.

§ 15. TASTE IS INDEPENDENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PERFECTION

Beauty is not perfection thought confusedly; aesthetic judgment is different in kind from cognition.

Objective purposiveness can be cognized only by relating the manifold to a determinate end, and hence only through a concept. From this alone it is already clear that the beautiful, which is judged on the basis of a merely formal purposiveness, i.e., a purposiveness without a purpose, is entirely independent of the representation of the good; for the good presupposes an

9 *parerga*: Greek, "by-works," things added beside the main work.

objective purposiveness, i.e., the relation of the object to a determinate end.

Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e., the *usefulness* of the object, or internal, i.e., its *perfection*. That the satisfaction in an object on account of which we call it beautiful cannot rest on the representation of its usefulness is sufficiently evident from the two preceding main sections. For then it would not [227] be an immediate satisfaction in the object, and immediacy is the essential condition of the judgment about beauty. But an objective internal purposiveness, i.e., perfection, already comes closer to the predicate of beauty, and has therefore been held by eminent philosophers to be the same as beauty, though with the proviso *if it is thought confusedly*.[10] In a critique of taste it is of the greatest importance to decide whether beauty can really be resolved into the concept of perfection.

To judge objective purposiveness we always need the concept of an end, and (if that purposiveness is to be not external [usefulness] but internal) the concept of an internal end that contains the ground of the internal possibility of the object. Now an end in general is that whose *concept* can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself. Likewise, in order to represent an objective purposiveness in a thing, the concept of *what sort of thing it is supposed to be* will come first. And the agreement of the manifold in the thing with this concept (which supplies the rule for combining that manifold in it) is the *qualitative perfection* of a thing. Entirely distinct from this is *quantitative* perfection, as the completeness of each thing in its kind. This is a mere concept of magnitude (of totality), in which *what the thing is supposed to be* is already thought of in advance as determined, and the only question is whether *everything* required for it is present in it. What is formal in the representation of a thing, i.e., the agreement of the manifold into a unity (leaving undetermined what it is supposed to be), gives by itself no cognition

10 Kant alludes to the school of Leibniz and Wolff, especially Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who defined beauty as perfection cognized by the senses, i.e., confusedly.

whatever of objective purposiveness. For since abstraction is made from this unity *as an end* (what the thing is supposed to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of the representations in the mind of the one who intuits. This does indicate a certain purposiveness of the representational state in the subject, and in this state a certain ease on the subject's part in taking up a given form into the imagination. But it indicates no perfection of any object, since the object is here not thought through any concept of an end. Thus, for example, if I come upon a grassy clearing in a wood with trees standing in a circle around it, and do not thereby represent an end to myself—say, that it is meant for country dancing—then not the slightest concept of [228] perfection is given through the mere form. But to represent a formal *objective* purposiveness without a purpose, i.e., the mere form of a *perfection* (without any matter and without any *concept* of that with which the manifold is to agree, even if this were merely the idea of lawfulness in general), is a genuine contradiction.

Now, the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, that is, one that rests on subjective grounds and whose determining ground cannot be a concept, and hence cannot be the concept of a determinate end either. So beauty, as a formal subjective purposiveness, in no way involves thinking a perfection of the object, as a purportedly formal yet nonetheless objective purposiveness. And the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and the good is void, if it is drawn as though the two differed only in logical form, the first being merely a confused and the second a distinct concept of perfection, while otherwise being the same in content and origin. For then there would be no *specific* difference between them. A judgment of taste would be just as much a cognitive judgment as the judgment by which something is declared good. It would be like the ordinary person who says that deception is wrong: he bases his judgment on confused principles of reason, the philosopher bases his on distinct ones, but at bottom both base it on the same principles of reason. But I have already pointed out that an aesthetic judg-

ment is unique in its kind and gives absolutely no cognition of the object, not even a confused one; that happens only through a logical judgment. The aesthetic judgment, by contrast, refers the representation through which an object is given solely to the subject. It brings to our notice no property of the object, but only the purposive form in the determination of the powers of representation that are occupied with the object. The judgment is called aesthetic precisely because its determining ground is not a concept but the feeling (of inner sense) of that accord in the play of the powers of the mind, insofar as it can only be sensed. If, on the other hand, one wanted to call confused concepts, and the objective judgment based on them, aesthetic, one would have an understanding that judges sensibly, or a sense that represents its objects through concepts. Both are self-contradictory. The faculty of concepts, whether they are confused or distinct, is the understanding. Understanding does belong to the judgment of taste as an aesthetic judgment, as it belongs to all judgments. But it belongs to it [229] not as the faculty of cognizing an object. It belongs to it as the faculty of determining the judgment and its representation (without a concept) according to the relation of that representation to the subject and the subject's inner feeling, and indeed insofar as this judgment is possible in accordance with a universal rule.

§ 16. FREE AND ADHERENT BEAUTY

Flowers and foliage patterns are free beauties; a person, a horse or a church has adherent beauty.

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) and merely adherent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). The first presupposes no concept of what the object is supposed to be. The second presupposes such a concept, and the perfection of the object in accordance with it. Beauties of the first kind are called (self-subsistent) beauties of this or that thing. The second kind,

as adhering to a concept (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to objects that fall under the concept of a particular end.[11]

Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone but a botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is supposed to be. Even the botanist, who recognizes in it the plant's organ of fertilization, takes no account of this natural end when he judges the flower by taste. So no perfection of any kind, no inner purposiveness to which the combination of the manifold might refer, lies at the basis of this judgment. Many birds (the parrot, the hummingbird, the bird of paradise) and a host of marine shellfish are beauties in themselves. They belong to no object determined by concepts with regard to its end; they please freely and for their own sake. In the same way, designs *à la grecque* [in the Greek manner], foliage for borders or on wallpaper, and so on,[12] mean nothing by themselves. They represent nothing, no object under a determinate concept, and are free beauties. What in music are called fantasias (without a theme), and indeed all music without words, can also be counted in the same class.

In judging a free beauty (according to its mere form) the judgment of taste is pure. No concept is presupposed of any end for which the manifold is supposed to serve the given object, and hence of what [230] the object is supposed to represent. Such a concept would only restrict the freedom of the imagination, which, as it were, plays in observing the figure.

But the beauty of a human being (and within this kind, that of a man, a woman or a child), the beauty of a horse, or of a building (such as a church, a palace, an arsenal or a summerhouse), presupposes a concept of the end that determines what the thing is supposed to be, and hence a concept of its perfection. It is therefore merely adherent beauty. Now, the combination of the agreeable (of sensation) with beauty, which properly concerns only form, hindered the purity of the judgment of taste. In just the same way, the combination of the good with beauty

11 Latin: literally "wandering (vague) beauty" and "adhering beauty."
12 *À la grecque*: the Greek key or meander pattern, a fashionable ornament in Kant's day.

impairs the purity of that judgment—the good, that is, for which the manifold is good to the thing itself, according to its end.

One could add much to a building that pleases immediately in intuition, if only it were not supposed to be a church. One could beautify a figure with all sorts of flourishes and light but regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattooing, if only it were not a human being. And a human being could have much finer features and a more pleasing, gentler facial outline, if only he were not supposed to represent a man, let alone a warlike one.[13]

Now, the satisfaction in the manifold in a thing, in relation to the inner end that determines its possibility, is a satisfaction grounded on a concept. The satisfaction in beauty, however, presupposes no concept; it is immediately bound up with the representation through which the object is given (not through which it is thought). If, then, the judgment of taste about the latter is made dependent on the end in the former, as a judgment of reason, and is thereby restricted, it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste.

It is true that taste gains something from this combination of aesthetic with intellectual satisfaction: it becomes fixed. It is not universal, but rules can nonetheless be prescribed for it with regard to certain purposively determined objects. But these, then, are not rules of taste either. They are merely rules for uniting taste with reason, that is, the beautiful with the good. Through this union the beautiful becomes usable as an instrument of our aim with regard to the good: the attunement of mind that sustains itself and has [231] subjective universal validity can then be made to underpin that way of thinking which can be maintained only by laborious resolve, but which is objectively universally valid. Strictly speaking, however, neither does perfection gain through beauty, nor beauty through perfection. Rather, when we use a concept to compare the representation through which an object is given to us with the object (with

13 Kant knew of Māori facial tattooing from the published accounts of Captain Cook's voyages.

regard to what it is supposed to be), we cannot avoid holding the representation up at the same time against the sensation in the subject. And so it is the *entire faculty* of the power of representation that gains when these two states of mind are in harmony.

A judgment of taste about an object with a determinate inner end would be pure only if the person judging either had no concept of this end or abstracted from it in his judgment. But then, although this person would be making a correct judgment of taste in judging the object as a free beauty, he would nevertheless be censured by someone else who considers the beauty in the object only as an adherent property (who looks to the end of the object), and be accused of false taste. Yet both judge correctly in their own way: the one according to what he has before his senses, the other according to what he has in his thoughts. This distinction allows us to settle many a dispute among judges of taste about beauty. We can show them that the one is concerned with free beauty, the other with adherent beauty; that the first is making a pure judgment of taste, the second an applied one.

§ 17. THE IDEAL OF BEAUTY

Only the human figure admits an ideal of beauty: the normal idea plus the expression of the moral.

There can be no objective rule of taste that would determine through concepts what is beautiful. For every judgment from this source is aesthetic; that is, its determining ground is the feeling of the subject and not a concept of an object. To seek a principle of taste that would provide the universal criterion of the beautiful through determinate concepts is a fruitless endeavor, because what is sought is impossible and self-contradictory. The universal communicability of sensation (of satisfaction or dissatisfaction), and indeed a communicability that obtains without a concept; the unanimity, as far as possible, of all ages and [232] peoples regarding this feeling in the representation of certain objects—this is the empirical criterion, weak

though it is and scarcely sufficient even for a conjecture, that a taste thus confirmed by examples springs from the deeply hidden ground, common to all human beings, of their unanimity in judging the forms under which objects are given to them.

That is why some products of taste are regarded as *exemplary*. This is not because taste could be acquired by imitating others. For taste must be a faculty of one's own. Whoever imitates a model shows skill insofar as he gets it right; but he shows taste only insofar as he can judge this model himself.[14] It follows, however, that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, which each person must produce in himself. By it he must judge everything that is an object of taste or an example of judging by taste, and even the taste of everyone else. *Idea* properly means a concept of reason, and *ideal* the representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea. That archetype of taste certainly rests on reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum; but it cannot be represented through concepts, only in an individual presentation. It can therefore better be called the ideal of the beautiful. Even if we do not possess such an ideal, we still strive to produce it in ourselves. But it will be merely an ideal of the imagination, precisely because it rests not on concepts but on presentation; and the faculty of presentation is the imagination.—How, then, do we arrive at such an ideal of beauty? *A priori* or empirically? And again: which kind of the beautiful is capable of an ideal?

First of all, it should be noted that the beauty for which an ideal is to be sought must be not a *vague* beauty but one *fixed* by a concept of objective purposiveness. Consequently it must belong not to the object of an entirely pure judgment of taste, but to that of a partly intellectualized judgment of taste. [233] That is, in whatever kind of grounds of judging an ideal is to be

14 KANT'S NOTE. Models of taste in the verbal arts must be written in a dead and learned language. It must be dead so that it need not suffer the change that inevitably befalls living languages, in which noble expressions become flat, common ones antiquated, and newly coined ones enjoy only a brief circulation. It must be learned so that it has a grammar that is not subject to the wanton changes of fashion but keeps its unchanging rule.

found, some idea of reason according to determinate concepts must lie at its basis, determining *a priori* the end on which the inner possibility of the object rests. An ideal of beautiful flowers, of beautiful furnishings, of a beautiful view cannot be conceived. But even of a beauty adhering to determinate ends— for example, a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, and so on— no ideal can be represented; presumably because the ends are not sufficiently determined and fixed by their concept, so that the purposiveness is almost as free as in the case of *vague* beauty. Only that which has the end of its existence in itself is capable of an ideal: the *human being*. He can determine his ends himself through reason; or, where he must take them from outer perception, he can still hold them up against essential and universal ends and then also judge aesthetically how well they harmonize with those ends. This *human being*, then, is alone among all objects in the world capable of an ideal of *beauty*, just as humanity in his person, as intelligence, is alone capable of the ideal of *perfection*.

This, however, requires two components. *First*, the aesthetic *normal idea*: an individual intuition (of the imagination) that represents the standard for judging the human being as a thing belonging to a particular animal species. *Second*, the *idea of reason*: it makes the ends of humanity, insofar as they cannot be represented sensibly, the principle for judging the human figure, through which, as their effect in appearance, those ends are revealed. The normal idea must take its elements for the figure of an animal of a particular kind from experience. But the greatest purposiveness in the construction of the figure, which would be fit to serve as the universal standard for aesthetically judging every individual of this species, lies merely in the idea of the one who judges. It is the image that, as it were, intentionally underlay the technique of nature, and to which only the kind as a whole, but no single individual on its own, is adequate. Yet this idea, with its proportions, can be presented fully *in concreto* as an aesthetic idea in a model image. To make it somewhat comprehensible how this comes about (for who can wrest her

secret entirely from nature?), let us attempt a psychological explanation.

It should be noted that, in a way wholly incomprehensible to us, the [234] imagination knows how not only to recall, on occasion, the signs for concepts, even from long ago, but also to reproduce the image and shape of an object out of an untold number of objects of different kinds, or even of one and the same kind. Indeed, when the mind sets out to make comparisons, the imagination knows how to let one image, as it were, fall upon another—in all likelihood actually, even if not sufficiently for consciousness—and, through the congruence of several of the same kind, to arrive at an average that serves as the common measure for them all. Someone has seen a thousand grown men. Now if he wants to judge the normal size, which is to be estimated by comparison, then (in my opinion) the imagination lets a great number of the images (perhaps all of those thousand) fall upon one another. If I may apply the analogy of optical presentation here: in the space where most of them coincide, and within the outline where the area is tinted with the most thickly laid-on color, the *average size* becomes recognizable. This is the size that, in height as well as breadth, is equally distant from the outermost limits of the largest and smallest statures. And this is the stature for a beautiful man. (One could get the very same result mechanically by measuring all thousand, adding up their heights among themselves and their breadths (and thicknesses) separately, and dividing each sum by a thousand. But the imagination does just this by means of a dynamic effect arising from the repeated apprehension of such figures on the organ of inner sense.) If in a similar way the average head is now sought for this average man, and for this head the average nose, and so on, then this figure underlies the normal idea of the beautiful man in the country where the comparison is made. That is why, under these empirical conditions, an African must necessarily have a different normal idea of the beauty of the figure than a white person, and a Chinese person a different one than a European. The same would hold for the model of a beau-

tiful horse or dog (of a certain breed).—This *normal idea* is not derived from proportions taken from experience *as determinate rules*; rather, it is what first makes rules of judging possible. It is the image for the whole kind, hovering among all the individual intuitions of individuals, which vary in many ways. It is the image that nature laid down as the archetype for its productions in that species, [235] but seems not to have fully attained in any single individual. It is by no means the whole *archetype* of *beauty* in this kind, but only the form that constitutes the indispensable condition of all beauty, and so merely *correctness* in the presentation of the kind. It is, as *Polyclitus's* famous *Doryphoros* was called, the *rule* (*Myron's* cow could also be used for just this purpose within its kind). For that very reason it can contain nothing specifically characteristic; otherwise it would not be the *normal idea* for the kind. Nor does its presentation please through beauty; it pleases merely because it contradicts none of the conditions under which alone a thing of this kind can be beautiful. The presentation is merely academically correct.[15][16]

The *ideal* of the beautiful is still distinct from its *normal idea*. For the reasons already given, the ideal can be expected only in the *human figure*. There, the ideal consists in the expression of the *moral*, without which the object would not please universally and, moreover, positively (not merely negatively, in an academically correct presentation). The visible expression of moral

15 KANT'S NOTE. One will find that a perfectly regular face, which a painter might like to ask to sit for him as a model, usually says nothing. This is because it contains nothing characteristic, and so expresses the idea of the kind more than what is specific to a person. When what is characteristic in this way is exaggerated—that is, when it impairs the normal idea (the purposiveness of the kind) itself—it is called *caricature*. Experience also shows that such entirely regular faces usually betray a person who is inwardly mediocre as well. This is presumably because (if it may be assumed that nature expresses the proportions of the inner in the outer) when none of the mental dispositions stands out beyond the proportion required merely to make up a person free of faults, nothing can be expected of what is called *genius*. In genius, nature seems to depart from its usual relations among the powers of the mind in favor of a single one.

16 Polyclitus (fifth century BC) sculpted the *Doryphoros* (Spear-Bearer) as the embodiment of his treatise on proportion, the *Canon* ("Rule"). Myron's bronze cow, by his contemporary, was celebrated in antiquity for its lifelikeness.

ideas that govern the human being inwardly can indeed be taken only from experience. But their connection with everything that our reason links with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness—goodness of soul, or purity, or strength, or serenity, and so on— to make this, as it were, visible in bodily expression (as the effect of what is inward) requires pure ideas of reason and great power of imagination united in anyone who would merely judge it, and still more in anyone who would present it. The correctness of such an ideal [236] of beauty is proved by this: it allows no charm of the senses to mingle with the satisfaction in its object, and yet it makes us take a great interest in that object. This in turn proves that judging by such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and that judging according to an ideal of beauty is not a mere judgment of taste.

DEFINITION OF THE BEAUTIFUL FROM THE THIRD MOMENT

Beauty is the form of purposiveness perceived in an object without the representation of an end.

Beauty is the form of the *purposiveness* of an object, insofar as it is perceived in it *without the representation of an end*.[17]

17 KANT'S NOTE. Against this definition one might cite as a counterexample that there are things in which one sees a purposive form without recognizing an end in them. Take the stone implements often dug out of ancient burial mounds, which are fitted with a hole as if for a handle. Although their shape clearly betrays a purposiveness whose end we do not know, they are not on that account declared beautiful. But the fact that we regard them as works of art is already enough to make us admit that we refer their figure to some intention and a determinate end. Hence there is no immediate satisfaction at all in intuiting them. A flower, on the other hand, such as a tulip, is held to be beautiful because in perceiving it we encounter a certain purposiveness which, as we judge it, is not referred to any end at all.

FOURTH MOMENT: MODALITY. § 18. WHAT THE MODALITY OF TASTE IS

The beautiful has a necessary relation to satisfaction, but the necessity is only exemplary.

Of every representation I can say that it is at least *possible* that it (as a cognition) is bound up with a pleasure. Of what I call *agreeable* I say that it *actually* produces pleasure in me. Of the *beautiful*, however, we think that it has a *necessary* relation to satisfaction. Now, this necessity is of a special kind. It is not a theoretical objective necessity, where it can be cognized *a priori* [237] that everyone *will feel* this satisfaction in the object I call beautiful. Nor is it a practical necessity, where, through concepts of a pure rational will that serves freely acting beings as a rule, this satisfaction is the necessary consequence of an objective law and means nothing other than that one absolutely ought (without any further aim) to act in a certain way. Rather, as a necessity thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called *exemplary*: that is, a necessity of the assent of *all* to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that cannot be stated. Since an aesthetic judgment is not an objective, cognitive judgment, this necessity cannot be derived from determinate concepts and is therefore not apodictic. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of experience (from a thoroughgoing unanimity of judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience hardly furnish enough evidence for this; no concept of the necessity of these judgments can be grounded on empirical judgments.

§ 19. THE NECESSITY OF TASTE IS CONDITIONED

We solicit everyone's assent on a ground common to all, if only the case is subsumed correctly.

The judgment of taste imputes assent to everyone. Whoever declares something beautiful holds that everyone *ought* to give their approval to the object before him and likewise declare it

beautiful. So the *ought* in an aesthetic judgment, even given all the data required for judging, is still pronounced only conditionally. We solicit everyone else's assent because we have a ground for it that is common to all. And we could count on this assent, if only we were always sure that the case had been correctly subsumed under that ground as the rule of approval.

§ 20. THE IDEA OF A COMMON SENSE

Judgments of taste presuppose a common sense: a feeling that determines, with universal validity, what pleases.

If judgments of taste (like cognitive judgments) had a determinate objective principle, then whoever made them in accordance with [238] that principle would claim unconditional necessity for his judgment. If they were without any principle at all, like judgments of mere taste of the senses, no thought of their necessity would ever enter our minds. So they must have a subjective principle, which determines only through feeling and not through concepts, yet with universal validity, what pleases or displeases. Such a principle, however, could only be regarded as a *common sense*. It is essentially different from common understanding, which is sometimes also called common sense (*sensus communis*). For common understanding judges not by feeling but always by concepts, though usually only by concepts as obscurely represented principles.[18]

Only on the presupposition that there is a common sense, then (by which, however, we understand not an outer sense but the effect of the free play of our cognitive powers)—only on the presupposition, I say, of such a common sense can the judgment of taste be made.

18 *Sensus communis*: Latin, "common sense." Kant distinguishes the aesthetic common sense from ordinary sound understanding, which also goes by that name.

§ 21. MAY WE PRESUPPOSE A COMMON SENSE?

Cognition must be communicable, so the attunement of our faculties, and its feeling, must be too.

Cognitions and judgments, together with the conviction that accompanies them, must be universally communicable. Otherwise they would have no agreement with the object: they would all be a merely subjective play of the powers of representation, just as skepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to be communicable, then the state of mind must also be universally communicable. That is, the attunement of the cognitive powers to cognition in general must be communicable—and specifically that proportion which is appropriate for a representation (through which an object is given to us) if cognition is to be made from it. For without this attunement, as the subjective condition of cognizing, cognition as an effect could not arise. And this actually always happens when a given object, by means of the senses, sets the imagination to work combining the manifold, and the imagination in turn sets the understanding to work unifying the manifold in concepts. But this attunement of the cognitive powers has a different proportion depending on the objects that are given. Yet there must be one proportion in which this inner relation, for the animation of each mental power by the other, is most conducive for both with a view to cognition (of given [239] objects) in general. And this attunement can be determined only by feeling (not by concepts). Now, this attunement itself must be universally communicable, and hence so must the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation); and the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense. So a common sense can be assumed with good reason. It is assumed without relying on psychological observations, but as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be presupposed in every logic and every principle of cognitions that is not skeptical.

§ 22. COMMON SENSE AS AN IDEAL NORM

The ought of taste rests on a common sense presupposed as an ideal norm, not on experience.

In all judgments by which we declare something beautiful, we allow no one to be of a different opinion. Yet we do not ground our judgment on concepts, but only on our feeling, which we therefore make its basis not as a private feeling but as a shared one. Now, this common sense cannot be grounded on experience for this purpose. For it aims to justify judgments that contain an ought: it does not say that everyone *will* agree with our judgment, but that everyone *ought* to concur with it. So the common sense—of whose judgment I here offer my judgment of taste as an example, and on account of which I ascribe *exemplary* validity to it—is a merely ideal norm. On the presupposition of this norm, a judgment that agreed with it, and the satisfaction in an object expressed in that judgment, could rightly be made a rule for everyone. For the principle, though only subjective, if assumed to be subjectively universal (an idea necessary for everyone), could still demand universal assent, as regards the unanimity of different people judging, just like an objective principle—provided only that one were sure of having subsumed correctly under it.

That we actually presuppose this indeterminate norm of a common sense is proved by our presuming to make judgments of taste. [240] Is there in fact such a common sense as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience? Or does a still higher principle of reason make it only a regulative principle for us, bidding us first to produce a common sense in ourselves for higher ends? Is taste, then, an original and natural faculty, or only the idea of a faculty that is artificial and still to be acquired? In that case a judgment of taste, with its claim to universal assent, would in fact be only a demand of reason to produce such unanimity in our way of sensing; and the ought—that is, the objective necessity that everyone's feeling flow together

with each person's particular feeling—would signify only the possibility of coming to agreement here, and the judgment of taste would merely offer an example of the application of this principle. These are questions we neither wish nor are able to investigate here yet. For now we have only to resolve the faculty of taste into its elements and finally unite them in the idea of a common sense.

DEFINITION OF THE BEAUTIFUL FROM THE FOURTH MOMENT

The beautiful is what is recognized, without a concept, as the object of a necessary satisfaction.

The *beautiful* is that which, without a concept, is recognized as the object of a *necessary* satisfaction.

GENERAL REMARK ON THE ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL

Taste is lawfulness without a law; stiff geometric regularity bores, while free natural variety never tires.

If we draw the result of the foregoing analyses, we find that everything comes down to the concept of taste: taste is a faculty for judging an object in relation to the *free lawfulness* of the imagination. Now if in the judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom, then it is taken, first, not as reproductive, as when it is subject to the laws of association, but as productive and self-active (as the originator of freely chosen forms of possible intuitions). In apprehending a given object of the senses, it is indeed bound to a determinate form of this object, and to that extent it has no free play (as it has in poetic invention). Still, it is quite conceivable that the object may offer it just such a form as contains a [241] combination of the manifold that the imagination, if it were left free to itself, would design in harmony with the *lawfulness of the understanding* in general. But that the *imagination* should be *free* and yet *lawful of itself*—that is, that it should carry an autonomy with it—is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law. If, however, the imagination

is compelled to proceed according to a determinate law, then its product is determined in its form by concepts, as to what it ought to be. But then, as shown above, the satisfaction is not satisfaction in the beautiful but in the good (in perfection, at most merely formal perfection), and the judgment is not a judgment by taste. Hence only a lawfulness without a law, and a subjective agreement of the imagination with the understanding without an objective one—in which the representation would be referred to a determinate concept of an object—can be compatible with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which has also been called purposiveness without a purpose) and with the distinctive character of a judgment of taste.

Now, geometrically regular figures—a circle, a square, a cube, and so on—are commonly cited by critics of taste as the simplest and most indubitable examples of beauty. And yet they are called regular precisely because the only way to represent them is to regard them as mere presentations of a determinate concept, which prescribes to the figure its rule (the rule according to which alone the figure is possible). So one of the two must be mistaken: either the critics' judgment that ascribes beauty to these figures, or ours, which finds that beauty requires purposiveness without a concept.

No one will readily think a person of taste necessary for taking more satisfaction in a circle than in a scrawled outline, or in an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in one that is oblique, unequal-sided and, as it were, misshapen. That requires only common understanding and no taste at all. Where an aim is perceived—for example, to judge the size of a plot of ground, or to make intelligible the relation of the parts to one another and to the whole in a division—regular figures are needed, and indeed those of the simplest kind. And then the satisfaction rests not immediately on the sight of the figure, but on its usefulness [242] for all sorts of possible aims. A room whose walls form oblique angles, a garden plot of that sort, indeed any violation of symmetry—in the figure of animals (for example, having only one eye), or of buildings, or of flower beds—displeases

because it is counterpurposive. It is counterpurposive not only practically, with regard to a determinate use of these things, but also for judging with a view to all sorts of possible aims. This is not the case in the judgment of taste. If it is pure, the judgment of taste connects satisfaction or dissatisfaction immediately with the mere *contemplation* of the object, without regard to use or to an end.

The regularity that leads to the concept of an object is indeed the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) for grasping the object in a single representation and determining the manifold in its form. This determination is an end with regard to cognition, and in relation to cognition it is also always bound up with satisfaction (which accompanies the accomplishment of any aim, even a merely problematic one). But then it is merely the approval of a solution that satisfies a problem. It is not a free and indeterminately purposive entertainment of the powers of the mind with what we call beautiful, in which the understanding is in the service of the imagination, and not the imagination in the service of the understanding.

In a thing that is possible only through an intention—a building, even an animal—the regularity that consists in symmetry must express the unity of the intuition that accompanies the concept of the end, and it belongs to cognition. But where only a free play of the powers of representation is to be sustained (though on condition that the understanding takes no offense at it)—in pleasure gardens, room decoration, all sorts of tasteful furnishings and the like —regularity that announces itself as constraint is avoided as far as possible. That is why the English taste in gardens and the baroque taste in furniture push the freedom of the imagination rather even to the verge of the grotesque. In this detachment from all constraint of rules they posit precisely the case in which taste can show its greatest perfection in the designs of the imagination.

Everything stiffly regular (whatever comes close to mathematical regularity) has something contrary to taste about it: contemplating it offers no lasting entertainment. Unless it [243]

expressly aims at cognition or at a determinate practical end, it becomes boring. By contrast, whatever the imagination can play with purposively and without contrivance is always new to us, and we never tire of looking at it. *Marsden*, in his description of Sumatra, remarks that there the free beauties of nature surround the observer everywhere and therefore hold little attraction for him any more. A pepper garden, on the other hand, where the poles on which this plant climbs form avenues between them in parallel lines, held great charm for him when he came upon it in the middle of a forest. From this he concludes that wild, apparently unregulated beauty pleases, as a change, only someone who has seen his fill of the regular.[19] But he need only have tried spending a day in his pepper garden to realize the following. Once the understanding, through the regularity, has put itself into the attunement to order that it needs everywhere, the object no longer entertains it; instead, it imposes a burdensome constraint on the imagination. Nature there, by contrast—lavish in its varieties to the point of luxuriance, and subject to no constraint of artificial rules—could give his taste constant nourishment. —Even birdsong, which we can bring under no musical rule, seems to contain more freedom, and therefore more for taste, than even a human song performed according to all the rules of music; for we tire of the latter far sooner when it is repeated often and at length. Here, however, we are probably confusing our sympathy with the merriment of a small, beloved creature with the beauty of its song. When a human being imitates that song quite exactly (as sometimes happens with the nightingale's warbling), it strikes our ear as entirely tasteless.

Beautiful objects must also be distinguished from beautiful views of objects

(which, because of their distance, often can no longer be clearly made out). In the latter, taste seems to attach not so much to what the imagination *apprehends* in this field as to what

19 William Marsden, *The History of Sumatra* (1783), which appeared in German translation in 1785.

it is prompted to *invent* on this occasion—that is, to the genuine fantasies with which the mind entertains itself while it is continually stirred by the variety the eye meets. So it is, for instance, when we watch the changing shapes of a fire in the hearth or of a rippling brook. Neither of these is [244] a beauty, but they carry a charm for the imagination, because they sustain its free play.

Analytic of the Sublime

The mathematically and the dynamically sublime: what overwhelms the senses reveals the power of reason.

§ 23. Übergang von dem Beurtheilungsvermögen des Schönen zu dem des Erhabenen.

The beautiful agrees with the sublime in that both please for their own sake. It agrees with it further in that both presuppose neither a judgment of sense nor a logically determining judgment, but a judgment of reflection. Consequently the satisfaction depends neither on a sensation, like that in the agreeable, nor on a determinate concept, like the satisfaction in the good; yet it is still referred to concepts, though it remains undetermined to which ones. Hence the satisfaction is connected with mere presentation, or with the faculty of presentation. In this way, the faculty of presentation, or the imagination, is regarded, in the case of a given intuition, as in harmony with the *faculty of concepts* of the understanding or of reason, as furthering the latter. Hence both kinds of judgment are *singular*, and yet they announce themselves as universally valid for every subject, although they lay claim merely to the feeling of pleasure and not to any cognition of the object.

But notable differences between the two also strike the eye. The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in limitation. The sublime, by contrast, can also be found in a formless object, insofar as *limitlessness* is represented in it, or at its instigation, and yet the totality of that limitlessness is added in thought. So the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate concept of the understand-

ing, the sublime as the presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason. Thus in the one case the satisfaction is bound up with the representation of *quality*, in the other with that of *quantity*. The latter satisfaction also differs very greatly in kind from the former. The beautiful directly carries with it a feeling of the furtherance of life, and is therefore compatible with charms and with a [245] playful imagination. The feeling of the sublime, on the other hand, is a pleasure that arises only indirectly: it is produced by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers, followed immediately by an outpouring of them that is all the stronger. Hence, as emotion, it seems to be not play but seriousness in the activity of the imagination. That is why it is also incompatible with charms. And since the mind is not merely attracted by the object but, alternately, also repelled by it again and again, the satisfaction in the sublime contains not so much positive pleasure as admiration or respect; that is, it deserves to be called negative pleasure.

But the most important and intrinsic difference between the sublime and the beautiful is probably this. Let us, as is fitting, consider here at first only the sublime in objects of nature (the sublime in art is always restricted to the conditions of agreement with nature). Then natural beauty (self-subsistent natural beauty) carries with it a purposiveness in its form, by which the object seems, as it were, predetermined for our power of judgment, and so in itself constitutes an object of satisfaction. By contrast, what arouses in us the feeling of the sublime, merely in apprehension and without any reasoning, may indeed appear in its form counterpurposive for our power of judgment, unsuited to our faculty of presentation, and, as it were, doing violence to the imagination; yet it is judged to be all the more sublime for that.

From this we see at once that we express ourselves incorrectly in general when we call any *object of nature* sublime, although we can quite correctly call a great many of them beautiful. For how can something that is apprehended as counterpurposive in itself be designated by an expression of approval? We

can say no more than that the object is suitable for presenting a sublimity that can be found in the mind. For the sublime, properly speaking, cannot be contained in any sensible form. It concerns only ideas of reason. Although no presentation adequate to them is possible, these ideas are stirred up and called to mind precisely by this inadequacy, which can be presented sensibly. Thus the wide ocean, enraged by storms, cannot be called sublime. The sight of it is horrifying. One must already have filled the mind with all sorts of ideas [246] if such an intuition is to attune it to a feeling that is itself sublime—a feeling in which the mind is incited to abandon sensibility and to occupy itself with ideas that contain a higher purposiveness.

Self-subsistent natural beauty reveals to us a technique of nature. This technique represents nature as a system in accordance with laws whose principle we find nowhere in our entire faculty of understanding: the principle of a purposiveness relative to the use of the power of judgment with regard to appearances. Appearances must therefore be judged as belonging not merely to nature in its purposeless mechanism but also to the analogy with art. So although natural beauty does not actually extend our cognition of natural objects, it does extend our concept of nature, from nature as mere mechanism to the concept of that same nature as art. This invites deep investigations into how such a form is possible. But in what we usually call sublime in nature there is so little that leads to particular objective principles, or to forms of nature conforming to them, that nature most arouses the ideas of the sublime in its chaos, or in its wildest and most lawless disorder and devastation, provided only that magnitude and power are in view. From this we see that the concept of the sublime in nature is not nearly as important, or as rich in consequences, as the concept of the beautiful in nature. It indicates nothing purposive in nature itself. It indicates only something purposive in the possible *use* of nature's intuitions, which makes us feel in ourselves a purposiveness entirely independent of nature. For the beautiful in nature we must seek a ground outside ourselves. For the sub-

lime we must seek one merely within ourselves, in the way of thinking that brings sublimity into the representation of nature. This is a very necessary preliminary remark. It entirely separates the ideas of the sublime from the idea of a purposiveness of *nature*, and it makes the theory of the sublime a mere appendix to the aesthetic judging of the purposiveness of nature. The reason is that this theory represents no particular form in nature. It only develops a purposive use that the imagination makes of its representation.

§ 24. DIVIDING THE INQUIRY INTO THE SUBLIME

The analysis starts from quantity and divides the sublime into the mathematical and the dynamical.

247 As for dividing up the moments of the aesthetic judging of objects in relation to the feeling of the sublime, the Analytic will be able to proceed on the same principle as in the analysis of judgments of taste. For as a judgment of the aesthetic reflecting power of judgment, the satisfaction in the sublime, just like that in the beautiful, must be represented as universally valid in its *quantity*, as without interest in its *quality*, and as subjective purposiveness in its *relation*; and in its *modality* it must represent this subjective purposiveness as necessary. In this respect, then, the method will not depart from that of the preceding section, unless one counts the following as a departure. There, where the aesthetic judgment concerned the form of the object, we began by investigating quality. Here, given the formlessness that can belong to what we call sublime, we shall begin with quantity as the first moment of the aesthetic judgment on the sublime. The reason for this can be seen from the preceding §.

But the analysis of the sublime needs a division that the analysis of the beautiful does not require: the division into the *mathematically* and the *dynamically sublime*.

The feeling of the sublime is characterized by a *movement* of the mind connected with the judging of the object, whereas taste for the beautiful presupposes that the mind is in *calm* con-

templation and keeps it there. This movement, however, is to be judged as subjectively purposive, because the sublime pleases. So the imagination relates it either to the *cognitive faculty* or to the *faculty of desire*. In either relation, the purposiveness of the given representation is judged only with regard to these *faculties* (without an end or interest). The first purposiveness is then attributed to the object as a *mathematical* attunement of the imagination, and the second as a *dynamical* one. That is how the object comes to be represented as sublime in these two ways.

A. THE MATHEMATICALLY SUBLIME. § 25. WHAT "SUBLIME" MEANS

We call sublime that which is absolutely great, great beyond all comparison.

[248] We call *sublime* that which is *absolutely great*. But being great and being a magnitude are entirely different concepts (*magnitudo* and *quantitas*). Likewise, to *say simply* (*simpliciter*) that something is great is quite different from saying that it is *absolutely great* (*absolute, non comparative magnum*). The latter is *what is great beyond all comparison*.—But what does it actually mean to say that something is great, or small, or middling? What the expression designates is not a pure concept of the understanding, still less an intuition of the senses. Nor is it a concept of reason, since it carries no principle of cognition with it at all.[1] It must therefore be a concept of the power of judgment, or derive from one, and be based on a subjective purposiveness of the representation in relation to the power of judgment. That something is a magnitude (*quantum*) can be cognized from the thing itself, without any comparison with other things: namely, when a multiplicity of homogeneous parts together makes up one thing. But *how great* it is always requires something else, which is also a magnitude, as its measure.[2] In judging magnitude, how-

1 Latin: *magnitudo* "greatness, size"; *quantitas* "quantity, amount"; *simpliciter* "simply"; *absolute, non comparative magnum* "great absolutely, not comparatively."
2 *Quantum*: Latin, "an amount," something that has magnitude.

ever, what matters is not only the multiplicity (the number) but also the magnitude of the unit (the measure). And the magnitude of this unit in turn always needs something else as a measure against which it can be compared. So we see that no determination of the magnitude of appearances can ever yield an absolute concept of a magnitude. It can only ever yield a comparative concept.

Now if I say simply that something is great, it seems that I have no comparison in mind at all, at least not with any objective measure, since this does not determine how great the object is. But even though the standard of comparison is merely subjective, the judgment nonetheless lays claim to universal assent. The judgments "the man is beautiful" and "he is tall" are not restricted to the judging subject alone. Like theoretical judgments, they demand everyone's assent.

[249] A judgment that simply calls something great does not merely mean to say that the object has a magnitude. It also ascribes this magnitude to the object in preference to many other things of the same kind, without specifying this preeminence. So the judgment is certainly based on a standard, one that we presuppose can be taken to be the same for everyone. This standard, however, can be used not for a logical (mathematically determinate) judging of magnitude but only for an aesthetic one, because it merely subjectively underlies the judgment that reflects on magnitude. The standard may, incidentally, be empirical, such as the average size of the people known to us, of animals of a certain kind, of trees, houses, mountains, and the like; or it may be a standard given *a priori*, which the deficiencies of the judging subject restrict to subjective conditions of presentation *in concreto*. Examples in the practical sphere are the magnitude of a certain virtue, or of public freedom and justice in a country. In the theoretical sphere, an example is the magnitude of the accuracy or inaccuracy of an observation or measurement that has been made, and the like.[3]

What is remarkable here is this. Even if we take no interest at all in the object, that is, even if its existence is a matter of indifference to us, its mere magnitude, even when the object is regarded as formless, can still carry with it a satisfaction that is universally communicable. This satisfaction therefore contains consciousness of a subjective purposiveness in the use of our cognitive faculties. But it is not a satisfaction in the object, as with the beautiful, where the reflecting power of judgment finds itself purposively attuned in relation to cognition in general (the object here may be formless). It is a satisfaction in the enlargement of the imagination in itself.

Suppose we say simply of an object (with the restriction mentioned above) that it is great. This is not a mathematically determining judgment. It is a mere judgment of reflection on the representation of the object, a representation that is subjectively purposive for a certain use of our cognitive powers in estimating magnitude. We then always connect a kind of respect with the representation, just as we connect a kind of contempt with what we simply call small. Moreover, the judging of things as great or small extends to everything, even to all their properties; that is why we even call beauty great or small. The reason for this [250] is to be sought in the following fact: whatever we may present in intuition in accordance with the precept of the power of judgment (and hence represent aesthetically) is, all of it, appearance, and hence also a quantum.

But when we call something not merely great but absolutely, unconditionally, in every respect (beyond all comparison) great, that is, sublime, one soon sees that we do not allow a standard suited to it to be sought outside it. We allow it to be sought only within it. It is a magnitude that is equal only to itself. It follows that the sublime is to be sought not in the things of nature but only in our ideas. In which of our ideas it lies, however, must be left for the deduction.

3 *In concreto*: Latin, "in the concrete," that is, in particular instances.

FORMULAS FOR THE SUBLIME

Sublime is that compared with which all else is small; it shows a faculty surpassing sense.

The above explanation can also be put this way: *That is sublime in comparison with which everything else is small*. Here it is easy to see that nothing can be given in nature, however great we may judge it to be, that could not be degraded to the infinitely small when considered in another relation. Conversely, nothing is so small that it could not be enlarged for our imagination to the size of a world when compared with still smaller standards. Telescopes have given us abundant material for the first observation, and microscopes for the second. Considered on this footing, then, nothing that can be an object of the senses is to be called sublime. But in our imagination there is a striving to progress to infinity, and in our reason there is a claim to absolute totality as to a real idea. For precisely this reason, the very inadequacy of our faculty for estimating the magnitude of things in the sensible world to this idea awakens the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us. And what is absolutely great is not the object of the senses. It is the use that the power of judgment naturally makes of certain objects on behalf of this feeling, and compared with this use every other use is small. Hence what is to be called sublime is not the object but the state of mind produced by a certain representation that occupies the reflecting power of judgment.

We can therefore add one more formula to the previous ones explaining the sublime: *That is sublime which, merely by our being able to think it, demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every standard of the senses*.

§ 26. ESTIMATING THE MAGNITUDE OF NATURAL THINGS

Imagination can apprehend endlessly but comprehend only so much; the pyramids and St. Peter's show the limit.

251 Estimating magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical; estimating it in mere intuition (by eye) is aesthetic. We can obtain determinate concepts of how great something is only through numbers, whose unit is the measure (or at most through approximations by numerical series that progress to infinity). To that extent all logical estimation of magnitude is mathematical. But the magnitude of the measure must still be assumed to be known. Suppose that this magnitude in turn could be estimated only through numbers, whose unit would have to be another measure, and hence only mathematically. Then we could never have a first or fundamental measure, and so we could have no determinate concept of a given magnitude either. Estimating the magnitude of the fundamental measure must therefore consist merely in our being able to grasp it immediately in an intuition and to use it, by means of the imagination, to present numerical concepts. That is, all estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is ultimately aesthetic (i.e., determined subjectively, not objectively).

Now for the mathematical estimation of magnitude there is, to be sure, no greatest, for the power of numbers extends to infinity. But for the aesthetic estimation of magnitude there certainly is a greatest. Of this greatest I say the following. When it is judged as an absolute measure, beyond which no greater is subjectively possible (for the judging subject), it carries the idea of the sublime with it. It then produces an emotion that no mathematical estimation of magnitudes by numbers can bring about, except insofar as that aesthetic fundamental measure is kept alive in the imagination. For the mathematical estimation only ever presents relative magnitude, by comparison with other magnitudes of the same kind, whereas the aesthetic one

presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can grasp it in one intuition.

Taking up a quantum intuitively into the imagination, so as to be able to use it as a measure, or as a unit for estimating magnitude by numbers, involves two acts of this faculty: *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) and *comprehension* (*comprehensio aesthetica*). Apprehension poses no problem, since it can go on to [252] infinity. But comprehension becomes ever harder the further apprehension advances, and it soon reaches its maximum: the aesthetically greatest fundamental measure for estimating magnitude.[4] For apprehension may get so far that the partial representations of sensible intuition that were apprehended first are already beginning to fade in the imagination while it advances to apprehending further ones. The imagination then loses on one side as much as it gains on the other, and in comprehension there is a greatest beyond which it cannot go.

This explains what *Savary* remarks in his account of Egypt: to feel the full emotion of the pyramids' magnitude, one must neither come very close to them nor stand too far away. If one is too far away, the parts that are apprehended (the stones piled on one another) are represented only obscurely, and their representation has no effect on the subject's aesthetic judgment. If one is too close, the eye needs some time to complete the apprehension from the base to the apex. During this time the first parts always partly fade before the imagination has taken in the last ones, and the comprehension is never complete.[5] —The same point may also suffice to explain the bewilderment, or kind of perplexity, that is said to come over the visitor on first entering St. Peter's in Rome. Here there is a feeling that one's imagination is inadequate for presenting the idea of a whole. In this the imagination reaches its maximum and, in striving to extend it, sinks

4 *Comprehensio aesthetica*: Latin, "aesthetic comprehension," holding the successively apprehended parts together in one intuition.

5 Claude-Étienne Savary (1750–1788), French traveler and orientalist, whose *Lettres sur l'Égypte* appeared in 1785–1786.

back into itself, but is thereby transported into a moving satisfaction.

I shall not yet say anything about the ground of this satisfaction. It is connected with a representation from which one would least expect it: a representation that makes us notice its own inadequacy, and hence also its subjective unpurposiveness, for the power of judgment in estimating magnitude. I shall only remark on the following. If the aesthetic judgment is to be *pure* (*mixed with no teleological* judgment as a judgment of reason), and if an example of it is to be given that is fully suited to the critique of the *aesthetic* power of judgment, then the sublime must not be shown in products of art (e.g., buildings, columns, etc.), where a human end determines the form as well as the magnitude. Nor must it be shown in natural things *whose concept already brings a determinate end* [253] *with it* (e.g., animals whose natural function is known). It must be shown in raw nature, merely insofar as it contains magnitude (and even in raw nature only insofar as it carries with it no charm, and no emotion arising from real danger). For in this kind of representation nature contains nothing that would be monstrous (nor anything magnificent or horrible). The magnitude that is apprehended may have grown as large as one likes, provided only that the imagination can comprehend it into a whole. An object is *monstrous* when its magnitude destroys the end that constitutes its concept. The mere presentation of a concept is called *colossal,* however, when the concept is almost too great for any presentation (bordering on the relatively monstrous). The reason is that the end of presenting a concept is made difficult when the intuition of the object is almost too great for our faculty of apprehension.—A pure judgment on the sublime, however, must have no end of the object whatsoever as its determining ground, if it is to be aesthetic and not mixed with some judgment of the understanding or of reason.

Everything that is to please the merely reflecting power of judgment without interest must carry in its representation a subjective purposiveness that is, as such, universally valid.

Here, however, the judging is not based on any purposiveness of the *form* of the object (as it is with the beautiful). So the question arises: what is this subjective purposiveness? And what prescribes it as a norm, so that it provides a ground for a universally valid satisfaction in the mere estimation of magnitude, and indeed in an estimation that has been pushed as far as the inadequacy of our faculty of imagination to present the concept of a magnitude?

In the composition required for representing magnitude, the imagination progresses to infinity of its own accord, with nothing to hinder it. The understanding, however, guides it by means of numerical concepts, for which the imagination must supply the schema. This procedure belongs to the logical estimation of magnitude. There is indeed something objectively purposive in it according to the concept of an end (every act of measurement is something of this kind), but nothing purposive for, or pleasing to, the aesthetic power of judgment. Nor is there anything in this intentional purposiveness that [254] would compel us to push the magnitude of the measure, and hence the *comprehension* of the many in one intuition, to the limit of the faculty of imagination, as far as this faculty can reach in its presentations. For in the understanding's estimation of magnitudes (arithmetic), one gets just as far whether one carries the comprehension of units up to the number 10 (in the decimal system) or only up to 4 (in the tetradic system). The further generation of magnitude, whether in composition or, if the quantum is given in intuition, in apprehension, is carried out merely progressively (not comprehensively), according to an adopted principle of progression. In this mathematical estimation of magnitude the understanding is served and satisfied equally well, whether the imagination chooses as its unit a magnitude that can be taken in at a single glance, e.g.,[6] a foot or a rod, or whether it chooses a German mile, or even the diameter of the earth. Of these latter, apprehension is indeed possible, but not comprehension into

6 Counting in base four had been proposed as a "tetractys" by the mathematician Erhard Weigel (1625–1699).

one intuition of the imagination (not by *comprehensio aesthetica*, though quite possibly by *comprehensio logica* in a numerical concept). In both cases the logical estimation of magnitude proceeds unhindered to infinity.[7]

THE INFINITE AND THE VOICE OF REASON

Reason demands totality, so merely thinking the infinite as a whole reveals a supersensible faculty.

But now the mind hears within itself the voice of reason. Reason demands totality for all given magnitudes, even for those that can never be entirely apprehended but are nonetheless judged (in sensible representation) as entirely given. It therefore demands comprehension in *one* intuition, and it demands *presentation* for all the members of a progressively increasing numerical series. It does not exempt even the infinite (space and past time) from this demand. On the contrary, it makes it unavoidable for us to think of the infinite (in the judgment of common reason) as *entirely given* (in its totality).

The infinite, however, is absolutely (not merely comparatively) great. Compared with it, everything else (among magnitudes of the same kind) is small. But what matters most is that even to be able to think it as *a whole* indicates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every standard of the senses. For that would require a comprehension that yielded, as a unit, a standard with a determinate relation to the infinite, one that could be stated in numbers, and this is impossible. Yet *even to be able to think* the given infinite without contradiction requires a faculty in the human mind that is itself supersensible. For only through this faculty and [255] its idea of a noumenon is the infinite of the sensible world *entirely* comprehended *under* one concept, in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude. The noumenon itself admits of no intuition, but it is nevertheless laid under the intu-

7 A German mile was about 7.5 kilometers (4.7 miles); a rod roughly 3 to 5 meters, depending on the region. *Comprehensio logica*: "logical comprehension," taking together in a concept.

ition of the world, as mere appearance, as its substratum. In the mathematical estimation, by contrast, the infinite can never be entirely thought *through numerical concepts*. Even a faculty of being able to think the infinite of supersensible intuition as given (in its intelligible substratum) surpasses every standard of sensibility, and is great beyond all comparison, even with the faculty of mathematical estimation. It is so, of course, not from a theoretical point of view, on behalf of the cognitive faculty, but as an enlargement of the mind, which feels itself able to overstep the limits of sensibility from another point of view: the practical one.

Nature, then, is sublime in those of its appearances whose intuition carries with it the idea of its infinity. This can happen only through the inadequacy of even the greatest effort of our imagination in estimating the magnitude of an object. For the mathematical estimation of magnitude, however, the imagination is equal to every object and can give it an adequate measure. The reason is that the understanding's numerical concepts can, by progression, make any measure adequate to any given magnitude. It must therefore be in the *aesthetic* estimation of magnitude that the effort at comprehension is felt: an effort that exceeds the imagination's capacity to take the progressive apprehension together into a whole of intuition. In this estimation we also perceive the inadequacy of this faculty, unbounded as it is in its progress, to grasp and use a fundamental measure that is suitable for estimating magnitude with the least expenditure of understanding. Now the proper, unchangeable fundamental measure of nature is the absolute whole of nature, and for nature as appearance this is infinity comprehended. But this fundamental measure is a self-contradictory concept, since the absolute totality of an endless progression is impossible. So the magnitude of a natural object on which the imagination fruitlessly spends its whole faculty of comprehension must lead the concept of nature to a supersensible substratum, which underlies both nature and our faculty of thinking. This substratum is great beyond every standard of the senses. It there-

fore lets us judge as *sublime* not so much [256] the object as the state of mind in which we estimate it.

In judging the beautiful, the aesthetic power of judgment relates the imagination in its free play to the *understanding*, so that it harmonizes with the understanding's *concepts* in general (without determining which). Just so, in judging a thing as sublime, it relates the same faculty to *reason*, so that it accords subjectively with reason's *ideas* (without determining which ones). That is, it produces a state of mind in keeping with, and compatible with, the state of mind that the influence of determinate (practical) ideas on feeling would produce.

From this we also see that true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the one who judges, not in the natural object whose judging occasions this state of mind. Who would want to call sublime shapeless masses of mountains, piled on one another in wild disorder, with their pyramids of ice, or the dark and raging sea, and so on? But the mind feels itself elevated in its own estimation when, contemplating them without regard to their form, it abandons itself to the imagination and to reason. Reason is here brought into connection with the imagination entirely without any determinate end, and merely extends it. Yet the mind finds the whole power of the imagination inadequate to reason's ideas.

Examples of the mathematically sublime in nature, in mere intuition, are supplied by all the cases in which the imagination is given not so much a larger numerical concept as a large unit to serve as its measure (to shorten the numerical series). A tree, which we estimate by a man's height, gives us a standard for a mountain, at any rate. If the mountain were, say, a mile high, it can serve as the unit for the number expressing the earth's diameter, so as to make that diameter intuitable. The earth's diameter can serve as the unit for the planetary system known to us, and this for that of the Milky Way. And the immeasurable multitude of such Milky Way systems, known as nebulae, which presumably form such a system among themselves in turn, lets

us expect no limits here.[8] Now in the aesthetic judging of so immeasurable a whole, the sublime lies not so much in the size of the number as in the fact that, the further we go, the larger the units we keep arriving at. The systematic division of the universe [257] contributes to this. It represents everything great in nature to us as small in its turn. In fact, though, it represents our imagination, in all its boundlessness, and nature along with it, as vanishing before the ideas of reason, if the imagination is to provide a presentation adequate to them.

§ 27. THE QUALITY OF THE SATISFACTION IN THE SUBLIME

The sublime is felt as respect: displeasure at imagination's inadequacy, pleasure at reason's superiority.

The feeling that our faculty is inadequate to attain an idea *that is a law for us* is *respect*. Now the idea of comprehending every appearance that may be given to us into the intuition of a whole is an idea imposed on us by a law of reason. For reason recognizes no determinate measure, valid for everyone and unchangeable, other than the absolute whole. Our imagination, however, is required to comprehend a given object into a whole of intuition (and hence to present the idea of reason). Even in its greatest exertion in this regard it demonstrates its limits and inadequacy, and yet at the same time its vocation to bring about adequacy to that idea as a law.[9] Thus the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation. We show this respect to an object of nature through a certain subreption: we substitute respect for the object in place of respect for the idea of humanity in ourselves as subjects. The object makes intuitable to us, as it were, the superiority of the rational vocation of our cognitive faculties over the greatest faculty of sensibility.[10]

8 Kant had argued in his *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755) that the nebulae are other galaxies like our own Milky Way.

9 *Bestimmung*: here "vocation," what we are destined for; elsewhere the same German word means "determination."

10 Subreption (from Latin *subreptio*, obtaining something by misrepresentation): for Kant, the error of attributing to an object what belongs to the subject.

The feeling of the sublime is thus a feeling of displeasure. It arises from the inadequacy of the imagination, in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude, to the estimation by reason. At the same time it is a pleasure, awakened by the agreement of this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest sensible faculty with ideas of reason, insofar as striving toward these ideas is nonetheless a law for us. For it is a law for us (a law of reason), and belongs to our vocation, to estimate as small, in comparison with ideas of reason, everything great that nature contains for us as an object of the senses. And whatever arouses in us the feeling of this supersensible vocation accords with that law. [258] Now the greatest effort of the imagination in presenting the unit for estimating magnitude is a relation to something *absolutely* great. It is therefore also a relation to the law of reason that this alone be adopted as the supreme measure of magnitudes. So the inner perception that every sensible standard is inadequate for reason's estimation of magnitude is an agreement with reason's laws. It is also a displeasure that arouses in us the feeling of our supersensible vocation, according to which it is purposive, and hence a pleasure, to find every standard of sensibility inadequate to the ideas of reason.

In the representation of the sublime in nature the mind feels itself *moved*, whereas in the aesthetic judgment on the beautiful in nature it is in *calm* contemplation. This movement (especially at its beginning) can be compared to a vibration, that is, to a rapidly alternating repulsion from and attraction to one and the same object. What is excessive for the imagination (and the imagination is driven to it in apprehending the intuition) is, as it were, an abyss in which it fears to lose itself. Yet for reason's idea of the supersensible it is not excessive to produce such an effort of the imagination; it is lawful. So it is attractive again in just the same measure as it was repellent to mere sensibility. But the judgment itself always remains merely aesthetic here. It is not based on any determinate concept of the object, and it represents merely the subjective play of the powers of the mind (imagination and reason) as harmonious, even through their

contrast. In judging the beautiful, imagination and *understanding* produce a subjective purposiveness of the mental powers through their unanimity. Here, in just the same way, imagination and *reason* produce it through their conflict. What they produce is a feeling that we have pure, independent reason, or a faculty for estimating magnitude, whose preeminence can be made intuitable by nothing except the inadequacy of that faculty which is itself unbounded in presenting magnitudes (of sensible objects).

Measuring a space (as apprehension) is at the same time describing it, and hence an objective movement in the imagination and a progression. By contrast, comprehending the multiplicity into unity (not of thought but of intuition), and hence comprehending what is successively apprehended into one instant, is a regression. This regression in turn cancels the condition of time in [259] the imagination's progression and makes *simultaneity* intuitable. Temporal succession is a condition of inner sense and of an intuition. So this comprehension is a subjective movement of the imagination by which it does violence to inner sense, and this violence must be all the more noticeable the greater the quantum that the imagination comprehends into one intuition. The effort, then, to take up into a single intuition a measure for magnitudes whose apprehension takes a noticeable amount of time is a mode of representation that is counterpurposive when considered subjectively. Considered objectively, however, it is required for the estimation of magnitude, and so it is purposive. And yet the very violence that the imagination inflicts on the subject is judged as purposive *for the whole vocation* of the mind.

The *quality* of the feeling of the sublime is this: it is a feeling of displeasure concerning the aesthetic faculty of judging an object, a displeasure that is nevertheless at the same time represented in it as purposive. This is possible because the subject's own incapacity reveals the consciousness of an unlimited capacity of the same subject, and the mind can judge this capacity aesthetically only through that incapacity.

In the logical estimation of magnitude, it was recognized that we can never arrive at absolute totality by the progression of measuring the things of the sensible world in time and space. This impossibility was recognized as objective, that is, as an impossibility of *thinking* the infinite as given, and not as merely subjective, that is, as an incapacity to *grasp* it. For there no attention at all is paid to the degree of comprehension into one intuition as a measure; everything depends on a numerical concept. In an aesthetic estimation of magnitude, however, the numerical concept must drop out or be altered. Only the imagination's comprehension into the unity of the measure is purposive for this estimation (and so the concepts of a law for the successive generation of concepts of magnitude are avoided). —Now suppose a magnitude almost reaches the utmost limit of our faculty of comprehension into one intuition, and the imagination is nonetheless called upon by numerical magnitudes (for which we are conscious that our faculty is unbounded) to comprehend aesthetically into a greater unit. Then we feel ourselves, in our mind, aesthetically confined within limits. Yet the imagination must necessarily be enlarged so as to be adequate to what is unbounded in our faculty of reason, namely the [260] idea of the absolute whole. With regard to this, the displeasure, and hence the unpurposiveness of the faculty of imagination, is nevertheless represented as purposive for the ideas of reason and for their awakening. But precisely thereby the aesthetic judgment itself becomes subjectively purposive for reason as the source of ideas, that is, the source of an intellectual comprehension for which all aesthetic comprehension is small. And the object is received as sublime with a pleasure that is possible only by means of a displeasure.

B. THE DYNAMICALLY SUBLIME. § 28. NATURE AS POWER

Nature is dynamically sublime when fearful yet powerless over us, calling up a strength beyond nature.

Power is a capacity that is superior to great obstacles. The same power is called *dominion* if it is superior even to the resistance of something that itself possesses power. Nature, considered in aesthetic judgment as a power that has no dominion over us, is *dynamically sublime*.

If we are to judge nature as dynamically sublime, it must be represented as arousing fear (though the converse does not hold: not every object that arouses fear is found sublime in our aesthetic judgment). For in aesthetic judging (without a concept), superiority over obstacles can be judged only by the magnitude of the resistance. Now what we strive to resist is an evil, and if we find our capacity unequal to it, it is an object of fear. So for the aesthetic power of judgment nature can count as a power, and hence as dynamically sublime, only insofar as it is regarded as an object of fear.

But we can regard an object as *fearful* without being afraid *of* it. This happens when we judge it in such a way that we merely *think* of the case in which we might want to resist it, and of all resistance then being utterly futile. Thus the virtuous person fears God without being afraid of him. For he does not think of wanting to resist God and his commands as a case in which he would have anything [261] to fear from *him*. But for any such case that he thinks of as not impossible in itself, he recognizes God as fearful.

Someone who is afraid can no more judge the sublime in nature than someone in the grip of inclination and appetite can judge the beautiful. The former flees the sight of an object that fills him with dread, and it is impossible to find satisfaction in a terror that is meant in earnest. Hence the agreeable feeling that comes when a hardship ceases is *gladness*. But this gladness at being released from a danger comes with the resolve never to

expose oneself to it again. Indeed, one does not even like to think back on that sensation, let alone go looking for an occasion for it.

Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening rocks; thunderclouds towering up in the sky, moving in with flashes of lightning and peals of thunder; volcanoes in all their destructive force; hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind; the boundless ocean in tumult; a high waterfall of a mighty river; and the like—these reduce our capacity to resist to an insignificant trifle in comparison with their power. But the more fearful the sight of them, the more attractive it becomes, provided only that we are in safety. And we gladly call these objects sublime, because they raise the strength of our soul above its ordinary middling level and let us discover in ourselves a capacity to resist of an entirely different kind, one that gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent omnipotence of nature.

For consider what we found before. In the immeasurability of nature, and in the inadequacy of our faculty to take a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of nature's *domain*, we found our own limitation. But at the same time we also found in our faculty of reason another, non-sensible standard, which has that very infinity under it as a unit, and compared with which everything in nature is small. And so we found in our mind a superiority over nature itself, even in its immeasurability. In just the same way, the irresistibility of nature's power does make us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical powerlessness. But at the same time it reveals a capacity to judge ourselves as independent of nature, and a superiority over nature. On this superiority is founded a self-preservation of an entirely different kind from the one that nature outside us can assail and [262] endanger. In it the humanity in our person remains undegraded, even though the human being would have to succumb to that dominion. In this way nature is judged sublime in our aesthetic judgment not insofar as it arouses fear, but because it calls up our strength in us (which is not nature). This strength lets us regard as small the

things we worry about (goods, health, and life). It therefore lets us regard nature's power, to which we are indeed subject as far as these things are concerned, as nonetheless no dominion over us and our personality to which we would have to bow, if it came down to our highest principles and whether we uphold or abandon them. Nature is called sublime here, then, merely because it elevates the imagination to present those cases in which the mind can make itself feel the sublimity proper to its own vocation, even above nature.

This self-esteem loses nothing from the fact that we must see ourselves as safe in order to feel this inspiring satisfaction. It might seem that, since the danger is not serious, the sublimity of our mental faculty is not serious either. But the satisfaction here concerns only the *vocation* of our faculty that reveals itself in such a case, just as the predisposition to this faculty lies in our nature, while its development and exercise remain left to us as our task. And there is truth in this, however conscious a human being may be of his present actual powerlessness when he extends his reflection that far.

This principle may seem too far-fetched and overly subtle, and hence excessive for an aesthetic judgment. But observation of human beings proves the opposite. It shows that the principle can underlie the most ordinary judgments, even though we are not always conscious of it. For what is it that is an object of the greatest admiration even for a person living in a state of nature? Someone who is not alarmed, who is not afraid, and so does not shrink from danger, but at the same time sets to work vigorously and with full deliberation. Even in the most civilized condition this exceptional esteem for the warrior remains. We only demand in addition that he also display all the virtues of peace—gentleness, compassion, and even a proper care for his own person—precisely because this shows that his mind cannot be subdued by danger. So one may argue as much as one likes, in comparing the statesman with the general, about which of them deserves the greater [263] respect: aesthetic judgment decides in favor of the general. Even war, if it is waged with order and with

sacred respect for the rights of citizens, has something sublime about it. At the same time it makes the way of thinking of the people who wage it in this manner all the more sublime, the more dangers they have been exposed to and the more courageously they have been able to hold their ground under them. A long peace, on the other hand, tends to make the mere commercial spirit dominant, and with it base self-interest, cowardice, and softness, and to debase the way of thinking of the people.

THE SUBLIME AND RELIGION

Awe before God is sublime only for a good conscience; fear and flattery belong to superstition.

This analysis of the concept of the sublime, insofar as sublimity is ascribed to power, seems to face an objection. We usually represent God as showing himself in thunderstorms, tempests, earthquakes, and the like, in his wrath, but at the same time in his sublimity. And yet here it would be at once folly and sacrilege to imagine that our mind is superior to the effects of such a power, and apparently even to its intentions. Here, it seems, the state of mind that befits the appearance of such an object, and that is usually connected with the idea of it in natural events of this kind, is not a feeling of the sublimity of our own nature. It is rather submission, dejection, and a feeling of complete powerlessness. In religion generally, prostrating oneself, worshiping with bowed head, with contrite and anxious gestures and voice, seems to be the only fitting conduct in the presence of the Deity; and that is why most peoples have adopted it and still observe it. But this state of mind is by no means intrinsically and necessarily connected with the idea of the *sublimity* of a religion and of its object. Consider a person who is actually afraid because he finds cause for fear in himself: he is conscious that, with his reprehensible disposition, he offends against a power whose will is irresistible and at the same time just. Such a person is not at all in the frame of mind to admire divine greatness, for that

requires an attunement to calm contemplation and a completely free judgment. Only when he is conscious of his sincere disposition, pleasing to God, do those effects of power serve to awaken in him the idea of the sublimity of this being. For then he recognizes in himself a sublimity of disposition in keeping with God's will, and is thereby raised above fear of such effects of nature, which he does not regard as outbursts [264] of God's wrath. Even humility, as an unsparing judging of one's own failings, is a sublime state of mind: the state of voluntarily submitting to the pain of self-reproach in order gradually to root out its cause. Otherwise, when one is conscious of good dispositions, these failings could easily be glossed over by appeal to the frailty of human nature. In this way alone does religion distinguish itself inwardly from superstition. Superstition grounds in the mind not reverence for the sublime, but fear and dread of the all-powerful being to whose will the terrified human being sees himself subjected, without holding that will in esteem. From this, of course, nothing can arise but the courting of favor and ingratiation, instead of a religion of good conduct of life.

Thus sublimity is contained in no thing of nature, but only in our mind. It lies there insofar as we can become conscious of being superior to nature within us, and thereby also to nature outside us (insofar as it influences us). Everything that arouses this feeling in us is then called sublime (though improperly), and this includes the *power* of nature, which challenges our powers. Only on the presupposition of this idea within us, and in relation to it, are we capable of arriving at the idea of the sublimity of that being which produces deep respect in us. It does so not merely through the power it displays in nature, but still more through the faculty placed within us of judging that power without fear and of thinking of our vocation as sublime above it.

§ 29. THE MODALITY OF JUDGMENTS ON THE SUBLIME

The sublime needs culture, yet its necessity rests on the predisposition to moral feeling.

There are countless things of beautiful nature about which we can straightforwardly require everyone to agree with our judgment, and can even expect such agreement without being much mistaken. But with our judgment about the sublime in nature we cannot so easily promise ourselves acceptance by others. For a far greater culture seems to be required in order to pass judgment on this excellence of natural objects. This culture is needed not merely in the aesthetic power of judgment, but also in the cognitive faculties on which it is based.

265 The disposition of the mind to the feeling of the sublime requires that the mind be receptive to ideas. For it is precisely in the inadequacy of nature to ideas that what repels sensibility consists. It therefore presupposes these ideas, and the imagination's straining to treat nature as a schema for them. Yet what repels is at the same time attractive, because it is a force that reason exerts on sensibility only in order to expand it in a way suited to reason's own proper domain (the practical), and to let sensibility look out toward the infinite, which for sensibility is an abyss. In fact, without the development of moral ideas, what we, prepared by culture, call sublime will strike the uncultivated person as merely repellent. In the evidence of nature's violence in its destruction, and of the great scale of its might, against which his own vanishes into nothing, he will see nothing but hardship, danger and misery that would surround anyone confined there. Thus the good Savoyard peasant, a sensible man in other respects, unhesitatingly called all lovers of the glaciers fools, as Mr. de Saussure relates. And who knows whether he would have been so entirely wrong? He would have had a point if that observer had taken on the dangers to which he exposed himself there merely as a hobby, as most travelers do, or in order one day to be able to give moving descriptions of

them. As it was, however, his aim was to instruct humankind. That excellent man had the soul-elevating sensation himself, and gave it to the readers of his travels into the bargain.[11]

But the judgment about the sublime in nature requires culture, more than the judgment about the beautiful does. It does not follow that it is first produced by culture, or introduced into society merely by convention. Rather, it has its foundation in human nature. Indeed, it is founded on something that, along with sound understanding, we can require of everyone and demand from them: namely, the predisposition to the feeling for (practical) ideas, that is, to moral feeling.

On this is based the necessity that the judgment of others about the sublime assent to our own, a necessity we at the same time include in our judgment. Someone may be indifferent in judging an object of nature that we find beautiful, and we reproach him with a lack of *taste*. In just the same way, we say of someone who remains unmoved by what we judge to be sublime that he has no *feeling*. We demand both, however, of every human being, and we also presuppose them in him if [266] he has some culture. The only difference is this. We demand the former straightforwardly of everyone, because in it the power of judgment relates the imagination merely to the understanding as the faculty of concepts. We demand the latter only under a subjective presupposition, because in it judgment relates the imagination to reason as the faculty of ideas. That presupposition is moral feeling in the human being, and we believe ourselves entitled to require it of everyone. In this way we ascribe necessity to this aesthetic judgment too.

In this modality of aesthetic judgments, namely their claimed necessity, lies a principal moment for the critique of the power of judgment. It is precisely this that makes an *a priori* principle recognizable in them. It lifts them out of empirical psychology, in which they would otherwise remain buried among the feelings of gratification and pain (with only the meaningless epithet

11 Horace-Bénédict de Saussure (1740–1799), Genevan naturalist and pioneer of Alpine exploration, author of *Voyages dans les Alpes* (1779–1796).

of a *finer* feeling). It places them, and by means of them the power of judgment, in the class of those that have *a priori* principles at their basis, and as such draws them over into transcendental philosophy.

GENERAL REMARK ON AESTHETIC REFLECTING JUDGMENTS

Agreeable, beautiful, sublime and good compared; the sublime is bound up with moral feeling.

In relation to the feeling of pleasure, an object is to be counted among the *agreeable*, the *beautiful*, the *sublime*, or the *good* (absolutely) (*iucundum*, *pulchrum*, *sublime*, *honestum* [the pleasant, the beautiful, the sublime, the honorable]).

The *agreeable*, as the incentive of desires, is of one and the same kind throughout. This holds wherever it may come from and however specifically different the representation (of sense and sensation, considered objectively) may be. Hence in judging its influence on the mind, all that matters is the number of charms (simultaneous and successive), and only, as it were, the mass of agreeable sensation. This can therefore be made intelligible by nothing but *quantity*. Nor does it cultivate; it belongs to mere enjoyment. —The *beautiful*, by contrast, requires the representation of a certain *quality* of the object. This quality can also be made intelligible and brought to concepts, although in an aesthetic judgment it is not brought to them. And the beautiful cultivates, inasmuch as it at the same time teaches us to attend to purposiveness in the feeling of pleasure.—The *sublime* consists merely in the *relation* in which [267] the sensible in the representation of nature is judged to be suitable for a possible supersensible use of it. —The *absolutely* good is the object of moral feeling. Judged subjectively, according to the feeling it inspires, it is the determinability of the subject's powers through the representation of an *absolutely necessitating* law. It is distinguished chiefly by the *modality* of a necessity resting on *a priori* concepts, a necessity that contains within itself not merely a *claim* to everyone's approval but also a *command* of it.

In itself it belongs not to the aesthetic but to the pure intellectual power of judgment. It is also ascribed not in a merely reflecting but in a determining judgment, and not to nature but to freedom. But then there is the *determinability of the subject* by this idea, and indeed of a subject that can feel in itself *hindrances* in sensibility, but at the same time its superiority over sensibility through overcoming them, *as a modification of its state*—that is, the moral feeling. This is nevertheless related to the aesthetic power of judgment and its *formal conditions*, to the extent that it can serve to represent the lawfulness of action from duty as at the same time aesthetic, that is, as sublime, or even as beautiful, without losing any of its purity. This would not be the case if one wanted to put it in natural connection with the feeling of the agreeable.

SHORT DEFINITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME

The beautiful pleases in mere judging; the sublime pleases through its resistance to the senses' interest.

If we draw the result from the exposition so far of both kinds of aesthetic judgment, the following brief definitions would emerge:

Beautiful is that which pleases in mere judging (thus not by means of the sensation of the senses according to a concept of the understanding). From this it follows of itself that it must please without any interest.

Sublime is that which, through its resistance to the interest of the senses, pleases immediately.

Both, as definitions of universally valid aesthetic judging, refer to subjective grounds. On the one hand these are grounds of sensibility, insofar as they are purposive in favor of the contemplative understanding. On the other, they are grounds insofar as they are purposive *against* sensibility and instead for the ends of practical reason. Yet both are united in the same subject, and both are purposive in relation to moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest;

the sublime prepares us to esteem it highly even against our (sensible) interest.

[268] The sublime can be described thus: it is an object (of nature) *the representation of which determines the mind to think of the unattainability of nature as a presentation of ideas*.

Taken literally and considered logically, ideas cannot be presented. But suppose we expand our empirical faculty of representation (mathematically or dynamically) for the intuition of nature. Then reason inevitably steps in, as the faculty of the independence of absolute totality. It produces the mind's striving, vain though it is, to make the representation of the senses adequate to this totality. This striving, and the feeling that the idea is unattainable by the imagination, is itself a presentation of the subjective purposiveness of our mind in using the imagination for the mind's supersensible vocation. It compels us, subjectively, to *think* nature itself in its totality as the presentation of something supersensible, without being able to bring about this presentation *objectively*.

For we soon become aware that nature in space and time entirely lacks the unconditioned, and hence also the absolute magnitude that even the most common reason demands. By this very fact we are also reminded that we are dealing only with nature as appearance. And we are reminded that this nature must itself still be regarded as the mere presentation of a nature in itself, which reason has in the idea. We cannot determine this idea of the supersensible any further. We therefore cannot *cognize* nature as its presentation, but can only *think* it as such. The idea is awakened in us by an object whose aesthetic judging strains the imagination to its limit, whether the limit of its expansion (mathematically) or of its might over the mind (dynamically). This judging is grounded on the feeling of a vocation of the mind that wholly oversteps the domain of the imagination, namely moral feeling. It is with regard to this feeling that the representation of the object is judged to be subjectively purposive.

Indeed, a feeling for the sublime in nature can hardly be thought without combining with it a disposition of the mind similar to the moral one. The immediate pleasure in the beautiful in nature likewise presupposes and cultivates a certain *liberality* in our way of thinking, that is, an independence of satisfaction from mere sensory enjoyment. Yet in it freedom is represented as being at *play* rather than engaged in a lawful *business*. Such business is the [269] genuine character of human morality, where reason must do violence to sensibility. The difference is only that in the aesthetic judgment on the sublime this violence is represented as exercised by the imagination itself, as an instrument of reason.

Hence the satisfaction in the sublime in nature is also only *negative*, whereas that in the beautiful is *positive*. It is a feeling that the imagination is deprived of its freedom by itself, since it is purposively determined according to a law other than that of its empirical use. The imagination thereby acquires an expansion and a might greater than what it sacrifices. But the ground of this is hidden from it, whereas it *feels* the sacrifice or deprivation, and at the same time the cause to which it is subjected. Consider the *astonishment* bordering on terror, the horror and the sacred shudder which, at the sight of mountain masses rising to the heavens, of deep gorges with waters raging in them, of deeply shadowed wastelands inviting melancholy reflection, and so on, seize the spectator. Given the safety in which he knows himself to be, these are not actual fear. They are only an attempt to let ourselves in for it with the imagination, in order to feel the might of that very faculty. We combine the movement of the mind thereby aroused with its state of rest. In this way we are superior to nature within ourselves, and hence also to nature outside us, insofar as it can influence our feeling of well-being. For the imagination, according to the law of association, makes our state of contentment physically dependent. But the very same imagination, according to principles of the schematism of the power of judgment, (and hence insofar as it is subordinate to freedom) is an instrument of reason and its ideas. As

such an instrument, it is a might to assert our independence against the influences of nature. It can degrade as small what is great according to the former, and so locate the absolutely great only in its own (the subject's) vocation. This reflection of the aesthetic power of judgment raises itself to adequacy with reason, though without a determinate concept of reason. It thereby represents the object itself as nevertheless subjectively purposive, precisely through the objective inadequacy of the imagination, in its greatest expansion, to reason (as the faculty of ideas).

Here one must in general bear in mind what has already been pointed out above. In the transcendental aesthetic of the power of judgment [270] we must be concerned solely with pure aesthetic judgments. Consequently the examples must not be taken from beautiful or sublime objects of nature that presuppose the concept of an end. For then the purposiveness would be either teleological, or based on mere sensations of an object (gratification or pain). In the first case it would not be aesthetic; in the second it would not be merely formal. So if we call the sight of the starry sky *sublime*, we must not base our judging of it on concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings. Nor must we take the bright points with which we see the space above us filled to be their suns, moving in orbits arranged very purposively for them. We must base our judging merely on how we see the sky: as a vast vault that encompasses everything. Only under this representation must we locate the sublimity that a pure aesthetic judgment ascribes to this object. The same holds for the sight of the ocean. We must not take it as we *think* of it, enriched with all sorts of knowledge that is not contained in immediate intuition. We might think of it, say, as a vast realm of aquatic creatures, or as the great reservoir of water for the evaporations that impregnate the air with clouds for the benefit of the lands. Or we might think of it as an element that separates the continents from one another yet makes possible the greatest communication among them. But all that yields nothing but teleological judgments. Instead, one must be able to find the ocean sublime

simply as the poets do, according to what meets the eye. When it is contemplated at rest, it is a clear mirror of water bounded only by the sky; when it is restless, it is like an abyss threatening to swallow everything. The same must be said of the sublime and the beautiful in the human figure. Here we must not look back to concepts of the ends *for which* all of a human being's limbs exist, as determining grounds of the judgment. We must not let agreement with those ends *influence* our aesthetic judgment, which would then no longer be pure. It is of course a necessary condition even of aesthetic satisfaction that the limbs do not conflict with those ends. Aesthetic purposiveness is the lawfulness of the power of judgment in its *freedom*. Satisfaction in the object depends on the relation in which we want to place the imagination, provided only that the imagination, by itself, keeps the mind occupied in free activity. If, on the other hand, something else, whether sensation or a concept of the understanding, [271] determines the judgment, then the judgment is indeed lawful. But it is not the judgment of a *free* power of judgment.

So when people speak of intellectual beauty or sublimity, *first*, these expressions are not entirely correct. They are aesthetic modes of representation, which would not be found in us at all if we were mere pure intelligences, or even if we transported ourselves into this quality in thought. *Second*, both are objects of an intellectual (moral) satisfaction. As such they are compatible with aesthetic satisfaction insofar as they do not *rest* on any interest. Yet in another respect they are hard to unite with it, because they are supposed to *produce* an interest. Suppose the presentation is to accord with the satisfaction in aesthetic judging. Then this could never happen in such judging except through an interest of the senses that one connects with it in the presentation. But this detracts from intellectual purposiveness and makes it impure.

The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual satisfaction is the moral law, in the might it exercises in us over each and every incentive of the mind that *precedes* it. This might actu-

ally makes itself known aesthetically only through sacrifices. Such a sacrifice is a deprivation, though one in the service of inner freedom. In return it reveals in us an unfathomable depth of this supersensible faculty, with consequences extending beyond anything we can foresee. Hence the satisfaction is negative from the aesthetic side (in relation to sensibility), that is, contrary to this interest. Considered from the intellectual side, however, it is positive and connected with an interest. From this it follows that the intellectual good, purposive in itself (the morally good), must be represented, when judged aesthetically, not so much as beautiful but rather as sublime. It should thus arouse the feeling of respect, which disdains charm, more than that of love and intimate affection. For human nature does not accord with that good of its own accord, but only through the violence that reason does to sensibility. Conversely, what we call sublime in nature outside us, or even within us (e.g., certain affects), will also be represented only as a might of the mind to soar above *certain* hindrances of sensibility by means of moral principles. It is through this that it becomes interesting.

ENTHUSIASM, APATHY AND THE NOBLE

Every affect is blind, yet enthusiasm is aesthetically sublime; composure on principle is nobler still.

I want to dwell a little on the latter. The idea of the good with [272] affect is called *enthusiasm*. This state of mind seems to be sublime, so much so that it is commonly alleged that nothing great can be accomplished without it. Now every affect[12] is blind, either in the choice of its end, or, even if this end has been given by reason, in carrying it out. For affect is that movement of the

12 KANT'S NOTE. *Affects* are specifically distinct from *passions*. The former relate merely to feeling. The latter belong to the faculty of desire, and are inclinations that make it difficult or impossible for choice to be determined by principles at all. The former are tempestuous and unpremeditated, the latter lasting and deliberate. Thus indignation as anger is an affect, but as hatred (vindictiveness) it is a passion. The latter can never, in any circumstances, be called sublime, because in affect the freedom of the mind is indeed *hindered*, but in passion it is abolished.

mind which makes it incapable of engaging in free deliberation on principles in order to determine itself accordingly. Hence it can in no way merit a satisfaction of reason. Aesthetically, however, enthusiasm is sublime, because it is a straining of our powers by ideas. These ideas give the mind a momentum that works far more powerfully and lastingly than the impulse given by sensory representations. But, strange as it may seem, even *affectlessness* (*apatheia*, *phlegma in significatu bono* [apathy; phlegm in the good sense]) in a mind that vigorously pursues its unalterable principles is sublime. It is sublime in a far superior way, because it at the same time has the satisfaction of pure reason on its side. Only such a cast of mind is called *noble*. This expression is afterwards applied to things as well, e.g., buildings, a garment, a style of writing, bodily bearing and the like. It applies when these arouse not so much *astonishment*, an affect in the representation of novelty that exceeds expectation, as *admiration*, an astonishment that does not cease when the novelty is lost. This happens when ideas in their presentation accord, unintentionally and without art, with aesthetic satisfaction.

Every affect of the *vigorous* kind is *aesthetically sublime*: that is, one that stirs up the consciousness of our powers to overcome any resistance (*animi strenui* [of a vigorous mind]). Examples are anger, and even despair, though only the *indignant* kind, not the *despondent*. But affect of the *melting* kind makes the very effort to resist an object of displeasure (*animum languidum* [a languid mind]). It has nothing *noble* [273] about it, although it can be counted as belonging to the beautiful in our way of sensing. Hence the *emotions* that can grow strong enough to become affects are also very diverse. There are *courageous* emotions, and there are *tender* ones. The latter, when they rise to the level of affect, are good for nothing; the propensity toward them is called *sentimentality*. Take a sympathetic pain that refuses to be consoled. Or take one that concerns fictitious evils, into which we deliberately enter until fancy deludes us into treating them as real. Such pain proves and produces a soft but at the same time weak soul. That soul shows a beautiful side and can indeed be called

fanciful, but not even enthusiastic. Consider novels, maudlin plays and shallow moral precepts that toy with so-called noble dispositions (falsely so called). In fact they make the heart languid and insensitive to the stern precept of duty. They make it incapable of any respect for the dignity of humanity in our own person and for the rights of human beings, which are something quite different from their happiness, and in general incapable of any firm principles. Consider even a religious discourse that recommends groveling, base currying of favor and ingratiation. Such a discourse gives up all trust in our own capacity to resist the evil within us. It does so instead of recommending the vigorous resolve to test, in overcoming our inclinations, whatever powers still remain to us for all our frailty. Consider the false humility that places the only way of becoming pleasing to the supreme being in self-contempt, in whimpering, feigned repentance and a merely passive frame of mind. None of these is compatible even with what could be counted as beauty in one's cast of mind, and still less with what could be counted as sublimity.

But even tempestuous movements of the mind cannot claim the honor of a *sublime* presentation, however much they strain the imagination. They may be connected, under the name of edification, with ideas of religion. Or they may be connected, as belonging merely to culture, with ideas containing a social interest. Either way, they can by no means claim that honor unless they leave behind a disposition of mind that influences, even if only indirectly, the consciousness of one's strength and resolve. That resolve is directed toward what carries pure intellectual purposiveness with it (the supersensible). For otherwise all these emotions belong only to *motion*, which people like to have for the sake of their health. The agreeable exhaustion that follows such a shaking-up by the play of the affects is an enjoyment [274] of well-being. It arises from the restored equilibrium of the various vital forces within us. In the end this amounts to the same thing as the enjoyment the voluptuaries of the East find so comfortable when they have their bodies kneaded, as it were, and all their muscles and joints gently pressed and bent. The

only difference is that in the former case the moving principle is for the most part within us, whereas in the latter it is entirely outside us. So many a person believes himself edified by a sermon in which nothing has been built up (no system of good maxims). Or he believes himself improved by a tragedy when he is merely glad to have happily driven away boredom. Thus the sublime must always relate to our *way of thinking*, that is, to maxims of giving the intellectual and the ideas of reason supremacy over sensibility.

THE PROHIBITION OF IMAGES

The commandment against graven images is sublime; morality needs no sensory props.

There is no need to worry that the feeling of the sublime will lose anything through such an abstract mode of presentation, which becomes wholly negative with respect to the sensible. Beyond the sensible, the imagination finds nothing it can hold on to. Yet precisely through this removal of its limits it feels itself unbounded. That separation is thus a presentation of the infinite. For that very reason it can never be anything but a merely negative presentation, but it nonetheless expands the soul. Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish Book of the Law than the commandment: "You shall not make for yourself any image, nor any likeness of anything that is in heaven, or on the earth, or under the earth," and so on.[13] This commandment alone can explain the enthusiasm that the Jewish people, in its civilized epoch, felt for its religion when it compared itself with other peoples. It can also explain the pride that Islam inspires. The same holds of the representation of the moral law and of the predisposition to morality within us. It is an entirely mistaken worry that, if it is deprived of everything that can recommend it to the senses, it will then carry with it nothing but cold, lifeless approval, and no moving force or emotion. It is exactly the other way around. Where the senses no

13 Exodus 20:4; compare Deuteronomy 5:8.

longer see anything before them, the unmistakable and inextinguishable idea of morality nevertheless remains. There it would be more necessary to temper the momentum of an unbounded imagination, so as not to let it rise to enthusiasm, than to seek help for these ideas in images and childish apparatus out of fear that they lack force. That is also why governments [275] have gladly permitted religion to be richly furnished with such accessories. They have thus sought to relieve the subject of the trouble of extending his powers of soul beyond the limits that can be arbitrarily set for him, but at the same time to deprive him of the capacity to do so. Those limits make him easier to deal with as merely passive.

This pure, soul-elevating, merely negative presentation of morality, by contrast, brings no danger of *fanaticism*. Fanaticism is *a delusion* of *wanting to see something beyond all bounds of sensibility*, that is, of dreaming according to principles (raving with reason). The danger is absent precisely because the presentation in the former case is merely negative. For *the inscrutability of the idea of freedom* completely cuts off the path to any positive presentation. The moral law, however, is in itself sufficiently and originally determining in us, so that it does not even permit us to look around for a determining ground outside it. If enthusiasm is comparable to *insanity*, fanaticism is comparable to *derangement*. Of all these, the latter is least compatible with the sublime, because it is ridiculous in its brooding. In enthusiasm, as an affect, the imagination is unbridled; in fanaticism, as a deep-rooted, brooding passion, it is without rule. The former is a passing accident that may occasionally befall even the soundest understanding; the latter is a disease that deranges it.

Simplicity (artless purposiveness) is, as it were, the style of nature in the sublime. So too it is the style of morality, which is a second (supersensible) nature. Of this nature we know only the laws. We cannot reach through intuition the supersensible faculty within ourselves that contains the ground of this legislation.

It should also be noted that the satisfaction in the beautiful, just as much as that in the sublime, is recognizably distinguished from other aesthetic judgings by its universal *communicability*. Through this property it also acquires an interest in relation to society, in which it can be communicated. Nevertheless, *separation from all society* is also regarded as something sublime, if it rests on ideas that look beyond all sensible interest. To be self-sufficient, and hence not to need society, without being unsociable, that is, without fleeing it, is something that approaches the sublime. So is every rising above needs. By contrast, to flee from people out of *misanthropy*, because one is hostile to them, [276] or out of *anthropophobia* (fear of people), because one fears them as one's enemies, is partly ugly and partly contemptible. Yet there is a kind of misanthropy (very improperly so called) to which the disposition tends to arise with age in the minds of many right-thinking people. It is philanthropic enough as far as *benevolence* is concerned. But long and sad experience has brought it far away from *satisfaction* in people. Evidence of this is the propensity to seclusion, and the fanciful wish to spend one's life on a remote country estate. In young people, it takes the form of the dreamed-of happiness of spending one's life with a small family on an island unknown to the rest of the world. Novelists and the poets of Robinsonades know very well how to exploit this dream.[14] Consider falseness, ingratitude, injustice, and the childishness of the ends that we ourselves regard as important and great, in pursuit of which people inflict every conceivable evil on one another. All this so contradicts the idea of what people could be if they wanted to, and is so opposed to our lively wish to see them better, that renouncing all social joys seems to be only a small sacrifice. One makes it in order not to hate them, since one cannot love them. This sadness is not over the evils that fate imposes on other people, of which sympathy is the cause. It is over those that people inflict on them-

14 Robinsonades: stories of castaways on remote islands in imitation of Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), a hugely popular genre in eighteenth-century Germany.

selves, and it rests on antipathy in principles. Because it rests on ideas, it is sublime, whereas the former sadness can likewise only count as beautiful. —*Saussure*, as brilliant as he is thorough, says in the description of his Alpine travels about the *Bonhomme*, one of the mountains of Savoy: "There reigns there a certain *insipid sadness*." So he also knew an *interesting* sadness, inspired by the sight of a wilderness. People might well like to transport themselves into such a place, so as to hear and learn nothing more of the world. Yet it must not be so entirely inhospitable that it offers human beings only an extremely arduous abode.[15] —I make this remark only to point out that even grief (not dejected sadness) can be counted among the *robust* affects, if it has its ground in moral ideas. But if it is grounded on sympathy, and as such is also lovable, it belongs merely to the *melting* affects. My aim is thereby to draw attention to the disposition of mind that is *sublime* only in the former case.

BURKE'S PHYSIOLOGICAL ACCOUNT COMPARED

Empirical psychology of pleasure cannot explain why a judgment of taste may demand everyone's agreement.

277 We can now also compare the transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgments just carried out with the physiological one, as worked out by a *Burke* and by many acute men among us. We can see thereby where a merely empirical exposition of the sublime and the beautiful leads. *Burke*[16] deserves to be named as the foremost author in this mode of treatment. By this route (p. 223 of his work), he arrives at the conclusion "that the feeling of the sublime is grounded on the drive to self-preservation and on

15 The Col du Bonhomme, a pass in the Mont Blanc massif, described in Saussure's *Voyages dans les Alpes*.

16 KANT'S NOTE. According to the German translation of his work: *Philosophische Untersuchungen über den Ursprung unserer Begriffe vom Schönen und Erhabenen* [Philosophical Inquiries into the Origin of Our Concepts of the Beautiful and Sublime]. Riga: Hartknoch, 1773.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The 1773 German translation of Burke's *Enquiry* was by the philosopher Christian Garve.

fear, that is,[17] on a pain which, because it does not go as far as actual disruption of the bodily parts, produces movements. Since these clear the finer or coarser vessels of dangerous and troublesome obstructions, they are capable of arousing agreeable sensations—not pleasure, indeed, but a kind of delightful shudder, a certain tranquility mixed with terror." The beautiful he grounds on love, from which, however, he wants desire kept separate. He traces it back (pp. 251–252) "to the relaxing, loosening and slackening of the fibers of the body, hence to a softening, dissolution, languor, a sinking, dying away, melting away with gratification." And he confirms this mode of explanation by cases in which the imagination can arouse in us the feeling of the beautiful as well as of the sublime, not only in combination with the understanding, but even in combination with sensation.—As psychological observations, these analyses of the phenomena of our mind are extremely fine. They provide rich material for the favorite investigations of empirical anthropology. Nor can it be denied that all representations in us, whether objectively they are merely sensible or entirely intellectual, can nevertheless be connected subjectively with gratification or pain, however imperceptible either may be. For they all affect the feeling of life, and none of them, insofar as it is a modification of the subject, can be indifferent. It cannot even be denied that, as Epicurus maintained, *gratification* and *pain* are ultimately always bodily, whether they begin from imagination or even from representations of the understanding. For life without the [278] feeling of the bodily organ is merely consciousness of one's existence, but no feeling of well-being or ill-being, that is,[18] of the furtherance or hindrance of the vital forces. For the mind by itself is entirely life (the principle of life itself). Hindrances or furtherances must therefore be sought outside it

17 Edmund Burke (1729–1797), Irish-born statesman and writer, author of *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757).
18 Epicurus (341–270 BC), Greek philosopher who taught that pleasure is the highest good.

and yet in the human being himself, hence in the mind's connection with his body.

But suppose one locates the satisfaction in the object wholly in the fact that the object gratifies through charm or emotion. Then one must also not require anyone *else* to assent to the aesthetic judgment that we make, for about that each person rightly consults only his private sense. But then all critical assessment of taste also ceases entirely. The only way out would be to make the example that others give, through the contingent agreement of their judgments, into a *command* of approval for us. We would presumably resist that principle, however. We would appeal to our natural right to submit a judgment that rests on the immediate feeling of our own well-being to our own sense, and not to that of others.

So the judgment of taste must not count as *egoistic*. By its inner nature, that is, for its own sake and not for the sake of examples that others give of their taste, it must necessarily count as *pluralistic*. This holds if one esteems it as a judgment that may at the same time require everyone to agree with it. If so, it must be based on some *a priori* principle, whether objective or subjective. Such a principle can never be reached by spying out empirical laws of the changes in the mind. For these only let us know how judgments are made. They do not command how judgments ought to be made, still less in such a way that the command is *unconditional*. Yet judgments of taste presuppose a command of this kind, since they want the satisfaction to be connected *immediately* with a representation. So the empirical exposition of aesthetic judgments may well make a start, in order to supply the material for a higher investigation. But a transcendental elucidation of this faculty is nevertheless possible, and it belongs essentially to the critique of taste. For unless taste had *a priori* principles, it could not possibly pass judgment on the judgments of others. It could not pronounce approval or rejection of them with even the slightest semblance of right.

The remainder of what belongs to the Analytic of the aesthetic power of judgment contains

first of all the

Deduction of Aesthetic Judgments

Why a judgment of taste may claim everyone's agreement; taste as a kind of common sense; the interest in beauty.

§ 30. Die Deduction der ästhetischen Urtheile über die Gegenstände der Natur darf nicht auf das, was wir in dieser erhaben nennen, sondern nur auf das schöne gerichtet werden.

279 An aesthetic judgment claims universal validity for every subject. As a judgment that must be based on some *a priori* principle, it therefore requires a deduction, that is, a legitimation of its pretension. This deduction must be added over and above its exposition, namely if the judgment concerns a satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the *form of the object*. Judgments of taste about the beautiful in nature are of this kind. For in that case the purposiveness does have its ground in the object and its shape. It does so even though it does not indicate the relation of the object to other objects according to concepts (for a cognitive judgment). Instead, it merely concerns in general the apprehension of this form, insofar as this form shows itself in the mind to be in accord with the *faculty* both of concepts and of their presentation. The faculty of presentation is one and the same as the faculty of apprehension. Hence, with regard to the beautiful in nature, one can also raise various questions concerning the cause of this purposiveness of its forms. For example, how would one explain why nature has spread beauty so lavishly everywhere, even at the bottom of the ocean, where the human eye (for which alone beauty is purposive) seldom reaches? And so on.

But things are different with the sublime in nature, if we make a pure aesthetic judgment about it. Such a judgment is not mixed with concepts of perfection as objective purposiveness, in which case it would be a teleological judgment. The sublime in nature can then be regarded as entirely formless or shapeless, and yet as the object of a pure satisfaction; and it can display a subjective purposiveness of the given representation. And now the question arises whether, for an aesthetic judgment of this kind, a deduction can also be demanded, over and above the exposition of what is thought in it. This would be a deduction of its claim to some (subjective) *a priori* principle.

[280] The answer to this is that the sublime in nature is only improperly so called. Sublimity must properly be ascribed only to the way of thinking, or rather to the foundation for it in human nature. The apprehension of an otherwise formless and unpurposive object merely provides the occasion for becoming conscious of this foundation. In this way the object is *used* as subjectively purposive, but it is not judged to be so *for itself* and on account of its form (as it were, *species finalis accepta, non data* [a purposive form received, not given]). Hence our exposition of judgments about the sublime in nature was at the same time their deduction. For when we analyzed the reflection of the power of judgment in these judgments, we found in them a purposive relation of the cognitive faculties. This relation must be laid *a priori* at the basis of the faculty of ends (the will), and is therefore itself purposive *a priori*. This immediately contains the deduction, that is, the justification of the claim of such a judgment to universally necessary validity.

We shall therefore have to seek only the deduction of judgments of taste, that is, of judgments about the beauty of natural things. In this way we shall satisfy the task for the aesthetic power of judgment as a whole.

§ 31. THE METHOD OF THE DEDUCTION

A judgment of taste claims universality and necessity without concepts or proofs; this needs a deduction.

The obligation to provide a deduction for a kind of judgment, that is, a guarantee of its legitimacy, arises only when the judgment lays claim to necessity. This is also the case when it demands subjective universality, that is, everyone's assent. Such a judgment is nevertheless not a cognitive judgment, but only one of pleasure or displeasure in a given object. It is, that is, a pretension to a subjective purposiveness that holds throughout for everyone. Because it is a judgment of taste, this purposiveness is not supposed to be grounded on any concepts of the thing.

In the latter case we have before us no cognitive judgment. It is neither a theoretical judgment, based on the concept of a *nature* in general through the understanding, nor a (pure) practical one, based on the idea of *freedom* as given *a priori* through reason. We therefore do not have to justify the *a priori* validity either of a judgment that represents what a thing is, or of one that represents that I should do something in order to produce it. All that will have to be established, for the power of judgment in general, is the *universal validity* of a [281] *singular* judgment that expresses the subjective purposiveness of an empirical representation of the form of an object. This is to explain how it is possible that something can please merely in judging, without sensation or concept. And it is to explain how the satisfaction of each person may be announced as a rule for everyone else, just as the judging of an object for the sake of *cognition* in general has universal rules.

Now this universal validity is not to be based on collecting votes and asking around among others about their way of sensing. Instead, it is to rest, as it were, on an autonomy of the subject judging about the feeling of pleasure (in the given representation), that is, on the subject's own taste. Yet it is also not to

be derived from concepts. Such a judgment, as the judgment of taste in fact is, then has a twofold and indeed logical peculiarity. *First*, it has universal validity *a priori*, which is yet not a logical universality according to concepts, but the universality of a singular judgment. *Second*, it has a necessity, which must always rest on *a priori* grounds, but which nevertheless depends on no *a priori* proofs. No representation of such proofs could compel the approval that the judgment of taste requires of everyone.

These logical peculiarities distinguish a judgment of taste from all cognitive judgments. Resolving them will by itself be sufficient for the deduction of this strange faculty, provided that at first we abstract from all its content, namely the feeling of pleasure, and simply compare the aesthetic form with the form of objective judgments as logic prescribes it. We shall therefore first set out these characteristic properties of taste, illustrated by examples.

§ 32. FIRST PECULIARITY: AUTONOMY

Taste judges as if objectively, yet each must judge for himself; classics are followed, not imitated.

The judgment of taste determines its object with regard to satisfaction (as beauty) with a claim to the assent of *everyone*, as if it were objective.

To say "this flower is beautiful" is as much as simply to repeat after it its own [282] claim to everyone's satisfaction. The agreeableness of its scent gives it no claims at all. This scent delights one person and gives another a headache. What, then, should we suppose from this, other than that beauty must be taken to be a property of the flower itself? On this view, beauty would not conform to the diversity of heads and of so many senses; rather, these would have to conform to it if they wanted to judge it. And yet this is not how things stand. For the judgment of taste consists precisely in this: it calls a thing beautiful only in virtue of that characteristic in which the thing conforms to our way of taking it in.

Moreover, every judgment that is supposed to prove the subject's taste requires that the subject judge for himself. He must not need to grope about empirically among the judgments of others and first inform himself of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the same object. His judgment, therefore, is to be pronounced not as imitation, because a thing does in fact happen to please universally, but *a priori*. One would think, however, that an *a priori* judgment must contain a concept of the object, for whose cognition the judgment contains the principle. But the judgment of taste is not grounded on concepts at all and is in no way a cognition; it is only an aesthetic judgment.

That is why a young poet does not let himself be talked out of his conviction that his poem is beautiful, whether by the judgment of the public or by that of his friends. If he does listen to them, it is not because he now judges the poem differently. Even if the whole public had false taste (at least as far as he is concerned), his desire for applause still gives him reason to accommodate himself to the common delusion (even against his own judgment). Only later, when his power of judgment has been sharpened by practice, does he freely abandon his earlier judgment, just as he does with those of his judgments that rest entirely on reason. Taste lays claim merely to autonomy. To make the judgments of others the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy.

We rightly praise the works of the ancients as models and call their authors classical, as if they were a kind of nobility among writers who give laws to the people by their example. This seems to point to *a posteriori* sources of taste and to refute its autonomy in each subject. But one could just as well [283] say that the ancient mathematicians prove our reason to be merely imitative. To this day they are held to be models of the utmost rigor and elegance of the synthetic method that we can scarcely do without. On that reasoning, they would also prove that our reason is incapable of producing rigorous proofs from itself, with the greatest intuition, through the construction of concepts. There is no use of our powers, however free it may be,

and not even of reason (which must draw all its judgments from the common source *a priori*), that would not fall into faulty attempts if each subject always had to start entirely from the raw predisposition of his natural endowment, and if others had not gone before him with their own attempts. They did so not to make those who follow into mere imitators. Rather, their procedure puts others on the track, so that they may seek the principles within themselves and so take their own, often better, course. Consider even religion. There each person must surely take the rule of his conduct from himself, since he also remains responsible for it himself and cannot shift the blame for his transgressions onto others as his teachers or predecessors. Yet general precepts, whether received from priests or philosophers or taken from oneself, will never accomplish as much as an example of virtue or holiness set up in history. Such an example does not make dispensable the autonomy of virtue, which springs from the proper and original idea of morality (*a priori*), nor does it turn that autonomy into a mechanism of imitation. *Following* that relates to a precedent, not imitation, is the right expression for any influence that the products of an exemplary author can have on others. It means only this: drawing from the same sources from which he himself drew, and learning from one's predecessor only the manner of proceeding in doing so. But of all faculties and talents, taste is precisely the one that most needs examples of what has kept its approval longest in the progress of culture, because its judgment cannot be determined by concepts and precepts. Without such examples it would soon become uncouth again and fall back into the crudeness of its first attempts.

§ 33. SECOND PECULIARITY: NO PROOF

No voting and no rules of critics can prove something beautiful; one must taste for oneself.

[284] The judgment of taste cannot be determined by grounds of proof at all, just as if it were merely *subjective*.

Suppose someone does not find a building, a view or a poem beautiful. Then, *first,* he does not let a hundred voices, all praising it highly, force his inner approval. He may of course pretend that he likes it too, so as not to be regarded as lacking taste. He may even begin to doubt whether he has adequately formed his taste through acquaintance with a sufficient number of objects of a certain kind (just as someone who thinks he recognizes a forest in the distance, where everyone else sees a town, doubts the judgment of his own eyes). But he does see clearly that the approval of others provides no valid proof at all for the judging of beauty. Others may perhaps see and observe for him. What many have seen in the same way may serve him, who believes he has seen it otherwise, as a sufficient ground of proof for a theoretical, and hence logical, judgment. But what has pleased others can never serve as the ground of an aesthetic judgment. An unfavorable judgment by others may rightly make us wary about our own, but it can never convince us that ours is incorrect. So there is no empirical *ground of proof* that could compel anyone to a judgment of taste.

Second, an *a priori* proof according to determinate rules can determine the judgment about beauty even less. Suppose someone reads me his poem, or takes me to a play, and in the end it does not suit my taste. He may cite *Batteux* or *Lessing*, or still older and more famous critics of taste, and all the rules they have laid down, as proof that his poem is beautiful. Certain passages that displease me may even agree very well with rules of beauty (as they are laid down there and universally recognized). Still I stop my ears: I will not listen to any reasons or arguments. I would rather assume that those rules of the critics are false, or at least that this is not a case for applying them, than let my judgment be determined by *a priori* [285] grounds of proof, since it

is supposed to be a judgment of taste and not of the understanding or of reason.[1]

This, it seems, is one of the main reasons why this aesthetic faculty of judging has been given precisely the name of taste. Someone may list for me all the ingredients of a dish and remark of each that I otherwise find it agreeable. He may even rightly praise how wholesome this food is. Yet I am deaf to all these reasons. I try the dish with *my* tongue and palate, and it is on that basis (not on universal principles) that I pass my judgment.

Indeed, the judgment of taste is always passed as a singular judgment about the object. By comparing the object, as regards its being pleasing, with the judgment of others, the understanding can make a universal judgment, for example: all tulips are beautiful. But that is then not a judgment of taste but a logical judgment, which makes the relation of an object to taste into a predicate of things of a certain kind in general. Only the judgment by which I find a single given tulip beautiful, that is, find my satisfaction in it to be universally valid, is the judgment of taste. Its peculiarity, however, consists in this: although it has merely subjective validity, it nonetheless lays claim to *all* subjects in just the way that could only ever happen if it were an objective judgment, resting on cognitive grounds, that could be compelled by a proof.

§ 34. NO OBJECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF TASTE IS POSSIBLE

Critics cannot deduce beauty from rules, but can study the faculties that judge it.

By a principle of taste one would understand a principle under whose condition one could subsume the concept of an object and then infer, by a syllogism, that the object is beautiful. But

1 Charles Batteux (1713–1780), French theorist of the arts, author of *Les Beaux-Arts réduits à un même principe* (1746); Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781), German dramatist and critic, author of *Laocoön* (1766) and the *Hamburg Dramaturgy* (1767–1769).

that is absolutely impossible. For I must feel the pleasure immediately in the representation of the object, and no grounds of proof can talk me into it. So although, as *Hume* says, critics can reason more plausibly than cooks, they nonetheless share the same fate. They cannot expect the determining ground of their judgment from the force of grounds of proof, but only from the [286] subject's reflection on its own state (of pleasure or displeasure), with all precepts and rules rejected.[2]

Critics nevertheless can and should reason about something, in a way that serves to correct and broaden our judgments of taste. That is not the setting forth of the determining ground of this kind of aesthetic judgment in a universally usable formula, which is impossible. It is rather the investigation of the cognitive faculties and their work in these judgments, and the analysis, by examples, of the reciprocal subjective purposiveness whose form in a given representation, as was shown above, is the beauty of the object of that representation. Thus the critique of taste is itself only subjective with regard to the representation through which an object is given to us. It is the art or science of bringing under rules the reciprocal relation of the understanding and the imagination to each other in the given representation (without reference to preceding sensation or concept), and hence their accord or discord, and of determining them with regard to their conditions. It is an *art* if it shows this only by examples; it is a *science* if it derives the possibility of such judging from the nature of these faculties as cognitive faculties in general. Here we are concerned throughout solely with the latter, as transcendental critique. Its task is to develop and justify the subjective principle of taste as an *a priori* principle of the power of judgment. Critique as an art merely seeks to apply the physiological (here psychological), and hence empirical, rules according to which taste actually proceeds (without reflecting on their possibility) to the judging of its objects, and it criticizes

2 David Hume, in his essay "The Sceptic" (1742), remarks that critics can reason and dispute more plausibly than cooks, but share the same fate.

the products of fine art. In the same way, *the other* critique, as a science, criticizes the very faculty of judging them.

§ 35. THE PRINCIPLE OF TASTE

Taste subsumes the imagination in its freedom under the understanding in its lawfulness.

The judgment of taste differs from the logical judgment in this: the latter subsumes a representation under concepts of the object, whereas the former does not subsume it under a concept at all, for otherwise the necessary universal approval could be compelled by proofs. Nevertheless it resembles the logical judgment in that it claims a universality and [287] necessity, though not according to concepts of the object, and hence a merely subjective one. Now the concepts in a judgment make up its content (what belongs to the cognition of the object). But the judgment of taste cannot be determined by concepts. So it is grounded only on the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general. The subjective condition of all judgments is the faculty of judging itself, or the power of judgment. When used with regard to a representation through which an object is given, this faculty requires the agreement of two powers of representation: the imagination (for intuition and the composition of its manifold) and the understanding (for the concept as the representation of the unity of this composition). Now since here no concept of the object underlies the judgment, the judgment can consist only in subsuming the imagination itself (in the case of a representation through which an object is given) under the condition that the understanding in general proceeds from intuition to concepts. That is: since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in its schematizing without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the imagination in its *freedom* and the understanding with its *lawfulness* as they reciprocally animate each other. It must rest, therefore, on a feeling that lets the object be judged according to the purposiveness of the representation (through which an object is given) for the further-

ance of the cognitive faculties in their free play. And taste, as a subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption. This is not a subsumption of intuitions under *concepts*, but of the *faculty* of intuitions or presentations (that is, the imagination) under the *faculty* of concepts (that is, the understanding), insofar as the former *in its freedom* harmonizes with the latter *in its lawfulness*.

Now in order to discover this ground of legitimacy through a deduction of judgments of taste, only the formal peculiarities of this kind of judgment can serve us as a guide, and hence only insofar as their logical form alone is considered.

§ 36. THE PROBLEM OF A DEDUCTION OF TASTE

How are judgments of taste possible? They are synthetic a priori judgments of a special kind.

The perception of an object can be immediately combined with the concept of an object in general, of which that perception contains the empirical [288] predicates, to form a cognitive judgment, and a judgment of experience can thereby be produced. Underlying such a judgment are *a priori* concepts of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition, by which that manifold is thought as the determination of an object. These concepts (the categories) require a deduction. That deduction was given in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and through it the solution of the problem could also be achieved: how are synthetic *a priori* cognitive judgments possible? This problem, then, concerned the *a priori* principles of the pure understanding and its theoretical judgments.

But a perception can also be immediately combined with a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure) and a satisfaction, which accompanies the representation of the object and serves it in place of a predicate. In this way an aesthetic judgment arises, which is not a cognitive judgment. Suppose such a judgment is not a mere judgment of sensation but a formal judgment of reflection, which requires this satisfaction of everyone as neces-

sary. Then something must underlie it as an *a priori* principle. This may well be a merely subjective principle (if an objective one should be impossible for this kind of judgment). But even as such it needs a deduction, so that we may comprehend how an aesthetic judgment can lay claim to necessity. On this is based the problem with which we are now concerned: how are judgments of taste possible? This problem, then, concerns the *a priori* principles of the pure power of judgment in *aesthetic* judgments. These are judgments in which the power of judgment does not merely have to subsume under objective concepts of the understanding and stand under a law (as in theoretical judgments), but in which it is, subjectively, both object and law to itself.

This problem can also be put as follows: how is a judgment possible that, merely from one's *own* feeling of pleasure in an object, independently of the object's concept, judges this pleasure *a priori*—that is, without having to wait for the assent of others—to be attached to the representation of the same object *in every other subject*?

That judgments of taste are synthetic is easy to see. They go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object, and add to the latter as a predicate something that is not even cognition at all, namely a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure). The predicate (one's *own* pleasure, combined with the representation) is empirical. But that they are nonetheless *a priori* judgments as regards the assent required *from everyone* [289] , or want to be taken as such, is likewise already contained in the expressions of their claim. And so this problem of the critique of the power of judgment belongs under the general problem of transcendental philosophy: how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?

§ 37. WHAT A JUDGMENT OF TASTE ASSERTS *a priori*

Not the pleasure itself but its universal validity is asserted a priori.

That the representation of an object is immediately combined with a pleasure can only be perceived internally. If one wanted

to indicate nothing more than this, it would yield a merely empirical judgment. For I cannot combine a determinate feeling (of pleasure or displeasure) *a priori* with any representation, except where an *a priori* principle in reason that determines the will lies at the ground. In that case the pleasure (in moral feeling) is the consequence of that principle. But for that very reason it cannot be compared at all with the pleasure in taste, since it requires a determinate concept of a law, whereas the pleasure in taste is supposed to be combined immediately with mere judging, prior to any concept. That is also why all judgments of taste are singular judgments: they combine their predicate of satisfaction not with a concept but with a given singular empirical representation.

Thus it is not the pleasure but the *universal validity of this pleasure*, perceived in the mind as combined with the mere judging of an object, that is represented *a priori* in a judgment of taste as a universal rule for the power of judgment, valid for everyone. That I perceive and judge an object with pleasure is an empirical judgment. But that I find it beautiful, that is, that I may require that satisfaction of everyone as necessary, is an *a priori* judgment.

§ 38. DEDUCTION OF JUDGMENTS OF TASTE

We may presuppose in everyone the subjective conditions of judging that we find in ourselves.

Suppose it is granted that in a pure judgment of taste the satisfaction in the object is combined with the mere judging of its form. Then what we feel as combined in the mind with the representation of the object is nothing other than the subjective purposiveness [290] of that form for the power of judgment. Now with regard to the formal rules of judging, without any matter (neither sensation nor concept), the power of judgment can be directed only to the subjective conditions of the use of the power of judgment in general (which is restricted neither to a particular kind of sense nor to a particular concept of the under-

standing). It can be directed, then, only to that subjective element which can be presupposed in all human beings (as requisite for possible cognition in general). Therefore the agreement of a representation with these conditions of the power of judgment must be capable of being assumed as valid *a priori* for everyone. That is, the pleasure, or the subjective purposiveness of the representation for the relation of the cognitive faculties in the judging of a sensible object in general, can rightly be required of everyone[3].

REMARK

The deduction is easy because beauty is no concept of the object; only subsumption can go wrong.

This deduction is so easy because it has no need to justify the objective reality of a concept; for beauty is not a concept of the object, and the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment. It asserts only that we are entitled to presuppose universally in every human being the same subjective conditions of the power of judgment that we find in ourselves; and, beyond that, only that we have correctly subsumed the given object under these conditions. This latter point, it is true, has unavoidable difficulties that do not attach to the logical power of judgment. For in the logical power of judgment one subsumes under concepts, but in the aesthetic one subsumes under a merely [291] felt relation of the imagination and the understanding as they reciprocally harmonize in the represented form of the object; and here the

3 KANT'S NOTE. To be entitled to lay claim to universal assent to a judgment of the aesthetic power of judgment that rests merely on subjective grounds, it is enough to grant two things. 1) In all human beings the subjective conditions of this faculty are the same, as regards the relation of the cognitive powers set in activity in it to a cognition in general. This must be true, since otherwise human beings could not communicate their representations, or even cognition, to one another. 2) The judgment has taken into account only this relation (hence the *formal condition* of the power of judgment) and is pure, that is, mixed neither with concepts of the object nor with sensations as determining grounds. Even if a mistake has been made with regard to this latter point, that concerns only the incorrect application to a particular case of the entitlement that a law gives us; the entitlement in general is not thereby cancelled.

subsumption can easily deceive. Yet this takes nothing away from the legitimacy of the power of judgment's claim to count on universal assent. That claim amounts only to this: judging the correctness of the principle, from subjective grounds, to be valid for everyone. For consider the difficulty and doubt about the correctness of the subsumption under that principle. It makes the legitimacy of an aesthetic judgment's claim to this validity in general, and hence the principle itself, no more doubtful than the equally faulty (though not so frequent or easy) subsumption of the logical power of judgment under its principle can make that principle, which is objective, doubtful. But suppose the question were: how is it possible to assume nature *a priori* as a sum total of objects of taste? Then this problem would have reference to teleology. For it would have to be regarded as an end of nature, attaching essentially to its concept, to set up forms purposive for our power of judgment. But the correctness of this assumption is still very much open to doubt, whereas the reality of natural beauties lies open to experience.

§ 39. THE COMMUNICABILITY OF A SENSATION

Pleasures of enjoyment, of moral feeling, of the sublime and of the beautiful are communicable differently.

When sensation, as the real in perception, is related to cognition, it is called sensation of the senses. The specific character of its quality can be represented as communicable throughout in the same way only if one assumes that everyone has a sense the same as ours. But this absolutely cannot be presupposed of a sensation of the senses. Thus someone who lacks the sense of smell cannot have this kind of sensation communicated to him. And even if he does not lack it, one still cannot be sure whether he has exactly the same sensation of a flower that we have. We must, however, imagine people as differing still more with regard to the *agreeableness* or *disagreeableness* in the sensation of one and the same object of the senses. And it absolutely cannot be demanded that everyone acknowledge the pleasure in such

objects. Pleasure of this [292] kind comes into the mind through sense, so that we are passive in it; it can therefore be called the pleasure of *enjoyment*.

The satisfaction in an action on account of its moral character, by contrast, is not a pleasure of enjoyment but of self-activity and its conformity with the idea of one's vocation. This feeling, which is called moral feeling, requires concepts, however, and presents not a free but a lawful purposiveness. So it too can be universally communicated only by means of reason and, if the pleasure is to be of the same kind in everyone, through very determinate practical concepts of reason.

The pleasure in the sublime in nature, as a pleasure of reasoning contemplation, also lays claim to universal participation. Yet it already presupposes another feeling, namely the feeling of one's supersensible vocation, which, however obscure it may be, has a moral foundation. But I am not simply entitled to presuppose that other people will take this into account and will find a satisfaction in contemplating the rugged magnitude of nature (a satisfaction that truly cannot be ascribed to the sight of it, which is rather terrifying). Nevertheless, considering that those moral predispositions ought to be taken into account on every suitable occasion, I can require that satisfaction too of everyone. But I can do so only by means of the moral law, which in its turn is grounded on concepts of reason.

The pleasure in the beautiful, on the other hand, is neither a pleasure of enjoyment nor one of lawful activity, nor yet one of reasoning contemplation according to ideas, but a pleasure of mere reflection. Without having any end or principle as its guide, this pleasure accompanies the ordinary apprehension of an object by the imagination, as the faculty of intuition, in relation to the understanding, as the faculty of concepts. It does so by means of a procedure that the power of judgment must also carry out for the sake of the most ordinary experience. The only difference is that in ordinary experience it is compelled to do this in order to perceive an empirical objective concept. Here, in aesthetic judging, it does so merely in order to perceive the suit-

ability of the representation for the harmonious (subjectively purposive) occupation of both cognitive faculties in their freedom, that is, to feel the representational state with pleasure. This pleasure must necessarily rest on the same conditions in everyone, since they are subjective conditions of the possibility of a cognition in general. And the proportion of these [293] cognitive faculties that taste requires is also required for common and sound understanding, which may be presupposed in everyone. That is precisely why someone who judges with taste may require the subjective purposiveness, that is, his satisfaction in the object, of everyone else, and assume his feeling to be universally communicable, and that without the mediation of concepts. He may do so provided only that he does not err in this consciousness and take matter for form, or charm for beauty.

§ 40. TASTE AS A KIND OF SENSUS COMMUNIS

Taste judges from everyone's standpoint; the three maxims: think for yourself, from others' place, consistently.

The power of judgment is often given the name of a sense when what is noticeable is not so much its reflection as merely the result of that reflection. People speak of a sense of truth, a sense of decency, of justice and so on. Yet they know, or at least in fairness ought to know, that it is not a sense in which these concepts can have their seat, still less that such a sense has the slightest capacity to pronounce universal rules. They should know, rather, that no such representation of truth, propriety, beauty or justice could ever come into our thoughts if we could not rise above the senses to higher cognitive faculties. *Common human understanding*, as merely sound (not yet cultivated) understanding, is regarded as the least that can always be expected of anyone who lays claim to the name of human being. It therefore also has the mortifying honor of being given the name of common sense (*sensus communis*). And indeed the word *common* is understood here (not only in our language, which really does contain an ambiguity on this point, but in many others as well)

to mean the vulgar, what is met with everywhere, which it is no merit or distinction whatever to possess.[4]

By *sensus communis*, however, must be understood the idea of a *communal* sense, that is, of a faculty of judging that in its reflection takes account (*a priori*) of everyone else's way of representing in thought. It does so in order, *as it were*, to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole, and thereby to escape the illusion that arises from subjective private conditions, which could easily be taken for objective, and that would have a detrimental influence on the judgment. [294] This is done by holding one's judgment up not so much to the actual as to the merely possible judgments of others, and by putting oneself in the place of everyone else, simply abstracting from the limitations that contingently attach to our own judging. This in turn is achieved by leaving out, as far as possible, whatever in one's representational state is matter, that is, sensation, and by paying attention solely to the formal features of one's representation or representational state. Now this operation of reflection may perhaps seem far too artificial to be attributed to the faculty we call *common* sense. But it only looks that way when it is expressed in abstract formulas. In itself nothing is more natural than to abstract from charm and emotion when one is seeking a judgment that is to serve as a universal rule.

The following maxims of common human understanding do not, it is true, belong here as parts of the critique of taste, but they can still serve to clarify its principles. They are these: 1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the place of everyone else; 3. Always to think in agreement with oneself. The first is the maxim of the *unprejudiced*, the second of the *enlarged*, the third of the *consistent* way of thinking. The first is the maxim of a reason that is never *passive*. The propensity to a passive reason, and hence to the heteronomy of reason, is called *prejudice*. And the greatest prejudice of all is to represent nature as not subject to the rules that the understanding, through its own essential

4 German *gemein* means both "shared" and "ordinary, vulgar," an ambiguity English "common" largely preserves.

law, lays at its basis—that is, *superstition*. Liberation from superstition is called *enlightenment*[5]. This name also applies to liberation from prejudices in general. But superstition deserves above all (*in sensu eminenti* [in the eminent sense]) to be called a prejudice. For the blindness into which superstition plunges one, and which it even demands as an obligation, makes [295] the need to be led by others, and hence the state of a passive reason, especially recognizable. As regards the second maxim of the way of thinking, we are otherwise accustomed to calling someone limited (*narrow-minded*, the opposite of *enlarged*) whose talents are not sufficient for any great use (especially intensive use). Here, however, we are speaking not of the faculty of cognition but of the *way of thinking*, of making purposive use of it. However small the range and degree of a person's natural endowment, this way of thinking still reveals a man of *enlarged thinking* if he sets himself above the subjective private conditions of judgment, within which so many others are, as it were, bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a *universal standpoint* (which he can determine only by putting himself in the standpoint of others). The third maxim, namely that of the *consistent* way of thinking, is the hardest to attain. It can be attained only by combining the first two, and after they have been followed often enough to become a skill. One can say: the first of these maxims is the maxim of the understanding, the second of the power of judgment, the third of reason.

I take up again the thread dropped by this digression and say that taste can be called *sensus communis* with more right than sound understanding can. The aesthetic power of judgment,

5 KANT'S NOTE. One soon sees that enlightenment, though easy *in thesi* [in principle], is *in hypothesi* [in application] a difficult matter that can only be carried out slowly. Not to be passive with one's reason, but always to be self-legislating, is indeed quite easy for someone who wants only to be suited to his essential end and does not ask to know what lies beyond his understanding. But the striving toward the latter can hardly be prevented, and there will never be a lack of others who promise with great confidence that they can satisfy this curiosity. So it must be very hard to preserve or establish the merely negative element (which constitutes enlightenment proper) in the way of thinking, especially the public way of thinking.

rather than the intellectual one, can bear the name of a communal sense[6], if one does want to use the word "sense" of an effect of mere reflection on the mind; for then by "sense" one means the feeling of pleasure. One could even define taste as the faculty of judging that which makes our feeling in a given representation *universally communicable* without the mediation of a concept.

The skill of human beings in communicating their thoughts also requires a relation of the imagination and the understanding, in order to join intuitions to concepts and concepts in turn to intuitions, so that they flow together into a cognition. But in that case the agreement of the two mental powers is *lawful*, under the constraint of determinate [296] concepts. Only where the imagination in its freedom awakens the understanding, and the understanding without concepts sets the imagination into a regular play, does the representation communicate itself—not as a thought, but as the inner feeling of a purposive state of the mind.

Taste is therefore the faculty of judging *a priori* the communicability of the feelings that are combined with a given representation (without the mediation of a concept). Suppose we could assume that the mere universal communicability of one's feeling must in itself already carry an interest for us (though we are not entitled to infer this from the character of a merely reflecting power of judgment). Then we could explain why the feeling in a judgment of taste is expected of everyone as if it were a duty.

§ 41. THE EMPIRICAL INTEREST IN THE BEAUTIFUL

In society beauty becomes interesting because it can be shared; this interest proves nothing moral.

That the judgment of taste by which something is declared beautiful must not have an interest *as its determining ground* has been

sufficiently shown above. But it does not follow that, once it has been given as a pure aesthetic judgment, no interest can be combined with it. This combination, however, can only ever be indirect. That is, taste must first be represented as combined with something else, so that a *pleasure in the existence* of an object (which is what all interest consists in) can be connected with the satisfaction of mere reflection on it. For what is said of cognitive judgments (about things in general) holds here in aesthetic judgments too: *a posse ad esse non valet consequentia* [the inference from possibility to actuality is not valid]. Now this something else can be something empirical, namely an inclination proper to human nature. Or it can be something intellectual, namely the will's property of being determinable *a priori* by reason. Both contain a satisfaction in the existence of an object, and so both can lay the ground for an interest in what has already pleased for itself and without regard to any interest.

Empirically, the beautiful interests only in *society*. Suppose we grant that the drive to society is natural to human beings, and that fitness and propensity for it, that is, *sociability*, is a requirement [297] of human beings as creatures destined for society, and hence a property belonging to *humanity*. Then we cannot fail to regard taste as well as a faculty of judging everything by which one can communicate even one's *feeling* to everyone else, and hence as a means of promoting what everyone's natural inclination demands.

Left to himself, a person abandoned on a desert island would adorn neither his hut nor himself, nor look for flowers, still less plant them, in order to decorate himself with them. Only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a human being but also, in his own way, a refined one (the beginning of civilization). For that is how we judge someone who is inclined and skilled to communicate his pleasure to others, and who is not content with an object if he cannot feel his satisfaction in it in

6 KANT'S NOTE. Taste could be designated as *sensus communis aestheticus* [aesthetic common sense], and common human understanding as *sensus communis logicus* [logical common sense].

community with others. Each person also expects and demands of everyone regard for universal communication, as if from an original contract dictated by humanity itself. And so, at first, it is admittedly only charms—for example colors for painting oneself (annatto among the Caribs and cinnabar among the Iroquois), or flowers, seashells, beautifully colored bird feathers—and in time also beautiful forms (on canoes, clothes and so on) that bring no gratification at all, that is, no satisfaction of enjoyment—that become important in society and bound up with a great interest. Finally, civilization, having reached its highest point, makes this almost the chief business of refined inclination, and sensations are held to be worth only as much as they can be universally communicated. At that point, even if the pleasure each person takes in such an object is only slight and, on its own, without noticeable interest, the idea of its universal communicability still increases its value almost infinitely.[7]

This interest, which attaches to the beautiful indirectly through the inclination to society and is therefore empirical, is of no importance for us here. We have to look only at what may have a bearing, even if only indirectly, on the judgment of taste *a priori*. For if an interest bound up with it should be discovered even in this form, then taste would reveal a transition of our faculty of judging from sensory enjoyment to moral feeling. And not only would we thereby be better [298] guided in occupying taste purposively; a middle link in the chain of human *a priori* faculties, on which all legislation must depend, would also be presented as such. This much can well be said of the empirical interest in objects of taste and in taste itself. Since taste indulges inclination, however refined that inclination may be, this interest readily lets itself be fused with all the inclinations and passions that reach their greatest variety and highest degree in society. And the interest in the beautiful, if it is grounded on this, could provide only a very ambiguous transition from the agreeable to the good. But whether this transition might not

7 Kant's *Rocou* is annatto, a red dye made from the seeds of the achiote shrub.

after all be furthered by taste, when taste is taken in its purity, is something we have reason to investigate.

§ 42. THE INTELLECTUAL INTEREST IN THE BEAUTIFUL

An immediate interest in the beauty of nature, not of art, marks a good soul.

Some people would gladly direct all the occupations to which their inner natural disposition drives human beings toward the ultimate end of humanity, namely the morally good. It was with good-natured intent that they regarded taking an interest in the beautiful in general as a sign of good moral character. But they have been contradicted, not without reason, by others who appeal to experience. Virtuosi of taste, these others say, are not just often but perhaps even usually vain, obstinate and given to ruinous passions, and could perhaps lay even less claim than other people to the distinction of attachment to moral principles. And so it seems that the feeling for the beautiful is not only (as it really is) specifically different from moral feeling. It seems too that the interest that can be combined with it is hard to reconcile with moral interest, and certainly not by any inner affinity.

Now I readily grant that the interest in the *beautiful in art* (in which I also include the artificial use of natural beauties for adornment, and hence for vanity) provides no proof at all of a way of thinking attached to the morally good, or even inclined toward it. On the other hand, I maintain that to take an *immediate interest* in the beauty of *nature* (not merely to have taste in order to judge it) is always a mark of a good soul. And I maintain that, [299] if this interest is habitual, it at least indicates a disposition of mind favorable to moral feeling, when it readily combines itself with the *contemplation of nature*. It must be well remembered, however, that here I really mean the beautiful *forms* of nature. I am still setting aside the *charms* that nature is accustomed to combine with them so abundantly, since the

interest in these, though also immediate, is nonetheless empirical.

Someone who, alone (and with no intention of communicating his observations to others), contemplates the beautiful shape of a wild flower, a bird, an insect and so on, in order to admire it and love it, and who would not want it to be missing from nature altogether, even if this caused him some harm, let alone offered him any advantage, takes an immediate and indeed intellectual interest in the beauty of nature. That is, not only does nature's product please him by its form, but its very existence pleases him, without any sensory charm having a share in this and without his connecting any end with it.

It is remarkable, however, that the following would happen if someone had secretly deceived this lover of the beautiful. Suppose artificial flowers (which can be made to look exactly like natural ones) had been planted in the ground, or artfully carved birds set on the branches of trees, and he then discovered the deception. The immediate interest he had previously taken in them would at once vanish. Perhaps another interest would take its place, namely the interest of vanity, in decorating his room with them for other people's eyes. The thought that nature produced that beauty must accompany the intuition and the reflection, and on this thought alone is founded the immediate interest we take in it. Otherwise what remains is either a mere judgment of taste without any interest, or one combined only with a mediate interest, namely an interest referred to society. The latter gives no reliable indication of a morally good way of thinking.

Natural beauty has this advantage over the beauty of art: even if art should surpass it in form, nature's beauty alone awakens an immediate interest. This agrees with the refined and well-grounded way of thinking of all people who have cultivated their moral feeling. Consider a man who has taste enough to judge the products of fine art with the greatest correctness and refinement. [300] Suppose he gladly leaves the room in which one finds those beauties that sustain vanity and, at most, social

pleasures, and turns to the beautiful in nature, in order to find there, as it were, a voluptuous delight for his spirit in a train of thought that he can never fully unfold. Then we shall regard this choice of his with high esteem and presuppose in him a beautiful soul, to which no connoisseur or lover of art can lay claim on account of the interest he takes in his objects. —What, then, accounts for the difference in our very different estimation of two kinds of object, which in a judgment of mere taste would hardly contest each other's precedence?

We have a faculty of merely aesthetic judgment. It judges forms without concepts and finds, in the mere judging of them, a satisfaction that we at the same time make a rule for everyone, although this judgment is not grounded on an interest and does not produce one.—On the other hand, we also have a faculty of intellectual judgment. It determines *a priori* a satisfaction in the mere forms of practical maxims (insofar as they qualify of themselves for universal legislation), and we make this satisfaction a law for everyone. Our judgment here is not grounded on any interest, *yet it does produce one*. The pleasure or displeasure in the first judgment is called that of taste; in the second, that of moral feeling.

But it is also of interest to reason that the ideas (for which it brings about an immediate interest in moral feeling) should have objective reality as well. That is, reason is interested in nature's showing at least a trace, or giving a hint, that it contains within itself some ground for assuming a lawful agreement of its products with our satisfaction, which is independent of all interest (a satisfaction that we recognize *a priori* as a law for everyone, without being able to base this on proofs). Reason must therefore take an interest in every manifestation in nature of an agreement similar to this. Consequently the mind cannot reflect on the beauty of *nature* without at the same time finding itself interested in it. This interest, however, is moral in its kinship; and whoever takes it in the beautiful in nature can do so only insofar as he has already firmly established his interest in the morally good. So if the beauty of nature [301] interests someone

immediately, we have cause to suppose in him at least a predisposition to a good moral disposition.

It will be said that this interpretation of aesthetic judgments in terms of a kinship with moral feeling looks far too contrived to be taken for the true reading of the cipher through which nature speaks to us figuratively in its beautiful forms. But, first, this immediate interest in the beautiful in nature is in fact not common. It is found only in those whose way of thinking is either already trained to the good or especially receptive to such training. Second, there is the analogy between the pure judgment of taste and the moral judgment. The former, without depending on any interest, lets us feel a satisfaction and at the same time represents it *a priori* as fitting for humanity in general; the latter does the very same from concepts. Even without distinct, subtle and deliberate reflection, this analogy leads to a like immediate interest in the object of the former as in that of the latter—except that the one is a free interest, the other an interest grounded on objective laws. Added to this is our admiration for nature, which in its beautiful products shows itself as art—not merely by chance, but as it were intentionally, in accordance with a lawful arrangement and as purposiveness without a purpose. Since we find this purpose nowhere outside us, we naturally look for it in ourselves, and indeed in what constitutes the ultimate end of our existence, namely our moral vocation. (The inquiry into the ground of the possibility of such a purposiveness of nature, however, will first be discussed in the Teleology.)[8]

It is also easy to explain why the satisfaction in fine art, in a pure judgment of taste, is not combined with an immediate interest in the same way as the satisfaction in beautiful nature. For fine art is either an imitation of nature that goes as far as deception, and then it has the effect of natural beauty (for which it is taken); or it is art visibly and intentionally directed at our satisfaction. In that case the satisfaction in this product would indeed arise immediately through taste, but it would awaken

8 The Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, the second part of this work.

only a mediate interest in the underlying cause, namely an art that can interest us only through its end, never in itself. It will perhaps be said that this is also the case when an object of nature interests us through its beauty only insofar as [302] a moral idea is associated with it. But it is not this that interests us immediately. What interests us immediately is rather the character of that beauty in itself: that it qualifies for such an association, a character that therefore belongs to it intrinsically.

The charms in beautiful nature, which are so often found as it were fused with beautiful form, belong either to modifications of light (in coloring) or of sound (in tones). For these are the only sensations that permit not merely sensory feeling but also reflection on the form of these modifications of the senses. And so they contain, as it were, a language that nature speaks to us and that seems to have a higher meaning. Thus the white color of the lily seems to attune the mind to ideas of innocence, and the seven colors, in order from red to violet, seem to attune it to the idea of 1) sublimity, 2) boldness, 3) candor, 4) friendliness, 5) modesty, 6) constancy and 7) tenderness. The song of birds proclaims joyfulness and contentment with its existence. At least that is how we interpret nature, whether or not such is its intention. But this interest that we here take in beauty absolutely requires that it be the beauty of nature. It vanishes entirely as soon as we notice that we have been deceived and that it is only art—so much so that even taste can then find nothing beautiful in it, nor sight anything charming. What do poets praise more highly than the bewitchingly beautiful song of the nightingale in lonely thickets on a still summer evening, in the soft light of the moon? Yet there are known cases where, no such songster being found, some jovial innkeeper has deceived his guests, who had come to stay with him to enjoy the country air, and done so to their greatest satisfaction. He hid in a thicket a mischievous lad who knew how to imitate this song (with a reed or a rush in his mouth) exactly as in nature. But as soon as one realizes that it is a trick, no one will long endure listening to this song that was before thought so charming; and the same holds for every other

songbird. It must be nature, or be taken by us for nature, if we are to be able to take an immediate *interest* in the beautiful as such—and all the more so if we are even to expect others to take such an interest in it. This does in fact happen, [303] since we regard as coarse and ignoble the way of thinking of those who have no *feeling* for beautiful nature (for that is what we call the receptivity to an interest in contemplating it) and who stick to the enjoyment of mere sensations of sense at their meals or over the bottle.

Art and Genius

Fine art, genius as the talent through which nature gives the rule to art, aesthetic ideas, and the division of the arts.

§ 43. VON DER KUNST ÜBERHAUPT.

1) *Art* is distinguished from *nature* as doing (*facere*) is distinguished from acting or operating in general (*agere*); and the product or result of the former, as a *work* (*opus*), is distinguished from that of the latter, as an effect (*effectus*).

By rights, only production through freedom, that is, through a power of choice that makes reason the basis of its actions, should be called art. For although we like to call the product of bees (the regularly built honeycombs) a work of art, this is done only by analogy with art in this sense. As soon as we reflect that they do not base their labor on any rational deliberation of their own, we say at once that it is a product of their nature (of instinct), and as art it is ascribed only to their creator.

If, in searching a bog, we come across a piece of hewn wood, as has sometimes happened, we do not say that it is a product of nature but of art: its producing cause conceived an end, to which the wood owes its form. We do also see art in everything so constituted that a representation of it in its cause must have preceded its actuality (as even with bees), though the cause need not actually have *thought* the effect. But when we call something simply a work of art, to distinguish it from an effect of nature, we always mean a work of human beings.

2) *Art*, as a human skill, is also distinguished from *science* (*being able* from *knowing*), as a practical faculty from a theoretical one, as technique from theory (as surveying is from geo-

metry). And in this sense, what one *can* do as soon as one merely *knows* what ought to be done, and so needs only to be sufficiently acquainted with the desired effect, is not really called art. Only something that one does not [304] at once have the skill to make, even when one knows it as completely as possible, belongs to art to that extent. Camper describes very precisely what the best shoe would have to be like, but he certainly could not make one[1].[2]

3) *Art* is also distinguished from *craft*. The first is called *free* art; the second can also be called *remunerative* art. We regard the first as if it could turn out purposively (succeed) only as play, that is, as an occupation that is agreeable in itself. We regard the second as work, that is, as an occupation that is disagreeable (burdensome) in itself and attractive only through its effect (e.g., the pay), and hence as one that can be imposed by compulsion. Whether, in the ranking of the guilds, watchmakers should count as artists and smiths, by contrast, as craftsmen—this calls for a different point of view for judging than the one we are taking here, namely the proportion of the talents that must underlie the one or the other of these occupations. Whether some of the so-called seven liberal arts might not have been listed that should be counted among the sciences, and many too that are comparable to crafts, I will not discuss here. But it is not inadvisable to point out that all free arts nevertheless require something compulsory, or, as it is called, a *mechanism*. Without it the *spirit*, which must be *free* in art and which alone animates the work, would have no body at all and would evaporate entirely (e.g., in poetry, correctness and richness of language, as well as

1 KANT'S NOTE. In my part of the country, if you set an ordinary person a problem like that of Columbus and his egg, he says: *there's no art in that, it's only a science*. That is, if you *know* it, you *can* do it; and he says exactly this of all the supposed arts of the conjurer. Those of the tightrope walker, on the other hand, he will not at all refuse to call art.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. In the anecdote, Columbus made an egg stand on its end by cracking its tip, showing that a feat looks easy once one knows how it is done.

2 Petrus Camper (1722–1789), Dutch anatomist and naturalist, who wrote a treatise on the best form of shoe (1781).

prosody and meter). This needs saying because many modern educators believe that the best way to promote a free art is to remove all constraint from it and turn it from work into mere play.[3]

§ 44. ON FINE ART

There is no science of the beautiful, only critique; fine art aims at pleasure accompanying representations as kinds of cognition.

There is neither a science of the beautiful, but only a critique, nor a fine science, but only fine art. For as regards the former, it would have to be settled in it scientifically, that is, by grounds of proof, [305] whether or not something is to be held beautiful; so the judgment about beauty, if it belonged to science, would not be a judgment of taste. As for the second, a science that is supposed to be beautiful as such is an absurdity. For if in it, as a science, one asked for grounds and proofs, one would be fobbed off with tasteful pronouncements (*bons mots*).[4] —What has given rise to the common expression *fine sciences* is doubtless nothing other than this. It has been quite rightly noticed that fine art in its full perfection requires a great deal of science—for example, knowledge of ancient languages, wide reading in the authors who count as classics, history, knowledge of antiquities, and so on. These historical sciences constitute the necessary preparation and foundation for fine art, and partly, too, they were taken to include knowledge of the products of fine art (oratory and poetry). For these reasons they have themselves been called fine sciences, through a confusion of words.

If art, conforming to the *cognition* of a possible object, merely performs the actions required to make it actual, it is *mechanical* art; but if it has the feeling of pleasure as its immediate aim, it is called *aesthetic* art. This is either *agreeable* or *fine* art. It is the

3 The medieval curriculum of grammar, rhetoric and dialectic (the trivium) and arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy (the quadrivium).
4 "Fine science" renders "schöne Wissenschaft"; the plural "schöne Wissenschaften" (after the French "belles-lettres") was the usual German term for literature and humane learning.

former if its end is that the pleasure should accompany the representations as mere *sensations*; the latter, if its end is that the pleasure should accompany them as *kinds of cognition*.

Agreeable arts are those aimed merely at enjoyment. Such are all the charms that can delight a company at table: telling entertaining stories, drawing the company into frank and lively conversation, and attuning it by jest and laughter to a certain tone of merriment. In such a mood, as they say, a good deal may be chattered away at random, and nobody wants to be held responsible for what he says, because it is all geared only to momentary entertainment, not to lasting material for reflection or repetition. (To this also belongs the way the table is furnished for enjoyment, or even, at great banquets, table music: a curious thing, which is meant to sustain the guests' cheerful mood merely as an agreeable noise and which, without anyone paying the least attention to its composition, [306] encourages free conversation between one neighbor and the next.) To this further belong all games that carry no interest beyond making time pass unnoticed.

Fine art, on the other hand, is a kind of representation that is purposive in itself and, although without an end, nevertheless promotes the cultivation of the powers of the mind for sociable communication.

The universal communicability of a pleasure already implies in its concept that this pleasure must be one of reflection, not one of enjoyment arising from mere sensation. And so aesthetic art, as fine art, is one that has reflecting judgment, and not the sensation of the senses, as its standard.

§ 45. FINE ART MUST LOOK LIKE NATURE

A work of fine art must be recognized as art yet seem as free from rules as nature.

In a product of fine art we must become conscious that it is art and not nature; yet the purposiveness in its form must seem as free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product

of mere nature. On this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties—a play that must at the same time be purposive—rests that pleasure which alone is universally communicable without being based on concepts. Nature was beautiful when it at the same time looked like art; and art can be called beautiful only if we are conscious that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature.

For we can say in general, whether it concerns the beauty of nature or of art: *that is beautiful which pleases in the mere judging* (not in the sensation of the senses, nor through a concept). Now art always has a determinate intention of producing something. But if this something were mere sensation (something merely subjective), meant to be accompanied by pleasure, then the product would please in the judging only by means of sensory feeling. If the intention were directed at producing a determinate object, then, if art achieved it, the object would please only through concepts. In both cases, however, art would please not *in the mere judging*, that is, not as fine art but as mechanical art.

Hence the purposiveness in the product of fine art, although
307 it is intentional, must not seem intentional; that is, fine art must be *regarded* as nature, even though we are conscious of it as art. A product of art appears as nature, however, when we find all *punctiliousness* in its agreement with the rules by which alone the product can become what it is meant to be, but without *laboriousness*, without the academic form showing through—that is, without any trace that the rule hovered before the artist's eyes and put fetters on the powers of his mind.

§ 46. FINE ART IS THE ART OF GENIUS

Genius is the innate talent through which nature gives the rule to art.

Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art. Since talent, as the artist's innate productive faculty, itself belongs to nature, we could also put it this way: *Genius* is the innate mental

disposition (*ingenium*) *through which* nature gives the rule to art.[5]

Whatever the case may be with this definition—whether it is merely arbitrary, or whether or not it fits the concept that we are accustomed to connect with the word *genius* (which is to be discussed in the following section)—we can already prove in advance that, on the meaning of the word adopted here, fine arts must necessarily be regarded as arts of *genius*.

For every art presupposes rules, and only by laying these down as a foundation can a product, if it is to be called a product of art, be represented as possible in the first place. But the concept of fine art does not permit the judgment about the beauty of its product to be derived from any rule that has a *concept* as its determining ground, and hence one that is based on a concept of how the product is possible. So fine art cannot itself devise the rule according to which it is to bring about its product. Yet since without a preceding rule a product can never be called art, nature in the subject (and through the attunement of its faculties) must give the rule to art; that is, fine art is possible only as a product of genius.

From this we see that genius 1) is a *talent* for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, and not a predisposition of skill for what can be learned according to some rule; [308] consequently, *originality* must be its first property. 2) Since there can also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, that is, *exemplary*. Hence, though not themselves arising from imitation, they must serve others for imitation, that is, as a standard or rule for judging. 3) Genius cannot itself describe or show scientifically how it brings about its product; rather, it gives the rule as *nature*. Hence the author of a product that he owes to his genius does not himself know how the ideas for it come to him. Nor does he have it in his power to devise such things at will or according to plan and to communicate them to others in precepts that would enable them to produce similar products. (That is presumably why the

5 Latin: natural capacity, inborn talent of mind.

word "genius" is derived from the Latin *genius*, the peculiar guardian and guiding spirit given to a person at birth, from whose inspiration those original ideas were thought to stem.) 4) Nature, through genius, prescribes the rule not to science but to art, and even then only insofar as the art is to be fine art.

§ 47. GENIUS EXPLAINED AND CONFIRMED

Genius is opposed to imitation: Newton's work can be learned, but not how to write inspired poetry.

Everyone agrees that genius is to be set in complete opposition to the *spirit of imitation*. Now since learning is nothing but imitation, the greatest aptitude for learning, teachableness (capacity) as teachableness, still cannot count as genius. But suppose someone thinks or composes for himself, and does not merely take in what others have thought—indeed, even invents a good deal for art and science. This is still not the proper ground for calling such a (often great) *mind* a *genius*, in contrast to someone who, because he can never do more than merely learn and imitate, is called a *dullard*. For precisely this *could* also have been learned; it thus still lies on the natural path of inquiry and reflection according to rules, and does not differ in kind from what can be acquired through diligence by means of imitation. Thus everything that Newton set out in his immortal work on the principles of natural philosophy can very well be learned, however great a mind was needed to discover such things. But one cannot learn to write poetry with spirit, however detailed [309] all the precepts of the art of poetry, and however excellent its models, may be.[6] The reason is that Newton could lay out all the steps he had to take, from the first elements of geometry to his great and profound discoveries, and make them entirely intuitive, not only to himself but to everyone else, so that others could follow them. But no Homer or Wieland can show how his ideas, rich in fantasy and yet at the same time full of thought, arise

6 Isaac Newton's *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 1687).

and come together in his head, because he does not know it himself and so cannot teach it to anyone else. In matters of science, therefore, the greatest inventor differs from the most laborious imitator and apprentice only in degree, whereas he differs in kind from someone whom nature has gifted for fine art.[7] This, however, implies no disparagement of those great men, to whom the human race owes so much, in comparison with nature's favorites in respect of their talent for fine art. Precisely in the fact that the talent of the former is made for the ever-advancing perfection of knowledge and of all the benefit that depends on it, and likewise for instructing others in that same knowledge, lies their great superiority over those who deserve the honor of being called geniuses: because for the latter art comes to a standstill somewhere, since a limit is set for it beyond which it cannot go—a limit that has presumably long since been reached and can no longer be extended. Moreover, such a skill cannot be communicated; it must be imparted to each person directly by the hand of nature, and so it dies with him, until nature someday endows another in the same way, one who needs nothing more than an example in order to let the talent of which he is conscious work in a similar way.

Since the natural gift must give the rule to art (as fine art), what kind of rule is this? It cannot be set down in a formula and serve as a precept, for then the judgment about the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Rather, the rule must be abstracted from the deed, that is, from the product, on which others may test their own talent, letting it serve them as a model not for *copying* but for *imitation*. How this is possible is hard to explain. The ideas of the artist arouse similar ideas in his apprentice, if nature has provided the apprentice with a similar proportion of the powers of the mind. The models of fine art are therefore [310] the only means of guidance for handing it down to posterity. This could not be done by mere descriptions (especially not in the domain of the arts of speech); and even in these

7 Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813), German poet and novelist, author of the verse epic *Oberon*.

arts only those models can become classical that are written in ancient, dead languages, now preserved only as learned ones.

Mechanical and fine art are very different from each other, the first as a mere art of diligence and learning, the second as that of genius. Nevertheless there is no fine art in which something mechanical, which can be grasped and followed according to rules—and thus something *academically correct*—does not constitute the essential condition of the art. For something must be thought as an end in it, otherwise its product cannot be ascribed to any art at all; it would be a mere product of chance. But to carry out an end, determinate rules are required, from which one may not exempt oneself. Now since the originality of talent constitutes one (but not the only) essential element of the character of genius, shallow minds believe they can best show themselves to be budding geniuses by renouncing the academic constraint of all rules. They believe one parades better on a wild horse than on a well-schooled one. Genius can only supply rich *material* for products of fine art; working it up, and giving it *form*, require a talent schooled by training, so as to make a use of it that can stand up before the power of judgment. But when someone speaks and decides like a genius even in matters of the most careful rational investigation, it is utterly ridiculous. One does not quite know whether to laugh more at the charlatan who spreads so much haze around him—in which one can judge nothing clearly but can imagine all the more—or at the public. The public naively imagines that its inability to recognize and grasp this masterpiece of insight clearly comes from having new truths thrown at it in whole masses, while detail (through measured explanations and academically correct examination of principles) seems to it mere bungling.

§ 48. GENIUS AND TASTE

Judging beautiful objects needs taste; producing them needs genius, and art beauty involves the thing's perfection.

311 *Taste* is required for *judging* beautiful objects as such; but for fine art itself, that is, for the *production* of such objects, *genius* is required.

Suppose we consider genius as a talent for fine art (which the proper meaning of the word implies) and wish, with this in view, to analyze it into the faculties that must come together to constitute such a talent. Then it is necessary first to determine precisely the difference between natural beauty, whose judging requires only taste, and the beauty of art, whose possibility requires genius (and this possibility must also be taken into account in judging such an object).

A natural beauty is a *beautiful thing*; the beauty of art is a *beautiful representation* of a thing.

To judge a natural beauty as such, I do not need to have a concept beforehand of what sort of thing the object is supposed to be; that is, I do not need to know its material purposiveness (the end). Rather, the mere form, without knowledge of the end, pleases by itself in the judging. But if the object is given as a product of art and is to be declared beautiful as such, then, since art always presupposes an end in the cause (and its causality), a concept of what the thing is supposed to be must first be laid down as a basis. And since the agreement of the manifold in a thing with an inner determination of it as an end is the perfection of the thing, the perfection of the thing will also have to be taken into account in judging the beauty of art—something that is not at issue at all in judging a natural beauty (as such).—It is true that in judging living objects of nature in particular, e.g. a human being or a horse, objective purposiveness is commonly taken into consideration as well, in order to judge their beauty. But then the judgment is also no longer purely aesthetic, that is, a mere judgment of taste. Nature is no longer judged as it

appears as art, but insofar as it actually *is* art (albeit superhuman art); and the teleological judgment serves the aesthetic one as a [312] basis and condition that the latter must take into account. In such a case, too, when it is said, for example, "That is a beautiful woman," what one thinks is in fact nothing other than this: in her figure nature beautifully presents the ends of the female build. For one must look beyond the mere form to a concept, in order for the object to be thought in this way through a logically conditioned aesthetic judgment.

Fine art shows its excellence precisely in this: that it describes beautifully things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The Furies, diseases, the devastations of war and the like can, as harmful things, be described very beautifully, and even represented in paintings. Only one kind of ugliness cannot be represented in accordance with nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, and hence the beauty of art: namely, the kind that arouses *disgust*.[8] For in this peculiar sensation, which rests on nothing but imagination, the object is represented as if it were, so to speak, forcing itself on us for enjoyment, while we strive against it with all our might. So the artistic representation of the object is no longer distinguished in our sensation from the nature of the object itself, and it then cannot possibly be taken for beautiful. Sculpture, too, because in its products art is almost confused with nature, has excluded the immediate representation of ugly objects from its creations. Instead it permits death, for example (in a beautiful genius), or warlike courage (in Mars) to be represented through an allegory or through attributes that look pleasing—hence only indirectly, by means of an interpretation by reason, and not for the merely aesthetic power of judgment.[9]

So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is really only the form of the presentation of a concept, the form through which the concept is universally communicated.—But

8 The Roman name for the Erinyes, the Greek goddesses of vengeance.
9 Ancient art showed death as a beautiful winged youth, a genius with an inverted torch, as Lessing had argued in *How the Ancients Represented Death* (1769).

to give this form to the product of fine art, mere taste is required. The artist, having practiced and corrected his taste through various examples of art or nature, holds his work up against it, and after many, often laborious, attempts to satisfy it, finds the form that contents him. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration or of a free flight of the powers of the mind, but of a slow and even painstaking revision, in order to make it adequate [313] to the thought and yet not detrimental to the freedom in the play of those powers.

Taste, however, is merely a faculty of judging, not a productive faculty; and what conforms to it is not for that reason a work of fine art. It may be a product belonging to useful and mechanical art, or even to science, made according to determinate rules that can be learned and must be followed exactly. The pleasing form given to it, however, is only the vehicle of communication and, as it were, a manner of delivery, in respect of which one still remains free to a certain extent, even though the delivery is otherwise bound to a determinate end. Thus we require that tableware, or even a moral treatise, even a sermon, should have this form of fine art without seeming *contrived*; but we will not for that reason call them works of fine art. To fine art, however, belong a poem, music, a picture gallery and the like; and here, in one would-be work of fine art, one can often perceive genius without taste, and in another, taste without genius.

§ 49. THE FACULTIES THAT MAKE UP GENIUS

Spirit is the animating principle of the mind, the faculty of presenting aesthetic ideas.

Of certain products, which are expected to show themselves, at least in part, as fine art, we say: they are without *spirit*, even though we find nothing to criticize in them as far as taste is concerned. A poem can be really neat and elegant, but it is without spirit. A history is exact and orderly, but without spirit. A formal speech is thorough and at the same time polished, but without spirit. Many a conversation is not without entertainment, yet it

is without spirit; even of a woman people may say: she is pretty, talkative and charming, but without spirit. What, then, do we mean here by spirit?

Spirit, in the aesthetic sense, is the animating principle in the mind. But that by which this principle animates the soul, the material it uses for the purpose, is what sets the powers of the mind into purposive motion, that is, into a play that sustains itself and even strengthens the powers for it.

AESTHETIC IDEAS

An aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination that prompts much thought no concept can capture.

Now I maintain that this principle is nothing other than the faculty [314] of presenting *aesthetic ideas*. By an aesthetic idea, however, I mean that representation of the imagination which occasions much thinking, though no determinate thought, that is, no *concept*, can be adequate to it, and which consequently no language can fully attain and make intelligible.—It is easy to see that it is the counterpart (pendant) of an *idea of reason*, which, conversely, is a concept to which no *intuition* (representation of the imagination) can be adequate.

For the imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it. We entertain ourselves with it when experience seems too commonplace to us. We even transform experience—still always according to analogical laws, to be sure, but also according to principles that lie higher up in reason (and that are just as natural to us as those according to which the understanding apprehends empirical nature). In doing so we feel our freedom from the law of association (which attaches to the empirical use of that faculty): although material is lent to us by nature in accordance with that law, we can work it up into something quite different, namely into what surpasses nature.

Such representations of the imagination can be called *ideas*. This is partly because they at least strive toward something lying beyond the bounds of experience, and so seek to approach a presentation of concepts of reason (of intellectual ideas), which gives them the semblance of objective reality. On the other hand, and chiefly, it is because no concept can be fully adequate to them as inner intuitions. The poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the realm of the blessed, the realm of hell, eternity, creation and the like. Or he takes things that do find examples in experience, e.g., death, envy and all the vices, and likewise love, fame and the like, and ventures to make them sensible beyond the limits of experience, in a completeness for which there is no example in nature, by means of an imagination that emulates reason's precedent in reaching for a maximum. And it is really in the art of poetry that the faculty of aesthetic ideas can show itself in its full measure. Considered by itself, however, this faculty is really only a talent (of the imagination).

Now suppose that a representation of the imagination [315] is placed under a concept, a representation that belongs to the presentation of that concept but by itself occasions so much thinking that it can never be comprehended in a determinate concept, and so aesthetically enlarges the concept itself in an unbounded way. Then the imagination is creative here and sets the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) in motion: that is, on the occasion of a representation it makes reason think more (though what it thinks does belong to the concept of the object) than can be apprehended and made distinct in that representation.

There are forms that do not constitute the presentation of a given concept itself but, as secondary representations of the imagination, only express the consequences connected with it and its kinship with other concepts. These are called (aesthetic) *attributes* of an object whose concept, as an idea of reason, cannot be adequately presented. Thus Jupiter's eagle with the lightning in its claws is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven,

and the peacock an attribute of heaven's magnificent queen.[10] Unlike *logical attributes,* they do not represent what lies in our concepts of the sublimity and majesty of creation, but something else. This gives the imagination occasion to spread itself over a multitude of related representations, which let us think more than can be expressed in a concept determined by words. And they yield an *aesthetic idea,* which serves that idea of reason in place of a logical presentation—but really in order to animate the mind by opening up for it a view into an immeasurable field of related representations. Fine art, however, does this not only in painting or sculpture (where the term "attributes" is usually used). Poetry and oratory, too, take the spirit that animates their works solely from the aesthetic attributes of objects. These go alongside the logical attributes and give the imagination an impetus to think more in connection with them, though in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended in a concept, and hence in a determinate linguistic expression.—For the sake of brevity I must restrict myself to a few examples.

Take the great King, when he expresses himself thus in one of his poems: "Let us leave life without complaint and without regret, leaving the world behind us still loaded with our benefactions. So the sun, once it has completed its daily course, still spreads a gentle light across the sky; and the last rays [316] that it sends into the air are its last sighs for the good of the world." Here he enlivens his idea of reason, a cosmopolitan disposition that holds even at the end of life, by means of an attribute. The imagination (in recalling all the pleasures of a beautiful summer's day now over, which a serene evening calls to mind) associates this attribute with that representation, and it stirs up a host of sensations and secondary representations for which no expression can be found.[11] Conversely, even an intellectual concept can serve as an attribute of a representation of the

10 Juno, Jupiter's consort and queen of the gods, whose sacred bird was the peacock.

11 The "great King" is Frederick II of Prussia. The lines come from one of his French poems, an epistle to Marshal Keith, which Kant renders in German prose.

senses, and so enliven the latter through the idea of the supersensible. But this works only by using the aesthetic element that subjectively attaches to our consciousness of the supersensible. Thus a certain poet, for example, says in describing a beautiful morning: "The sun welled forth, as calm wells forth from virtue." The consciousness of virtue, even when we merely put ourselves in thought in the place of a virtuous person, spreads through the mind a host of sublime and soothing feelings, and a boundless prospect of a happy future, which no expression adequate to a determinate concept fully captures.[12][13]

In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination associated with a given concept. In the free use of the imagination, this representation is bound up with such a manifold of partial representations that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it. It therefore allows us to add to a concept, in thought, much that is unnameable, and the feeling of this enlivens the cognitive faculties and joins spirit to language as mere letter.

The powers of the mind, then, whose union (in a certain relation) constitutes *genius*, are imagination and understanding. In the use of the imagination for cognition, the imagination is under the constraint of the understanding and is subject to the restriction of being adequate to its concept. In an aesthetic respect, [317] however, the imagination is free to supply, beyond that agreement with the concept, yet unsought, a rich and undeveloped material for the understanding, which the under-

12 KANT'S NOTE. Perhaps nothing more sublime has ever been said, nor any thought expressed more sublimely, than in that inscription above the temple of *Isis* (Mother *Nature*): "I am all that is, that was, and that shall be, and my veil no mortal has lifted." *Segner* made use of this idea in an *ingenious* vignette placed at the front of his textbook of natural science. His aim was to fill the pupil he was about to lead into this temple, beforehand, with the sacred awe that is meant to attune the mind to solemn attentiveness.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Plutarch (*On Isis and Osiris* 9) reports the inscription at Saïs in Egypt. Johann Andreas Segner (1704–1777), physicist, author of an *Einleitung in die Naturlehre* (Introduction to Natural Science).

13 The poet is Johann Philipp Lorenz Withof (1725–1789), in his *Akademische Gedichte* (Academic Poems).

standing did not take into account in its concept. The understanding employs this material not so much objectively, for cognition, as subjectively, to enliven the cognitive powers—and so, indirectly, for cognitions after all. Genius therefore properly consists in the happy relation, which no science can teach and no industry can learn, of finding ideas for a given concept and, on the other hand, of hitting upon the *expression* for these ideas, through which the subjective attunement of the mind that they produce, as the accompaniment of a concept, can be communicated to others. This latter talent is really what we call spirit. For to express what is unnameable in the state of mind accompanying a certain representation, and to make it universally communicable—whether the expression consists in language, painting or plastic art—requires a faculty of apprehending the rapidly passing play of the imagination and of unifying it in a concept that can be communicated without the constraint of rules. (This concept is original for that very reason, and at the same time it opens up a new rule that could not have been inferred from any preceding principles or examples.)

If, after these analyses, we look back at the explanation given above of what is called *genius*, we find: *first*, that it is a talent for art, not for science, in which clearly known rules must come first and determine its procedure; *second*, that, as a talent for art, it presupposes a determinate concept of the product as an end, and hence understanding, but also a representation (albeit an indeterminate one) of the material, i.e., of the intuition, for the presentation of this concept, and hence a relation of the imagination to the understanding; *third*, that it shows itself not so much in carrying out the proposed end in the presentation of a determinate *concept* as in the exposition or expression of *aesthetic ideas*, which contain rich material for that purpose, and hence that it represents the imagination, in its freedom from all guidance by rules, as nonetheless purposive for the presentation of the given concept; and *fourth* and finally, that the unsought, unintentional subjective purposiveness [318] in the free accord of the imagination with the lawfulness of the under-

standing presupposes such a proportion and attunement of these faculties as no following of rules, whether of science or of mechanical imitation, can bring about, but only the nature of the subject can produce.

On these presuppositions, genius is the exemplary originality of a subject's natural gift in the *free* use of his cognitive faculties. The product of a genius (as regards what in it is to be ascribed to genius, not to possible learning or to schooling) is accordingly an example not for imitation (for then what is genius in it, and constitutes the spirit of the work, would be lost), but for following by another genius. That other genius is thereby awakened to a feeling of his own originality: to exercise in art a freedom from the constraint of rules in such a way that art itself acquires a new rule through it—and this is how the talent shows itself to be exemplary. But since genius is a favorite of nature, something we must regard only as a rare appearance, its example produces for other good minds a school, i.e., a methodical instruction according to rules, insofar as such rules could be drawn from those products of spirit and their distinctive character. And for these minds fine art is to that extent imitation, to which nature gave the rule through a genius.

But this imitation becomes *aping* when the pupil *copies* everything, down to what the genius had to allow only as a deformity, because it could not well be removed without weakening the idea. This courage is a merit in a genius alone. A certain *boldness* of expression, and in general many a deviation from the common rule, suits him well; but it is by no means worthy of imitation. In itself it always remains a fault that one must try to remove; yet the genius is, as it were, privileged in this respect, since the inimitable quality of the soaring of his spirit would suffer from anxious caution. *Mannerism* is another kind of aping, namely of mere *peculiarity* (originality) in general, in order to distance oneself as far as possible from imitators, yet without possessing the talent to be at the same time *exemplary*.—There are, to be sure, two kinds of mode (*modus*) in general for arranging one's thoughts in exposition. One is called *manner*

(*modus aestheticus* [aesthetic mode]), the other *method* (*modus logicus* [logical mode]), and they differ from each other in this: [319] the former has no other standard than the *feeling* of unity in the presentation, whereas the latter follows determinate *principles* in this. For fine art, therefore, only the former holds. But a product of art is called *mannered* only when the exposition of its idea is *designed* to be singular, and is not made adequate to the idea. The showy (the precious), the stilted and the affected, adopted merely to set oneself apart from the common (but without spirit), resemble the behavior of someone of whom it is said that he listens to himself talk, or who stands and walks as if he were on a stage to be gaped at—which always betrays a bungler.

§ 50. TASTE AND GENIUS COMBINED

Where taste and genius conflict in a work, genius should be sacrificed rather than taste.

Suppose the question is what matters more in matters of fine art: that genius shows itself in them, or that taste does. This is equivalent to asking whether imagination or the power of judgment is more important there. Now in respect of the former an art deserves to be called *spirited*, but it deserves to be called a *fine* art only in respect of the latter. So the latter is, at least as an indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*), the most important thing to look to in judging art as fine art. To be rich and original in ideas is not so necessary for the sake of beauty; what is necessary is the adequacy of the imagination, in its freedom, to the lawfulness of the understanding. For all the richness of the imagination produces, in its lawless freedom, nothing but nonsense; the power of judgment, on the other hand, is the faculty of fitting it to the understanding.

Taste, like the power of judgment in general, is the discipline (or training) of genius. It clips its wings severely and makes it well-mannered or polished. But at the same time it gives genius guidance as to where and how far it should extend itself if it is to

remain purposive. And by bringing clarity and order into the abundance of thoughts, it makes the ideas durable—fit for lasting and at the same time universal approval, for being followed by others, and for an ever-advancing culture. If, therefore, in the conflict between these two properties in a product [320] something has to be sacrificed, it would have to be on the side of genius. And the power of judgment, which in matters of fine art pronounces its verdict from its own principles, will sooner permit the freedom and richness of the imagination to be curtailed than the understanding.

Fine art, then, would require *imagination*, *understanding*, *spirit* and *taste*.[14]

§ 51. THE DIVISION OF THE FINE ARTS

Kant divides the fine arts, by analogy with speech, into arts of speech, formative arts and arts of sensation.

We may in general call beauty (whether it is the beauty of nature or of art) the *expression* of aesthetic ideas. The only difference is this. In fine art, this idea must be occasioned by a concept of the object. In beautiful nature, however, mere reflection on a given intuition, without any concept of what the object is supposed to be, suffices to arouse and communicate the idea of which that object is regarded as the *expression*.

So if we wish to divide the fine arts, we can choose no more convenient principle for doing so, at least by way of trial, than the analogy between art and the kind of expression that human beings use in speaking, in order to communicate with one another as perfectly as possible, i.e., not merely as regards their

14 KANT'S NOTE. The first three faculties receive their *unification* only through the fourth. In his History, *Hume* gives the English to understand that although in their works they yield to no nation in the world as regards evidence of the first three properties, considered *separately*, they must nevertheless rank behind their neighbors, the French, in the one that unites them.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Hume's *The History of England* (1754–1762).

concepts but also as regards their sensations.[15]—This expression consists in *word*, *gesture* and *tone* (articulation, gesticulation and modulation). Only the combination of these three kinds of expression makes up the speaker's complete communication. For thought, intuition and sensation are thereby conveyed to the other simultaneously and united.

There are thus only three kinds of fine art: the art of *speech*, the [321] *formative* art, and the art *of the play of sensations* (as external sense impressions). This division could also be arranged dichotomously: fine art would be divided into the art of expressing thoughts or of expressing intuitions, and the latter again merely according to their form or their matter (sensation). But the division would then look too abstract, and not so well suited to ordinary concepts.

1) The arts of *speech* are *oratory* and *poetry*. *Oratory* is the art of conducting a business of the understanding as a free play of the imagination; *poetry*, the art of carrying out a free play of the imagination as a business of the understanding.

The orator, then, announces a business and carries it out as if it were merely a *play* with ideas, in order to entertain his listeners. The *poet* announces merely an entertaining *play* with ideas, and yet as much comes of it for the understanding as if his intention had been merely to carry on its business. The two cognitive faculties, sensibility and understanding, cannot do without each other, yet they cannot well be united without constraint and mutual detriment. Their combination and harmony must seem unintentional and seem to come about of its own accord; otherwise it is not *fine* art. Hence everything labored and painstaking must be avoided in it. For fine art must be free art in a double sense: it must not be work done as a paid occupation, whose magnitude can be judged, exacted or paid for according to a determinate standard; and the mind must feel

15 KANT'S NOTE. The reader will not judge this sketch of a possible division of the fine arts as an intended theory. It is only one of the various attempts that still can and should be made.

itself occupied, yet at the same time satisfied and awakened without looking to any other end (independently of payment).

The orator, then, does give something he does not promise, namely an entertaining play of the imagination; but he also falls short in something he does promise, which is after all his announced business, namely to occupy the understanding purposively. The poet, on the other hand, promises little and announces a mere play with ideas, but achieves something worthy of a business, namely to provide nourishment for the understanding in play and to give life to its concepts through the imagination. So the orator in fact achieves less than he promises, the poet more.

2) The *formative* arts, or the arts of expressing ideas in *sense intuition* (not through representations of the mere imagination [322] aroused by words), are either arts of *sensory truth* or of *sensory semblance*. The first is called *plastic art*, the second *painting*. Both make shapes in space into the expression of ideas: plastic art makes shapes knowable to two senses, sight and touch (though to touch not with a view to beauty), painting only to the first. In both, the aesthetic idea (*archetypon*, the original image) lies at the basis in the imagination. But the shape that constitutes its expression (*ectypon*, the copy) is given either in its bodily extension (as the object itself exists) or according to the way it paints itself in the eye (according to its apparent shape on a surface). Or, even in the first case, either the relation to an actual end or only the semblance of one is made the condition of reflection.

To *plastic art*, as the first kind of fine formative art, belong *sculpture* and *architecture*. The *first* is the art that presents concepts of things bodily, as they *could exist in nature* (though, as fine art, with regard to aesthetic purposiveness). The *second* is the art of presenting concepts of things that are possible *only through art*, and whose form has as its determining ground not nature but an arbitrary end—presenting them for this purpose, yet at the same time in an aesthetically purposive way. In architecture a certain *use* of the artificial object is the main thing, and the aesthetic ideas are restricted to this as a condition. In sculp-

ture the mere *expression* of aesthetic ideas is the main intention. Thus statues of human beings, gods, animals and the like are of the first kind; but temples, or splendid buildings for public assemblies, or also dwellings, triumphal arches, columns, cenotaphs and the like, erected as memorials of honor, belong to architecture. Indeed, all household furniture (the work of the cabinetmaker and similar things made for use) can be counted here, because the suitability of the product for a certain use constitutes what is essential to a *work of architecture*. A mere *work of sculpture*, by contrast, made solely to be looked at and meant to please on its own account, is, as a bodily presentation, mere imitation of nature, though with regard to aesthetic ideas. And here *sensory truth* must not go so far that the work ceases to appear as art and as a product of choice.

Painting, as the second kind of formative art, which presents
323 *sensory semblance* artfully combined with ideas, I would divide into the art of the beautiful *depiction* of *nature* and the art of the beautiful *arrangement* of its *products*. The first would be painting *proper*, the second *landscape gardening*. For the first gives only the semblance of bodily extension; the second gives bodily extension truly, but only the semblance of utility and use for ends other than merely the play of the imagination in contemplating its forms.[16] Landscape gardening is nothing other than adorning the ground with the same manifold (grasses, flowers, shrubs and trees, even waters, hills and valleys) with which nature presents it to our view, only arranged differently and in

16 KANT'S NOTE. That landscape gardening could be regarded as a kind of painting, even though it presents its forms bodily, seems strange. But it really takes its forms from nature (the trees, shrubs, grasses and flowers from forest and field, at least originally), and to that extent it is not art in the way plastic art is. Nor does it have a concept of the object and its end (as architecture does) as the condition of its arrangement, but only the free play of the imagination in contemplation. To that extent, therefore, it agrees with merely aesthetic painting, which has no determinate theme (and arranges air, land and water entertainingly through light and shadow). —In general, the reader will judge this only as an attempt to combine the fine arts under one principle—which this time is to be that of the expression of aesthetic ideas (after the analogy of a language)—and will not regard it as a derivation of them held to be settled.

accordance with certain ideas. The beautiful arrangement of bodily things, however, is also given only to the eye, as painting is; the sense of touch cannot provide an intuitive representation of such a form. To painting in the broad sense I would also assign the decoration of rooms with wall hangings, ornamental pieces and all beautiful furnishings that serve merely to be *looked at*; likewise the art of dressing with taste (rings, snuff-boxes, etc.). For a parterre of all sorts of flowers, or a room with all sorts of ornaments (including even the ladies' finery), makes up at a splendid festivity a kind of painting. Like paintings properly so called (those that do not, say, intend to *teach* history or natural science), it is there merely to be looked at, in order to entertain the imagination in free play with ideas and to occupy the aesthetic power of judgment without a determinate end. The workmanship in all this adornment may be mechanically very different [324] and may require quite different artists. Yet the judgment of taste about what is beautiful in this art is to that extent determined in one and the same way: namely, it judges only the forms (without regard to an end) as they present themselves to the eye, singly or in combination, according to the effect they have on the imagination. —How formative art can be counted (by analogy) as gesture in a language is justified by the fact that, through these shapes, the artist's spirit gives bodily expression to what he has thought and how, and makes the thing itself speak, as it were, in mime. This is a very common play of our fantasy, which imputes to lifeless things, in accordance with their form, a spirit that speaks from them.

3) The art of the *beautiful play of sensations* (sensations produced from outside, a play that must nonetheless be universally communicable) can concern nothing but the proportion of the different degrees of attunement (tension) of the sense to which the sensation belongs, i.e., its tone. In this broad sense of the word it can be divided into the artful play of sensations of hearing and of sight, and hence into music and the art of color. —It is remarkable that these two senses, besides being receptive to impressions to the extent required for obtaining concepts of

external objects by means of them, are also capable of a special sensation connected with this, of which one cannot rightly determine whether it has sense or reflection as its ground. It is remarkable too that this affectability can sometimes be lacking, even though the sense is otherwise, as regards its use for the cognition of objects, not at all deficient but perhaps even exceptionally fine. That is, one cannot say with certainty whether a color or a tone (sound) is merely an agreeable sensation, or is in itself already a beautiful play of sensations and, as such, carries with it a satisfaction in the form in aesthetic judging. Consider the rapidity of the vibrations of light or, in the second case, of the air, which in all probability far exceeds our entire capacity to judge immediately in perception the proportion of the division of time they produce. One would then think that only the *effect* of these vibrations on the elastic parts of our body is sensed, while the *division of time* they produce is not noticed and
325 taken into our judging; and hence that only agreeableness, not beauty of composition, is connected with colors and tones. But consider, on the other hand, *first*, the mathematical element that can be stated about the proportion of these vibrations in music and about the judging of it, and judge contrasts of color, as is only fair, by analogy with music. Consult, *second*, the examples—rare as they are—of people who with the best sight in the world could not distinguish colors, and with the sharpest hearing could not distinguish tones; and, for those who can, the perception of a changed quality (not merely of the degree of sensation) at the different degrees of tension on the scale of colors or tones, as well as the fact that the number of these is fixed for *comprehensible* differences. Then one might find oneself compelled to regard the sensations of both not as mere sense impressions, but as the effect of a judging of form in the play of many sensations. The difference that one opinion or the other makes to our judging of the ground of music would, however, change only the definition: music would be explained either, as we have done, as the beautiful play of sensations (through hearing), or as a play of *agreeable* sensations. Only on the first mode

of explanation will music be represented entirely as a *fine* art; on the second, it will be represented (at least in part) as an *agreeable* art.

§ 52. COMBINING THE FINE ARTS

Arts can be combined in drama, song, opera and dance, but form must remain essential.

Oratory can be combined with a pictorial presentation of its subjects as well as of objects in a *drama*; poetry with music in *song*, and song at the same time with pictorial (theatrical) presentation in an *opera*; the play of sensations in music with the play of shapes in *dance*, and so on. The presentation of the sublime, too, insofar as it belongs to fine art, can be united with beauty in a *verse tragedy*, a *didactic poem* or an *oratorio*. In these combinations fine art is still more artful. But whether it is also more beautiful (since so many different kinds of satisfaction cut across one another) may be doubted in some of these cases. Yet in all fine [326] art the essential thing is the form that is purposive for observation and judging. Here the pleasure is at the same time culture and attunes the spirit to ideas, and so makes it receptive to more such pleasure and entertainment. The essential thing is not the matter of sensation (charm or emotion), where everything is aimed merely at enjoyment. Enjoyment leaves nothing behind in the idea; it makes the spirit dull, the object gradually loathsome, and the mind dissatisfied with itself and moody, through its consciousness that its attunement is counterpurposive in the judgment of reason.

If the fine arts are not brought, closely or remotely, into connection with moral ideas, which alone carry with them a self-sufficient satisfaction, then this latter is their eventual fate. They then serve only as a distraction, of which one comes to need ever more the more one uses it to drive away the mind's dissatisfaction with itself—by making oneself ever more useless and ever more dissatisfied with oneself. In general, the beauties

of nature are most conducive to the first purpose, if one is accustomed early on to observe, judge and admire them.

§ 53. THE RANKING OF THE FINE ARTS

Poetry ranks highest, oratory deserves no respect, and music ranks lowest in culture though highest in charm.

Among all the arts, *poetry* (which owes its origin almost entirely to genius and is least willing to be guided by precept or by examples) holds the highest rank. It expands the mind by setting the imagination free. Within the limits of a given concept, and among the unbounded manifold of possible forms that accord with it, it offers the one that links the presentation of this concept with an abundance of thought to which no linguistic expression is fully adequate; and so it raises itself aesthetically to ideas. It strengthens the mind by letting it feel its faculty—free, self-active and independent of determination by nature—of regarding and judging nature, as appearance, according to aspects that nature does not of itself offer in experience either to sense or to the understanding, and hence of using nature for the sake of the supersensible and, as it were, as its schema. It plays with [327] semblance, which it produces at will, yet without deceiving by it; for it declares its own occupation to be mere play, which can nonetheless be used purposively by the understanding and for its business.—Oratory, insofar as it is understood as the art of persuading, i.e., of deceiving by means of beautiful semblance (as *ars oratoria* [the art of oratory]), and not as mere well-spokenness (eloquence and style), is a dialectic. It borrows from poetry only as much as is needed to win minds over to the speaker, to his advantage, before they judge, and to rob their judgment of its freedom. It can therefore be recommended neither for the courtroom nor for the pulpit. For when it is a matter of civil laws, of the rights of individual persons, or of lasting instruction and determination of minds toward correct knowledge and conscientious observance of their duty, then it is beneath the dignity of so important a business to show even a

trace of exuberance of wit and imagination—and still more of the art of persuading and of winning people over to anyone's advantage. For although this art can sometimes be employed for intentions that are in themselves legitimate and praiseworthy, it nevertheless becomes objectionable because in this way maxims and dispositions are subjectively corrupted, even if the deed is objectively in conformity with law. For it is not enough to do what is right; one must also practice it solely on the ground that it is right. Moreover, the mere clear concept of these kinds of human affairs, combined with a lively presentation in examples, and without offending against the rules of euphony of language or of propriety of expression for ideas of reason (which together make up well-spokenness), already has in itself sufficient influence on human minds; there is no need to bring in the machinery of persuasion as well. Since this machinery can just as well be used to gloss over or conceal vice and error, it cannot entirely eradicate the secret suspicion of artful trickery. In poetry everything proceeds honestly and sincerely. It declares that it wishes to pursue a merely entertaining play with the imagination, and indeed one that agrees in form with the laws of the

understanding; and it does not seek to steal up on the understanding and ensnare it by sensible presentation.[17]

328 After poetry I would place—*if it is a matter of charm and of moving the mind*—the art that comes closest to it among the arts of speech and can also be combined with it very naturally, namely *music*. For although it speaks through nothing but sensations without concepts, and so, unlike poetry, leaves nothing over for reflection, it nevertheless moves the mind in more manifold ways and, though only transitorily, more intimately. But it is admittedly more enjoyment than culture (the play of thought that it arouses along the way is merely the effect of an association that is, as it were, mechanical); and, judged by reason, it has less worth than any other of the fine arts. Hence, like every enjoyment, it demands frequent change and does not bear repeated repetition without producing weariness. Its charm, which can be communicated so universally, seems to rest on the following: that every expression of language has, in context, a tone appropriate to its sense; that this tone more or less signifies an affect of the speaker and in turn produces one in the hearer as well, which then conversely arouses in the hearer the idea that is expressed in language with such a tone; and that,

17 KANT'S NOTE. I must confess that a beautiful poem has always given me pure gratification, whereas reading the best speech of a Roman popular orator or of a present-day parliamentary or pulpit orator was always mixed with the unpleasant feeling of disapproval of an insidious art—an art that knows how to move people like machines, in important matters, to a judgment that must lose all weight with them on calm reflection. Eloquence and well-spokenness (together, rhetoric) belong to fine art; but the art of the orator (*ars oratoria*), as the art of using people's weaknesses for one's own purposes (however well meant, or even actually good, these may be), deserves no *respect* whatever. Moreover, in Athens as in Rome, it rose to its highest level only at a time when the state was hastening toward its ruin and true patriotic thinking had died out. Whoever has clear insight into things, commands language in its richness and purity, and, with a fertile imagination capable of presenting his ideas, takes a lively, heartfelt interest in the true good, is the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* [the good man skilled in speaking]: the orator without art but full of force, as *Cicero* would have him—though Cicero himself did not always remain true to this ideal.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The formula goes back to Cato the Elder and is transmitted by Quintilian (*Institutio oratoria* XII.1.1); Cicero sketches his ideal orator in *De oratore*.

just as modulation is, as it were, a universal language of sensations intelligible to every human being, music exercises this language on its own and in its full force, namely as a language of the affects, and so, according to the law of association, universally communicates the aesthetic ideas naturally connected with it; but that, because those [329] aesthetic ideas are not concepts or determinate thoughts, the form of the composition of these sensations (harmony and melody) serves only in place of the form of a language. By means of a proportionate attunement of the sensations, it serves to express the aesthetic idea of a coherent whole of an unnameable abundance of thought, in accordance with a certain theme that constitutes the dominant affect of the piece. (Since in the case of tones this attunement rests on the ratio of the number of vibrations of the air in the same time, insofar as the tones are combined simultaneously or successively, it can be brought mathematically under certain rules.) On this mathematical form alone, although it is not represented through determinate concepts, depends the satisfaction that mere reflection on such a number of sensations, accompanying or following one another, connects with this play of theirs as a condition of its beauty valid for everyone. And it is this form alone by which taste may presume to claim a right to pronounce in advance on everyone's judgment.

But in the charm and the movement of the mind that music produces, mathematics certainly has not the slightest share. It is only the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of that proportion of the impressions, in their combination as well as in their alternation, which makes it possible to comprehend them together and to prevent them from destroying one another. Instead, they harmonize into a continuous movement and enlivening of the mind through affects consonant with them, and so into a comfortable self-enjoyment.

If, on the other hand, one estimates the worth of the fine arts by the culture they provide for the mind, and takes as the standard the expansion of the faculties that must come together in the power of judgment for cognition, then music has to that

extent the lowest place among the fine arts (just as it has perhaps the highest among those that are also estimated by their agreeableness), because it merely plays with sensations. In this respect, therefore, the formative arts are far ahead of it. For in setting the imagination into a play that is free and yet at the same time adequate to the understanding, they also carry on a business: they bring about a product that serves the concepts of the understanding as a lasting vehicle, one that commends itself to them, for promoting their union with sensibility and so, as it were, the urbanity of the higher cognitive powers. [330] The two kinds of art take quite different courses: music proceeds from sensations to indeterminate ideas; the formative arts from determinate ideas to sensations. The latter make a *lasting* impression, the former only a *transitory* one. The imagination can call the lasting impressions back and entertain itself agreeably with them; but the transitory ones either fade out entirely or, if the imagination involuntarily repeats them, are more burdensome to us than agreeable. Besides this, music has a certain lack of urbanity: chiefly because of the character of its instruments, it extends its influence further (into the neighborhood) than is wanted, and so, as it were, imposes itself, thereby infringing on the freedom of others outside the musical company. The arts that speak to the eyes do not do this, since one need only turn one's eyes away if one does not wish to let their impression in. It is almost the same here as with the delight given by a scent that spreads far and wide. Someone who pulls his perfumed handkerchief out of his pocket regales everyone around and beside him against their will, and compels them, if they want to breathe, to enjoy it as well; which is why the practice has gone out of fashion.[18]—Among the formative arts I would give the preference to painting: partly because, as the art of drawing, it underlies all the other formative arts; partly

18 KANT'S NOTE. Those who have recommended the singing of hymns as part of domestic devotions did not consider that by such *noisy* (and for that very reason usually pharisaical) devotion they impose a great burden on the public: they compel the neighborhood either to sing along or to abandon its own business of thinking.

because it can penetrate much further into the region of ideas, and also expand the field of intuition in accordance with them further, than the others are permitted to do.

§ 54. REMARK: GRATIFICATION AND LAUGHTER

Gratification from play, music and jokes is ultimately bodily, a furthering of the feeling of health.

Between *what pleases merely in judging* and what *gratifies* (pleases in sensation) there is, as we have often shown, an essential difference. The latter is something that one cannot require of everyone, as one can the former. Gratification (even though its cause may lie in ideas) seems always to consist in [331] a feeling of the promotion of the whole life of the human being, and hence also of bodily well-being, i.e., of health. So Epicurus, who declared all gratification to be at bottom bodily sensation, may to that extent not have been wrong; he merely misunderstood himself when he counted intellectual and even practical satisfaction among the gratifications. If one keeps this latter distinction in view, one can explain how a gratification can displease the very person who feels it (like the joy of a needy but right-thinking man at the inheritance from his loving but miserly father); or how a deep pain can nevertheless please the one who suffers it (a widow's grief at the death of her deserving husband); or how a gratification can please into the bargain (like the gratification in the sciences we pursue); or how a pain (e.g., hatred, envy and vindictiveness) can displease us in addition. The satisfaction or dissatisfaction here rests on reason and is the same as *approval* or *disapproval*; but gratification and pain can rest only on the feeling or prospect of a possible (on whatever ground) *well-being* or *ill-being*.

Every changing free play of sensations (which have no intention at their basis) gratifies, because it promotes the feeling of health—whether or not, in the judging of reason, we take satisfaction in its object or even in this gratification itself. And this gratification can rise to the level of affect, even though we take

no interest in the object itself, or at least none proportionate to the degree of the affect. We can divide these plays into the *game of chance*, the *play of tones* and the *play of thought*. The *first* requires an *interest*, whether of vanity or of self-interest, but one that is far from being as great as the interest in the way we try to obtain what we seek. The *second* requires merely the alternation of *sensations*, each of which has its relation to affect, but without the degree of an affect, and arouses aesthetic ideas. The *third* arises merely from the alternation of representations in the power of judgment; no thought carrying any interest with it is thereby produced, but the mind is nevertheless enlivened.

How gratifying games must be, without one's needing to base them on an interested intention, is shown by all our evening parties; for hardly any of them can keep itself entertained without a game. But the affects of hope, fear, joy, anger and scorn [332] are in play here, changing their roles at every moment. They are so lively that through them, as an inner motion, the whole business of life in the body seems to be promoted—as the cheerfulness of mind this produces proves—even though nothing has been won or learned. But since the game of chance is not a beautiful play, we will set it aside here. Music and material for laughter, on the other hand, are two kinds of play with aesthetic ideas, or also with representations of the understanding, by which in the end nothing is thought, and which can gratify vividly merely through their alternation. In this they make it fairly clear that the enlivening in both is merely bodily, even though it is aroused by ideas of the mind; and that the feeling of health, produced by a movement of the viscera corresponding to that play, makes up the whole gratification of a lively party—a gratification so highly praised as refined and spirited. It is not the judging of harmony in tones or in flashes of wit, which with its beauty serves only as the necessary vehicle. Rather, it is the promoted business of life in the body—the affect that moves the viscera and the diaphragm, in a word the feeling of health (which otherwise, without such an occasion, cannot be felt)—that makes up the gratification we find in being able to reach the

body through the soul as well, and to use the soul as the body's physician.

In music, this play goes from bodily sensation to aesthetic ideas (of the objects of affects), and from these back again to the body, but with united force. In jest (which, just as much as music, deserves to be counted among the agreeable rather than the fine arts), the play begins with thoughts which, taken together, also occupy the body insofar as they seek sensible expression. In this presentation the understanding does not find what it expected, and suddenly slackens. We feel the effect of this slackening in the body through the oscillation of the organs, which promotes the restoration of their equilibrium and has a beneficial influence on health.

LAUGHTER

Laughter is an affect arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing.

In everything that is to provoke lively, convulsive laughter there must be something absurd (in which, therefore, the understanding in itself can find no satisfaction). *Laughter is an affect arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing.* This very transformation is certainly not gratifying to the understanding, yet indirectly it gives very lively gratification for a moment. So the [333] cause must lie in the influence of the representation on the body and the body's reciprocal effect on the mind. It does not lie in the representation being objectively an object of gratification (for how can a disappointed expectation gratify?), but solely in the fact that, as a mere play of representations, it produces an equilibrium of the vital forces in the body.

Suppose someone tells this story. An Indian at the table of an Englishman in Surat saw a bottle of ale being opened and all the beer, turned into froth, pouring out. With many exclamations he showed his great astonishment. When the Englishman asked, "What is so very astonishing here?" he answered, "I am not astonished that it is coming out, but at how you managed to get

it in." We laugh, and it gives us hearty pleasure. This is not because we find ourselves cleverer than this ignorant man, or because of anything else in it that the understanding might let us notice as satisfying. It is because our expectation was strained and suddenly vanishes into nothing.[19] Or take the heir of a wealthy relative who wants to give him a truly solemn funeral, but complains that he cannot quite manage it: "The more money I give my mourners to look sad," he says, "the more cheerful they look." We laugh out loud, and the reason is that an expectation is suddenly transformed into nothing. It should be carefully noted that the expectation must be transformed not into the positive opposite of an expected object—for that is always something, and can often be distressing—but into nothing. For if someone arouses great expectation in us by telling a story, and at the end we immediately see that it is untrue, this displeases us—as, for example, the story of people who are said to have gone grey in a single night from great grief. Suppose, by contrast, that another wag replies to a story of this kind by telling at great length of a merchant's grief. Returning from India to Europe with his entire fortune in goods, the merchant was forced in a heavy storm to throw everything overboard, and he grieved so much that his *wig* turned grey that very night. Then we laugh, and it gives us gratification. We toss our own blunder about an object that is otherwise indifferent to us—or rather the idea we were pursuing—back and forth like a ball for a while longer, when we merely meant to catch it and hold it fast. It is [334] not, here, the exposure of a liar or a fool that arouses the gratification. For even on its own, the second story, told with feigned seriousness, would set a company roaring with laughter; and such an exposure would ordinarily not be worth attention either.

It is remarkable that in all such cases the joke must always contain something that can deceive for a moment. Hence, when the illusion vanishes into nothing, the mind looks back to try it

19 Surat, a port in western India, was the site of the English East India Company's first major trading post.

once more. Tension and relaxation follow each other rapidly, so that the mind is jerked back and forth and set oscillating. The snap away from what was, as it were, tightening the string happened suddenly, not by gradual slackening. So this oscillation must cause a movement of the mind, together with an inner bodily movement in harmony with it, which continues involuntarily and produces fatigue, but also cheerfulness (the effects of a motion conducive to health).

For suppose we assume that some movement in the organs of the body is harmoniously connected with every one of our thoughts. Then we can fairly well understand how the mind's sudden shift, now to one standpoint and now to another from which to regard its object, could correspond to an alternating tension and release of the elastic parts of our viscera, communicated to the diaphragm (like what ticklish people feel). The lungs then expel the air in rapidly succeeding bursts, and so produce a movement beneficial to health. This movement alone, and not what goes on in the mind, is the real cause of the gratification in a thought that at bottom represents nothing. — Voltaire said that heaven has given us two things to counterbalance the many hardships of life: *hope* and *sleep*. He could have added *laughter*, if only the means of provoking it in reasonable people were so readily at hand. But the wit or originality of humor it requires is as rare as the talent for writing in a way that is *brain-racking*, like mystical brooders, *breakneck*, like geniuses, or *heartbreaking*, like sentimental novelists (and indeed moralists of that sort), is common.[20]

So, it seems to me, we may well concede to Epicurus that all gratification is *animal*, i.e., bodily, sensation, even when it is occasioned by concepts that [335] arouse aesthetic ideas. This concession does not in the least detract from the *spiritual* feeling of respect for moral ideas. That feeling is not gratification but a self-esteem (of the humanity in us) that raises us above the need for gratification. Nor does the concession detract even from the less noble feeling of *taste*.

20 Voltaire (1694–1778) says this in his epic *La Henriade* (1728), Canto VII.

Something composed of both is found in *naïveté*. Naïveté is the outbreak of the sincerity originally natural to humanity against the art of dissimulation that has become second nature. We laugh at the simplicity that does not yet know how to dissemble. Yet we also rejoice at the simplicity of nature, which here thwarts that art. We expected the everyday custom of artificial utterance, carefully designed for a fair appearance—and behold! It is unspoiled, innocent nature, which we did not expect to meet at all, and which the person who let it show did not mean to reveal either. The fair but false illusion, which usually counts for a great deal in our judgment, is here suddenly transformed into nothing; the rogue in ourselves, as it were, is exposed. This produces a movement of the mind in two opposite directions, one after the other, which at the same time gives the body a wholesome shaking. But something infinitely better than all assumed custom—purity in the way of thinking (or at least the disposition to it)—has, after all, not been entirely extinguished in human nature. That fact mixes seriousness and high esteem into this play of the power of judgment. But because it is an appearance that manifests itself only briefly, and the veil of the art of dissimulation is soon drawn over it again, there is also mixed in a regret. This regret is an emotion of tenderness, which, as play, can very well be combined with such good-hearted laughter, and in fact usually is. It also usually compensates the person who supplies the material for the laughter for the embarrassment of not yet being worldly-wise in the manner of human beings.—An art of being *naïve* is therefore a contradiction. But to represent naïveté in a fictional character is quite possible, and is a fine art, though also a rare one. Naïveté must not be confused with candid simplicity, which does not artificially distort nature only because it does not understand what the art of social intercourse is.

Among the things that are enlivening, closely related to the gratification from laughter, and belonging to originality of spirit, but not exactly to the talent for fine art, we may also count the *humorous* manner. [336] *Humor* in the good sense means

the talent for being able to put oneself at will into a certain mental disposition. In this disposition all things are judged quite differently from usual (even the other way round), and yet in accordance with certain principles of reason appropriate to such a frame of mind. Someone who is involuntarily subject to such changes is *moody*. But someone who can adopt them at will and purposively (for the sake of a lively presentation by means of a contrast that provokes laughter) is called *humorous*, and so is his manner of delivery. This manner, however, belongs more to agreeable than to fine art. For the object of fine art must always show some dignity in itself, and therefore requires a certain seriousness in the presentation, just as taste requires it in the judging.

Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment

The antinomy of taste and its solution; beauty as the symbol of morality.

§ 55.

337 A power of judgment that is to be dialectical must first of all be rationalizing; that is, its judgments must lay claim to universality, and indeed *a priori*[1], for dialectic consists in the opposition of such judgments. Hence the incompatibility of aesthetic judgments of sense (about the agreeable and the disagreeable) is not dialectical. Nor does the conflict of judgments of taste constitute a dialectic of taste, insofar as each person appeals merely to his own taste, since no one intends to make his judgment a universal rule. So there remains no concept of a dialectic that could concern taste except that of a dialectic of the *critique* of taste (not of taste itself) with regard to its *principles*. For concerning the ground of the possibility of judgments of taste in general, mutually conflicting concepts arise naturally and unavoidably. A transcendental critique of taste will therefore contain a part that can bear the name of a dialectic of the aesthetic power of judgment only if an antinomy is found among

1 KANT'S NOTE. Any judgment that proclaims itself to be universal can be called a rationalizing judgment (*iudicium ratiocinans*), for to that extent it can serve as the major premise in a syllogism. A judgment of reason (*iudicium ratiocinatum*), on the other hand, can only be one that is thought of as the conclusion of a syllogism, and consequently as grounded *a priori*.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. *Iudicium ratiocinans*: "a reasoning judgment"; *iudicium ratiocinatum*: "a reasoned (concluded) judgment."

the principles of this faculty—one that makes its lawfulness, and hence also its inner possibility, doubtful.

§ 56. THE ANTINOMY OF TASTE

One commonplace says everyone has his own taste; another that taste can be argued about.

338 The first commonplace of taste is contained in the proposition with which everyone who lacks taste thinks to protect himself against criticism: *everyone has his own taste*. This amounts to saying: the determining ground of this judgment is merely subjective (gratification or pain), and the judgment has no right to the necessary assent of others.

The second commonplace of taste, used even by those who grant the judgment of taste the right to speak with validity for everyone, is: *there is no disputing about taste*. This amounts to saying: the determining ground of a judgment of taste may well be objective, but it cannot be brought to determinate concepts. Hence nothing can be *decided* about the judgment itself by proofs, although one can quite well, and rightly, *argue* about it. *Arguing* and *disputing* are alike in that both seek to bring judgments into agreement through their mutual resistance. They differ, however, in that disputing hopes to achieve this according to determinate concepts as grounds of proof, and thus assumes *objective concepts* as the grounds of the judgment. But where this is regarded as unfeasible, disputing is judged to be just as unfeasible.

It is easy to see that between these two commonplaces a proposition is missing. It is not in proverbial circulation, but it is nevertheless in everyone's mind: *there can be argument about taste* (although not disputation). This proposition, however, contains the opposite of the first one. For where it is to be permissible to argue, there must be hope of coming to agreement with one another. Hence one must be able to count on grounds of judgment that do not have merely private validity, and so are

not merely subjective—and the principle *everyone has his own taste* is directly opposed to this.

Thus the following antinomy emerges with regard to the principle of taste:

1) *Thesis*. The judgment of taste is not based on concepts; for otherwise it would be possible to dispute about it (to decide by means of proofs).

2) *Antithesis*. The judgment of taste is based on concepts; for otherwise it would not even be possible to [339] argue about it, despite the diversity of such judgments (to lay claim to the necessary agreement of others with this judgment).

§ 57. RESOLVING THE ANTINOMY OF TASTE

The judgment of taste rests on an indeterminate concept, the supersensible substrate of humanity.

These principles underlie every judgment of taste; they are nothing other than the two peculiarities of the judgment of taste presented above in the Analytic. There is no way of removing the conflict between them except by showing three things: that the concept to which the object is referred in this sort of judgment is not taken in the same sense in both maxims of the aesthetic power of judgment; that this twofold sense, or point of view in judging, is necessary for our transcendental power of judgment; but also that the illusion arising from confusing the one with the other is unavoidable, as a natural illusion.

The judgment of taste must refer to some concept or other; for otherwise it could not possibly lay claim to necessary validity for everyone. But it must not for that reason be provable *from* a concept. For a concept can be either determinable, or else in itself undetermined and at the same time indeterminable. The concept of the understanding is of the first kind: it is determinable by predicates of the sensible intuition that can correspond to it. The transcendental concept of reason of the supersensible, which underlies all such intuition, is of the second kind; it therefore cannot be further determined theoretically.

Now the judgment of taste concerns objects of the senses, but not in order to determine a *concept* of them for the understanding; for it is not a cognitive judgment. Hence, as an intuitive, singular representation related to the feeling of pleasure, it is only a private judgment. To that extent its validity would be restricted to the judging individual alone: the object is an object of satisfaction *for me*; for others it may be otherwise—everyone has his own taste.

Nevertheless, the judgment of taste undoubtedly contains an enlarged reference of the representation of the object (and at the same time of the subject), and on this we base an extension of this kind of judgment as necessary for everyone. Some concept or other must therefore necessarily lie at its [340] basis—but a concept that cannot be determined through intuition at all, through which nothing can be cognized, and by means of which, therefore, *no proof can be conducted* for the judgment of taste. Such a concept, however, is the mere pure concept of reason of the supersensible that underlies the object (and also the judging subject) as an object of sense, and hence as appearance. For if we did not assume such a reference, the claim of the judgment of taste to universal validity could not be saved. If the concept on which it is based were merely a confused concept of the understanding—of perfection, say—to which the sensible intuition of the beautiful could be attached as corresponding to it, then it would at least be possible in itself to base the judgment of taste on proofs. And that contradicts the thesis.

But all contradiction disappears if I say: the judgment of taste is based on a concept (of a ground in general of the subjective purposiveness of nature for the power of judgment), from which, however, nothing can be cognized and proved with regard to the object, because the concept is in itself indeterminable and unfit for cognition. Yet through this very concept the judgment at the same time acquires validity for everyone (though in each person as a singular judgment immediately accompanying the intuition). For its determining ground per-

haps lies in the concept of what can be regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity.

In resolving an antinomy, all that matters is the possibility that two propositions which apparently conflict do not in fact contradict each other but can coexist, even if explaining the possibility of their concept exceeds our cognitive faculty. From this it can also be made comprehensible that this illusion is natural and unavoidable for human reason, and likewise why it is so and remains so, even though it no longer deceives once the apparent contradiction has been resolved.

For in both conflicting judgments we take the concept on which the universal validity of a judgment must be based in one and the same meaning, and yet we assert two opposite predicates of it. The thesis should therefore say: The judgment of taste is not based on *determinate* concepts. The antithesis, however, should say: The judgment of taste is nevertheless based on a concept, although an *indeterminate* [341] one (namely, the concept of the supersensible substrate of appearances). And then there would be no conflict between them.

We can do no more than remove this conflict between the claims and counterclaims of taste. It is absolutely impossible to provide a determinate objective principle of taste by which its judgments could be guided, tested and proved; for then it would not be a judgment of taste. The subjective principle—namely, the indeterminate idea of the supersensible in us—can only be pointed out as the sole key to unriddling this faculty, whose sources are hidden even from ourselves. It cannot be made comprehensible by anything further.

The antinomy set out and settled here is based on the correct concept of taste, namely as a merely reflecting aesthetic power of judgment. On this concept the two apparently conflicting principles were reconciled, since *both can be true*—which is sufficient. Suppose, on the other hand, that the determining ground of taste were taken to be *agreeableness* (because of the singularity of the representation underlying the judgment of taste), as some do; or the principle of *perfection* (because of the judgment's uni-

versal validity), as others would have it; and suppose the definition of taste were framed accordingly. Then there arises an antinomy that can be settled in no other way than by showing that *both* propositions, which are opposed to each other (though not merely contradictorily), *are false*. And this then proves that the concept on which each is based contradicts itself. We see, then, that the removal of the antinomy of the aesthetic power of judgment takes a course similar to the one the Critique followed in resolving the antinomies of pure theoretical reason. We see, too, that here, just as in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the antinomies compel us against our will to look beyond the sensible and to seek in the supersensible the point where all our faculties *a priori* are united. For no other way remains of making reason consistent with itself.

REMARK I: AESTHETIC IDEAS AND IDEAS OF REASON

An aesthetic idea is an inexponible intuition; an idea of reason an indemonstrable concept.

Since in transcendental philosophy we so often have occasion to distinguish ideas from concepts of the understanding, it may be [342] useful to introduce technical terms suited to their difference. I trust no one will object if I propose some.—Ideas, in the most general sense, are representations referred to an object according to a certain (subjective or objective) principle, insofar as they can nevertheless never become a cognition of it. Either they are referred to an intuition according to a merely subjective principle of the harmony of the cognitive faculties with one another (imagination and understanding); they are then called *aesthetic*. Or they are referred to a concept according to an objective principle, but can nevertheless never yield a cognition of the object; they are then called ideas of reason. In this case the concept is a *transcendent* concept. It differs from a concept of the understanding, which can always be supplied with an adequately corresponding experience, and is therefore called *immanent*.

An *aesthetic idea* cannot become a cognition, because it is an *intuition* (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found. An *idea of reason* can never become a cognition, because it contains a *concept* (of the supersensible) for which no adequate intuition can ever be given.

Now I believe the aesthetic idea may be called an *inexponible* representation of the imagination, and the idea of reason an *indemonstrable* concept of reason. Of both it is presupposed that they are by no means groundless, but that (according to the explanation of an idea in general given above) they are produced in accordance with certain principles of the cognitive faculties to which they belong—the former in accordance with subjective principles, the latter with objective ones.[2]

Concepts of the understanding must as such always be demonstrable (if by demonstrating we understand, as in anatomy, merely *presenting*). That is, the object corresponding to them must always be capable of being given in intuition (pure or empirical), for only in this way can they become cognitions. The concept of *magnitude* can be given *a priori* in the intuition of space, e.g., of a straight line, and so on; the concept of *cause* in impenetrability, in the impact of bodies, and so on. Hence both can be supported by an empirical intuition, i.e., the thought of them can be shown (demonstrated, exhibited) in an example. And this must [343] be possible; otherwise we cannot be certain whether the thought is not empty, i.e., without any object at all.

In logic the expressions "demonstrable" and "indemonstrable" are commonly used only with regard to *propositions*. The former might better be designated as propositions that are only mediately certain, the latter as *immediately certain* ones. For pure philosophy, too, has propositions of both kinds, if by them we understand true propositions that are capable, and incapable, of proof. But although philosophy, as philosophy, can prove from grounds *a priori*, it cannot demonstrate—unless one wants to depart entirely from the meaning of the word. On that

2 "Inexponible": incapable of being expounded, i.e., brought to concepts, as Kant explains a few paragraphs below.

meaning, to demonstrate (*ostendere*, *exhibere* [to show, to display]) means to present one's concept at the same time in intuition (whether in proving or merely in defining). If the intuition is *a priori*, this is called constructing the concept; but if it is empirical, it is still the displaying of the object, by which objective reality is secured for the concept. Thus we say of an anatomist that he demonstrates the human eye when, by dissecting this organ, he makes intuitive the concept he had previously set out discursively.

Accordingly, the concept of reason of the supersensible substrate of all appearances in general, or of what must be laid at the basis of our faculty of choice in relation to moral laws—namely, of transcendental freedom—is already in kind an indemonstrable concept and an idea of reason. Virtue, however, is so in degree. For nothing at all corresponding in quality to the former can in itself be given in experience; whereas in the case of the latter, no product of that causality in experience reaches the degree that the idea of reason prescribes as the rule.

In an idea of reason, the *imagination* with its intuitions does not attain the given concept. In the same way, in an aesthetic idea, the *understanding* with its concepts never attains the complete inner intuition of the imagination that the imagination connects with a given representation. Now to bring a representation of the imagination to concepts is to *expound* it. So the aesthetic idea can be called an *inexponible* representation of the imagination (in its free play). I shall have occasion later to say a little more about ideas of this kind. For now I note only that both kinds [344] of ideas, ideas of reason as well as aesthetic ones, must have their principles, and both in reason—the former in the objective, the latter in the subjective principles of its use.

Accordingly, *genius* can also be explained as the faculty of *aesthetic ideas*. This also indicates the reason why in products of genius it is nature (the nature of the subject), not a deliberate end of art (the production of the beautiful), that gives the rule. For the beautiful must not be judged according to concepts, but according to the purposive attunement of the imagination to

agreement with the faculty of concepts in general. So it cannot be rule and precept, but only what is merely nature in the subject and cannot be captured under rules or concepts—that is, the supersensible substrate of all the subject's faculties (which no concept of the understanding reaches), and consequently that in relation to which it is the ultimate end, given by the intelligible in our nature, to bring all our cognitive faculties into harmony—that can serve as the subjective standard of that aesthetic yet unconditioned purposiveness in fine art which is to make a rightful claim to please everyone. Only in this way, too, is it possible that this purposiveness, for which no objective principle can be prescribed, should be based on a subjective and yet universally valid principle *a priori*.

REMARK II: THE THREE ANTINOMIES

Antinomies of understanding, judgment and reason all force us to treat sensible objects as appearances.

The following important remark presents itself here of its own accord. There are *three kinds of antinomy* of pure reason, but they all agree in this: they force reason to give up the otherwise very natural presupposition that the objects of the senses are things in themselves. Instead, reason must let them count merely as appearances and place beneath them an intelligible substrate (something supersensible, the concept of which is only an idea and admits of no cognition proper). Without such an antinomy, reason could never bring itself to accept a principle that so greatly narrows the field of its speculation, or to make sacrifices in which so many otherwise very dazzling hopes must entirely vanish. For even now, when a correspondingly greater use in a practical respect opens up to it as compensation for this loss, reason seems unable [345] to part from those hopes and free itself from its old attachment without pain.

That there are three kinds of antinomy has its ground in the fact that there are three cognitive faculties—understanding, the power of judgment and reason—each of which (as a higher cog-

nitive faculty) must have its principles *a priori*. Reason, insofar as it judges about these principles themselves and their use, relentlessly demands, with regard to all of them, the unconditioned for the given conditioned. Yet the unconditioned can never be found if the sensible is regarded as belonging to things in themselves, instead of having placed beneath it, as mere appearance, something supersensible (the intelligible substrate of nature outside us and within us) as a thing in itself. So there is, 1) an antinomy of reason with regard to the theoretical use of the understanding, up to the unconditioned, *for the cognitive faculty*; 2) an antinomy of reason with regard to the aesthetic use of the power of judgment, *for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure*; 3) an antinomy with regard to the practical use of reason, which is in itself legislative, *for the faculty of desire*. This holds insofar as all these faculties have their higher principles *a priori* and, in accordance with an unavoidable demand of reason, must also be able to judge and determine their object *unconditionally* according to these principles.

With regard to two of these antinomies—that of the theoretical use and that of the practical use of those higher cognitive faculties—we have already shown elsewhere their *unavoidability*, if such judgments do not look back to a supersensible substrate of the given objects as appearances; but also their *resolvability*, as soon as this is done. As for the antinomy in the use of the power of judgment in accordance with the demand of reason, and the resolution of it given here, there is no other way of avoiding it than this. *Either* one denies that any principle *a priori* underlies the aesthetic judgment of taste. Then every claim to the necessity of universal assent would be groundless, empty delusion, and a judgment of taste would deserve to be held correct only because it *happens* that many people agree about it. And even this, strictly speaking, would not be because an *a priori* principle is *suspected* behind this agreement, but because (as with the taste of the palate) the subjects happen by chance to be uniformly [346] organized; *or* one would have to assume that the judgment of taste is really a disguised judgment of reason about

the perfection discovered in a thing and in the relation of the manifold in it to an end. It would then be called aesthetic only because of the confusion that attaches to this reflection of ours, although at bottom it is teleological. In that case one could declare the resolution of the antinomy by means of transcendental ideas unnecessary and void, and could thus reconcile those laws of taste with the objects of the senses, taken not as mere appearances but also as things in themselves. But how little either of these evasions helps has been shown in several places in the exposition of judgments of taste.

If, however, our deduction is granted at least this much—that it proceeds on the right path, even if it has not yet been made clear enough in every respect—then three ideas emerge: *first*, that of the supersensible in general, without further determination, as the substrate of nature; *second*, that of the same, as the principle of the subjective purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculty; *third*, that of the same, as the principle of the ends of freedom and as the principle of the agreement of freedom with nature in the moral sphere.

§ 58. THE IDEALISM OF PURPOSIVENESS

The purposiveness of natural and artistic beauty lies in our judging, not in nature's intentions.

To begin with, one can locate the principle of taste in the fact that taste always judges according to empirical determining grounds, and thus according to grounds given only *a posteriori* through the senses; or one can grant that it judges from an *a priori* ground. The former would be the *empiricism* of the critique of taste, the latter its *rationalism*. On the *first* view, the object of our satisfaction would not differ from the *agreeable*; on the second, if the judgment rested on determinate concepts, it would not differ from the *good*. And so all *beauty* would be denied out of the world, and in its place would remain only a special name, perhaps for a certain mixture of the two kinds of satisfaction just mentioned. But [347] we have shown that there are also grounds of

satisfaction *a priori*, which can therefore coexist with the principle of rationalism, even though they cannot be captured in *determinate concepts*.

The rationalism of the principle of taste, on the other hand, is either that of the *realism* of purposiveness or that of its *idealism*. Now a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment, and beauty is not a property of the object considered in itself. So the rationalism of the principle of taste can never be located in the purposiveness in this judgment being thought of as objective—that is, in the judgment being directed theoretically, and hence also logically (even if only in a confused judging), at the perfection of the object. It can be located only in the judgment being directed *aesthetically*, in the subject, at the agreement of the object's representation in the imagination with the essential principles of the power of judgment in general. Consequently, even according to the principle of rationalism, the judgment of taste, and the difference between its realism and its idealism, can be located only in this. In the first case, that subjective purposiveness is assumed to be an actual (intentional) *end* of nature (or of art) to agree with our power of judgment. In the second case, it is assumed to be only a purposive agreement with the needs of the power of judgment, with regard to nature and its forms produced according to particular laws—an agreement that arises without an end, of its own accord and contingently.

The beautiful formations in the realm of organized nature speak very strongly in favor of the realism of the aesthetic purposiveness of nature—that is, of the assumption that the production of the beautiful was based on an idea of the beautiful in the producing cause, namely on an *end* in favor of our imagination. Consider flowers, blossoms, even the shapes of whole plants; the elegance of animal formations of every kind, unnecessary for their own use but, as it were, selected for our taste; above all, the variety and harmonious combination of colors (in the pheasant, in shellfish, in insects, down to the commonest flowers), so pleasing and charming to our eyes. Since these concern only the surface—and even there not the figure of the creatures, which

might still be required for their inner ends—they seem to be aimed entirely at outward contemplation. All this gives [348] great weight to the kind of explanation that assumes actual ends of nature for our aesthetic power of judgment.

Against this assumption, however, stands not only reason, with its maxim of avoiding everywhere, as far as possible, the unnecessary multiplication of principles. Nature too, in its free formations, everywhere shows so strong a mechanical tendency to produce forms that seem, as it were, made for the aesthetic use of our power of judgment. And it offers not the slightest ground for supposing that anything more is needed for this than its mechanism, merely as nature—according to which these forms can be purposive for our judging even without any idea underlying them. By a *free formation* of nature, however, I understand *one* in which, from a *fluid at rest*, a part of it evaporates or separates out (sometimes merely the matter of heat), and the remainder, in solidifying, takes on a determinate shape or fabric (figure or texture). This shape differs according to the specific difference of the materials, but is exactly the same for one and the same material. What is presupposed here is what is always understood by a true fluid: namely, that the matter is completely dissolved in it, i.e., that the fluid is not to be regarded as a mere mixture of solid particles merely suspended in it.[3]

The formation then takes place by *shooting together*, i.e., by sudden solidification—not by a gradual transition from the fluid to the solid state, but, as it were, by a leap. This transition is also called *crystallization*. The commonest example of this kind of formation is freezing water. In it, straight little rays of ice form first and join at angles of 60 degrees, while others attach themselves in the same way at every point on them, until all has turned to ice. During this time the water between the rays of ice does not gradually become more viscous. It remains as perfectly fluid as it would be at a far higher temperature, and yet it has the full coldness of ice. The matter that separates out, suddenly

3 Eighteenth-century chemistry treated heat as a subtle material substance ("caloric").

escaping at the moment of solidification, is a considerable quantity of caloric. Since this was required only for the fluid state, its departure leaves the ice that has now formed not the least bit colder than the water that was fluid in it shortly before.

Many salts, and likewise stones that have a crystalline figure, are produced in the same way from an earthy substance dissolved in water through who knows what [349] mediation. In the same way the druse-like configurations of many minerals—cubic galena, ruby silver ore and the like—are in all probability also formed in water and by the shooting together of their particles, when some cause or other compels them to leave this vehicle and unite with one another in determinate external shapes.

But internally, too, all materials that were fluid merely through heat and have become solid through cooling show a determinate texture when broken. This lets us judge that, had their own weight or contact with the air not prevented it, they would also have displayed externally the shape specifically peculiar to them. This has been observed in some metals which, after melting, had hardened on the outside while still fluid inside: the inner, still fluid part was drawn off, and the rest remaining inside then shot together undisturbed. Many of those mineral crystallizations—spar druses, hematite, *flos ferri*—often yield exceedingly beautiful shapes, such as art could only ever devise; and the Glory in the cave of Antiparos is merely the product of water seeping through layers of gypsum.[4]

Fluid matter, to all appearances, is in general older than solid, and both plants and animal bodies are formed from fluid nutritive matter insofar as it takes form at rest. In the latter case, to be sure, this happens first of all according to a certain original predisposition directed at ends (which, as will be shown in the second part, must be judged not aesthetically but teleologically, according to the principle of realism). But alongside this it perhaps also happens by shooting together and forming freely, in

4 The "Glory" was a huge stalagmite in the cave on the Cycladic island of Antiparos, much admired in eighteenth-century travel accounts.

accordance with the universal law of the affinity of materials. Watery fluids dissolved in an atmosphere, which is a mixture of different kinds of air, separate from it through loss of heat and produce snow figures. Depending on the composition of the air at the time, these figures are often of a very artful-seeming and exceedingly beautiful shape. In just the same way, without taking anything away from the teleological principle for judging organization, one may well think that the beauty of flowers, of birds' feathers and of shells, in shape as well as in color, can be ascribed to nature and its faculty of forming itself freely, without particular ends directed at this, according to chemical laws, through the deposition of the matter required for [350] organization—and forming itself in an aesthetically purposive way as well.

But what directly proves the principle of the *ideality* of purposiveness in the beauty of nature—the principle we always lay at the basis of the aesthetic judgment itself, and which does not allow us to use any realism of an end of nature for our power of representation as a ground of explanation—is this. In judging beauty in general, we seek its standard *a priori* within ourselves, and the aesthetic power of judgment is itself legislative with regard to the judgment whether something is beautiful or not. This could not be so if we assumed the realism of the purposiveness of nature. For then we would have to learn from nature what we ought to find beautiful, and the judgment of taste would be subject to empirical principles. For in such judging, what matters is not what nature is, or even what it is for us as an end, but how we receive it. If nature had formed its forms for our satisfaction, that would always be an objective purposiveness of nature. It would not be a subjective purposiveness resting on the play of the imagination in its freedom—where it is we who receive nature with favor, not nature that shows us favor. Nature has the property of offering us occasion to perceive the inner purposiveness in the relation of our mental powers when we judge certain of its products—a purposiveness, moreover, that is to be declared necessary and universally valid on the

basis of a supersensible ground. This property cannot be a natural end, or rather cannot be judged by us as one. For otherwise the judgment determined by it would be heteronomy, and would not be free and grounded in autonomy, as befits a judgment of taste.

In fine art the principle of the idealism of purposiveness can be recognized even more clearly. Fine art shares with beautiful nature the fact that no aesthetic realism of purposiveness through sensations can be assumed here (for then it would be merely agreeable art rather than fine art). But the satisfaction through aesthetic ideas must not depend on the attainment of determinate ends (as in mechanically intentional art), and consequently, even within the rationalism of the principle, it is the ideality of ends, not their reality, that lies at the basis. This is evident already from the fact that fine art as such must be regarded not as a [351] product of the understanding and of science, but of genius, and thus receives its rule through *aesthetic* ideas, which are essentially different from ideas of reason of determinate ends.

Just as the *ideality* of the objects of the senses as appearances is the only way to explain how their forms can be determined *a priori*, so the *idealism* of purposiveness in judging the beautiful in nature and in art is the one presupposition under which alone critique can explain the possibility of a judgment of taste that demands validity for everyone *a priori*, yet without grounding on concepts the purposiveness that is represented in the object.

§ 59. BEAUTY AS THE SYMBOL OF MORALITY

Symbols present ideas indirectly by analogy; in this way the beautiful symbolizes the morally good.

Intuitions are always required to establish the reality of our concepts. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called *examples*. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called *schemata*. But if one goes so far as to

demand that the objective reality of the concepts of reason, i.e., of ideas, be established, and established for the sake of theoretical cognition of them, then one is asking for something impossible, because absolutely no intuition adequate to them can be given.

All *hypotyposis* (presentation, *subiectio sub adspectum*), as making something sensible, is of two kinds. It is either *schematic*, when the intuition corresponding to a concept grasped by the understanding is given *a priori*. Or it is *symbolic*, when a concept that only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, has an intuition placed under it. In that case the power of judgment proceeds with this intuition in a way merely analogous to what it observes in schematizing. That is, its procedure agrees with schematizing merely in the rule of the procedure, not in the intuition itself, and hence merely in the form of the reflection, not in its content.[5]

Recent logicians have adopted a use of the word *symbolic* in which it is opposed to the *intuitive* mode of representation. But this use is wrong and distorts the word's meaning, for the symbolic is only a species of the intuitive. The intuitive can in fact be divided into the *schematic* and the *symbolic* modes of representation. [352] Both are hypotyposes, i.e., presentations (*exhibitiones*). They are not mere *characterizations*, i.e., designations of concepts by accompanying sensible signs. Such signs contain nothing at all that belongs to the intuition of the object. Following the law of association of the imagination, they merely serve the concepts as a means of reproduction, and hence serve a subjective purpose. Signs of this kind are either words or visible (algebraic, even gestural) signs, as mere *expressions* for concepts[6].[7]

5 *Hypotyposis* is a Greek rhetorical term for vivid presentation; the Latin *subiectio sub adspectum* means "placing before the eyes."

6 KANT'S NOTE. The intuitive in cognition must be opposed to the discursive, not to the symbolic. The intuitive, in turn, is either *schematic*, by *demonstration*, or *symbolic*, as representation according to a mere *analogy*.

7 Kant probably has in mind Leibniz and his followers (Wolff, Baumgarten), who contrasted "symbolic" cognition through signs with "intuitive" cognition.

All intuitions that are placed under *a priori* concepts are therefore either *schemata* or *symbols*. The former contain direct presentations of the concept, the latter indirect ones. The former do this demonstratively. The latter do it by means of an analogy, for which empirical intuitions are also used. In such an analogy the power of judgment performs a double task. First it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition. Then, second, it applies the mere rule of reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol. Thus a monarchical state is represented by an animate body if it is ruled according to laws internal to the people, but by a mere machine (such as a hand mill) if it is ruled by a single absolute will. In both cases, however, it is represented only *symbolically*. For there is no similarity between a despotic state and a hand mill, but there certainly is one between the rules for reflecting on the two and on their causality. This task has so far received little analysis, however much it deserves deeper investigation; but this is not the place to dwell on it. Our language is full of such indirect presentations according to an analogy, in which the expression contains not the actual schema for the concept but merely a symbol for reflection. Thus the words *ground* (support, base), *depend* (be held from above), and from this *flow* (instead of follow), *substance* (in Locke's phrase, the bearer of accidents), and countless others are not schematic but symbolic hypotyposes. They are expressions for concepts not by means of a direct intuition but only according to an analogy with one. That is, they transfer reflection on [353] an object of intuition to an entirely different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond.[8] A mere mode of representation may perhaps already be called cognition. This is certainly permissible if it is a principle not of the theoretical determination of the object, of what it is in itself, but of the practical determination of what the idea of it ought to become for us and for the purposive

8 John Locke (1632–1704), English philosopher, in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), II.23, describes substance as the unknown "support" of qualities.

use of that idea. If so, then all our cognition of God is merely symbolic. Whoever takes it as schematic, together with the properties of understanding, will, and so on, which prove their objective reality only in beings of this world, falls into anthropomorphism. Likewise, if he leaves out everything intuitive, he falls into deism, through which nothing at all is cognized, not even from a practical point of view.

THE SYMBOL OF THE MORALLY GOOD

The beautiful pleases with a claim on everyone's assent only as the symbol of the morally good.

Now I say: the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good. And only in this respect (a relation that is natural to everyone, and that everyone also expects of others as a duty) does it please with a claim to the assent of everyone else. In this the mind is at the same time conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere receptivity to a pleasure from sensory impressions, and it esteems the worth of others, too, by a similar maxim of their power of judgment. This is the *intelligible*, toward which, as the previous section indicated, taste looks out. It is that, namely, in which even our higher cognitive faculties come into accord. Without it, sheer contradictions would arise between the nature of these faculties and the claims that taste makes. In this faculty the power of judgment does not see itself subjected to a heteronomy of empirical laws, as it otherwise does in empirical judging. With regard to the objects of so pure a satisfaction it gives the law to itself, just as reason does with regard to the faculty of desire. Both because of this inner possibility in the subject and because of the outer possibility of a nature that agrees with it, the power of judgment sees itself related to something in the subject itself and outside it. This something is neither nature nor freedom, yet it is connected with the ground of freedom, namely the supersensible. In the supersensible, the theoretical faculty is bound together with the practical into a unity, in a way that is common to both and unknown. We shall cite a few

points of this analogy, while also not leaving the differences unnoticed.

1) The beautiful pleases *immediately* (but only in reflecting 354
intuition, not, as morality does, in the concept). 2) It pleases *without any interest* (the morally good is indeed necessarily bound up with an interest, but not with one that precedes the judgment on the satisfaction; rather, with one that this judgment first brings about). 3) In judging the beautiful, the *freedom* of the imagination (hence of our faculty in its sensibility) is represented as in accord with the lawfulness of the understanding (in moral judgment, the freedom of the will is thought as the agreement of the will with itself according to universal laws of reason). 4) The subjective principle of judging the beautiful is represented as *universal*, i.e., as valid for everyone, but as not recognizable through any universal concept (the objective principle of morality is also declared universal, that is, valid for all subjects and at the same time for all actions of the same subject, and moreover recognizable through a universal concept). Hence moral judgment is not only capable of determinate constitutive principles, but is possible *only* by grounding its maxims on these principles and their universality.

Attention to this analogy is customary even for the common understanding, and we often call beautiful objects of nature or of art by names that seem to rest on a moral judging. We call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, or meadows laughing and joyful. Even colors are called innocent, modest, tender, because they arouse sensations that contain something analogous to the consciousness of a state of mind produced by moral judgments. Taste makes possible, as it were, the transition from sensory charm to habitual moral interest without too violent a leap. For it represents the imagination, even in its freedom, as purposively determinable for the understanding, and it teaches us to find a free satisfaction even in objects of the senses, even without sensory charm.

§ 60. APPENDIX: THE METHOD OF TASTE

Taste is cultivated not by precepts but by the humanities and, above all, by developing moral feeling.

The division of a critique into a doctrine of elements and a doctrine of method, which precedes science, cannot be applied to the critique of taste [355], because there neither is nor can be a science of the beautiful, and the judgment of taste cannot be determined by principles. As for the scientific element in every art, which aims at *truth* in the presentation of its object, this is indeed the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of fine art, but it is not fine art itself. For fine art, therefore, there is only a manner (*modus*), not a *method of teaching* (*methodus*). The master must show by example what the pupil is to produce and how. The universal rules under which he ultimately brings his procedure can serve to remind the pupil of its main moments now and then, rather than to prescribe them to him. Even so, regard must be had here to a certain ideal that art must keep in view, even though in practice it never fully attains it. The pupil's imagination must be awakened to adequacy to a given concept. The inadequacy of the expression for the idea must be pointed out, an idea that the concept itself does not reach, because the idea is aesthetic. And there must be sharp criticism. Only in these ways can one prevent the pupil from at once taking the examples set before him as prototypes, as models for imitation perhaps subject to no still higher norm and to no judgment of his own. Otherwise genius would be stifled, and with it the freedom of the imagination itself in its lawfulness. Without this freedom no fine art is possible, not even a correct taste of one's own for judging it.

The propaedeutic to all fine art, insofar as it aims at the highest degree of its perfection, seems to lie not in precepts but in the cultivation of the mental powers through the preparatory studies called the *humaniora*. Presumably this is because *humanity* means, on the one hand, the universal *feeling of sympathy*

and, on the other, the capacity to *communicate* oneself most inwardly and universally. Taken together, these properties constitute the sociability befitting humankind, by which it distinguishes itself from the narrow limits of animals.[9] Consider the age, and the peoples, in which the lively drive toward *lawful* sociability, by which a people constitutes a lasting commonwealth, wrestled with the great difficulties surrounding the hard task of uniting freedom (and hence also equality) with a constraint (one more of respect and submission from duty than of fear). Such an age and such a people had [356] to be the first to invent the art of the reciprocal communication of ideas between the most cultivated part and the cruder part. They had to invent the attunement of the breadth and refinement of the former to the natural simplicity and originality of the latter. In this way they had to invent that mean between higher culture and contented nature which constitutes the right standard for taste, too, as the universal human sense, a standard that no universal rules can specify.

A later age will hardly make those models dispensable. For it will be ever less close to nature, and in the end, lacking lasting examples of it, it might scarcely be able to form a concept of the happy union, in one and the same people, of the lawful constraint of the highest culture with the force and rightness of free nature that feels its own worth.

But taste is basically a faculty for judging how moral ideas are made sensible (by means of a certain analogy of reflection on both). From this, and from the greater receptivity to the feeling arising from moral ideas (which is called moral feeling) that is to be grounded on it, derives the pleasure that taste declares valid for humanity in general, and not merely for each person's private feeling. It is therefore evident that the true propaedeutic for grounding taste is the development of moral ideas and the cultivation of moral feeling. For only when sensibility is brought

9 *Humaniora*: Latin, "the more humane studies," i.e., the humanities, above all classical Greek and Latin literature.

into accord with this feeling can genuine taste take on a determinate, unchangeable form.

Analytic of Teleological Judgment

Objective purposiveness: living things as natural ends, organized beings whose parts exist through and for one another.

§ 61. VON DER OBJECTIVEN ZWECKMÄSSIGKEIT DER NATUR.

[359] On transcendental principles we have good reason to assume a subjective purposiveness of nature in its particular laws, for its comprehensibility to the human power of judgment and for the possibility of connecting particular experiences into a system. We may then expect that among nature's many products there could also be some that, as if they had been designed quite expressly for our power of judgment, contain specific forms suited to it. Through their manifoldness and unity these forms serve, as it were, to strengthen and entertain the mental powers (which are in play in the use of this faculty), and so we give them the name of *beautiful* forms.

But that things in nature serve one another as means to ends, and that their very possibility is sufficiently intelligible only through this kind of causality: for this we have no ground whatever in the universal idea of nature as the sum total of objects of the senses. In the case above, the representation of things, being something in us, could quite well be thought, even *a priori*, as fitted and suitable for the inwardly purposive attunement of our cognitive faculties. But ends that are not our own, and that do not belong to nature either (which we do not take to be an intelligent being), could or should still constitute a particular kind of causality, or at least an entirely distinctive lawfulness of it. How this might be cannot be presumed *a priori* with

any justification at all. What is more, not even experience can prove to us that such ends are actual, unless some subtle reasoning has come first. Such reasoning merely slips the concept of an end into [360] the nature of things, without taking it from the objects and our empirical cognition of them. It therefore uses the concept more to make nature comprehensible by analogy with a subjective ground of the connection of representations in us than to cognize nature from objective grounds.

Moreover, objective purposiveness, as a principle of the possibility of things in nature, is so far from being *necessarily* connected with the concept of nature that it is precisely what one chiefly appeals to in order to prove from it the contingency of nature and of its form. Suppose one cites, for example, the structure of a bird: the hollowness of its bones, the position of its wings for movement and of its tail for steering, and so on. Then one says that all this is contingent in the highest degree according to the mere *nexus effectivus* in nature, without calling on a special kind of causality, namely that of ends (*nexus finalis*). That is,[1] one says that nature, considered as mere mechanism, could have formed itself differently in a thousand ways without hitting precisely upon unity according to such a principle. One may therefore hope to find even the least ground for it *a priori* only outside the concept of nature, not within it.

Nonetheless teleological judging is rightly brought into the investigation of nature, at least problematically. But this is only in order to bring nature under principles of observation and inquiry by *analogy* with causality according to ends, without presuming to *explain* it thereby. Teleological judging therefore belongs to reflecting, not to determining, judgment. The concept of combinations and forms in nature according to ends is at least *one more principle* for bringing its appearances under rules where the laws of causality according to its mere mechanism fall short. For we cite a teleological ground when we ascribe causality with regard to an object to a concept of the object, as if

1 *Nexus effectivus*: Latin, the connection of efficient causes; *nexus finalis*: the connection of final causes, or ends.

that concept were to be found in nature (not in us). Or rather, we do so when we represent the possibility of the object by analogy with such a causality (of the kind we find in ourselves), and so think of nature as *technical* through a faculty of its own. If, by contrast, we did not ascribe such a way of acting to nature, its causality would have to be represented as blind mechanism. Suppose, on the other hand, that we attributed *intentionally acting* causes to nature. We would then be grounding [361] teleology not merely in a *regulative* principle for merely *judging* appearances, which nature could be thought to be subject to according to its particular laws, but thereby also in a *constitutive* principle for *deriving* its products from their causes. In that case the concept of a natural end would no longer belong to reflecting judgment but to determining judgment. But then it would in fact not belong peculiarly to the power of judgment at all (as the concept of beauty, as formal subjective purposiveness, does). Instead, as a concept of reason, it would introduce into natural science a new causality, one that we merely borrow from ourselves and ascribe to other beings, without wanting to assume, however, that they are of the same kind as we are.

§ 62. MERELY FORMAL PURPOSIVENESS

The purposive properties of geometrical figures are objective but formal, and need no end behind them.

[362] All geometrical figures drawn according to a principle display a manifold, often admired objective purposiveness, namely a suitability for solving many problems by a single principle, and each of them, too, in infinitely many different ways. The purposiveness here is evidently objective and intellectual, not merely subjective and aesthetic. For it expresses the suitability of the figure for producing many intended shapes, and it is cognized through reason. Yet this purposiveness does not make the concept of the object itself possible; that is, it is not regarded as possible merely with respect to this use.

In so simple a figure as the circle lies the ground for solving a multitude of problems, each of which on its own would require various preparations. The solution arises, as it were, of itself, as one of the infinitely many excellent properties of this figure. If, for example, the task is to construct a triangle from a given base and the angle opposite it, the problem is indeterminate, i.e., it can be solved in infinitely many ways. But the circle comprehends them all together, as the geometrical locus of all triangles that satisfy this condition. Or suppose two lines are to intersect in such a way that the rectangle formed from the two parts of the one equals the rectangle formed from the two parts of the other. To all appearances, solving this problem is very difficult. But all lines that intersect inside the circle, whose [363] circumference bounds each of them, divide of their own accord in this proportion. The other curved lines in turn furnish other purposive solutions, which were not in the least thought of in the rule that makes up their construction. All the conic sections, by themselves and compared with one another, are fruitful in principles for solving a multitude of possible problems, however simple the definition that determines their concept. —It is a true joy to see the zeal with which the ancient geometers investigated these properties of lines of this kind, without letting themselves be led astray by the question of narrow minds as to what use such knowledge might be. They studied, for example, the properties of the parabola without knowing the law of gravity on earth, which would have shown them how to apply it to the trajectory of heavy bodies (whose direction of gravity can be regarded as parallel throughout their motion). Or they studied those of the ellipse without suspecting that gravity is also to be found in the heavenly bodies, and without knowing its law at different distances from the point of attraction, which makes these bodies describe this line in free motion. While they were thus working for posterity, without knowing it, they delighted in a purposiveness in the essence of things that they could nonetheless present completely *a priori* in its necessity. Plato, himself a master of this science, was carried into enthusiasm by

such an original constitution of things, which we can discover without any experience at all. He was carried away, too, by the mind's capacity to draw the harmony of beings from their supersensible principle (to which must be added the properties of numbers, with which the mind plays in music). This enthusiasm raised him above empirical concepts to ideas that seemed to him explicable only through an intellectual communion with the origin of all beings. No wonder he banished from his school anyone ignorant of geometry, since he thought to derive from pure intuition, dwelling within the human mind, what Anaxagoras inferred from objects of experience and their purposive connection. For there is something purposive that is constituted as if it had been intentionally arranged for our use, yet seems to belong originally to the essence of things without any regard to our use. In the necessity of this lies precisely the ground of our great admiration of nature, not so much outside us as in our own reason. And it is surely [364] forgivable that this admiration, through misunderstanding, may gradually have risen to the point of fanaticism.[2]

This intellectual purposiveness, however, although it is objective (not subjective, like the aesthetic), can nonetheless be quite well comprehended, as regards its possibility, as merely formal (not real): that is, as purposiveness without any need to base it on an end, and hence without any need for teleology. But it can be comprehended only in general. The figure of the circle is an intuition that has been determined by the understanding according to a principle. I adopt this principle at will and lay it down as a concept. Its unity, applied to a form of intuition (space) that is likewise found in me merely as a representation, and indeed *a priori*, makes comprehensible the unity of many rules that result from the construction of that concept and are purposive for all sorts of possible aims. And it does so without my needing to attribute an *end*, or any other ground, to this pur-

2 The entrance to Plato's Academy was said to bear the words "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter." Anaxagoras (c. 500–428 BC), Presocratic philosopher, made mind (*nous*) the orderer of the world.

posiveness. It is quite different when, in a sum total of *things* outside me enclosed within certain bounds, a garden, for example, I find order and regularity of the trees, flowerbeds, paths, and so on, which I cannot hope to infer *a priori* from marking off a space according to some rule of my choosing. For these are existing things, which must be given empirically in order to be cognized, and not a mere representation in me determined according to a principle *a priori*. Hence the latter (empirical) purposiveness, as *real*, depends on the concept of an end.

But even the ground of our admiration for a purposiveness, one that is admittedly perceived in the essence of things (insofar as their concepts can be constructed), can be very well understood, and indeed understood as legitimate. The manifold rules whose unity (from one principle) arouses this admiration are all synthetic. They do not follow from a *concept* of the object, e.g., of the circle, but require that this object be given in intuition. Through this, however, their unity takes on the appearance of having, empirically, an external ground of the rules distinct from our power of representation. It then looks as if the agreement of the object with the understanding's own need for rules were contingent in itself, and so possible only through an end expressly directed toward it. Now this very [365] harmony, because despite all this purposiveness it is cognized not empirically but *a priori*, ought of itself to bring us to see the following. Space, through whose determination (by means of the imagination in accordance with a concept) alone the object was possible, is not a property of things outside me but merely a mode of representation in me. So in the figure that I draw *in conformity with a concept*, i.e., in my own mode of representing what is given to me externally, whatever it may be in itself, it is I who *bring the purposiveness into* it. I am not taught about it empirically by what is given; consequently, I need no particular end outside me in the object for that purposiveness. But this reflection already requires a critical use of reason, and so it cannot be contained straightaway in the judging of the object according to its proper-

ties. That judging, therefore, gives me immediately nothing but the unification of heterogeneous rules (even in what is dissimilar about them) in one principle. And I nonetheless cognize this principle *a priori* as true, without its requiring any particular ground lying outside my concept and, in general, outside my *a priori* representation. Now *astonishment* is a jolt the mind receives from the incompatibility of a representation, and of the rule given by it, with the principles already underlying it in the mind. It therefore produces a doubt as to whether one has seen or judged correctly. *Admiration*, however, is an astonishment that keeps recurring even after this doubt has vanished. Admiration is therefore an entirely natural effect of that observed purposiveness in the essence of things (as appearances), and to that extent it cannot be faulted either. For the union of that form of sensible intuition (called space) with the faculty of concepts (the understanding) is not only inexplicable to us, in being precisely this union and no other. It also expands the mind, letting it sense, as it were, something lying beyond those sensible representations, in which the ultimate ground of that accord may be found, though it is unknown to us. We do not, indeed, need to know this ground when we are concerned merely with the formal purposiveness of our representations *a priori*. But even having to look out in that direction instills admiration for the object that compels us to do so.

It is customary to call the properties just mentioned, of geometrical [366] shapes and also of numbers, *beauty*, because of a certain *a priori* purposiveness they have for all sorts of cognitive use, a purposiveness not to be expected from the simplicity of their construction. People speak, for example, of this or that *beautiful* property of the circle, discovered in this or that way. But it is not an aesthetic judging through which we find them purposive. It is not a judging without a concept that makes noticeable a merely *subjective* purposiveness in the free play of our cognitive faculties. It is rather an intellectual judging according to concepts, which clearly reveals an objective purposiveness, i.e., suitability for all sorts of (infinitely manifold)

ends. One ought to call it a *relative perfection* of the mathematical figure rather than a beauty. Nor can the expression *intellectual beauty* properly be permitted at all. Otherwise the word beauty would have to lose all determinate meaning, or intellectual satisfaction would have to lose all its superiority over sensible satisfaction. One could more readily call a *demonstration* of such properties beautiful. For through it the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, and the imagination, as the faculty of presenting them *a priori*, feel themselves strengthened (which, together with the precision that reason brings to it, is called its elegance). Here at least the satisfaction is subjective, although its ground lies in concepts, whereas perfection carries with it an objective satisfaction.

§ 63. RELATIVE PURPOSIVENESS

Usefulness of one natural thing for another does not justify judging it an end of nature.

Experience leads our power of judgment to the concept of an objective and material purposiveness, i.e., to the concept of an end of nature, only when a relation of cause to effect is to be judged[3] that we find ourselves [367] able to see as lawful only by placing the idea of the effect at the basis of the causality of its cause, as the condition, underlying that causality itself, of the possibility of the effect. This can happen in two ways. Either we regard the effect directly as a product of art, or we regard it only as material for the art of other possible natural beings. That is, we regard it either as an end or as a means to the purposive use of other causes. The latter purposiveness is called usefulness (for human beings) or benefit (for any other creature), and it is merely relative, whereas the former is an inner purposiveness of the natural being.

3 KANT'S NOTE. In pure mathematics there can be no talk of the existence of things, but only of their possibility, namely of an intuition corresponding to their concept; hence there can be no talk at all of cause and effect. It follows that all the purposiveness observed there must be regarded merely as formal, never as a natural end.

Rivers, for example, carry along all kinds of soil useful for the growth of plants, which they deposit sometimes inland and often at their mouths. On some coasts the tide carries this silt over the land or deposits it on the shore. And especially if human beings help, so that the ebb tide does not carry it away again, the fertile land increases, and the plant kingdom gains ground where fish and shellfish used to live. Most extensions of land in this way have probably been carried out by nature itself, and it still continues to do so, though slowly. —Now the question is whether this is to be judged an end of nature, since it contains a usefulness for human beings. For the usefulness for the plant kingdom itself cannot be taken into account, because as much is taken away from sea creatures as the land gains in advantage.

Or, to give an example of the benefit of certain natural things as means for other creatures (if these are presupposed as ends): no soil is more favorable to pines than sandy soil. Now the ancient sea, before it withdrew from the land, left behind so many tracts of sand in our northern regions that extensive pine forests have been able to spring up on this soil, otherwise so useless for any cultivation; and we often blame our ancestors for their unreasonable clearing of these forests. And here one may ask whether this primeval deposit of layers of sand was an end of nature for the sake of the pine forests that could grow on it. This much is clear: if one assumes the forests to be an end of nature, one must grant that the sand is one too, but only a relative end, for which in turn the ancient seashore and its withdrawal were the means. For in the series of subordinated members of a connection of ends, each intermediate member must be regarded as [368] an end (though not, indeed, as a final end), for which its proximate cause is the means. In the same way, if there were to be cattle, sheep, horses, and so on in the world, then there had to be grass on earth. But saltworts also had to grow in sandy deserts if camels were to thrive, and these and other grass-eating species had to be found in abundance if there were to be wolves, tigers, and lions. Hence the objective purposiveness that is grounded on benefit is not an objective purpos-

iveness of things in themselves. It is not as if the sand, taken by itself, could not be comprehended as an effect of its cause, the sea, without attributing an end to the sea and without regarding the effect, namely the sand, as a work of art. It is a merely relative purposiveness, merely contingent to the thing itself to which it is ascribed. And although, among the examples cited, the grasses by themselves are to be judged as organized products of nature, and hence as artful, they are nevertheless regarded as mere raw matter in relation to the animals that feed on them.

But suppose, further, that the human being, through the freedom of his causality, finds natural things beneficial for his often foolish purposes (colorful bird feathers to adorn his clothing, colored earths or plant juices for cosmetics), and sometimes for rational purposes too: the horse for riding, the bull, and in Minorca even the donkey and the pig, for plowing. Here one cannot assume even a relative natural end (for this use). For his reason knows how to make things agree with his arbitrary whims, for which he himself was not even predestined by nature. Only *if* one assumes that human beings were meant to live on earth must at least the means not be lacking without which they could not subsist as animals, and even as rational animals (to however low a degree). But in that case the natural things that are indispensable for this purpose would also have to be regarded as natural ends.

From this it is easy to see that external purposiveness (the benefit of one thing for others) can be regarded as an external natural end only on one condition: that the existence of that for which it is beneficial, proximately or remotely, is by itself an end of nature. But since this can never be settled by mere contemplation of nature, it follows that relative purposiveness, [369] although it points hypothetically to natural ends, nevertheless justifies no absolute teleological judgment.

In cold countries snow protects the crops against frost. It makes contact between people easier (by means of sleighs). The Sámi find animals there that make this contact possible (reindeer). These find enough nourishment in a dry moss that

they must scrape out from under the snow themselves, and yet they are easily tamed and willingly let themselves be deprived of the freedom in which they could quite well sustain themselves. For other peoples in the same frigid zone, the sea holds a rich store of animals. Besides the food and clothing these animals supply, and the wood that the sea, as it were, floats to these peoples for their dwellings, the animals also supply them with fuel to heat their huts. Here, then, is an admirable convergence of so many relations of nature to one end; and this end is the Greenlander, the Sámi, the Nenets, the Yakut, and so on. But one does not see why human beings have to live there at all. So to say that it is *for this reason* that vapors fall from the air in the form of snow, that the sea has its currents carrying there the wood grown in warmer lands, and that great oil-filled sea creatures are there, *because* the cause that brings about all these natural products is based on the idea of an advantage for certain poor creatures, would be a very rash and arbitrary judgment.[4] For even if all this natural usefulness did not exist, we would find nothing lacking in the adequacy of natural causes to this constitution of things. On the contrary, merely to demand such an arrangement and to ascribe such an end to nature would seem to us ourselves presumptuous and ill-considered (since it was, after all, only the most extreme discord among human beings that could have scattered them into such inhospitable regions).

§ 64. THINGS AS NATURAL ENDS

A thing is a natural end if it is cause and effect of itself, as a tree is.

Suppose we are to see that a thing is possible only as an end, that is, that the causality of its origin must be sought not in the mechanism of nature but in a cause whose faculty of acting is determined by concepts [370] . For this it is required that its form not be possible according to mere natural laws, i.e., laws that we

4 Arctic peoples: the Inuit of Greenland, the Sámi of northern Scandinavia, the Nenets of northern Russia, and the Yakuts (Sakha) of eastern Siberia.

can cognize through the understanding alone, applied to objects of the senses. Rather, even the empirical cognition of this form, as regards its cause and effect, must presuppose concepts of reason. Reason must recognize, in every form of a natural product, also the necessity of that form, if it wants even just to understand the conditions connected with the product's generation; and yet in that given form it cannot assume this necessity. This *contingency* of the thing's form under all empirical laws of nature, in relation to reason, is itself a ground for assuming the thing's causality as if, precisely for that reason, it were possible only through reason. But reason is then the faculty of acting according to ends (a will); and the object that is represented as possible only from this faculty would be represented as possible only as an end.

Suppose someone, in a country that seemed to him uninhabited, perceived a geometrical figure drawn in the sand, say a regular hexagon. His reflection, working on a concept of it, would become aware, though obscurely, of the unity of the principle of its production by means of reason. In accordance with this, he would not judge the sand, the nearby sea, the winds, or even animals, with the footprints he knows, or any other cause lacking reason, to be a ground of the possibility of such a shape: for the contingency of coinciding with such a concept, which is possible only in reason, would seem to him so infinitely great that it would be just as if there were no natural law for it at all. Consequently no cause in merely mechanically acting nature could contain the causality for such an effect either; only the concept of such an object could, a concept that only reason can supply and compare the object with. Consequently this effect could be regarded throughout as an end, but not as a natural end, that is, as a product of *art* (*vestigium hominis video* [I see the trace of a human being]).[5]

But to judge something that one cognizes as a product of nature as nevertheless also an end, and hence as a *natural end*,

more is required, if indeed there is not even a contradiction in this. I would provisionally say: a thing exists as a natural end *if it is* (although in a twofold sense) *cause and effect of itself*. [371] For this involves a causality of a kind that cannot be connected with the mere concept of a nature without attributing an end to it. Such a causality can then indeed be thought without contradiction, but it cannot be comprehended. Before analyzing this idea of a natural end in full, we shall first illustrate its determination by an example.

First, a tree generates another tree according to a known law of nature. But the tree it generates is of the same species. So it generates itself as regards the *species*. In the species it is, on the one hand, as effect, unceasingly produced by itself and, on the other, as cause, likewise often producing itself; and so it constantly preserves itself as a species.

Second, a tree also generates itself as an *individual*. To be sure, we call this kind of effect merely growth. But growth is to be taken in a sense in which it is entirely distinct from any other increase in magnitude according to mechanical laws and is to be counted as equivalent to generation, though under another name. The matter that this plant adds to itself it first processes into a specifically distinctive quality, which the mechanism of nature outside it cannot supply. And it develops itself further by means of a material that, in its composition, is its own product. For as regards the constituents it receives from nature outside it, the plant must indeed be regarded only as an educt. Yet in the separation and new composition of this raw material there is to be found such originality in the faculty of separating and forming possessed by this kind of natural being that all art remains infinitely far behind it. This is so when art attempts to reconstitute those products of the plant kingdom from the elements it

5 An allusion to the story told by Vitruvius (*On Architecture*, Book VI, preface): the philosopher Aristippus, shipwrecked on Rhodes, saw geometrical figures drawn in the sand and cried out that there was hope, for he saw human traces.

obtains by breaking them down, or from the material that nature supplies for their nourishment.[6]

Third, one part of this creature also generates itself in such a way that the preservation of the one depends reciprocally on the preservation of the others. A bud on a tree's leaf, grafted onto the twig of another tree, produces on a foreign stock a growth of its own kind, and so does a scion grafted onto another trunk. Hence on one and the same tree one can regard each branch or leaf as merely grafted or budded onto it, and so as a tree existing in its own right, which merely attaches itself to another and feeds [372] on it parasitically. At the same time, although the leaves are products of the tree, they in turn also preserve it. Repeatedly stripping it of its leaves would kill it, and its growth depends on their effect on the trunk. There is the self-help of nature in these creatures when they are injured, where the lack of a part that was needed to preserve the neighboring parts is made good by the rest. There are the malformations or deformities in growth, where certain parts, because of deficiencies or obstacles that arise, form themselves in an entirely new way in order to preserve what is there, and so produce an anomalous creature. I will mention these here only in passing, although they are among the most wonderful properties of organized creatures.

§ 65. NATURAL ENDS ARE ORGANIZED BEINGS

In an organized being the parts produce one another; unlike a watch, it organizes itself.

According to the character cited in the previous section, a thing that is a natural product, yet is to be cognized as possible only as a natural end, must be related to itself reciprocally as cause and effect. This is a somewhat loose and indeterminate expression, which needs to be derived from a determinate concept.

The causal connection, insofar as it is thought merely by the understanding, is a connection that constitutes a series (of

6 *Educt*: an eighteenth-century technical term for something merely drawn out of what already exists, as opposed to a product newly brought forth.

causes and effects) which always runs downward. The things that, as effects, presuppose others as their causes cannot at the same time be, reciprocally, causes of these. This causal connection is called that of efficient causes (*nexus effectivus*). On the other hand, a causal connection can also be thought according to a concept of reason (of ends). Regarded as a series, it would involve dependence both downward and upward: in it, the thing that has once been designated as an effect nevertheless deserves, going upward, the name of a cause of the very thing of which it is the effect. In practical matters (namely in art) such a connection is easily found. For example, the house is indeed the cause of the money taken in as rent, but conversely the representation of this possible income was also the cause of the building of the house. Such a causal connection is called that of final causes (*nexus finalis*). The former might perhaps more fittingly be called the connection of [373] real causes, and the latter that of ideal causes, since this designation also makes it clear that there cannot be more than these two kinds of causality.

Now, for a thing as a natural end it is required, *first*, that its parts (as regards both their existence and their form) be possible only through their relation to the whole. For the thing itself is an end, and so is comprehended under a concept or an idea that must determine *a priori* everything the thing is to contain. But insofar as a thing is thought as possible only in this way, it is merely a work of art. That is, it is the product of a rational cause distinct from its matter (its parts), whose causality (in procuring and combining the parts) is determined by its idea of a whole that is possible through it (and so not by nature outside the thing).

But suppose a thing, as a natural product, is nevertheless to contain in itself and in its inner possibility a relation to ends—that is, it is to be possible only as a natural end and without the causality of the concepts of rational beings outside it. Then it is required, *second*, that its parts combine into the unity of a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of one another's form. For only in this way is it possible that, conversely (reciprocally),

the idea of the whole should in turn determine the form and combination of all the parts: not as their cause—for then it would be a product of art—but, for whoever judges the thing, as the ground of cognition of the systematic unity of the form and combination of all the manifold contained in the given matter.

For a body, then, that is to be judged in itself and according to its inner possibility as a natural end, it is required that its parts all produce one another reciprocally, as regards both their form and their combination, and so produce a whole out of their own causality. The concept of this whole could in turn, conversely, be the cause of it according to a principle (in a being that possessed the causality according to concepts appropriate to such a product). Consequently the connection of *efficient causes* could at the same time be judged as an *effect through final causes*.

In such a product of nature each part, just as it exists only *through* all the others, is also thought as existing *for the sake of the others* and of the whole, that is, as an instrument (organ). This, [374] however, is not enough, for it could also be an instrument of art, and so be represented as possible only as an end in general. Rather, it must be thought as an organ that *produces* the other parts (and so each produces the others reciprocally). No instrument of art can be of this kind; only an instrument of nature can, since nature supplies all the material for instruments (even those of art). Only then, and for that reason, can such a product, as an *organized* and *self-organizing being*, be called a *natural end*.

In a watch one part is the instrument for moving the others, but one wheel is not the efficient cause of the production of another. One part is indeed there for the sake of another, but not through it. Hence the cause that produces the watch and its form is not contained in nature (in this matter) but outside it, in a being that can act according to ideas of a whole possible through its causality. Hence, too, one wheel in the watch does not produce another, still less does one watch produce other watches by using (organizing) other matter for the purpose. Nor does it of itself replace parts taken from it, or make good defects in its original construction through the help of its other parts, or

repair itself when it has fallen into disorder. All this, by contrast, we can expect from organized nature. —An organized being is therefore not a mere machine, for a machine has only *motive* force. An organized being possesses in itself *formative* force, and indeed a force that it communicates to materials that do not have it (it organizes them). It is thus a self-propagating formative force, which cannot be explained by the capacity for motion alone (by mechanism).

We say far too little about nature and its power in organized products if we call this an *analogue of art*; for then we think of the artist (a rational being) as outside it. Nature rather organizes itself, and does so in every species of its organized products—following, to be sure, a single pattern on the whole, but also with fitting deviations that self-preservation requires according to circumstances. Perhaps we come closer to this inscrutable property if we call it an *analogue of life*. But then we must either endow matter, as mere matter, with a property that conflicts with its essence (hylozoism), or else associate with it an alien principle *standing in community* with it (a soul). [375] But if such a product is to be a product of nature, then either we already presuppose organized matter as the instrument of that soul, and so make organized matter not the least bit more comprehensible; or else we must make the soul the artificer of this structure, and so withdraw the product from (corporeal) nature. Strictly speaking, then, the organization of nature has nothing analogous to any causality we know[7].[8] Beauty of nature can rightly be called

7 KANT'S NOTE. Conversely, one can shed light on a certain kind of association—though one found more in the idea than in reality—by an analogy with the immediate natural ends just mentioned. Thus, in the recently undertaken complete transformation of a great people into a state, the word *organization* has frequently, and very aptly, been used for the institution of the magistracies and so on, and even of the entire body politic. For in such a whole each member should certainly be not merely a means but at the same time also an end; and while it contributes to the possibility of the whole, it should in turn be determined by the idea of the whole as regards its place and function.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. An allusion to the reorganization of France after the Revolution of 1789, still under way when the *Critique* appeared in 1790.

8 Hylozoism: the doctrine that matter as such is alive.

an analogue of art, since it is attributed to objects only in relation to reflection on their *outer* intuition, and so only on account of the form of their surface. But *inner natural perfection*, such as is possessed by those things that are possible only as *natural ends* and are therefore called organized beings, cannot be thought or explained by analogy with any physical capacity known to us, that is, any capacity of nature. Indeed, since we ourselves belong to nature in the widest sense, it cannot be thought or explained even through an exactly fitting analogy with human art.

The concept of a thing as in itself a natural end is therefore not a constitutive concept of the understanding or of reason. It can, however, be a regulative concept for the reflecting power of judgment: by a remote analogy with our own causality according to ends in general, it can guide our investigation of objects of this kind and our reflection on their highest ground. The latter is not for the sake of knowledge of nature or of that original ground of nature, but rather for the sake of that same practical faculty of reason in us by analogy with which we considered the cause of that purposiveness.

Organized beings are therefore the only beings in nature which, even when considered by themselves and without any relation to other things, must nevertheless be thought as possible only as ends of nature. They are [376] thus what first gives objective reality to the concept of an *end* that is not a practical end but an end *of nature*. They thereby provide natural science with the basis for a teleology, that is, for a way of judging its objects according to a special principle—a principle that we would otherwise be utterly unjustified in introducing into natural science, since we cannot see the possibility of such a kind of causality *a priori* at all.

§ 66. THE PRINCIPLE FOR JUDGING ORGANISMS

In an organized product everything is an end and reciprocally a means; nothing in it is in vain.

This principle, which is at the same time their definition, runs: *An organized product of nature is one in which everything is an end and reciprocally also a means.* Nothing in it is in vain, without purpose, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature.

As regards what occasions it, this principle is indeed to be derived from experience—namely from the kind of experience that is methodically conducted and is called observation. But because of the universality and necessity it asserts of such purposiveness, it cannot rest merely on empirical grounds. It must have some principle *a priori* at its basis, even if that principle were merely regulative and those ends lay only in the idea of the one judging and nowhere in an efficient cause. The principle just stated can therefore be called a *maxim* for judging the inner purposiveness of organized beings.

It is well known that those who dissect plants and animals investigate their structure in order to see the reasons why, and to what end, such parts have been given to them, why such a position and combination of the parts, and why precisely this inner form. To do so they assume, as indispensably necessary, the maxim that nothing in such a creature is *in vain*, and they insist on it just as they do on the principle of the general doctrine of nature that *nothing happens by chance*. Indeed, they can no more renounce this teleological principle than the universal physical one. For just as abandoning the latter would leave no experience at all, so abandoning the former would leave no guiding thread for observing a kind of natural thing that we have once thought teleologically under the concept of natural ends.

377 For this concept leads reason into an entirely different order of things from that of a mere mechanism of nature, which no longer satisfies us here. An idea is to underlie the possibility

of the natural product. But this idea is an absolute unity of representation, whereas matter is a plurality of things that by itself can supply no determinate unity of composition. So if that unity of the idea is to serve even as the determining ground *a priori* of a natural law of the causality of such a form of the composite, the end of nature must be extended to *everything* that lies in its product. For once we refer such an effect, as a *whole*, to a supersensible determining ground beyond the blind mechanism of nature, we must also judge it entirely according to this principle. There is no reason to assume that the form of such a thing still depends partly on mechanism; for then, with heterogeneous principles mixed together, no reliable rule of judging would remain at all.

It may well be that in an animal body, for example, many parts could be conceived as concretions according to merely mechanical laws (such as skin, bones, hair). Yet the cause that procures the matter suited to this, modifies it, forms it, and deposits it in its proper places must always be judged teleologically. So everything in the body must be regarded as organized, and everything, in a certain relation to the thing itself, is in turn an organ.

§ 67. NATURE AS A SYSTEM OF ENDS

Organisms entitle us to view all of nature as a system of ends, as a maxim of judgment.

We said above of the *external* purposiveness of natural things that it gives no sufficient warrant for using them at the same time as ends of nature, as grounds explaining their existence, or for using their contingently purposive effects, in the idea, as grounds of their existence according to the principle of final causes. Thus one cannot straightaway take the *rivers* to be natural ends because they promote communication among peoples in the interior of the lands; or the *mountains* because they contain the sources of the rivers and, to maintain these, the store of snow for rainless seasons; or likewise the *slope* of the land,

which carries these waters off and lets the land [378] dry out. For although this shape of the earth's surface was very necessary for the emergence and preservation of the plant and animal kingdoms, it has nothing in itself for whose possibility one would find oneself compelled to assume a causality according to ends. The same holds of the plants that human beings use for their needs or enjoyment, and of animals—the camel, the ox, the horse, the dog, and so on— which human beings put to such varied use, partly as food and partly in their service, and for the most part cannot do without at all. In the case of things none of which one has reason to regard by itself as an end, their external relation can be judged purposive only hypothetically.

To judge a thing as a natural end on account of its inner form is something quite different from taking the existence of this thing to be an end of nature. For the latter assertion we need not merely the concept of a possible end but cognition of the final end (*scopus*) of nature. This requires relating nature to something supersensible, which far exceeds all our teleological cognition of nature; for the end of the existence of nature itself must be sought beyond nature. The inner form of a mere blade of grass can suffice to prove, for our human faculty of judging, that its origin is possible only according to the rule of ends. But suppose one sets this aside and looks only at the use that other natural beings make of it. One then abandons the consideration of inner organization and looks only at external purposive relations: how grass is needed by cattle, and cattle by human beings, as a means to their existence. And one does not see why it should be necessary that human beings exist (a question that might not be so easy to answer if one has in mind, say, the New Hollanders or the Fuegians). In that case one arrives at no categorical end. Instead, all this purposive relation rests on a condition that must always be pushed further back, and which, as unconditioned (the existence of a thing as final end), lies entirely outside the physical-teleological consideration of the

world.[9] But then such a thing is not a natural end either; for it (or its entire species) is not to be regarded as a natural product.

It is therefore only matter insofar as it is organized that necessarily carries with it the concept of itself as a natural end, because this specific form of it is at the same time a product of nature. But this concept [379] now necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system according to the rule of ends. To this idea all the mechanism of nature must now be subordinated according to principles of reason (at least in order to test the appearances of nature by it). This principle of reason is within its competence only as a subjective principle, that is, as a maxim: everything in the world is good for something; nothing in it is in vain. And by the example that nature gives in its organic products we are justified, indeed called upon, to expect nothing of nature and its laws but what is purposive on the whole.

It goes without saying that this is a principle not for the determining but only for the reflecting power of judgment; that it is regulative and not constitutive; and that through it we obtain only a guiding thread. With it we can consider natural things, in relation to a determining ground that is already given, according to a new lawful order, and extend natural science according to another principle, namely that of final causes—yet without prejudice to the principle of the mechanism of nature's causality. Moreover, this by no means settles whether anything we judge according to this principle is *intentionally* an end of nature: whether grasses exist for the ox or the sheep, and whether these and the other things of nature exist for human beings. It is good to consider from this angle even things that are disagreeable to us and, in particular relations, contrary to purpose. Thus one might say, for example, that the vermin that plague human beings in their clothes, hair, or beds are, by a wise provision of nature, a spur to cleanliness, which is in itself already an important means of preserving health. Or that the

9 The Aboriginal inhabitants of Australia (then called New Holland) and of Tierra del Fuego, known to Kant from voyagers' reports.

mosquitoes and other stinging insects that make the wildernesses of America so troublesome for the indigenous inhabitants are so many goads to activity for these people still at the beginning of their development: goads to drain the marshes and let light into the dense forests that block the flow of air, and in this way, as also by cultivating the soil, to make their dwelling places healthier at the same time. Even what seems to be contrary to nature in the inner organization of human beings, when treated in this way, opens up an entertaining, and sometimes also instructive, prospect onto a teleological order of things—one to which merely physical consideration, without such a principle, would not lead us. Some judge that the tapeworm has been given to the human being or animal it inhabits as if to compensate for a certain deficiency in its vital organs. [380] In the same way I would ask whether dreams (without which sleep never occurs, although we only rarely remember them) may not be a purposive arrangement of nature. For while all the body's motive forces are relaxed, dreams serve to move the vital organs most intimately by means of the imagination and its great activity (which in this state mostly rises to the pitch of an affect). Likewise, when the stomach is overfull and this movement is all the more necessary, the imagination usually plays all the more vividly in our night's sleep. Consequently, without this inwardly moving force and the tiring restlessness for which we blame our dreams (though in fact they may be remedies), sleep, even in a healthy state, might well amount to a complete extinction of life.

The beauty of nature, too—that is, its harmony with the free play of our cognitive faculties in apprehending and judging its appearance—can be regarded in this way as an objective purposiveness of nature as a whole, as a system of which the human being is a member. This holds once the teleological judging of nature, by means of the natural ends that organized beings present to us, has entitled us to the idea of a great system of

ends of nature. We can regard it as a favor[10] that nature has shown us that, over and above what is useful, it has dispensed beauty and charms so abundantly. We can love nature for this, just as we contemplate it with respect because of its immensity and feel ourselves ennobled in this contemplation—just as if nature had set up and adorned its magnificent stage expressly with this intention.

In this section we mean to say no more than this. Once we have discovered in nature a capacity to bring forth products that can be thought by us only according to the concept of final causes, we may go further. There are products which (or whose relation, [381] though purposive) do not exactly make it necessary to look beyond the mechanism of blindly acting causes for another principle of their possibility; yet we may still judge them too as belonging to a system of ends. For the first idea already leads us, as regards its ground, beyond the sensible world; and then the unity of the supersensible principle must be regarded as valid in the same way not merely for certain species of natural beings but for the whole of nature as a system.

§ 68. TELEOLOGY WITHIN NATURAL SCIENCE

Natural science may speak of natural ends but must not bring God into its explanations.

The principles of a science are either internal to it, and are then called domestic (*principia domestica*), or they are based on concepts that can find a place only outside it, and are *foreign* principles (*peregrina*). Sciences that contain the latter base their doctrines on borrowed propositions (*lemmata*); that is, they borrow

10 KANT'S NOTE. In the aesthetic part it was said that *we look upon beautiful nature with favor*, since we take an entirely free (disinterested) satisfaction in its form. For in the mere judgment of taste no regard at all is paid to the end for which these beauties of nature exist: whether to arouse pleasure in us, or without any relation to us as ends. In a teleological judgment, however, we also attend to this relation; and then we can *regard it as a favor of nature* that, by displaying so many beautiful shapes, it has wished to promote our culture.

some concept, and with it a ground of arrangement, from another science.

Every science is by itself a system. It is not enough to build within it according to principles, and so to proceed technically; one must also go to work architectonically with it, as a building standing on its own. One must treat it not as an annex or as part of another building, but as a whole in itself—although afterward one can construct a passage from this building into the other, or from each into the other.

Suppose, then, that one brings the concept of God into natural science and its context in order to make purposiveness in nature explicable, and afterward uses this purposiveness in turn to prove that there is a God. Then neither science has any internal stability, and a deceptive diallelon renders each of them uncertain, because they let their boundaries run into one another.[11]

The expression "end of nature" already sufficiently forestalls this confusion, so that natural science, and the occasion it gives for judging its objects *teleologically*, are not mixed up with the contemplation of God and thus with a *theological* derivation. And one must not regard it as insignificant whether one confuses that expression [382] with that of a divine end in the arrangement of nature, or even passes off the latter as more fitting and better suited to a pious soul, on the grounds that in the end it must come down to deriving those purposive forms in nature from a wise author of the world. Rather, one must carefully and modestly confine oneself to the expression that says exactly as much as we know, namely that of an end of nature. For even before we ask about the cause of nature itself, we find in nature and in the course of its generation products of this kind, which are generated in it according to known laws of experience. Natural science must judge its objects according to these laws, and so must also seek their causality according to the rule of ends within nature itself. It must therefore not leap over its boundary in

11 Diallelon: the logicians' term for a circular argument, which assumes what it sets out to prove.

order to draw into itself, as a domestic principle, something to whose concept no experience at all can be adequate, and which one is entitled to venture upon only once natural science has been completed.

Some properties of nature can be demonstrated *a priori*, so that their possibility can be understood from universal principles without any contribution from experience. Even though they carry a technical purposiveness with them, they cannot be counted as part of the teleology of nature—as a method, belonging to physics, of solving its problems—because they are absolutely necessary. Arithmetical and geometrical analogies, and likewise universal mechanical laws, may strike us as strange and admirable in that they unite in a single principle different rules that seem quite independent of one another. Yet they do not on that account make any claim to be teleological grounds of explanation in physics. And even if they deserve to be taken into consideration in the general theory of the purposiveness of things of nature in general, that theory would belong elsewhere, namely to metaphysics, and would constitute no internal principle of natural science. With the empirical laws of natural ends in organized beings, by contrast, it is not only permissible but also unavoidable to use the teleological *way of judging* as a principle of the doctrine of nature with respect to a special class of its objects.

Now, in order to keep strictly within its boundaries, physics entirely abstracts from the question whether natural ends are ends *intentionally* or *unintentionally*; for that would be meddling in another's business [383] (namely that of metaphysics). It is enough that there are objects that are *explicable* solely and exclusively according to natural laws which we can think only under the idea of ends as a principle, and which only in this way are *cognizable* as regards their inner form—indeed, cognizable internally at all. So as not to incur even the slightest suspicion of presuming to mix into our grounds of cognition something that does not belong in physics at all, namely a supernatural cause, teleology does indeed speak of nature as if the purposiveness in

it were intentional. But at the same time it speaks in such a way that it ascribes this intention to nature, that is, to matter. No misunderstanding can arise here, since no one will of their own accord ascribe intention, in the proper sense of the word, to lifeless material. By this one means to indicate that the word signifies here only a principle of the reflecting, not of the determining, power of judgment. It is thus not meant to introduce any special ground of causality, but only to add, for the use of reason, another kind of investigation besides that according to mechanical laws, in order to make up for the inadequacy of the latter even for the empirical search for all the particular laws of nature. Hence in teleology, insofar as it is drawn into physics, one speaks quite rightly of the wisdom, the economy, the foresight, the beneficence of nature. One does so without thereby making nature into an intelligent being (for that would be absurd), but also without daring to set another, intelligent being above it as its master builder, because that would be presumptuous[12]. Rather, these words are meant only to designate a kind of causality of nature by analogy with our own in the technical use of reason, in order to keep before our eyes the rule by which certain products of nature must be investigated.

But why, then, does teleology usually not form a separate part of theoretical natural science, but is instead drawn into theology as a propaedeutic or transition? This happens in order to keep [384] the study of nature according to its mechanism confined to what we can subject to our observation or to experiments in such a way that we could produce it ourselves as nature does, at least as regards the similarity of the laws. For we have complete insight

12 KANT'S NOTE. The German word *vermessen* [presumptuous] is a good and meaningful word. A judgment in which one forgets to reckon the measure of one's powers (of the understanding) can sometimes sound very humble, and yet make great claims and be very presumptuous. Of this kind are most of the judgments by which people profess to exalt divine wisdom, attributing to it, in the works of creation and preservation, intentions that are really meant to do honor to the would-be reasoner's own wisdom.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. As a verb, *vermessen* also means "to measure" and, reflexively, "to mismeasure"; Kant plays on the idea of misjudging one's own measure.

only into as much as we can ourselves make and bring about according to concepts. Organization, however, as an inner end of nature, infinitely surpasses every capacity for a similar presentation by art. And as for external arrangements of nature that are held to be purposive (for example, winds, rain, and the like), physics does indeed consider their mechanism. But it cannot present their relation to ends at all, insofar as this relation is supposed to be a condition that necessarily belongs to the cause; for this necessity of connection concerns only the combination of our concepts, not the constitution of things.

Dialectic of Teleological Judgment

The antinomy of mechanism and purpose, and the peculiarity of the human understanding.

§ 69. WAS EINE ANTINOMIE DER URTHEILSKRAFT SEI.

385 The *determining* power of judgment has by itself no principles that ground *concepts of objects*. It is no autonomy, for it only *subsumes* under given laws or concepts as principles. For this very reason it is exposed to no danger of an antinomy of its own and to no conflict of its principles. Thus the transcendental power of judgment, which contained the conditions for subsuming under categories, was not by itself *nomothetic*. It merely named the conditions of sensible intuition under which reality (application) can be given to a given concept, as a law of the understanding; and on this it could never fall into disagreement with itself (at least as regards principles).[1]

The *reflecting* power of judgment, by contrast, is to subsume under a law that is not yet given. This law is therefore in fact only a principle of reflection on objects for which we objectively lack a law altogether, or lack a concept of the object that would suffice as a principle for the cases that arise. Now since no use of the cognitive faculties may be permitted without principles, the reflecting power of judgment will in such cases have to serve as a principle to itself. Because this principle is not objective and can supply no ground of cognition of the object sufficient for the purpose, it is to serve as a merely subjective principle for the purposive use of the cognitive faculties, namely for reflecting on

1 Nomothetic: law-giving (from Greek).

a kind of objects. In relation to such cases, therefore, the reflecting power of judgment has its maxims, and indeed necessary ones, for the sake of cognizing the laws of nature [386] in experience. By means of them it arrives at concepts, even if these should be concepts of reason, whenever it absolutely needs such concepts merely in order to become acquainted with nature according to its empirical laws.—Now between these necessary maxims of the reflecting power of judgment a conflict, and hence an antinomy, can arise. On it is based a dialectic which, if each of two conflicting maxims has its ground in the nature of the cognitive faculties, can be called a natural dialectic—an unavoidable illusion that must be exposed and resolved in the critique, so that it does not deceive us.

§ 70. THE ANTINOMY OF JUDGMENT

Judgment has two maxims: explain everything mechanically, yet judge some products by final causes.

Insofar as reason has to do with nature as the sum total of objects of the outer senses, it can base itself on laws that the understanding partly prescribes *a priori* to nature itself, and partly can extend indefinitely by means of the empirical determinations that occur in experience. To apply the first kind of laws, namely the *universal* laws of material nature in general, the power of judgment needs no special principle of reflection. For there it is determining, since an objective principle is given to it by the understanding. But as regards the particular laws, which can become known to us only through experience, there can be such great manifoldness and heterogeneity among them that the power of judgment must serve as its own principle even just to search for a law in the appearances of nature and to track it down. For it needs such a principle as a guiding thread if it is even to hope for a coherent empirical cognition according to a thoroughgoing lawfulness of nature—for the unity of nature according to empirical laws. Given this contingent unity of the particular laws, it may come about that the power of judgment,

in its reflection, proceeds from two maxims. One of them is supplied to it *a priori* by the mere understanding. The other is occasioned by particular experiences that bring reason into play, so that corporeal nature and its laws are judged according to a special principle. It then happens that these two kinds of maxims seem unable to [387] coexist, and so a dialectic arises that leads the power of judgment astray in the principle of its reflection.

The first maxim of the power of judgment is the *thesis*: All generation of material things and their forms must be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws.

The second maxim is the *antithesis*: Some products of material nature cannot be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws (judging them requires an entirely different law of causality, namely that of final causes).

Now if one were to turn these regulative principles for investigation into constitutive principles of the possibility of the objects themselves, they would run as follows:

Thesis: All generation of material things is possible according to merely mechanical laws.

Antithesis: Some generation of such things is not possible according to merely mechanical laws.

In this latter capacity, as objective principles for the determining power of judgment, they would contradict each other, and so one of the two propositions would necessarily be false. But that would then indeed be an antinomy, though not of the power of judgment; it would be a conflict in the legislation of reason. Reason, however, can prove neither the one nor the other of these principles, because we can have no determining principle *a priori* of the possibility of things according to merely empirical laws of nature.

As for the maxim of a reflecting power of judgment presented first, on the other hand, it in fact contains no contradiction at all. For if I say that I must *judge* all events in material nature, and hence also all forms as its products, as regards their possibility, according to merely mechanical laws, I do not thereby say that they *are possible only according to these laws* (to the exclusion

of every other kind of causality). This is meant only to indicate that *I ought* always *to reflect* on them *according to the principle* of the mere mechanism of nature, and hence to investigate this mechanism as far as I can; for unless it is made the basis of investigation, there can be no proper cognition of nature at all. Now this does not prevent the second maxim, when occasion arises—namely in the case of some natural forms (and, occasioned by them, even of nature as a whole)—from tracing 388
them and reflecting on them according to a principle quite different from explanation according to the mechanism of nature, namely the principle of final causes. For reflection according to the first maxim is not thereby abolished; on the contrary, one is bidden to pursue it as far as one can. Nor is it thereby said that those forms would not be possible according to the mechanism of nature. It is only asserted that *human reason*, in following that maxim and in this way, will never be able to find the least ground of what constitutes the specific character of a natural end, although it may well find other cognitions of natural laws. It is left undecided whether, in the inner ground of nature itself, which is unknown to us, the physical-mechanical connection and the connection of ends in the same things may not cohere in one principle. It is only that our reason is not in a position to unite them in such a principle. And so the power of judgment, as *reflecting* (on a subjective ground), not as determining (in accordance with an objective principle of the possibility of things in themselves), is compelled to think, for certain forms in nature, a principle other than that of natural mechanism as the ground of their possibility.

§ 71. PREPARING THE RESOLUTION

The conflict dissolves once both maxims are taken as principles of reflecting, not determining, judgment.

We can by no means prove that organized natural products cannot be generated through the mere mechanism of nature. For we cannot see into the first inner ground of the infinite manifold-

ness of the particular laws of nature, which are contingent for us because they are cognized only empirically. And so we absolutely cannot reach the inner, thoroughly sufficient principle of the possibility of a nature (which lies in the supersensible). Is the productive capacity of nature, then, not just as adequate for what we judge to be formed or combined according to the idea of ends as for what we believe requires merely a machinery of nature? And does an entirely different kind of original causality —one that cannot be contained in material nature or its intelligible substratum at all, namely an architectonic understanding —in fact lie at [389] the basis of things as genuine natural ends (as we must necessarily judge them)? On these questions our reason, which is very narrowly restricted with regard to the concept of causality when that concept is to be specified *a priori*, can give absolutely no information. —But it is just as indubitably certain that, relative to our cognitive faculty, the mere mechanism of nature can furnish no ground for explaining the generation of organized beings either. *For the reflecting power of judgment*, therefore, this is an entirely correct principle: for the connection of things according to final causes, which is so evident, a causality distinct from mechanism must be thought, namely that of a world-cause acting according to ends (an intelligent world-cause)—however rash and unprovable this principle would be *for the determining* power of judgment. In the first case the principle is a mere maxim of the power of judgment. The concept of that causality is then a mere idea, to which one by no means undertakes to concede reality, but which one uses only as a guiding thread for reflection—a reflection that always remains open to all mechanical grounds of explanation and does not stray from the sensible world. In the second case the principle would be an objective principle, prescribed by reason, to which the power of judgment would have to submit as determining. But in doing so it would lose itself beyond the sensible world in the extravagant, and would perhaps be led astray.[2]

2 *Überschwenglich*, "extravagant": Kant's word for what goes beyond all bounds of possible experience, and so beyond any use the understanding can make of it.

All appearance of an antinomy between the maxims of the genuinely physical (mechanical) and the teleological (technical) way of explaining therefore rests on this: one confuses a principle of the reflecting power of judgment with one of the determining power of judgment, and the *autonomy* of the former (which holds merely subjectively, for our use of reason with regard to the particular laws of experience) with the *heteronomy* of the latter, which must conform to the laws (universal or particular) given by the understanding.

§ 72. SYSTEMS OF NATURAL PURPOSIVENESS

Kant sorts dogmatic systems into idealism (chance or fatality) and realism (hylozoism or theism).

No one has ever doubted that the principle is correct according to which certain things in nature (organized beings) and their possibility must be judged by the concept of final causes. This holds even if one wants no more than a *guiding thread* for getting to know their constitution through observation, without [390] venturing as far as an inquiry into their first origin. So the question can only be this: is this principle merely subjectively valid, i.e., merely a maxim of our power of judgment? Or is it an objective principle of nature, according to which nature has, besides its mechanism (according to mere laws of motion), yet another kind of causality, namely that of final causes, under which the former causes (the moving forces) would stand merely as intermediate causes?

Now, as far as speculation is concerned, one could leave this question or problem entirely unsettled and unresolved. For if we content ourselves with speculation within the bounds of mere knowledge of nature, those maxims are enough for us to study nature as far as human powers reach and to track down its most hidden secrets. So it is presumably a certain presentiment of our reason, or a hint given to us, as it were, by nature, that by means of that concept of final causes we might even reach beyond nature and connect it to the highest point in the series of

causes. We would do this if we abandoned the investigation of nature (although we have not yet got far in it), or at least suspended it for a while, and first tried to find out where that stranger in natural science, namely the concept of natural ends, leads.

Here, of course, that undisputed maxim would have to turn into a problem that opens a wide field for disputes. Does the connection of ends in nature *prove* a special kind of causality for it? Or is it not rather, considered in itself and according to objective principles, one and the same as the mechanism of nature, or does it not rest on one and the same ground? In that case, since this ground is often too deeply hidden for our investigation in many natural products, we would merely be trying out a subjective principle, namely that of art, i.e. causality according to ideas, so as to ascribe it to nature by analogy. This makeshift does succeed for us in many cases, and seems to fail in some; but in no case does it entitle us to introduce into natural science a special kind of efficacy distinct from causality according to the merely mechanical laws of nature itself. Since we call the procedure (the causality) of nature technique, on account of the end-like character we find in its products, we will divide this technique into the *intentional* (*technica intentionalis*) and the *unintentional* (*technica naturalis*).[3] The first is meant to signify that the productive [391] faculty of nature according to final causes must be regarded as a special kind of causality. The second signifies that this faculty is at bottom entirely one and the same as the mechanism of nature, and that its contingent agreement with our concepts of art and their rules, which is merely a subjective condition for judging it, is falsely interpreted as a special kind of natural generation.

Now when we speak of the systems for explaining nature with regard to final causes, it must be carefully noted that they all dispute with one another dogmatically. That is, they disagree about objective principles of the possibility of things, whether through intentionally or through purely unintentionally acting causes; they do not disagree, say, about the subjective maxim of

3 Latin: "intentional technique" and "natural technique."

merely judging about the cause of such purposive products. In the latter case *disparate* principles might still well be united, whereas in the former *contradictorily opposed* principles cancel each other out and cannot coexist.

The systems concerning the technique of nature, i.e., its productive power according to the rule of ends, are of two kinds: the *idealism* or the *realism* of natural ends. The first is the assertion that all purposiveness of nature is *unintentional*; the second, that some of it (in organized beings) is *intentional*. From the latter one could then also draw the consequence, grounded as a hypothesis, that the technique of nature is intentional, i.e., an end, even as regards all its other products in relation to the whole of nature.

1) Now the *idealism* of purposiveness (here I always mean objective purposiveness) is either that of the *chance* or that of the *fatality* of nature's determination in the purposive form of its products. The first principle concerns the relation of matter to the physical ground of its form, namely the laws of motion; the second concerns its relation to the *hyperphysical* ground of matter and of nature as a whole. The system of *chance*, which is attributed to Epicurus or Democritus, is, taken literally, so obviously absurd that it need not detain us. The system of fatality, by contrast (whose author is taken to be Spinoza, although by all appearances it is much older), appeals to something supersensible, where our insight therefore does not reach. It is not so easy to refute, precisely because its concept of the original being cannot be understood at all.[4] But this much is clear: in this system the connection of ends in the world must be assumed [392] to be unintentional. For it is derived from an original being, though not from its understanding, and hence not from any intention of that being, but from the necessity of its nature and from the unity of the world that stems from it. Consequently the fatalism of purposiveness is at the same time an idealism of it.

4 Democritus (c. 460–c. 370 BC), Greek atomist who, like Epicurus after him, explained the world by the motion of atoms. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) held in his *Ethics* that there is only one substance, God or nature.

2) The *realism* of the purposiveness of nature is likewise either physical or hyperphysical. The *first* bases the ends in nature on the analogue of a faculty acting with intention, the *life of matter* (either in matter itself or through an animating inner principle, a world-soul), and is called *hylozoism*. The *second* derives them from the original ground of the universe, as an intelligent being (originally living) that produces with intention, and is *theism*.[5]

§ 73. NONE OF THESE SYSTEMS SUCCEEDS

Epicurus, Spinoza, hylozoism and theism all fail to explain natural ends dogmatically.

What do all these systems want? They want to explain our teleological judgments about nature. They go about it in such a way that one party denies the truth of these judgments and so declares them to be an idealism of nature (represented as art), while the other party acknowledges them as true and promises to establish the possibility of a nature according to the idea of final causes.

1) Now the systems that argue for the idealism of final causes in nature do, on the one hand, grant to their principle a causality according to laws of motion (through which natural things exist purposively). But they deny that this causality has *intentionality*, i.e. [393] that it is intentionally determined to this purposive production of its products, or in other words that an end is the cause. This is *Epicurus*'s mode of explanation. On this account the difference between a technique of nature and mere mechanics is denied altogether. Blind chance is taken as the explanatory ground not only for the agreement of the generated

5 KANT'S NOTE. One sees from this that in most speculative matters of pure reason, as far as dogmatic assertions are concerned, the philosophical schools have usually tried every solution possible for a given question. Thus, to account for the purposiveness of nature, people have tried sometimes *lifeless matter* or a *lifeless God*, sometimes *living matter* or else a *living God*. For us nothing remains, should it prove necessary, but to abandon all these objective *assertions* and to weigh our judgment critically, merely in relation to our cognitive faculties. In this way we can secure for its principle the validity of a maxim, which, if not dogmatic, is nonetheless sufficient for the reliable use of reason.

products with our concepts of ends, and so for technique, but even for the determination of the causes of this generation according to laws of motion, and so for their mechanics. Thus nothing is explained, not even the semblance in our teleological judgment, and consequently the alleged idealism in it is by no means established.

Spinoza, on the other hand, wants to relieve us of all inquiry into the ground of the possibility of the ends of nature, and to take all reality away from this idea. He does so by not letting these ends count as products at all, but only as accidents inhering in an original being; and to this being, as the substrate of those natural things, he ascribes not causality with respect to them but mere subsistence. Because of the unconditioned necessity of this being, together with all natural things as accidents inhering in it, he does secure for natural forms the unity of ground that all purposiveness requires. But at the same time he wrests from them their contingency, without which no *unity of ends* can be conceived, and with it everything *intentional*, just as he takes all understanding away from the original ground of natural things.

But Spinozism does not accomplish what it wants. It wants to give an explanatory ground for the connection of ends among the things of nature (which it does not deny), and all it names is the unity of the subject in which they all inhere. Yet even if one grants it this mode of existence for the beings of the world, that ontological unity is not for that reason immediately a *unity of ends*, and it by no means makes the latter comprehensible. For a unity of ends is a quite special kind of unity. It does not follow at all from the connection of things (beings of the world) in one subject (the original being), but always carries with it a relation to a *cause* that has understanding. Even if one united all these things in one simple subject, this would still never present a relation of ends—unless one thought of them, first, as inner *effects* of the substance as a *cause*, and second, as effects of that same substance as a cause *through its understanding*. Without these formal conditions all unity is mere natural necessity; and

if it is nevertheless ascribed to things that we [394] represent as external to one another, it is blind necessity. But suppose one wanted to call purposiveness of nature what the Schools call the transcendental perfection of things (in relation to their own essence), according to which all things have in them everything required to be such a thing and no other. That would be a childish game with words instead of concepts. For if all things must be thought of as ends, so that being a thing and being an end are one and the same, then there is at bottom nothing that deserves to be represented specifically as an end.[6]

One can indeed see from this that Spinoza traced our concepts of the purposive in nature back to the consciousness of ourselves in an all-embracing (yet at the same time simple) being, and sought that form merely in the unity of this being. In doing so he must have intended to assert not the realism but merely the idealism of nature's purposiveness. Yet he could not carry out even this, because the mere representation of the unity of the substrate cannot produce even the idea of a purposiveness, not even of an unintentional one.

2) Those who not only assert the *realism* of natural ends but also claim to explain it believe that they can have insight into a special kind of causality, namely that of intentionally acting causes, at least as to its possibility; otherwise they could not undertake to explain it. For even the boldest hypothesis is warranted only if at least the *possibility* of what is assumed as its ground is *certain*, and one must be able to secure the objective reality of its concept.

But the possibility of living matter cannot even be thought, since its concept contains a contradiction: lifelessness, *inertia*, constitutes the essential character of matter. The possibility of animated matter, and of the whole of nature as an animal, can be used only in a meager way (for the sake of a hypothesis of purposiveness in nature at large), and only insofar as it is revealed to us in experience in the organization of nature on a

6 The scholastic and Wolffian school metaphysics taught that every being, simply as a being, is "transcendentally" perfect.

small scale; it can by no means be understood *a priori* as to its possibility. So one must commit a circle in explaining if one wants to derive the purposiveness of nature in organized beings from the life of matter, while knowing this life only in organized beings, and so being unable, without [395] such experience, to form any concept of its possibility. Hylozoism, therefore, does not accomplish what it promises.

Finally, *theism* is just as unable to establish dogmatically the possibility of natural ends as a key to teleology. It does, however, have this advantage over all other explanatory grounds of teleology: through the understanding it ascribes to the original being, it best rescues the purposiveness of nature from idealism and introduces an intentional causality for its generation.

For in that case it would first have to be proved, sufficiently for determining judgment, that unity of ends in matter is impossible through matter's mere mechanism; only then would one be entitled to place the ground of this unity beyond nature in a determinate way. But we can get no further than this. Given the constitution and limits of our cognitive faculties (since we have no insight into the first, inner ground even of this mechanism), we must in no way seek in matter a principle of determinate relations of ends; and for us no other way of judging the generation of its products as natural ends remains than judging it through a supreme understanding as cause of the world. But this is only a ground for reflecting, not for determining, judgment, and it can absolutely warrant no objective assertion.

§ 74. WHY NATURAL ENDS CANNOT BE TREATED DOGMATICALLY

The concept of a natural end cannot be proved objectively, so it can only guide reflection.

We proceed with a concept dogmatically (even if it should be empirically conditioned) when we regard it as contained under another concept of the object, one that constitutes a principle of reason, and determine it in accordance with that concept. But we proceed with it merely critically when we regard it only in

relation to our cognitive faculty, and so to the subjective conditions for thinking it, without undertaking to decide anything about its object. So the dogmatic procedure with a concept is the one that is lawful for determining judgment; the critical procedure is the one that is lawful merely for reflecting judgment.

[396] Now the concept of a thing as a natural end is a concept that subsumes nature under a causality thinkable only through reason, in order to judge, by this principle, what is given of the object in experience. But in order to use it dogmatically for determining judgment, we would first have to be assured of the objective reality of this concept, since otherwise we could not subsume any natural thing under it. The concept of a thing as a natural end is indeed empirically conditioned, i.e., possible only under certain conditions given in experience. Yet it cannot be abstracted from experience; it is possible only according to a principle of reason in judging the object. As such a principle, therefore, its objective reality (i.e. that an object is possible in accordance with it) can neither be understood nor dogmatically established at all. We do not know whether it is merely a sophistical and objectively empty concept (*conceptus ratiocinans*) or a concept of reason, one that grounds cognition and is confirmed by reason (*conceptus ratiocinatus*). So it cannot be treated dogmatically for determining judgment. That is, not only can it not be settled whether or not things of nature, considered as natural ends, require for their generation a causality of an entirely special kind (causality according to intentions); the question cannot even be asked. For the concept of a natural end cannot be proved by reason at all as to its objective reality (i.e., it is not constitutive for determining judgment, but merely regulative for reflecting judgment).[7]

That it is not constitutive is clear from the following. As the concept of a *natural product*, it contains natural necessity, and yet at the same time a contingency of the form of the object (in

7 Latin: a "reasoning" concept (one produced by mere sophistical reasoning) versus a "reasoned" concept (one validly inferred); Kant draws the distinction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

relation to mere laws of nature), in one and the same thing as an end. Consequently, if there is to be no contradiction here, it must contain a ground for the possibility of the thing in nature, and yet also a ground of the possibility of this nature itself and of its relation to something that is not empirically cognizable nature (something supersensible), and so is not cognizable for us at all. Only so can the thing be judged according to a kind of causality other than that of natural mechanism, if one wants to settle its possibility. The concept of a thing as a natural end, then, is extravagant *for determining judgment* when one considers the object through reason (even though it may be immanent for reflecting judgment with regard [397] to objects of experience), and so objective reality cannot be secured for it for determining judgments. It is understandable from this why all the systems one may ever devise for the dogmatic treatment of the concept of natural ends, and of nature as a whole connected through final causes, can decide nothing, either objectively affirming or objectively denying. For when things are subsumed under a concept that is merely problematic, its synthetic predicates (e.g. here: whether the end of nature that we think of for the generation of things is intentional or unintentional) can only yield equally (problematic) judgments of the object, whether affirmative or negative, since one does not know whether one is judging about something or about nothing. The concept of a causality through ends (that of art) certainly has objective reality, and so does the concept of a causality according to the mechanism of nature. But the concept of a causality of nature according to the rule of ends—still more the concept of a being that can never be given to us in experience at all, namely a being as original ground of nature—can indeed be thought without contradiction, but is nonetheless of no use for dogmatic determinations. For since it cannot be drawn from experience, and is not required for the possibility of experience either, its objective reality cannot be secured by anything. And even if it could, how could I still count things that are definitely declared to be products of divine art among the products of nature—a nature

whose very inability to produce such things according to its laws was what made it necessary to appeal to a cause distinct from it?

§ 75. A CRITICAL PRINCIPLE OF REASON

We must think organisms as intentional products; no Newton will explain a blade of grass mechanically.

It is surely quite another thing to say: the generation of certain things of nature, or even of nature as a whole, is possible only through a cause that determines itself to act according to intentions; or to say: *given the peculiar constitution of my cognitive faculties*, I cannot judge about the possibility of those things and their [398] generation otherwise than by thinking for it a cause that acts according to intentions, and hence a being that is productive by analogy with the causality of an understanding. In the first case I want to settle something about the object, and I am obliged to establish the objective reality of an assumed concept. In the second, reason merely determines the use of my cognitive faculties in keeping with their peculiarity and with the essential conditions both of their scope and of their limits. So the first principle is an *objective* principle for determining judgment; the second is a subjective principle merely for reflecting judgment, and hence a maxim of it that reason imposes on it.

For we have an indispensable need to ascribe the concept of an intention to nature if we want to investigate it through sustained observation even in its organized products alone; and so this concept is an absolutely necessary maxim even for the empirical use of our reason. It is evident that, once such a guiding thread for studying nature has been adopted and found reliable, we must at least try out this maxim of judgment on the whole of nature as well. For by means of it many laws of nature might still be discovered that would otherwise remain hidden from us, given the limits of our insight into the inner workings of its mechanism. With regard to this latter use, however, that maxim of judgment is useful but not indispensable, because

nature as a whole is not given to us as organized (in the narrowest sense of the word, indicated above). By contrast, with regard to those products of nature that must be judged only as intentionally formed thus and not otherwise, if we are to obtain even an empirical cognition of their inner constitution, that maxim of reflecting judgment is essentially necessary. For even the thought of them as organized things is impossible without connecting with it the thought of a generation with intention.

Now the concept of a thing whose existence or form we represent to ourselves as possible under the condition of an end is inseparably bound up with the concept of its contingency (according to natural laws). That is why the natural things that we find possible only as ends also provide the foremost proof of the contingency of the world as a whole. They are the only ground of proof, valid for the common understanding [399] as well as for the philosopher, that the world depends on, and originates from, a being existing outside the world—and indeed (on account of that purposive form) an intelligent being. Thus teleology finds the final answer to its inquiries only in a theology.

But what, in the end, does even the most complete teleology prove? Does it prove, say, that such an intelligent being exists? No. It proves nothing more than this: that, given the constitution of our cognitive faculties, and so in combining experience with the highest principles of reason, we can form absolutely no concept of the possibility of such a world except by thinking of a supreme cause of it that acts *intentionally*. So we cannot establish objectively the proposition that there is an intelligent original being. We can establish it only subjectively, for the use of our power of judgment in its reflection on the ends in nature, which cannot be thought according to any principle other than that of the intentional causality of a highest cause.

If we wanted to establish this supreme proposition dogmatically, from teleological grounds, we would be caught in difficulties from which we could not extricate ourselves. For these inferences would then have to be based on the proposition: the organized beings in the world are possible only through an

intentionally acting cause. And we would then unavoidably have to maintain that, because we can follow these things in their causal connection only under the idea of ends, and can cognize them in their lawfulness only in this way, we are also entitled to presuppose this very thing for every thinking and cognizing being as a necessary condition—one attaching, therefore, to the object and not merely to us as subject. But such an assertion cannot be carried through. For we do not really *observe* the ends in nature as intentional; we merely, in reflecting on nature's products, *think* this concept in addition, as a guiding thread for judgment. So these ends are not given to us through the object. *A priori* it is even impossible for us to justify such a concept as admissible as to its objective reality. It therefore remains, without qualification, a proposition resting only on subjective conditions, namely those of a power of judgment that reflects in a way suited to our cognitive faculties. Expressed as objectively and dogmatically valid, it would read: There is a God. But [400] for us human beings only the restricted formula is permitted: We cannot think the purposiveness that must lie at the basis even of our cognition of the inner possibility of many natural things, or make it comprehensible to ourselves, in any other way than by representing it, and the world in general, as a product of an intelligent cause (a God).

Now if this proposition, grounded on an indispensably necessary maxim of our power of judgment, is completely satisfactory for every use of our reason, speculative as well as practical, from every *human* point of view, then I would very much like to know what we lose by being unable to prove it valid for higher beings as well, namely from pure objective grounds (which, unfortunately, exceed our faculty). For it is quite certain that we cannot even adequately come to know organized beings and their inner possibility according to merely mechanical principles of nature, much less explain them. It is so certain, indeed, that one may boldly say: it is absurd for human beings even to make such an attempt, or to hope that a Newton may yet arise some day who could make comprehensible even the generation

of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no intention has ordered. Rather, this insight must be flatly denied to human beings. But then again, it would be too presumptuous a judgment on our part to claim that, if we could penetrate to the principle of nature in the specification of its universal laws known to us, a sufficient ground for the possibility of organized beings, without ascribing an intention to their generation (thus in nature's mere mechanism), *could* not lie hidden in nature too. For how could we know that? Probabilities drop out entirely here, where judgments of pure reason are at issue. —So we cannot judge objectively at all, either affirmatively or negatively, on the question whether a being acting according to intentions, as cause of the world (and so as its author), lies at the basis of what we rightly call natural ends. Only this much is certain: if we are at least to judge according to what our own nature allows us to see (according to the conditions and limits of our reason), we can place absolutely nothing but an intelligent being at the basis of the possibility of those natural ends. This alone accords with the maxim of our reflecting judgment, and hence with a ground that is subjective, [401] but that attaches inseparably to the human race.

§ 76. REMARK: THE PECULIARITY OF OUR UNDERSTANDING

Distinctions between possible and actual, ought and is, belong to our finite understanding.

This consideration, which very much deserves to be worked out in detail in transcendental philosophy, may enter here only as a digression, for elucidation (not as proof of what has been set out here).

Reason is a faculty of principles, and in its most extreme demand it aims at the unconditioned; the understanding, by contrast, is always at reason's service only under a certain condition that must be given. But without concepts of the understanding, to which objective reality must be given, reason cannot judge objectively (synthetically) at all; and as theoretical

reason it contains by itself absolutely no constitutive principles, only regulative ones. One soon realizes that where the understanding cannot follow, reason becomes extravagant and shows itself in ideas that are indeed well grounded (as regulative principles) but are not objectively valid concepts. The understanding, however, cannot keep pace with reason, and yet it would be needed for validity with respect to objects. It therefore restricts the validity of those ideas of reason to the subject alone—though universally, for all subjects of this kind. That is, it restricts it to the condition that, given the nature of our (human) cognitive faculty, or even according to the concept *we can form* of the faculty of a finite rational being in general, one can and must think in this way and no other—without, however, asserting that the ground of such a judgment lies in the object. We shall cite some examples. They are too important, and also too difficult, to be pressed on the reader here straight away as proven propositions; but they can give the reader material for reflection and serve to elucidate what is our proper business here.

It is indispensably necessary for the human understanding to distinguish between the possibility and the actuality of things. The ground of this lies in the subject and the nature of its cognitive faculties. For if their exercise did not require two quite heterogeneous components—understanding for concepts, and sensible intuition for objects corresponding to them—there would be no such distinction [402] (between the possible and the actual). If our understanding were intuitive, it would have no objects except what is actual. Concepts (which pertain merely to the possibility of an object) and sensible intuitions (which give us something without thereby letting us cognize it as an object) would both drop out. Now all our distinguishing of the merely possible from the actual rests on this: the former signifies only the positing of the representation of a thing with respect to our concept and to the faculty of thinking in general, whereas the latter signifies the positing of the thing in itself (outside this concept). So the distinction of possible from actual things is one that holds merely subjectively for the human understanding.

For we can always still have something in our thoughts even though it does not exist, or represent something to ourselves as given even though we do not yet have any concept of it. The propositions, therefore, that things can be possible without being actual, and so that actuality cannot be inferred from mere possibility at all, hold quite correctly for human reason, without thereby proving that this distinction lies in things themselves. That this cannot be inferred from them—and hence that these propositions do indeed hold of objects too, insofar as our cognitive faculty, being sensibly conditioned, also deals with objects of the senses, but not of things in general—is evident from reason's unremitting demand to assume some something (the original ground) as existing with unconditioned necessity. In this something, possibility and actuality are no longer to be distinguished at all; and for this idea our understanding has absolutely no concept, i.e. it can find no way in which it could represent such a thing and its manner of existing. For if the understanding *thinks* it (think it how it will), it is represented merely as possible. If the understanding is conscious of it as given in intuition, then it is actual, and nothing about possibility is thought in the process. Hence the concept of an absolutely necessary being is indeed an indispensable idea of reason, but a problematic concept that the human understanding cannot attain. It is valid, however, for the use of our cognitive faculties according to their peculiar constitution—and hence not of the object, nor therefore for every cognizing being. For I cannot presuppose that thinking and intuition, as two distinct conditions of the exercise of its cognitive faculties, and hence of the possibility and actuality of things, [403] are found in every such being. For an understanding in which this distinction did not arise, it would mean: all objects that I cognize *are* (exist). The possibility of some that did not exist, i.e., their contingency if they do exist, and so also the necessity to be distinguished from it, could not enter into the representation of such a being at all. What makes it so hard for our understanding to keep up with reason here by means of its concepts is simply this: for the understanding, as

human understanding, what reason makes into a principle as belonging to the object is extravagant (i.e., impossible under the subjective conditions of its cognition).—Here the maxim always holds that, wherever the cognition of objects exceeds the faculty of the understanding, we think all objects according to the subjective conditions of the exercise of our faculties—conditions that necessarily attach to our (i.e. human) nature. And if the judgments passed in this way cannot be constitutive principles that determine the object as it is constituted (as cannot be otherwise with regard to extravagant concepts), they will nonetheless remain regulative principles, immanent and secure in their exercise, and suited to the human point of view.

In the theoretical consideration of nature, reason must assume the idea of an unconditioned necessity of its original ground. In the same way, in the practical consideration, it presupposes its own causality, unconditioned (with regard to nature), i.e., freedom, since it is conscious of its moral command. But here the objective necessity of the action as duty is opposed to the necessity it would have as an event if its ground lay in nature and not in freedom (i.e., in the causality of reason); and the action that is morally absolutely necessary is regarded physically as wholly contingent (i.e. what necessarily *ought* to happen often does not happen). So it is clear that it stems only from the subjective constitution of our practical faculty that moral laws must be represented as commands (and actions in accordance with them as duties), and that reason expresses this necessity not through an *is* (a happening) but through an ought-to-be. This would not be the case if reason were considered, as to its causality, without sensibility (as the subjective condition of its application to objects of nature), and so as a cause in an intelligible world, one in thorough agreement with the moral law, [404] where there would be no difference between ought and doing, between a practical law of what is possible through us and the theoretical law of what is actual through us. An intelligible world, in which everything would be actual merely because it is possible (as something good), and even freedom as

its formal condition, is for us an extravagant concept, unfit to serve as a constitutive principle for determining an object and its objective reality. Nevertheless, given the constitution of our (partly sensible) nature and faculty, freedom serves as a universal *regulative principle* for us and for all rational beings connected with the sensible world, so far as we can represent them to ourselves according to the constitution of our reason. This principle does not determine objectively the constitution of freedom as a form of causality. Instead, and with no less validity than if it did, it makes the rule of actions according to that idea a command for everyone.

In the same way, as regards the case before us, one can also grant this: we would find no difference between natural mechanism and the technique of nature, i.e., the connection of ends in it, if our understanding were not of such a kind that it must go from the universal to the particular—and if, therefore, judgment could not cognize any purposiveness with regard to the particular, and so could not pass any determining judgments, without having a universal law under which to subsume that particular. Now the particular, as such, contains something contingent with regard to the universal. Yet reason still demands unity, and hence lawfulness, in the combination of particular laws of nature as well (and this lawfulness of the contingent is called purposiveness). And the derivation of the particular laws from the universal ones is impossible *a priori*, through determination of the concept of the object, as regards what is contingent in the particular laws. Hence the concept of the purposiveness of nature in its products will be a concept that is necessary for the human power of judgment with regard to nature, but that does not bear on the determination of the objects themselves. It is thus a subjective principle of reason for the power of judgment, which, as regulative (not constitutive), holds just as necessarily for our *human power of judgment* as if it were an objective principle.

§ 77. THE INTUITIVE UNDERSTANDING

A different, intuitive understanding could see parts from the whole; ours must think organisms through ends.

405 In the Remark we cited peculiarities of our cognitive faculty (even of the higher one) which we are easily led to transfer to things themselves as objective predicates. But they concern ideas to which no object adequate to them can be given in experience, and which could therefore serve only as regulative principles in the pursuit of experience. With the concept of a natural end the situation is indeed the same as regards the cause of the possibility of such a predicate, which can lie only in the idea. But the consequence corresponding to it (the product itself) is nevertheless given in nature; and the concept of a causality of nature, as of a being acting according to ends, seems to make the idea of a natural end into a constitutive principle of such an end. In this, the idea has something that distinguishes it from all other ideas.

This distinguishing feature, however, consists in the following. The idea in question is a principle of reason not for the understanding but for the power of judgment, and hence is merely the application of an understanding in general to possible objects of experience. And indeed it applies where the judgment cannot be determining but only reflecting: where, although the object is given in experience, one cannot even *judge determinately* about it in accordance with the idea (let alone in a fully adequate way), but can only reflect on it.

It therefore concerns a peculiarity of *our* (human) understanding with regard to the power of judgment, in judgment's reflection on things of nature. But if that is so, then the idea of some possible understanding other than the human must lie at the basis here (just as in the *Critique of Pure Reason* we had to have in mind another possible intuition if ours was to be regarded as a special kind, namely the kind for which objects count only as appearances). Only so can one say: given the par-

ticular constitution of our understanding, certain natural products *must be considered by us*, as to their possibility, as produced intentionally and as ends. One says this without thereby demanding that there actually be a particular [406] cause that has the representation of an end as its determining ground—and so without denying that an understanding other (higher) than the human might find the ground of the possibility of such products of nature even in the mechanism of nature, i.e., in a causal connection for which an understanding is not exclusively assumed as the cause.

What matters here, then, is the relation of *our* understanding to the power of judgment: namely, that we look in it for a certain contingency in the constitution of our understanding, so as to mark this peculiarity of our understanding as distinct from other possible ones.

This contingency is found quite naturally in the *particular*, which the power of judgment is to bring under the *universal* of the concepts of the understanding. For the particular is not determined by the universal of *our* (human) understanding; and it is contingent in how many different ways distinct things that nevertheless agree in a common characteristic can present themselves to our perception. Our understanding is a faculty of concepts, i.e., a discursive understanding. For such an understanding it must of course be contingent what kind of particular may be given to it in nature and brought under its concepts, and how very diverse that particular may be. But intuition also belongs to cognition, and a faculty of *complete spontaneity of intuition* would be a cognitive faculty distinct from sensibility and entirely independent of it, and so an understanding in the most general sense. So one can also think of an *intuitive* understanding (negatively, namely merely as not discursive). Such an understanding does not go from the universal to the particular and so to the individual (through concepts). For it, that contingency is not encountered—the contingency of nature's agreement with the understanding in its products according to *particular* laws—which makes it so hard for our understanding to

bring the manifold of nature to the unity of cognition. This is a task our understanding can accomplish only through the agreement of nature's characteristics with our faculty of concepts, an agreement that is highly contingent; an intuitive understanding has no need of it.

Our understanding therefore has this peculiarity with respect to the power of judgment: in cognition through it, the particular is not determined by the universal, and so the particular cannot be derived from the universal alone. And yet this particular, in the manifold of nature, [407] is supposed to agree with the universal (through concepts and laws), so that it can be subsumed under it. Under such circumstances this agreement must be highly contingent, and without any determinate principle for the power of judgment.

We represent such an agreement of the things of nature with the power of judgment as contingent, and hence as possible only through an end directed toward it. In order at least to be able to think its possibility, we must at the same time think of another understanding. In relation to this understanding, and indeed prior to any end attributed to it, we can represent as *necessary* that agreement of natural laws with our power of judgment which, for our understanding, is thinkable only through the connecting medium of ends.

For our understanding has this property: in its cognition, for example of the cause of a product, it must proceed from the *analytic universal* (from concepts) to the particular (the given empirical intuition). In doing so it determines nothing with regard to the manifold of the particular. Instead, for the power of judgment, it must await this determination from the subsumption of the empirical intuition under the concept (if the object is a product of nature). Now, however, we can also think of an understanding which, because it is not discursive like ours but intuitive, proceeds from the *synthetic universal* (the intuition of a whole as such) to the particular, that is, from the whole to the parts. Such an understanding, and its representation of the whole, does not contain within itself the *contingency* of the com-

bination of the parts in order to make a determinate form of the whole possible. Our understanding needs this contingency, since it must proceed from the parts, as universally thought grounds, to the various possible forms to be subsumed under them as consequences. Given the constitution of our understanding, by contrast, a real whole of nature can be regarded only as the effect of the concurrent moving forces of the parts. Suppose, then, that we do not want to represent the possibility of the whole as dependent on the parts, as befits our discursive understanding. Suppose we want instead, on the model of the intuitive (archetypal) understanding, to represent the possibility of the parts (in their constitution and combination) as dependent on the whole. Then, by this very same peculiarity of our understanding, this cannot happen in such a way that the whole contains the ground of the possibility of the connection of the parts, which would be a contradiction in the discursive mode of cognition. It can happen only in such a way that the [408] *representation* of a whole contains the ground of the possibility of its form and of the connection of the parts belonging to it. But the whole would then be an effect, a *product*, whose *representation* is regarded as the *cause* of its possibility. And the product of a cause whose determining ground is merely the representation of its effect is called an end. It follows that it is merely a consequence of the particular constitution of our understanding that we represent products of nature as possible according to a kind of causality other than that of the natural laws of matter, namely only according to the causality of ends and final causes. It also follows that this principle does not concern the possibility of such things themselves (even considered as phenomena) according to this mode of generation. It concerns only the judging of them that is possible for our understanding. At the same time we see why, in natural science, we are far from satisfied with an explanation of the products of nature through causality according to ends. The reason is that in such an explanation we demand only that natural generation be judged in a way commensurate with our faculty of judging it, that is, with the

reflecting power of judgment. We do not demand that it be judged in a way commensurate with the things themselves, on behalf of the determining power of judgment. Here, moreover, it is not at all necessary to prove that such an *intellectus archetypus* [archetypal intellect] is possible. We need only show two things. First, that we are led to this idea (of an *intellectus archetypus*) by contrasting it with our discursive understanding, which needs images (*intellectus ectypus* [ectypal intellect]), and with the contingency of such a constitution. Second, that this idea contains no contradiction.[8]

Now suppose we consider a material whole, as far as its form is concerned, as a product of the parts and of their forces and capacities to combine of their own accord (adding in thought other materials that bring these parts together). We then represent a mechanical mode of generating it. But in this way no concept emerges of a whole as an end. Such a whole is one whose inner possibility thoroughly presupposes the idea of a whole, on which even the constitution and mode of action of the parts depend, and this is how we must represent an organized body. But, as has just been shown, it does not follow from this that the mechanical generation of such a body is impossible. For that would amount to saying that it is impossible *for any understanding* (that is, contradictory) to represent such a unity in the connection of the manifold without the idea of this unity being at the same time its generating cause, that is, without intentional production. Nevertheless, this [409] would in fact follow if we were entitled to regard material beings as things in themselves. For then the unity that constitutes the ground of the possibility of natural formations would be merely the unity of space. Space, however, is not a real ground of generations but only their formal condition. It does have some similarity to the real ground we are seeking, in that no part of space can be determined except in relation to the whole, whose representa-

8 An archetypal intellect would produce its objects by thinking them; an ectypal ("copied" or derivative) intellect, like ours, depends on objects given to it in intuition.

tion therefore underlies the possibility of the parts. But it is at least possible to regard the material world as mere appearance. It is possible to think something as a thing in itself (which is not appearance) as its substrate, and to underlay this with a corresponding intellectual intuition (even if that intuition is not ours). There would then be a supersensible real ground for nature, though one unknowable to us, and we ourselves also belong to this nature. In it we would consider what is necessary in it as an object of the senses according to mechanical laws. We would also consider it as an object of reason (indeed, the whole of nature as a system), and in this respect we would consider, at the same time according to teleological laws, the agreement and unity of the particular laws and of the forms in accordance with them, which with regard to mechanical laws we must judge to be contingent. We would thus judge nature according to two kinds of principles, and the teleological mode of explanation would not exclude the mechanical one, as if they contradicted each other.

From this we can also see something that could otherwise easily be surmised but could hardly be asserted and proved with certainty. The principle of a mechanical derivation of purposive natural products can indeed coexist with the teleological principle, but it could by no means make the latter dispensable. That is, in a thing that we must judge as a natural end (an organized being), we can indeed try all the known laws of mechanical generation, as well as those yet to be discovered, and we may even hope to make good progress with them. But for the possibility of such a product we can never be relieved of the need to appeal to a ground of generation entirely different from these, namely causality through ends. Absolutely no human reason can hope to understand the generation of even a single little blade of grass from merely mechanical causes. Nor can any finite reason that resembled ours in quality, however far it might surpass it in degree. For suppose that the teleological connection of causes and [410] effects is quite indispensable to the power of judgment for the possibility of such an object, even merely in order to

study it under the guidance of experience. Suppose, too, that for external objects as appearances no sufficient ground relating to ends can be found at all. This ground, although it also lies in nature, must then be sought only in nature's supersensible substrate, and from all possible insight into that substrate we are cut off. In that case it is absolutely impossible for us to draw from nature itself grounds for explaining connections of ends. And given the constitution of the human cognitive faculty, it is necessary to seek the supreme ground of such connections in an original understanding as the cause of the world.

§ 78. UNITING MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY

Reason must pursue mechanism as far as possible but subordinate it to the teleological principle.

It matters infinitely to reason not to abandon the mechanism of nature in its generations, and not to pass it by in explaining them, because without it no insight into the nature of things can be attained. Suppose it is granted to us that a supreme architect directly created the forms of nature as they have always existed, or predetermined those that continually form themselves in the course of nature according to the same pattern. Our cognition of nature is still not advanced in the least by this. We do not know that being's way of acting at all, nor its ideas, which are supposed to contain the principles of the possibility of natural beings. So we cannot explain nature from that being as if from above downward (*a priori*). But suppose we start from the forms of the objects of experience, that is, from below upward (*a posteriori*). Because we believe we find purposiveness in these forms, we might want to appeal to a cause acting according to ends in order to explain them. Our explanation would then be entirely tautological, and we would be deceiving reason with words. There is a further danger. With this mode of explanation we lose ourselves in the extravagant, where the cognition of nature cannot follow us, and there reason is seduced into poetic

fanaticism. Preventing this is precisely reason's foremost vocation.

411 On the other hand, it is an equally necessary maxim of reason not to pass by the principle of ends in the products of nature. This principle does not make their mode of origin any more comprehensible to us. But it is nevertheless a heuristic principle for investigating the particular laws of nature. It remains so even if we did not want to use it to explain nature itself. After all, we still go on calling these products merely natural ends, even though they manifestly display an intentional unity of ends. That is, we do not seek the ground of their possibility beyond nature. But in the end the question of this ground must arise. Reason must therefore think a particular kind of causality that is not found in nature, and this is just as necessary as the causality that the mechanics of natural causes has. Matter is receptive to certain forms according to mechanics, but these are more and other forms than that. To this receptivity there must be added the spontaneity of a cause (which therefore cannot be matter), without which no ground can be given for those forms. Admittedly, before reason takes this step it must proceed cautiously and not seek to explain every technique of nature as teleological—that is, every productive capacity of nature that displays a purposiveness of shape in itself for our mere apprehension (as with regular solids). It must always regard such a capacity as merely mechanically possible for as long as it can. But reason might, on that account, exclude the teleological principle entirely. It might insist on following mere mechanism even where purposiveness, for reason's inquiry into the possibility of natural forms through their causes, shows itself quite undeniably as a relation to another kind of causality. This must make reason just as fantastical, sending it roaming among chimeras of natural capacities that cannot be thought at all, as a merely teleological mode of explanation that takes no account whatever of natural mechanism made it fanatical.

In one and the same thing of nature, the two principles cannot be connected as principles for explaining (deducing) one

from the other. That is, they cannot be united as dogmatic and constitutive principles of insight into nature for the determining power of judgment. Take a maggot. Suppose I assume that it is to be regarded as a product of the mere mechanism of matter, that is, of the new formation that matter brings about by itself when its elements are set free by putrefaction. I cannot then derive the very same product from the very same matter as a causality [412] acting according to ends. Conversely, if I take the same product to be a natural end, I cannot count on a mechanical mode of its generation, adopt this as a constitutive principle for judging its possibility, and so unite both principles. For one mode of explanation excludes the other. It does so even if objectively both grounds of the possibility of such a product rested on a single ground, provided we took no account of that ground. The principle that is to make the two compatible in judging nature according to them must be placed in what lies outside both (and hence also outside any possible empirical representation of nature) but nevertheless contains the ground of that representation, that is, in the supersensible. And each of the two modes of explanation must be related to it. Of the supersensible we can have nothing but the indeterminate concept of a ground that makes it possible to judge nature according to empirical laws, and we cannot determine this ground more closely through any predicate. It follows that the union of both principles cannot rest on a ground of *explanation* (explication) of the possibility of a product according to given laws for the *determining* power of judgment. It can rest only on a ground of the *elucidation* (exposition) of that possibility for the reflecting power of judgment.—For to explain means to derive from a principle, which one must therefore be able to cognize distinctly and to specify. Now the principle of the mechanism of nature and that of its causality according to ends must indeed cohere, in one and the same natural product, in a single higher principle and flow from it jointly. Otherwise they could not coexist in the consideration of nature. This principle is objectively common to both, and so it also warrants the community of the maxims of

natural inquiry that depend on it. But suppose it is of such a kind that it can indeed be indicated, yet never determinately cognized and distinctly specified for use in the cases that arise. Then no explanation can be drawn from it, that is, no distinct and determinate derivation of the possibility of a natural product that is possible according to those two heterogeneous principles. Now the common principle of mechanical derivation on the one hand and of teleological derivation on the other is the *supersensible*, which we must underlay nature as phenomenon. But of this, for theoretical purposes, we cannot form the least affirmatively determinate concept. How, then, in accordance with [413] this principle, nature (in its particular laws) constitutes a system for us, one that could be cognized as possible both according to the principle of generation from physical causes and according to that of final causes, can by no means be explained. We can only presuppose something for the case where objects of nature happen to present themselves whose possibility we cannot think according to the principle of mechanism (which always has a claim on a natural being) without relying on teleological principles. We may then confidently investigate natural laws in accordance with both principles, according as the possibility of the product is cognizable to our understanding from the one principle or the other. We need not take offense at the apparent conflict that arises between the principles for judging it. For at least the possibility that both might also be objectively reconcilable in one principle is secured, since they concern appearances that presuppose a supersensible ground.

Thus both the mechanism and the teleological (intentional)

technicism of nature, with regard to one and the same product and its possibility, may stand under a common higher principle of nature according to particular laws. Nevertheless, since this principle is *transcendent,* the limitation of our understanding means that we cannot unite the two principles *in the explanation* of one and the same natural generation, if the inner possibility of this product is *intelligible* only through a causality

according to ends (as is the case with organized matter). So the principle of teleology stated above stands firm. Given the constitution of the human understanding, no cause other than one acting intentionally can be assumed for the possibility of organic beings in nature, and the mere mechanism of nature cannot be at all sufficient to explain these products of nature. Yet this principle does not claim to decide anything regarding the possibility of such things themselves.

For this principle is only a maxim of the reflecting, not of the determining, power of judgment. It therefore holds only subjectively for us, not objectively for the possibility of this kind of thing itself, where both modes of generation might well cohere in one and the same ground. Moreover, the teleologically conceived mode of generation needs the added concept of a mechanism of nature to be found in it as well. Without this concept, such generation could not be judged [414] as a product of nature at all. Hence the above maxim at the same time carries with it the necessity of uniting both principles in judging things as natural ends. But the aim is not to put one wholly, or in certain respects, in the place of the other. For in place of what is thought (by us, at least) as possible only by design, no mechanism can be assumed. And in place of what is cognized as necessary according to mechanism, no contingency can be assumed that would need an end as its determining ground. One can only subordinate the one (mechanism) to the other (intentional technicism), and according to the transcendental principle of the purposiveness of nature this may quite legitimately be done.

For where ends are thought as grounds of the possibility of certain things, one must also assume means whose law of operation *by itself* requires nothing that presupposes an end. Such means can therefore be mechanical and yet be a subordinate cause of intentional effects. Hence even in organic products of nature we can think a great and even universal connection of mechanical laws with teleological ones in the generations of nature. We can do so still more if, prompted by the infinite multitude of such products, we now also take what is intentional in

the connection of natural causes according to particular laws as a *universal principle* of the reflecting power of judgment for the whole of nature (the world), at least by way of a permissible hypothesis. And we can do this without confusing the principles for judging these generations and putting one in the place of the other: for in a teleological judging, matter can also be subordinated as a means to that represented end, by its nature and in accordance with mechanical laws. It can be so even if the form it takes on is judged as possible only by design. The ground of this compatibility lies in what is neither the one nor the other (neither mechanism nor purposive connection) but the supersensible substrate of nature, of which we cognize nothing. For our (human) reason, therefore, the two ways of representing the possibility of such objects cannot be fused together. Rather, we cannot judge them otherwise than as grounded in a supreme understanding through the connection of final causes. And so nothing is taken away from the teleological mode of explanation.

Now it is entirely undetermined, and forever undeterminable for our reason, how much the mechanism of nature contributes as a means to [415] each final aim in nature. And because of the intelligible principle of the possibility of a nature in general, mentioned above, it can even be assumed that nature is possible throughout according to both kinds of universally harmonizing laws (the physical ones and those of final causes), although we cannot see at all how this comes about. So we also do not know how far the mechanical mode of explanation possible for us extends. We know only this for certain: however far we may ever get with it, it will always be insufficient for things that we have once acknowledged as natural ends. Given the constitution of our understanding, we must therefore subordinate all those grounds to a teleological principle.

On this is grounded our authorization to explain all products and events of nature mechanically, even the most purposive, as far as this is ever in our power. We cannot specify the limits of that power within this kind of inquiry. The study of nature

according to the principle of mechanism matters greatly for our theoretical use of reason, and so this is also our calling. But in doing so we must never lose sight of one thing. Some things we can even so much as propose for investigation only under the concept of an end of reason. These, in keeping with the essential constitution of our reason and notwithstanding those mechanical causes, we must ultimately subordinate to causality according to ends.

Doctrine of Method (I)

Mechanism under teleology; the ultimate end of nature and the final end of creation.

§ 79. Ob die Teleologie als zur Naturlehre gehörend abgehandelt werden müsse.

[416] Every science must have its determinate place in the encyclopedia of all the sciences. If it is a philosophical science, its place must be assigned to it either in the theoretical or in the practical part of that encyclopedia. If its place is in the theoretical part, it must be assigned either to the doctrine of nature, insofar as it considers what can be an object of experience (hence to the doctrine of body, the doctrine of the soul, and general cosmology), or to the doctrine of God (of the original ground of the world as the sum of all objects of experience).

Now the question is: What place is due to teleology? Does it belong to natural science (properly so called), or to theology? It must be one or the other. For no science can belong to the transition from one to the other, since a transition signifies only the articulation or organization of the system and not a place within it.

That it does not belong to theology as a part of it is self-evident, although theology can make the most important use of it. For its object is natural generations and their cause. It does point beyond to this cause as a ground lying outside and above nature (a divine author). But it does so not for the determining power of judgment. It does so merely for the reflecting power of judgment in the consideration of nature, in order to guide the

judging of things in the world by means of such an idea, as a regulative principle suited to the human understanding.

417 But just as little does it seem to belong to natural science, which needs determining and not merely reflecting principles in order to provide objective grounds for natural effects. Indeed, considering the phenomena of nature according to the relation of ends to one another gains nothing for the theory of nature, that is, for the mechanical explanation of those phenomena through their efficient causes. Setting out the ends of nature in its products, insofar as these constitute a system according to teleological concepts, really belongs only to the description of nature, which is composed according to a particular guiding thread. Here reason performs a splendid and instructive task, one that is practically purposive in many respects. But it gives no information at all about the origin and inner possibility of these forms, and that is what theoretical natural science is really concerned with.

Teleology as a science, therefore, belongs to no doctrine at all but only to critique, and indeed to the critique of a particular cognitive faculty, namely the power of judgment. But insofar as it contains *a priori* principles, it can and must specify the method by which nature must be judged according to the principle of final causes. And so its Doctrine of Method has at least a negative influence on the procedure of theoretical natural science. It also influences the relation that natural science, as a propaedeutic to theology, can have to theology in metaphysics.

§ 80. MECHANISM SUBORDINATE TO TELEOLOGY

We may explain organisms mechanically as far as we can, but must presuppose an original organization.

The *authorization* to *aim at* a merely mechanical mode of explaining all natural products is in itself entirely unrestricted. But the *capacity* to *get by* with it alone is not only very restricted but also clearly bounded, given the constitution of our understanding insofar as it has to do with things as natural ends.

According to a principle of the power of judgment, the mechanical procedure alone can accomplish nothing at all for the explanation of natural ends. Hence we must always at the same time subordinate our judging of such products to a teleological principle.

[418] It is therefore reasonable, even meritorious, to pursue natural mechanism for the sake of explaining natural products as far as can be done with probability. And if we give up this attempt, we should do so not because it is impossible *in itself* to meet up with the purposiveness of nature along this path, but only because it is impossible *for us* as human beings. For this would require an intuition other than sensible intuition and a determinate cognition of the intelligible substrate of nature, from which a ground could be given even for the mechanism of appearances according to particular laws. All of this wholly exceeds our faculties.

So that the natural scientist does not labor to no purpose, then, he must always take some original organization as his basis when he judges things whose concept as natural ends is indubitably grounded (organized beings). This original organization itself makes use of that mechanism in order to produce other organized forms, or to develop its own into new shapes. These, however, always follow from that end and in conformity with it.

A COMMON ARCHETYPE

Comparative anatomy suggests all animals descend from a common mother, yet the first organization remains unexplained.

It is praiseworthy to go through the great creation of organized natures by means of comparative anatomy, in order to see whether something like a system might not be found in it, and indeed a system with respect to the principle of generation. We would then not need to stop at the mere principle of judging, which gives no information for insight into their generation, or to give up dejectedly all claim to *insight into nature* in this field.

So many genera of animals agree in a certain common schema, which seems to underlie not only their skeletal structure but also the arrangement of their other parts. Here an admirable simplicity in the ground plan has been able to produce so great a variety of species by shortening some parts and lengthening others, by folding in some and unfolding others. This agreement lets a ray of hope, however faint, fall into the mind: here, perhaps, something might be accomplished with the principle of the mechanism of nature, without which there can be no natural science at all. Despite all their differences, these forms seem to have been produced according to a common archetype. Insofar as they do, this analogy of forms strengthens the suspicion that they are actually related by generation from a common original mother. One genus of animals gradually approaches [419] another. The series runs from the genus in which the principle of ends seems best confirmed, namely the human being, down to the polyp, from this even to mosses and lichens, and finally to the lowest stage of nature perceptible to us, raw matter. From raw matter and its forces, according to mechanical laws (like those by which it acts in the formation of crystals), the whole technique of nature seems to derive. Yet in organized beings this technique is so incomprehensible to us that we believe ourselves compelled to think another principle for it.

Here the *archaeologist* of nature is free to let that great family of creatures spring from the surviving traces of nature's most ancient revolutions, according to all the mechanism of nature he knows or conjectures. (For a family is how one would have to represent them, if the thoroughly interconnected kinship just mentioned is to have any foundation.) He can have the womb of the earth, just emerging from its chaotic state (like a great animal, as it were), first give birth to creatures of less purposive form. These in turn could give birth to others that developed in a way better suited to their place of generation and to their relations with one another. Eventually this womb itself would have stiffened and ossified and confined its births to determinate species that would no longer degenerate. The variety would then

have remained as it had turned out when that fertile formative power finished its operation. —Yet to this end he must nevertheless attribute to this universal mother an organization purposively directed toward all these creatures. Otherwise the purposive form of the products of the animal and plant kingdoms cannot be thought at all as regards its possibility.[1] But then [420] he has only pushed the ground of explanation further back, and he cannot presume to have made the generation of those two kingdoms independent of the condition of final causes.

Consider, too, the alteration to which certain individuals of organized genera are accidentally subjected. Suppose one finds that their character, thus altered, becomes hereditary and is taken up into the reproductive power. Even then this alteration cannot properly be judged otherwise than as the occasional development of a purposive predisposition originally present in the species for the self-preservation of the kind. For, given the thoroughgoing inner purposiveness of an organized being, the generation of its like is closely bound up with a condition: nothing may be taken up into the reproductive power that does not also belong, in such a system of ends, to one of the undeveloped

1 KANT'S NOTE. A hypothesis of this kind can be called a daring adventure of reason, and there may be few even among the most acute natural scientists through whose heads it has not occasionally passed. For it is not absurd in the way that *generatio aequivoca* [equivocal generation] is, by which is understood the generation of an organized being through the mechanics of raw, unorganized matter. It would still be *generatio univoca* [univocal generation] in the most general sense of the word, as long as something organic were generated from something else organic, even if the product were specifically different from it within this kind of being. This would be the case, for example, if certain aquatic animals gradually developed into marsh animals, and these, after some generations, into land animals. *A priori,* in the judgment of mere reason, this does not contradict itself. But experience shows no example of it. According to experience, rather, all generation we know is *generatio homonyma* [homonymous generation]. It is not merely *univoca,* as opposed to generation from unorganized material, but it also brings forth a product that is of the same kind as the generating being in its very organization. And *generatio heteronyma* [heteronymous generation] is found nowhere, as far as our empirical knowledge of nature extends.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Terms from contemporary biology: *generatio aequivoca* is the spontaneous generation of life from non-living matter; *generatio univoca* is the generation of the living from the living.

original predispositions. For if one departs from this principle, one cannot know with certainty whether several parts of the form now found in a species may not be of equally contingent, purposeless origin. And the principle of teleology, that nothing in an organized being that is preserved in its propagation is to be judged unpurposive, would thereby become very unreliable in its application and would be valid only for the original stock, which, however, we no longer know.

Some find it necessary to assume, for all such natural ends, a teleological principle of judging, that is, an architectonic understanding. *Hume* raises an objection against them: one could with equal right ask how such an understanding is possible. That is, one could ask how the various faculties and properties that make up the possibility of an understanding which at the same time has executive power could have come together so purposively in one being. But this objection is empty.[2] Consider the question of the first generation of a thing that contains ends within itself and is comprehensible only through them. The whole difficulty surrounding this question rests on the demand for unity in the ground of the combination of a manifold whose parts are *external to one another* in this product. Suppose this ground is placed in [421] the understanding of a producing cause as a simple substance. Then that question, insofar as it is teleological, is sufficiently answered. But suppose the cause is sought merely in matter, as an aggregate of many substances external to one another. Then there is no unity of the principle at all for the inwardly purposive form of its formation. And the *autocracy* of matter in generations that our understanding can conceive only as ends is a word without meaning.

This is why some seek a supreme ground of possibility for the objectively purposive forms of matter without granting that ground an understanding. They nevertheless like to make the whole of the world into a single all-embracing substance (pantheism). Or they make it into a sum of many determinations inhering in a single *simple substance* (Spinozism), which is only a

2 The objection comes from Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779).

more determinate version of pantheism. They do this merely in order to obtain that condition of all purposiveness, the *unity* of the ground. In doing so they satisfy *one* condition of the problem, namely unity in the relation to an end, by means of the merely ontological concept of a simple substance. But they adduce nothing for the *other* condition, namely the relation of this substance to its consequence as an *end*, through which that ontological ground is to be determined more closely for the question. Hence they by no means answer *the whole* question. And the question remains absolutely unanswerable (for our reason) unless we represent three things. First, we must represent that original ground of things as a simple *substance*. Second, we must represent its property with respect to the specific constitution of the natural forms grounded on it, namely their unity of end, as the property of an intelligent substance. Third, we must represent its relation to those forms as the relation of a *causality*, because of the contingency we find in everything we can think as possible only as an end.

§ 81. MECHANISM AS TELEOLOGY'S INSTRUMENT

Kant rejects occasionalism and individual preformation and endorses Blumenbach's epigenesis.

According to what has gone before, the mechanism of nature alone cannot suffice for us to think the possibility of an organized [422] being. At least given the constitution of our cognitive faculty, it must be originally subordinated to a cause acting intentionally. In just the same way, the mere teleological ground of such a being is insufficient for considering and judging it at the same time as a product of nature. For that, the mechanism of nature must be associated with the teleological ground, as the instrument, as it were, of a cause acting intentionally, to whose ends nature is nevertheless subordinated in its mechanical laws. Our reason does not comprehend the possibility of such a union of two entirely different kinds of causality. One is the causality of nature in its universal lawfulness. The other is that

of an idea which restricts nature to a particular form for which nature by itself contains no ground at all. This possibility lies in the supersensible substrate of nature. Of this substrate we can determine nothing affirmatively except that it is the being in itself of which we know merely the appearance. But the principle that everything we assume as belonging to this nature (*phaenomenon* [appearance]) and as its product must also be thought as connected with it according to mechanical laws nonetheless remains in force. For without this kind of causality, organized beings, as ends of nature, would not be products of nature at all.

Now suppose the teleological principle of the generation of these beings is assumed, as it cannot be otherwise. Then one can take either *occasionalism* or *prestabilism* as the basis for the cause of their inwardly purposive form. According to the former, the supreme cause of the world, in accordance with its idea, would directly give the organic formation to the matter mingling in each mating, on the occasion of that mating. According to the latter, it would have placed in the initial products of its wisdom only the predisposition by means of which an organic being produces its like and the species continually preserves itself. Likewise, the loss of individuals would be continually made good by their nature, which at the same time works toward their destruction.[3] If one assumes occasionalism in the production of organized beings, all nature is thereby entirely lost. With it goes all use of reason in judging the possibility of such a kind of product. Hence one can presuppose that no one who cares at all about philosophy will adopt this system.

Prestabilism, in turn, can proceed in two ways. It regards every organic [423] being generated by its like either as the *educt* or as the *product* of the being that generates it. The system of generations as mere educts is called that of *individual preformation*, or

3 Occasionalism (associated with Malebranche) makes God the only true cause, acting on the "occasion" of natural events; prestabilism holds that God established at creation the dispositions from which later effects unfold.

also the *theory of evolution*. The system of generations as products is called the system of *epigenesis*. The latter can also be called the system of *generic preformation*. For the productive capacity of the progenitors, and hence the specific form, was still preformed *virtualiter* [virtually, i.e., in potential], according to the inner purposive predispositions imparted to their stock. In keeping with this, the opposing theory of individual preformation could also better be called the *theory of involution* (or of encasement).[4]

The defenders of the *theory of evolution* exempt each individual from the formative power of nature, in order to have it come directly from the hand of the creator. Yet they did not dare to let this happen according to the hypothesis of occasionalism. On that hypothesis, mating would be a mere formality on the occasion of which a supreme intelligent cause of the world had decided each time to form an offspring directly with its own hand, leaving to the mother only its unfolding and nourishment. They declared themselves for preformation—as if it were not all the same whether such forms are made to arise supernaturally at the beginning of the world or in its course. Occasional creation would in fact save a great many supernatural arrangements. Such arrangements would be required so that the embryo formed at the beginning of the world would not suffer from the destructive forces of nature throughout the long time before its development, but would preserve itself unharmed. Occasional creation would also spare an immeasurably greater number of such preformed beings than were ever to be developed, and with them just as many creations, which preformation renders unnecessary and purposeless. But the defenders of preformation wanted at least to leave something here to nature, so as not to fall into complete hyperphysics, which can dispense with all natural explanation. They still held fast to their hyperphysics, to be sure. They did so even when

4 "Evolution" here means the unfolding of a germ already preformed, not evolution in the later Darwinian sense; "encasement" is the doctrine that germs have lain nested within one another since creation.

they found an admirable purposiveness in malformations, which surely cannot possibly be taken for ends of nature. Perhaps, they thought, that purposiveness was aimed only at making an anatomist someday take offense at it as a purposeless purposiveness and feel a dispiriting admiration. But they simply could not fit the generation of hybrids into the system of preformation. [424] To the seed of male creatures they had otherwise conceded nothing but the mechanical property of serving as the first nourishment for the embryo. Now they had to grant it a purposively formative power into the bargain. Yet with regard to the whole product of a generation from two creatures of the same genus, they were unwilling to concede such a power to either of them.

The defender of *epigenesis* has a great advantage over the defender of preformation with regard to the empirical grounds for proving his theory. But even if one did not know of this advantage, reason would still be prepossessed in advance, with particular favor, for his mode of explanation. For with regard to things that can originally be represented as possible only according to the causality of ends, his theory considers nature as itself producing and not merely developing, at least as far as propagation is concerned. And so, with the least possible expenditure of the supernatural, it leaves to nature everything that follows from the first beginning. It does not, however, determine anything about this first beginning, at which physics in general founders, whatever chain of causes it may try.

With regard to this theory of epigenesis, no one has done more than Court Councillor *Blumenbach*, both to prove it and to establish the genuine principles of its application, partly by restricting too presumptuous a use of it. He begins all physical explanation of these formations from organized matter.[5] For he rightly declares it contrary to reason that raw matter should originally have formed itself according to mechanical laws, that life should have sprung from the nature of the lifeless, and that

5 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840), Göttingen physician and naturalist, author of *Über den Bildungstrieb* (*On the Formative Drive*, 1781; 2nd ed. 1789).

matter should have been able to fit itself of its own accord into the form of a self-preserving purposiveness. But at the same time, under this *principle* of an original *organization*, inscrutable to us, he leaves natural mechanism a share that is indeterminable yet also unmistakable. The capacity of matter involved here is distinct from the merely mechanical *formative power* that belongs to matter universally. In an organized body he calls it a *formative drive*, one that stands, as it were, under the higher guidance and direction of that original principle.[6]

§ 82. EXTERNAL PURPOSIVENESS

Plants, animals and humans serve one another, but nature's mechanism spares humans no more than beasts.

425 By external purposiveness I understand the purposiveness by which one thing of nature serves another as a means to an end. Now things that have no inner purposiveness, or presuppose none for their possibility, can nevertheless be very purposive externally, that is, in relation to other beings. Earths, air and water are examples. But these other beings must always be organized beings, that is, natural ends, for otherwise the former things could not be judged as means either. Thus water, air and earths cannot be regarded as means to the piling up of mountains. For mountains contain nothing in themselves that would require a ground of their possibility according to ends. In relation to such a ground, therefore, their cause can never be represented under the predicate of a means (useful for that purpose).

External purposiveness is an entirely different concept from internal purposiveness. Internal purposiveness is connected with the possibility of an object, regardless of whether its actuality is itself an end or not. Of an organized being one can still ask: What does it exist for? But one cannot easily ask this of things in which one recognizes merely the effect of the mechan-

6 Blumenbach's *Bildungstrieb* (Latin *nisus formativus*): a drive to form and maintain a specific shape, found only in organized matter.

ism of nature. For in organized beings we already represent to ourselves a causality according to ends for their internal possibility, a creative understanding, and we relate this active faculty to its determining ground, the intention. There is only one external purposiveness that is connected with the internal purposiveness of organization. It serves in the external relation of a means to an end, without the question having to be raised of the end for which this being, so organized, had to exist. This is the organization of the two sexes in relation to one another for the propagation of their kind. For here one can still always ask, just as in the case of an individual: Why did such a pair have to exist? The answer is: this pair is what first constitutes an *organizing* whole, though not an organized whole in a single body.

Now if one asks what a thing exists for, there are two possible answers. The first is that its existence and its generation have no relation at all to a cause acting according to intentions, and then one always understands [426] their origin to lie in the mechanism of nature. The second is that there is some intentional ground of its existence (as a contingent natural being). This thought can hardly be separated from the concept of an organized thing. For since we must attribute to its internal possibility a causality of final causes and an idea underlying this causality, we cannot think of the existence of this product otherwise than as an end. For the represented effect whose representation is at the same time the determining ground of the intelligent efficient cause in producing it is called an *end*. In this case, then, one can say one of two things. Either the end of the existence of such a natural being lies within itself, i.e., it is not merely an end but also a *final end*. Or this end lies outside it, in other natural beings, i.e., it exists purposively not as a final end but necessarily also as a means.

But if we survey the whole of nature, we find in it, as nature, no being that could lay claim to the distinction of being the final end of creation. One can even prove *a priori* that whatever might perhaps still be an *ultimate end* for nature could, as a natural

thing, never be a *final end*, whatever conceivable determinations and properties one might equip it with.

If one looks at the plant kingdom, one might at first be led, by the immeasurable fertility with which it spreads over almost every soil, to regard it as a mere product of the mechanism of nature that nature displays in the formations of the mineral kingdom. But closer acquaintance with the indescribably wise organization within it does not let us rest with this thought; instead it prompts the question: What do these creatures exist for? If one answers: For the animal kingdom, which is nourished by them so that it has been able to spread over the earth in such manifold kinds, then the question returns: What, then, do these plant-eating animals exist for? The answer might be: For the predators, which can feed only on what has life. Finally the question is: What are these, together with the previous kingdoms of nature, good for? For the human being, for the manifold uses that his understanding teaches him to make of all those creatures. And he is the ultimate end of creation here on earth, because he is the only being on [427] it that can form a concept of ends and, by his reason, make a system of ends out of an aggregate of purposively formed things.

One could also, with the Chevalier Linnaeus, take the apparently opposite route and say: The herbivorous animals exist in order to moderate the luxuriant growth of the plant kingdom, which would otherwise choke many of its species; the predators exist to set limits to the voracity of the herbivores; and finally the human being exists so that, by hunting and reducing the predators, he may establish a certain equilibrium between the productive and the destructive forces of nature. And so the human being, however much he might be valued as an end in a certain respect, would in another respect again have only the rank of a means.[7]

Suppose we make it our principle that there is an objective purposiveness in the manifold kinds of creatures on earth and

7 Carl Linnaeus (1707–1778), Swedish naturalist and founder of modern biological classification; he was ennobled in 1757, hence Kant's title "Ritter."

in their external relation to one another as purposively constructed beings. Then it accords with reason to think in this relation, in turn, a certain organization and a system of all the kingdoms of nature according to final causes. But here experience seems loudly to contradict the maxim of reason. This holds above all for an ultimate end of nature, which is after all required for the possibility of such a system, and which we can place nowhere but in the human being. For with regard to him, as one of the many kinds of animal, nature has made not the slightest exception, whether in its destructive or in its generative forces, to subjecting everything to its mechanism without an end.

The first thing that would have to be intentionally arranged, in an ordering of the natural beings on earth into a purposive whole, would presumably be their dwelling place: the soil and the element on and in which they were to thrive. But closer knowledge of the constitution of this foundation of all organic generation indicates no causes other than those acting quite unintentionally. Indeed, it indicates causes that devastate rather than favor generation, order and ends. Land and sea not only contain memorials of ancient, mighty devastations that befell them and all the creatures on and in them. Their entire structure, the strata of the one and the boundaries of the other, has every appearance of being the product of wild, all-powerful forces of a nature working in a chaotic state. [428] The shape, structure and slope of the lands may now seem purposively arranged for receiving water from the air, for the springs between strata of manifold kinds (for various products), and for the course of rivers. Yet closer investigation proves that they have come about merely as the effect of eruptions, partly of fire and partly of water, or else of upheavals of the ocean. This holds both for the first generation of this shape and, above all, for its later transformation, together with the destruction of its first organic

products.[8] Now if the dwelling place of all these creatures, the mother soil (of the land) and the mother womb (of the sea), indicates nothing but an entirely unintentional mechanism of its generation, how and with what right can we demand and assert a different origin for these latter products? The most careful examination of the remains of those devastations of nature seems to prove (in Camper's judgment) that the human being was not caught up in these revolutions. Even so, he is so dependent on the other creatures of the earth that, if a mechanism of nature holding sway universally over the others is granted, he must be regarded as included under it, even if his understanding has been able (in large part, at least) to save him amid their devastations.

But this argument seems to prove more than it was put forward to prove. It seems to prove not merely that the human being cannot be an ultimate end of nature, and that for the same reason the aggregate of organized natural things on earth cannot be a system of ends, but that even the natural products previously held to be natural ends have no origin other than the mechanism of nature.

[429] However, in the above resolution of the antinomy between the principles of the mechanical and the teleological modes of generating organic natural beings, we saw the following. With regard to nature as it forms things according to its particular laws (to whose systematic connection we lack the key), these principles are merely principles of reflecting judgment. That is, they do not determine the origin of these beings in itself, but only say that, given the constitution of our understanding and

8 KANT'S NOTE. If the name *natural history*, once adopted, is to remain in use for the description of nature, then we could call what the former literally indicates the *archaeology of nature*, in contrast to that of art. What it literally indicates is a representation of the former, *ancient* state of the earth, about which one may venture conjectures with good reason, even if one cannot hope for certainty. To the archaeology of nature would belong fossils, just as engraved gems and the like belong to that of art. For people are in fact constantly working on such an archaeology (under the name of a theory of the earth), even if, as is only proper, slowly. So this name would not be given to a merely imaginary investigation of nature, but to one to which nature itself invites and summons us.

our reason, we cannot think this origin in beings of this kind otherwise than according to final causes. Consequently the greatest possible effort, indeed boldness, in attempts to explain them mechanically is not only permitted; we are even summoned to it by reason. And this although we know that we can never get all the way with it, for subjective reasons arising from the particular kind and limitation of our understanding (and not, say, because the mechanism of generation contradicted in itself an origin according to ends). We saw, finally, that the compatibility of the two ways of representing the possibility of nature may very well lie in the supersensible principle of nature (both outside us and within us). For the way of representing according to final causes is only a subjective condition of our use of reason. It applies when reason wants objects to be judged not merely as appearances, but demands that these appearances themselves, together with their principles, be related to the supersensible substrate, in order to find it possible that there are certain laws of their unity. And reason cannot represent these laws to itself otherwise than through ends (of which reason also has some that are supersensible).

§ 83. THE ULTIMATE END OF NATURE

Nature's ultimate end in the human being is not happiness but culture, fostered even through war.

We have shown above that we have sufficient cause to judge the human being not merely, like all organized beings, as a natural end, but also, here on earth, as the *ultimate end* of nature, in relation to which all other natural things constitute a system of ends. We judge him so according to principles of reason, not indeed for determining but for reflecting judgment. Now if what is to be promoted as an end through the human being's connection with nature must be found in the human being himself, there are two possibilities. Either the end [430] must be of such a kind that it can itself be satisfied by nature in its beneficence; or it is the aptitude and skill for all sorts of ends for which nature

(external and internal) can be used by him. The first end of nature would be the *happiness* of the human being, the second his *culture*.

The concept of happiness is not one that the human being abstracts, say, from his instincts and so derives from the animality within himself. It is rather a mere *idea* of a state, an idea to which he wants to make that state adequate under merely empirical conditions (which is impossible). He projects this idea himself, and in very different ways, through his understanding, entangled as it is with imagination and the senses. He even changes the concept so often that nature, even if it were entirely subject to his choice, could adopt absolutely no determinate, universal and fixed law by which to agree with this wavering concept, and so with the end that each person arbitrarily sets himself. But suppose we wanted either to reduce this concept to the genuine natural needs on which our species agrees throughout, or, on the other hand, to raise ever so high the skill of procuring imagined ends. Even then, what the human being understands by happiness, and what is in fact his own ultimate natural end (not an end of freedom), would never be attained by him. For his nature is not of the kind to stop anywhere in possession and enjoyment and be satisfied. On the other hand, far from nature's having taken him as its special favorite and favored him with benefits above all animals, it has instead, in its destructive workings—plague, famine, floods, frost, attacks by other animals great and small, and the like— spared him no more than any other animal. Still more, the contradictory element in his *natural predispositions* plunges him into self-devised torments, and puts still others of his own species into such misery through the oppression of domination, the barbarism of wars and so on; and he himself, as far as it lies with him, works at the destruction of his own species. So even with the most beneficent nature outside us, nature's end, if it were set on the happiness of our species, would not be attained in a system of nature on earth, because the nature within us is not receptive to it. He is therefore always only a link in the chain of natural ends.

He is indeed a principle with regard to many an [431] end for which nature seems to have destined him in its predisposition, insofar as he makes himself such a principle; but he is also a means to the preservation of purposiveness in the mechanism of the other links. As the only being on earth that has understanding, and hence a faculty of setting itself ends at will, he is indeed the titular lord of nature. And if nature is regarded as a teleological system, he is by his vocation the ultimate end of nature. But this is always only conditional: namely, on his understanding how, and having the will, to give nature and himself a relation to ends that can be self-sufficient independently of nature, and hence can be a final end—which, however, must not be sought in nature at all.

But in order to discover where in the human being we are to place at least that *ultimate end* of nature, we must single out what nature is able to do to prepare him for what he himself must do in order to be a final end. And we must separate this from all those ends whose possibility rests on conditions that can be expected from nature alone. Of the latter kind is happiness on earth, by which is understood the sum of all the human being's ends that are possible through nature outside and within him. That is the matter of all his ends on earth. If he makes it his whole end, it renders him incapable of setting a final end for his own existence and of bringing himself into harmony with it. Of all his ends in nature, then, there remains only the formal, subjective condition: namely, the aptitude for setting himself ends at all and (independently of nature in his determination of ends) for using nature as a means, in conformity with the maxims of his free ends in general. This is what nature can accomplish with a view to the final end that lies outside it, and it can therefore be regarded as nature's ultimate end. The production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends whatever (and thus in its freedom) is *culture*. Hence only culture can be the ultimate end that we have cause to ascribe to nature with regard to the human species (not his own happiness on earth, still less his

being merely the foremost instrument for establishing order and harmony in irrational nature outside him).

But not every culture is sufficient for this ultimate end of nature. The culture of *skill* is certainly the foremost subjective condition of the aptitude for promoting ends in general. But [432] it is not sufficient to promote the *will* in the determination and choice of its ends, and this belongs essentially to the whole scope of an aptitude for ends. The latter condition of aptitude, which could be called the culture of training (discipline), is negative. It consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires. By this despotism we are attached to certain natural things and made incapable of choosing for ourselves, because we let the drives serve as fetters. Yet nature gave us these drives only as guiding threads, so that we would not neglect or even violate the vocation of the animality in us; and meanwhile we are free enough to tighten or slacken them, to lengthen or shorten them, as the ends of reason require.

Skill can hardly be developed in the human species except by means of inequality among human beings. For the greatest number provide the necessities of life, as it were mechanically, without needing any special art for it, for the comfort and leisure of others, who work at the less necessary parts of culture, science and art. And these others keep the majority in a state of oppression, bitter toil and little enjoyment, though much of the culture of the higher class does gradually spread to this class too. But with the progress of culture, the torments grow equally mightily on both sides: on the one side through violence from others, on the other through inner insatiability. (The height of this progress, when the inclination for what one could do without begins to encroach on what is indispensable, is called luxury.) Yet this glittering misery is bound up with the development of the natural predispositions in the human species, and the end of nature itself, even if it is not our end, is still attained in the process. The formal condition under which alone nature can attain this final aim of hers is that constitution in the relations of human beings to one another in which lawful power,

within a whole called *civil society*, is set against the encroachments of freedoms mutually in conflict. For only in such a society can the greatest development of the natural predispositions take place. For this, however, even if human beings were clever enough to discover such a constitution and wise enough to submit willingly to its coercion, a *cosmopolitan* whole would still be required, i.e., a system of all states that are in danger of acting injuriously on one another. In the absence of such a whole, and given the obstacle [433] that ambition, lust for power and greed, above all in those who hold power, put in the way of even the possibility of such a plan, *war* is unavoidable. In war, sometimes states split apart and dissolve into smaller ones, and sometimes one state unites other, smaller ones with itself and strives to form a larger whole. War is an unintentional attempt of human beings (stirred up by unbridled passions), yet a deeply hidden and perhaps intentional attempt of the supreme wisdom, to prepare, if not to establish, lawfulness together with the freedom of states, and thereby the unity of a morally grounded system of states. And despite the most terrible hardships with which it afflicts the human race, and the perhaps still greater ones with which the constant readiness for it oppresses us in peacetime, war is nonetheless one more incentive (while the hope of a settled state of happiness for the people recedes ever further) for developing to the highest degree all the talents that serve culture.

Then there is the discipline of the inclinations. Our natural predisposition to them is entirely purposive with regard to our vocation as an animal species, but they make the development of humanity very difficult. Yet here too, with regard to this second requirement for culture, there appears a purposive striving of nature toward a cultivation that makes us receptive to higher ends than nature itself can supply. The refinement of taste to the point of its idealization, and even luxury in the sciences as food for vanity, pour evils out upon us through the insatiable multitude of inclinations they generate, and the preponderance of these evils cannot be denied. But neither can one fail

to recognize the end of nature here: to win more and more ground from the crudeness and vehemence of those inclinations that belong rather to the animality in us and are most opposed to our cultivation for our higher vocation (the inclinations of enjoyment), and to make room for the development of humanity. Fine art and the sciences, by means of a pleasure that can be universally communicated and by polish and refinement for society, make human beings, if not morally better, then at least civilized. They thereby win a great deal of ground from the tyranny of sensory propensity and prepare the human being for a dominion in which reason alone is to hold power. Meanwhile the evils visited upon us partly by nature and partly by the intolerant selfishness of human beings at the same time call up, heighten and steel the powers of the soul [434] so that they do not succumb to those evils. And so they let us feel an aptitude for higher ends that lies hidden in us.[9]

§ 84. THE FINAL END OF CREATION

Only the human being as a moral being, under moral laws, can be the final end of creation.

A *final end* is that end which requires no other end as the condition of its possibility.

If the mere mechanism of nature is taken as the explanatory ground of its purposiveness, then one cannot ask what the things in the world exist for. For according to such an idealistic system, what is at issue is then only the physical possibility of

9 KANT'S NOTE. It is easy to decide what value life has *for us* if this value is assessed merely by *what one enjoys* (by the natural end of the sum of all inclinations, happiness). It sinks below zero. For who would want to begin life anew under the same conditions, or even according to a new, self-devised plan (though one in keeping with the course of nature), if that plan too were set merely on enjoyment? What value life has in virtue of what it contains when lived in accordance with the end that nature has with us, a value that consists in *what one does* (not merely enjoys), has been shown above; though there we are always only means to an undetermined final end. What remains, then, is presumably nothing but the value that we ourselves give our life through what we not only do, but do purposively and so independently of nature that even the existence of nature can be an end only under this condition.

things (to think of which as ends would be mere sophistry without an object). Whether one attributes this form of things to chance or to blind necessity, in either case that question would be empty. But suppose we take the connection of ends in the world to be real, and assume for it a particular kind of causality, namely that of an *intentionally acting* cause. Then we cannot stop at the question why things in the world (organized beings) have this or that form, or are placed by nature in this or that relation to others. Rather, since an understanding has once been thought that must be regarded as the cause of the possibility of such forms as are actually found in things, we must also ask, in this very understanding, for the [435] objective ground that could have determined this productive understanding to an effect of this kind. And this ground is then the final end for which such things exist.

I said above that the final end is not an end that nature would be sufficient to bring about and to produce in accordance with its idea, because it is unconditioned. For there is nothing in nature (as a sensible being) for which the determining ground found in nature itself is not always in turn conditioned. And this holds not merely of nature outside us (material nature) but also of nature within us (thinking nature), it being understood that in myself I consider only what is nature. But a thing that is to exist necessarily, on account of its objective constitution, as the final end of an intelligent cause must be of such a kind that in the order of ends it depends on no further condition than merely its idea.

Now we have only a single kind of being in the world whose causality is teleological, i.e., directed toward ends, and yet at the same time so constituted that the law according to which these beings have to determine ends for themselves is represented by them as unconditioned and independent of natural conditions, yet in itself as necessary. The being of this kind is the human being, but considered as noumenon. The human being is the only natural being in whom, from the side of his own constitution, we can nevertheless recognize a supersensible faculty

(*freedom*), and even the law of causality together with its object, which he can set himself as highest end (the highest good in the world).

Now of the human being (and so of every rational being in the world) as a moral being, one cannot ask further for what end (*quem in finem*) he exists. His existence contains within itself the highest end. To this end he can subject the whole of nature, as far as he is able; at the least, he must not hold himself subject to any influence of nature that runs counter to it.[10] —Now if the things of the world, as beings dependent in their existence, require a supreme cause acting according to ends, then the human being is the final end of creation. For without him the chain of mutually subordinated ends would not be completely grounded. And only in the human being, and in him only as the subject of morality, is unconditioned legislation with regard to ends to be found; it is this legislation, therefore, which [436] alone

10 *Quem in finem*: Latin, "to what end."

makes him capable of being a final end to which the whole of nature is teleologically subordinated[11].

11 KANT'S NOTE. It would be possible for the happiness of rational beings in the world to be an end of nature, and then it would also be nature's *ultimate* end. At least one cannot see *a priori* why nature should not be so arranged, since through its mechanism this effect would quite possibly be attainable, at least as far as we can see. But morality, and a causality according to ends subordinated to it, is absolutely impossible through natural causes. For the principle of its determination to action is supersensible. It is therefore the only thing possible in the order of ends that is absolutely unconditioned with regard to nature, and it alone thereby qualifies its subject to be the *final end* of creation, to which the whole of nature is subordinated. *Happiness,* by contrast, as was shown in the previous section on the testimony of experience, is not even an *end of nature* with regard to human beings in preference to other creatures, let alone a *final end of creation*. Human beings may always make it their ultimate subjective end. But when I ask about the final end of creation, "What did human beings have to exist for?", what is at issue is an objective supreme end, such as the highest reason would require for its creation. If one then answers, "So that beings might exist to whom that supreme cause could do good," one contradicts the condition to which the human being's own reason subjects even his most heartfelt wish for happiness (namely, agreement with his own inner moral legislation). This proves that happiness can only be a conditioned end, and hence that the human being can be the final end of creation only as a moral being. As far as his state is concerned, however, happiness is connected with it only as a consequence, in proportion to his agreement with that end as the end of his existence.

Doctrine of Method (II)

Physicotheology, ethicotheology, and the moral proof of the existence of God.

§ 85. VON DER PHYSIKOTHEOLOGIE.

Physicotheology is the attempt of reason to infer from the *ends* of nature (which can be cognized only empirically) the supreme cause of nature and its properties. A *moral theology* (ethicotheology) would be the attempt to infer that cause and its properties from the moral end of rational beings in nature (which can be cognized *a priori*).[1]

The former naturally comes before the latter. For if we want to infer *teleologically* from the things in the world to a cause of the world, ends of nature must first be given. For these [437] we must then seek a final end, and for this final end, in turn, the principle of the causality of this supreme cause.

According to the teleological principle, many investigations of nature can and must be carried out without our having cause to ask about the ground of the possibility of acting purposively that we find in various of nature's products. But if one wants to have a concept of this too, we have absolutely no further-reaching insight for it than merely the maxim of reflecting judgment. According to this maxim, even if only a single organic product of nature were given to us, the constitution of our cognitive faculty would let us think no other ground for it than that of a cause of nature itself (whether of the whole of nature or only of

1 Physicotheology: the traditional argument from design, which reasons from order and purpose in nature to an intelligent author of the world.

this part of it) which contains the causality for this product through understanding. This is a principle of judging that does not advance us one step in explaining natural things and their origin. But it does open up some prospect beyond nature, so that we might perhaps be able to determine more closely the otherwise so barren concept of an original being.

Now I say: physicotheology, however far it may be pursued, can reveal nothing to us about a *final end* of creation, for it does not even reach the question of one. It can thus justify the concept of an intelligent cause of the world as a concept of the possibility of things that we can make intelligible to ourselves according to ends, a concept that is subjectively suited only to the constitution of our cognitive faculty. But it cannot determine this concept any further, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes. And its attempt fails in its aim of founding a theology; it always remains merely a physical teleology. For in it the relation to ends is and must be regarded always only as conditioned in nature. Hence it cannot even raise the question of the end for which nature itself exists (whose ground must be sought outside nature). Yet it is on the determinate idea of this end that the determinate concept of that higher intelligent cause of the world, and hence the possibility of a theology, depends.

What things in the world are useful to one another for; what the manifold in a thing is good for with respect to that thing itself; how we even have grounds to assume that nothing in the world is in vain, but that everything is good for something *in nature*, on the condition that certain things (as ends) were to exist—where, accordingly, our reason has in its power, for the power of judgment, [438] no other principle of the possibility of the object of its unavoidable teleological judging than that of subordinating the mechanism of nature to the architectonic of an intelligent author of the world: all this the teleological consideration of the world accomplishes splendidly, and to our utmost admiration. But the data, and hence the principles, for *determining* that concept of an intelligent cause of the world (as supreme artist) are merely empirical. So they permit us to infer no prop-

erties beyond those that experience reveals to us in the effects of this cause. Since experience can never embrace the whole of nature as a system, it must often come upon grounds of proof that (apparently) conflict with that concept and with one another. And even if we were able to survey empirically the whole system as well, insofar as it concerns mere nature, experience could never raise us above nature to the end of its existence itself, and thereby to the determinate concept of that higher intelligence.

If one makes the problem that physicotheology is concerned to solve a small one, its solution seems easy. One may squander the concept of a *deity* on every intelligent being we think of, whether there be one or several such beings, that has many and very great properties, but not exactly all those required for grounding a nature in general that accords with the greatest possible end. Or one may think nothing of making up, in a theory, for the shortfall in what the grounds of proof achieve by arbitrary additions, and, where one has grounds only for assuming much perfection (and what is "much" for us?), consider oneself entitled to presuppose *all possible* perfection. In that case physical teleology makes weighty claims to the glory of founding a theology. But suppose we are asked to show what impels us, and moreover entitles us, to make those additions. Then we shall look in vain for a ground to justify ourselves in the principles of the theoretical use of reason. For this use absolutely requires that, in explaining an object of experience, we attribute to it no more properties than we can find empirical data for its possibility. On closer examination we would see that what really underlies this in us *a priori* is an idea of a highest being that rests on an entirely different use of reason (the practical use). It is this idea that impels us to supplement physical teleology's deficient representation of the original ground of the ends in nature, up to the [439] concept of a deity. And we would not falsely imagine that we had brought about this idea, and with it a theology, through the theoretical use of reason applied to physical knowledge of the world, still less that we had proved its reality.

One cannot blame the ancients so severely for having thought of their gods as differing very widely, partly in their power and partly in their intentions and volitions, and yet all of them, not even excepting their chief, as still limited in human fashion. For when they considered the arrangement and course of things in nature, they did find ground enough to assume something more than the mechanical as its cause, and to suspect, behind the machinery of this world, intentions of certain higher causes that they could not think otherwise than as superhuman. But they found good and evil, the purposive and the counterpurposive, very much mixed in the world, at least as far as our insight goes. And they could not allow themselves to assume, for the sake of the arbitrary idea of a supremely perfect author, that wise and beneficent ends nevertheless secretly lay at the ground of it all, ends of which they saw no proof. So their judgment about the supreme cause of the world could hardly have turned out otherwise, insofar, that is, as they proceeded quite consistently according to maxims of the merely theoretical use of reason. Others, who as physicists wanted to be theologians at the same time, thought they could find satisfaction for reason by providing for the absolute unity of the principle of natural things, which reason demands. They did so by means of the idea of a being in which, as the sole substance, all natural things would be merely inhering determinations. This substance would not be the cause of the world through understanding, but all the understanding of the beings in the world would nevertheless be found in it as their subject. It would therefore be a being that did not indeed produce anything according to ends, but in which all things, because of the unity of the subject of which they are merely determinations, would nevertheless necessarily have to relate to one another purposively, even without end and intention. Thus they introduced the idealism of final causes: they transformed the unity of a multitude of purposively connected substances, so hard to account for, from causal dependence *on one* substance into inherence *in one*. Regarded from the side of the inhering beings of the world, this

system became *pantheism*; regarded from the side of the sole subsisting subject as original being, it became (later) *Spinozism*. It did not so much resolve the [440] question of the first ground of the purposiveness of nature as rather declare it null. For the latter concept, robbed of all its reality, was turned into a mere misinterpretation of a universal ontological concept of a thing in general.

On merely theoretical principles of the use of reason (on which alone physicotheology is based), therefore, the concept of a deity sufficient for our teleological judging of nature can never be arrived at. For either we declare all teleology to be a mere illusion of the power of judgment in judging the causal connection of things, and take refuge in the sole principle of a mere mechanism of nature. Nature would then, because of the unity of the substance of which it is nothing but the manifold of determinations, merely seem to us to contain a universal relation to ends; or else, instead of this idealism of final causes, we want to remain attached to the principle of the realism of this particular kind of causality. In that case we may posit many intelligent original beings, or only a single one, as underlying the natural ends. But as soon as we have nothing at hand for grounding the concept of this being except principles of experience drawn from the actual connection of ends in the world, two things follow. On the one hand, we can find no remedy for the discord that nature displays in many examples with regard to the unity of ends. On the other hand, we can never derive from it the concept of a single intelligent cause, as we arrive at it with the warrant of mere experience, determinately enough for any theology that would be usable in any way whatever (theoretically or practically).

Physical teleology does indeed impel us to seek a theology, but it cannot produce one, however far we may track nature through experience and come to the aid of the connection of ends discovered in it with ideas of reason (which, for physical problems, must be theoretical). What use is it, one will rightly complain, that we place a great understanding, one immeasur-

able for us, at the ground of all these arrangements and let it order this world according to intentions? What use is it, if nature tells us nothing, and never can tell us anything, about the final aim? Yet without this aim we can form no common point of reference for all these natural ends, no sufficient teleological principle, either for cognizing the ends all together in a system or for forming a [441] concept of the supreme understanding, as cause of such a nature, that could serve as a standard for our power of judgment as it reflects teleologically on nature. I would then indeed have an *artistic understanding* for scattered ends, but no *wisdom* for a final end, which must properly contain the determining ground of that understanding. But in the absence of a final end, which only pure reason can supply *a priori* (because all ends in the world are empirically conditioned and can contain nothing but what is good for this or that as a contingent aim, not what is absolutely good), and which alone would teach me what properties, what degree and what relation of the supreme cause of nature I have to think in order to judge nature as a teleological system—how, and by what right, may I then take my very limited concept of that original understanding, a concept I can base only on my meager knowledge of the world, my concept of the power of this original being to realize its ideas, of its will to do so, and so on, and extend it at will, completing it up to the idea of an all-wise, infinite being? If this were to be done theoretically, it would presuppose omniscience in me. I would have to see into the ends of nature in their entire connection and, over and above that, be able to think all other possible plans, in comparison with which the present one would have to be judged, with good reason, to be the best. For without this complete knowledge of the effect I cannot infer a determinate concept of the supreme cause, which can be found only in the concept of an intelligence infinite in every respect, i.e., the concept of a deity; nor can I establish a foundation for theology.

Thus, however far physical teleology may be extended according to the principle stated above, we can indeed say this: given the constitution and the principles of our cognitive fac-

ulty, we cannot think of nature, in those of its purposive arrangements that have become known to us, otherwise than as the product of an understanding to which it is subject. But whether this understanding may also have had a final aim with the whole of nature and its production (an aim that would then not lie in the nature of the sensible world): this, theoretical research into nature can never reveal to us. However much we know of nature, it remains undecided whether that supreme cause is its original ground according to a final end at all, or rather through an understanding determined by the mere necessity of its nature to produce certain forms [442] (by analogy with what we call the artistic instinct in animals). And there would be no need, on that account, to ascribe to it so much as wisdom, let alone supreme wisdom combined with all the other properties required for the perfection of its product.

Physicotheology is therefore a misunderstood physical teleology. It is useful only as a preparation (propaedeutic) for theology. It is sufficient for that purpose only when some other principle on which it can rely is added, and not in itself, as its name would suggest.

§ 86. ETHICOTHEOLOGY

Without human beings as moral beings, creation would be a mere wilderness without a final end.

There is a judgment that even the most common understanding cannot escape when it reflects on the existence of things in the world and on the existence of the world itself. It is this: all the manifold creatures, however great the art of their arrangement and however manifold and purposively interrelated their connection, indeed even the whole of so many systems of them, which we incorrectly call worlds, would exist for nothing if there were no human beings in them (rational beings in general). That is, without human beings the whole of creation would be a mere wilderness, in vain and without a final end. Yet it is not the human being's cognitive faculty (theoretical reason)

in relation to which the existence of everything else in the world first acquires its worth. The point is not, say, that there should be someone who could *contemplate* the world. For if this contemplation presented to him nothing but things without a final end, then the world's existence could gain no worth from the fact that it is known. One must already presuppose a final end of the world in relation to which the contemplation of the world itself would have worth. Nor is it the feeling of pleasure, and the sum of such pleasure, in relation to which we think of a final end of creation as given; that is, it is not well-being or enjoyment (whether bodily or mental), in a word happiness, by which we estimate that absolute worth. For the fact that the human being, once he exists, makes happiness his own final aim gives us no concept of why he exists at all. Nor does it tell us what worth he himself then has, such that his existence should be made agreeable to him. [443] He must therefore already be presupposed as the final end of creation if we are to have a rational ground for why nature must harmonize with his happiness when it is considered as an absolute whole according to principles of ends. —It is therefore only the faculty of desire. But it is not the faculty of desire that makes him dependent on nature (through sensible impulses), nor the one with respect to which the worth of his existence rests on what he receives and enjoys. It is rather the worth that he alone can give himself. This worth consists in what he does: how he acts, and according to what principles, not as a member of nature but in the *freedom* of his faculty of desire. That is, a good will is that through which alone his existence can have an absolute worth, and in relation to which the existence of the world can have a *final end*.

The most common judgment of sound human reason also agrees completely with this. It holds that the human being can be a final end of creation only as a moral being, provided one directs its judging to this question and prompts it to try to answer it. People will say: what good does it do that this man has so much talent, that he is even very active with it, that he thereby exerts a useful influence on the commonwealth and so

has great worth, both in relation to his own fortunes and to the benefit of others, if he has no good will? Considered in terms of his inner self, he is an object deserving contempt. And if creation is not to be altogether without a final end, then he, who as a human being also belongs to it, must, as an evil human being in a world under moral laws, forfeit his subjective end (happiness) in accordance with those laws. This is the only condition under which his existence can be consistent with the final end.

Now suppose we encounter arrangements of ends in the world and, as reason unavoidably demands, subordinate the ends that are only conditioned to an unconditioned supreme end, that is, to a final end. Then it is easy to see, first, that we are no longer speaking of an end of nature (within nature) insofar as it exists. We are speaking of the end of its existence together with all its arrangements, and hence of the ultimate *end of creation*. And in this we are properly speaking of the supreme condition under which alone a final end (that is, the determining ground of a highest understanding for producing the beings of the world) can take place.

444 Since we recognize the human being as the end of creation only as a moral being, we have, first, a ground, or at least the principal condition, for regarding the world as a whole connected according to ends and as a *system* of final causes. But above all, the constitution of our reason makes it necessary for us to relate natural ends to an intelligent cause of the world. For this relation we have *a principle* for thinking the nature and properties of this first cause as the supreme ground in the kingdom of ends, and so for determining the concept of it. Physical teleology could not do this. It could give rise only to indeterminate concepts of that cause, concepts that for that very reason were useless for theoretical as well as practical use.

From this principle of the causality of the original being, so determined, we shall have to think of that being not merely as an intelligence and as legislating for nature, but also as the legislating head in a moral kingdom of ends. In relation to the *highest good* possible solely under its rule, namely the existence of

rational beings under moral laws, we shall think of this original being in several ways. We shall think of it as *omniscient*, so that even the innermost part of dispositions (which constitutes the real moral worth of the actions of rational beings in the world) is not hidden from it. We shall think of it as *omnipotent*, so that it can make the whole of nature accord with this highest end. And we shall think of it as *all-good* and at the same time *just*, because these two properties (which, united, are *wisdom*) constitute the conditions of the causality of a supreme cause of the world as cause of the highest good under moral laws. In the same way we shall have to think in it all the remaining transcendental properties as well, such as *eternity*, *omnipresence*, and so on (for goodness and justice are moral properties), which are presupposed in relation to such a final end.—In this way *moral* teleology makes up for the deficiency of *physical* teleology and for the first time grounds a *theology*. For if physical teleology did not borrow from moral teleology without anyone noticing, but proceeded consistently, it could by itself ground nothing but a *demonology*, which is incapable of any determinate concept.

But consider the principle that relates the world to a supreme cause, as deity, on account of the moral determination of certain beings in it to ends. This principle does this not merely by supplementing the physico-teleological argument and so necessarily taking it as its basis. It is also sufficient for this *by itself*. And it spurs our attention [445] toward the ends of nature and toward investigating the incomprehensibly great art that lies hidden behind nature's forms, in order to give the ideas supplied by pure practical reason incidental confirmation in natural ends. For the concept of beings of the world under moral laws is a principle *a priori* according to which the human being must necessarily judge himself. Furthermore, suppose there is any world-cause at all that acts intentionally and is directed to an end. Then this moral relation must be the condition of the possibility of a creation just as necessarily as the relation according to physical laws (provided, that is, that this intelligent cause also has a final end). This, too, reason regards *a priori* as a principle

necessary for its teleological judging of the existence of things. Now everything depends only on this: whether we have any ground sufficient for reason (be it speculative or practical) to ascribe a *final end* to the supreme cause that acts according to ends. For if there is a final end, then, given the subjective constitution of our reason, and indeed however we may conceive the reason of other beings, it can be nothing other than *the human being under moral laws*. This can count for us as certain *a priori*. The ends of nature in the physical order, by contrast, cannot be cognized *a priori* at all; above all, there is no way of seeing that a nature could not exist without such ends.

REMARK: THE MORAL NEED FOR GOD

Gratitude, obedience and humility lead the moral mind to think of a moral author of the world.

Picture a human being in those moments when his mind is attuned to moral sentiment! If, surrounded by beautiful nature, he finds himself in a calm, serene enjoyment of his existence, he feels within himself a need to be grateful to someone for it. Or let him see himself at another time, in the same frame of mind, pressed by duties that he can and will satisfy only through voluntary sacrifice. Then he feels within himself a need to have thereby also carried out something commanded, and to have obeyed a sovereign lord. Or suppose he has thoughtlessly transgressed against his duty, though not in a way that has made him answerable to other people. The stern self-reproaches will nonetheless speak within him as if they were the voice of a judge to whom he had to [446] give an account of it. In a word, he needs a moral intelligence, so that, for the end for which he exists, he may have a being that is the cause of him and of the world in accordance with this end. It is futile to contrive hidden incentives behind these feelings. They are directly connected with the purest moral disposition, because *gratitude*, *obedience* and *humility* (submission to deserved chastisement) are particular attunements of the mind to duty. And the mind, inclined to extend its

moral disposition, here merely thinks freely of an object that is not in the world, in order, if possible, to prove its duty toward such an object as well. It is therefore at least possible, and the ground for it lies in the moral way of thinking, to represent a pure moral need for the existence of a being. Under such a being our morality gains either more strength or else (at least in our representation) more scope, namely a new object for its exercise; that is, it is possible to assume a morally legislating being outside the world. One would do so without any regard to theoretical proof, still less to self-interest, on a purely moral ground free from all alien influence (though admittedly only a subjective one), on the mere recommendation of a pure practical reason that legislates by itself alone. Such a frame of mind might occur only rarely, or might not last long. It might pass away fleetingly and without lasting effect, or without any reflection on the object represented in such a shadowy image and without any effort to bring it under distinct concepts. Even so, its ground is unmistakable: the moral predisposition in us, as a subjective principle, not to be content, in contemplating the world, with its purposiveness through natural causes, but to posit beneath it a supreme cause that rules nature according to moral principles. —There is a further point. We feel ourselves compelled by the moral law to strive for a universal highest end, yet we feel that we ourselves and the whole of nature are incapable of attaining it. And only insofar as we strive for it may we judge ourselves to be in conformity with the final end of an intelligent cause of the world (if there were such a cause). Thus there is a pure moral ground of practical reason for assuming this cause (since this can be done without contradiction). If for nothing more, we assume it so that we do not run the risk of regarding that striving as wholly futile in its effects and thereby letting it flag.

[447] All that is meant to be said here is this. *Fear* may indeed first have produced *gods* (demons), but it was *reason*, by means of its moral principles, that could first produce the concept of *God*. This held even when people were, as they usually were, very

ignorant in the teleology of nature, or very doubtful because of the difficulty of reconciling the mutually contradictory appearances in it through a sufficiently tested principle. And the inner *moral* determination of the human being's existence to an end supplied what knowledge of nature lacked. It directed us, for the final end of the existence of all things, for which only an *ethical* principle satisfies reason, to think of the supreme cause as having properties by which it is able to subject the whole of nature to that single aim (for which nature is merely an instrument), (that is,[2] as a *deity*).

§ 87. THE MORAL PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

To set ourselves the highest good as final end, we must assume a moral author of the world.

There is a *physical teleology* that provides an argument sufficient for our theoretically reflecting judgment to assume the existence of an intelligent cause of the world. But we also find in ourselves, and still more in the concept of a rational being in general endowed with freedom (of its causality), a *moral teleology*. The relation to ends in us can be determined *a priori* together with its law, and hence cognized as necessary. For this reason moral teleology needs no intelligent cause outside us for this inner lawfulness. In the same way, when we find something purposive in the geometrical properties of figures (for all sorts of possible practice of art), we may not look beyond them to a highest understanding that imparts this purposiveness to them. But this moral teleology still concerns us as beings of the world, and so as beings connected with other things in the world. And the very same moral laws prescribe that we direct our judging to those other things, either as ends or as objects with respect to which we ourselves are the final end. This moral teleology concerns the relation of our own causality to ends, and even to a final end that we must aim at in the world. It also concerns the

2 Kant alludes to the ancient saying "Primus in orbe deos fecit timor" ("Fear first made gods in the world"), found in Statius and Petronius.

reciprocal relation of the world to that moral end and the [448] external possibility of carrying it out (for which no physical teleology can give us guidance). From it there now arises the necessary question: does it compel our rational judging to go beyond the world and to seek an intelligent supreme principle for that relation of nature to the moral in us, in order to represent nature to ourselves as purposive also in relation to our inner moral legislation and its possible realization? Consequently there certainly is a moral teleology. It is connected with the *nomothetic* of freedom on the one hand and that of nature on the other just as necessarily as civil legislation is connected with the question of where the executive power is to be sought. In general there is such a connection wherever reason is to specify a principle of the actuality of a certain lawful order of things that is possible only according to ideas.—We shall first set out the progress of reason from that moral teleology and its relation to physical teleology to *theology*, and afterwards offer some reflections on the possibility and cogency of this kind of inference.

Suppose one takes the existence of certain things (or even only of certain forms of things) to be contingent, and hence possible only through something else as its cause. Then one can seek the supreme ground of this causality, and thus the unconditioned ground of the conditioned, either in the physical or in the teleological order (according to the *nexu effectivo* or *finali* [the connection of efficient or of final causes]). That is, one can ask: what is the supreme producing cause? Or: what is its supreme (absolutely unconditioned) end, that is, the final end of its producing these or all of its products in general? In the latter case it is of course presupposed that this cause is capable of representing ends, and hence is an intelligent being, or at least must be thought by us as acting according to the laws of such a being.

Now if one follows the latter order, there is a *principle* to which even the most common human reason is compelled to give its immediate assent: if there is to be a *final end* at all, which reason must specify *a priori*, it can be nothing other than *the*

human being (every rational being in the world) *under moral laws*.[3] For everyone judges as follows. If the world consisted of [449] nothing but lifeless beings, or partly of living but nonrational beings, the existence of such a world would have no worth at all, because there would exist in it no being that has the slightest concept of worth. Suppose, on the other hand, that there were also rational beings, but that their reason could place the worth of the existence of things only in the relation of nature to them (their well-being), and could not originally (in freedom) procure such a worth for itself. Then there would indeed be (relative) ends in the world, but no (absolute) final end, because the existence of such rational beings would still always be without purpose. Moral laws, however, have a peculiar character: they prescribe something to reason as an end without condition, and hence precisely as the concept of a final end requires. So the existence of such a reason, one that can be the supreme law to

3 KANT'S NOTE. I say deliberately: *under* moral laws. It is not the human being *according to* moral laws, that is, one who conducts himself in conformity with them, who is the final end of creation. For with the latter expression we would be saying more than we know: namely, that it lies in the power of an author of the world to bring it about that the human being always conducts himself in conformity with moral laws. That would presuppose a concept of freedom and of nature (and only of nature can one think an external author) which would have to contain an insight into the supersensible substratum of nature and into its identity with what makes causality through freedom possible in the world. Such an insight goes far beyond the insight of our reason. Only of the *human being under moral laws* can we say, without overstepping the limits of our insight, that his existence constitutes the final end of the world. This also agrees completely with the judgment of human reason when it reflects morally on the course of the world. We believe that we perceive traces of a wise relation to ends even in evil, if only we see that the wicked villain does not die before he has suffered the well-deserved punishment for his misdeeds. According to our concepts of free causality, good or bad conduct depends on us. But we place the highest wisdom in the government of the world in this: that the occasion for the former, and the outcome for both, is ordained according to moral laws. The glory of God properly consists in the latter, and theologians therefore not inappropriately call it the ultimate end of creation.—It should also be noted that when we use the word "creation," we understand by it nothing but what has been said here, namely the cause of the *existence* of a *world*, or of the things in it (the substances). This is also what the proper concept of the word implies (*actuatio substantiae est creatio* [the actualization of substance is creation]). It therefore does not already carry with it the presupposition of a freely acting, and hence intelligent, cause (whose existence we first want to prove).

itself in its relation to ends, in other words the existence of rational beings under moral laws, can alone be thought of as the final end [450] of the existence of a world. If this is not the case, then either no end at all in the cause underlies the world's existence, or ends without a final end underlie it.

The moral law, as the formal rational condition of the use of our freedom, obligates us by itself alone, without depending on any end as a material condition. Yet it also determines for us, and indeed *a priori*, a final end, and makes it obligatory for us to strive toward this end. And this is the *highest good in the world* possible through freedom.

The subjective condition under which the human being (and, according to all our concepts, every rational finite being as well) can set himself a final end under the above law is happiness. Consequently, the highest physical good possible in the world, which is to be promoted as a final end as far as lies in us, is *happiness*. But it stands under an objective condition: the human being's agreement with the law of *morality*, as worthiness to be happy.

But with all our faculties of reason we cannot possibly represent these two requirements of the final end set for us by the moral law as *connected* by mere natural causes and as adequate to the idea of that final end. So the concept of the *practical necessity* of such an end through the application of our powers does not agree with the theoretical concept of the *physical possibility* of bringing it about, if we connect with our freedom no causality (as a means) other than that of nature.

Consequently we must assume a moral cause of the world (an author of the world) in order to set before ourselves a final end in conformity with the moral law. And to the extent that the latter is necessary, to the same extent (that is, in the same degree

and on the same ground) it is also necessary to assume the former: namely, that there is a God.[4]

This proof, to which one can easily give the form of logical precision, does not mean to say that it is just as necessary to assume the existence of God [451] as to acknowledge the validity of the moral law, so that whoever cannot convince himself of the former could judge himself released from the obligations of the latter. No! All that would then have to be given up is the *aim* of the final end to be brought about in the world by following the moral law (a happiness of rational beings harmoniously coinciding with their following of moral laws, as the world's highest good). Every rational being would still have to recognize himself as strictly bound by the precept of morals, for its laws are formal and command unconditionally, without regard to ends (as the matter of willing). But one requirement of the final end, as practical reason prescribes it to beings of the world, is an irresistible end placed in them by their nature (as finite beings). Reason wants this end to be subject only to the moral law *as* its inviolable *condition*, or also to be made universal in accordance with that law. In this way reason makes the promotion of happiness in agreement with morality the final end. The moral law commands us to promote this final end as far as it lies in our power (as regards the former), whatever the outcome of this effort may be. The fulfillment of duty consists in the form of the earnest will, not in the intermediate causes of success.

Suppose, then, that a human being persuaded himself of the proposition that there is no God, moved partly by the weakness of all the much-vaunted speculative arguments, partly by the many irregularities he encounters in nature and in the moral

4 KANT'S NOTE. This moral argument is not meant to provide an *objectively valid* proof of the existence of God, nor to prove to someone of wavering faith that there is a God. It is meant to show that, if he wants to think consistently in moral terms, he *must adopt* the assumption of this proposition among the maxims of his practical reason.—Nor is it meant to say that it is necessary *for* morality to assume the happiness of all rational beings in the world in proportion to their morality, but rather that this assumption is made necessary *by* morality. Hence it is a *subjectively* sufficient argument, sufficient for moral beings.

world. He would still be a worthless person in his own eyes if he therefore took the laws of duty to be merely imaginary, invalid and not binding, and resolved to transgress them without scruple. Even if such a person could later convince himself of what he had at first doubted, he would still remain worthless with that way of thinking. This would hold even if he fulfilled his duty, as far as its effect is concerned, as punctiliously as could ever be demanded, but out of fear or with a view to reward, without [452] a disposition that reveres duty. Conversely, suppose that as a believer he follows the laws of duty sincerely and unselfishly, as far as he is aware. And yet whenever, as an experiment, he supposes that he might one day be convinced that there is no God, he at once believes himself free of all moral obligation. Then the inner moral disposition in him must be in a poor state indeed.

We can therefore suppose a righteous man (such as, say, Spinoza) who holds himself firmly persuaded that there is no God and (since with respect to the object of morality it comes to the same consequence) no future life either. How will he judge his own inner determination to an end through the moral law, which he actively reveres? He demands no advantage for himself from following it, either in this world or in another. Rather, he wants unselfishly only to bring about the good toward which that holy law directs all his powers. But his striving is limited. From nature he can indeed expect some contingent assistance here and there, but never an agreement with the end that he nonetheless feels obligated and impelled to bring about, an agreement that would be lawful and would occur according to constant rules (as his maxims inwardly are and must be). Deceit, violence and envy will always be rampant around him, even though he himself is honest, peaceable and benevolent. And the other righteous people he still encounters will, regardless of all their worthiness to be happy, nevertheless be subjected by nature, which pays no heed to that, to all the evils of want, disease and untimely death, just like the other animals on earth. So they will remain, until one wide grave swallows them all

together (honest or dishonest, it makes no difference here) and hurls them, who could believe themselves the final end of creation, back into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which they were drawn. —So this well-meaning man would certainly have to give up as impossible the end that he had, and ought to have, in view in following the moral laws. Or else he wants to remain faithful here, too, to the call of his inner moral vocation. He does not want to weaken the respect that the moral law immediately instills in him for obedience by the nullity of the only ideal final end adequate to its lofty demand (which cannot happen without damage to the moral disposition). [453] In that case he must assume the existence of a *moral* author of the world, that is, of God. He can very well do this, since it is at least not self-contradictory in itself. And he must do so with a practical aim, that is, in order at least to form a concept of the possibility of the final end morally prescribed to him.

§ 88. LIMITS OF THE MORAL PROOF

The moral proof holds only for practical reason and for reflecting, not determining, judgment.

Pure reason as a practical faculty, that is, as a faculty of determining the free use of our causality through ideas (pure concepts of reason), not only contains in the moral law a regulative principle of our actions. It thereby also provides at the same time a subjectively constitutive principle, in the concept of an object that only reason can think and that is to be made actual through our actions in the world according to that law. The idea of a final end in the use of freedom according to moral laws therefore has *subjectively practical* reality. We are determined *a priori* by reason to promote with all our powers the world's highest good. This consists in the combination of the greatest well-being of rational beings in the world with the supreme condition of the good in them, that is, of universal happiness with the most lawful morality. In this final end, the possibility of one part, namely happiness, is empirically conditioned, that is, dependent on the con-

stitution of nature (on whether or not it agrees with this end), and it is problematic in theoretical respect. The other part, by contrast, namely morality, with respect to which we are free of nature's cooperation, is firmly established *a priori* as to its possibility and is dogmatically certain. So the objective theoretical reality of the concept of the final end of rational beings in the world requires not only that we have a final end set before us *a priori*, but also that creation, that is, the world itself, has a final end as to its existence. If this could be proved *a priori*, it would add objective reality to the subjective reality of the final end. For if creation has a final end at all, we cannot think of it otherwise than as something that must agree [454] with the moral end (which alone makes the concept of an end possible). Now we do indeed find ends in the world. Physical teleology presents them to such an extent that, if we judge in accordance with reason, we ultimately have ground to assume, as the principle for investigating nature, that there is nothing at all in nature without an end. But we seek the final end of nature in nature itself in vain. Just as the idea of it lies only in reason, it can and must therefore be sought, even as to its objective possibility, only in rational beings. But the practical reason of these beings not only specifies this final end; it also determines this concept with respect to the conditions under which alone a final end of creation can be thought by us.

The question now is whether the objective reality of the concept of a final end of creation could not also be demonstrated sufficiently for the theoretical demands of pure reason: if not apodictically for the determining power of judgment, then at least sufficiently for the maxims of the theoretically reflecting power of judgment. This is the least one can ask of speculative philosophy, which undertakes to connect the moral end with natural ends by means of the idea of a single end. But even this little is far more than it can ever accomplish.

According to the principle of the theoretically reflecting power of judgment, we would say this. Suppose we have ground to assume, for the purposive products of nature, a supreme

cause of nature whose causality with respect to the actuality of nature (creation) must be thought of as being of a different kind from that required for the mechanism of nature, namely as the causality of an understanding. Then we shall also have sufficient ground to think in this original being not merely ends everywhere in nature, but also a final end. This ground would not suffice to demonstrate the existence of such a being. But it would at least (as happened in physical teleology) convince us that we can make the possibility of such a world comprehensible to ourselves not merely according to ends, but only by attributing a final end to its existence.

But a final end is merely a concept of our practical reason. It can neither be inferred from any data of experience for the theoretical judging of nature, nor be related to cognition of nature. No use of this concept is possible except solely for practical [455] reason according to moral laws. And the final end of creation is that constitution of the world which agrees with what we alone can specify determinately according to laws, namely the final end of our pure practical reason, and indeed insofar as that reason is to be practical. Now the moral law imposes this final end on us. Through it we have a ground, with a practical aim, namely in order to apply our powers to bringing that end about, to assume its possibility, its feasibility. Hence we also have a ground to assume a nature of things that agrees with it, since without nature's concurrence with a condition of the end that is not in our power, bringing it about would be impossible. So we have a moral ground for thinking, in a world, a final end of creation as well.

This, however, is not yet the inference from moral teleology to a theology, that is, to the existence of a moral author of the world. It is only the inference to a final end of creation, which is determined in this way. A second inference is needed to conclude that for this creation, that is, for the existence of things in accordance with a *final end*, we must assume, first, an intelligent being, but secondly not merely an intelligent being (as for the possibility of the things of nature that we were compelled to

judge as *ends*), but one that is at the same time a *moral* being, as author of the world, and hence a *God*. This second inference is so constituted that one sees it is made merely for the power of judgment according to concepts of practical reason, and as such for the reflecting, not the determining, power of judgment. For in us, morally practical reason is essentially distinct in its principles from technically practical reason. But we cannot presume to see that it must also be so in the supreme cause of the world, if that cause is assumed to be an intelligence, and that a particular and different kind of causality is required of it for the final end than merely for ends of nature. Nor, therefore, can we presume to see that in our final end we have a *moral ground* for assuming not only a final end of creation (as effect) but also a *moral being* as the original ground of creation. But we can indeed say this: *given the constitution of our faculty of reason*, we cannot make comprehensible to ourselves at all the possibility of such a purposiveness, one related *to the moral law* and its object, as there is in this final end, without an author and ruler of the world who is at the same time a moral legislator.

456 The actuality of a highest morally legislating author is therefore sufficiently demonstrated merely *for the practical use* of our reason, without determining anything theoretically with regard to his existence. For reason, for the possibility of its end, which is in any case set for us by its own legislation, needs an idea. Through this idea the obstacle that arises from our inability to follow that legislation, according to the mere natural concept of the world (sufficient for the reflecting power of judgment), is removed. And this idea thereby acquires practical reality, even though speculative cognition entirely lacks the means of procuring such reality for it in a theoretical respect, for explaining nature and determining the supreme cause. For the theoretically reflecting power of judgment, physical teleology sufficiently proved an intelligent cause of the world from the ends of nature. For the practical power of judgment, moral teleology achieves this through the concept of a final end that it is compelled, with a practical aim, to attribute to creation. Now

the objective reality of the idea of God as moral author of the world cannot, indeed, be demonstrated by physical ends *alone*. Nevertheless, when cognition of physical ends is combined with that of the moral end, they are of great importance, by virtue of the maxim of pure reason to pursue unity of principles as far as possible. They come to the aid of the practical reality of that idea through the reality it already has in a theoretical respect for the power of judgment.

Here, to prevent a misunderstanding that easily arises, it is most necessary to note two things. First, we can *think* these properties of the highest being only by analogy. For how could we investigate its nature, of which experience can show us nothing similar? Second, through them we can also only think it, not *cognize* it by means of them and, say, ascribe them to it theoretically. For that would be a matter for the determining power of judgment, with a speculative aim of our reason, namely to see what the supreme cause of the world is *in itself*. Here, however, the only concern is this. Given the constitution of our cognitive faculties, what concept must we form of this being? And must we assume its existence in order to procure merely practical reality, likewise, for an end that pure practical reason, without any such presupposition, imposes on us *a priori* to bring about with all our powers, that is, in order merely to be able to think an intended effect as possible? That concept may well be extravagant [457] for speculative reason. The properties we ascribe to the being thought through it may also, used objectively, conceal an anthropomorphism within them. But the aim of their use is not to determine that being's nature, which is beyond our reach. It is to determine ourselves and our will accordingly. We name a cause according to the concept we have of its effect (but only with respect to its relation to that effect), without on that account wishing to determine its inner constitution through the properties that are the only ones known to us of such causes and that must be given to us through experience. For example, we ascribe to the soul, among other things, a *vim locomotivam* [motive force], because movements of the body actually arise

whose cause lies in the soul's representations. Yet we do not on that account wish to ascribe to it the only way in which we know motive forces (namely through attraction, pressure, impact, and hence motion, which always presuppose an extended being). In just the same way we shall have to assume *something* that contains the ground of the possibility and of the practical reality, that is, the feasibility, of a necessary moral final end. According to the nature of the effect expected from it, we can think of this something as a wise being that rules the world according to moral laws. And in keeping with the constitution of our cognitive faculties, we must think of it as a cause of things distinct from nature, merely in order to express the *relation* of this being, which surpasses all our cognitive faculties, to the object of *our* practical reason. Yet we do not thereby wish to ascribe to it theoretically the only causality of this kind known to us, namely an understanding and a will. We do not even wish to distinguish objectively, within this being itself, the causality thought in it with respect to what is a final end *for us* from its causality with respect to nature (and nature's determinations to ends in general). We can assume this distinction only as subjectively necessary for the constitution of our cognitive faculty and as valid for the reflecting, not for the objectively determining, power of judgment. But when it comes to the practical, such a *regulative* principle (for prudence or wisdom) is at the same time *constitutive*, that is, practically determining: the principle of acting in conformity with, as an end, what, given the constitution of our cognitive faculties, we can think of as possible only in a certain way. As a principle for judging the objective possibility of things, however, the very same principle is by no means theoretically determining (that is, it does not assert that [458] the only kind of possibility that belongs to our faculty of thinking also belongs to the object). It is a merely *regulative* principle for the reflecting power of judgment.

REMARK: AN OLD ARGUMENT NEWLY EXPLAINED

The moral argument has always been present in human reason and first awakened interest in nature.

This moral proof is not some newly invented argument, but at most a newly discussed one. For it lay in the human faculty of reason even before that faculty first began to germinate, and it only becomes ever more developed as the faculty's cultivation advances. Human beings began to reflect on right and wrong at a time when they still looked past the purposiveness of nature with indifference, making use of it without thinking of anything but the accustomed course of nature. As soon as they did, the judgment was bound to arise: that in the end it could never be all the same whether a person had behaved honestly or falsely, fairly or violently, even if up to the end of his life he had met, at least visibly, with no happiness for his virtues or no punishment for his crimes. It is as if they perceived within themselves a voice saying that things must turn out otherwise. Hence there must also have lain hidden in them the representation, however obscure, of something they felt obligated to strive toward. Such an outcome could not be reconciled with it at all; or, once they regarded the course of the world as the only order of things, they in turn did not know how to reconcile that inner determination of their mind to an end with it. Now they might picture, in all sorts of ways however crude, how such an irregularity could be redressed. It is an irregularity that must be far more outrageous to the human mind than blind chance, which one might perhaps want to take as the principle for judging nature. Yet they could never devise any other principle of the possibility of uniting nature with their inner moral law than a supreme cause ruling the world according to moral laws. For a final end within them, set as a duty, and a nature without any final end outside them, in which that end is nonetheless to become actual, stand in contradiction. About the inner constitution of that world-cause they might hatch much nonsense. But that moral relation

in the government of the world always remained the same. It is universally comprehensible to the most uncultivated reason, insofar as it regards itself as practical, whereas speculative reason is far [459] from able to keep pace with it.—Moreover, in all probability it was this moral interest that first aroused attention to the beauty and ends of nature. That attention then served admirably to strengthen the idea, but it could not ground it, still less do without that interest. For even the investigation of the ends of nature acquires only in relation to the final end that immediate interest which shows itself so strongly in our admiration of nature, without regard to any advantage to be drawn from it.

§ 89. THE BENEFIT OF THE MORAL ARGUMENT

Restricting ideas of God to practical use guards against theosophy, demonology, theurgy and idolatry.

Restricting reason, in respect of all our ideas of the supersensible, to the conditions of its practical use has an unmistakable benefit where the idea of God is concerned. It prevents *theology* from soaring up into *theosophy* (into extravagant concepts that confound reason) or sinking down into *demonology* (an anthropomorphic way of representing the highest being). And it prevents *religion* from lapsing into *theurgy* (the fanatical delusion that we can have a feeling of other supersensible beings and, in turn, exert an influence on them) or into *idolatry* (the superstitious delusion that we can make ourselves pleasing to the highest being by means other than a moral disposition)[5].

For suppose we grant the vanity or presumption of subtle reasoning even the least theoretical determination (one that

5 KANT'S NOTE. In the practical sense, idolatry is still any religion that conceives the highest being as having properties according to which something other than morality could by itself be a sufficient condition for conforming to his will in what human beings are able to do. For however pure and free of sensible images one may have grasped that concept in a theoretical respect, in practice it is then nonetheless represented as an idol, that is, anthropomorphically, as regards the constitution of his will.

would extend cognition) regarding what lies beyond the world of the senses. Suppose we allow it to boast of insights into the existence and constitution of the divine nature, into his understanding and will, the laws of both, and the properties that flow from them onto the world. Then I should very much like to know where, at what point, one intends to set limits to the [460] pretensions of reason. For wherever those insights were drawn from, from that very source still more can surely be expected (if only, as people suppose, one strained one's reflection). Limiting such claims would surely have to happen according to some principle, and not merely on the ground that we find all attempts at them have so far failed; for that proves nothing against the possibility of a better outcome. But here no principle is possible except one of two assumptions. Either with respect to the supersensible absolutely nothing at all can be determined theoretically (except merely negatively); or our reason contains within itself a still untapped mine of who knows how vast a store of knowledge-extending cognitions, kept in reserve for us and our descendants.—As regards religion, however, that is, morality in relation to God as lawgiver: if theoretical cognition of him had to come first, then morality would have to take its direction from theology. Not only would an external, arbitrary legislation by a highest being be introduced in place of an inner, necessary legislation of reason; but in that legislation, too, whatever is deficient in our insight into his nature would extend to the moral precept, and so make religion immoral and pervert it.

As regards the hope of a future life: suppose that, instead of the final end we ourselves are to accomplish in accordance with the precept of the moral law, we consulted our theoretical cognitive faculty as the guiding thread for reason's judgment about our vocation (a judgment that is therefore regarded as necessary, or as worth accepting, only in a practical relation). Then the doctrine of the soul, for this purpose, just like theology above, yields nothing more than a negative concept of our thinking being. It tells us only that none of the soul's actions and none

of the appearances of inner sense can be explained materialistically; and hence that no extending, determining judgment whatsoever about its separate nature, or about the continuance or non-continuance of its personality after death, is possible for us on speculative grounds, through our entire theoretical cognitive faculty. Here, then, everything is left to the teleological judging of our existence in a practically necessary respect, and to the assumption of our continued existence as the condition required for the final end absolutely set us by reason. And so the benefit shows itself here as well (though at first glance it seems to be a loss). Just as theology can never become theosophy for us [461], so rational *psychology* can never become *pneumatology* as a science that extends our cognition—just as, on the other hand, it is also secured against falling into any *materialism*. Rather, it is merely an anthropology of inner sense, that is,[6] knowledge of our thinking self *in life*, and as theoretical cognition it also remains merely empirical. Rational psychology, by contrast, insofar as it concerns the question of our eternal existence, is no theoretical science at all, but rests on a single inference of moral teleology; and indeed its entire use is necessary only for the sake of moral teleology, as our practical vocation.

§ 90. ASSENT IN THE TELEOLOGICAL PROOF

No theoretical proof, by syllogism, analogy, probability or hypothesis, can establish God's existence.

First of all, every proof—whether it is conducted through an immediate empirical presentation of what is to be proved (as in proof by observation of the object, or by experiment) or by reason *a priori* from principles—is required not to *persuade* but to *convince*, or at least to work toward conviction. That is, the ground of proof, or the inference, must not be merely a subjective (aesthetic) determining ground of approval (mere illusion), but objectively valid and a logical ground of cognition. For oth-

6 Pneumatology: the traditional metaphysical doctrine of spirits, including the soul considered as a spirit.

erwise the understanding is beguiled, but not convinced. A specious proof of that kind is the one conducted in natural theology —perhaps with good intentions, but nevertheless with a deliberate concealment of its weakness. It gathers up the great mass of evidence for an origin of natural things according to the principle of ends, and exploits a merely subjective ground of human reason: namely, reason's peculiar propensity, wherever this can be done without contradiction, to think a single principle instead of many; and, where only some or even many of the requirements for determining a concept are found in this principle, to add the rest in thought, so as to complete the concept of the thing by arbitrary supplementation. For of course, when we meet with so many products in nature that are, for us, indications of an intelligent cause, why should we not rather think a single such cause instead of many? And why should we not think in it not merely great understanding, [462] power and so on, but rather infinite wisdom and omnipotence—in a word, think it as a cause that contains the sufficient ground of such properties for all possible things? And why should we not, besides, ascribe to this one all-powerful original being not only understanding with respect to the laws and products of nature, but also, as a moral cause of the world, the highest moral-practical reason—since by completing the concept in this way we specify a principle sufficient for insight into nature and for moral wisdom alike, and no objection with even the slightest foundation can be raised against the possibility of such an idea? If at the same time the moral incentives of the mind are set in motion, and the lively interest proper to them is added with rhetorical force (which they well deserve), there arises a persuasion of the proof's objective sufficiency. There also arises an illusion that is (in most cases of its use) even salutary—one that exempts itself entirely from any examination of the proof's logical rigor, and even regards such examination with abhorrence and aversion, as if it rested on an impious doubt.—Now, there is really nothing to be said against this, insofar as one's concern is popular usefulness. But the proof cannot, and must not, be kept from being

split into the two heterogeneous parts this argument contains—namely, what belongs to physical teleology and what belongs to moral teleology. For fusing the two makes it impossible to recognize where the real nerve of the proof lies, and on which part, and how, it would have to be worked on for its validity to hold up under the strictest examination (even if one should be compelled to admit, regarding one part, the weakness of our rational insight). It is therefore the philosopher's duty (even supposing he counted the demand of sincerity upon him as nothing) to expose the illusion that such a mixture can produce, however salutary it may be. He must separate what belongs merely to persuasion from what leads to conviction (these being modes of approval that differ not merely in degree but in kind). Only so can he openly present the state of mind at work in this proof in all its purity, and frankly submit the proof to the strictest examination.

A proof aimed at conviction, however, can in turn be of two kinds. It is meant to establish either what the object is *in itself*, or what it is *for us* (human beings in general) according to the [463] principles of reason necessary for us in judging it (a proof *κατ' αληθειαν* [according to truth] or *κατ' ανθρωπον* [according to the human being], the latter word taken in its general meaning, for human beings in general). In the first case it is founded on principles sufficient for determining judgment; in the second, on principles sufficient merely for reflecting judgment. In the latter case, if it rests on merely theoretical principles, it can never work toward conviction. But if it takes a practical principle of reason as its basis (one that is therefore universally and necessarily valid), it may well lay claim to a conviction that is sufficient in a purely practical respect, that is, a moral conviction. A proof, however, *works toward conviction* without yet convincing if it is merely conducted along the way to conviction—that is, if it contains only objective grounds for it which, though not yet sufficient for certainty, are nevertheless of such a kind that they do not serve persuasion merely as subjective grounds of judgment.

Now, all theoretical grounds of proof suffice either 1) for proof by logically rigorous *syllogisms*; or, where this is not the case, 2) for an *inference* according to *analogy*; or, should even this not be available, still 3) for *probable opinion*; or finally, what is least, 4) for assuming a merely possible ground of explanation, as a *hypothesis*.—Now I say that all grounds of proof whatever that work toward theoretical conviction can produce no assent of this kind, from its highest degree to its lowest, if what is to be proved is the proposition that an original being exists as a God, in the meaning adequate to the entire content of this concept—namely, as a *moral* author of the world, and hence in such a way that the final end of creation is at the same time specified through him.[7]

1) As for the *logically correct* proof, proceeding from the universal to the particular, it has been sufficiently shown in the *Critique* that no cognition whatever of such a being takes place (no cognition, that is, by which the scope of our theoretical knowledge would be extended in the least). For no intuition possible for us corresponds to the concept of a being that is to be sought beyond nature, and so its concept itself, insofar as it is to be determined theoretically through synthetic predicates, always remains problematic for us. Nor can the particular concept of a supersensible being be subsumed at all under the universal principles of the nature of things, so as to infer from the latter [464] to the former; for those principles hold solely for nature as an object of the senses.[8]

7 "Assent" renders Kant's *Fürwahrhalten*, literally "holding-to-be-true": his general term for every kind of acceptance, covering opinion, faith and knowledge alike.
8 Kant refers to the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which criticizes the traditional proofs of God's existence.

2) Of two heterogeneous things one can indeed *think* one according to an *analogy*[9] with the other, even in the very respect in which they are heterogeneous. But from what makes them heterogeneous one cannot *infer* from the one to the other according to the analogy, that is, transfer this mark of specific difference to the other. Thus, on the analogy of the law of the equality of action and reaction in the mutual attraction and repulsion of [465] bodies, I can also think the community of the members of a commonwealth according to rules of right. But I cannot transfer those specific determinations (material attrac-

9 KANT'S NOTE. *Analogy* (in the qualitative sense) is the identity of the relation between grounds and consequences (causes and effects), insofar as this identity obtains notwithstanding the specific difference of the things, or of those properties in themselves that contain the ground of similar consequences (that is, considered apart from this relation). Thus, comparing the artful activities of animals with those of human beings, we think of the ground of these effects in animals, which we do not know, as an analogue of reason, by comparison with the ground of similar effects in human beings (namely reason), which we do know. At the same time we mean to indicate that the ground of the animals' capacity for art, under the name of instinct, is in fact specifically different from reason, yet stands in a similar relation to the effect (compare the building of beavers with that of human beings). —But from the fact that human beings need *reason* for their building, I cannot infer that beavers must have something of the kind too, and call this an *inference* according to analogy. But from the similar way animals act (whose ground we cannot perceive directly), compared with the way human beings act (of which we are directly conscious), we can quite correctly infer *according to analogy* that animals too act according to *representations* (and are not, as Descartes would have it, machines), and that, notwithstanding their specific difference, they are of the same genus as human beings (as living beings). The principle entitling us to infer in this way lies in the sameness of a ground for counting animals, with respect to the determination in question, as belonging to the same genus as human beings qua human, so far as we compare them with one another externally by their actions. It is *par ratio* [the same ground]. In the same way, comparing the purposive products of the supreme cause of the world in the world with human works of art, I can think its causality on the analogy of an understanding; but I cannot *infer* these properties in it according to the analogy. For here precisely the principle that would make such a mode of inference possible is lacking—namely the *paritas rationis* [parity of ground] for counting the highest being and human beings (with respect to their respective causality) as one and the same genus. The causality of beings in the world, which is always sensibly conditioned (as is causality through understanding), cannot be transferred to a being that has no generic concept in common with them except that of a thing in general.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. René Descartes (1596–1650) held that animals are mere mechanisms without thought or feeling.

tion or repulsion) to the latter and ascribe them to the citizens, in order to make up a system called a state. In the same way, we may well think the causality of the original being with respect to the things of the world, as natural ends, on the analogy of an understanding as the ground of the forms of certain products that we call works of art. (This is done only for the sake of the theoretical or practical use of our cognitive faculty that we have to make of this concept, according to a certain principle, with respect to the natural things in the world.) But among beings in the world, understanding must be ascribed to the cause of an effect that is judged to be a product of art; from this we can by no means infer, according to an analogy, that the very same causality we perceive in human beings also belongs, with respect to nature itself, to the being that is entirely distinct from nature. For this concerns precisely the point of heterogeneity that is thought, in the concept of the supersensible original being itself, between a cause sensibly conditioned with respect to its effects and that being; and so it cannot be transferred to the latter. —Precisely in the fact that I am to think divine causality only on the analogy of an understanding (a faculty we know in no being other than the sensibly conditioned human being) lies the prohibition against ascribing understanding to God in the proper sense[10].

3) *Opinion* has no place at all in *a priori* judgments: through them one cognizes something either as entirely certain or not at all. But even if the given grounds of proof from which we start (as here, from the ends in the world) are empirical, one still cannot use them to form any opinion about anything beyond the world of the senses, nor grant such venturesome judgments the least claim to probability. For probability is a part of a certainty possible within a certain series of grounds (the grounds of probability are compared in it with the sufficient ground as parts

10 KANT'S NOTE. In this way we lose not the least thing in representing the relations of this being to the world, as regards the theoretical as well as the practical consequences of this concept. To want to investigate what it is in itself is a curiosity as purposeless as it is futile.

with a whole), and it must be possible to supplement that insufficient [466] ground up to full certainty. But since these grounds, as determining grounds of the certainty of one and the same judgment, must be homogeneous—otherwise they would not together make up a magnitude (as certainty is)—one part of them cannot lie within the bounds of possible experience and another outside all possible experience. Hence, since merely empirical grounds of proof lead to nothing supersensible, and the gap in their series cannot be filled by anything either, the attempt to reach the supersensible, and a cognition of it, by means of them makes not the least approximation. Consequently, a judgment about the supersensible made through arguments taken from experience has no probability either.

4) Whatever is to serve as a *hypothesis* for explaining the possibility of a given appearance must at least be entirely certain in its own possibility. It is enough that with a hypothesis I renounce cognition of actuality (which is still asserted in an opinion put forward as probable); more than that I cannot give up. The possibility of what I take as the basis of an explanation must at least not be open to any doubt, for otherwise there would be no end of empty chimeras. But to assume the possibility of a supersensible being determined according to certain concepts would be a completely groundless presupposition. For none of the conditions required for a cognition, as regards what in it rests on intuition, is given here; and so the mere principle of contradiction (which can prove nothing but the possibility of thinking, not the possibility of the object thought) is all that remains as a criterion of this possibility.

The result of all this is that, for the existence of the original being as a deity, or of the soul as an immortal spirit, no proof whatever with a theoretical aim is possible for human reason that would produce even the least degree of assent. And this for an entirely comprehensible reason: we have no material at all for determining the ideas of the supersensible. We would have to take this material from things in the world of the senses, but such material is utterly inadequate to that object. So, with no

determination of these ideas, nothing remains but the concept of a non-sensible something that contains the ultimate ground of the world of the senses—a concept that does not yet amount to any cognition (as an extension of the concept) of its inner constitution.

§ 91. ASSENT THROUGH PRACTICAL FAITH

Kant distinguishes matters of opinion, fact and faith; God and immortality are matters of faith.

[467] If we look merely at the way in which something can be an object of cognition (*res cognoscibilis* [a knowable thing]) *for us* (according to the subjective constitution of our powers of representation), then concepts are compared not with objects but merely with our cognitive faculties and with the use these can make of the given representation (with a theoretical or practical aim). And the question whether something is a knowable being or not concerns not the possibility of things themselves, but the possibility of our cognition of them.

Now, *knowable* things are of three kinds: *matters of opinion* (*opinabile* [what can be opined]), *matters of fact* (*scibile* [what can be known]) and *matters of faith* (*mere credibile* [what can only be believed]).

1) Objects of mere ideas of reason, which cannot be presented in any possible experience at all for theoretical cognition, are to that extent not *knowable* things at all; hence one cannot even *hold an opinion* about them. Indeed, to hold an opinion *a priori* is absurd in itself and the direct road to nothing but chimeras. Either our *a priori* proposition is certain, then, or it contains nothing at all to assent to. *Matters of opinion* are therefore always objects of a cognition through experience that is at least possible in itself (objects of the world of the senses), but that is impossible *for us* given the mere degree of this faculty that we possess. Thus the ether of recent physicists—an elastic fluid that permeates all other matter (and is most intimately mixed with it)—is a mere matter of opinion. Yet it is still of such a kind that

it could be perceived if our outer senses were sharpened to the highest degree, though it can never be presented in any observation or experiment. To assume that there are rational inhabitants of other planets is a matter of opinion. For if we could come closer to them, which is possible in itself, we would settle by experience whether they exist or not; but we will never come that close to them, and so it remains a matter of opinion. But to hold the opinion that there are pure spirits in the material universe, thinking without bodies (setting aside, as is only fair, certain actual appearances passed off as such), is sheer invention and [468] not a matter of opinion at all. It is a mere idea, which remains when one takes away everything material from a thinking being and yet leaves it its thinking. But whether thinking (which we know only in human beings, that is, in combination with a body) would then remain, we cannot settle. Such a thing is a *being of reasoning* (*ens rationis ratiocinantis*), not a *being of reason* (*ens rationis ratiocinatae*). Of the latter, it is possible to establish the objective reality of its concept, sufficiently at least for the practical use of reason; for that use, which has its own *a priori* principles, apodictically certain, even requires (postulates) it.[11]

2) Objects for concepts whose objective reality can be proved (whether through pure reason or through experience—in the former case from theoretical or practical data of reason, but in every case by means of an intuition corresponding to them) are (*res facti*) *matters of fact*[12]. Of this kind are the mathematical properties of magnitudes (in geometry), because they are capable of an *a priori presentation* for the theoretical use of reason. Further, things or their properties that can be established by

11 Scholastic terms: an *ens rationis ratiocinantis* is a mere product of reason's subtle reasoning; an *ens rationis ratiocinatae* is a concept that reason legitimately arrives at.

12 KANT'S NOTE. Here, rightly as it seems to me, I extend the concept of a matter of fact beyond the usual meaning of the word. For it is not necessary, indeed not even feasible, to restrict this expression merely to actual experience when we are speaking of the relation of things to our cognitive faculties; a merely possible experience is already sufficient for speaking of them merely as objects of a determinate kind of cognition.

experience (one's own experience, or that of others by means of testimony) are likewise matters of fact. —What is very remarkable, however, is that there is even an idea of reason among the matters of fact (though in itself it is capable of no presentation in intuition, and hence of no theoretical proof of its possibility). This is the idea of *freedom*. Its reality, as a particular kind of causality (the concept of which would be extravagant from a theoretical point of view), can be established through practical laws of pure reason and, in accordance with these, in actual actions, and hence in experience.—It is the only one among all the ideas of pure reason whose object is a matter of fact and must be counted among the *scibilia* [things that can be known].

[469] 3) Objects that must be thought *a priori* in relation to the dutiful use of pure practical reason (whether as consequences or as grounds), but that are extravagant for its theoretical use, are mere *matters of faith*. Of this kind is the *highest good* in the world, to be brought about through freedom. Its concept cannot be proved in its objective reality in any experience possible for us, and hence not sufficiently for the theoretical use of reason. Yet its use for bringing about that end as fully as possible is commanded by pure practical reason, and so it must be assumed to be possible. This commanded effect, *together with the only conditions of its possibility conceivable for us*—namely, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul—are *matters of faith* (*res fidei*), and indeed the only ones among all objects that can be so called[13]. For although what we can learn only from the experience of others through *testimony* must be believed by us, it is not on that account a matter of faith in itself; for to *one* of those witnesses it was, after all, his own experience and a matter of fact, or is presupposed to have been. Moreover, it must be possible to arrive at knowledge by this route (that of historical

13 KANT'S NOTE. Matters of faith are not on that account *articles of faith*, if by the latter one understands matters of faith whose *profession* (inner or outer) can be made obligatory; natural theology contains nothing of that kind. For since, as matters of faith, they cannot be based (like matters of fact) on theoretical proofs, the assent is a free one, and only as such is it compatible with the morality of the subject.

faith). The objects of history and geography—like everything whatever that it is at least possible to know, given the constitution of our cognitive faculties—belong not to matters of faith but to matters of fact. Only objects of pure reason can possibly be matters of faith, and even then not as objects of merely pure speculative reason; for there they cannot even be counted with any certainty among the "matters," that is, among objects of that cognition which is possible for us. They are ideas, that is, concepts whose objective reality cannot be secured theoretically. By contrast, the highest final end to be brought about by us—that through which alone we can become worthy of being ourselves the final end of a creation—is an idea that has objective reality for us in a practical relation, and so is a matter. But because we cannot provide this concept with such reality in [470] a theoretical respect, it is a mere matter of faith of pure reason. And along with it, so are God and immortality, as the conditions under which alone we, given the constitution of our (human) reason, can think the possibility of that effect of the lawful use of our freedom. Assent in matters of faith, however, is assent with a purely practical aim, that is, a moral faith. It proves nothing for pure rational cognition as theoretical, but only as practical, directed toward the fulfillment of one's duties; and it does not extend speculation at all, nor the practical rules of prudence according to the principle of self-love. If the supreme principle of all moral laws is a postulate, then the possibility of their highest object, and hence also the condition under which we can think this possibility, is thereby postulated along with it. This does not make our cognition of these conditions either knowledge or opinion of their existence and constitution, as a theoretical mode of cognition, but merely an assumption in a practical relation—one commanded for the moral use of our reason.

Even if we could seemingly ground a *determinate* concept of an intelligent cause of the world on the ends of nature that physical teleology lays before us in such abundance, the existence of this being would still not be a matter of faith. For since it is

assumed not for the sake of fulfilling my duty but only for explaining nature, it would be merely the opinion and hypothesis best suited to our reason. Now that teleology by no means leads to a determinate concept of God. Such a concept is found only in the concept of a moral author of the world, because this alone specifies the final end—an end to which we can count ourselves as belonging only insofar as we conduct ourselves in conformity with what the moral law imposes on us as final end, and hence obligates us to. Consequently, the concept of God acquires the privilege of counting, in our assent, as a matter of faith only through its relation to the object of our duty, as the condition of the possibility of attaining duty's final end. The same concept, on the other hand, cannot validate its object as a matter of fact. For although the necessity of duty is quite clear to practical reason, the attainment of its final end, insofar as that end is not wholly in our power, is only assumed for the sake of

the practical use of [471] reason, and so is not practically necessary in the way that duty itself is[14].

Faith (as *habitus* [a standing disposition], not as *actus* [a single act]) is reason's moral way of thinking in assenting to what is inaccessible to theoretical cognition. It is therefore the mind's steadfast principle of assuming as true, on account of our obligation to the highest moral final end, whatever must necessarily

14 KANT'S NOTE. The final end that the moral law enjoins us to promote is not the ground of duty. That ground lies in the moral law, which, as a formal practical principle, guides categorically, regardless of the objects of the faculty of desire (the matter of willing), and hence regardless of any end. This formal character of my actions (their subordination to the principle of universal validity), in which alone their inner moral worth consists, is wholly in our power. And I can quite well abstract from the possibility or impracticability of the ends that it is incumbent on me to promote in accordance with that law (since only the external worth of my actions consists in them), as from something that is never wholly in my power, so as to look only at what is my own doing. Yet the aim of promoting the final end of all rational beings (happiness, so far as it is possible in harmony with duty) is imposed precisely by the law of duty. But speculative reason has no insight whatever into the feasibility of this aim (neither on the side of our own physical capacity nor on that of nature's cooperation). Rather, for these reasons, as far as we can reasonably judge, it must regard such a result of our good conduct, coming from mere nature (within us and outside us) without our assuming God and immortality, as a groundless and empty, if well-meant, expectation. And if it could have complete certainty of this judgment, it would have to regard the moral law itself as a mere deception of our reason in a practical respect. But speculative reason is fully convinced that such certainty can never be had, while those ideas whose object lies beyond nature can be thought without contradiction. It will therefore have to acknowledge those ideas as real for the sake of its own practical law and the task that law imposes—thus in a moral respect—so as not to come into contradiction with itself.

be presupposed as the condition of that end's possibility[15]—even though its possibility, [472] but equally its impossibility, is beyond our insight. Faith (simply so called) is trust in the attainment of an aim whose promotion is a duty, but the possibility of whose realization we cannot *see into* (and consequently not the possibility of the only conditions of it conceivable for us either). Faith, then, which relates to particular objects that are not objects of possible knowledge or opinion, is entirely moral. (In the latter case, especially in historical matters, it would have to be called credulity rather than faith.) It is a free assent—not to that for which dogmatic proofs can be found for theoretically determining judgment, nor to that which we hold ourselves obliged to accept, but to what we assume for the sake of an aim according to laws of freedom. Yet it is not like an opinion without sufficient ground. It is grounded in reason (though only with respect to reason's practical use) *as sufficient for reason's aim*. For without it, the moral way of thinking, when it runs up against theoretical reason's demand for a proof (of the possibility of the object of morality), has no firm steadiness, but wavers between practical commands and theoretical doubts. To be *incredulous* means to cling to the maxim of not believing testimony at all. But he is *unbelieving* who denies all validity to those ideas of reason because they lack a *theoretical* grounding of their reality. Such a person therefore judges dogmatically. A dogmatic *unbelief*, how-

15 KANT'S NOTE. It is a trust in the promise of the moral law—not, however, a promise contained in that law, but one that I put into it, and indeed on morally sufficient grounds. For no law of reason can command a final end without reason at the same time promising that this end is attainable, even if uncertainly, and thereby also justifying assent to the only conditions under which our reason can conceive this attainment. The word *Fides* [faith, trust, good faith] already expresses this. It might only seem questionable how this expression and this particular idea come into moral philosophy, since they were first introduced with Christianity, and adopting them might perhaps seem to be merely a flattering imitation of its language. But this is not the only case in which this wondrous religion, in the utmost simplicity of its teaching, has enriched philosophy with far more determinate and purer concepts of morality than philosophy had been able to supply until then. Yet once these concepts are there, reason approves them *freely* and accepts them as concepts it could and should well have arrived at and introduced by itself.

ever, cannot coexist with a moral maxim prevailing in one's way of thinking (for reason cannot command us to pursue an end recognized as nothing but a chimera). But a *doubting faith* can. For such a faith, the lack of conviction by grounds of speculative reason is merely an obstacle; a critical insight into the limits of speculative reason can remove its influence on conduct and [473] put in its place, by way of compensation, an overriding practical assent.

When one wants to set up another principle in place of certain failed attempts in philosophy and gain influence for it, it is a great satisfaction to see how and why those attempts were bound to fail.

God, freedom and *the immortality of the soul* are the problems at whose solution all the apparatus of metaphysics aims, as its ultimate and sole end. Now, it was believed that the doctrine of freedom was needed only as a negative condition for practical philosophy, whereas the doctrine of God and of the nature of the soul, belonging to theoretical philosophy, had to be established on its own and separately. Both were then to be connected afterwards with what the moral law (which is possible only on the condition of freedom) commands, and in this way a religion was to be brought about. But one can soon see that these attempts were bound to fail. For from mere ontological concepts of things in general, or of the existence of a necessary being, one can form absolutely no concept of an original being determined by predicates that can be given in experience and could therefore serve for cognition. And the concept that was based on experience of the physical purposiveness of nature could in turn provide no proof sufficient for morality, and hence for cognition of a God. Just as little could knowledge of the soul through experience (which we can gain only in this life) supply a concept of its spiritual, immortal nature, and hence one sufficient for morality. *Theology* and *pneumatology*, as problems for the sciences of a speculative reason, cannot be brought about through any empirical data and predicates, because their concept is extravagant for all our cognitive faculties. The determination of

both concepts—of God as well as of the soul (with respect to its immortality)—can take place only through predicates that, although they are themselves possible only from a supersensible ground, must nevertheless prove their reality in experience. For only so can they make a cognition of entirely supersensible beings possible. Now, the only concept of this kind to be found in human reason is [474] the concept of the freedom of human beings under moral laws, together with the final end that freedom prescribes through these laws. Of these, the former are suited to ascribing to the author of nature, and the latter to ascribing to human beings, those properties that contain the necessary condition of the possibility of both. And so from this very idea we can infer the existence and the constitution of those beings that are otherwise entirely hidden from us.

Thus the reason why the attempt to prove God and immortality by the merely theoretical route failed lies in this: by this route (that of concepts of nature) no cognition at all of the supersensible is possible. That it succeeds, on the other hand, by the moral route (that of the concept of freedom) has this reason: here the supersensible that lies at the basis (freedom), through a determinate law of causality that springs from it, not only supplies material for a cognition of the other supersensible (the moral final end and the conditions of its feasibility), but also establishes its own reality as a matter of fact in actions. For that very reason, however, it can provide no ground of proof that is valid except with a practical aim (which is also the only aim religion needs).

It remains very remarkable in all this that, of the three pure ideas of reason—*God*, *freedom* and *immortality*—that of freedom is the only concept of the supersensible that proves its objective reality (by means of the causality thought in it) in nature, through the effect it can have there. Precisely in this way it makes possible the connection of the other two with nature, and of all three with one another, into a religion. We thus have within us a principle capable of determining the idea of the supersensible within us, and thereby also the idea of the super-

sensible outside us, into a cognition—though one possible only with a practical aim—something that merely speculative philosophy (which could give only a merely negative concept even of freedom) had to despair of. Hence the concept of freedom (as the fundamental concept of all unconditionally practical laws) can extend reason beyond those bounds within which every (theoretical) concept of nature would have to remain confined without hope.

GENERAL REMARK ON TELEOLOGY

The ontological and physico-teleological proofs fail; only the moral proof yields a concept of God fit for theology.

475 If the question is what rank the moral argument—which proves the existence of God only as a matter of faith for pure practical reason—holds among the other arguments in philosophy, then philosophy's entire holdings here can easily be surveyed. It then turns out that there is no choice to be made: before an impartial critique, philosophy's theoretical faculty must of its own accord give up all its claims.

Philosophy must first of all base all assent on a matter of fact, if that assent is not to be completely groundless. So the only difference that can arise in proving is whether assent to the consequence drawn from this fact can be grounded as *knowledge* for theoretical cognition, or merely as *faith* for practical cognition. All matters of fact belong either to the *concept of nature*, which proves its reality in the objects of the senses given (or capable of being given) prior to all concepts of nature; or to the *concept of freedom*, which sufficiently establishes its reality through the causality of reason with respect to certain effects in the world of the senses that reason makes possible and irrefutably postulates in the moral law. Now, the concept of nature (belonging merely to theoretical cognition) is either metaphysical and wholly *a priori*, or physical, that is, *a posteriori* and necessarily thinkable only through determinate experience. The metaphysical

concept of nature (which presupposes no determinate experience) is therefore ontological.

The *ontological* proof of the existence of God from the concept of an original being takes one of two forms. It either infers from ontological predicates, through which alone that being can be thought as thoroughly determined, to its absolutely necessary existence. Or it infers from the absolute necessity of the existence of some thing or other, whatever it may be, to the predicates of the original being. For if an original being is not to be derived, its concept must include the unconditioned necessity of its existence and, in order to represent this, its thoroughgoing determination by its own concept. Both requirements were believed to be found in the concept of the ontological idea of a *most real being*, and so two metaphysical proofs arose.

The proof that rests on a merely metaphysical concept of nature, the one properly called ontological, inferred from the concept of the most real [476] being to its absolutely necessary existence. For, so the argument runs, if this being did not exist, it would lack a reality, namely existence.—The other proof, also called the *metaphysical-cosmological* proof, inferred from the necessity of the existence of some thing or other to that thing's thoroughgoing determination as the most real being. That something necessarily exists must certainly be granted, since an existence is given to me in self-consciousness. The reasoning was that everything that exists is thoroughly determined, but what is absolutely necessary (that is, what *we* are to cognize as such, and hence *a priori*) must be thoroughly determined *through its concept*, and such a concept is to be found only in the concept of a most real thing. There is no need here to expose the sophistry in these two inferences, since that has already been done elsewhere. It is enough to remark that such proofs, even if they could be defended by every kind of dialectical subtlety, could never make their way out of the schools into the public at

large, or have the slightest influence on plain sound understanding.[16]

The proof that rests on a concept of nature which can only be empirical, but which is nevertheless supposed to lead beyond the bounds of nature as the sum total of objects of the senses, can be none other than the proof from the *ends* of nature. The concept of these ends cannot be given *a priori*, but only through experience. Yet it promises a concept of the original ground of nature that, alone among all the concepts we can think, is suited to the supersensible: the concept of a highest understanding as cause of the world. And according to principles of reflecting judgment, that is, according to the constitution of our (human) cognitive faculty, the proof does in fact achieve this completely. But can it furnish, from the same data, this concept of a *supreme*, that is, independent, intelligent being also as the concept of a God, that is, of the author of a world under moral laws, and hence as sufficiently determined for the idea of a final end of the existence of the world? That is the question on which everything depends, whether what we demand is a theoretically adequate concept of the original being for the sake of our knowledge of nature as a whole, or a practical one for religion.

This argument, taken from physical teleology, deserves respect. It has the same power to convince the common understanding as the subtlest thinker. A *Reimarus*, in his still unsurpassed work, where he develops this argument at length with the [477] thoroughness and clarity peculiar to him, has thereby earned immortal merit.—But how does this proof gain such powerful influence over the mind, especially when it is judged by cool reason? (The emotion and elevation that the wonders of nature produce in the mind could be counted as mere persuasion.) How does it win a calm assent that gives itself over entirely?[17] It is not the physical ends, all of which point to an

16 Kant refers to the chapter "The Ideal of Pure Reason" in the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

17 Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768), German philosopher, author of *The Principal Truths of Natural Religion* (1754).

unfathomable understanding in the cause of the world. These are insufficient for the purpose, because they do not satisfy the need of inquiring reason. For reason asks: what are all those artful things of nature for? What is the human being himself for, with whom we must stop as the ultimate end of nature that we can conceive? What does this whole of nature exist for, and what is the final end of so great and so manifold an art? That the world was created for enjoyment, or for being intuited, contemplated and admired (which, if it goes no further, is likewise nothing more than enjoyment of a particular kind), as the ultimate final end for which the world and the human being himself exist, cannot satisfy reason. For reason presupposes a personal worth, which the human being alone can give himself, as the condition under which alone he and his existence can be a final end. Without this worth, which alone admits of a determinate concept, the ends of nature do not satisfy reason's inquiry. This is chiefly because they cannot furnish a *determinate* concept of the highest being as an all-sufficient being (and for that very reason the only one, the one properly to be called *highest*), nor of the laws according to which its understanding is cause of the world.

The physico-teleological proof convinces as if it were at the same time a theological one. But this does not come from using the ideas of ends of nature as so many empirical grounds of proof of a *highest* understanding. Rather, the moral ground of proof, which dwells in every human being and moves him so deeply, mingles unnoticed in the inference. Following it, one also ascribes a final end, and hence wisdom, to the being that reveals itself with such incomprehensible artfulness in the ends of nature, though the perception of those ends gives one no entitlement to do so. In this way one arbitrarily makes up for what is still lacking in that argument. In fact, then, only the moral ground of proof produces conviction, and even this only in a moral respect, to which everyone [478] most deeply feels his assent. The physico-teleological proof has only the merit of guiding the mind, in its contemplation of the world, onto the

path of ends, and thereby to an *intelligent* author of the world. The moral relation to ends, and the idea of just such a lawgiver and author of the world as a theological concept, then seem to develop of themselves out of that ground of proof, although this concept is pure addition.

In ordinary presentations one may continue to leave the matter there. The common and sound understanding mixes different principles, and in fact draws its conclusion, correctly, from only one of them. When separating them calls for much reflection, it usually finds it hard to distinguish them from one another as heterogeneous. But the moral ground of proof of the existence of God does not really just *supplement* the physico-teleological one so as to make it a complete proof. It is a separate proof, which *makes good* the lack of conviction in the latter. For the physico-teleological proof can in fact do no more than this. When reason judges the ground of nature and its contingent yet admirable order, which is known to us only through experience, this proof directs reason toward the causality of a cause that contains the ground of that order according to ends (a cause that, given the constitution of our cognitive faculties, we must think as an intelligent cause). It makes reason attentive to this cause, and so more receptive to the moral proof. For what the latter concept requires is so essentially different from anything that concepts of nature can contain and teach that it needs a separate ground of proof and a proof entirely independent of the previous ones, in order to specify the concept of the original being adequately for a theology and to infer its existence.—The moral proof, which admittedly proves the existence of God only in a practical respect of reason, though in one that cannot be relaxed, would therefore still keep its force even if we found in the world no material for physical teleology at all, or only ambiguous material. It is conceivable that rational beings might find themselves surrounded by a nature that showed no clear trace of organization, but only effects of a mere mechanism of raw matter. Because of this, and given the changeableness of some merely contingently purposive forms and relations, there

would seem to be no reason to infer an intelligent author, and so there would be no occasion for a [479] physical teleology either. And yet reason, which here receives no guidance from concepts of nature, would find in the concept of freedom, and in the moral ideas grounded on it, a practically sufficient ground to postulate the concept of the original being in conformity with these ideas, that is, as a deity, and to postulate nature (even our own existence) as a final end in conformity with freedom and its laws. It would do so with regard to the unremitting command of practical reason.—But the actual world does offer the rational beings in it abundant material for physical teleology, which need not have been so. This serves the moral argument as a welcome confirmation, insofar as nature is able to set up something analogous to the (moral) ideas of reason. For the concept of a supreme cause that has understanding, which is far from sufficient for a theology, thereby acquires reality sufficient for reflecting judgment. But this concept is not needed as a basis for the moral proof. Nor does the moral proof serve to complete the physico-teleological one, which on its own does not point to morality at all, into a single proof by continuing the inference according to one principle. Two principles as heterogeneous as nature and freedom can yield only two different kinds of proof, and the attempt to conduct the proof from nature is found insufficient for what is to be proved.

If the physico-teleological ground of proof were sufficient for the proof we are seeking, that would be very satisfying for speculative reason. It would hold out hope of producing a theosophy, for that is what we would have to call a theoretical cognition of the divine nature and its existence that sufficed both to explain the constitution of the world and to determine the moral laws. In the same way, if psychology were sufficient for attaining cognition of the immortality of the soul, it would make possible a pneumatology, which would be just as welcome to speculative reason. But neither of them fulfills reason's wish with respect to theory, which would have to be grounded on knowledge of the nature of things, however dear such a theory may be to the con-

ceit of curiosity. Would the former, as theology, and the latter, as anthropology, fulfill their objective final aim better if both were grounded on the moral principle, that is, the principle of freedom, and were therefore suited to the practical use of reason? That is another question, which we need not pursue further here.

480 The physico-teleological ground of proof falls short of theology because it does not and cannot give a concept of the original being that is determinate enough for this purpose. One must take that concept entirely from elsewhere, or else make good its lack by an arbitrary addition. You infer from the great purposiveness of the forms of nature and their relations to an intelligent cause of the world. But to what degree of understanding? You surely cannot presume to infer the highest possible understanding. That would require you to see that no greater understanding is conceivable than the one of which you perceive evidence in the world, which would be to ascribe omniscience to yourselves. In the same way, you infer from the magnitude of the world to a very great power in its author. But you will admit that this has meaning only comparatively, relative to your own power of comprehension. You do not know everything possible, so you cannot compare it with the magnitude of the world as far as you know it. From so small a standard you therefore cannot infer the omnipotence of its author, and so on. By this route, then, you arrive at no determinate concept of an original being fit for a theology. Such a concept can be found only in the concept of the totality of perfections united with an understanding, and merely *empirical* data cannot help you to this at all. But without such a determinate concept you cannot infer a *single* intelligent original being either; you can only assume one, for whatever purpose.—It can certainly be granted that you may arbitrarily add, since reason has nothing well-founded to say against it, that where so much perfection is found one may well assume all perfection to be united in a single cause of the world. For reason gets on better, theoretically and practically, with so determinate a principle. But then you

cannot extol this concept of the original being as something you have proved, since you have only assumed it for the sake of a better use of reason. All wailing, then, and all impotent rage over the alleged sacrilege of doubting the cogency of your chain of inference, is vain bluster. It would like the doubt openly voiced against your argument to be taken for doubt about sacred truth, only so that the argument's shallowness can slip through behind this cover.

Moral teleology, by contrast, is no less firmly grounded [481] than physical teleology. Indeed it deserves precedence, because it rests *a priori* on principles inseparable from our reason. It leads to what is required for the possibility of a theology: a determinate *concept* of the supreme cause as cause of the world according to moral laws, and hence of a cause that satisfies our moral final end. For this, nothing less is required than omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and so on, as the natural attributes belonging to it. These must be thought as bound up with the moral final end, which is infinite, and hence as adequate to it. And so moral teleology alone can supply the concept of a *single* author of the world that is fit for a theology.

In this way a theology also leads directly to *religion*, that is, to the *cognition of our duties as divine commands*. For it was the cognition of our duty, and of the final end that reason imposes on us in it, that could first produce the concept of God determinately. This concept is therefore, from its very origin, inseparable from obligation toward this being. Suppose, by contrast, that the concept of the original being could also be found determinately by the merely theoretical route, namely as the concept of a mere cause of nature. It would then still be very difficult afterwards, perhaps even impossible without arbitrary interpolation, to ascribe to this being a causality according to moral laws by well-grounded proofs. Yet without such causality that supposedly theological concept cannot form a foundation for religion. Even if a religion could be founded by this theoretical route, it would in fact differ, with regard to disposition, in which its essence after all consists, from a religion in which the concept of God

and the (practical) conviction of his existence arise from fundamental ideas of morality. For suppose we had to presuppose the omnipotence, omniscience and so on of an author of the world as concepts given to us from elsewhere, so as afterwards merely to apply our concepts of duties to our relation to him. Then these concepts would have to carry a very strong tinge of coercion and extorted submission. If instead respect for the moral law, entirely freely and as our own reason prescribes, represents to us the final end of our vocation, then we take up into our moral outlook a cause that harmonizes with this end and with its accomplishment. We do so with the truest reverence, which is wholly distinct [482] from pathological fear, and we submit to this cause willingly[18].

Suppose one asks why it matters to us to have a theology at all. It is clearly evident that we need it not for extending or correcting our knowledge of nature, or any theory whatever, but solely for religion, that is, for the practical and specifically the moral use of reason, in a subjective respect. Now if it turns out that the only argument leading to a determinate concept of the object of theology is itself moral, this will not seem strange. Nor will anything be found lacking in the adequacy of the assent from this ground of proof to its final aim, once it is admitted that such an argument sufficiently establishes the existence of God only for our moral vocation, that is, with a practical aim, and that speculation in no way shows its strength in it, or extends the scope of its domain by it. There is also the surprise, or the alleged contradiction, between the possibility of a theology asserted here and what the critique of speculative reason said about the categories: that they can produce cognition only when

18 KANT'S NOTE. The admiration of beauty, and the emotion aroused by the so manifold ends of nature, which a reflective mind is able to feel even before it has a clear representation of a rational author of the world, both have something in them similar to a *religious* feeling. They therefore seem to act on the mind first through a way of judging them analogous to moral judging, working on moral feeling (the feeling of gratitude and veneration toward the cause unknown to us), and so, by arousing moral ideas, on the mind itself. They do this when they inspire an admiration that is bound up with far more interest than mere theoretical contemplation can produce.

applied to objects of the senses, and by no means when applied to the supersensible. This will vanish once one sees them used here for a cognition of God, though not in a theoretical respect (as to what his nature, unfathomable to us, may be in itself), but solely with a practical aim. —That doctrine of the Critique is very necessary, but, to the annoyance of the blind dogmatist, it sends reason back within its bounds. To put an end, on this occasion, to its misinterpretation, I add the following elucidation of it.

If I ascribe *motive force* to a body, and thus think it [483] through the category of *causality*, I thereby at the same time *cognize* it. That is, I determine the concept of it as an object in general through what belongs to it on its own account as an object of the senses (as the condition of the possibility of that relation). For if the motive force I ascribe to it is a repulsive one, then there belongs to it, even if I do not yet posit another body beside it against which it exerts that force, a place in space, and further an extension, that is, space within itself; in addition, the filling of this space by the repulsive forces of its parts; and finally also the law of this filling (namely that the ground of the repulsion of the parts must decrease in the same proportion as the extension of the body grows and the space that it fills with the same parts through this force increases).—By contrast, suppose I think a supersensible being as the *first mover*, and thus through the category of causality with respect to the same determination in the world, the motion of matter. Then I must not think it as being in any place in space, nor as extended; indeed I may not even think it as existing in time and simultaneously with other things. So I have no determinations at all that could make intelligible to me the condition of the possibility of motion through this being as its ground. Consequently, through the predicate of cause (as first mover) I do not in the least cognize this being in itself. I have only the representation of a something that contains the ground of the motions in the world. Its relation to them as their cause gives me nothing else that belongs to the constitution of the thing that is the cause, and so it leaves the concept of this cause

quite empty. The reason is this. With predicates that find their object only in the world of sense, I can indeed advance to the existence of something that must contain the ground of that world. But I cannot advance to the determination of its concept as a supersensible being, a concept that excludes all those predicates. Through the category of causality, then, if I determine it through the concept of a *first mover*, I do not in the least cognize what God is. But perhaps I shall do better if I take occasion from the order of the world not merely to *think* his causality as that of a supreme *understanding*, but also to *cognize* him through this determination of that concept. For here the troublesome condition of space and extension drops away. —Certainly the great purposiveness in the world compels us to *think* a supreme cause of it, and to think its causality as operating [484] through an understanding. But this by no means entitles us to *ascribe* this understanding to it. It is the same as when we think God's eternity as existence at all times, because otherwise we can form no concept at all of mere existence as a magnitude, that is, as duration; or when we think divine omnipresence as existence in all places, in order to make his immediate presence to things outside one another comprehensible to ourselves. We do this without being permitted to ascribe either of these determinations to God as something cognized in him. Suppose I determine the causality of the human being with respect to certain products that can be explained only through intentional purposiveness, and I do so by thinking this causality as his understanding. Then I need not stop there. I can ascribe this predicate to him as a well-known property of his, and thereby cognize him. For I know that intuitions are given to the human senses and are brought by the understanding under a concept, and thereby under a rule. I know that this concept contains only the common characteristic, leaving out what is particular, and is therefore discursive. I know that the rules for bringing given representations under a consciousness in general are given by the understanding even prior to those intuitions, and so on. So I ascribe this property to the human being as one through which I

cognize him. But suppose I now want to *think* a supersensible being (God) as an intelligence. In a certain respect of my use of reason this is not only permitted but unavoidable. To ascribe understanding to it, however, and to flatter myself that I can thereby *cognize* it through a property of its own, is by no means permitted. For then I must leave out all those conditions under which alone I know an understanding. Hence the predicate that serves only to determine the human being cannot be referred to a supersensible object at all, and what God is cannot be cognized at all through a causality determined in this way. And so it goes with all the categories: they can have no significance at all for cognition in a theoretical respect unless they are applied to objects of possible experience.—But by analogy with an understanding I can, indeed must, think even a supersensible being in a certain other respect, without thereby wanting to cognize it theoretically. This is so when this determination of its causality concerns an effect in the world that contains an aim which is morally necessary but unattainable for sensible beings. For then a cognition of God and his existence (theology) is possible through properties and determinations of his causality that are thought in him merely according to [485] analogy. This cognition has all the requisite reality in a practical relation, but also *only with regard to this relation* (as a moral one). An ethicotheology is therefore certainly possible. Morality can indeed subsist without theology as far as its rule is concerned, but not as far as the final aim that this very rule imposes, unless reason is to be left at a loss with regard to that aim. But a theological ethics (of pure reason) is impossible. Laws that reason does not itself originally give, and whose observance it does not also bring about as a pure practical faculty, cannot be moral. Likewise, a theological physics would be an absurdity, because it would present not laws of nature but ordinances of a supreme will. A physical (properly, physico-teleological) theology, on the other hand, can at least serve as a propaedeutic to theology proper. Through the contemplation of natural ends, for which it offers rich material, it gives occasion for the idea of a final end, which nature cannot

set up. It can thus make us feel the need for a theology that would determine the concept of God adequately for the highest practical use of reason. But it cannot produce such a theology, or ground it adequately on its evidence.