Parmenides

PLATO

c. 428–348 BC

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Παρμενίδης

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited

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Parmenides · Plato (c. 428–348 BC)

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INTRODUCTION

Around 450 BC the great philosopher Parmenides, now about sixty-five, came to Athens with his pupil Zeno. A very young Socrates went to hear them. Decades later Cephalus of Clazomenae tells how he tracked down the one man who could still recite what was said.

First Socrates sets out his theory of forms: things are like or unlike, one or many, because they share in forms such as likeness and unity. Parmenides takes it apart with objections that still occupy philosophers, the most famous being the "third man" regress. Yet he insists that without forms thinking would be impossible. Socrates, he says, has simply tried to define things before he is trained.

Then the old man gives a demonstration of that training, questioning a young man named Aristoteles. He works through what follows if "the one" is and if it is not, and every line of argument ends in contradiction. Readers have taken this second half as a logical exercise, a joke at the expense of Parmenides' own doctrine, or the deepest metaphysics Plato wrote.

Parmenides

Athens, at the Great Panathenaea, around 450 BC, as Cephalus heard it retold years later. The aged Parmenides and his pupil Zeno test the young Socrates' theory of forms, then Parmenides runs through a long exercise on "the one."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
126a	**CEPHALUS** ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδειμάντῳ τε καὶ Γλαύκωνι· καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Χαῖρ', ἔφη, ὦ Κέφαλε, καὶ εἴ του δέῃ τῶν τῇδε ὧν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί, φράζε. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, πάρειμί γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.	**CEPHALUS** When we came to Athens from our home in Clazomenae, we ran into Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace. Adeimantus took me by the hand. "Welcome, Cephalus!" he said. "If there's anything here you need that we can do for you, just tell us." "Well, as it happens," I said, "that's exactly why I'm here: to ask something of you."[1]
	ADEIMANTUS λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν. 126b	**ADEIMANTUS** "Then tell us what you'd like," he said. 126b
126b	**CEPHALUS** καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι. παῖς δέ που ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν· πολὺς δὲ ἤδη χρόνος ἐξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης ὄνομα.	**CEPHALUS** And I said, "Your half-brother on your mother's side—what was his name? I don't remember. He was just a boy, I think, when I last came here from Clazomenae, and that was a long time ago now. His father's name, I believe, was Pyrilampes."[2]
	ADEIMANTUS πάνυ γε, ἔφη.	**ADEIMANTUS** "That's right," he said.
	CEPHALUS αὐτῷ δέ γε;	**CEPHALUS** "And his own name?"
	ADEIMANTUS Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνῃ;	**ADEIMANTUS** "Antiphon. But why do you ask, exactly?"
	CEPHALUS οἵδε, εἶπον ἐγώ, πολῖταί τ' ἐμοί εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν Πυθοδώρῳ τινὶ Ζήνωνος 126c ἑταίρῳ πολλὰ ἐντετύχηκε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὕς ποτε Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει.	**CEPHALUS** "These men," I said, "are fellow citizens of mine, and very keen on philosophy. They've heard that this Antiphon spent a lot of time with a certain Pythodorus, a companion of Zeno's, 126c and that he heard Pythodorus tell many times the conversation that Socrates, Zeno and Parmenides once had, and can repeat it from memory."[3]
126c	**ADEIMANTUS** ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.	**ADEIMANTUS** "That's true," he said.

1 Clazomenae was a Greek city on the coast of Asia Minor; Adeimantus and Glaucon were Plato's older brothers.
2 Pyrilampes was the second husband of Plato's mother, Perictione, so Antiphon was Plato's half-brother.
3 Parmenides of Elea, in southern Italy, was the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy; Zeno, his younger follower, was famous for his paradoxes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	CEPHALUS τούτων τοίνυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι.	**CEPHALUS** "Well, that's what we'd like to hear in full," I said.
	ADEIMANTUS ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· μειράκιον γὰρ ὢν αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἱππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτόν· ἄρτι γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οἰκεῖ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ. 127a	**ADEIMANTUS** "That won't be hard," he said. "When he was a young man he rehearsed it very thoroughly—though these days, like his grandfather and namesake, he spends most of his time with horses. But if that's what you want, let's go and see him. He's just left here for home, and he lives nearby, in Melite." 127a [4]
127a	**CEPHALUS** ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι, χαλινόν τινα χαλκεῖ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἵ τε ἀδελφοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὧν ἕνεκα παρεῖμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέν τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καί με ἠσπάζετο, καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει—πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι— ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγεῖτο. ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν Πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφίκοιντό ποτε εἰς Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα 127b Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα ἤδη πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολιόν, καλὸν δὲ κἀγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα· Ζήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς τῶν τετταράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν, καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου γεγονέναι.	**CEPHALUS** With that we set off, and we found Antiphon at home, handing a bridle over to a smith to be fixed. When he was done with the man, and his brothers had told him why we'd come, he recognized me from my earlier visit and greeted me warmly. We asked him to go through the conversation. At first he was reluctant—it was a big job, he said—but then he did tell it. Antiphon said that, according to Pythodorus, once, for the Great Panathenaea, 127b Zeno and Parmenides came to Athens. Parmenides was already quite old, very gray, but handsome and noble-looking, about sixty-five. Zeno was then nearly forty, tall and attractive to look at, and he was said to have been Parmenides' beloved.[5]
127b	καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ τῷ 127c Πυθοδώρῳ ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν Κεραμεικῷ· οἷ δὴ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι τόν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος γραμμάτων—τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων κομισθῆναι—Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον. ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ζήνωνα αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ Παρμενίδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὄντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, ἡνίκα 127d αὐτός τε ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρ' ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ Ζήνωνος.	They were staying, he said, with 127c Pythodorus, outside the city wall in the Ceramicus. Socrates came there, and a good many others with him, eager to hear Zeno's writings—this was the first time the two had brought them to Athens—and Socrates was very young then. So Zeno himself was reading to them, while Parmenides happened to be out. Very little of the arguments was left to be read when, 127d Pythodorus said, he himself came in from outside, and Parmenides with him, and Aristoteles, the one who became one of the Thirty; and they heard only a little more of the writings. Not that Pythodorus himself hadn't heard them: he had heard Zeno read them before.[6]

4 Melite was a residential district of Athens, just west of the marketplace.
5 The Panathenaea was Athens' chief festival, in honor of Athena; every fourth year it was celebrated on a grander scale as the Great Panathenaea.
6 Aristoteles (not the philosopher Aristotle) later became one of the Thirty, the oligarchs who seized power in Athens in 404–403 BC, at the end of the Peloponnesian War.

ZENO'S BOOK

Socrates questions Zeno about his treatise and answers its puzzles with forms such as likeness and unlikeness.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
127d	**SOCRATES** τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι, καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, [127e] πῶς, φάναι, ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὅμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια οἷόν τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** Socrates listened, and then asked for the first hypothesis of the first argument to be read again. When it had been read, [127e] he said, "What do you mean by this, Zeno? That if the things that are are many, then they must be both like and unlike, but that this is impossible, because unlike things can't be like, and like things can't be unlike? Isn't that what you're saying?"
127e	**ZENO** οὕτω, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.	**ZENO** "It is," said Zeno.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τά τε ἀνόμοια ὅμοια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι; εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴη, πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα. ἆρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστι; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἴει σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ ἡγῇ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὅσουσπερ λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ [128a] ἔστι πολλά; οὕτω λέγεις, ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω;	**SOCRATES** "Then if it's impossible for unlike things to be like and like things unlike, it's also impossible for there to be many things? Because if there were many, they would have impossible things happen to them. Is that what your arguments are after—nothing other than to fight against everything people say and maintain that there aren't many things? And do you think each of your arguments is a proof of exactly that, so that you believe you're offering as many proofs that there aren't [128a] many things as you've written arguments? Is that what you're saying, or am I not understanding you correctly?"
128a	**ZENO** οὔκ, ἀλλά, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνῆκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται.	**ZENO** "No, you've got it," said Zeno. "You've understood perfectly what the whole book is after."
	SOCRATES μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὅτι Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται ᾠκειῶσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι. ταὐτὸν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειρᾶται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἕτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἓν φῂς εἶναι τὸ [128b] πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχῃ καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἓν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἑκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταὐτά, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρῆσθαι.	**SOCRATES** "I see, Parmenides," said Socrates, "that Zeno here wants to be close to you not only in friendship generally but in his writing too. In a way he's written the same thing you did, but by turning it around he tries to fool us into thinking he's saying something different. You, in your verses, say that the all is one, [128b] and you offer fine, excellent proofs of it; he, for his part, says it is not many, and he too offers proofs—a great many, and great ones. So when one of you says 'one' and the other 'not many,' and each of you puts it in such a way as to seem to have said nothing the same, though you're saying nearly the same things, it looks as if you two have said what you've said over the heads of the rest of us."
128b	**ZENO** ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, ὦ Σώκρατες. σὺ δ' οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ᾔσθησαι. καίτοι [128c] ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ	**ZENO** "Yes, Socrates," said Zeno. "But you haven't caught the truth about the book in every respect. Mind you, [128c] like a Spartan hound you're good at

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ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὥς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας [128d] αὐτὸν κωμῳδεῖν ὡς εἰ ἕν ἐστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὑτῷ.

128d ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταὐτὰ καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίοι. διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καί τις αὐτὸ ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτ' [128e] ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μή. ταύτῃ οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονικίας οἴει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας· ἐπεί, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπῄκασας.

128e **SOCRATES** ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' [129a] αὑτὸ εἶδός τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον· τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ [129b] αὑτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν;

129b εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν οἶμαι ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ, οὐδέ γε εἰ ἓν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὖ μετέχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἕν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ [129c] ἕν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι.

ENGLISH

chasing down and tracking the scent of what's said. But first of all, this escapes you: the book isn't so very pretentious as to have been written with the intention you describe, while hiding it from people as if it were achieving something grand. What you mentioned is something incidental. The truth is that these writings are a kind of defense of Parmenides' argument against those who try [128d] to make fun of it, saying that if it is one, the argument ends up with many absurd consequences that contradict it.

"So this book argues against those who say there are many, and pays them back in the same coin, and more. It wants to show that their hypothesis, that there are many, would have even more absurd consequences than the hypothesis that it is one, if someone followed it out thoroughly. It was in that spirit of contention that I wrote it, when I was young; and once it was written someone stole it, so I didn't even get the chance to decide whether [128e] it should be brought out into the light or not. So that's what escapes you, Socrates: you think it was written not out of a young man's love of contention but out of an older man's love of honor. Otherwise, as I said, your picture of it wasn't bad."

SOCRATES "I accept that," said Socrates, "and I think it is as you say. But tell me this. Don't you believe that there is a form of likeness, itself by [129a] itself, and another, opposite to it, which is what unlike is? And that you and I and the other things we call 'many' partake of these two? And that things that partake of likeness become like, in that respect and to the extent that they partake, while things that partake of unlikeness become unlike, and things that partake of both become both? And if all things partake of both, opposites though they are, and by sharing in both are both like and unlike [129b] themselves, what's surprising about that?

"If someone showed that the like things themselves become unlike, or the unlike things like, that, I think, would be a marvel. But if he shows that things which share in both of these have both properties, that doesn't seem at all strange to me, Zeno—any more than if someone shows that all things are one by sharing in the one, and that these same things are many by sharing, in their turn, in multitude. But if he demonstrates that the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		very thing that is one is many, and in turn that the many are [129c] one—that's when I'll be amazed.
129c	καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὡσαύτως· εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἕν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφῆναι, ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μού ἐστιν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὄπισθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως—πλήθους γὰρ οἶμαι μετέχω—ὅταν δὲ ἕν, ἐρεῖ ὡς [129d] ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγώ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα.	"And the same goes for all the rest. If he showed that the kinds and forms themselves have these opposite properties in themselves, that would deserve amazement. But if someone demonstrates that I am one and many, what's surprising about that? When he wants to show I'm many, he'll say that my right side is different from my left, and my front different from my back, and likewise my upper and lower parts—for I do, I suppose, share in multitude. When he wants to show I'm one, he'll say [129d] that of the seven of us here I am one human being, since I share in the one as well. So he shows that both are true.
129d	ἐὰν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρῇ πολλὰ καὶ ἓν ταὐτὸν ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὶ φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ ἓν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἕν, οὐδέ τι θαυμαστὸν λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῖμεν· ἐὰν δέ τις ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οἷον ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος [129e] καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων.	"So if someone tries to show that things like these—stones and sticks and the like—are many and one, we'll say that what he's showing to be many and one is a particular thing, not the one being many or the many one; and he isn't saying anything surprising, only what we would all agree on. But if someone first distinguishes as separate, themselves by themselves, the forms I was just talking about—likeness and unlikeness, for instance, multitude [129e] and the one, rest and motion, and everything of that kind—and then shows that among themselves they can be mixed together and separated, I for one," he said, "would be wonderfully amazed, Zeno.
129e	ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάνυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι· πολὺ μεντἂν ὧδε μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι [130a] παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις διήλθετε, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδεῖξαι.	"I do think you've worked at these matters with real vigor. But I'd be far more impressed, as I say, if someone could show this same puzzle among the forms themselves, [130a] woven together in all sorts of ways—show that, just as you two went through it among the things we see, so too among the things we grasp by reasoning."

FORMS OF WHAT?

Parmenides asks which things have forms: justice and beauty, surely, but human beings, fire, hair, mud?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
130a	**PARMENIDES** λέγοντος δή, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν ἂν οἴεσθαι ἐφ' ἑκάστου ἄχθεσθαι τόν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδιᾶν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ παυσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην· ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιος εἶ [130b] ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. καί μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διῄρησαι ὡς	**PARMENIDES** While Socrates was saying all this, Pythodorus said, he himself kept expecting Parmenides and Zeno to get annoyed at every point; but they paid close attention to him, and often glanced at each other and smiled, as if they admired Socrates. And that is just what Parmenides said when Socrates had finished. "Socrates," he

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἅττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; καί τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἓν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ Ζήνωνος ἤκουες;	said, "how much you deserve [130b] to be admired for your eagerness for argument! Now tell me: have you yourself drawn the distinction you describe—certain forms themselves on one side, and on the other the things that share in them? And do you think there is likeness itself, separate from the likeness we have, and one and many, and all the things you heard Zeno talk about just now?"
130b	SOCRATES ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.	SOCRATES "I do," said Socrates.
	PARMENIDES ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων;	PARMENIDES "And things like these too?" said Parmenides. "A form of the just, for instance, itself by itself, and of the beautiful and the good and all such things?"
	SOCRATES ναί, φάναι. [130c]	SOCRATES "Yes," he said. [130c]
130c	PARMENIDES τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος;	PARMENIDES "What about a form of human being, separate from us and from all those like us—some form itself of human being, or of fire, or of water?"
	SOCRATES ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολλάκις δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως.	SOCRATES "I've often been at a loss about them, Parmenides," he said, "whether I should say the same about them as about the others, or something different."
	PARMENIDES ἦ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων [130d] ἑκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, ὃν ἄλλο αὖ ἢ ὧν τι ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή;	PARMENIDES "And what about these, Socrates, which might actually seem ridiculous—hair, mud, dirt, or anything else utterly worthless and trivial? Are you at a loss whether to say that of each of these [130d] too there is a separate form, something other than the things we handle, or not?"
130d	SOCRATES οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν γε ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ᾖ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε μή τι ᾖ περὶ πάντων ταὐτόν· ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μή ποτε εἴς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ· ἐκεῖσε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εἴδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω. [130e]	SOCRATES "Not at all," said Socrates. "These things are just what we see them to be, and to think there's a form of them would, I'm afraid, be too absurd. Still, it has sometimes troubled me that the same might hold for everything. But whenever I take that position, I turn and run, afraid I might fall into some bottomless pit of nonsense and be ruined. So I come back to the things we were just saying have forms, and spend my time working on those." [130e]
130e	PARMENIDES νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. τόδε δ' οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῄς, εἶναι εἴδη ἅττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον [131a] ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαβόντα	PARMENIDES "That's because you're still young, Socrates," said Parmenides, "and philosophy hasn't yet taken hold of you as, in my opinion, it will one day, when you'll despise none of these things. As it is, because of your age, you still look to what people think. But tell me this. You think,

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὅμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι;	as you say, that there are certain forms, and that these other things, by partaking of them, get their names from them—for instance, [131a] that by partaking of likeness they become like, of largeness large, and of beauty and justice just and beautiful?"
131a	**SOCRATES** πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.	**SOCRATES** "Certainly," said Socrates.

WHOLE OR PART?

If many things share one form, does each get all or part? Socrates suggests a day; Parmenides, a sail.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἤτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἴδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο;	**PARMENIDES** "Then each thing that partakes partakes either of the whole form or of a part of it? Or could there be any other kind of partaking apart from these?"
	SOCRATES καὶ πῶς ἄν; εἶπεν.	**SOCRATES** "How could there be?" he said.
	PARMENIDES πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἓν ὄν, ἢ πῶς;	**PARMENIDES** "Then do you think the whole form, being one, is in each of the many things? Or how?"
	SOCRATES τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἓν εἶναι; [131b]	**SOCRATES** "Why, what's to stop it from being one, Parmenides?" said Socrates. [131b]
131b	**PARMENIDES** ἓν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "So, being one and the same, it will be in many separate things at once as a whole; and so it would be separate from itself."
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα εἴη μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὑτῆς χωρίς ἐστιν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἓν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταὐτὸν εἴη.	**SOCRATES** "No, it wouldn't," he said, "if it were like a day. One and the same day is in many places at once, and yet it isn't in the least separate from itself. In that way each of the forms too could be one and the same in all things at once."
	PARMENIDES ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἓν ταὐτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἱστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον· ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγῇ λέγειν; [131c]	**PARMENIDES** "How neatly you make one and the same thing be in many places at once, Socrates," he said. "It's as if you spread a sail over many people and said it was one thing, whole, over many. Or isn't that the sort of thing you mean?" [131c]
131c	**SOCRATES** ἴσως, φάναι.	**SOCRATES** "Perhaps," he said.
	PARMENIDES ἦ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἱστίον εἴη ἄν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ;	**PARMENIDES** "Then would the whole sail be over each person, or a different part of it over each?"
	SOCRATES μέρος.	**SOCRATES** "A part."
	PARMENIDES μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἑκάστου ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "So the forms themselves are divisible, Socrates," he said, "and the things that share in them would share in a part. No longer would

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		the whole be in each thing; a part of it would be in each."
	SOCRATES φαίνεται οὕτω γε.	**SOCRATES** "It does look that way."
	PARMENIDES ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται;	**PARMENIDES** "Then will you be willing to say, Socrates, that our one form really is divided, and will still be one?"
	SOCRATES οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν.	**SOCRATES** "Not at all," he said.
	PARMENIDES ὅρα γάρ, φάναι· εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον [131d] τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἆρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται;	**PARMENIDES** "No—look," he said. "If you divide largeness itself, and each [131d] of the many large things is going to be large by a part of largeness smaller than largeness itself, won't that seem unreasonable?"
131d	**SOCRATES** πάνυ γ', ἔφη.	**SOCRATES** "Very much so," he said.
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; τοῦ ἴσου μέρος ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει ᾧ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῳ ἔσται;	**PARMENIDES** "What about this? Suppose each thing gets some small part of the equal. Will it have something less than the equal itself by which its possessor will be equal to anything?"
	SOCRATES ἀδύνατον.	**SOCRATES** "Impossible."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἕξει, τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται· ᾧ δ' ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ [131e] ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐ μεῖζον ἢ πρίν.	**PARMENIDES** "Or suppose one of us will have a part of the small. The small will be larger than this part, since the part is a part of it; and so the small itself will be larger. And whatever the part [131e] taken away is added to will be smaller, not larger, than before."
131e	**SOCRATES** οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτό γε.	**SOCRATES** "That certainly couldn't happen," he said.
	PARMENIDES τίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα;	**PARMENIDES** "So in what way, Socrates," he said, "will the other things partake of your forms, if they can partake of them neither by parts nor as wholes?"
	SOCRATES οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.	**SOCRATES** "By Zeus," he said, "it doesn't seem at all easy to me to settle a question like that."
	PARMENIDES τί δὲ δή; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις;	**PARMENIDES** "Well, then, what about this? How do you stand on it?"
	SOCRATES τὸ ποῖον; [132a]	**SOCRATES** "On what?" [132a]

THE THIRD MAN

Seeing large things and largeness together seems to produce another form of largeness, and so on without end.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
132a		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ μέγα ἡγῇ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "I think this is why you believe that each form is one. When a number of things seem large to you, there seems, perhaps, to be some one form, the same, as you look over them all; and from that you believe the large is one."
	SOCRATES ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.	**SOCRATES** "That's true," he said.
	PARMENIDES τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἕν τι αὖ μέγα φανεῖται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "What about the large itself and the other large things? If you look over them all in the same way with your soul, won't some one large thing appear again, by which all of these appear large?"
	SOCRATES ἔοικεν.	**SOCRATES** "It seems so."
	PARMENIDES ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ 132b πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἓν ἕκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.	**PARMENIDES** "So another form of largeness will appear, which has come into being alongside largeness itself and the things that share in it; and over all of these, again, 132b another, by which all of them will be large. And so each of your forms will no longer be one, but unlimited in number."

FORMS AS THOUGHTS

Socrates suggests each form is a thought in the soul; Parmenides asks what the thought is a thought of.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
132b	**SOCRATES** ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἕν γε ἕκαστον εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο.	**SOCRATES** "But, Parmenides," said Socrates, "maybe each of these forms is a thought, and can't properly come to be anywhere except in souls. That way each would be one, at least, and would no longer have happen to it what was just described."
	PARMENIDES τί οὖν; φάναι, ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός;	**PARMENIDES** "What then?" he said. "Is each of these thoughts one, but a thought of nothing?"
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν.	**SOCRATES** "No, that's impossible," he said.
	PARMENIDES ἀλλά τινός;	**PARMENIDES** "Of something, then?"
	SOCRATES ναί. 132c	**SOCRATES** "Yes." 132c
132c	**PARMENIDES** ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος;	**PARMENIDES** "Of something that is, or of something that is not?"
	SOCRATES ὄντος.	**SOCRATES** "Of something that is."
	PARMENIDES οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν;	**PARMENIDES** "Isn't it of some one thing, which that thought thinks of as present over all the cases —some one form?"
	SOCRATES ναί.	**SOCRATES** "Yes."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;	**PARMENIDES** "Then won't this thing that is thought to be one, always the same over all the cases, be a form?"
	SOCRATES ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται.	**SOCRATES** "That too looks necessary."
	PARMENIDES τί δὲ δή; εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ ᾗ τἆλλα φῂς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "Well then," said Parmenides, "given that you say the other things share in the forms, won't you necessarily think either that each thing is made of thoughts and all things think, or that, being thoughts, they are unthinking?"

FORMS AS PATTERNS

Socrates proposes that forms are patterns things resemble, and resemblance starts the regress again.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον, ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, [132d] μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς.	**SOCRATES** "That doesn't make sense either," he said. "But, Parmenides, [132d] it looks to me most likely to be like this: these forms stand fixed in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are likenesses of them; and this participation of the other things in the forms is nothing other than their being made like them."
132d	**PARMENIDES** εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικεν τῷ εἴδει, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "Then if something resembles the form," he said, "can that form fail to be like what has been made like it, to the extent that it has been made like it? Or is there any way for what is like not to be like what is like it?"
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἔστι.	**SOCRATES** "There isn't."
	PARMENIDES τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἆρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἑνὸς τοῦ [132e] αὐτοῦ εἴδους μετέχειν;	**PARMENIDES** "And isn't it absolutely necessary for what is like, and what it is like, to share in one and the [132e] same form?"
132e	**SOCRATES** ἀνάγκη.	**SOCRATES** "It is necessary."
	PARMENIDES οὗ δ' ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾖ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος;	**PARMENIDES** "And whatever it is that like things share in to be like, won't that be the form itself?"
	SOCRATES παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**SOCRATES** "Absolutely."
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἴδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, [133a] καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τῳ ὅμοιον ᾖ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἀεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται.	**PARMENIDES** "So it isn't possible for anything to be like the form, or for the form to be like anything else. Otherwise, alongside the form another form will always appear, [133a] and if that one is like anything, yet another; and there will never be an end to a new form always coming to be, if the form becomes like what shares in it."
133a	**SOCRATES** ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.	**SOCRATES** "That's very true."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τἆλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει.	**PARMENIDES** "So it isn't by likeness that the other things partake of the forms; we have to look for something else by which they partake."
	SOCRATES ἔοικεν.	**SOCRATES** "It seems so."

THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY

If forms exist by themselves, we could not know them, and the gods could not know or rule us.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ὁρᾷς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἡ ἀπορία ἐάν τις ὡς εἴδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διορίζηται;	**PARMENIDES** "So do you see, Socrates," he said, "how great the difficulty is if someone marks off forms as being themselves by themselves?"
	SOCRATES καὶ μάλα.	**SOCRATES** "I certainly do."
	PARMENIDES εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι, φάναι, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἅπτῃ [133b] αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἓν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀεί τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις.	**PARMENIDES** "Well, you can be sure," he said, "that you haven't yet, so to speak, laid hold of [133b] how great the difficulty is, if you're going to set down one form for each of the things that are, each time marking it off as something."
133b	**SOCRATES** πῶς δή; εἰπεῖν.	**SOCRATES** "How so?" he said.
	PARMENIDES πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γιγνώσκεσθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν μὲν τύχοι ἔμπειρος ὢν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυής, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἕπεσθαι, ἀλλ' [133c] ἀπίθανος εἴη ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "There are many other reasons," he said, "but the greatest is this. Suppose someone were to say that the forms, if they are such as we say they must be, can't even be known. No one could show the person who says this that he's wrong, unless the one disputing with him happened to have wide experience and natural ability, and was willing to follow someone working it out through a great many steps from far back. Otherwise the one who insists [133c] they are unknowable would remain unpersuaded."
133c	**SOCRATES** πῇ δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.	**SOCRATES** "Why is that, Parmenides?" said Socrates.
	PARMENIDES ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτήν τινα καθ' αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν.	**PARMENIDES** "Because, Socrates, I think that you, or anyone else who holds that there is a being of each thing itself by itself, would agree, first of all, that none of them is in us."
	SOCRATES πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.	**SOCRATES** "Yes—how could it still be itself by itself?" said Socrates.
	PARMENIDES καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν.	**PARMENIDES** "Well said," he said.
	οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὑτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' [133d] ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα	"Then those forms that are what they are in relation to one another have their being in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the things [133d] among us—whether likenesses or whatever one

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὑτά ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἴδη, καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως.	takes them to be—which we share in and so are called by their various names. And these things among us, which share their names with the forms, are in turn what they are in relation to themselves, not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in this way are of themselves, not of the forms."
133d	**SOCRATES** πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.	**SOCRATES** "What do you mean?" said Socrates.
	PARMENIDES οἷον, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου δήπου, ὃ ἔστι δεσπότης, [133e] ἐκείνου δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὃ ἔστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως αὐτὴ δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὑτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ [134a] τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς αὑτά. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;	**PARMENIDES** "For instance," said Parmenides, "if one of us is someone's master or slave, he is surely not the slave of master itself, what a master is, [133e] nor is the master the master of slave itself, what a slave is. Being a human being, he is both of these things to a human being. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is in relation to slavery itself, and in the same way slavery itself is slavery to mastery itself. The things in our world don't have their power in relation to those things, nor do those things have theirs in relation to us. Rather, as I say, those things are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves, and [134a] the things in our world are likewise what they are in relation to themselves. Or don't you understand what I'm saying?"
134a	**SOCRATES** πάνυ γ', εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω.	**SOCRATES** "Of course I understand," said Socrates.
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη;	**PARMENIDES** "Then knowledge too," he said, "knowledge itself, what knowledge is, would be knowledge of that truth itself, what truth is?"
	SOCRATES πάνυ γε.	**SOCRATES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES ἑκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἣ ἔστιν, ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη· ἢ οὔ;	**PARMENIDES** "And again, each of the kinds of knowledge, as it is, would be knowledge of one of the things that are, as it is. Or not?"
	SOCRATES ναί.	**SOCRATES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὖ ἑκάστη ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν [134b] ὄντων ἑκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "And the knowledge in our world would be knowledge of the truth in our world, and again each kind of knowledge in our world would turn out to be knowledge of one of the things [134b] that are in our world?"
134b	**SOCRATES** ἀνάγκη.	**SOCRATES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἴδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "But the forms themselves, as you agree, we don't have, and they can't be in our world."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**SOCRATES** “No, they can’t.”
	PARMENIDES γιγνώσκεται δέ γέ που ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα;	**PARMENIDES** “And the kinds themselves, what each of them is, are known, I take it, by the form of knowledge itself?”
	SOCRATES ναί.	**SOCRATES** “Yes.”
	PARMENIDES ὅ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν.	**PARMENIDES** “Which we don’t have.”
	SOCRATES οὐ γάρ.	**SOCRATES** “No, we don’t.”
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν.	**PARMENIDES** “So none of the forms is known by us, since we don’t share in knowledge itself.”
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**SOCRATES** “It seems not.”
	PARMENIDES ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ [134c] τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.	**PARMENIDES** “Then the beautiful itself, what it is, is unknowable to us, and [134c] the good, and all the things we take to be forms in themselves.”
134c	**SOCRATES** κινδυνεύει.	**SOCRATES** “It looks that way.”
	PARMENIDES ὅρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε.	**PARMENIDES** “Now consider something still more alarming than this.”
	SOCRATES τὸ ποῖον;	**SOCRATES** “What’s that?”
	PARMENIDES φαίης ἄν που, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κάλλος καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτω.	**PARMENIDES** “You would say, I suppose, that if there is a kind, knowledge itself, it is far more precise than the knowledge in our world—and the same with beauty and all the others.”
	SOCRATES ναί.	**SOCRATES** “Yes.”
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἄν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην;	**PARMENIDES** “Then if anything at all shares in knowledge itself, wouldn’t you say that a god, more than anyone, has this most precise knowledge?”
	SOCRATES ἀνάγκη. [134d]	**SOCRATES** “Necessarily.” [134d]
134d	**PARMENIDES** ἆρ’ οὖν οἷός τε αὖ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων;	**PARMENIDES** “Then will the god, in turn, be able to know the things in our world, having knowledge itself?”
	SOCRATES τί γὰρ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** “Why not?”
	PARMENIDES ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μήτε ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἴδη πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἣν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἑκάτερα.	**PARMENIDES** “Because,” said Parmenides, “we’ve agreed, Socrates, that those forms don’t have the power they have in relation to the things in our world, nor do the things in our world have theirs in relation to them, but each set has it only in relation to itself.”

GREEK

SOCRATES ὡμολόγηται γάρ.

PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὔτ' ἂν [134e] ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γιγνώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες.

134e **SOCRATES** ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη, ᾖ θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι.

PARMENIDES ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι [135a] ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὁριεῖταί τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος· ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴ τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα, καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τὶ λέγειν καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσανάπειστον εἶναι. καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἑκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ [135b] καθ' αὑτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὑρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον.

135b **SOCRATES** συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὁ Σωκράτης· πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις.

ENGLISH

SOCRATES "Yes, we did agree to that."

PARMENIDES "Then if this most precise mastery and this most precise knowledge belong to the god, their mastery would never master us, nor would [134e] their knowledge know us or anything else in our world. Just as we don't rule them with the rule we have, and don't know anything of the divine with our knowledge, so they in turn, by the same argument, are neither our masters nor do they know human affairs, gods though they are."

SOCRATES "But I'm afraid," he said, "the argument may be far too astonishing, if it's going to rob the god of knowing."

PARMENIDES "And yet, Socrates," said Parmenides, "these difficulties, and [135a] a great many more besides, are bound to attach to the forms, if there are these forms of the things that are and one marks off each form as something itself. The result is that whoever hears this is perplexed and disputes that they exist, and argues that even if they very much do exist, they must necessarily be unknowable to human nature. And in saying this he seems to have a point and, as we said just now, is astonishingly hard to win over. It will take a very gifted man to be able to learn that there is a kind of each thing, a being itself [135b] by itself, and someone more remarkable still to discover all this and be able to teach it to someone else, having sifted it all through thoroughly."

SOCRATES "I agree with you, Parmenides," said Socrates. "What you say is very much to my mind."

WHY FORMS ARE STILL NEEDED

Without forms there is nothing for thought to fix on, and discussion itself is destroyed.

GREEK

PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ τις δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἐάσει εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἐῶν [135c] ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ᾐσθῆσθαι.

ENGLISH

PARMENIDES "But on the other hand, Socrates," said Parmenides, "if someone, with his eye on all the difficulties we've just raised and others like them, won't allow that there are forms of the things that are, and won't mark off a form of each single thing, he won't have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesn't allow [135c] that each of the things that are has a form that is always the same. And in this way he'll destroy the power of discus-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		sion altogether. I think you've been especially aware of this."
135c	**SOCRATES** ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.	**SOCRATES** "That's true," he said.
	PARMENIDES τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ τρέψῃ ἀγνοουμένων τούτων;	**PARMENIDES** "Then what will you do about philosophy? Where will you turn while these things remain unknown?"
	SOCRATES οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι.	**SOCRATES** "I don't think I can see my way clearly at all—not at present, anyway."

TRAINING FOR PHILOSOPHY

Socrates needs exercise first: follow out what results from each hypothesis and from its denial.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES πρῳ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν 135d ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν. ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρῴην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια.	**PARMENIDES** "That's because you're trying too early, Socrates," he said, "before you've been trained, to define something beautiful, and just, and good, and each one 135d of the forms. I noticed it the other day too, listening to you talking here with Aristoteles. The impulse that drives you toward arguments is fine and divine, believe me. But stretch yourself and train more, while you're still young, through what seems useless and what most people call idle chatter. Otherwise the truth will escape you."
135d	**SOCRATES** τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας;	**SOCRATES** "Then what is the method of this training, Parmenides?" he said.
	PARMENIDES οὗτος, εἶπεν, ὅνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν τοῦτό γέ 135e σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὅτι οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "The one you heard from Zeno," he said. "Except that I did admire this 135e in what you said to him: you wouldn't allow the wandering inquiry to be carried on among the things we see, or about them, but only about those things that one would grasp above all by reason and would consider to be forms."
135e	**SOCRATES** δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν.	**SOCRATES** "Yes, because it seems to me," he said, "that in that way it's no trouble at all to show that the things that are are both like and unlike, or have anything else whatever happen to them."
	PARMENIDES καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ 136a συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι.	**PARMENIDES** "And rightly so," he said. "But in addition to that you must also do this: not only hypothesize that each thing is and examine the consequences 136a of the hypothesis, but also hypothesize that this same thing is not, if you want to be more fully trained."
136a	**SOCRATES** πῶς λέγεις; φάναι.	**SOCRATES** "How do you mean?" he said.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οἷον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ πρός τε αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μή ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς [136b] αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.	**PARMENIDES** "For example," he said, "if you like, take the hypothesis Zeno proposed: if there are many, what must follow both for the many themselves, in relation to themselves and in relation to the one, and for the one, in relation to itself and in relation to the many. And again, if there are not many, you must examine in turn what will follow both for the one and for the many, both in relation [136b] to themselves and in relation to each other. And yet again, if you hypothesize that likeness is, or that it is not, you must examine what will follow on each hypothesis both for the things hypothesized themselves and for the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other."
136b	καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα [136c] πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς σύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τἆλλα αὖ πρὸς αὑτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅτι ἂν προαιρῇ ἀεί, ἐάντε ὡς ὂν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἄντε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές.	"And the same goes for unlike, and for motion and rest, and for coming to be and perishing, and for being itself and not-being. In a word, whatever you hypothesize as being or as not being, or as having any other property whatever, you must examine the consequences [136c] in relation to itself and in relation to each one of the others, whichever you choose, and in relation to more of them and to all of them together in the same way. And again you must examine the others, in relation to themselves and in relation to whatever else you choose each time, whether you hypothesize what you were hypothesizing as being or as not being—if you're going to train yourself completely and discern the truth in the full sense."
136c	**SOCRATES** ἀμήχανόν γ' ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Παρμενίδη, πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω. ἀλλά μοι τί οὐ διῆλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; [136d]	**SOCRATES** "That's an impossible task you're describing, Parmenides," he said, "and I don't quite understand. Why don't you go through it yourself, hypothesizing something, so that I can understand better?" [136d]
136d	**PARMENIDES** πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῷδε.	**PARMENIDES** "That's a big job you're assigning, Socrates," he said, "for a man my age."
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, Ζήνων, τί οὐ διῆλθες ἡμῖν;	**SOCRATES** "Well then, Zeno," said Socrates, "why don't you go through it for us?"
	ZENO καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι· αὐτοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου· μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον ᾖ ὃ λέγει. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι· ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ· [136e] ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ	**ZENO** And Zeno, he said, laughed and said, "Let's ask Parmenides himself, Socrates. I'm afraid what he's talking about is no small matter. Or don't you see how big a job you're assigning? If there were more of us, it wouldn't be right to ask him. It isn't fitting to talk about such things in front of a lot of people, especially for a man his age. [136e] Most people don't know that without this thorough tour

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.	through everything, this wandering, it's impossible to hit upon the truth and gain understanding. So, Parmenides, I join Socrates in asking, so that I too can hear you after all this time."

PARMENIDES AGREES TO PERFORM

Pressed by everyone, the old man compares himself to an aging racehorse and takes young Aristoteles as his respondent.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
136e	**PARMENIDES** ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτόν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. τὸν οὖν Παρμενίδην· ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καίτοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, [137a] ᾧ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῇ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφ' ἅρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἰέναι· κἀγώ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων· ὅμως δὲ δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὃ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοί ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ [137b] ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα;	**PARMENIDES** When Zeno had said this, Antiphon said that Pythodorus said he himself begged Parmenides, and so did Aristoteles and the others, to demonstrate what he meant and not refuse. So Parmenides said, "I have to do as you ask. And yet I feel I'm in the same state as the horse in Ibycus' poem. [137a] Ibycus compared himself to that horse—a champion, getting on in years, about to race in harness and trembling at what lay ahead because he knew it from experience—and said that he too, old as he was, was being forced against his will to go in for love. I too, when I remember, feel very much afraid of how a man my age is to swim across such a vast and formidable sea of arguments. Still, I must oblige you, since, as Zeno says, we're among ourselves. So where shall we [137b] begin, and what shall we hypothesize first?[7]
137b	ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν;	"Or would you like me—since we seem to have agreed to play this laborious game—to begin with myself and my own hypothesis, hypothesizing about the one itself, whether it is one or not one, and asking what must follow?"
	ZENO πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.	**ZENO** "Certainly," said Zeno.
	PARMENIDES τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἥκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἃ οἴεται μάλιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις. [137c]	**PARMENIDES** "Then who will answer me?" he said. "The youngest? He'd be least likely to make difficulties, and most likely to answer what he thinks. And at the same time his answering would give me a breather." [137c]
137c	**ARISTOTELES** ἕτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη· ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων. ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου.	**ARISTOTELES** "I'm ready for this, Parmenides," said Aristoteles. "It's me you mean when you say the youngest. Ask away—I'll answer."

7 Ibycus was a lyric poet of the sixth century BC; in a surviving fragment he compares himself, an old man caught by love once more, to an aging prize horse yoked again to the chariot.

HYPOTHESIS 1: IF THE ONE IS ONE

A strictly single one has no parts, shape, place, motion, likeness or time, and so cannot even be.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES εἶεν δή, φάναι· εἰ ἕν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἕν;	**PARMENIDES** "Very well," he said. "If it is one, the one wouldn't be many, would it?"[8]
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γὰρ ἄν;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it?"
	PARMENIDES οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "Then there can't be a part of it, nor can it be a whole."
	ARISTOTELES τί δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "Why is that?"
	PARMENIDES τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἐστίν.	**PARMENIDES** "A part, I take it, is part of a whole."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὗ ἂν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῇ ὅλον ἂν εἴη;	**PARMENIDES** "And what about the whole? Wouldn't a whole be that from which no part is missing?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὂν καὶ μέρη ἔχον.	**PARMENIDES** "So either way the one would be made up of parts, both if it's a whole and if it has parts."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα [137d] οὕτως τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἴη ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "So either way [137d] the one would thus be many and not one."
137d	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἀλλ' ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "But it has to be not many but one."
	ARISTOTELES δεῖ.	**ARISTOTELES** "It has to."
	PARMENIDES οὔτ' ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἕξει, εἰ ἓν ἔσται τὸ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "So it won't be a whole, nor will it have parts, if the one is to be one."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "Then if it has no part, it couldn't have a beginning or an end or a middle; for such things would already be parts of it."
	ARISTOTELES ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Right."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἑκάστου.	**PARMENIDES** "And again, an end and a beginning are the limit of each thing."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course."

8 "The one" is unity itself, the subject of Parmenides' own hypothesis; the Greek for "if it is one" can also mean "if one is."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἕν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one is unlimited, if it has neither beginning nor end."
	ARISTOTELES ἄπειρον.	**ARISTOTELES** "Unlimited."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα· οὔτε γὰρ [137e] στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει.	**PARMENIDES** "So it's also without shape; for it shares in neither [137e] round nor straight."
137e	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How so?"
	PARMENIDES στρογγύλον γέ που ἐστι τοῦτο οὗ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχῃ.	**PARMENIDES** "Round, I take it, is that whose extremities are everywhere equally distant from the middle."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε, οὗ ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν ἐπίπροσθεν ᾖ.	**PARMENIDES** "And straight is that whose middle is in front of both extremities."
	ARISTOTELES οὕτως.	**ARISTOTELES** "So it is."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἂν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι.	**PARMENIDES** "Then the one would have parts and would be many, whether it shared in a straight shape or a round one."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε [138a] περιφερές ἐστιν, ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει.	**PARMENIDES** "So it's neither straight nor [138a] round, since it doesn't have parts either."
138a	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Right."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἴη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "And again, being like this, it wouldn't be anywhere; for it would be neither in another nor in itself."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "How is that?"
	PARMENIDES ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὂν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἅπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἑνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ ἅπτεσθαι.	**PARMENIDES** "If it were in another, it would presumably be contained all around by that in which it was, and would touch it at many places and with many points. But for what is one and partless and doesn't share in circle, it's impossible to be touched all around at many places."
	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατον.	**ARISTOTELES** "Impossible."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν κἂν ἑαυτῷ εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν [138b] ἑαυτῷ εἴη· ἔν τῳ γάρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον.	**PARMENIDES** "But then if it were in itself, what contained it would be none other than itself, if it really were [138b] in itself; for it's impossible for something to be in something that doesn't contain it."
138b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀδύνατον γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, that's impossible."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἄν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἅμφω ταὐτὸν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἓν ἀλλὰ δύο.	**PARMENIDES** "Then what contains would be one thing, and what is contained another; for the same thing won't, as a whole, both undergo and do the same thing at once. And so the one would no longer be one but two."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it wouldn't."
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἕν, μήτε ἐν αὑτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one isn't anywhere, since it's neither in itself nor in another."
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔστιν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It isn't."
	PARMENIDES ὅρα δή, οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἑστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι.	**PARMENIDES** "Now see whether, being in this condition, it can be at rest or in motion."
	ARISTOTELES τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "Why couldn't it?"
	PARMENIDES ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ 138c ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν· αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.	**PARMENIDES** "Because if it were in motion, it would either be carried along or 138c be altered; for those are the only motions."
138c	**ARISTOTELES** ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἓν ἔτι εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "But if the one were altered from itself, it surely couldn't still be one."
	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατον.	**ARISTOTELES** "It couldn't."
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται.	**PARMENIDES** "So it doesn't move by alteration, at any rate."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently not."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλ' ἆρα τῷ φέρεσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "Then is it by being carried along?"
	ARISTOTELES ἴσως.	**ARISTOTELES** "Perhaps."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας.	**PARMENIDES** "And if the one were carried along, it would either spin around in a circle in the same place or exchange one place for another."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ᾧ δὲ 138d μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι;	**PARMENIDES** "Now if it spins in a circle, it must be poised on a middle and have other parts of itself carried around the middle. But for something to which neither a middle nor parts belong, 138d what way could there ever be for it to be carried in a circle on a middle?"
138d	**ARISTOTELES** οὐδεμία.	**ARISTOTELES** "None."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμεῖβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;	**PARMENIDES** "Then does it change place, coming to be now here, now there, and move in that way?"

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ARISTOTELES εἴπερ γε δή.	**ARISTOTELES** "If it moves at all, yes."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν εἶναι μέν που ἔν τινι αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη;	**PARMENIDES** "But didn't it turn out that it's impossible for it to be in anything?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον;	**PARMENIDES** "Then is it even more impossible for it to come to be in something?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ.	**ARISTOTELES** "I don't see how."
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἔν τῳ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ' ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴπερ ἤδη ἐγγίγνεται;	**PARMENIDES** "If something comes to be in something, mustn't it be not yet in that thing, since it is still coming to be in it, and yet no longer entirely outside it, if it is already coming to be in it?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα τι [138e] ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὗ μέρη εἴη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἴη ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναί τινος μήτε ἔξω.	**PARMENIDES** "So if anything [138e] is to undergo this, only something with parts could undergo it; for some of it would already be in that thing and some outside, at the same time. But what has no parts surely can't in any way be, as a whole, at the same time neither inside something nor outside it."
138e	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES οὗ δὲ μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήτε ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαί που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον;	**PARMENIDES** "And for what has no parts and isn't a whole either, isn't it far more impossible still to come to be in something, since it can come to be in it neither part by part nor as a whole?"
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES οὔτ' ἄρα ποι ἰὸν καὶ ἕν [139a] τῳ γιγνόμενον χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον.	**PARMENIDES** "So it doesn't change place by going somewhere and coming to be in [139a] something, nor by spinning in the same place, nor by being altered."
139a	**ARISTOTELES** οὐκ ἔοικε.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems not."
	PARMENIDES κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἓν ἀκίνητον.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one is unmoved with respect to every kind of motion."
	ARISTOTELES ἀκίνητον.	**ARISTOTELES** "Unmoved."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί γέ φαμεν ἕν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον.	**PARMENIDES** "But we also say that it's impossible for it to be in anything."
	ARISTOTELES φαμὲν γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, we do."
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "So it's never in the same either."

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	ARISTOTELES τί δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "Why is that?"
	PARMENIDES ὅτι ἤδη ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "Because then it would already be in that thing—the same—in which it is."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι.	**PARMENIDES** "But it turned out that it can be neither in itself nor in another."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it can't."
	PARMENIDES οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one is never in the same."
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems not."
139b	**PARMENIDES** ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὂν οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ' ἕστηκεν.	**PARMENIDES** "But what is never in the same neither keeps still nor stands at rest."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it can't."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, it seems, is neither at rest nor in motion."
	ARISTOTELES οὔκουν δὴ φαίνεταί γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "It certainly doesn't appear to be."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ταὐτόν γε οὔτε ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, οὐδ' αὖ ἕτερον οὔτε αὑτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "Nor will it be the same as another or as itself; nor again would it be different from itself or from another."
	ARISTOTELES πῇ δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "How so?"
	PARMENIDES ἕτερον μέν που ἑαυτοῦ ὂν ἑνὸς ἕτερον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "If it were different from itself, I take it, it would be different from one and would not be one."
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν ταὐτόν γε ἑτέρῳ ὂν ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη, αὐτὸ 139c δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἕν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἑνός.	**PARMENIDES** "And again, if it were the same as another, it would be that other and wouldn't be 139c itself; so in this case too it wouldn't be just what it is, one, but different from one."
139c	**ARISTOTELES** οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it wouldn't."
	PARMENIDES ταὐτὸν μὲν ἄρα ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται.	**PARMENIDES** "So it won't be the same as another, or different from itself."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES ἕτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἑνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί.	**PARMENIDES** "But it won't be different from another, as long as it is one. For to be different from something belongs not to one but only to the different, to be different from another, and to nothing else."

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	ARISTOTELES ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** “Right.”
	PARMENIDES τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· ἢ οἴει;	**PARMENIDES** “So it won’t be different by being one. Or do you think it will?”
	ARISTOTELES οὐ δῆτα.	**ARISTOTELES** “No indeed.”
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ αὑτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὂν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται [139d] ἕτερον.	**PARMENIDES** “But if it isn’t different by this, it won’t be by itself; and if not by itself, then it itself won’t be different; and it itself, being in no way different, will be different [139d] from nothing.”
139d	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** “Right.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ταὐτόν γε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται.	**PARMENIDES** “Nor again will it be the same as itself.”
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ’ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** “Why not?”
	PARMENIDES οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὴ δήπου καὶ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ.	**PARMENIDES** “The very nature of the one is surely not also the nature of the same.”
	ARISTOTELES τί δή;	**ARISTOTELES** “Why is that?”
	PARMENIDES ὅτι οὐκ, ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν γένηταί τῳ τι, ἓν γίγνεται.	**PARMENIDES** “Because when something comes to be the same as something, it doesn’t come to be one.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀλλὰ τί μήν;	**ARISTOTELES** “What, then?”
	PARMENIDES τοῖς πολλοῖς ταὐτὸν γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** “When it comes to be the same as the many, it must come to be many and not one.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** “True.”
	PARMENIDES ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὁπότε τι ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο, ἀεὶ ἂν ἓν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὁπότε ἕν, ταὐτόν. [139e]	**PARMENIDES** “But if the one and the same differed in no way, then whenever something came to be the same, it would always come to be one, and whenever it came to be one, the same.” [139e]
139e	**ARISTOTELES** πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** “Certainly.”
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἑαυτῷ ταὐτὸν ἔσται, οὐχ ἓν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· καὶ οὕτω ἓν ὂν οὐχ ἓν ἔσται. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον· ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἢ ἑτέρου ἕτερον εἶναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ ταὐτόν.	**PARMENIDES** “So if the one is to be the same as itself, it won’t be one with itself; and so, being one, it won’t be one. But this is impossible. So it’s impossible for the one either to be different from another or to be the same as itself.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατον.	**ARISTOTELES** “Impossible.”
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἓν οὔτ’ ἂν αὐτῷ οὔτ’ ἂν ἑτέρῳ εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** “So the one would be neither different from nor the same as either itself or another.”
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** “No, it wouldn’t.”

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	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ὅμοιόν τινι ἔσται οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ.	**PARMENIDES** "Nor again will it be like anything or unlike, either itself or another."
	ARISTOTELES τί δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "Why is that?"
	PARMENIDES ὅτι τὸ ταὐτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.	**PARMENIDES** "Because what has the property of the same, I take it, is like."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES τοῦ δέ γε ἑνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταὐτόν. 140a	**PARMENIDES** "But the same turned out to be separate in nature from the one." 140a
140a	**ARISTOTELES** ἐφάνη γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, it did."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἕν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον.	**PARMENIDES** "But if the one had any property apart from being one, it would have the property of being more than one, and that's impossible."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ.	**PARMENIDES** "So in no way can the one have the property of being the same, either as another or as itself."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently not."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ ὅμοιον ἄρα δυνατὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ.	**PARMENIDES** "So it can't be like either another or itself."
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems not."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "Nor again does the one have the property of being different; for in that way too it would have the property of being more than one."
	ARISTOTELES πλείω γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, more."
	PARMENIDES τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ 140b ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.	**PARMENIDES** "Now what has the property of different, either from itself or from another, would be unlike either itself 140b or another, if what has the property of the same is like."
140b	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Right."
	PARMENIDES τὸ δέ γε ἕν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιόν ἐστιν οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ.	**PARMENIDES** "But the one, it seems, since it in no way has the property of different, is in no way unlike either itself or another."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it isn't."
	PARMENIDES οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὔθ' ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one would be neither like nor unlike, either another or itself."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently not."

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	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.	**PARMENIDES** “And again, being like this, it will be neither equal nor unequal, either to itself or to another.”
	ARISTOTELES πῇ;	**ARISTOTELES** “How so?”
	PARMENIDES ἴσον μὲν ὂν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἴσον ᾖ.	**PARMENIDES** “If it’s equal, it will be of the same measures as whatever it’s equal to.”
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes.”
	PARMENIDES μεῖζον δέ που [140c] ἢ ἔλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν σύμμετρον ᾖ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω.	**PARMENIDES** “And if it’s greater [140c] or less, then compared with things it’s commensurable with, it will have more measures than the lesser ones and fewer than the greater.”
140c	**ARISTOTELES** ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes.”
	PARMENIDES οἷς δ’ ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται.	**PARMENIDES** “And compared with things it isn’t commensurable with, it will be of smaller measures than some and of greater measures than others.”
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** “Of course.”
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν τῶν αὐτῶν;	**PARMENIDES** “Isn’t it impossible for what doesn’t share in the same to be either of the same measures or of the same anything else whatever?”
	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατον.	**ARISTOTELES** “Impossible.”
	PARMENIDES ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὔτ’ ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν.	**PARMENIDES** “So it wouldn’t be equal either to itself or to another, since it isn’t of the same measures.”
	ARISTOTELES οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε.	**ARISTOTELES** “It certainly doesn’t appear to be.”
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν πλειόνων γε μέτρων ὂν ἢ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσωνπερ μέτρων, τοσούτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἴη· καὶ [140d] οὕτω αὖ οὐκέτι ἓν ἔσται ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα.	**PARMENIDES** “But if it were of more measures or fewer, it would have as many parts as it has measures; and [140d] so again it will no longer be one but as many as its measures.”
140d	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** “Right.”
	PARMENIDES εἰ δέ γε ἑνὸς μέτρου εἴη, ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη, ἴσον τῳ αὐτὸ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** “But if it were of a single measure, it would come to be equal to that measure. And it turned out to be impossible for it to be equal to anything.”
	ARISTOTELES ἐφάνη γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes, it did.”
	PARMENIDES οὔτε ἄρα ἑνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔτε	**PARMENIDES** “So since it shares in neither one measure nor many nor few, and doesn’t share in the same at all, it will never, it seems, be equal either to itself or to another. Nor again will it be

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	ἄλλῳ· οὔτε αὖ μεῖζον οὐδὲ ἔλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου.	greater or smaller than either itself or something else."
	ARISTOTELES παντάπασι μὲν οὖν οὕτω. [140e]	ARISTOTELES "That's absolutely so." [140e]
140e	PARMENIDES τί δέ; πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἓν δοκεῖ τῳ δυνατὸν εἶναι;	PARMENIDES "What about this? Does it seem possible to anyone that the one is older or younger, or the same age?"
	ARISTOTELES τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ;	ARISTOTELES "Why on earth not?"
	PARMENIDES ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὑτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἑνί, οὔτε ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἰσότητος.	PARMENIDES "Because, I take it, if it has the same age as itself or as another, it will share in equality of time and in likeness—and we said the one has no share in these, neither likeness nor equality."
	ARISTOTELES ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν.	ARISTOTELES "Yes, we did say that."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν.	PARMENIDES "And further, we said this too: that it doesn't share in unlikeness or inequality."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	ARISTOTELES "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES πῶς οὖν [141a] οἷόν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῳ τοιοῦτον ὄν;	PARMENIDES "Then how [141a] will it be possible for something like that to be older or younger than anything, or the same age as anything?"
141a	ARISTOTELES οὐδαμῶς.	ARISTOTELES "There's no way."
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα ἂν εἴη νεώτερόν γε οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἓν οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.	PARMENIDES "So the one would not be younger or older, or the same age, either as itself or as another."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ φαίνεται.	ARISTOTELES "Apparently not."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύναιτο ἂν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἐάν τι ᾖ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι;	PARMENIDES "Then could the one not even be in time at all, if it is like this? Or isn't it necessary, if something is in time, that it is always becoming older than itself?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	ARISTOTELES "It is necessary."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν τό γε πρεσβύτερον ἀεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον;	PARMENIDES "And isn't the older always older than a younger?"
	ARISTOTELES τί μήν; [141b]	ARISTOTELES "Of course." [141b]
141b	PARMENIDES τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνηται.	PARMENIDES "So what is becoming older than itself is at the same time becoming younger than itself too, if it's going to have something it is becoming older than."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς λέγεις;	ARISTOTELES "What do you mean?"
	PARMENIDES ὧδε· διάφορον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἤδη ὄντος διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἤδη ὄντος	PARMENIDES "This. Nothing that differs from another has to become different from it when that

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	ἤδη εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν, τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλλειν οὔτε εἶναί πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως 141c οὐκ εἶναι.	other is already different. Rather, from what already is different it already is different; from what has become different it has become different; from what will be different it will be different. But from what is becoming different it has neither become different, nor will be, nor yet is: it is becoming different, and 141c is not different in any other way."
141c	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη γὰρ δή.	ARISTOTELES "Yes, that's necessary."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεωτέρου ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.	PARMENIDES "But the older is a difference from the younger, and from nothing else."
	ARISTOTELES ἔστι γάρ.	ARISTOTELES "Yes, it is."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἅμα ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι.	PARMENIDES "So what is becoming older than itself must also at the same time be becoming younger than itself."
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	ARISTOTELES "It seems so."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον μήτε ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι.	PARMENIDES "But it must also become neither for more time than itself nor for less; it must become, and be, and have become, and be going to be, for a time equal to itself."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα.	ARISTOTELES "Yes, that's necessary too."
	PARMENIDES ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν 141d καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτήν τε αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβύτερόν τε αὐτοῦ ἅμα καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι.	PARMENIDES "So it is necessary, it seems, that each of the things that are in time 141d and share in this sort of thing has the same age as itself, and is becoming at once both older and younger than itself."
141d	ARISTOTELES κινδυνεύει.	ARISTOTELES "It looks that way."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ γε ἑνὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν.	PARMENIDES "But the one, we saw, had no share in any attributes of this kind."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ μετῆν.	ARISTOTELES "No, it didn't."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἔν τινι χρόνῳ.	PARMENIDES "So it has no share in time either, and it is not in any time."
	ARISTOTELES οὔκουν δή, ὥς γε ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ.	ARISTOTELES "No, it isn't—at least as the argument concludes."
	PARMENIDES τί οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγίγνετο οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος;	PARMENIDES "What then? Don't 'was' and 'has come to be' and 'was coming to be' seem to signify participation in time gone by?"
	ARISTOTELES καὶ μάλα.	ARISTOTELES "Very much so."
141e		

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	PARMENIDES τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτα τοῦ μέλλοντος;	**PARMENIDES** "And 'will be' and 'will come to be' and 'will be brought to be'—don't they signify the time hereafter, the time to come?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος;	**PARMENIDES** "And 'is' and 'is coming to be'—don't they signify the time now present?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἓν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ' ἐγίγνετο οὔτ' ἦν ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτ' ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτε ἔσται.	**PARMENIDES** "So if the one has no share in any time in any way, then it never came to be, nor was coming to be, nor ever was; nor has it now come to be, nor is it coming to be, nor is it; nor will it hereafter come to be, nor be brought to be, nor be."
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθέστατα.	**ARISTOTELES** "Very true."
	PARMENIDES ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἄν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι;	**PARMENIDES** "Now, is there any way something could share in being other than in one of these ways?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔστιν.	**ARISTOTELES** "There isn't."
	PARMENIDES οὐδαμῶς ἄρα τὸ ἓν οὐσίας μετέχει.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one in no way shares in being."
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems not."
	PARMENIDES οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one in no way is."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently not."
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἓν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὂν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ 142a τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν.	**PARMENIDES** "So it isn't even in such a way as to be one, since then it would already be, and share in being. Rather, it seems, the one neither is one nor is, if we're to trust 142a an argument of this kind."
142a	**ARISTOTELES** κινδυνεύει.	**ARISTOTELES** "It looks that way."
	PARMENIDES ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἄν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ;	**PARMENIDES** "But if something is not, could anything belong to this thing that is not, or be of it?"
	ARISTOTELES καὶ πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it?"
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα.	**PARMENIDES** "So no name belongs to it, nor any account, nor any knowledge, nor perception, nor opinion."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently not."
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται.	**PARMENIDES** "So it isn't named or spoken of, or the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does any of the things that are perceive it."

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	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems not."
	PARMENIDES ἦ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἓν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;	**PARMENIDES** "Now, is it possible that this is how things stand with the one?"
	ARISTOTELES οὔκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [142b]	**ARISTOTELES** "I don't think so." [142b]

HYPOTHESIS 2: IF THE ONE IS

A one that is has parts and number, is limited and unlimited, and both moves and rests.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
142b	**PARMENIDES** βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῇ;	**PARMENIDES** "Then would you like us to go back to the hypothesis and start again from the beginning, in case something different appears to us as we go back over it?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, I'd very much like that."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα· οὐχ οὕτω;	**PARMENIDES** "Well, if the one is, as we say, we must agree on what follows about it, whatever that turns out to be. Isn't that so?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν;	**PARMENIDES** "Look at it from the beginning, then. If the one is, can it be, and yet not share in being?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐχ οἷόν τε.	**ARISTOTELES** "It can't."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταὐτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἑνί· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν [142c] ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἕν, ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἕν τε εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἕν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἓν ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτω;	**PARMENIDES** "Then there would also be a being of the one, and it would not be the same as the one. Otherwise it wouldn't be the being of that thing, nor would [142c] that thing, the one, share in it; saying 'one is' would be just like saying 'one one.' But as it is, our hypothesis isn't what must follow if one is one, but if one is. Isn't that so?"
142c	**ARISTOTELES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἕν;	**PARMENIDES** "Then 'is' signifies something other than 'one'?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἆρα οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἕν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδάν τις συλλήβδην εἴπῃ ὅτι ἓν ἔστιν;	**PARMENIDES** "So when someone says, in short, 'one is,' would this be what's meant: nothing other than that the one shares in being?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, τί συμβήσεται. σκόπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν	**PARMENIDES** "Then let's say once more what will follow if the one is. Consider whether this hypo-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὂν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, οἷον [142d] μέρη ἔχειν;	thesis must not signify that the one is such as [142d] to have parts."
142d	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How?"
	PARMENIDES ὧδε· εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἕν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου οὗ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἓν ὂν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "Like this. If 'is' is said of the one which is, and 'one' of the being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to that same thing we hypothesized, the one that is, then mustn't the whole be the one that is, and one and being come to be its parts?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES πότερον οὖν ἑκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσεροῦμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε μόριον προσρητέον;	**PARMENIDES** "Now, shall we call each of these parts just a part, or must a part be called a part of the whole?"
	ARISTOTELES τοῦ ὅλου.	**ARISTOTELES** "Of the whole."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστί, ὃ ἂν ἓν ᾖ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει.	**PARMENIDES** "So whatever is one is a whole, and has a part."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον [142e] τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἆρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου;	**PARMENIDES** "What then? Of these two parts [142e] of the one that is, one and being, does either ever fall away from the other—the one from the part being, or being from the part one?"
142e	**ARISTOTELES** οὐκ ἂν εἴη.	**ARISTOTELES** "It couldn't."
	PARMENIDES πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τό τε ἓν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὖ μορίοιν τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἀεί, ὅτιπερ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτῳ τὼ μορίω ἀεὶ ἴσχει· τό τε γὰρ ἓν τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἕν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη [143a] δύ' ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἓν εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "So again each of the parts possesses both one and being, and the smallest part in turn comes to consist of two parts; and by the same reasoning it goes on like this forever: whatever part turns up always possesses these two parts, since the one always possesses being, and being the one. So it must [143a] always be becoming two, and never be one."
143a	**ARISTOTELES** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Absolutely."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἓν ὂν εἴη;	**PARMENIDES** "Then in this way wouldn't the one that is be unlimited in multitude?"
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems so."
	PARMENIDES ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι.	**PARMENIDES** "Come then, take it this way too."
	ARISTOTELES πῇ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How?"
	PARMENIDES οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν τὸ ἕν, διὸ ἔστιν;	**PARMENIDES** "We say the one shares in being, and that's why it is?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἓν ὂν πολλὰ ἐφάνη.	**PARMENIDES** "And it's for this reason that the one that is turned out to be many."
	ARISTOTELES οὕτω.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's right."
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ' αὑτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὗ φαμεν μετέχειν, ἆρά γε ἓν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;	**PARMENIDES** "Well then: the one itself, which we say shares in being—if we take it in thought alone, by itself, apart from this thing we say it shares in, will it appear only one, or will this same thing appear many as well?"
	ARISTOTELES ἕν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.	**ARISTOTELES** "One, I'd think."
143b	**PARMENIDES** ἴδωμεν δή· ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἓν οὐσίας μετέσχεν.	**PARMENIDES** "Let's see. Isn't it necessary that its being is one thing and it itself another, if the one is not being but, as one, has come to share in being?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν τὸ ἓν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.	**PARMENIDES** "Then if being is one thing and the one another, it isn't by being one that the one is different from being, nor by being being that being is other than the one. They are different from each other by the different and the other."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES ὥστε οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον.	**PARMENIDES** "So the different is not the same as either the one or being."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γάρ; 143c	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it be?" 143c
143c	**PARMENIDES** τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἓν εἴτε τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθά τινε ὧ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω;	**PARMENIDES** "What then? If we pick out from them, say, being and the different, or being and the one, or the one and the different, in each choice don't we pick out a pair that can rightly be called 'both'?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How do you mean?"
	PARMENIDES ὧδε· ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν;	**PARMENIDES** "Like this. We can say 'being'?"
	ARISTOTELES ἔστιν.	**ARISTOTELES** "We can."
	PARMENIDES καὶ αὖθις εἰπεῖν ἕν;	**PARMENIDES** "And again say 'one'?"
	ARISTOTELES καὶ τοῦτο.	**ARISTOTELES** "That too."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἴρηται;	**PARMENIDES** "Then hasn't each of the two been spoken of?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES τί δ' ὅταν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἕν, ἆρα οὐκ ἀμφοτέρω;	**PARMENIDES** "And when I say 'being and one,' don't I speak of both?"

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	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	ARISTOTELES "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ᾖ ἑτερόν τε καὶ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἑκάστου ἄμφω λέγω;	PARMENIDES "And also if I say 'being and different' or 'different and one'—so that in every case I'm speaking of both, each time?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	ARISTOTELES "Yes."
143d	PARMENIDES ὧ δ' ἂν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἆρα οἷόν τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτὼ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή;	PARMENIDES "And whatever things are rightly called 'both'—can they be both and not two?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐχ οἷόν τε.	ARISTOTELES "They can't."
	PARMENIDES ὧ δ' ἂν δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἓν εἶναι;	PARMENIDES "And whatever things are two—is there any way for each of the two not to be one?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐδεμία.	ARISTOTELES "None."
	PARMENIDES τούτων ἄρα ἐπείπερ σύνδυο ἕκαστα συμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἓν ἂν εἴη ἕκαστον.	PARMENIDES "So since each of these turns out to be in a pair, each would also be one."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	ARISTOTELES "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES εἰ δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι, συντεθέντος ἑνὸς ὁποιουοῦν ἡτινιοῦν συζυγίᾳ οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ πάντα;	PARMENIDES "And if each of them is one, then when any one at all is added to any pair whatever, doesn't the total become three?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	ARISTOTELES "Yes."
	PARMENIDES τρία δὲ οὐ περιττὰ καὶ δύο ἄρτια;	PARMENIDES "And isn't three odd, and two even?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	ARISTOTELES "Of course."
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; δυοῖν ὄντοιν οὐκ 143e ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δίς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δὶς ἓν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρὶς ἕν;	PARMENIDES "What about this? If there are two, mustn't there 143e also be twice, and if there are three, three times—given that two is twice one, and three is three times one?"
143e	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	ARISTOTELES "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES δυοῖν δὲ ὄντοιν καὶ δὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δὶς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ τρία τρὶς εἶναι;	PARMENIDES "And if there are two and twice, mustn't there be twice two? And if there are three and three times, mustn't there in turn be three times three?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	ARISTOTELES "Of course."
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δὶς ὄντων καὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ τρὶς ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δὶς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς;	PARMENIDES "What about this? If there are three and there is twice, and there are two and there is three times, mustn't there be twice three and three times two?"
	ARISTOTELES πολλή γε.	ARISTOTELES "There certainly must."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ἂν εἴη καὶ [144a] περιττὰ περιττάκις καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις.	**PARMENIDES** "So there would be evens an even number of times, and [144a] odds an odd number of times, and evens an odd number of times, and odds an even number of times."
144a	**ARISTOTELES** ἔστιν οὕτω.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's so."
	PARMENIDES εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἴει τινὰ ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "If this is how things are, then, do you think there's any number left over that need not be?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐδαμῶς γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "None at all."
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἕν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "So if one is, there must be number too."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πολλὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὄντων· ἢ οὐκ ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται;	**PARMENIDES** "But if there is number, there would be many things, an unlimited multitude of things that are. Or doesn't number turn out to be unlimited in multitude, and to share in being?"
	ARISTOTELES καὶ πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "It certainly does."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἂν αὐτῆς;	**PARMENIDES** "Then if all number shares in being, each part of number would also share in it?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί. [144b]	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes." [144b]
144b	**PARMENIDES** ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν ὄντων του ἀποστατοῖ;	**PARMENIDES** "So being has been distributed over all things, which are many, and is missing from none of the things that are, neither the smallest nor the largest? Or is it absurd even to ask that? For how could being be missing from any of the things that are?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐδαμῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "There's no way."
	PARMENIDES κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὡς οἷόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι [144c] μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας.	**PARMENIDES** "So it has been chopped up into things as small and as large as can be, and that are in every way; it is the most divided of all things, and there are [144c] endless parts of being."
144c	**ARISTOTELES** ἔχει οὕτω.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's so."
	PARMENIDES πλεῖστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς.	**PARMENIDES** "So its parts are the most numerous."
	ARISTOTELES πλεῖστα μέντοι.	**ARISTOTELES** "They certainly are."
	PARMENIDES τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος;	**PARMENIDES** "Well then: is there any of them that is a part of being and yet not a single part?"
	ARISTOTELES καὶ πῶς ἄν τοι τοῦτο γένοιτο;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could that happen?"

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἀλλ’ εἴπερ γε οἶμαι ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεί, ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾖ, ἕν γέ τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον.	**PARMENIDES** “No; if it is at all, I suppose, it must always, as long as it is, be some one thing; it can’t be no thing.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** “Necessarily.”
	PARMENIDES πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἑκάστῳ τῷ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστιν τὸ ἕν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός.	**PARMENIDES** “So the one is present to every single part of being, not missing from any part, smaller or larger or any other.”
	ARISTOTELES οὕτω.	**ARISTOTELES** “That’s right.”
	PARMENIDES ἆρα οὖν ἓν [144d] ὂν πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἐστί; τοῦτο ἄθρει.	**PARMENIDES** “Now, being one, [144d] is it in many places at once as a whole? Look at this closely.”
144d	**ARISTOTELES** ἀλλ’ ἀθρῶ καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον.	**ARISTOTELES** “I am looking, and I see that it’s impossible.”
	PARMENIDES μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον· ἄλλως γάρ που οὐδαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασι τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας μέρεσιν παρέσται ἢ μεμερισμένον.	**PARMENIDES** “So it’s divided, if it isn’t a whole; for surely there’s no other way it could be present to all the parts of being at once than divided.”
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes.”
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη.	**PARMENIDES** “And what is divided must, quite necessarily, be as many as its parts.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** “Necessarily.”
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν λέγοντες ὡς πλεῖστα μέρη ἡ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἴη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω τοῦ ἑνὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ’ [144e] ἴσα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ ἑνί· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ’ ἐξισοῦσθον δύο ὄντε ἀεὶ παρὰ πάντα.	**PARMENIDES** “So we weren’t speaking the truth just now when we said that being had been distributed into the most numerous parts. It hasn’t been distributed into more parts than the one, but into [144e] equally many, it seems, as the one. For being doesn’t fall short of the one, nor the one of being; the two are always equal throughout everything.”
144e	**ARISTOTELES** παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** “It appears absolutely so.”
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθός ἐστιν.	**PARMENIDES** “So the one itself, chopped up by being, is many and unlimited in multitude.”
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** “Apparently.”
	PARMENIDES οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὂν ἓν πολλά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενεμημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** “So not only is the one that is many; the one itself too, distributed by being, must be many.”
	ARISTOTELES παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** “Absolutely.”
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἕν· ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ [145a] μόρια;	**PARMENIDES** “And further, since the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited with respect to the whole. Or aren’t the [145a] parts contained by the whole?”

	GREEK	ENGLISH
145a	**ARISTOTELES** ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρας ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "But what contains would be a limit."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν ἕν τέ ἐστί που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one that is is, I take it, both one and many, both whole and parts, and both limited and unlimited in multitude."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπείπερ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον;	**PARMENIDES** "Then since it's limited, doesn't it also have extremities?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; εἰ ὅλον, οὐ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; κἄν του ἓν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὅλον εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "What about this? If it's a whole, wouldn't it also have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is missing from something, will it still consent to be a whole?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἐθελήσει.	**ARISTOTELES** "It won't."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ἀρχὴν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ 145b τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, it seems, would also have a beginning, 145b an end, and a middle."
145b	**ARISTOTELES** ἔχοι.	**ARISTOTELES** "It would."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "But the middle is equally distant from the extremities; otherwise it wouldn't be a middle."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it wouldn't."
	PARMENIDES καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὂν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἤ τινος μεικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.	**PARMENIDES** "So, being like this, the one would also share in some shape, it seems—either straight or round or some mixture of the two."
	ARISTOTELES μετέχοι γὰρ ἄν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, it would."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ;	**PARMENIDES** "Then, being in this condition, won't it be both in itself and in another?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How?"
	PARMENIDES τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου.	**PARMENIDES** "Each of the parts, I take it, is in the whole, and none is outside the whole."
	ARISTOTELES οὕτω.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's so."
	PARMENIDES πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ 145c ὅλου περιέχεται;	**PARMENIDES** "And all the parts are contained by the 145c whole?"

	GREEK	ENGLISH
145c	ARISTOTELES ναί.	ARISTOTELES "Yes."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν τά γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἕν ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε τι πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα.	PARMENIDES "And the one is all its own parts, and neither more nor less than all."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	ARISTOTELES "No, neither."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἕν ἐστιν;	PARMENIDES "And isn't the one also the whole?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	ARISTOTELES "Of course."
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάντα τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη.	PARMENIDES "So if all the parts are in a whole, and the one is both all of them and the whole itself, and all of them are contained by the whole, then the one would be contained by the one; and in this way the one itself would thereby be in itself."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	ARISTOTELES "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσίν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε 145d ἐν τινί. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἑνί· ἕν τινι γὰρ ἑνὶ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναιτο ἕν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἁπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἔνι, πῶς ἔτι ἕν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται;	PARMENIDES "But then again, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor 145d in any one. For if it's in all, it must also be in one, since if it weren't in some one, it surely could no longer be in all. And if this one is one of them all, and the whole isn't in it, how will it still be in them all?"
145d	ARISTOTELES οὐδαμῶς.	ARISTOTELES "There's no way."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἴη, τὸ πλέον ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἴη, ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον.	PARMENIDES "Nor is it in some of the parts. For if the whole were in some, the greater would be in the lesser, which is impossible."
	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατον γάρ.	ARISTOTELES "Yes, impossible."
	PARMENIDES μὴ ὂν δ' ἐν πλέοσιν μηδ' ἐν ἑνὶ μηδ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι ἢ μηδαμοῦ 145e ἔτι εἶναι;	PARMENIDES "And if the whole is not in several, or in one, or in all the parts, mustn't it be in something different, or else no longer be 145e anywhere at all?"
145e	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	ARISTOTELES "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὂν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι;	PARMENIDES "Now, if it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but since it is a whole, and isn't in itself, mustn't it be in another?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	ARISTOTELES "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES ᾗι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν· ᾗ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.	PARMENIDES "So insofar as the one is a whole, it is in another; but insofar as it is all the parts, it is in itself. And so the one must be both in itself and in something different."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	ARISTOTELES "Necessarily."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς τὸ ἓν ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι;	**PARMENIDES** "With this nature, then, mustn't the one be both in motion and at rest?"
	ARISTOTELES πῇ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How?"
	PARMENIDES ἕστηκε μέν που, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ [146a] ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ ἑνὶ ὂν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ.	**PARMENIDES** "It's at rest, I suppose, if it is itself in itself. [146a] For being in one thing and not passing out of it, it would be in the same thing—in itself."
146a	**ARISTOTELES** ἔστι γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, it is."
	PARMENIDES τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ὂν ἑστὸς δήπου ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "And what is always in the same thing must surely always be at rest."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀεὶ ὂν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτ' ἐν ταὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ ὂν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἑστάναι, μὴ ἑστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "What about this? With what is always in something different, isn't it the opposite: mustn't it never be in the same thing, and never being in the same thing, not be at rest either, and not being at rest, be in motion?"
	ARISTOTELES οὕτως.	**ARISTOTELES** "Just so."
	PARMENIDES ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ ἕν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἑστάναι.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, being always both in itself and in something different, must always be both in motion and at rest."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."

SAME AND DIFFERENT, LIKE AND UNLIKE

The one that is proves the same as and different from itself and others, and like and unlike.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν ταὐτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἕτερον [146b] ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταὐτόν τε καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν.	**PARMENIDES** "And further, it must be the same as itself and different [146b] from itself, and likewise be both the same as and different from the others, given that it has the earlier attributes as well."
146b	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How?"
	PARMENIDES πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει, ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον· ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτὸν ᾖ μηδ' ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "Everything, I suppose, stands to everything in this way: either it is the same or different; or, if it is neither the same nor different, it would be a part of what it stands in this relation to, or else a whole in relation to it as a part."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν;	**PARMENIDES** "Now, is the one a part of itself?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐδαμῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Not at all."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν.	**PARMENIDES** "So it wouldn't be a whole of itself, as if in relation to a part, either—for then it would be a part in relation to itself."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οἷόν [146c] τε.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it [146c] couldn't."
146c	**PARMENIDES** ἀλλ' ἆρα ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἑνὸς τὸ ἕν;	**PARMENIDES** "But is the one different from one?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐ δῆτα.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly not."
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕτερον ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "So it wouldn't be different from itself either."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ μέντοι.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it wouldn't."
	PARMENIDES εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερον μήτε ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ταὐτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ;	**PARMENIDES** "So if it is neither different from, nor whole, nor part in relation to itself, mustn't it then be the same as itself?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; τὸ ἑτέρωθι ὂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἑτέρωθι ἔσται;	**PARMENIDES** "What about this? If something is elsewhere than itself while it is also in the same place as itself, mustn't it be different from itself, if it is also going to be elsewhere?"
	ARISTOTELES ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**ARISTOTELES** "I think so."
	PARMENIDES οὕτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἕν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν ἅμα καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.	**PARMENIDES** "And that is how the one turned out to be: both in itself and at the same time in something different."
	ARISTOTELES ἐφάνη γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, it did."
	PARMENIDES ἕτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, [146d] εἴη ταύτῃ ἂν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "So in this way, it seems, [146d] the one would be different from itself."
146d	**ARISTOTELES** ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems so."
	PARMENIDES τί οὖν; εἴ τού τι ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἑτέρου ὄντος ἕτερον ἔσται;	**PARMENIDES** "Well then: if something is different from something, won't it be different from what is different?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἕν ἐστιν, ἅπανθ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἑνός;	**PARMENIDES** "And aren't all the things that are not one different from the one, and the one from the things that are not one?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course."
	PARMENIDES ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one would be different from the others."
	ARISTOTELES ἕτερον.	**ARISTOTELES** "Different."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ὅρα δή· αὐτό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἆρ' οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις;	**PARMENIDES** "Now look: aren't the same itself and the different opposites of each other?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course."
	PARMENIDES ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσει ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ταὐτῷ ποτε εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "Then will the same ever consent to be in the different, or the different in the same?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἐθελήσει.	**ARISTOTELES** "It won't."
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἕτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν τὸ ἕτερον χρόνον οὐδένα· [146e] εἰ γὰρ ὁντινοῦν εἴη ἔν τῳ, ἐκεῖνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν ταὐτῷ εἴη τὸ ἕτερον. οὐχ οὕτως;	**PARMENIDES** "So if the different will never be in the same, there is nothing among the things that are in which the different is for any time; [146e] for if it were in anything for any time at all, for that time the different would be in the same. Isn't that so?"
146e	**ARISTOTELES** οὕτως.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's so."
	PARMENIDES ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε ἕν τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕτερον.	**PARMENIDES** "But since it is never in the same, the different would never be in any of the things that are."
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἓν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ἐνείη ἂν τὸ ἕτερον.	**PARMENIDES** "So the different would be neither in the things that are not one nor in the one."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it wouldn't."
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα τῷ ἑτέρῳ γ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἓν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one wouldn't be different from the not-ones by the different, and the not-ones wouldn't be different from the one by it either."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἕτερ' ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα [147a] τοῦ ἑτέρου.	**PARMENIDES** "Nor would they be different from each other by themselves, if they don't share in [147a] the different."
147a	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς γάρ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could they?"
	PARMENIDES εἰ δὲ μήτε αὑτοῖς ἕτερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων;	**PARMENIDES** "But if they're different neither by themselves nor by the different, wouldn't they escape altogether from being different from each other?"
	ARISTOTELES ἐκφεύγοι.	**ARISTOTELES** "They would."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἑνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἓν ἦν, ἀλλά πῃ ἂν ἓν ἦν.	**PARMENIDES** "And yet the not-ones don't share in the one either. Otherwise they wouldn't be not-one, but would in some way be one."
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἓν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμόν γε ἔχοντα.	**PARMENIDES** "So the not-ones wouldn't be a number either. For in that case, too, they wouldn't be wholly not-one, since they'd have number."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly not."
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἆρα μόριά ἐστιν; ἢ κἂν οὕτω μετεῖχε τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ μὴ ἕν;	**PARMENIDES** "What about this? Are the not-ones parts of the one? Or would the not-ones share in the one in that way too?"
	ARISTOTELES μετεῖχεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "They would."
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα πάντῃ τὸ μὲν ἕν ἐστι, [147b] τὰ δὲ μὴ ἕν, οὔτ' ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἓν τὸ ἓν εἴη οὔτε ὅλον ὡς μορίων· οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια, οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ τῷ ἑνί.	**PARMENIDES** "So if the one is in every way one, [147b] and the not-ones are in every way not one, the one wouldn't be a part of the not-ones, nor a whole of them as of parts; nor, again, would the not-ones be parts of the one, nor wholes with the one as their part."
147b	**ARISTOTELES** οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε ὅλα μήτε ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ταὐτὰ ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.	**PARMENIDES** "But we said that things that are neither parts nor wholes nor different from each other will be the same as each other."
	ARISTOTELES ἔφαμεν γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "We did."
	PARMENIDES φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἓν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἓν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς;	**PARMENIDES** "Shall we say, then, that the one, since it stands this way toward the not-ones, is the same as them?"
	ARISTOTELES φῶμεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Let's say so."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, it seems, is different from the others and from itself, and the same as them and as itself."
	ARISTOTELES κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου. [147c]	**ARISTOTELES** "It looks that way—from the argument, at least." [147c]
147c	**PARMENIDES** ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;	**PARMENIDES** "Then is it also both like and unlike itself and the others?"
	ARISTOTELES ἴσως.	**ARISTOTELES** "Perhaps."
	PARMENIDES ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τἆλλά που ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "Well, since it turned out to be different from the others, the others too would presumably be different from it."
	ARISTOTELES τί μήν;	**ARISTOTELES** "What else?"
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττον;	**PARMENIDES** "Isn't it different from the others just as the others are from it, neither more nor less?"

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ARISTOTELES τί γὰρ ἄν;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it be otherwise?"
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὁμοίως.	**PARMENIDES** "So if neither more nor less, then alike."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ᾗ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τἆλλα τῷ ἑνί.	**PARMENIDES** "Then insofar as it has the property of being different from the others, and the others likewise from it, in that respect the one and the others would have the same property—the one as the others, and the others as the one."
147d	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς λέγεις;	**ARISTOTELES** "What do you mean?"
	PARMENIDES ὧδε· ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς;	**PARMENIDES** "This: don't you apply each name to something?"
	ARISTOTELES ἔγωγε.	**ARISTOTELES** "I do."
	PARMENIDES τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ;	**PARMENIDES** "Well then, could you say the same name more than once, or only once?"
	ARISTOTELES ἔγωγε.	**ARISTOTELES** "I could."
	PARMENIDES πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὗπέρ ἐστι τοὔνομα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταὐτὸν καὶ λέγειν ἀεί;	**PARMENIDES** "Then if you say it once, do you address the thing whose name it is, but if you say it many times, not that thing? Or whether you utter the same name once or many times, is it quite necessary that you always mean the same thing too?"
	ARISTOTELES τί μήν;	**ARISTOTELES** "What else?"
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπί τινι;	**PARMENIDES** "Now 'different,' too, is a name for something, isn't it?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
147e	**PARMENIDES** ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗπερ ἦν ὄνομα.	**PARMENIDES** "So whenever you utter it, whether once or many times, you don't apply it to anything else, or name anything other than that whose name it was."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, δὶς τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν ἥσπερ ἦν τοὔνομα.	**PARMENIDES** "So when we say that the others are different from the one, and the one is different from the others, though we've said 'different' twice, we don't apply it any more to some other nature: we always apply it to that nature whose name it was."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Absolutely."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἦι ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν [148a] ἄλλων τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις· τὸ δέ που ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον· οὐχί;	**PARMENIDES** "Then insofar as the one is different from the [148a] others and the others from the one, in virtue of having the property of the different itself, the one would have not another property but the same one as the others. And what has the same property is presumably like—isn't it?"
148a	**ARISTOTELES** ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES ἦι δὴ τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "So insofar as the one has the property of being different from the others, by that very fact everything would be like everything; for everything is different from everything."
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "So it seems."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον.	**PARMENIDES** "But surely the like is the opposite of the unlike."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταὐτῷ.	**PARMENIDES** "And the different the opposite of the same."
	ARISTOTELES καὶ τοῦτο.	**ARISTOTELES** "That too."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γ᾽ ἐφάνη, ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἓν τοῖς [148b] ἄλλοις ταὐτόν.	**PARMENIDES** "But this too came to light: that the one is the same as the [148b] others."
148b	**ARISTOTELES** ἐφάνη γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "It did."
	PARMENIDES τοὐναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.	**PARMENIDES** "And being the same as the others is the opposite property to being different from the others."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES ἦι γε μὴν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον ἐφάνη.	**PARMENIDES** "And insofar as it was different, it turned out to be like."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES ἦι ἄρα ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τοὐναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὡμοίου δέ που τὸ ἕτερον;	**PARMENIDES** "So insofar as it is the same, it will be unlike, in virtue of the property opposite to the one that made it like. And it was the different, wasn't it, that made it like?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τὸ ταὐτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἑτέρῳ.	**PARMENIDES** "Then the same will make it unlike —or else it won't be the opposite of the different."
148c	**ARISTOTELES** ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "So it seems."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ὅμοιον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ᾗ μὲν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον, ᾗ δὲ ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον.	**PARMENIDES** “So the one will be both like and unlike the others: insofar as it is different, like, and insofar as it is the same, unlike.”
	ARISTOTELES ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes—it seems the argument can take that line too.”
	PARMENIDES καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει.	**PARMENIDES** “Yes, and this one as well.”
	ARISTOTELES τίνα;	**ARISTOTELES** “Which?”
	PARMENIDES ᾗ ταὐτὸν πέπονθε, μὴ ἀλλοῖον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἀλλοῖον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι· ᾗ δ’ ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἀλλοῖον, ἀλλοῖον δὲ ὂν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** “Insofar as it has the same property, it doesn’t have a property of another kind; and not having a property of another kind, it isn’t unlike; and not being unlike, it is like. But insofar as it has another property, it is of another kind; and being of another kind, it is unlike.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**ARISTOTELES** “You’re right.”
	PARMENIDES ταὐτόν τε ἄρα ὂν τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατ’ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον, ὅμοιόν 148d τε ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις.	**PARMENIDES** “So because the one is the same as the others, and because it is different, on both grounds together and on each separately, it would be both like 148d and unlike the others.”
148d	**ARISTOTELES** πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** “Certainly.”
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπείπερ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ’ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται;	**PARMENIDES** “And in the same way in relation to itself: since it turned out to be both different from itself and the same as itself, won’t it turn out, on both grounds together and on each separately, to be both like and unlike itself?”
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** “Necessarily.”

TOUCHING, EQUAL AND UNEQUAL

It both touches and does not touch itself and the others, and is equal, larger and smaller.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι τὸ ἓν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι πέρι πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει.	**PARMENIDES** “Now then—what about the one’s touching itself and the others, and its not touching them? Consider how that stands.”
	ARISTOTELES σκοπῶ.	**ARISTOTELES** “I’m considering it.”
	PARMENIDES αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ τὸ ἓν ἐφάνη ὄν.	**PARMENIDES** “The one itself, as we saw, turned out to be in itself as a whole.”
	ARISTOTELES ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** “Right.”
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἕν;	**PARMENIDES** “And isn’t the one also in the others?”
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes.”

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἦι μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, [148e] τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτοιτο ἄν· ᾗ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἅπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἅπτοιτο ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν.	**PARMENIDES** "So insofar as it is in the others, [148e] it would touch the others; but insofar as it is itself in itself, it would be kept from touching the others, and would touch itself, being in itself."
148e	**ARISTOTELES** φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἅπτοιτο ἂν τὸ ἓν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	**PARMENIDES** "In this way, then, the one would touch both itself and the others."
	ARISTOTELES ἅπτοιτο.	**ARISTOTELES** "It would."
	PARMENIDES τί δὲ τῇδε; ἆρ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἅψεσθαί τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κεῖσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὗ μέλλει ἅπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἕδραν κατέχον ἣ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ᾗ ἕδρα ᾗ ἂν κέηται, ἅπτεται;	**PARMENIDES** "But what about this way? Mustn't everything that is going to touch something lie next to what it is going to touch, occupying the position that comes right after the position in which the thing it touches lies?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἅψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κεῖσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἐν ᾗ αὐτό ἐστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one too, if it is going to touch itself, must lie right next to itself, occupying the place adjacent to the one it is in."
	ARISTOTELES δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, it must."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν ὂν τὸ ἓν ποιήσειεν [149a] ἂν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο· ἕως δ' ἂν ᾗ ἕν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει;	**PARMENIDES** "Now the one could do that if it were two, [149a] and so be in two places at once; but as long as it is one, it won't be willing to, will it?"
149a	**ARISTOTELES** οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly not."
	PARMENIDES ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἑνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ.	**PARMENIDES** "So the same necessity bars the one from being two and from touching itself."
	ARISTOTELES ἡ αὐτή.	**ARISTOTELES** "The same."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἅψεται.	**PARMENIDES** "But it won't touch the others either."
	ARISTOTELES τί δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "Why not?"
	PARMENIDES ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἅψεσθαι χωρὶς ὂν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ εἶναι οὗ μέλλει ἅψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "Because, we say, what is going to touch something must, while being separate, be next to what it is going to touch, with no third thing between them."
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἅψις εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "So there must be two things at the least, if there is going to be contact."
	ARISTOTELES δεῖ.	**ARISTOTELES** "There must."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἐὰν δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ὅροιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἑξῆς, αὐτὰ [149b] μὲν τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἅψεις δύο.	**PARMENIDES** "And if a third term is added in a row to the two, they [149b] will be three, but the contacts two."
149b	**ARISTOTELES** ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀεὶ ἑνὸς προσγιγνομένου μία καὶ ἅψις προσγίγνεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἅψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ᾧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἅψεων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς ἅψεις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἅψεων πλεονεκτεῖ· ἤδη [149c] γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἅμα ἕν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἅψις ταῖς ἅψεσιν.	**PARMENIDES** "And so, each time one term is added, one contact is added as well, and it follows that the contacts are one fewer than the number of terms. For the amount by which the first two exceeded the contacts, making the number greater than the contacts—by that same amount every later number exceeds all the contacts; for [149c] from then on one is added to the number and one contact to the contacts at the same time."
149c	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Right."
	PARMENIDES ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶν τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἀεὶ μιᾷ αἱ ἅψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν.	**PARMENIDES** "So however many the things that are may be in number, the contacts are always one fewer than they are."
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES εἰ δέ γε ἓν μόνον ἐστίν, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἅψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "But if there is only one, and there is no two, there would be no contact."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γάρ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could there be?"
	PARMENIDES οὔκουν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν.	**PARMENIDES** "Now the others than the one, we say, neither are one nor share in it, if they really are others."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἑνὸς μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν αὐτοῖς.	**PARMENIDES** "So there is no number in the others, since one is not in them."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γάρ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could there be?"
	PARMENIDES οὔτ' ἄρα ἕν ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε [149d] ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν.	**PARMENIDES** "So the others are neither one nor two, nor [149d] do they have the name of any other number at all."
149d	**ARISTOTELES** οὔ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ἕν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one alone is one, and there could be no two."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently not."
	PARMENIDES ἅψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν δυοῖν μὴ ὄντοιν.	**PARMENIDES** "So there is no contact, since there aren't two things."
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔστιν.	**ARISTOTELES** "There isn't."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὔτ’ ἄρα τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείπερ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** “So the one doesn’t touch the others, nor the others the one, since there is no contact.”
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** “Certainly not.”
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἅπτεταί τε καὶ οὐχ ἅπτεται.	**PARMENIDES** “So on all these grounds the one both touches and does not touch the others and itself.”
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** “So it seems.”
	PARMENIDES ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;	**PARMENIDES** “Then is it also both equal and unequal to itself and to the others?”
	ARISTOTELES πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** “How so?”
	PARMENIDES εἰ μεῖζον εἴη τὸ ἓν ἢ τἆλλα ἢ ἔλαττον, [149e] ἢ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἆρα οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἑκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἕν, σμικρότητα δὲ τἆλλα, ὁποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἴδει μέγεθος προσείη, μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, ᾧ δὲ σμικρότης, ἔλαττον;	**PARMENIDES** “If the one were greater or smaller than the others, [149e] or again the others greater or smaller than the one, wouldn’t it be that by the one’s being one and the others’ being other than the one, they would be neither greater nor smaller than each other—not, at least, by virtue of their very being? But if, in addition to being what they are, each had equality, they would be equal to each other. And if the others had largeness and the one smallness, or the one largeness and the others smallness, then whichever form had largeness attached to it would be greater, and whichever had smallness, smaller?”
149e	**ARISTOTELES** ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** “Necessarily.”
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἐστόν γέ τινε τούτω εἴδη, τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίω τε ἀλλήλοιν εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς [150a] οὖσιν ἐγγιγνοίσθην.	**PARMENIDES** “Now these two are forms, aren’t they—largeness and smallness? For surely if they were not, they couldn’t be opposites of each other and come to be in the [150a] things that are.”
150a	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς γὰρ ἄν;	**ARISTOTELES** “How could they?”
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἤτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη.	**PARMENIDES** “So if smallness comes to be in the one, it would be either in the whole of it or in a part of it.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** “Necessarily.”
	PARMENIDES τί δ’ εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δι’ ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό;	**PARMENIDES** “What if it came to be in the whole? Wouldn’t it either be stretched through the whole of the one on equal terms with it, or else contain it?”
	ARISTOTELES δῆλον δή.	**ARISTOTELES** “Obviously.”

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	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὖσα ἡ σμικρότης τῷ ἑνὶ ἴση ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων;	**PARMENIDES** "Then wouldn't smallness, if it were on equal terms with the one, be equal to it, and if it contained it, be larger?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it not?"
	PARMENIDES δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἴσην τῳ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ [150b] μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς;	**PARMENIDES** "Is it possible, then, for smallness to be equal to anything or larger than anything, and to do the work of largeness and equality rather [150b] than its own?"
150b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀδύνατον.	**ARISTOTELES** "Impossible."
	PARMENIDES ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἑνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη σμικρότης, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει.	**PARMENIDES** "So smallness wouldn't be in the one as a whole, but, if anywhere, in a part."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES οὐδέ γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὰ ποιήσει ἅπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζων τοῦ μέρους ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐνῇ.	**PARMENIDES** "But not in the whole of the part either; otherwise it will do just what it did in relation to the whole: it will be equal to or larger than whatever part it happens to be in."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES οὐδενί ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων σμικρότης, μήτ' ἐν μέρει μήτ' ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη· οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος.	**PARMENIDES** "So smallness will never be in any of the things that are, coming to be neither in a part nor in a whole; and nothing will be small except smallness itself."
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems not."
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ· μεῖζον γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη ἄλλο καὶ [150c] πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὗ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ᾖ μέγα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἔνι.	**PARMENIDES** "So largeness won't be in it either. For then something else would be larger, even [150c] apart from largeness itself—namely, that in which the largeness was—and that without there being anything small for it, which it must exceed if it is large. But that's impossible, since smallness is in nothing anywhere."
150c	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μεῖζον ἢ αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ μεγέθους.	**PARMENIDES** "But largeness itself isn't larger than anything except smallness itself, nor is smallness smaller than anything except largeness itself."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES οὔτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζω τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχοντα, οὔτε [150d] αὐτὼ τούτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἔχετον τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλω, οὔτε αὖ	**PARMENIDES** "So the others are neither larger nor smaller than the one, since they have neither largeness nor smallness; nor [150d] do these two themselves have their power of exceeding and being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in re-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τὸ ἓν τούτοιν οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μεῖζον ἂν οὐδ' ἔλαττον εἴη, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον.	lation to each other; nor, again, would the one be larger or smaller than these two or than the others, since it has neither largeness nor smallness."
150d	**ARISTOTELES** οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently not, at any rate."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν, εἰ μήτε μεῖζον μήτε ἔλαττον τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "Then if the one is neither larger nor smaller than the others, must it neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὂν ἴσον εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "And surely what neither exceeds nor is exceeded must, quite necessarily, be on equal terms, and being on equal terms, be equal."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γὰρ [150e] οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "Of [150e] course."
150e	**PARMENIDES** καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό γε τὸ ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι· μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ὂν ἴσον ἂν εἴη ἑαυτῷ.	**PARMENIDES** "And further, the one itself would stand this way toward itself too: having neither largeness nor smallness in itself, it would neither be exceeded by itself nor exceed itself, but being on equal terms with itself, it would be equal to itself."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Absolutely."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one would be equal both to itself and to the others."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἂν εἴη ἔξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον [151a] ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ οὕτω μεῖζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "And yet, being itself in itself, it would also be around itself on the outside; and as containing, it would be larger [151a] than itself, and as contained, smaller. And so the one would be both larger and smaller than itself."
151a	**ARISTOTELES** εἴη γὰρ ἄν.	**ARISTOTELES** "So it would."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων;	**PARMENIDES** "Isn't this necessary too: that there is nothing outside the one and the others?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ τό γε ὂν ἀεί.	**PARMENIDES** "But surely what is must always be somewhere."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔν τῳ ὂν ἐν μείζονι ἔσται ἔλαττον ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "And what is in something will be in something larger, being smaller, won't it? For otherwise one thing couldn't be in another."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔστι χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἔν τῳ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, [151b] ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "And since there is nothing else apart from the others and the one, and they must be in something, mustn't they then be in each other—the others in the one and the one in the others— [151b] or else be nowhere?"
151b	**ARISTOTELES** φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστι, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἓν ἔλαττον τῶν ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλάττω.	**PARMENIDES** "So because the one is in the others, the others would be larger than the one, since they contain it, and the one smaller than the others, since it is contained. And because the others are in the one, by the same argument the one would be larger than the others, and the others smaller than the one."
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "So it seems."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα ἴσον τε καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one is equal to, larger than, and smaller than both itself and the others."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων [151c] αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν.	**PARMENIDES** "And further, if it is larger and smaller and equal, it would have measures equal to, more than, and fewer than [151c] itself and the others; and since measures, parts too."
151c	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it not?"
	PARMENIDES ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὂν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἔλαττον ἂν καὶ πλέον εἴη αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἴσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταὐτά.	**PARMENIDES** "So having equal and more and fewer measures, it would also be fewer and more in number than itself and the others, and equal to itself and the others in the same way."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How so?"
	PARMENIDES ὥνπερ μεῖζόν ἐστι, πλειόνων που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν, ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν· καὶ ὧν ἔλαττον, ὡσαύτως· καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταὐτά.	**PARMENIDES** "Whatever things it is larger than, it would presumably have more measures than them too, and as many measures, so many parts. And the same with those it is smaller than; and with those it is equal to, in the same way."
	ARISTOTELES οὕτως.	**ARISTOTELES** "Just so."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ὂν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη [151d] μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὑτῷ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν;	**PARMENIDES** "So, being larger and smaller than itself and equal to itself, wouldn't it have measures equal to, [151d] more than, and fewer than itself; and since measures, parts too?"
151d	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it not?"
		PARMENIDES "So having parts equal to itself, it would be equal to itself in multitude; having more,

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὂν αὐτῷ ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλέον, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ.	more; and having fewer, fewer in number than itself."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα ὡσαύτως ἕξει τὸ ἕν; ὅτι μὲν μεῖζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἔλαττον· ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις;	**PARMENIDES** "And won't the one stand the same way toward the others? Insofar as it turns out larger than they are, it must be more in number than they are too; insofar as smaller, fewer; and insofar as equal in size, equal also in multitude to the others?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ αὖ, ὡς [151e] ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	**PARMENIDES** "So again, it [151e] seems, the one will be equal to, more than, and fewer than both itself and the others in number."
151e	**ARISTOTELES** ἔσται.	**ARISTOTELES** "It will."

THE ONE IN TIME

Sharing in time, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and also neither.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἕν, καὶ ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον;	**PARMENIDES** "Then does the one also share in time? And, sharing in time, is it and is it becoming both younger and older than itself and the others, and also neither younger nor older than itself or the others?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How so?"
	PARMENIDES εἶναι μέν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἓν ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "To be, presumably, belongs to it, if one is."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ [152a] τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία;	**PARMENIDES** "And is 'to be' anything other than participation in being together with present time, just as [152a] 'was' is association with being together with past time, and again 'will be' together with future time?"
152a	**ARISTOTELES** ἔστι γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, it is."
	PARMENIDES μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "So it shares in time, if it shares in being as well."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου;	**PARMENIDES** "And time is moving on, isn't it?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἀεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον.	**PARMENIDES** "So it is always becoming older than itself, if it goes forward in time."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται;	**PARMENIDES** "Now do we remember that what is older becomes older than something that is becoming younger?"
	ARISTOTELES μεμνήμεθα.	**ARISTOTELES** "We do."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἕν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον [152b] γίγνοιτο;	**PARMENIDES** "Then since the one is becoming older than itself, wouldn't it be becoming older than a self that is [152b] becoming younger?"
152b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES γίγνεται μὲν δὴ νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτοῦ οὕτω.	**PARMENIDES** "So in this way it becomes both younger and older than itself."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἆρ' οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον ᾖ γιγνόμενον τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πορευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν.	**PARMENIDES** "But isn't it older when, in its becoming, it is at the present time, the now, which lies between 'was' and 'will be'? For surely, going from then to later, it won't skip over the now."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδὰν [152c] τῷ νῦν ἐντύχῃ, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἔστι τότ' ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προϊὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ληφθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προϊὸν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δ' ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τε ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν.	**PARMENIDES** "Then doesn't it stop becoming older at that point, when [152c] it meets the now, and it isn't becoming, but by then already is older? For if it were going forward, it could never be caught by the now. What goes forward is such as to grasp both the now and the later, letting go of the now and laying hold of the later, coming to be between the two—the later and the now."
152c	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὰν κατὰ τοῦτο ᾖ, [152d] ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ γιγνόμενον.	**PARMENIDES** "But if everything that is becoming must not pass by the now, then whenever it is at it, [152d] it always stops becoming, and then is whatever it happened to be becoming."
152d	**ARISTOTELES** φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one too, when in becoming older it meets the now, has stopped becoming, and then is older."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Absolutely."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν οὗπερ ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν· ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ;	

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		PARMENIDES “Isn’t it older than that very thing it was becoming older than? And it was becoming older than itself?”
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes.”
	PARMENIDES ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον;	**PARMENIDES** “And what is older is older than something younger?”
	ARISTOTELES ἔστιν.	**ARISTOTELES** “It is.”
	PARMENIDES καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὑτοῦ ἐστι τὸ ἕν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν.	**PARMENIDES** “So the one is also younger than itself at that point, when in becoming older it meets the now.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** “Necessarily.”
	PARMENIDES τό γε μὴν [152e] νῦν ἀεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἑνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι· ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ νῦν ὅτανπερ ᾖ.	**PARMENIDES** “But the [152e] now is always present to the one throughout its being; for it always is now, whenever it is.”
152e	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** “Of course.”
	PARMENIDES ἀεὶ ἄρα ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** “So the one always both is and is becoming older and younger than itself.”
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** “So it seems.”
	PARMENIDES πλείω δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον;	**PARMENIDES** “And is it, or does it become, for more time than itself, or for an equal time?”
	ARISTOTELES τὸν ἴσον.	**ARISTOTELES** “An equal time.”
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ ὂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει.	**PARMENIDES** “But what becomes or is for an equal time has the same age.”
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ’ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** “How could it not?”
	PARMENIDES τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν.	**PARMENIDES** “And what has the same age is neither older nor younger.”
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** “No.”
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὂν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν οὐδὲ γίγνεται.	**PARMENIDES** “So the one, since it both becomes and is for a time equal to itself, neither is nor becomes younger or older than itself.”
	ARISTOTELES οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.	**ARISTOTELES** “I think not.”
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων;	**PARMENIDES** “What about this? Than the others?”
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. [153a]	**ARISTOTELES** “I can’t say.” [153a]
153a	**PARMENIDES** τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἕτερά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἑνός· ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὂν ἓν ἂν ἦν, ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἑνός ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι.	**PARMENIDES** “But you can say this much: that the others than the one, if they are different things and not a different thing, are more than one. For if they were a different thing, they would be one; but

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		being different things, they are more than one and would have multitude."
	ARISTOTELES ἔχοι γὰρ ἄν.	ARISTOTELES "Yes, they would."
	PARMENIDES πλῆθος δὲ ὂν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἑνός.	PARMENIDES "And being a multitude, they would share in a number greater than one."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	ARISTOTELES "How could they not?"
	PARMENIDES τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω;	PARMENIDES "Well then: shall we say that, among numbers, the greater come to be and have come to be earlier, or the smaller?"
	ARISTOTELES τὰ ἐλάττω.	ARISTOTELES "The smaller."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον· τοῦτο [153b] δ' ἔστι τὸ ἕν. ἦ γάρ;	PARMENIDES "So the smallest is first; and this [153b] is the one. Isn't it?"
153b	ARISTOTELES ναί.	ARISTOTELES "Yes."
	PARMENIDES πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἓν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐχόντων· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστίν.	PARMENIDES "So of all things that have number, the one has come to be first; and all the others have number too, if they are others and not an other."
	ARISTOTELES ἔχει γάρ.	ARISTOTELES "They do."
	PARMENIDES πρῶτον δέ γε οἶμαι γεγονὸς πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον, τὰ δ' ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος· καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τἆλλα νεώτερα τοῦ ἑνός, τὸ δὲ ἓν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων.	PARMENIDES "And what has come to be first, I suppose, has come to be earlier, and the others later; and what has come to be later is younger than what came to be earlier. And so the others would be younger than the one, and the one older than the others."
	ARISTOTELES εἴη γὰρ ἄν.	ARISTOTELES "So it would."
	PARMENIDES τί δὲ τόδε; ἆρ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ [153c] γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον;	PARMENIDES "What about this? Could the one have come to be contrary to its own [153c] nature, or is that impossible?"
153c	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατον.	ARISTOTELES "Impossible."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἕν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον.	PARMENIDES "But the one was shown to have parts. And if parts, then a beginning, an end, and a middle."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	ARISTOTELES "Yes."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους;	PARMENIDES "Now doesn't the beginning come to be first of all, both of the one itself and of each of the others? And after the beginning, all the rest too, right up to the end?"
	ARISTOTELES τί μήν;	ARISTOTELES "Of course."

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	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ' εἶναι πάντα τἆλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἕν τε καὶ ὅλον.	**PARMENIDES** "And we'll say, too, that all these others are parts of the whole and one, and that it has itself come to be one and whole at the same time as the end."
	ARISTOTELES φήσομεν γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, we'll say that."
	PARMENIDES τελευτὴ δέ γε οἶμαι ὕστατον γίγνεται, τούτῳ [153d] δ' ἅμα τὸ ἓν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι· ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι.	**PARMENIDES** "And the end, I take it, comes to be last, and it is the one's nature to come to be [153d] at the same time as the end. So if the one itself must not come to be contrary to its nature, then, having come to be at the same time as the end, it would by nature come to be last of the others."
153d	**ARISTOTELES** φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἕν ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one is younger than the others, and the others are older than the one."
	ARISTOTELES οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Again, that's how it looks to me."
	PARMENIDES τί δὲ δή; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἓν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν;	**PARMENIDES** "What about this, then? A beginning, or any other part whatever of the one or of anything else whatever, provided it's a part and not parts—mustn't it be one, since it is a part?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "It must."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἂν καὶ [153e] ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὅτιπερ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὁτῳοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἓν γένηται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει.	**PARMENIDES** "Then the one would come to be at the same time as the first part that comes to be, and [153e] at the same time as the second. And it falls behind none of the others as they come to be, whichever is added to whichever, until it has passed through to the last and become one whole, having been left behind in its coming to be by neither middle nor first nor last nor anything else."
153e	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES πᾶσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει τὸ ἕν· ὥστ' εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' ἅμα. [154a] καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one has the same age as all the others. And so, if the one itself has not grown contrary to its nature, it would have come to be neither before nor after the others, but at the same time as them. [154a] And by this argument the one would be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one. But by the earlier argument it is both older and younger, and the others likewise than it."
154a	**ARISTOTELES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἆρα ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἑτέρως;	**PARMENIDES** "So that is how it is and how it has come to be. But what, in turn, about its *becoming* older and younger than the others, and the others than the one—and becoming neither younger nor older? Is it with becoming as it is with being, or otherwise?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ [154b] ἔχω λέγειν.	**ARISTOTELES** "I can't [154b] say."
154b	**PARMENIDES** ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε· εἰ καὶ ἔστιν πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, γίγνεσθαί γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύναιτο, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὂν ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι· ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὅσῳπερ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ.	**PARMENIDES** "But I can say this much at least. Even if one thing is older than another, it could no longer become older still by more than the difference in age it had right at the start, as soon as it came to be; nor, again, could what is younger become younger still. For equals added to unequals —whether in time or in anything else whatever— always make them differ by an amount equal to whatever they differed by at first."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it not?"
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος γίγνοιτ' [154c] ἄν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ' οὔ.	**PARMENIDES** "So a thing that is could never become older or younger than a thing that is one, [154c] if they always differ in age by an equal amount. Rather, it is and has come to be older, and the other younger, but neither becomes so."
154c	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται.	**PARMENIDES** "And so the one, which is, never becomes either older or younger than the others, which are."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it doesn't."
	PARMENIDES ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται.	**PARMENIDES** "But see whether they become older and younger in this way."
	ARISTOTELES πῇ δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "In what way?"
	PARMENIDES ἧι τό τε ἓν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός.	**PARMENIDES** "In the way in which the one was shown to be older than the others, and the others than the one."
	ARISTOTELES τί οὖν;	**ARISTOTELES** "What of it?"
	PARMENIDES ὅταν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον ᾖ, πλείω που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ τὰ [154d] ἄλλα.	**PARMENIDES** "When the one is older than the others, it has presumably come to be for a longer time than the [154d] others."
154d	**ARISTOTELES** ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
		PARMENIDES "Now look at it again. If we add an equal time to a longer and a shorter time, will the

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	PARMENIDES πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἆρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ διοίσει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ;	longer differ from the shorter by an equal fraction, or by a smaller one?"
	ARISTOTELES σμικροτέρῳ.	**ARISTOTELES** "A smaller one."
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται, ὅτιπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τἆλλα ἡλικίᾳ διαφέρον τὸ ἕν, τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλαττον ἀεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρότερον· ἢ οὔ;	**PARMENIDES** "So by whatever fraction the one differed in age from the others at first, it won't go on differing by that afterward too. Rather, getting an equal time with the others, it will always differ from them in age by less than before. Or not?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρον [154e] ἡλικίᾳ πρός τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον;	**PARMENIDES** "Now wouldn't what differs from something by less [154e] in age than before become younger than it was earlier, in relation to the things it was formerly older than?"
154e	**ARISTOTELES** νεώτερον.	**ARISTOTELES** "Younger."
	PARMENIDES εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἓν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον;	**PARMENIDES** "And if it becomes younger, don't those others, in turn, become older in relation to the one than before?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, certainly."
	PARMENIDES τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὄν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. [155a] τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως. ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου· γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἷω τε εἴτην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιντο, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄν. νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἓν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὂν καὶ πρότερον [155b] γεγονός, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ὕστερα γέγονε.	**PARMENIDES** "So what came to be younger becomes older in relation to what came to be earlier and is older. Yet it never *is* older; it is always becoming older than that. For the former advances toward the younger, the latter toward the older. [155a] And the older, in turn, becomes younger than the younger in the same way. For as the two go in opposite directions, they become each other's opposite: the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. But they could never have become so. For if they had become so, they would no longer be becoming; they would be. As it is, they do become older and younger than each other: the one becomes younger than the others, because it was shown to be older and to have come to be [155b] earlier, and the others become older than the one, because they came to be later."
155b	κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἴσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα.	"And by the same argument the others stand in this way toward the one, too, since they were shown to be older than it and to have come to be earlier."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, so it appears."

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	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ᾗ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων ἀεὶ διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός· ᾗ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἀεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη [155c] τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὕστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτῃ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων;	**PARMENIDES** "Isn't it so, then? Insofar as nothing becomes older or younger than anything else, by virtue of their always differing from each other by an equal number, the one would not become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one. But insofar as things that came to be earlier must always differ [155c] from those that came to be later, and the later from the earlier, by a different fraction, in that respect the others must become both older and younger than the one, and the one than the others."
155c	**ARISTOTELES** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὑτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων.	**PARMENIDES** "By all these arguments, then, the one both is and is becoming older and younger than itself and than the others; and it neither is nor is becoming older or younger than either itself or the others."
	ARISTOTELES παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Completely so."
	PARMENIDES ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἓν καὶ τοῦ [155d] πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει;	**PARMENIDES** "But since the one shares in time and in [155d] becoming older and younger, mustn't it also share in the 'once,' the 'hereafter,' and the 'now,' if it does share in time?"
155d	**ARISTOTELES** ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἓν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become."
	ARISTOTELES τί μήν;	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course."
	PARMENIDES καὶ εἴη ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.	**PARMENIDES** "And there could be something for it and of it, and there was and is and will be."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, certainly."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν.	**PARMENIDES** "And there would be knowledge of it, and opinion and perception, seeing that we ourselves are doing all these things concerning it right now."
	ARISTOTELES ὀρθῶς λέγεις.	**ARISTOTELES** "You're right."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ [155e] ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἓν ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "And it has a name and an account, and [155e] it is named and spoken of. And whatever things of this kind hold for the others hold for the one as well."
155e	**ARISTOTELES** παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's completely how it is."

HYPOTHESIS 3: THE INSTANT

A one that both is and is not must change between them in "the instant," which takes no time.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἕν τε ὂν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἕν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας;	**PARMENIDES** "Let's take it up still a third time. If the one is such as we have described—being both one and many, and neither one nor many, and sharing in time—mustn't it, insofar as it is one, at some time share in being, and, insofar as it is not, at some time not share in being?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἷόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν;	**PARMENIDES** "Now when it shares in being, will it be possible for it at that time not to share in it, or, when it does not share in it, to share in it?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐχ οἷόν τε.	**ARISTOTELES** "It's not possible."
	PARMENIDES ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι. 156a	**PARMENIDES** "So it shares in being at one time and does not share in it at another; for only in this way could it both share and not share in the same thing." 156a
156a	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Right."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μή ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφίῃ;	**PARMENIDES** "Isn't there also this time, then, when it comes to partake of being and when it parts from it? Or how will it be possible for it to have the same thing at one time and not have it at another, unless at some point it both takes it and lets it go?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐδαμῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "In no way."
	PARMENIDES τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἆρά γε οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς;	**PARMENIDES** "Now coming to partake of being—don't you call that coming to be?"
	ARISTOTELES ἔγωγε.	**ARISTOTELES** "I do."
	PARMENIDES τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἆρα οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "And parting from being—isn't that perishing?"
	ARISTOTELES καὶ πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Very much so."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιὲν οὐσίαν γίγνεταί 156b τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, it seems, by taking and letting go of being, comes to be 156b and perishes."
156b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἓν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὂν καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ἆρ' οὐχ, ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἕν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλά, τὸ ἓν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται;	**PARMENIDES** "And since it is one and many, and comes to be and perishes, isn't it the case that when it comes to be one, its being many perishes,

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		and when it comes to be many, its being one perishes?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, certainly."
	PARMENIDES ἓν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαί τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "And as it comes to be one and many, mustn't it be separated and combined?"
	ARISTOTELES πολλή γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "It certainly must."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαί τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "Moreover, when it comes to be unlike and like, mustn't it be made like and made unlike?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ὅταν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαί τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "And when it comes to be greater and less and equal, mustn't it increase and decrease and be made equal?"
	ARISTOTELES οὕτως. [156c]	**ARISTOTELES** "Just so." [156c]
156c	**PARMENIDES** ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἵστηται καὶ ὅταν ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δήπου αὐτό γε μηδ' ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "And when, being in motion, it comes to rest, and when, being at rest, it changes to moving, it surely cannot itself be in any single time."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "How so?"
	PARMENIDES ἑστός τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἑστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν.	**PARMENIDES** "Being at rest earlier and moving later, and moving earlier and being at rest later—it won't be possible for it to undergo these without changing."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γάρ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it?"
	PARMENIDES χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἷόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἑστάναι.	**PARMENIDES** "But there is no time in which anything can at once be neither moving nor at rest."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, there isn't."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.	**PARMENIDES** "And yet surely it doesn't change without changing."
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ εἰκός.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's not likely."
	PARMENIDES πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἑστὸς ὂν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν [156d] χρόνῳ ὄν.	**PARMENIDES** "So when does it change? For it doesn't change while it is at rest, or while it is moving, or while it is in [156d] time."
156d	**ARISTOTELES** οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it doesn't."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει;	**PARMENIDES** "Is there, then, this strange thing in which it would be at the moment when it changes?"

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ARISTOTELES τὸ ποῖον δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "What sort of thing?"
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἑστάναι ἑστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, [156e] ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.	**PARMENIDES** "The instant. For 'the instant' seems to signify something like this: that from it a thing changes into each of the two states. For a thing doesn't change from rest while it is still at rest, nor from motion while it is still in motion. Rather, this strange nature, the instant, lies between motion and rest, [156e] being in no time at all; and it is into it and out of it that what is moving changes to being at rest, and what is at rest changes to moving."[9]
156e	**ARISTOTELES** κινδυνεύει.	**ARISTOTELES** "It looks that way."
	PARMENIDES καὶ τὸ ἓν δή, εἴπερ ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα—μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ—μεταβάλλον δ' ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινοῖτ' ἂν τότε, οὐδ' ἂν σταίη.	**PARMENIDES** "And so the one, if it is both at rest and in motion, would change to each—for only in this way could it do both. And in changing, it changes in the instant; and when it changes, it would be in no time, and at that moment it would be neither moving nor at rest."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it wouldn't."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι [157a] μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται;	**PARMENIDES** "Is it the same, then, with the other changes too? When it changes from being to perishing, [157a] or from not being to coming to be, does it then come to be between certain motions and rests, so that at that moment it neither is nor is not, and neither comes to be nor perishes?"
157a	**ARISTOTELES** ἔοικε γοῦν.	**ARISTOTELES** "So it seems, at any rate."
	PARMENIDES κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὅμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ [157b] ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν.	**PARMENIDES** "By the same argument, then, when it is going from one to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and is neither being separated nor being combined. And when it is going from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither being made like nor being made unlike. And [157b] when it is going from small to large and to equal, and into the opposites, it would be neither small nor large nor equal, and neither increasing nor decreasing nor being made equal."
157b	**ARISTOTELES** οὐκ ἔοικε.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems not."
	PARMENIDES ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἕν, εἰ ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one would have all these properties, if it is."

9 "The instant" renders *to exaiphnes*, literally "the suddenly," an ordinary adverb here turned into a noun for the point at which a change happens.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ’ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** “How could it not?”

HYPOTHESIS 4: THE OTHERS, IF THE ONE IS

Sharing in the one, the things other than the one are limited and unlimited, like and unlike, and more.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES τί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οὐ σκεπτέον;	**PARMENIDES** “But shouldn’t we examine what properties it would be fitting for the others to have, if the one is?”
	ARISTOTELES σκεπτέον.	**ARISTOTELES** “We should.”
	PARMENIDES λέγωμεν δή, ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι;	**PARMENIDES** “Let’s say, then: if the one is, what properties must the others than the one have?”
	ARISTOTELES λέγωμεν.	**ARISTOTELES** “Let’s.”
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἕν ἐστι τἆλλα· οὐ [157c] γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν.	**PARMENIDES** “Now, since they are other than the one, the others are not the one; for [157c] otherwise they wouldn’t be other than the one.”
157c	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** “Right.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τἆλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ.	**PARMENIDES** “And yet the others aren’t entirely deprived of the one, either; they share in it in a way.”
	ARISTOTELES πῇ δή;	**ARISTOTELES** “In what way?”
	PARMENIDES ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** “Presumably in that the others than the one are other by having parts. For if they had no parts, they would be entirely one.”
	ARISTOTELES ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** “Right.”
	PARMENIDES μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾖ.	**PARMENIDES** “And parts, we say, are parts of that which is a whole.”
	ARISTOTELES φαμὲν γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes, we do say that.”
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὗ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου.	**PARMENIDES** “But the whole must be one thing made of many, of which the parts will be parts. For each of the parts must be a part not of many but of a whole.”
	ARISTOTELES πῶς τοῦτο;	**ARISTOTELES** “How so?”
	PARMENIDES εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, [157d] ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δήπου μόριον ἔσται, ὃ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων. ἑνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὂν μόριον, πλὴν τούτου τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἑνὸς ἑκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὂν δὲ μόριον ἑκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὂν πάντων	**PARMENIDES** “If something were a part of many, [157d] among which it itself was, it will surely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if it is indeed a part of all of them. For if it is not a part of some one of them, it will be a part of the others except that one, and so it will not be a part of each one; and if it is not a part of

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τούτων τι εἶναι, ὧν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.	each, it will be a part of none of the many. But if it belongs to none of them, it's impossible for it to be anything—a part or anything else whatever—of all these things, when it is nothing of any one of them."
157d	**ARISTOTELES** φαίνεταί γε δή.	**ARISTOTELES** "It certainly appears so."
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ [157e] ἑνός τινος ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, ἐξ ἁπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἂν τὸ μόριον εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "So the part is a part not of the many, nor of all of them, but of some single form and [157e] some one thing that we call a whole, one complete thing that has come to be from all of them. Of this the part would be a part."
157e	**ARISTOTELES** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Absolutely."
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἄρα τἆλλα μόρια ἔχει, κἂν τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνὸς μετέχοι.	**PARMENIDES** "So if the others have parts, they would also share in the whole and one."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, certainly."
	PARMENIDES ἓν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός.	**PARMENIDES** "So the others than the one must be one complete whole that has parts."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἑκάστου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν [158a] τοῦ ἑνός. εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριόν ἐστι, τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἓν δήπου σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται.	**PARMENIDES** "And the same argument goes for each part, too; for it too must share [158a] in the one. For if each of them is a part, being 'each' surely signifies one thing, marked off from the others and being by itself, if it is to be 'each.'"
158a	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Right."
	PARMENIDES μετέχοι δέ γε ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο ὂν ἢ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν αὐτὸ ἕν. νῦν δὲ ἑνὶ μὲν εἶναι πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀδύνατόν που.	**PARMENIDES** "But clearly it would share in the one by being something other than one; otherwise it wouldn't share in it, but would itself be one. As it is, though, it's presumably impossible for anything except the one itself to be one."
	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατον.	**ARISTOTELES** "Impossible."
	PARMENIDES μετέχειν δέ γε τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ὅλον ἔσται, οὗ μόρια τὰ μόρια· τὸ δ' αὖ ἕκαστον ἓν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ ἂν ᾖ [158b] μόριον ὅλου.	**PARMENIDES** "And both the whole and the part must share in the one. For the whole will be one thing, of which the parts are parts; and each, in turn, will be one part of the whole—whatever is [158b] a part of a whole."
158b	**ARISTOTELES** οὕτως.	**ARISTOTELES** "Just so."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ;	**PARMENIDES** "Now won't the things that share in the one share in it as things different from it?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could they not?"

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES τὰ δ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἓν μήτε ἑνὸς πλείω εἴη τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "And things different from the one would presumably be many. For if the others than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, they'd be nothing."
	PARMENIDES ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλείω ἑνός ἐστι τά τε τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὅλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκεῖνα τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα τοῦ ἑνός;	**PARMENIDES** "And since the things that share in the single part and in the single whole are more than one, mustn't those very things that come to partake of the one be, as such, unlimited in multitude?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How?"
	PARMENIDES ὧδε ἴδωμεν. ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἓν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑνὸς τότε, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει;	**PARMENIDES** "Let's look at it this way. Isn't it the case that, at the time when they come to partake of it, they come to partake of it while not being one and not sharing in the one?"
	ARISTOTELES δῆλα δή.	**ARISTOTELES** "Clearly."
158c	**PARMENIDES** οὐκοῦν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἔνι;	**PARMENIDES** "So they are multitudes, in which the one is not present?"
	ARISTOTELES πλήθη μέντοι.	**ARISTOTELES** "Multitudes, certainly."
	PARMENIDES τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἷοί τέ ἐσμεν ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ μετέχοι, πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἕν;	**PARMENIDES** "Well then, if we were willing to subtract in thought from such things the very smallest amount we could, mustn't what was subtracted, too, if it does not share in the one, be a multitude and not one?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοποῦντες αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς ἀεὶ ὁρῶμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει;	**PARMENIDES** "So if we always consider in this way the nature other than the form, itself by itself, won't however much of it we see at any time be unlimited in multitude?"
	ARISTOTELES παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Absolutely."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν ἐπειδάν γε [158d] ἓν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται, πέρας ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια.	**PARMENIDES** "And yet once [158d] each single part has become a part, it then has a limit in relation to the others and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts."
158d	**ARISTOTELES** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Quite so."
	PARMENIDES τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἑνὸς συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἡ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν.	**PARMENIDES** "So it turns out for the others than the one, it seems, that when the one and they themselves come together, something different comes to be in them, which gives them a limit in

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		relation to one another; while their own nature, by itself, gives them unlimitedness."
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	ARISTOTELES "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει.	PARMENIDES "Thus the others than the one, both as wholes and part by part, are unlimited and share in limit."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε. [158e]	ARISTOTELES "Yes, certainly." [158e]
158e	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς;	PARMENIDES "Aren't they also both like and unlike each other and themselves?"
	ARISTOTELES πῇ δή;	ARISTOTELES "How so?"
	PARMENIDES ἧι μέν που ἄπειρά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταὐτὸν πεπονθότα ἂν εἴη ταύτῃ.	PARMENIDES "Insofar as they are all unlimited by their own nature, they would presumably have the same property in that respect."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	ARISTOTELES "Yes, certainly."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν ᾗ γε ἅπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτῃ πάντ' ἂν εἴη ταὐτὸν πεπονθότα.	PARMENIDES "And again, insofar as they all share in limit, in that respect too they would all have the same property."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	ARISTOTELES "How could they not?"
	PARMENIDES ᾗ δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ [159a] πάθη πέπονθεν.	PARMENIDES "But insofar as they have the properties of being limited and unlimited, they have these [159a] properties, which are opposite to each other."
159a	ARISTOTELES ναί.	ARISTOTELES "Yes."
	PARMENIDES τὰ δ' ἐναντία γε ὡς οἷόν τε ἀνομοιότατα.	PARMENIDES "And opposites are as unlike as possible."
	ARISTOTELES τί μήν;	ARISTOTELES "Of course."
	PARMENIDES κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἑκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὅμοια ἂν εἴη αὐτά τε αὑτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ' ἀμφότερα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα.	PARMENIDES "So with respect to each property taken singly, they would be like themselves and each other; but with respect to both together, in both ways, they would be most opposite and most unlike."
	ARISTOTELES κινδυνεύει.	ARISTOTELES "It looks that way."
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὑτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη.	PARMENIDES "Thus the others would be both like and unlike themselves and each other."
	ARISTOTELES οὕτως.	ARISTOTELES "Just so."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ταὐτὰ δὴ καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἑστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι	PARMENIDES "And we'll no longer have any trouble finding that the others than the one are the same as and different from each other, moving

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	χαλεπῶς εὑρήσομεν πεπονθότα τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείπερ καὶ [159b] ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα.	and at rest, and have all the opposite properties, since [159b] they were shown to have these, too."
159b	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθῶς λέγεις.	**ARISTOTELES** "You're right."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐῷμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοποῖμεν δὲ πάλιν ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ οὕτω μόνον;	**PARMENIDES** "Then suppose we now let these points go as evident, and examine again, if the one is, whether the others than the one are also not like this, or only like this?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."

HYPOTHESIS 5: THE OTHERS, APART FROM THE ONE

If the one is wholly separate from them, the others are not one, many, like, unlike, or anything else.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES λέγωμεν δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πεπονθέναι.	**PARMENIDES** "Let's say from the beginning, then: if the one is, what properties must the others than the one have?"
	ARISTOTELES λέγωμεν γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, let's."
	PARMENIDES ἆρ' οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "Isn't the one separate from the others, and the others separate from the one?"
	ARISTOTELES τί δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "Why?"
	PARMENIDES ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, ὃ ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τοῦ ἑνός, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων· [159c] πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῇ τό τε ἓν καὶ τἆλλα.	**PARMENIDES** "Because there is presumably nothing else besides these, which is other than the one and also other than the others. [159c] For everything has been mentioned once the one and the others have been mentioned."
159c	**ARISTOTELES** πάντα γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, everything."
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἔστιν ἕτερον τούτων, ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἓν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τἆλλα.	**PARMENIDES** "So there is nothing further, different from these, in which both the one and the others could be, in the same thing."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, there isn't."
	PARMENIDES οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταὐτῷ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one and the others are never in the same thing."
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems not."
	PARMENIDES χωρὶς ἄρα;	**PARMENIDES** "Separate, then?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "And further, we say that what is truly one does not have parts."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γάρ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it?"

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὔτ’ ἄρα ὅλον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τέ ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει.	**PARMENIDES** “So neither would the one as a whole be in the others, nor parts of it, if it is separate from the others and does not have parts.”
	ARISTOTELES πῶς [159d] γάρ;	**ARISTOTELES** “How [159d] could it?”
159d	**PARMENIDES** οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα.	**PARMENIDES** “So the others would in no way share in the one, since they share neither in some part of it nor in it as a whole.”
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** “It seems not.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἓν τἆλλά ἐστιν, οὐδ’ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἓν οὐδέν.	**PARMENIDES** “So the others are in no way one, nor do they have in themselves any one thing at all.”
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** “No, they don’t.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδ’ ἄρα πολλά ἐστι τἆλλα· ἓν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἓν οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μόριά ἐστι τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει.	**PARMENIDES** “So the others are not many, either. For if they were many, each of them would be one part of the whole. As it is, the others than the one are neither one nor many, neither whole nor parts, since they in no way share in it.”
	ARISTOTELES ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** “Right.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδ’ ἄρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, [159e] εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς πανταχῇ στέρεται.	**PARMENIDES** “So the others are not themselves two or three, nor are two or three in them, [159e] if they are entirely deprived of the one.”
159e	**ARISTOTELES** οὕτως.	**ARISTOTELES** “Just so.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης· εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἴη ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἴδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός.	**PARMENIDES** “So the others are neither themselves like and unlike the one, nor are likeness and unlikeness in them. For if they themselves were like and unlike, or had likeness and unlikeness in themselves, the others than the one would presumably have in themselves two forms opposite to each other.”
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** “Apparently.”
	PARMENIDES ἦν δέ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν ἃ μηδ’ ἑνὸς μετέχοι.	**PARMENIDES** “But it was impossible for things that do not share even in one to share in any two.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατον.	**ARISTOTELES** “Impossible.”
	PARMENIDES οὔτ’ ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτ’ ἀνόμοιά ἐστιν οὔτ’ ἀμφότερα τἆλλα. [160a] ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἑνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἴδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοιν· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη.	**PARMENIDES** “So the others are neither like nor unlike, nor both. [160a] For if they were like or unlike, they would share in one of the two forms, and if they were both, in the two opposites. And these things turned out to be impossible.”
160a	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** “True.”

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἑστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα· οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων· εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον [160b] ἐφάνη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός γε πάντῃ πάντως στερομένοις.	**PARMENIDES** "So they aren't the same or different either, nor moving or at rest, nor coming to be or perishing, nor larger or smaller or equal. Nor do they have any other property of that sort. For if the others submit to having any such property, they will share in one and two and three, and in odd and even. And it turned out that they can't [160b] share in these, since they are entirely and in every way deprived of the one."
160b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθέστατα.	**ARISTOTELES** "Very true."
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.	**PARMENIDES** "So if one is, the one is all things and is not even one, both in relation to itself and in relation to the others alike."
	ARISTOTELES παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Entirely so."

HYPOTHESIS 6: IF THE ONE IS NOT

A one that is not is still known and different, shares in many things, and in a way is.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν ἆρ' οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ τοῦτο;	**PARMENIDES** "Very well. But now, if the one is not, mustn't we consider next what follows?"
	ARISTOTELES σκεπτέον γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, we must."
	PARMENIDES τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; ἆρά τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν;	**PARMENIDES** "So what would this hypothesis be, 'if one is not'? Does it differ at all from this one, 'if not-one is not'?"
	ARISTOTELES διαφέρει μέντοι.	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course it differs."
	PARMENIDES διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν [160c] τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν;	**PARMENIDES** "Does it merely differ, or is saying 'if not-one is not' the complete [160c] opposite of saying 'if one is not'?"
160c	**ARISTOTELES** πᾶν τοὐναντίον.	**ARISTOTELES** "The complete opposite."
	PARMENIDES τί δ' εἴ τις λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἆρα ἐφ' ἑκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν;	**PARMENIDES** "What if someone were to say 'if largeness is not' or 'if smallness is not' or anything else of that sort? Wouldn't it be clear in each case that what he calls 'what is not' is something different?"
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει;	**PARMENIDES** "Isn't it clear now as well, then, that what he calls 'what is not' is something different from the others, when he says 'if one is not,' and that we know what he means?"
	ARISTOTELES ἴσμεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "We know."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἕν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε [160d] τὸ μὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον γιγνώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὔ;	**PARMENIDES** "So when he says 'one,' he is speaking first of all of something knowable, and second of something different from the others, whether he attaches being to it or [160d] not-being. For it is known no less what it is that is said not to be, and that it is distinct from the others. Or isn't it?"
160d	**ARISTOTELES** ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ὧδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "Then we must state from the beginning, like this: if one is not, what must be the case? First of all, it seems, this must belong to it: there must be knowledge of it. Otherwise not even what is meant would be known, when someone says 'if one is not.'"
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἕτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "And mustn't the others be different from it as well? Or else it couldn't be called different from the others either."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ἑτεροιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. [160e] οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτεροιότητα λέγει, ὅταν τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου.	**PARMENIDES** "So difference belongs to it too, in addition to knowledge. [160e] For when someone says that the one is different from the others, he isn't speaking of the difference of the others, but of its own."
160e	**ARISTOTELES** φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ ἄν τι ἦν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἄν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων.	**PARMENIDES** "What's more, the one that is not shares in 'that' and 'some' and 'this' and 'to this' and 'of these' and all such things. For otherwise the one wouldn't be spoken of, nor would there be things different from the one, nor would anything belong to that or be of that, nor would it be spoken of as anything, if it had a share neither in 'some' nor in these others."
	ARISTOTELES ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Right."
	PARMENIDES εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἑνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν [161a] κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἓν μήτ' ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι.	**PARMENIDES** "Being, then, is not possible for the one, if it really is not. But nothing [161a] prevents it from sharing in many things. In fact it must, if it is that one, and not some other, that is not. If, however, what is not is to be neither the one nor that, and our talk is about something else, we oughtn't to utter a word. But if it is posited that that one, and not another, is not, then it must have a share both in 'that' and in many other things."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
161a	**ARISTOTELES** καὶ πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Most certainly."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα ἑτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἄν.	**PARMENIDES** "So it also has unlikeness in relation to the others. For the others, being different from the one, would also be of a different kind."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES τὰ δ' ἑτεροῖα οὐκ ἀλλοῖα;	**PARMENIDES** "And aren't things of a different kind of another sort?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course."
	PARMENIDES τὰ δ' ἀλλοῖα οὐκ [161b] ἀνόμοια;	**PARMENIDES** "And aren't things of another sort [161b] unlike?"
161b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, unlike."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** "Isn't it clear, then, that if they are unlike the one, the unlike things would be unlike something unlike?"
	ARISTOTELES δῆλον.	**ARISTOTELES** "Clearly."
	PARMENIDES εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "Then the one too would have an unlikeness, in relation to which the others are unlike it."
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems so."
	PARMENIDES εἰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "But if it has unlikeness to the others, mustn't it have likeness to itself?"
	ARISTOTELES πῶς;	**ARISTOTELES** "How?"
	PARMENIDES εἰ ἑνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι τῷ ἑνί, οὐκ ἄν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οἵου τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἑνός.	**PARMENIDES** "If the one had unlikeness to one, our discussion surely wouldn't be about such a thing as the one, nor would our hypothesis be about one, but about something other than one."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ [161c] γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, [161c] certainly."
161c	**PARMENIDES** οὐ δεῖ δέ γε.	**PARMENIDES** "But it mustn't be."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ δῆτα.	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course not."
	PARMENIDES δεῖ ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one must have a likeness of itself to itself."
	ARISTOTELES δεῖ.	**ARISTOTELES** "It must."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὖ ἴσον γ' ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἴσον, εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα. ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν.	**PARMENIDES** "And again, it isn't equal to the others either. For if it were equal, it would then be, and it would be like them by virtue of the equality. But both of these are impossible, if one is not."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατα.	**ARISTOTELES** “Impossible.”
	PARMENIDES ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** “And since it isn’t equal to the others, mustn’t the others also be not equal to it?”
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** “Necessarily.”
	PARMENIDES τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα;	**PARMENIDES** “And aren’t things that are not equal unequal?”
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes.”
	PARMENIDES τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα;	**PARMENIDES** “And aren’t unequal things unequal by virtue of the unequal?”
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ’ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** “Of course.”
	PARMENIDES καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἕν, [161d] πρὸς ἣν τἆλλα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἄνισα;	**PARMENIDES** “So the one shares in inequality too, [161d] in relation to which the others are unequal to it?”
161d	**ARISTOTELES** μετέχει.	**ARISTOTELES** “It does.”
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γε ἐστὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης.	**PARMENIDES** “But largeness and smallness belong to inequality.”
	ARISTOTELES ἔστι γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes, they do.”
	PARMENIDES ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἑνί;	**PARMENIDES** “So does such a one also have largeness and smallness?”
	ARISTOTELES κινδυνεύει.	**ARISTOTELES** “It looks that way.”
	PARMENIDES μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν.	**PARMENIDES** “Yet largeness and smallness always stand apart from each other.”
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** “Certainly.”
	PARMENIDES μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν ἀεί ἐστιν.	**PARMENIDES** “So there is always something between them.”
	ARISTOTELES ἔστιν.	**ARISTOTELES** “There is.”
	PARMENIDES ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα;	**PARMENIDES** “Can you name anything between them other than equality?”
	ARISTOTELES οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.	**ARISTOTELES** “No, only that.”
	PARMENIDES ὅτῳ ἄρα ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ μεταξὺ τούτοιν οὖσα.	**PARMENIDES** “So whatever has largeness and smallness also has equality, lying between the two.”
161e	**ARISTOTELES** φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** “Apparently.”
	PARMENIDES τῷ δὴ ἑνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετείη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος.	**PARMENIDES** “So the one that is not, it seems, would have a share in equality and in largeness and smallness.”

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems so."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ.	**PARMENIDES** "What's more, it must also share in being in some way."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "How so?"
	PARMENIDES ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἓν μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;	**PARMENIDES** "It must be in the condition we say it's in. For if it isn't, we wouldn't be speaking the truth when we say that the one is not. But if we are speaking the truth, clearly we are saying things that are. Or isn't that so?"
	ARISTOTELES οὕτω μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, it is."
	PARMENIDES ἐπειδὴ δέ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη [162a] ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν.	**PARMENIDES** "And since we claim to be speaking the truth, we must [162a] also claim to be saying things that are."
162a	**ARISTOTELES** ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν οὐκ ὄν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλά πῃ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν.	**PARMENIDES** "So, it seems, the one is something that is not. For if it isn't to be something that is not, but somehow lets go of being in the direction of not-being, it will at once be something that is."
	ARISTOTELES παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Absolutely."
	PARMENIDES δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι ᾖ· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὂν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὂν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ [162b] ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν αὖ τελέως μὴ ἔσται.	**PARMENIDES** "So it must have being something that is not as the bond of its not-being, if it is to not be—just as what is must have not being something that is not, so that it, in its turn, may completely be. For that is how what is would most fully be, and what is not would not be: what is, by sharing in being with respect to being something that is, and in not-being with respect to not being something that is not, [162b] if it is to be completely; and what is not, by sharing in not-being with respect to not being something that is not, and in being with respect to being something that is not, if what is not, in its turn, is to not be completely."
162b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθέστατα.	**ARISTOTELES** "Very true."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ ἑνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "Well then, since what is has a share in not-being, and what is not has a share in being, mustn't the one too, since it is not, have a share in being, in order to not be?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἑνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one turns out to have being, if it is not."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	ARISTOTELES "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν.	PARMENIDES "And not-being too, then, if it really is not."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	ARISTOTELES "Of course."
	PARMENIDES οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως;	PARMENIDES "Now can something that is in a certain state not be in that state, without changing out of that condition?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐχ οἷόν τε.	ARISTOTELES "It can't."
	PARMENIDES πᾶν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον 162c μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ.	PARMENIDES "So everything of that sort, 162c which is both so and not so, signifies change."
162c	ARISTOTELES πῶς δ' οὔ;	ARISTOTELES "Of course."
	PARMENIDES μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις· ἢ τί φήσομεν;	PARMENIDES "And change is motion—or what shall we say?"
	ARISTOTELES κίνησις.	ARISTOTELES "Motion."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὂν ἐφάνη;	PARMENIDES "Now didn't the one turn out to be both something that is and something that is not?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	ARISTOTELES "Yes."
	PARMENIDES οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται.	PARMENIDES "So it turns out to be both so and not so."
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	ARISTOTELES "It seems so."
	PARMENIDES καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἓν πέφανται, ἐπείπερ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον.	PARMENIDES "So the one that is not has also turned out to be moving, since it has a change from being to not-being."
	ARISTOTELES κινδυνεύει.	ARISTOTELES "It looks that way."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίσταιτό ποθέν ποι.	PARMENIDES "But if it is nowhere among the things that are—as it isn't, if it really is not—it couldn't shift from anywhere to anywhere."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γάρ;	ARISTOTELES "How could it?"
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε 162d μεταβαίνειν κινοῖτ' ἄν.	PARMENIDES "So it couldn't move by 162d changing place."
162d	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	ARISTOTELES "No."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν στρέφοιτο· ταὐτοῦ γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ ἅπτεται. ὂν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ταὐτόν· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν ἔν τῳ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι.	PARMENIDES "Nor, surely, could it rotate in the same place, since it is nowhere in contact with the same. For the same is something that is, and what is not can't be in any of the things that are."
	ARISTOTELES ἀδύνατον γάρ.	ARISTOTELES "Yes, impossible."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἕν γε μὴ ὂν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, being not, couldn't rotate in that in which it is not."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly not."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦταί που τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὂν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἠλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τινός.	**PARMENIDES** "Nor, surely, is the one altered from itself, neither the one that is nor the one that is not. For our discussion would no longer be about the one, if it were altered from itself, but about something else."
	ARISTOTELES ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Right."
	PARMENIDES εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταὐτῷ στρέφεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἆρ' [162e] ἄν πῃ ἔτι κινοῖτο;	**PARMENIDES** "But if it is neither altered nor rotates in the same place nor changes place, could it [162e] still be moving in any way?"
162e	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς γάρ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it?"
	PARMENIDES τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἑστάναι.	**PARMENIDES** "And what is unmoved must keep still, and what keeps still must be at rest."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὂν ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, it seems, being not, is both at rest and in motion."
	ARISTOTELES ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It seems so."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· [163a] ὅπῃ γὰρ ἄν τι κινηθῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκέθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρως.	**PARMENIDES** "And yet if it does move, it is quite necessary for it to be altered. [163a] For in whatever respect a thing is moved, to that extent it is no longer in the same state it was in, but in a different one."
163a	**ARISTOTELES** οὕτως.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's so."
	PARMENIDES κινούμενον δὴ τὸ ἓν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, in moving, is also altered."
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἂν ἀλλοιοῖτο.	**PARMENIDES** "And yet if it is in no way moving, it would in no way be altered."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES ἦι μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἕν, ἀλλοιοῦται· ᾗ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.	**PARMENIDES** "So insofar as the one that is not moves, it is altered; and insofar as it doesn't move, it isn't altered."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES τὸ ἓν ἄρα μὴ ὂν ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, being not, is both altered and not altered."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ARISTOTELES φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently."
	PARMENIDES τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς [163b] προτέρας ἕξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε γίγνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "And mustn't what is altered come to be different from before, and perish out of its [163b] former condition, while what isn't altered neither comes to be nor perishes?"
163b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα μὴ ὂν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν μὴ ὂν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ' ἀπόλλυται.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, being not, comes to be and perishes in being altered, and in not being altered neither comes to be nor perishes. And so the one, being not, comes to be and perishes, and neither comes to be nor perishes."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "It can't be otherwise."

HYPOTHESIS 7: IF THE ONE IS NOT, ABSOLUTELY

A one that is not, in no sense at all, has no properties and cannot be known or named.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES αὖθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν ὀψόμενοι εἰ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἅπερ καὶ νῦν ἢ ἕτερα.	**PARMENIDES** "Let's go back to the beginning once again, to see whether the same results will appear to us as now, or different ones."
	ARISTOTELES ἀλλὰ χρή.	**ARISTOTELES** "We should."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν [163c] ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τί χρὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν;	**PARMENIDES** "Well then, [163c] if one is not—so we say—what must follow about it?"
163c	**ARISTOTELES** ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἆρα μή τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "And when we say 'is not,' does it signify anything other than absence of being for whatever we say is not?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐδὲν ἄλλο.	**ARISTOTELES** "Nothing else."
	PARMENIDES πότερον οὖν, ὅταν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναί τι, πὼς οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν αὐτό, πὼς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἁπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν;	**PARMENIDES** "Now when we say that something is not, are we saying that in some way it is not, but in some way it is? Or does this 'is not,' when said, signify without qualification that what is not is in no way whatever and in no respect, and in no way shares in being?"
	ARISTOTELES ἁπλούστατα μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Quite without qualification."
	PARMENIDES οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναιτο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὂν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς [163d] οὐσίας μετέχειν.	**PARMENIDES** "So what is not could neither be nor in any other way at all [163d] share in being."
163d	**ARISTOTELES** οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μή τι ἄλλο ἦν ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν;	**PARMENIDES** "And weren't coming to be and perishing nothing other than, respectively, coming to partake of being and losing being?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐδὲν ἄλλο.	**ARISTOTELES** "Nothing else."
	PARMENIDES ὧι δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὔτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό.	**PARMENIDES** "But what has no share in this could neither take it on nor lose it."
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γάρ;	**ARISTOTELES** "How could it?"
	PARMENIDES τῷ ἑνὶ ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὔτε ἑκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, since it in no way is, must in no way have being, or give it up, or come to partake of it."
	ARISTOTELES εἰκός.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's likely."
	PARMENIDES οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὂν ἓν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπείπερ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one that is not neither perishes nor comes to be, since it in no way shares in being."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently not."
	PARMENIDES οὐδ' ἄρ' [163e] ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῇ· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τοῦτο πάσχον.	**PARMENIDES** "Nor, then, is it [163e] altered in any way; for if that happened to it, it would then be coming to be and perishing."
163e	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι;	**PARMENIDES** "And if it isn't altered, mustn't it also not be moving?"
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ἑστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ ἑστὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινι δεῖ ἀεὶ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "Nor, surely, shall we say that what is nowhere is at rest; for what is at rest must always be in some one and the same thing."
	ARISTOTELES τῷ αὐτῷ· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "In the same thing. How could it not?"
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ αὖ τὸ μὴ ὂν μήτε ποτὲ ἑστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.	**PARMENIDES** "So once again let's say that what is not is never at rest and never in motion."
	ARISTOTELES μὴ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, let's say it's neither."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν τούτου [164a] μετέχον ὄντος οὐσίας μετέχοι.	**PARMENIDES** "But neither does it have anything that is; for then, sharing in [164a] something that is, it would share in being."
164a	**ARISTOTELES** δῆλον.	**ARISTOTELES** "Clearly."
	PARMENIDES οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης οὔτε ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "So it has neither largeness nor smallness nor equality."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοιότης γε οὐδὲ ἑτεροιότης οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς τἆλλα εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ.	**PARMENIDES** "Nor, surely, would it have likeness or difference, either in relation to itself or in relation to the others."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ φαίνεται.	**ARISTOTELES** "Apparently not."
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; τἆλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "What about this? Is there any way the others could be anything to it, if nothing is to be anything to it?"
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔστιν.	**ARISTOTELES** "There's no way."
	PARMENIDES οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια οὔτε ταὐτὰ οὔθ' ἕτερά ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα.	**PARMENIDES** "So the others are neither like nor unlike it, nor the same as it nor different from it."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἢ τὸ τὶ ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ [164b] ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται;	**PARMENIDES** "And what about 'of that' or 'to that' or 'some' or 'this' or 'of this' or 'of another' or 'to another,' or 'once' or [164b] 'later' or 'now,' or knowledge or opinion or perception or account or name or anything else that is—will any of these apply to what is not?"
164b	**ARISTOTELES** οὐκ ἔσται.	**ARISTOTELES** "They won't."
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ ἓν οὐκ ὂν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ.	**PARMENIDES** "So the one, being not, is in no state in any way at all."
	ARISTOTELES οὔκουν δὴ ἔοικέν γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν.	**ARISTOTELES** "No, it doesn't seem to be in any state at all."

HYPOTHESIS 8: THE OTHERS, IF THE ONE IS NOT

Without the one, the others only appear one or many, like masses in a dream or seen from afar.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἔτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι.	**PARMENIDES** "Let's go on to say, then, if one is not, what must be true of the others."
	ARISTOTELES λέγωμεν γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, let's."
	PARMENIDES ἄλλα μέν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο.	**PARMENIDES** "They must, I suppose, be others; for if they aren't even others, we wouldn't be talking about the others."
	ARISTOTELES οὕτω.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's so."
	PARMENIDES εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, τά γε ἄλλα ἕτερά ἐστιν. ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ [164c] ἕτερον;	**PARMENIDES** "But if our discussion is about the others, the others are different. Or don't you use 'other' and 'different' of the same [164c] thing?"
164c	**ARISTOTELES** ἔγωγε.	**ARISTOTELES** "I do."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἕτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου;	**PARMENIDES** "And we say, I take it, that the different is different from something different, and that the other, likewise, is other than something other?"
	ARISTOTELES ναί.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes."
	PARMENIDES καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὗ ἄλλα ἔσται.	**PARMENIDES** "So the others too, if they are to be others, have something that they will be other than."
	ARISTOTELES ἀνάγκη.	**ARISTOTELES** "Necessarily."
	PARMENIDES τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε.	**PARMENIDES** "So what could it be? They won't be other than the one, since it isn't."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "No."
	PARMENIDES ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστί· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις.	**PARMENIDES** "So they are other than each other. For that's all that's still left to them—or else to be other than nothing."
	ARISTOTELES ὀρθῶς.	**ARISTOTELES** "Right."
	PARMENIDES κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστί· κατὰ ἓν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἷά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἑνός. ἀλλ' ἕκαστος, ὡς [164d] ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἄπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, κἂν τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβῃ τις, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀντὶ ἑνὸς δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ.	**PARMENIDES** "So each of them is other than the others as multitudes; for they couldn't be so one by one, since one is not. Rather, each mass of them, it [164d] seems, is unlimited in multitude. Even if you take what seems to be the smallest, then, like a dream in sleep, suddenly, instead of what seemed to be one, it appears many, and instead of the smallest, enormous in relation to the bits chopped up from it."
164d	**ARISTOTELES** ὀρθότατα.	**ARISTOTELES** "Quite right."
	PARMENIDES τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τἄλλα, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν.	**PARMENIDES** "So it is as masses of that sort that the others would be other than each other, if they are others when one is not."
	ARISTOTELES κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Quite so."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἷς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὢν δὲ οὔ, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται;	**PARMENIDES** "So won't there be many masses, each appearing to be one, though it isn't, if one is not to be?"
	ARISTOTELES οὕτω.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's so."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν [164e] δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων.	**PARMENIDES** "And there will also seem to be a number of [164e] them, if each is also one, while they are many."
164e	**ARISTOTELES** πάνυ γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται.	**PARMENIDES** "And among them some will appear to be even and others odd, but not truly, if one is not to be."
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Certainly not."
	PARMENIDES καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι· φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν [165a] πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων.	**PARMENIDES** "What's more, there will seem, we say, to be a smallest among them; but this appears many and large in relation to each of the [165a] many, since they are small."
165a	**ARISTOTELES** πῶς δ' οὔ;	**ARISTOTELES** "Of course."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν, τοῦτο δ' εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος.	**PARMENIDES** "And each mass will also be thought to be equal to the many small ones. For it couldn't appear to pass from larger to smaller before it seemed to come to what lies between—and this would be a semblance of equality."
	ARISTOTELES εἰκός.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's likely."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων;	**PARMENIDES** "And won't it have a limit in relation to another mass, while in relation to itself it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle?"
	ARISTOTELES πῇ δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "In what way?"
	PARMENIDES ὅτι ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη [165b] ἀεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἔν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνός.	**PARMENIDES** "Because whenever anyone grasps any of them in thought as being one of these, before the beginning another [165b] beginning always appears, and after the end another end remains, and in the middle others more in the middle than the middle, but smaller. This is because it's impossible to grasp each of them as one, since the one is not."
165b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθέστατα.	**ARISTOTELES** "Very true."
	PARMENIDES θρύπτεσθαι δὴ οἶμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἄν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ· ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἑνὸς ἀεὶ λαμβάνοιτ' ἄν.	**PARMENIDES** "Then everything that is, I think, which anyone grasps in thought, must be broken up and chopped into pieces; for presumably it would always be grasped as a mass without one."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Very much so."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν [165c] ὁρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἓν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὀξὺ νοοῦντι πλήθει ἄπειρον ἓν ἕκαστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος;	**PARMENIDES** "And mustn't such a thing appear one to someone [165c] who sees it from far off and dimly, while to someone who considers it close up and sharply each one must appear unlimited in multitude, if it really is deprived of the one, since that is not?"
165c	**ARISTOTELES** ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's quite necessary."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὕτω δὴ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἕκαστα τἆλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τἆλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός.	**PARMENIDES** "So each of the others must appear both unlimited and having a limit, and both one and many, if one is not, but things other than the one are."
	ARISTOTELES δεῖ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, they must."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι;	**PARMENIDES** "And won't they also seem to be both like and unlike?"
	ARISTOTELES πῇ δή;	**ARISTOTELES** "In what way?"
	PARMENIDES οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἓν πάντα φαινόμενα ταὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "As with things in a scene-painting: to someone standing at a distance, they all appear to be one, and so appear to have the same property and to be alike."[10]
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ [165d] γε.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, [165d] certainly."
165d	**PARMENIDES** προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς.	**PARMENIDES** "But to someone who comes closer, they appear many and different, and, through the semblance of the different, different in kind and unlike themselves."
	ARISTOTELES οὕτω.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's so."
	PARMENIDES καὶ ὁμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτούς τε αὑτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις.	**PARMENIDES** "So the masses must appear both like and unlike, both to themselves and to each other."
	ARISTOTELES πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Very much so."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἁπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἑστῶτας πάντῃ, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετὲς ἤδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἑνὸς [165e] μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** "And also both the same as and different from each other, both in contact with and apart from themselves, both moving with every motion and at rest in every way, both coming to be and perishing and neither, and presumably all such things, which it would now be easy for us to go through, if, when one [165e] is not, many are."
165e	**ARISTOTELES** ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "That's very true."

HYPOTHESIS 9: IF THE ONE IS NOT, NOTHING IS

Without the one, the others neither are nor appear anything; finally, all things both are and are not.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES ἔτι δὴ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι.	**PARMENIDES** "Let's go back to the beginning once more and say what must be, if one is not, but things other than the one are."
	ARISTOTELES εἴπωμεν γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Yes, let's."

10 Scene-painting (skiagraphia) used patches of light and shade that blended into a likeness only when viewed from a distance.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τἆλλα.	**PARMENIDES** “Well then, the others won’t be one.”
	ARISTOTELES πῶς γάρ;	**ARISTOTELES** “How could they?”
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν πολλά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἕν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἕν, ἅπαντα οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐδ’ ἂν πολλὰ εἴη.	**PARMENIDES** “Nor, surely, many. For in things that are many, one would also be present. If none of them is one, all of them are nothing, so that they couldn’t be many either.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** “True.”
	PARMENIDES μὴ ἐνόντος δὲ ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ἕν ἐστι τἆλλα.	**PARMENIDES** “And if one is not present in the others, the others are neither many nor one.”
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** “No.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδέ [166a] γε φαίνεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά.	**PARMENIDES** “Nor [166a] do they appear to be one or many.”
166a	**ARISTOTELES** τί δή;	**ARISTOTELES** “Why so?”
	PARMENIDES ὅτι τἆλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν.	**PARMENIDES** “Because the others have no association of any kind, in any way or respect whatever, with any of the things that are not, nor is any of the things that are not present with any of the others. For things that are not have no part.”
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** “True.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδ’ ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	**PARMENIDES** “So there is no opinion of what is not among the others, nor any semblance of it, nor is what is not in any way or respect whatever believed of the others.”
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** “Certainly not.”
	PARMENIDES ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεταί τι τῶν [166b] ἄλλων ἓν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἑνὸς πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον.	**PARMENIDES** “So if one is not, none of the [166b] others is even believed to be one or many; for it’s impossible to believe in many without one.”
166b	**ARISTOTELES** ἀδύνατον γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** “Yes, impossible.”
	PARMENIDES ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά.	**PARMENIDES** “So if one is not, the others neither are nor are believed to be one or many.”
	ARISTOTELES οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**ARISTOTELES** “It seems not.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδ’ ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια.	**PARMENIDES** “Nor, then, like or unlike.”
	ARISTOTELES οὐ γάρ.	**ARISTOTELES** “No.”
	PARMENIDES οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδ’ ἕτερα, οὐδὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τἆλλα, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.	**PARMENIDES** “Nor, surely, the same or different, nor in contact or apart, nor any of the other things we went through earlier as ways they appear: the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not."
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθῆ.	**ARISTOTELES** "True."
	PARMENIDES οὐκοῦν καὶ [166c] συλλήβδην εἰ εἴποιμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποιμεν;	**PARMENIDES** "Then wouldn't we also be right if we said, [166c] in sum, 'If one is not, nothing is'?"
166c	**ARISTOTELES** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**ARISTOTELES** "Absolutely."
	PARMENIDES εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἓν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.	**PARMENIDES** "Let that be said, then, and this as well: whether one is or is not, it and the others, it seems, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other, all are and are not, in every way, and appear and do not appear."
	ARISTOTELES ἀληθέστατα.	**ARISTOTELES** "Very true."