Protagoras

PLATO

c. 428–348 BC

Protagoras

Πρωταγόρας

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited



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Protagoras · Plato (c. 428–348 BC)

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INTRODUCTION

Before dawn one morning the young Hippocrates bangs on Socrates' door: Protagoras, the most famous of the sophists—traveling teachers who charged high fees to make young men successful—is in Athens, and Hippocrates wants Socrates to get him taken on as a pupil. Socrates goes with him to the house of the rich Callias, crowded with sophists and their admirers, and later tells a friend the whole story.

Protagoras claims to teach excellence: how to manage one's own affairs and the city's. Socrates doubts it can be taught at all, and Protagoras answers with a myth of how Zeus gave every human being a share of justice and a sense of shame, followed by a long speech. What follows is a contest of styles as much as of arguments: long speeches against short questions, a quarrel about procedure that nearly breaks up the meeting, a mock-learned reading of a poem by Simonides, and finally Socrates' argument that no one does wrong willingly, and that what is called being "overcome by pleasure" is really a failure of knowledge, to be cured by an art of measuring pleasures and pains.

At the end the two have changed places: Socrates, who doubted that excellence can be taught, is arguing that it is knowledge, while Protagoras, who teaches it, is denying that. Socrates says they must take the question up again from the beginning.

Protagoras

Athens, at the house of the rich Callias, where the most famous sophists of the day are staying. Socrates tells a friend how he questioned Protagoras about whether excellence can be taught.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
309a	**FRIEND** πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν; καὶ μήν μοι καὶ πρῴην ἰδόντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἀνὴρ ἔτι, ἀνὴρ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ πώγωνος ἤδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος.	**FRIEND** Where have you just come from, Socrates? No, it's obvious: from your hunt for Alcibiades in his youthful bloom. I did see him just the other day, and he struck me as still a beautiful man. But a man, Socrates, just between ourselves, and already filling out with a beard.[1]
	SOCRATES εἶτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης εἶ, 309b ὃς ἔφη χαριεστάτην ἥβην εἶναι τοῦ πρῶτον ὑπηνήτου, ἣν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;	**SOCRATES** Well, what of it? Aren't you an admirer of Homer, 309b who said that youth is at its most charming when the first beard appears, which is just the age Alcibiades is now?[2]
309b	**FRIEND** τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἦ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνῃ; καὶ πῶς πρός σε ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;	**FRIEND** So how do things stand now? Have you come from him? And how does the young man feel about you?
	SOCRATES εὖ, ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν ἡμέρᾳ· καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἄτοπον μέντοι τί σοι ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν· παρόντος γὰρ ἐκείνου, οὔτε προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, ἐπελανθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ θαμά. 309c	**SOCRATES** Well, I thought, and not least today. He said a great deal on my side and came to my defense, and in fact I've only just left him. But I want to tell you something strange. Although he was there, I paid him no attention, and I kept forgetting about him altogether. 309c
309c	**FRIEND** καὶ τί ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη περὶ σὲ κἀκεῖνον τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τινὶ καλλίονι ἐνέτυχες ἄλλῳ ἔν γε τῇδε τῇ πόλει.	**FRIEND** And what could have happened between you and him to matter that much? Surely you haven't met anyone more beautiful, not in this city anyway.
	SOCRATES καὶ πολύ γε.	**SOCRATES** Yes, and far more beautiful.
	FRIEND τί φῄς; ἀστῷ ἢ ξένῳ;	**FRIEND** What do you mean? A citizen or a foreigner?
	SOCRATES ξένῳ.	**SOCRATES** A foreigner.
	FRIEND ποδαπῷ;	**FRIEND** From where?
	SOCRATES Ἀβδηρίτῃ.	**SOCRATES** From Abdera.[3]

1 Alcibiades (c. 450–404 BC), son of Clinias, later became a brilliant and notorious Athenian general. As a youth he was famous for his beauty, and Socrates' attachment to him was well known.
2 The line occurs twice in Homer (*Iliad* 24.348, *Odyssey* 10.279).
3 Abdera, a Greek city on the coast of Thrace in the northern Aegean, was Protagoras' home.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	FRIEND καὶ οὕτω καλός τις ὁ ξένος ἔδοξέν σοι εἶναι, ὥστε τοῦ Κλεινίου ὑέος καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;	**FRIEND** And this foreigner seemed so beautiful to you that he struck you as more beautiful than the son of Clinias?
	SOCRATES πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει, ὦ μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτατον κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** How could what is wisest not look more beautiful, my blessed friend?
	FRIEND ἀλλ' ἦ σοφῷ τινι ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐντυχὼν πάρει; [309d]	**FRIEND** So you've met some wise man, Socrates, and that's where you've come from? [309d]
309d	**SOCRATES** σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.	**SOCRATES** Oh, the wisest man alive today, surely, if you think Protagoras is the wisest.
	FRIEND ὦ τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;	**FRIEND** Oh, what are you saying? Protagoras is in town?
	SOCRATES τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν.	**SOCRATES** This is already his third day.
	FRIEND καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνῳ συγγεγονὼς ἥκεις;	**FRIEND** So you've just come from being with him?
310a	**SOCRATES** πάνυ γε, πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας.	**SOCRATES** I certainly have, after a good deal of talking and listening.
	FRIEND τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, εἰ μή σέ τι κωλύει, καθεζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί;	**FRIEND** Then why don't you tell us about the conversation, if nothing's stopping you? Sit down here. Make the boy here get up.
	SOCRATES πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ χάριν γε εἴσομαι, ἐὰν ἀκούητε.	**SOCRATES** Gladly. And I'll be grateful to you if you listen.
	FRIEND καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοί, ἐὰν λέγῃς.	**FRIEND** And we'll be grateful to you if you tell it.
	SOCRATES διπλῆ ἂν εἴη ἡ χάρις. ἀλλ' οὖν ἀκούετε.	**SOCRATES** Then the gratitude will be double. Well then, listen.

HIPPOCRATES AT DAWN

Before daylight Hippocrates wakes Socrates, eager to become a pupil of Protagoras.

GREEK	ENGLISH
SOCRATES τῆς γὰρ παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου, Ἱπποκράτης, ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου ὑὸς Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν [310b] θύραν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἀνέῳξέ τις, εὐθὺς εἴσω ᾔει ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύδεις; καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνοὺς αὐτοῦ, "Ἱπποκράτης," ἔφην, "οὗτος· μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις;" οὐδέν γ', ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε. "εὖ ἂν λέγοις," ἦν δ' ἐγώ· "ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἕνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου;" Πρωταγόρας, ἔφη, ἥκει, στὰς παρ' ἐμοί. "πρῴην," ἔφην ἐγώ· "σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι;" νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ἑσπέρας γε. [310c] καὶ ἅμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ εἶπεν· ἑσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε ὀψὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνόης.	**SOCRATES** Last night, while it was still deep dark before dawn, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and brother of Phason, started banging very hard on the [310b] door with his stick. When someone opened it for him, he came straight in in a great hurry and called out in a loud voice, "Socrates, are you awake or asleep?" I recognized his voice and said, "That's Hippocrates. You're not bringing bad news, are you?" "Nothing," he said, "except good news." "That would be nice," I said. "But what is it? Why have you come at this hour?" "Protagoras has come," he said, standing over me. "The day before yesterday," I said. "Have you only just found out?"

GREEK	ENGLISH
	"Yes, by the gods," he said, "last night." 310c And as he spoke he felt for the bed, sat down by my feet and said, "Last night, yes. I got back very late from Oenoe."
310c ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν ὅτι διωξοίμην αὐτόν, ὑπό τινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμην. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δεδειπνηκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε μοι ἀδελφὸς λέγει ὅτι ἥκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἰέναι, ἔπειτά μοι λίαν πόρρω ἔδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ 310d δὲ τάχιστά με ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς οὕτω δεῦρο ἐπορευόμην. καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, "τί οὖν σοι," ἦν δ' ἐγώ, "τοῦτο; μῶν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας;" καὶ ὃς γελάσας, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ.	"You see, my slave Satyrus ran away from me. I actually meant to tell you I'd be going after him, but something else put it out of my head. When I got back, and we'd had dinner and were about to go to bed, that was when my brother told me Protagoras had come. Even then I set off to come straight to you, but then it seemed far too late at night. But 310d the moment sleep let go of me after my exhaustion, I got straight up and came here." Knowing his courage and his excitability, I said, "So what's that to you? Protagoras hasn't done you some wrong, has he?" He laughed and said, "By the gods, Socrates, he has: he alone is wise, and he doesn't make me wise."
310d "ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία," ἔφην ἐγώ, "ἂν αὐτῷ διδῷς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθῃς ἐκεῖνον, ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν." εἰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν 310e τούτῳ εἴη· ὡς οὔτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποιμι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων· ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἥκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῇς αὐτῷ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός εἰμι, ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἑώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἔτι γὰρ παῖς ἦ ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησε. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν καί φασιν σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα 311a ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου· ἀλλ' ἴωμεν.	"Oh, but by Zeus," I said, "if you give him money and win him over, he'll make you wise too." "Zeus and all the gods," he said, "if only it came down to 310e that! I wouldn't hold back a thing of my own, or of my friends' either. But that's exactly why I've come to you now, so that you can talk to him on my behalf. For one thing, I'm too young. For another, I've never even seen Protagoras or heard a word from him. I was still a child the last time he was in town. But you know, Socrates, everyone praises the man and says he's the wisest of men at speaking. So why don't we go to him, so we can 311a catch him at home? He's staying, I hear, with Callias son of Hipponicus. Come on, let's go."[4]
311a καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· "μήπω, ἀγαθέ, ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν—πρῲ γάρ ἐστιν—ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν, καὶ περιιόντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν ἕως ἂν φῶς γένηται· εἶτα ἴωμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει, ὥστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔνδον."	And I said, "Let's not go there yet, my good friend —it's early—but let's get up and go out here into the courtyard and pass the time walking around until it gets light. Then let's go. Protagoras spends most of his time indoors, so don't worry: we'll most likely find him in."
μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν περιῄμεν· καὶ ἐγὼ 311b ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης διεσκόπουν αὐτὸν καὶ ἠρώτων, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἰέναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος;	After that we got up and walked around the courtyard. I wanted 311b to test Hippocrates' resolve, so I examined him with some questions. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, you're now setting out to go to Protagoras and pay him money as a fee on your own behalf. Whom do you think you're going to, and what do you expect to become?
311b ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπενόεις παρὰ τὸν σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν Ἱπποκράτη τὸν Κῷον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον	Suppose you had it in mind to go to your namesake Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and pay

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκείνῳ, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο· "εἰπέ μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, Ἱπποκράτει [311c] μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὄντι;" τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω;—εἶπον ἄν, ἔφη, ὅτι ὡς ἰατρῷ.—"ὡς τίς γενησόμενος;"—ὡς ἰατρός, ἔφη.—εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἢ Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἐπενόεις ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελεῖν ἐκείνοις, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο· "τελεῖν τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον ὡς τίνι ὄντι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις Πολυκλείτῳ τε καὶ Φειδίᾳ;" τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω;—εἶπον ἄν ὡς ἀγαλματοποιοῖς.—"ὡς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός;"—δῆλον ὅτι ἀγαλματοποιός.—εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· [311d] παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἀργύριον ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἕτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἂν μὲν ἐξικνῆται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες.	him money as a fee on your own behalf, and someone asked you, "Tell me, Hippocrates, you're going to pay [311c] Hippocrates a fee because he's what?" What would you answer?—I'd say, he said, because he's a doctor.—"And to become what?"—A doctor, he said.—And if you had it in mind to go to Polyclitus of Argos or Phidias of Athens and pay them a fee on your own behalf, and someone asked you, "You mean to pay this money to Polyclitus and Phidias because they're what?" What would you answer?—I'd say, because they're sculptors.—"And to become what yourself?"—A sculptor, obviously.—All right, I said. [311d] Now you and I are going to Protagoras, and we'll be ready to pay him money as a fee on your behalf: our own, if our funds stretch that far and we can win him over with them, and if not, we'll spend our friends' money too.[5]
311d	εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο· "εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Ἱππόκρατες, ὡς τίνι ὄντι τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν νῷ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν;" τί ἂν αὐτῷ [311e] ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν;	So if someone saw how terribly keen we are about this and asked us, "Tell me, Socrates and Hippocrates, you mean to pay Protagoras money because he's what?" What would we [311e] answer him? What other name do we hear used of Protagoras?
311e	ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου ποιητήν, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν;—σοφιστὴν δή τοι ὀνομάζουσί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἔφη.—ὡς σοφιστῇ ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τελοῦντες τὰ χρήματα;—μάλιστα.— εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτό τίς σε προσέροιτο· [312a] "αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχῃ παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν;"—καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας—ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας, ὥστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι—εἰ μέν τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστὴς γενησόμενος.—σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; —νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν.—ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν [312b] ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου;	Phidias, we hear, is called a sculptor, and Homer a poet. What name of that sort do we hear for Protagoras?—Well, Socrates, he said, a sophist is what they call the man.—So we're going to pay our money to him as a sophist?—Exactly.—And if someone asked you this as well: [312a] "And you yourself, what are you going to Protagoras to become?"—And he answered, blushing—for there was already a glimmer of daylight, so that I could see him clearly—If it's anything like the earlier cases, obviously to become a sophist.—And you, I said, by the gods: wouldn't you be ashamed to present yourself to the Greeks as a sophist?—Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I would, if I'm to say what I really think.—Well then, Hippocrates, maybe that isn't the kind of learning you expect to get from Protagoras. [312b] Maybe you expect the kind you got from your teacher of letters, your lyre teacher and your trainer?[6]
312b	τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἑκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην	You didn't learn any of those as a profession, to become a craftsman. You learned them as part of an

4 Callias son of Hipponicus was reputed to be the richest man in Athens and was a lavish patron of sophists.
5 Hippocrates of Cos was the famous physician; the Asclepiads were a guild of doctors who claimed descent from the god Asclepius. Polyclitus and Phidias were the most celebrated sculptors of the day.
6 Sophists were paid traveling teachers who offered instruction, above all in speaking and success in public life. The word is related to *sophos*, "wise," but had come to carry a suspect ring.

GREEK

καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.—πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἢ σε λανθάνει; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—τοῦ πέρι;—ὅτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρασχεῖν [312c] θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρί, ὡς φῄς, σοφιστῇ· ὅτι δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἐστιν, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἶσθα. καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτ' εἰ κακῷ πράγματι.—οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, εἰδέναι.—λέγε δή, τί ἡγῇ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν;—ἐγὼ μέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὥσπερ τοὔνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα.—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες· ἀλλ' [312d] εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, "τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες," εἴποιμεν ἄν που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.

312d εἰ δέ τις ἐκεῖνο ἔροιτο, "ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστιν;" τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης;—τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν;—ἴσως ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν· ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς [312e] δεινὸν δήπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως· ἦ γάρ; —ναί.—εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;—δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι;—εἰκός γε. τί δή ἐστιν τοῦτο περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ;—μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν. [313a]

313a καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον μετὰ τοῦτο· τί οὖν; οἶσθα εἰς οἷόν τινα κίνδυνον ἔρχῃ ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχήν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῳ διακινδυνεύοντα ἢ χρηστὸν αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἢ πονηρόν, πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέψω εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε οὔ, καὶ εἰς συμβουλὴν τούς τε φίλους ἂν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους σκοπούμενος ἡμέρας συχνάς·

ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγῇ, τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐστὶν τὰ σὰ ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ

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education, the way a private citizen and a free man should.—Yes, he said, I do think the learning I'll get from Protagoras is more like that.

Then do you know what you're about to do, or doesn't it occur to you? I said.—About what?—That you're about to hand over your own soul [312c] to be cared for by a man who is, as you say, a sophist. But what on earth a sophist is, I'd be surprised if you knew. And yet if you don't know that, you don't even know whom you're handing your soul over to, or whether it's to something good or something bad.—I think I do know, he said.—Then tell me, what do you think a sophist is?—I think, he said, that he is what his name says: the one who has knowledge of wise things.—But you could say that about painters and carpenters too, I said: that they are the ones who have knowledge of wise things. But [312d] if someone asked us, "Painters have knowledge of which wise things?" we'd presumably tell him: of those that have to do with producing images. And so on with the rest.

But if someone asked, "And the sophist, which wise things does he know?" what would we answer him? What kind of work is he master of?—What else could we say he is, Socrates, but a master at making people clever at speaking?—Perhaps, I said, we'd be telling the truth, but not enough of it. Our answer still calls for a further question: what does the sophist make people clever at speaking about? The lyre teacher, [312e] I take it, makes people clever at speaking about the thing he makes them know, namely lyre playing. Isn't that so?—Yes.—All right. Then what does the sophist make people clever at speaking about?—Obviously, about the thing he also makes them know?—Very likely. So what is this thing that the sophist both knows himself and makes his student know?—By Zeus, he said, I can't tell you any more. [313a]

After that I said: Well then? Do you know what kind of danger you're walking into, staking your soul like this? If you had to entrust your body to someone, with the risk of its turning out healthy or diseased, you'd think long and hard about whether to entrust it or not. You'd call in your friends and family for advice and spend days on end considering it.

But what you value more than your body is your soul, and everything of yours goes well or badly

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πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ γενομένου, περὶ δὲ τούτου οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀδελφῷ [313b] ἐπεκοινώσω οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν ἑταίρων οὐδενί, εἶτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ τὴν σὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ἑσπέρας ἀκούσας, ὡς φῄς, ὄρθριος ἥκων περὶ μὲν τούτου οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλὴν ποιῇ, εἴτε χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἴτε μή, ἕτοιμος δ' εἶ ἀναλίσκειν τά τε σαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἤδη διεγνωκὼς ὅτι πάντως συνεστέον Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὃν οὔτε γιγνώσκεις, ὡς φῄς, οὔτε [313c] διείλεξαι οὐδεπώποτε, σοφιστὴν δ' ὀνομάζεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν φαίνῃ ἀγνοῶν, ᾧ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν;—καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας, ἔοικεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις.—ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὢν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται;

313c φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις.—τρέφεται δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίνι;—μαθήμασιν δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσῃ ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ [313d] ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ὧν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγίμων οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ γυμναστικὸς ἢ ἰατρὸς ὤν.

313d οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ἃ πωλοῦσιν, τάχα δ' ἄν τινες, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ τούτων ἀγνοοῖεν ὧν πωλοῦσιν ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν [313e] πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν· ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὖ ἰατρικὸς ὤν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, [314a] μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύῃς. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὠνῇ ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν σιτίων.

314a σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπόρου ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστιν συμβουλεύσασθαι,

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depending on whether it turns out good or bad. Yet about this you haven't consulted your father or your brother [313b] or any of us, your companions, on whether or not to entrust your soul to this newly arrived foreigner. Instead you heard about him last night, as you say, and you turn up at dawn without a word of discussion or advice about whether you ought to entrust yourself to him or not. And you're ready to spend your own money and your friends', as if you'd already decided that you absolutely must study with Protagoras. Yet you don't know him, as you say, and you've never once [313c] talked to him. You call him a sophist, but you obviously don't know what a sophist is, and this is the man you're about to entrust yourself to? —When he heard this he said, It seems so, Socrates, from what you say.—Then is the sophist, Hippocrates, really a kind of importer or retailer of the goods a soul feeds on?

That's certainly what he looks like to me.—But what does a soul feed on, Socrates?—On things learned, of course, I said. And let's make sure, my friend, that the sophist doesn't deceive us by praising what he sells, the way the people who deal in the body's food do, [313d] the importer and the retailer. They themselves, I take it, don't know which of the goods they deal in are good or bad for the body, though they praise everything they sell. Neither do the people who buy from them, unless one of them happens to be a trainer or a doctor.

It's the same with those who carry lessons around from city to city, selling and peddling them to whoever wants them at the moment. They praise everything they sell. But some of them, my excellent friend, may well not know which of their wares are good or bad [313e] for the soul either, and the same goes for the people who buy from them, unless one of them happens to be a doctor of the soul. So if you happen to know which of these are good and which are bad, it's safe for you to buy lessons from Protagoras or from anyone else. But if not, my blessed friend, watch out [314a] that you don't gamble and take risks with what's dearest to you. There's actually a far greater risk in buying lessons than in buying food.

When you buy food and drink from the retailer or the importer, you can carry them away in separate containers. Before you take them into your body by eating or drinking them, you can put them

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	παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαΐοντα, ὅτι τε ἐδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅτι μή, καὶ ὁπόσον καὶ ὁπότε· ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὠνῇ οὐ μέγας ὁ 314b κίνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπιέναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὠφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι.	down at home and call in an expert for advice about what you should eat or drink and what not, and how much, and when. So the risk in buying 314b isn't great. But you can't carry lessons away in a separate container. Once you've paid the price, you have no choice but to take the lesson into your soul itself, learn it, and go away harmed or benefited. So let's look into these things with people older than we are. We're still too young to settle a matter this big.
314b	νῦν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ὡρμήσαμεν, ἴωμεν καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντες καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσώμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἐστίν, 314c ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος—οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον—καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί.	For now, though, since we've started, let's go and hear the man, and once we've heard him, let's consult others too. Protagoras isn't the only one there. 314c There's also Hippias of Elis, and Prodicus of Ceos too, I think, and many other wise men.[7]
314c	δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περί τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἀτελὴς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν, στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα ἕως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός τις, κατήκουεν ἡμῶν, κινδυνεύει δὲ 314d διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν· ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἰδὼν ἡμᾶς, ἔα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ· καὶ ἅμα ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως ὡς οἷός τ' ἦν ἐπήραξεν. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούομεν, καὶ ὃς ἐγκεκλημένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ; "ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ," ἔφην ἐγώ, "οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἥκομεν οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν.	That was our decision, and we set off. When we reached the doorway, we stood there discussing an argument that had come up between us on the way. We didn't want to leave it unfinished; we wanted to settle it before going in, so we stood in the doorway and talked until we reached agreement. Now I think the doorkeeper, a eunuch, overheard us, and it seems 314d that because of the crowd of sophists he was fed up with people coming to the house. Anyway, when we knocked on the door, he opened it, saw us and said, "Ugh, sophists! He's busy." And at the same time he slammed the door with both hands as hard as he could. We knocked again, and he answered through the closed door, "You people, didn't you hear me say he's busy?" "But my good man," I said, "we haven't come to see Callias, and we aren't sophists.
314d	ἀλλὰ θάρρει· 314e Πρωταγόραν γάρ τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἤλθομεν· εἰσάγγειλον οὖν." μόγις οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέῳξεν τὴν θύραν.	Don't worry. 314e We've come because we want to see Protagoras. So announce us." After that the fellow finally opened the door for us, reluctantly.

THE HOUSE OF CALLIAS

Socrates describes Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus, each surrounded by admirers.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
314e	**SOCRATES** ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσήλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ προστῴῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἑξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπεριεπάτουν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ 315a ὁ ὁμομήτριος, Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ	**SOCRATES** When we went in, we found Protagoras walking up and down in the portico. Walking with him in a line, on one side, were Callias son of Hipponicus, his half-brother 315a on his mother's side Paralus son of Pericles, and Char-

7 Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos were, with Protagoras, the most famous sophists of the day.

GREEK

τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁ ἕτερος τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος, καὶ Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὅσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστὴς ἐσόμενος. τούτων δὲ οἳ ὄπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο—οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ [315b] Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται κεκηλημένοι — ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ.

ENGLISH

mides son of Glaucon. On the other side were Pericles' other son Xanthippus, Philippides son of Philomelus, and Antimoerus of Mende, who has the highest reputation of Protagoras' students and is studying professionally, to become a sophist. Most of the people following behind them and listening to the conversation seemed to be foreigners. Protagoras brings them from every city he passes through, enchanting them with his voice like [315b] Orpheus, and they follow the voice, spellbound. But there were some locals in the chorus too.

[315b] τοῦτον τὸν χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγωγε ἰδὼν ἥσθην, ὡς καλῶς ηὐλαβοῦντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδὼν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περιεσχίζοντο οὗτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ περιιόντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.

Watching this chorus was what delighted me most: how beautifully they took care never to get in Protagoras' way in front. Whenever he and the men with him turned around, these listeners split neatly and in good order to one side and the other, wheeled around, and every time took up their places behind him, beautifully done.

τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα, ἔφη Ὅμηρος, Ἱππίαν τὸν [315c] Ἠλεῖον, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀντικρὺ προστῴῳ ἐν θρόνῳ· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχός τε ὁ Ἀκουμενοῦ καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖταί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἄττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἱππίαν, ὁ δ' ἐν θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ διεξῄει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

"And after him I beheld," as Homer says, Hippias [315c] of Elis, sitting on a high chair in the portico opposite. Around him on benches sat Eryximachus son of Acumenus, Phaedrus of Myrrhinus, Andron son of Androtion, and some foreigners, fellow citizens of his and others. They seemed to be asking Hippias questions about nature and astronomical matters concerning the heavens, while he, sitting on his chair, gave each of them his rulings and went through their questions in detail.[8]

[315c] καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον—ἐπεδήμει [315d] γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος—ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματί τινι, ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμιείῳ ἐχρῆτο Ἱππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν καταλυόντων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κῳδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίναις Παυσανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Παυσανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς μὲν ἐγῷμαι καλόν τε [315e] κἀγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκοῦσαι ὄνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ παιδικὰ Παυσανίου τυγχάνει ὤν.

And yes, I saw Tantalus too, for Prodicus of Ceos was [315d] in town as well. He was in a room that Hipponicus used to use as a storeroom, but now, because of the number of guests, Callias had cleared it out too and turned it into guest quarters. Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped up in some fleeces and blankets, a great many of them, by the look of it. On the couches next to him sat Pausanias of Cerameis and, with Pausanias, a lad still quite young, fine and [315e] good by nature, I think, and certainly very good-looking. I thought I heard that his name was Agathon, and I wouldn't be surprised if he happens to be Pausanias' beloved.[9]

[315e] τοῦτό τ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τὼ Ἀδειμάντω ἀμφοτέρω, ὅ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ Λευκολοφίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς

There was this lad, and both Adeimantuses, the son of Cepis and the son of Leucolophides, and

8 Socrates borrows Odysseus' words from his tour of the underworld (*Odyssey* 11.601), casting the sophists as the famous dead; Tantalus, in the next sentence, comes from the same scene.
9 Agathon later became a celebrated tragic poet; he and Pausanias appear again in Plato's *Symposium*.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐφαίνοντο· περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου—πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ [316a] εἶναι καὶ θεῖος—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα.	some others could be seen. What they were discussing I couldn't make out from outside, though I was dying to hear Prodicus—for the man strikes me as all-wise [316a] and divine. But because of the deepness of his voice, a sort of booming filled the room and made what was said unclear.
316a	καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθεμεν, κατόπιν δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπεισῆλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης τε ὁ καλός, ὡς φῂς σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου.	We'd only just come in when, right behind us, in came Alcibiades the beautiful, as you call him, and I agree, and Critias son of Callaeschrus.
	ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς εἰσήλθομεν, ἔτι σμίκρ' ἄττα διατρίψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι προσῆμεν πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόραν, [316b] καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σέ τοι ἥλθομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Ἱπποκράτης οὗτος.	Once we were in, we spent a little more time looking all this over, and then went up to Protagoras, [316b] and I said, Protagoras, Hippocrates here and I have come to see you.
	πότερον, ἔφη, μόνῳ βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων;	Do you want to talk with me alone, he said, or with the others too?
	ἡμῖν μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀκούσας δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα ἥλθομεν, αὐτὸς σκέψαι.	It makes no difference to us, I said. Hear why we've come, and then decide for yourself.
	τί οὖν δή ἐστιν, ἔφη, οὗ ἕνεκα ἥκετε;	Well then, he said, what have you come for?[10]
316b	Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε ἐστὶν μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδώρου υἱός, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἡλικιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν δέ μοι [316c] δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, τοῦτο δὲ οἴεται οἱ μάλιστ' ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένοιτο· ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἴει δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους, ἢ μετ' ἄλλων.	Hippocrates here is an Athenian, the son of Apollodorus, from a great and prosperous family, and by natural gifts he seems a match for anyone his age. My impression [316c] is that he wants to make a name for himself in the city, and he believes he'd have the best chance of that if he studied with you. So now it's up to you to consider whether you think you should discuss this alone, with just us, or with others present.
316c	ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, προμηθῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἰόντα εἰς πόλεις μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας, καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ὀθνείων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεωτέρων, ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ [316d] τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα· οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί.	You're right, Socrates, he said, to show forethought on my behalf. A foreigner goes into great cities and persuades the best of the young men there to abandon their association with others, relatives and strangers, older and younger, and to associate with him instead, on the grounds that they'll become better through [316d] associating with him. A man who does this has to be careful, because no small amount of envy comes of it, and other kinds of hostility and plotting too.
316d	ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἷον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμῳδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίους δέ τινας ἤσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικήν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἥττων σοφιστὴς [316e]	Now I say the sophist's art is ancient. But those of the men of old who practiced it were afraid of the resentment it attracts, so they made a disguise of it and covered it up. Some used poetry, like Homer, Hesiod and Simonides. Others used mystery rites and oracle-chanting, like Orpheus and Musaeus and their followers. Some, I've noticed, even used athletic training, like Iccus of Tarentum

10 Critias, a relative of Plato, later led the oligarchy of the Thirty that ruled Athens in 404–403 BC.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς· μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὢν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο.	and, still alive today and a sophist second to none, [316e] Herodicus of Selymbria, originally of Megara. Your own Agathocles made music his disguise, and he was a great sophist, and so did Pythoclides of Ceos and many others. All of these, as I say, were afraid of envy and used these arts as screens.
316e	ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις [317a] ἅπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ συμφέρομαι· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὔ τι διαπράξασθαι ὃ ἐβουλήθησαν—οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὧνπερ ἕνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ προσχήματα· ἐπεὶ οἵ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἅττ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγγέλλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν—τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος, [317b] καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ἡγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανοῦργον εἶναι.	But I [317a] don't go along with any of them on this. I think they didn't achieve what they wanted at all, because they didn't escape the notice of the men with power in their cities, who are the very reason for these disguises. The many, after all, notice practically nothing; they just repeat whatever these men proclaim. Now to run away and fail to get away, and be caught in plain sight, is great folly even as an undertaking, [317b] and it can only make people far more hostile, since they think a man like that is a scoundrel on top of everything else.
317b	ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἅπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι· καὶ ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτῃ ἔσκεμμαι, ὥστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν δεινὸν πάσχειν διὰ [317c] τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστὴς εἶναι. καίτοι πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν — οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην —ὥστε πολύ μοι ἥδιστόν ἐστιν, εἴ τι βούλεσθε, περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι.	So I've taken the completely opposite road. I admit that I'm a sophist and that I educate people, and I think this precaution, admitting it rather than denying it, is better than theirs. I've worked out other precautions besides this one, so that, god willing, I suffer nothing terrible for [317c] admitting I'm a sophist. And yet I've been in the profession for many years now. Indeed, my years all told are many: there's none of you here whose father I couldn't be. So by far the most pleasant thing for me, if you're willing, would be to discuss all this in front of everyone in the house.
317c	καὶ ἐγώ—ὑπώπτευσα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προδίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἱππίᾳ ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι ὅτι ἐρασταὶ [317d] αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἴμεν— τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἱππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν;	And I—for I suspected he wanted to show off to Prodicus and Hippias and preen himself on our having come as his admirers [317d] —said, Well then, why don't we call Prodicus and Hippias and the people with them too, so they can listen to us?
	πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.	By all means, said Protagoras.
	βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη, συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν, ἵνα καθεζόμενοι διαλέγησθε;	Then would you like us, said Callias, to set up seats in a circle, so you can sit down while you talk?
317d	ἐδόκει χρῆναι· ἅσμενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατεσκευάζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἱππίᾳ—ἐκεῖ γὰρ προϋπῆρχε τὰ βάθρα—ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης [317e] ἡκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον, ἀναστήσαντες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.	Everyone agreed that we should. We were all delighted at the prospect of hearing wise men, and we took hold of the benches and couches ourselves and arranged them beside Hippias, since the benches were already there. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades [317e] came bringing Prodicus, whom they had got up from his bed, along with Prodicus' companions.
	ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεζόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, νῦν δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἵδε πάρεισιν,	

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιοῦ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου. 318a	When we were all seated together, Protagoras said, Now then, Socrates, since these people are here too, you can tell us what you mentioned to me a little while ago on the young man's behalf. 318a

WHAT PROTAGORAS TEACHES

Protagoras promises good counsel and the art of politics; Socrates doubts that excellence can be taught.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
318a	**SOCRATES** καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι ἡ αὐτή μοι ἀρχή ἐστιν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἥπερ ἄρτι, περὶ ὧν ἀφικόμην. Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ ὅδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὢν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας· ὅτι οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται, ἐάν σοι συνῇ, ἡδέως ἄν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὅ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος.	**SOCRATES** And I said, Protagoras, I'll begin just where I did a moment ago, with what I came for. Hippocrates here happens to be eager to study with you. So he says he'd like to find out what he'll get out of it if he does. That's all we have to say.
	ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν· ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ συνῇς, ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἐμοὶ συγγένῃ, ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα· καὶ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. 318b	Protagoras took this up and said, Young man, here is what you'll get if you study with me: on the very day you join me, you'll go home a better man, and the same again the next day, and every day you'll keep making progress toward the better. 318b
318b	καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν λέγεις, ἀλλὰ εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κἂν σύ, καίπερ τηλικοῦτος ὢν καὶ οὕτως σοφός, εἴ τίς σε διδάξειεν ὃ μὴ τυγχάνοις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε ἐπιθυμήσειεν τῆς συνουσίας τούτου τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπιδημοῦντος, Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτόν, ὥσπερ παρὰ σὲ 318c νῦν, ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ σοῦ, ὅτι ἑκάστης ἡμέρας συνὼν αὐτῷ βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐπανέροιτο·	When I heard that, I said, Protagoras, there's nothing surprising in what you say; it's only to be expected. Even you, old and wise as you are, would become better if someone taught you something you didn't happen to know. But don't answer like that. Suppose Hippocrates here suddenly changed his mind and set his heart on studying with that young man who has only just come to town, Zeuxippus of Heraclea. And suppose he went to him, as he has now come to you, 318c and heard from him exactly what he heard from you: that every day he spent with him he would become better and make progress. If he asked him in turn,[11]
318c	"τί δὴ φῂς βελτίω ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπιδώσειν;" εἴποι ἂν αὐτῷ ὁ Ζεύξιππος ὅτι πρὸς γραφικήν· κἂν εἰ Ὀρθαγόρᾳ τῷ Θηβαίῳ συγγενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ σοῦ, ἐπανέροιτο αὐτὸν εἰς ὅτι βελτίων καθ' ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγιγνόμενος ἐκείνῳ, εἴποι ἂν ὅτι εἰς αὐλησιν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ 318d τούτου ἐρωτῶντι, Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε Πρωταγόρᾳ συγγενόμενος, ᾗ ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμέρᾳ συγγένηται, βελτίων ἅπεισι γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἑκάστης οὕτως ἐπιδώσει εἰς τί, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ;	"Better at what, exactly, and progress toward what?" Zeuxippus would tell him: at painting. And if he studied with Orthagoras of Thebes and heard from him exactly what he heard from you, and asked him what he would get better at day by day by studying with him, Orthagoras would say: at playing the flute. So you too, tell the young man, and me, since I'm asking on his 318d behalf: if Hippocrates here studies with Protagoras, he'll go away better on the very day he studies with him, and every day after that he'll make progress in the same way. Toward what, Protagoras, and in what?

11 Zeuxippus is probably the famous painter better known as Zeuxis.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
318d	καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας, σύ τε καλῶς ἐρωτᾷς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται ἅπερ ἂν ἔπαθεν ἄλλῳ τῳ συγγενόμενος τῶν σοφιστῶν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· [318e] τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὗ ἥκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, [319a] καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.	And Protagoras, hearing this from me, said, You ask well, Socrates, and I enjoy answering those who ask well. If Hippocrates comes to me, he won't have the experience he would have had with any other sophist. The others treat the young shamefully. [318e] The young have escaped the specialized arts, and these sophists drag them back against their will and push them into the arts again, teaching them arithmetic and astronomy and geometry and music—and as he said this he glanced at Hippias. But if he comes to me, he'll learn nothing except what he came for. What I teach is good counsel, both about one's own affairs, how best to manage one's household, [319a] and about the city's affairs, how to be most capable of acting and speaking in public life.
319a	ἆρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἕπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας. αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.	Am I following what you're saying? I said. You seem to me to mean the art of politics, and to promise to make men good citizens. That, Socrates, he said, is exactly what I profess.
	ἦ καλόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ κέκτησαι· οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρός γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἅπερ νοῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ᾤμην διδακτὸν [319b] εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως ἂν ἀπιστῶ. ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις, δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι.	What a fine skill you have, then, I said, if you really have it. To you of all people I'll say nothing but what I really think. I didn't think, Protagoras, that this could [319b] be taught, but when you say it can, I don't see how I can disbelieve you. Still, it's only fair that I explain why I think it can't be taught, or provided by human beings to human beings. I say, as the other Greeks do too, that the Athenians are wise.
319b	ὁρῶ οὖν, ὅταν συλλεγῶμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέῃ πρᾶξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους μεταπεμπομένους συμβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως, [319c] ὅσα ἡγοῦνται μαθητά τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι· ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἴονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ᾖ καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποστῇ ὁ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθείς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελκύσωσιν ἢ ἐξάρωνται κελευόντων τῶν πρυτάνεων.	Now I see that when we gather in the Assembly and the city has to take some action about building, they send for the builders to advise on the buildings; when it's about shipbuilding, the shipwrights; and the same with everything else [319c] they consider learnable and teachable. But if anyone else tries to advise them whom they don't consider an expert, even if he's very handsome and rich and well-born, they're not a bit more willing to accept him for that. They laugh at him and shout him down until either the would-be speaker is shouted down and gives up of his own accord, or the archers drag him away or carry him out on the orders of the presiding officers.[12]
319c		

12 The archers were publicly owned slaves who kept order in Athens; the presiding officers (*prytaneis*) were the council members who ran the Assembly's meetings.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται· ἐπειδὰν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς [319d] πόλεως διοικήσεως δέῃ βουλεύσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος ναύκληρος, πλούσιος πένης, γενναῖος ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθών, οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ ἡγοῦνται διδακτὸν εἶναι.	That's how they act on matters they think are a matter of skill. But when they have to deliberate about something to do with governing the [319d] city, the man who stands up to advise them may just as well be a carpenter, a smith, a shoemaker, a merchant, a ship owner, rich or poor, well-born or not. And nobody throws it in these men's faces, as they did with the others, that without having learned it anywhere, without ever having had a teacher, he still tries to give advice. Clearly, then, they don't think it can be taught.
319d	μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς [319e] πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι· ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν, [320a] ἃ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τῳ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιιόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι, ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τουτουῖ νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ Περικλῆς, δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῇ δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἐπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν ἓξ μῆνας γεγονέναι, [320b] ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι χρήσαιτο αὐτῷ.	And it isn't only the public life of the [319e] city that's like this. In private life, too, the wisest and best of our citizens are unable to pass on to others this excellence that they have. Take Pericles, the father of these young men here. In everything that depended on teachers he educated them well and properly, [320a] but in what he himself is wise in, he neither educates them himself nor hands them over to anyone else. They wander around grazing on their own, like sacred cattle let loose, in case they happen to stumble on excellence by themselves. Or, if you like, take Clinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades here. This same Pericles was his guardian, and fearing that Alcibiades would corrupt him, he took him away from his brother and placed him in Ariphron's house to be educated. Before six months were up, [320b] he gave him back to Alcibiades, not knowing what to do with him.[13]
320b	καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίω ἐποίησαν οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηυρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς [320c] διδακτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσῃς ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον.	And I could name a great many others for you who, though good themselves, never made anyone better, either in their own families or outside them. So I, Protagoras, looking at these facts, don't think excellence can be taught. But when I hear you say what you say, I waver, and I think there's something in it, because I consider you a man of wide experience who has learned a great deal and discovered a great deal for himself. So if you can show us more clearly that [320c] excellence can be taught, don't keep it to yourself; show us.

13 "Excellence" translates *aretē*, which covers any way of being good at something; here it includes the "good counsel" and civic skill Protagoras claims to teach.

THE MYTH OF PROMETHEUS

Protagoras tells how Zeus gave every human being a share of shame and justice.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
320c	**SOCRATES** ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω· ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθών;	**SOCRATES** Why, Socrates, he said, I won't keep it to myself. But shall I show you by telling a story, as an older man to younger ones, or by going through it as an argument?
	πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθημένων ὁποτέρως βούλοιτο οὕτως διεξιέναι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν.	Many of those sitting around him replied that he should go through it whichever way he liked. Well then, he said, I think it will be more pleasant to tell you a story.
	ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη [320d] οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἱμαρμένος γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μείξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῇ κεράννυται. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον, προσέταξαν Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμῆσαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἑκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθέα δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι, "νείμαντος δέ μου," ἔφη, "ἐπίσκεψαι·" καὶ οὕτω πείσας νέμει. νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσῆπτεν, [320e] τοὺς δ' ἀσθενεστέρους τάχει ἐκόσμει· τοὺς δὲ ὥπλιζε, τοῖς δ' ἄοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν.	There was once a time when gods existed, but mortal kinds [320d] did not. When the appointed time came for these too to be born, the gods molded them inside the earth from a mixture of earth and fire and everything that is blended from fire and earth. When they were about to bring them up into the light, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them and distribute powers to each kind as was fitting. Epimetheus begged Prometheus to let him do the distributing himself. "Once I've distributed," he said, "you inspect." Having persuaded him, he set to distributing. In distributing, to some he gave strength without speed, [320e] while the weaker he equipped with speed. Some he armed, and for those to whom he gave an unarmed nature he devised some other power to keep them safe.[14]
320e	ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἢ κατάγειον οἴκησιν ἔνεμεν· ἃ δὲ ηὔξε μεγέθει, τῷδε [321a] αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσῳζεν· καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἔνεμεν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλάβειαν ἔχων μή τι γένος ἀϊστωθείη· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὥρας εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ πυκναῖς τε θριξὶν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν ἀμῦναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ εἰς εὐνὰς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνὴ οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυὴς ἑκάστῳ· καὶ [321b] ὑποδῶν τὰ μὲν ὁπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ θριξὶν καὶ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις.	To those he wrapped in smallness he gave winged flight or a home underground; those he made large, he kept [321a] safe by their very size. And so he distributed the rest, keeping things in balance. He devised all this taking care that no kind should be wiped out. When he had supplied them with ways of escaping destruction at one another's hands, he devised protection against the seasons sent by Zeus. He clothed them with thick hair and tough hides, enough to keep out the winter cold and able to keep out the heat too, so that when they went to bed these same things would serve each as its own natural bedding. And [321b] he shod some with hooves, others with hair and tough, bloodless skin.
321b	τοὐντεῦθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς, τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας·	Next he provided different foods for different animals: for some, grass from the earth; for others,

14 Prometheus ("Forethought") and Epimetheus ("Afterthought") are Titan brothers in Greek myth.

GREEK

ENGLISH

ἔστι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ζῴων ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς δ' ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων. ἅτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν [321c] καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὰ ἄλογα· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅτι χρήσαιτο. ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος τὴν νομήν, καὶ ὁρᾷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῷα ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον· ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἱμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρῆν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς φῶς.

the fruit of trees; for others, roots. And to some he gave other animals' flesh as their food. To these he gave few offspring, and to those they preyed on, many, so as to preserve the kind. But Epimetheus was not altogether wise, and he didn't notice that [321c] he had used up all the powers on the animals that lack reason. The human race was still left unequipped, and he was at a loss what to do with it. While he was at a loss, Prometheus came to inspect the distribution, and he saw the other animals well provided with everything, but human beings naked, unshod, without bedding and unarmed. And the appointed day was already at hand on which human beings too had to come out of the earth into the light.

321c ἀπορίᾳ οὖν σχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς ἥντινα σωτηρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὕροι, [321d] κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί—ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητήν τῳ ἢ χρησίμην γενέσθαι—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτῃ ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν· ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Διί.

So Prometheus, at a loss to find any means of survival for human beings, [321d] stole from Hephaestus and Athena their wisdom in the crafts, together with fire. Without fire there was no way anyone could acquire it or use it. And so he gave it to human beings as a gift. This is how human beings came to have the wisdom needed to make a living. But they didn't have the wisdom of politics, for that was with Zeus.

321d τῷ δὲ Προμηθεῖ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν—πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν—εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ [321e] ἐφιλοτεχνείτην, λαθὼν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τήν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ [322a] βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθέα δὲ δι' Ἐπιμηθέα ὕστερον, ἥπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν.

There was no longer any chance for Prometheus to get into the citadel where Zeus dwelt, and besides, Zeus' guards were terrifying. But he slipped unseen into the workshop that Athena and Hephaestus shared, where [321e] they practiced their arts together, stole Hephaestus' art of fire and Athena's art too, and gave them to human beings. From this, human beings came to have plenty of the means [322a] of life. But later, thanks to Epimetheus, Prometheus was brought to justice for the theft, so the story goes.

322a ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν ζῴων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν, καὶ ἐπεχείρει βωμούς τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν· ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ, καὶ οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ηὕρετο. οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ' ἀρχὰς [322b] ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν· ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῇ αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής —πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὔπω εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική— ἐζήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σῴζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις· ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν,

Since human beings had a share in the divine portion, first of all, because of their kinship with the divine, they alone of animals believed in gods, and set about building altars and statues of gods. Then by their art they quickly articulated speech and words, and invented houses and clothes and shoes and bedding and the food that comes from the earth. Equipped in this way, human beings at first [322b] lived scattered, and there were no cities. So they were being killed off by wild beasts, because they were weaker than the beasts in every way. Their craftsmanship was an adequate help in getting food, but it fell short in the war against the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο.	beasts, for they didn't yet have the art of politics, of which the art of war is a part. So they sought to band together and save themselves by founding cities. But whenever they banded together, they wronged one another, since they didn't have the art of politics, so they scattered again and were destroyed.
322c	Ζεὺς οὖν δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, Ἑρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί. ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἑρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις· "πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω;	So Zeus, afraid that our race might be wiped out entirely, sent Hermes to bring shame and justice to human beings, so that there would be order in cities and bonds of friendship to draw people together. Hermes asked Zeus in what way he should give justice and shame to human beings: "Should I distribute these the way the arts have been distributed?[15]
	νενέμηνται δὲ ὧδε· εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ [322d] οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω;" "ἐπὶ πάντας," ἔφη ὁ Ζεύς, "καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον γε θὲς παρ' ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως." οὕτω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ᾖ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ ἐάν [322e] τις ἐκτὸς ὢν τῶν ὀλίγων συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῄς—εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι— ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς [323a] ἀρετῆς ἴωσιν, ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις.	This is how they've been distributed: one person with medical skill is enough for many laymen, and the same goes for the other craftsmen. Shall I put justice and shame [322d] among human beings this way too, or distribute them to all?" "To all," said Zeus, "and let all have a share. For cities could not come into being if only a few had a share in these, as with the other arts. And lay down a law from me: whoever is unable to share in shame and justice shall be put to death as a disease of the city." That, Socrates, is how it is, and that is why the Athenians, like everyone else, when the discussion is about excellence in carpentry or in some other craft, think only a few have any business giving advice, and if [322e] someone outside the few offers advice, they won't put up with it, as you say—and rightly, say I. But when they come to deliberate on political [323a] excellence, which must proceed entirely through justice and moderation, they rightly put up with everyone, on the grounds that everyone must share in this excellence at least, or else there would be no cities.
323a	αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.	That, Socrates, is the reason for it.
	ἵνα δὲ μὴ οἴῃ ἀπατᾶσθαι ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἐάν τις φῇ ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην ἣν μή ἐστιν, ἢ καταγελῶσιν [323b] ἢ χαλεπαίνουσιν, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, ἐάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν, ἐὰν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτοῦ τἀληθῆ λέγῃ	But so that you won't think you're being misled, here is another piece of evidence that all people really do believe that everyone shares in justice and the rest of political excellence. With the other kinds of excellence, as you say, if someone claims to be a good flute player, or good at any other art, when he isn't, people either laugh at him [323b] or get angry, and his family come and take him to task as

15 "Shame" (*aidōs*) is a sense of shame and of respect for others; "justice" (*dikē*) is a sense of what is right and owed to others.

GREEK

ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καί φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, ἐάντε ὦσιν ἐάντε μή, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην· ὡς ἀναγκαῖον 323c οὐδένα ὅντιν' οὐχὶ ἀμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

323c ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι 323d φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ὦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν· οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν;

323d ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, 323e ἐάν τις ταῦτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία τούτων κακά, ἐπὶ τούτοις που οἵ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. ὧν ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ 324a συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς· ἔνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὔσης. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει ὅτι οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν.

324a οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις 324b μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται—οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. καὶ τοιαύτην διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει. ταύτην οὖν τὴν

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if he were mad. But with justice and the rest of political excellence, even if they know someone is unjust, if he himself tells the truth about himself in front of many people, then what they considered moderation in the other case, telling the truth, they consider madness here. They say that everyone must claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that anyone who doesn't pretend to justice is mad, since everyone without exception 323c must share in it in some way or other, or else not be among human beings at all.

So that much I maintain: they rightly accept everyone as an adviser on this excellence, because they think everyone has a share in it. Next I'll try to prove to you that they don't think it comes by nature or by chance, but that it can be taught, and that it comes through cultivation to whoever has it. Take all the bad qualities that people think others have 323d by nature or by chance: no one gets angry with those who have them, or takes them to task, or teaches them, or punishes them, so that they won't be like that. People pity them. Who, for instance, is so foolish as to try anything of the kind with the ugly, or the small, or the weak?

These things, I imagine, they know come to people by nature and chance, both the fine qualities and their opposites. But with the good things they think people get through cultivation, practice and teaching, 323e if someone lacks them and has the opposite bad qualities instead, that's presumably where anger and punishment and reproof come in. Among these bad qualities are injustice and impiety and, 324a in short, everything opposed to political excellence. Here everyone is angry with everyone and takes everyone to task, clearly on the grounds that it can be acquired through cultivation and learning. If you're willing to consider, Socrates, what punishing wrongdoers is actually meant to achieve, that alone will teach you that people do think excellence can be acquired.

No one punishes wrongdoers with his mind on the fact that they did wrong, and for that reason, unless he's taking mindless 324b revenge like a wild beast. Someone who sets out to punish rationally doesn't exact the penalty for the sake of the past wrong, since he couldn't undo what has been done. He does it for the sake of the future, so that neither this man himself nor anyone else who sees

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δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν ὅσοιπερ [324c] τιμωροῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἵ τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὓς ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ σοὶ πολῖται· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσι τῶν ἡγουμένων παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν.

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him punished will do wrong again. And holding this view, he holds that excellence can be instilled by education; he punishes, after all, to deter. This, then, is the view of everyone who [324c] exacts penalties, privately or publicly. And people do exact penalties from those they think are doing wrong, and punish them—everyone does, and not least the Athenians, your fellow citizens. So by this argument the Athenians too are among those who think excellence can be instilled and taught.

324c ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολῖται καὶ χαλκέως καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἡγοῦνται ἀρετήν, ἀποδέδεικταί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς, ὥς γέ μοι [324d] φαίνεται.

So, Socrates, that your fellow citizens are right to accept a smith and a shoemaker giving advice on political matters, and that they think excellence can be taught and instilled, has been sufficiently shown to you, at least as it [324d] seems to me.

WHY GOOD MEN HAVE ORDINARY SONS

Protagoras argues that everyone teaches excellence, so no single teacher stands out.

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324d **SOCRATES** ἔτι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστίν, ἢν ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί δήποτε οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοὺς αὑτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκουσιν ἃ διδασκάλων ἔχεται καὶ σοφοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἢν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοὶ οὐδενὸς βελτίους ποιοῦσιν. τούτου δὴ πέρι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι μῦθόν σοι ἐρῶ ἀλλὰ λόγον. ὧδε γὰρ ἐννόησον· πότερον ἔστιν τι ἓν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὗ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν, [324e] εἴπερ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ αὕτη λύεται ἡ ἀπορία ἣν σὺ ἀπορεῖς ἢ ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ.

SOCRATES There remains the puzzle you raise about good men: why on earth good men teach their own sons the other things that depend on teachers, and make them wise in those, yet in the excellence in which they themselves are good they make them no better than anyone else. On this point, Socrates, I'll no longer tell you a story but give you an argument. Consider it this way. Is there or is there not some one thing that all the citizens must share in, [324e] if there is to be a city at all? For the solution to this puzzle of yours lies here and nowhere else.

324e εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἓν οὐ τεκτονικὴ οὐδὲ χαλκεία οὐδὲ κεραμεία [325a] ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἓν αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν—εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν οὗ δεῖ πάντας μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα, ἐάν τι καὶ ἄλλο βούληται μανθάνειν ἢ πράττειν, οὕτω πράττειν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτου μή, ἢ τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ κολάζειν καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα, ἕωσπερ ἂν κολαζόμενος βελτίων γένηται, ὃς δ' ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος, ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα τοῦτον [325b] ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀποκτείνειν—εἰ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει, οὕτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες εἰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς υἱεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ μή, σκέψαι ὡς θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί.

Suppose there is such a thing, and this one thing isn't carpentry or smithing or pottery, [325a] but justice and moderation and being pious—what, taken all together, I call a man's excellence. Suppose this is what everyone must share in, and every man must act with it, whatever else he wants to learn or do, and never without it. Suppose that whoever doesn't share in it, child or man or woman, must be taught and punished until punishment makes him better, and that whoever doesn't respond to punishment and teaching must, as incurable, [325b] be expelled from cities or put to death. If that is how things are, and that is its nature, and yet good men teach their sons everything else but not this, consider how strange these good men turn out to be.

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	ὅτι μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀπεδείξαμεν· διδακτοῦ δὲ ὄντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς ὑεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία ἐὰν μὴ ἐπίστωνται, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ ἥ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ φυγαὶ μὴ μαθοῦσι [325c] μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς ἀρετήν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν συλλήβδην τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὗπερ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ νουθετοῦσιν.	We've shown that they think it can be taught, both privately and publicly. It can be taught and cultivated, then. Do they really teach their sons the other things, where the penalty for not knowing them isn't death, while in the one case where the penalty for their children, if they aren't taught and cultivated toward excellence, is death and exile, [325c] and on top of death the confiscation of property and, in a word, the ruin of their households—this they don't teach them, or take every possible care over? Surely we must think they do, Socrates. They begin when the children are small, and as long as they live they teach them and take them to task.
325c	ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς [325d] ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε μὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς.	As soon as a child understands what's said to him, nurse and mother and attendant and the father [325d] himself compete over this, to make the child as good as possible. At every word and deed they teach him and point out that this is just and that unjust, this fine and that shameful, this pious and that impious, and "Do this, don't do that." If he obeys willingly, well and good. If not, they straighten him out with threats and blows, like a piece of wood that is warped and bent.
325d	μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι [325e] εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδων ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως· οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν αὖ γράμματα μάθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα ὥσπερ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν [326a] ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις ἔνεισιν πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι.	After this they send them to teachers and tell them to care much more about [325e] the children's good conduct than about their letters and lyre playing. The teachers do take care of this, and when the children have learned their letters and are about to understand what's written, as earlier they understood speech, they set before them on the benches the poems of good poets to read and make them learn them by heart. [326a] These poems contain many admonitions and many tales, praises and eulogies of good men of old, so that the child will want to rival and imitate them and long to become like them.
326a	οἵ τ' αὖ κιθαρισταί, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσιν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ [326b] κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ [326c] οὔσῃ, καὶ μὴ	The lyre teachers, in the same way, take care of their moderation and see that the young do nothing wrong. Besides this, once the children have learned to play the lyre, the teachers teach them the poems of other good poets, the lyric poets, setting them [326b] to the music of the lyre, and they make the rhythms and harmonies at home in the children's souls, so that they become gentler and, with more rhythm and harmony in them, more capable in speech and action. For the whole of human life needs rhythm and harmony. And then on top of this they send them to a trainer, so that with

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ἀναγκάζωνται ἀποδειλιᾶν διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν.

better bodies they can serve minds that are already good, [326c] and won't be forced to turn coward through bodily weakness, in war or anywhere else.

326c καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι μάλιστα—μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι—καὶ οἱ τούτων ὑεῖς, πρῳαίτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, ὀψιαίτατα ἀπαλλάττονται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν, ἡ πόλις αὖ τούς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν κατὰ παράδειγμα, [326d] ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὑτῶν εἰκῇ πράττωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι οὕτω τὸ γραμματεῖον διδόασιν καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμμῶν, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὑρήματα, κατὰ τούτους ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, ὃς δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς βαίνῃ τούτων, κολάζει· καὶ ὄνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτῃ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν [326e] καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ, ὡς εὐθυνούσης τῆς δίκης, εὐθῦναι.

Those most able to do this do it most, and the most able are the richest. Their sons start going to school earliest in life and leave latest. When they've finished with their teachers, the city in turn makes them learn the laws and live by them as a pattern, [326d] so that they won't act at random on their own. It's exactly like writing teachers with children who can't yet write well: they trace lines with the stylus, then hand over the tablet and make them write following the guide lines. In the same way the city traces out laws, the inventions of good lawgivers of old, and makes people rule and be ruled by them, and whoever steps outside them it punishes. And the name for this punishment, both among you [326e] and in many other places, is "straightening," since justice straightens.[16]

326e τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας οὔσης περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, θαυμάζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή; ἀλλ' οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰ μὴ διδακτόν.

With so much care taken over excellence, privately and publicly, are you surprised, Socrates, and puzzled about whether excellence can be taught? You shouldn't be surprised at that. It would be far more surprising if it couldn't be taught.

διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ ὑεῖς φαῦλοι γίγνονται; τοῦτο αὖ μάθε· οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, [327a] τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὃ λέγω οὕτως ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως—ἐνθυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὁτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελόμενος.

Why, then, do many sons of good fathers turn out worthless? Learn this too. It's nothing surprising, if what I said earlier was true: that in this matter, [327a] excellence, no one may be a layman if there's to be a city at all. For if what I'm saying is so—and it is so, more than anything—pick any other pursuit or subject you like and think it through.

327a εἰ μὴ οἷόν τ' ἦν πόλιν εἶναι εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ ἦμεν ὁποῖός τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνει τούτου, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' [327b] ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων—λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ οἶμαι ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα—εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυμίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἴχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἷόν ἄν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς ὑεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων;

Suppose there could be no city unless we were all flute players, each as good as he could manage. And suppose everyone taught everyone else this, in private and in public, and scolded anyone who played badly, and nobody kept it to himself, just as now nobody keeps what is just and lawful to himself or [327b] hides it, the way people do with other skills. For our justice and excellence toward one another benefit us, I think. That's why everyone is eager to tell and teach everyone what is just and lawful. Well, if in flute playing too we were just as eager and ungrudging about teaching one another,

16 In Athens the "straightenings" (*euthynai*) were the audits every public official underwent at the end of his term of office.

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	would you think, Socrates, he said, that the sons of good flute players would be any more likely to become good flute players than the sons of poor ones?
327b οἶμαι μὲν οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ ὑὸς εὐφυέστατος γενόμενος εἰς αὔλησιν, οὗτος 327c ἂν ἐλλόγιμος ηὐξήθη, ὅτου δὲ ἀφυής, ἀκλεής· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ αὐλητοῦ φαῦλος ἂν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δ' ἂν φαύλου ἀγαθός· ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν αὐλήσεως ἐπαΐοντας. οὕτως οἶου καὶ νῦν, ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι 327d πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄγριοί τινες οἷοίπερ οὓς πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητὴς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ.	I don't think so. Rather, whoever happened to have a son with the greatest natural gift for flute playing, that son 327c would have grown up to be distinguished, and whoever had an ungifted son would have seen him stay obscure. Often a good flute player's son would have turned out poor, and often a poor one's son good. But at any rate they'd all have been competent flute players compared with laymen who know nothing about flute playing. In the same way, you must suppose now that the man who seems to you the most unjust of all those brought up among laws and human beings is just, a craftsman in this very thing, if he had to be judged 327d against people who had no education, no law courts, no laws, no compulsion of any kind forcing them at every turn to care about excellence, but were some sort of wild men like those the poet Pherecrates put on stage last year at the Lenaea.[17]
327d ἦ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσαις ἂν εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ Φρυνώνδᾳ, καὶ ἀνολοφύραι' ἂν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων 327e πονηρίαν. νῦν δὲ τρυφᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς καθ' ὅσον δύνανται ἕκαστος, καὶ οὐδείς σοι φαίνεται· εἶθ', ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος 328a τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φανείη, οὐδέ γ' ἂν οἶμαι εἰ ζητοῖς τίς ἂν ἡμῖν διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν υἱεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ' ὅσον οἷός τ' ἦν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων παντάπασι ῥᾴδιον, οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει 328b ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀγαπητόν.	Really, if you found yourself among people like that, like the man-haters in that play's chorus, you'd be delighted to run into Eurybatus and Phrynondas, and you'd wail with longing for the wickedness of people here. 327e As it is, you're spoiled, Socrates, because everyone is a teacher of excellence as far as each is able, and so none of them looks like one to you. It's as if you looked for someone who teaches 328a people to speak Greek: not a single one would turn up. Nor, I think, if you looked for someone who could teach the sons of craftsmen the very craft they've learned from their father, as far as their father and his friends in the same trade were able to teach it—who could take them any further? It wouldn't be easy, I think, Socrates, for a teacher of these to turn up, whereas for those with no experience at all it would be perfectly easy. So it is with excellence and with everything else. But if there's anyone even a little better than 328b the rest of us at helping people along toward excellence, we should be glad of him.[18]

17 Pherecrates was a comic poet; his play *The Wild Men* was staged at the Lenaea, an Athenian winter festival with dramatic competitions.

18 Eurybatus and Phrynondas were proverbial scoundrels.

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328b	ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἷς εἶναι, καὶ διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὀνῆσαί τινα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν πράττομαι καὶ ἔτι πλείονος, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποίημαι· ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὃ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον· 328c ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας ὅσου ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκε.	I think I'm one of these, and that I can help a person become fine and good better than anyone else, in a way that's worth the fee I charge and even more, so much so that the student himself thinks so. That's why I've set up my way of charging the way I have. When someone has studied with me, if he's willing, he pays the sum I charge; 328c if not, he goes to a temple, swears an oath to what he says the lessons were worth, and deposits that amount.
328c	τοιοῦτόν σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῦθον καὶ λόγον εἴρηκα, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως ἡγοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φαύλους υἱεῖς γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων ἀγαθούς, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ Πολυκλείτου υἱεῖς, Παράλου καὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦδε ἡλικιῶται, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰσίν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων δημιουργῶν. τῶνδε δὲ 328d οὔπω ἄξιον τοῦτο κατηγορεῖν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν ἐλπίδες· νέοι γάρ.	That, Socrates, he said, is the story and the argument I've given you, to show that excellence can be taught and that the Athenians think so, and that it's no wonder good fathers have worthless sons and worthless fathers good ones. After all, the sons of Polyclitus, who are the same age as Paralus and Xanthippus here, are nothing compared to their father, and the same goes for the sons of other craftsmen. But it's 328d not yet fair to make this charge against these two: there's still hope for them, since they're young.

IS EXCELLENCE ONE OR MANY?

Socrates asks whether justice, moderation, piety, wisdom and courage are parts of one thing or names for it.

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328d	**SOCRATES** Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον κεκηλημένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι, ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἠσθόμην ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πεπαυμένος εἴη, μόγις πως ἐμαυτὸν ὡσπερεὶ συναγείρας εἶπον, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Ἱπποκράτη· ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου, ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προύτρεψάς με ὧδε ἀφικέσθαι· πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι 328e ἀκηκοέναι ἃ ἀκήκοα Πρωταγόρου. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ᾗ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται· νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρόν τί μοι ἐμποδών, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥᾳδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξεν.	**SOCRATES** Protagoras, having put on a display of this length and this kind, stopped speaking. And I, spellbound, went on looking at him for a long time, as if he were going to say something more, eager to hear it. But when I realized that he really had finished, I somehow just managed to gather myself together, and I said, looking at Hippocrates: Son of Apollodorus, how grateful I am to you for urging me to come here! It means a great deal to me 328e to have heard what I've heard from Protagoras. Until now I used to think there was no human care by which good people become good; but now I'm persuaded. Except that one small thing stands in my way, which Protagoras will obviously clear up for me with ease, since he's cleared up so much already.
328e	καὶ γὰρ εἰ μέν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων συγγένοιτο ὁτῳοῦν τῶν 329a δημηγόρων, τάχ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό τινά τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει ἐὰν μὴ	For if you were to meet any of the 329a popular orators about these same matters, you might well hear speeches like this from Pericles or someone else who's good at speaking. But if you ask one of them a further question, they're like books: they have nothing to answer and can't ask anything themselves. If you question even some small point

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ἐπιλάβηταί τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω, σμικρὰ [329b] ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἃ ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε.

of what's been said, then just as bronze vessels, once struck, go on ringing for a long time unless someone puts a hand on them, so it is with the orators: asked [329b] a small question, they stretch out a speech as long as a distance race. But Protagoras here is able to give long, fine speeches, as the present one shows, and he's also able, when questioned, to answer briefly, and when he asks, to wait and take in the answer, a combination few are equipped with. So now, Protagoras, I'm short of only one small thing to have it all, if you'd answer me this.

329b τὴν ἀρετὴν φῂς διδακτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι· [329c] ὃ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ πέμψειε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὖ πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἕν τι εἴη συλλήβδην, ἀρετή· ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτὰ δίελθέ μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἓν μέν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ [329d] ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ.

You say that excellence can be taught, and if I'd believe any human being, I believe you. [329c] But there's one thing that surprised me while you were speaking: fill in that gap in my soul. You said that Zeus sent justice and shame to human beings; and then again, at many points in your speech, you spoke of justice and moderation and piety and all the rest as if, taken together, they were one thing, excellence. So go through this for me precisely, in argument: is excellence one thing, and justice, moderation and piety parts of it, or are the things I just [329d] listed all names of one and the same thing? That's what I still want to know.

329d ἀλλὰ ῥᾴδιον τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἑνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστιν ἃ ἐρωτᾷς.—πότερον, ἔφην, ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά ἐστιν, στόμα τε καὶ ῥὶς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἢ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι;—ἐκείνως μοι φαίνεται, ὦ [329e] Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον.—πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀνάγκη, ἐάνπερ τις ἓν λάβῃ, ἅπαντα ἔχειν;—οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, ἄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὖ, σοφοὶ δὲ οὔ.— ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια [330a] τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία;—πάντων μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη· καὶ μέγιστόν γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων.—ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο;—ναί.—ἦ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει;

Well, that's easy to answer, Socrates, he said: excellence is one thing, and the things you're asking about are parts of it.—Parts, I said, the way the parts of a face are parts, mouth and nose and eyes and ears? Or the way the parts of gold don't differ at all from one another, either from each other or from the whole, except in size?—The first way, it seems to me, [329e] Socrates: the way the parts of the face are related to the whole face.—Then do people also get a share of these parts of excellence some one part and some another, I said, or must anyone who gets one have them all?—Not at all, he said, since many people are brave but unjust, or just but not wise.—So these are parts [330a] of excellence too, I said, wisdom and courage?—Most certainly, he said; and wisdom is the greatest of the parts.—And each of them, I said, is something different from the others?—Yes.—And does each of them also have its own power?

330a ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμὸς οἷον τὰ ὦτα, οὐδ' ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τἆλλα· ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ [330b] ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις

Take the parts of the face: an eye isn't like the ears, and its power isn't the same either; nor is any of the others like another, whether in its power or in anything else. Is it the same, then, with the parts

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αὐτοῦ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ τῷ παραδείγματί γε ἔοικε;—ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.—καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἷον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ' οἷον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδ' οἷον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ' οἷον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ' οἷον ὁσιότης.—οὐκ ἔφη.—φέρε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε· 330c ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα;

330c ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί;—κἀμοί, ἔφη.—τί οὖν; εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· "ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἴπετον δή μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδικον;" ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίν' ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο;

τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην;—τὴν αὐτήν, ἔφη.—ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ 330d ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ;—ναί, ἔφη.—εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· "οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι;" φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.—ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.—"οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμά τι εἶναι;" φαῖμεν ἄν· ἢ οὔ;—καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη.—"πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμά φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὅσιον;" ἀγανακτήσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἴποιμ' ἄν· εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῇ μεντἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή 330e γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

330e εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς· "πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἆρ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον·" εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἤκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἴει εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρήκουσας· Πρωταγόρας γὰρ 331a ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἴποι· "ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῂς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν;" τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιο; —ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογεῖν.

331a τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· "οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁσιότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὅσιον ἀλλ' οἷον μὴ ὅσιον· ἡ δ' ὁσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον,

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of excellence, that none is like 330b another, either in itself or in its power? Isn't it clear that it must be so, if it matches the example?—Well, it is so, Socrates, he said.—And I said: Then no part of excellence is like another: none is like knowledge, none like justice, none like courage, none like moderation, none like piety.—No, he said.—Come on, then, I said, let's look together at what sort of thing each of them is. First, this: 330c is justice some thing, or no thing at all?

I think it is something; what about you?—So do I, he said.—Well, then: suppose someone asked you and me, "Protagoras and Socrates, tell me: this thing you named just now, justice—is it itself just, or unjust?" I'd answer him that it's just. How would you cast your vote?

The same vote as mine, or a different one?—The same, he said.—Then justice is the sort of thing that is just: that's what I'd say in answer to the 330d questioner. Wouldn't you too?—Yes, he said.—Suppose he asked us next, "Don't you also say there's such a thing as piety?" We'd say yes, I think.—Yes, he said.—"And don't you say that this too is some thing?" We'd say so, wouldn't we?—He agreed to this too.—"And do you say this very thing is by nature the sort of thing that is impious, or the sort that is pious?" I'd be annoyed at the question, I said, and I'd say: Watch your tongue, man! Hardly anything else could be pious, if piety 330e itself isn't going to be pious. What about you? Wouldn't you answer that way?—Certainly, he said.

Now suppose he then went on to ask us, "Then what were you saying a little while ago? Didn't I hear you right? You seemed to me to say that the parts of excellence are related to one another in such a way that none of them is like another." I'd say that he heard the rest right, but if he thinks I said this too, he misheard: Protagoras 331a here gave those answers; I was asking the questions. Then if he said, "Is this man telling the truth, Protagoras? Is it you who say that no part of excellence is like another? Is this claim yours?" what would you answer him?—I'd have to agree, Socrates, he said.

Then what shall we answer him, Protagoras, having agreed to this, if he asks us further, "So piety isn't the sort of thing that is just, and justice isn't the sort that is pious, but the sort that isn't pious;

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ἀλλ’ ἄδικον [331b] ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον;” τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον· καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἴ με ἐᾷς, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην, ὅτι ἤτοι ταὐτόν γ’ ἐστιν δικαιότης ὁσιότητι ἢ ὅτι ὁμοιότατον, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσιότης καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης οἷον δικαιοσύνη.	and piety is the sort that isn’t just, but unjust [331b] after all, and justice impious?” What shall we answer him? For my part, speaking for myself, I’d say both that justice is pious and that piety is just; and on your behalf too, if you’d let me, I’d give this same answer: that justice is either the same thing as piety or as close to it as can be, and above all that justice is like piety and piety like justice.
331b ἀλλ’ ὅρα εἰ διακωλύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτως.—οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἁπλοῦν [331c] εἶναι, ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι τήν τε δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὁσιότης δίκαιον.—μή μοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ “εἰ βούλει” τοῦτο καὶ “εἴ σοι δοκεῖ” ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δ’ “ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ” τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστ’ [331d] ἂν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ “εἰ” ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ.—ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δ’ ὅς, προσέοικέν τι δικαιοσύνη ὁσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὁτῳοῦν ἀμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν.	But see whether you forbid me to answer this way, or whether you agree with it too.—It doesn’t seem to me quite so simple, Socrates, he said, [331c] that I should concede that justice is pious and piety just. There seems to me to be some difference in it. But what does it matter? he said. If you like, let justice be pious for us, and piety just.—Don’t give me that, I said. I’ve no need to test this “if you like” and “if you think so,” but you and me. And I say “you and me” because I think the argument would be best tested [331d] if you took the “if” out of it.—Well, all the same, he said, justice does resemble piety somewhat. After all, anything resembles anything else in some way or other.
331d τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπῃ προσέοικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἃ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἀμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν καὶ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον. ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ [331e] κἂν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις.	White resembles black in some respect, and hard resembles soft, and so with the other things that seem most opposed to each other. And the things we said earlier have different powers and aren’t like one another, the parts of the face—these too resemble each other in some way or other, and are like one another. So in this way [331e] you could prove, if you wanted, that even these are all similar to one another.
331e ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὰ ὅμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὅμοιον.—καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν· ἦ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει, ὥστε ὅμοιόν τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις;— οὐ πάνυ, [332a] ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι.—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα.	But it isn’t right to call things similar because they have some point of similarity, or dissimilar because they have some point of dissimilarity, when the similarity is very small.—And I was surprised, and said to him: Is that really how the just and the pious stand to each other in your view, that they have only some small similarity?—Not quite [332a] that, he said, but not as you seem to me to think, either.—Well then, I said, since you seem to me to find this awkward, let’s drop it and look at another of the things you said.
332a ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς;—ἔφη.—τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία;—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.—πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἄνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ εἰ τοὐναντίον ἔπραττον;—σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν [332b] σωφροσύνῃ σωφρονοῦσιν;—ἀνάγκη.—οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ	Is there something you call folly?—He said there was.—Isn’t wisdom the complete opposite of this thing?—I think so, he said.—And when people act rightly and beneficially, do they seem to you to be showing moderation in acting that way, or if they acted the opposite way?—Moderation, he said.—So [332b] it’s by moderation that they show moderation?

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σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες;—συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.—τοὐναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως;—ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνῃ πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνῃ;—ὡμολόγει.—οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς;—ἐδόκει.—καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος, 332c βραδέως;—ἔφη.—καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου;—συνέφη.—φέρε δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν;—συνεχώρει.—τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν;—οὐκ ἔστιν.—τί δέ;

332c ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν;—ἔστιν.—τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν;—οὐκ ἔστιν.—τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῇ;—ἔφη.—τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ;—οὐκ ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἓν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;—συνωμολόγει. 332d

332d ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή;—ὡμολογήκαμεν.—τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι;—ἔφη.—ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ;—ἔφη.—τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; 332e —συνεχώρει.—οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτ' ἄν;—ναί.—πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;—ναί.—ἐναντίως;—πάνυ γε.—οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων;—ναί.—ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης;—φαίνεται.—μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφίᾳ ἐναντίον εἶναι;—συνωμολόγει.— ἓν δὲ ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον 333a εἶναι;—φημί.—πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων;

333a τὸ ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἑκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ συνᾴδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γὰρ ἂν συνᾴδοιεν, εἴπερ

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—Necessarily.—And those who don't act rightly act foolishly, and don't show moderation in acting that way?—I agree, he said.—So acting foolishly is the opposite of acting with moderation?—He said so.—And what's done foolishly is done with folly, and what's done with moderation is done with moderation?—He agreed.—And if anything is done with strength, it's done strongly, and if with weakness, weakly?—He thought so.—And if with speed, quickly, and if with slowness, 332c slowly?—He said so.—And whatever is done in the same way is done by the same thing, and whatever is done in the opposite way, by the opposite?—He agreed.—Come on, then, I said: is there such a thing as the beautiful?—He granted it.—Does it have any opposite except the ugly?—No.—Well then?

Is there such a thing as the good?—There is.—Does it have any opposite except the bad?—No.—Well then: is there such a thing as high pitch in the voice?—He said there was.—And it has no opposite other than low pitch?—He said no.—So, I said, each single one of the opposites has only one opposite, not many?—He agreed. 332d

Come on, then, I said, let's add up what we've agreed. Have we agreed that one thing has only one opposite, not more?—We have.—And that what is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?—He said so.—And we've agreed that what is done foolishly is done in the opposite way to what is done with moderation?—He said so.—And that what is done with moderation is done by moderation, and what is done foolishly by folly?— 332e He granted it.—Then if they're done in opposite ways, they'd be done by opposites?—Yes.—And one is done by moderation, the other by folly?—Yes.—In opposite ways?—Certainly.—So by things that are opposites?—Yes.—So folly is the opposite of moderation?—Apparently.—Now, do you remember that earlier we agreed that folly is the opposite of wisdom?—He agreed.—And that one thing has only one 333a opposite?—I do.—Then which of our statements shall we give up, Protagoras?

That one thing has only one opposite? Or the one where it was said that wisdom is different from moderation, each being a part of excellence, and that besides being different they're dissimilar, both in themselves and in their powers, like the parts of the face? Which, then, shall we give up?

GREEK

γε ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ [333b] μὲν ἓν μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείοσιν δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνῃ ἑνὶ ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὖ φαίνεται· ἦ γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως;—ὡμολόγησεν καὶ μάλ' ἀκόντως.—οὐκοῦν ἓν ἂν εἴη ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν ὄν.

333b ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. ἆρά τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν [333c] ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ;—αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοί γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.—πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ;—εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν.—ἀλλ' οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἴτ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα εἴτε μή· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι. [333d]

333d τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας—τὸν γὰρ λόγον ᾐτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι—ἔπειτα μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.—ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες;—ἔστω, ἔφη.—τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν;—ἔφη.—τὸ δ' εὖ φρονεῖν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν;—ἔστω, ἔφη.—πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς;—εἰ εὖ.—λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἄττα εἶναι;—λέγω.—ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἃ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; [333e] —καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, κἂν μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὠφέλιμα ᾖ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά.—καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἑώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος ἠρέμα ἠρόμην.

333e πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ [334a] Πρωταγόρα, ἃ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἃ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὠφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς;—οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἃ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστι, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ

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These two statements together don't sound very musical: they aren't in tune and don't harmonize with each other. And how could they be in tune, if one thing [333b] must have only one opposite and no more, while folly, which is one thing, plainly has both wisdom and moderation as its opposites? Isn't that so, Protagoras, I said, or is it somehow otherwise?—He agreed, and very reluctantly.—Then moderation and wisdom would be one thing? And earlier, again, justice and piety turned out to be pretty much the same.

Come on, Protagoras, I said, let's not tire, but examine the rest too. Does a person who does wrong [333c] seem to you to be showing moderation, in that he does wrong?—I'd be ashamed to agree to that, Socrates, he said, though many people do say so.—Then shall I address my argument to them, I said, or to you?—If you like, he said, argue first against this view, the view of the many.—It makes no difference to me, as long as you're the one who answers, whether or not you hold these views yourself. It's the argument above all that I'm examining; but it may well turn out that I, the one asking, and the one answering are examined too. [333d]

At first Protagoras played hard to get with us—he complained that the argument was an awkward one—but then he agreed to answer.—Come on, then, I said, answer me from the beginning. Do some people seem to you to show moderation while doing wrong?—Let's say so, he said.—And by showing moderation you mean being sensible?—He said so.—And being sensible means deliberating well in doing wrong?—Let's say so, he said.—Is that, I said, if they do well by doing wrong, or if they do badly?—If they do well.—So you say there are things that are good?—I do.—Well then, I said, are good things those that are beneficial to human beings?— [333e] Yes, by Zeus, he said, and even things that aren't beneficial to human beings I call good.—And it seemed to me that Protagoras was by now getting prickly and agitated and drawn up in battle order against answering. So when I saw him in that state, I was careful, and asked gently.

Do you mean, Protagoras, I said, [334a] things that aren't beneficial to any human being, or things that aren't beneficial at all? Do you call things like that good?—Not at all, he said. But I know many things that are of no benefit to human beings—

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δέ γε ὠφέλιμα· τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ· τὰ δὲ βουσὶν μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσίν· τὰ δέ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδενί, δένδροις δέ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθά, ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις πονηρά, οἷον καὶ ἡ κόπρος πάντων [334b] τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλῶνας ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασίν ἐστιν πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς θριξὶν πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων πλὴν ταῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρωγὸν καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι.

334b οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ [334c] σώματος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐντὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἔδεσθαι, ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένην ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις.

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foods and drinks and drugs and countless other things—and others that are beneficial; some that are neither to humans, but are to horses; some only to cattle, some to dogs; some to none of these, but to trees; and some that are good for a tree's roots but bad for its shoots. Manure, for instance, is good for all [334b] plants when put around the roots, but if you were to pile it on the shoots and young branches, it ruins everything. Olive oil, too, is thoroughly bad for all plants and the worst enemy of the hair of every animal except human beings, while for human hair and the rest of the human body it's a help.

So varied and many-sided a thing is the good that even here the same thing is good for the outside of a person's [334c] body and very bad for the inside. That's why all doctors forbid the sick to use olive oil, except the very smallest amount in what they're going to eat, just enough to take away the unpleasantness the nose senses in food and dishes.

LONG SPEECHES OR SHORT ANSWERS

Socrates threatens to leave, and the company argues over how the discussion should go on.

GREEK

334c **SOCRATES** εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, [334d] ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὤν, ᾧου ἂν χρῆναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μεῖζον φθέγγεσθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἕπεσθαι.

πῶς οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἢ βραχύτερά σοι, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἢ δεῖ;

μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

334d ἀλλ' ὅσα δεῖ; ἔφη. [334e]

ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαῦτά σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί;

ἀκήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι σὺ οἷός τ' εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, οὕτως ὥστε τὸν λόγον μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ

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SOCRATES When he'd said this, the audience broke into loud applause at how well he'd spoken, and I said: Protagoras, I happen to be a forgetful sort of person, and if someone speaks at length to me, [334d] I forget what the discussion is about. So just as, if I happened to be hard of hearing, you'd think that if you were going to talk with me you'd have to speak louder than you do to other people, so now too, since you've run into a forgetful man, cut your answers down for me and make them shorter, if I'm going to follow you.

How do you mean, answer briefly? Am I to give you answers shorter than they need to be? he said.

Certainly not, I said.

As long as they need to be, then? he said. [334e]

Yes, I said.

Then am I to give you answers as long as I think they need to be, or as long as you think?

Well, I've heard, I said, that you're able yourself, and able to teach others, to speak on the same subjects at length, if you like, so that your speech nev-

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βραχέα [335a] οὕτως ὥστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις εἰπεῖν· εἰ οὖν μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ πρός με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ.	er runs dry, and again briefly, [335a] so that nobody could say it in fewer words than you. So if you're going to talk with me, use the second manner with me: short answers.
335a ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοῖς ἤδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἐποίουν ὃ σὺ κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευέν με διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὐδενὸς ἂν βελτίων ἐφαινόμην οὐδ' ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.	Socrates, he said, I've entered contests of argument with a great many people by now, and if I'd done what you're telling me to do and talked the way my opponent told me to talk, I'd have looked no better than anyone, and the name of Protagoras would never have become known among the Greeks.
καὶ ἐγώ—ἔγνων γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ταῖς [335b] ἀποκρίσεσιν ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθελήσοι ἑκὼν εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι—ἡγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἀλλά τοι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐδ' ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τὰ σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν σὺ βούλῃ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, τότε σοι διαλέξομαι. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φῂς δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ οἷός τ' εἶ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι [335c] —σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ—ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τ' εἶναι.	And I—for I could see that he wasn't pleased with himself over his [335b] earlier answers, and that he wouldn't willingly carry on the discussion as the one answering—thought it was no longer my business to stay at the gathering, and said: Well, Protagoras, I'm not keen either on our meeting going on against your wishes. When you're willing to talk in a way I can follow, then I'll talk with you. You, as people say of you and as you say yourself, can hold a discussion either with long speeches or with short answers— [335c] you're wise, after all—while I'm incapable of these long ones, though I wish I could manage them.
335c ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα ἡ συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' εἴην σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους—ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με δεῖ—εἶμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον.	But you, who can do both, ought to have made allowances for us, so that the conversation could happen. As it is, since you're not willing, and I'm busy and couldn't stay while you stretch out long speeches—there's somewhere I have to go—I'll be off. Though I'd probably have quite enjoyed hearing these from you too.
καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καί μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ, [335d] τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος τουτουΐ, καὶ εἶπεν· οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὸς ἥδιον ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν.	And as I said this I got up to leave. As I was getting up, Callias took hold of my hand with his right hand, [335d] and with his left he grabbed this cloak of mine, and said: We won't let you go, Socrates. If you leave, our discussions won't be the same. So I beg you to stay with us. There's nothing I'd rather hear than you and Protagoras in discussion. Do us all this favor.
335d καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον—ἤδη δὲ ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιών—ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου, ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, ἀτὰρ [335e] καὶ νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὥστε βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαί σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο· νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἱμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἕπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῳ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἕπεσθαι, [336a] εἴποιμι ἄν σοι ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θέουσιν τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖν,	And I said—I'd already stood up to go—Son of Hipponicus, I've always admired your love of wisdom, and [335e] I praise and love it now as well, so I'd like to do you a favor, if you asked me for something I could do. But as it is, it's as if you asked me to keep up with Crison of Himera, the runner, in his prime, or to race and keep pace with one of the long-distance runners or the all-day couriers. [336a]

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	ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι δέῃ θεάσασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας, τούτου δέου συγκαθεῖναι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως.	I'd tell you that I want to keep up with them as they run far more than you want me to, but I just can't. If you want to see Crison and me running together, ask him to come down to my pace: I can't run fast, but he can run slowly.[19]
336a	εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· 336b εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγ' ᾠμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναί τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν.	So if you're eager to hear Protagoras and me, ask him to answer now the way he answered me at first, briefly and to the actual question. 336b Otherwise, what sort of discussion will it be? I always thought that being together in conversation was one thing and making public speeches another.
336b	ἀλλ'—ὁρᾷς; —ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν αὐτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται, καὶ σὺ ὅπως ἂν αὖ σὺ βούλῃ.	But—you see?—he said, Socrates, Protagoras seems to have a fair point in thinking he should be allowed to talk the way he wants, and you the way you want.
	ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Καλλία· Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναί οἱ μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι 336c οἷός τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἴ τῳ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεχθῆναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ' ἑκάστῃ ἐρωτήσει μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων 336d διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀπομηκύνων ἕως ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων· ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καί φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν· χρὴ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι.	Then Alcibiades broke in: That's not right, Callias, he said. Socrates here admits he's no hand at long speeches and concedes that to Protagoras; but when it comes to being able to converse 336c and knowing how to give and receive an argument, I'd be amazed if he concedes it to anyone alive. So if Protagoras, too, admits he's worse at conversation than Socrates, that's enough for Socrates. But if he lays claim to it, let him converse by asking and answering, not stretching out a long speech in reply to every question, fending off the arguments and refusing 336d to give an account, dragging it out until most of the audience has forgotten what the question was. Though I guarantee that Socrates won't forget, never mind his joking and saying he's forgetful. So it seems to me Socrates is being more reasonable. Each of us ought to state his own view.
336d	μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπών· ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἱππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα πρὸς 336e Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὁρμήσῃ· ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλῦσαι τὴν συνουσίαν. 337a	After Alcibiades, I think, it was Critias who spoke: Prodicus and Hippias, Callias seems to me to be very much 336e on Protagoras' side, and Alcibiades always has to win whatever he throws himself into. But we have no need to join the fight on either side, Socrates' or Protagoras', but should jointly ask both of them not to break up the gathering halfway through. 337a
337a	εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρόδικος, καλῶς μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία· χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή—ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ ταὐτόν· κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ	When he'd said this, Prodicus said: You seem to me to speak well, Critias. Those who attend discussions of this kind ought to be impartial listeners to both speakers, but not equal ones—for that is not the same thing. One must listen to both im-

19 Crison of Himera was a celebrated sprinter, three times Olympic champion in the mid-fifth century BC.

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νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον.

ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μέν, [337b] ἐρίζειν δὲ μή—ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὔνοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις—καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἡ συνουσία γίγνοιτο· ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε—εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γάρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων— [337c] ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεσθα—εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἥδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἡδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι.

ENGLISH

partially, but not give an equal share to each: more to the wiser, less to the more ignorant.

For my part, Protagoras and Socrates, I too think you should give way to each other and dispute about the arguments, but [337b] not wrangle—for friends dispute with friends even out of goodwill, whereas it is opponents and enemies who wrangle with one another. In that way our gathering would be at its finest. You who speak would in that way most win the esteem of us listeners, rather than their praise—for esteem resides in the souls of the listeners, without deceit, while praise is often found in the words of people who lie against their own opinion. [337c] And we who listen would in that way most be gladdened, rather than pleased—for being gladdened belongs to one who learns something and gains understanding with the mind itself, while being pleased belongs to one who eats something or has some other pleasant experience with the body itself.

337c ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο· μετὰ δὲ τὸν Πρόδικον Ἱππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι — [337d] φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται—ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ [337e] ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήνασθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.

When Prodicus had said this, a great many of those present approved. After Prodicus, Hippias the wise spoke. Gentlemen, he said, all of you here present, I regard you all as kinsmen, family and fellow citizens— [337d] by nature, not by convention. For like is by nature akin to like, but convention, a tyrant over human beings, forces many things against nature. So it would be shameful for us, who know the nature of things, who are the wisest of the Greeks, and who for this very reason have now come together from all Greece into the very council hall of wisdom, and into the greatest and most prosperous house of this city itself, to show nothing worthy of [337e] this standing, and instead to quarrel with one another like the lowest of men.

337e ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων [338a] εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, εἰ μὴ ἡδὺ Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρίᾳ ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. ὡς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν ἑλέσθαι ὃς ὑμῖν [338b] φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἑκατέρου.

So I beg and advise you, Protagoras and Socrates, to come to terms, with us as arbitrators bringing you together [338a] in the middle. You shouldn't insist on this precise style of discussion, the excessively brief one, if Protagoras doesn't like it, but let go and give the reins of the argument some slack, so that it may appear grander and more graceful to us. Nor should Protagoras, for his part, let out every rope and, running before the wind, flee into the open sea of words, leaving the land out of sight. Both of you should cut a middle course. So do that, and take my advice: choose an umpire, a

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chairman, a presiding officer, who [338b] will keep each of your speeches to a reasonable length.

338b ταῦτα ἤρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπῄνεσαν, καὶ ἐμέ τε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν καὶ ἑλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην. εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἴη βραβευτὴν ἑλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἱρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἴτε ὅμοιος, οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ ὅμοιος ἡμῖν ὅμοια καὶ ποιήσει, ὥστε ἐκ [338c] περιττοῦ ἡρήσεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἱρήσεσθε. τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἑλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαύλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἱρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει.

This pleased those present and everyone approved; Callias said he wouldn't let me go, and they asked me to choose a chairman. So I said it would be shameful to choose a referee for a discussion. If the one chosen is worse than we are, it wouldn't be right for the worse to preside over the better; and if he's our equal, that wouldn't be right either, since someone like us will do the same as we would, so that [338c] choosing him will have been pointless. But then you'll choose someone better than us. In truth, I think, you can't possibly choose anyone wiser than Protagoras here; and if you choose someone who is no better but say that he is, this too is an insult to him, as if you were choosing a chairman for some nobody—since as far as I'm concerned it makes no difference.

338c ἀλλ' οὑτωσὶ ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵν' ὃ προθυμεῖσθε συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωνται· εἰ μὴ βούλεται [338d] Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι ὡς ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὁπόσ' ἂν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ ἅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν· [338e] καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου ἕνεκα ἕνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι· καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, ὅμως δὲ ἠναγκάσθη ὁμολογῆσαι ἐρωτήσειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἱκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος.

But here's what I'm willing to do, so that the gathering and discussion you're eager for can go ahead. If Protagoras doesn't want [338d] to answer, let him ask the questions and I'll answer, and at the same time I'll try to show him how I say the one answering ought to answer. And when I've answered as many questions as he wants to ask, let him in turn submit to giving an account to me in the same way. Then if he doesn't seem willing to answer the actual question asked, you and I together will beg him, as you begged me, not to ruin the gathering. [338e] There's no need for a single chairman for this: you'll all preside together. Everyone agreed that this was what we should do. Protagoras was quite unwilling, but all the same he was forced to agree to ask questions and, when he'd asked enough, to give an account in his turn, answering briefly.

SIMONIDES' POEM

Protagoras claims a poem by Simonides contradicts itself, and Socrates offers his own reading.

GREEK

ENGLISH

338e **SOCRATES** ἤρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὑτωσί πως· —ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν [339a] δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἃ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν περὶ οὗπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν

SOCRATES So he began asking roughly like this. I think, Socrates, he said, that the greatest part of a man's education is being clever [339a] about poetry. That means being able to understand what the poets say, which parts are composed correctly and which aren't, and knowing how to analyze them and give an account when questioned. And now

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δ' εἰς ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ που Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν τὸν Κρέοντος ὑὸν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ ὅτι— [339b] ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον. τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ᾆσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω;	the question will be about the same thing you and I are discussing now, excellence, only transferred to poetry; that's the only difference. Simonides says somewhere to Scopas, the son of Creon the Thessalian, that [339b] "for a man to become truly good is, on the one hand, hard, foursquare in hands and feet and mind, fashioned without fault." Do you know this song, or shall I go through the whole of it for you?[20]
339b	καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.	And I said there was no need: I know it, and I happen to have given the song a good deal of attention.
	εὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὔ;—πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς.—δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ ποιητής;—οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—ὅρα δή, ἔφη, [339c] βέλτιον.—ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, ἔσκεμμαι ἱκανῶς.—οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προιόντος τοῦ ᾄσματος λέγει που—οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.	Good, he said. Then do you think it's been composed well and correctly, or not?—Very well and correctly, I said.—And do you think it's well composed if the poet contradicts himself?—Not well, I said.—Then look at it [339c] more closely, he said.—But, my good man, I've examined it enough.—Then you know, he said, that as the song goes on he says somewhere: "Nor does the saying of Pittacus ring right to me, though spoken by a wise man: hard, he said, it is to be good."[21]
339c	ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κἀκεῖνα τὰ ἔμπροσθεν;—οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι;—φαίνεταί μοιγε (καὶ ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τὶ λέγοι) ἀτάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται;—πῶς γὰρ ἂν [339d] φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων, ὅς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀλαθείᾳ, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τοῦτον μέμφεταί τε καὶ οὔ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος; καίτοι ὁπότε τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα αὑτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἤτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει.	You realize that it's the same man who says both this and the earlier lines?—I know, I said.—Then do you think, he said, that these agree with those?—They seem to me to (though at the same time I was afraid he had a point). But, I said, don't they seem so to you?—How could [339d] a man who says both these things seem to agree with himself? First he himself laid down that it's hard for a man to become truly good, and then, going a little further on in the poem, he's forgotten, and he blames Pittacus, who says the same thing as he does, that it is hard to be good, and says he won't accept it from him, though he's saying the same as himself. Yet when he blames someone for saying the same as himself, he obviously blames himself too, so that either the first statement or the later one is wrong.
339d	εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον [339e] τῶν ἀκουόντων· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων· ἔπειτα—ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τἀληθῆ, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής—τρέπομαι πρὸς	When he said this, it drew loud applause and praise from many [339e] of the listeners. And at first, as if I'd been hit by a good boxer, everything went dark and my head spun at his words and the others' applause. Then—to tell you the truth, so as to win some time to think about what the poet meant

20 Simonides of Ceos (c. 556–468 BC) was a lyric poet; Scopas was a ruling noble of Thessaly. The poem survives only through this passage.
21 Pittacus of Mytilene on Lesbos (c. 640–568 BC) was a statesman counted among the Seven Sages.

GREEK

τὸν Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· 340a δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνδρί. δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ· ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα—φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ σχῶμεν, ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ.

340a καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ᾗ τό τε βούλεσθαι καὶ 340b ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸν ὄν, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν σκόπει εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταὐτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο;—ἄλλο νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.—οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα 340c ἀγαθὸν ἀληθείᾳ γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἴη;—ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.—τὸν δέ γε Πιττακόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέμφεται, οὐχ ὡς οἴεται Πρωταγόρας, ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο.

340c οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακὸς ἔλεγεν τὸ χαλεπόν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι· ἔστιν δὲ οὐ ταὐτόν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ὥς φησιν Πρόδικος ὅδε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν τὸ εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης αὐτὸς αὑτῷ. καὶ ἴσως ἂν 340d φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καθ' Ἡσίοδον γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν εἶναι—τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν τοὺς θεοὺς ἱδρῶτα θεῖναι—ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δὴπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

340d ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπῄνεσέν με· ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας, τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μεῖζον ἁμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὃ ἐπανορθοῖς.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ 340e Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός· ἰώμενος μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ.

ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.

πῶς δή; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

πολλὴ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία εἴη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν τί φησιν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὅ ἐστιν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς ἅπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις.

ENGLISH

—I turn to Prodicus and, calling on him, Prodicus, I said, Simonides is your fellow citizen, you know: 340a it's only right for you to come to the man's rescue. So I think I'll call on you, the way Homer says Scamander, besieged by Achilles, called on Simois, saying, "Dear brother, let us both together hold back this man's might." I too call on you, so that Protagoras doesn't sack our Simonides.[22]

For, indeed, the defense of Simonides needs that artistry of yours by which you distinguish wishing and 340b desiring as not the same thing, along with all those fine distinctions you drew just now. So now see whether you agree with me. For it doesn't seem to me that Simonides contradicts himself. You, Prodicus, give your opinion first: do you think becoming and being are the same thing, or different?—Different, by Zeus, said Prodicus.—Now, I said, in the first lines Simonides declared his own opinion, that it's hard for a man 340c to become truly good?—That's true, said Prodicus.—But Pittacus, I said, he blames not, as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing as himself, but for saying something different.

Pittacus didn't say that the hard thing was to become good, as Simonides did, but to be good. And being and becoming, Protagoras, are not the same thing, as Prodicus here says. And if being isn't the same as becoming, Simonides doesn't contradict himself. And perhaps 340d Prodicus here and many others would say, with Hesiod, that it's hard to become good—for the gods have set sweat before excellence—but when one reaches its summit, then it is easy to possess, hard though it is.

When Prodicus heard this he praised me. But Protagoras said: Your correction, Socrates, contains a bigger mistake than the one you're correcting.

And I said: Then I've done harm, it seems, 340e Protagoras, and I'm a ridiculous sort of doctor: by treating the illness I make it worse.

Well, that's how it is, he said.

How so? I said.

It would be great ignorance on the poet's part, he said, if he says that possessing excellence is such a trivial thing, when it's the hardest thing of all, as everyone thinks.

22 Prodicus, like Simonides, came from the island of Ceos. In the *Iliad* (Book 21) the river Scamander calls on his brother river Simois for help against Achilles.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
340e	καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· νὴ τὸν Δία, εἰς καιρόν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος ὅδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ [341a] Πρωταγόρα, ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἤτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρα. σὺ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ὢν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνῃ, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουΐ· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ τὸ "χαλεπὸν" τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ "δεινοῦ" Πρόδικός με οὑτοσὶ νουθετεῖ ἑκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινός ἐστιν ἀνήρ, ἐρωτᾷ [341b] εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τἀγαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν.	And I said: By Zeus, Prodicus here has turned up in our discussion at just the right moment. For it may well be, [341a] Protagoras, that Prodicus' wisdom is something divine and ancient, going back to Simonides, or even older. You, experienced as you are in many other things, seem to be inexperienced in this one, not experienced as I am through being a student of Prodicus here. And now you don't seem to me to understand that Simonides perhaps didn't take this word "hard" the way you take it. It may be like the word "terrible," on which Prodicus here corrects me every time: when I'm praising you or someone else and say that Protagoras is a wise and terribly clever man, he asks [341b] whether I'm not ashamed to call good things terrible.
341b	τὸ γὰρ δεινόν, φησίν, κακόν ἐστιν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει ἑκάστοτε "δεινοῦ πλούτου" οὐδὲ "δεινῆς εἰρήνης" οὐδὲ "δεινῆς ὑγιείας," ἀλλὰ "δεινῆς νόσου" καὶ "δεινοῦ πολέμου" καὶ "δεινῆς πενίας," ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τὸ "χαλεπὸν" αὖ οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ κακὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις· ἐρώμεθα οὖν Πρόδικον—δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνὴν τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν—τί ἔλεγεν, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸ [341c] "χαλεπὸν" Σιμωνίδης;	For the terrible, he says, is bad. At any rate, nobody ever speaks of "terrible wealth" or "terrible peace" or "terrible health," but of "terrible disease" and "terrible war" and "terrible poverty," since the terrible is bad. So perhaps the people of Ceos and Simonides, in their turn, take "hard" to mean bad, or something else that you don't understand. So let's ask Prodicus—it's only fair to ask him about Simonides' dialect: What did Simonides mean, Prodicus, by [341c] "hard"?
341c	κακόν, ἔφη. διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πιττακὸν λέγοντα χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶν κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ἔφη, λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, καὶ ὀνειδίζειν τῷ Πιττακῷ ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἠπίστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν ἅτε Λέσβιος ὢν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένος; ἀκούεις δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε. [341d] ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν;	Bad, he said. So that's why he blames Pittacus, Prodicus, I said, for saying it is hard to be good—as if he'd heard him say that it's bad to be good. Well, what else do you think Simonides means, Socrates, he said, but this? He's reproaching Pittacus for not knowing how to distinguish words correctly, since he was from Lesbos and brought up in a foreign dialect. You hear Prodicus here, Protagoras, I said. [341d] Have you anything to say to this?
341d	καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Πρόδικε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ "χαλεπὸν" ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μὴ ῥᾴδιον ᾖ ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνηται.	And Protagoras said: It's nothing of the kind, Prodicus. I know perfectly well that Simonides meant by "hard" what the rest of us mean: not bad, but whatever isn't easy and only comes about with a lot of trouble.
	ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι εἰ οἷός τ' ἔσῃ τῷ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν	Why, I think so too, Protagoras, I said: that this is what Simonides means, and that Prodicus here knows it, but he's joking and, I suppose, testing you to see whether you'll be able to defend your

GREEK

ENGLISH

341e κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ῥῆμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι—θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας, οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων, κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, εἶτα τὸν θεόν φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνῳ· ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἄν τινα λέγοι Σιμωνίδην ὁ Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. ἀλλ' ἅ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ᾄσματι, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν, 342a εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πεῖραν ὅπως ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι.

own argument. For there's strong evidence that Simonides doesn't mean that "hard" 341e is bad in the very next phrase. He says, "A god alone could have this privilege." Surely he isn't saying that it's bad to be good and then saying that the god alone could have this, assigning this privilege to the god alone. Prodicus would be making Simonides out to be some kind of reprobate and no Cean at all. But I'm willing to tell you what I think Simonides means in this song, 342a if you'd like to test how I stand, as you put it, on poetry; or if you'd rather, I'll listen to you.[23]

342a ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος, εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας ἐκελευέτην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Protagoras, hearing me say this, said: If you like, Socrates. And Prodicus and Hippias strongly urged me to, and so did the others.

ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἅ γέ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελθεῖν. φιλοσοφία γάρ ἐστιν παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ 342b ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ σοφισταὶ πλεῖστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσιν· ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ὦσιν ὅτι σοφίᾳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὓς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς, ἀλλὰ δοκῶσιν τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ περιεῖναι, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ γνωσθεῖεν ᾧ περίεισιν, πάντας τοῦτο ἀσκήσειν, τὴν σοφίαν.

Well then, I said, I'll try to go through for you what I think about this song. Philosophy is oldest and most plentiful among the Greeks in Crete and 342b Sparta, and that's where the most sophists on earth are to be found. But they deny it and pretend to be ignorant, so that it won't become obvious that they surpass the Greeks in wisdom—like the sophists Protagoras was describing—and so that they'll seem to excel in fighting and courage instead. They think that if people found out what it is they really excel in, everyone would practice it: wisdom.

342b νῦν δὲ ἀποκρυψάμενοι ἐκεῖνο ἐξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὦτά τε κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι 342c αὐτούς, καὶ ἱμάντας περιειλίττονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσιν καὶ βραχείας ἀναβολὰς φοροῦσιν, ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδὰν βούλωνται ἀνέδην τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῖς συγγενέσθαι σοφισταῖς καὶ ἤδη ἄχθωνται λάθρᾳ συγγιγνόμενοι, ξενηλασίας ποιούμενοι τῶν τε λακωνιζόντων τούτων καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος ξένος ὢν ἐπιδημήσῃ, συγγίγνονται τοῖς σοφισταῖς λανθάνοντες τοὺς ξένους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα ἐῶσιν τῶν νέων 342d εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξιέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Κρῆτες, ἵνα μὴ ἀπομανθάνωσιν ἃ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες.

As it is, by keeping that hidden, they've fooled the admirers of Sparta in other cities, who get their ears battered imitating 342c them, bind on boxing thongs, are mad about athletic training and wear short cloaks, as though it were by these things that the Spartans have the upper hand over the Greeks. The Spartans, when they want to meet their own sophists freely and are tired of meeting them in secret, hold expulsions of foreigners—both of these Sparta-imitators and of any other foreigner who happens to be in town—and meet with the sophists without the foreigners knowing. And they don't allow any of their young men 342d to go abroad to other cities, nor do the Cretans, so that they won't unlearn what they teach them. And in these cities it's not only men who pride themselves on their education, but women too.[24]

342d γνοῖτε δ' ἂν ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἄριστα

You can see that I'm telling the truth, and that the Spartans are the best educated in philosophy and

23 The people of Ceos were proverbial for their sober, upright way of life.

GREEK

πεπαίδευνται, ὧδε· εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις Λακεδαιμονίων τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὑρήσει [342e] αὐτὸν φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἳ κατανενοήκασι καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνίζειν πολὺ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ῥήματα φθέγγεσθαι [343a] τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου.

343a τούτων ἦν καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεύς, καὶ ἕβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας, καὶ καταμάθοι ἄν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὖσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνημόνευτα ἑκάστῳ εἰρημένα· οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ συνελθόντες [343b] ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι εἰς τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα ἃ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ μηδὲν ἄγαν. τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Λακωνική· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἰδίᾳ περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

343b ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, [343c] ἅτε φιλότιμος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἔγνω ὅτι εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητὴν καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις. εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολοῦσαι αὐτὸ ἅπαν τὸ ᾄσμα πεποίηκεν, ὥς μοι φαίνεται.

343c ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ ἅπαντες, εἰ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ᾄσματος μανικὸν ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, [343d] ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλῆσθαι, ἐὰν μή τις ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην·

343d λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν

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argument, in this way. If you're willing to talk with the most ordinary Spartan, you'll find [342e] him seeming quite ordinary for most of the conversation. But then, at whatever point in the discussion it happens, he hurls in a remark worth noting, short and compact, like a skilled javelin-thrower, so that the person talking with him looks no better than a child. Some people today, and some in the past, have realized precisely this: that being Spartan is much more a matter of loving wisdom than of loving athletics, since they know that being able to utter remarks like that belongs to [343a] a perfectly educated person.

Among these were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, our own Solon, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and the seventh of them was said to be the Spartan Chilon. All these were admirers, lovers and students of Spartan education, and you can recognize their wisdom as being of this kind: short, memorable sayings spoken by each. These men also came together [343b] and dedicated the first fruits of their wisdom to Apollo in the temple at Delphi, inscribing the words everyone celebrates, "Know yourself" and "Nothing too much." Why do I mention this? Because this was the ancients' way of doing philosophy: a kind of Spartan brevity. And in particular this saying of Pittacus was passed around privately, praised by the wise: "It is hard to be good."

So Simonides, [343c] being ambitious for a name for wisdom, realized that if he could throw this saying, like a famous wrestler, and get the better of it, he himself would become famous among the people of his day. So it's against this saying, and for this reason, scheming to cut it down, that he composed the whole song, as it seems to me.

Let's all examine it together, then, to see whether what I say is true. The very beginning of the song would look mad if, wanting to say that it's hard for a man to become good, [343d] he then threw in the "on the one hand." For it doesn't seem to have been thrown in for any reason at all, unless one supposes that Simonides is speaking as if quarreling with the saying of Pittacus:

when Pittacus says that it is hard to be good, Simonides disputes it and says: No, to become a

24 Sparta periodically expelled foreigners; admirers of Spartan ways elsewhere copied their dress and their passion for boxing.

GREEK

χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὦ Πιττακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς— οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα ὄντων τινῶν [343e] τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς—εὔηθες γὰρ τοῦτό γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου— ἀλλ' ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὑτωσί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπόντα· ὦ ἄνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τὸν δὲ [344a] ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μέν ἐστιν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως.

344a οὕτω φαίνεται τὸ πρὸς λόγον τὸ μέν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν [344b] ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποίηται—πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει—ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω διελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστιν τοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.

344b λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθών, ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως, οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπί γε χρόνον τινά· γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν [344c] ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἕξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι, ὃν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ. τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου ἀρχῇ; δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἀεὶ καθῄρηται.

344c ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἑστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι ἄν τις ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον [344d] οὔ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὄντα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀμήχανον ὄντα οὔ, καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμὼν ἐπιπεσὼν ἀμήχανον ἂν ποιήσειεν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπὴ ὥρα ἐπελθοῦσα ἀμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ἰατρὸν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος—αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός· [344e] τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη.

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good man is, on the one hand, hard, Pittacus, truly —not truly good. He doesn't apply the "truly" to that, as if some people [343e] were truly good and others good but not truly so—that would seem silly, and not like Simonides. Rather, one must take the "truly" in the song as displaced, and supply Pittacus' saying before it, roughly like this, as if we had Pittacus himself speaking and Simonides replying. Pittacus says: People, it is hard to be good; and Simonides [344a] replies: Pittacus, what you say isn't true: not to be but to become, on the one hand, a man good, foursquare in hands and feet and mind, fashioned without fault, is hard, truly.

Read this way, the "on the one hand" turns out to have been thrown in for a reason, and the "truly" to be rightly placed at the end. And everything that follows bears this out, that this is how it was meant. There's a great deal one could show about each of the [344b] things said in the song, how well they're composed—for it's crafted with great charm and care—but it would take a long time to go through it that way. Let's go through its overall outline and its intention instead: that more than anything it is a refutation of Pittacus' saying, all the way through the song.

After this he goes on a little and says, as though he were setting out an argument, that to become a good man is hard, truly, but possible, at least for a while. But once you have become good, to stay [344c] in that condition and be a good man, as you say, Pittacus, is impossible, and not for human beings: "a god alone could have this privilege," "but a man cannot help being bad, whom misfortune beyond resource casts down." Whom, then, does misfortune beyond resource cast down in the command of a ship? Clearly not the layman, since the layman is always down already.

You can't knock down someone who is already lying down. You can knock down someone who is standing, so that he ends up lying down, but not someone already lying [344d] down. In the same way, misfortune beyond resource might at some point cast down the man who is resourceful, but not the one who is always without resource. A great storm falling on a helmsman could leave him without resource. A hard season coming on could leave a farmer without resource, and the same goes for a

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doctor. For the good man can become bad, as another poet also testifies, who said: "But a good man is at one time bad, at another good." 344e The bad man, though, can't become bad. He has to be bad always.

344e ὥστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ, οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι· σὺ δὲ φῄς, ὦ Πιττακέ, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι· τὸ δ' ἐστὶ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν, δυνατὸν δέ, ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον· πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς. 345a τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, καὶ τίς ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τούτων μάθησις. τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖ; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῶν καμνόντων τῆς θεραπείας μάθησις. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς· τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς γένοιτο;

So when misfortune beyond resource casts down the resourceful, wise and good man, "he cannot help being bad." But you say, Pittacus, "it is hard to be good." The truth is that becoming good is hard, though possible, while being good is impossible: "for every man who does well is good, and bad if he does badly." 345a What, then, is doing well with letters, and what makes a man good at letters? Clearly, learning them. And what kind of doing well makes a good doctor? Clearly, learning how to treat the sick. "And bad if he does badly": who, then, could become a bad doctor?

345a δῆλον ὅτι ᾧ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῷ εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῷ ἰατρῷ—οὗτος γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς γένοιτο—ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς ἰδιῶται οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ἰατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες οὔτε 345b ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅστις δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρός. οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος — αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι —ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο κακός—ἔστιν γὰρ ἀεί— ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.

Clearly someone who is, first, a doctor, and then a good doctor, since he's the one who could also become bad. We who are laymen in medicine could never, by doing badly, become doctors, or carpenters, or 345b anything else of the kind. And whoever couldn't become a doctor by doing badly clearly couldn't become a bad doctor either. In the same way the good man might at some point become bad too, through age, or hardship, or illness, or some other accident, for this is the only bad doing: being deprived of knowledge. But the bad man could never become bad, since he is bad always. If he is to become bad, he must first become good.

345b ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ᾄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, 345c ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε, διατελοῦντα ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἷόν τε, καὶ κακόν γε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον· ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν. ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ᾄσματος ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλοῖ. φησὶ γάρ —τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄ- πρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός· ἐπί θ' ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω, 345d φησίν—οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ᾄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι—πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκὼν ὅστις ἔρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκῃ δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰρημένον.

So this part of the poem points the same way: 345c it isn't possible to be a good man, continuing good, but it is possible to become good, and for this same man to become bad as well; "and best for the longest time are those whom the gods love." All this, then, is aimed at Pittacus, and what comes next in the poem makes it even clearer. For he says: "Therefore I shall never, seeking what cannot come to be, cast away my share of life on an empty, unachievable hope: an all-blameless human being, among all of us who reap the fruit of the broad-based earth. When I find him, I shall bring you word," 345d he says. That is how hard he goes after Pittacus' saying all through the poem. "But all I praise and love willingly who do nothing shameful; against necessity not even gods fight." This too is said with the same aim.

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	οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ ἑκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν [345e] σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἑκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες ποιοῦσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῇ ἑκών, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἑκών. ἡγεῖτο γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινέτην [346a] φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν, οἷον ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.	Simonides was not so uneducated as to say that he praises those who willingly do nothing bad, as though there were people who do bad things willingly. I'm fairly confident of this much: none of the [345e] wise thinks that any human being goes wrong willingly, or willingly does anything shameful or bad. They know well that everyone who does shameful and bad things does them unwillingly. So Simonides isn't saying that he praises whoever doesn't willingly do bad things. He says this "willingly" of himself. For he believed that a fine and good man often forces himself to become someone's friend and admirer, [346a] to love and praise him: when, for instance, a man happens to have a difficult mother or father, or country, or something else of that kind.
346a	τοὺς μὲν οὖν πονηρούς, ὅταν τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτοῖς συμβῇ, ὥσπερ ἀσμένους ὁρᾶν καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδ᾽ ὀνειδίζωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας [346b] ἑκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δ᾽ ἀγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπτεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἄν τι ὀργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις δὲ οἶμαι καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἠγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἑκών, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαζόμενος.	Wicked people, when something like this happens to them, look on it almost with pleasure. They make a show of blaming their parents or country and denouncing their wickedness, so that people won't reproach them or reprove them for neglecting them. So they blame them even more and add [346b] enmities of their own choosing to the ones forced on them. Good people, though, keep it hidden and force themselves to praise. If they're angry with their parents or country for some wrong done them, they calm themselves and make their peace, compelling themselves to love and praise their own. And often, I think, Simonides himself found that he had to praise and extol a tyrant or someone else of that sort, not willingly but under compulsion.
346b	ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιττακῷ λέγει ὅτι ἐγώ, [346c] ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω, ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόψογος, ἐπεὶ—ἔμοιγ᾽ ἐξαρκεῖ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ᾖ μηδ᾽ ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰ- δώς τ᾽ ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ· οὔ μιν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι— οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος—τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα, πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ᾽ αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται. [346d] οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά, οἷς μέλανα μὴ μέμεικται—γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη πολλαχῇ—ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὥστε μὴ ψέγειν.	That is what he is saying to Pittacus too: It isn't, [346c] Pittacus, because I'm fond of blaming that I blame you, since "for me it is enough if a man be not bad, nor too shiftless, a sound man who knows the justice that helps the city. Him I will not fault—for I am not fond of faulting—for the race of fools is endless. All things are fine, I tell you, with which shameful things are not mixed." [346d] He doesn't mean this as if he had said "All things are white, I tell you, with which black is not mixed," which would be ridiculous in many ways. He means that he himself accepts even what lies in between and doesn't blame it.
346d	καὶ οὐ ζητῶ, ἔφη, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, ἐπί θ᾽ ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω· ὥστε τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλά μοι ἐξαρκεῖ ἂν ᾖ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας	"And I am not looking," he says, "for an all-blameless human being, among all of us who reap the fruit of the broad-based earth; when I find him, I shall bring you word." So on that account, at least,

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	φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι—καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ [346e] τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιττακὸν λέγων τὸ πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκών—ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῷ ἑκών διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα—ὅστις ἔρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν, ἄκων δ' ἔστιν οὓς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ. σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως [347a] ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἔψεγον· νῦν δὲ σφόδρα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω. ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ᾄσμα.	I shall praise no one. It's enough for me if a man is middling and does nothing bad, since "all I love and praise." Here he has used the dialect [346e] of the Mytileneans, as one addressing Pittacus: "all I praise and love willingly." In reciting it you have to pause at "willingly." Then: "who do nothing shameful." But there are some I praise and love unwillingly. So if you had said, [347a] even moderately, what was reasonable and true, Pittacus, I would never have blamed you. As it is, you are badly wrong, and about the most important matters, while seeming to tell the truth, and that is why I blame you. That, Prodicus and Protagoras, I said, is what I think Simonides had in mind when he composed this poem.[25]
347a	καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας, εὖ μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος διειληλυθέναι· ἔστιν μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ [347b] ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω, ἂν βούλησθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ναί, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, εἰς αὖθίς γε· νῦν δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἃ ὡμολογησάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλω Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἔτι βούλεται ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτη, εἰ δὲ δὴ βούλεται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐρωτᾶν τὸν ἕτερον.	And Hippias said: I think you too have given a good account of the poem, Socrates. But I also have [347b] a fine speech about it, he said, which I'll present to you, if you like. And Alcibiades said: Yes, Hippias, some other time. Right now it's only fair to do what Protagoras and Socrates agreed between them: if Protagoras still wants to ask questions, Socrates answers, and if he'd rather answer Socrates, then the other one asks.

BACK TO THE ARGUMENT

Socrates sets poetry aside and asks Protagoras to resume the question about excellence.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
347b	**SOCRATES** καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρωταγόρᾳ ὁπότερον αὐτῷ ἥδιον· εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ᾀσμάτων τε καὶ ἐπῶν [347c] ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγώ σε ἠρώτησα, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων.	**SOCRATES** And I said: For my part, I leave it to Protagoras to choose whichever he prefers. But if he's willing, let's leave odes and verses [347c] aside. The questions I asked you at first, Protagoras, I would gladly see through to the end, examining them with you. Talking about poetry seems to me very much like the drinking parties of second-rate, vulgar people.
347c	καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι [347d] τὰς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοῦ μισθούμενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν· ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις οὔτ' αὐλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίας, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς ἱκανοὺς	Being too uneducated to keep each other company over their wine by themselves, with their own voices and their own conversation, these people drive up the price [347d] of flute-girls. They pay a great deal for an alien voice, the voice of the flute, and keep each other company through that. But where the drinkers are fine and good men and educated, you won't see flute-girls or dancing-girls

25 *Epainēmi* ("I praise") is the Lesbian form of the verb, the dialect of Pittacus' Mytilene.

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ENGLISH

ὄντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως, κἂν πάνυ [347e] πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν.

or harp-girls. You'll see them quite capable of keeping each other company without such nonsense and games, with their own voices, speaking and listening in turn in an orderly way, even when they [347e] drink a great deal of wine.

347e οὕτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν οἷοίπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὓς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ' ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὃ ἀδυνατοῦσι ἐξελέγξαι· ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας [348a] ἐῶσιν χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἑαυτοῖς σύνεισιν δι' ἑαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες.

Gatherings like ours are the same. If they include men such as most of us claim to be, they need no alien voice, not even poets. You can't question poets about what they mean, and when people bring them into the discussion, some say the poet means this and others that, arguing about something they have no way of settling. Men like that [348a] leave such gatherings alone and keep company with each other by themselves, testing one another and being tested in their own words.

348a τοὺς τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλλον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνοντας· κἂν μὲν βούλῃ ἔτι ἐρωτᾶν, ἕτοιμός εἰμί σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχες, περὶ ὧν μεταξὺ ἐπαυσάμεθα διεξιόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι. [348b]

People like these are the ones I think you and I should rather imitate. Let's set the poets aside and carry on our discussion with each other by ourselves, testing the truth and ourselves. If you want to keep asking questions, I'm ready to put myself at your service as answerer. Or, if you like, put yourself at mine, so that we can bring to a conclusion the things we broke off in the middle of going through. [348b]

348b λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπεσάφει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὁπότερα ποιήσοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, ὦ Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐθέλων εἴτε δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἤτοι διαλεγέσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν, Σωκράτης δὲ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέγηται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν βούληται ἄλλῳ. [348c]

As I was saying these and other such things, Protagoras gave no clear sign which he would do. So Alcibiades looked at Callias and said: Callias, do you think Protagoras is behaving well now, either, refusing to make clear whether he'll give an account or not? I don't. Let him either discuss or say that he's unwilling to discuss, so that we know where we stand with him, and Socrates can discuss with someone else, or anyone else who likes with whoever he likes. [348c]

348c καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθείς, ὥς γέ μοι ἔδοξεν, τοῦ τε Ἀλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τῶν παρόντων, μόγις προυτράπετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρινούμενος.

And Protagoras was ashamed, or so it seemed to me, with Alcibiades saying this and Callias and nearly everyone else present begging him. Reluctantly he was brought round to discussing, and told me to ask him questions, since he would answer.

εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οἷου διαλέγεσθαί μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἃ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἑκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν Ὅμηρον τὸ— [348d] σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν. εὐπορώτεροι γάρ πως ἅπαντές ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα· μοῦνος δ' εἴπερ τε νοήσῃ, αὐτίκα περιιὼν ζητεῖ ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξηται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσηται, ἕως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕνεκα

So I said: Protagoras, don't imagine that I'm discussing with you for any other purpose than to examine whatever puzzles me at the time. I think Homer is quite right when he says: [348d] "When two go together, one sees before the other." Somehow all of us human beings are better equipped that way for every deed and word and thought. "But if one alone notices something," he immediately

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τούτου σοὶ ἡδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, ἡγούμενός σε βέλτιστ᾽ ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων [348e] περὶ ὧν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ;	goes around looking for someone to show it to and to confirm it with, until he finds one. That is exactly why I'd rather discuss with you than with anyone else: I think you would examine best the matters [348e] a decent man is likely to look into, and excellence above all. Who else but you?[26]
348e	ὅς γε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οἴει καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν· σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τ᾽ εἶ ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς, καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων [349a] σύ γ᾽ ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνυσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σὲ χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως οὔ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἠρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι.	You don't just think yourself fine and good, the way some people are decent themselves but can't make others so. You are both good yourself and able to make others good. And you trust yourself so much that, while others keep this art hidden, [349a] you have had yourself openly proclaimed to all the Greeks. You named yourself a sophist and declared yourself a teacher of education and excellence, the first to think it right to charge a fee for it. How, then, could I not call on you to examine these things, and question and consult you? There's no way I couldn't. So now I want to take up again from the beginning the questions I first asked about these things, partly to be reminded by you, partly to examine them together.
349a	ἦν δέ, [349b] ὡς ἐγῷμαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἑνὶ πράγματί ἐστιν, ἢ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὂν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἕτερον; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ [349c] ἕκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὅμοιά ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα.	The question, [349b] I believe, was this. Wisdom, moderation, courage, justice and piety: are these five names for one thing, or does each of these names have underlying it some distinct being, a thing that has its own power, each one unlike any of the others? You said they weren't names for one thing, but [349c] that each of these names applies to a distinct thing, and that all of them are parts of excellence. Not as the parts of gold are like one another and like the whole they are parts of, but as the parts of the face are unlike both the whole they are parts of and one another, each having its own power.
349c	ταῦτα εἰ μέν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὥσπερ τότε, φάθι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πῃ ἄλλῃ νῦν φήσῃς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός [349d] μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες.	If you still think now as you did then, say so. If you think somewhat differently, spell it out, since I won't hold it against you if you say something different now. I wouldn't be surprised if you were saying those things then to test [349d] me.

COURAGE

Protagoras holds that courage differs from the other parts; Socrates links it to knowledge and confidence.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
349d	**SOCRATES** ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μέν ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία	**SOCRATES** Well, Socrates, he said, I tell you that all these are parts of excellence. Four of them are

26 The lines are from *Iliad* 10.224–226, where Diomedes asks for a companion on a night expedition.

GREEK

πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον πάντων τούτων. ὧδε δὲ γνώσῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω· εὑρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως. 349e

349e ἔχε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι;—καὶ ἴτας γε, ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι.—φέρε δή, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῂς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις;—κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε.—πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν, ἢ ὅλον καλόν;—ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.— οἶσθα οὖν τίνες εἰς τὰ 350a φρέατα κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως;—ἔγωγε, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί.—πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;—ὅτι ἐπίστανται.—τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἢ οἱ ἄφιπποι;—οἱ ἱππικοί.—τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μή;—οἱ πελταστικοί.

350a καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν 350b ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν.—ἤδη δέ τινας ἑώρακας, ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων;—ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας.—οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν;—αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἡ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοί εἰσιν.—πῶς οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι;—καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη.— 350c οὐκοῦν οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀλλὰ μαινόμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι καὶ θαρραλεώτατοί εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι; καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη;

350c οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ ἔλεγόν τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι. ἔγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην—εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι 350d οὐ πάντες—τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολόγησα. ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς

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reasonably close to one another, but courage is very different from all of them. Here's how you'll know I'm telling the truth: you'll find many people who are utterly unjust, impious, licentious and ignorant, and yet exceptionally courageous. 349e

Hold on, I said. What you say is worth examining. Do you mean that the courageous are confident, or something else?—Yes, and eager, he said, to go at what most people are afraid to approach.—Well now, do you say excellence is something fine, and is it as something fine that you offer yourself as its teacher?—The finest of things, he said, unless I'm mad.—Then is part of it shameful and part fine, I said, or is it fine as a whole?—Fine as a whole, surely, as fine as anything can be.—Do you know, then, who dive confidently into 350a wells?—I do: divers.—Is that because they know how, or for some other reason?—Because they know how.—And who are confident fighting on horseback? Skilled riders or those who can't ride?—Skilled riders.—And who are confident carrying light shields? Those trained in it, or those who aren't?—Those trained in it.

And in everything else too, if that's what you're after, he said, those who know are more confident than those who don't, and more 350b confident themselves once they've learned than they were before.—But have you ever seen people, I said, who know nothing about any of these things and yet are confident in each of them?—I have, he said, and all too confident.—Then aren't these confident people courageous too?—Courage would be a shameful thing then, he said, since these people are mad.—Then what do you mean by the courageous, I said? Didn't you say they were the confident?—I still do, he said.— 350c Then these people, I said, who are confident in this way, turn out to be not courageous but mad? And in the other case, again, the wisest are also the most confident, and being most confident, the most courageous? And by this argument wisdom would be courage?

You aren't remembering properly, Socrates, he said, what I said in answering you. When you asked me whether the courageous are confident, I agreed. I wasn't asked whether the confident are courageous too; if you had asked me that then, I would have said 350d not all of them. And as for the courageous not being confident, you nowhere

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ἑαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἴει τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταὐτὸν εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιὼν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν οἰηθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὕτω μετιὼν ἔροιό με εἰ οἱ ἰσχυροὶ [350e] δυνατοί εἰσιν, φαίην ἄν· ἔπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαίειν δυνατώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων παλαίειν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἄν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογήσαντος ἐξείη ἄν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχύς. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ὁμολογῶ τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς μέντοι ἰσχυροὺς δυνατούς· [351a] οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι δύναμίν τε καὶ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας γε καὶ θυμοῦ, ἰσχὺν δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν σωμάτων.

οὕτω δὲ κἀκεῖ οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ ἀνδρείαν· ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι τούς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους πάντας· θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ [351b] ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.

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showed that I was wrong to agree to it. Next, you show that those who know are more confident than they were before and than others who don't know, and on that basis you think courage and wisdom are the same. Going about it this way, you might think strength was wisdom too.

Going about it this way, you might first ask me whether the strong [350e] are powerful, and I would say yes. Then whether those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who don't, and than they themselves were before they learned, and I would say yes. Once I had agreed to these, you could use these same proofs to say that by my own admission wisdom is strength. But I don't agree here either, anywhere, that the powerful are strong, only that the strong are powerful. [351a] Power and strength aren't the same. Power comes from knowledge, and from madness and passion too, but strength comes from nature and the good nurture of bodies.

In the same way, in the other case, confidence and courage aren't the same. So it turns out that the courageous are confident, but not all the confident are courageous. Confidence comes to people from skill, and [351b] from passion and madness too, as power does, but courage comes from the nature and good nurture of souls.

PLEASURE AND THE GOOD

Socrates asks whether living pleasantly is good and whether knowledge can be overcome by pleasure.

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SOCRATES λέγεις δέ τινας, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς;—ἔφη.—ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος ζώη;—οὐκ ἔφη.—τί δ' εἰ ἡδέως βιοὺς τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν; οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι;—ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.—τὸ μὲν ἄρα [351c] ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν.—εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζώη ἡδόμενος.—τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἡδέ' ἄττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθά; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἆρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, μὴ εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο;

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SOCRATES Do you say, Protagoras, I said, that some people live well and others badly?—He said he did.—Then do you think a person would be living well if he lived in distress and pain?—He said no.—What if he lived pleasantly to the end of his life? Don't you think he'd have lived well that way?—I do, he said.—So [351c] living pleasantly is good, and living unpleasantly bad?—Yes, he said, provided he lived taking pleasure in fine things.—What's this, Protagoras? Surely you don't, like most people, call some pleasant things bad and some painful things good? What I mean is: insofar as things are pleasant, aren't they in that respect good, leaving aside anything else that may come of them?

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καὶ αὖθις αὖ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρά, κακά;—οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, [351d] εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά· ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δ' αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακά, ἔστι δ' ἃ ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθά.—ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς [351e] μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν;—πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—τοῦτο τοίνυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἡδέα ἐστίν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθά, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.—ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἑκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνηται ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν.

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And painful things, likewise: aren't they bad insofar as they are painful?—I don't know, Socrates, he said, whether I should answer as simply as you put the question, [351d] that all pleasant things are good and all painful things bad. It seems to me safer, not only for my present answer but for the whole rest of my life, to answer that there are some pleasant things that aren't good, and again some painful things that aren't bad, and some that are, and a third class that are neither, neither bad nor good.—By pleasant things, I said, don't you mean things that partake of pleasure [351e] or produce pleasure?—Certainly, he said.—That's what I mean, then, when I ask whether they aren't good insofar as they're pleasant: I'm asking whether pleasure itself isn't a good.—As you're always saying, Socrates, he said, let's examine it. If the inquiry seems reasonable and the pleasant and the good turn out to be the same, we'll agree. If not, then we'll dispute it.

351e πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σὺ βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγὼ ἡγῶμαι;

δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις τοῦ λόγου. [352a]

Then would you like to lead the inquiry, I said, or shall I?

It's right that you should lead, he said, since you started this argument. [352a]

352a ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῇδέ πῃ καταφανὲς ἂν ἡμῖν γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας εἶπoι· "ἴθι δή μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον," καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν· θεασάμενος ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς φῄς, δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν· ἴθι δή μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, [352b] καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον· πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως;

Well, I said, perhaps it might become clear to us in some such way as this. Suppose someone were examining a person by his appearance, for his health or some other bodily function, and after seeing his face and hands said: "Come now, uncover your chest and back as well and show me, so I can examine you more clearly." I want something like that for our inquiry. Having seen that your attitude to the good and the pleasant is what you say, I need to say something like this: Come now, Protagoras, [352b] uncover this part of your mind as well. What is your attitude to knowledge? Do you think about it as most people do, or differently?

352b δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς [352c] διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν

Most people think something like this about knowledge: that it isn't strong, or a leader, or a ruler. They don't think of it that way at all. They think that often, though a person has knowledge in him, it isn't knowledge that rules him but something else: sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, at times love, often fear. They simply [352c] think of knowledge as if it were a slave, dragged around by all the rest. Do you think something like that about it too? Or do you think that knowledge is a fine thing, able to rule a person,

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κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ;

352c καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, [352d] εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.

352d καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν· καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὅτι ποτε αἴτιόν ἐστι τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν [352e] ἡττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας.

πολλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι.

352e ἴθι δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὅ φασιν ὑπὸ [353a] τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεσθε, ἔροιντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς· "ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατον ἡμῖν."

353a τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; [353b]

οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναί τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τἆλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτ' ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγήσασθαι ᾗ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερὸν γενέσθαι, ἔπου· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, ἐῶ χαίρειν.

ἀλλ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε ὥσπερ ἦρξω. [353c]

353c πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς· "τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί· Ἀκούετε δή· πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν

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and that if someone knows what is good and what is bad, nothing could ever overpower him into doing anything other than what knowledge commands, and that understanding is enough to come to a person's rescue?

I think just as you say, Socrates, he said. And besides, [352d] it would be shameful for me, if for anyone, not to say that wisdom and knowledge are the most powerful of all things in human life.

That's well said, I replied, and true. Now you know that most people don't believe you and me. They say that many who know what is best are unwilling to do it, though they could, and do other things instead. And everyone I've asked what on earth the cause of this is says that those who act this way do so because they are [352e] overcome by pleasure, or pain, or overpowered by one of the things I mentioned just now.

Yes, Socrates, he said, I think people say many other things that are wrong too.

Come on, then, try with me to persuade people and teach them what this experience of theirs really is, the one they call being overcome [353a] by pleasures and failing to do what is best because of them, though they know what it is. If we told them, You're wrong, people, you're mistaken, they might ask us: "Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience isn't being overcome by pleasure, then what on earth is it? What do you two say it is? Tell us."

But Socrates, why should we examine the opinion of most people, who say whatever comes into their heads? [353b]

I think, I said, that this will help us find out about courage, and how it relates to the other parts of excellence. So if you're content to stand by what we agreed just now, that I should lead the way I think it will become clearest, follow me. If you'd rather not, and if you prefer, I'll drop it.

No, he said, you're right. Carry on as you began. [353c]

Again, then, I said, suppose they asked us: "Then what do you say it is, this thing we were calling being overcome by pleasures?" I would say to them: Listen, then. Protagoras and I will try to explain it to you. Don't you say, people, that this hap-

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τοῖσδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν;—φαῖεν ἄν.—οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν· Πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῇ φατε εἶναι; [353d] πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει;

353d ἢ κἂν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὁπηοῦν; ἆρ' οἰόμεθ' ἂν αὐτούς, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἄλλο τι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἢ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν κακά ἐστιν, [353e] ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ὕστερον γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τἆλλα. —ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.—οὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.—συνέφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.— οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν, ὥς φαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ ἄλλων [354a] ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ;

354a Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν;—συνεδόκει ἡμῖν ἀμφοῖν.—οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐροίμεθα· ὦ ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τά τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεών τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακειῶν καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν γιγνομένας, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ μέν ἐστιν, ἀνιαρὰ δέ; φαῖεν ἄν;—συνεδόκει.—πότερον [354b] οὖν κατὰ τόδε ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ὑγίειαί τε ἀπ' αὐτῶν γίγνονται καὶ εὐεξίαι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαι καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.—συνεδόκει.—ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ ἀποτροπάς;

354b ἢ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο τέλος [354c] λέγειν, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.—οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.—οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς κακόν;—συνεδόκει.—τοῦτ' ἄρα ἡγεῖσθ' εἶναι κακόν, τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῇ ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους

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pens to you in cases like these: often, overpowered by food and drink and sex, which are pleasant, you still do these things, though you know they're bad?—They'd say so.—Then you and I would ask them again: In what way do you say they're bad? [353d] Is it because they give this pleasure at the moment, and each of them is pleasant, or because later on they cause diseases and poverty and bring about many other such things?

Or, even if one of them brought about none of this later and only gave enjoyment, would they still be bad, just because they make a person enjoy himself, in whatever way? Do we suppose, Protagoras, that they would answer anything other than that these things are bad not because of the immediate pleasure itself and what it produces, [353e] but because of what comes later, diseases and the rest?—I think, said Protagoras, that most people would answer that.—Then in causing diseases they cause pains, and in causing poverty they cause pains? They would agree, I think.—Protagoras assented.—Then doesn't it appear to you, people, as Protagoras and I say, that these things are bad for no other reason than that they end in pains and deprive you of other [354a] pleasures?

Would they agree?—We both thought so.—Then suppose we asked them the opposite: People, you who say, on the other hand, that good things are painful, don't you mean things like athletic training, military campaigns, and doctors' treatments by cautery, surgery, drugs and starvation diets? Don't you mean that these are good, but painful? Would they say so?—He agreed.—Then [354b] do you call them good because at the moment they bring the most extreme pain and suffering, or because later on they result in health and fitness of body, the preservation of cities, rule over others, and wealth? They would say the latter, I think.—He agreed.—And are these things good for any other reason than that they end in pleasures and in relief from pains and the warding off of them?

Or can you name some other end [354c] you look to when you call them good, other than pleasures and pains? They would say not, I think.—I don't think so either, said Protagoras.—Then you pursue pleasure as something good and avoid pain as something bad?—He agreed.—So this is what you consider bad, pain, and pleasure good, since you call even enjoyment itself bad when it deprives

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παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν 354d αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε. —οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.—ἄλλο τι οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος;

354d τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ μείζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι 354e ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε.—ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

354e πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἀνέροισθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, "τίνος οὖν δήποτε ἕνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῇ;" Συγγιγνώσκετέ μοι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδεῖξαι τί ἐστίν ποτε τοῦτο ὃ ὑμεῖς καλεῖτε τῶν ἡδονῶν ἥττω εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν, 355a εἴ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν· ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε.

355a φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε ὅτι πολλάκις γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἄνθρωπος ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἐξὸν μὴ πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν 355b ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ αὖθις αὖ λέγετε ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τἀγαθὰ πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ τούτων ἡττώμενος. ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστιν, κατάδηλον ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἅμα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἔπειτα αὖθις ἡδεῖ τε 355c καὶ ἀνιαρῷ. θέμενοι δὴ οὕτω λέγωμεν ὅτι Γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ.

355c ἐὰν οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, "διὰ τί;" Ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν· "ὑπὸ τοῦ;" ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν—ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν—ἐκείνῳ δὴ ἀποκρινώμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι Ἡττώμενος—"ὑπὸ τίνος;" φήσει. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νὴ Δία. ἂν οὖν τύχῃ ὁ ἐρόμενος ἡμᾶς

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you of greater pleasures than it contains, or brings about pains greater than the 354d pleasures in it. For if you called enjoyment itself bad on some other ground, looking to some other end, you could tell us what it was. But you won't be able to.—I don't think they will either, said Protagoras.—And isn't it the same again with being in pain itself?

Do you call being in pain itself good just when it either rids you of pains greater than those it contains or brings about pleasures greater than its pains? For if you look to some other end when you call being in pain 354e good, other than the one I mention, you can tell us what it is. But you won't be able to.—What you say is true, said Protagoras.

Again, then, people, I said, suppose you asked me: "Why on earth do you go on about this at such length and in so many ways?" I would say: Forgive me. First, it isn't easy to show what this thing you call being overcome by pleasures actually is. And second, all the proofs depend on it. But even now you can still take it back, 355a if you can somehow say that the good is something other than pleasure, or the bad something other than pain. Or is it enough for you to live out your life pleasantly, without pains? If it is enough, and you can't say that anything is good or bad unless it ends in these, then listen to what follows.

I tell you that if this is so, your account becomes ridiculous. You say that a person often knows that bad things are bad and does them all the same, though he could refrain, because he is led on and carried away 355b by pleasures. And again you say that a person who knows what is good is unwilling to do it because of immediate pleasures, being overcome by them. How ridiculous this is will become quite clear if we stop using many names at once, pleasant, painful, good and bad, and instead, since these have turned out to be two things, call them by two names as well: first good and bad, and then again pleasant 355c and painful. With that settled, let's say: A person knows that bad things are bad and does them all the same.

Now if someone asks us, "Why?" Because he's overcome, we'll say. "By what?" he'll ask us. And we can no longer say "by pleasure," since pleasure has taken another name instead, "the good." So let us answer him and say: Because he's overcome. "By what?" he'll say. By the good, we'll say, by

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ὑβριστὴς ὤν, γελάσεται [355d] καὶ ἐρεῖ· "ἦ γελοῖον λέγετε πρᾶγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἆρα," φήσει, "οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων;" φήσομεν δῆλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξημάρτανεν ὃν φαμεν ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν. "κατὰ τί δέ," φήσει ἴσως, "ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν;

355d ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ [355e] σμικρότερα ᾖ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ᾖ;" οὐχ ἕξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. "δῆλον ἄρα," φήσει, "ὅτι τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν." ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω. μεταλάβωμεν δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι Ἄνθρωπος πράττει—τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν τὰ ἀνιαρά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστιν, ἡττώμενος [356a] ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν. καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία ἡδονῆ πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.

356a εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι "ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ," μῶν ἄλλῳ τῳ, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἢ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ [356b] ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεὶς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεὶς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, εἰπὲ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν.

356b ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἱστῇς, τὰ μείζω ἀεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐάντε τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐάντε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ᾗ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐνῇ· ἐὰν [356c] δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα. μή πῃ ἄλλῃ ἔχει, φαίην ἄν, ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνθρωποι; οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν.—συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνῳ.

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Zeus! Now if the person asking us happens to be insolent, he'll laugh [355d] and say: "What a ridiculous thing you're saying, that a person does bad things, knowing that they're bad, when he shouldn't do them, because he's overcome by good things! Is it," he'll say, "because in you the bad things aren't worth enough to win out over the good ones, or because they are?" Clearly we'll answer that they aren't worth enough, since otherwise the person we say is overcome by pleasures wouldn't have gone wrong. "And in what respect," he may say, "are good things unequal in worth to bad ones, or bad things to good?

Is it in any other respect than when one lot is greater and the other [355e] smaller? Or when one lot is more numerous and the other fewer?" We won't be able to name anything but that. "Clearly, then," he'll say, "by this being overcome you mean taking greater bad things in exchange for lesser good ones." So much for that. Now let's switch the names back to pleasant and painful for these same things, and say: A person does—before we said bad things, now let's say painful things—knowing that they are painful, because he is overcome [356a] by pleasant things, clearly when these aren't worth enough to win. And what other disparity in worth is there between pleasure and pain than one exceeding or falling short of the other? That is, their being greater and smaller than each other, more and fewer, and more and less intense.

Now if someone were to say, "But Socrates, what is pleasant at the moment is very different from what is pleasant or painful later on," I would reply: Different in anything but pleasure and pain? There's nothing else it could be different in. No: like [356b] someone who is good at weighing, put the pleasant things together and the painful things together, set both the near and the distant on the scale, and say which side is more.

If you weigh pleasant things against pleasant, you must always take the greater and the more. If painful against painful, the fewer and the smaller. If pleasant against painful, then if the painful are outweighed by the pleasant, whether the near by the distant or the distant by the near, you must do the action that contains these. But [356c] if the pleasant are outweighed by the painful, you mustn't do it. Is it in any way otherwise, people? I would ask. I know they couldn't say otherwise.—He agreed too.

THE ART OF MEASUREMENT

Socrates argues that weighing pleasures and pains rightly would be the salvation of life.

GREEK

356c **SOCRATES** ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω. φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω· ἢ οὔ;—φήσουσιν.—καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ αἱ ἴσαι ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι;—φαῖεν ἄν.—εἰ οὖν [356d] ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἆρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις;

356d ἢ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταὐτὰ καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα [356e] δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον; ἆρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σῴζειν ἂν τέχνην ἢ ἄλλην;—τὴν μετρητικήν, ὡμολόγει.— τί δ' εἰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἱρέσει ἡμῖν ἦν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, ὁπότε τὸ πλέον ὀρθῶς ἔδει ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁπότε τὸ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτ' ἐγγὺς εἴτε πόρρω εἴη; τί ἂν ἔσῳζεν ἡμῖν τὸν [357a] βίον;

357a ἆρ' ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἆρ' ἂν οὐ μετρητική τις, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἆρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητική; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ οὔ;—ἐδόκουν ἂν καὶ τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὁμολογεῖν.—εἶεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ [357b] μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις;—ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη.—ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκῃ δήπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη.—συμφήσουσιν.—ἥτις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὕτη, εἰς αὖθις σκεψόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἣν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωταγόραν [357c] ἀποδεῖξαι περὶ ὧν ἤρεσθ' ἡμᾶς.

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SOCRATES Since this is so, I'll say, answer me this. Do the same magnitudes look larger to your sight close up and smaller from far away, or not?—They'll say they do.—And thicknesses and numbers likewise? And equal sounds louder close up and softer from far away?—They would say so.—Now if [356d] our doing well depended on this, on doing and choosing large lengths and avoiding and not doing small ones, what would turn out to be the salvation of our life? The art of measurement, or the power of appearance?

Doesn't that power lead us astray, and make us often take up the same things now one way, now the other, and regret both our actions and our choices between large and small? Whereas the art of measurement would have robbed this appearance of its authority, and by revealing [356e] the truth would have given the soul peace, abiding by the truth, and would have saved our life. Would people agree, in view of this, that the art of measurement would save us, or some other art?—The art of measurement, he agreed.—And what if the salvation of our life lay in choosing odd and even, when we had to choose rightly the greater and when the lesser, whether of the same kind against itself or of one against the other, and whether near or far? What would save our [357a] life?

Wouldn't it be knowledge? And wouldn't it be a kind of measurement, since the art deals with excess and deficiency? And since it deals with odd and even, could it be anything but arithmetic? Would people agree with us or not?—Protagoras too thought they would agree.—Very well, people. Since the salvation of our life has turned out to lie in the right choice of pleasure and pain, of more and fewer, [357b] greater and smaller, farther and nearer, doesn't it appear, first of all, to be measurement, since it is an inquiry into excess and deficiency and equality relative to one another?—It has to be.—And since it is measurement, it must surely be an art and a knowledge.—They'll agree.—Which art and which knowledge it is, we'll examine another time. That it is knowledge is enough for the proof that Protagoras and I [357c] have to give in answer to your question.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
357c	ἤρεσθε δέ, εἰ μέμνησθε, ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὡμολογοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων· ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὡμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς· “ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατε [357d] ἡμῖν.” εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἴπομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελᾶτε ἂν ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελᾶτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε.	You asked it, if you remember, when we were agreeing with each other that nothing is more powerful than knowledge, and that wherever it is present it always prevails over pleasure and everything else. You, though, said that pleasure often prevails even over the man who knows. When we didn’t agree with you, you went on to ask us: “Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience isn’t being overcome by pleasure, then what on earth is it? What do you say it is? Tell [357d] us.” Now if we had told you then and there that it was ignorance, you would have laughed at us. But if you laugh at us now, you’ll be laughing at yourselves too.
357d	καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὡμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείᾳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας—ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά—καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἧς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ὡμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη πρᾶξις [357e] ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθίᾳ πράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη, ἧς Πρωταγόρας ὅδε φησὶν ἰατρὸς εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἱππίας· ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς πέμπετε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. [358a]	For you have agreed that those who go wrong in their choice of pleasures and pains, which is to say of good and bad things, go wrong through a lack of knowledge. And not just knowledge, but the kind you agreed a moment ago was measurement. And a wrong action done [357e] without knowledge, as you surely know yourselves, is done through ignorance. So this is what being overcome by pleasure is: ignorance, the greatest ignorance there is. Protagoras here claims to be a doctor for it, and so do Prodicus and Hippias. But because you think it is something other than ignorance, you neither go yourselves nor send your children to these sophists here, the teachers of these things, on the ground that it can’t be taught. Instead you hold on to your money and won’t give it to them, and so you fare badly both in private and in public life. [358a]
358a	ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ἦμεν· ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, ὦ Ἱππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε (κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος) πότερον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι.—ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα.—ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν. τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι· εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα [358b] ὀνομάζων, ὦ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι.—γελάσας οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.—τί δὲ δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἆρ’ οὐ καλαί καὶ ὠφέλιμοι;	That is how we would have answered most people. But now I ask you, Hippias and Prodicus, along with Protagoras (let the argument be shared with you too), whether you think what I say is true or false.—Everyone thought what had been said was tremendously true.—So you agree, I said, that the pleasant is good and the painful bad. I must beg Prodicus here to excuse me from his distinctions between names. Whether you call it pleasant or delightful or enjoyable, or however and from whatever source you like to name [358b] such things, my excellent Prodicus, answer me on the point I mean.—Prodicus laughed and agreed, and so did the others.—Well then, gentlemen, I said, what about this? All actions aimed at this, at living without pain and pleasantly, aren’t they fine and beneficial?

GREEK

ENGLISH

358b καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον;—συνεδόκει. —εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἄλλα βελτίω εἶναι ἢ [358c] ἃ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἔπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω· οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμαθία, οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία.—συνεδόκει πᾶσιν.—τί δὲ δή;

And isn't a fine action good and beneficial?—They agreed.—Then if the pleasant is good, I said, no one who knows or believes that something else is better than [358c] what he is doing, and possible, goes on doing what he's doing when he could do the better. Nor is being defeated by oneself anything other than ignorance, nor being master of oneself anything other than wisdom.—Everyone agreed.—Well, then?

358c ἀμαθίαν ἆρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων;—καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει.—ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπί γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδὲ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' [358d] ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῇ δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον αἱρήσεται ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαττον;—ἅπαντα ταῦτα συνεδόκει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν.—τί οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἆρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; (πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικε).

Do you call ignorance something like this: having a false belief and being mistaken about matters of great importance?—Everyone agreed to this too.—Then isn't it the case, I said, that no one willingly goes toward bad things, or toward what he thinks bad? Nor [358d] is it, it seems, in human nature to be willing to go toward what one thinks bad instead of the good. And when someone is forced to choose one of two bad things, no one will choose the greater when he could choose the lesser?—All of us agreed to all of this.—Well, then, I said, is there something you call dread and fear? And is it what I mean? (I'm speaking to you, Prodicus.)

358d προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε.—ἐδόκει Πρωταγόρᾳ μὲν καὶ Ἱππίᾳ δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, [358e] Προδίκῳ δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὔ.—ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφην ἐγώ, Πρόδικε, διαφέρει· ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν ἐστιν, ἆρά τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰέναι ἃ δέδοικεν, ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἃ μή; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων; ἃ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὡμολόγηται ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἃ δὲ ἡγεῖται κακά, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἑκόντα.—ἐδόκει [359a] καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν.

I mean an expectation of something bad, whether you call it fear or dread.—Protagoras and Hippias thought this was both dread and fear, [358e] Prodicus that it was dread, but not fear.—It makes no difference, Prodicus, I said. The point is this. If what we said before is true, will any human being be willing to go toward what he dreads, when he could go toward what he doesn't? Or is that impossible, given what we have agreed? For it has been agreed that what a person dreads he thinks bad, and no one willingly goes toward or takes what he thinks bad.—Everyone [359a] agreed to this too.

COURAGE IS WISDOM

Socrates argues that cowardice is ignorance of what is to be feared, so courage is wisdom.

GREEK

ENGLISH

359a **SOCRATES** οὕτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Πρόδικέ τε καὶ Ἱππία, ἀπολογείσθω ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει—μὴ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασι· τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε ὄντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλ' ἃ τὸ ὕστερον εἶπεν. τὸ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔφη τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις [359b] εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἓν πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, γνώσεσθαι δέ μ' ἔφη τεκμηρίῳ τῷδε· εὑρήσεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες,

SOCRATES With this laid down, Prodicus and Hippias, I said, let Protagoras here defend to us how his first answer is right. Not his very first answer: then he said that of the five parts of excellence none was like any other, each having its own distinct power. I don't mean that, but what he said later. Later he said that four of them were reasonably close to one [359b] another, but that one, courage, differed very much from the others. And he

GREEK

ENGLISH

ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ· ᾧ γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς.

said I would know it by this evidence: You'll find, Socrates, people who are utterly impious, unjust, licentious and ignorant, yet supremely courageous, and from this you will know that courage is very different from the other parts of excellence.

359b καὶ ἐγὼ εὐθὺς τότε πάνυ ἐθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μεθ' ὑμῶν διεξῆλθον. ἠρόμην δ' οὖν τοῦτον εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· ὁ δέ, καὶ 359c ἵτας γ', ἔφη. μέμνησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος;—ὡμολόγει.—ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἦ ἐφ' ἅπερ οἱ δειλοί;—οὐκ ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἕτερα.—ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.—πότερον οἱ μὲν δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά;—λέγεται δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.—ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο 359d ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φῂς ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους;

I was very surprised at that answer right then, and even more so since I have gone through these things with you. Anyway, I asked him whether he meant that the courageous are confident, and he said, 359c Yes, and eager too. Do you remember giving that answer, Protagoras? I said.—He agreed he did.—Come on, then, I said, tell us: toward what do you say the courageous are eager to go? Toward the same things as cowards?—He said no.—Toward different things, then?—Yes, he said.—Do cowards go toward things that inspire confidence, and the courageous toward frightening things?—So people say, Socrates.—That's true, I said, but that's not 359d what I'm asking. Toward what do you say the courageous are eager to go?

359d ἆρ' ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά, ἡγουμένους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ μή;—ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἀδύνατον.—καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ὥστ' εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἃ δεινὰ ἡγεῖται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ ηὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα.—ὡμολόγει.—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπί ἅ γε θαρροῦσι πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ταύτῃ γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ 359e ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοί τε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι.—ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πᾶν γε τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἃ οἵ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι.

Toward frightening things, believing them to be frightening, or toward things that aren't?—But that, he said, was just shown to be impossible, in the arguments you were making.—That's true too, I said. So if that was correctly shown, no one goes toward what he thinks frightening, since being defeated by oneself was found to be ignorance.—He agreed.—But then everyone goes toward what they are confident about, cowards and courageous alike, and in this respect cowards and courageous go toward the same 359e things.—But surely, Socrates, he said, what cowards go toward and what the courageous go toward are complete opposites.

359e αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν.—πότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλὸν ὂν ἰέναι ἢ αἰσχρόν;—καλόν, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὡμολογήσαμεν.—ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.— ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. 360a ἀλλὰ ποτέρους φῂς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι, καλὸν ὂν καὶ ἀγαθόν;—τοὺς δειλούς, ἦ δ' ὅς.—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ;—ὡμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη.—ἆρ' οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον;—ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας.—τί δ' ὁ ἀνδρεῖος;

Take war: the one lot are willing to go to war, the others aren't.—Is going to war fine, I said, or shameful?—Fine, he said.—Then if it's fine, we agreed earlier that it's good too, since we agreed that all fine actions are good.—True, and I always think so.—And rightly, I said. 360a But which do you say are unwilling to go to war, though it is fine and good?—The cowards, he said.—Then if it's fine and good, I said, is it also pleasant?—That has been agreed, at any rate, he said.—So are the cowards, knowing it, unwilling to go toward what is finer and better and more pleasant?—But if we agree to that as well, he said, we'll wreck our earlier agreements.—And what about the courageous man?

360a

GREEK

οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἔρχεται;—ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν.—οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ [360b] ἀνδρεῖοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν;—ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.—εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἆρ' οὐ καλά;—ὡμολόγει.—εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά;—ναί.—οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι τοὐναντίον αἰσχρούς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται καὶ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν;—ὡμολόγει.—θαρροῦσιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν;—οὕτως [360c] ἔχει, ἔφη.—τί οὖν;

ENGLISH

Doesn't he go toward what is finer and better and more pleasant?—We have to agree, he said.—So in general the [360b] courageous don't feel shameful fears when they're afraid, or shameful confidence when they're confident?—True, he said.—And if not shameful, aren't they fine?—He agreed.—And if fine, then good too?—Yes.—Whereas cowards, the rash and the mad, on the contrary, feel shameful fears and shameful confidence?—He agreed.—And is it through anything other than lack of understanding and ignorance that they are confident about what is shameful and bad?—That's [360c] so, he said.—Well, then?

360c τοῦτο δι' ὃ δειλοί εἰσιν οἱ δειλοί, δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς;—δειλίαν ἔγωγ', ἔφη.—δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες;—πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—διὰ ταύτην ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοί εἰσιν;—ὡμολόγει.—δι' ὃ δὲ δειλοί εἰσιν, δειλία ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ;—συνέφη.—οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη;—ἐπένευσε.—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντίον [360d] ἀνδρεία δειλίᾳ.—ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ ἐστίν;—καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν.—ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία;—πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν.—ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία οὖσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ;—οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὔτ' ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε.—καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φῂς ἃ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφῃς;—αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον.—ἕν γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, μόνον [360e] ἐρόμενος ἔτι σέ, εἴ σοι ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτι δοκοῦσιν εἶναί τινες ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μέν, ἀνδρειότατοι δέ.—φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.

That through which cowards are cowards, do you call it cowardice or courage?—Cowardice, he said.—And didn't it turn out that they are cowards through ignorance of what is frightening?—Certainly, he said.—So it is through this ignorance that they are cowards?—He agreed.—And that through which they are cowards is, you agree, cowardice?—He assented.—Then ignorance of what is and isn't frightening would be cowardice?—He nodded.—But surely, I said, courage is the opposite [360d] of cowardice.—He said yes.—And wisdom about what is and isn't frightening is the opposite of ignorance of these things?—Here too he still nodded.—And ignorance of these things is cowardice?—Here he nodded very reluctantly.—So wisdom about what is and isn't frightening is courage, being the opposite of ignorance of these things?—At this he was no longer willing even to nod, and kept silent.—And I said: What's this, Protagoras? You neither say yes to my question nor no?—Finish it yourself, he said.—I'll ask you just one more thing, I said: [360e] do you still think, as you did at first, that some people are utterly ignorant and yet supremely courageous?—You seem to me, Socrates, he said, to be set on winning by making me the one who answers. So I'll do you this favor and say that, given what we have agreed, it seems to me impossible.

THE REVERSAL

Socrates notes that he and Protagoras have switched sides on whether excellence can be taught.

GREEK

360e **SOCRATES** οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου φανεροῦ [361a] γενομένου μάλιστ' ἂν κατάδηλον

ENGLISH

SOCRATES Really, I said, I'm asking all these questions for no other reason than that I want to examine how matters stand with excellence, and what excellence itself is. For I know that once this [361a]

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	γένοιτο ἐκεῖνο περὶ οὗ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἑκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν.	became clear, that other question would become perfectly clear too, the one on which you and I each spun out a long speech, I saying that excellence can't be taught, you that it can.
361a	καί μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι "ἄτοποί γ' ἐστέ, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ τἀναντία [361b] σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ᾧ τρόπῳ μάλιστ' ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη ἡ ἀρετή. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετή, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἦν διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν.	And it seems to me that the outcome of our argument just now is accusing us and laughing at us, like a person, and if it found a voice it would say: "You're strange people, Socrates and Protagoras. You, who said earlier that excellence can't be taught, are now bent on contradicting yourself, [361b] trying to show that everything is knowledge, justice and moderation and courage alike, which is the way excellence would most clearly turn out to be teachable. If excellence were something other than knowledge, as Protagoras was trying to say, it clearly couldn't be taught. But now, if it turns out to be knowledge through and through, as you are bent on showing, Socrates, it will be astonishing if it can't be taught.
361b	Πρωταγόρας δ' αὖ διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος, νῦν τοὐναντίον ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι ὀλίγου πάντα [361c] μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἥκιστα εἴη διδακτόν." ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἄνω κάτω ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ αὐτὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅτι ἔστιν, καὶ πάλιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν, μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῇ σκέψει [361d] σφήλῃ ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ ἠμέλησεν ἡμῶν, ὡς φῂς σύ.	Protagoras, on the other hand, who assumed then that it could be taught, now seems bent on the opposite, on showing it to be almost anything [361c] rather than knowledge. And that way it would be least teachable of all." So, Protagoras, seeing all this terribly tangled and turned upside down, I am very eager for it to become clear. I'd like us to go through all this and arrive at what excellence is, and then examine again whether it can be taught or not, so that your Epimetheus doesn't trip us up and deceive us in our inquiry [361d] too, just as he neglected us in the distribution, according to you.
361d	ἤρεσεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως· ᾧ χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ ἐθέλοις, ὅπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἥδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην.	In the myth, too, I liked Prometheus better than Epimetheus. It is by following him and taking forethought for my whole life that I busy myself with all these things. And if you were willing, as I said at the start, I would be very glad to look into them with you.
	καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε [361e] τἆλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἥκιστ' ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἴρηκα ὅτι ὧν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαί σε, τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνυ· καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰς αὖθις, ὅταν βούλῃ, διέξιμεν· νῦν δ' ὥρα ἤδη καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο τι τρέπεσθαι. [362a]	And Protagoras said: I commend your eagerness, Socrates, and the way you work through an argument. I don't think I'm a bad man [361e] in other respects, and I'm the least envious of men. I've told many people, in fact, that of all those I meet I admire you by far the most, and of those your age far above all. And I say that I wouldn't be surprised if you became one of the men renowned for wisdom. We'll go through these matters another time, whenever you like. But now it's time to turn to something else. [362a]

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362a	ἀλλ’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οἷπερ ἔφην ἰέναι πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ καλῷ χαριζόμενος παρέμεινα.	Well, I said, that’s what we should do, if you think so. In fact it has long been time for me to go where I said I was going. I stayed only as a favor to the beautiful Callias.
	ταῦτ’ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῆμεν.	When these things had been said and heard, we left.[27]

27 “The beautiful Callias” puns on his name, which echoes *kalos*, “beautiful.”