Cratylus

PLATO

c. 428–348 BC

Cratylus

Κρατύλος

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited



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Cratylus · Plato (c. 428–348 BC)

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INTRODUCTION

Are names correct by nature or only by agreement? Cratylus says every thing has a naturally correct name. Hermogenes says a name is whatever people agree to call something. They ask Socrates to settle it.

Socrates first argues against Hermogenes that a name is a tool, made by a skilled "name-maker" to fit what it names. To show it, he launches into a long and dazzling string of etymologies—of heroes, gods, the heavens and the words for wisdom and justice. Much of it is plainly playful, and Socrates says he is "inspired."

Then he turns on Cratylus. Names are imitations, and imitations can be bad; custom plays a part after all. And if the first name-makers thought that everything flows, their names may mislead us. The dialogue ends with the question of whether anything stays the same long enough to be known. It is the first sustained Western inquiry into language.

Cratylus

Athens.
Hermogenes asks Socrates to settle his argument with Cratylus: are names correct by nature or by convention?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
383a	**HERMOGENES** βούλει οὖν καὶ Σωκράτει τῷδε ἀνακοινωσώμεθα τὸν λόγον;	**HERMOGENES** Shall we let Socrates here in on our discussion too?
	CRATYLUS εἴ σοι δοκεῖ.	**CRATYLUS** If you like.

CONVENTION OR NATURE?

Hermogenes says names are correct by agreement, Cratylus by nature; they ask Socrates to decide.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	HERMOGENES Κρατύλος φησὶν ὅδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἄν τινες συνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι, τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς μόριον ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ὀρθότητά τινα τῶν [383b] ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν. ἐρωτῶ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ εἰ αὐτῷ Κρατύλος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὄνομα ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ· ὁ δὲ ὁμολογεῖ. "τί δὲ Σωκράτει;" ἔφην. "Σωκράτης," ἦ δ' ὅς.	**HERMOGENES** Socrates, Cratylus here says that each of the things that are has a correctness of name that belongs to it by nature. A name, he says, isn't whatever some people agree to call a thing, uttering a bit of their own speech at it. Rather, there is a natural correctness of [383b] names, the same for everyone, Greeks and non-Greeks alike. So I ask him whether his name really is Cratylus or not, and he agrees that it is. "And what about Socrates?" I said. "Socrates," he said.
383b	"οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν, ὅπερ καλοῦμεν ὄνομα ἕκαστον, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα;" ὁ δέ, "οὔκουν σοί γε," ἦ δ' ὅς, "ὄνομα Ἑρμογένης, οὐδὲ ἂν πάντες καλῶσιν ἄνθρωποι." καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος καὶ προθυμουμένου εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτὲ [384a] λέγει, οὔτε ἀποσαφεῖ οὐδὲν εἰρωνεύεταί τε πρός με, προσποιούμενός τι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διανοεῖσθαι ὡς εἰδὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃ εἰ βούλοιτο σαφῶς εἰπεῖν, ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ ἐμὲ ὁμολογεῖν καὶ λέγειν ἅπερ αὐτὸς λέγει. εἰ οὖν πῃ ἔχεις συμβαλεῖν τὴν Κρατύλου μαντείαν, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι· μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτῷ σοι ὅπῃ δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος ἔτι ἂν ἥδιον πυθοίμην, εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἐστίν.	"Then for everyone else too, is the name we call each person by that person's name?" And he said, "Well, yours isn't Hermogenes, at any rate, not even if the whole human race calls you that." And when I keep asking him and am eager to know what on earth [384a] he means, he makes nothing clear. He's ironic with me instead, pretending he has something in mind, as if he knew something about it which, if he cared to say it plainly, would make me agree and say just what he says. So if you can somehow interpret Cratylus' oracle, I'd be glad to hear it. Or rather, I'd be even gladder to learn what you yourself think about the correctness of names, if you're willing.[1]
384a	**SOCRATES** ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου Ἑρμόγενες, παλαιὰ παροιμία ὅτι [384b] χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά ἐστιν ὅπῃ ἔχει μαθεῖν·	**SOCRATES** Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there's an old proverb that [384b] fine things are hard

1 The name Hermogenes means "offspring of Hermes," the god of luck and profit; Hermogenes was poor, though his brother Callias was very rich.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ σμικρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν μάθημα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ὥς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυέν σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, [384c] ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν. οὔκουν οἶδα πῇ ποτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· συζητεῖν μέντοι ἕτοιμός εἰμι καὶ σοὶ καὶ Κρατύλῳ κοινῇ. ὅτι δὲ οὔ φησί σοι Ἑρμογένη ὄνομα εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὥσπερ ὑποπτεύω αὐτὸν σκώπτειν· οἴεται γὰρ ἴσως σε χρημάτων ἐφιέμενον κτήσεως ἀποτυγχάνειν ἑκάστοτε.	to learn about. And the subject of names happens to be no small subject. Now if I had already heard Prodicus' fifty-drachma lecture, which, as he tells it, gives anyone who hears it a full education on this topic, nothing would have stopped you from knowing the truth about the correctness of names right away. As it is, I haven't heard it. [384c] I've only heard the one-drachma version. So I don't know what the truth about such things is. But I'm ready to look into it together with you and Cratylus. As for his saying that Hermogenes isn't really your name, I suspect he's teasing you. He probably thinks that you're always going after money and failing every time.[2]
384c	ἀλλ', ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, εἰδέναι μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαλεπόν, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν δὲ καταθέντας χρὴ σκοπεῖν εἴτε ὡς σὺ λέγεις ἔχει εἴτε ὡς Κρατύλος.	But, as I was just saying, knowing such things is hard. We have to put the question before us in common and examine whether it's as you say or as Cratylus says.
	HERMOGENES καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ καὶ τούτῳ διαλεχθεὶς καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι [384d] ὡς ἄλλη τις ὀρθότης ὀνόματος ἢ συνθήκη καὶ ὁμολογία. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὅτι ἄν τίς τῳ θῆται ὄνομα, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀρθόν· καὶ ἂν αὖθίς γε ἕτερον μεταθῆται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μηκέτι καλῇ, οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ὕστερον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν τοῦ προτέρου, ὥσπερ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἡμεῖς μετατιθέμεθα οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦτ' εἶναι ὀρθὸν τὸ μετατεθὲν τοῦ πρότερον κειμένου· οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκέναι ὄνομα οὐδὲν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων. εἰ δέ πῃ ἄλλῃ [384e] ἔχει, ἕτοιμος ἔγωγε καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ ἀκούειν οὐ μόνον παρὰ Κρατύλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν.	HERMOGENES Well, Socrates, I've often discussed this with Cratylus here and with many others, and I can't be persuaded [384d] that there's any correctness of name other than agreement and convention. It seems to me that whatever name someone gives to a thing, that is the correct one. And if he changes it again for another and stops using the first, the later one is no less correct than the earlier. It's like when we change the names of our household slaves: the new name is no less correct than the one given before. No name belongs to anything by nature. It belongs by the custom and habit of those who establish the usage and do the calling. But if it's some other [384e] way, I'm ready to learn and to listen, not only to Cratylus but to anyone at all.
385a	SOCRATES ἴσως μέντοι τὶ λέγεις, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· σκεψώμεθα δέ. ὃ ἂν φῇς καλῇ τις ἕκαστον, τοῦθ' ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα;	SOCRATES You may well have a point, Hermogenes. But let's look into it. Whatever someone calls a thing, you say, that's its name?
	HERMOGENES ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	HERMOGENES I think so.
	SOCRATES καὶ ἐὰν ἰδιώτης καλῇ καὶ ἐὰν πόλις;	SOCRATES Whether a private individual calls it that or a city?
	HERMOGENES φημί.	HERMOGENES Yes.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; ἐὰν ἐγὼ καλῶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων, οἷον ὃ νῦν καλοῦμεν ἄνθρωπον, ἐὰν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἵππον προσαγορεύω, ὃ δὲ νῦν ἵππον, ἄνθρωπον, ἔσται δημοσίᾳ	SOCRATES Well then: suppose I call one of the things that are—for example, what we now call "human being"—by the name "horse," and what

2 Prodicus of Ceos was a well-known sophist who lectured for fees and was famous for drawing fine distinctions between words.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	μὲν ὄνομα ἄνθρωπος τῷ αὐτῷ, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἵππος; καὶ ἰδίᾳ μὲν αὖ ἄνθρωπος, δημοσίᾳ δὲ ἵππος; οὕτω λέγεις;	we now call "horse" by the name "human being." Will the same thing then have the name "human being" publicly and "horse" privately? And the other one, again, "human being" privately and "horse" publicly? Is that what you mean?
385b	**HERMOGENES** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**HERMOGENES** I think so.

TRUE AND FALSE NAMES

Socrates argues that if statements can be true or false, so can names, their smallest parts.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES φέρε δή μοι τόδε εἰπέ· καλεῖς τι ἀληθῆ λέγειν καὶ ψευδῆ;	**SOCRATES** Come now, tell me this. Is there something you call speaking truly and speaking falsely?
	HERMOGENES ἔγωγε.	**HERMOGENES** Yes, there is.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν λόγος ἀληθής, ὁ δὲ ψευδής;	**SOCRATES** So there could be a true statement and a false one?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν οὗτος ὃς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής· ὃς δ' ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής;	**SOCRATES** And is the statement that says the things that are as they are true, and the one that says them as they are not false?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, λόγῳ λέγειν τὰ ὄντα τε καὶ μή;	**SOCRATES** So it's possible to say in a statement both the things that are and the things that are not?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
385c	**SOCRATES** ὁ λόγος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθὴς πότερον μὲν ὅλος ἀληθής, τὰ μόρια δ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ;	**SOCRATES** And is a true statement true only as a whole, while its parts aren't true?
	HERMOGENES οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια.	**HERMOGENES** No, its parts are true too.
	SOCRATES πότερον δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μόρια ἀληθῆ, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ οὔ· ἢ πάντα;	**SOCRATES** Are the large parts true but not the small ones, or are they all true?
	HERMOGENES πάντα, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.	**HERMOGENES** All of them, I think.
	SOCRATES ἔστιν οὖν ὅτι λέγεις λόγου σμικρότερον μόριον ἄλλο ἢ ὄνομα;	**SOCRATES** Now is there any part of a statement you can mention that's smaller than a name?
	HERMOGENES οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο σμικρότατον.	**HERMOGENES** No, that's the smallest.
	SOCRATES καὶ τοῦτο ὄνομα ἄρα τὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λόγου λέγεται;	**SOCRATES** So the name that's part of a true statement is also something said?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἀληθές γε, ὡς φῄς.	**SOCRATES** And it's true, as you say.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES τὸ δὲ τοῦ ψεύδους μόριον οὐ ψεῦδος;	**SOCRATES** And isn't a part of a false statement false?
	HERMOGENES φημί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes, it is.
	SOCRATES ἔστιν ἄρα ὄνομα ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, εἴπερ καὶ λόγον;	**SOCRATES** So it's possible to say a false name as well as a true one, since it's possible to say a false statement as well as a true one?
385d	**HERMOGENES** πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**HERMOGENES** Of course.
	SOCRATES ὃ ἂν ἄρα ἕκαστος φῇ τῳ ὄνομα εἶναι, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα;	**SOCRATES** So whatever each person says is the name of a thing, that is its name?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ ὁπόσα ἂν φῇ τις ἑκάστῳ ὀνόματα εἶναι, τοσαῦτα ἔσται καὶ τότε ὁπόταν φῇ;	**SOCRATES** And however many names someone says a thing has, it will have that many, and for just as long as he says so?
	HERMOGENES οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ἄλλην ὀρθότητα ἢ ταύτην, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἕτερον εἶναι καλεῖν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα, ὃ ἐγὼ ἐθέμην, σοὶ δὲ ἕτερον, ὃ αὖ σύ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ [385e] ταῖς πόλεσιν ὁρῶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάσταις ἐνίοις ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς κείμενα ὀνόματα, καὶ Ἕλλησι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, καὶ Ἕλλησι παρὰ βαρβάρους.	**HERMOGENES** Yes, Socrates, because I know of no other correctness of name than this. I can call each thing by one name, the one I gave it, and you can call it by another, the one you gave it. In the same way [385e] I see that individual cities have their own names established for the same things, and that Greeks differ from other Greeks, and Greeks from non-Greeks.

THINGS HAVE A NATURE OF THEIR OWN

Against Protagoras, things are not as each person sees them, and neither are the actions done to them.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
385e	**SOCRATES** φέρε δὴ ἴδωμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, πότερον καὶ τὰ ὄντα οὕτως ἔχειν σοι φαίνεται, ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν λέγων "πάντων χρημάτων [386a] μέτρον" εἶναι ἄνθρωπον—ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί· οἷα δ' ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ σοί—ἢ ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὰ αὑτῶν τινα βεβαιότητα τῆς οὐσίας;	**SOCRATES** Come then, Hermogenes, let's see whether you think the things that are are like this too, with their being private to each person. That was what Protagoras meant when he said that a human being is "the measure of all [386a] things": that however things appear to me, that's how they are for me, and however they appear to you, that's how they are for you. Or do you think they have some stability of being of their own?[3]
386a	**HERMOGENES** ἤδη ποτὲ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορῶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξηνέχθην εἰς ἅπερ Πρωταγόρας λέγει· οὐ πάνυ τι μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.	**HERMOGENES** There have been times, Socrates, when I was so puzzled that I was swept along into exactly what Protagoras says. But I don't really think it's like that.

3 Protagoras of Abdera (fifth century BC) was the most famous of the sophists; the "measure" saying opened his book *Truth*.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES τί δέ; ἐς τόδε ἤδη ἐξηνέχθης, ὥστε μὴ πάνυ σοι [386b] δοκεῖν εἶναί τινα ἄνθρωπον πονηρόν;	**SOCRATES** What? Have you ever been swept along so far that you didn't think [386b] any human being was really bad?
386b	**HERMOGENES** οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ πέπονθα, ὥστε μοι δοκεῖν πάνυ πονηροὺς εἶναί τινας ἀνθρώπους, καὶ μάλα συχνούς.	**HERMOGENES** No, by Zeus. It's actually happened to me often that I've thought some people were very bad indeed—and quite a lot of them.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; πάνυ χρηστοὶ οὔπω σοι ἔδοξαν εἶναι ἄνθρωποι;	**SOCRATES** And haven't you ever thought that some people were very good?
	HERMOGENES καὶ μάλα ὀλίγοι.	**HERMOGENES** Very few.
	SOCRATES ἔδοξαν δ' οὖν;	**SOCRATES** But you have thought so?
	HERMOGENES ἔμοιγε.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES πῶς οὖν τοῦτο τίθεσαι; ἆρ' ὧδε· τοὺς μὲν πάνυ χρηστοὺς πάνυ φρονίμους, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ πονηροὺς πάνυ ἄφρονας;	**SOCRATES** Then how do you account for it? Like this: the very good are full of understanding, and the very bad are utterly foolish?
386c	**HERMOGENES** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.	**HERMOGENES** Yes, I think that's how it is.
	SOCRATES οἷόν τε οὖν ἐστιν, εἰ Πρωταγόρας ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ οἷα ἂν δοκῇ ἑκάστῳ τοιαῦτα καὶ εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν ἡμῶν φρονίμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας;	**SOCRATES** Now if Protagoras was telling the truth, and the truth is that things are for each person just as they seem to him, is it possible for some of us to have understanding and others to be foolish?
	HERMOGENES οὐ δῆτα.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly not.
	SOCRATES καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, σοὶ πάνυ δοκεῖ, φρονήσεως οὔσης καὶ ἀφροσύνης μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸν εἶναι Πρωταγόραν ἀληθῆ λέγειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου φρονιμώτερος εἴη, εἴπερ ἃ ἂν ἑκάστῳ [386d] δοκῇ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθῆ ἔσται.	**SOCRATES** And this too, I imagine, you're quite sure of: if there is such a thing as understanding and such a thing as foolishness, Protagoras can't possibly be telling the truth. For no one would really have any more understanding than anyone else if whatever seems so to each [386d] person is going to be true for him.
386d	**HERMOGENES** ἔστι ταῦτα.	**HERMOGENES** That's right.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' Εὐθύδημόν γε οἶμαι σοὶ δοκεῖ πᾶσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀεί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἶεν οἱ μὲν χρηστοί, οἱ δὲ πονηροί, εἰ ὁμοίως ἅπασι καὶ ἀεὶ ἀρετή τε καὶ κακία εἴη.	**SOCRATES** But I don't think you agree with Euthydemus either, that all things belong to all people alike, at the same time and always. For in that case too, some people couldn't be good and others bad, if excellence and badness belonged to everyone alike and always.[4]
	HERMOGENES ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**HERMOGENES** That's true.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε πᾶσι πάντα ἐστὶν ὁμοίως ἅμα καὶ ἀεί, μήτε ἑκάστῳ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν,	**SOCRATES** Then if it isn't the case that all things belong to all people alike, at the same time and al-

4 Euthydemus was a sophist whom Plato mocks, along with his brother Dionysodorus, in the dialogue *Euthydemus*.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δῆλον δὴ [386e] ὅτι αὐτὰ αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἑλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ᾗπερ πέφυκεν.	ways, and it isn't the case that each thing is private to each person, it's clear [386e] that things have some stable being of their own. They aren't relative to us, and they aren't dragged up and down by us according to how they appear to us. They exist by themselves, in relation to their own being, just as their nature is.
386e	**HERMOGENES** δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω.	**HERMOGENES** I think so, Socrates.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν αὐτὰ μὲν ἂν εἴη οὕτω πεφυκότα, αἱ δὲ πράξεις αὐτῶν οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον; ἢ οὐ καὶ αὗται ἕν τι εἶδος τῶν ὄντων εἰσίν, αἱ πράξεις;	**SOCRATES** Then could the things themselves have this sort of nature, while the actions we perform on them don't? Or aren't actions also one kind of the things that are?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε καὶ αὗται.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly they are, too.
387a	**SOCRATES** κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἄρα φύσιν καὶ αἱ πράξεις πράττονται, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν δόξαν. οἷον ἐάν τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν ἡμεῖς τῶν ὄντων τέμνειν, πότερον ἡμῖν τμητέον ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλώμεθα καὶ ᾧ ἂν βουληθῶμεν, ἢ ἐὰν μὲν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν βουληθῶμεν ἕκαστον τέμνειν τοῦ τέμνειν τε καὶ τέμνεσθαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε, τεμοῦμέν τε καὶ πλέον τι ἡμῖν ἔσται καὶ ὀρθῶς πράξομεν τοῦτο, ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ἐξαμαρτησόμεθά τε καὶ οὐδὲν πράξομεν;	**SOCRATES** So actions too are performed according to their own nature, not according to our opinion. For example, if we set out to cut one of the things that are, should we cut each thing however we want and with whatever we want? Or will we cut it, and get something done, and do it correctly, if we're willing to cut each thing according to the nature of cutting and being cut, and with what is natural for it; while if we go against nature we'll fail and accomplish nothing?
387b	**HERMOGENES** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω.	**HERMOGENES** That's how it seems to me.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν κάειν τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν δόξαν δεῖ κάειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὀρθήν; αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ᾗ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστον κάεσθαί τε καὶ κάειν καὶ ᾧ ἐπεφύκει;	**SOCRATES** And again, if we set out to burn something, we mustn't burn it according to just any opinion, but according to the correct one? And that's the one about how, and with what, it's each thing's nature to burn and be burned?
	HERMOGENES ἔστι ταῦτα.	**HERMOGENES** That's right.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω;	**SOCRATES** And the same goes for everything else?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μία τις τῶν πράξεών ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** Now isn't speaking also one kind of action?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν ᾗ ἄν τῳ δοκῇ λεκτέον εἶναι, ταύτῃ [387c] λέγων ὀρθῶς λέξει, ἢ ἐὰν μὲν ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα λέγειν τε καὶ λέγεσθαι καὶ ᾧ, ταύτῃ καὶ τούτῳ λέγῃ, πλέον τέ τι ποιήσει καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἂν δὲ μή, ἐξαμαρτήσεταί τε καὶ οὐδὲν ποιήσει;	**SOCRATES** Then will someone speak correctly by speaking however he thinks he should, [387c] or will he get something done and actually speak only if he speaks in the way and with the means by which it's natural to say things and for them to be said?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		And otherwise will he fail and accomplish nothing?
387c	**HERMOGENES** οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.	**HERMOGENES** I think it's as you say.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τοῦ λέγειν μόριον τὸ ὀνομάζειν; διονομάζοντες γάρ που λέγουσι τοὺς λόγους.	**SOCRATES** Now isn't naming a part of speaking? For it's by naming things, surely, that people make statements.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὀνομάζειν πρᾶξίς τίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λέγειν πρᾶξίς τις ἦν περὶ τὰ πράγματα;	**SOCRATES** Then isn't naming also a kind of action, if speaking was a kind of action concerning things?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
387d	**SOCRATES** αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἐφάνησαν ἡμῖν οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὖσαι, ἀλλ' αὑτῶν τινα ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχουσαι;	**SOCRATES** And we saw that actions aren't relative to us, but have a nature peculiar to themselves?
	HERMOGENES ἔστι ταῦτα.	**HERMOGENES** That's right.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀνομαστέον ἐστὶν ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα ὀνομάζειν τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι καὶ ᾧ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἂν ἡμεῖς βουληθῶμεν, εἴπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν μέλλει ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι; καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἂν πλέον τι ποιοῖμεν καὶ ὀνομάζοιμεν, ἄλλως δὲ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Then we should name things in the way and with the means by which it's natural to name them and for them to be named, and not however we want, if this is going to be consistent with what we said before? And that way we'd get something done and actually name, but otherwise not?
	HERMOGENES φαίνεταί μοι.	**HERMOGENES** It seems so to me.
	SOCRATES φέρε δή, ὃ ἔδει τέμνειν, ἔδει τῳ, φαμέν, τέμνειν;	**SOCRATES** Come now: what has to be cut, we say, has to be cut with something?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
387e	**SOCRATES** καὶ ὃ ἔδει κερκίζειν, ἔδει τῳ κερκίζειν; καὶ ὃ ἔδει τρυπᾶν, ἔδει τῳ τρυπᾶν;	**SOCRATES** And what has to be woven has to be woven with something? And what has to be drilled has to be drilled with something?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES καὶ ὃ ἔδει δὴ ὀνομάζειν, ἔδει τῳ ὀνομάζειν;	**SOCRATES** And so what has to be named has to be named with something?
388a	**HERMOGENES** ἔστι ταῦτα.	**HERMOGENES** That's right.

THE NAME AS A TOOL

Like a drill or a shuttle, a name is a tool: for teaching and sorting things as they are.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES τί δὲ ἦν ἐκεῖνο ᾧ ἔδει τρυπᾶν;	**SOCRATES** And what was it we had to drill with?
	HERMOGENES τρύπανον.	**HERMOGENES** A drill.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES τί δὲ ᾧ κερκίζειν;	**SOCRATES** And to weave with?
	HERMOGENES κερκίς.	**HERMOGENES** A shuttle.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ ᾧ ὀνομάζειν;	**SOCRATES** And to name with?
	HERMOGENES ὄνομα.	**HERMOGENES** A name.
	SOCRATES εὖ λέγεις. ὄργανον ἄρα τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὄνομα.	**SOCRATES** Well said. So a name is a kind of tool too.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην "τί ἦν ὄργανον ἡ κερκίς;" οὐχ ᾧ κερκίζομεν;	**SOCRATES** Now if I asked, "What sort of tool was a shuttle?" wouldn't the answer be, the one we weave with?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
388b	**SOCRATES** κερκίζοντες δὲ τί δρῶμεν; οὐ τὴν κρόκην καὶ τοὺς στήμονας συγκεχυμένους διακρίνομεν;	**SOCRATES** And what do we do when we weave? Don't we separate the weft and the warp, which are tangled together?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τρυπάνου ἕξεις οὕτως εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων;	**SOCRATES** And you'll be able to say the same sort of thing about a drill and the rest?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἔχεις δὴ καὶ περὶ ὀνόματος οὕτως εἰπεῖν; ὀργάνῳ ὄντι τῷ ὀνόματι ὀνομάζοντες τί ποιοῦμεν;	**SOCRATES** Then can you say the same sort of thing about a name? When we name with a name, which is a tool, what are we doing?
	HERMOGENES οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.	**HERMOGENES** I can't say.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὐ διδάσκομέν τι ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακρίνομεν ᾗ ἔχει;	**SOCRATES** Aren't we teaching each other something, and separating things according to how they are?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον καὶ 388c διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος.	**SOCRATES** So a name is a tool for teaching, one that separates 388c being, as a shuttle separates a fabric.
388c	**HERMOGENES** ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ὑφαντικὸν δέ γε ἡ κερκίς;	**SOCRATES** And the shuttle is a weaver's tool?
	HERMOGENES πῶς δ' οὔ;	**HERMOGENES** Of course.
	SOCRATES ὑφαντικὸς μὲν ἄρα κερκίδι καλῶς χρήσεται, καλῶς δ' ἐστὶν ὑφαντικῶς· διδασκαλικὸς δὲ ὀνόματι, καλῶς δ' ἐστὶ διδασκαλικῶς.	**SOCRATES** So a weaver will use a shuttle well—and "well" means as a weaver should. And a teacher will use a name well—and "well" means as a teacher should.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES τῷ τίνος οὖν ἔργῳ ὁ ὑφάντης καλῶς χρήσεται ὅταν τῇ κερκίδι χρῆται;	**SOCRATES** Then whose work will the weaver be using well when he uses the shuttle?
	HERMOGENES τῷ τοῦ τέκτονος.	**HERMOGENES** The carpenter's.
	SOCRATES πᾶς δὲ τέκτων ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;	**SOCRATES** Is everyone a carpenter, or only the one who has the craft?
	HERMOGENES ὁ τὴν τέχνην.	**HERMOGENES** The one who has the craft.
388d	**SOCRATES** τῷ τίνος δὲ ἔργῳ ὁ τρυπητὴς καλῶς χρήσεται ὅταν τῷ τρυπάνῳ χρῆται;	**SOCRATES** And whose work will the driller be using well when he uses the drill?
	HERMOGENES τῷ τοῦ χαλκέως.	**HERMOGENES** The blacksmith's.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν πᾶς χαλκεὺς ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;	**SOCRATES** And is everyone a blacksmith, or only the one who has the craft?
	HERMOGENES ὁ τὴν τέχνην.	**HERMOGENES** The one who has the craft.
	SOCRATES εἶεν. τῷ δὲ τίνος ἔργῳ ὁ διδασκαλικὸς χρήσεται ὅταν τῷ ὀνόματι χρῆται;	**SOCRATES** Very well. And whose work will the teacher be using when he uses a name?
	HERMOGENES οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἔχω.	**HERMOGENES** I can't say that either.
	SOCRATES οὐδὲ τοῦτό γ' ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, τίς παραδίδωσιν ἡμῖν τὰ ὀνόματα οἷς χρώμεθα;	**SOCRATES** Can't you say this either: who gives us the names we use?
	HERMOGENES οὐ δῆτα.	**HERMOGENES** No, I can't.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὐχὶ ὁ νόμος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὁ παραδιδοὺς αὐτά;	**SOCRATES** Don't you think it's the law—custom—that hands them down?
	HERMOGENES ἔοικεν.	**HERMOGENES** It seems so.

THE NAME-MAKER

A lawgiver makes names by looking to the form of name, supervised by their user, the dialectician.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
388e	**SOCRATES** νομοθέτου ἄρα ἔργῳ χρήσεται ὁ διδασκαλικὸς ὅταν ὀνόματι χρῆται;	**SOCRATES** So the teacher, when he uses a name, will be using the work of a lawgiver?
	HERMOGENES δοκεῖ μοι.	**HERMOGENES** I think so.
	SOCRATES νομοθέτης δέ σοι δοκεῖ πᾶς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;	**SOCRATES** And do you think every man is a lawgiver, or only the one who has the craft?
	HERMOGENES ὁ τὴν τέχνην.	**HERMOGENES** The one who has the craft.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρός, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὄνομα θέσθαι [389a] ἐστὶν ἀλλά τινος ὀνοματουργοῦ· οὗτος δ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιουργῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται.	**SOCRATES** So it isn't every man's business, Hermogenes, to give names. [389a] It belongs to a name-maker. And this, it seems, is the lawgiver, who is the rarest of craftsmen among human beings.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
389a	**HERMOGENES** ἔοικεν.	**HERMOGENES** It seems so.
	SOCRATES ἴθι δή, ἐπίσκεψαι ποῖ βλέπων ὁ νομοθέτης τὰ ὀνόματα τίθεται· ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν δὲ ἀνάσκεψαι. ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τέκτων τὴν κερκίδα ποιεῖ; ἆρ' οὐ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ ἐπεφύκει κερκίζειν;	**SOCRATES** Come now, consider what the lawgiver looks to when he gives names. Examine it in light of what we said before. What does the carpenter look to when he makes a shuttle? Isn't it to something whose nature is to weave?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
389b	**SOCRATES** τί δέ; ἂν καταγῇ αὐτῷ ἡ κερκὶς ποιοῦντι, πότερον πάλιν ποιήσει ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατεαγυῖαν βλέπων, ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἣν κατέαξεν ἐποίει;	**SOCRATES** Well, if the shuttle breaks while he's making it, will he make another one by looking to the broken one? Or will he look to that form he was looking to when he made the one he broke?
	HERMOGENES πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**HERMOGENES** To that form, I think.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο δικαιότατ' ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν κερκὶς καλέσαιμεν;	**SOCRATES** Then wouldn't we be entirely right to call that "what a shuttle itself is"?
	HERMOGENES ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**HERMOGENES** I think so.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὰν δέῃ λεπτῷ ἱματίῳ ἢ παχεῖ ἢ λινῷ ἢ ἐρεῷ ἢ ὁποιῳοῦν τινι κερκίδα ποιεῖν, πάσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς κερκίδος ἔχειν εἶδος, οἵα δ' ἑκάστῳ καλλίστη ἐπεφύκει, [389c] ταύτην ἀποδιδόναι τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἕκαστον;	**SOCRATES** So whenever he has to make a shuttle for a light garment or a heavy one, or for linen or wool or anything else, all of them must have the form of shuttle; but whatever nature is naturally finest for each kind, [389c] that is the nature he must give to each product?
389c	**HERMOGENES** ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ὀργάνων ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· τὸ φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκὸς ὄργανον ἐξευρόντα δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ἔργον, οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς βουληθῇ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπεφύκει. τὸ φύσει γὰρ ἑκάστῳ, ὡς ἔοικε, τρύπανον πεφυκὸς εἰς τὸν σίδηρον δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι.	**SOCRATES** And the same goes for the other tools. He has to discover the tool that is naturally suited to each task and put it into the material he's making it from—not as he himself would like, but as its nature is. For it seems he has to know how to put into iron the drill that is naturally suited to each task.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES καὶ τὴν φύσει κερκίδα ἑκάστῳ πεφυκυῖαν εἰς ξύλον.	**SOCRATES** And how to put into wood the shuttle that is naturally suited to each.
	HERMOGENES ἔστι ταῦτα.	**HERMOGENES** That's right.
389d	**SOCRATES** φύσει γὰρ ἦν ἑκάστῳ εἴδει ὑφάσματος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἑκάστη κερκίς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.	**SOCRATES** For each shuttle, it seems, is naturally suited to a particular kind of fabric, and the same holds for the rest.
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὸ ἑκάστῳ φύσει πεφυκὸς ὄνομα τὸν νομοθέτην ἐκεῖνον εἰς τοὺς φθόγγους	**SOCRATES** Then, my excellent friend, mustn't that lawgiver of ours also know how to put into

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι, καὶ βλέποντα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἔστιν ὄνομα, πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖν τε καὶ τίθεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει κύριος εἶναι ὀνομάτων θέτης; εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς συλλαβὰς ἕκαστος ὁ νομοθέτης τίθησιν, οὐδὲν [389e] δεῖ τοῦτο ἀμφιγνοεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν σίδηρον ἅπας χαλκεὺς τίθησιν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ὄργανον· ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως, ἕως ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν ἀποδιδῷ, ἐάντε [390a] ἐν ἄλλῳ σιδήρῳ, ὅμως ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον, ἐάντε ἐνθάδε ἐάντε ἐν βαρβάροις τις ποιῇ. ἦ γάρ;	sounds and syllables the name that is naturally suited to each thing? And mustn't he make and give all his names while looking to what a name itself is, if he's going to be a genuine giver of names? And if different lawgivers don't put names into the same syllables, we mustn't [389e] let that confuse us. After all, not every blacksmith puts the tool into the same iron, even when he's making the same tool for the same purpose. Still, so long as he gives it the same form, even if [390a] it's in different iron, the tool is correct, whether someone makes it here or among non-Greeks. Isn't that so?
390a	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην τόν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἕως ἂν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῷ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἐν ὁποιαισοῦν συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χείρω νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὁπουοῦν ἄλλοθι;	**SOCRATES** Then you'll judge the lawgiver in the same way, whether he's here or among non-Greeks. So long as he gives each thing the form of name that fits it, in whatever syllables, the lawgiver here is no worse than one anywhere else?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
390b	**SOCRATES** τίς οὖν ὁ γνωσόμενος εἰ τὸ προσῆκον εἶδος κερκίδος ἐν ὁποιῳοῦν ξύλῳ κεῖται; ὁ ποιήσας, ὁ τέκτων, ἢ ὁ χρησόμενος ὁ ὑφάντης;	**SOCRATES** Now who will know whether the right form of shuttle has been put into a given piece of wood? The one who made it, the carpenter, or the one who'll use it, the weaver?
	HERMOGENES εἰκὸς μὲν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν χρησόμενον.	**HERMOGENES** More likely the one who'll use it, Socrates.
	SOCRATES τίς οὖν ὁ τῷ τοῦ λυροποιοῦ ἔργῳ χρησόμενος; ἆρ᾽ οὐχ οὗτος ὃς ἐπίσταιτο ἂν ἐργαζομένῳ κάλλιστα ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ εἰργασμένον γνοίη εἴτ᾽ εὖ εἴργασται εἴτε μή;	**SOCRATES** Then who will use the lyre-maker's work? Isn't it the person who'd know how best to supervise the making of it, and who'd recognize, once it was made, whether it had been made well or not?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τίς;	**SOCRATES** Who is that?
	HERMOGENES ὁ κιθαριστής.	**HERMOGENES** The lyre-player.
	SOCRATES τίς δὲ ὁ τῷ τοῦ ναυπηγοῦ;	**SOCRATES** And who will use the shipwright's work?
390c	**HERMOGENES** κυβερνήτης.	**HERMOGENES** The helmsman.
	SOCRATES τίς δὲ τῷ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἔργῳ ἐπιστατήσειέ τ᾽ ἂν κάλλιστα καὶ εἰργασμένον κρίνειε καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις; ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὅσπερ χρήσεται;	**SOCRATES** And who would best supervise the lawgiver's work and judge it once it was done, both here and among non-Greeks? Isn't it the one who'll use it?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἆρ’ οὖν οὐχ ὁ ἐρωτᾶν ἐπιστάμενος οὗτός ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** And isn’t this the person who knows how to ask questions?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** And the same person knows how to answer them?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES τὸν δὲ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον ἄλλο τι σὺ καλεῖς ἢ διαλεκτικόν;	**SOCRATES** And the person who knows how to ask and answer questions—do you call him anything but a dialectician?
	HERMOGENES οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.	**HERMOGENES** No, that’s what I call him.
390d	**SOCRATES** τέκτονος μὲν ἄρα ἔργον ἐστὶν ποιῆσαι πηδάλιον ἐπιστατοῦντος κυβερνήτου, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ πηδάλιον.	**SOCRATES** So it’s a carpenter’s job to make a rudder, under a helmsman’s supervision, if the rudder is going to be a fine one.
	HERMOGENES φαίνεται.	**HERMOGENES** So it seems.
	SOCRATES νομοθέτου δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὄνομα, ἐπιστάτην ἔχοντος διαλεκτικὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ὀνόματα θήσεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** And it’s a lawgiver’s job, it seems, to make a name, with a dialectician as his supervisor, if names are going to be given well.
	HERMOGENES ἔστι ταῦτα.	**HERMOGENES** That’s right.
	SOCRATES κινδυνεύει ἄρα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἶναι οὐ φαῦλον, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσις, οὐδὲ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων. καὶ Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει 390e τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὂν ἑκάστῳ καὶ δυνάμενον αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶδος τιθέναι εἴς τε τὰ γράμματα καὶ τὰς συλλαβάς.	**SOCRATES** So it looks, Hermogenes, as if giving names isn’t a trivial matter, as you think, or a job for trivial people or for just anyone. And Cratylus is right when he says that it’s by nature 390e that things have their names, and that not everyone is a craftsman of names. Only the one who looks to the name that belongs to each thing by nature, and can put its form into letters and syllables, is one.
390e	**HERMOGENES** οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως χρὴ πρὸς ἃ λέγεις 391a ἐναντιοῦσθαι. ἴσως μέντοι οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν οὕτως ἐξαίφνης πεισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ δοκῶ μοι ὧδε ἂν μᾶλλον πιθέσθαι σοι, εἴ μοι δείξειας ἥντινα φῂς εἶναι τὴν φύσει ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος.	**HERMOGENES** I don’t see how I can 391a argue against what you’re saying, Socrates. But perhaps it isn’t easy to be persuaded so suddenly. I think I’d be more readily persuaded if you showed me what you say this natural correctness of a name is.
391a	**SOCRATES** ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ μακάριε Ἑρμόγενες, οὐδεμίαν λέγω, ἀλλ’ ἐπελάθου γε ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην ἀλλὰ σκεψοίμην μετὰ σοῦ. νῦν δὲ σκοπουμένοις ἡμῖν, ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί, τοσοῦτον μὲν ἤδη φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ πρότερα, φύσει τέ τινα ὀρθότητα ἔχον εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ οὐ 391b παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπίστασθαι καλῶς αὐτὸ πράγματι ὁτῳοῦν θέσθαι· ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** My dear Hermogenes, I’m not saying it’s anything. You’ve forgotten what I said a little while ago: that I didn’t know, but would look into it with you. But now that we’ve been looking into it, you and I, this much at least is already clear, contrary to what we thought before: a name has a kind of natural correctness, and it isn’t 391b every man’s business to know how to give a name well to anything whatever. Isn’t that so?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
391b	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο χρὴ ζητεῖν, εἴπερ ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι, ἥτις ποτ' αὖ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὀρθότης.	**SOCRATES** Then the next thing we have to look for, if you really want to know, is what its correctness actually is.
	HERMOGENES ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπιθυμῶ γε εἰδέναι.	**HERMOGENES** Well, I certainly do want to know.
	SOCRATES σκόπει τοίνυν.	**SOCRATES** Then look into it.
	HERMOGENES πῶς οὖν χρὴ σκοπεῖν;	**HERMOGENES** How should I look into it?
	SOCRATES ὀρθοτάτη μὲν τῆς σκέψεως, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων, χρήματα ἐκείνοις τελοῦντα καὶ χάριτας κατατιθέμενον. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ σοφισταί, οἷσπερ καὶ ὁ ἀδελφός [391c] σου Καλλίας πολλὰ τελέσας χρήματα σοφὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατὴς εἶ τῶν πατρῴων, λιπαρεῖν χρὴ τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ δεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ διδάξαι σε τὴν ὀρθότητα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἣν ἔμαθεν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου.	**SOCRATES** The most correct way to look into it, my friend, is with people who know, by paying them money and doing them favors. These are the sophists. Your brother [391c] Callias paid them a lot of money, and now he has a reputation for wisdom. But since you don't have control of your inheritance, you should plead with your brother and beg him to teach you the correctness about such things that he learned from Protagoras.[5]
391c	**HERMOGENES** ἄτοπος μεντἂν εἴη μου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δέησις, εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου ὅλως οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπῴην ὥς του ἄξια.	**HERMOGENES** That would be an odd request for me to make, Socrates, if I reject Protagoras' *Truth* entirely but then welcomed what's said in such a *Truth* as if it were worth something.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ αὖ σε ταῦτα ἀρέσκει, παρ' Ὁμήρου χρὴ [391d] μανθάνειν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν.	**SOCRATES** Well, if you don't like that either, then you should learn [391d] from Homer and the other poets.

HOMER ON NAMES

Socrates turns to Homer's names for rivers, birds and the son of Hector.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
391d	**HERMOGENES** καὶ τί λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ὅμηρος περὶ ὀνομάτων, καὶ ποῦ;	**HERMOGENES** And what does Homer say about names, Socrates, and where?
	SOCRATES πολλαχοῦ· μέγιστα δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα ἐν οἷς διορίζει ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἅ τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὀνόματα καλοῦσι καὶ οἱ θεοί. ἢ οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν μέγα τι καὶ θαυμάσιον λέγειν ἐν τούτοις περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος; δῆλον γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἵ γε θεοὶ αὐτὰ καλοῦσιν πρὸς ὀρθότητα ἅπερ ἔστι φύσει ὀνόματα· [391e] ἢ σὺ οὐκ οἴει;	**SOCRATES** In many places. But the greatest and finest are the passages where he distinguishes between the names human beings and gods give to the same things. Don't you think he says something great and wonderful about the correctness of names in those passages? For clearly the gods, at any rate, call things by the names that are correct by nature. [391e] Or don't you think so?
391e	**HERMOGENES** εὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, εἴπερ καλοῦσιν, ὅτι ὀρθῶς καλοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα ταῦτα λέγεις;	**HERMOGENES** I know perfectly well that if they call things anything, they call them correctly. But which passages do you mean?

5 Callias, son of Hipponicus, was reputedly the richest man in Athens and a lavish patron of the sophists.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ, ὃς ἐμονομάχει τῷ Ἡφαίστῳ, "ὃν Ξάνθον," φησί, "καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον;"	**SOCRATES** Don't you know that he says of the river at Troy that fought in single combat with Hephaestus, "whom the gods call Xanthus, but men Scamander"?[6]
	HERMOGENES ἔγωγε.	**HERMOGENES** I do.
392a	**SOCRATES** τί οὖν δή; οὐκ οἴει τοῦτο σεμνόν τι εἶναι γνῶναι, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκεῖνον τὸν ποταμὸν Ξάνθον καλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ Σκάμανδρον; εἰ δὲ βούλει, περὶ τῆς ὄρνιθος ἣν λέγει ὅτι—χαλκίδα κικλήσκουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ κύμινδιν, φαῦλον ἡγῇ τὸ μάθημα ὅσῳ ὀρθότερόν ἐστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκὶς κυμίνδιδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὀρνέῳ; ἢ τὴν Βατίειάν τε καὶ Μυρίνην, [392b] καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ ἄλλων; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως μείζω ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ ἐξευρεῖν· ὁ δὲ Σκαμάνδριός τε καὶ ὁ Ἀστυάναξ ἀνθρωπινώτερον διασκέψασθαι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ῥᾷον, ἅ φησιν ὀνόματα εἶναι τῷ τοῦ Ἕκτορος υἱεῖ, τίνα ποτὲ λέγει τὴν ὀρθότητα αὐτῶν. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.	**SOCRATES** Well then, don't you think it would be an impressive thing to know why it's more correct to call that river Xanthus than Scamander? Or, if you like, take the bird of which he says, "the gods call it *chalkis*, but men *kymindis*": do you think it a trivial lesson, how much more correct it is for the same bird to be called *chalkis* than *kymindis*? Or Batieia and Myrine, [392b] and many other examples from this poet and others? But perhaps these things are too big for you and me to figure out. Scamandrius and Astyanax, though, which he says were the names of Hector's son, are more within human reach, I think, and easier to examine: what correctness does he say these names have? You surely know the lines that contain what I mean.[7]
392b	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν οἴει Ὅμηρον ὀρθότερον ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδί, τὸν "Ἀστυάνακτα" ἢ τὸν "Σκαμάνδριον";	**SOCRATES** Then which of the two names do you think Homer considered more correctly given to the boy, "Astyanax" or "Scamandrius"?
392c	**HERMOGENES** οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.	**HERMOGENES** I can't say.
	SOCRATES ὧδε δὴ σκόπει. εἴ τις ἔροιτό σε πότερον οἴει ὀρθότερον καλεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους ἢ τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους;	**SOCRATES** Look at it this way, then. Suppose someone asked you who you think give names more correctly, the more intelligent or the less intelligent.
	HERMOGENES δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, φαίην ἄν.	**HERMOGENES** The more intelligent, obviously, I'd say.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν φρονιμώτεραί σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος;	**SOCRATES** And do you think the women in our cities are more intelligent than the men, taking each sex as a whole?
	HERMOGENES οἱ ἄνδρες.	**HERMOGENES** The men.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι Ὅμηρος τὸ παιδίον τὸ τοῦ Ἕκτορος [392d] ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων φησὶν καλεῖσθαι Ἀστυάνακτα, Σκαμάνδριον δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν	**SOCRATES** Then you know that Homer says Hector's little boy [392d] was called Astyanax by the Trojans. So obviously it was by the women that he

6 In the *Iliad* the river god Scamander attacks Achilles and is beaten back by Hephaestus' fire; the quoted line is *Iliad* 20.74.
7 The bird line is *Iliad* 14.291. Batieia ("thicket hill") is the human name for a mound before Troy that the gods call the tomb of Myrine (*Iliad* 2.813–814).

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	γυναικῶν, ἐπειδὴ οἵ γε ἄνδρες αὐτὸν Ἀστυάνακτα ἐκάλουν;	was called Scamandrius, since the men, at any rate, called him Astyanax.
392d	**HERMOGENES** ἔοικέ γε.	**HERMOGENES** So it seems.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ Ὅμηρος τοὺς Τρῶας σοφωτέρους ἡγεῖτο ἢ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν;	**SOCRATES** And Homer, too, considered the Trojans wiser than their wives?
	HERMOGENES οἶμαι ἔγωγε.	**HERMOGENES** I think so.
	SOCRATES τὸν "Ἀστυάνακτα" ἄρα ὀρθότερον ᾤετο κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδὶ ἢ τὸν "Σκαμάνδριον";	**SOCRATES** So he thought "Astyanax" was more correctly given to the boy than "Scamandrius"?
	HERMOGENES φαίνεται.	**HERMOGENES** Apparently.
	SOCRATES σκοπῶμεν δὴ διὰ τί ποτε. ἢ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν κάλλιστα ὑφηγεῖται τὸ διότι; φησὶν γάρ— 392e οἷος γάρ σφιν ἔρυτο πόλιν καὶ τείχεα μακρά. διὰ ταῦτα δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖν τὸν τοῦ σωτῆρος υἱὸν Ἀστυάνακτα τούτου ὃ ἔσῳζεν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ὥς φησιν Ὅμηρος.	**SOCRATES** Then let's look into why. Or does he himself show us the reason, and beautifully? He says: 392e "For he alone defended their city and long walls." That, it seems, is why it's correct to call the savior's son Astyanax, "lord (*anax*) of the city (*asty*)"—lord of the very thing his father was saving, as Homer says.[8]
392e	**HERMOGENES** φαίνεταί μοι.	**HERMOGENES** It seems so to me.
	SOCRATES τί δή ποτε; οὐ γάρ πω οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔγωγε μανθάνω· ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, σὺ δὲ μανθάνεις;	**SOCRATES** But why, exactly? I don't understand it myself yet. Do you, Hermogenes?
	HERMOGENES μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.	**HERMOGENES** No, by Zeus, I don't.
393a	**SOCRATES** ἀλλ' ἆρα, ὠγαθέ, καὶ τῷ Ἕκτορι αὐτὸς ἔθετο τὸ ὄνομα Ὅμηρος;	**SOCRATES** Well, my good friend, didn't Homer give Hector his name too?
	HERMOGENES τί δή;	**HERMOGENES** Why do you ask?
	SOCRATES ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο παραπλήσιόν τι εἶναι τῷ Ἀστυάνακτι, καὶ ἔοικεν Ἑλληνικοῖς ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα. ὁ γὰρ "ἄναξ" καὶ ὁ "Ἕκτωρ" σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν σημαίνει, βασιλικὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα· οὗ γὰρ ἄν τις "ἄναξ" ᾖ, καὶ "Ἕκτωρ" δήπου ἐστὶν τούτου· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κρατεῖ 393b τε αὐτοῦ καὶ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει αὐτό. ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ λανθάνω καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οἰόμενός τινος ὥσπερ ἴχνους ἐφάπτεσθαι τῆς Ὁμήρου δόξης περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος;	**SOCRATES** Because it seems to me that this name is pretty much like Astyanax, and both look like Greek names. The word *anax* ("lord") and the name Hector mean almost the same thing: both are kingly names. Whatever a man is *anax* of, he is surely also *hektōr* ("holder") of, since obviously he rules 393b it, possesses it, and holds (*echei*) it. Or do you think I'm talking nonsense, and fooling even myself when I imagine I've come upon a trace, as it were, of Homer's view about the correctness of names?
393b	**HERMOGENES** μὰ Δί' οὐ σύ γε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἴσως τοῦ ἐφάπτῃ.	**HERMOGENES** By Zeus, I don't think you're fooling yourself. You may well be onto something.
	SOCRATES δίκαιόν γέ τοί ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τὸν λέοντος ἔκγονον λέοντα καλεῖν καὶ τὸν ἵππου ἔκγονον ἵππον. οὔ τι λέγω ἐὰν ὥσπερ τέρας γένηται ἐξ ἵππου ἄλλο	**SOCRATES** It seems only just to me, at any rate, to call a lion's offspring a lion and a horse's offspring a horse. I don't mean if something other than a

8 The line (*Iliad* 22.507) is said of Hector, Astyanax's father.

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τι ἢ ἵππος, [393c] ἀλλ' οὗ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ γένους ἔκγονον τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτο λέγω· ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον ἀλλὰ μόσχον· οὐδ' ἂν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου οἶμαι μὴ τὸ ἀνθρώπου ἔκγονον γένηται, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν τὸ ἔκγονον ἄνθρωπος κλητέος· καὶ τὰ δένδρα ὡσαύτως καὶ τἆλλα ἅπαντα· ἢ οὐ συνδοκεῖ;

393c **HERMOGENES** συνδοκεῖ.

SOCRATES καλῶς λέγεις· φύλαττε γάρ με μή πῃ παρακρούσωμαί σε. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κἂν ἐκ βασιλέως γίγνηταί τι [393d] ἔκγονον, βασιλεὺς κλητέος· εἰ δὲ ἐν ἑτέραις συλλαβαῖς ἢ ἐν ἑτέραις τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει, οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα· οὐδ' εἰ πρόσκειταί τι γράμμα ἢ ἀφῄρηται, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ἕως ἂν ἐγκρατὴς ᾖ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος δηλουμένη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι.

393d **HERMOGENES** πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

SOCRATES οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τῶν στοιχείων οἶσθα ὅτι ὀνόματα λέγομεν ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, πλὴν τεττάρων, τοῦ Ε καὶ τοῦ Υ καὶ τοῦ Ο καὶ τοῦ Ω· τοῖς δ' [393e] ἄλλοις φωνήεσί τε καὶ ἀφώνοις οἶσθα ὅτι περιτιθέντες ἄλλα γράμματα λέγομεν, ὀνόματα ποιοῦντες· ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ δηλουμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐντιθῶμεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖν ὃ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν δηλώσει. οἷον τὸ "βῆτα"· ὁρᾷς ὅτι τοῦ ἦτα καὶ τοῦ ταῦ καὶ τοῦ ἄλφα προστεθέντων οὐδὲν ἐλύπησεν, ὥστε μὴ οὐχὶ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ στοιχείου φύσιν δηλῶσαι ὅλῳ τῷ ὀνόματι οὗ ἐβούλετο ὁ νομοθέτης· οὕτως ἠπιστήθη καλῶς θέσθαι τοῖς γράμμασι τὰ ὀνόματα.

393e **HERMOGENES** ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

394a **SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ βασιλέως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; ἔσται γάρ ποτε ἐκ βασιλέως βασιλεύς, καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ καλός, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως, ἐξ ἑκάστου γένους ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ἔκγονον, ἐὰν μὴ τέρας γίγνηται· κλητέον δὴ ταὐτὰ ὀνόματα. ποικίλλειν δὲ ἔξεστι ταῖς συλλαβαῖς, ὥστε δόξαι ἂν τῷ ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντι ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα· ὥσπερ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν φάρμακα χρώμασιν καὶ ὀσμαῖς πεποικιλμένα ἄλλα φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα, τῷ δέ γε [394b] ἰατρῷ, ἅτε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν φαρμάκων σκοπουμένῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῶν προσόντων. οὕτω δὲ ἴσως

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horse is born from a horse, like a monster. [393c] I mean whatever is by nature the offspring of its kind. If a horse, contrary to nature, gives birth to a calf, the natural offspring of a cow, it should be called a calf, not a foal. Nor, I think, if what is born from a human being isn't human offspring, should it be called human; only if the offspring is human. And the same goes for trees and everything else. Don't you agree?

HERMOGENES I agree.

SOCRATES Good. But keep an eye on me, in case I trick you somehow. By the same reasoning, if some [393d] offspring is born of a king, it should be called a king. Whether the same thing is signified in these syllables or in others makes no difference. Nor does it matter if a letter is added or taken away, so long as the essence of the thing, as revealed in the name, still prevails.

HERMOGENES What do you mean?

SOCRATES Nothing complicated. You know that when we speak of the letters, we say their names, not the letters themselves—except for four: e, u, o and ō. To the [393e] other vowels and the consonants, as you know, we add other letters when we say them, and so make names. But as long as we include the letter's own power, plainly shown, it's correct to call it by the name that will reveal it to us. Take "beta." You see that adding eta, tau, and alpha did no harm: it didn't stop the whole name from revealing the nature of the letter the lawgiver wanted to name. That's how well he knew how to give the letters their names.[9]

HERMOGENES I think what you say is true.

SOCRATES Doesn't the same argument hold for a king? From a king, sooner or later, there'll be a king; from a good man, a good one; from a fine one, a fine one; and so with everything else—from each kind another offspring of the same sort, unless a monster is born. So they should be called by the same names. But the syllables can be varied, so that to the layman names that are the same seem different from each other. It's like doctors' drugs: dressed up with various colors and smells, they look different to us though they're the same,

9 In Plato's day these four vowels were named simply by their sounds; the names epsilon, upsilon, omicron and omega came later.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν σκοπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα ἢ μετάκειται ἢ ἀφῄρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις παντάπασιν γράμμασίν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις.	while to the [394b] doctor, since he looks at the power of the drugs, they look the same, and he isn't thrown by the additions. In the same way, perhaps, someone who knows about names looks at their power, and isn't thrown if a letter is added, or transposed, or taken away, or even if the power of the name lies in entirely different letters.
394b	ὥσπερ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, "Ἀστυάναξ" τε καὶ "Ἕκτωρ" οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν [394c] γραμμάτων ἔχει πλὴν τοῦ ταῦ, ἀλλ' ὅμως ταὐτὸν σημαίνει. καὶ "Ἀρχέπολίς" γε τῶν μὲν γραμμάτων τί ἐπικοινωνεῖ; δηλοῖ δὲ ὅμως τὸ αὐτό· καὶ ἄλλα πολλά ἐστιν ἃ οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ βασιλέα σημαίνει· καὶ ἄλλα γε αὖ στρατηγόν, οἷον "Ἆγις" καὶ "Πολέμαρχος" καὶ "Εὐπόλεμος". καὶ ἰατρικά γε ἕτερα, "Ἰατροκλῆς" καὶ "Ἀκεσίμβροτος"· καὶ ἕτερα ἂν ἴσως συχνὰ εὕροιμεν ταῖς μὲν συλλαβαῖς καὶ τοῖς γράμμασι διαφωνοῦντα, τῇ δὲ δυνάμει ταὐτὸν φθεγγόμενα. φαίνεται οὕτως ἢ οὔ;	Take what we were just saying: "Astyanax" and "Hector" have none of the same [394c] letters except tau, and yet they signify the same thing. And what letters does "Archepolis" ("ruler of the city") share with them? Yet it reveals the same thing. There are many other names that signify nothing but king. Others again signify general, such as "Agis" ("leader"), "Polemarchus" ("war-leader"), and "Eupolemus" ("good at war"). And others are doctors' names, such as "Iatrocles" ("famed healer") and "Acesimbrotus" ("healer of mortals"). We could probably find a great many others that differ in their syllables and letters but say the same thing in their power. Does it seem so or not?
394d	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**HERMOGENES** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES τοῖς μὲν δὴ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέον ὀνόματα.	**SOCRATES** So those born according to nature should be given the same names.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν, οἳ ἂν ἐν τέρατος εἴδει γένωνται; οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ θεοσεβοῦς ἀσεβὴς γένηται, ἆρ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, κἂν ἵππος βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκῃ, οὐ τοῦ τεκόντος δήπου ἔδει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γένους οὗ εἴη;	**SOCRATES** And what about those born contrary to nature, who come out as a kind of monster? For example, when an impious son is born to a good and god-fearing man. Isn't it just as in our earlier example, where a horse gave birth to a cow's offspring? Surely it ought to bear the name not of the parent but of the kind it belongs to?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
394e	**SOCRATES** καὶ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς ἄρα γενομένῳ ἀσεβεῖ τὸ τοῦ γένους ὄνομα ἀποδοτέον.	**SOCRATES** So the impious son of a pious father should be given the name of his kind.
	HERMOGENES ἔστι ταῦτα.	**HERMOGENES** That's right.
	SOCRATES οὐ "Θεόφιλον," ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲ "Μνησίθεον" οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ὅτι τἀναντία τούτοις σημαίνει, ἐάνπερ τῆς ὀρθότητος τυγχάνῃ τὰ ὀνόματα.	**SOCRATES** Not "Theophilus" ("dear to the gods"), it seems, or "Mnesitheus" ("mindful of the gods"), or anything of that sort, but something that signifies the opposite—if names are to be correct.
	HERMOGENES παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**HERMOGENES** Absolutely, Socrates.

NAMES OF HEROES

Orestes, Agamemnon, Atreus, Pelops, Tantalus and Zeus each seem named for what they were.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ "Ὀρέστης," ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, κινδυνεύει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, εἴτε τις τύχη ἔθετο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα εἴτε καὶ ποιητής τις, τὸ θηριῶδες τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἄγριον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ὀρεινὸν ἐνδεικνύμενος τῷ ὀνόματι.	**SOCRATES** Just as "Orestes," too, Hermogenes, may well be correct, whether it was chance that gave him the name or some poet. It shows the brutishness of his nature, his savagery, his wild mountain (*oros*) side.
395a	**HERMOGENES** φαίνεται οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**HERMOGENES** So it seems, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἔοικεν δέ γε καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** And his father's name also seems to accord with nature.
	HERMOGENES φαίνεται.	**HERMOGENES** Apparently.
	SOCRATES κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοιοῦτός τις εἶναι ὁ "Ἀγαμέμνων," οἷος ἃ δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι καὶ καρτερεῖν τέλος ἐπιτιθεὶς τοῖς δόξασι δι' ἀρετήν. σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐν Τροίᾳ μονὴ τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ καρτερίας. ὅτι οὖν ἀγαστὸς κατὰ [395b] τὴν ἐπιμονὴν οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐνσημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ὁ "Ἀγαμέμνων." ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὁ "Ἀτρεὺς" ὀρθῶς ἔχει. ὅ τε γὰρ τοῦ Χρυσίππου αὐτῷ φόνος καὶ ἃ πρὸς τὸν Θυέστην ὡς ὠμὰ διεπράττετο, πάντα ταῦτα ζημιώδη καὶ ἀτηρὰ πρὸς ἀρετήν. ἡ οὖν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπωνυμία σμικρὸν παρακλίνει καὶ ἐπικεκάλυπται, ὥστε μὴ πᾶσι δηλοῦν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνδρός· τοῖς δ' ἐπαΐουσι περὶ ὀνομάτων ἱκανῶς δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται ὁ "Ἀτρεύς." καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀτειρὲς καὶ [395c] κατὰ τὸ ἄτρεστον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀτηρὸν πανταχῇ ὀρθῶς αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα κεῖται.	**SOCRATES** "Agamemnon" is likely to be the sort of man who toils and perseveres at whatever he has resolved, bringing his resolutions to completion through excellence. The sign of this is his staying (*monē*) at Troy, with all the suffering and endurance it took. So the name "Agamemnon" indicates that this man is admirable (*agastos*) for his [395b] staying power (*epimonē*). And perhaps "Atreus" is correct too. His murder of Chrysippus, and the cruelties he committed against Thyestes—all these were damaging and ruinous (*atēra*) to excellence. So the name's meaning is slightly bent and veiled, so as not to reveal the man's nature to everyone. But to those who understand names, "Atreus" reveals well enough what it means. For whether you take it from the stubborn (*ateires*), [395c] the fearless (*atreston*), or the ruinous (*atēron*), the name is correctly given to him in every way.[10]
395c	δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τῷ Πέλοπι τὸ ὄνομα ἐμμέτρως κεῖσθαι· σημαίνει γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὸν τὰ ἐγγὺς ὁρῶντα ἄξιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπωνυμίας.	And I think Pelops, too, has a fitting name. It signifies that someone who sees only what is near deserves to be called by it.
	HERMOGENES πῶς δή;	**HERMOGENES** How so?
	SOCRATES οἷόν που καὶ κατ' ἐκείνου λέγεται τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῷ τοῦ Μυρτίλου φόνῳ οὐδὲν οἵου τε γενέσθαι προνοηθῆναι οὐδὲ προϊδεῖν τῶν πόρρω τῶν εἰς τὸ πᾶν γένος, ὅσης αὐτὸ [395d] δυστυχίας ἐνεπίμπλη, τὸ ἐγγὺς μόνον ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ παραχρῆμα—τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ "πέλας" — ἡνίκα προεθυμεῖτο λαβεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὸν τῆς Ἱπποδαμείας γάμον. τῷ δὲ Ταντάλῳ καὶ πᾶς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο	**SOCRATES** It's like what they say of him: when he murdered Myrtilus, he was quite unable to foresee or take thought for the distant consequences for his whole family, how much [395d] misfortune he was filling it with. He saw only what was near and immediate—that's what *pelas* ("near") means—when he was so eager to win Hippodamia's hand by any means. As for Tantalus, anyone would

10 Atreus killed his half-brother Chrysippus, and served his brother Thyestes the flesh of Thyestes' own sons.

GREEK

τοὔνομα ὀρθῶς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν τεθῆναι εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν λεγόμενα.

395d **HERMOGENES** τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

SOCRATES ἆ τέ που ἔτι ζῶντι δυστυχήματα ἐγένετο πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ὧν καὶ τέλος ἡ πατρὶς αὐτοῦ ὅλη ἀνετράπετο, καὶ τελευτήσαντι ἐν Ἅιδου ἡ ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ λίθου [395e] ταλαντεία θαυμαστὴ ὡς σύμφωνος τῷ ὀνόματι· καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις βουλόμενος ταλάντατον ὀνομάσαι ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὀνομάσειε καὶ εἴποι ἀντ' ἐκείνου "Τάνταλον," τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἔοικεν ἐκπορίσαι ἡ τύχη τῆς φήμης. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένῳ τῷ Διὶ [396a] παγκάλως τὸ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι· ἔστι δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον κατανοῆσαι.

396a ἀτεχνῶς γάρ ἐστιν οἷον λόγος τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα, διελόντες δὲ αὐτὸ διχῇ οἱ μὲν τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρώμεθα— οἱ μὲν γὰρ "Ζῆνα," οἱ δὲ "Δία" καλοῦσιν —συντιθέμενα δ' εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃ δὴ προσήκειν φαμὲν ὀνόματι οἵῳ τε εἶναι ἀπεργάζεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων.

συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς [396b] ὀνομάζεσθαι οὗτος ὁ θεὸς εἶναι, δι' ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει· διείληπται δὲ δίχα, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἓν ὂν τὸ ὄνομα, τῷ "Διὶ" καὶ τῷ "Ζηνί." τοῦτον δὲ Κρόνου ὑὸν ὑβριστικὸν μὲν ἄν τις δόξειεν εἶναι ἀκούσαντι ἐξαίφνης, εὔλογον δὲ μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία· κόρον γὰρ σημαίνει οὐ παῖδα, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ.

396b ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Οὐρανοῦ ὑός, ὡς λόγος· ἡ δὲ αὖ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις καλῶς ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖσθαι, [396c] "οὐρανία," ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω, ὅθεν δὴ καί φασιν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, τὸν καθαρὸν νοῦν παραγίγνεσθαι οἱ μετεωρολόγοι, καὶ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὀρθῶς τὸ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι· εἰ δ' ἐμεμνήμην τὴν Ἡσιόδου γενεαλογίαν, τίνας ἔτι τοὺς ἀνωτέρω προγόνους λέγει τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἐπαυόμην διεξιὼν ὡς ὀρθῶς αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται, ἕως ἀπεπειράθην τῆς σοφίας ταυτησὶ τί ποιήσει, εἰ ἄρα ἀπερεῖ

ENGLISH

think his name was given correctly and according to nature, if what they say about him is true.[11]

HERMOGENES What do they say?

SOCRATES The many terrible misfortunes that befell him while he was still alive, which in the end overturned his entire homeland. And then, after his death, in Hades, the swaying of the stone over his head—its *talanteia*— [395e] which is remarkably in tune with his name. It's exactly as if someone wanting to call him *talantatos* ("most wretched") had disguised the word and said "Tantalus" instead. Something like that is the name chance and legend seem to have supplied for him. And his father, said to be Zeus, [396a] also seems to have a superbly given name, though it isn't easy to grasp.[12]

The name of Zeus is really just like a whole phrase. We divide it in two, and some of us use one part, some the other—some call him "Zēna," others "Dia." But put together into one, they reveal the god's nature, which is exactly what we say a name should be able to do. For there is no one more responsible for life (*zēn*), for us and for everything else, than the ruler and king of all things.[13]

So it turns out that this god is correctly [396b] named, as the one through whom (*di' hon*) all living things always have life (*zēn*). But the name, though it is one, has been split in two, as I say, into "Dia" and "Zēna." That he is the son of Cronus might sound like an insult to someone hearing it for the first time, but it's reasonable that Zeus should be the offspring of some great intelligence. For *koros* here signifies not "boy" but the purity and unblemished clarity of his mind (*nous*).[14]

And Cronus is the son of Uranus, as the story goes. Now, sight directed upward is well called by this name, [396c] *ourania* ("heavenly"), because it looks at the things above (*horōsa ta anō*). And from there, Hermogenes, the students of the heavens say, comes a pure mind, and so the heavens (*ouranos*) were correctly given their name. If I remembered Hesiod's genealogy, and which still earlier ancest-

11 Pelops bribed the charioteer Myrtilus to sabotage the chariot of Hippodamia's father in a race for her hand, then killed him; the dying Myrtilus cursed Pelops' house.
12 In one version of the myth, Tantalus is punished in Hades by a boulder hanging over his head, forever about to fall.
13 *Zēna* and *Dia* are both forms of Zeus's name in Greek; Socrates hears in them *zēn* ("to live") and *di' hon* ("through whom").
14 Socrates reads Kronos (Cronus) as *koros* ("pure") plus *nous* ("mind"); since *koros* normally means "boy," he adds the disclaimer.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἢ οὔ, ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐξαίφνης νῦν οὑτωσὶ [396d] προσπέπτωκεν ἄρτι οὐκ οἶδ' ὁπόθεν.	ors he gives them, I wouldn't have stopped explaining how correctly their names were given until I'd tested what this wisdom will do—whether it will give out or not. It has fallen on me so suddenly just now, [396d] from I don't know where.
396d	**HERMOGENES** καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτεχνῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξαίφνης χρησμῳδεῖν.	**HERMOGENES** Really, Socrates, you seem to me exactly like someone possessed who suddenly starts chanting oracles.
	SOCRATES καὶ αἰτιῶμαί γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, μάλιστα αὐτὴν ἀπὸ Εὐθύφρονος τοῦ Προσπαλτίου προσπεπτωκέναι μοι· ἕωθεν γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆ καὶ παρεῖχον τὰ ὦτα. κινδυνεύει οὖν ἐνθουσιῶν οὐ μόνον τὰ ὠτά μου ἐμπλῆσαι τῆς δαιμονίας σοφίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπειλῆφθαι. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι [396e] χρῆναι οὑτωσὶ ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι· τὸ μὲν τήμερον εἶναι χρήσασθαι αὐτῇ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψασθαι, αὔριον δέ, ἂν καὶ ὑμῖν συνδοκῇ, ἀποδιοπομπησόμεθά τε αὐτὴν καὶ καθαρούμεθα ἐξευρόντες ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα δεινὸς [397a] καθαίρειν, εἴτε τῶν ἱερέων τις εἴτε τῶν σοφιστῶν.	**SOCRATES** Yes, Hermogenes, and I mostly blame Euthyphro of Prospalta for its falling on me. I was with him for a long time this morning, lending him my ears. So it looks as if, in his possessed state, he's not only filled my ears with his superhuman wisdom but taken hold of my soul as well. So I think [396e] this is what we should do: for today, make use of it and examine the rest of the names; but tomorrow, if you two agree, we'll exorcise it and purify ourselves, once we've found someone who's good at that sort of [397a] purification, whether one of the priests or one of the sophists.[15]
397a	**HERMOGENES** ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν συγχωρῶ· πάνυ γὰρ ἂν ἡδέως τὰ ἐπίλοιπα περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀκούσαιμι.	**HERMOGENES** I'm all for it. I'd be very glad to hear the rest about names.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ χρὴ οὕτω ποιεῖν. πόθεν οὖν βούλει ἀρξώμεθα διασκοποῦντες, ἐπειδήπερ εἰς τύπον τινὰ ἐμβεβήκαμεν, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιμαρτυρήσει αὐτὰ τὰ ὀνόματα μὴ πάνυ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὕτως ἕκαστα κεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν [397b] τινὰ ὀρθότητα; τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἡρώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα ὀνόματα ἴσως ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατήσειεν· πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κεῖται κατὰ προγόνων ἐπωνυμίας, οὐδὲν προσῆκον ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλέγομεν, πολλὰ δὲ ὥσπερ εὐχόμενοι τίθενται, οἷον "Εὐτυχίδην" καὶ "Σωσίαν" καὶ "Θεόφιλον" καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι ἐᾶν· εἰκὸς δὲ μάλιστα ἡμᾶς εὑρεῖν τὰ ὀρθῶς κείμενα περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα καὶ πεφυκότα. ἐσπουδάσθαι γὰρ ἐνταῦθα [397c] μάλιστα πρέπει τὴν θέσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων· ἴσως δ' ἔνια αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ θειοτέρας δυνάμεως ἢ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐτέθη.	**SOCRATES** Then that's what we must do. Where would you like us to begin our examination, now that we've hit on a kind of outline? We want to find out whether the names themselves will bear witness for us that each was not given just at random, but has [397b] some correctness. Now, the names of heroes and human beings might well deceive us. Many of them were given after the names of ancestors, and sometimes don't fit at all, as we were saying at the start; and many are given as if in prayer, like "Eutychides" ("lucky"), "Sosias" ("safe and sound"), "Theophilus," and plenty of others. I think we should leave names of that sort alone. We're most likely to find correctly given names among the things that always are and exist by nature. For it's here [397c] most of all that the giving of names ought to have been done with care. Perhaps some of them were even given by a power more divine than human.
397c	**HERMOGENES** δοκεῖς μοι καλῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**HERMOGENES** I think you're right, Socrates.

15 Probably the self-styled religious expert of Plato's *Euthyphro*; Prospalta was his deme, or local district, in Attica.

GODS, SPIRITS, HEROES AND HUMANS

Socrates explains the words for gods, spirits, heroes, human beings, soul and body.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἄρχεσθαι, σκοπουμένους πῇ ποτε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα οἱ “θεοὶ” ὀρθῶς ἐκλήθησαν;	**SOCRATES** Then isn’t it only right to begin with the gods, and look at how the gods ever came to be correctly called by this very name, *theoi*?
	HERMOGENES εἰκός γε.	**HERMOGENES** That makes sense.
	SOCRATES τοιόνδε τοίνυν ἔγωγε ὑποπτεύω· φαίνονταί μοι οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τούτους μόνους [397d] τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι οὕσπερ νῦν πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ γῆν καὶ ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανόν· ἅτε οὖν αὐτὰ ὁρῶντες πάντα ἀεὶ ἰόντα δρόμῳ καὶ θέοντα, ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως τῆς τοῦ θεῖν “θεοὺς” αὐτοὺς ἐπονομάσαι· ὕστερον δὲ κατανοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἤδη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύειν. ἔοικέ τι ὃ λέγω τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἢ οὐδέν;	**SOCRATES** Well, here’s what I suspect. It seems to me that the first human beings in Greece believed only in those [397d] gods that many non-Greeks believe in now: the sun, the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens. Since they saw them all always on the move, running (*theonta*) their course, they named them *theoi* from this nature of theirs, running (*thein*). Later, when they came to know the other gods, they addressed them all by this name too. Is there anything true in what I’m saying, or nothing?
397d	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν.	**HERMOGENES** There certainly seems to be.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν ἂν μετὰ τοῦτο σκοποῖμεν;	**SOCRATES** Then what should we look at after this?
	HERMOGENES δῆλον δὴ ὅτι δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας καὶ ἀνθρώπους.	**HERMOGENES** Obviously spirits, heroes, and human beings.
397e	**SOCRATES** καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, τί ἄν ποτε νοοῖ τὸ ὄνομα οἱ “δαίμονες”; σκέψαι ἄν τί σοι δόξω εἰπεῖν.	**SOCRATES** Yes, truly, Hermogenes—what could the name *daimones* (“spirits”) mean? See whether you think there’s anything in what I say.
	HERMOGENES λέγε μόνον.	**HERMOGENES** Just tell me.
	SOCRATES οἶσθα οὖν τίνας φησὶν Ἡσίοδος εἶναι τοὺς δαίμονας;	**SOCRATES** Do you know who Hesiod says the spirits are?
	HERMOGENES οὐκ ἐννοῶ.	**HERMOGENES** I can’t think.
	SOCRATES οὐδὲ ὅτι χρυσοῦν γένος τὸ πρῶτόν φησιν γενέσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων;	**SOCRATES** Not even that he says the first race of human beings was a golden one?
	HERMOGENES οἶδα τοῦτό γε.	**HERMOGENES** That much I do know.
	SOCRATES λέγει τοίνυν περὶ αὐτοῦ—αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρ᾽ ἐκάλυψεν, [398a] οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι καλέονται, ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.	**SOCRATES** Well, he says of it: “But since fate has covered over this race, [398a] they are called holy spirits beneath the earth, noble, warders-off of evil, guardians of mortal human beings.”[16]
398a	**HERMOGENES** τί οὖν δή;	**HERMOGENES** Well, what of it?

16 Hesiod, *Works and Days* 121–23.

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SOCRATES ὅτι οἶμαι ἐγὼ λέγειν αὐτὸν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος οὐκ ἐκ χρυσοῦ πεφυκὸς ἀλλ' ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν. τεκμήριον δέ μοί ἐστιν ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς φησιν σιδηροῦν εἶναι γένος.

SOCRATES I think he means that the golden race wasn't made of gold, but was good and fine. My evidence is that he says we are an iron race.

HERMOGENES ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

HERMOGENES That's true.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν νῦν οἴει ἂν φάναι αὐτὸν εἴ τις [398b] ἀγαθός ἐστιν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι;

SOCRATES So don't you think that if anyone among people today [398b] is good, he'd say that person belongs to that golden race?

398b **HERMOGENES** εἰκός γε.

HERMOGENES Very likely.

SOCRATES οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἄλλο τι ἢ φρόνιμοι;

SOCRATES And are good people anything other than people of understanding?

HERMOGENES φρόνιμοι.

HERMOGENES People of understanding.

SOCRATES τοῦτο τοίνυν παντὸς μᾶλλον λέγει, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τοὺς δαίμονας· ὅτι φρόνιμοι καὶ δαήμονες ἦσαν, "δαίμονας" αὐτοὺς ὠνόμασεν· καὶ ἔν γε τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει τὸ ὄνομα. λέγει οὖν καλῶς καὶ οὗτος καὶ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ ὅσοι λέγουσιν ὡς, ἐπειδάν τις ἀγαθὸς ὢν τελευτήσῃ, μεγάλην μοῖραν καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει καὶ γίγνεται [398c] δαίμων κατὰ τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως ἐπωνυμίαν. ταύτῃ οὖν τίθεμαι καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν δαήμονα πάντ' ἄνδρα ὃς ἂν ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, δαιμόνιον εἶναι καὶ ζῶντα καὶ τελευτήσαντα, καὶ ὀρθῶς "δαίμονα" καλεῖσθαι.

SOCRATES Then this, I think, is above all what he means by spirits. Because they had understanding and were knowing (*daēmones*), he named them *daimones*. And in fact in our old dialect this very word occurs. So he's right—he and the many other poets who say that when a good man dies he has a great portion and honor, and becomes a [398c] spirit, in keeping with the name for understanding. So I too lay it down that every man who is good is knowing (*daēmōn*), is divine (*daimonios*) both in life and in death, and is correctly called a spirit (*daimōn*).

398c **HERMOGENES** καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου πάνυ σοι σύμψηφος εἶναι. ὁ δὲ δὴ "ἥρως" τί ἂν εἴη;

HERMOGENES And I think, Socrates, I'm entirely with you on this. But what would "hero" (*hērōs*) be?

SOCRATES τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν ἐννοῆσαι. σμικρὸν γὰρ παρῆκται αὐτῶν τὸ ὄνομα, δηλοῦν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἔρωτος γένεσιν.

SOCRATES That's not very hard to grasp. Their name has been altered only slightly, and it shows that they were born from love (*erōs*).

HERMOGENES πῶς λέγεις;

HERMOGENES What do you mean?

SOCRATES οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἡμίθεοι οἱ ἥρωες;

SOCRATES Don't you know that the heroes are demigods?

HERMOGENES τί οὖν;

HERMOGENES So what?

398d **SOCRATES** πάντες δήπου γεγόνασιν ἐρασθέντος ἢ θεοῦ θνητῆς ἢ θνητοῦ θεᾶς. ἐὰν οὖν σκοπῇς καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν παλαιὰν φωνήν, μᾶλλον εἴσῃ· δηλώσει γάρ σοι ὅτι παρὰ τὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄνομα, ὅθεν γεγόνασιν οἱ ἥρωες, σμικρὸν παρηγμένον ἐστὶν ὀνόματος χάριν. καὶ ἤτοι τοῦτο λέγει τοὺς ἥρωας, ἢ ὅτι σοφοὶ ἦσαν καὶ ῥήτορες καὶ δεινοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοί, ἐρωτᾶν ἱκανοὶ ὄντες· τὸ γὰρ "εἴρειν" λέγειν ἐστίν. ὅπερ οὖν ἄρτι λέγομεν, ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ φωνῇ λεγόμενοι [398e] οἱ ἥρωες ῥήτορές τινες καὶ ἐρωτητικοὶ συμβαίνουσιν, ὥστε ῥητόρων καὶ σοφιστῶν

SOCRATES Surely they were all born when a god fell in love with a mortal woman or a mortal man with a goddess. If you consider this, too, in the old Attic dialect, you'll understand better. It will show you that the name has been only slightly altered from the name of love, from which the heroes were born, for the sake of making a name. Either that's what "heroes" means, or else that they were wise, skilled speakers (*rhētores*), clever, and dialec-

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	γένος γίγνεται τὸ ἡρωικὸν φῦλον. ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦτο χαλεπόν ἐστιν ἐννοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τί ποτε "ἄνθρωποι" καλοῦνται· ἢ σὺ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;	ticians, good at asking questions (*erōtan*)—for *eirein* means "to speak." So, as we were just saying, when they're named in the Attic dialect, [398e] the heroes turn out to be speakers and questioners of a sort, so that the heroic tribe turns out to be a race of orators and sophists. But that's not the hard one to grasp. Harder is the name of human beings: why in the world are they called *anthrōpoi*? Or can you say?
398e	**HERMOGENES** πόθεν, ὠγαθέ, ἔχω; οὐδ' εἴ τι οἷός τ' ἂν εἴην εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σὲ μᾶλλον εὑρήσειν ἢ ἐμαυτόν.	**HERMOGENES** How could I, my good friend? Even if I were able to find something, I wouldn't strain myself, because I think you're more likely to find it than I am.
399a	**SOCRATES** τῇ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος ἐπιπνοίᾳ πιστεύεις, ὡς ἔοικας.	**SOCRATES** You're putting your faith in Euthyphro's inspiration, it seems.
	HERMOGENES δῆλα δή.	**HERMOGENES** Obviously.
	SOCRATES ὀρθῶς γε σὺ πιστεύων· ὡς καὶ νῦν γέ μοι φαίνομαι κομψῶς ἐννενοηκέναι, καὶ κινδυνεύσω, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῶμαι, ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι. σκόπει δὴ ὃ λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι περὶ ὀνομάτων, ὅτι πολλάκις ἐπεμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δ' ἐξαιροῦμεν, παρ' ὃ βουλόμεθα ὀνομάζοντες, καὶ τὰς ὀξύτητας μεταβάλλομεν. οἷον "Διὶ φίλος" —τοῦτο ἵνα [399b] ἀντὶ ῥήματος ὄνομα ἡμῖν γένηται, τό τε ἕτερον αὐτόθεν ἰῶτα ἐξείλομεν καὶ ἀντὶ ὀξείας τῆς μέσης συλλαβῆς βαρεῖαν ἐφθεγξάμεθα. ἄλλων δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δὲ βαρύτερα ὀξύτερα φθεγγόμεθα.	**SOCRATES** And you're right to. Even now I seem to have had a clever idea, and if I'm not careful, I'll be in danger of becoming wiser than I ought to before the day is out. Look at what I'm saying. First, we need to bear in mind this point about names: we often insert letters and take others out, so that the name departs from what we mean, and we change the accents. Take *Dii philos* ("dear to Zeus"). So that [399b] it would become a name for us instead of a phrase, we took out one of its iotas and pronounced the middle syllable with a low pitch instead of a high one. With other names, conversely, we insert letters, and pronounce low-pitched syllables higher.[17]
399b	**HERMOGENES** ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**HERMOGENES** That's true.
	SOCRATES τούτων τοίνυν ἓν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄνομα πέπονθεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐκ γὰρ ῥήματος ὄνομα γέγονεν, ἑνὸς γράμματος τοῦ ἄλφα ἐξαιρεθέντος καὶ βαρυτέρας τῆς τελευτῆς γενομένης.	**SOCRATES** Well, the name of human beings has undergone one of these changes, I think. It has become a name from a phrase, with one letter, alpha, taken out and the ending lowered in pitch.
	HERMOGENES πῶς λέγεις;	**HERMOGENES** What do you mean?
399c	**SOCRATES** ὧδε. σημαίνει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ὁ "ἄνθρωπος" ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα θηρία ὧν ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν ἐπισκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἀναλογίζεται οὐδὲ ἀναθρεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅμα ἑώρακεν—τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ "ὄπωπε" —καὶ ἀναθρεῖ καὶ λογίζεται τοῦτο ὃ ὄπωπεν. ἐντεῦθεν δὴ μόνον τῶν θηρίων ὀρθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος "ἄνθρωπος" ὠνομάσθη, ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπε.	**SOCRATES** This. The name *anthrōpos* ("human being") signifies that the other animals don't examine, or reason about, or look up at (*anathrei*) anything they see, whereas a human being, as soon as he has seen—that's what *opōpe* means—both looks up at and reasons about what he has seen. That's

17 *Dii philos* thus becomes the personal name Diphilus (*Diphilos*).

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		why the human being, alone among the animals, was correctly named *anthrōpos*: *anathrōn ha opōpe*, "one who looks up at what he has seen."
	HERMOGENES τί οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἔρωμαί σε ὃ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην;	**HERMOGENES** What comes next, then? May I ask you something I'd be glad to find out?
	SOCRATES πάνυ γε.	**SOCRATES** Certainly.
399d	**HERMOGENES** ὥσπερ τοίνυν μοι δοκεῖ τούτοις ἑξῆς εἶναί τι χρῆμα. "ψυχὴν" γάρ που καὶ "σῶμα" καλοῦμεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.	**HERMOGENES** Well, it seems to me there's something that comes right after these. We speak, I suppose, of a human being's "soul" (*psychē*) and "body" (*sōma*).
	SOCRATES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Of course.
	HERMOGENES πειρώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα διελεῖν ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν.	**HERMOGENES** Let's try to take these apart too, the way we did the earlier ones.
	SOCRATES ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι ὡς εἰκότως τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνει, ἔπειτ' αὖ τὸ σῶμα;	**SOCRATES** You mean examine how reasonably the soul has come by this name, and then the body?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ὡς μὲν τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα λέγειν, οἶμαί τι τοιοῦτον νοεῖν τοὺς τὴν ψυχὴν ὀνομάσαντας, ὡς τοῦτο ἄρα, ὅταν παρῇ τῷ σώματι, αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ, τὴν τοῦ [399e] ἀναπνεῖν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψῦχον, ἅμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψύχοντος τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυταί τε καὶ τελευτᾷ· ὅθεν δή μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸ "ψυχὴν" καλέσαι. εἰ δὲ βούλει —ἔχε ἠρέμα· δοκῶ γάρ μοί τι καθορᾶν πιθανώτερον τούτου [400a] τοῖς ἀμφὶ Εὐθύφρονα. τούτου μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καταφρονήσαιεν ἂν καὶ ἡγήσαιντο φορτικὸν εἶναι· τόδε δὲ σκόπει ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ἀρέσῃ.	**SOCRATES** Well, speaking off the cuff, I think those who named the soul had something like this in mind: that when it's present in the body, it is the cause of the body's living, supplying it with the power to [399e] breathe and refreshing it (*anapsychon*), and that as soon as this refreshing force fails, the body perishes and dies. That, I think, is why they called it *psychē*. But if you like—wait a moment. I think I can make out something more persuasive than this, [400a] at least to Euthyphro and his circle. They would scorn this one, I think, and consider it crude. But look at this one and see whether you like it too.
400a	**HERMOGENES** λέγε μόνον.	**HERMOGENES** Just tell me.
	SOCRATES τὴν φύσιν παντὸς τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε καὶ ζῆν καὶ περιιέναι, τί σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὀχεῖν ἄλλο ἢ ψυχή;	**SOCRATES** What do you think holds and carries the nature of the whole body, so that it lives and moves about, if not soul?
	HERMOGENES οὐδὲν ἄλλο.	**HERMOGENES** Nothing else.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων φύσιν οὐ πιστεύεις Ἀναξαγόρᾳ νοῦν καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν διακοσμοῦσαν καὶ ἔχουσαν;	**SOCRATES** Well then, don't you believe Anaxagoras that the nature of everything else, too, is ordered and held by mind and soul?[18]
	HERMOGENES ἔγωγε.	**HERMOGENES** I do.

18 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (fifth century BC) taught that mind (*nous*) set the whole cosmos in order.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
400b	**SOCRATES** καλῶς ἄρα ἂν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχοι τῇ δυνάμει ταύτῃ ἣ φύσιν ὀχεῖ καὶ ἔχει "φυσέχην" ἐπονομάζειν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ "ψυχὴν" κομψευόμενον λέγειν.	**SOCRATES** Then it would be a fine name to give this power, which carries (*ochei*) and holds (*echei*) nature (*physis*): *physechē*. And one may also, to be elegant, say *psychē*.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ δοκεῖ γέ μοι τοῦτο ἐκείνου τεχνικώτερον εἶναι.	**HERMOGENES** Absolutely. And this one seems to me more expert than the other.
	SOCRATES καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν· γελοῖον μέντοι φαίνεται ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζόμενον ὡς ἐτέθη.	**SOCRATES** So it is. All the same, it does sound truly ridiculous when it's pronounced the way it was originally given.
	HERMOGENES ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο πῶς φῶμεν ἔχειν;	**HERMOGENES** Well, what shall we say about the next one?
	SOCRATES τὸ σῶμα λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** You mean the body?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES πολλαχῇ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε· ἂν μὲν καὶ σμικρόν [400c] τις παρακλίνῃ, καὶ πάνυ. καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὖ τούτῳ σημαίνει ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ "σῆμα" ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι. δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σῴζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, τὸ "σῶμα," καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδ' ἓν γράμμα.	**SOCRATES** In many ways, I think—and if you bend it even a little, [400c] in every way. Some people say it is the *sēma* ("tomb") of the soul, as though the soul were buried in its present life. And because it is through the body that the soul signifies (*sēmainei*) whatever it signifies, on that ground too it is correctly called a *sēma* ("sign"). But I think it was most likely the followers of Orpheus who gave it this name. Their idea is that the soul is paying the penalty for whatever it is paying for, and has the body around it as an enclosure to keep it safe (*sōzētai*), like a prison. So the body is, just as its name says, the *sōma* of the soul until the soul has paid off what it owes, and there's no need to change even a single letter.[19]

THE NAMES OF THE GODS

Disclaiming knowledge of the gods, Socrates explains Hestia, Rhea, Cronus, Tethys, Poseidon, Pluto and Hades.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
400d	**HERMOGENES** ταῦτα μέν μοι δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαι· περὶ δὲ τῶν θεῶν τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοῦ "Διὸς" νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ἔχοιμεν ἄν που κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπισκέψασθαι κατὰ τίνα ποτὲ ὀρθότητα αὐτῶν τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται;	**HERMOGENES** That seems to me well enough said, Socrates. But what about the names of the gods, like what you were saying just now about Zeus? Could we examine them the same way, and see on what principle of correctness their names were given?
	SOCRATES ναὶ μὰ Δία ἡμεῖς γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἴπερ γε νοῦν ἔχοιμεν, ἕνα μὲν τὸν κάλλιστον τρόπον, ὅτι περὶ	**SOCRATES** Yes, by Zeus, Hermogenes, we could—if we had any sense. There is one way, the finest: to

19 The Orphics were a religious movement that claimed the legendary singer Orpheus as its founder and taught that the soul is punished by being confined in the body.

GREEK

θεῶν οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὔτε περὶ αὐτῶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἅττα ποτὲ ἑαυτοὺς καλοῦσιν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐκεῖνοί γε τἀληθῆ καλοῦσι. [400e] δεύτερος δ' αὖ τρόπος ὀρθότητος, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὔχεσθαι, οἵτινές τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι, ταῦτα καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καλεῖν, ὡς ἄλλο μηδὲν [401a] εἰδότας· καλῶς γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νενομίσθαι. εἰ οὖν βούλει, σκοπῶμεν ὥσπερ προειπόντες τοῖς θεοῖς ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἡμεῖς σκεψόμεθα—οὐ γὰρ ἀξιοῦμεν οἷοί τ' ἂν εἶναι σκοπεῖν—ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἥν ποτέ τινα δόξαν ἔχοντες ἐτίθεντο αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνεμέσητον.

ENGLISH

say that we know nothing about the gods, either about them or about the names they call themselves, whatever those may be. For clearly they, at least, call themselves by the true ones. [400e] Then there's a second kind of correctness. In our prayers it's our custom to address the gods by whatever names, and from whatever origin, they like to be called. In the same way we should call them by those names ourselves, since we know nothing else. [401a] That seems to me a fine custom. So, if you like, let's investigate as though we had first announced to the gods that we won't investigate anything about them, since we don't consider ourselves capable of it. We will investigate human beings instead, and what opinion they held when they gave the gods their names. No god could resent that.

401a **HERMOGENES** ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέγειν, καὶ οὕτω ποιῶμεν.

HERMOGENES Well, Socrates, I think you're being reasonable. Let's do that.

401b **SOCRATES** ἄλλο τι οὖν ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἀρχώμεθα κατὰ τὸν νόμον;

SOCRATES Then shouldn't we begin with Hestia, as custom requires?

HERMOGENES δίκαιον γοῦν.

HERMOGENES It's only right, at any rate.

SOCRATES τί οὖν ἄν τις φαίη διανοούμενον τὸν ὀνομάσαντα Ἑστίαν ὀνομάσαι;

SOCRATES Then what would anyone say the person who named Hestia had in mind when he named her?

HERMOGENES οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐδὲ τοῦτο οἶμαι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι.

HERMOGENES By Zeus, I don't think that one's easy either.

SOCRATES κινδυνεύουσι γοῦν, ὠγαθὲ Ἑρμόγενες, οἱ πρῶτοι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι ἀλλὰ μετεωρολόγοι καὶ ἀδολέσχαι τινές.

SOCRATES Well, my good Hermogenes, it looks as though the first people to lay down names were no simpletons. They were some sort of stargazers and babblers.

HERMOGENES τί δή;

HERMOGENES Why do you say so?

SOCRATES καταφαίνεταί μοι ἡ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων τοιούτων [401c] τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἐάν τις τὰ ξενικὰ ὀνόματα ἀνασκοπῇ, οὐχ ἧττον ἀνευρίσκεται ὃ ἕκαστον βούλεται. οἷον καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὃ ἡμεῖς "οὐσίαν" καλοῦμεν, εἰσὶν οἳ "ἐσσίαν" καλοῦσιν, οἳ δ' αὖ "ὠσίαν." πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα τούτων ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσία "Ἑστία" καλεῖσθαι ἔχει λόγον, καὶ ὅτι γε αὖ ἡμεῖς τὸ τῆς οὐσίας μετέχον "ἔστιν" φαμέν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖτο "Ἑστία"· ἐοίκαμεν γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸ παλαιὸν "ἐσσίαν" καλεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς θυσίας ἄν τις [401d] ἐννοήσας ἡγήσαιτο οὕτω νοεῖν ταῦτα τοὺς τιθεμένους· τὸ γὰρ πρὸ πάντων θεῶν τῇ Ἑστίᾳ

SOCRATES It's quite plain to me that the giving of names was the work of people like that, [401c] and if you look closely at foreign names, you find what each one means just as well. Take what we call *ousia* ("being"). Some people call it *essia*, and others again *ōsia*. First, then, going by one of these names, *essia*, it makes sense that the being of things should be called *Hestia*. And since we say that whatever partakes of being *estin* ("is"), on this ground too it would be correctly called *Hestia*. It seems that we too called *ousia essia* in the old days. Moreover, if you think about the sacrifices, [401d]

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	πρώτῃ προθύειν εἰκὸς ἐκείνους οἵτινες τὴν πάντων οὐσίαν "ἐσσίαν" ἐπωνόμασαν.	you'd conclude that the name-makers understood things this way. For it's natural that people who called the being of all things *essia* should sacrifice to Hestia first, before all the other gods.
401d	ὅσοι δ' αὖ "ὠσίαν," σχεδόν τι αὖ οὗτοι καθ' Ἡράκλειτον ἂν ἡγοῖντο τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδέν· τὸ οὖν αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ὠθοῦν, ὅθεν δὴ καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτὸ "ὠσίαν" ὠνομάσθαι. καὶ ταῦτα [401e] μὲν δὴ ταύτῃ ὡς παρὰ μηδὲν εἰδότων εἰρήσθω· μετὰ δ' Ἑστίαν δίκαιον Ῥέαν καὶ Κρόνον ἐπισκέψασθαι. καίτοι τό γε τοῦ Κρόνου ὄνομα ἤδη διήλθομεν. ἴσως μέντοι οὐδὲν λέγω.	Those who say *ōsia*, on the other hand, would pretty much hold, with Heraclitus, that all the things that are are on the move and nothing stays still. So the cause and origin of things is what pushes (*to ōthoun*), and that's why it's rightly named *ōsia*. Well, [401e] let that much be said, coming from people who know nothing. After Hestia it's right to look at Rhea and Cronus. And yet we've already gone through the name of Cronus. But maybe I'm talking nonsense.[20]
401e	**HERMOGENES** τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**HERMOGENES** Why do you say that, Socrates?
	SOCRATES ὠγαθέ, ἐννενόηκά τι σμῆνος σοφίας.	**SOCRATES** My good friend, I've just noticed a whole swarm of wisdom.
	HERMOGENES ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;	**HERMOGENES** What sort of swarm?
402a	**SOCRATES** γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ πιθανότητα ἔχον.	**SOCRATES** It sounds quite ridiculous to say it, but I think it has a certain plausibility.
	HERMOGENES τίνα ταύτην;	**HERMOGENES** What is it?
	SOCRATES τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαί' ἄττα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν.	**SOCRATES** I seem to see Heraclitus saying some ancient pieces of wisdom, straight out of the days of Cronus and Rhea, things Homer said too.
	HERMOGENES πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;	**HERMOGENES** What do you mean?
	SOCRATES λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι "πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει," καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς "δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης."	**SOCRATES** Heraclitus says somewhere that "everything gives way and nothing stays put." He likens the things that are to the flow of a river and says, "You cannot step into the same river twice."
	HERMOGENES ἔστι ταῦτα.	**HERMOGENES** So he does.
402b	**SOCRATES** τί οὖν; δοκεῖ σοι ἀλλοιότερον Ἡρακλείτου νοεῖν ὁ τιθέμενος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν προγόνοις "Ῥέαν" τε καὶ "Κρόνον"; ἆρα οἴει ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου αὐτὸν ἀμφοτέροις ῥευμάτων ὀνόματα θέσθαι; ὥσπερ αὖ Ὅμηρος "Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσίν" φησιν "καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν·" οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος. λέγει δέ που καὶ Ὀρφεὺς ὅτι Ὠκεανὸς πρῶτος καλλίρροος ἦρξε γάμοιο, [402c] ὅς ῥα κασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὄπυιεν. ταῦτ' οὖν σκόπει ὅτι καὶ ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνει.	**SOCRATES** Well then? Do you think that whoever gave the names "Rhea" and "Cronus" to the ancestors of the other gods had anything different in mind from Heraclitus? Do you suppose it was by chance that he gave both of them names of streams? Homer, likewise, speaks of "Ocean, origin of the gods, and mother Tethys," and so does Hesiod, I think. And Orpheus says somewhere, "Fair-flowing Ocean was the first to marry; [402c] he wed his sister Tethys, born of the same mother." See

20 Heraclitus of Ephesus (active around 500 BC) held that all things are in constant flux; Cratylus is presented as his follower.

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		how these agree with one another, and how they all point toward Heraclitus' views.[21]
402c	**HERMOGENES** φαίνῃ τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· τὸ μέντοι τῆς Τηθύος οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὄνομα τί βούλεται.	**HERMOGENES** You seem to me to be onto something, Socrates. But I don't see what the name of Tethys means.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ὀλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι πηγῆς ὄνομα ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ διαττώμενον καὶ 402d τὸ ἠθούμενον πηγῆς ἀπείκασμά ἐστιν· ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ "Τηθὺς" τὸ ὄνομα σύγκειται.	**SOCRATES** That one practically tells you itself: it's the name of a spring in disguise. For what is sifted through (*diattōmenon*) and 402d what is strained (*ēthoumenon*) are images of a spring, and the name *Tēthys* is put together from both these words.
402d	**HERMOGENES** τοῦτο μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, κομψόν.	**HERMOGENES** That's clever, Socrates.
	SOCRATES τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; τὸν μὲν Δία εἴπομεν.	**SOCRATES** How could it not be? But what comes next? We've talked about Zeus.
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς δὴ αὐτοῦ λέγωμεν, τόν τε Ποσειδῶ καὶ τὸν Πλούτωνα καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα ὃ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτόν.	**SOCRATES** Then let's talk about his brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, and the other name people call Pluto by.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** By all means.
	SOCRATES τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ Ποσειδῶνός μοι φαίνεται ὠνομάσθαι 402e τοῦ πρώτου ὀνομάσαντος, ὅτι αὐτὸν βαδίζοντα ἐπέσχεν ἡ τῆς θαλάττης φύσις καὶ οὐκέτι εἴασεν προελθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ δεσμὸς τῶν ποδῶν αὐτῷ ἐγένετο. τὸν οὖν ἄρχοντα τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης θεὸν ὠνόμασεν "Ποσειδῶνα," ὡς "ποσίδεσμον" ὄντα· τὸ δὲ ε ἔγκειται ἴσως εὐπρεπείας ἕνεκα. τάχα δὲ οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο λέγοι, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ σῖγμα 403a δύο λάβδα τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγετο, ὡς πολλὰ εἰδότος τοῦ θεοῦ. ἴσως δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ σείειν "ὁ σείων" ὠνόμασται· πρόσκειται δὲ τὸ πεῖ καὶ τὸ δέλτα.	**SOCRATES** Well, it seems to me Poseidon got his name 402e from the first person to name him because the nature of the sea held him back as he was walking and wouldn't let him go any further. It became a kind of fetter on his feet. So he named the god who rules over this power *Poseidōn*, as being a *posidesmos* ("foot-fetter"). The epsilon was perhaps put in to make it sound better. Or perhaps that isn't what it means. Perhaps at first it was pronounced with two lambdas instead of the sigma, 403a because the god knows many things. Or perhaps he was named "the shaker" from *seiein* ("to shake"), with the pi and the delta added.[22]
403a	τὸ δὲ Πλούτωνος, τοῦτο μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πλούτου δόσιν, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς γῆς κάτωθεν ἀνίεται ὁ πλοῦτος, ἐπωνομάσθη· ὁ δὲ "Ἅιδης," οἱ πολλοὶ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸ ἀιδὲς προσειρῆσθαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ, καὶ φοβούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα "Πλούτωνα" καλοῦσιν αὐτόν.	Pluto got his name from his giving of wealth (*ploutos*), because wealth comes up out of the earth from below. As for *Haidēs*, most people seem to me to assume that the name refers to the unseen (*aides*), and because they fear the name they call him "Pluto."
403b	**HERMOGENES** σοὶ δὲ πῶς φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**HERMOGENES** And how does it look to you, Socrates?
	SOCRATES πολλαχῇ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι διημαρτηκέναι περὶ τούτου τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ	**SOCRATES** I think people are mistaken in many ways about this god's power, and they fear him

21 Socrates hears *rhein* ("to flow") in *Rhea* and *krounos* ("spring") in *Kronos*.

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	φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὸν οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν. ὅτι τε γάρ, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τις ἡμῶν ἀποθάνῃ, ἀεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστιν, φοβοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ γυμνὴ τοῦ σώματος παρ' ἐκεῖνον ἀπέρχεται, καὶ τοῦτο πεφόβηνται· τὰ δ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πάντα ἐς ταὐτόν τι συντείνειν, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα.	when they have no reason to. They're afraid because, once any of us has died, we stay there forever. And they're terrified, too, that the soul goes off to him stripped of the body. But to me all of this seems to point the same way, both the god's office and his name.
	HERMOGENES πῶς δή;	**HERMOGENES** How so?
403c	**SOCRATES** ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ ἅ γέ μοι φαίνεται. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, δεσμὸς ζῴῳ ὁτῳοῦν ὥστε μένειν ὁπουοῦν, πότερος ἰσχυρότερός ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἐπιθυμία;	**SOCRATES** I'll tell you how it looks to me, at any rate. Tell me: of the bonds that keep any living creature in any place, which is stronger, necessity or desire?
	HERMOGENES πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ ἐπιθυμία.	**HERMOGENES** Desire, by far, Socrates.
	SOCRATES οἴει οὖν τὸν Ἅιδην οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς ἐκφεύγειν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἰσχυροτάτῳ δεσμῷ ἔδει τοὺς ἐκεῖσε ἰόντας;	**SOCRATES** Then don't you think many people would escape from Hades if he didn't bind those who go there with the strongest bond?
	HERMOGENES δῆλα δή.	**HERMOGENES** Obviously.
	SOCRATES ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἄρα τινὶ αὐτούς, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ, εἴπερ τῷ μεγίστῳ δεσμῷ δεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ.	**SOCRATES** So it seems he binds them with some desire and not with necessity, if he binds them with the greatest bond.
	HERMOGENES φαίνεται.	**HERMOGENES** Apparently.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐπιθυμίαι αὖ πολλαί εἰσιν;	**SOCRATES** Now, there are many desires, aren't there?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
403d	**SOCRATES** τῇ μεγίστῃ ἄρα ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν δεῖ αὐτούς, εἴπερ μέλλει τῷ μεγίστῳ δεσμῷ κατέχειν.	**SOCRATES** Then he binds them with the greatest of all desires, if he's going to hold them with the greatest bond.
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἔστιν οὖν τις μείζων ἐπιθυμία ἢ ὅταν τίς τῳ συνὼν οἴηται δι' ἐκεῖνον ἔσεσθαι ἀμείνων ἀνήρ;	**SOCRATES** And is there any desire greater than the one you feel when you're with someone and believe that through him you'll become a better man?
	HERMOGENES μὰ Δί' οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**HERMOGENES** By Zeus, none at all, Socrates.
	SOCRATES διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα φῶμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, οὐδένα δεῦρο ἐθελῆσαι ἀπελθεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖθεν, οὐδὲ αὐτὰς τὰς Σειρῆνας, 403e ἀλλὰ κατακεκηλῆσθαι ἐκείνας τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας· οὕτω καλούς τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπίσταται λόγους λέγειν ὁ Ἅιδης, καὶ ἔστιν, ὡς γ' ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου, ὁ θεὸς οὗτος τέλεος σοφιστής τε καὶ μέγας	**SOCRATES** Then let's say, Hermogenes, that this is why no one there wants to come back here, not even the Sirens themselves. 403e They and all the others have been put under a spell, so beautiful, it seems, are the words Hades knows how to speak. And by this account the god is a perfect sophist

22 With two lambdas the name would be *Polleidōn*, suggesting *polla eidōs*, "knowing many things."

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	εὐεργέτης τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ, ὅς γε καὶ τοῖς ἐνθάδε τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἀνίησιν· οὕτω πολλὰ αὐτῷ τὰ περιόντα ἐκεῖ ἐστιν, καὶ τὸν "Πλούτωνα" ἀπὸ τούτου ἔσχε τὸ ὄνομα.	and a great benefactor to those who are with him. He even sends up so many good things to us here. That's how much he has to spare down there, and that's how he got the name "Pluto."
403e	καὶ τὸ αὖ μὴ ἐθέλειν συνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα, ἀλλὰ τότε συγγίγνεσθαι, [404a] ἐπειδὰν ἡ ψυχὴ καθαρὰ ᾖ πάντων τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐ φιλοσόφου δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ εὖ ἐντεθυμημένου ὅτι οὕτω μὲν ἂν κατέχοι αὐτοὺς δήσας τῇ περὶ ἀρετὴν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ἔχοντας δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος πτοίησιν καὶ μανίαν οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Κρόνος δύναιτο ὁ πατὴρ συγκατέχειν αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς δήσας τοῖς αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις;	Then again, he refuses to keep company with human beings while they still have their bodies, and associates with them only [404a] once the soul is pure of all the evils and desires that belong to the body. Doesn't that seem to you the mark of a philosopher? Of someone who has thought it through and seen that this way he can hold them by binding them with the desire for excellence, whereas if they still had the body's agitation and madness, not even his father Cronus could keep them with him, bound in those famous bonds of his?
404a	**HERMOGENES** κινδυνεύεις τι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**HERMOGENES** You may be onto something, Socrates.
404b	**SOCRATES** καὶ τό γε ὄνομα ὁ "Ἅιδης," ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀιδοῦς ἐπωνομάσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα τὰ καλὰ εἰδέναι, ἀπὸ τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου "Ἅιδης" ἐκλήθη.	**SOCRATES** And the name *Haidēs*, Hermogenes, is far from coming from "the unseen." It's much more likely that the lawgiver called him *Haidēs* from his knowing (*eidenai*) all fine things.

APOLLO, ATHENA AND THE REST

Demeter, Hera, Persephone, Apollo, Artemis, Dionysus, Aphrodite, Athena, Hephaestus, Ares, Hermes and Pan.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	HERMOGENES εἶεν· τί δὲ Δήμητρά τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ Ἀπόλλω καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ Ἥφαιστον καὶ Ἄρη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεούς, πῶς λέγομεν;	**HERMOGENES** All right. And what do we say about Demeter, Hera, Apollo, Athena, Hephaestus, Ares, and the other gods?
	SOCRATES Δημήτηρ μὲν φαίνεται κατὰ τὴν δόσιν τῆς ἐδωδῆς διδοῦσα ὡς μήτηρ "Δημήτηρ" κεκλῆσθαι, Ἥρα δὲ ἐρατή [404c] τις, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ λέγεται ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτῆς ἐρασθεὶς ἔχειν. ἴσως δὲ μετεωρολογῶν ὁ νομοθέτης τὸν ἀέρα "Ἥραν" ὠνόμασεν ἐπικρυπτόμενος, θεὶς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τελευτήν· γνοίης δ' ἄν, εἰ πολλάκις λέγοις τὸ τῆς Ἥρας ὄνομα. "Φερρέφαττα" δέ· πολλοὶ μὲν καὶ τοῦτο φοβοῦνται τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν "Ἀπόλλω," ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος. καὶ γὰρ μεταβάλλοντες σκοποῦνται τὴν "Φερσεφόνην," καὶ δεινὸν αὐτοῖς φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ μηνύει [404d] σοφὴν εἶναι τὴν θεόν. ἅτε γὰρ φερομένων τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ ἐφαπτόμενον καὶ ἐπαφῶν καὶ δυνάμενον ἐπακολουθεῖν σοφία ἂν εἴη.	**SOCRATES** Demeter seems to have been called *Dēmētēr* from her giving of food (*edōdē*), giving it like a mother (*mētēr*). Hera is a kind of *eratē* ("lovely one"), [404c] just as Zeus is in fact said to have married her out of love. Or perhaps the lawgiver, with his head in the heavens, named the air (*aēr*) *Hēra* in disguise, putting the beginning at the end. You'd see it if you said Hera's name over and over. Then there's *Pherrephatta*. Many people are afraid of this name too, and of "Apollo," out of inexperience, it seems, in the correctness of names. They change it and look at the form *Phersephonē*, and it seems frightening to them. But in fact it reveals [404d] that the goddess is wise. Since things are in motion (*pheromena*), what grasps them, touches (*epaphōn*) them, and is able to keep up with them would be wisdom.[23]

	GREEK	ENGLISH
404d	"Φερέπαφα" οὖν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπαφὴν τοῦ φερομένου ἡ θεὸς ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο, ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι—δι' ὅπερ καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῇ ὁ Ἅιδης σοφὸς ὤν, διότι τοιαύτη ἐστίν—νῦν δὲ αὐτῆς ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ ὄνομα εὐστομίαν περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥστε "Φερρέφατταν" αὐτὴν καλεῖν. ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν [404e] Ἀπόλλω, ὅπερ λέγω, πολλοὶ πεφόβηνται περὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥς τι δεινὸν μηνύοντος· ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι;	So because of her wisdom and her touching of what is in motion, the goddess would correctly be called *Pherepapha*, or something like that. That's why Hades, being wise, keeps company with her, because she's like that. But nowadays people bend her name, valuing a pleasant sound above the truth, and so they call her *Pherrephatta*. The same has happened with [404e] Apollo, as I say: many people are frightened of the god's name, as though it signified something terrible. Or haven't you noticed?
404e	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**HERMOGENES** Of course I have, and you're right.
	SOCRATES τὸ δέ γ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, κάλλιστα κείμενον πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ θεοῦ.	**SOCRATES** But in fact, as I see it, the name is beautifully suited to the god's power.
	HERMOGENES πῶς δή;	**HERMOGENES** How so?
	SOCRATES ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ [405a] ἔστιν ὅτι ἂν μᾶλλον ὄνομα ἥρμοσεν ἓν ὂν τέτταρσι δυνάμεσι ταῖς τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥστε πασῶν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ δηλοῦν τρόπον τινὰ μουσικήν τε καὶ μαντικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ τοξικήν.	**SOCRATES** I'll try to explain how it looks to me. There's no [405a] single name that could better suit the god's four powers, so as to touch on all of them and in a way make plain his music, his prophecy, his medicine, and his archery.
405a	**HERMOGENES** λέγε δή· ἄτοπον γάρ τί μοι λέγεις τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι.	**HERMOGENES** Go on, then. It sounds like a strange name you're describing.
	SOCRATES εὐάρμοστον μὲν οὖν, ἅτε μουσικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ κάθαρσις καὶ οἱ καθαρμοὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ αἱ τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς [405b] φαρμάκοις καὶ αἱ τοῖς μαντικοῖς περιθειώσεις τε καὶ τὰ λουτρὰ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ αἱ περιρράνσεις, πάντα ἕν τι ταῦτα δύναιτ' ἄν, καθαρὸν παρέχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν· ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** No, a harmonious one, since the god is a musician. First of all, purification and purifying rites, in medicine and in prophecy alike, and fumigations with sulfur, both with medicinal [405b] drugs and with prophetic ones, and the baths that go with such things, and the sprinklings—all of these would have one effect: to make a person pure in both body and soul. Isn't that so?
405b	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὁ καθαίρων θεὸς καὶ ὁ ἀπολούων τε καὶ ἀπολύων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν οὗτος ἂν εἴη;	**SOCRATES** And isn't this the god who purifies, who washes away (*apolouōn*) and releases (*apolyōn*) people from evils like these?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES κατὰ μὲν τοίνυν τὰς ἀπολύσεις τε καὶ ἀπολούσεις, [405c] ὡς ἰατρὸς ὢν τῶν τοιούτων, "Ἀπολούων" ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο· κατὰ δὲ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν— ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν— ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ Θετταλοὶ καλοῦσιν αὐτόν, ὀρθότατ' ἂν καλοῖτο· "Ἅπλουν" γάρ φασι πάντες Θετταλοὶ τοῦτον τὸν	**SOCRATES** So, with reference to his releasings and washings, [405c] since he is the physician for such things, he would correctly be called *Apolouōn* ("the one who washes away"). With reference to prophecy, and to truth and simplicity—for these are the same thing—he would be most correctly

23 *Pherrephatta* is the Athenian form of Persephone's name. *Phersephonē* suggests *pherein phonon*, "bringing death."

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	θεόν. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ βολῶν ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι τοξικῇ "Ἀειβάλλων" ἐστίν.	called by the name the Thessalians use for him: all the Thessalians call this god *Aploun* ("the simple one"). And because he is always (*aei*) master of his shots (*bolai*) in archery, he is *Aeiballōn* ("the ever-shooting").
405c	κατὰ δὲ τὴν μουσικὴν δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν ὥσπερ τὸν ἀκόλουθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἄκοιτιν ὅτι τὸ ἄλφα σημαίνει πολλαχοῦ τὸ ὁμοῦ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὁμοῦ πόλησιν καὶ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, οὓς δὴ "πόλους" καλοῦσιν, καὶ τὴν περὶ 405d τὴν ἐν τῇ ᾠδῇ ἁρμονίαν, ἣ δὴ συμφωνία καλεῖται, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα, ὡς φασιν οἱ κομψοὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἁρμονίᾳ τινὶ πολεῖ ἅμα πάντα· ἐπιστατεῖ δὲ οὗτος ὁ θεὸς τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ ὁμοπολῶν αὐτὰ πάντα καὶ κατὰ θεοὺς καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπους· ὥσπερ οὖν τὸν ὁμοκέλευθον καὶ ὁμόκοιτιν "ἀκόλουθον" καὶ "ἄκοιτιν" ἐκαλέσαμεν, μεταβαλόντες ἀντὶ τοῦ "ὁμο—" "ἀ—," οὕτω καὶ "Ἀπόλλωνα" ἐκαλέσαμεν 405e ὃς ἦν "ὁμοπολῶν," ἕτερον λάβδα ἐμβαλόντες, ὅτι ὁμώνυμον ἐγίγνετο τῷ χαλεπῷ ὀνόματι.	With reference to music, we have to understand that alpha often signifies "together" (*homou*), as in *akolouthos* ("follower") and *akoitis* ("wife"). Here it signifies moving together (*homou polēsis*), both of the things around the heavens, the revolutions they call *poloi* ("poles"), and 405d of the harmony in song, which is called concord. For all these things, as the experts in music and astronomy say, revolve (*polei*) together by a kind of harmony. And this god presides over the harmony, making them all move together (*homopolōn*), among gods and among human beings alike. So just as we called the *homokeleuthos* ("fellow traveler") and the *homokoitis* ("bedfellow") *akolouthos* and *akoitis*, changing *homo-* to *a-*, so we called the one who was *homopolōn Apollōn*, 405e putting in a second lambda, because otherwise it would have sounded the same as an ill-omened word.[24]
405e	ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ὑποπτεύοντές τινες διὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ ὀνόματος φοβοῦνται αὐτὸ ὡς σημαῖνον φθοράν τινα· τὸ 406a δὲ πολύ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, πασῶν ἐφαπτόμενον κεῖται τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεων, ἁπλοῦ, ἀεὶ βάλλοντος, ἀπολούοντος, ὁμοπολοῦντος. τὰς δὲ "Μούσας" τε καὶ ὅλως τὴν μουσικὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μῶσθαι, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τῆς ζητήσεώς τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἐπωνόμασεν. Λητὼ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρᾳότητος τῆς θεοῦ, κατὰ τὸ ἐθελήμονα εἶναι ὧν ἄν τις δέηται. ἴσως δὲ ὡς οἱ ξένοι καλοῦσιν— πολλοὶ γὰρ "Ληθὼ" καλοῦσιν—ἔοικεν οὖν πρὸς τὸ μὴ τραχὺ τοῦ ἤθους ἀλλ' ἥμερόν τε καὶ λεῖον "Ληθὼ" 406b κεκλῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦτο καλούντων.	Even now some people suspect this, because they don't examine the meaning of the name correctly, and they fear it as if it signified some kind of destruction. 406a But in fact, as we said just now, the name was given so as to touch on all the god's powers: simple, ever-shooting, washing away, moving together. As for the Muses, and music generally, it seems the name-maker named them from *mōsthai* ("to strive after"), from inquiry and philosophy. The name *Lētō* comes from the goddess's gentleness, from her being willing (*ethelēmōn*) to do whatever anyone asks. Or perhaps it's as foreigners call her, since many call her *Lēthō*. In that case it seems she's called *Lēthō* 406b by those who use that name because her character has nothing rough about it but is mild and smooth (*leion*).
406b	"Ἄρτεμις" δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀρτεμὲς φαίνεται καὶ τὸ κόσμιον, διὰ τὴν τῆς παρθενίας ἐπιθυμίαν· ἴσως δὲ ἀρετῆς ἴστορα τὴν θεὸν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ καλέσας, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ὡς τὸν ἄροτον μισησάσης τὸν ἀνδρὸς ἐν γυναικί· ἢ διὰ τούτων τι ἢ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ὁ τιθέμενος ἔθετο τῇ θεῷ.	*Artemis* seems to come from her being *artemes* ("sound, intact") and orderly, because of her desire for virginity. Or perhaps whoever named the goddess called her "expert in excellence" (*aretēs histōr*). Or maybe it's because she hated the plowing (*arotos*) of a woman by a man. Whoever gave the goddess this name gave it either for one of these reasons or for all of them.

24 With a single lambda, *Apolōn* would sound like *apolōn*, "destroying."

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	HERMOGENES τί δὲ ὁ “Διόνυσός” τε καὶ ἡ “ἀφροδίτη”;	**HERMOGENES** What about Dionysus and Aphrodite?
	SOCRATES μεγάλα, ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου, ἐρωτᾷς. ἀλλὰ ἔστι γὰρ καὶ σπουδαίως εἰρημένος ὁ τρόπος τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτοις [406c] τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παιδικῶς. τὸν μὲν οὖν σπουδαῖον ἄλλους τινὰς ἐρώτα, τὸν δὲ παιδικὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει διελθεῖν· φιλοπαίσμονες γὰρ καὶ οἱ θεοί. ὅ τε γὰρ Διόνυσος εἴη ἂν ὁ διδοὺς τὸν οἶνον “Διδοίνυσος” ἐν παιδιᾷ καλούμενος, οἶνος δ’, ὅτι οἴεσθαι νοῦν ἔχειν ποιεῖ τῶν πινόντων τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐκ ἔχοντας, “οἰόνους” δικαιότατ’ ἂν καλούμενος. περὶ δὲ ἀφροδίτης οὐκ ἄξιον Ἡσιόδῳ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ [406d] συγχωρεῖν ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀφροῦ γένεσιν “ἀφροδίτη” ἐκλήθη.	**SOCRATES** Those are big questions, son of Hipponicus. But in fact the names of these gods can be explained in two ways, seriously [406c] and playfully. For the serious explanation you’ll have to ask someone else, but nothing stops me from going through the playful one, since the gods love a joke too. Dionysus would be the one who gives (*didous*) wine (*oinos*), playfully called *Didoinysos*. And wine, since it makes most drinkers think (*oiesthai*) they have sense (*nous*) when they don’t, would most justly be called *oionous*. As for Aphrodite, it isn’t worth contradicting Hesiod. [406d] We should agree that she was called *Aphroditē* because she was born from the foam (*aphros*).
406d	**HERMOGENES** ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ Ἀθηνᾶς Ἀθηναῖός γ’ ὤν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιλήσῃ, οὐδ’ Ἡφαίστου τε καὶ Ἄρεως.	**HERMOGENES** But you’re an Athenian, Socrates, so you surely won’t forget Athena—or Hephaestus and Ares either.
	SOCRATES οὐδὲ εἰκός γε.	**SOCRATES** That would hardly be likely.
	HERMOGENES οὐ γάρ.	**HERMOGENES** No, it wouldn’t.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ὄνομα αὐτῆς οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν δι’ ὃ κεῖται.	**SOCRATES** Well, one of her names isn’t hard to account for.
	HERMOGENES τὸ ποῖον;	**HERMOGENES** Which one?
	SOCRATES “Παλλάδα” που αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν.	**SOCRATES** We call her *Pallas*, don’t we?
	HERMOGENES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**HERMOGENES** Of course.
	SOCRATES τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ὀρχήσεως [406e] ἡγούμενοι τεθῆναι ὀρθῶς ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἡγοίμεθα· τὸ γάρ που ἢ αὐτὸν ἤ τι ἄλλο μετεωρίζειν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἢ ἐν ταῖς [407a] χερσὶν “πάλλειν” τε καὶ “πάλλεσθαι” καὶ ὀρχεῖν καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι καλοῦμεν.	**SOCRATES** We’d be right, I think, to suppose this name was given from the dance in armor. [406e] For lifting oneself or something else up, whether off the ground or in [407a] the hands, is what we call *pallein* and *pallesthai* (“to brandish” and “to leap”), or making something dance and dancing.
407a	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES “Παλλάδα” μὲν τοίνυν ταύτῃ.	**SOCRATES** So that’s where *Pallas* comes from.
	HERMOGENES καὶ ὀρθῶς γε. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ ἕτερον πῶς λέγεις;	**HERMOGENES** And rightly too. But how do you explain her other name?
	SOCRATES τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς;	**SOCRATES** *Athena*?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.

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	SOCRATES τοῦτο ἐμβριθέστερον, ὦ φίλε. ἐοίκασι δὴ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν νομίζειν ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν περὶ Ὅμηρον [407b] δεινοί. καὶ γὰρ τούτων οἱ πολλοὶ ἐξηγούμενοι τὸν ποιητήν φασι τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν αὐτὸν νοῦν τε καὶ διάνοιαν πεποιηκέναι, καὶ ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα ποιῶν ἔοικε τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι, ἔτι δὲ μειζόνως λέγων θεοῦ νόησιν ὡσπερεὶ λέγει ὅτι "ἁ θεονόα" ἐστὶν αὕτη, τῷ ἄλφα ξενικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦτα χρησάμενος καὶ τὸ ἰῶτα καὶ τὸ σῖγμα ἀφελών. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτῃ, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ θεῖα νοούσης αὐτῆς διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων "Θεονόην" ἐκάλεσεν. οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπέχει καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἤθει νόησιν ὡς οὖσαν τὴν θεὸν ταύτην "Ἠθονόην" μὲν [407c] βούλεσθαι προσειπεῖν· παραγαγὼν δὲ ἢ αὐτὸς ἤ τινες ὕστερον ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον ὡς ᾠοντο, "Ἀθηνάαν" ἐκάλεσαν.	**SOCRATES** That's a weightier matter, my friend. It seems the ancients thought about Athena the way present-day experts on Homer do. [407b] Most of them, when they interpret the poet, say that he made Athena mind (*nous*) and thought (*dianoia*) personified. And the maker of names seems to have had some such idea about her. Speaking of her still more grandly as god's intellect (*theou noēsis*), he says, as it were, that she is *ha theonoa* ("the mind of god"), using alpha in place of eta, the foreign way, and removing the iota and the sigma. Or perhaps not that. Perhaps he called her *Theonoē* because she understands divine things (*ta theia noei*) better than anyone else. And nothing rules out that he wanted to call the goddess *Ēthonoē*, as being understanding in character (*ēthos*). [407c] Then either he himself or others later altered it to something finer, as they thought, and called her *Athēnaa*.
407c	**HERMOGENES** τί δὲ δὴ τὸν Ἥφαιστον, πῇ λέγεις;	**HERMOGENES** And what about Hephaestus? How do you explain him?
	SOCRATES ἦ τὸν γενναῖον τὸν "φάεος ἵστορα" ἐρωτᾷς;	**SOCRATES** You're asking about the noble "master of light" (*phaeos histōr*)?
	HERMOGENES ἔοικα.	**HERMOGENES** It looks that way.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οὗτος μὲν παντὶ δῆλος "Φαῖστος" ὤν, τὸ ἦτα προσελκυσάμενος;	**SOCRATES** Isn't it obvious to everyone that he is *Phaistos*, with an eta tacked on in front?
	HERMOGENES κινδυνεύει, ἐὰν μή πῃ σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔτι ἄλλη δόξῃ.	**HERMOGENES** Probably—unless, it seems, you come up with yet another idea.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ, τὸν Ἄρη ἐρώτα.	**SOCRATES** Well, so that I don't, ask me about Ares.
	HERMOGENES ἐρωτῶ.	**HERMOGENES** I'm asking.
407d	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν βούλει, κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν τε καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον "Ἄρης" ἂν εἴη· εἰ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὸ σκληρόν τε καὶ ἀμετάστροφον, ὃ δὴ "ἄρρατον" καλεῖται, καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν πανταχῇ πολεμικῷ θεῷ πρέποι "Ἄρη" καλεῖσθαι.	**SOCRATES** Well, if you like, he'd be *Arēs* from the male (*arren*) and the manly. Or again, from what is hard and unbending, which is called *arraton* ("rigid"), and on that ground too it would suit a god of war in every way to be called *Arēs*.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν θεῶν πρὸς θεῶν ἀπαλλαγῶμεν, ὡς ἐγὼ δέδοικα περὶ αὐτῶν διαλέγεσθαι· περὶ δὲ ἄλλων ὧν τινων βούλει προβαλλέ μοι, "ὄφρα ἴδηαι οἷοι" Εὐθύφρονος "ἵπποι."	**SOCRATES** Then, for the gods' sake, let's get away from the gods, since I'm afraid to discuss them. But put any other names you like to me, "so you may see what" Euthyphro's "horses are like."[25]

25 Adapted from Homer, *Iliad* 5.221–222; Socrates has earlier claimed to be inspired by the seer Euthyphro.

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407e	**HERMOGENES** ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα, ἔτι γε ἓν ἐρόμενός σε περὶ Ἑρμοῦ, ἐπειδή με καὶ οὔ φησιν Κρατύλος Ἑρμογένη εἶναι. πειρώμεθα οὖν τὸν "Ἑρμῆν" σκέψασθαι τί καὶ νοεῖ τὸ ὄνομα, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶμεν εἰ τὶ ὅδε λέγει.	**HERMOGENES** I will, but first just one more question, about Hermes, since Cratylus says I'm not Hermogenes. Let's try to examine *Hermēs* and see what the name means, so we can also find out whether he has a point.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι ὁ "Ἑρμῆς," καὶ τὸ ἑρμηνέα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον καὶ τὸ 408a κλοπικόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις καὶ τὸ ἀγοραστικόν, περὶ λόγου δύναμίν ἐστιν πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, τὸ "εἴρειν" λόγου χρεία ἐστί, τὸ δέ, οἷον καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ λέγει, "ἐμήσατό" φησιν, τοῦτο δὲ μηχανήσασθαί ἐστιν. ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὖν τούτων τὸν τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ τὸν λόγον μησάμενον—τὸ δὲ λέγειν δή ἐστιν εἴρειν—τοῦτον τὸν θεὸν ὡσπερεὶ ἐπιτάττει 408b ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης· "ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἴρειν ἐμήσατο, δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ὑπὸ ὑμῶν εἰρέμης"· νῦν δὲ ἡμεῖς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, καλλωπίζοντες τὸ ὄνομα "Ἑρμῆν" καλοῦμεν. καὶ ἥ γε Ἶρις ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴρειν ἔοικεν κεκλημένη, ὅτι ἄγγελος ἦν.	**SOCRATES** Well, this name *Hermēs* seems to have something to do with speech. Being an interpreter (*hermēneus*) and a messenger, and 408a being thievish and deceptive in words, and good at bargaining—this whole business has to do with the power of speech. Now, as we were saying earlier, *eirein* ("to speak") is the use of speech, and *emēsato*, a word Homer uses in many places, means "he devised." From both of these, then, the lawgiver, as it were, instructs 408b us about this god who devised speaking and speech—and speaking is *eirein*: "Human beings, the one who devised speaking (*eirein emēsato*) would justly be called *Eiremēs* by you." Nowadays, prettifying the name, as we suppose, we call him *Hermēs*. And Iris too seems to have been named from *eirein*, because she was a messenger.
408b	**HERMOGENES** νὴ τὸν Δία, εὖ ἄρα μοι δοκεῖ Κρατύλος λέγειν τὸ ἐμὲ μὴ εἶναι Ἑρμογένη· οὔκουν εὐμήχανός γέ εἰμι λόγου.	**HERMOGENES** By Zeus, then I think Cratylus is right when he says I'm not Hermogenes. I'm certainly no good at devising speeches.
	SOCRATES καὶ τό γε τὸν Πᾶνα τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ εἶναι ὑὸν διφυῆ ἔχει τὸ εἰκός, ὦ ἑταῖρε.	**SOCRATES** And it makes sense, my friend, that Pan, the double-natured, is Hermes' son.
408c	**HERMOGENES** πῶς δή;	**HERMOGENES** How so?
	SOCRATES οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει καὶ κυκλεῖ καὶ πολεῖ ἀεί, καὶ ἔστι διπλοῦς, ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδής.	**SOCRATES** You know that speech signifies everything (*to pan*), and is always circling and revolving (*polei*), and that it is double, true and false.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ λεῖον καὶ θεῖον καὶ ἄνω οἰκοῦν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος κάτω ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τραχὺ καὶ τραγικόν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πλεῖστοι οἱ μῦθοί τε καὶ τὰ ψεύδη ἐστίν, περὶ τὸν τραγικὸν βίον.	**SOCRATES** Then the true part of it is smooth and divine and dwells above among the gods, while the false part dwells below among most human beings, and is rough and *tragikon* ("goatish," but also "tragic"). For it's down here, in the tragic life, that most myths and falsehoods are found.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ὀρθῶς ἄρ' ἂν ὁ πᾶν μηνύων καὶ ἀεὶ πολῶν 408d "Πὰν αἰπόλος" εἴη, διφυὴς Ἑρμοῦ ὑός, τὰ μὲν ἄνωθεν λεῖος, τὰ δὲ κάτωθεν τραχὺς καὶ τραγοειδής. καὶ ἔστιν ἤτοι λόγος ἢ λόγου ἀδελφὸς ὁ Πάν, εἴπερ Ἑρμοῦ ὑός	**SOCRATES** So the one who reveals everything (*pan*) and is always moving it (*aei polōn*) would rightly be 408d *Pan aipolos* ("Pan the goatherd"), the double-natured son of Hermes, smooth in his up-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐστιν· ἀδελφῷ δὲ ἐοικέναι ἀδελφὸν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὦ μακάριε, ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν.	per parts and rough and goat-shaped below. And Pan is either speech or the brother of speech, if he really is Hermes' son, and there's nothing surprising in a brother resembling his brother. But as I was saying, my blessed friend, let's get away from the gods.

THE HEAVENLY BODIES

Sun, moon, month and stars, then fire, air, ether, earth, the seasons and the year.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
408d	**HERMOGENES** τῶν γε τοιούτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει. περὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε δὲ τί σε κωλύει διελθεῖν, οἷον ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων καὶ γῆς καὶ αἰθέρος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς 408e καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ὡρῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ;	**HERMOGENES** From gods like these, Socrates, if you like. But what's stopping you from going through things of another sort, such as the sun, the moon, the stars, earth, ether, air, fire, 408e water, the seasons, and the year?
408e	**SOCRATES** συχνὰ μέν μοι προστάττεις, ὅμως δέ, εἴπερ σοι κεχαρισμένον ἔσται, ἐθέλω.	**SOCRATES** That's a lot you're ordering me to do. Still, if it will please you, I'm willing.
	HERMOGENES καὶ μὴν χαριῇ.	**HERMOGENES** Oh, it will.
	SOCRATES τί δὴ οὖν πρῶτον βούλει; ἢ ὥσπερ εἶπες τὸν ἥλιον διέλθωμεν;	**SOCRATES** So what do you want first? Shall we go through the sun, as you said?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** By all means.
	SOCRATES ἔοικε τοίνυν κατάδηλον γενόμενον ἂν μᾶλλον εἰ 409a τῷ Δωρικῷ τις ὀνόματι χρῷτο— "ἅλιον" γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ Δωριῆς— "ἅλιος" οὖν εἴη μὲν ἂν κατὰ τὸ ἁλίζειν εἰς ταὐτὸν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπειδὰν ἀνατείλῃ, εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀεὶ εἱλεῖν ἰών, ἐοίκοι δ' ἂν καὶ ὅτι ποικίλλει ἰὼν τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐκ τῆς γῆς· τὸ δὲ ποικίλλειν καὶ αἰολεῖν ταὐτόν.	**SOCRATES** Well, it looks as though it would become clearer if 409a one used the Doric name, because the Dorians call it *halios*. So *halios* might come from its *halizein* ("gathering") people together in one place when it rises. Or it might come from its always *heilein* ("rolling") around the earth as it goes. Or it could be because, as it goes, it *poikillei* ("makes many-colored") the things that grow from the earth, and *poikillein* and *aiolein* are the same thing.[26]
409a	**HERMOGENES** τί δὲ ἡ "σελήνη";	**HERMOGENES** And what about *selēnē* ("moon")?
	SOCRATES τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ὄνομα φαίνεται τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν πιέζειν.	**SOCRATES** Now this name looks as if it puts Anaxagoras in a tight spot.
	HERMOGENES τί δή;	**HERMOGENES** Why's that?
	SOCRATES ἔοικε δηλοῦντι παλαιότερον ὃ ἐκεῖνος νεωστὶ ἔλεγεν, 409b ὅτι ἡ σελήνη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἔχει τὸ φῶς.	**SOCRATES** It seems to show that what he was saying only recently is actually much older, 409b namely that the moon gets its light from the sun.
409b	**HERMOGENES** πῶς δή;	**HERMOGENES** How so?

26 The ordinary Attic word for "sun" is *hēlios*; the Dorians said *halios*. *Aiolein* is meant to echo *hēlios*.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES τὸ μέν που “σέλας” καὶ τὸ “φῶς” ταὐτόν.	**SOCRATES** *Selas* (“gleam”) and *phōs* (“light”) are the same thing, I take it.
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES νέον δέ που καὶ ἕνον ἀεί ἐστι περὶ τὴν σελήνην τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι λέγουσιν· κύκλῳ γάρ που ἀεὶ αὐτὴν περιιὼν νέον ἀεὶ ἐπιβάλλει, ἕνον δὲ ὑπάρχει τὸ τοῦ προτέρου μηνός.	**SOCRATES** And this light around the moon is always *neon* and *henon* (“new” and “old”), if what Anaxagoras’ followers say is true. As the sun goes around the moon in its circle, it’s always casting new light on it, while the light from the previous month is still there as old light.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES “Σελαναίαν” δέ γε καλοῦσιν αὐτὴν πολλοί.	**SOCRATES** And lots of people call it *Selanaia*.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ὅτι δὲ σέλας νέον καὶ ἕνον ἔχει ἀεί, “Σελαενονεοάεια” 409c μὲν δικαιότατ’ ἂν τῶν ὀνομάτων καλοῖτο, συγκεκροτημένον δὲ “Σελαναία” κέκληται.	**SOCRATES** Since it always has a *selas* that is *neon* and *henon*, *Selaenoneoaeia* 409c would be the most fitting of all names to call it. Squeezed together, it’s been called *Selanaia*.
409c	**HERMOGENES** διθυραμβῶδές γε τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἀλλὰ τὸν μῆνα καὶ τὰ ἄστρα πῶς λέγεις;	**HERMOGENES** That name belongs in a dithyramb, Socrates! But what do you say about the month and the stars?[27]
	SOCRATES ὁ μὲν “μεὶς” ἀπὸ τοῦ μειοῦσθαι εἴη ἂν “μείης” ὀρθῶς κεκλημένος, τὰ δ’ “ἄστρα” ἔοικε τῆς ἀστραπῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν. ἡ δὲ “ἀστραπή,” ὅτι τὰ ὦπα ἀναστρέφει, “ἀναστρωπὴ” ἂν εἴη, νῦν δὲ “ἀστραπὴ” καλλωπισθεῖσα κέκληται.	**SOCRATES** *Meis* (“month”) would be correctly called *meiēs*, from *meiousthai* (“to wane”). The *astra* (“stars”) seem to take their name from *astrapē* (“lightning”). And because *astrapē anastrephei ta ōpa* (“turns the eyes upward”), it would be *anastrōpē*. Now it’s been prettified and is called *astrapē*.
	HERMOGENES τί δὲ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ;	**HERMOGENES** And what about fire and water?
409d	**SOCRATES** τὸ “πῦρ” ἀπορῶ· καὶ κινδυνεύει ἤτοι ἡ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονός με μοῦσα ἐπιλελοιπέναι, ἢ τοῦτό τι παγχάλεπον εἶναι. σκέψαι οὖν ἣν εἰσάγω μηχανὴν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἃ ἂν ἀπορῶ.	**SOCRATES** *Pyr* (“fire”) has me stumped. Either Euthyphro’s muse has deserted me, or this one is extremely difficult. So consider the device I bring in for all the cases like this that stump me.
	HERMOGENES τίνα δή;	**HERMOGENES** What device?
	SOCRATES ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. ἀπόκριναι γάρ μοι· ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πῦρ κατὰ τίνα τρόπον καλεῖται;	**SOCRATES** I’ll tell you. Answer me this: could you say in what way *pyr* gets its name?
	HERMOGENES μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἔγωγε.	**HERMOGENES** No, by Zeus, I couldn’t.
	SOCRATES σκέψαι δὴ ὃ ἐγὼ ὑποπτεύω περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ 409e ὅτι πολλὰ οἱ Ἕλληνες ὀνόματα ἄλλως τε	**SOCRATES** Then consider what I suspect about it. It occurs to me 409e that the Greeks, especially

27 A dithyramb was a choral song to Dionysus, notorious for its bombastic compound words.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκοῦντες παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων εἰλήφασιν.	those who live under non-Greek rule, have taken many names from non-Greeks.
409e	**HERMOGENES** τί οὖν δή;	**HERMOGENES** So what?
	SOCRATES εἴ τις ζητοῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φωνὴν ὡς εἰκότως κεῖται, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ᾽ ἐκείνην ἐξ ἧς τὸ ὄνομα τυγχάνει ὄν, οἶσθα ὅτι ἀποροῖ ἄν.	**SOCRATES** If someone tried to work out how these names were fittingly given according to the Greek language, and not according to the language the name actually comes from, you know he'd be stumped.
	HERMOGENES εἰκότως γε.	**HERMOGENES** Naturally.
410a	**SOCRATES** ὅρα τοίνυν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὸ "πῦρ" μή τι βαρβαρικὸν ᾖ. τοῦτο γὰρ οὔτε ῥᾴδιον προσάψαι ἐστὶν Ἑλληνικῇ φωνῇ, φανεροί τ᾽ εἰσὶν οὕτως αὐτὸ καλοῦντες Φρύγες σμικρόν τι παρακλίνοντες· καὶ τό γε "ὕδωρ" καὶ τὰς "κύνας" καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.	**SOCRATES** Well then, see whether this name *pyr* isn't something foreign as well. It isn't easy to connect it with the Greek language, and the Phrygians plainly call it that, with a slight variation. The same goes for *hydōr* ("water"), *kynes* ("dogs"), and many others.[28]
	HERMOGENES ἔστι ταῦτα.	**HERMOGENES** That's so.
	SOCRATES οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ταῦτα προσβιάζεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἔχοι γ᾽ ἄν τις εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ταύτῃ [410b] ἀπωθοῦμαι· ὁ δὲ δὴ ἀὴρ ἆρά γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὅτι αἴρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, "ἀὴρ" κέκληται; ἢ ὅτι ἀεὶ ῥεῖ; ἢ ὅτι πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται ῥέοντος; οἱ γὰρ ποιηταί που τὰ πνεύματα "ἀήτας" καλοῦσιν· ἴσως οὖν λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι πνευματόρρουν, "ἀητόρρουν" ὅθεν δὴ βούλεται αὐτὸν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀήρ. τὸν δὲ αἰθέρα τῇδέ πῃ ὑπολαμβάνω, ὅτι ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέων "ἀειθεὴρ" δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο. γῆ δὲ μᾶλλον σημαίνει ὃ βούλεται ἐάν τις [410c] "γαῖαν" ὀνομάσῃ· γαῖα γὰρ γεννήτειρα ἂν εἴη ὀρθῶς κεκλημένη, ὥς φησιν Ὅμηρος· τὸ γὰρ "γεγάασιν" γεγεννῆσθαι λέγει.	**SOCRATES** So we mustn't force these, since one could still say something about them. That's how I'm setting fire and water [410b] aside. But air, Hermogenes: is it called *aēr* because it *airei* ("lifts") things off the earth? Or because it *aei rhei* ("always flows")? Or because wind arises from it as it flows? After all, the poets call the winds *aētai*. So perhaps the name means *aētorrhoun* ("wind-flow"), as if one said *pneumatorrhoun*, and that's what the name-maker means when he says it is *aēr*. As for *aithēr* ("upper air"), I understand it something like this: because it always *thei* ("runs"), flowing around the air, it would rightly be called *aeitheēr*. And *gē* ("earth") shows what it means better if one [410c] calls it *gaia*. *Gaia* would correctly be called "the one who gives birth," as Homer says, since by *gegaasin* he means "have been born."
410c	εἶεν· τί οὖν ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;	Very well. So what came next on our list?
	HERMOGENES ὧραι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς καὶ ἔτος.	**HERMOGENES** The seasons, Socrates, and the two words for "year," *eniautos* and *etos*.
	SOCRATES αἱ μὲν δὴ ὧραι Ἀττικιστὶ ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν ῥητέον, εἴπερ βούλει τὸ εἰκὸς εἰδέναι· ΗΟΡΑΙ γάρ εἰσι διὰ τὸ ὁρίζειν χειμῶνάς τε καὶ θέρη καὶ πνεύματα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς γῆς· ὁρίζουσαι δὲ δικαίως ἂν "ὅραι" καλοῖντο. [410d] ἐνιαυτὸς δὲ καὶ ἔτος κινδυνεύει ἕν τι εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τὰ φυόμενα καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον	**SOCRATES** Well, *hōrai* ("seasons") should be pronounced the old Attic way, if you want to know the likely explanation. They are HORAI because they *horizein* ("mark off") winters and summers, the winds, and the crops that come from the earth; and as things that mark off they would rightly be

28 The Phrygians were a people of west-central Asia Minor.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	προάγον εἰς φῶς καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ ἐξετάζον, τοῦτο, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα δίχα διῃρημένον οἱ μὲν Ζῆνα, οἱ δὲ Δία ἐκάλουν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα οἱ μὲν "ἐνιαυτόν," ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οἱ δὲ "ἔτος," ὅτι ἐτάζει· ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἐστὶν τὸ "ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐτάζον" τοῦτο προσαγορεύεσθαι ἓν ὂν δίχα, ὥστε δύο ὀνόματα γεγονέναι, "ἐνιαυτόν" τε καὶ 410e "ἔτος," ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου.	called *horai*. 410d *Eniautos* and *etos* are probably one thing. Take what brings to light each of the things that grow and come into being in its turn, and examines it within itself. Earlier we saw Zeus's name split in two, with some calling him *Zēna* and others *Dia*. In the same way, some here call this *eniautos*, because it does this *en heautōi* ("within itself"), and others *etos*, because it *etazei* ("examines"). The whole phrase is *en heautōi etazon* ("examining within itself"), and this single thing is addressed in two ways, so that two names, *eniautos* and 410e *etos*, have come from one phrase.[29]
410e	**HERMOGENES** ἀλλὰ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολὺ ἐπιδίδως.	**HERMOGENES** Well, Socrates, you really are making great strides.
	SOCRATES πόρρω ἤδη οἶμαι φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν.	**SOCRATES** I think I must already look as though I'm driving far down the road of wisdom.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**HERMOGENES** You certainly do.
	SOCRATES τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις.	**SOCRATES** You'll soon say so even more.

WORDS FOR WISDOM AND EXCELLENCE

Understanding, knowledge, wisdom and the good seem named by people who thought everything moves.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
411a	**HERMOGENES** ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἔγωγε ἡδέως ἂν θεασαίμην ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ ὀνόματα τίνι ποτὲ ὀρθότητι κεῖται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἷον "φρόνησίς" τε καὶ "σύνεσις" καὶ "δικαιοσύνη" καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα.	**HERMOGENES** Well, after names of this kind, I'd be glad to see by what correctness those fine names concerned with excellence were given, such as *phronēsis* ("understanding"), *synesis* ("comprehension"), *dikaiosynē* ("justice"), and all the rest of that kind.
	SOCRATES ἐγείρεις μέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐ φαῦλον γένος ὀνομάτων· ὅμως δὲ ἐπειδήπερ τὴν λεοντῆν ἐνδέδυκα, οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον ἀλλ' ἐπισκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικε, φρόνησιν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ γνώμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τἆλλα δὴ ἃ φῂς πάντα ταῦτα τὰ 411b καλὰ ὀνόματα.	**SOCRATES** You're stirring up no trivial family of names, my friend. Still, since I've put on the lion's skin, I mustn't lose my nerve. It seems I have to examine *phronēsis*, *synesis*, *gnōmē* ("judgment"), *epistēmē* ("knowledge"), and all the other 411b fine names you mention.[30]
411b	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐ δεῖ ἡμᾶς προαποστῆναι.	**HERMOGENES** We certainly mustn't give up before we start.
	SOCRATES καὶ μήν, νὴ τὸν κύνα, δοκῶ γέ μοι οὐ κακῶς μαντεύεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐνενόησα, ὅτι οἱ πάνυ παλαιοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ τιθέμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα παντὸς μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν νῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυκνὰ	**SOCRATES** And, by the dog, I don't think the hunch that struck me just now is a bad one. The very ancient people who gave names were, more than anything, like most of our wise men today:

29 Old Attic spelling used H for the rough breathing and O for both short and long o, so the word was written HORAI, which suits *horizein*.

30 The lion's skin was the emblem of Heracles; Socrates casts himself as a hero taking on a labor.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	περιστρέφεσθαι ζητοῦντες ὅπῃ ἔχει τὰ ὄντα εἰλιγγιῶσιν, κἄπειτα αὐτοῖς φαίνεται περιφέρεσθαι τὰ πράγματα καὶ πάντως [411c] φέρεσθαι. αἰτιῶνται δὴ οὐ τὸ ἔνδον τὸ παρὰ σφίσιν πάθος αἴτιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς δόξης, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα οὕτω πεφυκέναι, οὐδὲν αὐτῶν μόνιμον εἶναι οὐδὲ βέβαιον, ἀλλὰ ῥεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι καὶ μεστὰ εἶναι πάσης φορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως ἀεί. λέγω δὴ ἐννοήσας πρὸς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ ὀνόματα.	from constantly spinning around as they search for how things are, they get dizzy, and then things seem to them to be going around and to be in motion in every [411c] way. And they don't blame the condition inside themselves for this opinion. Instead they hold that things themselves are by nature like this: that nothing in them is stable or firm, but they are flowing and moving and always full of every kind of motion and coming-to-be. I say this because it occurred to me in connection with all the names we've just mentioned.
411c	**HERMOGENES** πῶς δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**HERMOGENES** How's that, Socrates?
	SOCRATES οὐ κατενόησας ἴσως τὰ ἄρτι λεγόμενα ὅτι παντάπασιν ὡς φερομένοις τε καὶ ῥέουσι καὶ γιγνομένοις τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπίκειται.	**SOCRATES** Perhaps you didn't notice that the names just mentioned are given entirely on the assumption that things are moving and flowing and coming to be.
	HERMOGENES οὐ πάνυ ἐνεθυμήθην.	**HERMOGENES** I hadn't really thought about it.
411d	**SOCRATES** καὶ μὴν πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ὃ πρῶτον εἴπομεν παντάπασιν ὡς ἐπὶ τοιούτων ἐστίν.	**SOCRATES** Well, to start with, the first one we mentioned is given entirely as if to things of that sort.
	HERMOGENES τὸ ποῖον;	**HERMOGENES** Which one?
	SOCRATES ἡ "φρόνησις"· φορᾶς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ῥοῦ νόησις. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὄνησιν ὑπολαβεῖν φορᾶς· ἀλλ' οὖν περί γε τὸ φέρεσθαί ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ "γνώμη" παντάπασιν δηλοῖ γονῆς σκέψιν καὶ νώμησιν· τὸ γὰρ "νωμᾶν" καὶ τὸ "σκοπεῖν" ταὐτόν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸ ἡ "νόησις" τοῦ νέου ἐστὶν ἔσις, τὸ δὲ νέα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα σημαίνει [411e] γιγνόμενα ἀεὶ εἶναι· τούτου οὖν ἐφίεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μηνύει τὸ ὄνομα ὁ θέμενος τὴν "νεόεσιν." οὐ γὰρ "νόησις" τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκαλεῖτο, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦτα εἶ ἔδει λέγειν δύο, "νοέεσιν." "σωφροσύνη" δὲ σωτηρία οὖ νυνδὴ ἐσκέμμεθα, [412a] φρονήσεως.	**SOCRATES** *Phronēsis*. It is *phoras kai rhou noēsis* ("the understanding of motion and flow"). One could also take it as *onēsis phoras* ("the benefit of motion"), but either way it has to do with being in motion. And if you like, *gnōmē* plainly indicates *gonēs skepsis kai nōmēsis* ("the examining and pondering of begetting"), since *nōman* ("to ponder") and *skopein* ("to examine") are the same thing. Or if you like, *noēsis* ("thought") itself is *tou neou hesis* ("the longing for the new"). For things to be new signifies [411e] that they are always coming to be, so the person who gave the name *neoesis* is indicating that the soul longs for this. In the old days it wasn't called *noēsis*: instead of the eta you had to say two epsilons, *noeesis*. And *sōphrosynē* ("moderation") is the *sōtēria* ("preservation") of what we've just examined, [412a] understanding.
412a	καὶ μὴν ἥ γε ἐπιστήμη μηνύει ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἑπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀξίας λόγου, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολειπομένης οὔτε προθεούσης· διὸ δὴ ἐμβάλλοντας δεῖ τὸ εἶ "ἐπεϊστήμην" αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν. "σύνεσις" δ' αὖ οὕτω μὲν δόξειεν ἂν ὥσπερ συλλογισμὸς εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ συνιέναι λέγῃ, ταὐτὸν παντάπασιν τῷ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει λεγόμενον· συμπορεύεσθαι γὰρ λέγει [412b] τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸ "συνιέναι." ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε	And *epistēmē* indicates that the soul worth talking about *hepetai* ("follows") things as they move, neither falling behind nor running ahead. So we ought to insert the epsilon and call it *hepeïstēmē*. *Synesis*, in turn, might look like a kind of reckoning together, a *syllogismos*. But when it says *syni-enai* ("to comprehend"), it turns out to say exactly

GREEK	ENGLISH
"σοφία" φορᾶς ἐφάπτεσθαι σημαίνει. σκοτωδέστερον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ξενικώτερον· ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὅτι πολλαχοῦ λέγουσιν περὶ ὅτου ἂν τύχωσιν τῶν ἀρχομένων ταχὺ προϊέναι "ἐσύθη" φασίν. Λακωνικῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ τῶν εὐδοκίμων καὶ ὄνομα ἦν "Σοῦς"· τὴν γὰρ ταχεῖαν ὁρμὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦτο καλοῦσιν. ταύτης οὖν τῆς φορᾶς ἐπαφὴν σημαίνει ἡ σοφία, ὡς φερομένων τῶν ὄντων.	the same thing as *epistasthai* ("to know"), because *synienai* says that [412b] the soul travels together with things. And *sophia* ("wisdom") signifies touching motion. This one is rather obscure and foreign, but we must remember from the poets that, again and again, when anything starts to move forward quickly, they say *esythē* ("it rushed"). There was even a famous Laconian named *Sous*, which is what the Spartans call a swift rush. So *sophia* signifies the touching of this motion, on the assumption that things are in motion.
412c καὶ μὴν τό γε "ἀγαθόν," τοῦτο τῆς φύσεως πάσης τῷ ἀγαστῷ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικεῖσθαι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πορεύεται τὰ ὄντα, ἔνι μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοῖς τάχος, ἔνι δὲ βραδυτής. ἔστιν οὖν οὐ πᾶν τὸ ταχὺ ἀλλὰ τὶ αὐτοῦ ἀγαστόν. τοῦ θοοῦ δὴ τῷ ἀγαστῷ αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστίν, "τἀγαθόν."	And *agathon* ("good"): this name is meant to be given to what is *agaston* ("admirable") in all of nature. Since things are in motion, there is speed in them and there is slowness. So it isn't everything fast but some part of it that is admirable. This name, *t'agathon*, then, is given to the admirable part of the *thoos* ("swift").

WHAT IS THE JUST?

Justice is named for what passes through all things, but no one can say what that is.

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SOCRATES "δικαιοσύνη" δέ, ὅτι μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δικαίου συνέσει τοῦτο κεῖται τὸ ὄνομα, ῥᾴδιον συμβαλεῖν· αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ "δίκαιον" χαλεπόν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔοικε μέχρι μέν του ὁμολογεῖσθαι [412d] παρὰ πολλῶν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι. ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναί τι διεξιόν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἰέναι παντός, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ [412e] ἄλλα πάντα διαϊόν, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς "δίκαιον," εὐστομίας ἕνεκα τὴν τοῦ κάππα δύναμιν προσλαβόν.	**SOCRATES** As for *dikaiosynē*, it's easy to guess that this name is given to the *synesis* ("comprehension") of the *dikaion* ("just"). But *dikaion* itself is difficult. In fact it seems to be agreed up to a point [412d] by many people, and after that it's disputed. Those who think that the universe is in motion suppose that most of it is the kind of thing that does nothing but move along, and that through all of this passes something by means of which everything that comes to be comes to be. This, they say, is the swiftest and the finest thing there is. For it couldn't pass through all that is unless it were so fine that nothing could keep it out, and so swift that it treated everything else as if it were standing still. Since, then, it governs all the [412e] other things by *diaïon* ("passing through") them, it was rightly given the name *dikaion*, taking on the sound of kappa to make it easier to say.
412e μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται [413a] τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἅτε λιπαρὴς ὢν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον—δι' ὃ γὰρ γίγνεται, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον—καὶ "Δία" καλεῖν ἔφη τις τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταῦτα. ἐπειδὰν δ' ἠρέμα αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ ἀκούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν ἧττον· "τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε, δίκαιον, εἰ	Up to this point, then, many people agree that what we were just describing [413a] is the just. But I, Hermogenes, being persistent about it, have learned all this in secret teachings: that this is the just and the cause, since the cause is that through which something comes to be. And someone told me that it was correct to call it *Dia* ("Zeus") for this reason. But after hearing all this, when I gently ask

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τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;" δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα [413b] ἅλλεσθαι. ἱκανῶς γάρ μέ φασι πεπύσθαι ἀκηκοέναι καὶ ἐπιχειροῦσιν, βουλόμενοι ἀποπιμπλάναι με, ἄλλος ἄλλα ἤδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτι συμφωνοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τίς φησιν τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διαΐόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα.

413b ἐπειδὰν οὖν τῳ λέγω αὐτὸ ἄσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκοώς, καταγελᾷ μου οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπειδὰν [413c] ὁ ἥλιος δύῃ. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὅτι αὖ ἐκεῖνος λέγει αὐτό, τὸ πῦρ φησιν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι. ὁ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησιν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὁ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾶν φησιν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο· αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμειγμένον πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ ἢ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι μανθάνειν [413d] περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν.

413d ἀλλ' οὖν οὔπερ ἕνεκα ἐσκοποῦμεν, τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο φαίνεται αὐτῷ διὰ ταῦτα κεῖσθαι.

HERMOGENES φαίνῃ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα μὲν ἀκηκοέναι του καὶ οὐκ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν.

SOCRATES τί δὲ τἆλλα;

HERMOGENES οὐ πάνυ.

SOCRATES ἄκουε δή· ἴσως γὰρ ἄν σε καὶ τὰ ἐπίλοιπα ἐξαπατήσαιμι ὡς οὐκ ἀκηκοὼς λέγω. μετὰ γὰρ δικαιοσύνην τί ἡμῖν λείπεται; ἀνδρείαν οἶμαι οὔπω διήλθομεν. ἀδικία μὲν γὰρ [413e] δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶν ὄντος ἐμπόδισμα τοῦ διαΐόντος, ἀνδρεία δὲ σημαίνει ὡς ἐν μάχῃ ἐπονομαζομένης τῆς ἀνδρείας—μάχην δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι, εἴπερ ῥεῖ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν ῥοήν—ἐὰν οὖν τις ἐξέλῃ τὸ δέλτα τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἀνδρείας, αὐτὸ μηνύει τὸ ἔργον τὸ ὄνομα ἡ "ἀνρεία." δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάσῃ ῥοῇ ἡ ἐναντία ῥοὴ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ παρὰ [414a] τὸ δίκαιον ῥεούσῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπῃνεῖτο ἡ ἀνδρεία. καὶ τὸ "ἄρρεν" καὶ ὁ "ἀνὴρ" ἐπὶ παραπλησίῳ τινὶ τούτῳ ἐστί, τῇ ἄνῳ ῥοῇ. "γυνὴ" δὲ γονή μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι εἶναι.

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them all the same, "Then what on earth is the just, my excellent friend, if that's how things are?" they think I'm now asking more than is proper and jumping past the [413b] landing pit. They tell me I've been told enough, and in trying to satisfy me they each start saying different things, and they no longer agree. One says that the just is the sun, since it alone governs the things that are by *diaïon* ("passing through") them and *kaon* ("burning") them.[31]

So when I happily pass this on to someone, as if I'd heard something fine, he laughs at me when he hears it and asks whether I think there's nothing just among human beings once [413c] the sun has set. So I press him to say what he thinks it is, and he says it's fire. But that isn't easy to understand. Another says it isn't fire itself but the heat itself that is in fire. Another says he laughs at all of these, and that the just is what Anaxagoras says, namely mind. For he says that mind, being its own master and mixed with nothing, orders all things by passing through all of them. And at that point, my friend, I'm in much greater perplexity than before I tried to learn [413d] what on earth the just is.

Still, as far as the point of our inquiry goes, the name at any rate appears to have been given to it for these reasons.

HERMOGENES It seems to me, Socrates, that you've heard this from someone and aren't just making it up as you go.

SOCRATES And the rest?

HERMOGENES Not really.

SOCRATES Then listen. Perhaps I can trick you into thinking that I haven't heard the rest from anyone either. After justice, what's left for us? Courage, I think; we haven't gone through that yet. Injustice, [413e] clearly, is a hindrance of what passes through. And *andreia* ("courage") signifies that courage got its name in battle; and battle in what is, if what is flows, is nothing but a counter-flow. So if you take the delta out of the name *andreia*, the name *anreia* itself indicates what it does. Clearly, then, courage isn't the counter-flow to every flow, but to the flow running contrary [414a] to the just; otherwise courage wouldn't be praised.

31 "Jumping past the pit" is a long-jump image: overshooting the dug-out landing area, that is, going beyond the limits.

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		And *arrhen* (“male”) and *anēr* (“man”) refer to something close to this, to the *anō rhoē* (“upward flow”). And *gynē* (“woman”) seems to me to mean *gonē* (“birth”).[32]
414a	τὸ δὲ “θῆλυ” ἀπὸ τῆς θηλῆς τι φαίνεται ἐπωνομάσθαι· ἡ δὲ “θηλὴ” ἆρά γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὅτι τεθηλέναι ποιεῖ ὥσπερ τὰ ἀρδόμενα;	And *thēly* (“female”) seems to be named from *thēlē* (“nipple”). And is *thēlē* so called, Hermogenes, because it makes things *tethēlenai* (“flourish”), as watered plants do?
	HERMOGENES ἔοικέν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**HERMOGENES** It looks that way, Socrates.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ “θάλλειν” τὴν αὔξην μοι δοκεῖ ἀπεικάζειν τὴν τῶν νέων, ὅτι ταχεῖα καὶ ἐξαιφνιδία γίγνεται. 414b οἷόνπερ οὖν μεμίμηται τῷ ὀνόματι, συναρμόσας ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν καὶ ἅλλεσθαι τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖς με ὥσπερ ἐκτὸς δρόμου φερόμενον ἐπειδὰν λείου ἐπιλάβωμαι· ἐπίλοιπα δὲ ἡμῖν ἔτι συχνὰ τῶν δοκούντων σπουδαίων εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** And *thallein* (“to bloom”) itself seems to me to depict the growth of the young, because it’s quick and sudden. 414b That’s just what the name-maker imitated with the name, putting it together from *thein* (“to run”) and *hallesthai* (“to leap”). But you aren’t watching me—I’m practically running off the track once I hit smooth ground. And we still have plenty left of the names that seem important.
414b	**HERMOGENES** ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**HERMOGENES** That’s true.
	SOCRATES ὧν γ’ ἔστιν ἓν καὶ “τέχνην” ἰδεῖν ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** One of which is to see what on earth *technē* (“craft”) means.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε ἕξιν νοῦ σημαίνει, τὸ μὲν ταῦ 414c ἀφελόντι, ἐμβαλόντι δὲ οὖ μεταξὺ τοῦ χεῖ καὶ τοῦ νῦ καὶ τοῦ νῦ καὶ τοῦ ἦτα;	**SOCRATES** Doesn’t it signify *hexis nou* (“possession of mind”), if you take away the tau 414c and put an omicron between the chi and the nu, and between the nu and the eta?[33]
414c	**HERMOGENES** καὶ μάλα γε γλίσχρως, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**HERMOGENES** That’s quite a strain, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ οἶσθ’ ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τεθέντα κατακέχωσται ἤδη ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγῳδεῖν αὐτά, περιτιθέντων γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιρούντων εὐστομίας ἕνεκα καὶ πανταχῇ στρεφόντων, καὶ ὑπὸ καλλωπισμοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρόνου. ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ “κατόπτρῳ” οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ ἐμβεβλῆσθαι τὸ ῥῶ; ἀλλὰ τοιαῦτα οἶμαι ποιοῦσιν οἱ τῆς μὲν 414d ἀληθείας οὐδὲν φροντίζοντες, τὸ δὲ στόμα πλάττοντες, ὥστ’ ἐπεμβάλλοντες πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τελευτῶντες ποιοῦσιν μηδ’ ἂν ἕνα ἀνθρώπων συνεῖναι ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα· ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν Σφίγγα ἀντὶ “φικὸς” “σφίγγα” καλοῦσιν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.	**SOCRATES** My dear fellow, don’t you know that the primary names given have long since been buried by people who want to dress them up in tragic style? They add letters and take them out for the sake of euphony, and twist them in every direction, partly for embellishment and partly through the passage of time. Take *katoptron* (“mirror”): don’t you think it odd that the rho has been put in? I think this is the sort of thing done by people who care nothing for 414d truth and only for how the words feel in the mouth. By piling more and more onto the primary names, they end up making it impossible for a single human being to understand what the name means. That’s how

32 *Anreia* suggests *ana* (“up,” “against”) and *rhein* (“to flow”): a flowing against.
33 The result, *echonoē*, suggests *echein noun*, “having mind.”

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		they call the Sphinx *Sphinx* instead of *Phix*, and there are many other examples.
414d	**HERMOGENES** ταῦτα μὲν ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**HERMOGENES** That's so, Socrates.
	SOCRATES εἰ δ' αὖ τις ἐάσει καὶ ἐντιθέναι καὶ ἐξαιρεῖν ἅττ' ἂν βούληταί τις εἰς τὰ ὀνόματα, πολλὴ εὐπορία ἔσται καὶ πᾶν ἂν παντί τις ὄνομα πράγματι προσαρμόσειεν.	**SOCRATES** On the other hand, if you allow people to put into names and take out of them whatever they like, it will be all too easy, and anyone could fit any name to any thing.
414e	**HERMOGENES** ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**HERMOGENES** That's true.
	SOCRATES ἀληθῆ μέντοι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέτριον οἶμαι δεῖ φυλάττειν καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς σὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐπιστάτην.	**SOCRATES** True indeed. But I think you, as our wise supervisor, must keep a watch on due measure and plausibility.
	HERMOGENES βουλοίμην ἄν.	**HERMOGENES** I'd like to.
	SOCRATES καὶ ἐγώ σοι συμβούλομαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες. ἀλλὰ μὴ 415a λίαν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀκριβολογοῦ, "μή μ' ἀπογυιώσῃς μένεος." ἔρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν ὧν εἴρηκα, ἐπειδὰν μετὰ τέχνην μηχανὴν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. "μηχανὴ" γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦ ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολὺ σημεῖον εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ "μῆκός" πως τὸ πολὺ σημαίνει· ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὖν τούτοιν σύγκειται, "μήκους" τε καὶ τοῦ "ἄνειν," τὸ ὄνομα ἡ "μηχανή." ἀλλ', ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν δεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλθεῖν· "ἀρετὴ" γὰρ καὶ "κακία" ὅτι βούλεται τὰ ὀνόματα 415b ζητητέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον οὔπω καθορῶ, τὸ δ' ἕτερον δοκεῖ μοι κατάδηλον εἶναι. συμφωνεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν πᾶσιν.	**SOCRATES** And I'd like that with you, Hermogenes. But don't be 415a too exacting, my good friend, "lest you sap me of my strength." I'm coming to the summit of what I've been saying, once we've looked at *mēchanē* ("contrivance") after *technē*. *Mēchanē* seems to me to be a sign of *anein epi poly* ("achieving a great deal"), since *mēkos* ("length") in a way signifies "a great deal." So the name *mēchanē* is made up of these two, *mēkos* and *anein*. But, as I was just saying, we must get to the summit of what has been said: we have to look into what the names *aretē* ("excellence") and *kakia* ("badness") 415b mean. One of them I can't yet make out, but the other seems to me perfectly clear, since it fits with everything that came before.[34]
415b	ἅτε γὰρ ἰόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, πᾶν τὸ κακῶς ἰὸν "κακία" ἂν εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ὅταν ἐν ψυχῇ ᾖ, τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα, μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει τῆς κακίας. τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἰέναι ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν, δοκεῖ μοι δηλοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ "δειλίᾳ," ὃ οὔπω διήλθομεν ἀλλ' 415c ὑπερέβημεν, δέον αὐτὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν σκέψασθαι· δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὑπερβεβηκέναι. ἡ δ' οὖν δειλία τῆς ψυχῆς σημαίνει δεσμὸν εἶναι ἰσχυρόν· τὸ γὰρ "λίαν" ἰσχύς τίς ἐστιν. δεσμὸς οὖν ὁ λίαν καὶ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δειλία ἂν εἴη· ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ ἀπορία κακόν, καὶ πᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ἂν ἐμποδὼν ᾖ τῷ ἰέναι καὶ πορεύεσθαι.	Since things are *ionta* ("going"), everything that is *kakōs ion* ("going badly") would be *kakia*. And when this going badly toward things is in the soul, it has the name for the whole, *kakia*, most of all. What going badly is, I think, is also shown in *deilia* ("cowardice"), which we haven't gone through yet but 415c skipped over, though we should have examined it after courage; and I think we've skipped over many others too. Well, *deilia* signifies that it is a strong *desmos* ("bond") of the soul, since *lian* ("too much") is a kind of strength. So *deilia* would be the excessive and greatest bond of the soul. Just as *aporia* ("having no way through") is an evil, and so, it seems, is everything that gets in the way of going and traveling.
415c	τοῦτ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι δηλοῦν, τὸ ἰσχομένως τε καὶ ἐμποδιζομένως πορεύεσθαι, ὃ δὴ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ,	This, then, is apparently what going badly shows: traveling held back and hindered. And when a

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	κακίᾳ μεστὴ γίγνεται. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ἡ "κακία" ἐστὶν τοὔνομα, τοὐναντίον τούτου ἡ "ἀρετὴ" ἂν εἴη, σημαῖνον πρῶτον [415d] μὲν εὐπορίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ λελυμένην τὴν ῥοὴν τῆς ἀγαθῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι ἀεί, ὥστε τὸ ἀσχέτως καὶ τὸ ἀκωλύτως ἀεὶ ῥέον ἐπωνυμίαν εἴληφεν, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ὃ ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔχει "ἀειρείτην" καλεῖν, ἴσως δὲ αἱρετὴν λέγει, ὡς οὔσης ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως αἱρετωτάτης, συγκεκρότηται δὲ καὶ καλεῖται "ἀρετή." καὶ ἴσως με αὖ φήσεις πλάττειν· ἐγὼ δέ φημι, εἴπερ ὃ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἡ "κακία," [415e] καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν "ἀρετὴν" ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.	soul has this, it becomes full of *kakia*. If *kakia* is the name for things like this, *aretē* would be the opposite. It would signify, first, [415d] *euporia* ("an easy way through"), and then that the flow of the good soul is always unbound. So this name, it seems, was given to what always flows unrestrained and unhindered. It would be correct to call it *aeirheitē* ("ever-flowing"), but perhaps it means *hairetē* ("choiceworthy"), since this is the most choiceworthy condition there is; and it's been squeezed together and is called *aretē*. And maybe you'll say I'm making things up again. But I say that if what I said before about *kakia* is correct, [415e] then this name *aretē* is correct too.
416a	**HERMOGENES** τὸ δὲ δὴ "κακόν," δι' οὗ πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηκας, τί ἂν νοοῖ τοὔνομα;	**HERMOGENES** And *kakon* ("bad"), which you've used to explain many of the earlier names: what could that name mean?
	SOCRATES ἄτοπόν τι νὴ Δία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ χαλεπὸν συμβαλεῖν. ἐπάγω οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐκείνην τὴν μηχανήν.	**SOCRATES** Something strange, by Zeus, it seems to me, and hard to make out. So I'll bring that device of mine to bear on this one too.
	HERMOGENES ποίαν ταύτην;	**HERMOGENES** Which one?
	SOCRATES τὴν τοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι καὶ τοῦτο φάναι εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** Saying that this one too is something foreign.
	HERMOGENES καὶ ἔοικάς γε ὀρθῶς λέγοντι. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ταῦτα μὲν ἐῶμεν, τὸ δὲ "καλὸν" καὶ τὸ "αἰσχρὸν" πειρώμεθα ἰδεῖν πῇ εὐλόγως ἔχει.	**HERMOGENES** And you may well be right. But if you agree, let's leave these and try to see how *kalon* ("beautiful," "fine") and *aischron* ("shameful") are reasonably named.
	SOCRATES τὸ μὲν τοίνυν "αἰσχρὸν" καὶ δὴ κατάδηλόν μοι [416b] φαίνεται ὃ νοεῖ· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογεῖται. τὸ γὰρ ἐμποδίζον καὶ ἴσχον τῆς ῥοῆς τὰ ὄντα λοιδορεῖν μοι φαίνεται διὰ παντὸς ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθείς, καὶ νῦν τῷ ἀεὶ ἴσχοντι τὸν ῥοῦν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔθετο τὸ "ἀεισχοροῦν"· νῦν δὲ συγκροτήσαντες "αἰσχρὸν" καλοῦσιν.	**SOCRATES** Well, it already seems to me [416b] perfectly clear what *aischron* means, since it too fits with what came before. The name-maker seems to me to disparage, at every turn, whatever hinders things and *ischon* ("holds them back") from their flow. And here he gave the name *aeischoroun* to what *aei ischei ton rhoun* ("always holds back the flow"). But now they've squeezed it together and call it *aischron*.
416b	**HERMOGENES** τί δὲ τὸ "καλόν";	**HERMOGENES** And what about *kalon*?
	SOCRATES τοῦτο χαλεπώτερον κατανοῆσαι. καίτοι λέγει γε αὐτό· ἁρμονίᾳ μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ οὗ παρῆκται.	**SOCRATES** That's harder to understand. And yet it says it outright: it's been altered only in its accent and in the length of the omicron.
	HERMOGENES πῶς δή;	**HERMOGENES** How so?

34 The quotation is from Homer, *Iliad* 6.265, where Hector refuses the wine his mother offers him.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES τῆς διανοίας τις ἔοικεν ἐπωνυμία εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα.	**SOCRATES** This name seems to be a name for *dianoia* (“thought”).
	HERMOGENES πῶς λέγεις;	**HERMOGENES** What do you mean?
416c	**SOCRATES** φέρε, τί οἴει σὺ εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον κληθῆναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων; ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τὰ ὀνόματα θέμενον;	**SOCRATES** Tell me, what do you think is the cause of each thing’s being *klēthēnai* (“called”) what it is? Isn’t it whatever gave the names?
	HERMOGENES πάντως που.	**HERMOGENES** Of course, I suppose.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν διάνοια ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἤτοι θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀμφότερα;	**SOCRATES** And wouldn’t this be the thought of gods, or of human beings, or of both?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὸ καλέσαν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὸ καλοῦν ταὐτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο, διάνοια;	**SOCRATES** And isn’t what *kalesan* (“called”) things and what *kaloun* (“calls”) them one and the same thing, namely thought?
	HERMOGENES φαίνεται.	**HERMOGENES** Apparently.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσα μὲν ἂν νοῦς τε καὶ διάνοια ἐργάσηται, ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐπαινετά, ἃ δὲ μή, ψεκτά;	**SOCRATES** And whatever mind and thought produce is praiseworthy, and whatever they don’t is blameworthy?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
416d	**SOCRATES** τὸ οὖν ἰατρικὸν ἰατρικὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ τεκτονικὸν τεκτονικά; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** Now, what practices medicine produces works of medicine, and what practices carpentry produces works of carpentry? Or how would you put it?
	HERMOGENES οὕτως ἔγωγε.	**HERMOGENES** That’s how I’d put it.
	SOCRATES καὶ τὸ καλοῦν ἄρα καλά;	**SOCRATES** And so what *kaloun* (“calls”) produces *kala* (“fine things”)?
	HERMOGENES δεῖ γέ τοι.	**HERMOGENES** It must, surely.
	SOCRATES ἔστι δέ γε τοῦτο, ὥς φαμεν, διάνοια;	**SOCRATES** And this, we say, is thought?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ὀρθῶς ἄρα φρονήσεως αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶν τὸ “καλὸν” τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζομένης, ἃ δὴ καλὰ φάσκοντες εἶναι ἀσπαζόμεθα.	**SOCRATES** So this name *kalon* is rightly a name for the understanding that produces the sort of things we call fine and welcome.
	HERMOGENES φαίνεται.	**HERMOGENES** Apparently.

PROFIT, HARM AND THE PASSIONS

Words for profit and harm, then pleasure, pain, desire, love and opinion, are traced to flow.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
416e	**SOCRATES** τί οὖν ἔτι ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῶν τοιούτων;	

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		SOCRATES So what do we still have left of this kind?
	HERMOGENES ταῦτα τὰ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν, συμφέροντά [417a] τε καὶ λυσιτελοῦντα καὶ ὠφέλιμα καὶ κερδαλέα καὶ τἀναντία τούτων.	**HERMOGENES** The ones connected with the good and the fine: *sympheronta* ("advantageous"), [417a] *lysitelounta* ("profitable"), *ōphelima* ("beneficial"), *kerdalea* ("gainful"), and their opposites.
417a	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν "συμφέρον" ἤδη που κἂν σὺ εὕροις ἐκ τῶν πρότερον ἐπισκοπῶν· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἀδελφόν τι φαίνεται. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο δηλοῖ ἢ τὴν ἅμα φορὰν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου πραττόμενα "συμφέροντά" τε καὶ "σύμφορα" κεκλῆσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ συμπεριφέρεσθαι ἔοικε, τὸ δέ γε "κερδαλέον" ἀπὸ τοῦ [417b] κέρδους. "κέρδος" δὲ νῦ ἀντὶ τοῦ δέλτα ἀποδιδόντι ἐς τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ὀνομάζει. ὅτι γὰρ κεράννυται ἐς πάντα διεξιόν, ταύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπονομάζων ἔθετο τοὔνομα· δέλτα δ' ἐνθεὶς ἀντὶ τοῦ νῦ "κέρδος" ἐφθέγξατο.	**SOCRATES** Well, by now you could probably find *sympheron* for yourself if you looked back at what we said earlier, since it seems to be a sibling of *epistēmē*. It shows nothing other than the soul's moving along together with things. And what is done by something like that seems to have been called *sympheronta* and *symphora* from *symperipheresthai* ("being carried around together"). And *kerdaleon* comes from [417b] *kerdos* ("gain"). *Kerdos* shows what it means if you put a nu back into the name in place of the delta, since it names the good in another way. Because the good *kerannytai* ("is mixed") into everything as it passes through, the name-maker named this power of it when he gave the name. But by putting in a delta in place of the nu, he pronounced it *kerdos*.
417b	**HERMOGENES** "Λυσιτελοῦν" δὲ τί δή;	**HERMOGENES** And what about *lysiteloun* ("profitable")?
	SOCRATES ἔοικεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, οὐχὶ καθάπερ οἱ κάπηλοι αὐτῷ χρῶνται, ἐὰν τὸ ἀνάλωμα ἀπολύῃ, οὐ ταύτῃ λέγειν [417c] μοι δοκεῖ τὸ "λυσιτελοῦν," ἀλλ' ὅτι τάχιστον ὂν τοῦ ὄντος ἵστασθαι οὐκ ἐᾷ τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲ τέλος λαβοῦσαν τὴν φορὰν τοῦ φέρεσθαι στῆναί τε καὶ παύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ λύει αὐτῆς ἄν τι ἐπιχειρῇ τέλος ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ παρέχει ἄπαυστον καὶ ἀθάνατον αὐτήν, ταύτῃ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιφημίσαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν λυσιτελοῦν· τὸ γὰρ τῆς φορᾶς λύον τὸ τέλος "λυσιτελοῦν" καλέσαι. "ὠφέλιμον" δὲ ξενικὸν τοὔνομα, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ κέχρηται, τῷ "ὀφέλλειν"· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ αὔξειν καὶ ποιεῖν ἐπωνυμία.	**SOCRATES** It seems, Hermogenes, that he doesn't mean it the way tradespeople use the word, of something that pays back (*apolyē*) its outlay. That isn't the sense in which, [417c] I think, he says *lysiteloun*. Rather, the good is the swiftest of all that is. It doesn't let things stand still, or let the motion of their being carried along reach an end (*telos*) and halt and stop. Instead it always releases (*lyei*) any end that tries to arise in that motion, and keeps it unceasing and immortal. That, I think, is why he applied the name *lysiteloun* to the good: he called what releases the end of motion *lysiteloun*. *Ōphelimon* ("beneficial") is a foreign name, from *ophellein*, which Homer uses in many places. It's a name for increasing and making.
417d	**HERMOGENES** τὰ δὲ δὴ τούτων ἐναντία πῶς ἔχει ἡμῖν;	**HERMOGENES** And how do we stand with the opposites of these?
	SOCRATES ὅσα μὲν ἀπόφησιν αὐτῶν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτα διεξιέναι.	**SOCRATES** The ones that simply negate them don't need to be gone through, as far as I can see.
	HERMOGENES ποῖα ταῦτα;	**HERMOGENES** Which ones are those?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES "ἀσύμφορον" καὶ "ἀνωφελὲς" καὶ "ἀλυσιτελὲς" καὶ "ἀκερδές."	**SOCRATES** *Asymphoron* ("disadvantageous"), *anōpheles* ("unbeneficial"), *alysiteles* ("unprofitable"), and *akerdes* ("ungainful").
	HERMOGENES ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**HERMOGENES** That's true.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ "βλαβερόν" γε καὶ "ζημιῶδες."	**SOCRATES** But *blaberon* ("harmful") and *zēmiōdes* ("damaging") are another matter.
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ τὸ μέν γε "βλαβερὸν" τὸ [417e] βλάπτον τὸν ῥοῦν εἶναι λέγει· τὸ δὲ "βλάπτον" αὖ σημαίνει βουλόμενον ἅπτειν· τὸ δὲ "ἅπτειν" καὶ δεῖν ταὐτόν ἐστι, τοῦτο δὲ πανταχοῦ ψέγει. τὸ βουλόμενον οὖν ἅπτειν ῥοῦν ὀρθότατα μὲν ἂν εἴη "βουλαπτεροῦν," καλλωπισθὲν δὲ καλεῖσθαί μοι φαίνεται "βλαβερόν."	**SOCRATES** Now, *blaberon* says that it is what [417e] harms (*blapton*) the flow (*rhous*). *Blapton*, in turn, signifies what wants to fasten (*boulomenon haptein*). Fastening is the same as binding, and binding is something he finds fault with everywhere. So what wants to fasten the flow would most correctly be *boulapteroun*. But I think it has been prettied up and is called *blaberon*.
417e	**HERMOGENES** ποικίλα γέ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκβαίνει τὰ ὀνόματα. καὶ γὰρ νῦν μοι ἔδοξας ὥσπερ τοῦ τῆς Ἀθηνάας νόμου προαύλιον στομαυλῆσαι, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα προειπὼν τὸ [418a] "βουλαπτεροῦν."	**HERMOGENES** The names certainly come out intricate when you handle them, Socrates! Just now, when you produced that name [418a] *boulapteroun*, you sounded to me as if you were puffing out the prelude to the Hymn of Athena on the pipes.[35]
418a	**SOCRATES** οὐκ ἐγώ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, αἴτιος, ἀλλ' οἱ θέμενοι τὸ ὄνομα.	**SOCRATES** I'm not to blame, Hermogenes. The people who gave the name are.
	HERMOGENES ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ "ζημιῶδες" τί ἂν εἴη;	**HERMOGENES** True. But then what would *zēmiōdes* be?
	SOCRATES τί δ' ἂν εἴη ποτὲ "ζημιῶδες"; θέασαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω λέγων ὅτι προστιθέντες γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιροῦντες σφόδρα ἀλλοιοῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων διανοίας, οὕτως ὥστε σμικρὰ πάνυ παραστρέφοντες ἐνίοτε τἀναντία [418b] ποιεῖν σημαίνειν. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῷ "δέοντι"· ἐνενόησα γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνεμνήσθην ἄρτι ἀπὸ τοῦδε ὃ ἔμελλόν σοι ἐρεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν νέα φωνὴ ἡμῖν ἡ καλὴ αὐτὴ καὶ τοὐναντίον περιέτρεψε μηνύειν τὸ "δέον" καὶ τὸ "ζημιῶδες," ἀφανίζουσα ὅτι νοεῖ, ἡ δὲ παλαιὰ ἀμφότερον δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται τοὔνομα.	**SOCRATES** What on earth could *zēmiōdes* be? Look, Hermogenes, how right I was when I said that people change the meanings of names drastically by adding and removing letters. A very small twist is sometimes enough to [418b] make a name mean the opposite. Take *deon* ("what is needful"), for example. It came to my mind just now, and this word reminded me of what I was about to tell you. This fine new pronunciation of ours has turned both *deon* and *zēmiōdes* around to indicate the opposite, obscuring what they mean. The old pronunciation, by contrast, shows what each name intends.
418b	**HERMOGENES** πῶς λέγεις;	**HERMOGENES** What do you mean?
	SOCRATES ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι τῷ ἰῶτα καὶ τῷ δέλτα εὖ μάλα ἐχρῶντο, καὶ οὐχ	**SOCRATES** I'll tell you. You know that our ancestors made a great deal of use of iota and delta, and

35 The Hymn (*nomos*) of Athena was a famous solo piece for the aulos, a reed pipe. Hermogenes is joking that the long, puffed-out word sounds like its overture.

GREEK

ENGLISH

ἥκιστα [418c] αἱ γυναῖκες, αἵπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σῴζουσι. νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἰῶτα ἢ εἶ ἢ ἦτα μεταστρέφουσιν, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ δέλτα ζῆτα, ὡς δὴ μεγαλοπρεπέστερα ὄντα.

not least [418c] the women, who more than anyone preserve the old way of speaking. Nowadays, though, people turn iota into epsilon or eta, and delta into zeta, on the grounds that these sound grander.

418c **HERMOGENES** πῶς δή;

HERMOGENES How so?

SOCRATES οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότατοι "ἱμέραν" τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάλουν, οἱ δὲ "ἑμέραν," οἱ δὲ νῦν "ἡμέραν."

SOCRATES For example, the very earliest people called day *himera*, later ones *hemera*, and people now say *hēmera*.

HERMOGENES ἔστι ταῦτα.

HERMOGENES That's so.

SOCRATES οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι μόνον τούτων δηλοῖ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄνομα τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ θεμένου; ὅτι γὰρ ἀσμένοις τοῖς [418d] ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἱμείρουσιν ἐκ τοῦ σκότους τὸ φῶς ἐγίγνετο, ταύτῃ ὠνόμασαν "ἱμέραν."

SOCRATES Then do you know that of these names only the old one reveals the thought of the person who gave it? Light came out of the darkness to [418d] human beings who welcomed it and longed (*himeirousin*) for it, and so they named it *himera*.

418d **HERMOGENES** φαίνεται.

HERMOGENES Apparently.

SOCRATES νῦν δέ γε τετραγῳδημένον οὐδ' ἂν κατανοήσαις ὅτι βούλεται ἡ "ἡμέρα." καίτοι τινὲς οἴονται, ὡς δὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἥμερα ποιεῖ, διὰ ταῦτα ὠνομάσθαι αὐτὴν οὕτως.

SOCRATES But now that it's been dressed up in tragic grandeur, you couldn't even work out what *hēmera* means. Some people actually think day got this name because it makes things gentle (*hēmera*).

HERMOGENES δοκεῖ μοι.

HERMOGENES I think so too.

SOCRATES καὶ τό γε "ζυγὸν" οἶσθα ὅτι "δυογὸν" οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκάλουν.

SOCRATES And you know that the ancients called a yoke (*zygon*) a *duogon*.

HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.

HERMOGENES Certainly.

SOCRATES καὶ τὸ μέν γε "ζυγὸν" οὐδὲν δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ τοῖν [418e] δυοῖν ἕνεκα τῆς δέσεως ἐς τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπωνόμασται "δυογὸν" δικαίως· νῦν δὲ "ζυγόν." καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα οὕτως ἔχει.

SOCRATES *Zygon* shows nothing. *Duogon*, though, was rightly named for binding two (*duo*) [418e] together for hauling. Now it's *zygon*. A great many other words are like this.

418e **HERMOGENES** φαίνεται.

HERMOGENES Apparently.

SOCRATES κατὰ ταὐτὰ τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν τὸ "δέον" οὕτω λεγόμενον τοὐναντίον σημαίνει πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀνόμασιν· ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἰδέα οὖσα τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς εἶναι καὶ κώλυμα φορᾶς, ὥσπερ ἀδελφὸν ὂν τοῦ βλαβεροῦ.

SOCRATES In the same way, then, first of all *deon*, pronounced as it is now, means the opposite of all the names connected with the good. Though it is a kind of good, *deon* appears to be a bond (*desmos*) and a hindrance to motion, a sort of brother of *blaberon*.

HERMOGENES καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω φαίνεται.

HERMOGENES It certainly does look that way, Socrates.

SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐὰν τῷ ἀρχαίῳ ὀνόματι χρῇ, ὃ πολὺ [419a] μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστιν ὀρθῶς κεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ νῦν, ἀλλ' ὁμολογήσει τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀγαθοῖς, ἐὰν ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶ τὸ ἰῶτα ἀποδιδῷς, ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιόν· διϊὸν γὰρ αὖ σημαίνει,

SOCRATES But not if you use the old name, which is much [419a] more likely to have been given correctly than the present one. If you put back iota in place of epsilon, as people did long ago, it will

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ἀλλ' οὐ δέον, τἀγαθόν, ὅπερ δὴ ἐπαινεῖ. καὶ οὕτω οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενος, ἀλλὰ "δέον" καὶ "ὠφέλιμον" καὶ "λυσιτελοῦν" καὶ "κερδαλέον" καὶ "ἀγαθὸν" καὶ "συμφέρον" καὶ "εὔπορον" τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται, ἑτέροις ὀνόμασι σημαῖνον τὸ διακοσμοῦν καὶ ἰὸν πανταχοῦ ἐγκεκωμιασμένον, [419b] τὸ δὲ ἴσχον καὶ δοῦν ψεγόμενον. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ "ζημιῶδες," ἐὰν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν ἀποδῷς ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆτα δέλτα, φανεῖταί σοι κεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῷ δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν, ἐπονομασθὲν "δημιῶδες."

agree with the earlier names for good things. Then it signifies the good as *diïon* ("going through"), not as *deon*, and going through is precisely what he praises. That way the one who gave the names doesn't contradict himself. *Deon*, *ōphelimon*, *lysiteloun*, *kerdaleon* ("gainful"), *agathon* ("good"), *sympheron* ("advantageous"), and *euporon* ("resourceful") all turn out to be the same thing under different names. Each signifies what orders and goes, which is praised everywhere, [419b] while what holds back and binds is found fault with. And *zēmiōdes*, too: if you restore delta in place of zeta, as in the old pronunciation, you'll see that the name was given to what binds (*dounti*) what goes (*ion*), and was named *dēmiōdes*.

419b **HERMOGENES** τί δὲ δὴ "ἡδονὴ" καὶ "λύπη" καὶ "ἐπιθυμία" καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

HERMOGENES And what about *hēdonē* ("pleasure"), *lypē* ("pain"), *epithymia* ("desire"), and the like, Socrates?

SOCRATES οὐ πάνυ χαλεπά μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες. ἥ τε γὰρ "ἡδονή," ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὄνησιν ἔοικε τείνουσα πρᾶξις τοῦτο ἔχειν τὸ ὄνομα—τὸ δέλτα δὲ ἔγκειται, ὥστε "ἡδονὴ" [419c] ἀντὶ "ἡονῆς" καλεῖται—ἥ τε "λύπη" ἀπὸ τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος ἔοικεν ἐπωνομάσθαι ἣν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει ἴσχει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἥ γε "ἀνία" τὸ ἐμποδίζον τοῦ ἰέναι. ἡ δὲ "ἀλγηδὼν" ξενικόν τι φαίνεταί μοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ ὠνομασμένον. "ὀδύνη" δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης κεκλημένη ἔοικεν. "ἀχθηδὼν" δὲ καὶ παντὶ δῆλον ἀπεικασμένον τὸ ὄνομα τῷ τῆς φορᾶς βάρει. "χαρὰ" δὲ τῇ διαχύσει καὶ εὐπορίᾳ τῆς ῥοῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔοικε κεκλημένη.

SOCRATES They don't seem very hard to me, Hermogenes. *Hēdonē* seems to get its name from being the activity that tends toward benefit (*onēsis*). The delta has been inserted, so that it's called *hēdonē* [419c] instead of *hēonē*. *Lypē* seems to have been named from the dissolution (*dialysis*) the body suffers in this condition. *Ania* ("distress") is what hinders going (*ienai*). *Algēdōn* ("suffering") looks to me like a foreign word, named from *algeinos* ("painful"). *Odynē* ("anguish") seems to be named from pain's putting itself on (*endysis*). As for *achthēdōn* ("vexation"), it's plain to anyone that the name is a likeness of the heaviness of motion. *Chara* ("joy") seems to be named for the spreading out (*diachysis*) and easy passage of the soul's flow.

419d "τέρψις" δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τερπνοῦ· τὸ δὲ "τερπνὸν" ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕρψεως πνοῆ ἀπεικασθὲν κέκληται, ἐν δίκῃ μὲν ἂν "ἕρπνουν" καλούμενον, ὑπὸ χρόνου δὲ "τερπνὸν" παρηγμένον. "εὐφροσύνη" δὲ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι ῥηθῆναι· παντὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν συμφέρεσθαι τοῦτο ἔλαβε τὸ ὄνομα, "εὐφεροσύνην" τό γε δίκαιον· ὅμως δὲ αὐτὸ καλοῦμεν "εὐφροσύνην." οὐδ' "ἐπιθυμία" χαλεπόν· τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰούσῃ [419e] δυνάμει δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα. "θυμὸς" δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοι ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα.

Terpsis ("delight") comes from *terpnon* ("delightful"). *Terpnon* is so called because it is likened to the creeping (*herpsis*) of a breath (*pnoē*) through the soul. By rights it would be called *herpnoun*, but over time it has been altered into *terpnon*. *Euphrosynē* ("cheerfulness") needs no explanation of why it's so called. It's plain to anyone that it got its name from the soul's moving well (*eu*) along with things (*syphēresthai*). By rights it would be *eupherosynē*, but we call it *euphrosynē* all the same. Nor is *epithymia* difficult. The name was obviously given to the power [419e] that goes toward (*epi*) *thymos* ("spirit"). And *thymos* would get its name from the raging (*thysis*) and boiling of the soul.

419e

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ἀλλὰ μὴν "ἵμερός" γε τῷ μάλιστα ἕλκοντι τὴν ψυχὴν ῥῷ
420a ἐπωνομάσθη· ὅτι γὰρ ἱέμενος ῥεῖ καὶ ἐφιέμενος τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐπισπᾷ σφόδρα τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν ἕσιν τῆς ῥοῆς, ἀπὸ ταύτης οὖν πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως "ἵμερος" ἐκλήθη. καὶ μὴν "πόθος" αὖ καλεῖται σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἱμέρου τε καὶ ῥεύματος ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἄλλοθί που ὄντος καὶ ἀπόντος, ὅθεν "πόθος" ἐπωνόμασται ὃς τότε, ὅταν παρῇ οὗ τις ἐφίετο, "ἵμερος" ἐκαλεῖτο· ἀπογενομένου δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος "πόθος" ἐκλήθη.

And then there's *himeros* ("longing"), named for the stream (*rhous*) that draws the soul most strongly. 420a It flows (*rhei*) with a rush (*hiemenos*), aiming at things, and so it pulls hard on the soul through the rushing of its flow. From this whole power it was called *himeros*. *Pothos* ("yearning"), in turn, is so called because it signifies a longing and flow directed not at what is present but at what is somewhere (*pou*) else and absent. That is why it's been named *pothos*. When what someone was aiming at was present, the very same thing was called *himeros*. When that had gone away, it was called *pothos*.

420a "ἔρως" δέ, ὅτι εἰσρεῖ ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οἰκεία ἐστὶν ἡ ῥοὴ
420b αὕτη τῷ ἔχοντι ἀλλ' ἐπείσακτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐσρεῖν "ἔσρος" τό γε παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο — τῷ γὰρ οὖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὦ ἐχρώμεθα—νῦν δ' "ἔρως" κέκληται διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὦ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὖ μεταλλαγήν. ἀλλὰ τί ἔτι σὺ λέγεις ὅτι σκοπῶμεν;

Erōs ("love") is so called because it flows in (*eisrei*) from outside. This flow 420b doesn't belong to the one who has it; it is brought in through the eyes. For this reason it was called *esros* in the old days, from "flowing in" (*esrein*), since we used to use omicron where we now use omega. Now it is called *erōs* because omicron was changed to omega. But what else do you say we should examine?

420b **HERMOGENES** "δόξα" καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πῇ σοι φαίνεται;

HERMOGENES How do *doxa* ("opinion") and words like that look to you?

SOCRATES "δόξα" δὴ ἤτοι τῇ διώξει ἐπωνόμασται, ἢν ἡ ψυχὴ διώκουσα τὸ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ ἔχει τὰ πράγματα πορεύεται, ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόξου βολῇ. ἔοικε δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον. ἡ 420c γοῦν "οἴησις" τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ. "οἶσιν" γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν πρᾶγμα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, δηλούσῃ προσέοικεν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ "βουλή" πως τὴν βολήν, καὶ τὸ "βούλεσθαι" τὸ ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ "βουλεύεσθαι"· πάντα ταῦτα δόξῃ ἑπόμεν' ἄττα φαίνεται τῆς βολῆς ἀπεικάσματα, ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἡ "ἀβουλία" ἀτυχία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὡς οὐ βαλόντος οὐδὲ τυχόντος οὗ τ' ἔβαλλε καὶ ὃ ἐβούλετο καὶ περὶ οὗ ἐβουλεύετο καὶ οὗ ἐφίετο.

SOCRATES *Doxa* has been named either for the pursuit (*diōxis*) the soul engages in as it makes its way in pursuit of knowing how things are, or for the shot from a bow (*toxon*). The latter seems more likely. 420c *Oiēsis* ("belief"), at any rate, chimes with it. It seems to indicate the soul's motion (*oisis*) toward every thing, toward what each of the things that are is like. In the same way *boulē* ("counsel") somehow indicates a shot (*bolē*), and *boulesthai* ("to want") and *bouleuesthai* ("to deliberate") mean aiming at something. All these words, following *doxa*, appear to be likenesses of a shot. And conversely, *aboulia* ("ill-advisedness") seems to be a failure to hit, as when someone has not shot at or hit what he was aiming at, what he wanted, what he was deliberating about, what he was striving for.

420d **HERMOGENES** ταῦτα ἤδη μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πυκνότερα ἐπάγειν.

HERMOGENES You seem to me to be piling these on thicker and faster now, Socrates.

SOCRATES τέλος γὰρ ἤδη θέω. "ἀνάγκην" δ' οὖν ἔτι βούλομαι διαπερᾶναι, ὅτι τούτοις ἑξῆς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ "ἑκούσιον." τὸ μὲν οὖν "ἑκούσιον," τὸ εἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀντιτυποῦν ἀλλ', ὥσπερ λέγω, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι

SOCRATES That's because I'm already racing for the finish. But I still want to get through *anankē* ("necessity"), since it comes next, and *hekousion* ("voluntary"). *Hekousion* would signify what yields

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δεδηλωμένον ἂν εἴη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, τῷ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν γιγνομένῳ· τὸ δὲ "ἀναγκαῖον" καὶ ἀντίτυπον, παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν ὄν, τὸ περὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀμαθίαν, ἀπείκασται δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὰ [420e] ἄγκη πορείᾳ, ὅτι δύσπορα καὶ τραχέα καὶ λάσια ὄντα ἴσχει τοῦ ἰέναι. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἴσως ἐκλήθη "ἀναγκαῖον," τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἄγκους ἀπεικασθὲν πορείᾳ. ἕως δὲ πάρεστιν ἡ ῥώμη, μὴ ἀνιῶμεν αὐτήν· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ μὴ ἀνίει, ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα.	(*eikon*) and doesn't resist, what yields, as I say, to what is going. That is what happens in accordance with one's will. *Anankaion* ("necessary"), on the other hand, is what resists and runs contrary to one's will, and so it would have to do with error and ignorance. It is likened to a journey through [420e] ravines (*ankē*), because they are hard to get through, rough, and overgrown, and hold one back from going. That may be why it was called *anankaion*, likened to a journey through a ravine. But while my strength lasts, let's not slacken it. And don't you slacken either: keep asking.
421a **HERMOGENES** ἐρωτῶ δὴ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα, τήν τε "ἀλήθειαν" καὶ τὸ "ψεῦδος" καὶ τὸ "ὂν" καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν, "ὄνομα," δι' ὅτι τὸ ὄνομα ἔχει.	**HERMOGENES** Then I'm asking about the greatest and finest of them: *alētheia* ("truth"), *pseudos* ("falsehood"), *on* ("what is"), and the very thing our discussion is now about, *onoma* ("name"). Why does each have the name it has?
SOCRATES μαίεσθαι οὖν καλεῖς τι;	**SOCRATES** Is there something you call *maiesthai*?
HERMOGENES ἔγωγε, τό γε ζητεῖν.	**HERMOGENES** Yes, I do: searching.
SOCRATES ἔοικε τοίνυν ἐκ λόγου ὀνόματι συγκεκροτημένῳ, λέγοντος ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὄν, οὗ τυγχάνει ζήτημα ὄν, τὸ "ὄνομα." μᾶλλον δὲ ἂν αὐτὸ γνοίης ἐν ᾧ λέγομεν τὸ "ὀνομαστόν"· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ σαφῶς λέγει τοῦτο εἶναι ὃν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν. [421b] ἡ δ' "ἀλήθεια," καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔοικε συγκεκροτῆσθαι· ἡ γὰρ θεία τοῦ ὄντος φορὰ ἔοικε προσειρῆσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι, τῇ "ἀληθείᾳ," ὡς θεία οὖσα ἄλη. τὸ δὲ "ψεῦδος" τοὐναντίον τῇ φορᾷ· πάλιν γὰρ αὖ λοιδορούμενον ἥκει τὸ ἰσχόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον ἡσυχάζειν, ἀπείκασται δὲ τοῖς καθεύδουσι· τὸ ψεῖ δὲ προσγενόμενον ἐπικρύπτει τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ ὀνόματος. τὸ δὲ "ὂν" καὶ ἡ "οὐσία" ὁμολογεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ ἰῶτα ἀπολαβόν· ἰὸν γὰρ [421c] σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ "οὐκ ὄν" αὖ, ὥς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτό, "οὐκ ἰόν."	**SOCRATES** Then *onoma* seems to be a name hammered together from a phrase that says: "this is a being (*on*) that happens to be the object of a search." You'd see it more clearly in the word *onomaston* ("nameable"). There it plainly says that this is a being of which there is a search (*on hou masma estin*). [421b] *Alētheia* also seems to have been hammered together like the others. The divine motion of what is seems to be addressed by this word, *alētheia*, as a divine wandering (*theia alē*). *Pseudos* is the opposite of motion. Once again, what is held back and forced to be at rest comes in for abuse, and it is likened to people sleeping (*katheudousi*). But the added psi hides what the name means. *On* and *ousia* ("being") agree with *alēthes* ("true") once they lose the iota, since they mean *ion* ("going"). [421c] And *ouk on* ("what is not"), in turn, means *ouk ion* ("not going"), and in fact some people call it that.

THE PRIMARY NAMES

Analysis must stop at primary names, which can only show things by imitating them in sound.

GREEK	ENGLISH
421c **HERMOGENES** ταῦτα μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνδρείως πάνυ διακεκροτηκέναι· εἰ δέ τίς σε ἔροιτο τοῦτο τὸ "ἰὸν" καὶ τὸ "ῥέον" καὶ τὸ "δοῦν," τίνα ἔχει ὀρθότητα ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα—	**HERMOGENES** You seem to me to have hammered these out very bravely, Socrates. But suppose someone asked you about this *ion* and

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		rheon (“flowing”) and *doun* (“binding”), and what correctness these names have—
	SOCRATES “τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα;” λέγεις; ἦ γάρ;	SOCRATES “What would we answer him?” Is that what you mean?
	HERMOGENES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	HERMOGENES Exactly.
	SOCRATES ἓν μὲν τοίνυν ἄρτι που ἐπορισάμεθα ὥστε δοκεῖν τὶ λέγειν ἀποκρινόμενοι.	SOCRATES Well, we came up with one way just now to seem to be saying something when we answer.
	HERMOGENES τὸ ποῖον τοῦτο;	HERMOGENES What was that?
	SOCRATES φάναι, ὃ ἂν μὴ γιγνώσκωμεν, βαρβαρικόν τι τοῦτ’ [421d] εἶναι. εἴη μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἄν τι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν, εἴη δὲ κἂν ὑπὸ παλαιότητος τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνεύρετα εἶναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πανταχῇ στρέφεσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἂν εἰ ἡ παλαιὰ φωνὴ πρὸς τὴν νυνὶ βαρβαρικῆς μηδὲν διαφέρει.	SOCRATES To say that whatever we don’t understand is something foreign. [421d] Perhaps some of them really are like that. But it could also be that the primary names can’t be discovered because they are so old. Names get twisted in every direction, so it would be no wonder if the old language were no different from a foreign one compared with ours today.
421d	HERMOGENES καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις.	HERMOGENES There’s certainly nothing unreasonable in what you say.
	SOCRATES λέγω γὰρ οὖν εἰκότα. οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ προφάσεις ἀγὼν δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ προθυμητέον ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἐνθυμηθῶμεν δέ, εἴ τις ἀεί, δι’ ὧν ἂν λέγηται τὸ [421e] ὄνομα, ἐκεῖνα ἀνερήσεται τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ αὖθις αὖ δι’ ὧν ἂν τὰ ῥήματα λεχθῇ, ἐκεῖνα πεύσεται, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ παύσεται ποιῶν, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα ἀπειπεῖν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον;	SOCRATES Yes, what I’m saying is plausible. But I don’t think this contest allows excuses. We must be eager to examine these names thoroughly. Let’s consider this. Suppose someone keeps asking about the words through which the [421e] name is expressed, and then asks about the words through which those words are expressed, and never stops doing this. Won’t the person answering have to give up in the end?
421e	HERMOGENES ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	HERMOGENES I think so.
422a	SOCRATES πότε οὖν ἀπειπὼν ὁ ἀπαγορεύων δικαίως παύοιτο ἄν; ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γένηται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ἃ ὡσπερεὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ λόγων καὶ ὀνομάτων; ταῦτα γάρ που οὐκέτι δίκαιον φανῆναι ἐξ ἄλλων ὀνομάτων συγκείμενα, ἂν οὕτως ἔχῃ. οἷον νυνδὴ τὸ “ἀγαθὸν” ἔφαμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαστοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θοοῦ συγκεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ “θοὸν” ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν ἐξ ἑτέρων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων· [422b] ἀλλ’ ἐάν ποτέ γε λάβωμεν ὃ οὐκέτι ἔκ τινων ἑτέρων σύγκειται ὀνομάτων, δικαίως ἂν φαῖμεν ἐπὶ στοιχείῳ τε ἤδη εἶναι καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἡμᾶς δεῖν εἰς ἄλλα ὀνόματα ἀναφέρειν.	SOCRATES Then at what point would the one who gives up be right to stop? Wouldn’t it be when he reaches the names that are like elements of the other phrases and names? Those, presumably, if this is how things stand, should no longer be shown to be composed of other names. For example, we said just now that *agathon* is composed of *agaston* (“admirable”) and *thoon* (“swift”). Perhaps we’d say that *thoon* comes from other words, and those from still others. [422b] But if we ever reach a name that is no longer composed of any other names, we’d be right to say we have now reached an element, and that we must no longer trace it back to other names.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
422b	**HERMOGENES** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.	**HERMOGENES** I think you're right.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν καὶ νῦν ἃ γ' ἐρωτᾷς τὰ ὀνόματα στοιχεῖα ὄντα τυγχάνει, καὶ δεῖ αὐτῶν ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἤδη τὴν ὀρθότητα ἐπισκέψασθαι ἥτις ἐστίν;	**SOCRATES** So are the names you're asking about now in fact elements? And must we now examine their correctness, what it is, in some other way?
	HERMOGENES εἰκός γε.	**HERMOGENES** That's likely.
	SOCRATES εἰκὸς δῆτα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· πάντα γοῦν φαίνεται τὰ 422c ἔμπροσθεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνεληλυθέναι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν, δεῦρο αὖ συνεπίσκεψαι μετ' ἐμοῦ μή τι παραληρήσω λέγων οἵαν δεῖ τὴν τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** Likely indeed, Hermogenes. At any rate, all the 422c earlier names appear to have led back to these. If that's so, as I think it is, come here and look into it with me again, in case I talk nonsense when I say what the correctness of the primary names must be like.
422c	**HERMOGENES** λέγε μόνον, ὡς ὅσον γε δυνάμεως παρ' ἐμοί ἐστιν συνεπισκέψομαι.	**HERMOGENES** Just go ahead. I'll look into it with you as far as I'm able.
	SOCRATES ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν μία γέ τις ἡ ὀρθότης παντὸς ὀνόματος καὶ πρώτου καὶ ὑστάτου, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῷ ὄνομα εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν, οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ.	**SOCRATES** Well then, there is one single correctness for every name, first and last alike, and none of them differs from the others in being a name. I think you agree with that too.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
422d	**SOCRATES** ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γε νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ ὀρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι, οἵα δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων.	**SOCRATES** Now, the correctness of the names we went through just now was meant to be of this kind: to show what each of the things that are is like.
	HERMOGENES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**HERMOGENES** Of course.
	SOCRATES τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ τὰ πρῶτα δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ὕστερα, εἴπερ ὀνόματα ἔσται.	**SOCRATES** Then the primary names must have this no less than the later ones, if they are going to be names.
	HERMOGENES πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὕστερα, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ τῶν προτέρων οἷά τε ἦν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** But the later ones, it seems, were able to accomplish this by means of the earlier ones.
	HERMOGENES φαίνεται.	**HERMOGENES** Apparently.
	SOCRATES εἶεν· τὰ δὲ δὴ πρῶτα, οἷς οὔπω ἕτερα ὑπόκειται, τίνι τρόπῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅτι μάλιστα φανερὰ ἡμῖν 422e ποιήσει τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ μέλλει ὀνόματα εἶναι; ἀπόκριναί μοι τόδε· εἰ φωνὴν μὴ εἴχομεν μηδὲ γλῶτταν, ἐβουλόμεθα δὲ δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πράγματα, ἆρ' οὐκ ἄν, ὥσπερ νῦν οἱ ἐνεοί, ἐπεχειροῦμεν ἂν σημαίνειν ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι;	**SOCRATES** Very well. But the primary names, which have no others underlying them yet: how will they make the things that are as clear as possible to us, 422e if they are going to be names? Answer me this. If we had no voice and no tongue, but wanted to show things to one another, wouldn't we try to signify them with our hands and head and the rest of the body, the way people who cannot speak do now?
422e	**HERMOGENES** πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**HERMOGENES** How else could we, Socrates?

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423a	**SOCRATES** εἰ μέν γ' οἶμαι τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ᾗρομεν ἂν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν χεῖρα, μιμούμενοι αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος· εἰ δὲ τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ βαρέα, πρὸς τὴν γῆν. καὶ εἰ ἵππον θέοντα ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, οἶσθα ὅτι ὡς ὁμοιότατ' ἂν τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν σώματα καὶ σχήματα ἐποιοῦμεν ἐκείνοις.	**SOCRATES** If we wanted to show what is above and light, I imagine we'd raise our hand toward the sky, imitating the very nature of the thing. If we wanted to show what is below and heavy, we'd point toward the ground. And if we wanted to show a horse galloping, or some other animal, you know we'd make our own bodies and postures as much like theirs as possible.
	HERMOGENES ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν.	**HERMOGENES** It seems to me it must be as you say.
	SOCRATES οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι δήλωμά του σώματος ἐγίγνετο, [423b] μιμησαμένου, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐβούλετο δηλῶσαι.	**SOCRATES** That way, I think, the body would show something, [423b] by imitating, it seems, whatever it wanted to show.
423b	**HERMOGENES** ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἐπειδὴ δὲ φωνῇ τε καὶ γλώττῃ καὶ στόματι βουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ἆρ' οὐ τότε ἑκάστου δήλωμα ἡμῖν ἔσται τὸ ἀπὸ τούτων γιγνόμενον, ὅταν μίμημα γένηται διὰ τούτων περὶ ὁτιοῦν;	**SOCRATES** And since we want to show things with voice and tongue and mouth, won't what comes from these show us each thing when an imitation of anything at all is made through them?
	HERMOGENES ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ.	**HERMOGENES** It must, I think.
	SOCRATES ὄνομ' ἄρ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῇ ἐκείνου ὃ μιμεῖται, καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ ὃ ἂν μιμῆται	**SOCRATES** A name, then, it seems, is a vocal imitation of what it imitates, and the person who imitates something with his voice names whatever he imitates.
	HERMOGENES δοκεῖ μοι.	**HERMOGENES** I think so.
423c	**SOCRATES** μὰ Δί' ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμοί πω δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε.	**SOCRATES** By Zeus, I don't think that's well put yet, my friend.
	HERMOGENES τί δή;	**HERMOGENES** Why not?
	SOCRATES τοὺς τὰ πρόβατα μιμουμένους τούτους καὶ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναγκαζοίμεθ' ἂν ὁμολογεῖν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα ἅπερ μιμοῦνται.	**SOCRATES** We'd be forced to agree that these people who imitate sheep and roosters and other animals are naming the creatures they imitate.
	HERMOGENES ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**HERMOGENES** That's true.
	SOCRATES καλῶς οὖν ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι;	**SOCRATES** So do you think that's right?
	HERMOGENES οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ τίς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μίμησις εἴη τὸ ὄνομα;	**HERMOGENES** Not I. But then what sort of imitation would a name be, Socrates?
	SOCRATES πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐὰν καθάπερ τῇ [423d] μουσικῇ μιμούμεθα τὰ πράγματα οὕτω μιμώμεθα, καίτοι φωνῇ γε καὶ τότε μιμούμεθα· ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐὰν ἅπερ ἡ μουσικὴ μιμεῖται καὶ ἡμεῖς μιμώμεθα, οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν ὀνομάσειν. λέγω δέ τοι τοῦτο· ἔστι τοῖς	**SOCRATES** First of all, it seems to me, we won't be naming if we imitate things the way we imitate them in [423d] music, even though there too we imitate with our voices. Second, we won't be naming if we imitate the same things music imitates. What I

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	πράγμασι φωνὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἑκάστῳ, καὶ χρῶμά γε πολλοῖς;	mean is this: does each thing have a sound and a shape, and many of them a color too?
423d	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ γε.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἔοικε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐάν τις ταῦτα μιμῆται, οὐδὲ περὶ ταύτας τὰς μιμήσεις ἡ τέχνη ἡ ὀνομαστικὴ εἶναι. αὗται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἡ μὲν μουσική, ἡ δὲ γραφική· ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Then it seems the art of naming isn't a matter of imitating these, and it isn't concerned with these imitations. Those arts are music in the one case and painting in the other. Isn't that so?
	HERMOGENES ναί.	**HERMOGENES** Yes.
423e	**SOCRATES** τί δὲ δὴ τόδε; οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως, τοῦ εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** And what about this? Don't you think each thing also has a being (*ousia*), just as it has a color and the other things we were just mentioning? To begin with, don't color itself and sound each have a being? And so do all the other things that are thought to deserve the description "being."
	HERMOGENES ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**HERMOGENES** I think so.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο ἑκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Well then, suppose someone could imitate exactly this about each thing, its being, with letters and syllables. Wouldn't he show what each thing is? Or not?
424a	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly he would.
	SOCRATES καὶ τί ἂν φαίης τὸν τοῦτο δυνάμενον, ὥσπερ τοὺς προτέρους τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν ἔφησθα, τὸν δέ τινα γραφικόν. τοῦτον δὲ τίνα;	**SOCRATES** And what would you call the person who can do this? You called the earlier ones a musician and a painter. What would you call this one?
	HERMOGENES τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπερ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν, οὗτος ἂν εἶναι ὁ ὀνομαστικός.	**HERMOGENES** This one, Socrates, seems to me to be what we've been looking for all along: the expert in naming.
	SOCRATES εἰ ἄρα τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἤδη ἔοικεν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ὀνομάτων ὧν σὺ ἤρου, περὶ "ῥοῆς" τε καὶ τοῦ "ἰέναι" καὶ "σχέσεως," εἰ τοῖς γράμμασι καὶ ταῖς συλλαβαῖς 424b τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν ὥστε ἀπομιμεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, εἴτε καὶ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** If that's true, then it seems we must now examine the names you were asking about, *rhoē* ("flow"), *ienai* ("to go"), and *schesis* ("holding back"). Do they, by means of their letters and syllables, grasp 424b what is, so as to imitate its being, or not?
424b	**HERMOGENES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**HERMOGENES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES φέρε δὴ ἴδωμεν πότερον ἄρα ταῦτα μόνα ἐστὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ἢ καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.	**SOCRATES** Come on, then, let's see whether these are the only primary names, or whether there are many others too.
	HERMOGENES οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλα.	**HERMOGENES** I think there are others too.
	SOCRATES εἰκὸς γάρ. ἀλλὰ τίς ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος τῆς διαιρέσεως ὅθεν ἄρχεται μιμεῖσθαι ὁ μιμούμενος; ἆρα οὐκ ἐπείπερ συλλαβαῖς τε καὶ γράμμασιν ἡ μίμησις τυγχάνει	**SOCRATES** That's likely. But what would be the method of division from which the imitator begins his imitating? The imitation of being happens to

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οὖσα τῆς οὐσίας, ὀρθότατόν ἐστι διελέσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα πρῶτον, ὥσπερ 424c οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς τῶν στοιχείων πρῶτον τὰς δυνάμεις διείλοντο, ἔπειτα τῶν συλλαβῶν, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς σκεψόμενοι, πρότερον δ' οὔ;

424c **HERMOGENES** ναί.

SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διελέσθαι, ἔπειτα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ εἴδη τά τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα—οὑτωσὶ γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων— καὶ τὰ αὖ φωνήεντα μὲν οὔ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα; καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν φωνηέντων ὅσα διάφορα εἴδη ἔχει ἀλλήλων;

καὶ 424d ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα διελώμεθα τὰ ὄντα εὖ πάντα αὖ οἷς δεῖ ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι, εἰ ἔστιν εἰς ἃ ἀναφέρεται πάντα ὥσπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν αὐτά τε καὶ εἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔνεστιν εἴδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις·

424d ταῦτα πάντα καλῶς διαθεασαμένους ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιφέρειν ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα, ἐάντε ἓν ἑνὶ δέῃ ἐπιφέρειν, ἐάντε συγκεραννύντα πολλὰ ἑνί, ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι βουλόμενοι ἀφομοιοῦν ἐνίοτε μὲν ὄστρεον μόνον ἐπήνεγκαν, ἐνίοτε δὲ 424e ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν φαρμάκων, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε πολλὰ συγκεράσαντες, οἷον ὅταν ἀνδρείκελον σκευάζωσιν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων—ὡς ἂν οἶμαι δοκῇ ἑκάστη ἡ εἰκὼν δεῖσθαι ἑκάστου φαρμάκου—οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐποίσομεν, καὶ ἓν ἐπὶ ἕν, οὗ ἂν δοκῇ δεῖν, καὶ σύμπολλα, ποιοῦντες ὃ δὴ συλλαβὰς καλοῦσιν, καὶ συλλαβὰς αὖ συντιθέντες, 425a ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται· καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων μέγα ἤδη τι καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὅλον συστήσομεν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ζῷον τῇ γραφικῇ, ἐνταῦθα τὸν λόγον τῇ ὀνομαστικῇ ἢ ῥητορικῇ ἢ ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.

425a μᾶλλον δὲ οὐχ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ λέγων ἐξηνέχθην. συνέθεσαν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ᾗπερ σύγκειται οἱ παλαιοί· ἡμᾶς δὲ δεῖ,

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be made of syllables and letters. So isn't it most correct to divide up the letters first? That is what 424c people who take up the study of rhythms do: they first distinguish the powers of the letters, then those of the syllables, and only then come to examine rhythms, not before.

HERMOGENES Yes.

SOCRATES So mustn't we, too, first divide off the vowels? Then, among the rest, we must divide by kinds those that have neither voice nor sound (that, I believe, is what the experts in these matters call them), and also those that aren't vowels but aren't soundless either. And among the vowels themselves, mustn't we divide all the kinds that differ from one another?[36]

And 424d once we have divided these up, we must in turn divide up well all the things that are, to which names have to be given. We must see whether there are things to which they can all be traced back, as with the letters, things from which one can see both what they are and whether there are kinds within them, in the same way as among the letters.

Once we have surveyed all this well, we must know how to apply each letter according to its likeness, whether one letter has to be applied to one thing or many have to be mixed together for one. Painters do the same when they want to make a likeness. Sometimes they apply only purple, sometimes 424e some other pigment, and sometimes they mix many together, as when they prepare a flesh tone or something else of that kind, according, I suppose, to which pigment each image seems to need. In the same way we too will apply the letters to things: one to one, where that seems necessary, and several together, making what people call syllables. Then we will combine syllables in turn, 425a and from these names and verbs are composed. From names and verbs, again, we will build something great and beautiful and whole. There, painting produces a picture of a living thing; here, the art of naming, or rhetoric, or whatever the art may be, will produce speech.

Or rather, not we: I got carried away as I talked. It was the ancients who put names together the way

36 Greek grammarians sorted letters into vowels, "mutes" (stops such as p, t, k), and "semivowels" (continuants such as l, r, s), which have sound but are not vowels.

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εἴπερ τεχνικῶς ἐπιστησόμεθα σκοπεῖσθαι αὐτὰ πάντα, [425b] οὕτω διελομένους, εἴτε κατὰ τρόπον τά τε πρῶτα ὀνόματα κεῖται καὶ τὰ ὕστερα εἴτε μή, οὕτω θεᾶσθαι· ἄλλως δὲ συνείρειν μὴ φαῦλον ᾖ καὶ οὐ καθ' ὁδόν, ὦ φίλε Ἑρμόγενες.

425b **HERMOGENES** ἴσως νὴ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

SOCRATES τί οὖν; σὺ πιστεύεις σαυτῷ οἷός τ' ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα οὕτω διελέσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὔ.

HERMOGENES πολλοῦ ἄρα δέω ἔγωγε.

SOCRATES ἐάσομεν οὖν, ἢ βούλει οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δυνώμεθα, καὶ ἂν σμικρόν τι αὐτῶν οἷοί τ' ὦμεν κατιδεῖν, ἐπιχειρῶμεν, [425c] προειπόντες, ὥσπερ ὀλίγον πρότερον τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόγματα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκάζομεν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ νῦν αὖ εἰπόντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἴωμεν, ὅτι εἰ μέν τι χρῆν ἔδει αὐτὰ διελέσθαι εἴτε ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν εἴτε ἡμᾶς, οὕτως ἔδει αὐτὰ διαιρεῖσθαι, νῦν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ δύναμιν δεήσει ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματεύεσθαι; δοκεῖ ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

425c **HERMOGENES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

425d **SOCRATES** γελοῖα μὲν οἶμαι φανεῖσθαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, γράμμασι καὶ συλλαβαῖς τὰ πράγματα μεμιμημένα κατάδηλα γιγνόμενα· ὅμως δὲ ἀνάγκη. οὐ γὰρ ἔχομεν τούτου βέλτιον εἰς ὅτι ἐπανενέγκωμεν περὶ ἀληθείας τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων, εἰ μὴ ἄρα βούλει, ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοποιοὶ ἐπειδάν τι ἀπορῶσιν ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσι θεοὺς αἴροντες, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως εἰπόντες ἀπαλλαγῶμεν, ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα οἱ θεοὶ ἔθεσαν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἔχει. ἆρα [425e] καὶ ἡμῖν κράτιστος οὗτος τῶν λόγων; ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι παρὰ βαρβάρων τινῶν αὐτὰ παρειλήφαμεν, εἰσὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἀρχαιότεροι βάρβαροι; ἢ ὅτι ὑπὸ παλαιότητος ἀδύνατον αὐτὰ [426a] ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ βαρβαρικά; αὗται γὰρ ἂν πᾶσαι ἐκδύσεις εἶεν καὶ μάλα κομψαὶ τῷ μὴ ἐθέλοντι λόγον διδόναι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὡς ὀρθῶς κεῖται.

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they are composed. If we are going to know how to examine all of them with real skill, [425b] we must divide them up in this way and then look to see whether the primary names and the later ones have been given properly or not. Stringing them together any other way would, I'm afraid, be shoddy work, and off the proper road, my dear Hermogenes.

HERMOGENES Quite possibly, by Zeus, Socrates.

SOCRATES Well then? Do you trust yourself to be able to divide these things up like that? I certainly don't.

HERMOGENES Then I'm very far from it myself.

SOCRATES So shall we give it up? Or would you like us to try as best we can, even if we can only make out a little of it? [425c] We'd say first, as we did a little while ago with the gods, that we know nothing of the truth and are only guessing at what human beings believe about them. So now, too, let's tell ourselves before we go on: if anyone, whether someone else or we ourselves, were ever to divide these things up properly, this is how they would have to be divided; but as things stand we'll have to deal with them, as the saying goes, as best we can. Does that seem right, or what do you say?

HERMOGENES It certainly does, very much so.

SOCRATES I expect it will look ridiculous, Hermogenes, for things to become clear by being imitated in letters and syllables. But there's no way around it. We have nothing better than this to fall back on for the truth of the primary names—unless, of course, you'd like us to do what the tragic poets do when they're stuck. They take refuge in the stage machinery and hoist up gods. We could do the same, say that the gods laid down the primary names and that's why they're correct, and be done with it. Is [425e] that the best account for us too? Or the other one, that we got them from some non-Greeks, and non-Greeks are older than we are? Or that their antiquity makes it impossible to [426a] examine them, just as with foreign words? All of these would be evasions—and very clever ones—for someone unwilling to give an account of how the primary names are correctly laid down.[37]

37 The *mēchanē* was a crane used in the theater to lift actors playing gods onto the stage—the origin of the phrase "deus ex machina."

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426a	καίτοι ὅτῳ τις τρόπῳ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων τὴν ὀρθότητα μὴ οἶδεν, ἀδύνατόν που τῶν γε ὑστέρων εἰδέναι, ἃ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀνάγκη δηλοῦσθαι ὧν τις πέρι μηδὲν οἶδεν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν φάσκοντα περὶ αὐτῶν τεχνικὸν εἶναι περὶ τῶν πρώτων [426b] ὀνομάτων μάλιστά τε καὶ καθαρώτατα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀποδεῖξαι, ἢ εὖ εἰδέναι ὅτι τά γε ὕστερα ἤδη φλυαρήσει. ἢ σοὶ ἄλλως δοκεῖ;	And yet anyone who doesn't know how the primary names are correct can't possibly know about the later ones, which have to be explained by means of those he knows nothing about. Clearly, then, anyone who claims to be an expert on names must be able to explain the first [426b] names above all and with the greatest clarity—or else he should know full well that what he says about the later ones will be so much nonsense. Or do you see it differently?
426b	**HERMOGENES** οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως.	**HERMOGENES** Not in the least, Socrates.

WHAT LETTERS IMITATE

Rho for motion, iota for what is fine, lambda for smoothness: the sounds of speech as imitation.

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	SOCRATES ἃ μὲν τοίνυν ἐγὼ ᾔσθημαι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὑβριστικὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα. τούτων οὖν σοι μεταδώσω, ἂν βούλῃ· σὺ δ' ἄν τι ἔχῃς βέλτιόν ποθεν λαβεῖν, πειρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐμοὶ μεταδιδόναι.	**SOCRATES** Well, what I've perceived about the primary names strikes me as quite outrageous and ridiculous. I'll share it with you, if you like. And if you can get hold of something better anywhere, try to share it with me in turn.
	HERMOGENES ποιήσω ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν λέγε.	**HERMOGENES** I will. Go ahead, speak boldly.
426c	**SOCRATES** πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ῥῶ ἔμοιγε φαίνεται ὥσπερ ὄργανον εἶναι πάσης τῆς κινήσεως, ἣν οὐδ' εἴπομεν δι' ὅτι ἔχει τοῦτο τοὔνομα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἔσις βούλεται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἦτα ἐχρώμεθα ἀλλὰ εἶ τὸ παλαιόν. ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ "κίειν" —ξενικὸν δὲ τοὔνομα —τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἰέναι. εἰ οὖν τις τὸ παλαιὸν αὐτῆς εὕροι ὄνομα εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν φωνὴν συμβαῖνον, "ἔσις" ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο· νῦν δὲ ἀπό τε τοῦ ξενικοῦ τοῦ κίειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἦτα μεταβολῆς καὶ τῆς τοῦ νῦ ἐνθέσεως "κίνησις" κέκληται, ἔδει [426d] δὲ "κιείνησιν" καλεῖσθαι ἢ εἶσιν. ἡ δὲ στάσις ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἰέναι βούλεται εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸν καλλωπισμὸν "στάσις" ὠνόμασται.	**SOCRATES** First of all, then, rho seems to me to be a kind of tool for all motion. We haven't even said why motion has the name *kinēsis*. But clearly it means *hesis* ("going"), since in the old days we didn't use eta but epsilon. Its root is *kiein*—a foreign word—which means *ienai* ("to go"). So if someone found its old name in the form that fits our language, it would correctly be called *hesis*. As it is, from the foreign *kiein*, together with the change to eta and the insertion of nu, it has been called *kinēsis*, though it ought [426d] to have been called *kieinēsis* or *eisin*. And *stasis* ("rest") means to be the negation of going, but has been named *stasis* for the sake of embellishment.
426d	τὸ δὲ οὖν ῥῶ τὸ στοιχεῖον, ὥσπερ λέγω, καλὸν ἔδοξεν ὄργανον εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως τῷ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ ἀφομοιοῦν τῇ φορᾷ, πολλαχοῦ γοῦν χρῆται αὐτῷ εἰς αὐτήν· πρῶτον μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ "ῥεῖν" καὶ "ῥοῇ" διὰ τούτου τοῦ γράμματος τὴν φορὰν μιμεῖται, εἶτα ἐν τῷ [426e] "τρόμῳ," εἶτα ἐν τῷ "τρέχειν," ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε ῥήμασιν οἷον "κρούειν," "θραύειν," "ἐρείκειν," "θρύπτειν," "κερματίζειν," "ῥυμβεῖν," πάντα ταῦτα τὸ πολὺ ἀπεικάζει διὰ τοῦ ῥῶ. ἑώρα γὰρ οἶμαι τὴν γλῶτταν ἐν τούτῳ ἥκιστα μένουσαν, μάλιστα δὲ σειομένην· διὸ φαίνεταί μοι τούτῳ πρὸς ταῦτα κατακεχρῆσθαι. τῷ δὲ αὖ	Anyway, the letter rho, as I say, struck the name-maker as a fine tool of motion for making likenesses of movement; at any rate, he uses it for that purpose in many places. First, in *rhein* ("to flow") itself and in *rhoē* ("flow") he imitates movement through this letter; then in [426e] *tromos* ("trembling"), then in *trechein* ("to run"), and also in verbs like *krouein* ("to strike"), *thrauein* ("to shatter"), *ereikein* ("to rend"), *thryptein* ("to crumble"), *kermatizein* ("to chop up"), *rhymbein* ("to whirl")—he mostly represents all of these through rho. He

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ἰῶτα πρὸς τὰ λεπτὰ πάντα, ἃ δὴ μάλιστα διὰ πάντων ἴοι ἄν.	saw, I think, that in this letter the tongue is least at rest and most agitated, and that's why he seems to me to have made such use of it for these. Iota, in turn, he used for all the fine things, the ones that can most easily pass through everything.
426e διὰ ταῦτα τὸ [427a] "ἰέναι" καὶ τὸ "ἵεσθαι" διὰ τοῦ ἰῶτα ἀπομιμεῖται, ὥσπερ γε διὰ τοῦ φεῖ καὶ τοῦ ψεῖ καὶ τοῦ σῖγμα καὶ τοῦ ζῆτα, ὅτι πνευματώδη τὰ γράμματα, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μεμίμηται αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζων, οἷον τὸ "ψυχρὸν" καὶ τὸ "ζέον" καὶ τὸ "σείεσθαι" καὶ ὅλως σεισμόν. καὶ ὅταν που τὸ φυσῶδες μιμῆται, πανταχοῦ ἐνταῦθα ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ τοιαῦτα γράμματα ἐπιφέρειν φαίνεται ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενος. τῆς δ' αὖ τοῦ δέλτα συμπιέσεως καὶ τοῦ ταῦ καὶ ἀπερείσεως τῆς γλώττης [427b] τὴν δύναμιν χρήσιμον φαίνεται ἡγήσασθαι πρὸς τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ "δεσμοῦ" καὶ τῆς "στάσεως." ὅτι δὲ ὀλισθάνει μάλιστα ἐν τῷ λάβδα ἡ γλῶττα κατιδών, ἀφομοιῶν ὠνόμασε τά τε "λεῖα" καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ "ὀλισθάνειν" καὶ τὸ "λιπαρὸν" καὶ τὸ "κολλῶδες" καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.	That's why he imitates [427a] *ienai* ("to go") and *hiesthai* ("to hasten") by means of iota. In the same way, by means of phi, psi, sigma and zeta, because they're breathy letters, he has imitated all such things in naming them—*psychron* ("cold"), for instance, and *zeon* ("seething"), and *seiesthai* ("to shake"), and shaking (*seismos*) in general. And whenever he imitates something windy, the name-maker almost always seems to apply letters of this kind. Again, the compression of delta and tau and the pressing of the tongue [427b] —he seems to have thought their power useful for imitating *desmos* ("bond") and *stasis* ("rest"). And noticing that the tongue glides most in lambda, he made likenesses in naming *leia* ("smooth"), *olisthanein* ("to glide") itself, *liparon* ("sleek"), *kollōdes* ("gluey"), and all the rest of that kind.
427b ᾗ δὲ ὀλισθανούσης τῆς γλώττης ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡ τοῦ γάμμα δύναμις, τὸ "γλίσχρον" ἀπεμιμήσατο καὶ "γλυκὺ" καὶ "γλοιῶδες." [427c] τοῦ δ' αὖ νῦ τὸ εἴσω αἰσθόμενος τῆς φωνῆς, τὸ "ἔνδον" καὶ τὰ "ἐντὸς" ὠνόμασεν, ὡς ἀφομοιῶν τοῖς γράμμασι τὰ ἔργα. τὸ δ' αὖ ἄλφα τῷ "μεγάλῳ" ἀπέδωκε, καὶ τῷ "μήκει" τὸ ἦτα, ὅτι μεγάλα τὰ γράμματα. εἰς δὲ τὸ "γογγύλον" τοῦ οὗ δεόμενος σημείου, τοῦτο πλεῖστον αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ ὄνομα ἐνεκέρασεν. καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω φαίνεται προσβιβάζειν καὶ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων σημεῖόν τε καὶ ὄνομα ποιῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη αὐτοῖς τούτοις συντιθέναι ἀπομιμούμενος. αὕτη [427d] μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, βούλεσθαι εἶναι ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης, εἰ μή τι ἄλλο Κρατύλος ὅδε λέγει.	Where the power of gamma catches the tongue as it glides, he imitated *glischron* ("sticky"), *glyky* ("sweet") and *gloiōdes* ("gummy"). [427c] Perceiving, again, the inward quality of the sound of nu, he named *endon* ("inside") and *entos* ("within"), making the realities like the letters. Alpha, in turn, he assigned to *megalon* ("large"), and eta to *mēkos* ("length"), because these letters are large. For *gongylon* ("round") he needed the sign of omicron, and he mixed plenty of it into the name. And this is how the lawgiver appears to fit everything else, making a sign and a name for each of the things that are by means of letters and syllables, and then composing the rest out of these very elements, imitating as he goes. That, [427d] Hermogenes, seems to me what the correctness of names means to be—unless Cratylus here has something else to say.

CRATYLUS JOINS IN

Hermogenes hands the argument over, and Cratylus agrees with everything Socrates has said.

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427d **HERMOGENES** καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλά γέ μοι πολλάκις πράγματα παρέχει Κρατύλος, ὥσπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, φάσκων μὲν εἶναι ὀρθότητα ὀνομάτων, ἥτις δ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲν σαφὲς λέγων, ὥστε με μὴ δύνασθαι εἰδέναι	**HERMOGENES** Well, Socrates, Cratylus often gives me a great deal of trouble, as I said at the start. He claims there is such a thing as correctness of names, but never says anything clear about what

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πότερον ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων οὕτως ἀσαφῶς ἑκάστοτε περὶ αὐτῶν λέγει. νῦν οὖν [427e] μοι, ὦ Κρατύλε, ἐναντίον Σωκράτους εἰπὲ πότερον ἀρέσκει σοι ἢ λέγει Σωκράτης περὶ ὀνομάτων, ἢ ἔχεις πῃ ἄλλῃ κάλλιον λέγειν; καὶ εἰ ἔχεις, λέγε, ἵνα ἤτοι μάθῃς παρὰ Σωκράτους ἢ διδάξῃς ἡμᾶς ἀμφοτέρους.

427e **CRATYLUS** τί δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες; δοκεῖ σοι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι οὕτω ταχὺ μαθεῖν τε καὶ διδάξαι ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον, ὃ δὴ δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις μέγιστον εἶναι;

428a **HERMOGENES** μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου καλῶς μοι φαίνεται ἔχειν, τὸ εἰ καί τις σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθείη, προὔργου εἶναι. εἰ οὖν καὶ σμικρόν τι οἷός τ' εἶ πλέον ποιῆσαι, μὴ ἀπόκαμνε ἀλλ' εὐεργέτει καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε—δίκαιος δ' εἶ—καὶ ἐμέ.

SOCRATES καὶ μὲν δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὐδὲν ἂν ἰσχυρισαίμην ὧν εἴρηκα, ᾗ δέ μοι ἐφαίνετο μεθ' Ἑρμογένους ἐπεσκεψάμην, ὥστε τούτου γε ἕνεκα θαρρῶν λέγε, εἴ τι [428b] ἔχεις βέλτιον, ὡς ἐμοῦ ἐνδεξομένου. εἰ μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι αὐτός τε ἐσκέφθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ παρ' ἄλλων μεμαθηκέναι. ἐὰν οὖν λέγῃς τι κάλλιον, ἕνα τῶν μαθητῶν περὶ ὀρθότητος ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐμὲ γράφου.

428b **CRATYLUS** ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, μεμέληκέν τέ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἴσως ἄν σε ποιησαίμην [428c] μαθητήν. φοβοῦμαι μέντοι μὴ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον ᾖ, ὅτι μοί πως ἐπέρχεται λέγειν πρὸς σὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, ὃ ἐκεῖνος ἐν Λιταῖς πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα λέγει. φησὶ δὲ Αἶαν διογενὲς Τελαμώνιε, κοίρανε λαῶν, πάντα τί μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἐείσω μυθήσασθαι. καὶ ἐμοὶ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς φαίνῃ κατὰ νοῦν χρησμῳδεῖν, εἴτε παρ' Εὐθύφρονος ἐπίπνους γενόμενος, εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις Μοῦσα πάλαι σε ἐνοῦσα ἐλελήθει.

428d **SOCRATES** ὠγαθὲ Κρατύλε, θαυμάζω καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ σοφίαν καὶ ἀπιστῶ. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι χρῆναι ἐπανασκέψασθαι τί καὶ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ' αὑτοῦ πάντων χαλεπώτατον· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀποστατῇ ἀλλ' ἀεὶ παρῇ ὁ ἐξαπατήσων, πῶς οὐ δεινόν; δεῖ

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it is, so I can't tell whether he's being so obscure about it every time on purpose or not. So now, [427e] Cratylus, tell me in front of Socrates: are you happy with what Socrates says about names, or can you put it better some other way? And if you can, tell us, so that either you learn from Socrates or you teach the two of us.

CRATYLUS What's this, Hermogenes? Do you think it's easy to learn or teach any subject so quickly—let alone one this big, which seems to be the greatest among the greatest?

HERMOGENES No, by Zeus, I don't. But I think Hesiod puts it well: even if you add only a little to a little, it's worth doing. So if you can make even a little progress, don't give up. Do a kindness to Socrates here—you owe him that much—and to me.[38]

SOCRATES For my own part, Cratylus, I wouldn't insist on anything I've said. I've just looked into things with Hermogenes as they seemed to me. So as far as I'm concerned, speak boldly if you [428b] have something better, because I'll welcome it. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if you can say something finer than this; you seem to me both to have looked into such questions yourself and to have learned from others. So if you do have something finer to say, sign me up too as one of your students in the correctness of names.

CRATYLUS Well, Socrates, as you say, I have given these matters some thought, and perhaps I could make you [428c] my student. But I'm afraid it's quite the opposite. Somehow I feel like saying to you what Achilles says to Ajax in the *Prayers*. He says: "Ajax, son of Telamon, sprung from Zeus, leader of the people, everything you've said seems spoken after my own heart." That's how you seem to me, Socrates: your oracles are pretty much to my mind, whether you've been inspired by Euthyphro or some other Muse has been living in you for a long time without your noticing.[39]

SOCRATES My good Cratylus, I've been amazed at my own wisdom myself for some time now, and I don't trust it. So I think I need to go back over what I'm saying. Being deceived by yourself is the hardest thing of all: when the deceiver never stands

38 The allusion is to Hesiod's *Works and Days* 361–62, on how small savings added together grow large.
39 The *Prayers* is the ancient title for Book 9 of the *Iliad*; the lines quoted are 9.644–45.

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	δή, ὡς ἔοικε, θαμὰ μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι, τὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ ποιητοῦ, βλέπειν "ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω." καὶ δὴ καὶ νυνὶ ἡμεῖς ἴδωμεν τί ἡμῖν εἴρηται. 428e ὀνόματος, φαμέν, ὀρθότης ἐστὶν αὕτη, ἥτις ἐνδείξεται οἷόν ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα· τοῦτο φῶμεν ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι;	even a little way off but is always right there with you, isn't that terrible? So it seems we must keep turning back to what we said before, and try, in that poet's words, to look "both before and behind." Let's do that now and see what we've said. 428e The correctness of a name, we say, is this: that it shows what the thing is like. Shall we say that's been adequately stated?
428e	**CRATYLUS** ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ πάνυ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CRATYLUS** It seems so to me, absolutely, Socrates.
	SOCRATES διδασκαλίας ἄρα ἕνεκα τὰ ὀνόματα λέγεται;	**SOCRATES** So names are spoken for the sake of instruction?
	CRATYLUS πάνυ γε.	**CRATYLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν φῶμεν καὶ ταύτην τέχνην εἶναι καὶ δημιουργοὺς αὐτῆς;	**SOCRATES** Then shall we say that this too is an art, and that it has its craftsmen?
	CRATYLUS πάνυ γε.	**CRATYLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τίνας;	**SOCRATES** Who are they?
429a	**CRATYLUS** οὕσπερ σὺ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγες, τοὺς νομοθέτας.	**CRATYLUS** The ones you mentioned at the beginning: the lawgivers.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν καὶ ταύτην φῶμεν τὴν τέχνην ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγίγνεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἢ μή; βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε. ζωγράφοι εἰσίν που οἱ μὲν χείρους, οἱ δὲ ἀμείνους;	**SOCRATES** Now, shall we say this art, too, arises among human beings like the others, or not? Here's what I mean. Some painters, I suppose, are worse and others better?
	CRATYLUS πάνυ γε.	**CRATYLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οἱ μὲν ἀμείνους τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα καλλίω παρέχονται, τὰ ζῷα, οἱ δὲ φαυλότερα; καὶ οἰκοδόμοι ὡσαύτως οἱ μὲν καλλίους τὰς οἰκίας ἐργάζονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίους;	**SOCRATES** And the better ones produce finer works—their pictures—and the others poorer ones? And builders likewise: some build finer houses, others uglier ones?
	CRATYLUS ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.

CAN A NAME BE FALSE?

Cratylus denies that a name can be wrong; Socrates compares names to misassigned portraits.

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429b	**SOCRATES** ἆρ' οὖν καὶ νομοθέται οἱ μὲν καλλίω τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν παρέχονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίω;	**SOCRATES** Then do lawgivers, too, produce works that are finer in some cases and uglier in others?
	CRATYLUS οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἔτι.	**CRATYLUS** There I no longer agree.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι νόμοι οἱ μὲν βελτίους, οἱ δὲ φαυλότεροι εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** So you don't think some laws are better and others worse?
	CRATYLUS οὐ δῆτα.	**CRATYLUS** No, I don't.

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	SOCRATES οὐδὲ δὴ ὄνομα, ὡς ἔοικε, δοκεῖ σοι κεῖσθαι τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ἄμεινον;	**SOCRATES** Nor, it seems, do you think one name is laid down worse and another better?
	CRATYLUS οὐ δῆτα.	**CRATYLUS** No, I don't.
	SOCRATES πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα ὀρθῶς κεῖται;	**SOCRATES** So all names are laid down correctly?
	CRATYLUS ὅσα γε ὀνόματά ἐστιν.	**CRATYLUS** Yes, all that really are names.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; ὃ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, Ἑρμογένει τῷδε πότερον [429c] μηδὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο κεῖσθαι φῶμεν, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως προσήκει, ἢ κεῖσθαι μέν, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς γε;	**SOCRATES** Well then, what about the point raised a moment ago? In the case of Hermogenes here, shall we say [429c] that this name isn't laid down for him at all, unless he has some connection with the birth of Hermes? Or that it is laid down, but not correctly?
429c	**CRATYLUS** οὐδὲ κεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι, εἶναι δὲ ἑτέρου τοῦτο τοὔνομα, οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῦσα.	**CRATYLUS** I don't think it's even laid down for him, Socrates; it only seems to be. This name belongs to someone else—the one whose nature the name makes clear.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὐδὲ ψεύδεταί ὅταν τις φῇ Ἑρμογένη αὐτὸν εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὖ ᾖ, τὸ τοῦτον φάναι Ἑρμογένη εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν;	**SOCRATES** Then isn't someone even lying when he says this man is Hermogenes? Or might it not even be possible to say that this man is Hermogenes, if he isn't?
	CRATYLUS πῶς λέγεις;	**CRATYLUS** What do you mean?
429d	**SOCRATES** ἆρα ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἆρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι.	**SOCRATES** Is it that it's altogether impossible to say false things—is that what your argument amounts to? Plenty of people say so, my dear Cratylus, both now and in the past.
	CRATYLUS πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο ὃ λέγει, μὴ τὸ ὂν λέγοι; ἢ οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν, τὸ μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν;	**CRATYLUS** Well, how could anyone, Socrates, say what he's saying and not be saying what is? Isn't that what saying false things is—saying what isn't?
	SOCRATES κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἡλικίαν, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ὅμως μέντοι εἰπέ μοι τοσόνδε· [429e] πότερον λέγειν μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ψευδῆ, φάναι δέ;	**SOCRATES** That argument is too clever for me, my friend, at my age. All the same, tell me just this much: [429e] do you think it's impossible to speak falsely, but possible to assert something false?
429e	**CRATYLUS** οὔ μοι δοκεῖ οὐδὲ φάναι.	**CRATYLUS** I don't think it's possible to assert it either.
	SOCRATES οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ προσειπεῖν; οἷον εἴ τις ἀπαντήσας σοι ἐπὶ ξενίας, λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἴποι· "χαῖρε, ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, ὑὲ Σμικρίωνος Ἑρμόγενες," οὗτος λέξειεν ἂν ταῦτα ἢ φαίη ἂν ταῦτα ἢ εἴποι ἂν ταῦτα ἢ προσείποι ἂν οὕτω σὲ μὲν οὔ, Ἑρμογένη δὲ τόνδε; ἢ οὐδένα;	**SOCRATES** Nor to say it, nor to address someone falsely? Suppose, for example, someone met you abroad, took your hand and said, "Greetings, my Athenian visitor, Hermogenes son of Smicrion." Would he be speaking these words, or asserting them, or saying them, or addressing them in this way not to you but to Hermogenes here? Or to no one?

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	CRATYLUS ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως ἂν οὗτος ταῦτα φθέγξασθαι.	**CRATYLUS** I think, Socrates, that this man would be uttering these words for nothing.
430a	**SOCRATES** ἀλλ' ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο. πότερον γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἂν φθέγξαιτο ταῦτα ὁ φθεγξάμενος ἢ ψευδῆ; ἢ τὸ μέν τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος; καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἐξαρκοῖ.	**SOCRATES** Well, I'll gladly take even that. Would the one who uttered them be uttering something true or something false? Or would part of it be true and part false? That too would be enough for me.
	CRATYLUS ψοφεῖν ἔγωγ' ἂν φαίην τὸν τοιοῦτον, μάτην αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις χαλκίον κινήσειε κρούσας.	**CRATYLUS** I'd say a man like that was just making noise, moving himself to no purpose, as if someone were to strike a bronze pot and set it vibrating.
	SOCRATES φέρε δή, ἐάν πῃ διαλλαχθῶμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε· ἆρ' οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἂν φαίης τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὗ τὸ ὄνομά ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** Come now, Cratylus, let's see if we can somehow come to terms. Wouldn't you say that the name is one thing and the thing it's the name of is another?
	CRATYLUS ἔγωγε.	**CRATYLUS** I would.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὁμολογεῖς μίμημά τι εἶναι τοῦ [430b] πράγματος;	**SOCRATES** And you agree that the name is a kind of imitation of the [430b] thing?
430b	**CRATYLUS** πάντων μάλιστα.	**CRATYLUS** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα τρόπον τινὰ ἄλλον λέγεις μιμήματα εἶναι πραγμάτων τινῶν;	**SOCRATES** And you say that paintings, too, are imitations of certain things, but in a different way?
	CRATYLUS ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES φέρε δή—ἴσως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐ μανθάνω ἅττα ποτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγεις, σὺ δὲ τάχ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοις—ἔστι διανεῖμαι καὶ προσενεγκεῖν ταῦτα ἀμφότερα τὰ μιμήματα, τά τε ζωγραφήματα κἀκεῖνα τὰ ὀνόματα, τοῖς πράγμασιν ὧν μιμήματά ἐστιν, ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Come then—maybe I don't understand what on earth you're saying, and you may well be right—can both these kinds of imitation, the paintings and those names, be assigned and applied to the things they're imitations of, or not?
430c	**CRATYLUS** ἔστιν.	**CRATYLUS** They can.
	SOCRATES πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκόπει τόδε. ἆρ' ἄν τις τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἰκόνα τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἀποδοίη, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῇ γυναικί, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως;	**SOCRATES** First, then, consider this. Could someone assign the picture of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so on?
	CRATYLUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**CRATYLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τῇ γυναικί, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῷ ἀνδρί;	**SOCRATES** And the reverse as well—the man's picture to the woman and the woman's to the man?
	CRATYLUS ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα.	**CRATYLUS** That's possible too.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν αὗται αἱ διανομαὶ ἀμφότεραι ὀρθαί, ἢ ἡ ἑτέρα;	**SOCRATES** Now, are both these assignments correct, or only one of them?
	CRATYLUS ἡ ἑτέρα.	**CRATYLUS** Only one.

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SOCRATES ἢ ἂν ἑκάστῳ οἶμαι τὸ προσῆκόν τε καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀποδιδῷ.

SOCRATES The one, I take it, that gives each thing what belongs to it and resembles it.

CRATYLUS ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

CRATYLUS I think so.

430d SOCRATES ἵνα τοίνυν μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φίλοι ὄντες, ἀπόδεξαί μου ὃ λέγω. τὴν τοιαύτην γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καλῶ ἔγωγε διανομὴν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις μὲν τοῖς μιμήμασιν, τοῖς τε ζῴοις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὀρθήν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πρὸς τῷ ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθῆ· τὴν δ' ἑτέραν, τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου δόσιν τε καὶ ἐπιφοράν, οὐκ ὀρθήν, καὶ ψευδῆ ὅταν ἐπ' ὀνόμασιν ᾖ.

SOCRATES Then, so that you and I don't come to blows in our discussion when we're friends, accept what I'm saying. This kind of assignment, my friend, I call correct in the case of both kinds of imitation, pictures and names alike; and in the case of names, true as well as correct. The other kind, the giving and applying of what's unlike, I call not correct—and false, when it involves names.

CRATYLUS ἀλλ' ὅπως μή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν 430e ᾖ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὔ, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ ἀεὶ ὀρθῶς.

CRATYLUS But be careful, Socrates: it may be that with paintings 430e this is possible—assigning them incorrectly—but not with names, which must always be assigned correctly.

430e SOCRATES πῶς λέγεις; τί τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρει; ἆρ' οὐκ ἔστι προσελθόντα ἀνδρί τῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι "τουτί ἐστι σὸν γράμμα," καὶ δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, γυναικός; τὸ δὲ δεῖξαι λέγω εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι.

SOCRATES What do you mean? How is one different from the other? Can't someone go up to a man and say, "This is your portrait," and show him what may happen to be his likeness, or may happen to be a woman's? By "show" I mean bring it before the perception of his eyes.

CRATYLUS πάνυ γε.

CRATYLUS Certainly.

SOCRATES τί δέ; πάλιν αὐτῷ τούτῳ προσελθόντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι "τουτί ἐστιν σὸν ὄνομα"; ἔστι δέ που καὶ τὸ ὄνομα μίμημα ὥσπερ τὸ ζωγράφημα. τοῦτο δὴ λέγω· ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ 431a εἰπεῖν ὅτι "τουτί ἐστι σὸν ὄνομα," καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀκοῆς αὖ αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα, εἰπόντα ὅτι ἀνήρ, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, τὸ τοῦ θήλεος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, εἰπόντα ὅτι γυνή; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο οἷόν τ' εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐνίοτε;

SOCRATES Well then? Can't he go up to this same man again and say, "This is your name"? A name, after all, is an imitation, just as a painting is. Here's my point: wouldn't it be possible to 431a say to him, "This is your name," and then bring before the perception of his hearing what may happen to be his imitation, saying "man," or may happen to be the imitation of the female of the human race, saying "woman"? Don't you think this is possible and sometimes happens?

431a CRATYLUS ἐθέλω σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἔστω οὕτως.

CRATYLUS I'm willing to grant you that, Socrates. Let it be so.

SOCRATES καλῶς γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ φίλε, εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ νῦν πάνυ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δ' οὖν 431b ἔστι τοιαύτη τις διανομὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τούτων ἀληθεύειν βουλόμεθα καλεῖν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ψεύδεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν τὰ ὀνόματα μηδὲ ἀποδιδόναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, εἴη ἂν καὶ ῥήματα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα ἔστιν οὕτω τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους· 431c λόγοι γάρ που, ὡς

SOCRATES That's good of you, my friend—if it really is so, since there's no need to fight it out over this now. Anyway, if 431b there's such an assignment here too, we want to call one of these speaking truly and the other speaking falsely. And if that's so, and it's possible to assign names incorrectly—not giving each thing what fits it, but sometimes what doesn't—then it would be possible to do the same thing with verbs. And if verbs

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	ἐγῷμαι, ἡ τούτων σύνθεσίς ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Κρατύλε;	and names can be laid down this way, so can sentences: [431c] for sentences, I take it, are a combination of these. Or what do you say, Cratylus?
431c	**CRATYLUS** οὕτω· καλῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.	**CRATYLUS** That's right; I think you put it well.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἰ γράμμασιν αὖ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα ἀπεικάζομεν, ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν καὶ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μὴ πάντα αὖ, ἀλλ' ἔνια ἐλλείπειν, ἔνια δὲ καὶ προστιθέναι, καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω· ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;	**SOCRATES** Then if we compare the primary names, in turn, to pictures, it's possible, as with paintings, to give them all the fitting colors and shapes—or not all of them, but to leave some out and add others, putting in too many or too large. Or isn't it possible?
	CRATYLUS ἔστιν.	**CRATYLUS** It is.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδοὺς πάντα καλὰ τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ ἢ προστιθεὶς ἢ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα μὲν καὶ εἰκόνας ἐργάζεται καὶ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ πονηράς;	**SOCRATES** And the one who gives them all produces fine pictures and images, while the one who adds or takes away also produces pictures and images, but bad ones?
431d	**CRATYLUS** ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ ὁ διὰ τῶν συλλαβῶν τε καὶ γραμμάτων τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπομιμούμενος; ἆρα οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἂν μὲν πάντα ἀποδῷ τὰ προσήκοντα, καλὴ ἡ εἰκὼν ἔσται—τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὄνομα—ἐὰν δὲ σμικρὰ ἐλλείπῃ ἢ προστιθῇ ἐνίοτε, εἰκὼν μὲν γενήσεται, καλὴ δὲ οὔ; ὥστε τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰργασμένα ἔσται τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ κακῶς;	**SOCRATES** And what about the one who imitates the being of things through syllables and letters? By the same reasoning, if he gives them everything that fits, won't the image be fine—and that's a name—while if he sometimes leaves out or adds small things, an image will still come about, but not a fine one? So some names will be well made and others badly?
	CRATYLUS ἴσως.	**CRATYLUS** Perhaps.
431e	**SOCRATES** ἴσως ἄρα ἔσται ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δημιουργὸς ὀνομάτων, ὁ δὲ κακός;	**SOCRATES** So perhaps one craftsman of names will be good and another bad?
	CRATYLUS ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τούτῳ ὁ "νομοθέτης" ἦν ὄνομα.	**SOCRATES** And this craftsman's name, we said, was "lawgiver."
	CRATYLUS ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἴσως ἄρα νὴ Δί' ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ μὲν ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ κακός, ἐάνπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα ὁμολογηθῇ ἡμῖν.	**SOCRATES** So perhaps, by Zeus, just as in the other arts, one lawgiver will be good and another bad—provided we agree on those earlier points.
	CRATYLUS ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα, τό τε ἄλφα καὶ τὸ βῆτα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀποδιδῶμεν τῇ γραμματικῇ τέχνῃ, [432a] ἐάν τι ἀφέλωμεν ἢ προσθῶμεν ἢ μεταθῶμέν τι, οὐ γέγραπται μὲν ἡμῖν τὸ ὄνομα, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ γέγραπται, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐάν τι τούτων πάθῃ.	**CRATYLUS** That's so. But you see, Socrates, when we assign these letters—alpha and beta and each of the others—to names by the art of grammar, [432a] if we take anything away, or add or transpose anything, it isn't that we've written the name, only incorrectly. We haven't written it at all: it immedi-

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ately becomes a different name if any of that happens to it.

432a **SOCRATES** μὴ γὰρ οὐ καλῶς σκοπῶμεν οὕτω σκοποῦντες, ὦ Κρατύλε.

SOCRATES I'm afraid we're not examining it well if we examine it that way, Cratylus.

CRATYLUS πῶς δή;

CRATYLUS How so?

SOCRATES ἴσως ὅσα ἔκ τινος ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι πάσχοι ἂν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τι ἢ [432b] προσθῇς, ἕτερος εὐθὺς γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ τινος καὶ συμπάσης εἰκόνος μὴ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν δέῃ πάντα ἀποδοῦναι οἷόν ἐστιν ᾧ εἰκάζει, εἰ μέλλει εἰκὼν εἶναι. σκόπει δὲ εἰ τὶ λέγω.

SOCRATES What you describe might well happen to things that must either be or not be from a certain number—like ten itself or any other number you like: if you take something away or [432b] add something, it immediately becomes a different number. But this may not be the correctness of a quality, or of an image in general. On the contrary, an image mustn't reproduce every feature of what it represents at all, if it's to be an image. See whether I'm making sense.

432b ἆρ' ἂν δύο πράγματα εἴη τοιάδε, οἷον Κρατύλος καὶ Κρατύλου εἰκών, εἴ τις θεῶν μὴ μόνον τὸ σὸν χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσειεν ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς πάντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσειεν οἷάπερ τὰ σά, καὶ μαλακότητας [432c] καὶ θερμότητας τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδοίη, καὶ κίνησιν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ σοὶ ἐνθείη αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ πάντα ἅπερ σὺ ἔχεις, τοιαῦτα ἕτερα καταστήσειεν πλησίον σου; πότερον Κρατύλος ἂν καὶ εἰκὼν Κρατύλου τότ' εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ δύο Κρατύλοι;

Would there be two such things as Cratylus and an image of Cratylus if some god not only reproduced your color and shape, as painters do, but also made all the insides just like yours, gave them the same softness [432c] and warmth, put motion and soul and understanding into them like yours, and, in short, set a duplicate of everything you have right next to you? Would that be Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?

432c **CRATYLUS** δύο ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κρατύλοι.

CRATYLUS Two Cratyluses, it seems to me, Socrates.

SOCRATES ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἄλλην χρὴ εἰκόνος ὀρθότητα ζητεῖν καὶ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκάζειν, ἐάν τι [432d] ἀπῇ ἢ προσῇ, μηκέτι αὐτὴν εἰκόνα εἶναι; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅσου ἐνδέουσιν αἱ εἰκόνες τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν εἰκόνες εἰσίν;

SOCRATES So you see, my friend, that we must look for a different kind of correctness for an image and for the things we were just talking about, and not insist that if anything [432d] is missing or added it's no longer an image? Or don't you perceive how far images fall short of having the same features as the things they're images of?

432d **CRATYLUS** ἔγωγε.

CRATYLUS I do.

SOCRATES γελοῖα γοῦν, ὦ Κρατύλε, ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάθοι ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὧν ὀνόματά ἐστιν τὰ ὀνόματα, εἰ πάντα πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς ὁμοιωθείη. διττὰ γὰρ ἄν που πάντα γένοιτο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν οὐδεὶς οὐδέτερον ὁπότερόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα.

SOCRATES At any rate, Cratylus, the things that names are names of would be ridiculously treated by their names if they were made like them in every way. Everything would be doubled, I suppose, and no one could say of either which was the thing itself and which the name.

CRATYLUS ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

CRATYLUS That's true.

SOCRATES θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ὦ γενναῖε, ἔα καὶ ὄνομα τὸ μὲν εὖ [432e] κεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μή, καὶ μὴ ἀνάγκαζε πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ γράμματα, ἵνα κομιδῇ ᾖ τοιοῦτον οἷόνπερ οὗ ὄνομά

SOCRATES Take heart, then, my noble friend, and allow that one name may be well [432e] laid down and another not. Don't insist that it have all the let-

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	ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἔα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσῆκον γράμμα ἐπιφέρειν. εἰ δὲ γράμμα, καὶ ὄνομα ἐν λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ ὄνομα, καὶ λόγον ἐν λόγῳ μὴ προσήκοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν ἧττον ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ λέγεσθαι, ἕως ἂν ὁ τύπος ἐνῇ τοῦ πράγματος περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς [433a] τῶν στοιχείων ὀνόμασιν, εἰ μέμνησαι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ καὶ Ἑρμογένης ἐλέγομεν.	ters, so that it's exactly like what it's the name of; allow that an unfitting letter may be applied too. And if a letter, then a name in a sentence; and if a name, then a sentence in a speech may be applied that doesn't fit the things, and the thing will be named and described no less, as long as the outline of the thing the speech is about is present in it —as in the [433a] names of the letters, if you remember what Hermogenes and I were saying just now.
433a	**CRATYLUS** ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι.	**CRATYLUS** Yes, I remember.
	SOCRATES καλῶς τοίνυν. ὅταν γὰρ τοῦτο ἐνῇ, κἂν μὴ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα ἔχῃ, λέξεταί γε τὸ πρᾶγμα, καλῶς ὅταν πάντα, κακῶς δὲ ὅταν ὀλίγα· λέγεσθαι δ' οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἐῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ ὄφλωμεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιιόντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξωμεν αὖ [433b] τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἢ ζήτει τινὰ ἄλλην ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα, καὶ μὴ ὁμολόγει δήλωμα συλλαβαῖς καὶ γράμμασι πράγματος ὄνομα εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἐρεῖς, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσῃ συμφωνεῖν σαυτῷ.	**SOCRATES** Good. When that is present, even if the name doesn't have all the appropriate letters, the thing will still be spoken of: well when it has them all, badly when it has only a few. So let's allow that it is spoken of, my dear friend. Otherwise we'll pay the penalty, like the people in Aegina who are out on the road late at night, and seem for our part [433b] to have truly arrived at things somehow later than we should. Or else look for some other correctness of names, and don't agree that a name is a way of revealing a thing by syllables and letters. If you say both, you won't be able to agree with yourself.[40]
433b	**CRATYLUS** ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέγειν, καὶ οὕτω τίθεμαι.	**CRATYLUS** Well, Socrates, I think what you say is reasonable, and I'll accept it.

LIKENESS AND CUSTOM

The word for hardness contains a soft letter yet is understood, so custom must play a part.

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	SOCRATES ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἡμῖν συνδοκεῖ, μετὰ ταῦτα τάδε σκοπῶμεν· εἰ μέλλει φαμὲν καλῶς κεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα, τὰ προσήκοντα δεῖ αὐτὸ γράμματα ἔχειν;	**SOCRATES** Since we agree on that, let's look at the next point. If a name is going to be well set down, we say, must it have the appropriate letters?
	CRATYLUS ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
433c	**SOCRATES** προσήκει δὲ τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν;	**SOCRATES** And the appropriate ones are those that are like the things?
	CRATYLUS πάνυ γε.	**CRATYLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τὰ μὲν ἄρα καλῶς κείμενα οὕτω κεῖται· εἰ δὲ μή τι καλῶς ἐτέθη, τὸ μὲν ἂν πολὺ ἴσως ἐκ προσηκόντων εἴη γραμμάτων καὶ ὁμοίων, εἴπερ ἔσται εἰκών, ἔχοι δ' ἄν τι καὶ οὐ προσῆκον, δι' ὃ οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἴη οὐδὲ καλῶς εἰργασμένον τὸ ὄνομα. οὕτω φαμὲν ἢ ἄλλως;	**SOCRATES** So names that are well set down are set down that way. But if one wasn't set down well, most of it might perhaps be made of appropriate, similar letters, if it's going to be an image at all. Yet it would also contain something inappropriate,

40 The allusion is obscure. It seems to refer to a proverb or a local rule in Aegina that penalized people found on the roads late at night.

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		and because of that the name wouldn't be fine or finely made. Is that what we say, or something else?
	CRATYLUS οὐδὲν δεῖ οἶμαι διαμάχεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀρέσκει γέ με τὸ φάναι ὄνομα μὲν εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι καλῶς γε κεῖσθαι.	CRATYLUS I don't think there's any need to fight it out, Socrates. Still, I'm not happy saying that something is a name and yet isn't well set down.
433d	SOCRATES πότερον τοῦτο οὐκ ἀρέσκει σε, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα δήλωμα τοῦ πράγματος;	SOCRATES Is this what you're not happy with, that a name is a means of revealing the thing?
	CRATYLUS ἔμοιγε.	CRATYLUS No, I'm happy with that.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκ προτέρων συγκείμενα, τὰ δὲ πρῶτα, οὐ καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι;	SOCRATES And you think it's right to say that some names are composed of earlier ones, while others are primary?
	CRATYLUS ἔμοιγε.	CRATYLUS I do.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ τὰ πρῶτα εἰ μέλλει δηλώματά τινων γίγνεσθαι, ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίω τρόπον τοῦ δηλώματα αὐτὰ γενέσθαι [433e] ἄλλον ἢ αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι ὅτι μάλιστα τοιαῦτα οἷα ἐκεῖνα ἃ δεῖ δηλοῦν αὐτά; ἢ ὅδε μᾶλλόν σε ἀρέσκει ὁ τρόπος ὃν Ἑρμογένης λέγει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, τὸ συνθήματα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ δηλοῦν τοῖς συνθεμένοις προειδόσι δὲ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ εἶναι ταύτην ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος, συνθήκην, διαφέρειν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐάντε τις συνθῆται ὥσπερ νῦν σύγκειται, ἐάντε καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ μὲν ᾧ νῦν σμικρόν, μέγα καλεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ᾧ μέγα, σμικρόν; πότερός σε ὁ τρόπος ἀρέσκει;	SOCRATES But if the primary ones are going to reveal anything, do you have any better way for them to become means of revealing [433e] than to make them as much as possible like the things they're supposed to reveal? Or do you prefer the way Hermogenes and many others describe? On that view names are agreed tokens, and they reveal things to those who made the agreement and already knew the things. Agreement is the correctness of a name, and it makes no difference whether we agree as things are agreed now, or the other way round, calling "big" what we now call "small," and "small" what we now call "big." Which way do you prefer?
434a	CRATYLUS ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ὁμοιώματι δηλοῦν ὅτι ἄν τις δηλοῖ ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι.	CRATYLUS Revealing whatever you reveal by a likeness, Socrates, is utterly different from doing it by any random thing.
	SOCRATES καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἔσται τὸ ὄνομα ὅμοιον τῷ πράγματι, ἀναγκαῖον πεφυκέναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματά τις συνθήσει; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· ἆρά ποτ' ἄν τις συνέθηκεν ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ζωγράφημα ὅμοιόν τῳ τῶν ὄντων, εἰ μὴ φύσει ὑπῆρχε [434b] φαρμακεῖα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ ζωγραφούμενα, ἐκείνοις ἃ μιμεῖται ἡ γραφική· ἢ ἀδύνατον;	SOCRATES Well said. Then if the name is going to be like the thing, the letters from which anyone will put together the primary names must be naturally like the things, mustn't they? Here's what I mean. Could anyone ever have put together the painting we were talking about a moment ago, a likeness of something real, if there didn't exist by nature [434b] pigments like the things painting imitates, from which painted images are composed? Or would that be impossible?
434b	CRATYLUS ἀδύνατον.	CRATYLUS Impossible.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως καὶ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὅμοια γένοιτο οὐδενί, εἰ μὴ ὑπάρξει ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον	SOCRATES Then in the same way names could never become like anything, unless the things

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	ὁμοιότητά τινα ἔχοντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐκείνοις ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα μιμήματα; ἔστι δέ, ἐξ ὧν συνθετέον, στοιχεῖα;	they're composed of had some likeness from the start to the things the names imitate? And the things they must be composed of are letters?
	CRATYLUS ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ σὺ κοινώνῃ τοῦ λόγου οὗπερ ἄρτι [434c] Ἑρμογένης. φέρε, καλῶς σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ῥῶ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ κινήσει καὶ σκληρότητι προσέοικεν, ἢ οὐ καλῶς;	**SOCRATES** So now you too are a partner in the argument that just now [434c] Hermogenes was a partner in. Come on: do you think we were right to say that rho resembles rushing, motion, and hardness, or not?
434c	**CRATYLUS** καλῶς ἔμοιγε.	**CRATYLUS** I think you were right.
	SOCRATES τὸ δὲ λάβδα τῷ λείῳ καὶ μαλακῷ καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν;	**SOCRATES** And lambda resembles what's smooth and soft and the other things we were just mentioning?
	CRATYLUS ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμεῖς μέν φαμεν "σκληρότης," Ἐρετριῆς δὲ "σκληροτήρ";	**SOCRATES** Do you know, then, that for the same thing we say *sklērotēs* ("hardness"), while the Eretrians say *sklērotēr*?[41]
	CRATYLUS πάνυ γε.	**CRATYLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν τό τε ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σῖγμα ἔοικεν ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ δηλοῖ ἐκείνοις τε τὸ αὐτὸ τελευτῶντος τοῦ ῥῶ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ σῖγμα, ἢ τοῖς ἑτέροις ἡμῶν οὐ δηλοῖ;	**SOCRATES** Then do rho and sigma both resemble the same thing, so that the word reveals the same thing to them when it ends in rho as it does to us when it ends in sigma? Or does it fail to reveal it to one side or the other?
434d	**CRATYLUS** δηλοῖ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέροις.	**CRATYLUS** No, it reveals it to both.
	SOCRATES πότερον ᾗ ὅμοια τυγχάνει ὄντα τὸ ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σῖγμα, ἢ ᾗ μή;	**SOCRATES** Insofar as rho and sigma are alike, or insofar as they aren't?
	CRATYLUS ᾗι ὅμοια.	**CRATYLUS** Insofar as they're alike.
	SOCRATES ἦ οὖν ὅμοιά ἐστι πανταχῇ;	**SOCRATES** Then are they alike in every respect?
	CRATYLUS πρός γε τὸ ἴσως φορὰν δηλοῦν.	**CRATYLUS** Well, perhaps for revealing rushing.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ τὸ λάβδα ἐγκείμενον; οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ σκληρότητος;	**SOCRATES** And the lambda in the word? Doesn't it reveal the opposite of hardness?
	CRATYLUS ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγκειται, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὥσπερ καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ σὺ πρὸς Ἑρμογένη ἔλεγες ἐξαιρῶν τε καὶ ἐντιθεὶς γράμματα οὗ δέοι, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἐδόκεις ἔμοιγε. καὶ νῦν ἴσως ἀντὶ τοῦ λάβδα ῥῶ δεῖ λέγειν.	**CRATYLUS** Perhaps it's in there wrongly, Socrates. It would be like the cases you were going through with Hermogenes a moment ago, taking letters out and putting them in where needed, and I thought you were right. Perhaps here too we ought to say rho instead of lambda.
434e		

41 Eretria was a city on the island of Euboea. Its dialect often had rho where Athenian Greek had sigma.

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	SOCRATES εὖ λέγεις. τί οὖν; νῦν ὡς λέγομεν, οὐδὲν μανθάνομεν ἀλλήλων, ἐπειδάν τις φῇ "σκληρόν," οὐδὲ οἶσθα σὺ νῦν ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω;	**SOCRATES** Good point. What then? As we speak now, do we understand nothing of each other when someone says *sklēron* ("hard")? Don't you know right now what I mean?
	CRATYLUS ἔγωγε, διά γε τὸ ἔθος, ὦ φίλτατε.	**CRATYLUS** I do, my dear friend, through habit at any rate.
	SOCRATES ἔθος δὲ λέγων οἴει τι διάφορον λέγειν συνθήκης; ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγεις τὸ ἔθος ἢ ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν τοῦτο φθέγγωμαι, διανοοῦμαι ἐκεῖνο, σὺ δὲ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι ἐκεῖνο διανοοῦμαι; οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** And when you say "habit," do you think you mean anything different from agreement? Or do you mean by habit anything other than this: when I utter this word, I have that thing in mind, and you recognize that I have that thing in mind? Isn't that what you mean?
435a	**CRATYLUS** ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἰ γιγνώσκεις ἐμοῦ φθεγγομένου, δήλωμα σοι γίγνεται παρ' ἐμοῦ;	**SOCRATES** Then if you recognize it when I utter it, something is revealed to you by me?
	CRATYLUS ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὃ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι, εἴπερ τὸ λάβδα ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι τῇ ᾗ φῂς σὺ σκληρότητι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τί ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς σαυτῷ συνέθου καί σοι γίγνεται ἡ ὀρθότης τοῦ ὀνόματος συνθήκη, ἐπειδή γε δηλοῖ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ ἀνόμοια γράμματα, ἔθους τε καὶ συνθήκης τυχόντα; εἰ δ' ὅτι μάλιστα μή ἐστι τὸ ἔθος [435b] συνθήκη, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς ἔτι ἔχοι λέγειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα δήλωμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔθος· ἐκεῖνο γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἀνομοίῳ δηλοῖ.	**SOCRATES** And it's revealed by something unlike what I have in mind when I utter it, if lambda is unlike the hardness you speak of. But if that's so, what else have you done but make an agreement with yourself? Correctness of names becomes agreement for you, since both like and unlike letters reveal things once habit and agreement attach to them. And even if habit is as far as you like from [435b] agreement, it still wouldn't be right to say that likeness is what reveals. Habit is, since habit, it seems, reveals by means of both the like and the unlike.
435b	ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα συγχωροῦμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε—τὴν γὰρ σιγήν σου συγχώρησιν θήσω—ἀναγκαῖόν που καὶ συνθήκην τι καὶ ἔθος συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς δήλωσιν ὧν διανοούμενοι λέγομεν· ἐπεί, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ 'θέλεις ἐπὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐλθεῖν, πόθεν οἴει ἕξειν ὀνόματα ὅμοια ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐπενεγκεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐᾷς τι [435c] τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην κῦρος ἔχειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος πέρι; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν· ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ᾖ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ συνθήκῃ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα.	Since we agree on this, Cratylus (I'll take your silence as agreement), agreement and habit must surely contribute something to revealing what we have in mind when we speak. After all, my excellent friend, suppose you'd like to turn to number. Where do you think you'll find names like each single number to apply to them, if you don't allow [435c] your convention and agreement some authority over correctness of names? I myself like the idea that names should be as similar to things as possible. But I'm afraid that this dragging-in of likeness really is, to use Hermogenes' word, a sticky business, and that we're forced to use this vulgar thing, agreement, as well, to make names correct.
435c	ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστ' ἂν λέγοιτο ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίοις λέγηται, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ	For perhaps a thing would be spoken of most finely, as far as that's possible, when it is spoken of

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	προσήκουσιν, [435d] αἴσχιστα δὲ τοὐναντίον. τόδε δέ μοι ἔτι εἰπὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, τίνα ἡμῖν δύναμιν ἔχει τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τί φῶμεν αὐτὰ καλὸν ἀπεργάζεσθαι;	with letters that are all, or as many as possible, like it—that is, appropriate— [435d] and most shamefully when the opposite is true. But tell me this next. What power do names have for us, and what fine thing shall we say they accomplish?

DO NAMES TEACH?

If the name-makers believed in flux and were wrong, names cannot be our guide to things.

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435d	**CRATYLUS** διδάσκειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τοῦτο πάνυ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπίστηται, ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα.	**CRATYLUS** To teach, I think, Socrates. And this is quite simple: whoever knows the names knows the things too.
	SOCRATES ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Κρατύλε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, ὡς ἐπειδάν τις εἰδῇ τὸ ὄνομα οἷόν ἐστιν—ἔστι δὲ οἷόνπερ τὸ πρᾶγμα— [435e] εἴσεται δὴ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπείπερ ὅμοιον τυγχάνει ὂν τῷ ὀνόματι, τέχνη δὲ μία ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ πάντων τῶν ἀλλήλοις ὁμοίων. κατὰ τοῦτο δή μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν ὡς ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα εἰδῇ εἴσεται καὶ τὰ πράγματα.	**SOCRATES** Perhaps, Cratylus, you mean something like this: when someone knows what a name is like (and it's like the thing), [435e] then he'll know the thing too, since the thing happens to be like the name, and there's one and the same art for all things that are like one another. I take it that's why you say whoever knows the names will know the things too.
435e	**CRATYLUS** ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.	**CRATYLUS** Exactly right.
	SOCRATES ἔχε δή, ἴδωμεν τίς ποτ' ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς διδασκαλίας τῶν ὄντων ὃν σὺ λέγεις νῦν, καὶ πότερον ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἄλλος, οὗτος μέντοι βελτίων, ἢ οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄλλος ἢ οὗτος. ποτέρως οἴει;	**SOCRATES** Hold on, then. Let's see what this way of teaching about the things that are, the one you're describing now, might be. Is there another way as well, with this one the better of the two, or is there no other way but this? Which do you think?
436a	**CRATYLUS** οὕτως ἔγωγε, οὐ πάνυ τι εἶναι ἄλλον, τοῦτον δὲ καὶ μόνον καὶ βέλτιστον.	**CRATYLUS** The latter. There's no other way at all. This one is both the only way and the best.
	SOCRATES πότερον δὲ καὶ εὕρεσιν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην εἶναι, τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα εὑρόντα καὶ ἐκεῖνα ηὑρηκέναι ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα· ἢ ζητεῖν μὲν καὶ εὑρίσκειν ἕτερον δεῖν τρόπον, μανθάνειν δὲ τοῦτον;	**SOCRATES** And is discovering the things that are the same thing too, so that whoever has discovered the names has also discovered the things they're names of? Or must one search and discover by a different way, and learn by this one?
	CRATYLUS πάντων μάλιστα καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ εὑρίσκειν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον κατὰ ταὐτά.	**CRATYLUS** Absolutely. Searching and discovering work in exactly the same way.
	SOCRATES φέρε δὴ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἴ τις ζητῶν τὰ [436b] πράγματα ἀκολουθοῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, σκοπῶν οἷον ἕκαστον βούλεται εἶναι, ἆρ' ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐ σμικρὸς κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἐξαπατηθῆναι;	**SOCRATES** Come then, Cratylus, let's think it over. If someone searching for [436b] things follows the names, looking into what each one means to be, do you realize there's no small danger of being deceived?
436b	**CRATYLUS** πῶς;	**CRATYLUS** How so?

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SOCRATES δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θέμενος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα ἡγεῖτο εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα ἐτίθετο καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥς φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;

SOCRATES Clearly whoever first set down the names set them down to match what he took the things to be, as we say. Isn't that so?

CRATYLUS ναί.

CRATYLUS Yes.

SOCRATES εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνος μὴ ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖτο, ἔθετο δὲ οἷα ἡγεῖτο, τί οἴει ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀκολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ πείσεσθαι; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι;

SOCRATES So if his thinking wasn't correct, and he set them down to match what he thought, what do you think will happen to us who follow him? Anything but being deceived?

CRATYLUS ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον [436c] ᾖ εἰδότα τίθεσθαι τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, οὐδ' ἂν ὀνόματα εἴη. μέγιστον δέ σοι ἔστω τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ τιθέμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε οὕτω σύμφωνα ἦν αὐτῷ ἅπαντα. ἢ οὐκ ἐνενόεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο τὰ ὀνόματα;

CRATYLUS But surely that's not how it is, Socrates. It must [436c] be that the one who set down the names did so knowing. Otherwise, as I said long ago, they wouldn't even be names. And here's the strongest evidence for you that the name-maker didn't miss the truth: otherwise his names would never have been so consistent. Or didn't you notice yourself, as you were talking, that all the names came about on the same principle and pointed the same way?

436c **SOCRATES** ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ὠγαθὲ Κρατύλε, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀπολόγημα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον σφαλεὶς ὁ τιθέμενος τἆλλα ἤδη [436d] πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐβιάζετο καὶ αὐτῷ συμφωνεῖν ἠνάγκαζεν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου σμικροῦ καὶ ἀδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα ἤδη ὄντα ἑπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις. δεῖ δὴ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς παντὸς πράγματος παντὶ ἀνδρὶ τὸν πολὺν λόγον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ὑπόκειται· ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενα. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ [436e] θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς. πάλιν γὰρ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἃ τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν. ὡς τοῦ παντὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ φερομένου καὶ ῥέοντός φαμεν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὀνόματα. ἄλλο τι οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ δηλοῦν;

SOCRATES But that's no defense at all, my good Cratylus. Suppose the name-maker slipped at the start, then forced the rest [436d] into line with that first step and made them agree with it. That's nothing strange. It's like geometrical diagrams: sometimes a small, unnoticed error is made at the start, and all the many steps that follow agree with one another. So with every matter, every man must give most of his discussion and most of his scrutiny to the starting point, to see whether it's correctly laid down or not. Once that has been examined adequately, the rest should be seen to follow from it. All the same, [436e] I'd be surprised if the names do agree with one another. Let's look again at what we went through before. We say the names signify being to us on the assumption that everything is moving, rushing, and flowing. Isn't that how you think they reveal it?

437a **CRATYLUS** πάνυ σφόδρα, καὶ ὀρθῶς γε σημαίνει.

CRATYLUS Very much so, and they signify it correctly.

SOCRATES σκοπῶμεν δὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, τὴν "ἐπιστήμην," ὡς ἀμφίβολόν ἐστι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαίνοντι ὅτι ἵστησιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται, καὶ ὀρθότερόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ νῦν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμβάλλοντας τὸ εἶ "ἐπεϊστήμην," ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμβολὴν ποιήσασθαι ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ εἶ ἐν τῷ ἰῶτα. ἔπειτα

SOCRATES Then let's pick out some of them and look. First take this name, *epistēmē* ("knowledge"), and see how ambiguous it is. It seems rather to signify that it brings our soul to a stand (*histēsin*) at things than that it's carried around along with them. And it's more correct to pronounce its beginning as we do now, rather than inserting the

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	τὸ “βέβαιον,” ὅτι βάσεώς τινός ἐστιν καὶ στάσεως μίμημα ἀλλ’ οὐ φορᾶς. [437b] ἔπειτα ἡ “ἱστορία” αὐτό που σημαίνει ὅτι ἵστησι τὸν ῥοῦν. καὶ τὸ “πιστὸν” ἱστὰν παντάπασι σημαίνει. ἔπειτα δὲ ἡ “μνήμη” παντί που μηνύει ὅτι μονή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀλλ’ οὐ φορά.	epsilon as *hepeïstēmē*; the insertion should be made with iota instead of epsilon. Next, *bebaion* (“firm”): it’s an imitation of a standing base (*basis*) and of rest, not of movement. [437b] Then *historia* (“inquiry”), I suppose, signifies just that it stops (*histēsi*) the flow. And *piston* (“trustworthy”) plainly signifies stopping (*histan*). And then *mnēmē* (“memory”) surely indicates to anyone that it’s a staying (*monē*) in the soul, not a movement.
437b	εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ “ἁμαρτία” καὶ ἡ “συμφορά,” εἰ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομά τις ἀκολουθήσει, φανεῖται ταὐτὸν τῇ “συνέσει” ταύτῃ καὶ “ἐπιστήμῃ” καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα ὀνόμασιν. ἔτι τοίνυν ἡ “ἀμαθία” καὶ ἡ “ἀκολασία” παραπλησία τούτοις φαίνεται· ἡ μὲν [437c] γὰρ τοῦ ἅμα θεῷ ἰόντος πορεία φαίνεται, ἡ “ἀμαθία,” ἡ δ’ “ἀκολασία” παντάπασιν ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασι φαίνεται. καὶ οὕτως, ἃ νομίζομεν ἐπὶ τοῖς κακίστοις ὀνόματα εἶναι, ὁμοιότατ’ ἂν φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πόλλ’ ἄν τις εὕροι εἰ πραγματεύοιτο, ἐξ ὧν οἰηθείη ἂν αὖ πάλιν τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον οὐχὶ ἰόντα οὐδὲ φερόμενα ἀλλὰ μένοντα τὰ πράγματα σημαίνειν.	And if you like, *hamartia* (“error”) and *symphora* (“misfortune”), if you follow the name, will turn out to be the same as *synesis* (“comprehension”) here and *epistēmē* and all the other names for things of serious worth. What’s more, *amathia* (“ignorance”) and *akolasia* (“licentiousness”) look much like them. [437c] *Amathia* looks like the journey of someone going along with god (*hama theōi iontos*), and *akolasia* looks exactly like a following along (*akolouthia*) with things. So the names we take to belong to the worst things would turn out to be very like the names for the finest. And I think one could find many others too, if one worked at it, that would lead one to believe the opposite: that the name-maker meant things to be not moving or rushing, but staying still.[42]
437d	CRATYLUS ἀλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ἐκείνως ἐσήμαινεν.	CRATYLUS But Socrates, you can see that most of them signified it the other way.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Κρατύλε; ὥσπερ ψήφους διαριθμησόμεθα τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔσται ἡ ὀρθότης; ὁπότερα ἂν πλείω φαίνηται τὰ ὀνόματα σημαίνοντα, ταῦτα δὴ ἔσται τἀληθῆ;	SOCRATES What of it, Cratylus? Are we going to count names like voting pebbles, and is that where correctness will lie? Will whatever the greater number of names appear to signify be the truth?
	CRATYLUS οὔκουν εἰκός γε.	CRATYLUS That’s not likely, no.
	SOCRATES οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ταῦτα μέν γε αὐτοῦ [438a] ἐάσωμεν, ἐπανέλθωμεν δὲ πάλιν ὅθεν δεῦρο μετέβημεν. ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα ἀναγκαῖον ἔφησθα εἶναι εἰδότα τίθεσθαι οἷς ἐτίθετο. πότερον οὖν ἔτι σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ οὔ;	SOCRATES Not in the least, my friend. Let’s leave this where it is [438a] and go back to the point where we turned aside. A little while ago, if you remember, you said that the one who set down the names must have known the things he set them down for. Do you still think so, or not?
438a	CRATYLUS ἔτι.	CRATYLUS Still.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ τὸν τὰ πρῶτα τιθέμενον εἰδότα φῂς τίθεσθαι;	SOCRATES And do you say that the one who set down the primary ones also knew when he set them down?

42 Both words suggest “going along with” things: *hamartia* sounds like *homartein* (“to go along with”), and *symphora* means literally “being carried along with.” *Synesis* had earlier been explained the same way.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	CRATYLUS εἰδότα.	**CRATYLUS** He knew.
	SOCRATES ἐκ ποίων οὖν ὀνομάτων ἢ μεμαθηκὼς ἢ ηὑρηκὼς ἦν [438b] τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ τά γε πρῶτα μήπω ἔκειτο, μαθεῖν δ' αὖ φαμεν τὰ πράγματα καὶ εὑρεῖν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἄλλως ἢ τὰ ὀνόματα μαθόντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐξευρόντας οἷά ἐστι;	**SOCRATES** Then from what sort of names had he learned or discovered [438b] the things, if the primary ones hadn't yet been set down? And we say it's impossible to learn and discover things except by learning the names or by finding out for ourselves what they're like.
438b	**CRATYLUS** δοκεῖς τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CRATYLUS** I think you have a point, Socrates.
	SOCRATES τίνα οὖν τρόπον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς εἰδότας θέσθαι ἢ νομοθέτας εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ὄνομα κεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἐκείνους εἰδέναι, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι τὰ πράγματα μαθεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων;	**SOCRATES** Then how shall we say they set down names knowingly, or were lawgivers, before any name at all had been set down for them to know, if it's impossible to learn things except from names?

BEFORE THERE WERE NAMES

The first name-makers must have known things without names, so things can be learned through themselves.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
438c	**CRATYLUS** οἶμαι μὲν ἐγὼ τὸν ἀληθέστατον λόγον περὶ τούτων εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν εἶναι ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν τὴν θεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτὰ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.	**CRATYLUS** I think the truest account of this, Socrates, is that some power greater than human set down the primary names for things, so that they must be correct.
	SOCRATES εἶτα οἴει ἐναντία ἂν ἐτίθετο αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ θείς, ὢν δαίμων τις ἢ θεός; ἢ οὐδέν σοι ἐδοκοῦμεν ἄρτι λέγειν;	**SOCRATES** So do you think the one who set them down, being some divinity or god, would have set down names that contradicted each other? Or do you think there was nothing in what we were saying just now?
	CRATYLUS ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦν τούτων τὰ ἕτερα ὀνόματα.	**CRATYLUS** But maybe one of the two groups weren't names at all.
	SOCRATES πότερα, ὦ ἄριστε, τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν στάσιν ἄγοντα ἢ τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν φοράν; οὐ γάρ που κατὰ τὸ ἄρτι λεχθὲν πλήθει κριθήσεται.	**SOCRATES** Which group, my excellent friend? The ones that point toward rest, or the ones that point toward movement? Surely, given what we just said, it won't be decided by numbers.
438d	**CRATYLUS** οὔτοι δὴ δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CRATYLUS** No, that wouldn't be fair, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ὀνομάτων οὖν στασιασάντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φασκόντων ἑαυτὰ εἶναι τὰ ὅμοια τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, τῶν δ' ἑαυτά, τίνι ἔτι διακρινοῦμεν, ἢ ἐπὶ τί ἐλθόντες; οὐ γάρ που ἐπὶ ὀνόματά γε ἕτερα ἄλλα τούτων· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλ' ἄττα ζητητέα πλὴν ὀνομάτων, ἃ ἡμῖν ἐμφανιεῖ ἄνευ ὀνομάτων ὁπότερα τούτων ἐστὶ τἀληθῆ, δείξαντα δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ὄντων.	**SOCRATES** So when names are in civil war, some claiming that they're the ones like the truth and others claiming that they are, what will we use to decide, or where will we turn? Surely not to yet other names besides these, since there aren't any. No, clearly we must look for something other than names, something that will show us without names which of these are the true ones, clearly by showing the truth of the things that are.
438e	**CRATYLUS** δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.	**CRATYLUS** I think so.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, δυνατὸν μαθεῖν ἄνευ ὀνομάτων τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.	**SOCRATES** Then it is possible, it seems, Cratylus, to learn the things that are without names, if this is right.
	CRATYLUS φαίνεται.	**CRATYLUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES διὰ τίνος ἄλλου οὖν ἔτι προσδοκᾷς ἂν ταῦτα μαθεῖν; ἆρα δι' ἄλλου του ἢ οὗπερ εἰκός τε καὶ δικαιότατον, δι' ἀλλήλων γε, εἴ πῃ συγγενῆ ἐστιν, καὶ αὐτὰ δι' αὑτῶν; τὸ γάρ που ἕτερον ἐκείνων καὶ ἀλλοῖον ἕτερον ἄν τι καὶ ἀλλοῖον σημαίνοι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνα.	**SOCRATES** Then through what else would you still expect to learn them? Through anything other than what's reasonable and most just: through one another, if they're in any way akin, and through themselves? Something different from them and of another kind would signify something different and of another kind, not them.
	CRATYLUS ἀληθῆ μοι φαίνῃ λέγειν.	**CRATYLUS** I think you're right.
439a	**SOCRATES** ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ πολλάκις μέντοι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὰ καλῶς κείμενα ἐοικότα εἶναι ἐκείνοις ὧν ὀνόματα κεῖται, καὶ εἶναι εἰκόνας τῶν πραγμάτων;	**SOCRATES** Hold on, by Zeus. Didn't we agree many times that names that are well set down resemble the things they're set down as names of, and are images of the things?
	CRATYLUS ναί.	**CRATYLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES εἰ οὖν ἔστι μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα δι' ὀνομάτων τὰ πράγματα μανθάνειν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτῶν, ποτέρα ἂν εἴη καλλίων καὶ σαφεστέρα ἡ μάθησις; ἐκ τῆς εἰκόνος μανθάνειν αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν εἰ καλῶς εἴκασται, καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἧς ἦν εἰκών, [439b] ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῆς εἰ πρεπόντως εἴργασται;	**SOCRATES** So suppose it's entirely possible to learn things through names, and also possible to learn them through the things themselves. Which would be the finer and clearer way to learn? Learning from the image both the image itself, whether it's a good likeness, and the truth it was an image of, [439b] or learning from the truth both the truth itself and its image, whether it was fittingly made?
439b	**CRATYLUS** ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας μοι δοκεῖ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.	**CRATYLUS** It must be from the truth, I think.
	SOCRATES ὅντινα μὲν τοίνυν τρόπον δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ εὑρίσκειν τὰ ὄντα, μεῖζον ἴσως ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ σέ· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσασθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν καὶ μαθητέον καὶ ζητητέον ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων.	**SOCRATES** Well, how one ought to learn or discover the things that are is perhaps too great a question for you and me to have settled. But we should be content to agree on this much: they must be learned and searched for not from names but, much rather, from themselves.
	CRATYLUS φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CRATYLUS** Apparently, Socrates.

CRATYLUS AND THE FLUX

Socrates' "dream" of beauty itself: if everything flowed, nothing could be known. Cratylus still sides with Heraclitus.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἔτι τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς τὰ [439c] πολλὰ ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐς ταὐτὸν τείνοντα ἐξαπατᾷ, εἰ τῷ ὄντι μὲν οἱ θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες γε ἔθεντο ὡς ἰόντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων—φαίνονται γὰρ ἔμοιγε	**SOCRATES** Then let's look into this further, so that we aren't deceived by this great number of [439c] names all pointing the same way. Perhaps those who set them down really did set them down

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι—τὸ δ', εἰ ἔτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὗτοι αὐτοί τε ὥσπερ εἴς τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντες κυκῶνται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμβάλλουσιν. σκέψαι γάρ, ὦ θαυμάσιε Κρατύλε, ὃ ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω. πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν [439d] ὄντων οὕτω, ἢ μή;	thinking that everything is always moving and flowing (they certainly seem to me to have thought so). And perhaps that isn't how things are at all. Perhaps the name-makers have fallen into a kind of whirlpool and are being churned around in it, and they're dragging us in after them. Consider, my remarkable Cratylus, something I often dream about. Shall we say that there is such a thing as beauty itself, and the good itself, and so with each one of the [439d] things that are, or not?
439d	CRATYLUS ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶναι.	CRATYLUS I think there is, Socrates.
	SOCRATES αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τί ἐστιν καλὸν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ῥεῖν· ἀλλ' αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον ἀεί ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν;	SOCRATES Then let's look at that thing itself. The question isn't whether some face or other such thing is beautiful, since all those things seem to flow. Rather, shall we say that beauty itself is always such as it is?
	CRATYLUS ἀνάγκη.	CRATYLUS Necessarily.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;	SOCRATES Then can we correctly call it anything if it's always slipping away, saying first that it is that, then that it's of such a kind? Or must it, even as we speak, at once become something else, slip away, and no longer be so?
	CRATYLUS ἀνάγκη.	CRATYLUS Necessarily.
439e	SOCRATES πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη τὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει; εἰ γάρ ποτε ὡσαύτως ἴσχει, ἕν γ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβαίνει· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, πῶς ἂν τοῦτό γε μεταβάλλοι ἢ κινοῖτο, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας;	SOCRATES Then how could something that is never in the same state be anything? If it's ever in the same state, then clearly it isn't changing at all during that time. And if it's always in the same state and is the same, how could it change or move, when it never departs from its own form?
	CRATYLUS οὐδαμῶς.	CRATYLUS It couldn't, in any way.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν γνωσθείη γε ὑπ' οὐδενός. ἅμα [440a] γὰρ ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ γνωσομένου ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλοῖον γίγνοιτο, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γνωσθείη ἔτι ὁποῖόν γέ τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον· γνῶσις δὲ δήπου οὐδεμία γιγνώσκει ὃ γιγνώσκει μηδαμῶς ἔχον.	SOCRATES Nor, for that matter, could it be known by anyone. Just as [440a] the one who was going to know it approached, it would become something else, of another kind, so that it could no longer be known what sort of thing it is or what state it's in. And surely no knowledge knows what it knows if that thing is in no state at all.
440a	CRATYLUS ἔστιν ὡς λέγεις.	CRATYLUS It is as you say.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἡ γνῶσις, τοῦ γνῶσις εἶναι μὴ μεταπίπτει, μένοι τε ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ γνῶσις καὶ εἴη γνῶσις. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος [440b] μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἅμα τ' ἂν	SOCRATES Nor is it reasonable to say that there's knowledge at all, Cratylus, if all things are changing and nothing stays. If this very thing, knowledge, doesn't change from being knowledge, then knowledge would always stay and would be know-

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μεταπίπτοι εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος γνώσεως καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταπίπτει, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἴη. εἰ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οὔ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῇ [440c] οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾷ.

440c ταῦτ' οὖν πότερόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἐκείνως ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσιν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ᾖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὑτὸν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, διισχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἰδότα, καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ κατάρρῳ νοσοῦντες [440d] ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, ὑπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα τὰ χρήματα ἔχεσθαι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν δή, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ οὔ. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ εὖ, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποδέχεσθαι—ἔτι γὰρ νέος εἶ καὶ ἡλικίαν ἔχεις—σκεψάμενον δέ, ἐὰν εὕρῃς, μεταδιδόναι καὶ ἐμοί.

440d **CRATYLUS** ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. εὖ μέντοι ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ νυνὶ ἀσκέπτως ἔχω, ἀλλά μοι σκοπουμένῳ καὶ [440e] πράγματα ἔχοντι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκείνως φαίνεται ἔχειν ὡς Ἡράκλειτος λέγει.

440e **SOCRATES** εἰς αὖθις τοίνυν με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, διδάξεις, ἐπειδὰν ἥκῃς· νῦν δέ, ὥσπερ παρεσκεύασαι, πορεύου εἰς ἀγρόν· προπέμψει δέ σε καὶ Ἑρμογένης ὅδε.

CRATYLUS ταῦτ' ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ πειρῶ ἔτι ἐννοεῖν ταῦτα ἤδη.

ENGLISH

ledge. But if the very form [440b] of knowledge changes, then at that same moment it would change into another form, other than knowledge, and there would be no knowledge. And if it's always changing, there would always be no knowledge, and on this argument there would be nothing to do the knowing and nothing to be known. But if there is always that which knows, and there is that which is known, and there is the beautiful, and there is the good, and there is each one of the things that are, then I don't think these things we're now talking about are at all like flow [440c] or movement.

Now whether these things are so, or as Heraclitus and his followers and many others say, I'm afraid may not be easy to investigate. But surely no one with any sense would put himself and his own soul into the care of names, trusting them and the people who set them down. He wouldn't insist that he knows something, or condemn himself and the things that are as having nothing sound in any of them, as though everything leaked like cracked pots. Nor would he believe, just like people sick with a streaming cold, [440d] that things too are in that condition, that all things are in the grip of flux and streaming. Perhaps it is so, Cratylus, and perhaps it isn't. So you must look into it bravely and well, and not accept anything easily, since you're still young and in your prime. And once you've looked into it, if you find the answer, share it with me too.

CRATYLUS I'll do that. But you can be sure, Socrates, that even now I haven't failed to consider it. As I consider it and [440e] take trouble over it, it seems to me much more that things are the way Heraclitus says.

SOCRATES Then you'll teach me another time, my friend, when you're back. For now, go off to the country as you've been getting ready to do. Hermogenes here will see you on your way.

CRATYLUS I will, Socrates. But you too should keep trying to think these things over from now on.