Phaedo

PLATO
c. 428–348 BC

Phaedo

Φαίδων

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited

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Phaedo · Plato (c. 428–348 BC)

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INTRODUCTION

The *Phaedo* tells the story of Socrates' last day. Phaedo, who was there, recounts it to a friend: the conversation in the prison about whether the soul survives death, and then the hemlock.

Along the way Plato sets out his theory of forms, the argument that learning is recollection, and Socrates' account of how he turned from natural science to philosophy. The ending is one of the most moving passages in ancient literature.

Phaedo

Phlius, some time after Socrates' death. Phaedo tells Echecrates what happened. Socrates argues for the soul's immortality on his last day, then drinks the poison.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
57a	**ECHECRATES** αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας;	**ECHECRATES** Were you there with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day he drank the poison in the prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?
	PHAEDO αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες.	**PHAEDO** I was there myself, Echecrates.
	ECHECRATES τί οὖν δή ἐστιν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλειασίων οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφῖκται χρόνου συχνοῦ [57b] ἐκεῖθεν ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἷός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράζειν.	**ECHECRATES** Then what did the man say before his death? And how did he die? I'd be glad to hear. You see, none of our citizens in Phlius goes to Athens much these days, and no visitor has come in a long time [57b] from there who could give us any clear report about all this—except, of course, that he drank the poison and died. About the rest he had nothing to tell us.[1]
58a	**PHAEDO** οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο;	**PHAEDO** So you didn't even learn how the trial went?
	ECHECRATES ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων;	**ECHECRATES** Yes, somebody did report that to us, and we were surprised that he evidently died long after it took place. Why was that, Phaedo?
	PHAEDO τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχεν γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.	**PHAEDO** It was a stroke of luck, Echecrates. It so happened that on the day before the trial the stern of the ship the Athenians send to Delos had been garlanded.
	ECHECRATES τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;	**ECHECRATES** And what is that?
	PHAEDO τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς "δὶς ἑπτὰ" ἐκείνους ᾤχετο [58b] ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι ηὔξαντο ὡς λέγεται τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἑκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἣν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτεινύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες [58c] αὐτούς.	**PHAEDO** That, according to the Athenians, is the ship in which Theseus once sailed to Crete taking [58b] those famous "twice seven," and saved them and was saved himself. The story goes that the Athenians vowed to Apollo at the time that if they were saved they would send a sacred mission to Delos every year; and ever since then they have sent it to the god annually, as they still do now. Once the mission has begun, it's their law that for that period the city must be kept pure and no one

1 Phlius was a small city in the northeastern Peloponnese, where Phaedo tells this story to Echecrates.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός.	may be publicly executed until the ship has reached Delos and come back here again. Sometimes this takes a long time, when the winds happen to hold 58c them back. The mission begins when the priest of Apollo garlands the ship's stern —and this, as I say, happened to have been done on the day before the trial.[2]
58c	διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.	That's why Socrates spent a long time in prison between his trial and his death.
	ECHECRATES τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὐκ εἴων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;	ECHECRATES And what about the death itself, Phaedo? What was said and done, and which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities not let them be there, so that he died without friends?
58d	PHAEDO οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοί γε.	PHAEDO Not at all. Some were there—quite a few, in fact.
	ECHECRATES ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὖσα.	ECHECRATES Then please be good enough to tell us all of it as clearly as you can, unless you happen to be busy.
	PHAEDO ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.	PHAEDO No, I have time, and I'll try to tell you the whole story. Remembering Socrates, whether I'm talking about him myself or listening to someone else, is always the most pleasant thing of all for me.
	ECHECRATES ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἑτέρους ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.	ECHECRATES Well, Phaedo, the people who'll be listening to you feel just the same. So try to go through everything as precisely as you can.
	PHAEDO καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῄει· εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς Ἅιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν 59a εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος.	PHAEDO Well, what I felt while I was there was extraordinary. I wasn't overcome by pity, as you might expect of someone present at the death of a friend. The man seemed happy to me, Echecrates, both in his manner and in his words, so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his end. It struck me that even in going to Hades he was not going without some divine dispensation, and that when he got there he would fare well, 59a if anyone ever did.
59a	διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεινὸν εἰσῄει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει, οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων ὥσπερ εἰώθεμεν — καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν — ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καί τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπό τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες	That's why I felt no pity at all, as would seem natural for someone present at a scene of grief—nor, on the other hand, the pleasure we used to feel when we were engaged in philosophy, though our conversation was of that kind. Instead, I was in a truly strange state, an unfamiliar blend of pleasure and pain mixed together, as I reflected that he

2 The "twice seven" were the seven young men and seven young women Athens sent as tribute to the Minotaur in Crete; Theseus killed the monster and brought them home.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, τοτὲ μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος — [59b] οἶσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.	was about to die any moment. All of us who were there were in much the same condition, sometimes laughing, sometimes crying, and one of us in particular, Apollodorus— [59b] I expect you know the man and what he's like.[3]
59b	**ECHECRATES** πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**ECHECRATES** Of course.
	PHAEDO ἐκεῖνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.	**PHAEDO** Well, he was completely like that, and I was shaken myself, and so were the others.
	ECHECRATES ἔτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;	**ECHECRATES** And who happened to be there, Phaedo?
	PHAEDO οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἠσθένει.	**PHAEDO** Of the locals, there was this Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and also Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines and Antisthenes. Ctesippus of Paeania was there too, and Menexenus, and some other locals. Plato, I believe, was ill.[4]
	ECHECRATES ξένοι δέ τινες παρῆσαν;	**ECHECRATES** Were there any visitors from elsewhere?
59c	**PHAEDO** ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.	**PHAEDO** Yes: Simmias of Thebes, and Cebes and Phaedondes, and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.
	ECHECRATES τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο;	**ECHECRATES** What about Aristippus and Cleombrotus? Were they there?
	PHAEDO οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.	**PHAEDO** No, they weren't; they were said to be in Aegina.
	ECHECRATES ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;	**ECHECRATES** Was anyone else there?
	PHAEDO σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.	**PHAEDO** I think those were about all.
	ECHECRATES τί οὖν δή; τίνες φῂς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;	**ECHECRATES** Well then? What do you say the conversation was?

THE LAST DAY IN PRISON

Phaedo describes the friends' final visit, and Socrates says a philosopher welcomes death but may not take his life.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PHAEDO ἐγώ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθεμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἕωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἑκάστοτε ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων, ἀνεῴγετο γὰρ οὐ πρῴ· ἐπειδὴ	**PHAEDO** I'll try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days too, the others and I had always been in the habit of visiting Socrates. We would gather at dawn at the courthouse where the trial had taken place, since it was close to the prison. Each day we would wait around,

3 Apollodorus was a devoted and famously emotional follower of Socrates; he narrates Plato's *Symposium*.
4 Critobulus' father is Crito, Socrates' old friend, who plays a large part in what follows.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρῳαίτερον συνελέγημεν· τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ [59e] ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἑσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἴη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἥκειν ὡς πρῳαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός.	talking with one another, until the prison opened—it didn't open early—and when it did, we would go in to Socrates and usually spend the day with him. On that day we gathered earlier than usual, because the day before, [59e] when we left the prison in the evening, we had learned that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we told each other to come to the usual place as early as possible.
59e	καὶ ἥκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ· "λύουσι γάρ," ἔφη, "οἱ ἕνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτᾷ."	We came, and the doorkeeper who usually answered us came out and told us to wait and not go in until he gave the word. "The Eleven," he said, "are releasing Socrates from his chains and giving instructions for his death today."[5]
	οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἦκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσιόντες οὖν [60a] κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην — γιγνώσκεις γάρ — ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνηυφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι "ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δή σε προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους." καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, "ὦ Κρίτων," ἔφη, "ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οἴκαδε."	He didn't keep us waiting long, though; he came back and told us to go in. When we went in, [60a] we found Socrates just released from his chains, and Xanthippe—you know her—sitting beside him holding their little boy. When Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the sort of thing women usually say: "Socrates, this is the last time your friends will talk to you, and you to them." And Socrates looked at Crito and said, "Crito, have someone take her home."[6]
60a	καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν [60b] τε καὶ κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα, ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτὼ μὴ ᾽θέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμμένω [60c] δύ' ὄντε.	Some of Crito's people led her away, crying out [60b] and beating her breast. Socrates sat up on the bed, bent his leg, and rubbed it with his hand, and as he rubbed it he said, "What a strange thing it seems to be, gentlemen, this thing people call pleasure! How remarkably it's related to what's thought to be its opposite, pain: the two refuse to come to a person at the same time, yet if someone pursues one of them and catches it, he's almost always compelled to catch the other too, as though they were joined to a single head [60c] while being two."
60c	καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν· ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.	"I think," he said, "that if Aesop had noticed this, he'd have made up a fable about it: the god wanted to reconcile them in their war with each other, and when he couldn't, he fastened their heads together; and that's why whoever gets one of them finds the other following close behind. That's just how it seems to be with me, too. Since there was pain in my leg from the chain, now pleasure seems to have come following after it."[7]

5 The Eleven were the Athenian officials in charge of the prison and of executions.
6 Xanthippe was Socrates' wife.
7 Aesop was the legendary author of the Greek animal fables.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβών, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν [60d] ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὔηνος πρῴην, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅταν με αὖθις ἐρωτᾷ — εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται — εἰπὲ τί χρὴ λέγειν.	Cebes broke in: "By Zeus, Socrates," he said, "I'm glad you reminded me. Several people have asked me about the [60d] poems you've made by putting Aesop's stories into verse, and your hymn to Apollo—Evenus among them, just the other day. They wanted to know what you had in mind when you wrote them after coming here, since you'd never written any poetry before. So if you care at all about my having an answer for Evenus when he asks me again—and I know very well he will—tell me what I should say."[8]
60d	λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τἀληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος [60e] εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα — ᾔδη γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη — ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, "ὦ Σώκρατες," ἔφη, "μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου."	Well, Cebes, he said, tell him the truth: that I didn't make them because I wanted to compete [60e] with him or his poems—I knew that wouldn't be easy—but to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure I hadn't neglected a sacred duty, in case this was the kind of music they were telling me to make. It was like this. The same dream often came to me in my past life, appearing in different forms at different times but always saying the same thing: "Socrates," it said, "make music and work at it."[9]
60e	καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε [61a] καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἥ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν· ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι [61b] ποιήσαντα ποιήματα καὶ πιθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ.	In the past I took it that the dream was urging [61a] and encouraging me to do what I was already doing. Just as people cheer on runners, so the dream was cheering me on in what I was doing, making music—since philosophy is the greatest music, and that was what I was doing. But now, after the trial, since the god's festival was preventing my death, I thought that if the dream happened to be telling me to make music in the popular sense, I ought not to disobey it, but to make some. It seemed safer not to depart before I had fulfilled my sacred duty [61b] by making poems and obeying the dream.
61b	οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα οὗ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οἷς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους καὶ ἠπιστάμην τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα. [61c] ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι.	So first I composed a poem to the god whose festival it was. After the god, I realized that a poet, if he's really going to be a poet, has to make stories, not arguments, and I myself was no storyteller. So I took the stories I had at hand and knew, Aesop's, and made poems out of the first ones I came across. Tell Evenus this, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he's sensible, to follow me as quickly as he can. [61c] I'm leaving today, it seems; the Athenians order it.

8 Evenus of Paros was a teacher of rhetoric and a poet.
9 The Greek *mousikē* covers all the arts of the Muses, poetry and song as well as music.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
61c	καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, οἷον παρακελεύῃ, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνῳ. πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθημαι οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν σοι ἑκὼν εἶναι πείσεται.	And Simmias said, "What advice to give Evenus, Socrates! I've met the man many times, and from what I've seen of him, he won't be at all willing to take it."
	τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὔηνος;	"Why?" he said. "Isn't Evenus a philosopher?"
	ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.	"I think so," said Simmias.
	ἐθελήσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὔηνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὑτόν· οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε 61d τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο.	"Then Evenus will be willing, and so will anyone who takes part in this pursuit in a worthy way. Still, he probably won't do violence to himself; they say that isn't permitted." And as he said this he put 61d his feet down on the ground, and he stayed sitting like that for the rest of the conversation.
61d	ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἕπεσθαι;	Then Cebes asked him, "What do you mean, Socrates, that it isn't permitted to do violence to oneself, and yet the philosopher would be willing to follow someone who is dying?"
	τί δέ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες;	"What, Cebes? Haven't you and Simmias heard about such things, when you spent time with Philolaus?"[10]
	οὐδέν γε σαφές, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"Nothing clear, Socrates."
	ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοὼς φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως 61e καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;	"Well, I too speak about them only from hearsay; but I don't mind telling you what I happen to have heard. And in fact it's perhaps 61e most fitting for someone about to travel to that other place to examine and tell stories about the journey there, and what we think it's like. What else would one do in the time until sunset?"
61e	κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὔ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νυνδὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.	"Then why is it, Socrates, that they say it isn't permitted to kill oneself? To answer what you were just asking, I did hear Philolaus say, when he was living with us, and some others too, that one mustn't do this; but I've never heard anything clear about it from anyone."
62a	ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις. ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον ὂν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην.	"Well, you must keep trying," he said, "for you may yet hear it. Still, it will perhaps seem surprising to you if this alone of all things is without exception, and it never happens for a human being, as other things do, that at some times and for some people it is better to be dead than alive; and it perhaps seems surprising to you that for those

10 Philolaus was a Pythagorean philosopher who had lived in Thebes, the home city of Simmias and Cebes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		people for whom it is better to be dead, it's not holy to do themselves this good, but they must wait for someone else to be their benefactor."
	καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἠρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, Ἴττω Ζεύς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών. 62b	And Cebes gave a quiet laugh. "Zeus knows it!" he said, speaking in his own dialect. 62b **11**
62b	καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως;	"It would seem unreasonable, put that way," said Socrates. "Still, perhaps there is some reason in it. The account given in the secret teachings about these things, that we humans are in a kind of custody and must not release ourselves from it or run away, seems to me a weighty one and not easy to see through. But this much at least, Cebes, seems to me well said: that it is gods who take care of us, and that we humans are among the gods' possessions. Or don't you think so?"
	ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης. 62c	"I do," said Cebes. 62c
62c	οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτεινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν;	"Then," he said, "if one of your own possessions were to kill itself when you hadn't indicated that you wanted it dead, wouldn't you be angry with it, and punish it if you had some way of punishing it?"
	πάνυ γ', ἔφη.	"Certainly," he said.
	ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.	"Then perhaps in this sense it isn't unreasonable that one must not kill oneself before a god sends some necessity, like the one now before us."
	ἀλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὃ μέντοι νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν 62d ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον· οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὑτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος.	That does seem likely, said Cebes. But what you were saying just now, that philosophers would readily be willing 62d to die—that seems strange, Socrates, if what we were saying a moment ago is reasonable, that it is a god who takes care of us and that we are his possessions. It makes no sense that the most sensible people shouldn't be upset at leaving this service, in which they are overseen by the best overseers there are, the gods. Surely a sensible man doesn't think he'll take better care of himself once he's free.
62d	ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον 62e εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπό γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν ἀεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὐναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὃ	A foolish person might perhaps think so, that he should run away 62e from his master; he wouldn't reason that one mustn't run away from a good master, but should stay with him as much as possible, and so he would run away without thinking. But a person with sense would always want, I imagine, to be with someone better than himself. And

11 Cebes, a Theban, swears in the Boeotian form of the oath.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνῄσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας χαίρειν.	yet, Socrates, on this reasoning the opposite of what was said just now is likely to be true: it's fitting for the sensible to be upset at dying, and for the foolish to be glad.
62e	ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ 63a κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἀεί τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τις εἴπῃ.	When Socrates heard this, he seemed to me pleased with Cebes' 63a persistence, and he looked at us and said, "Cebes is always tracking down arguments, and he isn't at all willing to be persuaded straight away by whatever anyone says."
63a	καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς. 63b	And Simmias said, "But this time, Socrates, I think myself that Cebes has a point. Why would truly wise men want to run away from masters better than themselves and part from them so lightly? And I think Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you're taking it so lightly to leave both us and good rulers—the gods, as you admit yourself." 63b
63b	δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε· οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ.	"What you both say is fair," he said. "I take it you mean I have to defend myself against this, as though in a law court."
	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.	"Exactly," said Simmias.

A DEFENSE BEFORE FRIENDS

Socrates explains why he faces death calmly: the philosopher seeks truth free of the body.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PHAEDO φέρε δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ' 63c ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς — καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην — ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.	**PHAEDO** "Come on, then," he said, "let me try to make a more persuasive defense to you than I did to the jury. Simmias and Cebes," he said, "if I didn't believe that I was going, first, to other gods who are wise and good, and then also to dead people better than those here, I'd be wrong not to be upset at death. But as things are, you can be sure that I hope to come among 63c good men—though I wouldn't insist on that very strongly—but that I will come to gods who are very good masters, you can be sure that if I'd insist on anything of that sort, I'd insist on this. So for this reason I'm not as upset, but I'm hopeful that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has long been said, something much better for the good than for the bad."
63c	τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; 63d κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι	"Well, Socrates," said Simmias, "do you mean to go away keeping this thought to yourself, or would you share it with us too? 63d It seems to me this is a good that's ours as well, and at the same time it

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα σοι ἡ ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἅπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσῃς.	will be your defense, if you persuade us of what you're saying."
63d	ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα τί ἐστιν ὃ βούλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν.	"I'll try," he said. "But first let's see what it is that Crito here seems to have been wanting to say for some time."
	τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν [63e] τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς πίνειν τούς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας.	"Only this, Socrates," said Crito: "the man who is going to give you the poison has been telling me for some time that I must tell you to talk as little as possible. He says people get heated when they talk, and one mustn't bring anything like that to bear [63e] on the poison; otherwise people who do that sometimes have to drink it two or even three times."
63e	καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δὶς δώσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέῃ, καὶ τρίς.	And Socrates said, "Never mind him. Just let him get his own part ready to give it twice, or three times if need be."
	ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μέν τι ᾔδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλά μοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει.	"I pretty much knew you'd say that," said Crito, "but he's been bothering me for some time."
	ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη.	"Never mind him," he said.
	ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὡς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων [64a] ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ. πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.	But now I want to give my account to you, my judges, of why it seems to me reasonable that a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy should be confident when he is about [64a] to die, and hopeful that he will win the greatest goods there once he has died. How this can be so, Simmias and Cebes, I'll try to explain.
64a	κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λελῆθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὃ πάλαι προυθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον.	Those who happen to engage in philosophy in the right way are likely to have escaped other people's notice in this: that they themselves practice nothing other than dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would surely be strange to be eager for nothing but this all one's life, and then, when it actually comes, to be upset at the very thing one had long been eager for and practicing.
	καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, [64b] οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας — καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ — ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν.	And Simmias laughed and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, [64b] you made me laugh, though I was hardly in a mood for laughing just now. I think most people, hearing just this, would think it very well said about philosophers—and people back home would agree entirely—that philosophers really are longing for death, and that they themselves are well aware that philosophers deserve to suffer it."
64b	καὶ ἀληθῆ γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾗ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ᾗ ἄξιοί	"And they'd be telling the truth, Simmias, except for their being well aware. They aren't aware in

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	εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. [64c] εἶπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι;	what way true philosophers long for death, in what way they deserve death, and what kind of death. [64c] Let's talk among ourselves," he said, "and say goodbye to them. Do we think that death is something?"
64c	πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας.	"Certainly," Simmias replied.
	ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο;	"Is it anything other than the separation of the soul from the body? And is being dead this: the body's having come to be apart, separated from the soul, itself by itself, and the soul's being apart, separated from the body, itself by itself? Death couldn't be anything other than this, could it?"
	οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη.	"No, it's this," he said.
	σκέψαι δή, ὠγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί· [64d] ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν;	"Now consider, my good friend, whether you agree with me about this. [64d] I think it will help us understand better what we're looking into. Do you think it's characteristic of a philosopher to be serious about the so-called pleasures of this sort, such as those of food and drink?"
64d	ἥκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.	"Not in the least, Socrates," said Simmias.
	τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;	"What about the pleasures of sex?"
	οὐδαμῶς.	"Not at all."
	τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, [64e] καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν;	"And what about the other ways of tending the body? Do you think such a man regards them as important? Owning fine clothes and shoes, for example, and the other adornments of the body—do you think he values them or thinks little of them, [64e] except insofar as he absolutely has to have them?"
64e	ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος.	"I think he thinks little of them," he said, "the true philosopher, at any rate."
	οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;	"Then in general," he said, "do you think that such a man's concern is not with the body, but that as far as he can, he stands apart from it and is turned toward the soul?"
	ἔμοιγε.	"I do."
	ἆρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ [65a] φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;	"So first of all, in matters like these, isn't it clear that the [65a] philosopher, more than other people, releases his soul as far as possible from its partnership with the body?"
65a	φαίνεται.	"It seems so."

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	καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν.	"And I suppose, Simmias, most people think that someone who finds nothing of this sort pleasant and has no share in it doesn't have a life worth living; the man who cares nothing for the pleasures that come through the body is pretty close to being dead."
	πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	"What you say is quite true."
	τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει [65b] κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἆρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν;	"And what about the actual acquiring of understanding? Is the body a hindrance or not, if one takes it along as a partner [65b] in the search? What I mean is this: do sight and hearing give people any truth, or is it as even the poets are forever telling us, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? And yet if these among the bodily senses aren't accurate or clear, the others hardly will be, since they're all inferior to these, I suppose. Or don't you think so?"
65b	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.	"I certainly do," he said.
	πότε οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. [65c]	"When, then," he said, "does the soul grasp the truth? Whenever it tries to examine anything together with the body, it's clearly deceived by it." [65c]
65c	ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	"That's true."
	ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων;	"So isn't it in reasoning, if anywhere, that any of the things that are becomes clear to it?"
	ναί.	"Yes."
	λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος.	"And it reasons best, I suppose, when none of these things troubles it—neither hearing nor sight nor pain nor any pleasure—but it comes to be, as far as possible, itself by itself, saying goodbye to the body, and, as far as it can, without partnership or contact with it, reaches out for what is."
	ἔστι ταῦτα.	"That's so."
	οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα [65d] ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι;	"So here too the philosopher's soul most of all [65d] disdains the body and flees from it, and seeks to be itself by itself?"
65d	φαίνεται.	"It seems so."
	τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;	"And what about things like this, Simmias? Do we say that there is something just itself, or not?"
	φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία.	"By Zeus, we certainly do."
	καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν;	"And again, something beautiful, and good?"

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	πῶς δ’ οὔ;	“Of course.”
	ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες;	“Now, have you ever seen any of these with your eyes?”
	οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ’ ὅς.	“Never,” he said.
	ἀλλ’ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ [65e] τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν· ἆρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδε ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον;	“Or grasped them with any other of the senses that work through the body? I’m speaking about all of them—for example, about size, health, strength, and, in a word, about the being of all the others, what [65e] each of them actually is. Is their truest nature observed through the body? Or is it like this: whichever of us prepares himself most fully and most precisely to think about each thing he examines, the thing itself, will come closest to knowing each thing?”
65e	πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	“Certainly.”
	ἆρ’ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ’ ἕκαστον, μήτε τιν’ ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην [66a] αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτῇ καθ’ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὤτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῇ; ἆρ’ οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος;	“Then wouldn’t the person who does this most purely be the one who approaches each thing with thought alone, as far as possible, neither bringing sight into his thinking nor dragging any other [66a] sense along with his reasoning, but using pure thought itself by itself, tries to hunt down each of the things that are, pure and itself by itself—freed as far as possible from eyes and ears and, so to speak, from the whole body, since the body disturbs the soul and doesn’t let it acquire truth and understanding whenever it is its partner? Isn’t this the man, Simmias, who will reach what is, if anyone will?”
66a	ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. [66b]	“What you say is extraordinarily true, Socrates,” said Simmias. [66b]

PHILOSOPHY AS PRACTICE FOR DYING

Socrates argues that philosophy is practice for dying, since it separates the soul from the body.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
66b	**PHAEDO** οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἄττα λέγειν, ὅτι “κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπός τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν [66c] τροφήν· ἔτι δέ, ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν	**PHAEDO** Then from all this, he said, genuine philosophers must come to hold some such belief, so that they say something like this to one another: “There seems to be a kind of path that carries us, with reason as our guide, to this view in our inquiry: as long as we have the body, and our soul is mixed up with such an evil, we will never adequately acquire what we desire—and this, we say, is the truth. The body gives us countless distractions because of its need for [66c] nourishment; and

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	τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν.	besides, if any diseases fall upon us, they hinder our hunt for what is. It fills us with lusts and desires and fears and all sorts of phantoms and a great deal of nonsense, so that, as the saying goes, truly and really, because of it we can never think about anything at all.
66c	καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα [66d] ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὖ πανταχοῦ παραπῖπτον θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τἀληθές.	"Wars, too, and factions and battles are caused by nothing other than the body and its desires. All wars come about for the sake of getting money, and it's because of the body that we are [66d] compelled to get money, enslaved as we are to its care. So, because of all this, we have no leisure for philosophy. And worst of all, if we do get some leisure from it and turn to looking into something, it keeps intruding everywhere in our inquiries, causing uproar and confusion and throwing us into a daze, so that because of it we can't make out the truth.
66d	ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, [66e] ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ."	"In fact it has been shown to us that if we are ever going to know anything purely, [66e] we must get free of the body and look at things themselves with the soul itself. And then, it seems, we will have what we desire and claim to be in love with—understanding—once we have died, as the argument indicates, but not while we are alive.
66e	"εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν· τότε [67a] γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' οὔ.	"For if it is impossible to know anything purely in the body's company, then one of two things follows: either knowledge can be gained nowhere, or only by the dead. For then, [67a] and not before, the soul will be itself by itself, apart from the body.
67a	καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν [67b] αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές· μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ." τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως;	"And while we are alive, it seems, we will come closest to knowing if we associate with the body as little as possible and have nothing to do with it beyond what is absolutely necessary, and don't let ourselves be filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure of it until the god himself releases us. In this way, pure and rid of the body's folly, we will probably be in the company of things that are likewise pure, and we will know through our [67b] own selves all that is unmixed—and that, perhaps, is the truth. For it may well be that the impure is not permitted to lay hold of the pure." Things like this, Simmias, are what I think all who rightly love learning must say to one another and believe. Or don't you think so?
67b	παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"More than anything, Socrates."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ γε 67c ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.	"Well then, my friend," said Socrates, "if this is true, there is great hope that when I arrive where I am going, there, if anywhere, I will fully gain what all our great effort in our past life has been for. So the 67c journey now laid upon me begins with good hope, and so it does for any other man who believes his mind has been prepared by being, as it were, purified."
67c	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.	"Certainly," said Simmias.
	κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ 67d ἔπειτα μόνην καθ' αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;	"And doesn't purification turn out to be just what was said some time ago in our argument: separating the soul from the body as far as possible, and accustoming it to gather and collect itself by itself out of every part of the body, and to live, as far as it can, both now and 67d hereafter, alone by itself, released from the body as if from chains?"
67d	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.	"Certainly," he said.
	οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;	"And isn't this what is called death—a release and separation of the soul from the body?"
	παντάπασί γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.	"Absolutely," he said.
	λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· ἢ οὔ;	"And it's those who practice philosophy rightly, we say, who are always most eager to release the soul, and they alone; and this very thing is the philosophers' practice: the release and separation of the soul from the body. Isn't that so?"
	φαίνεται.	"It seems so."
	οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα 67e παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κἄπειθ' ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν;	"Then, as I said at the beginning, wouldn't it be absurd for a man 67e to prepare himself throughout his life to live as close as possible to being dead, and then, when that comes to him, to resent it?"
67e	γελοῖον· πῶς δ' οὔ;	"Absurd—of course it would."
	τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει.	So in truth, Simmias, he said, those who practice philosophy rightly are practicing dying, and to them, of all people, being dead is least frightening. Look at it this way.
	εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὑτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ 68a ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἷ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὗ διὰ βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν — ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως — ᾧ τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ	If they are at odds with the body in every way and desire to have the soul by itself, then when this comes about, if they were afraid and resentful, wouldn't it be highly unreasonable of them not 68a to go gladly to the place where, once they arrive, they can hope to obtain what they longed for all their lives—and what they longed for was under-

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	γυναικῶν καὶ ὑέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἑκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἅιδου μετελθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ [68b] ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἅιδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐχ ἅσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε;	standing—and to be rid of the companion they were at odds with? Many people, when their human beloveds or wives or sons have died, have been willing to go to Hades of their own accord, led by the hope of seeing there those they longed for and being with them. And will someone who is truly in love with understanding, and who firmly holds this same hope, that he will meet with it nowhere else [68b] worth speaking of than in Hades, resent dying and not go there gladly?
68b	οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ᾖ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος;	One would have to think he'll go gladly, my friend, if he really is a philosopher. For he will be firmly convinced that he will meet with understanding in its purity nowhere but there. And if that is so, wouldn't it be highly unreasonable, as I was saying just now, for such a man to fear death?
	πολλὴ μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.	"Highly unreasonable, by Zeus," he said.
	οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρός, ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' [68c] ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα.	"Then isn't this sufficient evidence for you," he said, "that any man you see resenting it when he is about to die was not, after all, [68c] a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body? And this same man, I suppose, is also a lover of money or a lover of honor, either one or both."
68c	πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις.	"It is just as you say," he said.
	ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει;	"Well, Simmias," he said, "doesn't what is called courage also belong above all to people of this disposition?"
	πάντως δήπου, ἔφη.	"Surely it does," he said.
	οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἆρ' οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσίν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν;	"And moderation too—what even most people call moderation, not being carried away by one's desires but treating them with disdain and keeping them in order—doesn't it belong only to those who most disdain the body and live in philosophy?"
	ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.	"Necessarily," he said.
	εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τήν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος.	"Yes," he said, "because if you are willing to consider the courage and moderation of other people, you'll find it strange."
	πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;	"How so, Socrates?"
	οἶσθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν;	"You know," he said, "that all other people consider death one of the great evils?"
	καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.	"Very much so," he said.

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οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν;	"And the courageous among them endure death, when they do endure it, out of fear of greater evils?"
ἔστι ταῦτα.	"That's so."
τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι. 68e	"So it's by being afraid—by fear—that everyone except philosophers is courageous. And yet it's unreasonable for anyone to be courageous through fear and cowardice." 68e
68e πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	"Certainly."
τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν· ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην· φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι.	What about the orderly ones among them? Isn't it the same with them—they are moderate through a kind of self-indulgence? We say that's impossible, and yet what happens to them with this simple-minded moderation is something like that. Because they are afraid of being deprived of some pleasures and desire them, they abstain from others, being mastered by the first.
καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν 69a τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ᾧ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι.	And yet people call it self-indulgence 69a to be ruled by pleasures. All the same, what happens to them is that, being mastered by pleasures, they master other pleasures. And this is like what was just said, that in a way they have been made moderate through self-indulgence.
69a ἔοικε γάρ.	"So it seems."
ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ᾖ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, 69b καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ᾖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετή, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ᾖ 69c κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ᾖ.	My dear Simmias, this may not be the right exchange with a view to excellence—trading pleasures for pleasures and pains for pains and fear for fear, greater for lesser, like coins. It may be that the only right coin, for which all these must be exchanged, is understanding, 69b and that everything bought and sold for this and with this is truly courage and moderation and justice—in short, true excellence goes with understanding, whether pleasures and fears and everything else of that kind are added or taken away. But when they are separated from understanding and exchanged for one another, such excellence may be a kind of illusionist's painting, fit for slaves in truth, with nothing sound or true about it. What is true, in truth, may be 69c a kind of purification from all such things, and moderation and justice and courage, and understanding itself, may be a kind of rite of purification.[12]

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καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δή, ὡς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, "ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι·" οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προυθυμήθην γενέσθαι· εἰ δ' ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καί τι ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.

And it may be that the people who established our initiation rites were not so foolish after all, but have long been speaking in riddles when they say that whoever arrives in Hades uninitiated and unconsecrated will lie in the mud, while whoever arrives there purified and initiated will dwell with the gods. For, as those concerned with the rites say, "Many carry the fennel wand, but few are Bacchants." And these, in my view, are none other than those who have practiced philosophy rightly. I myself, as far as I could, left nothing undone in my life to become one of them, but strove to in every way. Whether I strove rightly and achieved anything, we will know for certain when we get there, god willing, a little while from now, as it seems to me.[13]

ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος κἀκεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἑταίροις· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει· εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

This, then, Simmias and Cebes, he said, is my defense: that it is reasonable for me not to be distressed or resentful at leaving you and my masters here, since I believe that there, no less than here, I will find good masters and good companions. Most people don't believe this. So if my defense is any more persuasive to you than it was to the Athenian jurors, that would be good.

THE ARGUMENT FROM OPPOSITES

Cebes doubts the soul survives death, and Socrates argues that the living come from the dead.

GREEK

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PHAEDO εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μή, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾖ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται ᾗ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνήσκῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ. ἐπεί, εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νυνδὴ διῆλθες, πολλὴ ἂν εἴη ἐλπὶς καὶ καλή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν.

PHAEDO When Socrates had said this, Cebes took it up and said, "Socrates, the rest seems to me well said, but what you say about the soul leaves people with grave doubts. They fear that when it is released from the body it no longer exists anywhere, but is destroyed and perishes on the very day the person dies: that as soon as it is released from the body, it goes out like breath or smoke, scattered, flies off and is gone, and no longer exists anywhere at all. Of course, if it did exist somewhere, gathered together itself by itself and rid of those evils you went through just now, there would be great and fine hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But this, perhaps, needs no little reassurance and proof: that the soul exists

12 "Illusionist's painting" (skiagraphia) was a technique of shading that looked convincing from a distance but showed only blotches up close.

13 The fennel wand (narthex) was carried by worshippers of Dionysus; a Bacchant is one truly possessed by the god.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		when the person has died, and has some power and understanding."
70b	ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή;	"What you say is true, Cebes," said Socrates. "But what are we to do? Do you want us to talk through these very things, whether it's likely to be so or not?"
	ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν.	"I, at any rate," said Cebes, "would be glad to hear what view you hold about them."
	οὔκουν γ' ἂν οἶμαι, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.	Well, said Socrates, I don't think anyone who heard me now, not even a comic poet, would say I'm babbling and talking about things that are none of my business. So if you like, we should examine it thoroughly.[14]
	σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ, εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν Ἅιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν [70d] ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λόγου.	Let's consider it in some such way as this: whether the souls of people who have died are in Hades or not. Now there is an ancient account, which we remember, that they go there from here, and come back here again and are born from the dead. And if this is so, that the living are born again from those who have died, then wouldn't our souls [70d] exist there? They could hardly be born again if they didn't exist, and it would be sufficient evidence that this is so if it really became clear that the living come from nowhere else than from the dead. But if this is not so, we would need some other argument.
70d	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.	"Certainly," said Cebes.
	μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων [70e] ἴδωμεν ἆρ' οὑτωσὶ γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα ἀναγκαῖον ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι;	"Then don't consider this only in the case of human beings," he said, "if you want to understand it more easily, but in the case of all animals and plants as well. In short, for everything that comes into being, [70e] let's see whether all things come into being like this: opposites from nowhere else than from their opposites, in all cases where there is such a thing—as the beautiful, I suppose, is opposite to the ugly, and the just to the unjust, and countless other things are the same way. So let's consider this: whether it is necessary that whatever has an opposite comes to be from nowhere else than from its own opposite. For example, when something becomes larger, it must, I suppose, become larger from being smaller before?"

14 Comic poets, Aristophanes in the *Clouds* among them, had mocked Socrates as an idle babbler.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
70e	ναί.	"Yes."
	οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον [71a] ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται;	"And if it becomes smaller, it will become smaller later [71a] from being larger before?"
71a	ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη.	"That's so," he said.
	καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶττον;	"And the weaker comes from the stronger, and the faster from the slower?"
	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
	τί δέ; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου;	"What about this? If something becomes worse, isn't it from better, and if more just, from less just?"
	πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	"Of course."
	ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα;	"Then have we established this sufficiently," he said, "that all things come into being this way, opposite things from opposites?"
	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
	τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν δύο γενέσεις, [71b] ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον· μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν;	"Next: is there also something like this about them? Between each pair of opposites, since there are two of them, there are two processes of coming-to-be, [71b] from the first to the second, and back again from the second to the first. Between a larger thing and a smaller there is increase and decrease, and so we call the one increasing and the other decreasing?"
71b	ναί, ἔφη.	"Yes," he said.
	οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαί τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα;	"And separating and combining, cooling and heating, and all things like that—even if in some cases we don't have names for them, still in fact it must be so everywhere: they come into being from each other, and there is a process of each passing into the other?"
	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς. [71c]	"Certainly," he said. [71c]
71c	τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν;	"Well then," he said, "is there something opposite to living, as sleeping is to being awake?"
	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.	"Certainly," he said.
	τί;	"What?"
	τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη.	"Being dead," he said.

GREEK	ENGLISH
οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστιν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντοιν;	“Then these come into being from each other, if they are opposites, and there are two processes between them, since they are two?”
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	“Of course.”
τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ [71d] ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ’ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὔ;	“Now,” said Socrates, “I will tell you one of the pairs I mentioned just now, both the pair itself and its processes, and you tell me the other. I mean sleeping and being awake: being awake comes from sleeping, and [71d] sleeping from being awake, and their processes are falling asleep and waking up. Is that sufficient for you,” he said, “or not?”
71d πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	“Certainly.”
λέγε δή μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῂς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;	“Now you tell me in the same way about life and death,” he said. “Don’t you say that being dead is the opposite of living?”
ἔγωγε.	“I do.”
γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων;	“And that they come into being from each other?”
ναί.	“Yes.”
ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον;	“Then what comes into being from the living?”
τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη.	“The dead,” he said.
τί δέ, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος;	“And what,” he said, “from the dead?”
ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν.	“I have to agree,” he said, “that it’s the living.”
ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται;	“Then it’s from the dead, Cebes, that living things and living people come into being?”
φαίνεται, ἔφη.	“So it seems,” he said.
εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἅιδου.	“Then our souls exist in Hades,” he said.
ἔοικεν.	“It seems so.”
οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἥ γ’ ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκειν σαφὲς δήπου, ἢ οὔ;	“Now of the two processes involved here, one happens to be plain to see, doesn’t it? Dying, surely, is plain to see, isn’t it?”
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.	“Certainly,” he said.
πῶς οὖν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν;	“So what shall we do?” he said. “Shall we not supply the opposite process in return, and leave nature lame in this respect? Or must we supply some process opposite to dying?”
πάντως που, ἔφη.	“Surely we must,” he said.

GREEK	ENGLISH
τίνα ταύτην;	"What is it?"
τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι.	"Coming back to life."
οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν [72a] τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὖτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι;	"Then," he said, "if there is such a thing as coming back to life, this, coming back to life, would be a process from the [72a] dead to the living?"
72a πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων, τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι.	"So we agree in this way too that the living have come from the dead no less than the dead from the living. And if this is so, we thought, I believe, that it was sufficient evidence that the souls of the dead must exist somewhere, from which they are then born again."
δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.	"It seems to me, Socrates," he said, "that given what we have agreed, it must be so."
ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ [72b] ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὥσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα, ἀλλ' εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα;	"Then look at it this way, Cebes," he said, "and you'll see that we weren't wrong to agree, as I think. If the two sets of things coming into being did not always balance [72b] each other, going round as if in a circle, but coming-to-be went in a straight line, only from the one into its opposite, and did not bend back again to the first or make a turn, you know that everything would in the end have the same form and be in the same state, and would stop coming into being?"
72b πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.	"What do you mean?" he said.
οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἷον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' [72c] ἂν λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, "ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα." ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἆρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα [72d] τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν;	It's not hard to see what I mean, he said. For example, if there were falling asleep, but waking up did not balance it by coming out of the sleeping state, you know that in the end everything [72c] would make a nonsense of Endymion, and he would be nowhere to be seen, because everything else would be in the same state as he is—asleep. And if everything were combined and nothing separated, Anaxagoras' saying would soon come true: "All things together." In the same way, my dear Cebes, if everything that shares in life were to die, and once dead, the dead stayed in that form and did not come back to life, wouldn't it be quite inevitable that in the end everything [72d] would be dead and nothing would be alive?[15]
72d	

15 Endymion was a youth of myth granted everlasting sleep. The philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (5th century BC) began his book by saying that at first "all things were together."

GREEK	ENGLISH
εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνῄσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;	For if living things came into being from other things, and the living died, what way could there be to prevent everything being used up in death?
οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.	"None at all, I think, Socrates," said Cebes. "What you say seems to me entirely true."
ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς [72e] εἶναι καὶ ταῖς μέν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον.	"Yes, Cebes," he said, "it is so, as I see it, more than anything, and we are not deceived in agreeing to these very things. There really is coming back to life, and the living do come into being from the dead, and the souls of the dead [72e] exist, and it is better for the good ones and worse for the bad."

LEARNING AS RECOLLECTION

Socrates argues that knowing the equal itself shows the soul existed before birth.

GREEK	ENGLISH
72e **PHAEDO** καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμεθα.	**PHAEDO** Moreover, Cebes put in, it's also so according to that argument you're often in the habit of stating, Socrates, if it's true: that learning for us is in fact nothing but recollection. By this argument too, I suppose, we must have learned at some earlier time the things we now recollect.
τοῦτο δὲ [73a] ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εἶναι.	But this is [73a] impossible unless our soul existed somewhere before it came to be in this human form. So in this way too, the soul seems to be something immortal.
73a ἀλλά, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι.	"But Cebes," Simmias put in, "what are the proofs of this? Remind me, since I don't remember very well at the moment."
ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἃ ἔχει — καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι — ἔπειτα [73b] ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει.	"One argument, the finest," said Cebes, "is that when people are questioned, if someone questions them well, they state everything as it is by themselves—and yet if knowledge and a right account weren't already present in them, they wouldn't be able to do this. Then, [73b] if you lead someone to diagrams or something else of that sort, that shows most clearly that this is so."[16]
73b εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθῃ, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἂν τῇδέ πῃ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν;	"But if you aren't persuaded this way, Simmias," said Socrates, "see whether you may come to agree if you look at it like this. You doubt, don't you, how what is called learning can be recollection?"
ἀπιστῶ μέν σοι ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος,	"I don't doubt you," said Simmias, "but what I need is to undergo the very thing the argument is about —to be reminded. In fact, from what Cebes set out

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μεντἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν πῇ σὺ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. [73c]	to say, I nearly remember already, and I'm persuaded. Still, I would like to hear now how you set out to put it." [73c]
73c	τῇδ' ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι.	"Like this," he said. "We agree, I suppose, that if someone is to recollect something, he must have known it at some earlier time."
	πάνυ γ', ἔφη.	"Certainly," he said.
	ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε. ἐάν τίς τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἄλλη, ἆρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὗ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβεν;	"Then do we also agree on this, that when knowledge comes about in the following way, it is recollection? What way do I mean? This: if someone, on seeing or hearing something, or perceiving it with some other sense, not only recognizes that thing but also thinks of something else, the knowledge of which is not the same but different, aren't we right to say that he was reminded of the thing he thought of?"
	πῶς λέγεις;	"What do you mean?"
	οἷον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας.	"Things like this: knowledge of a person is different, I suppose, from knowledge of a lyre."
	πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	"Of course."
	οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη.	"Well, you know that when lovers see a lyre or a cloak or anything else their beloved is accustomed to use, this is what happens to them: they recognize the lyre and in their mind they get the image of the boy whose lyre it was. And this is recollection. In the same way, someone who sees Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there would be countless other cases like this."
	μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. [73e]	"Countless indeed, by Zeus," said Simmias. [73e]
73e	οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο;	"So isn't something like this a kind of recollection?" he said. "Especially when it happens with things one had already forgotten through time and not paying attention to them?"
	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.	"Certainly," he said.
	τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι;	"What about this?" he said. "Is it possible, on seeing a painted horse or a painted lyre, to be reminded of a person, and on seeing a painted Simmias, to be reminded of Cebes?"
	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."

16 Cebes seems to allude to a demonstration like the one in Plato's *Meno*, where Socrates questions a slave boy about a geometrical diagram.

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	οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; 74a	"And on seeing a painted Simmias, to be reminded of Simmias himself?" 74a
74a	ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.	"It certainly is," he said.
	ἆρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων;	"Then doesn't it turn out, in all these cases, that recollection comes both from similar things and from dissimilar things?"
	συμβαίνει.	"It does."
	ἀλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνῄσκηταί τίς τι, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη;	"But when someone is reminded of something by similar things, mustn't he also experience this: thinking whether or not the thing falls short at all, in its likeness, of what he was reminded of?"
	ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.	"He must," he said.
	σκόπει δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον· φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; 74b	"Then consider whether this is so," he said. "We say, I suppose, that there is something equal—I don't mean a stick equal to a stick, or a stone to a stone, or anything else of that kind, but something else beyond all these, the equal itself. Shall we say it is something, or nothing?" 74b
74b	φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε.	"By Zeus, we certainly shall say it is something," said Simmias, "most emphatically."
	ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν;	"And do we also know what it is?"
	πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.	"Certainly," he said.
	πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἆρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὔ;	"Where did we get our knowledge of it? Wasn't it from the things we were just talking about? Seeing sticks or stones or other things that were equal, didn't we think, from them, of that, which is different from them? Or doesn't it seem different to you? Look at it this way too. Don't equal stones and sticks, while remaining the same, sometimes seem equal to one person and not to another?"
	πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 74c	"Certainly." 74c
74c	τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;	"Well, have the equals themselves ever seemed unequal to you, or equality inequality?"
	οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"Never, Socrates."
	οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον.	"Then these equals," he said, "and the equal itself are not the same."
	οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"Not at all, it seems to me, Socrates."

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	ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας;	"And yet it is from these equals," he said, "different as they are from that equal, that you have thought of and gained knowledge of it?"
	ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.	"That's very true," he said.
	οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου;	"And that whether it is similar to them or dissimilar?"
	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
	διαφέρει δέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν· ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ 74d ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι.	"It makes no difference," he said. "As long as, on seeing one thing, you think of another 74d from seeing it, whether similar or dissimilar, this must," he said, "have been recollection."
74d	πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	"Certainly."
	τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν;	"What about this?" he said. "Do we experience something like this with the equal sticks and the other equals we were just talking about? Do they seem to us to be equal in the same way as what the equal itself is, or do they fall somewhat short of it in being like the equal, or not at all?"
	καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ.	"They fall far short," he said.
	οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἴσον οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν;	"Then we agree that when someone, on seeing something, thinks, 'This thing I now see wants to be like some other thing that is, but it falls short and cannot be equal to it in that way, but is inferior,' the person who thinks this must, I suppose, have previously known the thing he says it resembles but falls short of?"
	ἀνάγκη.	"He must."
	τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἢ οὔ περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον;	"Well then, has this happened to us too, or not, with equal things and the equal itself?"
	παντάπασί γε.	"Absolutely."
	ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ 75a χρόνου ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως.	"Then we must have known the equal before the 75a time when we first saw equal things and thought that all these strive to be like the equal but fall short of it."
75a	ἔστι ταῦτα.	"That's so."
	ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.	"Moreover, we also agree on this: that we have not thought of it, and could not think of it, from anything but seeing or touching or some other of the senses—I count all these as the same."

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	ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρός γε ὃ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος.	"Yes, Socrates, it's all the same, at least for what the argument wants to show."
	ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι [75b] πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;	"But surely it's from the senses that we must come to realize that [75b] all the things we perceive are striving for what the equal is, and fall short of it. Or how do we put it?"
75b	οὕτως.	"Like that."
	πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα.	"So before we began to see and hear and use our other senses, we must somehow have acquired knowledge of what the equal itself is, if we were going to refer the equal things we get from our senses back to it, and see that they're all eager to be like it but are inferior to it."
	ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"That follows necessarily from what's been said, Socrates."
	οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν;	"Now weren't we seeing and hearing and in possession of our other senses from the moment we were born?"
	πάνυ γε. [75c]	"Certainly." [75c]
75c	ἔδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι;	"But we must, we're saying, have acquired our knowledge of the equal before these?"
	ναί.	"Yes."
	πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.	"Then it seems we must have acquired it before we were born."
	ἔοικεν.	"It seems so."
	οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλόν τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ [75d] ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἁπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ "αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι" καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι.	"Then if we acquired it before birth and were born having it, didn't we know, both before birth and immediately after, not only the equal and the larger and the smaller but everything of that kind? After all, our argument now is no more about the equal than it is about the beautiful itself and the [75d] good itself and the just and the holy—about everything, as I say, that we stamp with the seal 'what it is itself,' both in the questions we ask and in the answers we give. So we must have acquired knowledge of all these before we were born."
75d	ἔστι ταῦτα.	"That's so."
	καὶ εἰ μέν γε λαβόντες ἑκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἔστιν, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ	"And if, having acquired it, we didn't forget it each time, then we must always be born knowing and go on knowing throughout our lives. For that's what knowing is: having acquired knowledge of

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	ἀπολωλεκέναι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὦ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν;	something, to keep it and not lose it. Or isn't this what we call forgetting, Simmias—the loss of knowledge?"
	πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"Absolutely, Socrates," he said.
	εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἃς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἆρ' οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;	"But if, I suppose, we acquired it before birth and lost it at birth, and later, using our senses on these things, we recover the knowledge we once had before, wouldn't what we call learning be recovering knowledge that is our own? And wouldn't we be right to call this recollecting?"
	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
76a	δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὃ ἐπελέλητο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὂν ἢ ᾧ ὅμοιον· ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη.	"Yes, because this did turn out to be possible: that on perceiving something—seeing it or hearing it or getting some other perception of it—a person could be led from it to think of something else that he had forgotten, something this was associated with, whether unlike it or like it. So, as I say, it's one of two things: either we were born knowing these things and all of us know them throughout life, or those who we say learn later are doing nothing but recollecting, and learning would be recollection."
	καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"That's very much how it is, Socrates."
	πότερον οὖν αἱρῇ, ὦ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, [76b] ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὧν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν;	"So which do you choose, Simmias? That we were born knowing, [76b] or that we later recollect what we had acquired knowledge of before?"
76b	οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἑλέσθαι.	"I can't choose right now, Socrates."
	τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἑλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὔ;	"Well, can you choose on this, and what do you think about it? Would a man who knows be able to give an account of what he knows, or not?"
	πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"He'd have to be, Socrates," he said.
	ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν;	"And do you think everyone can give an account of the things we were just talking about?"
	βουλοίμην μεντἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ᾖ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. [76c]	"I only wish they could," said Simmias. "But I'm much more afraid that by this time tomorrow there won't be a single person left who can do it properly." [76c]
76c	οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά;	"So you don't think everyone knows these things, Simmias?" he said.
	οὐδαμῶς.	"Not at all."
	ἀναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα ἃ ποτε ἔμαθον;	

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		“Then they’re recollecting what they once learned?”
	ἀνάγκη.	“They must be.”
	πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ’ οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν.	“When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Not since we were born as human beings, surely.”
	οὐ δῆτα.	“Certainly not.”
	πρότερον ἄρα.	“Before, then.”
	ναί.	“Yes.”
	ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον.	“So our souls existed before, Simmias, before they were in human form—apart from bodies—and they had understanding.”
	εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. 76d	“Unless, Socrates, we acquire these pieces of knowledge at the very moment we’re born. That time is still left.” 76d
76d	εἶεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; — οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν — ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον;	“Very well, my friend. But then at what other time do we lose them? We aren’t born with them, as we agreed just now. Or do we lose them at the same moment we acquire them? Or can you name some other time?”
	οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.	“Not at all, Socrates. I didn’t notice I was talking nonsense.”
	ἆρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, 76e ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ἆρ’ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;	“So is this how things stand for us, Simmias?” he said. “If the things we’re always harping on exist—a beautiful and a good and every being of that kind—and if we refer everything that comes from our senses to that being, 76e discovering that it was there before and was ours, and we compare these things to it, then just as these exist, so our soul must also exist even before we were born. But if they don’t exist, this argument would have been made for nothing, wouldn’t it? Is this how it is: there’s an equal necessity that these things exist and that our souls existed before we were born, and if not the one, then not the other?”
76e	ὑπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς 77a τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὂν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ’ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.	“Socrates,” said Simmias, “I’m overwhelmingly convinced that the necessity is the same. And the argument takes refuge in a fine place: 77a that our soul exists before we’re born just as surely as the being you’re now speaking of. For there’s nothing so plain to me as this: that all such things exist as fully as anything can—beautiful and good and all

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		the others you were just mentioning. As far as I'm concerned, it's been adequately proved."
77a	τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν.	"And what about Cebes?" said Socrates. "We have to persuade Cebes too."
	ἱκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι· καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι 77b ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή· εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν ὃ νυνδὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα ἀποθνῄσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ᾖ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ συνίστασθαι ἄλλοθέν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; 77c	"Adequately," said Simmias, "as far as I can tell—though he's the most stubborn man alive when it comes to distrusting arguments. But I think he's been fully persuaded of this much: that before we were born 77b our soul existed. Whether it will still exist once we die, though, doesn't seem to me to have been proved either, Socrates," he said. "What Cebes was saying just now still stands in the way—what most people fear, that as a person dies his soul is scattered, and that this is the end of its existence. For what's to stop it coming into being and being put together from somewhere or other, and existing before it ever enters a human body, and yet, once it has entered one and is released from it, coming to an end itself and being destroyed?" 77c
77c	εὖ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἥμισυ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὗ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἕξειν.	"You're right, Simmias," said Cebes. "It looks as if half of what's needed has been proved—that our soul existed before we were born. But we still have to prove in addition that it will exist no less after we die than before we were born, if the proof is to be complete."
	ἀποδέδεικται μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ ᾽θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταὐτὸν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν 77d ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένῃ μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε δεῖ αὖθις αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν.	It has been proved, Simmias and Cebes, said Socrates, even now, if you're willing to put this argument together with the one we agreed on before it—that everything living comes from what is dead. For if the 77d soul exists beforehand too, and if, when it enters life and is born, it must come from nowhere else but death and being dead, how can it not also exist after it dies, since it has to be born again? So what you're asking for has been proved even now.
77d	ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ 77e καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνῄσκων.	All the same, I think you and Simmias would like to work through this argument still further. You're afraid, like children, that when the soul leaves the body the wind really will blow it apart 77e and scatter it—especially if someone happens to die not in calm weather but in a strong gale.
77e	καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν· μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται.	Cebes laughed and said, "Try to win us over, Socrates, as though we were afraid—or rather, not as though we were afraid; but maybe there's a child inside us too who's frightened of such things. So

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	τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.	try to talk him out of fearing death as if it were a bogeyman."
	ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε.	"Then you must sing charms over him every day," said Socrates, "until you've charmed his fear away."
78a	πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπῳδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις;	"Then where, Socrates," he said, "are we going to find a good charmer for such things, since you," he said, "are leaving us?"
	πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐν ᾗ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπῳδόν, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅτι ἂν εὐκαιρότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίως εὕροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν.	"Greece is a big place, Cebes," he said, "and there must be good men in it; and there are many foreign peoples too. You must search through all of them looking for such a charmer, sparing neither money nor effort, since there's nothing you could spend money on to better purpose. And you must search among yourselves as well, together; for you may not easily find people better able to do this than you."
	ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ 78b ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν.	"That will certainly be done," said Cebes. "But let's go back to where 78b we left off, if you'd like to."
78b	ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;	"Of course I'd like to. How could I not?"
	καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.	"Good," he said.

THE SOUL AND THE INVISIBLE

Socrates argues the soul resembles the invisible, unchanging forms and so is unlikely to scatter at death.

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	PHAEDO οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὔ· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς;	**PHAEDO** "Well then," said Socrates, "shouldn't we ask ourselves something like this: what sort of thing is naturally liable to have this happen to it—being scattered—and for what sort of thing should we fear that it might happen, and for what sort not? And after that, shouldn't we consider which sort the soul is, and on that basis be confident or afraid for our soul?"
	ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. 78c	"That's true," he said. 78c
78c	ἆρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι ταύτῃ ᾗπερ συνετέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὂν ἀσύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ;	"Now isn't it what has been put together, and is composite by nature, that is liable to this—to be split apart at the points where it was put together? And if there is something that isn't composite, isn't it this alone, if anything, that is not liable to it?"
	δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης.	"I think that's how it is," said Cebes.
		"And the things that are always the same and in the same state are most likely to be the non-com-

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	οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀσύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα;	posite ones, while those that are different at different times and never the same are composite?"
	ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.	"I think so."
	ἴωμεν δή, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐφ' ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν 78d λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται;	"Then let's turn," he said, "to the same things we dealt with in our earlier 78d argument. Being itself, whose being we give an account of in our questions and answers—is it always the same and in the same state, or different at different times? The equal itself, the beautiful itself, each thing itself that is, what is—does it ever admit any change whatsoever? Or does each of them that is, being uniform, itself by itself, stay the same and in the same state, never admitting any alteration in any way at all?"
78d	ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"It must stay the same and in the same state, Socrates," said Cebes.
	τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ 78e ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; ἆρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταὐτά;	"And what about the many beautiful things—people, say, or horses or 78e cloaks or anything else of that kind—or equal things, or beautiful things, or all the things that share a name with those? Are they the same? Or, quite the opposite of those, are they practically never the same in any way, either as themselves or as one another?"
78e	οὕτως αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ταῦτα· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει.	"That's how these are," said Cebes. "They're never the same."
79a	οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἅψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀιδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά;	"Now these you could touch or see or perceive with your other senses; but the things that stay the same you can never grasp with anything except the reasoning of the mind. Such things are invisible, not seen, aren't they?"
	παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	"What you say is entirely true," he said.
	θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀιδές;	"Then shall we posit," he said, "two kinds of things that are, one visible, the other invisible?"
	θῶμεν, ἔφη.	"Let's posit them," he said.
	καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀιδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά;	"And the invisible always the same, the visible never the same?"
	καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. 79b	"Let's posit that too," he said. 79b
79b	φέρε δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή;	"Come then," he said, "are we made up of anything other than body on the one hand and soul on the other?"

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οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη.	“Nothing else,” he said.
ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαμὲν ἂν εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα;	“So which kind would we say the body is more like and more akin to?”
παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ.	“That’s clear to anyone,” he said: “the visible.”
τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀιδές;	“And the soul? Is it visible or invisible?”
οὐχ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.	“Not visible to human beings, at any rate, Socrates,” he said.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν· ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ οἴει;	“But we were talking about what is visible and not visible to human nature, weren’t we? Or do you think we meant some other nature?”
τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.	“Human nature.”
τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι;	“So what do we say about the soul? Is it visible or not visible?”
οὐχ ὁρατόν.	“Not visible.”
ἀιδὲς ἄρα;	“Invisible, then?”
ναί.	“Yes.”
ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστιν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ.	“So soul is more like the invisible than body is, and body more like the visible.”
πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.	“It must be, Socrates.”
οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι’ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως — τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι’ αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι — τότε μὲν ἕλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ εἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη;	“Now weren’t we saying a while ago that when the soul uses the body to investigate something, whether through sight or hearing or some other sense—since investigating something through the body means investigating it through the senses—it is dragged by the body toward things that are never the same, and it wanders and is confused and dizzy, as though drunk, because it’s in contact with things of that kind?”
πάνυ γε. 79d	“Certainly.” 79d
79d ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται;	“But when it investigates by itself, it goes off there, to what is pure and always is and is immortal and stays the same; and being akin to it, it is always with it whenever it comes to be by itself and is able to. Then it has ceased from its wandering, and in relation to those things it stays always the same, in the same state, because it’s in contact with things of that kind. And isn’t this state of the soul called understanding?”
παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.	

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		"That's entirely well and truly said, Socrates," he said.
	ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ ἐκ [79e] τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχὴ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον;	"So again, which kind do you think the soul is more like and more akin to, judging from what we said before and [79e] what we're saying now?"
79e	πᾶς ἄν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, συγχωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή.	"I think anyone would concede from this line of inquiry, Socrates," he said, "even the slowest learner, that soul is wholly and entirely more like what is always the same than what isn't."
	τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα;	"And the body?"
	τῷ ἑτέρῳ.	"Like the other."
	ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ [80a] σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἷον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν;	"Now look at it this way too. When soul and [80a] body are together, nature assigns the one to serve and be ruled, the other to rule and be master. On this basis, again, which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Or don't you think the divine is naturally fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to be ruled and serve?"
80a	ἔμοιγε.	"I do."
	ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικεν;	"So which does the soul resemble?"
	δῆλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ.	"Obviously, Socrates, the soul resembles the divine and the body the mortal."
	σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων [80b] τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;	"Consider, then, Cebes," he said, "whether from everything we've said [80b] this is what we get: that soul is most like what is divine and immortal and intelligible and uniform and indissoluble and always the same as itself and in the same state, while body, in turn, is most like what is human and mortal and multiform and unintelligible and dissoluble and never the same as itself. Can we say anything against this, my dear Cebes, to show it isn't so?"
80b	οὐκ ἔχομεν.	"We can't."
	τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἆρ' οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου; [80c]	"Well then, if this is so, isn't it natural for body to be quickly dissolved, but for soul to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so?" [80c]
80c	πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	"Of course."
	ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ'	"Now you realize," he said, "that when a person dies, the visible part of him, the body, which lies in the visible world and which we call a corpse, and which is naturally liable to dissolve and fall

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα· συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον, [80d] ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν σαπῇ, ὀστᾶ τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν· ἢ οὔ;	apart and be blown away, doesn't undergo any of this right away. It lasts a fair length of time—and a very long time indeed if someone dies with his body in fine condition and in the bloom of life. In fact, when the body is shrunk and embalmed, like those embalmed in Egypt, it stays almost whole for an incredibly long time; [80d] and some parts of the body, even if it rots—bones and sinews and everything like that—are nonetheless, so to speak, immortal. Isn't that so?"
80d	ναί.	"Yes."
	ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀιδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀιδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ [80e] ἄνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὧδ' ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο — τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι [81a] τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου;	"But the soul, the invisible part, which goes off to another place like itself—noble and pure and invisible—to Hades in the true sense of the name, to the good and wise god, where, god willing, my own soul must go very soon: is this soul of ours, being of such a kind and such a nature, blown apart and destroyed as soon as it's released from the body, as most [80e] people say? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. This is much more how it is. If it's released pure, dragging nothing of the body along with it, since in life it never willingly had anything in common with the body, but shunned it and gathered itself into itself, since this is what it was always practicing—and that is nothing other than practicing philosophy rightly and really [81a] practicing, readily, how to be dead. Or wouldn't this be the practice of death?"[17]
81a	παντάπασί γε.	"Absolutely."
	οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀιδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἷ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένῃ, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;	"Then if it's in this state, it goes off to what is like it, the invisible—the divine and immortal and wise—and when it arrives there it gets to be happy, freed from wandering and folly and fears and wild passions and the other human evils, and, as they say of the initiated, truly spending the rest of time with the gods. Is that what we should say, Cebes, or something else?"[18]
	οὕτω νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. [81b]	"Yes, by Zeus, that's what we should say," said Cebes. [81b]

17 Plato plays on "Hades" (Haidēs), which was popularly linked with aidēs, "invisible."
18 The initiated: those admitted into mystery cults, such as the Mysteries at Eleusis, which promised them a blessed afterlife.

SOULS WEIGHED DOWN BY THE BODY

Socrates describes how souls tied to bodily pleasures wander or are reborn, while philosophers' souls go free.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
81b	**PHAEDO** ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ συνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γοητευομένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὗ τις ἂν ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀιδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω 81c δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι;	**PHAEDO** "But if, I think, it is polluted and impure when it's released from the body, because it was always with the body and served it and loved it and was bewitched by it and by its desires and pleasures, so that it thought nothing was real except what is bodily—what one can touch and see and drink and eat and use for sex—while what is dark to the eyes and invisible, but intelligible and grasped by philosophy, this it has grown used to hating and dreading and fleeing: do you think 81c a soul in that state will be released pure, itself by itself?"
81c	οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.	"Not in the least," he said.
	ἀλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε σύμφυτον;	"No; rather, I think, it will be permeated by the bodily, which its intercourse and association with the body, through constant company and much practice, have made part of its nature, won't it?"
	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
	ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον φόβῳ τοῦ ἀιδοῦς τε καὶ Ἅιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ 81d μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὤφθη ἄττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται.	"And this, my friend, we must think of as ponderous and heavy and earthy and visible. A soul like that, having this in it, is weighed down and dragged back into the visible world by fear of the invisible and of Hades, as they say, and it roams around 81d the monuments and tombs, where in fact certain shadowy apparitions of souls have been seen—the kind of phantoms that souls like these produce, souls that were not released in purity but share in the visible, which is why they can be seen."
81d	εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"That's likely, Socrates."
	εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὔ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης. καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ 81e τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα· ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ' ἄττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.	"Likely indeed, Cebes. And these aren't the souls of the good, but of the bad, which are forced to wander around such places, paying the penalty for their former way of life, which was bad. And they wander until, through the 81e desire of what accompanies them—the bodily—they're bound into a body again. And they're bound, naturally enough, into characters of whatever sort they happen to have practiced in life."
81e	τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;	"What sorts do you mean, Socrates?"

GREEK	ENGLISH
οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διηυλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη [82a] καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι.	For example, those who have practiced gluttony and wanton violence and heavy drinking, and haven't taken care to avoid them, are likely to enter the races of donkeys [82a] and animals like that.
82a ἢ οὐκ οἴει;	Don't you think so?
πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις.	"What you say is very likely indeed."
τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι;	"And those who have valued injustice and tyranny and robbery above all go into the races of wolves and hawks and kites. Or where else would we say such souls go?"
ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.	"Into those, no doubt," said Cebes.
οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἢ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης;	"So," he said, "it's clear where all the others would go too, each according to the likeness of what they practiced?"
δῆλον δή, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὔ;	"Clear enough," he said. "Of course."
οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν [82b] ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ;	"And the happiest of these," he said, "who go to the best place, are those who have practiced popular, civic [82b] excellence—what people call moderation and justice—which comes from habit and practice without philosophy and intelligence?"
82b πῇ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι;	"How are these the happiest?"
ὅτι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἤ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους.	"Because they're likely to come back into some social and gentle race like that—bees, perhaps, or wasps or ants—or into the same human race again, and decent men will come from them."
εἰκός.	"That's likely."
εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς [82c] καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα, ὦ ἑταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἁπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς, οὔ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν.	"But no one who hasn't practiced philosophy and doesn't depart entirely [82c] pure is permitted to enter the race of gods—only the lover of learning. It's for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that true philosophers keep away from all bodily desires and hold out against them and don't surrender themselves to them. It's not at all that they fear the ruin of their household and poverty, as most people and money-lovers do; nor, again, that they dread the dishonor and disgrace that come with wickedness, as lovers of power and lovers of honor do, that they keep away from them."
82c οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. [82d]	"No, that wouldn't be fitting, Socrates," said Cebes. [82d]

	GREEK	ENGLISH
82d	οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν, ὦ Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι οἷς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόντες, οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὰ πορεύονται αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ ταύτῃ δὴ τρέπονται ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενοι, ᾗ ἐκείνη ὑφηγεῖται.	"No, by Zeus, it wouldn't," he said. "And so, Cebes, those who care at all about their own soul, and don't live molding themselves to the body, say goodbye to all these people and don't travel the same road as them, since those people don't know where they're going. They themselves believe they mustn't act against philosophy and the release and purification she brings, and so they turn in her direction and follow wherever she leads."
	πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;	"How, Socrates?"
	ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη. γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς [82e] ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἱργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὑτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἱργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ [83a] εἴη τοῦ δεδέσθαι,	I'll tell you, he said. Lovers of learning know, he said, that [82e] when philosophy takes charge of their soul, it finds it simply bound fast in the body and glued to it, forced to examine the things that are through the body, as if through prison bars, rather than by itself, and wallowing in total ignorance. And philosophy sees how clever the prison is—that it works through desire, so that the prisoner himself becomes the chief accomplice [83a] in his own imprisonment—
83a	— ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὑτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' [83b] ἢ αὐτὴν αὑτῇ, ὅτι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὅτι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ νοητόν τε καὶ ἀιδές.	—as I say, lovers of learning know that when philosophy takes charge of their soul in this condition, it gently encourages it and tries to free it. It shows the soul that investigation through the eyes is full of deception, and so is investigation through the ears and the other senses; it persuades the soul to withdraw from them, except insofar as it must use them, and urges it to collect and gather itself into itself, and to trust nothing but [83b] itself—whatever it grasps, itself by itself, of the things that are, each itself by itself. Whatever it investigates by other means, which is different in different things, it's to regard as nothing true. That sort of thing is perceptible and visible; what the soul sees by itself is intelligible and invisible.
83b	ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ λυπηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' [83c] αὐτῶν ὧν ἄν τις οἰηθείη, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἤ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό.	Now the soul of the true philosopher, believing it mustn't oppose this release, keeps away from pleasures and desires and pains and fears as far as it can. It reckons that when someone feels intense pleasure or fear or pain or desire, the harm he suffers from [83c] them isn't as great as one might think —falling ill, say, or spending money because of his desires. No, he suffers the greatest and most extreme of all evils, and doesn't even take it into account.
83c	τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.	"What's that, Socrates?" said Cebes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἐπί τῳ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὁρατά· ἢ οὔ;	"That the soul of every human being, when it feels intense pleasure or pain about something, is forced at the same time to believe that whatever it feels this about most is most vivid and most true, when it isn't. And these are mostly visible things, aren't they?"
	πάνυ γε. 83d	"Certainly." 83d
83d	οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος;	"And isn't it in this experience that soul is most thoroughly bound down by body?"
	πῶς δή;	"How so?"
	ὅτι ἑκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἧλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἶμαι ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οἵα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἅιδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς 83e ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας.	"Because every pleasure and pain has a nail, as it were, and nails the soul to the body and pins it there and makes it bodily, so that it takes to be true whatever the body says is true. For by sharing the body's beliefs and delighting in the same things, it is forced, I think, to become like it in character and upbringing, and to be the kind of soul that never arrives in Hades pure, but always leaves full of the body. So it soon falls back into 83e another body and grows in it as if sown there, and as a result it has no share in communion with the divine and pure and uniform."
83e	ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"That's very true, Socrates," said Cebes.
	τούτων τοίνυν ἕνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκά φασιν· ἢ σὺ οἴει;	"Well then, Cebes, it's for these reasons that those who rightly love learning are orderly and brave, not for the reasons most people give. Or do you think so?"
84a	οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε.	"No, I certainly don't."
	οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι αὐτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης, αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένης, ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον 84b θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἴεται οὕτω δεῖν ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν.	No, indeed. The soul of a philosophic man would reason as I've said. It wouldn't think that philosophy should set it free, and then, while philosophy was freeing it, hand itself over to pleasures and pains to bind it back in again, performing the endless labor of a Penelope working her loom the opposite way. Instead it secures a calm from these things, follows reasoning and stays with it always, contemplating what is true and divine and beyond opinion 84b and nourished by it. That, it thinks, is how it must live for as long as it lives, and when it dies it will go to what is akin to it and of its own kind, and be rid of human ills.[19]
84b		

GREEK

ENGLISH

ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ταῦτα δ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ. 84c

With a nurture like that, Simmias and Cebes, and after pursuing these practices, there's no danger that it will fear being torn apart at its release from the body, blown away and scattered by the winds, gone and no longer anywhere at all. 84c

SIMMIAS AND CEBES OBJECT

Simmias suggests the soul is an attunement of the body, and Cebes compares it to a weaver who dies.

GREEK

ENGLISH

84c **PHAEDO** σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι· Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλω διελεγέσθην. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτὼ ἤρετο, τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δή τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ 84d διελθεῖν, εἴ πῃ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον ἂν λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν.

PHAEDO When Socrates had said this there was a long silence. Socrates himself was absorbed in the argument just given, to judge by his look, and so were most of us. But Cebes and Simmias were talking quietly to each other. Seeing them, Socrates asked, "What is it? You don't think what's been said falls short, do you? It certainly still leaves plenty of room for doubts and objections, if anyone means to go through it properly. Now if you two are looking into something else, I've nothing to say. But if you're puzzled about any of this, don't hesitate to speak up and 84d go through it yourselves, if you think it could be put better somehow, and to bring me along too, if you think you'll get further with me."

84d καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη· καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τἀληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, ὀκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι ἀηδὲς ᾖ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν.

And Simmias said, "Well, Socrates, I'll tell you the truth. For some time now each of us has been puzzled and has been pushing the other forward and urging him to ask, because we want to hear but hesitate to be a nuisance, in case it's unwelcome to you in your present misfortune."

καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἠρέμα καί φησιν· Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι 84e ὡς οὐ συμφορὰν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ· καί, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, οἳ ἐπειδὰν αἴσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ᾄδοντες καὶ ἐν 85a τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ᾄδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι οὗπέρ εἰσι θεράποντες.

When he heard this he laughed gently and said: Oh dear, Simmias! I'd have a hard time persuading other people 84e that I don't consider my present lot a misfortune, when I can't even persuade you two, and you're afraid I'm in a worse temper now than I was earlier in my life. It seems you think I'm worse at prophecy than the swans. When swans sense that they must die, though they have sung in 85a the time before as well, then they sing most and most beautifully of all, rejoicing that they are about to go away to the god whose servants they are.

85a οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καί φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας

But human beings, because of their own fear of death, tell lies about the swans too, and say that

19 In Homer's *Odyssey*, Penelope put off her suitors by weaving a shroud by day and secretly unraveling it by night.

GREEK

τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξᾴδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνεον ᾄδει ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγῷ ἤ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἥ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δή φασι διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ᾄδειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται [85b] λυπούμενα ᾄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες, μαντικοί τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀγαθὰ ᾄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

ENGLISH

they sing out their death in grief, lamenting it. They don't consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or suffering any other pain—not even the nightingale, the swallow and the hoopoe, which they say sing laments out of grief. To me, though, neither these birds seem [85b] to sing from grief nor do the swans. I think that because they belong to Apollo they have prophetic power, and it's because they foresee the good things in Hades that they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I consider myself a fellow servant of the swans and consecrated to the same god, with a gift of prophecy from our master no worse than theirs, and I'm leaving life no more downheartedly than they are.[20]

85b ἀλλὰ τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἐῶσιν ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα.

So as far as that goes, you should say and ask whatever you like, as long as the Eleven of Athens allow it.

καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ [85c] ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ ὅδε, ᾗ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν ἥ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, ἢ λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι.

You put that well, said Simmias. So I'll tell you what [85c] puzzles me, and then Cebes here will say where he doesn't accept what's been said. It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps it does to you too, that clear knowledge about such matters is either impossible in this life or extremely hard to get. And yet not to test what is said about them in every way, and to give up before one is worn out from examining them from every side, is the mark of a very soft man. On these questions one must achieve one of these things: learn how they stand, or find it out for oneself; or, if that's impossible, at least take the best and hardest to refute of human accounts, and ride on it as on a raft, and sail through life at one's peril—unless one could make the journey more safely and with less danger on some sturdier vessel, some divine account.

85c καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἅ μοι δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι. [85e]

So now I won't be ashamed to ask, since you say this yourself, and I won't blame myself later for not saying now what I think. For, Socrates, when I examine what has been said, both by myself and with Cebes here, it doesn't seem quite adequate. [85e]

85e καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπῃ δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς.

And Socrates said, "Maybe what seems so to you is true, my friend. But tell me in what way it isn't adequate."

ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾗ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ

In this way, as I see it, he said: that someone could make this very same argument about attunement, and a lyre and its strings. He could say that the at-

GREEK

μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ
86a θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ
αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ
γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ.

86a ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἢ κατάξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ
διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδάς, εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ
ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ
μὴ ἀπολωλέναι — οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν
λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγυιῶν τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς
θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν 86b ἀπολωλέναι τὴν
τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῆ τε καὶ συγγενῆ,
προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην — ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη
ἔτι που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα
καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν —

86b καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο
ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν
τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν
καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ
ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν 86c
αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς
καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα — εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ
ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα
ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν,
τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι,
καίπερ οὖσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἵ
τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις
πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἑκάστου πολὺν χρόνον
παραμένειν, 86d ἕως ἂν ἢ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ — ὅρα
οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ
κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ
καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

86d διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ
μειδιάσας, δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις
ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ
φαύλως ἔοικεν ἅπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι
χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον κέβητος
ἀκοῦσαι 86e τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου
ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ
ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐάν τι δοκῶσι προσᾴδειν,
ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἦ δ'
ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον ἀπιστίαν
παρέχει.

ENGLISH

tunement in a tuned lyre is something invisible and bodiless, altogether beautiful and 86a divine, while the lyre itself and its strings are bodies, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal.

Now suppose someone smashes the lyre, or cuts and snaps the strings, and someone insisted, by the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have perished. For there would be no way, he'd say, that the lyre, and the strings, which are mortal in kind, should still exist once the strings are broken, while the attunement, 86b which shares the nature of the divine and immortal and is akin to it, had perished—perishing before what is mortal. No, he would say, the attunement itself must still exist somewhere, and the wood and strings will rot away before anything happens to it—

—and in fact, Socrates, I think you've realized yourself that we take the soul to be something very like this. Our body is held taut and together by hot and cold, dry and wet and the like, and our soul is a blend and attunement 86c of these very things, when they are blended with each other well and in due measure. Well, if the soul really is a kind of attunement, it's clear that when our body is slackened or strained beyond measure by diseases and other ills, the soul must perish at once, however divine it is, like the other attunements, those in musical notes and in all the works of craftsmen, while the remains of each body last a long time, 86d until they are burned or rot away. So consider what we'll say to this argument, if someone claims that the soul, being a blend of the things in the body, is the first to perish in what is called death.

Then Socrates looked at us intently, as he often used to, and smiled. "What Simmias says is fair," he said. "So if any of you is more resourceful than I am, why hasn't he answered? He seems to be getting a real grip on the argument. But I think that before the answer we should first hear from Cebes 86e what charge he in turn brings against the argument, so that we gain time to consider what to say. Then, when we've heard them, we can either agree with them if they seem to strike the right note, or, if not, go on to defend our argument. Come on,

20 In myth the nightingale, swallow and hoopoe had once been human (Procne, Philomela and Tereus), transformed after a story of violence and grief.

GREEK

ENGLISH

Cebes," he said, "tell us what it was that was troubling you and making you doubt."

86e λέγω δή, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Κέβης.

All right, I'll tell you, said Cebes.

ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, 87a ταὐτὸν ἔγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔστιν, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε. ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὁρᾷς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σῴζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ;

It seems to me that the argument is still where it was, and open, as we were saying before, 87a to the same objection. That our soul existed even before it came into this form, I don't take back that this has been very elegantly and—if it isn't presumptuous to say so—quite adequately demonstrated. But that it still exists somewhere after we die doesn't seem to me to be shown this way. I don't concede Simmias' objection that soul isn't stronger and longer-lasting than body; I think it's far superior in all these respects. "Why do you still doubt, then," the argument might say, "when you see that after a person dies even the weaker part still exists? Don't you think the longer-lasting part must still be preserved during that time?"

87a πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἴ τι λέγω· εἰκόνος γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, κἀγὼ ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἄν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοἰμάτιον ὃ ἠμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἴ τις 87c ἀπιστοίη αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῴη πότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν ἐστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δή τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἴοιτο ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὅ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἃ λέγω.

Consider whether there's anything in what I say in reply to this. It seems I too, like Simmias, need an image. To me this sounds just as if someone were to say about an old weaver who had died that the man hasn't perished but is safe somewhere, and offered as evidence the cloak he himself had woven and wore, which is safe and hasn't perished. And if anyone 87c doubted him, he would ask which kind of thing lasts longer, a human being or a cloak in use and being worn; and when told that a human being lasts much longer, he would think it proved that the man is surely all the more safe, since the shorter-lived thing hasn't perished. But I don't think that's so, Simmias. Look at what I'm saying for yourself too.

87c πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὖηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν 87d ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἶμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἱματίου φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον.

Anyone would see that the person who says this is talking nonsense. This weaver wore out many such cloaks and wove them, and he perished after them, many as 87d they were, but before the last one, I suppose; and that doesn't make a human being any more inferior or weaker than a cloak.

87d τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην οἶμαι εἰκόνα δέξαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καί τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἄν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἑκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν πολλὰ ἔτη βιῷ — εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, 87e ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι — ἀναγκαῖον μεντἂν εἶη, ὁπότε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα τυχεῖν

The soul in relation to the body, I think, would admit this same image, and anyone who said these same things about them would seem to me to be talking sense: that the soul is long-lasting, while the body is weaker and shorter-lived. But, he would say, each soul wears out many bodies, especially if it lives many years. For if the body were in flux and perishing while the person was still alive, 87e and the soul kept reweaving what was being

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αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ' ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο.

87e ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὔπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν ὡς [88a] ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἃ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὖθις — οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν — δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν [88b] θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὅλεθρον μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι — ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτῳοῦν αἰσθέσθαι ἡμῶν — εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον·

88b εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.

88c πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ᾖ.

ECHECRATES νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν [88d] πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται· "τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὤν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν." θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεί, τὸ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέν με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προυδέδοκτο. καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνῄσκει ἡ ψυχή. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διὸς πῇ ὁ

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worn out, still, whenever the soul perished, it would have to be wearing its last garment and perish before that one alone. And once the soul had perished, only then would the body show its natural weakness, and quickly rot and be gone.

So this argument doesn't yet entitle anyone to trust it and be confident that [88a] after we die our soul still exists somewhere. Suppose someone were to grant the speaker even more than you do. Suppose he allowed not only that our souls existed in the time before we were born, but also that nothing prevents some of them from still existing after we die, and continuing to exist, and being born and dying again many times—since soul is so strong by nature that it holds out through many births. But having granted this, suppose he no longer conceded that it doesn't suffer in its many births and end up perishing altogether in one of its deaths, and said that no one knows which particular [88b] death, which dissolution of the body, brings destruction to the soul, since none of us can possibly perceive it. If that's how things stand, anyone who is confident about death is foolish in his confidence, unless he can demonstrate that soul is altogether immortal and indestructible.

If he can't, then anyone about to die must always fear for his own soul, that in the present separation from the body it may perish altogether.

All of us, when we heard them say this, felt dismayed, as we told each other afterward. We had been thoroughly persuaded by the earlier argument, and now they seemed to have thrown us into confusion again and plunged us into doubt, not only about the arguments already given but also about what was going to be said later. Perhaps we were worthless judges, or else the matters themselves could not be trusted.

ECHECRATES By the gods, Phaedo, I sympathize with you. Hearing you now, I find myself saying something like this [88d] to myself: "What argument are we to trust now? The argument Socrates gave was so very convincing, and now it has fallen into doubt." This argument that our soul is a kind of attunement has a remarkable hold on me, now and always, and hearing it stated reminded me, as it were, that I had believed it myself before. So I badly need some other argument, starting again as

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	Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον [88e] κἀκεῖνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φῄς, ἔνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πρᾴως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; ἢ καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς;	if from the beginning, that will persuade me that when someone dies his soul doesn't die along with him. So tell me, by Zeus, how did Socrates pursue the argument? Did [88e] he too, as you say you all did, show signs of being upset, or not? Did he calmly come to the argument's defense? And did he defend it adequately or not?
88e	πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.	Go through everything for us as precisely as you can.
	PHAEDO καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. [89a] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ᾔσθετο ὧ ᾽πεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.	**PHAEDO** Well, Echecrates, I had often marveled at Socrates, but I never admired him more than when I was with him then. [89a] That he had something to say is perhaps not surprising. What I most admired in him was, first, how pleasantly, kindly and respectfully he received the young men's argument; then how sharply he saw what the arguments had done to us; and then how well he healed us, rallied us like men routed and beaten, and turned us round to follow him and examine the argument together.
89a	**ECHECRATES** πῶς δή;	**ECHECRATES** How so?

AGAINST HATRED OF ARGUMENT

Socrates warns against hatred of argument, comparing it to hatred of humankind.

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	PHAEDO ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας — εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας — Αὔριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερῇ.	**PHAEDO** I'll tell you. I happened to be sitting at his right, beside the bed on a low stool, and he was sitting much higher than I was. He stroked my head and gathered up the hair at the back of my neck—he had a habit of playing with my hair whenever he had the chance—and said, "Tomorrow, Phaedo, I suppose you'll cut off this beautiful hair."[21]
	ἔοικεν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"It looks that way, Socrates," I said.
	οὔκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ.	"Not if you take my advice."
	ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.	"What then?" I said.
	τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. [89c] καὶ ἔγωγ᾽ ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἴην καί με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ κέβητος λόγον.	"Today," he said, "I'll cut mine and you'll cut yours, if our argument dies on us and we can't bring it back to life. [89c] And if I were you and the argument escaped me, I'd swear an oath like the Argives not to let my hair grow long until I had fought again and beaten the argument of Simmias and Cebes."[22]

21 Cutting one's hair was a sign of mourning.

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89c	ἀλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἷός τε εἶναι.	"But," I said, "they say even Heracles couldn't take on two."
	ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστιν.	"Then call on me as your Iolaus," he said, "while there's still light."[23]
	παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.	"Then I call on you," I said, "not as Heracles, but as Iolaus calling on Heracles."
	οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν.	"It will make no difference," he said. "But first let's be careful that something doesn't happen to us."
	τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. 89d	"What?" I said. 89d
89d	μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι· ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἄν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἥ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο 89e οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι σύ πω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;	"That we don't become haters of argument," he said, "the way people become haters of humankind. There's no greater evil," he said, "that anyone could suffer than to hate arguments. Hatred of argument and hatred of humankind come about in the same way. Hatred of humankind creeps in when someone puts intense trust in a person without skill, and believes him to be altogether true and sound and reliable, and then a little later finds him to be bad and unreliable—and then again with another. When this happens to someone many times, especially at the hands of those he would have considered 89e his closest and dearest friends, he ends up, after one knock after another, hating everyone and thinking that there's nothing sound in anyone at all. Or haven't you ever noticed this happening?"
89e	πάνυ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.	"Certainly," I said.
	οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπεχείρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;	Isn't it shameful, he said, and isn't it clear that such a person was trying to deal with people without any skill in human affairs?
	εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρῆτο, ὥσπερ ἔχει οὕτως 90a ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.	If he had dealt with them skillfully, he would have believed things to be as they 90a are: that the very good and the very bad are each very few, and those in between are the great majority.
90a	πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ.	"What do you mean?" I said.
	ὥσπερ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων· οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ	"It's just as with the very small and the very large," he said. "Do you think anything is rarer than to find an extremely large or extremely small man, or dog, or anything else? Or again one that's ex-

22 According to Herodotus, the Argives, after losing the district of Thyrea to Sparta, vowed to keep their hair short until they won it back.

23 Iolaus, Heracles' nephew, helped him fight the Hydra when a giant crab joined the fight against him.

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	οὐχὶ ἤσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά;	tremely fast or slow, ugly or beautiful, white or black? Haven't you noticed that in all such cases the extremes at either end are rare and few, while those in between are plentiful and many?"
	πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. 90b	"Certainly," I said. 90b
90b	οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι;	"So don't you think," he said, "that if a contest in wickedness were held, here too very few would turn out to be first?"
	εἰκός γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.	"Probably," I said.
	εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ, ᾗ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· — καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ 90c περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει.	"Probably so," he said. "But that isn't where arguments resemble people—I was just following your lead a moment ago. It's rather in this: someone trusts an argument to be true without the skill that concerns arguments, and then a little later it seems to him false—sometimes when it is, sometimes when it isn't—and then another, and another. And you know that especially those 90c who have spent their time on arguments for arguing both sides end up thinking they've become the wisest of men, and that they alone have grasped that there's nothing sound or stable in any thing or in any argument, but that all that exists simply twists up and down, as in the Euripus, and never stays anywhere for any time at all."[24]
90c	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	"Absolutely," I said. "What you say is true."
	οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ 90d κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἅσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη.	"Then, Phaedo," he said, "it would be a pitiful thing if, when there is an argument that is true and stable and possible 90d to grasp, someone who had come across arguments of the sort that seem true at one time and not at another were to blame not himself or his own lack of skill, but in the end, because it pains him, gladly push the blame off himself onto arguments, and spend the rest of his life hating and abusing arguments, and be deprived of the truth and knowledge of the things that are."
90d	νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.	"By Zeus," I said, "pitiful indeed."
	πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ 90e παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὔπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς	First, then, he said, let's guard against this, and not 90e let into our soul the thought that there may be nothing sound in arguments, but much rather that we ourselves are not yet sound, and that we must be brave and eager to become sound—you

24 The Euripus, the strait between the island of Euboea and mainland Greece, was famous for currents that reverse direction several times a day.

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ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ [91a] αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως.

and the others for the sake of your whole life to come, and I [91a] for the sake of death itself, since I'm in danger at present of approaching this very question not philosophically but, like the thoroughly uneducated, out of a love of winning.

91a καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως [91b] ἔχειν.

For when they dispute about something, they don't care how things actually stand on the subject under discussion; what they're eager for is that the positions they've put forward will seem true to those present. And I think I'll differ from them at present only to this extent: I won't be eager for what I say to seem true to those present, except incidentally, but to seem, as far as possible, to me myself to be [91b] so.

91b λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε — θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς — εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ συνδιατελεῖ — κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν — ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολεῖται. παρεσκευασμένος δή, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὑτωσὶ ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

For I calculate, my dear friend—see how I'm playing to my own advantage—that if what I say happens to be true, it's a fine thing to be persuaded of it; and if there's nothing for the dead, then at least during this very time before my death I'll be less unpleasant to those present by not lamenting. And this folly of mine won't last—that would be bad—but will perish shortly. That is how I'm prepared, Simmias and Cebes, he said, as I come to the argument. But you, if you take my advice, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth. If you think I'm saying something true, agree with me; if not, resist me with every argument you have, taking care that in my eagerness I don't deceive both myself and you together and go off like a bee, leaving my sting behind.

IS THE SOUL AN ATTUNEMENT?

Socrates refutes the view that the soul is an attunement of the body.

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PHAEDO ἀλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ [91d] κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα· Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ᾗ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἆρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; [91e]

PHAEDO "Well, we must get on," he said. "First, remind me of what you were saying, if I seem not to remember. Simmias, I believe, doubts and fears that the soul, though it is more divine and [91d] more beautiful than the body, may perish first, since it is of the nature of an attunement. And Cebes seemed to me to grant me this much, that soul lasts longer than body, but to say that no one can be sure whether, after wearing out many bodies many times, the soul may itself perish now, on leaving the last body, and whether this very thing is death, the destruction of soul, since body is perishing all the time without ever stopping. Is that

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		what we have to examine, Simmias and Cebes, or is it something else?" 91e
91e	συνωμολογείτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω.	They both agreed that it was.
	πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ' οὔ;	"Now do you reject all the earlier arguments," he said, "or some and not others?"
	τοὺς μέν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὔ.	"Some and not others," they said.
	τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν 92a ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι;	"Then what do you say," he said, "about the argument in which we said that learning is recollection, and that if this is so, our soul must have existed somewhere else before 92a it was bound in the body?"
92a	ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ.	"For my part," said Cebes, "I was wonderfully persuaded by it at the time, and I stand by it now as by no other argument."
	καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἴ μοι περί γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτέ τι δόξειεν.	"And I'm in the same position myself," said Simmias, "and I'd be very surprised if I ever came to think otherwise about that, at least."
	καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάνπερ μείνῃ ἥδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι· οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξῃ γε 92b σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξῃ;	And Socrates said, "But you'll have to think otherwise, my Theban friend, if you keep this view: that attunement is a composite thing, and that the soul is a kind of attunement composed of the things held taut in the body. For surely you won't accept 92b your own statement that an attunement existed, already composed, before the things it had to be composed of existed. Or will you?"
92b	οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"Not at all, Socrates," he said.
	αἰσθάνῃ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῇς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ 92c οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων συνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνᾴσεται;	"Do you see, then," he said, "that this is what you end up saying, when you claim that the soul exists before it even enters human form and body, and yet that it is composed of things that don't yet exist? An attunement isn't the sort of thing you liken it to. Rather, the lyre, the strings and 92c the notes come into being first, while still untuned, and the attunement is the last of all to be put together and the first to perish. So how will this account of yours be in tune with that one?"
92c	οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.	"In no way," said Simmias.
	καὶ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ συνῳδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας.	"And yet," he said, "if any account ought to be in tune, it's one about attunement."
	πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.	"It ought," said Simmias.

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οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ συνῳδός· ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα πότερον αἱρῇ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν;	"Well, this one of yours isn't in tune," he said. "So consider which of the two accounts you choose: that learning is recollection, or that soul is attunement."
πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ 92d μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις σύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι᾽ ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ "ὃ ἔστιν" 92e ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή ἐστιν ἁρμονία.	"The first, by far, Socrates," he said. "This other one came to me 92d without demonstration, from a certain plausibility and attractiveness, which is also why most people believe it. But I know that accounts that make their demonstrations from plausibilities are impostors, and if you aren't on guard against them they deceive you thoroughly, in geometry and in everything else. The account about recollection and learning, though, was stated on the basis of a hypothesis worth accepting. For it was said, I think, that our soul exists even before it enters the body just as surely as the reality that bears the name 'what it is' belongs to it. 92e And I have accepted this, as I convince myself, adequately and correctly. So it seems that for these reasons I must not accept it from myself or from anyone else when he says that the soul is an attunement."
92e τί δέ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῇδε;	Well then, Simmias, he said, what about this?
δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ἄλλῃ 93a τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγκέηται;	Do you think it's appropriate for an attunement, or any other 93a composite, to be in any condition other than that of the things it's composed of?
93a οὐδαμῶς.	"Not at all."
οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ᾽ ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ; συνέφη.	"Nor, I take it, to do anything or have anything done to it beyond what those components do or have done to them?" He agreed.
οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαί γε προσήκει ἁρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἕπεσθαι. συνεδόκει.	"So an attunement shouldn't lead the things it's composed of, but follow them." He thought so too.
πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία κινηθῆναι ἂν ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἤ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὑτῆς μέρεσιν.	"Then an attunement is far from being able to move or sound in opposition to its own parts, or to oppose them in any other way."
πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη.	"Very far," he said.
τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἑκάστη ἁρμονία ὡς ἂν ἁρμοσθῇ;	"Well now: isn't every attunement naturally an attunement just to the degree it has been tuned?"
οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη.	"I don't follow," he said.
ἢ οὐχί, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, 93b εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλόν τε ἂν ἁρμονία	"Isn't it the case," he said, "that if it's tuned more, and to a greater extent, 93b supposing that can happen, it would be more of an attunement, and a

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	εἴη καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ' ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἥττων τε καὶ ἐλάττων;	greater one; and if it's tuned less, and to a lesser extent, it would be less of one, and a lesser one?"
93b	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
	ἦ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχήν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἧττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχήν;	"Now is that true of the soul? Could one soul, even to the smallest degree, be more fully and to a greater extent, or less fully and to a lesser extent, than another, this very thing—a soul?"
	οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.	"In no way at all," he said.
	φέρε δή, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἡ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν [93c] καὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται;	"Come then, by Zeus," he said. "Isn't one soul said to have intelligence and excellence and to be good, and another to have folly and wickedness [93c] and to be bad? And is that said truly?"
93c	ἀληθῶς μέντοι.	"Truly, of course."
	τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὖσῃ ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἄλλην;	"Then what will anyone who holds the soul to be an attunement say these things in our souls are, the excellence and the badness? Another attunement, and a lack of attunement? That the good soul has been tuned, and, being an attunement, has another attunement within it, while the bad one is itself untuned and has no further attunement within it?"
	οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δ' ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἄττ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος. [93d]	"I can't say myself," said Simmias. "But clearly whoever made that assumption would say something of the sort." [93d]
93d	ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἧττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ' ἧττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας εἶναι. ἦ γάρ;	"But it's already been agreed," he said, "that no soul is more or less a soul than another; and that amounts to agreeing that no attunement is more, or to a greater extent, or less, or to a lesser extent, an attunement than another. Isn't that so?"
	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
	τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧττον ἁρμονίαν οὖσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν οὕτως;	"And what is no more and no less an attunement is tuned neither more nor less. Is that right?"
	ἔστιν.	"It is."
	ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον ἡρμοσμένη ἔστιν ὅτι πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον;	"And does what is tuned neither more nor less have a greater or smaller share of attunement, or an equal one?"
	τὸ ἴσον.	"An equal one."
	οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἧττον ἄλλη [93e] ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχή, ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἧττον ἥρμοσται;	"So since no soul is more or less [93e] than another this very thing, a soul, it isn't tuned more or less either?"

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93e	οὕτω.	“Just so.”
	τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχοι ἄν;	“And in that condition it would have no greater share of lack of attunement, or of attunement?”
	οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	“No, it wouldn’t.”
	τοῦτο δ’ αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἆρ’ ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχοι ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία εἴη;	“And again, in that condition, could one soul have any greater share of badness or excellence than another, if badness is lack of attunement and excellence is attunement?”
	οὐδὲν πλέον.	“No greater share.”
94a	μᾶλλον δέ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἁρμονία ἐστίν· ἁρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ’ ἂν μετάσχοι.	“Or rather, Simmias, if we reason correctly, no soul will share in badness at all, if it’s an attunement. For surely an attunement, being completely this very thing, an attunement, could never share in lack of attunement.”
	οὐ μέντοι.	“Certainly not.”
	οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχή, οὖσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας.	“Nor, surely, could a soul, being completely a soul, share in badness.”
	πῶς γὰρ ἔκ γε τῶν προειρημένων;	“How could it, given what we’ve said?”
	ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῴων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι.	“So on this argument the souls of all living things will be equally good, if souls are all by nature equally this very thing, souls.”
	ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.	“I think so, Socrates,” he said.
	ἦ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν 94b ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι;	“And do you think it’s right to say that,” he said, “or that the argument would 94b have come to this if the hypothesis were correct, that the soul is an attunement?”
94b	οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.	“In no way at all,” he said.
	τί δέ; ἦ δ’ ὅς· τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ’ ὅτι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον;	“Well then,” he said, “of everything in a human being, is there anything you’d say rules except the soul, especially a soul with understanding?”
	οὐκ ἔγωγε.	“No, there isn’t.”
	πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον καύματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἕλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρῶμεν 94c ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὔ;	“Does it rule by going along with the body’s feelings, or by opposing them as well? I mean something like this: when heat and thirst are present, it pulls us the opposite way, toward not drinking, and when hunger is present, toward not eating; and surely we see countless other cases 94c of the soul opposing what the body feels. Don’t we?”
94c	πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	“Very much so.”

GREEK

οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτήν, ἁρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ᾄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῷτο καὶ ψάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἕπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὔποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν;

ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν [94d] εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πρᾳότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα· στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· [94e] τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

94e ἆρ' οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἵας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἁρμονίαν;

νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν [95a] ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

95a ἔχει οὕτως, ἔφη.

εἶεν δή, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἵλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ;

σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν· τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον [95b] εἴ τι ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνυ οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταὐτὰ δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

ENGLISH

"And didn't we agree earlier that, if it were an attunement, it would never sing against the tightening and loosening and plucking of the things it's made of, or anything else that happened to them, but would follow them and never lead?"

"We did agree," he said. "Of course."

Well then? Don't we now find it doing just the opposite? It leads all the things it's supposed to be made [94d] of, opposes them in almost everything throughout life, and masters them in every way: punishing some more harshly and painfully, as in physical training and medicine, others more gently; now threatening, now admonishing; talking to the desires and fits of anger and fears as if it were one thing talking to something quite different. It's just as Homer portrays it in the *Odyssey*, where he says of Odysseus: "He struck his chest and rebuked his heart: [94e] 'Endure, my heart; you've endured worse than this before.'"[25]

Do you think he composed that believing the soul to be an attunement, the kind of thing to be led by the body's feelings, rather than the kind of thing to lead and master them, being itself something far more divine than an attunement?

"By Zeus, Socrates, I think the latter."

"Then, my excellent friend, it's in no way right for us to say that the soul [95a] is an attunement. It seems we'd be agreeing neither with Homer, that divine poet, nor with ourselves."

"That's so," he said.

"Well now," said Socrates, "Harmonia of Thebes has been appeased, it seems, reasonably well. But what about Cadmus, Cebes?" he said. "How shall we appease him, and with what argument?"[26]

"I think you'll find a way," said Cebes. "You certainly made this argument against the attunement amazingly, beyond anything I expected. When Simmias was stating his difficulty, I really wondered [95b] whether anyone would be able to do anything with his argument. So it struck me as very odd that it couldn't withstand even the first

25 Homer, *Odyssey* 20.17–18: Odysseus restraining his anger at the disloyal maidservants.
26 In myth, Harmonia ("Attunement") was the wife of Cadmus, founder of Thebes; Simmias and Cebes are both Thebans, so Socrates is joking about their two objections.

GREEK

ENGLISH

assault of yours. I wouldn't be surprised if Cadmus' argument met the same fate."

95b ὠγαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μή τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὁμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς· ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν [95c] ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὖσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανὼν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἠλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει.

My good friend, said Socrates, don't boast, or some evil eye may upset the argument that's coming. But that will be the god's concern; let's close in, as they do in Homer, and test whether there's anything in what you say. The heart of what you're after is this: you demand a demonstration that our soul is [95c] indestructible and immortal, if a philosopher about to die, who is confident and believes that after death he'll fare far better there than if he had lived some other kind of life, isn't to be feeling a senseless and foolish confidence.

95c τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῂς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιόν τέ ἐστιν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ᾔδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ [95d] οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῴη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ φῂς οὐδὲν εἴτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρός γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι [95e] ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι.

And you say that showing that the soul is something strong and godlike, and existed even before we were born as human beings, may well indicate, all of it, not immortality, but only that the soul is long-lasting, that it existed somewhere before for an immeasurable length of time, and knew and did a great many things. Yet [95d] it was none the more immortal for that; in fact its very entry into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease. It would live this life in hardship and at the end perish in what we call death. And you say it makes no difference whether it enters a body once or many times, as far as each of us having reason to fear goes: anyone who isn't senseless should be afraid if he doesn't know, and can't give an account [95e] to show, that it is immortal.

95e τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐστίν, οἶμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῇς ἢ ἀφέλῃς.

That's more or less what you're saying, I think, Cebes. And I'm going over it again on purpose, so that nothing escapes us, and so that you can add or take away anything you like.

καὶ ὁ Κέβης, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λέγω.

And Cebes said, "No, there's nothing I need to take away or add at present. That's what I'm saying."

SOCRATES' TURN FROM NATURAL SCIENCE

Socrates recounts his youthful study of nature and his disappointment with Anaxagoras on mind as cause.

GREEK

ENGLISH

PHAEDO ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος, οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.

PHAEDO Socrates paused for a good while, considering something to himself, and then said: It's no small matter you're after, Cebes. We have to work through the whole question of the cause of coming-to-be and perishing.

96a

GREEK	ENGLISH
ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν δὴ λέγεις χρήσῃ.	So I'll go through my own experiences in this area for you, if you like; then if anything I say seems useful to you, you can use it to support your conviction about what you're saying.
ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε.	"I'd certainly like that," said Cebes.
ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν· ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι. καὶ πολλάκις [96b] ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε· ἆρ' ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα συντρέφεται; καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ; ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην;	Then listen to what I have to tell you. When I was young, Cebes, he said, I was amazingly keen on the kind of wisdom they call inquiry into nature. It seemed to me a magnificent thing to know the causes of each thing—why each thing comes to be, why it perishes, and why it is. And I kept [96b] going back and forth, first examining questions like these. Is it when the hot and the cold undergo a kind of putrefaction, as some people said, that living creatures are formed? Is it blood we think with, or air, or fire? Or is it none of these, but the brain that provides the senses of hearing and seeing and smelling, and from these come memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion, once they've settled down, knowledge comes to be in this way?
96b καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν [96c] τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυὴς εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾤμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται.	And again, as I examined how these things perish, and what happens in the heavens [96c] and on the earth, I finally concluded that I was as unfit for this kind of inquiry as anyone could possibly be. I'll give you good evidence of that. This inquiry blinded me so badly about things I'd previously known clearly—or so I and others thought—that I unlearned even what I thought I knew before, about many things, and in particular about why a human being grows.
96c τοῦτο γὰρ ᾤμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν· [96d] ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἑκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. οὕτως τότε ᾤμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως;	I used to think it was obvious to everyone that it was due to eating and drinking: [96d] when, from food, flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and on the same principle each of the other parts gets added what belongs to it, then what was a small bulk later becomes large, and so the small person becomes big. That's what I thought then. Doesn't it seem reasonable to you?
96d ἔμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.	"It does to me," said Cebes.
σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ᾤμην γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων [96e] εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.	"Now consider this as well. I thought I had a satisfactory view whenever a big man standing next to a small one appeared to be bigger [96e] by a head, and likewise one horse than another. And, still clearer than these, I thought ten was more than eight because two was added to it, and a two-cubit

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		length was bigger than a one-cubit length because it exceeded it by half its length."
96e	νῦν δὲ δή, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν;	"And now," said Cebes, "what do you think about them?"
	πόρρω που, ἔφη, νὴ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἑνί τις προσθῇ ἕν, ἢ τὸ ἓν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη [97a] διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἓν ἄρα ἑκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὡς ἐάν τις ἓν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ [97b] γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι.	By Zeus, he said, I'm far, I suppose, from thinking I know the cause of any of these things. Why, I won't even accept from myself that when someone adds one to one, it's either the one it was added to that has become two, or the one that was added, or that the added one and the one it was added to [97a] became two because of the addition of the one to the other. For it amazes me that when each of them was apart from the other, each was one and they weren't two then, but when they came near each other, this became the cause of their becoming two—the coming together involved in their being placed near each other. Nor can I be persuaded any longer that if someone splits one, this—the splitting—has now become the cause of its becoming two. For then the cause [97b] of becoming two is the opposite of what it was before.
97b	τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι' ὅτι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.	Before, it was because they were brought near each other and one was added to the other; now it's because one is taken away and separated from the other. Nor can I persuade myself any longer that I know why one comes to be, or, in a word, why anything else comes to be or perishes or is, by this method of inquiry. Instead I jumble together some other method of my own at random, and I have no time at all for this one.
	ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου [97c] ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ [97d] ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον.	But then I once heard someone reading from a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras, [97c] and saying that it is intelligence that orders all things and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause, and it seemed to me somehow right that intelligence should be the cause of everything. And I thought that if this is so, intelligence, in ordering things, would order them all and arrange each one in whatever way is best. So if anyone wanted to find the cause of how each thing comes to be or perishes or is, he should find out how it is best for it to be, or [97d] to undergo or do anything else. On this account, a human being should consider nothing else, both about himself and about everything else, but what is best—the very best.
97d	ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν.	And that same person must also know what's worse, since the knowledge of both is the same.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος ἠὑρηκέναι ᾤμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καί μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ [97e] στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἴ μοι [98a] ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος.	Reasoning like this, I was delighted to think I'd found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of things after my own heart, and that he would tell me, first, whether the earth is flat or [97e] round, and, having told me, would go on to explain the cause and the necessity of it, saying what's better, and that it was better for it to be like that. And if he said it was at the center, he'd go on to explain how it was better for it to be at the center. And if he [98a] made these things clear to me, I was prepared never again to long for any other kind of cause.
98a	καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμην ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾤμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν [98b] ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει· ἑκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον ᾤμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἦ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.	I was prepared, too, to find out about the sun in just the same way, and about the moon and the other stars—about their speeds relative to one another, their turnings, and everything else that happens to them—how it's better for each of them to do and undergo what they undergo. For I never supposed that, having said they were ordered by intelligence, he would bring in any cause for them other than that it's best for them to be just as they [98b] are. So I thought that in assigning the cause to each of them and to all in common, he'd go on to explain what's best for each and what's good for all in common. I wouldn't have sold my hopes for a great deal; I got hold of the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could, so that I might know as soon as possible what's best and what's worse.
98b	ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ᾠχόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊὼν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ [98c] διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα.	Well, my friend, I was swept right away from that wonderful hope when, as I went on reading, I saw a man making no use of intelligence and not citing any causes for the ordering [98c] of things, but citing airs and aethers and waters and many other strange things.
98c	καί μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειταί μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστῶν καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι [98d] καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὃ συνέχει αὐτά· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν συμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαί που ποιεῖ οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι·	It seemed to me very much as if someone were to say that Socrates does everything he does with intelligence, and then, trying to state the causes of each thing I do, were to say first that the reason I'm sitting here now is that my body is made of bones and sinews; that the bones are hard and have joints separating them from one another, while the sinews are such as to tighten [98d] and relax, wrapping around the bones along with the flesh and the skin that holds them together; so, as the bones swing in their sockets, the sinews, by loosening and tightening, somehow make me able to bend my limbs now, and that's the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent;

GREEK

ENGLISH

98d καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία [98e] τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν· ἐπεὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πάλαι ἂν [99a] ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾠμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν' ἂν τάττῃ.

and again, as if he were to give you other causes of the same sort for my talking with you, citing sounds and air and hearing and countless other [98e] such things, and neglecting to state the true causes: that since the Athenians decided it was better to condemn me, for that very reason I in turn have decided it's better to sit here, and more just to stay and submit to whatever penalty they order. Because, by the dog, I think these sinews and bones would long ago [99a] have been somewhere around Megara or Boeotia, carried off by an opinion about what's best, if I hadn't thought it more just and finer, rather than escaping and running away, to submit to whatever penalty the city imposes.[27]

99a ἀλλ' αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' ἦ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττων, ἀλλ' οὐ [99b] τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον· ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν.

But to call things like that causes is very strange. If someone said that without having such things—bones and sinews and whatever else I have—I couldn't do what I've decided to do, he'd be telling the truth. But to say that it's because of them that I do what I do, and that I act with intelligence, yet not [99b] by choosing what's best, would be a great and far-reaching carelessness in speaking. It means being unable to distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that without which the cause could never be a cause is another. That's what most people seem to me to be groping at, as if in the dark, when they give it a name that doesn't belong to it and call it a cause.

99b διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μέν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει· [99c] τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον [99d] πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης;

That's why one person puts a vortex around the earth and so makes it stay in place beneath the heavens, while another props it up on a base of air, as if it were a broad kneading-trough. [99c] But the power by which things are now placed in the best way they could be placed—that they neither look for nor think has any divine strength. Instead they think they'll someday find an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this, and better at holding everything together; they don't think that the good, which binds, truly binds and holds anything together. Now, I'd gladly become anyone's student to learn how such a cause works. But since I was deprived of it and couldn't discover it myself or learn it from anyone else, would you like me, Cebes, he said, to give you a demonstration of how

27 "By the dog" is an oath characteristic of Socrates. Megara and Boeotia were neighboring territories to which he could have fled.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		I've conducted my second [99d] voyage in search of the cause?[28]
99d	ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι.	"I'd like that more than anything," he said.

THE SECOND VOYAGE

Socrates describes his second approach: explaining things through the forms they partake in.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	PHAEDO ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσιν· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ [99e] τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοήθην, καὶ ἔδεισα μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν.	**PHAEDO** After that, then, he said, when I'd worn myself out looking into the things that are, I decided I must be careful not to suffer what people suffer when they watch and study the sun during an eclipse. Some of them ruin their eyes, unless they study its image in water or [99e] something of the kind. I had some such thought myself, and I was afraid I might be completely blinded in my soul by looking at things with my eyes and trying to grasp them with each of my senses. So I decided I had to take refuge in arguments and examine the truth of the things that are in them.
99e	ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον [100a] τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὄντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν.	Perhaps my comparison is in a way [100a] inexact; for I don't at all agree that someone who examines the things that are in arguments is looking at them in images any more than someone who examines them in concrete things. Anyway, that's the way I set out. In each case I lay down as a hypothesis whatever account I judge to be strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with it I treat as true, whether about cause or about anything else, and whatever doesn't, as not true. But I want to tell you more clearly what I mean; I don't think you understand yet.
100a	οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα. [100b]	"No, by Zeus," said Cebes, "not very well." [100b]
100b	ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ἀεί τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα· ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή. [100c]	"Well," he said, "this is what I mean. It's nothing new; it's what I've never stopped saying, at other times and in the discussion we've just had. I'm going to try to show you the kind of cause I've worked out, and I'll go back to those much-repeated things and start from them, hypothesizing that there is a beautiful itself by itself, and a good, and a large, and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they exist, I hope to show you the cause from them and to discover that the soul is immortal." [100c]

28 A "second voyage" was proverbial for the next-best way: taking to the oars when the wind fails.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
100c	ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων.	"Well," said Cebes, "take it that I grant it, and go straight on to finish."
	σκόπει δή, ἔφη, τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις ἐάν σοι συνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς;	"Then consider," he said, "what comes next, and see whether you agree with me. It appears to me that if anything else is beautiful besides the beautiful itself, it's beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that beautiful. And I say the same for everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause?"
	συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.	"I agree," he said.
	οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν· ἀλλ' ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ 100d δι' ὅτι καλόν ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, — ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι — τοῦτο δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά.	Well then, he said, I no longer understand, nor can I recognize, those other clever causes. If someone tells me 100d that something is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or anything else of that kind, I let the others go—they only confuse me—and I hold to this, simply and artlessly and perhaps naively: that nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence of that beautiful, or its communion, or however and in whatever way it comes to be added. I'm not insisting on that point any longer, but only that it's by the beautiful that all beautiful things become beautiful.
100d	τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος 100e ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἄν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;	That seems to me the safest answer to give to myself or to anyone else, and holding on to this 100e I think I'll never fall. It's safe for me and for anyone else to answer that it's by the beautiful that beautiful things become beautiful. Or don't you think so too?
100e	δοκεῖ.	"I do."
	καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω;	"And so it's by largeness that large things are large and larger things larger, and by smallness that smaller things are smaller?"
	ναί.	"Yes."
	οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἑτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ 101a ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος οἶμαι μή τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῇς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὔσῃ τὸν 101b μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα;	"Then you too wouldn't accept it if someone said that one person is larger than another by a head, and that the smaller is smaller by that same thing. 101a You'd protest that all you say is that everything larger than something else is larger by nothing but largeness, and larger because of that, because of largeness; and the smaller is smaller by nothing but smallness, and smaller because of that, because of smallness. You'd be afraid, I think, that some contrary argument would confront you if you said someone was larger and smaller by a head: first, that the larger is larger and the smaller

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		smaller by the same thing; and then that the larger [101b] is larger by a head, which is small—and that it's monstrous for someone to be large by something small. Or wouldn't you be afraid of that?"
101b	καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, ἔγωγε, ἔφη.	And Cebes laughed and said, "I would."
	οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος.	"Then," he said, "wouldn't you be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two, and exceeds it for that reason, rather than by number and because of number? And that two cubits is larger than one cubit by a half, rather than by largeness? It's the same fear, surely."
	πάνυ γ', ἔφη.	"Certainly," he said.
	τί δέ; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι [101c] τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐῴης ἂν χαίρειν, παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἄν, τὸ [101d] λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν.	And what about this? When one is added to one, wouldn't you beware of saying that the addition is the cause [101c] of their becoming two, or, when one is split, that the splitting is? You'd shout loudly that you know no other way for each thing to come to be than by sharing in the particular being of whatever it shares in; and that in these cases you have no other cause of becoming two than sharing in twoness, and that whatever is going to be two must share in this, and whatever is going to be one, in oneness. As for these splittings and additions and other such subtleties, you'd bid them goodbye, leaving them for those wiser than you to answer with. You'd be afraid, as the saying goes, [101d] of your own shadow and your inexperience, and you'd hold on to the safety of the hypothesis and answer accordingly.
101d	εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐῴης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, [101e] ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν; ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἷς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ', εἴπερ εἶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, [102a] οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς.	But if anyone fastened on the hypothesis itself, you would let him be and wouldn't answer until you had examined whether the consequences that start out from it agree or disagree with one another. And when you had to give an account of the hypothesis itself, you would give it in the same way, positing another hypothesis—whichever seemed best of those higher up— [101e] until you arrived at something adequate. And you wouldn't jumble things together the way the contradiction-mongers do, discussing the starting point and what follows from it at the same time—not if you wanted to discover any of the things that are. For those people, perhaps, this isn't a matter of a single word or thought: their wisdom lets them stir everything together and still manage to be pleased with them-

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		selves. But you, if you are one of the philosophers, [102a] would do as I say, I think.[29]
102a	ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.	"What you say is very true," said Simmias and Cebes together.
	ECHECRATES νὴ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.	**ECHECRATES** By Zeus, Phaedo, and with good reason! It seems to me amazing how clearly he put those things—clear even to someone with only a little sense.
	PHAEDO πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.	**PHAEDO** Certainly, Echecrates, and that's how it seemed to everyone who was there.
	ECHECRATES καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;	**ECHECRATES** And to us too, who weren't there but are hearing it now. But what was said after that?

THE FINAL ARGUMENT

Socrates argues the soul, bringing life, cannot admit death and is therefore immortal and indestructible.

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	PHAEDO ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἠρώτα, εἰ δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἆρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῂς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα;	**PHAEDO** As I recall, once these points had been granted him, and it was agreed that each of the forms is something, and that the other things, by partaking in them, get their names from them, he next asked: "If that's what you say," he said, "then when you say that Simmias is bigger than Socrates but smaller than Phaedo, aren't you saying that both are in Simmias then, bigness and smallness?"
	ἔγωγε.	"I am."
	ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς [102c] ἔχειν; οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ, τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος;	"But," he said, "you agree that 'Simmias overtops Socrates' doesn't state the truth [102c] in quite the way the words put it? Surely it isn't by nature, by being Simmias, that Simmias overtops him, but by the bigness he happens to have. Nor, again, does he overtop Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness relative to his bigness?"
102c	ἀληθῆ.	"True."
	οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα;	"Nor again is he overtopped by Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has bigness relative to Simmias' smallness?"
	ἔστι ταῦτα.	"That's so."

29 The "contradiction-mongers" (antilogikoi) were debaters who made a practice of arguing both sides of a question to trip up an opponent.

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	οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὢν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει [102d] ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον. καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας, ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. συνέφη.	"So that's how Simmias gets called both small and big: he sits between the two, submitting his smallness to the bigness [102d] of the one to be overtopped, and presenting to the other his bigness to overtop its smallness." And with a smile he said, "I seem to be about to talk like a written treatise. But anyway, surely it is as I say." He agreed.
102d	λέγω δὴ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ' ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ [102e] προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρόν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν.	My reason for saying this is that I want you to share my view. For it appears to me not only that bigness itself is never willing to be big and small at the same time, but also that the bigness in us never admits the small and isn't willing to be overtopped. Instead, one of two things: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the small, [102e] approaches it, or at that approach it has perished. It isn't willing to stand its ground and admit smallness and so be something other than what it was.
102e	ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἦν, ἅμα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε [103a] καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.	Just as I, having admitted and endured smallness and still being who I am, am this same person, only small; but that bigness, being big, has not dared to be small. In the same way the small in us is never willing to become or to be big; nor is any other of the opposites willing, while still being what it was, to become its opposite and [103a] be it at the same time. Rather, it either goes away or perishes when this happens to it.
103a	παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεταί μοι.	"That's exactly how it seems to me," said Cebes.
	καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας — ὅστις δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι — πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὖτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο.	And one of those present, when he heard this—who it was I don't clearly remember—said, "Good gods! Wasn't the very opposite of what's being said now agreed in our earlier discussion: that the bigger comes to be from the smaller and the smaller from the bigger, and that this, quite simply, is how opposites come to be—from opposites? But now it seems to me it's being said that this could never happen."
	καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, [103b] ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· [103c] αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ	Socrates turned his head toward him and listened. [103b] "That was bravely remembered," he said, "but you don't notice the difference between what's being said now and what was said then. Then we said that an opposite thing comes to be from an opposite thing; now we say that the opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither the opposite in us nor the one in nature. Then, my friend, we were talking about things that have the opposites, calling them by those opposites' names;

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	ἄν ποτέ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἅμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, ἆρα μή που, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν;	now we're talking about the opposites themselves, from whose presence in them the things named get their names. [103c] Those opposites themselves, we say, would never be willing to admit coming to be from one another." And at the same time he looked at Cebes and said, "Cebes, did anything this man said trouble you too, by any chance?"
103c	οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὔτι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει.	"No, I don't feel that way this time," said Cebes, "though I'm certainly not saying that many things don't trouble me."
	συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἁπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι.	"Then we've agreed on this without qualification," he said: "an opposite will never be opposite to itself."
	παντάπασιν, ἔφη.	"Absolutely," he said.
	ἔτι δή μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;	"Now consider this too," he said, "and see whether you'll agree with me. Is there something you call hot, and something you call cold?"
	ἔγωγε.	"There is."
	ἆρ' ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ; [103d]	"The same things as snow and fire?" [103d]
103d	μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.	"No, by Zeus, not I."
	ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν;	"So the hot is something other than fire, and the cold something other than snow?"
	ναί.	"Yes."
	ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὖσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι.	"But this much, I think, you believe: that snow, being snow, will never admit the hot, as we were saying before, and still be what it was, snow and hot; when the hot approaches, it will either withdraw before it or perish."
	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
	καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξιέναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. [103e]	"And fire, again, when the cold approaches it, will either get out of the way or perish; it will never dare to admit coldness and still be what it was, fire and cold." [103e]
103e	ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.	"What you say is true," he said.
	ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεί, ὅτανπερ ᾖ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω· τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεί που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὔ;	"So with some things of this kind," he said, "it's the case that not only is the form itself entitled to its own name for all time, but so is something else, which is not the form but always has its character whenever it exists. Perhaps what I mean will be clearer in this example. The odd must surely always get this name we're now using, mustn't it?"

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	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
	ἆρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων — τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ — ἢ καὶ ἄλλο [104a] τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἀεὶ διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ τριὰς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἆρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὑτῆς ὀνόματι ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος;	Is it the only thing there is—this is my question—or is there something else [104a] which is not the same as the odd, but which we must nevertheless always call by this name as well as its own, because it's by nature such that it never leaves the odd behind? I mean the sort of thing that happens with three, and with many others. Take three. Don't you think it must always be called both by its own name and by the name of the odd, even though the odd is not the same as three?
104a	ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριὰς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε [104b] οὐκ ὢν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἀεὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστι περιττός· καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὢν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν ἀεί· συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ;	Yet three and five and the whole half of the numbers are by nature such that [104b] each of them, though not the same as the odd, is always odd. And again, two and four and the whole other row of numbers, though not the same as the even, are each always even. Do you agree or not?
104b	πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη.	"Of course," he said.
	ὃ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ἄθρει. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τἀναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσῃ ἐναντία ᾖ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἤτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολεῖσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι;	"Then look closely at what I want to point out," he said. "It's this. It appears that not only do those opposites not admit one another, but also that whatever things, while not opposite to one another, always contain the opposites—these too seem not to admit whichever form is opposite to the one in them; when it attacks, they either perish or withdraw. Or won't we say that three will perish, or suffer anything else whatever, before it would endure becoming even while still being three?"
	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.	"Certainly," said Cebes.
	οὐδὲ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι.	"And yet," he said, "two is not the opposite of three."
	οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	"No, it isn't."
	οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα.	"So it's not only opposite forms that won't stand their ground when they attack one another; there are some other things too that won't stand their ground when opposites attack."
	ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.	"Very true," he said.
	βούλει οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἷοί τ' ὦμεν, ὁρισώμεθα ὁποῖα ταῦτά ἐστιν;	"Then would you like us," he said, "to define what sort of things these are, if we can?"
	πάνυ γε. [104d]	"Certainly." [104d]
104d		"Then would they be these, Cebes," he said: "things which compel whatever they occupy to

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	ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδε εἴη ἄν, ἃ ὅτι ἂν κατάσχῃ μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὑτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ ἀεί τινος;	have not only their own form, but always also the form of some opposite?"
	πῶς λέγεις;	"What do you mean?"
	ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι ἃ ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχῃ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.	"What we were saying just now. You know, surely, that whatever the form of three occupies must be not only three but also odd."
	πάνυ γε.	"Certainly."
	ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ ἣ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι.	"To such a thing, we say, the form opposite to the character that brings this about could never come."
	οὐ γάρ.	"No, it couldn't."
	εἰργάζετο δέ γε ἡ περιττή;	"And it was the odd that brought it about?"
	ναί.	"Yes."
	ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου;	"And the opposite of this is the form of the even?"
	ναί. 104e	"Yes." 104e
104e	ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἥξει.	"So the form of the even will never come to three."
	οὐ δῆτα.	"Certainly not."
	ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.	"Then three has no share in the even."
	ἄμοιρα.	"None."
	ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς.	"So three is uneven."
	ναί.	"Yes."
	ὃ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον — οἷον νῦν ἡ τριὰς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὖσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ 105a τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα — ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὁρίζῃ, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴῃ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμνήσκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον.	Now as for what I said we should define—what sort of things, while not opposite to something, still don't admit it, the opposite (as three, for instance, though not opposite to the even, is no more willing to admit it, since it always brings the opposite against it; and so two with the odd, and 105a fire with the cold, and a great many others)—well, see whether you would define it this way: not only does an opposite not admit its opposite, but also whatever brings some opposite to whatever it approaches—the bringer itself will never admit the opposite of what it brings. Recall it again, since there's no harm in hearing something many times. Five will not admit the form of the even, nor will ten, its double, admit the form of the odd.
105a	τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν 105b τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τἆλλα	The double is itself the opposite of something else, but still it won't admit the form 105b of the odd. Nor

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	τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἔπη τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως.	will one and a half, or the others of that kind, the half, admit the form of the whole; nor again will a third and all such things—if you're following and agree with me that it's so.
105b	πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἕπομαι.	"I agree very strongly," he said, "and I'm following."
	πάλιν δή μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὴ παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ' ὅτι βούλομαι.	"Then tell me again from the beginning," he said. "And don't answer me in the terms of my question, but imitate me. I say this because, besides the answer I gave at first, that safe one, I now see from what we're saying another kind of safety. If you were to ask me what it is that, when it comes to be in a body, will make it hot, I won't give you that safe, ignorant answer, that it's heat, but a more sophisticated one, based on what we're saying now: that it's fire. And if you ask what it is that, when it comes to be in a body, will make it sick, I won't say sickness but fever. Nor, if you ask what it is that, when it comes to be in a number, will make it odd, will I say oddness, but the unit; and so on with the rest. See whether you now understand well enough what I want."
	ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.	"Quite well enough," he said.
	ἀποκρίνου δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν ἔσται;	"Answer, then," he said: "what is it that, when it comes to be in a body, will make it alive?"
	ᾧι ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη. 105d	"Soul," he said. 105d
105d	οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;	"And is this always so?"
	πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ' ὅς.	"Of course," he said.
	ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν;	"So whatever soul itself occupies, it always comes to it bringing life?"
	ἥκει μέντοι, ἔφη.	"It does indeed," he said.
	πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν;	"Is there anything opposite to life, or nothing?"
	ἔστιν, ἔφη.	"There is," he said.
	τί;	"What?"
	θάνατος.	"Death."
	οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται;	"Then soul will never admit the opposite of what it always brings, as we've agreed from what went before?"
	καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.	"Very definitely," said Cebes.

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	τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νυνδὴ ὠνομάζομεν;	"Well then, what did we just now call what doesn't admit the form of the even?"
	ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.	"Uneven," he said.
	τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; 105e	"And what doesn't admit the just, and whatever doesn't admit the musical?" 105e
105e	ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.	"Unmusical," he said, "and unjust."
	εἶεν· ὃ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται τί καλοῦμεν;	"Very well. And what do we call whatever doesn't admit death?"
	ἀθάνατον, ἔφη.	"Immortal," he said.
	οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;	"And soul doesn't admit death?"
	οὔ.	"No."
	ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχή.	"So soul is immortal."
	ἀθάνατον.	"Immortal."
	εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ;	"Very well," he said. "Shall we say that this has been proved? Or how does it seem to you?"
	καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"Quite adequately proved, Socrates."
	τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν 106a ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν;	"Well then, Cebes," he said, "if the uneven were necessarily 106a imperishable, wouldn't three be imperishable?"
106a	πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	"Of course."
	οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπάγοι, ὑπεξήει ἂν ἡ χιὼν οὖσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα.	"And if the unhot were necessarily imperishable too, then whenever someone brought something hot against snow, wouldn't the snow get out of the way safe and unmelted? It would never have perished, nor again would it have stood its ground and admitted the heat."
	ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.	"What you say is true," he said.
	ὡς δ' αὕτως οἶμαι κἂν εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπήει, οὔποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὸν ᾤχετο.	"In the same way, I think, if the uncoolable were imperishable, then whenever something cold came against the fire, it would never have been put out or perished, but would have gone away safe and sound."
	ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. 106b	"Necessarily," he said. 106b
106b	οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴῃ, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ' αὖ τὸ	Then mustn't we say the same about the immortal too? he said. If the immortal is also imperishable, it's impossible for soul to perish when death comes against it. For from what we've said

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	περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης.	already, it won't admit death or be dead—just as three, we said, won't be even, nor again will the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor the heat in the fire.
	"ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει," φαίη ἄν τις, "ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου, ὥσπερ ὡμολόγηται, [106c] ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι;" τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμαχέσασθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἦ οὔ;	"But what prevents," someone might say, "the odd from not becoming even when the even attacks, as has been agreed, [106c] but perishing instead and having even come to be in its place?" Against someone who said that, we couldn't insist that it doesn't perish, since the uneven isn't imperishable. If that had been agreed by us, we could easily insist that when the even attacks, the odd and three go off and away; and we could insist in the same way about fire and heat and the rest. Isn't that so?
106c	πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	"Certainly."
	οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι [106d] καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου.	"So now too, with the immortal: if we agree that it is also imperishable, soul would be, besides being immortal, [106d] imperishable too. If not, we would need another argument."
106d	ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἕνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ τό γε ἀθάνατον ἀίδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται.	"There's no need, as far as that goes," he said. "For hardly anything else would fail to admit destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is going to admit destruction."
	ὁ δέ γε θεὸς οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθείη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι.	"And god, I think," said Socrates, "and the form of life itself, and anything else that is immortal, would be agreed by everyone never to perish."
	παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. [106e]	"By everyone, by Zeus," he said, "by human beings at any rate—and even more, I think, by gods." [106e]
106e	ὁπότε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἆλλο τι ψυχὴ ἥ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη;	"Then since the immortal is also indestructible, wouldn't soul, if it really is immortal, be imperishable as well?"
	πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.	"It must be, absolutely."
	ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἀπιόν, ὑπεκχωρῆσαν τῷ θανάτῳ.	"So when death comes against a human being, the mortal part of him, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes off and away safe and undestroyed, having withdrawn before death."
	φαίνεται.	"So it appears."
	παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ [107a] ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἅιδου.	"Then beyond all doubt, Cebes," he said, "soul is immortal and [107a] imperishable, and our souls really will exist in Hades."
107a	οὔκουν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πῃ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δή τι Σιμμίας	"For my part, Socrates," he said, "I have nothing further to say against this, and no reason to dis-

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	ὅδε ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι· ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἥ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι.	trust the arguments. But if Simmias here or anyone else has something to say, he'd do well not to keep quiet. I don't know what other occasion anyone could put it off to than the present one, if he wants to say or hear anything about such matters."
	ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ [107b] ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.	"Well," said Simmias, "I myself have no remaining ground for distrust either, at least from what's been said. But the magnitude of [107b] what the arguments are about, and the low opinion I have of human weakness, compel me still to keep some distrust in my own mind about what's been said."
107b	οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.	"Not only that, Simmias," said Socrates. "You're right to say so, but our first hypotheses too, even if you all find them convincing, should still be examined more clearly. And if you analyze them adequately, you will follow the argument, I think, as far as it is possible for a human being to follow it. And if this itself becomes clear, you'll look for nothing further."
	ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. [107c]	"What you say is true," he said. [107c]

THE SOUL'S JOURNEY TO HADES

Socrates says the soul needs care for all time and begins a myth of its journey after death.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
107c	**PHAEDO** ἀλλὰ τόδε γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὑτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν [107d] εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι.	**PHAEDO** But this much, gentlemen, he said, it's right to bear in mind: if the soul is immortal, it needs care not only for this time in which what we call living goes on, but for all time; and now the danger of neglecting it would seem terrible indeed. If death were a release from everything, it would be a windfall for the wicked, when they die, to be released from the body and, along with the soul, from their own wickedness. But as it is, since the soul appears to be immortal, there can be [107d] no other escape from evils for it, and no salvation, except to become as good and as full of understanding as possible.
107d	οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δή τινα τόπον, οἷ δεῖ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου [107e] πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε πορεῦσαι· τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δὴ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν	For the soul goes to Hades taking nothing with it but its education and upbringing, which are said to do the greatest good or harm to the dead right at the start of the journey there. The story goes like this. When each person dies, the guardian spirit who was allotted to him while he lived tries to lead him to a certain place, where those gathered there must submit to judgment and then journey to Hades [107e] with the guide who has been appointed

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις.	to conduct those from here to there. And when they have met there with what they must meet, and stayed there the time they must, another guide brings them back here again over many long cycles of time.[30]
107e	ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκεῖνος [108a] μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῆν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Ἅιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ' οὔτε ἁπλῆ οὔτε μία φαίνεταί μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γάρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὔσης. νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ τριόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἕπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν [108b] χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη.	The journey isn't as Aeschylus' Telephus describes it. He [108a] says a simple path leads to Hades, but to me it seems neither simple nor single. Otherwise there would be no need of guides, since no one could go astray anywhere if there were only one road. As it is, it seems to have many forks and crossroads; I say this judging from the sacrifices and rites observed here. Now the orderly soul, the one with understanding, follows along and isn't ignorant of its surroundings. But the soul that is passionately attached to the body, as I said earlier, flutters about it for a long [108b] time, and about the visible region, and after much resistance and much suffering it is led off by force and with difficulty by the spirit appointed to it.[31]
108b	ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καί τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε συνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ [108c] δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορίᾳ ἕως ἂν δή τινες χρόνοι γένωνται, ὧν ἐλθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν· ἡ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ συνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ᾤκησεν τὸν αὐτῇ ἑκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἷα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι. [108d]	When it arrives where the others are, the soul that is impure and has done some such thing—has had a hand in unjust killings, or committed other deeds of that kind, which are the kin of these and the work of kindred souls—this soul everyone shuns and turns away from, and no one is willing to be its fellow traveler or guide. It [108c] wanders in utter helplessness until certain periods of time have passed, and when they come it is carried by necessity to the dwelling that befits it. But the soul that has passed through life purely and with moderation finds gods as its fellow travelers and guides, and each such soul settles in the place appropriate to it. There are many wonderful regions of the earth, and the earth itself is neither of the kind nor of the size supposed by those who usually talk about the earth—as I have been persuaded by someone. [108d]
108d	καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει· ἡδέως οὖν ἂν ἀκούσαιμι.	And Simmias said, "What do you mean by that, Socrates? I've heard a great deal about the earth myself, but not the things that persuade you. So I'd be glad to hear them."
	ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ' ἐστίν· ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην,	"Well, Simmias, it doesn't seem to me to take the skill of Glaucus to relate what they are. But to prove them true seems to me harder than the skill

30 The guardian spirit (daimōn) is a divine being, below the gods, believed to be assigned to each person for life.
31 *Telephus* is a lost tragedy by Aeschylus.

GREEK

καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἂν οἷός τε εἴην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς οἵαν [108e] πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν.

108e ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.

πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε [109a] ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἕξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἧττον οὐδαμόσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι.

109a καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν [109b] τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖσι τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ συνερρυηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐν ᾧπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν [109c] τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν· οὗ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ συρρεῖν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς.

109c ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἴεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἴοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὁρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ [109d] βραδυτῆτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς εἴη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοὼς εἴη τοῦ ἑωρακότος.

ENGLISH

of Glaucus could manage. For one thing, I might not be able to; for another, even if I knew how, my life, Simmias, seems to me too short for the length of the argument. Still, nothing prevents me from telling you what I am persuaded the shape of the earth is like, [108e] and what its regions are."[32]

"Well," said Simmias, "that will be enough too."

"I am persuaded, then," he said, "first, that if it is round and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither [109a] air nor any other such force to keep it from falling. What suffices to hold it is the uniformity of the heavens themselves in every direction, and the equilibrium of the earth itself. For a thing in equilibrium placed in the middle of something uniform won't be able to tilt more or less in any direction; being uniformly situated, it will stay without tilting. That, then, is the first thing I am persuaded of," he said.

"And rightly so," said Simmias.

Further, he said, that it is very large, and that we [109b] who live between the Phasis and the Pillars of Heracles inhabit some small part of it, living around the sea like ants or frogs around a pond, and that many others live elsewhere in many such regions. For all around the earth there are many hollows of every kind of shape and size, into which water and mist and air have flowed together. But the earth itself lies pure in the pure heaven where the stars are, which is called the ether by [109c] most of those who usually talk about such things. It is the sediment of this ether that these things are, and they are always flowing together into the hollows of the earth.[33]

So we live in its hollows without realizing it, and think we live up on the surface of the earth—as if someone living in the middle of the ocean floor thought he lived on the surface of the sea, and, seeing the sun and the other stars through the water, took the sea to be the heavens; and because of his [109d] sluggishness and weakness had never reached the top of the sea, and had never seen, by emerging and poking his head up out of the sea into this region here, how much purer and more

32 "The skill of Glaucus" was a proverbial phrase for a task needing exceptional skill; its origin was disputed even in antiquity.
33 The Phasis (a river at the eastern end of the Black Sea) and the Pillars of Heracles (the Strait of Gibraltar) marked the eastern and western limits of the Greek world.

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	beautiful it is than the place where his kind live, nor ever heard about it from anyone else who had seen it.
109d ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἔν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἴεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταὐτόν, 109e ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἵους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα· ἐπεί, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν ἂν ἀνακύψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνασχέσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς 110a καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ.	This is just what has happened to us. Living in some hollow of the earth, we think we live on top of it, and we call the air the heavens, as though the stars moved through it as the heavens. And it's the same thing: 109e because of weakness and sluggishness we are unable to pass through to the outer limit of the air. For if someone came to its top, or grew wings and flew up, he would poke his head out and see—just as fish here poke their heads out of the sea and see the things here, so he would see the things there. And if his nature were strong enough to bear the sight, he would recognize that that is the true heaven and the true light 110a and the true earth.
110a ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἅλμης, καὶ οὔτε φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέν ἐστι, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροί εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ ἡ γῆ ᾖ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἄξια. ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὖ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλέον φανείη διαφέρειν· 110b εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα.	For this earth of ours, and the stones, and the whole region here, are corrupted and eaten away, as things in the sea are by the brine. Nothing worth mentioning grows in the sea, and there is nothing, you might say, fully formed; there are caverns and sand and endless mud and mire wherever there is earth there too, things not in the least worthy to be judged against the beauties we have. But those things above, in turn, would appear to surpass ours by far more still. 110b Indeed, if it's good to tell a story, Simmias, it's worth hearing what the things on the earth beneath the heavens are like.
110b ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.	"Well, Socrates," said Simmias, "we for our part would be glad to hear this story."

THE TRUE EARTH

Socrates describes the true earth, its rivers and the fates of souls, and asks Crito not to mourn.

GREEK	ENGLISH
PHAEDO λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῷτο, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφῆς 110c καταχρῶνται. ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἁλουργῆ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν. καὶ	PHAEDO Well then, my friend, he said, the story goes like this. First, the earth itself, if you could look at it from above, would look like those balls made of twelve pieces of leather: many-colored, marked out in patches of color. The colors we have here are like samples of these—the ones painters 110c use. But there the whole earth is made of such colors, and of colors far brighter and purer than these. One part is purple, of wonderful beauty; another is golden; another, the white part, is whiter than chalk or snow; and the rest is made up of the

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	γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἔκπλεα 110d ὄντα, χρώματός τι εἶδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἕν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος συνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι.	other colors in the same way, colors more numerous and more beautiful than any we have seen. Even these hollows of it, full 110d as they are of water and air, present a kind of color of their own, gleaming amid the variety of the other colors, so that the earth appears as one continuous, many-colored surface.[34]
110d	ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὔσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τήν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους 110e καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων καλλίω. τὸ δ' αἴτιον τούτου εἶναι ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο συνερρυηκότων, ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει.	On an earth like this, the things that grow grow in proportion: trees and flowers and fruits. The mountains, likewise, and the stones have, in the same proportion, a smoothness and a transparency and colors more beautiful than ours. The little stones we prize so much here are fragments of those—carnelians, jaspers, emeralds 110e and all the rest. There, everything is like that, and still more beautiful than these. The reason is that those stones are pure, not eaten away or spoiled as ours are by rot and brine from what has flowed together down here—things that bring ugliness and disease to stones and earth, and to animals and plants as well.
110e	τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμῆσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ 111a τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῆ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζῷα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νήσοις ἃς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἠπείρῳ οὔσας· καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ 111b τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα.	The earth itself is adorned with all of these, and with gold and silver besides, and 111a everything else of that kind. They lie there in plain view, abundant and large and everywhere on the earth, so that to see it is a sight for blessed spectators. Many living creatures live on it, human beings among them. Some live inland; some live along the edge of the air, as we live along the sea; and some on islands, close to the mainland, around which the air flows. In a word, what water and the sea are to us for our needs, there 111b air is; and what air is to us, ether is to them.
111b	τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ᾗπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας 111c γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷά τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.	Their seasons are so well tempered that they are free of disease and live far longer than people here. In sight and hearing and understanding and everything of that kind they stand as far above us as air stands above water, and ether above air, in purity. They also have groves and temples of the gods, in which gods really do dwell; they have voices and oracles and direct perceptions of the gods, and meetings of that kind 111c take place between them and the gods. They see the sun and moon and stars as they really are, and the rest of their happiness is in keeping with all this.
111c	καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγκοιλα αὐτῆς	Such, then, is the nature of the earth as a whole and of what surrounds it. Within it, in its hollows,

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	κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν [111d] τόπου, ἔστι δ' οὓς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους.	all the way around, there are many regions. Some are deeper and more widely open than the one we live in; some are deeper but have a narrower opening than our [111d] region; and some are shallower than ours and broader.
111d	τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαί τε πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ᾗ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ῥεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, [111e] ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ· ὧν δὴ καὶ ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἑκάστοις τύχῃ ἑκάστοτε ἡ περιρροὴ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά.	All of these are bored through to one another beneath the earth in many places, by narrower and wider channels, and they have passages through which much water flows from one into another, as into mixing bowls. Under the earth there are everflowing rivers of unimaginable size, of hot water and of cold; there is much fire, and great rivers of fire; and many rivers of liquid mud, some cleaner, some muddier, [111e] like the rivers of mud in Sicily that flow ahead of the lava, and the lava itself. Each of the regions is filled with these, according to how the flow happens to come round to each at any given time. All of this is moved up and down by a kind of oscillation inside the earth, and this oscillation comes about through a natural cause of the following sort.[35]
111e	ἕν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε [112a] μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὂν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτό τῆλε μάλ', ᾖχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον· ὃ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γίγνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι δι' οἵας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δὲ [112b] αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ῥεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο.	One of the chasms of the earth happens to be the largest [112a] of all, and it is bored right through the whole earth. It is the one Homer spoke of when he said: "Far, far away, where the deepest pit beneath the earth lies." Elsewhere he, and many other poets, have called it Tartarus. Into this chasm all the rivers flow together, and out of it they flow again, and each takes on the character of whatever earth it flows through. The [112b] reason all the streams flow out of it and into it is that this liquid has no bottom and no foundation.[36]
112b	αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταὐτὸν ποιεῖ· συνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς ὁρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ συναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ [112c] εἰσιὸν καὶ ἐξιόν.	So it swings and surges up and down, and the air and wind around it do the same, for they follow it both when it rushes toward the far side of the earth and when it rushes toward this side. Just as the breath of those who breathe is always flowing out and in, so there too the wind, swinging along with the liquid, produces terrible, overwhelming gales as it [112c] goes in and comes out.
112c	ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, δεῦρο δὲ ὁρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν	When the water withdraws to the region called "below," it flows through the earth into the streams in those parts and fills them, as if it were being pumped in. When in turn it leaves there and rushes back here, it fills the streams here again.

34 A ball stitched from twelve pentagonal pieces of leather, each dyed a different color.
35 The lava flows of Mount Etna.
36 The line is Homer, *Iliad* 8.14.

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	ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἑκάστοις ὡδοποίηται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα [112d] κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ᾗ ἐπηντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς, καὶ ἔνια μὲν καταντικρὺ ἢ ᾗ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ ἃ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει.	Once filled, these flow through channels and through the earth, each reaching the places to which a path has been made for it, and they form seas and lakes and rivers and springs. From there they sink back [112d] beneath the earth, some going round more and longer regions, others fewer and shorter, and empty into Tartarus again—some far lower than the point where they were drawn off, others only a little lower; but all flow in below where they flowed out. Some pour in on the opposite side from where they came out, some on the same side. And there are some that go right round in a circle, coiling once or even several times around the earth like snakes, descend as low as they can, and empty in again.
112e	δυνατὸν δέ ἐστιν ἑκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὔ· ἄναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἑκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.	It is possible to descend in either direction as far as the center, but not beyond, since the part on either side is uphill for the streams from both sides.
	τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεύματά ἐστι· τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἄττα ῥεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ῥέον περὶ κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὠκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι' ἐρήμων τε τόπων [113a] ῥεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ῥέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οὗ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καί τινας εἱμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις.	Now there are many other streams, great and of every kind; but among these many there happen to be four in particular. The largest, which flows outermost in a circle, is the one called Ocean. Opposite it, flowing in the opposite direction, is Acheron, which flows through various desolate [113a] regions and then, flowing underground, arrives at the Acherusian Lake. There the souls of most of the dead arrive, and after staying for certain appointed periods, some longer, some shorter, they are sent out again to be born as living creatures.
113a	τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ [113b] χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῇ ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμειγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι· περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς.	A third river issues between these two, and near its source it falls into a vast region burning with a great fire, and forms a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud. From there [113b] it moves in a circle, turbid and muddy, and winding around within the earth it reaches, among other places, the edge of the Acherusian Lake, without mixing with its water. After coiling around many times underground, it empties into Tartarus at a lower point. This is the river they call Pyriphlegethon, and its lava streams spout up fragments of it wherever on earth they happen to break through.
113b	τούτου δὲ αὖ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δ' ἔχοντα ὅλον οἷον ὁ [113c] κυανός, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα· ὁ δ' ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν	Opposite this, in turn, the fourth river issues, first into a place that is terrible and wild, so they say, entirely the color of dark-blue [113c] enamel. They call this place Stygian, and the lake the river forms as it flows in they call Styx. Having fallen in there

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ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μείγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, κωκυτός. 113d

and taken on terrible powers in its water, the river sinks beneath the earth and, coiling around, moves in the opposite direction to Pyriphlegethon, meeting it from the opposite side in the Acherusian Lake. Its water, too, mixes with none, but it also goes round in a circle and empties into Tartarus opposite Pyriphlegethon. Its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus. 113d

113d τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἷ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἵ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μή. καὶ οἳ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν 113e τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος· οἳ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν.

Such being the nature of these things, when the dead arrive at the place to which each one's guardian spirit brings them, they are first judged—both those who have lived good and holy lives and those who have not. Those who are found to have lived middling lives travel to the Acheron, board the vessels that are there for them, and on these arrive at the lake. There they dwell and are purified: they pay the penalty for their wrongs and are released from them, if anyone has done wrong, and they receive rewards for their good deeds, 113e each according to his merit. But those who are found to be incurable because of the magnitude of their offenses—who have committed many great robberies of temples, or many unjust and lawless killings, or other crimes of that kind—these their fitting fate hurls into Tartarus, and they never come out.

113e οἳ δ' ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα 114a ὑπ' ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιῶσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κῦμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὓς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἱκετεύουσι 114b καὶ δέονται ἐᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη.

Those who are found to have committed offenses that are curable but great—for example, who have done some violence to a father or mother 114a in anger and lived the rest of their lives in remorse, or who have killed someone in some other such way—these must fall into Tartarus. But when they have fallen in and been there a year, the wave casts them out: the killers by way of Cocytus, and those who struck a father or mother by way of Pyriphlegethon. When they are carried along to the Acherusian Lake, they shout and call out there, some to those they killed, others to those they abused; and having called them, they beg 114b and plead with them to let them come out into the lake and to receive them. If they persuade them, they come out and their suffering ends; if not, they are carried back into Tartarus and from there into the rivers again, and they don't stop suffering this until they persuade those they wronged. That is the penalty the judges have laid down for them.

114b οἳ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ

Those who are found to have been outstanding in living holy lives are the ones who are freed from

GREEK

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ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι [114c] ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.

these regions within the earth and released [114c] as if from prison, and who go up to the pure dwelling-place and settle on the surface of the earth. Of these, the ones who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live entirely without bodies for all time to come and arrive at dwellings more beautiful still. Those are not easy to describe, and there isn't enough time at present. But it is for the sake of the things we have gone through, Simmias, that one must do everything to have a share in excellence and understanding in this life. For the prize is a fine one, and the hope is great.

114c τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν — καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος — καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον.

Now, to insist that these things are exactly as I've described them would not befit a man of sense. But that this, or something like it, is the truth about our souls and their dwellings, given that the soul has been shown to be immortal—that, I think, is fitting, and worth the risk of believing that it is so. For it's a fine risk to run. One should repeat such things to oneself like a spell, and that is why I've been drawing out the story for so long.

ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ [114e] ἄνδρα ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἴασε χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄντας, καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ [115a] δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, οὕτω περιμένει τὴν εἰς Ἅιδου πορείαν ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν ἡ εἱμαρμένη καλῇ.

So for these reasons a man should be confident about his own soul [114e] if in his life he has said goodbye to the other pleasures, those of the body, and to its adornments, as alien to him and as doing more harm than good; if he has been serious about the pleasures of learning; and if he has adorned his soul not with an alien adornment but with its own—with moderation and [115a] justice and courage and freedom and truth—and so awaits his journey to Hades, ready to go whenever fate calls.

115a ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰς αὖθις ἔν τινι χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἄν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἱμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδόν τί μοι ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν. [115b]

"As for you, Simmias and Cebes and the rest of you," he said, "you will each make that journey at some later time. But as for me, fate is calling now, as a character in a tragedy would say, and it's just about time for me to go to the bath. It seems better to bathe before drinking the poison, and not give the women the trouble of washing a corpse." [115b]

115b ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅτι ἄν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν;

When he had said this, Crito said, "Very well, Socrates. But what instructions do you have for these friends or for me, about your children or anything else? What could we do that would please you most?"

ἅπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν ποιῆτε, κἂν μὴ

"Just what I'm always saying, Crito," he said, "nothing new. If you take care of yourselves, whatever you do will please me and mine, and

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	νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελῆτε καὶ μὴ ᾽θέλητε ὥσπερ κατ᾽ ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε [115c] ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε.	yourselves too, even if you don't promise it now. But if you neglect yourselves and aren't willing to live following in the tracks, so to speak, of what we've said today and in times past, then no matter how much you promise [115c] right now, and however earnestly, it will do no good."
115c	ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον;	"We'll be eager to do as you say, then," he said. "But how shall we bury you?"
	ὅπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν· οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι οὗτος Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ᾽ οἴεταί με ἐκεῖνον εἶναι [115d] ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ᾽ οἰχήσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δή τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ᾽ ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυᾶτο.	However you like, he said, if you can catch me, and I don't get away from you. And laughing quietly, he looked at us and said: Gentlemen, I can't persuade Crito that I am this Socrates, the one now talking with you and setting out each point of the argument. He thinks I'm the one [115d] he'll see in a little while as a corpse, and so he asks how he should bury me. All that long argument I've been making—that when I drink the poison I'll no longer stay with you, but will go off to the joys of the blessed—he takes, I think, as mere talk, meant to comfort you and myself at the same time. So give Crito a guarantee for me, he said, the opposite of the guarantee he gave the judges.
115d	οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἦ μὴν παραμενεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἦ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι [115e] ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾷον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὁρῶν μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς.	He guaranteed that I would stay. You must guarantee that I won't stay once I'm dead, but will go [115e] away, so that Crito may bear it more easily and not be distressed on my behalf, as if I were suffering something terrible, when he sees my body being burned or buried; and so that he won't say at the funeral that it's Socrates he is laying out, or carrying to the grave, or burying. Be sure of this, my excellent Crito, he said: to speak badly is not only a false note in itself; it also does some harm to souls.
115e	ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι τοὐμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν [116a] οὕτως ὅπως ἄν σοι φίλον ᾖ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι.	You must take heart, then, and say that it is my body you are burying; and bury it [116a] however you please and in whatever way you think most customary.

THE DEATH OF SOCRATES

Socrates bathes, bids his family farewell, drinks the poison and dies.

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116a	**PHAEDO** ταῦτ᾽ εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἵπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ᾽ ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ᾽ αὖ περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς διεξιόντες ὅση ἡμῖν γεγονυῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ πατρὸς	**PHAEDO** After saying this he got up and went into another room to bathe. Crito followed him, and he told us to wait. So we waited, talking among ourselves about what had been said and going over it again, and then dwelling on how great a misfortune had befallen us, truly feeling that we

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στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ 116b δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία — δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ ὑεῖς σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας — καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο ἐκεῖναι, ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθείς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον.	would spend the rest of our lives like orphans who had lost a father. When 116b he had bathed, his children were brought to him—he had two small sons and one grown one—and the women of his household arrived. He talked with them in Crito's presence and gave them whatever instructions he wished; then he told the women and children to go, and came back to us. By now it was near sunset, for he had spent a long time inside.
116b ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἅττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἕνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς 116c παρ' αὐτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαί γε σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρῶνται ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγείλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πρᾳότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνους. νῦν οὖν, οἷσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον 116d ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾷστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῄει.	He came and sat down, freshly bathed, and not much was said after that. Then the servant of the Eleven came and, standing 116c beside him, said: "Socrates, I won't find fault with you as I do with others, who get angry with me and curse me when, on the orders of the authorities, I tell them to drink the poison. You, though, I have come to know during this time as the noblest, gentlest and best man who has ever come here, and now especially I'm sure you're not angry with me—you know who is responsible—but with them. So now, since you know what I've come 116d to tell you, farewell, and try to bear what must be as easily as you can." With that he burst into tears, turned, and went away.
116d καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῄει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῷστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δή, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος. 116e	Socrates looked up at him and said, "Farewell to you too; we'll do as you say." And turning to us he said, "What a courteous man! All this time he's been coming to see me, and sometimes talked with me, and was the kindest of men; and now how generously he weeps for me. Come, Crito, let's do as he says. Have someone bring the poison, if it has been ground; if not, let the man grind it." 116e
116e καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσιν καὶ οὔπω δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὀψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ συγγενομένους γ' ἐνίους ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου· ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ.	Crito said, "But I think, Socrates, the sun is still on the mountains and hasn't set yet. Besides, I know others who drink it very late, well after they've been told to, after dining and drinking plenty, and some even after sleeping with whoever they happen to desire. Don't hurry; there's still time."
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰκότως γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὓς σὺ λέγεις — οἴονται γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες — καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ 117a οἶμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πιὼν ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.	Socrates said, "It's natural, Crito, for the people you mention to do that—they think they gain something by it—and it's natural for me not to. I don't 117a think I'd gain anything by drinking a little later, except to make myself ridiculous in my own eyes, clinging to life and hoarding it when there's nothing left. So go on," he said, "do as I ask, and don't refuse."

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117a	καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἑστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἦκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν;	Hearing this, Crito nodded to the servant standing nearby. The servant went out and, after a good while, came back bringing the man who was to give the poison, carrying it, already ground, in a cup. When Socrates saw the man, he said, "Well, my good man, you're the expert in these things. What should I do?"
	οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πιόντα περιιέναι, ἕως ἄν σου βάρος 117b ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. καὶ ἅμα ὤρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει.	"Nothing," he said, "except drink it and walk around until a heaviness 117b comes into your legs, and then lie down. That way it will do its work." And with that he held out the cup to Socrates.
117b	καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἵλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαί τινι; ἔξεστιν ἢ οὔ;	He took it, Echecrates, quite serenely, without a tremor or any change of color or expression; and looking up at the man from under his brows like a bull, as he used to, he said, "What do you say about pouring a libation from this drink to someone? Is it allowed or not?"[37]
	τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν ὅσον οἰόμεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. 117c	"We grind only as much, Socrates," he said, "as we think is the right amount to drink." 117c
117c	μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὔχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτῃ. καὶ ἅμ' εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἷοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὡς δὲ εἴδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτόν — οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἵου ἀνδρὸς 117d ἑταίρου ἐστερημένος εἴην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη.	"I understand," he said. "But it is allowed, I suppose, and even necessary, to pray to the gods that my move from here to there may be a fortunate one. That is my prayer; may it be so." And as he said this, he raised the cup to his lips and, quite readily and calmly, drained it. Up to then most of us had been fairly well able to hold back our tears, but when we saw him drinking, and then that he had drunk it, we could do so no longer. In my own case the tears came flooding out in spite of myself, so that I covered my face and wept for myself—not for him, but for my own misfortune, to be losing such a man 117d as my companion. Crito had got up and left even before I did, since he couldn't hold back his tears.
117d	Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους.	Apollodorus, who even before had never stopped crying, now broke into loud sobs of grief and anger, and there was no one present whom he didn't make break down, except Socrates himself.
	ἐκεῖνος δέ, οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ 117e τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε.	But Socrates said, "What are you doing, you strange people! This is the main reason I sent the women away, so that they wouldn't 117e strike such a wrong note. I've heard that one should die in reverent silence. Keep quiet, and be strong."

37 A libation was a small amount of a drink poured out as an offering to a god.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
117e	καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἠσχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθών, ἐπειδή οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίνη ὕπτιος — οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος — καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κἄπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο, [118a] ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη.	When we heard this we were ashamed and held back our tears. He walked around, and when he said his legs were getting heavy, he lay down on his back, as the man had told him to. Then the man who had given him the poison put his hands on him, and after a while examined his feet and legs; then he pressed hard on his foot and asked if he could feel it. [118a] He said no.
118a	καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται.	After that he pressed his shins, and moving upward in this way he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. Then he touched him once more and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone.
	ἤδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἧτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος — ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ — εἶπεν — ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο — "ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε."	The cold had now nearly reached his abdomen when he uncovered his face—for he had covered it—and said what were to be his last words: "Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius. Pay it and don't forget."[38]
	ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις.	"It will be done," said Crito. "But see if there's anything else you want to say."
	ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.	To this question he gave no further answer. After a short while he stirred, and the man uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. When Crito saw this, he closed his mouth and his eyes.
	ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.	This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend: a man who was, we would say, the best of all those we came to know in his time, and also the wisest and the most just.

38 Asclepius was the god of healing; a cock was a customary offering to him.