Gorgias

PLATO
c. 428–348 BC

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Γοργίας

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited

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Gorgias · Plato (c. 428–348 BC)

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited. Parallel-text edition, Forage, September 2026. forage.com/plato/gorgias

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INTRODUCTION

Gorgias of Leontini was the most famous teacher of public speaking in Greece. The dialogue opens just after he has given a display in Athens, and Socrates wants to know what exactly his art is, and what it is good for.

The conversation gets steadily angrier. Gorgias is polite; his pupil Polus insists that tyrants who can do whatever they like are enviable; Socrates answers that doing wrong is worse than suffering it, and that a wrongdoer is better off punished than not. Then Callicles, a rising politician, attacks the whole idea of justice: by nature, he says, the strong should have more, and the best life is one of unlimited appetite.

Socrates holds that rhetoric as practised is mere flattery, and that the only real statesman is the one who makes citizens better. The dialogue ends with a myth about the judgment of souls after death.

Gorgias

Athens, just after Gorgias has given a public display of his oratory.
Socrates questions Gorgias, Polus and Callicles about rhetoric, power and how one ought to live.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
447a	**CALLICLES** πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.	**CALLICLES** They say that's the way to take part in a war or a battle, Socrates.[1]
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν;	**SOCRATES** What? Have we come, as the saying goes, when the feast is over? Are we too late?
	CALLICLES καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.	**CALLICLES** And a very elegant feast it was. Gorgias gave us a fine display of many things just a little while ago.[2]
	SOCRATES τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῖψαι.	**SOCRATES** Well, Callicles, the one to blame for that is Chaerephon here: he made us waste our time in the marketplace.[3]
447b	**CHAEREPHON** οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, εἰς αὖθις.	**CHAEREPHON** No harm done, Socrates. I'll make up for it too. Gorgias is a friend of mine, so he'll give us a display—now, if you like, or some other time, if you'd rather.
	CALLICLES τί δέ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου;	**CALLICLES** What's that, Chaerephon? Does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?
	CHAEREPHON ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.	**CHAEREPHON** That's exactly what we're here for.
	CALLICLES οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε· παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.	**CALLICLES** Then come to my house whenever you like. Gorgias is staying with me, and he'll give you a display.
	SOCRATES εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν [447c] ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεταί τε καὶ διδάσκει· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν εἰς αὖθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.	**SOCRATES** That's kind of you, Callicles. But would he be willing [447c] to have a discussion with us? I want to find out from him what the power of the man's craft is, and what it is that he professes and teaches. As for the rest of the display, let him give it some other time, as you suggest.
447c	**CALLICLES** οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἓν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.	**CALLICLES** There's nothing like asking him yourself, Socrates. In fact this was one part of his display: just now he was inviting anyone in the house

1 Callicles, Gorgias' host, is an ambitious young Athenian known only from this dialogue.
2 Gorgias of Leontini, in Sicily, was the most celebrated teacher of rhetoric of his day; a "display" was a showpiece speech performed before an audience.
3 Chaerephon was Socrates' devoted, excitable friend, known from Aristophanes' *Clouds* and from Plato's *Apology*.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		to ask whatever he liked, and said he would answer every question.
	SOCRATES ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.	**SOCRATES** That's splendid. Chaerephon, ask him.
	CHAEREPHON τί ἔρωμαι;	**CHAEREPHON** Ask him what?
447d	**SOCRATES** ὅστις ἐστίν.	**SOCRATES** Who he is.
	CHAEREPHON πῶς λέγεις;	**CHAEREPHON** What do you mean?
	SOCRATES ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;	**SOCRATES** Well, if he happened to be a maker of shoes, he would presumably answer you that he was a shoemaker. Or don't you see what I mean?
	CHAEREPHON μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλῃ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;	**CHAEREPHON** I see, and I'll ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles here telling the truth when he says you profess to answer any question anyone asks you?
448a	**GORGIAS** ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.	**GORGIAS** It's true, Chaerephon. Just now I was making that very claim, and I can tell you that no one has asked me anything new for many years.
	CHAEREPHON ἦ που ἄρα ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρινῇ, ὦ Γοργία.	**CHAEREPHON** Then I suppose you'll answer easily, Gorgias.
	GORGIAS πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.	**GORGIAS** You're welcome to put that to the test, Chaerephon.
	POLUS νὴ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.	**POLUS** Yes, by Zeus—and if you like, Chaerephon, test me. I think Gorgias must be quite worn out; he's just been through a great deal.[4]
	CHAEREPHON τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; οἴει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι;	**CHAEREPHON** What, Polus? Do you think you'd answer better than Gorgias?
448b	**POLUS** τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς;	**POLUS** What does that matter, as long as I answer well enough for you?
	CHAEREPHON οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.	**CHAEREPHON** It doesn't. Since you want to, then, answer.
	POLUS Ἐρώτα.	**POLUS** Ask.
	CHAEREPHON ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τί ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον;	**CHAEREPHON** All right, I'm asking. If Gorgias happened to be expert in the same craft as his brother Herodicus, what would we rightly call him? Wouldn't it be the same as we call his brother?[5]
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.

4 Polus, from Acragas in Sicily, was a young follower of Gorgias and the author of a handbook on rhetoric.
5 This Herodicus, Gorgias' brother, was a physician.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	CHAEREPHON ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.	**CHAEREPHON** So we'd be right to say he was a doctor.
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	CHAEREPHON εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν;	**CHAEREPHON** And if he were skilled in the same craft as Aristophon son of Aglaophon, or Aristophon's brother, what would be the right name for him?[6]
448c	**POLUS** δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.	**POLUS** A painter, obviously.
	CHAEREPHON νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν;	**CHAEREPHON** As it is, then, since he's an expert in some craft, what would be the right thing to call him?
	POLUS ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ηὑρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.	**POLUS** Chaerephon, there are many crafts among human beings, discovered by experience out of experiences. For experience makes our life proceed by craft, and inexperience by chance. Of each of these, different people partake of different ones in different ways, and the best people partake of the best. Gorgias here is one of these, and he shares in the finest of the crafts.
448d	**SOCRATES** καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ.	**SOCRATES** Well, Gorgias, Polus certainly seems splendidly equipped for speechmaking. But he isn't doing what he promised Chaerephon.[7]
	GORGIAS τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**GORGIAS** How so, Socrates?
	SOCRATES τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** He doesn't seem to me to be answering the question at all.
	GORGIAS ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.	**GORGIAS** Well, you ask him, if you like.
	SOCRATES οὔκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** No—not if you yourself are willing to answer. I'd much rather ask you. It's clear to me from what Polus has said that he has practiced what's called rhetoric more than conversation.
448e	**POLUS** τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**POLUS** Why is that, Socrates?
	SOCRATES ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.	**SOCRATES** Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked what craft Gorgias is expert in, you praised his craft as though someone were criticizing it, but you didn't answer what it is.
	POLUS οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη;	**POLUS** But didn't I answer that it was the finest?

6 Aristophon's brother was Polygnotus, the most famous painter of the fifth century BC.
7 Polus' name means "colt," and Socrates' word for him here plays on it; his answer parodies the jingling style of Gorgias' school.

WHAT IS RHETORIC?

Socrates asks Gorgias what his craft is and what a rhetorician should be called.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES καὶ μάλα. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν· ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς [449a] καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.	**SOCRATES** You certainly did. But nobody is asking what Gorgias' craft is like; we're asking what it is, and what we ought to call Gorgias. Chaerephon laid out the earlier examples for you, and you answered him well [449a] and briefly. Now tell us in the same way what the craft is and what we should call Gorgias. Or rather, Gorgias, you tell us yourself: what should we call you, as an expert in what craft?
449a	**GORGIAS** τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**GORGIAS** Rhetoric, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;	**SOCRATES** So we should call you a rhetorician?
	GORGIAS ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.	**GORGIAS** A good one, Socrates, if you want to call me what I "boast myself to be," as Homer put it.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.	**SOCRATES** Yes, I do want to.
	GORGIAS κάλει δή.	**GORGIAS** Then call me that.
449b	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν;	**SOCRATES** And shall we say you're able to make others rhetoricians too?
	GORGIAS ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.	**GORGIAS** That's just what I profess—not only here but elsewhere too.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰς αὖθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** Then would you be willing, Gorgias, to carry on as we're talking now, one of us asking and the other answering, and to put off for another time lengthy speeches like the one Polus started on? Don't go back on your promise: be willing to answer the questions briefly.
	GORGIAS εἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ [449c] πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.	**GORGIAS** Some answers, Socrates, can only be given at length. Even so, [449c] I'll try to make them as short as possible. In fact this is another of my claims: that no one could say the same things in fewer words than I can.
449c	**SOCRATES** τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰς αὖθις.	**SOCRATES** That's just what we need, Gorgias. Give me a display of exactly that—brevity—and save the long speeches for another time.
	GORGIAS ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.	**GORGIAS** I will, and you'll say you've never heard anyone speak more concisely.
	SOCRATES φέρε δή· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῂς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης [449d] εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ἡ	**SOCRATES** Come on, then. You say you're an expert in the craft of rhetoric [449d] and that you could make someone else a rhetorician too. What among

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἦ γάρ;	the things that exist is rhetoric concerned with? Weaving, for instance, is concerned with making clothes, isn't it?
449d	GORGIAS ναί.	GORGIAS Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;	SOCRATES And music with composing melodies?
	GORGIAS ναί.	GORGIAS Yes.
	SOCRATES νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνῃ ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.	SOCRATES By Hera, Gorgias, I do admire your answers: you're answering as briefly as it's possible to be.
	GORGIAS πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.	GORGIAS Yes, Socrates, I think I do it quite adequately.
	SOCRATES εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;	SOCRATES Good. Now answer me in the same way about rhetoric: what among the things that exist is it knowledge about?
449e	GORGIAS περὶ λόγους.	GORGIAS Speeches.
	SOCRATES ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἆρα οἳ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν;	SOCRATES What sort of speeches, Gorgias? The ones that show the sick what regimen will make them well?
	GORGIAS οὔ.	GORGIAS No.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν.	SOCRATES So rhetoric isn't about all speeches.
	GORGIAS οὐ δῆτα.	GORGIAS Certainly not.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.	SOCRATES And yet it does make people able to speak.
	GORGIAS ναί.	GORGIAS Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;	SOCRATES And to understand the things they speak about?
	GORGIAS πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	GORGIAS Of course.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν, 450a ἣν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;	SOCRATES Now, 450a the craft we mentioned just now, medicine—does it make people able to understand and speak about the sick?
450a	GORGIAS ἀνάγκη.	GORGIAS It must.
	SOCRATES καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.	SOCRATES Then medicine too, it seems, is about speeches.
	GORGIAS ναί.	GORGIAS Yes.
	SOCRATES τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;	SOCRATES The ones about diseases?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	GORGIAS μάλιστα.	**GORGIAS** Exactly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;	**SOCRATES** And physical training is about speeches too—the ones about the good and bad condition of bodies?
	GORGIAS πάνυ γε.	**GORGIAS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως [450b] ἔχουσιν· ἑκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους, οἳ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἑκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.	**SOCRATES** And the other crafts, Gorgias, are the same way. [450b] Each of them is about the speeches that concern the particular thing that it's the craft of.
450b	**GORGIAS** φαίνεται.	**GORGIAS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν ᾖ περὶ λόγους;	**SOCRATES** Then why on earth don't you call the other crafts rhetoric, since they're about speeches, if you call this one rhetoric because it's about speeches?
	GORGIAS ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων [450c] ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.	**GORGIAS** Because, Socrates, the knowledge involved in the other crafts is, practically speaking, all about manual work and activities of that sort, whereas rhetoric has no such handiwork: all its activity and all its effect comes about through speech. [450c] That's why I maintain that the craft of rhetoric is about speeches—and rightly, I claim.
450c	**SOCRATES** ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Now, do I understand what sort of craft you mean to call it? Perhaps I'll soon know more clearly. But answer me: there are crafts, aren't there?
	GORGIAS ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES πασῶν δὴ οἶμαι τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστιν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας [450d] μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φῂς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι· ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Among all the crafts, I think, some consist mostly of work and need little speech, and some need none at all: their business could be carried out even in silence—painting, for example, and sculpture, and many others. It's crafts like these [450d] that you seem to me to mean when you say rhetoric isn't concerned with them. Or not?
450d	**GORGIAS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**GORGIAS** You've understood me perfectly, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἔτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ [450e] κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ	**SOCRATES** But there are other crafts that accomplish everything through speech, and need practically no action besides, or very little—arithmetic, say, and calculation and geometry, and draughts too, and many other crafts. Some of these involve about as much speech as action, but most involve more, and for them all their activity and

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λόγων ἐστίν. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικήν.

450e **GORGIAS** ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὔτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, "τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικήν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις;" ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.

451a **GORGIAS** ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις.

SOCRATES ἴθι νυν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἡ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν· "ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς 451b ἐστιν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη;" εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἐχουσῶν. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο· "τῶν περὶ τί;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν γνῶσις, ὅσα ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνῃ ὄντα.

451b εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο· "τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο· "ἡ περὶ τί;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ 451c συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει—περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστιν, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν—διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, "οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας," εἰ φαίη, "περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.

451c **GORGIAS** ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

451d **SOCRATES** ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων· ἦ γάρ;

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all their 450e effect is achieved through speech. It seems to me you mean that rhetoric is one of these.

GORGIAS That's true.

SOCRATES And yet I don't think you mean to call any of these rhetoric—even though, going by your words, you did say that the craft whose effect comes through speech is rhetoric, and someone who wanted to make trouble in the discussion might take you up: "So you're saying arithmetic is rhetoric, Gorgias?" But I don't think you're calling either arithmetic or geometry rhetoric.

GORGIAS You're right to think so, Socrates, and you take me fairly.

SOCRATES Come on, then, and finish the answer I asked for. Since rhetoric is one of the crafts that make heavy use of speech, and there are others like it too, try to say what rhetoric's effect through speech is concerned with. Suppose someone asked me about any of the crafts I just mentioned: "Socrates, what 451b is the craft of arithmetic?" I'd tell him, as you did just now, that it's one of those whose effect comes through speech. And if he went on to ask, "One of those concerned with what?" I'd say it's knowledge of the even and the odd, however many of each there may be.

And if he asked next, "And what craft do you call calculation?" I'd say this too is one of those whose whole effect is achieved by speech. And if he went on to ask, "Concerned with what?" I'd answer the way people draft motions in the Assembly: 451c "in other respects" calculation is like arithmetic—since it's about the same thing, the even and the odd—"but differs in this respect": calculation examines how the odd and even stand in quantity both to themselves and to each other. And if someone asked about astronomy, when I said that it too achieves everything by speech, and went on, "And what are the speeches of astronomy about, Socrates?" I'd say they're about the motion of the stars and the sun and the moon, and how they stand to one another in speed.

GORGIAS And you'd be right, Socrates.

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	SOCRATES Now you do the same, Gorgias. Rhetoric is one of the crafts that accomplish and achieve everything by speech, isn't it?
GORGIAS ἔστι ταῦτα.	**GORGIAS** That's so.
SOCRATES λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; τί ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;	**SOCRATES** Then tell me: concerned with what? What is this thing among the things that exist that these speeches used by rhetoric are about?
GORGIAS τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.	**GORGIAS** The greatest of human affairs, Socrates, and the best.
SOCRATES ἀλλ', ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις [451e] καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἶομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ᾀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ᾄδοντες ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.	**SOCRATES** But Gorgias, that's disputable too, what you're saying, [451e] and still not at all clear. I expect you've heard people at drinking parties singing that song where they count off that the best thing is to be healthy, the second is to be good-looking, and the third, as the songwriter puts it, is to be rich without fraud.[8]
451e **GORGIAS** ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;	**GORGIAS** Yes, I've heard it. But what's your point?
452a **SOCRATES** ὅτι εἴ σοι αὐτίκα παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὧν ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἰατρὸς ὅτι "ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμή" —εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν ταῦτα λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι ἰατρός. τί οὖν λέγεις; ἦ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; "πῶς γὰρ οὔ," φαίη ἂν ἴσως, "ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια;	**SOCRATES** That the producers of the things the songwriter praised might suddenly stand before you—a doctor, a trainer and a businessman—and first the doctor might say, "Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you. It isn't his craft that deals with the greatest good for human beings; it's mine." Then if I asked him, "And who are you, to say this?" he'd presumably say he was a doctor. "What do you mean, then? Is the product of your craft the greatest good?" "Of course, Socrates," he might well say, "it's health.
τί δ' ἐστὶν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν [452b] ἀνθρώποις ὑγιείας;" εἰ δ' αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι ὅτι "θαυμάζοιμί τἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς εἴ σοι ἔχοι Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς·" εἴποιμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον· σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; "παιδοτρίβης," φαίη ἄν, "τὸ δὲ ἔργον μού ἐστιν καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα." μετὰ δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἴποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῷμαι πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων· [452c] "σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἢ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἢ παρ' ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν." φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· τί δὲ δή; ἦ σὺ τούτου δημιουργός; φαίη ἄν. τίς ὤν; "χρηματιστής." τί οὖν;	And what good is greater [452b] for human beings than health?" And if after him the trainer said, "I'd be amazed too, Socrates, if Gorgias could show you a greater good from his craft than I can from mine," I'd say to him as well, "And who are you, sir, and what is your product?" "A trainer," he'd say, "and my product is making people's bodies handsome and strong." After the trainer the businessman would speak, looking down on everybody, I imagine: [452c] "Just consider, Socrates, whether you find any good greater than wealth, either with Gorgias or with anyone else at all." So we'd say to him, "Really? Are you a producer of that?" He'd say yes. "Being who?" "A businessman." "Well then,
452c κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. "πῶς γὰρ οὔκ;" ἐρεῖ. καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε	do you judge wealth to be the greatest good for human beings?" we'll say. "Of course," he'll say.

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	Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ' ἄν· "καὶ τί ἐστιν [452d] τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας." ἴθι οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ φῂς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.	"Well, Gorgias here disputes that: he claims his own craft is the cause of a greater good than yours," we'd say. Clearly his next question would be, "And what [452d] is this good? Let Gorgias answer." So come on, Gorgias: consider yourself questioned both by them and by me, and answer. What is this thing that you say is the greatest good for human beings, and that you are the producer of?
452d	**GORGIAS** ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ.	**GORGIAS** The thing, Socrates, that truly is the greatest good, and the source both of freedom for people themselves and, for each person, of rule over others in his own city.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** And what do you say that is?

THE CRAFT OF PERSUASION

Gorgias says rhetoric is the power to persuade by speech, and Socrates asks what kind of persuasion.

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452e	**GORGIAS** τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.	**GORGIAS** Being able to persuade by speech—jurors in a court, councillors in the Council, assemblymen in the Assembly, and people in any other gathering that is a gathering of citizens. And with this power you'll have the doctor as your slave, and the trainer as your slave, and this businessman of yours will turn out to be making money for someone else, not for himself—for you, who are able to speak and persuade the masses.[9]
	SOCRATES νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν [453a] ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγῇ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ· ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;	**SOCRATES** Now, Gorgias, I think you've come very close to showing [453a] what craft you take rhetoric to be. If I understand you, you're saying that rhetoric is a producer of persuasion, and its whole business and the sum of it comes down to this. Or can you say that rhetoric is able to do anything more than produce persuasion in the souls of its hearers?
453a	**GORGIAS** οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὁρίζεσθαι· ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.	**GORGIAS** Not at all, Socrates. I think you've defined it adequately. That is the sum of it.
	SOCRATES ἄκουσον δή, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὡς [453b] ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλόμενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἕνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ.	**SOCRATES** Then listen, Gorgias. You can be sure that, as [453b] I'm convinced myself, if anyone ever has a discussion with someone else because he wants to know what the discussion is actually

8 This was a *skolion*, a traditional song sung in turn by guests at a drinking party.
9 Athens was governed by the Assembly of all citizens, a Council of Five Hundred that prepared its business, and large popular juries.

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		about, I'm one of those people. And I count you one too.
453b	**GORGIAS** τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**GORGIAS** What of it, Socrates?
	SOCRATES ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ, ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων ἐστὶν πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον ἐρήσομαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς [453c] ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ ἕνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προΐῃ ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται.	**SOCRATES** I'll tell you now. Rest assured that I don't clearly know what this persuasion from rhetoric is that you speak of, or what matters it is persuasion about. Still, I do have a suspicion about which persuasion I think you mean, and about what. Nonetheless I'll ask you what persuasion you mean that comes from [453c] rhetoric, and what it's about. Why, then, since I have a suspicion myself, will I ask you rather than say it myself? Not for your sake but for the argument's, so that it moves forward in the way that makes its subject clearest to us.
453c	σκόπει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστιν τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἶ μοι εἶπες ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῷα γράφων, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῴων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;	Consider whether you think I'm right to press you with questions. Suppose I happened to ask you which of the painters Zeuxis is, and you told me, "The one who paints living things." Wouldn't I be right to ask you, "Which living things does he paint, and where?"[10]
	GORGIAS πάνυ γε.	**GORGIAS** Certainly.
453d	**SOCRATES** ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῷα;	**SOCRATES** Because there are other painters as well, who paint many other living things?
	GORGIAS ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο;	**SOCRATES** But if no one except Zeuxis painted, your answer would have been a good one?
	GORGIAS πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**GORGIAS** Of course.
	SOCRATES ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποιεῖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Come on, then, and tell me about rhetoric. Do you think rhetoric is the only craft that produces persuasion, or do other crafts too? Here's what I mean. When someone teaches anything at all, does he persuade people of what he teaches, or not?
	GORGIAS οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.	**GORGIAS** Certainly he does, Socrates. He persuades more than anyone.
453e	**SOCRATES** πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὥνπερ νυνδή· ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;	**SOCRATES** Then let's go back to the same crafts we were talking about just now. Doesn't arithmetic teach us the facts about number—and so does the arithmetician?

10 Zeuxis of Heraclea was a celebrated painter of the late fifth century BC.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	GORGIAS πάνυ γε.	**GORGIAS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;	**SOCRATES** And so it persuades too?
	GORGIAS ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστιν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική;	**SOCRATES** So arithmetic is a producer of persuasion too?
	GORGIAS φαίνεται.	**GORGIAS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινούμεθά που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ [454a] ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστίν· καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἁπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὔσας καὶ ἦστινος καὶ περὶ ὅτι· ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Then if someone asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what, we'll presumably answer him: the teaching kind, about the even [454a] and the odd, and how many there are. And we'll be able to show that all the other crafts we mentioned just now are producers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about what. Or not?
454a	**GORGIAS** ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστιν δημιουργός.	**SOCRATES** So rhetoric isn't the only producer of persuasion.
	GORGIAS ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**GORGIAS** That's true.
	SOCRATES ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα· ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν τέχνη; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι [454b] δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι;	**SOCRATES** Well then, since it isn't the only one to accomplish this result, and others do too, we'd be right to go on and ask the speaker, as we did about the painter: "Of what sort of persuasion, and persuasion about what, is rhetoric the craft?" Or don't you think [454b] it's fair to ask that further question?
454b	**GORGIAS** ἔμοιγε.	**GORGIAS** I do.
	SOCRATES ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως.	**SOCRATES** Then answer, Gorgias, since you agree.
	GORGIAS ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἅ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.	**GORGIAS** Well, Socrates, I mean the persuasion that takes place in the courts and in other crowds, as I said a moment ago, and it's about what is just and unjust.
	SOCRATES καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὼ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς ἐὰν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον [454c] εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ —ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἑξῆς ἕνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς.	**SOCRATES** I did suspect you meant this persuasion, Gorgias, and about these things. But don't be surprised if a little later I ask you something like this—something that seems obvious, [454c] but I ask about it anyway. As I say, I'm asking so that the argument may be carried through in order—not for your sake, but so that we don't get into the habit of guessing and snatching each other's words away in advance. I want you to carry through your own views, on your own premises, however you like.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
454c	**GORGIAS** καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**GORGIAS** And I think you're quite right to do so, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;	**SOCRATES** Come on, then, let's look at this too. Is there something you call "having learned"?
	GORGIAS καλῶ.	**GORGIAS** There is.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;	**SOCRATES** Well, and "having come to believe"?
454d	**GORGIAS** ἔγωγε.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;	**SOCRATES** Do you think having learned and having come to believe—learning and belief—are the same thing, or different?
	GORGIAS οἶομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.	**GORGIAS** I think they're different, Socrates.
	SOCRATES καλῶς γὰρ οἴει· γνώσῃ δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο· "ἆρ' ἔστιν τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;" φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.	**SOCRATES** And you're right. You can tell from this: if someone asked you, "Gorgias, is there such a thing as false belief and true belief?" you'd say there is, I think.
	GORGIAS ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;	**SOCRATES** Well, is there false knowledge and true knowledge?
	GORGIAS οὐδαμῶς.	**GORGIAS** Not at all.
	SOCRATES δῆλον ἄρ' αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν.	**SOCRATES** Then it's clear they aren't the same.
	GORGIAS ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**GORGIAS** That's true.
454e	**SOCRATES** ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.	**SOCRATES** And yet both those who have learned and those who have come to believe have been persuaded.
	GORGIAS ἔστι ταῦτα.	**GORGIAS** That's so.
	SOCRATES βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην;	**SOCRATES** Shall we propose, then, two kinds of persuasion: one that provides belief without knowing, and one that provides knowledge?
	GORGIAS πάνυ γε.	**GORGIAS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;	**SOCRATES** Then which persuasion does rhetoric produce in the courts and other crowds about what's just and unjust? The one that results in believing without knowing, or the one that results in knowing?
	GORGIAS δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.	**GORGIAS** Obviously, Socrates, the one that results in believing.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς [455a] δημιουργός ἐστιν πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον.	**SOCRATES** So rhetoric, it seems, is a producer of persuasion [455a] that brings belief but doesn't teach, about what's just and unjust.
455a	**GORGIAS** ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς μόνον· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.	**SOCRATES** Then the rhetorician doesn't teach courts and other crowds about what's just and unjust; he only makes them believe. After all, he could hardly teach so large a crowd such important matters in a short time.
	GORGIAS οὐ δῆτα.	**GORGIAS** Certainly not.
	SOCRATES φέρε δή, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς [455b] ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὅτι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ᾖ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι. οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἱρέσεως πέρι ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων [455c] καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ᾖ, ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὔ· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε φῂς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** Come on, then, let's see what we're actually saying about [455b] rhetoric. For my part, I can't yet make out what I'm saying myself. When the city holds a meeting to choose doctors, or shipbuilders, or any other body of craftsmen, surely the rhetorician won't be the one to give advice then? Clearly in each choice it's the most skilled person who ought to be chosen. Nor will he advise when it's a matter of building walls or equipping harbors or dockyards: the master builders will. Nor again when there's a decision about choosing generals, or drawing up troops against the enemy, or [455c] seizing positions: then the military experts will give advice, and the rhetoricians won't. Or what do you say about such cases, Gorgias? Since you claim both to be a rhetorician yourself and to make others rhetoricians, it's right to learn about your craft from you.
455c	καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητής σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως αἰσχύνοιντ' ἄν σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ' [455d] ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι· "τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου ἢ καὶ περὶ ὧν νυνδὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν;" πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.	And consider that I'm looking after your interests too. Perhaps someone in the house actually wants to become your pupil—I notice quite a few, in fact—who might be too embarrassed to question you. [455d] So when I question you, consider yourself questioned by them as well: "What will we get, Gorgias, if we study with you? What will we be able to advise the city about? Only about what's just and unjust, or also about the things Socrates was just mentioning?" So try to answer them.
455d	**GORGIAS** ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα [455e] καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.	**GORGIAS** Well, Socrates, I'll try to reveal the whole power of rhetoric to you clearly—since you yourself have led the way so well. You know, of course, that these dockyards [455e] and the walls of Athens and the equipping of the harbors came about on the advice of Themistocles, and some of

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		it on the advice of Pericles—not on the advice of the craftsmen.[11]
455e	**SOCRATES** λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.	**SOCRATES** So they say about Themistocles, Gorgias. As for Pericles, I heard him myself when he was advising us about the middle wall.[12]

THE POWER OF RHETORIC

Gorgias boasts that rhetoric outdoes every expert and says teachers are not to blame for its misuse.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
456a	**GORGIAS** καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ᾖ ὧν νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.	**GORGIAS** And whenever there's a choice of the kind you were just talking about, Socrates, you see that it's the rhetoricians who give the advice and whose proposals carry the day.
	SOCRATES ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς ποτε ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.	**SOCRATES** It's because I'm amazed at that, Gorgias, that I've been asking all this while what on earth the power of rhetoric is. When I look at it this way, it seems to me something supernatural in its magnitude.
	GORGIAS εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἁπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὑτῇ ἔχει. [456b] μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρά τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπῃ βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι ἰατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ [456c] ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρόν, ἀλλ' αἱρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο.	**GORGIAS** If only you knew the whole of it, Socrates! It gathers up practically all powers and holds them under its sway. [456b] I'll give you strong evidence. Many times I've gone with my brother and other doctors to visit one of their patients who wouldn't take his medicine or let the doctor cut or cauterize him, and when the doctor couldn't persuade him, I persuaded him—by no other craft than rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a doctor went into any city you like and had to compete in speeches before the Assembly or some other gathering over which of them should be chosen as doctor, the doctor [456c] would be nowhere; the man able to speak would be chosen, if he wanted.
456c	καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὁντινοῦν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἑλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν περὶ ὅτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶν καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης· δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ [456d] τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθεν πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν, οὐ	And if he competed against any other craftsman whatever, the rhetorician would persuade them to choose him rather than anyone else. There's nothing the rhetorician couldn't speak about more persuasively before a crowd than any other craftsman at all. So that's how great the power of this craft is, and what it's like. Still, Socrates, one should use rhetoric the way one uses any other competitive skill. [456d] With other competitive skills, too, one shouldn't use them against everyone just because

11 Themistocles built up Athens' navy and fortifications in the 480s–470s BC; Pericles was the city's leading statesman from about 460 to his death in 429 BC.

12 The middle wall was one of the Long Walls linking Athens to its port, the Piraeus.

GREEK

τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι.

456d οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία ἐάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς [456e] παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆσθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας· [457a] οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχύϊ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὔκουν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι οἶμαι ὀρθῶς. ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς.

457a δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν [457b] ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι— ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι—οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δὲ οἶμαι ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾆτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ [457c] δικαίου χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

457c **SOCRATES** οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτούς, [457d] οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περί του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικοῦντας ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἴσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἠξίωσαν [457e] ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα;

ENGLISH

one has learned boxing and all-in wrestling and fighting in armor, so as to be stronger than friend and foe alike. That's no reason to beat one's friends, or stab them and kill them.

No, by Zeus, and if someone goes to the wrestling school, gets his body in good shape and becomes a boxer, and then beats his father and mother or some other relative or friend, that's no reason to hate [456e] the trainers and the teachers of fighting in armor and banish them from their cities. They passed on their skills to be used justly against enemies and wrongdoers, in self-defense, not as aggression. [457a] It's the pupils who turn them around and use their strength and their craft wrongly. So it isn't the teachers who are wicked, and the craft isn't to blame or wicked on that account; it's those, I think, who don't use it rightly. The same argument applies to rhetoric too.

The rhetorician is able to speak against anyone and on any subject, so as to be more persuasive before crowds [457b] on, in short, anything he likes. But that's no more reason for him to rob the doctors of their reputation—just because he could do it—or the other craftsmen either. He should use rhetoric justly too, as with competitive skills. And if, I think, someone becomes a rhetorician and then does wrong with this power and this craft, it isn't the teacher who should be hated and banished from cities. He passed it on [457c] to be used justly; the other man uses it the opposite way. So it's just to hate and banish and kill the one who uses it wrongly, not the one who taught him.

SOCRATES Gorgias, I think you too have had experience of many discussions and have noticed something like this in them: people can't easily define for one another whatever they set out to discuss, learn from and teach each other, [457d] and so bring their conversation to an end. Instead, if they disagree about something and one says the other isn't speaking correctly or clearly, they get angry and think the other is speaking out of spite, because he wants to win and isn't looking into the question under discussion. Some of them end up parting in the most shameful way, heaping abuse on each other and saying and hearing such things that even the bystanders are annoyed on their own account for having thought such people worth [457e] listening to. Why do I say this?

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457e	ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. [458a] ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὥνπερ καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἄν σε διερωτῴην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῴην ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγξάντων εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα [458b] ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὤν.	Because I think what you're saying now isn't quite consistent or in tune with what you said at first about rhetoric. So I'm afraid to refute you, in case you suppose I'm speaking out of rivalry—not about the subject, to make it clear, but against you. [458a] So if you're the same sort of person as I am, I'd be glad to keep questioning you; if not, I'd let it go. And what sort of person am I? One of those who would be glad to be refuted if I say something untrue, and glad to refute someone else if he says something untrue—but no less glad to be refuted than to refute. I think being refuted is the greater good, just as it's a greater good to be rid of the greatest evil oneself than to rid someone else of it. For I think nothing is so great an evil for a person as false [458b] belief about the things our discussion happens to be about now.
458b	εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῂς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐᾶν, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.	So if you say you're that sort of person too, let's talk. But if you think we ought to drop it, let's say goodbye to it now and end the discussion.
	GORGIAS ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷον σὺ ὑφηγῇ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, [458c] ἢν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.	GORGIAS Well, Socrates, I say I'm the sort of person you describe too. But perhaps we should also think about the people here. Quite a while ago, before you all came, I gave them a long display, and now we might drag things out a long way [458c] if we have a discussion. So we should consider them too, in case we're keeping some of them who want to do something else.
458c	CHAEREPHON τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν βουλομένων ἀκούειν ἐάν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὐργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.	CHAEREPHON You can hear the noise these gentlemen are making yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates: they want to hear anything you have to say. As for me, I hope I'm never so busy that I'd drop discussions like this, conducted like this, because something else was more important to do.
458d	CALLICLES νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.	CALLICLES By the gods, Chaerephon, I've been present at many discussions myself, and I don't know that I've ever enjoyed one as much as this. So as far as I'm concerned, even if you want to talk the whole day, you'll be doing me a favor.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.	SOCRATES Well, Callicles, nothing's stopping me, if Gorgias is willing.
	GORGIAS αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλεται. [458e] ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει.	GORGIAS It would be shameful of me after this, Socrates, not to be willing, when I myself invited anyone to ask whatever he liked. [458e] So if these people agree, carry on the discussion and ask what you like.

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458e	**SOCRATES** ἄκουε δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῂς ποιεῖν οἷός τ᾽ εἶναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν;	**SOCRATES** Then listen, Gorgias, to what surprises me in what you've said. Perhaps you're right and I'm not understanding you rightly. You say you can make someone a rhetorician if he wants to learn from you?
	GORGIAS ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ᾽ ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ 459a πείθοντα;	**SOCRATES** So that he's persuasive about everything before a crowd—not by teaching but 459a by persuading?
459a	**GORGIAS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**GORGIAS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.	**SOCRATES** You said just now, you know, that even about health the rhetorician will be more persuasive than the doctor.
	GORGIAS καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.	**GORGIAS** I did—before a crowd, at any rate.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.	**SOCRATES** And "before a crowd" means among those who don't know? Surely he won't be more persuasive than the doctor among those who do know.
	GORGIAS ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**GORGIAS** That's true.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;	**SOCRATES** So if he's going to be more persuasive than the doctor, he becomes more persuasive than the one who knows?
	GORGIAS πάνυ 459b γε.	**GORGIAS** Certainly 459b he does.
459b	**SOCRATES** οὐκ ἰατρός γε ὤν· ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Though he isn't a doctor, is he?
	GORGIAS ναί.	**GORGIAS** No.
	SOCRATES ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων.	**SOCRATES** And someone who isn't a doctor presumably lacks knowledge of what the doctor knows.
	GORGIAS δῆλον ὅτι.	**GORGIAS** Obviously.
	SOCRATES ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;	**SOCRATES** So the one who doesn't know will be more persuasive among those who don't know than the one who does know, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the doctor. Is that what follows, or something else?
	GORGIAS τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.	**GORGIAS** That's what follows in this case, yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν	**SOCRATES** And isn't the rhetorician, and rhetoric, in the same position with regard to all the other crafts too? It doesn't need to know how things actually are; it just needs to have found some 459c

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	[459c] δέ τινα πειθοῦς ηὑρηκέναι ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.	device of persuasion so as to appear, to those who don't know, to know more than those who do.
459c	GORGIAS οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;	GORGIAS But isn't that a great convenience, Socrates—to learn not the other crafts but just this one, and yet come off no worse than the craftsmen?
	SOCRATES εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα [459d] τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακόν ἐστιν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν [459e] μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικήν;	SOCRATES Whether the rhetorician comes off worse than the others or not because of this, we'll look into shortly, if it's relevant to our argument. But first let's consider this. Is [459d] the rhetorician in the same position about what is just and unjust, shameful and fine, good and bad, as he is about health and the subjects of the other crafts? Does he not know these things themselves—what is good or bad, fine or shameful, just or unjust—but has devised persuasion about them, so that, not knowing, he seems to those who don't know [459e] to know more than the one who does? Or must he know, and must the person who is going to learn rhetoric from you come to you already knowing these things?
459e	εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον —ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσῃ αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία; [460a] καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποθ' ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν.	And if not, will you, the teacher of rhetoric, teach the person who comes to you none of these things —since that isn't your job—but make him seem to the many to know such things when he doesn't, and seem to be good when he isn't? Or will you be completely unable to teach him rhetoric unless he knows the truth about these things beforehand? How do matters stand, Gorgias? [460a] And by Zeus, as you said just now, reveal rhetoric to us and tell us what on earth its power is.
460a	GORGIAS ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.	GORGIAS Well, Socrates, I suppose if he happens not to know them, he'll learn these things from me too.
	SOCRATES ἔχε δή· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.	SOCRATES Hold it there—that's well said. If you make someone a rhetorician, he must know what is just and unjust, having learned it either beforehand or later from you.
460b	GORGIAS πάνυ γε.	GORGIAS Certainly.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὔ;	SOCRATES Well then: someone who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, isn't he?
	GORGIAS ναί.	GORGIAS Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;	SOCRATES And someone who has learned music is a musician?

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	GORGIAS ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός; καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;	**SOCRATES** And someone who has learned medicine is a doctor? And so on with the rest by the same reasoning: someone who has learned each thing is such as the knowledge of it makes him?
	GORGIAS πάνυ γε.	**GORGIAS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;	**SOCRATES** Then by this reasoning, someone who has learned what is just is just?
	GORGIAS πάντως δήπου.	**GORGIAS** Absolutely, of course.
	SOCRATES ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει.	**SOCRATES** And the just man, I take it, does just things.
	GORGIAS ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
460c	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;	**SOCRATES** Then the rhetorician must be just, and the just man must want to do just things?
	GORGIAS φαίνεταί γε.	**GORGIAS** So it appears.
	SOCRATES οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.	**SOCRATES** So the just man will never want to do wrong.
	GORGIAS ἀνάγκη.	**GORGIAS** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** And according to the argument, the rhetorician must be just.
	GORGIAS ναί.	**GORGIAS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.	**SOCRATES** So the rhetorician will never want to do wrong.
	GORGIAS οὐ φαίνεταί γε.	**GORGIAS** Apparently not.
	SOCRATES μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς 460d παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδίκως χρῆται καὶ ἀδικῇ, ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδ' ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Now, do you remember saying a little earlier that we shouldn't blame 460d the trainers or banish them from our cities if a boxer uses his boxing, and uses it unjustly and does wrong—and in the same way, if the rhetorician uses rhetoric unjustly, we shouldn't blame his teacher or drive him out of the city, but the one who does wrong and doesn't use rhetoric rightly? Was that said or not?
460d	**GORGIAS** ἐρρήθη.	**GORGIAS** It was.
	SOCRATES νῦν 460e δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** But now 460e this same man, the rhetorician, turns out to be someone who would never do wrong. Or not?
460e		

GREEK

GORGIAS φαίνεται.

SOCRATES καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἦ γάρ;

GORGIAS ναί.

SOCRATES ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γ' ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ [461a] τῇ ῥητορικῇ κἂν ἀδίκως χρῷτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνᾄδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν χαίρειν. ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν [461b] κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

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GORGIAS So it appears.

SOCRATES And at the start of our discussion, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric was about speeches—not those about the even and the odd, but those about the just and the unjust. Wasn't it?

GORGIAS Yes.

SOCRATES Well, when you said that then, I took it that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since it always makes its speeches about justice. But when a little later you said that the rhetorician [461a] might even use rhetoric unjustly, I was surprised, and thinking that what was being said didn't hang together, I said what I did then: that if you thought being refuted was a gain, as I do, it would be worth having the discussion, but if not, we should let it go. And now that we've looked into it, you can see for yourself that it's agreed, on the contrary, that the rhetorician can't use rhetoric unjustly or be willing to do wrong. So how these matters really stand—by the [461b] dog, Gorgias!—will take more than a short conversation to examine properly.[13]

POLUS TAKES OVER

Polus breaks in angrily and demands that Socrates say what he himself thinks rhetoric is.

GREEK

461b **POLUS** τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἴει—ὅτι Γοργίας ᾐσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς [461c] λόγοις—τοῦτο ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα—ἐπεὶ τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν; —ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶν τοὺς λόγους.

461c **SOCRATES** ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθῶτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ [461d] Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις

ENGLISH

POLUS What's this, Socrates? Do you really believe what you're now saying about rhetoric? Or do you think—just because Gorgias was ashamed not to agree with you that the rhetorician also knows what's just and fine and good, and that if someone came to him without knowing these things he would teach them himself, and then, from this agreement perhaps, some contradiction turned up in the [461c] argument—the very thing you love, since you yourself led him into such questions (for who do you think would deny that he himself knows what's just and would teach it to others?)—well, dragging the argument into that sort of thing is thoroughly boorish.

SOCRATES Polus, my fine fellow, that's exactly why we deliberately acquire friends and sons: so that when we get older and stumble, you younger people will be there to set our lives straight, in deeds and in words. And now, if Gorgias and I [461d]

13 "By the dog" was Socrates' characteristic oath.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου— δίκαιος δ' εἶ—καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἓν μόνον φυλάττῃς.	are stumbling in the argument, you're here—set us straight. It's only right that you should. And if you think anything we've agreed to was wrongly agreed, I'm willing to take back whatever you like, provided you observe just one thing for me.
461d	**POLUS** τί τοῦτο λέγεις;	**POLUS** What's that?
	SOCRATES τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθέρξῃς, ᾗ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.	**SOCRATES** That you keep a lid on the long speeches, Polus, which you tried to use at the start.
	POLUS τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι;	**POLUS** What? Won't I be allowed to say as much as I like?
461e	**SOCRATES** δεινὰ μεντἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται [462a] μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἴ τι κήδῃ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῂς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας· ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** That would be hard on you, my good friend, if you came to Athens, where there's more freedom of speech than anywhere in Greece, and then you alone were denied it here. But look at it the other way: if you talk at length and won't answer the question, wouldn't it be hard on me in turn if I'm not allowed [462a] to go away and not listen to you? No—if you care at all about the argument we've had and want to set it straight, take back whatever you like, as I said just now, and take your turn asking and being asked, as Gorgias and I did, refuting and being refuted. You claim, I take it, that you know the same things Gorgias does, don't you?
462a	**POLUS** ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I do.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἑκάστοτε ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** And you too invite people to ask you whatever they like, each time, since you know how to answer?
	POLUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**POLUS** Certainly.
462b	**SOCRATES** καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου.	**SOCRATES** Then now do whichever of these you like: ask or answer.
	POLUS ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῂς εἶναι;	**POLUS** All right, I will. Answer me, Socrates. Since you think Gorgias is at a loss about rhetoric, what do you say it is?
	SOCRATES ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** Are you asking what craft I say it is?
	POLUS ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I am.
	SOCRATES οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι.	**SOCRATES** None at all, in my view, Polus—to tell you the truth.
	POLUS ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;	**POLUS** Well, what do you think rhetoric is?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES πρᾶγμα ὃ φῂς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι [462c] ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνων.	**SOCRATES** The thing that you say, in the treatise [462c] I read recently, produced craft.
462c	**POLUS** τί τοῦτο λέγεις;	**POLUS** What do you mean?
	SOCRATES ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.	**SOCRATES** A sort of knack.[14]
	POLUS ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;	**POLUS** So you think rhetoric is a knack?
	SOCRATES ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.	**SOCRATES** I do, unless you say something else.
	POLUS τίνος ἐμπειρία;	**POLUS** A knack for what?
	SOCRATES χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.	**SOCRATES** For producing a certain gratification and pleasure.
	POLUS οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;	**POLUS** Then don't you think rhetoric is a fine thing, being able to gratify people?
	SOCRATES τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι φημὶ [462d] αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ καλή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** What, Polus? Have you already found out from me what I say [462d] it is, so that you ask next whether I think it's fine?
462d	**POLUS** οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῂς εἶναι;	**POLUS** Haven't I found out that you say it's a sort of knack?
	SOCRATES βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι;	**SOCRATES** Since you prize gratification, then, would you like to gratify me in a small way?
	POLUS ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** Sure.
	SOCRATES ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** Ask me now what craft I think cookery is.
	POLUS ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία;	**POLUS** All right, I'm asking: what craft is cookery?
	SOCRATES οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.	**SOCRATES** None, Polus.
	POLUS ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.	**POLUS** Then what? Tell me.
	SOCRATES φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις.	**SOCRATES** I'll tell you: a sort of knack.
	POLUS τίς; φάθι.	**POLUS** For what? Tell me.
	SOCRATES φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς [462e] ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε.	**SOCRATES** I'll tell you: for producing gratification and [462e] pleasure, Polus.
462e	**POLUS** ταὐτὸν ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική;	**POLUS** So cookery and rhetoric are the same thing?
	SOCRATES οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.	**SOCRATES** Not at all. But they're parts of the same practice.
	POLUS τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;	**POLUS** What practice do you mean?

14 The word is the one Polus used for "experience" in his showpiece at 448c; Socrates turns it against him.

RHETORIC AS FLATTERY

Socrates calls rhetoric a knack, a part of flattery, and maps it against the real crafts.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας [463a] ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα—καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται—ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.	**SOCRATES** I'm afraid it may be rather rude to tell the truth. I hesitate to say it because of Gorgias, in case he thinks I'm making fun of his own practice. For my part, I don't know whether this is the rhetoric Gorgias [463a] practices—in fact nothing became clear to us just now from the discussion about what he thinks it is. But what I call rhetoric is a part of something that's not at all fine.
463a	**GORGIAS** τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ· μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθῇς.	**GORGIAS** Of what, Socrates? Tell us—don't hold back on my account.
	SOCRATES δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ [463b] ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἓν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τήν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικήν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ [463c] πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** Well, Gorgias, it seems to me there's a practice that isn't a craft, but belongs to a soul that's good at guessing, bold, and naturally clever at dealing with people. The sum of it [463b] I call flattery. This practice seems to me to have many other parts, and one of them is cookery, which seems to be a craft but, as I argue, isn't a craft but a knack and a routine. Rhetoric too I call a part of it, and cosmetics as well, and sophistry—these four parts, for four kinds of thing. So if Polus wants to find out, let him find out. He hasn't [463c] yet found out what sort of part of flattery I say rhetoric is; he hasn't noticed that I haven't answered that yet, and he goes on to ask whether I don't think it's fine.
463c	ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.	But I won't answer him whether I think rhetoric is fine or shameful before I first answer what it is. That wouldn't be fair, Polus. If you do want to find out, ask what sort of part of flattery I say rhetoric is.
	POLUS ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ὁποῖον μόριον.	**POLUS** All right, I'm asking: answer what sort of part it is.
463d	**SOCRATES** ἆρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.	**SOCRATES** Would you understand if I answered? Rhetoric, on my account, is a phantom of a part of statesmanship.
	POLUS τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;	**POLUS** Well? Do you call it fine or shameful?
	SOCRATES αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε—τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ—ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.	**SOCRATES** Shameful—since I call bad things shameful—seeing that I have to answer you as though you already knew what I mean.
	GORGIAS μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.	**GORGIAS** By Zeus, Socrates, even I don't understand what you mean.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
463e	**SOCRATES** εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.	**SOCRATES** Naturally, Gorgias, since I'm not saying anything clear yet. But Polus here is young and quick.[15]
	GORGIAS ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.	**GORGIAS** Well, never mind him. Tell me what you mean by saying rhetoric is a phantom of a part of statesmanship.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο, πῶλος ὅδε 464a ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν;	**SOCRATES** All right, I'll try to explain what rhetoric appears to me to be. If it turns out not to be this, Polus here 464a will refute me. I take it there's something you call body, and something you call soul?
464a	**GORGIAS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**GORGIAS** Of course.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;	**SOCRATES** And do you think each of these has a good condition?
	GORGIAS ἔγωγε.	**GORGIAS** I do.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δ' οὔ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.	**SOCRATES** Well, and a condition that seems good but isn't? Here's the sort of thing I mean. Many people seem to be in good bodily condition, and no one could easily tell that they aren't, except a doctor or a trainer.
	GORGIAS ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**GORGIAS** That's true.
	SOCRATES τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, 464b ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.	**SOCRATES** I say there's something like this in the body and in the soul, which makes the body and the soul seem to be in good condition, 464b though they're no better off at all.
464b	**GORGIAS** ἔστι ταῦτα.	**GORGIAS** That's so.
	SOCRATES φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. 464c ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσίν τι ἀλλήλων.	**SOCRATES** Come on, then, and I'll show you more clearly what I mean, if I can. There being two things, I say there are two crafts. The one concerned with the soul I call statesmanship. The one concerned with the body I can't give you a single name for offhand, but while the care of the body is one thing, I say it has two parts, gymnastics and medicine. In statesmanship, legislation corresponds to gymnastics, and justice is the counterpart of medicine. 464c Each pair has something in common, since they deal with the same thing—medicine with gymnastics, and justice with legislation—but even so they differ somewhat from each other.
464c		

15 Again a play on Polus' name: a colt is young and skittish.

GREEK

τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη —οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη—τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται 464d εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκεν, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρόν, ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαΐει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ 464e πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν.

ENGLISH

There being these four, then, which always care for what's best, two for the body and two for the soul, flattery—perceiving this, not knowing it, I mean, but by guesswork—has divided itself into four, slipped in under each of the parts, and pretends 464d to be the one it has slipped under. It cares nothing for what's best, but with whatever is most pleasant at the moment it hunts out folly and tricks it, so that it seems to be worth a great deal. Cookery has slipped in under medicine and pretends to know which foods are best for the body. So if a cook and a doctor had to compete before children, or before men as foolish as children, over which of them understands good and 464e bad foods, the doctor or the cook, the doctor would starve to death.

464e κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι 465a εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Πῶλε—τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω—ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει ὁποῖ' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα· τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον. 465b

So I call it flattery, and I say that this sort of thing is 465a shameful, Polus—I'm saying this to you—because it aims at the pleasant without the best. And I say it's not a craft but a knack, because it has no rational account, in applying what it applies, of what those things are by nature, and so it can't state the cause of each. And I don't call anything a craft that lacks a rational account. If you dispute any of this, I'm willing to give an account. 465b

465b τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτική, κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵν' οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι—ἤδη γὰρ 465c ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις—ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν, καὶ ὅτι ὃ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἄτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις.

So, as I say, cookery is flattery lurking under medicine. In the same way cosmetics lurks under gymnastics—a mischievous, deceptive, low and servile thing, deceiving with shapes and colors, smoothness and clothes, so that people take on a borrowed beauty and neglect their own, which comes through gymnastics. So, not to make a long speech, I'm willing to put it to you the way geometers do—by now 465c you may be able to follow: as cosmetics is to gymnastics, so sophistry is to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so rhetoric is to justice. And yet, as I say, while they are distinct by nature in this way, because they are so close, sophists and rhetoricians get jumbled together in the same field and about the same things, and neither do they themselves know what to make of themselves, nor do other people know what to make of them.

465c καὶ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι 465d ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἥ τε ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὦ φίλε Πῶλε—σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος—ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ

And indeed, if the soul didn't govern the body, 465d but the body governed itself, and cookery and medicine weren't examined and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself judged them, measuring by the gratifications it received, then the say-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν. ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον [465e] ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα.	ing of Anaxagoras would be everywhere, my dear Polus—you're familiar with these things—"all things would be jumbled together," and there'd be no telling apart what was medicinal and healthy from what was cookery. So now you've heard what I say rhetoric is: the counterpart [465e] of cookery in the soul, as cookery is in the body. Perhaps I've done something odd: I wouldn't let you make long speeches, and I've gone on at some length myself.[16]
465e	ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἧν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ [466a] ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.	But I deserve to be forgiven. When I spoke briefly you didn't understand, and you couldn't make any use of the answer I gave you; you needed an explanation. So if I too, [466a] when you answer, can't make use of what you say, you may stretch out a speech as well. But if I can, let me use it. That's only fair. And now, if you can make any use of this answer, use it.

DO ORATORS HAVE GREAT POWER?

Socrates argues that orators and tyrants do what seems best to them but not what they want.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
466a	**POLUS** τί οὖν φῄς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική;	**POLUS** What do you say, then? You think rhetoric is flattery?
	SOCRATES κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;	**SOCRATES** No—I said a part of flattery. Can't you remember, Polus, at your age? What'll you do when you're older?
	POLUS ἆρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;	**POLUS** Then do you think good rhetoricians are held in low regard in their cities, as flatterers?
466b	**SOCRATES** ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** Is that a question you're asking, or the start of some speech?
	POLUS ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I'm asking.
	SOCRATES οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.	**SOCRATES** I don't think they're regarded at all.
	POLUS πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;	**POLUS** What do you mean, not regarded? Don't they have the greatest power in their cities?
	SOCRATES οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.	**SOCRATES** No—not if you mean that having power is something good for the one who has it.
	POLUS ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγω γε.	**POLUS** That's certainly what I mean.
	SOCRATES ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.	**SOCRATES** Then I think rhetoricians have the least power of anyone in the city.

16 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, a philosopher who lived in Athens, began his book with the words "all things were together."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	POLUS τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε 466c ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;	**POLUS** What? Don't they, like tyrants, put to death 466c anyone they like, and confiscate property, and banish from their cities anyone they please?
466c	**SOCRATES** νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἑκάστου ὧν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνῃ, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.	**SOCRATES** By the dog, Polus, I really can't tell, with each thing you say, whether you're saying it yourself and declaring your own opinion, or asking me.
	POLUS ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.	**POLUS** I'm asking you.
	SOCRATES εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;	**SOCRATES** Very well, my friend. Then are you asking me two things at once?
	POLUS πῶς δύο;	**POLUS** How two?
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· "ἦ οὐχὶ ἀποκτεινύασιν 466d οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;"	**SOCRATES** Didn't you say just now something like, "Don't rhetoricians put to death 466d anyone they like, like tyrants, and confiscate property and drive out of their cities anyone they please?"
466d	**POLUS** ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I did.
	SOCRATES λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστιν τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν 466e γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** Then I tell you that these are two questions, and I'll answer you on both. I say, Polus, that both rhetoricians and tyrants have the least power in their cities, as I said just now. For they do practically nothing 466e they want to do—though they do whatever seems best to them.
466e	**POLUS** οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;	**POLUS** Well, isn't that having great power?
	SOCRATES οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησιν πῶλος.	**SOCRATES** Not according to Polus.
	POLUS ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** Not according to me? I certainly say it is!
	SOCRATES μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.	**SOCRATES** By the—no, you don't, since you said that having great power is good for the one who has it.
	POLUS φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.	**POLUS** Yes, I do say that.
	SOCRATES ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς σὺ μέγα δύνασθαι;	**SOCRATES** Then do you think it's good if someone who has no sense does what seems best to him? And do you call that having great power?
	POLUS οὐκ ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** No, I don't.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ 467a τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται, ἡ δὲ	**SOCRATES** Then will you prove that rhetoricians have sense, and that 467a rhetoric is a craft and not flattery, by refuting me? If you leave me unrefuted, the rhetoricians who do what seems good to them in their cities, and the tyrants, will have gained nothing good by it. Power, you say, is a

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι· ἢ οὔ;	good; but doing what seems good to one without sense is—as you yourself agree—bad. Or not?
467a	**POLUS** ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I agree.
	SOCRATES πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;	**SOCRATES** So how could rhetoricians or tyrants have great power in their cities, unless Polus refutes Socrates and shows that they do what they want?
467b	**POLUS** οὗτος ἀνήρ—	**POLUS** Why, this fellow—
	SOCRATES οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλά μ' ἔλεγχε.	**SOCRATES** I say they don't do what they want. Go on, refute me.
	POLUS οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι, τούτου πρόσθεν;	**POLUS** Didn't you agree a moment ago—before this—that they do what seems best to them?
	SOCRATES καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.	**SOCRATES** And I agree now too.
	POLUS οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;	**POLUS** Then don't they do what they want?
	SOCRATES οὔ φημι.	**SOCRATES** I say not.
	POLUS ποιοῦντες ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;	**POLUS** Even though they do what seems good to them?
	SOCRATES φημί.	**SOCRATES** I say so.
	POLUS σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**POLUS** That's outrageous, Socrates—monstrous!
	SOCRATES μὴ κακηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε 467c κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.	**SOCRATES** Don't abuse me, my peerless Polus—to address you 467c in your own style. If you're able to question me, show that I'm wrong; if not, answer yourself.[17]
467c	**POLUS** ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις.	**POLUS** All right, I'm willing to answer, so that I can find out what you mean.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν;	**SOCRATES** Well then, do you think people want the thing they're doing at any given time, or the thing for the sake of which they do what they do? For example, those who take medicine from their doctors—do you think they want what they're doing, drinking the medicine and suffering, or that other thing, being healthy, for the sake of which they drink it?
	POLUS δῆλον ὅτι τὸ 467d ὑγιαίνειν.	**POLUS** Obviously 467d being healthy.
467d	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ	**SOCRATES** And similarly with those who go to sea and do other kinds of business: what they want isn't what they're doing at any given time—who

17 Socrates mimics the alliterative, rhyming style of Polus and Gorgias.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν;) ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν.	wants to sail and run risks and have trouble?—but, I think, that for the sake of which they sail: being rich. It's for the sake of wealth that they sail.
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο [467e] οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει;	**SOCRATES** Then isn't it the same with everything? If someone does something for the sake of something else, what he wants isn't the thing he's doing but the thing [467e] for whose sake he's doing it?
467e	**POLUS** ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;	**SOCRATES** Now is there anything that exists that isn't either good or bad or in between—neither good nor bad?
	POLUS πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**POLUS** No—everything must be one of those, Socrates.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων;	**SOCRATES** And you say that wisdom and health and wealth and other things like that are good, and their opposites bad?
	POLUS ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I do.
	SOCRATES τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, [468a] ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά;	**SOCRATES** And by things that are neither good nor bad, do you mean things like this: things that sometimes share in the good, [468a] sometimes in the bad, and sometimes in neither—sitting, for instance, and walking and running and sailing, or again stones and sticks and other things like that? Isn't that what you mean? Or is there something else you call neither good nor bad?
468a	**POLUS** οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.	**POLUS** No, those are the ones.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ;	**SOCRATES** Now when people do these in-between things, do they do them for the sake of the good things, or the good things for the sake of the in-between ones?
	POLUS τὰ [468b] μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.	**POLUS** The [468b] in-between things for the sake of the good ones, surely.
468b	**SOCRATES** τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** So it's in pursuit of the good that we walk, when we walk, thinking it better; and when we stand still, the opposite, we stand still for the same reason—for the good. Isn't that so?
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
		SOCRATES And don't we also put someone to death, if we do, or banish him or confiscate his

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	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τιν' ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;	property, because we think it better for us to do these things than not?
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἕνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.	**SOCRATES** So it's for the sake of the good that those who do all these things do them.
	POLUS φημί.	**POLUS** I agree.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, [468c] ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;	**SOCRATES** And didn't we agree that when we do things for the sake of something, we don't want those things, [468c] but the thing for whose sake we do them?
468c	**POLUS** μάλιστα.	**POLUS** Very much so.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;	**SOCRATES** Then we don't want to slaughter people, or banish them from cities, or confiscate their property, just like that. If these things are beneficial, we want to do them; if they're harmful, we don't. For we want the good things, as you say; what's neither good nor bad we don't want, and what's bad we don't want either. Isn't that right? Do you think I'm telling the truth, Polus, or not? Why don't you answer?
	POLUS ἀληθῆ.	**POLUS** It's true.
468d	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Then if we agree on that, when someone—whether he's a tyrant or an orator—puts someone to death or banishes him from the city or confiscates his property, thinking it better for himself when in fact it turns out to be worse, this man is surely doing what seems best to him. Isn't he?
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;	**SOCRATES** But is he also doing what he wants, if in fact these things turn out to be bad? Why don't you answer?
	POLUS ἀλλ' οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.	**POLUS** No, I don't think he's doing what he wants.
	SOCRATES ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος [468e] μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;	**SOCRATES** Is there any way, then, that such a man [468e] has great power in that city, if having great power is something good, as you agreed?
468e	**POLUS** οὐκ ἔστιν.	**POLUS** There isn't.
	SOCRATES ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.	**SOCRATES** So I was telling the truth when I said that it's possible for a man who does what seems

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		best to him in a city not to have great power, and not to do what he wants.
	POLUS ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.	**POLUS** As if you, Socrates, wouldn't welcome the freedom to do whatever seemed best to you in the city, rather than not! As if you don't envy it when you see someone putting to death whoever he thinks fit, or confiscating his property, or throwing him in chains!
	SOCRATES δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;	**SOCRATES** Justly, you mean, or unjustly?
469a	**POLUS** ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν;	**POLUS** Whichever way he does it, isn't it enviable either way?
	SOCRATES εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.	**SOCRATES** Hush, Polus!
	POLUS τί δή;	**POLUS** Why?
	SOCRATES ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν.	**SOCRATES** Because you shouldn't envy the unenviable, or the wretched. You should pity them.
	POLUS τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;	**POLUS** What? Is that how you think it is with the people I'm talking about?
	SOCRATES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** How could it not be?
	POLUS ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός;	**POLUS** So a man who puts to death whoever he thinks fit, and does it justly, seems to you wretched and pitiable?
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.	**SOCRATES** No, not to me; but not enviable either.
	POLUS οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;	**POLUS** Didn't you just say he was wretched?

IS IT BETTER TO SUFFER INJUSTICE THAN TO DO IT?

Socrates claims that doing injustice is the greatest evil, and Polus cites the tyrant Archelaus against him.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
469b	**SOCRATES** τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.	**SOCRATES** The one who kills unjustly, my friend —and pitiable besides. The one who kills justly is unenviable.
	POLUS ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνῄσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.	**POLUS** Surely it's the one who is put to death unjustly who's pitiable and wretched.
	SOCRATES ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκων.	**SOCRATES** Less so than the one who kills him, Polus, and less so than the one who is put to death justly.
	POLUS πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**POLUS** How on earth can that be, Socrates?
	SOCRATES οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.	**SOCRATES** Like this: doing injustice happens to be the greatest of evils.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	POLUS ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον;	**POLUS** What, that's the greatest? Isn't suffering injustice worse?
	SOCRATES ἥκιστά γε.	**SOCRATES** Not in the least.
	POLUS σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;	**POLUS** So you'd rather suffer injustice than do it?
469c	**SOCRATES** βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.	**SOCRATES** I'd rather neither. But if I had to either do injustice or suffer it, I would choose to suffer it rather than do it.
	POLUS σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;	**POLUS** So you wouldn't welcome being a tyrant?
	SOCRATES οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.	**SOCRATES** No—not if by being a tyrant you mean what I mean.
	POLUS ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.	**POLUS** Well, I mean what I said just now: having the freedom in the city to do whatever seems best to you—killing, banishing, and doing everything just as you see fit.
	SOCRATES ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. 469d εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι "ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται—οὕτω 469e μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει," εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι "ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια·" ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;	**SOCRATES** My dear fellow, let me say my piece, and then take hold of the argument. 469d Suppose I tucked a dagger under my arm in a crowded marketplace and said to you: "Polus, I've just come into a marvelous sort of power, a tyranny. If I decide that any of these people you see here ought to die this very minute, the one I decide on will be dead. If I decide one of them ought to have his head broken, it'll be broken this very minute; if his cloak ought to be torn to shreds, it'll be torn. That's how 469e great my power is in this city." Now if you didn't believe me and I showed you the dagger, you'd probably see it and say, "Socrates, on those terms everyone would have great power. By this method you could burn down any house you liked—yes, and the Athenian dockyards and warships and all the ships, public and private." So this isn't what having great power is after all—doing what seems best to you. Or do you think it is?
469e	**POLUS** οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.	**POLUS** Not like that, no.
470a	**SOCRATES** ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι' ὅτι μέμφῃ τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν;	**SOCRATES** Can you tell me, then, why you find fault with that kind of power?
	POLUS ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I can.
	SOCRATES τί δή; λέγε.	**SOCRATES** Why, then? Tell me.
	POLUS ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστιν.	**POLUS** Because the man who acts that way is bound to be punished.
	SOCRATES τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν;	**SOCRATES** And isn't being punished bad?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. [470b] σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτεινύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Well then, my remarkable friend, once again it appears to you that having great power is good if acting as one sees fit is accompanied by acting beneficially—and that, it seems, is what having great power is; if not, it's bad and amounts to having little power. [470b] But let's look at this too. Don't we agree that sometimes it's better to do the things we were just talking about—putting people to death, banishing them, confiscating their property—and sometimes not?
470b	**POLUS** πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.	**SOCRATES** Then this, it seems, is agreed by both of us.
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES πότε οὖν σὺ φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζῃ.	**SOCRATES** When, then, do you say it's better to do these things? Tell me where you draw the line.
	POLUS σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο.	**POLUS** No, Socrates, you answer that question yourself.
470c	**SOCRATES** ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.	**SOCRATES** All right, Polus, if you'd rather hear it from me: I say that when someone does these things justly it's better, and when he does them unjustly it's worse.
	POLUS χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;	**POLUS** How hard you are to refute, Socrates! Why, couldn't even a child show that what you say isn't true?
	SOCRATES πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.	**SOCRATES** Then I'll be very grateful to the child—and just as grateful to you, if you refute me and rid me of my nonsense. Don't grow tired of doing a friend a kindness; go on, refute me.
	POLUS ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς [470d] πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν.	**POLUS** Well, Socrates, there's no need to refute you with ancient [470d] history. The events of just the other day are enough to refute you and prove that many people who act unjustly are happy.
470d	**SOCRATES** τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;	**SOCRATES** What events are those?
	POLUS Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;	**POLUS** You see Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, ruling Macedonia, I take it?[18]
	SOCRATES εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.	**SOCRATES** If I don't see it, I certainly hear of it.

18 Archelaus was king of Macedonia from about 413 to 399 BC; the dialogue is set during his reign.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	POLUS εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;	**POLUS** Well, do you think he's happy or wretched?
	SOCRATES οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.	**SOCRATES** I don't know, Polus. I've never met the man.
470e	**POLUS** τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;	**POLUS** What? You'd know if you'd met him, but otherwise you can't tell straight off that he's happy?
	SOCRATES μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα.	**SOCRATES** No, by Zeus, I can't.
	POLUS δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.	**POLUS** Then obviously, Socrates, you'll say you don't know whether even the Great King is happy.[19]
	SOCRATES καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.	**SOCRATES** And I'll be telling the truth. I don't know how he stands in education and justice.
	POLUS τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;	**POLUS** What? Does happiness lie entirely in that?
	SOCRATES ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.	**SOCRATES** Yes, as I say, Polus. I say that a fine and good man or woman is happy, and one who is unjust and wicked is wretched.
471a	**POLUS** ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον;	**POLUS** So by your account this Archelaus is wretched?
	SOCRATES εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.	**SOCRATES** Yes, my friend, if he's unjust.
	POLUS ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἧν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἣ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν· [471b] ὃς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν αὑτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἅμαξαν, νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους.	**POLUS** Well, how could he not be unjust? He had no claim at all to the throne he now holds, since his mother was a slave belonging to Alcetas, Perdiccas' brother. By rights he was Alcetas' slave, and if he'd wanted to do what was just he'd have remained Alcetas' slave and been happy, by your account. As it is, he's become amazingly wretched, since he's committed the greatest injustices. [471b] First he invited this very man, his master and uncle, on the pretext of restoring to him the throne Perdiccas had taken from him. He entertained him and got him drunk, together with his son Alexander—Archelaus' own cousin and about his age—and then he threw them both into a wagon, carried them off by night, cut their throats, and made away with them.
471b	καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον [471c] ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν γνήσιον τοῦ Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἑπτέτη, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν καὶ	And after committing these crimes he failed to notice that he'd become the most wretched of men, and felt no remorse. A little [471c] later, instead of choosing to become happy by justly raising his brother—Perdiccas' legitimate son, a boy of about

19 The "Great King" was the Greeks' name for the king of Persia.

GREEK

ENGLISH

ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ [471d] ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος.

seven, to whom the throne rightfully belonged—and handing the throne over to him, he threw the boy into a well and drowned him, and then told the boy's mother, Cleopatra, that the boy had fallen in while chasing a goose and died. So now, of course, having committed the greatest crimes of anyone in Macedonia, he is the most wretched of all Macedonians rather than the happiest! And perhaps there's some Athenian, starting with you, [471d] who would rather be any other Macedonian at all than Archelaus!

471d **SOCRATES** καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπῄνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἠμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ᾧ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὠγαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φῄς.

SOCRATES Even at the start of our discussion, Polus, I complimented you because I thought you were well trained in rhetoric but had neglected conversation. And now is this the argument that even a child could refute me with? Have I now been refuted by you, as you think, with this argument, when I claim that the man who does injustice isn't happy? How so, my good man? Why, I don't agree with a single thing you say.

471e **POLUS** οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

POLUS That's because you don't want to—you really think as I do.

SOCRATES ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τἀναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν [472a] ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι.

SOCRATES My dear fellow, you're trying to refute me the orators' way, like people in the law courts who think they're refuting someone. There, too, one side thinks it's refuting the other when it produces many reputable witnesses for its claims, while the man arguing the opposite produces just one, or none. But this kind of refutation is worth nothing when it comes to the [472a] truth. A man can sometimes even be convicted by the false testimony of many people who seem to be somebody.

472a καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταὐτὰ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἑστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης [472b] ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἐστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

And now, on what you're saying, nearly everyone, Athenians and foreigners alike, will agree with you, if you want to bring witnesses against me that what I say isn't true. If you like, Nicias son of Niceratus will testify for you, and his brothers with him, whose tripods stand in a row in the precinct of Dionysus. If you like, Aristocrates [472b] son of Scellius, whose fine offering stands in turn in the shrine of Pythian Apollo. If you like, the whole house of Pericles, or any other family here you care to pick. But I, one man alone, don't agree with you. For you don't compel me; instead you produce a host of false witnesses against me and try to drive me out of my property, the truth.[20]

	GREEK	ENGLISH
472b	ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν [472c] ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἢ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ [472d] ὅστις μή.	But unless I produce you yourself as my one witness agreeing with what I say, I don't think I've achieved anything worth mentioning on the questions we're [472c] discussing. Nor, I think, have you, unless I testify for you—just me, all alone—and you dismiss all these others. So there's this kind of refutation, as you and many others think; and there's another kind too, which I think is the right one. Let's set them side by side and see whether they differ. For what we disagree about is no small matter; it's just about the thing it's finest to know and most shameful not to know. In short, it comes down to knowing or not knowing who is happy and [472d] who is not.
472d	αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ ἡγῇ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγῇ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ. ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα;	To start with the point we're now discussing: you think a man can be blessedly happy while doing injustice and being unjust, since you think Archelaus is unjust but happy. Should we take it that this is your view?
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἓν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἄρ', ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;	**SOCRATES** And I say that's impossible. That's one point of dispute. Very well. But will a man who does injustice be happy if he meets with justice and punishment?
	POLUS ἥκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.	**POLUS** Not in the least. In that case he'd be most wretched.
472e	**SOCRATES** ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται;	**SOCRATES** But if the one who does injustice doesn't meet with justice, then by your account he'll be happy?
	POLUS φημί.	**POLUS** That's what I say.
	SOCRATES κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.	**SOCRATES** But in my opinion, Polus, the man who does injustice, the unjust man, is wretched in any case—but more wretched if he doesn't pay the penalty and isn't punished for his wrongdoing, and less wretched if he does pay the penalty and meets with justice from gods and men.
473a	**POLUS** ἄτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.	**POLUS** What absurd things you try to say, Socrates!
	SOCRATES πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστιν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** I'll try to get you to say the same things as me, my friend, since I count you a friend. For now, these are the points on which we differ—

20 Tripods were awarded to wealthy citizens who sponsored winning choruses and were set up as public monuments.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		you look at them too. I said earlier, I think, that doing injustice is worse than suffering it.
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.	**SOCRATES** And you said suffering it was worse.
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.	**SOCRATES** And I said that those who do injustice are wretched, and you refuted me.
	POLUS ναὶ μὰ Δία.	**POLUS** Yes, by Zeus!
473b	**SOCRATES** ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Πῶλε.	**SOCRATES** So you think, Polus.
	POLUS ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος.	**POLUS** And I think truly.
	SOCRATES ἴσως. σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.	**SOCRATES** Perhaps. And you, for your part, said that those who do injustice are happy, if they don't pay the penalty.
	POLUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**POLUS** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES ἐγὼ δέ γε αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἧττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;	**SOCRATES** And I say they're the most wretched, and those who do pay the penalty less so. Do you want to refute that too?
	POLUS ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.	**POLUS** Why, that's even harder to refute than the other, Socrates!
	SOCRATES οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.	**SOCRATES** Not harder, Polus—impossible. The truth is never refuted.
	POLUS πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι 473c ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὑτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῷ ποιῶν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν 473d πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;	**POLUS** What do you mean? If a man is caught acting unjustly, plotting to make himself 473c tyrant, and once caught he's put on the rack, castrated, and has his eyes burned out; if he suffers many other great outrages of every kind himself, and sees his wife and children suffer them, and finally he's crucified or burned alive in pitch—this man will be happier than if he escaped, set himself up as tyrant, and lived out his life ruling the city and doing whatever he liked, envied and congratulated on his happiness by the 473d citizens and by foreigners too? Is that what you say is impossible to refute?
473d	**SOCRATES** μορμολύττῃ αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν. ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες;	**SOCRATES** Now you're trying to scare me with bogeymen, my noble Polus, instead of refuting me; a moment ago you were calling witnesses. Still, remind me of one small thing: "unjustly plotting to make himself tyrant," did you say?
	POLUS ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I did.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ διδοὺς δίκην—δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν [473e] οὐκ ἂν εἴη—ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφεύγων καὶ τυραννεύσας. τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή;	**SOCRATES** Then neither of them will ever be happier—neither the one who unjustly achieved the tyranny nor the one who pays the penalty. Of two wretched men, neither [473e] could be happier. But the one who escapes and becomes tyrant is more wretched. What's this, Polus? You're laughing? Is this yet another form of refutation—when someone says something, laugh him down instead of refuting him?
473e	**POLUS** οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί.	**POLUS** Don't you think you've been refuted, Socrates, when you say things no human being would say? Just ask anyone here.
	SOCRATES ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, [474a] γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἄν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾖ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ [474b] πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.	**SOCRATES** Polus, I'm not a politician. Last year, when I was chosen by lot for the Council and my tribe was presiding, and it was my job to put a question to the vote, [474a] I made a laughingstock of myself because I didn't know how. So don't tell me to put the question to the vote among the people here now. If you have no better refutation than these, then, as I suggested just now, hand it over to me in my turn and try out the kind of refutation I think is called for. For I know how to produce one witness to what I say—the very person I'm talking with—and I let the many go their way. And I know how to put the question to the vote with one person; with the [474b] many I don't even carry on a conversation. So see whether you'll be willing in your turn to submit to refutation by answering my questions.[21]
474b	ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι.	For I think that I and you and everyone else believe that doing injustice is worse than suffering it, and not paying the penalty worse than paying it.
	POLUS ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν;	**POLUS** And I think that neither I nor anyone else believes it. Would you, then, rather suffer injustice than do it?
	SOCRATES καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.	**SOCRATES** Yes, and so would you and everyone else.
	POLUS πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς.	**POLUS** Far from it. Neither I nor you nor anyone else would.
474c	**SOCRATES** οὔκουν ἀποκρινῇ;	**SOCRATES** Then won't you answer?

21 Each of Athens' ten tribes took a turn presiding over the Council (the prytany), and one of its members chaired meetings and put motions to the vote.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	POLUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ' ἐρεῖς.	**POLUS** Certainly. In fact I'm eager to know what on earth you'll say.
	SOCRATES λέγε δή μοι, ἵν' εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἠρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;	**SOCRATES** Then tell me, so you'll find out, as though I were asking you from the beginning: which do you think is worse, Polus, doing injustice or suffering it?
	POLUS τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.	**POLUS** Suffering it, I think.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ δή; αἴσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου.	**SOCRATES** And what about this: which is more shameful, doing injustice or suffering it? Answer.
	POLUS τὸ ἀδικεῖν.	**POLUS** Doing it.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἴσχιον.	**SOCRATES** Then it's also worse, if it's more shameful.
	POLUS ἥκιστά γε.	**POLUS** Not in the least.
	SOCRATES μανθάνω· οὐ 474d ταὐτὸν ἡγῇ σύ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν.	**SOCRATES** I see. You don't 474d think, it seems, that fine and good are the same, or bad and shameful.
474d	**POLUS** οὐ δῆτα.	**POLUS** No, I don't.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονήν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους;	**SOCRATES** Then what about this? All fine things—bodies, for instance, and colors and shapes and sounds and practices—do you call them fine each time without reference to anything? Take fine bodies first: don't you say they're fine either with reference to their use, according to what each is useful for, or with reference to some pleasure, if in being looked at they delight those who look at them? Can you say anything besides these about the fineness of a body?
474e	**POLUS** οὐκ ἔχω.	**POLUS** I can't.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονήν τινα ἢ διὰ ὠφελίαν ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;	**SOCRATES** And isn't it the same with everything else—shapes and colors too: you call them fine either because of some pleasure or because of some benefit, or both?
	POLUS ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I do.
	SOCRATES οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα ὡσαύτως;	**SOCRATES** And isn't it the same with sounds and everything that has to do with music?
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφότερα.	**SOCRATES** And certainly what has to do with laws and practices—the fine ones, surely, don't fall outside this: being either beneficial or pleasant or both.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
475a	**POLUS** οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**POLUS** I don't think so.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως;	**SOCRATES** And isn't it the same with the fineness of branches of learning?
	POLUS πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.	**POLUS** Certainly. And that's a fine definition you're giving now, Socrates, when you define the fine by pleasure and good.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ;	**SOCRATES** And the shameful by the opposite—pain and bad?
	POLUS ἀνάγκη.	**POLUS** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾖ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.	**SOCRATES** So when one of two fine things is finer, it's finer because it exceeds in one of these or in both—either in pleasure or in benefit or in both.
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ [475b] ἕτερον αἴσχιον ᾖ, ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;	**SOCRATES** And when one of two shameful things is [475b] more shameful, it will be more shameful because it exceeds either in pain or in badness. Isn't that necessarily so?
475b	**POLUS** ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;	**SOCRATES** Come, then: what was being said just now about doing and suffering injustice? Weren't you saying that suffering injustice is worse, but doing it more shameful?
	POLUS ἔλεγον.	**POLUS** I was.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;	**SOCRATES** Then if doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, isn't it either more painful—and more shameful because it exceeds in pain—or because it exceeds in badness, or both? Isn't this necessary too?
	POLUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**POLUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES πρῶτον [475c] μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;	**SOCRATES** First, [475c] then, let's consider whether doing injustice exceeds suffering it in pain. Do those who do injustice feel more pain than those who suffer it?
475c	**POLUS** οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.	**POLUS** Not at all, Socrates, not that.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.	**SOCRATES** Then it doesn't exceed in pain.
	POLUS οὐ δῆτα.	**POLUS** No, it doesn't.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.	**SOCRATES** And if not in pain, then it could no longer exceed in both.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	POLUS οὐ φαίνεται.	**POLUS** Apparently not.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.	**SOCRATES** Then it's left to exceed in the other.
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τῷ κακῷ.	**SOCRATES** In badness.
	POLUS ἔοικεν.	**POLUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.	**SOCRATES** Then since it exceeds in badness, doing injustice would be worse than suffering it.
	POLUS δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.	**POLUS** Clearly.
475d	**SOCRATES** ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;	**SOCRATES** Now didn't most people, and you yourself, agree with us earlier that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it?
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.	**SOCRATES** And now it's turned out to be worse.
	POLUS ἔοικε.	**POLUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον; μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ 475e φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ.	**SOCRATES** Then would you welcome what's worse and more shameful rather than what's less so? Don't hesitate to answer, Polus—you won't come to any harm. Submit yourself nobly to the argument as you would to a doctor, and answer: 475e say yes or no to what I ask.
475e	**POLUS** ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**POLUS** No, I wouldn't welcome it, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;	**SOCRATES** And would anyone else?
	POLUS οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.	**POLUS** I don't think so—not on this argument, anyway.
	SOCRATES ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἂν σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.	**SOCRATES** Then I was telling the truth when I said that neither I nor you nor anyone else would rather do injustice than suffer it. For it happens to be worse.
	POLUS φαίνεται.	**POLUS** Apparently.

PAYING THE PENALTY

Socrates argues that a wrongdoer is better off punished, as a sick man is better off treated.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν 476a μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν,	**SOCRATES** So you see, Polus, when one refutation is set beside the other, they're nothing alike. Everyone else agrees with you except me; but for

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἆρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ ᾠου, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾤμην.	me you alone are enough, just one [476a] man, agreeing and testifying; and I put the question to the vote with you alone and let the others go their way. Let that stand as it is. Next, let's consider the second point we disagreed about: whether paying the penalty for wrongdoing is the greatest of evils, as you thought, or whether not paying it is greater, as I for my part thought.
476a	σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;	Let's look at it this way. Do you call paying the penalty and being justly punished for wrongdoing the same thing?
	POLUS ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I do.
476b	**SOCRATES** ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστιν, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.	**SOCRATES** Then can you say that just things aren't all fine, insofar as they're just? Think it over before you answer.
	POLUS ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**POLUS** No, I think they are, Socrates.
	SOCRATES σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος;	**SOCRATES** Now consider this too. If someone does something, must there also be something that has it done to it by the one doing it?
	POLUS ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**POLUS** I think so.
	SOCRATES ἆρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** And does it have done to it what the doer does, and of the same kind as what the doer does? What I mean is this: if someone strikes, must something be struck?
	POLUS ἀνάγκη.	**POLUS** It must.
	SOCRATES καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ [476c] τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** And if the [476c] striker strikes hard or fast, is what's struck struck in the same way?
476c	**POLUS** ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;	**SOCRATES** So what happens to the thing struck is of the same kind as what the striker does?
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** And again, if someone burns, must something be burned?
	POLUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**POLUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάῃ;	**SOCRATES** And if he burns severely or painfully, is what's burned burned just as the burner burns it?
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τι, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι.	**SOCRATES** And isn't it the same account if someone cuts? Something is cut.
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον [476d] τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει;	**SOCRATES** And if the cut is large or deep or painful, the thing cut is cut with the same kind [476d] of cut as the cutter cuts?
476d	**POLUS** φαίνεται.	**POLUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.	**SOCRATES** Then, to sum up, see whether you agree to what I said just now about everything: whatever kind of thing the doer does, the one it's done to has the same kind of thing done to it.
	POLUS ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.	**POLUS** Yes, I agree.
	SOCRATES τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν;	**SOCRATES** Given all that, is paying the penalty having something done to you, or doing something?
	POLUS ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.	**POLUS** Necessarily it's having something done to you, Socrates.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος;	**SOCRATES** By someone who does it?
	POLUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὑπό γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.	**POLUS** Of course—by the one who punishes.
	SOCRATES ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων [476e] δικαίως κολάζει;	**SOCRATES** And does the one who punishes rightly [476e] punish justly?
476e	**POLUS** ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Doing what's just, or not?
	POLUS δίκαια.	**POLUS** What's just.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει;	**SOCRATES** Then the one being punished, when he pays the penalty, has something just done to him?
	POLUS φαίνεται.	**POLUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;	**SOCRATES** And we've agreed, I think, that just things are fine?
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.	**SOCRATES** Then of these two, the one does something fine, and the other—the one being punished—has something fine done to him.
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
477a	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.	**SOCRATES** And if fine, then good? For it's either pleasant or beneficial.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	POLUS ἀνάγκη.	**POLUS** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;	**SOCRATES** So the one who pays the penalty has something good done to him?
	POLUS ἔοικεν.	**POLUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;	**SOCRATES** So he's benefited?
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;	**SOCRATES** Is it the benefit I suppose it is—does he become better in his soul, if he's justly punished?
	POLUS εἰκός γε.	**POLUS** That's likely.
	SOCRATES κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;	**SOCRATES** So the one who pays the penalty is freed from badness of soul?
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἆρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται [477b] κακοῦ; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν;	**SOCRATES** Then is he freed from the greatest [477b] evil? Look at it this way. In the matter of a person's wealth, do you see any badness other than poverty?
477b	**POLUS** οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.	**POLUS** No, just poverty.
	SOCRATES τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;	**SOCRATES** And in the body's condition? Would you say its badness is weakness and disease and ugliness and so on?
	POLUS ἔγωγε.	**POLUS** I would.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγῇ τινα εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** And do you think there's a kind of wickedness in the soul too?
	POLUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**POLUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;	**SOCRATES** And don't you call it injustice and ignorance and cowardice and so on?
	POLUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**POLUS** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν χρημάτων [477c] καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν;	**SOCRATES** So for wealth [477c] and body and soul, three things, you've named three kinds of defect: poverty, disease, injustice?
477c	**POLUS** ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;	**SOCRATES** Which of these defects is most shameful, then? Isn't it injustice—in short, the soul's wickedness?
	POLUS πολύ γε.	**POLUS** By far.
	SOCRATES εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;	**SOCRATES** And if most shameful, also worst?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	POLUS πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;	**POLUS** What do you mean, Socrates?
	SOCRATES ὠδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.	**SOCRATES** This: what's most shameful is always most shameful because it causes either the greatest pain or the greatest harm or both. That follows from what we agreed earlier.
	POLUS μάλιστα.	**POLUS** Very much so.
	SOCRATES αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ [477d] ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν;	**SOCRATES** And we've just [477d] agreed that injustice, and wickedness of soul generally, is most shameful?
477d	**POLUS** ὡμολόγηται γάρ.	**POLUS** Yes, we have.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβῃ ἢ ἀμφότερα;	**SOCRATES** Then either it's most distressing, and most shameful of these because it exceeds in distress, or it exceeds in harm, or both?
	POLUS ἀνάγκη.	**POLUS** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;	**SOCRATES** Now is being unjust and intemperate and cowardly and ignorant more painful than being poor or sick?
	POLUS οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.	**POLUS** I don't think so, Socrates, not from what we've said.
	SOCRATES ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα [477e] τἆλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.	**SOCRATES** So it must be by some prodigiously great harm and astonishing badness that the wickedness of the soul exceeds [477e] the others and is most shameful of all—since it isn't by pain, on your account.
477e	**POLUS** φαίνεται.	**POLUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.	**SOCRATES** But surely what exceeds in the greatest harm would be the greatest evil there is.
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** Then injustice and intemperance and the rest of the soul's wickedness are the greatest evil there is?
	POLUS φαίνεται.	**POLUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;	**SOCRATES** Now what craft frees us from poverty? Isn't it moneymaking?
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;	**SOCRATES** And from disease? Isn't it medicine?
478a	**POLUS** ἀνάγκη.	**POLUS** Necessarily.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;	**SOCRATES** And from wickedness and injustice? If you're at a loss that way, look at it like this: where do we take people who are sick in body, and to whom?
	POLUS παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**POLUS** To the doctors, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας;	**SOCRATES** And where do we take those who act unjustly and intemperately?
	POLUS παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;	**POLUS** To the judges, you mean?
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;	**SOCRATES** To pay the penalty?
	POLUS φημί.	**POLUS** I agree.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;	**SOCRATES** And don't those who punish rightly punish by using a kind of justice?
	POLUS δῆλον δή.	**POLUS** Clearly.
	SOCRATES χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, [478b] ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.	**SOCRATES** So moneymaking frees us from poverty, [478b] medicine from disease, and justice from intemperance and injustice.
478b	**POLUS** φαίνεται.	**POLUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν ὧν λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** Which of these things you mention is finest?
	POLUS τίνων λέγεις;	**POLUS** Which things do you mean?
	SOCRATES χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.	**SOCRATES** Moneymaking, medicine, justice.
	POLUS πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.	**POLUS** Justice is far superior, Socrates.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** Then again, if it's finest, it produces either the most pleasure or the most benefit or both?
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;	**SOCRATES** Now is it pleasant to be given medical treatment? Do people enjoy being treated?
	POLUS οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**POLUS** I don't think so.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** But it's beneficial, isn't it?
478c	**POLUS** ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** Because the patient is freed from a great evil, so that it pays to put up with the pain and be healthy.
	POLUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**POLUS** Of course.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἆρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;	**SOCRATES** Then would a man be happiest where his body is concerned by being treated, or by not being sick in the first place?
	POLUS δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.	**POLUS** Obviously by not being sick.
	SOCRATES οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις.	**SOCRATES** Because happiness, it seems, wasn’t being freed from an evil, but never having it in the first place.
	POLUS ἔστι ταῦτα.	**POLUS** That’s so.
478d	**SOCRATES** τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτ’ ἐν σώματι εἴτ’ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;	**SOCRATES** Well then, of two people who have something bad, whether in body or in soul, which is more wretched: the one who is treated and freed from the bad thing, or the one who isn’t treated but keeps it?
	POLUS φαίνεταί μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.	**POLUS** The one who isn’t treated, it seems to me.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας;	**SOCRATES** And wasn’t paying the penalty a release from the greatest evil, wickedness?
	POLUS ἦν γάρ.	**POLUS** It was.
	SOCRATES σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη.	**SOCRATES** Because justice, I suppose, teaches people self-control and makes them more just; it turns out to be a medicine for wickedness.
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο [478e] μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.	**SOCRATES** So the happiest is the one who has no badness in his soul, since that [478e] has turned out to be the greatest of evils.
478e	**POLUS** δῆλον δή.	**POLUS** Clearly.
	SOCRATES δεύτερος δέ που ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.	**SOCRATES** And second, I suppose, is the one who is freed from it.
	POLUS ἔοικεν.	**POLUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES οὗτος δ’ ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς.	**SOCRATES** And that was the one who is admonished and rebuked and pays the penalty.
	POLUS ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.	**SOCRATES** So the one who lives worst is the one who has injustice and isn’t freed from it.
	POLUS φαίνεται.	**POLUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι [479a] μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην	**SOCRATES** And isn’t this in fact the man who commits the greatest wrongs and practices the greatest injustice, and then manages to avoid be-

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διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;

479a **POLUS** ἔοικε.

SOCRATES σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος ὡσπερανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι [479b] ἀλγεινόν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω;

479b **POLUS** ἔμοιγε.

SOCRATES ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ [479c] καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὡσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν· εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἆρ' αἰσθάνῃ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;

479c **POLUS** εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ.

SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ [479d] ἀδικεῖν;

479d **POLUS** φαίνεταί γε.

SOCRATES καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι;

POLUS κινδυνεύει.

SOCRATES τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;

POLUS ναί.

SOCRATES δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.

ENGLISH

ing admonished [479a] or punished or paying the penalty—just as you say Archelaus has contrived to do, and the other tyrants and orators and potentates?

POLUS It seems so.

SOCRATES For what these people have managed, my excellent friend, is pretty much the same as if someone afflicted with the worst diseases managed not to pay the penalty to the doctors for his bodily faults, and not to be treated, because like a child he was afraid of being cauterized and cut, since [479b] it hurts. Or don't you think so too?

POLUS I do.

SOCRATES Because he doesn't know, it seems, what health and bodily excellence are like. And from what we've now agreed, Polus, those who run away from justice are probably doing something similar: they see what's painful in it but are blind to what's beneficial, and don't realize how much more wretched than living with an unhealthy body it is to live with a soul that isn't healthy but rotten, unjust [479c] and unholy. That's why they do everything they can to avoid paying the penalty and being freed from the greatest evil, providing themselves with money and friends and the ability to speak as persuasively as possible. But if what we've agreed is true, Polus, do you see what follows from the argument? Or would you like us to draw the conclusions together?

POLUS If you think so.

SOCRATES Doesn't it follow that injustice and doing [479d] injustice are the greatest evil?

POLUS It seems so.

SOCRATES And paying the penalty turned out to be a release from this evil?

POLUS It looks that way.

SOCRATES And not paying it is a continuing in the evil?

POLUS Yes.

SOCRATES So doing injustice is second among evils in magnitude; but doing injustice and not

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		paying the penalty is by its nature the greatest and first of all evils.
	POLUS ἔοικεν.	**POLUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα [479e] δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον οἰόμενος, εἴτε Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ᾽ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὁστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ᾽ ἦν τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;	**SOCRATES** Now wasn't this what we disagreed about, my friend? You called Archelaus happy, the man who commits the greatest injustices [479e] and pays no penalty at all, while I thought the opposite: that whether it's Archelaus or anyone else at all who does injustice and doesn't pay the penalty, he deserves to be wretched beyond all other men; and that the one who does injustice is always more wretched than the one who suffers it, and the one who doesn't pay the penalty more wretched than the one who does. Wasn't that what I was saying?
479e	**POLUS** ναί.	**POLUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;	**SOCRATES** Then hasn't it been proved that what I said was true?
	POLUS φαίνεται.	**POLUS** Apparently.

WHAT RHETORIC IS GOOD FOR

Socrates concludes that rhetoric is useful only for accusing oneself and one's friends.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
480a	**SOCRATES** εἶεν· εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὡμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσει, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἕξοντα. οὐ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Very well. If this is true, Polus, what is the great use of rhetoric? For on what we've now agreed, a man should above all guard himself against doing injustice, since it will bring him quite enough evil. Isn't that so?
	POLUS πάνυ γε.	**POLUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, [480b] σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας ὕπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσει καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή;	**SOCRATES** And if he does do injustice, he himself or anyone else he cares about, he should go of his own accord where he'll pay the penalty as quickly as possible—to the judge, as he would to a doctor—[480b] hurrying so that the disease of injustice doesn't become chronic and make his soul fester and turn incurable. Or what are we to say, Polus, if our earlier agreements stand? Isn't it necessary that this agrees with them only in this way and in no other?
480b	**POLUS** τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**POLUS** Well, what else are we to say, Socrates?
	SOCRATES ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὑτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν,	**SOCRATES** So for defending oneself when one has done injustice, or when one's parents or friends or children or country do injustice, rhetoric is of no

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ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις [480c] ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον—κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ ὑγιὴς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε αὑτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς [480d] ᾖ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνῄσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.

ENGLISH

use to us at all, Polus—unless one [480c] took it to be useful for the opposite purpose: that one should accuse oneself above all, and then one's family and whichever of one's friends happens to be doing injustice at the time; and not hide the wrongdoing but bring it into the open, so that the wrongdoer pays the penalty and becomes healthy; and force oneself and the others not to shrink back, but to submit with eyes shut, bravely, as to a doctor's cutting and cauterizing, pursuing what is good and fine and not counting the pain. If one's wrongdoing [480d] deserves a flogging, one should submit to the flogging; if prison, to imprisonment; if a fine, pay it; if exile, go into exile; if death, die. One should be the first to accuse oneself and the rest of one's family, and use rhetoric for this: that by having their wrongdoings exposed they may be freed from the greatest evil, injustice.

480d φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε;

Are we to say this or not, Polus?

480e **POLUS** ἄτοπα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται.

POLUS It seems absurd to me, Socrates, though I suppose it agrees with what you said earlier.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἢ κἀκεῖνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;

SOCRATES Then either we must undo those conclusions as well, or this necessarily follows?

POLUS ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.

POLUS Yes, that is how it stands.

SOCRATES τοὐναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὁντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον—ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον, καὶ [481a] πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῷ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάντε χρυσίον ᾖ ἡρπακὼς πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκῃ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάντε αὖ θανάτου ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὤν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς [481b] πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὤν.

SOCRATES And to turn the other way round: suppose one ought to harm someone, whether an enemy or anyone else—provided only that one isn't being wronged by the enemy oneself, for that one must guard against—but if the enemy wrongs someone else, one must do everything in one's power, in both [481a] action and speech, to see that he doesn't pay the penalty or come before the judge. And if he does come before the judge, one must contrive for the enemy to get away and not pay the penalty. If he's stolen a lot of gold, he shouldn't give it back but keep it and spend it on himself and his people, unjustly and godlessly. If his crimes deserve death, he shouldn't die—preferably never, but be immortal in his wickedness, or failing that, live [481b] as long as possible in that condition.

481b ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν τις χρεία, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὖσα.

That's the sort of thing, Polus, that rhetoric seems useful for to me. For someone who isn't going to do injustice, its use doesn't seem to me to be great—if indeed it has any use at all, since in our earlier discussion it turned out to have none whatever.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	CALLICLES εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;	**CALLICLES** Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates serious about this, or is he joking?
	CHAEREPHON ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.	**CHAEREPHON** He seems to me to be extraordinarily serious, Callicles. But there's nothing like asking him yourself.
	CALLICLES νὴ τοὺς θεούς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, [481c] πότερόν σε θῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;	**CALLICLES** By the gods, that's just what I want to do. Tell me, Socrates, [481c] are we to take you as serious just now, or joking? Because if you're serious and what you say happens to be true, wouldn't the life of us human beings be turned upside down? Wouldn't we be doing, it seems, the exact opposite of what we should?
481c	**SOCRATES** ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχεν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥᾴδιον [481d] ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους.	**SOCRATES** Callicles, if human beings didn't share some common experience—if some had one experience and others another, and each of us had some private experience unlike everyone else's—it wouldn't be easy [481d] to show another person what one felt oneself. I say this because I notice that you and I are in fact in the same situation just now: we are both in love, and each of us with two loves—I with Alcibiades son of Clinias and with philosophy, and you with two, the Athenian people and Pyrilampes' son.[22]
481d	αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἑκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω [481e] καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου· ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλεύμασίν τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἑκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὅτι εἰ μή τις παύσει τὰ [482a] σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ παύσῃ ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων.	So I notice that every time, clever as you are, whatever your beloved says and however he says things are, you can't contradict him; you shift up [481e] and down. In the Assembly, if you say something and the Athenian people say it isn't so, you shift your ground and say what they want. And with Pyrilampes' handsome young son you're in just the same position. You can't oppose your beloved's wishes and words; so if anyone were amazed at how absurd the things are that you keep saying because of them, you'd probably tell him, if you wanted to tell the truth, that unless someone stops your [482a] beloved from saying these things, you'll never stop saying them either.
482a	νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καί μοί ἐστιν τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἧττον ἔμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ [482b] τῶν αὐτῶν, λέγει δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἢ οὖν	So think that you must hear the same sort of thing from me, too. Don't be amazed that I say these things; instead, stop philosophy, my beloved, from saying them. For she is the one, my dear friend, who says what you now hear from me, and she is far less fickle than my other beloved. That son of Clinias says one thing at one time and another at another; but philosophy always [482b] says the same

22 Pyrilampes' son was named Demos—the same word as dēmos, "the people," which makes the pairing a pun.

GREEK

ENGLISH

ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἁπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ.

thing—and she says what you're now amazed at; you were there yourself when it was said. So either refute her, as I said just now, and show that doing injustice and not paying the penalty for it is not the worst of all evils; or, if you leave this unrefuted, by the dog, god of the Egyptians, Callicles won't agree with you, Callicles—he'll be out of tune with you all your life.[23]

482b καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστόν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην, [482c] καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἕνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

And yet I think, my good man, it's better for my lyre to be out of tune and jarring, or a chorus I'm sponsoring, [482c] and for most people to disagree with me and contradict me, than for me, being one person, to be out of tune with myself and contradict myself.

CALLICLES: THE RULE OF THE STRONGER BY NATURE

Callicles says justice by nature means the stronger having more, and tells Socrates to give up philosophy.

GREEK

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482c **CALLICLES** ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν [482d] βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ φαίη—διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν—καί σου καταγελᾶν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς, τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔπαθεν.

CALLICLES Socrates, you're swaggering about in these arguments like a real mob orator. And now you're haranguing us like this because Polus has fallen into the very same trap he accused Gorgias of falling into with you. He said, I think, that when you asked Gorgias whether, if someone came to him wanting to learn rhetoric [482d] without knowing what's just, Gorgias would teach it to him, Gorgias was ashamed and said he would, because of people's habits—they'd be indignant if anyone said no. And because of that admission he was forced to contradict himself, which is just what you love. And Polus laughed at you then—rightly, in my view. But now he himself has had exactly the same thing happen to him.

482d καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ [482e] ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν καλά, νόμῳ δέ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντί' ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος· ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται [483a] καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου.

And that is exactly why I'm not impressed with Polus: he conceded to you that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. For [482e] it was through this admission, in his turn, that you tied his legs up in the argument and muzzled him, because he was too ashamed to say what he thought. For you really do, Socrates, while claiming to pursue the truth, drag us into this sort of vulgar, crowd-pleasing stuff—things that aren't fine by nature, but by convention. For the most part these two are opposed to each other, nature and convention. So if someone is ashamed [483a] and doesn't dare to say what he thinks, he's forced to contra-

23 Socrates' usual oath "by the dog," here tied to the dog-headed Egyptian god Anubis.

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dict himself. And you've spotted this clever point and use it to play dirty in arguments: if someone speaks in terms of convention, you slip in questions in terms of nature; if he speaks of what belongs to nature, you ask about what belongs to convention.[24]

483a ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν λόγον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ 483b γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινὸς ᾧ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὗ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν καὶ οἱ πολλοί.

Just so in this case, doing and suffering injustice: when Polus was speaking of what is more shameful by convention, you pursued the argument in terms of nature. For by nature everything that is worse is also more shameful—suffering injustice; but by convention doing it is. Indeed, 483b this experience, suffering injustice, isn't for a man at all, but for some slave who'd be better off dead than alive—someone who, when he's wronged and trampled on, can't stand up for himself or for anyone else he cares about. But I think the people who make the laws are the weaklings, the many.

483b πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὑτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς 483c ψόγους ψέγουσιν· ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν φαυλότεροι ὄντες. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε οἶμαι φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει 483d αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου.

So they make the laws with an eye to themselves and their own advantage, and they hand out praise and 483c blame accordingly. They scare off the stronger types, the ones capable of having more, so that they won't have more than them; and they say that having more is shameful and unjust, and that doing injustice is this—seeking to have more than others. They're content, I think, to have an equal share, being second-rate themselves. That's why, by convention, this is called unjust and shameful—seeking to have more than the many—and they call it doing injustice. But nature herself, I think, reveals 483d that it is just for the better man to have more than the worse, and the more capable than the less capable.

483d δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ 483e ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα· πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας, κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα 484a

And nature shows in many places that this is so—among the other animals, and among human beings in whole cities and peoples—that this is how justice has been decided: that the stronger rules the weaker and has more. By what justice did Xerxes march against Greece, or his father against the Scythians? 483e One could name countless other cases like these. But I think these men act according to the nature of justice—yes, by Zeus, according to the law of nature, though perhaps not according to the one we lay down. We mold the best and strongest among us, taking them from youth like lion cubs, and by charms and spells we en-

24 Nature (physis) and convention (nomos, also "law" or "custom") was a famous contrast in fifth-century BC debate; Callicles uses it to set natural justice against man-made rules.

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λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.

484a ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα 484b ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι—νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων· οὗτος δὲ δή, φησίν,—ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί· τεκμαίρομαι ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ—ἀπριάτας— λέγει οὕτω πως—τὸ γὰρ ᾆσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι—λέγει δ' ὅτι οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο τὰς βοῦς, 484c ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ τἆλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.

484c τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσῃ δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἅψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι 484d ἐστὶν ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἠθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίγνονται.

484d ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἴς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν 484e πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσιν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου· λαμπρός τέ ἐστιν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται, νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος, ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν· 485a ὅπου δ'

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slave them, 484a telling them that one should have an equal share and that this is what is fine and just.[25]

But I think that if a man with a strong enough nature comes along, he'll shake all this off, break through it, and escape. He'll trample underfoot our rules and hocus-pocus and charms and all our laws that go against nature; he'll rise up, this slave of ours revealed as our master, and then 484b the justice of nature will blaze out. Pindar too, I think, makes the point I'm making in the song where he says that "Law, king of all, mortals and immortals"—and this law, he says, "leads on, making just the utmost violence with a sovereign hand. I take as proof the deeds of Heracles, since—unbought—" something like that; I don't know the song by heart. But he says that Heracles drove off Geryon's cattle without buying them and without Geryon giving them to him, 484c on the grounds that this is what is just by nature: that the cattle and all the other possessions of the worse and weaker belong to the better and stronger.[26]

That is the truth of it, and you'll recognize it if you move on to greater things and leave philosophy behind at last. For philosophy, Socrates, is a charming thing, if one engages in it in moderation at the right age; but if one spends more time on it than one should, it ruins a man. For even if someone is very gifted, if he goes on philosophizing well beyond that age, he's bound to end up without experience 484d of all the things a man must be experienced in if he is to be a fine and good and well-regarded man. Such people become inexperienced in the laws of the city, and in the kind of speech one must use in dealing with people in business, private and public, and in human pleasures and desires—in short, they become utterly inexperienced in human character.

So whenever they get involved in some private or political 484e affair, they make themselves ridiculous—just as, I suppose, politicians are ridiculous whenever they get involved in your pursuits and arguments. What Euripides says turns out to be true: each man shines in this, and presses on toward this, "giving the greatest part of the day to it,

25 Xerxes invaded Greece in 480 BC; his father Darius led an expedition against the Scythians north of the Black Sea around 513 BC.
26 The lines are from a lost poem of Pindar (fifth century BC). For his tenth labor Heracles took the cattle of the monster Geryon by force.

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	ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν.	where he happens to be at his best"; [485a] but wherever he's poor, he runs away from that and runs it down, and praises the other, out of partiality to himself, thinking that this way he's praising himself. But I think the most correct thing is to have a share of both.[27]
485a	φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε [485b] ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ, ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾷ μου τὰ ὦτα καί μοι δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ [485c] ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὐτὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας.	It's a fine thing to have a share of philosophy so far as it serves education, and it isn't shameful for a young man to do philosophy. But when a man who's already older still does philosophy, the thing becomes ridiculous, Socrates. [485b] I feel toward people who do philosophy very much as I do toward people who lisp and play games. When I see a little child, for whom it's still fitting to talk like that, lisping and playing, I enjoy it; it seems charming to me, fitting for a freeborn child and suitable to its age. But when I hear a small child speaking clearly, it strikes me as something grating; it offends my ears and seems to me somehow slavish. And when [485c] one hears a grown man lisping or sees him playing games, it seems ridiculous, unmanly, and deserving of a beating. That's exactly how I feel toward people who do philosophy.
485c	παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου [485d] πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ. ὃ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ [485e] τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι.	When I see philosophy in a young man, I admire it; it seems fitting to me, and I consider this person freeborn, and one who doesn't do philosophy unfree, someone who'll never think himself worthy of any fine or noble [485d] deed. But when I see an older man still doing philosophy and not giving it up, that man, Socrates, is asking for a thrashing by now. For as I was just saying, this man, however gifted he may be, is bound to become unmanly, avoiding the centers of the city and the marketplaces where, as the poet said, men become "preeminent"; he'll slink away and spend the rest of his life whispering in a corner with three or [485e] four young men, never uttering anything free or great or worthy.[28]
485e	ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς· κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι "ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρακιώδει	Now I feel quite friendly toward you, Socrates. So I seem to be feeling just what Euripides' Zethus, whom I mentioned, felt toward Amphion. For it occurs to me to say to you the same sort of thing he said to his brother: "You neglect, Socrates, what you ought to care for; you distort a soul so noble

27 The quoted line and the later allusions to Zethus and Amphion come from Euripides' lost play *Antiope*, in which two brothers debated the active versus the contemplative life.
28 "Preeminent" echoes Homer, *Iliad* 9.441, where the assembly is called the place where men become distinguished.

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[486a] τινὶ διατρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὔτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάβοις, οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο." καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῇς· εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας;	by nature with a boyish [486a] guise; you couldn't rightly contribute a speech to the councils of justice, nor seize on what's plausible and persuasive, nor devise a bold plan on another's behalf." And yet, my dear Socrates—don't be annoyed with me; I'll say it out of goodwill toward you—don't you think it's shameful to be in the state I think you're in, you and the others who keep pressing ever further into philosophy?
486a νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι [486b] χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἰλιγγιῴης ἂν καὶ χασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥτις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ [486c] τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην.	As it is, if someone took hold of you or anyone else like you and hauled you off to prison, claiming you'd done wrong when you hadn't, you know you wouldn't know what [486b] to do with yourself. You'd be dizzy and gaping, with nothing to say. And when you came up before the court, facing some utterly worthless and wicked accuser, you'd be put to death if he chose to propose the death penalty for you. And yet how can this be wise, Socrates, "a craft that took a gifted man and made him worse," unable to help himself or save himself or anyone else from the greatest dangers, to be stripped by [486c] his enemies of all his property, and to live simply without rights in the city? A man like that—if I may put it rather crudely—you can slap in the face and not pay the penalty for it.
486c ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ [486d] ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.	Take my advice, my good man: stop refuting, "practice the harmony of affairs," practice what will make you look intelligent, "leaving these subtleties to others," whether one should call them drivel or nonsense, "from which you'll dwell in empty houses." Emulate not men who refute these petty [486d] points, but those who have a livelihood and a reputation and many other good things.
486d SOCRATES εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἄσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων ᾗ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;	**SOCRATES** If my soul happened to be made of gold, Callicles, don't you think I'd be delighted to find one of those stones they test gold on—the best one—so that I could apply my soul to it, and if it agreed with me that my soul had been well cared for, I'd know for certain that I was in good condition and needed no further test?[29]
486e CALLICLES πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**CALLICLES** What's the point of that question, Socrates?
SOCRATES ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ· νῦν οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς τοιούτῳ ἑρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέναι.	**SOCRATES** I'll tell you. I think that in meeting you I've met with just such a godsend.
CALLICLES τί δή;	**CALLICLES** How so?

29 A touchstone was a dark stone on which gold was rubbed; the streak it left showed the gold's purity.

GREEK

SOCRATES εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἄν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ [487a] ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω οἳ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τέ εἰσιν βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ· τὼ δὲ ξένω τώδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ πῶλος, σοφὼ μὲν καὶ [487b] φίλω ἐστὸν ἐμώ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

487b ὦ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν· πεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶ εὔνους. [487c] τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα· καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι [487d] παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.

487d ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύοντος ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν μοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὔνους εἶ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φῂς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὐτωσὶ δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί· [487e] ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ' ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδείᾳ οὔτ' αἰσχύνης περιουσίᾳ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαις ἄν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῄς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἕξει τῆς ἀληθείας.

ENGLISH

SOCRATES I know for certain that if you agree with me on the opinions my soul holds, then these are the very truth. For I realize [487a] that anyone who is going to test a soul adequately as to whether it lives rightly or not must have three things, all of which you have: knowledge, goodwill, and frankness. I meet many people who can't test me because they aren't wise, as you are. Others are wise, but aren't willing to tell me the truth because they don't care about me as you do. And our two visitors here, Gorgias and Polus, are wise and [487b] my friends, but rather lacking in frankness and more bashful than they should be. How could they not be?

They've gone so far in bashfulness that out of shame each of them brings himself to contradict himself in front of a crowd of people—and on the most important matters. But you have all the qualities the others lack. You're well enough educated, as many Athenians would say, and you're well disposed toward me. [487c] What evidence am I using? I'll tell you. I know, Callicles, that the four of you have become partners in wisdom: you, Tisander of Aphidna, Andron son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of Cholarges. And I once overheard you deliberating how far one should cultivate wisdom, and I know that some such view as this won out among you: that one shouldn't be eager to pursue philosophy to the point of precision; instead, you urged each other to be careful [487d] not to become wiser than you should and be ruined without noticing it.

So when I hear you giving me the same advice you gave your closest friends, that's enough evidence for me that you really are well disposed toward me. And as for your being the sort to speak frankly and not be ashamed, you say so yourself, and the speech you made a little while ago bears you out. So clearly this is how things stand now: [487e] if you agree with me on anything in our discussion, it will have been adequately tested by you and me, and there will be no need to take it to any other test. For you would never have conceded it through lack of wisdom or excess of shame; nor again would you concede it to deceive me, since you're my friend, as you say yourself. So your agreement and mine will really have reached the final truth.

GREEK

ENGLISH

487e πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ὧν σὺ δή μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί [488a] ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ· σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστῇς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι τί ἔστιν τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό, καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν μέν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταὐτὰ πράττοντα ἅπερ ὡμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλᾶκα εἶναι καὶ [488b] μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσῃς ὕστερον, ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα.

And the finest of all inquiries, Callicles, is into the very things you reproached me for: what sort of man one should be, and what one should [488a] pursue, and how far, both when older and when younger. For if I'm doing anything wrong in my own life, you can be sure I'm not going wrong willingly, but through my own ignorance. So since you've begun to admonish me, don't give up; show me adequately what it is I ought to pursue and how I might acquire it. And if you catch me agreeing with you now and later not doing what I agreed to, consider me a complete dolt and [488b] never admonish me again, as a worthless fellow.

WHO ARE THE STRONGER?

Socrates presses Callicles to say whether the stronger are the many, the better, or the more intelligent.

GREEK

ENGLISH

488b **SOCRATES** ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε πῶς φῂς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;

SOCRATES Go back to the beginning for me: what do you and Pindar say natural justice is? That the stronger should carry off by force the property of the weaker, the better rule the worse, and the superior have more than the inferior? You don't say justice is something else, do you, or have I remembered correctly?

CALLICLES ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν λέγω.

CALLICLES Well, that's what I said then, and it's what I say now.

SOCRATES πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω; [488c] οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἷός τ' ἦ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγοις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶν καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι, ὡς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον ταὐτὸν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότερον δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς [488d] ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ κρείττονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;

SOCRATES Do you call the same person "better" and "stronger"? [488c] I really couldn't make out back then what exactly you meant. Do you call the more powerful "stronger," and must the weaker obey the more powerful? That's what you seemed to be showing me then too, when you said that big cities attack small ones in accordance with natural justice because they are stronger and more powerful—as though stronger, more powerful and better were the same thing. Or is it possible to be better but weaker and feebler, and to be stronger but more wicked? Or is the [488d] definition of the better and the stronger the same? Define this very point for me clearly: are the stronger, the better and the more powerful the same or different?

488d **CALLICLES** ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν.

CALLICLES I'm telling you clearly: they're the same.

SOCRATES Now aren't the many stronger by nature than the one? They're the ones, after all,

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ φύσιν; οἳ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνί, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.	who make the laws against the one, as you yourself were saying just now.
	CALLICLES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**CALLICLES** Of course.
	SOCRATES τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἐστίν.	**SOCRATES** So the rules of the many are the rules of the stronger.
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
488e	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους πολὺ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.	**SOCRATES** And so the rules of the better? For by your account the stronger are far better.
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρειττόνων γε ὄντων;	**SOCRATES** Then their rules are fine by nature, since they're the stronger?
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** I say so.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν [489a] τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἁλώσῃ ἐνταῦθα σὺ αὖ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλέον δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν', ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος.	**SOCRATES** Now do the many believe, as you yourself were saying again just now, that it is just to have an equal share, and that doing injustice is more shameful [489a] than suffering it? Is that so or not? And mind you don't get caught being ashamed yourself this time. Do the many believe, or don't they, that having an equal share, not more, is just, and that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it? Don't begrudge me an answer on this, Callicles, so that if you agree with me I can have it confirmed by you at last, since a man competent to judge will have agreed.
489a	**CALLICLES** ἀλλ' οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.	**CALLICLES** Well, the many do believe that.
	SOCRATES οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ [489b] ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.	**SOCRATES** So it isn't only by convention that doing injustice is more shameful than [489b] suffering it, or that having an equal share is just, but by nature too. It looks, then, as if what you said earlier wasn't true, and you were wrong to accuse me of saying that convention and nature are opposed —and that I, knowing this, play dirty in arguments: if someone speaks in terms of nature, I steer him to convention, and if in terms of convention, to nature.
489b	**CALLICLES** οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ [489c] ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτῃ, ἔρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων	**CALLICLES** This man will never stop talking drivel! Tell me, Socrates, aren't you ashamed, at your age, to go hunting after words, and [489c] to treat it as a windfall if someone slips up on a phrase? Do you imagine that by "stronger" I mean anything other than "better"? Haven't I been telling you for ages that I say the better and the stronger are the same?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα;	Or do you think I mean that if a rabble of slaves and all sorts of people gets together, people worth nothing except perhaps for their bodily strength, and they declare something, then that is the law?
489c	**SOCRATES** εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** Very well, Callicles, you wisest of men. Is that what you mean?
	CALLICLES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**CALLICLES** Absolutely.
489d	**SOCRATES** ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγῇ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπὲ τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πρᾳότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.	**SOCRATES** Well, my remarkable friend, I've been guessing for some time myself that this sort of thing was what you meant by "stronger," and I keep questioning you because I'm eager to know clearly what you mean. For surely you don't think two people are better than one, or your slaves better than you because they're more powerful than you are. So start again from the beginning and tell me: what on earth do you mean by the better, since you don't mean the more powerful? And, my wonderful friend, go easier on me with my first lessons, or I'll stop coming to your school.
489e	**CALLICLES** εἰρωνεύῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CALLICLES** You're being ironic, Socrates.
	SOCRATES μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** No, by Zethus, Callicles—the one you made such ironic use of against me just now. But come, tell me: who do you say the better are?
	CALLICLES τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** The superior, of course.
	SOCRATES ὁρᾷς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;	**SOCRATES** Do you see that you yourself are uttering words and revealing nothing? Won't you say whether by the better and stronger you mean the more intelligent, or some other people?
	CALLICLES ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.	**CALLICLES** Yes, by Zeus, those are the ones I mean—emphatically.
490a	**SOCRATES** πολλάκις ἄρα εἷς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων· τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν—καὶ οὐ ῥήματι θηρεύω—εἰ ὁ εἷς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.	**SOCRATES** So on your account one intelligent man is often stronger than ten thousand unintelligent ones, and he should rule and they be ruled, and the ruler should have more than those he rules. That's what you seem to me to mean—and I'm not hunting after phrases—if the one is stronger than the ten thousand.
	CALLICLES ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.	**CALLICLES** Yes, that's what I mean. For this, I think, is what is just by nature: that the man who is better and more intelligent should both rule and have more than his inferiors.
490b	**SOCRATES** ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ᾖ ἐν	

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δ' ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν ᾖ φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἰατρὸς ὤν, ᾖ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος, φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὤν, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;	**SOCRATES** Hold it right there. What do you mean this time? Suppose we were gathered in the same place, as we are now, many of us together, and we had plenty of food and drink in common, and we were a mixed lot, some strong, some weak; and suppose one of us, being a doctor, were more intelligent about these things, but, as is likely, stronger than some and weaker than others. Won't this man, since he is more intelligent than us, be better and stronger in these matters?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
490c	**SOCRATES** ἦ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἑκτέον αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν τῷ δὲ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἑκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὤν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὠγαθέ;	**SOCRATES** Should he then have more of this food than the rest of us, because he is better? Or should he, as the one in charge, distribute it all, but when it comes to consuming it and using it up on his own body, not take more than his share, if he isn't to suffer for it, but have more than some and less than others? And if he happens to be the weakest of all, should the best man get the least of all, Callicles? Isn't that how it is, my good friend?
	CALLICLES περὶ σιτία, λέγεις, καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· 490d ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω.	**CALLICLES** Food, you say, and drink and doctors and drivel! 490d That's not what I mean.
490d	**SOCRATES** πότερον οὐ τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; φάθι ἢ μή.	**SOCRATES** Don't you say the more intelligent man is better? Yes or no?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;	**SOCRATES** And that the better man should have more?
	CALLICLES οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.	**CALLICLES** Not of food, at any rate, or drink.
	SOCRATES μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιιέναι;	**SOCRATES** I see. Perhaps of cloaks, then: the best weaver should have the biggest cloak and go around wrapped in the most and the finest?
	CALLICLES ποίων ἱματίων;	**CALLICLES** Cloaks? What cloaks?
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν 490e φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν.	**SOCRATES** Well, when it comes to shoes, clearly the 490e man most intelligent and best in that field should have more. Perhaps the shoemaker should walk around wearing the biggest shoes, and the most of them.
490e	**CALLICLES** ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.	**CALLICLES** Shoes? What shoes? You keep talking drivel.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν	**SOCRATES** Well, if you don't mean things like these, perhaps things like this: take a farmer, say, a man intelligent about the land, a fine, upstanding

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ γῆν.	man. Perhaps he should have more seed than others and sow as much seed as possible on his own land.
	CALLICLES ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CALLICLES** How you keep saying the same things, Socrates!
	SOCRATES οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.	**SOCRATES** Not only that, Callicles, but about the same things too.
491a	**CALLICLES** νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύῃ, ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.	**CALLICLES** By the gods, you simply never stop going on about shoemakers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if our discussion were about them!
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξῃ οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;	**SOCRATES** Then will you tell me in what things the stronger and more intelligent man justly gets the advantage by having more? Or will you neither put up with my suggestions nor say it yourself?
	CALLICLES ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ' 491b οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὦσιν, ὅντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.	**CALLICLES** But I've been saying it for ages. First, by the stronger I don't mean shoemakers or cooks, but 491b those who are intelligent about the city's affairs, about how it would be well run; and not only intelligent but courageous, capable of carrying out whatever they have in mind, and not flagging through softness of soul.
491b	**SOCRATES** ὁρᾷς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταὐτὰ σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῂς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφῃ μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοὐναντίον, ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τοὺς 491c βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὡρίζου, αὖθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἥκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅτι.	**SOCRATES** Do you see, my excellent Callicles, that you and I don't accuse each other of the same thing? You say I always say the same things, and you find fault with me for it. I say the opposite about you: that you never say the same things about the same subjects. At one moment you were defining the 491c better and stronger as the more powerful, then as the more intelligent, and now you've turned up with something else again: according to you the stronger and better are some more courageous people. Come on, my good friend, tell me once and for all whom you mean by the better and stronger, and in what.
491c	**CALLICLES** ἀλλ' εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ 491d προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.	**CALLICLES** But I've already said: those who are intelligent about the city's affairs, and courageous. These are the ones 491d who ought to rule the cities, and justice is this: that they have more than the others, the rulers more than the ruled.
491d	**SOCRATES** τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τί; ἢ τι ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;	**SOCRATES** What about over themselves, my friend? Are they rulers or ruled in some way?
	CALLICLES πῶς λέγεις;	**CALLICLES** What do you mean?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;	**SOCRATES** I mean each individual ruling himself. Or is there no need for that—ruling oneself—only for ruling others?
	CALLICLES πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;	**CALLICLES** What do you mean, ruling himself?

SELF-CONTROL AND APPETITE

Callicles says the best life lets its desires grow as large as possible and satisfies them.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν [491e] ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.	**SOCRATES** Nothing complicated, just what most people mean: being self-controlled and master of oneself, ruling the pleasures and desires [491e] within oneself.
491e	**CALLICLES** ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ· τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας.	**CALLICLES** How charming you are! By the self-controlled you mean the simpletons.
	SOCRATES πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγω.	**SOCRATES** Of course! Anyone at all can see that's not what I mean.
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, [492a] ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οἶμαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην [492b] καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀνανδρίαν.	**CALLICLES** Oh, they very much are, Socrates. For how could a person be happy if he's a slave to anyone at all? No, what is fine and just by nature is this—and I'm telling you frankly now: the man who is going to live rightly must let his own desires grow as great as possible and not discipline them, [492a] and when they are as great as can be, he must be able to serve them through courage and understanding, and fill them with whatever his desire is for at any moment. But this, I think, isn't possible for the many. So they criticize people like that out of shame, hiding their own incapacity, and they say that intemperance is shameful, as I was saying earlier, enslaving those who are better by nature; and since they themselves can't provide fulfillment for their pleasures, they praise self-control [492b] and justice because of their own lack of manliness.[30]
492b	ἐπεὶ ὅσοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων ὑέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχήν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν, τί ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδὼν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες [492c] εἶεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον	For those who were born the sons of kings, or were naturally capable of winning some office or tyranny or position of power for themselves—what in truth could be more shameful and worse for such people than self-control and justice? They could enjoy good things with nothing standing in their way, and yet they would bring in, as master over themselves, the law and the talk and the censure of the many! Or how could they fail to be

30 "Intemperance" (*akolasia*) literally means "not being disciplined" (*kolazein*); the argument plays on the link.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὑτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει;	made miserable [492c] by that fine thing, justice and self-control, when they give no more to their own friends than to their enemies—and that while ruling in their own city?
492c	ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν φῂς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ' ἔχει· τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀνθρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.	No, the truth, Socrates, which you claim to pursue, is this: luxury, intemperance and freedom, if they have the means behind them, are virtue and happiness; and the rest of it, all these pretty ornaments, these agreements people make against nature, are drivel and worth nothing.
492d	**SOCRATES** οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχῃ τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. δέομαι οὖν ἐγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῂς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ [492e] τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν;	**SOCRATES** There's nothing ignoble, Callicles, about the frankness with which you pursue the argument. You're saying clearly now what other people think but aren't willing to say. So I beg you not to let up in any way, so that it may become truly plain how one should live. Tell me: you say that one mustn't discipline one's desires if one is to be the kind of person one should be, but let them grow as great as possible and provide them with fulfillment from any source whatever, and [492e] that this is virtue?
492e	**CALLICLES** φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.	**CALLICLES** That's what I say.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** So it's wrong to call those who need nothing happy.
	CALLICLES οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν.	**CALLICLES** Yes—that way stones and corpses would be happiest of all.

THE LEAKY JARS

Socrates compares the intemperate soul to a leaky jar that can never be filled.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων—τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν; [493a] καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ἤδη γάρ του ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους, [493b] τῶν δ' ἀνοήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας.	**SOCRATES** But then even the life you describe is a strange and terrible one. I wouldn't be surprised, you know, if Euripides is telling the truth when he says, "Who knows if to live is to be dead, and to be dead is to live?" [493a] Perhaps we really are dead. In fact I once heard one of the wise say that we are dead now, and that the body (*sōma*) is our tomb (*sēma*), and that the part of the soul where the desires are happens to be the kind of thing that can be talked round and swings up and down. And so some clever teller of stories, a Sicilian perhaps, or an Italian, played on the word: because this part is so persuadable (*pithanon*) and easily persuaded, he named it a jar (*pithos*); and the unintelligent (*anoētoi*) he named the uninitiated (*amuētoi*). [493b]

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		That part of the soul of the unintelligent where the desires are—its intemperate part, which can't hold tight—he likened to a leaky jar, because of its insatiability.[31]
493b	τοὐναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου—τὸ ἀιδὲς δὴ λέγων—οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν, οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ [493c] λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπῄκασεν τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν πως οἷός τε ὦ, πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἑλέσθαι.	This man, Callicles, shows the opposite of what you say: that of those in Hades—by which he means the unseen (*aidēs*)—these would be the most miserable, the uninitiated, and they would carry water to the leaky jar in another leaky thing, a sieve. And by the sieve, as the man who told me [493c] said, he means the soul; he likened the soul of the unintelligent to a sieve because it is leaky, unable to hold anything because of its unreliability and forgetfulness. These things are, admittedly, rather strange; but they make clear what I want to show you, in the hope that I can somehow persuade you to change your mind and choose, instead of the insatiable and intemperate life, the orderly life that is satisfied and content with whatever it has at any time.
493c	ἀλλὰ πότερον [493d] πείθω τί σε καὶ μετατίθεσθαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσῃ;	Well, [493d] am I persuading you at all to change your mind and believe that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or, even if I tell many other stories like these, will you change your mind not a bit the more?
493d	**CALLICLES** τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CALLICLES** That last thing you said is nearer the truth, Socrates.
	SOCRATES φέρε δή, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν καὶ τῷ μὲν [493e] ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἴνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δ' ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ [494a] ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας· ἆρα τοιούτου ἑκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου;	**SOCRATES** Come, then, let me give you another image from the same school as this one. Consider whether this is what you'd say about each of the two lives, the self-controlled and the intemperate. Suppose each of two men had many jars. One man's [493e] jars were sound and full, one of wine, one of honey, one of milk, and many others full of many things; and the sources of each of these were scarce and hard to come by, obtainable only with much hard labor. Now the one man, having filled his jars, would pour nothing more in and give them no further thought, but as far as they are concerned would be at peace. The other man, like the first, would have sources he could draw on, though with difficulty; but his vessels would be leaky and rotten, and he'd be forced to keep filling them constantly, night and [494a] day, or else suffer the most extreme pains. If each life is like

31 Socrates is playing on Greek puns (sōma/sēma, pithanon/pithos, anoētoi/amuētoi); southern Italy and Sicily were centers of Pythagorean and Orphic teaching about the soul.

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		this, do you say the life of the intemperate man is happier than that of the orderly one?
494a	πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;	By saying this, am I persuading you at all to concede that the orderly life is better than the intemperate one, or am I not?
	CALLICLES οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν 494b πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρεῖν.	CALLICLES You're not, Socrates. That man who has filled himself up has no pleasure left at all. That's what I was just saying: it's living like a stone, once he's 494b full, no longer feeling either joy or pain. No, living pleasantly lies in this: in having as much as possible flow in.
494b	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς;	SOCRATES But if a lot flows in, then a lot must flow out too, and the holes for it to flow out must be pretty big?
	CALLICLES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	CALLICLES Certainly.
	SOCRATES χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;	SOCRATES Now it's the life of a plover you're describing, not that of a corpse or a stone. Tell me: do you mean something like being hungry and, when hungry, eating?[32]
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	CALLICLES I do.
494c	SOCRATES καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;	SOCRATES And being thirsty and, when thirsty, drinking?
	CALLICLES λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.	CALLICLES I do—and having all the other desires, and being able to fill them and enjoy it, and so living happily.
	SOCRATES εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνῇ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.	SOCRATES Well done, my excellent friend! Keep on as you began, and mind you don't lose your nerve out of shame. And it seems I mustn't lose my nerve out of shame either. First tell me whether a man who has an itch and wants to scratch, with all the scratching he likes, can live happily spending his whole life scratching.
494d	CALLICLES ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος.	CALLICLES How absurd you are, Socrates—a regular crowd-pleaser.
	SOCRATES τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου μόνον.	SOCRATES That's just how I shocked Polus and Gorgias, Callicles, and made them ashamed. But you won't be shocked, and you won't be ashamed: you're courageous. Just answer.
	CALLICLES φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.	CALLICLES Then I say that even the man who scratches would live pleasantly.

32 The plover (charadrios) was a bird proverbial for eating and excreting at the same time.

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	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;	**SOCRATES** And if pleasantly, then happily too?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
494e	**SOCRATES** πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῷ—ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινῇ, ἐάν τίς σε τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὁ τῶν κιναίδων βίος, οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;	**SOCRATES** What if he itches only on his head—or what more shall I ask you? Think, Callicles, how you'll answer if someone asks you, one after another, about everything that goes along with this. And as the culmination of all such things, the life of men who seek to be the passive partner in sex with other men—isn't that terrible and shameful and miserable? Or will you dare to say that they are happy, if they have all they want in abundance?
	CALLICLES οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;	**CALLICLES** Aren't you ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion to such things?

ARE PLEASURE AND THE GOOD THE SAME?

Socrates argues that pleasure and the good cannot be the same, since pleasure and pain cease together.

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	SOCRATES ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, [495a] εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε πότερον φῂς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;	**SOCRATES** Is it I who am leading it there, my noble friend, or the man who says so unreservedly that those who enjoy themselves, however they enjoy themselves, [495a] are happy, and doesn't distinguish which pleasures are good and which bad? But even now, tell me: do you say that the pleasant and the good are the same, or is there something pleasant that isn't good?
495a	**CALLICLES** ἵνα δή μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ᾖ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι.	**CALLICLES** So that my argument won't be inconsistent if I say they're different, I say they're the same.
	SOCRATES διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.	**SOCRATES** You're wrecking your earlier statements, Callicles, and you'd no longer be investigating the truth with me properly if you're going to say things contrary to what you think.
495b	**CALLICLES** καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CALLICLES** So are you, Socrates.
	SOCRATES οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἆθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.	**SOCRATES** Well then, if I'm doing that, I'm not acting rightly either, any more than you are. But, my blessed friend, consider whether the good is really this: enjoying oneself in any way whatever. For if it is, the many shameful consequences just hinted at evidently follow, and many others besides.
	CALLICLES ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CALLICLES** So you think, Socrates.

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	SOCRATES σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζῃ;	**SOCRATES** And do you really insist on these things, Callicles?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
495c	**SOCRATES** ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος;	**SOCRATES** Shall we take up the argument, then, on the understanding that you're serious?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε σφόδρα.	**CALLICLES** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES ἴθι δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε· ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι;	**SOCRATES** Come on, then, since that's your view, draw this distinction for me. I suppose there's something you call knowledge?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** There is.
	SOCRATES οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης;	**SOCRATES** And weren't you saying just now that there's such a thing as courage along with knowledge?
	CALLICLES ἔλεγον γάρ.	**CALLICLES** Yes, I was.
	SOCRATES ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;	**SOCRATES** And you spoke of them as two, meaning that courage is something other than knowledge?
	CALLICLES σφόδρα γε.	**CALLICLES** Very much so.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον;	**SOCRATES** Well then: are pleasure and knowledge the same or different?
495d	**CALLICLES** ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ.	**CALLICLES** Different, of course, you wisest of men.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς;	**SOCRATES** And courage is different from pleasure too?
	CALLICLES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**CALLICLES** Of course.
	SOCRATES φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.	**SOCRATES** Come, then, let's make sure we remember this: Callicles of Acharnae said that pleasant and good are the same, but that knowledge and courage are different both from each other and from the good.[33]
	CALLICLES Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα. ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;	**CALLICLES** And Socrates of Alopece doesn't agree with us on this. Or does he?
495e	**SOCRATES** οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγῇ πάθος πεπονθέναι;	**SOCRATES** He doesn't agree. And I don't think Callicles will either, once he looks at himself properly. Tell me: don't you think that those who fare well are in the opposite condition to those who fare badly?

33 Acharnae and Alopece were Attic demes (local districts); naming a citizen by his deme was the formal Athenian style.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου.	**SOCRATES** Then, if these are opposites, must it be with them as it is with health and sickness? For surely a person isn't healthy and sick at the same time, nor is he rid of health and sickness at the same time.
	CALLICLES πῶς λέγεις;	**CALLICLES** What do you mean?
	SOCRATES οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν [496a] σκόπει. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;	**SOCRATES** Take any part of the body you like, for example, and [496a] consider. A person can be sick in the eyes, with what's called ophthalmia?
496a	**CALLICLES** πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**CALLICLES** Of course.
	SOCRATES οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;	**SOCRATES** Surely he isn't also healthy in those same eyes at the same time?
	CALLICLES οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.	**CALLICLES** Not in any way.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται; ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;	**SOCRATES** And what about when he gets rid of the ophthalmia? Does he then get rid of the health of his eyes too, and in the end is he rid of both at once?
	CALLICLES ἥκιστά γε.	**CALLICLES** Not in the least.
	SOCRATES θαυμάσιον γὰρ [496b] οἶμαι καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται· ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** That would be amazing, I think, [496b] and unreasonable, wouldn't it?
496b	**CALLICLES** σφόδρα γε.	**CALLICLES** Very much so.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;	**SOCRATES** Rather, I think, he gets and loses each of them in turn?
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** I agree.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;	**SOCRATES** And strength and weakness likewise?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;	**SOCRATES** And speed and slowness?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;	**SOCRATES** And good things and happiness, and their opposites, bad things and misery—does he get each in turn and get rid of each in turn?
	CALLICLES πάντως δήπου.	**CALLICLES** Absolutely, of course.
496c	**SOCRATES** ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρα ἄττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.	**SOCRATES** So if we find things that a person is rid of at the same time and has at the same time, clearly these couldn't be the good and the bad. Do

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		we agree on that? Think it over very carefully before you answer.
	CALLICLES ἀλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.	**CALLICLES** I agree with it wholeheartedly.
	SOCRATES ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.	**SOCRATES** Go back, then, to what we agreed earlier. Did you say that being hungry is pleasant or painful? I mean being hungry itself.
	CALLICLES ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδὺ [496d] λέγω.	**CALLICLES** Painful, I'd say. But eating when you're hungry I say is [496d] pleasant.
496d	**SOCRATES** μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί;	**SOCRATES** I see. But in any case being hungry itself is painful, isn't it?
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;	**SOCRATES** And being thirsty too?
	CALLICLES σφόδρα γε.	**CALLICLES** Very much so.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** Shall I ask any more questions, then, or do you agree that every lack and desire is painful?
	CALLICLES ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.	**CALLICLES** I agree—just stop asking.
	SOCRATES εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῂς εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** Very well. But drinking when thirsty—you say that's pleasant, don't you?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;	**SOCRATES** Now in what you're describing, being thirsty surely means being in pain?
496e	**CALLICLES** ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή;	**SOCRATES** And drinking is a filling of the lack, and a pleasure?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** So you say that in drinking one enjoys oneself?
	CALLICLES μάλιστα.	**CALLICLES** Very much.
	SOCRATES διψῶντά γε.	**SOCRATES** When thirsty, that is.
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** I agree.
	SOCRATES λυπούμενον;	**SOCRATES** And in pain?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES αἰσθάνῃ οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε	**SOCRATES** Do you notice what follows—that you're saying someone enjoys himself and is in pain at the same time, when you speak of a thirsty

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;	person drinking? Or doesn't this happen at the same time and in the same place, whether of soul or body, as you like? I don't think it makes any difference. Is that so or not?
	CALLICLES ἔστιν.	CALLICLES It is.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς [497a] πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῂς εἶναι.	SOCRATES But you say it's impossible for someone faring well to be faring badly [497a] at the same time.
497a	CALLICLES φημὶ γάρ.	CALLICLES I do.
	SOCRATES ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὡμολόγηκας.	SOCRATES Yet you've agreed that it's possible to enjoy oneself while in pain.
	CALLICLES φαίνεται.	CALLICLES Apparently.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.	SOCRATES So enjoying oneself isn't faring well, nor is being in pain faring badly; and so the pleasant turns out to be different from the good.
	CALLICLES οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα σοφίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.	CALLICLES I don't know what clever tricks you're up to, Socrates.
	SOCRATES οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόιθί γε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς [497b] ὢν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;	SOCRATES You do know, Callicles; you're just playing coy. Go on a bit further—you know you're only playing the fool—so you can see what a wise man it is who [497b] lectures me. Doesn't each of us stop being thirsty and stop feeling pleasure through drinking at the same time?
497b	CALLICLES οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.	CALLICLES I don't know what you mean.
	GORGIAS μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.	GORGIAS No, Callicles, don't do that. Answer, for our sakes too, so that the discussion can be brought to a finish.
	CALLICLES ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.	CALLICLES But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias. He asks petty questions of little value and refutes people with them.
	GORGIAS ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται.	GORGIAS What difference does that make to you? It isn't your reputation at stake in any case, Callicles. Let Socrates refute you in whatever way he likes.
497c	CALLICLES Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.	CALLICLES Go on, then, ask your petty, narrow little questions, since that's what Gorgias wants.
	SOCRATES εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.	SOCRATES You're a lucky man, Callicles, to have been initiated into the Greater Mysteries before the Lesser. I didn't think that was permitted. So answer from where you left off: doesn't each of us

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		stop being thirsty and feeling pleasure at the same time?[34]
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** I agree.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;	**SOCRATES** And stop being hungry, and stop having the other desires and pleasures, at the same time?
	CALLICLES ἔστι ταῦτα.	**CALLICLES** That's so.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν 497d καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;	**SOCRATES** So we stop having pains 497d and pleasures at the same time?
497d	**CALLICLES** ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὡμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;	**SOCRATES** But we don't stop having good things and bad things at the same time, as you agreed. Or don't you agree now?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε· τί οὖν δή;	**CALLICLES** I do. So what?
	SOCRATES ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων· πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδε ἐπίσκεψαι (οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ 497e ὁμολογεῖσθαι· ἄθρει δέ) τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;	**SOCRATES** So, my friend, good things don't turn out to be the same as pleasant ones, nor bad things the same as painful ones. For with one pair we stop having both at once, with the other we don't, since they are different. How, then, could pleasant things be the same as good ones, or painful things the same as bad? And if you like, look at it this way too (for I don't think you'll agree this way 497e either—but consider it): don't you call good people good because of the presence of good things, just as you call beautiful those in whom beauty is present?
497e	**CALLICLES** ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;	**SOCRATES** Well, do you call foolish and cowardly men good? You didn't just now; you said it was the courageous and intelligent. Or aren't these the ones you call good?
	CALLICLES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**CALLICLES** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;	**SOCRATES** Well then, have you ever seen a child with no sense enjoying himself?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I have.
	SOCRATES ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;	**SOCRATES** And have you never yet seen a man with no sense enjoying himself?
	CALLICLES οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;	**CALLICLES** I suppose I have. But what of it?

34 At Eleusis near Athens, initiation into the Lesser Mysteries was the required preliminary to the Greater.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
498a	**SOCRATES** οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.	**SOCRATES** Nothing. Just answer.
	CALLICLES εἶδον.	**CALLICLES** I have.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;	**SOCRATES** Well, and a man with sense, in pain and enjoying himself?
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;	**SOCRATES** Which enjoy themselves and feel pain more, the intelligent or the foolish?
	CALLICLES οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν.	**CALLICLES** I don't think there's much difference.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;	**SOCRATES** That will do. Now, have you ever seen a cowardly man in war?
	CALLICLES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**CALLICLES** Of course.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;	**SOCRATES** Well, when the enemy withdrew, who seemed to you to enjoy it more, the cowards or the courageous?
	CALLICLES ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε [498b] μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.	**CALLICLES** Both, [498b] it seemed to me, enjoyed it more; or if not, about equally.
498b	**SOCRATES** οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;	**SOCRATES** It makes no difference. In any case the cowards enjoy themselves too?
	CALLICLES σφόδρα γε.	**CALLICLES** Very much so.
	SOCRATES καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν.	**SOCRATES** And the foolish too, it seems.
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;	**SOCRATES** And when the enemy advance, do only the cowards feel pain, or the courageous too?
	CALLICLES ἀμφότεροι.	**CALLICLES** Both.
	SOCRATES ἆρα ὁμοίως;	**SOCRATES** Equally?
	CALLICLES μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.	**CALLICLES** The cowards more, perhaps.
	SOCRATES ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;	**SOCRATES** And when the enemy withdraw, don't they enjoy it more?
	CALLICLES ἴσως.	**CALLICLES** Perhaps.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, [498c] ὡς σὺ φῄς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων;	**SOCRATES** So the foolish and the intelligent, the cowardly and the courageous, feel pain and enjoyment about equally, [498c] as you say, but the cowards more than the courageous?
498c	**CALLICLES** φημί.	**CALLICLES** I agree.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;	**SOCRATES** But the intelligent and the courageous are good, and the cowardly and the foolish bad?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;	**SOCRATES** So the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain about equally?
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** I agree.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;	**SOCRATES** Then are the good and the bad about equally good and bad? Or are the bad even more good and bad?
498d	**CALLICLES** ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις.	**CALLICLES** By Zeus, I don't know what you mean.
	SOCRATES οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῂς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;	**SOCRATES** Don't you know that you say the good are good by the presence of good things, and the bad bad by the presence of bad things? And that pleasures are the good things, and pains the bad?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;	**SOCRATES** So good things—pleasures—are present to those who are enjoying themselves, if they really are enjoying themselves?
	CALLICLES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**CALLICLES** Of course.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;	**SOCRATES** So since good things are present, those who enjoy themselves are good?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;	**SOCRATES** Well, and aren't bad things—pains—present to those who are in pain?
	CALLICLES πάρεστιν.	**CALLICLES** They are.
498e	**SOCRATES** κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῂς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῄς;	**SOCRATES** And it's by the presence of bad things, you say, that the bad are bad. Or don't you say so any more?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
	SOCRATES ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἳ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἳ ἂν ἀνιῶνται;	**SOCRATES** So whoever enjoys himself is good, and whoever is in pain is bad?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οἳ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἳ δ' ἧττον ἧττον, οἳ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;	**SOCRATES** Those who do so more, more so; those who do so less, less so; and those who do so about equally, about equally?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν φῂς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς;	**SOCRATES** Now you say that the intelligent and the foolish, the cowardly and the courageous, enjoy themselves and feel pain about equally, or the cowards even more?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
	SOCRATES συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν [499a] εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Then work out with me what follows for us from what we've agreed. For they say it's a fine thing [499a] to say and examine fine things twice, even three times. We say the intelligent and courageous man is good, don't we?
499a	**CALLICLES** ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;	**SOCRATES** And the foolish and cowardly man bad?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;	**SOCRATES** And again, the one who enjoys himself good?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;	**SOCRATES** And the one in pain bad?
	CALLICLES ἀνάγκη.	**CALLICLES** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;	**SOCRATES** And the good man and the bad man feel pain and enjoyment alike, and perhaps the bad man even more?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.

BETTER AND WORSE PLEASURES

Callicles admits some pleasures are better than others, and Socrates returns to the crafts that serve the good.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον [499b] ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταὐτὰ φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;	**SOCRATES** Then doesn't the bad man turn out just as bad and good as the good man, or even more [499b] good? Isn't this what follows, along with those earlier points, if someone says that pleasant things and good things are the same? Isn't it necessary, Callicles?
499b	**CALLICLES** πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἅσμενος ἔχῃ ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.	**CALLICLES** I've been listening to you and agreeing for a long time now, Socrates, all the while noting that if anyone concedes you anything at all, even in jest, you seize on it gleefully, like a youngster. As if you really supposed that I—or anyone else at all—didn't believe that some pleasures are better and others worse!

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ καί μοι [499c] ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Oh, Callicles, what a rogue you are! You're treating me [499c] like a child, saying at one moment that things are one way and at another that they're another, to deceive me. And yet I didn't think at the start that you would deliberately deceive me, since you were my friend. Now I see I was wrong, and it seems I must, as the old saying goes, make the best of what I have and accept what you give me. What you're saying now, it seems, is that some pleasures are good and some bad. Right?
499d	**CALLICLES** ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;	**SOCRATES** And the beneficial ones are good, and the harmful ones bad?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι;	**SOCRATES** And the beneficial ones are those that do some good, and the bad ones those that do some harm?
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** I agree.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς, ἦ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ [499e] τἀναντία τούτων κακαί;	**SOCRATES** Now do you mean ones like these—the bodily pleasures, for example, that we were just talking about, in eating and drinking: those of them that produce health in the body, or strength, or some other excellence of the body, are good, and those that [499e] produce the opposite are bad?
499e	**CALLICLES** πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;	**SOCRATES** And likewise with pains: some are useful and some harmful?
	CALLICLES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**CALLICLES** Of course.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;	**SOCRATES** So it's the useful pleasures and pains that one should choose and act on?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;	**SOCRATES** But not the harmful ones?
	CALLICLES δῆλον δή.	**CALLICLES** Obviously.
	SOCRATES ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἆρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι [500a] ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων;	**SOCRATES** For Polus and I, if you remember, decided that everything should be done for the sake of good things. Do you share this view too, that the good is the goal of all actions, and that everything else should be done for its sake, [500a] and not it for

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		the sake of everything else? Will you cast your vote with ours and make it three?
500a	**CALLICLES** ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I will.
	SOCRATES τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.	**SOCRATES** So the pleasant things too, like everything else, should be done for the sake of the good things, not the good for the sake of the pleasant.
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἆρ᾽ οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;	**SOCRATES** Now is it up to just anyone to pick out which pleasant things are good and which bad, or does it take an expert in each case?
	CALLICLES τεχνικοῦ.	**CALLICLES** An expert.
	SOCRATES ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, [500b] ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀλλὰ οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην.	**SOCRATES** Let's recall, then, what I happened to be saying to Polus and Gorgias. I said, if you remember, [500b] that there are practices that go only as far as pleasure, providing that alone and ignorant of better and worse, and others that know what is good and what is bad. And among those concerned with pleasures I placed cookery, as a knack, not a craft, and among those concerned with the good, the craft of medicine.
500b	καὶ πρὸς Φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἷου δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ᾽ ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ᾽ [500c] αὖ τὰ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων.	And by Zeus, god of friendship, Callicles, don't think you should play games with me, and don't answer whatever occurs to you, contrary to what you think; [500c] and don't take what I say as if I were playing, either. For you see that our discussion is about something that anyone with even a little sense would take more seriously than anything else: how one should live. Should it be the life you urge me toward, doing these so-called manly things—speaking before the people, practicing rhetoric, and engaging in politics the way you people do now? Or this life of philosophy? And how does the one differ from the other?
500c	ἴσως [500d] οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν τούτω διττὼ τὼ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὔπω οἶσθα τί λέγω.	Perhaps, [500d] then, it's best to do what I tried to do a moment ago: to draw distinctions, and once we've drawn them and agreed with each other whether these two lives really exist, to examine how they differ from each other and which of them one should live. But perhaps you don't yet know what I mean.
500d	**CALLICLES** οὐ δῆτα.	**CALLICLES** No, I don't.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι	**SOCRATES** Well, I'll put it more clearly. You and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good and

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	δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ [500e] σύμφαθι ἢ μή. σύμφῃς;	such a thing as pleasant, and that the pleasant is different from the good, and that for each of them there is a practice and a preparation for obtaining it, the pursuit of the pleasant and the pursuit of the good—but first tell me whether [500e] you agree with this or not. Do you?
500e	CALLICLES οὕτως φημί.	CALLICLES I agree.
	SOCRATES ἴθι δή, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὗ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, [501a] ἡ δ' ἰατρική, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρική· ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστιν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σῳζομένη [501b] τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς.	SOCRATES Come, then, and agree with me explicitly on what I was saying to these men here, if you really thought I was speaking the truth then. I was saying, I think, that cookery doesn't seem to me a craft but a knack, [501a] whereas medicine is a craft. I said that the one, medicine, has investigated both the nature of what it treats and the cause of what it does, and can give an account of each of these; while the other, concerned with pleasure, to which all its service is directed, goes about it quite without craft, having examined neither the nature of pleasure nor its cause, entirely without reason, having sorted out, you might say, nothing at all; by routine and knack it merely preserves the memory [501b] of what usually happens, and that is how it provides its pleasures.
501b	ταῦτ' οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι [501c] μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου ἄν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφῃς;	First consider whether you think this is adequately put, and whether there are also other such pursuits concerned with the soul: some based on craft, which have some forethought for what is best for the soul, and others that neglect this and, as in the other case, have examined only the soul's pleasure and how it might be produced, but neither consider which pleasures are better or worse nor care about anything except gratifying, [501c] whether for better or worse. For to me, Callicles, there do seem to be such things, and I say this sort of thing is flattery, whether it concerns the body or the soul or anything else whose pleasure someone serves without considering the better and the worse. Do you share our opinion on this, or do you contradict it?
501c	CALLICLES οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.	CALLICLES I don't contradict it. I concede it, so that your argument can get finished, and to gratify Gorgias here.
501d	SOCRATES πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;	SOCRATES Does this happen with one soul, but not with two or many?
	CALLICLES οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλάς.	CALLICLES No, with two and with many as well.

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	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;	**SOCRATES** So it's also possible to gratify them in a crowd, all at once, without considering what is best?
	CALLICLES οἶμαι ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I think so.
	SOCRATES ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι. [501e] πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;	**SOCRATES** Can you say, then, which practices do this? Or rather, if you like, I'll ask, and when one seems to you to be of this kind, say yes, and when it doesn't, say no. [501e] First let's consider pipe-playing. Doesn't it seem to you to be of this kind, Callicles, pursuing only our pleasure and caring about nothing else?
501e	**CALLICLES** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**CALLICLES** It does to me.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;	**SOCRATES** And all similar practices too, such as lyre-playing in competitions?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγῇ τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει [502a] χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;	**SOCRATES** What about the training of choruses and the composition of dithyrambs? Doesn't that strike you as the same kind of thing? Or do you think Cinesias son of Meles cares at all about saying something that would make his listeners better, rather than what will [502a] gratify the crowd of spectators?[35]
502a	**CALLICLES** δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε πέρι.	**CALLICLES** That's obvious, Socrates, in Cinesias' case at least.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἦ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον; ἡνία γὰρ ᾄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἥ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ηὑρῆσθαι;	**SOCRATES** And what about his father Meles? Did he seem to you to sing to the lyre with his eye on what is best? Or did he not even aim at what is most pleasant? For his singing used to pain the audience. But consider: don't you think that all singing to the lyre, and the composition of dithyrambs, were invented for the sake of pleasure?
	CALLICLES ἔμοιγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
502b	**SOCRATES** τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδή, ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ᾖ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ᾄσεται, ἐάντε χαίρωσιν ἐάντε μή;	**SOCRATES** And what about that august and wonderful thing, the composition of tragedy—what is it so serious about? Is all its endeavor and seriousness, as you see it, only to gratify the spectators? Or does it also fight hard not to say something that is pleasant and gratifying to them but bad, and to say and sing something that happens to be unpleasant but beneficial, whether they enjoy it or

35 Cinesias was a composer of dithyrambs (choral songs to Dionysus) in the late fifth century BC, often mocked in comedy; his father Meles was a singer to the lyre.

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ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις;	not? Which way do you think the composition of tragedies is set up?
CALLICLES δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν [502c] ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς.	**CALLICLES** That's obvious, Socrates: it's geared more toward [502c] pleasure and gratifying the spectators.
502c **SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ κολακείαν εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** And didn't we say just now, Callicles, that this sort of thing is flattery?
CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
SOCRATES φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;	**SOCRATES** Come, then: if someone stripped away from all poetry its melody, its rhythm and its meter, would what's left be anything but words?
CALLICLES ἀνάγκη.	**CALLICLES** It must be words.
SOCRATES οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι;	**SOCRATES** And these words are spoken to a great crowd, a whole people?
CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** I agree.
SOCRATES δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική.	**SOCRATES** So poetry is a kind of public oratory.
502d **CALLICLES** φαίνεται.	**CALLICLES** Apparently.
SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;	**SOCRATES** And public oratory would be rhetoric. Or don't you think the poets practice rhetoric in the theaters?
CALLICLES ἔμοιγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
SOCRATES νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ηὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** So now we have found a kind of rhetoric addressed to a public made up of children and women and men alike, slaves and free—one we don't much admire, since we say it is a form of flattery.
CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.

THE GOOD ORATOR AND ORDER

Socrates asks whether any orator has made citizens better, and argues that goodness comes from order.

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SOCRATES εἶεν· τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ [502e] καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δήμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὑτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὡρμημένοι, καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὑτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς	**SOCRATES** Very well. And what about the rhetoric addressed to the people of Athens [502e] and to the other peoples in the cities, made up of free men—what on earth do we make of that? Do you think the orators always speak with a view to what is best, aiming at this, that the citizens become as good as possible through their speeches? Or are they, too, geared toward gratifying the citizens, neglecting the common good for their own private

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	πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους [503a] διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;	interest, and treating the people like children, trying only to gratify them, without caring in the least whether they will become better or worse [503a] as a result?
503a	**CALLICLES** οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἳ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἵους σὺ λέγεις.	**CALLICLES** That's no longer a simple question you're asking. There are some who say what they say out of concern for the citizens, and there are also some of the kind you describe.
	SOCRATES ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. [503b] ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικήν· ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** That's enough. For if this too is double, one part of it would presumably be flattery and shameful public oratory, and the other fine: working to make the citizens' souls as good as possible, and fighting hard to say what is best, whether the listeners find it more pleasant or less. [503b] But you have never seen this kind of rhetoric. Or if you can name any orator like that, why haven't you told me who he is?
503b	**CALLICLES** ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.	**CALLICLES** No, by Zeus, I can't name you anyone, not among today's orators, anyway.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν δι' ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.	**SOCRATES** Well, can you name anyone from the past thanks to whom the Athenians are held to have become better once he started speaking to them, when they had been worse before? I certainly don't know who that would be.
503c	**CALLICLES** τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;	**CALLICLES** What? Haven't you heard that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles, who died recently, and whom you heard speak yourself?[36]
	SOCRATES εἰ ἔστιν γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν —ὅτι αἳ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, [503d] ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἳ δὲ χείρω, μή, τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἴη—τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.	**SOCRATES** Yes, Callicles—if what you earlier called virtue is true virtue: filling up one's desires, both one's own and other people's. But if not that, but what we were forced to agree in the later discussion—that one should satisfy those desires whose fulfillment makes a person better, [503d] and not those that make him worse, and that this is a kind of craft—I don't see how I can say that any of these men was that sort of man.
503d	**CALLICLES** ἀλλ' ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὑρήσεις.	**CALLICLES** But if you look properly, you'll find one.
	SOCRATES ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονεν· φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ,	**SOCRATES** Let's see, then, looking at it calmly like this, whether any of them was like that. Come: the good man, who speaks with a view to what is best,

36 Miltiades, victor at Marathon (490 BC), and his son Cimon were, like Themistocles and Pericles, leading Athenian statesmen of the fifth century BC.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀλλ’ [503e] ἀποβλέπων πρός τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτῶν, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται.	won’t say what he says at random, will he, but [503e] with his eye on something? Just as all other craftsmen, each with his eye on his own work, don’t select what they apply to their work at random, but so that what they are making may take on a certain form.
503e	οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ [504a] ἅπαν συστήσηται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα· καὶ οἵ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ’ ἔχειν ἢ οὔ;	Look at painters, for example, if you like, or builders, shipwrights, all the other craftsmen, any of them you like: see how each puts each thing he places into a certain order, and compels one part to suit and fit another, until the [504a] whole has been put together as an ordered and arranged thing. And both the other craftsmen and the ones we were just mentioning, those concerned with the body, trainers and doctors, surely give order and arrangement to the body. Do we agree that this is so or not?
504a	**CALLICLES** ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω.	**CALLICLES** Let it be so.
	SOCRATES τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;	**SOCRATES** So a house that gets order and arrangement would be a good one, and one that gets disorder a bad one?
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** I agree.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;	**SOCRATES** And a ship likewise?
504b	**CALLICLES** ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;	**SOCRATES** And we say the same about our bodies?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τί δ’ ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;	**SOCRATES** And what about the soul? Will it be good if it gets disorder, or if it gets order and some arrangement?
	CALLICLES ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.	**CALLICLES** Given what we said before, we must agree to this too.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;	**SOCRATES** Now what is the name in the body for what comes from order and arrangement?
	CALLICLES Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.	**CALLICLES** Health and strength, I suppose you mean.
504c	**SOCRATES** ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ὄνομα.	**SOCRATES** I do. And what, in turn, is the name for what arises in the soul from order and arrangement? Try to find the name and say it, as you did there.
	CALLICLES τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;	

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		CALLICLES Why don't you say it yourself, Socrates?
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;	**SOCRATES** Well, if you prefer, I'll say it. But you, if you think I'm right, say so; and if not, refute me and don't let it pass. It seems to me that the name for the body's orderings is "healthy," and from them health arises in it, and the rest of the body's excellence. Is that so or not?
	CALLICLES ἔστιν.	**CALLICLES** It is.
504d	**SOCRATES** ταῖς δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσιν νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῂς ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** And for the soul's orderings and arrangements the name is "lawful" and "law," from which people become law-abiding and orderly; and these are justice and self-control. Do you agree or not?
	CALLICLES ἔστω.	**CALLICLES** Let it be so.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις 504e δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίῃ. συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** So it is with his eye on these that our orator, the one who has craft and is good, will apply to souls whatever speeches he makes, and all his actions too; and if he gives a gift he will give it, and if he takes something away he will take it away, always with his mind on this: how justice may come to be in his fellow citizens' 504e souls and injustice be removed, how self-control may be implanted and intemperance removed, how the rest of virtue may be implanted and vice depart. Do you concede this or not?
504e	**CALLICLES** συγχωρῶ.	**CALLICLES** I concede it.
	SOCRATES τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτι πλέον ἢ τοὐναντίον κατά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι ταῦτα;	**SOCRATES** For what use is it, Callicles, to give a body that is sick and in bad condition lots of food, even the most pleasant, or drink, or anything else, when it won't benefit the body any more than the opposite would—or, by the right reckoning, will benefit it even less? Is that so?
505a	**CALLICLES** ἔστω.	**CALLICLES** Let it be so.
	SOCRATES οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;	**SOCRATES** For I don't think it profits a person to live with his body in bad condition, since then he must also live badly. Or isn't that so?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἐῶσιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;	**SOCRATES** And doctors generally allow a healthy person to satisfy his desires—to eat as much as he wants when he's hungry, say, or drink when he's thirsty—but practically never allow a sick person

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		to fill himself with what he desires? Do you concede that much too?
	CALLICLES ἔγωγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
505b	**SOCRATES** περὶ δὲ ψυχήν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται· φῂς ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** And with the soul, my excellent friend, isn't it the same way? As long as it is in a bad state, being foolish, intemperate, unjust and impious, one must keep it away from its desires and not allow it to do anything except what will make it better. Do you agree or not?
	CALLICLES φημί.	**CALLICLES** I agree.
	SOCRATES οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;	**SOCRATES** For that way, presumably, it's better for the soul itself?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;	**SOCRATES** And keeping it away from what it desires is disciplining it?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ᾤου.	**SOCRATES** So being disciplined is better for the soul than intemperance, which you thought better just now.
505c	**CALLICLES** οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα.	**CALLICLES** I don't know what you're talking about, Socrates. Ask someone else.
	SOCRATES οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.	**SOCRATES** This man won't put up with being benefited and himself undergoing the very thing our discussion is about: being disciplined.
	CALLICLES οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.	**CALLICLES** I don't care at all about anything you say. I only gave you those answers for Gorgias' sake.
	SOCRATES εἶεν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;	**SOCRATES** Very well. What shall we do, then? Break off the discussion halfway?
	CALLICLES αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.	**CALLICLES** You decide.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι 505d καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιίῃ. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.	**SOCRATES** But they say it isn't right to leave even stories halfway: 505d one should put a head on them, so they don't go wandering around headless. So answer the rest too, so that our argument gets its head.
505d	**CALLICLES** ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέξῃ.	**CALLICLES** How pushy you are, Socrates! If you take my advice, you'll let this argument go, or else have your discussion with someone else.

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	SOCRATES τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῆ γε τὸν λόγον καταλίπωμεν.	**SOCRATES** Who else is willing, then? We really mustn't leave the argument unfinished.
	CALLICLES αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;	**CALLICLES** Couldn't you go through the argument yourself, either talking on your own or answering your own questions?
505e	**SOCRATES** ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ "πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον," εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστιν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος· κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι 506a μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τὶ φαίνηται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.	**SOCRATES** So that Epicharmus' line comes true of me, and I, being one man, prove equal to what "two men said before"? Still, it looks as if that's absolutely unavoidable. But if we do it this way, I think we should all be vying with one another to know what is true about the things we're discussing and what is false; for it is a common good for everyone that this be made clear. So I will go 506a through the argument as I think it stands. And if any of you thinks I'm agreeing with myself on things that aren't so, you must pull me up and refute me. For I'm not saying what I say as someone who knows; I'm searching together with you, so that if the one who disputes with me clearly has a point, I'll be the first to concede it. But I say this only if you think the argument should be finished. If you don't want that, let's drop it now and go away.[37]
506a	**GORGIAS** ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω 506b ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διιόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.	**GORGIAS** Well, I don't think, Socrates, that we should 506b leave yet; you should go through the argument. And the others seem to me to think so too. I myself certainly want to hear you go through the rest yourself.
506b	**SOCRATES** ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ 506c καλῶς λέγειν. καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγχῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψῃ.	**SOCRATES** Well, Gorgias, I too would gladly have gone on discussing with Callicles here, until I had paid him back with Amphion's speech in return for Zethus'. But since you, Callicles, aren't willing to help finish the argument, at least listen to me and take me up if you think I'm saying something 506c wrong. And if you refute me, I won't be annoyed with you as you are with me; you'll be inscribed in my records as my greatest benefactor.[38]
506c	**CALLICLES** λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.	**CALLICLES** Speak, my good man, and finish it yourself.

37 Epicharmus was a Sicilian comic poet of the early fifth century BC.
38 Greek cities honored benefactors by inscribing their names on public records.

ORDER IN THE SOUL

Socrates finishes the argument alone: the self-controlled soul is good and happy, the intemperate one wretched.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. ἆρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν;—οὐ ταὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν.—πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος;—τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.—ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὗ 506d παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν;—πάνυ γε.—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσ' ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης;—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.—ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν·	**SOCRATES** Listen, then, as I take up the argument from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same?—Not the same, as Callicles and I agreed.—Should the pleasant be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant?—The pleasant for the sake of the good.—And the pleasant is that by whose 506d arrival we are pleased, and the good that by whose presence we are good?—Certainly.—But we are good, both we and everything else that is good, by the arrival of some virtue?—That seems to me necessary, Callicles.—But the virtue of each thing, whether of an implement or a body, or again of a soul or any living creature, doesn't come to be present in its finest form at random, but through the order, correctness and craft that are assigned to each of them.
506d	ἆρα ἔστιν ταῦτα;—ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι.— 506e τάξει ἆρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου;—φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε.—κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου;—ἀνάγκη.—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία;—πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;— ἡ δέ 507a γε κοσμία σώφρων;—πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.—ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή.	Is that so?—I say it is.— 506e So the virtue of each thing is something ordered and arranged by order?—I would say so.—So it is a certain order, arising in each thing—each thing's own proper order—that makes each of the things there are good?—It seems so to me.—So a soul too that has its own order is better than a disorderly one?—Necessarily.—But the one that has order is orderly?—How could it not be?—And the orderly one 507a is self-controlled?—Quite necessarily.—So the self-controlled soul is good.
507a	ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.	I can't say anything beyond this, my dear Callicles. If you can, teach me.
	CALLICLES λέγ', ὠγαθέ.	**CALLICLES** Speak, my good man.
	SOCRATES λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθή ἐστιν, ἡ τοὐναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακὴ ἐστιν· ἦν δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος.—πάνυ γε.—καὶ μὴν ὅ γε σώφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττων;— 507b ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω.—καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι.—ἔστι ταῦτα.—καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη·	**SOCRATES** I say, then, that if the self-controlled soul is good, the soul in the opposite condition to the self-controlled one is bad; and that, we saw, is the foolish and intemperate one.—Certainly.—And the self-controlled man would do what is fitting with regard to both gods and men; for he wouldn't be self-controlled if he did what isn't fitting?— 507b That must be so.—And doing what is fitting with regard to men, he would be doing just things, and with regard to gods, pious things; and one who does just and pious things must be just and pious.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		—That is so.—And indeed he must be courageous too.
507b	οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἃ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλὴ 507c ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον· οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπῄνεις.	For it isn't the mark of a self-controlled man either to pursue or to avoid what isn't fitting, but to avoid and pursue what he should—things and people, pleasures and pains—and to stand firm and endure where he should. So it is quite 507c necessary, Callicles, that the self-controlled man, being, as we have gone through, just and courageous and pious, is a perfectly good man; that the good man does well and finely whatever he does; and that the man who does well is blessed and happy, while the wicked man, who does badly, is miserable. And that would be the man in the opposite condition to the self-controlled one: the intemperate man you were praising.
507c	ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καί φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα 507d εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ αὑτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη 507e τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἐῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, λῃστοῦ βίον ζῶντα.	So that is my position, and I say it's true. And if it is true, then anyone who wants to be happy 507d must, it seems, pursue and practice self-control and run from intemperance as fast as each of our feet will carry us. Ideally he should arrange things so that he never needs to be disciplined; but if he does need it—he himself or anyone close to him, a private person or a city—then he must pay the penalty and be disciplined, if he's going to be happy. This, I think, is the target to keep your eyes on as you live: bend all your own efforts and the city's toward it, and act so that justice and self-control will be present 507e in whoever is to be blessed—not letting your appetites be intemperate and trying to fill them, an endless evil, living the life of a bandit.
507e	οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλὴς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ 508a γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς.	A man like that could be dear neither to another human being nor to a god. He's incapable of partnership, and where there's no partnership there can be no friendship. The wise say, Callicles, that partnership and friendship, orderliness, self-control and justice hold heaven and 508a earth, gods and men together, and that's why they call this whole universe a *kosmos*, an order, my friend, and not disorder or intemperance. But you don't seem to me to pay attention to these things, wise as you are. You've failed to notice that geometrical equality has great power among gods and men alike, and you think one ought to practice having more than one's share. That's because you neglect geometry.[39]

GREEK

ENGLISH

508a εἶεν· ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος [508b] ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὡς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσει εὐδαίμονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι, ἢ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθής ἐστιν, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρου εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ υἱέος καὶ ἑταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον· καὶ ἃ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ᾧου συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅσῳπερ [508c] αἴσχιον τοσούτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολογῆσαι.

Well then. Either we have to refute this argument [508b] and show that the happy aren't happy by possessing justice and self-control, nor the wretched wretched by possessing vice; or, if it's true, we have to consider what follows from it. What follows, Callicles, is everything I said before—the things you asked me whether I was saying in earnest, when I said that one must accuse oneself, one's son and one's friend if he does anything wrong, and use rhetoric for that purpose. And what you thought Polus conceded out of shame turns out to have been true: that doing injustice is worse than suffering it by just as much as [508c] it's more shameful. And whoever is to be a rhetorician in the right way must, after all, be just and have knowledge of what is just—which Polus in turn said Gorgias agreed to out of shame.

508c τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων σκεψώμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἆρα καλῶς λέγεται ἢ οὔ, ὡς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, [508d] ἄντε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, ἐάντε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάντε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάντε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.

That being so, let's look at what exactly it is you reproach me for, and whether it's fairly said or not: that I'm unable to help myself or any of my friends or family, or rescue them from the greatest dangers, but am at the mercy of anyone who pleases, like a man stripped of his rights at the mercy of whoever wants, [508d] whether he wants to hit me on the jaw (to use that brash phrase of yours), or take my money, or throw me out of the city, or, last of all, kill me. And to be in that condition, by your account, is the most shameful thing of all.[40]

508d ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς ὅστις, πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι· οὔ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως αἴσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι [508e] οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἴσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ.

What my own view is has been said many times already, but nothing stops it being said once more. I say, Callicles, that being hit on the jaw unjustly is not the most shameful thing, nor having my body [508e] or my purse cut. It's more shameful and worse to hit and cut me and mine unjustly; and stealing, enslaving, housebreaking—in short, doing any wrong at all to me and mine—is worse and more shameful for the one who does the wrong than for me, the one who suffers it.

508e ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις οὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ [509a] εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσί, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστιν ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὧν

These conclusions, which came to light back there in our earlier discussion, are held fast and bound, as I say— [509a] if I may put it rather crudely—with arguments of iron and adamant; so it would seem, at least, as things stand. And unless you, or someone brasher than you, can untie them, no one who

39 The Greek *kosmos* means both "order" and "world." The "wise" here are probably the Pythagoreans.
40 Citizens deprived of civic rights (*atimoi*) could not go to law, so anyone could assault them with impunity.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἵός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι.	says anything other than what I'm saying now can be speaking well. For my account is always the same: I don't know how these things are, but of all the people I've ever talked with, as I have now, not one has been able to say otherwise without making himself ridiculous.

PROTECTION AGAINST INJUSTICE

Socrates asks what power protects against suffering injustice and whether saving one's life is what matters.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
509a	**SOCRATES** ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι [509b] ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μεῖζον μεγίστου ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἆρα οὐ ταύτην, ἥτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὑτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ [509c] τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως· ὡς ἑκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἕκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνη τοῦ μή. ἆρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;	**SOCRATES** So once again I lay it down [509b] that this is how things are. And if they are so, and injustice is the greatest of evils for the one who does it, and if there's something even greater than this greatest evil—doing injustice and not paying the penalty—then what kind of help would a person be truly ridiculous to be unable to give himself? Isn't it the help that will turn away the greatest harm from us? Surely it must be that the most shameful thing is to be unable to give this help to oneself or one's friends and family; second [509c] comes the inability to help against the second evil, third against the third, and so on. As great as each evil is by nature, so fine is it to be able to help against it, and so shameful to be unable. Is it so, Callicles, or otherwise?
509c	**CALLICLES** οὐκ ἄλλως.	**CALLICLES** Not otherwise.
	SOCRATES δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὑτῷ, [509d] ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν, τήν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;	**SOCRATES** Of the two, then, doing injustice and suffering it, we say doing injustice is the greater evil and suffering it the lesser. What should a person equip himself with, then, in order to help himself [509d] so as to have both these benefits, the one that comes from not doing injustice and the one that comes from not suffering it? Power or wish? Here's what I mean: will he avoid suffering injustice if he doesn't wish to suffer it, or if he equips himself with the power to avoid it?
509d	**CALLICLES** δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.	**CALLICLES** That much is obvious: if he has the power.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν—οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει—ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ [509e] τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὡς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ πῶλος ἢ	**SOCRATES** And what about doing injustice? If he doesn't wish to do it, is that enough—he won't do it—or must he equip himself with some power and craft for [509e] this too, since unless he learns and practices them he'll do injustice? Why don't you answer me this one thing, Callicles: do you think Polus and I were rightly compelled to agree in our

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οὔ, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν;	earlier discussion, or not, when we agreed that no one does injustice because he wants to, but that all who do injustice do it unwillingly?
510a	**CALLICLES** ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπεράνῃς τὸν λόγον.	**CALLICLES** Have it your way, Socrates, so you can finish your argument.
	SOCRATES καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν.	**SOCRATES** Then for this too, it seems, we have to equip ourselves with some power and craft, so that we won't do injustice.
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἑταῖρον εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** So what is the craft of equipping oneself to suffer no injustice, or as little as possible? See whether you think what I think. I think it's this: one must either rule in the city oneself, or even be its tyrant, or else be a supporter of the regime in power.
	CALLICLES ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἕτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, [510b] ἄν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.	**CALLICLES** You see, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you [510b] when you say something well? That, I think, was very well said.
510b	**SOCRATES** σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοί;	**SOCRATES** Then see whether you think I'm right about this too. It seems to me that the closest friendship anyone can have is the one the wise men of old speak of: like is friend to like. Don't you think so too?
	CALLICLES ἔμοιγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἅπαντος [510c] τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι;	**SOCRATES** So where a savage, uneducated tyrant is in power, if there were someone in the city far better than he, the tyrant would surely fear him and could never be his friend with all [510c] his heart?
510c	**CALLICLES** ἔστι ταῦτα.	**CALLICLES** That's so.
	SOCRATES οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.	**SOCRATES** Nor could someone far worse, either. The tyrant would despise him and never take him seriously as a friend.
	CALLICLES καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.	**CALLICLES** That's true too.
	SOCRATES λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὤν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα [510d] ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;	**SOCRATES** The only friend worth mentioning left for such a man, then, is someone of like character, who blames and praises the same things, and is willing to be ruled and to submit to the ruler. This man will have great power [510d] in that city; no one will wrong him and get away with it. Isn't that so?
510d	**CALLICLES** ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, "τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοῖ;" αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὑτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;	**SOCRATES** So if one of the young men in that city were to think, "How could I gain great power and have no one wrong me?"—this, it seems, is the road for him: to train himself from his earliest youth to enjoy and dislike the same things as his master, and to contrive to be as much like him as possible. Isn't that so?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα [510e] δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράξεται.	**SOCRATES** And so he will have achieved not suffering injustice and having great [510e] power in the city, as you people say.
510e	**CALLICLES** πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὑτωσὶ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἵῳ τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** And not doing injustice as well? Or far from it, if he's going to be like his unjust ruler and have great influence with him? I, for one, think quite the opposite: that his preparation will be aimed at being able to do as much injustice as possible and not pay the penalty for it. Isn't that right?
	CALLICLES φαίνεται.	**CALLICLES** Apparently.
511a	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.	**SOCRATES** Then the greatest evil will be his, with his soul corrupt and maimed by his imitation of the master and by his power.
	CALLICLES οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἑκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα.	**CALLICLES** I don't know how you manage to twist the arguments up and down every time, Socrates. Don't you know that this imitator will kill the man who doesn't imitate, if he wants to, and take away his property?
511b	**SOCRATES** οἶδα, ὠγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα.	**SOCRATES** I know, my good Callicles—unless I'm deaf—since I've heard it so often, from you and from Polus just now, and from almost everyone else in the city. But you listen to me too: he'll kill him, yes, if he wants to, but it will be a bad man killing a fine and good one.
	CALLICLES οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;	**CALLICLES** And isn't that exactly what makes it infuriating?
	SOCRATES οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἴει δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας αἳ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν [511c] κινδύνων σῴζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἣν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασῴζουσαν;	**SOCRATES** Not to a person with any sense, as our argument shows. Or do you think a man should make this his aim—to live as long as possible—and practice the crafts that always save us from [511c] danger, like the one you tell me to practice, rhetoric, which keeps people safe in the law courts?
511c	**CALLICLES** ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.	

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CALLICLES Yes, by Zeus, and I'm giving you sound advice.

SOCRATES τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

SOCRATES Tell me, my excellent friend: do you think knowing how to swim is something grand?

CALLICLES μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

CALLICLES No, by Zeus, I don't.

SOCRATES καὶ μὴν σῴζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἴς τι τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὗ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγώ σοι [511d] μείζω ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικήν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σῴζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική.

SOCRATES And yet that too saves people from death, when they get into a situation that calls for that knowledge. But if you think that one is trivial, I'll name [511d] a greater one: the pilot's craft, which saves not just lives but bodies and property from the utmost dangers, just as rhetoric does.

511d καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶν καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ διαπραξαμένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δύ' ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, [511e] ἐὰν πάμπολυ, ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασα ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσασ' εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι· λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ἐπίσταται ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν οὕστινάς τε ὠφέληκεν τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὕστινας ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν [512a] αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἷοι ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχάς.

And this craft is modest and unassuming; it doesn't put on airs and strike poses as if it were achieving something magnificent. It achieves the same as courtroom pleading, yet if it brings someone safely here from Aegina, it charges, I believe, two obols; if from Egypt or the Black Sea, [511e] at the very most—for this great service, having kept safe the things I just mentioned, the man himself and his children and property and wives, and landed them in the harbor—it charges two drachmas. And the man who has the craft and has accomplished all this gets off and strolls along the shore beside his ship with a modest air. He knows how to reckon, I suppose, that it's unclear which of his passengers he has helped by not letting them drown, and which he has harmed, knowing that he has landed them no [512a] better than they were when they came aboard, in body or in soul.[41]

512a λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει, ἄντε ἐκ θαλάττης ἄντε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἐάντε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθενοῦν [512b] σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν.

His reckoning is this. It can't be that if someone gripped by serious, incurable diseases of the body didn't drown, that man is miserable for not having died and has got no benefit from the pilot, while if someone has many incurable diseases in what is more precious than the body, the soul, that man ought to live, and the pilot will do him good by saving him, whether from the sea or from a law court or from anywhere else at all. [512b] No, he knows that it isn't better for a corrupt person to be alive, since he can only live badly.

512b διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σῴζοντα ἡμᾶς, οὐδέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σῴζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σῴζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν

That's why it isn't the custom for the pilot to give himself airs, though he saves us; nor, my remarkable friend, for the military engineer, who can sometimes save as much as a general—let alone a pilot—or anyone else, since there are times when

41 Aegina is an island a few hours' sail from Athens. An obol was a small coin; six obols made a drachma.

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δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων [512c] τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὡς οὐδὲν τἆλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ υἱεῖ αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ' ἂν αὐτὸς λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου.

512c καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ [512d] τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον; οἶδ' ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὸ σῴζειν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἰατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὅσαι τοῦ σῴζειν ἕνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾖ ἢ τὸ σῴζειν τε καὶ σῴζεσθαι.

512d μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁποσονδὴ [512e] χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὅτι τὴν εἱμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιοίη, ἆρα ἐξομοιῶν [513a] αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ ἐν ᾗ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σὲ ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλὴς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει.

513a εἰ δέ σοι οἴει ὀντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἥτις [513b] σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον

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he saves whole cities. You don't think he's in the same class as the courtroom speaker, do you? Yet if he chose to talk the way you people do, Callicles, glorifying [512c] his business, he'd bury you in words, arguing and urging that you must become engineers, as if nothing else counted; he'd have a strong enough case. But you despise him and his craft no less for that. You'd call him "engineer" as an insult, and you wouldn't want to give your daughter to his son, or take his daughter for yourself.

And yet, given the grounds on which you praise your own pursuits, what fair reason do you have for despising the engineer and [512d] the others I just mentioned? I know you'd say you're a better man and come from better people. But if "better" isn't what I say it is, and virtue is simply this—saving oneself and one's property, whatever sort of person one happens to be—then your contempt for the engineer and the doctor and all the other crafts devised for the sake of saving becomes ridiculous. But look, my blessed friend: the noble and the good may be something other than saving and being saved.

For surely a true man should let go of living for this or that length [512e] of time, and not cling to life. He should leave all that to the god, trust the women's saying that no one can escape his destiny, and then consider how he may live the time he has to live as well as possible. Is it by making [513a] himself like the regime of the place where he lives? In that case you must now become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you're going to be dear to them and have great power in the city. See whether this is to your advantage and mine, my friend, so that we don't suffer what they say happens to the Thessalian women who draw down the moon: our choice of this power in the city will cost us what we hold dearest.[42]

But if you think anyone at all will teach you some craft of the kind that [513b] will make you powerful in this city while you're unlike its regime, whether for better or for worse, then in my opinion you're badly advised, Callicles. You mustn't be an imitator; you must be like them by your very nature, if you're going to achieve anything genuine in the way of friendship with the Athenian people—and

42 Thessalian witches were said to pull the moon from the sky, paying for it with their eyes or their children.

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	ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ 513c ἥθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὦ φίλη κεφαλή. λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;	yes, by Zeus, with Pyrilampes' son as well. Whoever makes you most like them, then, will make you a statesman, as you want to be, and a rhetorician. For each group enjoys speeches made in its own 513c character and dislikes those made in someone else's—unless you have something else to say, my dear friend. Do we have any answer to this, Callicles?
513c	CALLICLES οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.	CALLICLES I don't know how it is, Socrates, but I think you're right; and yet I feel what most people feel with you: I'm not really persuaded.
	SOCRATES ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις ἴσως καὶ βέλτιον 513d ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσῃ. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν ὅτι δύ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν, καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἃ τότε ὡριζόμεθα;	SOCRATES It's your love of the *dēmos*, Callicles, lodged in your soul, that resists me. But if we examine these same questions often, and better, 513d perhaps you'll be persuaded. Anyway, remember that we said there are two ways of caring for each thing, body and soul: one deals with it with a view to pleasure, the other with a view to what's best, not indulging it but fighting it. Weren't those the distinctions we drew then?
513d	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	CALLICLES Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὖσα· ἦ γάρ;	SOCRATES And the one aimed at pleasure is ignoble and turns out to be nothing but flattery, isn't it?
513e	CALLICLES ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως.	CALLICLES Have it so, if you like.
	SOCRATES ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὂν εἴτε ψυχή, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;	SOCRATES Whereas the other aims at making the thing we care for, whether body or soul, as good as possible?
	CALLICLES πάνυ γε.	CALLICLES Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστιν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ηὑρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδεμίαν 514a προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ κἀγαθὴ ἡ διάνοια ᾖ τῶν μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχήν τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν. φῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν;	SOCRATES Then mustn't we set about caring for the city and its citizens in this way, by making the citizens themselves as good as possible? Without this, as we found earlier, it's no use conferring any other benefit 514a on people, unless the minds of those who are to receive lots of money, or rule over others, or any other kind of power, are fine and good. Shall we say that's so?
514a	CALLICLES πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον.	CALLICLES Certainly, if you like it better that way.
	SOCRATES εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς	SOCRATES Now suppose, Callicles, that we were urging each other on, meaning to take up public business, to building projects—the biggest structures, walls or dockyards or temples. Wouldn't we

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σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ [514b] ἐξετάσαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὔ;

514b **CALLICLES** πάνυ γε.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα ᾠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν· καὶ εἰ μὲν ηὑρίσκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ [514c] ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ᾠκοδομημένα ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια ἡμῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, νοῦν ἐχόντων ἦν ἂν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἴχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὴ ἀνόητον ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι [514d] ἢ οὔ;

514d **CALLICLES** πάνυ γε.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἐγώ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;

κἂν ἐγὼ οἶμαι περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ηὑρίσκομεν δι' ἡμᾶς μηδένα [514e] βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;

514e **CALLICLES** ἔμοιγε.

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have had to examine ourselves and [514b] scrutinize, first, whether we know the craft, the builder's craft, or not, and from whom we learned it? Would we have had to, or not?

CALLICLES Certainly.

SOCRATES And second, this: whether we'd ever put up a building privately, for one of our friends or for ourselves, and whether that building is handsome or ugly. And if on inquiry we found that our teachers had been good and [514c] well regarded, and that we'd built many fine buildings together with our teachers, and many on our own after we'd left them—in that case it would make sense to go on to public works. But if we couldn't point to any teacher of ours, and had either no buildings or many worthless ones, then surely it would be foolish to attempt public works and urge each other on to them. Shall we say this is right [514d] or not?

CALLICLES Certainly.

SOCRATES So too with everything else. In particular, if we were trying to take up public practice and urging each other on as competent doctors, I would surely have examined you, and you me: "Come now, by the gods, how is Socrates' own body for health? Has anyone else, slave or free, ever been rid of an illness thanks to Socrates?"

And I suppose I'd have looked into other such questions about you. And if we found that no one [514e] had become better in body because of us, foreigner or citizen, man or woman—by Zeus, Callicles, wouldn't it be truly ridiculous for people to reach such a pitch of folly that, before doing a great deal as private individuals, however it turned out, and getting a great deal right, and training themselves properly in the craft, they would try, as the saying goes, to learn pottery on the wine jar, and try to practice publicly themselves and urge others like them to do the same? Don't you think it would be foolish to act like that? [43]

CALLICLES I do.

43 A proverb for starting to learn a craft on its largest and hardest piece of work.

PERICLES AND THE OLD STATESMEN

Socrates argues that Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles did not make the Athenians better.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
515a	**SOCRATES** νῦν δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχῃ πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκεν τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὢν, ἄδικός τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλός τε κἀγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; λέγε μοι, [515b] ἐάν τίς σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστιν τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;	**SOCRATES** But as it is, best of men, since you yourself are just beginning to take part in the city's affairs, and you're urging me to do the same and reproaching me for not doing it, shouldn't we examine each other? "Come, has Callicles ever made any of the citizens better? Is there anyone, formerly bad—unjust, intemperate and foolish—who has become fine and good thanks to Callicles, foreigner or citizen, slave or free?" Tell me, [515b] Callicles, if someone questions you on these points, what will you say? Whom will you claim to have made better by your company? Are you reluctant to answer—if there really is some achievement of yours from when you were still a private individual, before you set about public life?
515b	**CALLICLES** φιλόνικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CALLICLES** You love to win, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὐ φιλονικίᾳ γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον οἴει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν. ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσῃ ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ [515c] τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν; ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὡμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὔ; ἀποκρίνου. ὡμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, [515d] Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς.	**SOCRATES** No, it isn't out of love of winning that I'm asking, but because I really want to know how you think one should conduct politics among us. When you come to the [515c] city's affairs, will you concern yourself with anything else for us than that we citizens should be as good as possible? Haven't we agreed many times already that this is what the statesman must do? Have we agreed or not? Answer. We have agreed—I'll answer for you. Well then, if this is what the good man must bring about for his own city, now think back and tell me about the men you mentioned a little earlier: do you still think they proved to be good citizens— [515d] Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles?
515d	**CALLICLES** ἔμοιγε.	**CALLICLES** I do.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Well, if they were good, then clearly each of them made the citizens better instead of worse. Did he or not?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;	**SOCRATES** So when Pericles began speaking before the people, the Athenians were worse than when he made his last speeches?
	CALLICLES ἴσως.	**CALLICLES** Perhaps.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἴσως δή, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης.	**SOCRATES** Not "perhaps," my excellent friend; it necessarily follows from what we've agreed, if he really was a good citizen.
515e	**CALLICLES** τί οὖν δή;	**CALLICLES** Well, what of it?
	SOCRATES οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.	**SOCRATES** Nothing. But tell me this besides: are the Athenians said to have become better because of Pericles, or, quite the opposite, to have been corrupted by him? What I hear, at any rate, is that Pericles made the Athenians lazy, cowardly, chattering and greedy for money, by first putting them on public pay.[44]
	CALLICLES τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**CALLICLES** You hear that from the men with the broken ears, Socrates.[45]
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηὐδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν [516a] ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.	**SOCRATES** But this I don't just hear; I know it clearly, and so do you: at first Pericles was highly esteemed, and the Athenians passed no disgraceful sentence against him while they were worse. But once they'd been made fine and good [516a] by him, at the end of Pericles' life, they convicted him of embezzlement and very nearly condemned him to death—obviously because they thought him a bad man.
516a	**CALLICLES** τί οὖν; τούτου ἕνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;	**CALLICLES** So what? Did that make Pericles bad?
	SOCRATES ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας ἑαυτὸν μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι [516b] κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητὴς ὁστισοῦν ὁτουοῦν ζῴου, ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέλαβε; δοκεῖ ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Well, someone in charge of donkeys or horses or cattle would certainly be thought bad if he were like that—if he took them over when they didn't kick him or butt him or bite him, and made them do all these things out of wildness. Or don't you think [516b] anyone in charge of any animal at all is bad if he takes them over gentler and makes them wilder than when he got them? Do you or not?
516b	**CALLICLES** πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.	**CALLICLES** Certainly—to please you.
	SOCRATES καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότερον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἓν τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Then please me with this answer too: is man one of the animals as well, or not?
	CALLICLES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**CALLICLES** Of course he is.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;	**SOCRATES** And Pericles was in charge of men?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων	**SOCRATES** Well then, shouldn't they, as we agreed just now, have become more just instead of more

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ [516c] ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά;	unjust under him, if [516c] he was in charge of them and was good at politics?
516c	**CALLICLES** πάνυ γε.	**CALLICLES** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος· σὺ δὲ τί φῄς; οὐχ οὕτως;	**SOCRATES** And the just are gentle, as Homer said. What do you say? Isn't that so?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἵους παρέλαβεν, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.	**SOCRATES** But he made them wilder than they were when he took them over—and wilder toward himself, the last person he'd have wanted.
	CALLICLES βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;	**CALLICLES** Do you want me to agree with you?
	SOCRATES εἰ δοκῶ γε σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.	**SOCRATES** If you think I'm telling the truth.
	CALLICLES ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.	**CALLICLES** All right, let it be so.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους;	**SOCRATES** And if wilder, then more unjust and worse?
516d	**CALLICLES** ἔστω.	**CALLICLES** Let it be so.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.	**SOCRATES** So Pericles wasn't good at politics, by this argument.
	CALLICLES οὐ σύ γε φῄς.	**CALLICLES** So you say.
	SOCRATES μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὡμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον [516e] ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὡς σὺ φῄς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὔκουν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσιν τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότ' ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὔτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;	**SOCRATES** By Zeus, and so do you, from what you agreed. Now tell me about Cimon in turn: didn't the very people he served ostracize him, so they wouldn't have to hear his voice for ten years? And didn't they do the same to Themistocles, and punish him with exile besides? And Miltiades, the man of Marathon—didn't they vote to throw him into the pit, [516e] and wouldn't he have gone in but for the presiding magistrate? Yet if these men had been good, as you say, they would never have suffered this. Good charioteers, surely, don't stay in the chariot at first and then get thrown out once they've trained their horses and become better charioteers themselves. That doesn't happen in driving chariots or in any other work. Or do you think it does?[46]
516e	**CALLICLES** οὐκ ἔμοιγε.	**CALLICLES** I don't.
	SOCRATES ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, [517a] ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα	**SOCRATES** So it seems our earlier statements were true, [517a] that we know of no man who has

44 Pericles introduced pay for jurors, and later for other public duties.
45 That is, admirers of Sparta, whose fondness for boxing left them with battered ears.
46 Ostracism was a vote that exiled a citizen for ten years; the pit (*barathron*) was a gully where condemned criminals were thrown.

GREEK

τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὡμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας· οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον—οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

ENGLISH

proved good at politics in this city. You agreed that no one today is, but said some in the past were, and you picked out these men. But they turned out to be on a level with the men of today, so that if they were rhetoricians, they used neither true rhetoric—or they wouldn't have been thrown out—nor the flattering kind.

517a **CALLICLES** ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται οἷα τούτων ὅστις [517b] βούλει εἴργασται.

CALLICLES But really, Socrates, none of the men of today will ever come anywhere near achieving the kind of things that any of those men you care to [517b] name achieved.

517b **SOCRATES** ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν [517c] τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διαλεγόμεθα οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅτι λέγομεν.

SOCRATES My strange friend, I don't fault them as servants of the city either. In fact they seem to me to have been better servants than those of today, and more able to supply the city with what it desired. But at redirecting its desires instead of giving way to them, persuading and compelling the citizens toward what would make them better, those men were practically no [517c] different from these; and that's the only work of a good citizen. As for ships and walls and dockyards and plenty of other things like that, I agree with you that they were cleverer at providing them than these men are. We're doing something absurd, you and I, in this discussion: the whole time we've been talking, we keep going round and round to the same point, each not understanding what the other is saying.

517c ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὡμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι ὡς ἄρα διττή αὖτη τις [517d] ἡ πραγματεία ἔστιν καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονική ἐστιν, ᾗ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ ῥιγῷ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾷον καταμάθῃς.

At any rate, I think you've agreed and recognized many times that there's a twofold business here, [517d] concerning both body and soul. One side is servile: through it one can supply our bodies with food if they're hungry, drink if they're thirsty, and if they're cold, clothes, bedding, shoes—the things bodies come to desire. I'm deliberately using the same images with you, so that you'll understand more easily.

517d τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν [517e] τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἢ ὀψοποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ σκυτοδεψόν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι ὅτι ἔστιν τις παρὰ ταύτας ἁπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ τῷ ὄντι γε ἐστὶν σώματος θεραπεία, ἥνπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἐστιν εἰς ἀρετὴν [518a] σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ

Someone who supplies these things, as a retailer or a merchant or a producer of any of these very [517e] things—a baker, a cook, a weaver, a cobbler, a tanner—may well, being such a person, seem both to himself and to others to be a caretaker of the body; no wonder, to anyone who doesn't know that besides all these there is a craft of gymnastics and one of medicine, which are really the care of the body. It is they that ought to rule over all these crafts and use their products, because they know what food or drink is good or bad for the body's [518a]

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων.	excellence, while all the others don't. That's why these other crafts, concerned as they are with the body, are fit for slaves, servile and unworthy of a free person, while gymnastics and medicine are by rights their mistresses.
518a	ταὐτὰ οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἥκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων ὅτι ἄνθρωποι [518b] καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οἵτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἵτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς τὴν Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς [518c] παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον.	Now when I say the same holds for the soul, at times you seem to understand what I'm saying, and you agree as if you knew what I mean. But a little later you come along saying that there have been fine and good [518b] citizens in the city, and when I ask who, the men you put forward in politics seem to me exactly like this—as if I asked you who had been or were good caretakers of bodies in gymnastics, and you told me in all seriousness, "Thearion the baker, and Mithaecus, who wrote the book on Sicilian cookery, and Sarambus the wine seller: these have been wonderful caretakers of bodies, the first [518c] providing wonderful loaves, the second fine dishes, the third wine."[47]
518c	ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγανάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι Ἄνθρωπε, ἐπαΐεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαΐοντας καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἵ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας· οἱ [518d] δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντές τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ ἡ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῷ ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσιν καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἷοί τ' ὦσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν [518e] ἐγκωμιάσουσιν.	You might well be annoyed if I said to you, "My good man, you know nothing about gymnastics. You're telling me about servants and suppliers of appetites, people who understand nothing fine and good about them. These people, if it so happens, will stuff and fatten people's bodies and be praised by them for it, and then destroy their original flesh as well. [518d] And their victims, in their inexperience, won't blame those who feasted them as the cause of their illnesses and the loss of their original flesh. When their earlier overeating brings them illness a good while later—since it happened without regard for health—it's whoever happens to be with them then, giving some advice, that they'll blame and criticize and harm if they can, while the earlier ones, who were responsible for their troubles, [518e] they'll praise."
518e	καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζῃ· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τούτους εἰστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν. καί φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν [519a] δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ	And you're doing just the same now, Callicles. You're praising men who feasted these people with all they desired. And people say those men made the city great; but that it's swollen and festering underneath [519a] because of those men of old, they don't perceive. For without self-control and justice they've stuffed the city with harbors and dockyards and walls and tribute and suchlike rubbish. So when this attack of sickness comes, they'll blame the advisers who are around at the time and praise Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who

47 Well-known tradesmen of the day; Mithaecus was a famous Sicilian cook.

GREEK

εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι [519b] πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι.

519b αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός ἐστιν· προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως [519c] οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἧς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τἆλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς, τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, [519d] εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

519d καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ ἑταῖρε; ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

CALLICLES σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;

519e **SOCRATES** ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἐπειδή μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;

CALLICLES ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;

520a

ENGLISH

were responsible for their troubles. And perhaps they'll lay hands on you, if you're not careful, and on my friend Alcibiades, when they lose what they had to begin with as well as [519b] what they've acquired—though you two aren't responsible for their troubles, only perhaps accomplices. And yet I see a foolish thing happening now, and hear of it concerning the men of old.[48]

For I notice that when the city deals with one of its politicians as a wrongdoer, they're indignant and complain that they're being treated terribly: after doing the city a great deal of good they're being unjustly destroyed by it—so they say. But the whole thing is false. For no leader of a city [519c] could ever be unjustly destroyed by the very city he leads. Those who claim to be statesmen are probably in the same position as the sophists. The sophists, wise as they are in other respects, do this strange thing: they claim to be teachers of virtue, yet they often accuse their students of wronging them by cheating them of their fees and not otherwise showing gratitude, [519d] though they've been well treated by them.

And what could be more illogical than this claim: that people who have become good and just, whose injustice has been removed by their teacher and who have come to possess justice, should do wrong through something they don't have? Don't you think this is strange, my friend? You've really forced me to make a public speech, Callicles, by refusing to answer.

CALLICLES And you couldn't speak unless someone answered you?

SOCRATES It seems so. At any rate I'm stretching out my speeches at length now, since you won't answer me. But, my good man, tell me, in the name of Zeus, god of friendship: don't you think it's illogical for someone who claims to have made another person good to blame him for being bad, when he became and is good thanks to him?

CALLICLES I do.

SOCRATES Well, don't you hear people saying just that who claim to educate men in virtue?

48 Alcibiades, Socrates' brilliant and ambitious companion, later led Athens into disaster and turned against it.

GREEK

ENGLISH

CALLICLES ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;

CALLICLES I do. But why would you talk about people who are worth nothing?

SOCRATES τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἴει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταὐτόν, ὦ μακάρι', ἐστὶν σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν [520b] τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστιν σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς· μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ᾤμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὕς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

SOCRATES And what would you say about those who claim to lead the city and to care that it will be as good as possible, and then turn around and accuse it, whenever they get the chance, of being utterly bad? Do you think there's any difference between these and those? Sophist and rhetorician are the same thing, my blessed friend, or something close and very similar, as I was saying to Polus. But you, out of ignorance, [520b] think the one, rhetoric, a splendid thing, and despise the other. In truth, sophistry is finer than rhetoric to the same degree that legislation is finer than the administration of justice, and gymnastics than medicine. And I used to think that public speakers and sophists, alone of all people, couldn't complain that the very thing they educate treats them badly, or else by that same argument they'd be accusing themselves at the same time of having done no good to those they claim to benefit. Isn't that so?

520c CALLICLES πάνυ γε.

CALLICLES Certainly.

SOCRATES καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι [520d] τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ βραδυτῆτι οἶμαι ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικίᾳ· ἦ γάρ;

SOCRATES And they alone, surely, could afford to offer their service without a fee, as you'd expect, if what they said were true. Someone who has received a different service—say, he's become fast thanks to a trainer—might perhaps cheat the trainer of his gratitude, if the trainer offered it to him freely and didn't agree on a fee and collect [520d] the money as close as possible to the moment he imparted the speed. For it isn't through slowness, I think, that people do wrong, but through injustice. Right?

520d CALLICLES ναί.

CALLICLES Yes.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;

SOCRATES So if someone removes this very thing, injustice, he need never fear being wronged; he alone can safely offer this service freely, if he really can make people good. Isn't that so?

CALLICLES φημί.

CALLICLES I agree.

SOCRATES διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

SOCRATES That's why, it seems, there's nothing shameful in taking money for other kinds of advice—about building, say, or the other crafts.

520e CALLICLES ἔοικέ γε.

CALLICLES So it seems.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντιν' ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** But about this activity—how one might become as good as possible and manage one's own household or city best—it's considered shameful to refuse to give advice unless someone pays you. Right?
	CALLICLES ναί.	**CALLICLES** Yes.
	SOCRATES δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;	**SOCRATES** The reason is clear: this is the only kind of service that makes the one who receives it want to return the favor. So it seems a good sign if someone who has done this service is treated well in return, and if not, not. Is that how things are?
521a	**CALLICLES** ἔστιν.	**CALLICLES** It is.

THE TRUE POLITICAL CRAFT

Socrates says he is one of the few who practice true politics, and would be tried like a doctor before children.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; τἀληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἦρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.	**SOCRATES** So which kind of care of the city are you urging me toward? Spell it out for me. The kind that fights with the Athenians to make them as good as possible, like a doctor, or the kind that serves them and deals with them to please them? Tell me the truth, Callicles. You began by speaking frankly to me, so it's only right that you go on saying what you think. Speak well and nobly now.
	CALLICLES λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.	**CALLICLES** Then I say: the kind that serves them.
521b	**SOCRATES** κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.	**SOCRATES** So you're urging me, my most noble friend, to be a flatterer.
	CALLICLES εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις—	**CALLICLES** If you'd rather call it something even more contemptible, Socrates. Because if you don't do it—
	SOCRATES μὴ εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἕξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ 521c λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.	**SOCRATES** Don't say what you've said so often, that anyone who wants to will kill me—or I'll have to say again, "Yes, a bad man killing a good one." And don't say he'll take away whatever I have—or I'll have to say again, "But when he's taken it he won't know what to do with it. Just as he took it from me unjustly, so 521c he'll use it unjustly once he has it; and if unjustly, shamefully; and if shamefully, badly."
521c	**CALLICLES** ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἂν ἓν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν	**CALLICLES** How confident you seem to me, Socrates, that none of this could happen to you—as if you lived out of harm's way and couldn't be hauled

GREEK

εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.

SOCRATES ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἶομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὁντινοῦν ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ [521d] τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων, ὃ σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς μ' ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων—οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι—καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἴπω δι' ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

521d **CALLICLES** πάνυ γε.

SOCRATES οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς [521e] τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἥκει λόγος ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ.

521e σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι "ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ [522a] ἰσχναίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ηὐώχουν ὑμᾶς·" τί ἂν οἴει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι "ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς," πόσον τι οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;

522a **CALLICLES** ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅτι [522b] χρὴ εἰπεῖν;

522b **CALLICLES** πάνυ γε.

SOCRATES τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ

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into court by some perhaps thoroughly wicked and worthless person.

SOCRATES Then I really would be a fool, Callicles, if I didn't think that in this city anything might happen to anyone. But this much I know well: if I do come into court facing one of [521d] those dangers you speak of, it will be some wicked man who brings me there—no decent man would haul an innocent person into court—and it would be no surprise if I were put to death. Do you want me to tell you why I expect this?

CALLICLES Certainly.

SOCRATES I think I'm one of a few Athenians—not to say the only one—who takes up the true political craft, and the only man of today who practices politics. So since the speeches I make on each occasion aren't aimed at gratification but at what's best, not at [521e] what's most pleasant, and since I'm not willing to do what you recommend, those clever tricks, I won't know what to say in court. The same thing I said to Polus applies to me: I'll be tried as a doctor would be tried before a jury of children, with a cook for prosecutor.

Think about it: what could a man like that say in his defense, caught in that position, if someone accused him like this: "Children, this man has done all of you a great deal of harm. He ruins the youngest of you by cutting and burning, and [522a] he wastes you away and chokes you until you don't know what to do, giving you the bitterest drinks and forcing you to go hungry and thirsty. He's not like me—I used to feast you on plenty of sweet things of every kind." What do you think a doctor caught in such a bad spot could say? Or if he told the truth—"I did all this, children, for your health"—how loudly do you think jurors like that would shout him down? Pretty loudly, wouldn't they?

CALLICLES Perhaps. One has to think so.

SOCRATES So don't you think he'd be at a complete loss for what [522b] to say?

CALLICLES Certainly.

SOCRATES And I know the same sort of thing would happen to me if I came into court. I won't be able to point to pleasures I've provided them,

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ὠφελίας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δικαίως [522c] πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

which they regard as benefits and services—and I don't envy either those who provide them or those they're provided for. And if someone says that I corrupt the younger by leaving them at a loss, or abuse the older by speaking bitter words in private or in public, I won't be able to tell the truth —"Everything I say is just, [522c] gentlemen of the jury, and it's your good I'm working for"—or anything else. So I'll probably suffer whatever comes my way.

522c **CALLICLES** δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν;

CALLICLES So do you think it's a good thing, Socrates, for a man in a city to be in this position, unable to help himself?

SOCRATES εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἓν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὐτῷ, μήτε περὶ [522d] ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκὼς μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γὰρ τῆς βοηθείας ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνῄσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν· εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ τελευτῴην ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα [522e] τὸν θάνατον.

SOCRATES Yes, Callicles, provided he has that one thing you've agreed to many times: that he has helped himself by never having said or done anything unjust toward [522d] men or gods. For we've agreed many times that this is the most powerful kind of help one can give oneself. Now if someone proved me unable to give this help to myself or anyone else, I'd be ashamed to be proved so, whether before many or few, or alone by one person alone; and if I were put to death through this inability, I'd be upset. But if I died for lack of flattering rhetoric, I know well that you'd see me bear [522e] death easily.

522e αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.

No one fears dying itself, unless he's utterly irrational and unmanly; it's doing injustice he fears. For to arrive in Hades with one's soul full of many injustices is the worst of all evils. If you like, I'm willing to tell you a story to show that this is so.

CALLICLES ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τἆλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.

CALLICLES Well, since you've finished everything else, finish this too.

THE MYTH OF JUDGMENT

Socrates tells how souls are judged naked after death and punished or rewarded.

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523a **SOCRATES** ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ [523b] ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς

SOCRATES Listen, then, as they say, to a very fine account. You'll think it's a myth, I suppose, but I think it's an account, since I'll tell you what I'm going to tell you as the truth. As Homer says, Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the rule among themselves when they took it over from their father. Now in the time of Cronus there was this law concerning human beings, and it still holds

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	μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι.	among the gods, always and to this day: that whoever has lived his life justly and [523b] piously goes, when he dies, to the Isles of the Blessed, to live in complete happiness beyond the reach of evils; but whoever has lived unjustly and godlessly goes to the prison of retribution and punishment, which they call Tartarus.[49]
523b	τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες ᾗ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν· κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὅ τε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία ὅτι φοιτῷέν [523c] σφιν ἄνθρωποι ἑκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεύς· "ἀλλ' ἐγώ," ἔφη, "παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ," ἔφη, "οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται.	In the time of Cronus, and still recently under the rule of Zeus, these people had living judges judging them while alive, deciding their cases on the very day they were going to die. So the cases were decided badly. Pluto and the overseers from the Isles of the Blessed went and told Zeus that undeserving people were turning up [523c] in both places. So Zeus said: Well, I'll put a stop to this. The cases are being judged badly now because, he said, those on trial are judged with their clothes on: they're judged while they're alive.
523c	πολλοὶ οὖν," ἦ δ' ὅς, "ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν· [523d] οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν," ἔφη, "παυστέον ἐστὶν προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν γὰρ προΐσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ [523e] ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἁπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι.	So many, he said, who have wicked souls are dressed in handsome bodies and noble birth and wealth, and when the judgment comes, many witnesses come forward for them to testify that they've lived justly. [523d] The judges are overawed by all this, and besides, they themselves judge with their clothes on, their own souls screened by eyes and ears and the whole body. All this stands in their way, their own coverings and those of the people on trial. So first, he said, they must be stopped from knowing their death in advance; for as things are they know it beforehand. Prometheus has already been told [523e] to put a stop to that. Next, they must be judged stripped of all these things, for they must be judged when they're dead.
523e	καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς υἷεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, [524a] ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν· οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνῳ δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορῆτόν τι τὼ ἑτέρω, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ᾖ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις."	The judge too must be naked, and dead, looking with his soul itself at the soul itself of each person the moment he dies, cut off from all his kin and with all that finery left behind on earth, so that the judgment may be just. Now I realized this before you did, and have made my own sons judges, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, [524a] and one from Europe, Aeacus. When they die, they will sit in judgment in the meadow, at the crossroads from which the two roads lead, one to the Isles of the Blessed and the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus will judge those who come from Asia, Aeacus those from Europe; and to Minos I'll give the privilege of the final decision if the other two are

49 Cronus ruled the world before his son Zeus. Pluto is Hades, lord of the dead; the Isles of the Blessed lay at the ends of the earth.

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in doubt about anything, so that the judgment about people's journey may be as just as possible.[50]

524a ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω 524b ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῆτον ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἧττον ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἔνδηλα 524c πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας, καὶ εἰ παχύς, παχὺς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως· καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός.

This, Callicles, is what I've heard, and I believe 524b it's true. And from these stories I reckon that something like this follows. Death, it seems to me, is nothing other than the separation of two things, the soul and the body, from each other. And when they have been separated from each other, each of them keeps much the same condition it had when the person was alive: the body keeps its own nature, and the marks of how it was cared for and what happened to it, all 524c plainly visible. For instance, if someone's body was large by nature or by nurture or both while he lived, his corpse is large too when he dies; if he was fat, he's fat when dead too, and so on. And if he made a habit of wearing his hair long, his corpse has long hair too.

524c μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· ἢ κατεαγότα εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ 524d τεθνεῶτος ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον. ταὐτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

Again, if someone was a rogue who'd been flogged and bore traces of the blows, scars on his body from whips or other wounds received in life, you can see his body has them when he's dead too. Or if someone's limbs were broken or twisted while he lived, 524d when he's dead these same things are plain to see. In a word, however the body had been shaped in life, those features remain visible after death too, all or most of them, for some time. And it seems to me, Callicles, that the same is true of the soul: once it's stripped of the body, everything in the soul is plain to see, both its natural features and the marks the person has acquired in his soul through the way he pursued each thing.

524d ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας 524e παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ 525a ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἑκάστη ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οἷ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη.

So when they come before the judge—those from Asia 524e before Rhadamanthus—Rhadamanthus halts them and looks at each one's soul without knowing whose it is. Often he's laid hold of the Great King, or some other king or potentate, and seen that nothing in his soul is sound: it has been thoroughly flogged and is full of scars from 525a perjuries and injustice, which each of his actions has stamped on his soul; everything in it is crooked from lies and pretension, and nothing straight, because it was raised without truth. And he saw that from license and luxury and arrogance and lack of self-mastery in its actions, the soul was full of disproportion and ugliness. Seeing

50 Minos and Rhadamanthus were legendary kings of Crete, and Aeacus of Aegina; all three were sons of Zeus.

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		this, he sent it off in disgrace straight to the prison, where it is to go and endure the sufferings it deserves.
525b	προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφελία καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.	It's fitting for everyone who is being punished, if rightly punished by another, either to become better and be benefited, or to become an example to others, so that others, seeing him suffer whatever he suffers, may be afraid and become better. Those who are benefited, and pay the penalty at the hands of gods and humans, are those whose wrongs are curable; still, the benefit comes to them through pain and suffering, both here and in Hades, for there's no other way to be rid of injustice.
525c	οἳ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. [525d] ὧν ἐγώ φημι ἕνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι.	But those who have committed the worst wrongs, and through such crimes have become incurable, are the ones the examples are made from. They themselves no longer benefit at all, since they're incurable, but others benefit who see them suffering the greatest, most painful and most terrifying torments for their offenses for all time, simply hung up there in the prison in Hades as examples, a spectacle and a warning to every wrongdoer who arrives. [525d] I say Archelaus will be one of them, if what Polus says is true, and anyone else who is that kind of tyrant. And I think most of these examples come from tyrants and kings and potentates and those who have run the affairs of cities, since because of their license they commit the greatest and most unholy wrongs.
525d	μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκεν [525e] τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν· Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον—οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν— ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν [526a] δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι.	Homer too bears witness to this. It's kings and potentates he has depicted [525e] being punished in Hades for all time: Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But Thersites, or any other private person who was wicked, no one has depicted as held fast in great punishments as incurable—because, I think, he didn't have the power; and that is why he was happier than those who did. No, Callicles, it's from among [526a] the powerful that the exceedingly wicked come. Yet nothing prevents good men from arising among them too, and those who do deserve the highest admiration. For it's hard, Callicles, and deserves much praise, to live out one's life justly when one has great license to do injustice.[51]
526a	ὀλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ	Such people are few. There have been some, here and elsewhere, and I think there will be, men fine

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	ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως [526b] διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν. ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν, οὔθ' ὅστις οὔθ' ὧντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάντε ἰάσιμος ἐάντε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος [526c] τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει.	and good in this virtue, the virtue of justly [526b] managing whatever is entrusted to them. One has become very famous, even among the rest of the Greeks: Aristides, son of Lysimachus. But most potentates, my excellent friend, turn out bad. So, as I was saying, when that Rhadamanthus gets someone like this, he knows nothing else about him, neither who he is nor who his people are, only that he's wicked. And seeing this, he sends him off to Tartarus, putting a mark on him to show whether he seems curable or incurable; and when he arrives there, [526c] he suffers what he deserves.[52]
526c	ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός—ἑκάτερος τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει—ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν [526d] σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὁμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν—χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπό τε τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν· χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνῄσκω [526e] ἀποθνῄσκειν.	Sometimes he sees another soul, one that has lived piously and with truth, a private person's or someone else's—most often, I say, Callicles, a philosopher's, who minded his own business and didn't meddle in others' during his life—and he admires it and sends it to the Isles of the Blessed. Aeacus does the same—each of them holds a staff as he judges—while Minos sits overseeing them, the only one holding a golden [526d] scepter, as Homer's Odysseus says he saw him: "holding a golden scepter, giving judgment to the dead." As for me, Callicles, I'm persuaded by these accounts, and I'm considering how I can present my soul to the judge in the soundest possible health. So I'll say goodbye to the honors most people care about, and, practicing the truth, I'll try in all truth to be as good as I can, both in living and, when I die, [526e] in dying.
526e	παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσῃ σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾖ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, [527a] τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης ὑόν, ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσῃ καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακιεῖ.	And I urge all other people too, as far as I can—and you in particular I urge in return—toward this life and this contest, which I say is worth all the contests here put together. And I reproach you, because you won't be able to help yourself when your trial and judgment come, the ones I was just describing. When you come before the judge, [527a] the son of Aegina, and he takes hold of you and leads you off, you'll gape and your head will spin there no less than mine would here, and perhaps someone will even hit you on the jaw, to your disgrace, and treat you with every kind of contempt.[53]
527a	τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἂν ἧν θαυμαστὸν	Now perhaps you think this is told like an old wives' tale, and you despise it. And there would be

51 In the *Odyssey* the great sinners Tantalus, Sisyphus and Tityus suffer in Hades; Thersites is the common soldier who jeers at the kings in the *Iliad*.
52 Aristides "the Just," Athenian statesman and general in the Persian Wars.

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	καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ πῶλος καὶ [527b] Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται συμφέρων.	nothing surprising in despising it if by searching we could somehow find something better and truer. But as it is, you see that the three of you, the wisest Greeks of today—you and Polus and [527b] Gorgias—can't show that one should live any other life than this one, which is clearly to our advantage in that other world as well.
527b	ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ [527c] κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει. ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἷ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει.	Out of all these arguments, while the rest were refuted, this one alone stands firm: that one should beware of doing injustice more than of suffering it, and that above all a man should practice not seeming good but being good, in private and in public life; that if someone turns out bad in some respect, he must be punished, and that this is the second good after being just—becoming just and, [527c] through punishment, paying the penalty; that one must avoid all flattery, of oneself and of others, of the few and of the many; and that one must always use rhetoric in this way, for what is just, and likewise every other activity. So be persuaded by me and follow me there, where once you've arrived you'll be happy both in life and after death, as the argument indicates.
527c	καὶ ἔασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν [527d] ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσῃ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾖς καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν. κἄπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὁποῖον ἄν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλεύεσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὡς τί ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ [527e] τῶν μεγίστων—εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας—ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι.	And let anyone despise you as a fool and abuse you, if he wants; yes, by Zeus, and have the courage to let him strike you that [527d] dishonoring blow. You'll suffer nothing terrible if you really are fine and good, practicing virtue. And then, once we've practiced it together like this, we'll turn to politics, if that seems the thing to do, or deliberate about whatever else seems right to us, when we're better at deliberating than we are now. For it's shameful, in the state we now appear to be in, to swagger as if we were somebody, when we never think the same about the same things—and that about [527e] the most important things; that's how far we've sunk in our lack of education. So let's use as our guide the argument that has now come to light, which shows us that this is the best way of life: to live and to die practicing justice and the rest of virtue.
527e	τούτῳ οὖν ἑπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ὦ Καλλίκλεις.	Let's follow this argument, then, and urge others to follow it too—not that one you believe in and urge on me. For it's worth nothing, Callicles.

53 Aeacus, son of Zeus and the nymph Aegina.