# Sophist

PLATO
c. 428–348 BC

# Sophist

Σοφιστής

*Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited*

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*Sophist* · Plato (c. 428–348 BC)

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# INTRODUCTION

The day after the conversation in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates, Theodorus and Theaetetus are joined by a visitor from Elea, the home of Parmenides. Socrates asks him a question: are the sophist, the statesman and the philosopher one thing or three? The Stranger takes the young Theaetetus as his partner and sets out to catch the sophist.

His method is division: split a broad class in two, keep the half the quarry belongs to, and repeat. The sophist slips away again and again—hunter of rich young men, merchant of learning, professional arguer—until he is cornered as a maker of images and falsehoods. But a falsehood says what is not, and Parmenides taught that what is not cannot even be spoken of.

To answer him, the Stranger has to commit what he calls parricide against his teacher. The middle of the dialogue is one of Plato's richest pieces of philosophy: a battle between materialists and friends of the forms, the "greatest kinds" and the claim that not-being is simply difference. Only then can the sophist be caught.

# Sophist

*Athens, the day after the Theaetetus.*
*A visitor from Elea hunts down the sophist and finds he must say how "what is not" can be.*

GREEK

ENGLISH

216a **THEODORUS** κατὰ τὴν χθὲς ὁμολογίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥκομεν αὐτοί τε κοσμίως καὶ τόνδε τινὰ ξένον ἄγομεν, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἐλέας, ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα ἑταίρων, μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον.

**THEODORUS** Here we are, Socrates, as we agreed yesterday, punctual as we should be. And we've brought this man along, a stranger. He comes from Elea, he belongs to the circle of Parmenides and Zeno, and he's very much a philosopher.[1]

**SOCRATES** ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, οὐ ξένον ἀλλά τινα θεὸν ἄγων κατὰ τὸν Ὁμήρου λόγον λέληθας; ὅς φησιν ἄλλους [216b] τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοι μετέχουσιν αἰδοῦς δικαίας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ξένιον οὐχ ἥκιστα θεὸν συνοπαδὸν γιγνόμενον ὕβρεις τε καὶ εὐνομίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθορᾶν. τάχ' οὖν ἂν καὶ σοί τις οὗτος τῶν κρειττόνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποψόμενός τε καὶ ἐλέγξων, θεὸς ὢν τις ἐλεγκτικός.

**SOCRATES** Then are you perhaps, Theodorus, bringing not a stranger but some god without knowing it, as Homer's account has it? He says that the other [216b] gods, and not least the god of strangers, keep company with human beings who have a just sense of shame, and look down on people's insolence and their lawfulness. So perhaps this man following you is one of the higher powers, come to watch over us and refute us, poor as we are at arguments. He'd be a sort of god of refutation.[2]

216b **THEODORUS** οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ξένου, ἀλλὰ μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότων. καί μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἀνὴρ οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μήν· πάντας [216c] γὰρ ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσαγορεύω.

**THEODORUS** That's not our stranger's way, Socrates. He's more measured than the people who are keen on disputes. To me the man doesn't seem to be a god at all, but he's certainly godlike, since I call all [216c] philosophers that.

216c **SOCRATES** καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ φίλε. τοῦτο μέντοι κινδυνεύει τὸ γένος οὐ πολύ τι ῥᾷον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἶναι διακρίνειν ἢ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ· πάνυ γὰρ ἄνδρες οὗτοι παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγνοιαν ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόλης, οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, καθορῶντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον, καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι, τοῖς δ' ἄξιοι τοῦ παντός· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν πολιτικοὶ [216d] φαντάζονται, τοτὲ δὲ σοφισταί, τοτὲ δ' ἔστιν οἷς δόξαν παράσχοιντ' ἂν ὡς παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς. τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἂν πυνθανοίμην, εἰ φίλον αὐτῷ, τί ταῦθ' [217a] οἱ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ τόπον ἡγοῦντο καὶ ὠνόμαζον.

**SOCRATES** And rightly so, my friend. But this kind is probably not much easier to tell apart, so to speak, than the kind of the god. These men take on all sorts of appearances because of other people's ignorance, and they "go about the cities." I mean those who aren't fake but genuine philosophers, looking down from on high at the life of those below. Some people think them worth nothing, others worth everything. Sometimes they appear as statesmen, [216d] sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they might give some people the impression of being completely mad. But I'd be glad to learn from our stranger, if he doesn't mind,

1 Elea was a Greek city in southern Italy, home of the philosopher Parmenides and his follower Zeno. The visitor is called simply "the Stranger" throughout.
2 In Homer's *Odyssey*, gods disguised as strangers "go about the cities" watching how people behave. The god of strangers is Zeus, protector of guests.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | | what [217a] the people in his part of the world thought about these things, and what they called them. |
| 217a | **THEODORUS** τὰ ποῖα δή; | **THEODORUS** What things, exactly? |
| | **SOCRATES** σοφιστήν, πολιτικόν, φιλόσοφον. | **SOCRATES** Sophist, statesman, philosopher. |
| | **THEODORUS** τί δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν διαπορηθεὶς ἐρέσθαι διενοήθης; | **THEODORUS** What is it about them that puzzles you most? What sort of question did you have in mind to ask? |
| | **SOCRATES** τόδε· πότερον ἓν πάντα ταῦτα ἐνόμιζον ἢ δύο, ἢ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα τρία, τρία καὶ τὰ γένη διαιρούμενοι καθ' ἓν ὄνομα γένος ἑκάστῳ προσῆπτον; | **SOCRATES** This: did they think all of these were one thing, or two? Or, since there are three names, did they also divide them into three kinds and attach a kind to each name, one by one? |
| | **THEODORUS** ἀλλ' οὐδείς, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, φθόνος αὐτῷ διελθεῖν αὐτά· ἢ πῶς, ὦ ξένε, λέγωμεν; | **THEODORUS** Well, I don't think he'd begrudge going through them. Or what do you say, Stranger? |
| 217b | **STRANGER** οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε. φθόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γε τρί' ἡγοῦντο· καθ' ἕκαστον μὴν διορίσασθαι σαφῶς τί ποτ' ἔστιν, οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἔργον. | **STRANGER** Just that, Theodorus. I don't begrudge it, and it isn't hard to say that they thought there were three. But to define clearly what each one is—that's no small or easy job. |
| | **THEODORUS** καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίων ὧν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς δεῦρ' ἐλθεῖν διερωτῶντες αὐτὸν ἐτυγχάνομεν, ὁ δὲ ταὐτὰ ἅπερ πρὸς σὲ νῦν καὶ τότε ἐσκήπτετο πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπεὶ διακηκοέναι γέ φησιν ἱκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμνημονεῖν. | **THEODORUS** As it happens, Socrates, you've hit on questions very close to the ones we were putting to him before we came here. He made the same excuses to us then that he's making to you now. Yet he says he's heard the subject thoroughly discussed and hasn't forgotten it. |
| 217c | **SOCRATES** μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, ἡμῶν τήν γε πρώτην αἰτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένῃ, τοσόνδε δ' ἡμῖν φράζε. πότερον εἴωθας ἥδιον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων τοῦτο ὃ ἂν ἐνδείξασθαί τῳ βουληθῇς, ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὤν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου; | **SOCRATES** Then, Stranger, don't refuse us the very first favor we've asked. Just tell us this much. Which do you usually prefer: to go through what you want to show someone on your own, in a long speech, or to do it by questions? Parmenides once used questions when he went through some magnificent arguments in my presence. I was young then, and he was already quite old.[3] |
| 217d | **STRANGER** τῷ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως προσδιαλεγομένῳ ῥᾷον οὕτω, τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ καθ' αὑτόν. | **STRANGER** If the other person is no trouble and responds easily to the rein, Socrates, it's easier the first way, with a partner. If not, it's easier on one's own. |
| | **SOCRATES** ἔξεστι τοίνυν τῶν παρόντων ὃν ἂν βουληθῇς ἐκλέξασθαι, πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούσονταί σοι πρᾴως· συμβούλῳ μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τινὰ αἱρήσῃ, Θεαίτητον τόνδε, ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τίς σοι κατὰ νοῦν. | **SOCRATES** Well, you can choose whichever of those present you like; they'll all answer you gently. But if you take my advice, you'll pick one of the young ones, Theaetetus here, or anyone else, if someone's more to your liking. |

3 Plato depicts this meeting between the young Socrates and the aged Parmenides in his dialogue *Parmenides*.

GREEK

ENGLISH

**STRANGER** ὦ Σώκρατες, αἰδώς τίς μ' ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον συγγενόμενον ὑμῖν μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος ποιεῖσθαι [217e] τὴν συνουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐκτείναντα ἀπομηκύνειν λόγον συχνὸν κατ' ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενον· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν οὐχ ὅσον ὧδε ἐρωτηθὲν ἐλπίσειεν ἂν αὐτὸ εἶναί τις, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει λόγου παμμήκους ὄν. τὸ δὲ αὖ σοὶ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ τοῖσδε, ἄλλως τε καὶ σοῦ λέξαντος ὡς εἶπες, ἄξενόν τι καταφαίνεταί μοι καὶ [218a] ἄγριον. ἐπεὶ Θεαίτητόν γε τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον εἶναι δέχομαι παντάπασιν ἐξ ὧν αὐτός τε πρότερον διείλεγμαι καὶ σὺ τὰ νῦν μοι διακελεύῃ.

**STRANGER** Socrates, since this is the first time I've met you all, I'm somewhat embarrassed at the idea of not conducting [217e] our conversation in short exchanges, word for word. I'd rather not stretch out a long speech on my own, or even addressed to someone else, as if I were giving a display. In fact the question you just asked isn't as small as one might expect from the way it was put; it calls for a very long account. On the other hand, not to oblige you and these gentlemen, especially after you've spoken as you did, strikes me as ungracious to my hosts and [218a] boorish. So I gladly accept Theaetetus as my partner in conversation, both because of my own earlier talk with him and because you now urge me to.

218a **THEAETETUS** δρᾶ τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, οὕτω καὶ καθάπερ εἶπε Σωκράτης πᾶσιν κεχαρισμένος ἔσῃ.

**THEAETETUS** Then do just that, Stranger, and as Socrates said, you'll be doing all of us a favor.

**STRANGER** κινδυνεύει πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔτι λεκτέον εἶναι, Θεαίτητε· πρὸς δὲ σὲ ἤδη τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνοιτο ἂν ὁ λόγος. ἂν δ' ἄρα τι τῷ μήκει πονῶν ἄχθῃ, μὴ ἐμὲ αἰτιᾶσθαι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τούσδε τοὺς σοὺς ἑταίρους.

**STRANGER** It looks as if there's nothing more to say about that, Theaetetus. From here on, it seems, the conversation will be with you. But if the length wears you out and you get annoyed, don't blame me—blame these friends of yours.

218b **THEAETETUS** ἀλλ' οἶμαι μὲν δὴ νῦν οὕτως οὐκ ἀπερεῖν· ἂν δ' ἄρα τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται, καὶ τόνδε παραληψόμεθα Σωκράτη, τὸν Σωκράτους μὲν ὁμώνυμον, ἐμὸν δὲ ἡλικιώτην καὶ συγγυμναστήν, ᾧ συνδιαπονεῖν μετ' ἐμοῦ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἄηθες.

**THEAETETUS** Well, I don't think I'll give up just now. But if anything like that does happen, we'll bring in Socrates here. He's Socrates' namesake, but he's my age and my partner at the gymnasium, and he's used to sharing most of my hard work.[4]

**STRANGER** εὖ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἰδίᾳ βουλεύσῃ προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου· κοινῇ δὲ μετ' ἐμοῦ σοι συσκεπτέον ἀρχομένῳ πρῶτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ζητοῦντι [218c] καὶ ἐμφανίζοντι λόγῳ τί ποτ' ἔστι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ σύ τε κἀγὼ τούτου πέρι τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ, τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐφ' ᾧ καλοῦμεν ἑκάτερος τάχ' ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν· δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνωμολογῆσθαι χωρὶς λόγου. τὸ δὲ φῦλον ὃ νῦν ἐπινοοῦμεν ζητεῖν οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον συλλαβεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ὁ σοφιστής· ὅσα δ' αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσιν καὶ πάλαι [218d] τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥᾴοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις.

**STRANGER** Well said. You can decide about that privately as the discussion goes on. But you and I need to look into this together. As it seems to me, we should start now with the sophist, searching out [218c] and bringing to light in an account what he is. For at present you and I have only the name in common about him. As for the thing we each call by that name, we may well each have our own private idea of it. But in every case one should always reach agreement about the thing itself through accounts, rather than about the name alone without an account. Now, the tribe we have in mind to search for, the sophist, isn't the easiest thing in the world to grasp, to say what it is. Yet for any great matter that needs to be worked through well, everyone has agreed, and long ago, [218d] that

4 This is the "young Socrates," who becomes the respondent in Plato's *Statesman*.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | | one should practice first on small and easier things before tackling the greatest ones. |

## THE ANGLER

*The Stranger practices the method of division on an easy example before hunting the sophist.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 218d | **STRANGER** νῦν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔγωγε καὶ νῷν οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσθήρευτον ἡγησαμένοις εἶναι τὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον ἐν ἄλλῳ ῥᾴονι τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελετᾶν, εἰ μὴ σύ ποθεν εὐπετεστέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἄλλην ὁδόν. | **STRANGER** So now, Theaetetus, that's my advice for the two of us as well. We regard the kind of the sophist as difficult and hard to hunt down, so we should first practice the method of pursuing him on something easier. That is, unless you can suggest some other, more convenient route. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχω. | **THEAETETUS** No, I can't. |
| | **STRANGER** βούλει δῆτα περί τινος τῶν φαύλων μετιόντες πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος; | **STRANGER** Then shall we take up something trivial and try to make it a model for the greater thing? |
| 218e | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δῆτα προταξαίμεθ' ἂν εὔγνωστον μὲν καὶ σμικρόν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς ἐλάττονα ἔχον τῶν μειζόνων; οἷον ἀσπαλιευτής· ἆρ' οὐ πᾶσί τε γνώριμον καὶ σπουδῆς οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινος ἐπάξιον; | **STRANGER** What, then, should we put before us that's familiar and small, but no less open to an account than any of the greater things? The angler, say. Isn't he known to everyone, and not worth much serious attention? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** That's so. |
| 219a | **STRANGER** μέθοδον μὴν αὐτὸν ἐλπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ ἀνεπιτήδειον ἡμῖν ἕξειν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα. | **STRANGER** Still, I expect he'll give us a method and an account that suit what we want. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι. | **THEAETETUS** That would be fine. |
| | **STRANGER** φέρε δή, τῇδε ἀρχώμεθα αὐτοῦ. καί μοι λέγε· πότερον ὡς τεχνίτην αὐτὸν ἢ τινα ἄτεχνον, ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντα θήσομεν; | **STRANGER** Come on, then, let's start with him like this. Tell me: shall we class him as someone with an art, or as someone without an art but with some other capacity? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἥκιστά γε ἄτεχνον. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly not as someone without an art. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν εἴδη δύο. | **STRANGER** But of all the arts there are, roughly speaking, two kinds. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| | **STRANGER** γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὅση περὶ τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν σῶμα θεραπεία, τό τε αὖ περὶ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ πλαστόν, ὃ δὴ 219b σκεῦος ὠνομάκαμεν, ἥ τε μιμητική, σύμπαντα ταῦτα δικαιότατ' ἂν ἑνὶ προσαγορεύοιτ' ἂν ὀνόματι. | **STRANGER** There's farming, and all care of any mortal body. Then there's whatever has to do with things put together and molded, which we 219b call equipment. And there's imitation. All of these together could most justly be called by a single name. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 219b | **THEAETETUS** πῶς καὶ τίνι; | **THEAETETUS** How, and by what name? |
| | **STRANGER** πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερόν τις ὂν ὕστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγῃ, τὸν μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀγόμενον ποιεῖσθαί πού φαμεν. | **STRANGER** Whenever someone brings into being anything that didn't exist before, we say, I take it, that the one who brings it produces, and that what is brought is produced. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Right. |
| | **STRANGER** τὰ δέ γε νυνδὴ ἃ διήλθομεν ἅπαντα εἶχεν εἰς τοῦτο τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν. | **STRANGER** And all the things we just went through had their power directed to this. |
| | **THEAETETUS** εἶχε γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, they did. |
| | **STRANGER** ποιητικὴν τοίνυν αὐτὰ συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι προσείπωμεν. | **STRANGER** Then let's sum them up and call them the productive art. |
| 219c | **THEAETETUS** ἔστω. | **THEAETETUS** So be it. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δὴ μαθηματικὸν αὖ μετὰ τοῦτο εἶδος ὅλον καὶ τὸ τῆς γνωρίσεως τό τε χρηματιστικὸν καὶ ἀγωνιστικὸν καὶ θηρευτικόν, ἐπειδὴ δημιουργεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν τούτων, τὰ δὲ ὄντα καὶ γεγονότα τὰ μὲν χειροῦται λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι, τὰ δὲ τοῖς χειρουμένοις οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει, μάλιστ' ἄν που διὰ ταῦτα συνάπαντα τὰ μέρη τέχνη τις κτητικὴ λεχθεῖσα ἂν διαπρέψειεν. | **STRANGER** Next, there's the whole kind that has to do with learning and with coming to know, and also money-making, competition and hunting. None of these crafts anything. Some get things that are, or that have come to be, into their hands by words and deeds; others don't let them fall into the hands of those trying to get them. For these reasons, I suppose, all these parts together would most fittingly be called an acquisitive art. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί· πρέποι γὰρ ἄν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, that would fit. |
| 219d | **STRANGER** κτητικῆς δὴ καὶ ποιητικῆς συμπασῶν οὐσῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν ποτέρᾳ τὴν ἀσπαλιευτικήν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τιθῶμεν; | **STRANGER** Now, since all the arts are either acquisitive or productive, Theaetetus, in which shall we place angling? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἐν κτητικῇ που δῆλον. | **THEAETETUS** In the acquisitive, obviously. |
| | **STRANGER** κτητικῆς δὲ ἆρ' οὐ δύο εἴδη; τὸ μὲν ἑκόντων πρὸς ἑκόντας μεταβλητικὸν ὂν διά τε δωρεῶν καὶ μισθώσεων καὶ ἀγοράσεων, τὸ δὲ λοιπόν, ἢ κατ' ἔργα ἢ κατὰ λόγους χειρούμενον σύμπαν, χειρωτικὸν ἂν εἴη; | **STRANGER** And aren't there two kinds of acquisition? One is exchange between willing parties, through gifts, hiring and buying. The rest, which gets everything into its hands by deeds or by words, would be capture. |
| | **THEAETETUS** φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. | **THEAETETUS** So it seems, at least from what's been said. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; τὴν χειρωτικὴν ἆρ' οὐ διχῇ τμητέον; | **STRANGER** Well then, shouldn't capture be cut in two? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** How? |
| 219e | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν ἀναφανδὸν ὅλον ἀγωνιστικὸν θέντας, τὸ δὲ κρυφαῖον αὐτῆς πᾶν θηρευτικόν. | **STRANGER** By setting down all of it that's done openly as competition, and all of it that's done in secret as hunting. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν δέ γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἄλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ τέμνειν διχῇ. | **STRANGER** And it would make no sense not to cut hunting in two as well. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγε ὅπῃ. | **THEAETETUS** Tell me how. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν ἀψύχου γένους διελομένους, τὸ δ' ἐμψύχου. | **STRANGER** By dividing it into the hunting of the lifeless kind and the hunting of the living kind. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; εἴπερ ἔστον γε ἄμφω. | **THEAETETUS** Of course—if there really are both. |
| 220a | **STRANGER** πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστον; καὶ δεῖ γε ἡμᾶς τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀψύχων, ἀνώνυμον ὂν πλὴν κατ' ἔνια τῆς κολυμβητικῆς ἄττα μέρη καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄλλα βραχέα, χαίρειν ἐᾶσαι, τὸ δέ, τῶν ἐμψύχων ζῴων οὖσαν θήραν, προσειπεῖν ζῳοθηρικήν. | **STRANGER** How could there not be? We should let the hunting of lifeless things go. It has no name, apart from some parts of diving and a few other little things like that. The other part, the hunting of living animals, we should call animal-hunting. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔστω. | **THEAETETUS** So be it. |
| | **STRANGER** ζῳοθηρικῆς δὲ ἆρ' οὐ διπλοῦν εἶδος ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν δίκῃ, τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοῖς εἴδεσι καὶ ὀνόμασι διῃρημένον, πεζοθηρικόν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον νευστικοῦ ζῴου πᾶν ἐνυγροθηρικόν; | **STRANGER** And wouldn't it be right to speak of two kinds of animal-hunting? One concerns the kind that goes on foot and is divided into many kinds with many names: land-hunting. The other, all hunting of swimming animals, is fluid-hunting. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| 220b | **STRANGER** νευστικοῦ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνὸν φῦλον ὁρῶμεν, τὸ δὲ ἔνυδρον; | **STRANGER** And among swimming creatures, don't we see one tribe that's winged and another that lives in water? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τοῦ πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἡ θήρα λέγεταί πού τις ὀρνιθευτική. | **STRANGER** And all hunting of the winged kind is called, I believe, fowling. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγεται γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, it is. |
| | **STRANGER** τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἁλιευτική. | **STRANGER** And the hunting of water creatures is, pretty much as a whole, fishing. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; ταύτην αὖ τὴν θήραν ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διέλοιμεν; | **STRANGER** Well then, couldn't we divide this hunting into two very large parts in turn? |
| | **THEAETETUS** κατὰ ποῖα; | **THEAETETUS** What parts? |
| | **STRANGER** καθ' ἃ τὸ μὲν ἔρκεσιν αὐτόθεν ποιεῖται τὴν θήραν, τὸ δὲ πληγῇ. | **STRANGER** One part does its hunting simply with enclosures, the other by striking. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς λέγεις, καὶ πῇ διαιρούμενος ἑκάτερον; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean? How are you distinguishing each one? |
| 220c | | |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μέν, ὅτι πᾶν ὅσον ἂν ἕνεκα κωλύσεως εἴργῃ τι περιέχον, ἕρκος εἰκὸς ὀνομάζειν. | **STRANGER** The first like this: anything that surrounds something and shuts it in to keep it from escaping can reasonably be called an enclosure. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** κύρτους δὴ καὶ δίκτυα καὶ βρόχους καὶ πόρκους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μῶν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἕρκη χρὴ προσαγορεύειν; | **STRANGER** Then wicker traps, nets, snares, creels and the like—surely we should call them nothing but enclosures? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδέν. | **THEAETETUS** Nothing else. |
| | **STRANGER** τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἑρκοθηρικὸν τῆς ἄγρας τὸ μέρος φήσομεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. | **STRANGER** So we'll call this part of hunting enclosure-hunting, or something like that. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δὲ ἀγκίστροις καὶ τριόδουσι πληγῇ γιγνόμενον [220d] ἕτερον μὲν ἐκείνου, πληκτικὴν δέ τινα θήραν ἡμᾶς προσειπεῖν ἑνὶ λόγῳ νῦν χρεών· ἢ τί τις ἄν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἴποι κάλλιον; | **STRANGER** And the part done by striking with hooks and tridents is [220d] different from that one. We should now call it, in a single word, strike-hunting. Or what better name could anyone give it, Theaetetus? |
| 220d | **THEAETETUS** ἀμελῶμεν τοῦ ὀνόματος· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. | **THEAETETUS** Let's not worry about the name. That one will do. |
| | **STRANGER** τῆς τοίνυν πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν νυκτερινὸν οἶμαι πρὸς πυρὸς φῶς γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν θήραν πυρευτικὴν ῥηθῆναι συμβέβηκεν. | **STRANGER** Of strike-hunting, then, the part done at night by firelight has come to be called fire-fishing, I think, by the hunters themselves. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε μεθημερινόν, ὡς ἐχόντων ἐν ἄκροις ἄγκιστρα καὶ τῶν τριοδόντων, πᾶν ἀγκιστρευτικόν. | **STRANGER** And all the part done by day is hook-hunting, since even tridents have hooks at their points. |
| 220e | **THEAETETUS** λέγεται γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, that's what it's called. |
| | **STRANGER** τοῦ τοίνυν ἀγκιστρευτικοῦ τῆς πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν ἄνωθεν εἰς τὸ κάτω γιγνόμενον διὰ τὸ τοῖς τριόδουσιν οὕτω μάλιστα χρῆσθαι τριοδοντία τις οἶμαι κέκληται. | **STRANGER** Now, of the hook-hunting part of strike-hunting, the part done from above downward is called, I think, trident-fishing, because that's how tridents are mostly used. |
| | **THEAETETUS** φασὶ γοῦν τινές. | **THEAETETUS** Some people call it that, anyway. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε λοιπόν ἐστιν ἓν ἔτι μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν εἶδος. | **STRANGER** And what's left is, you might say, just one more kind. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** Which one? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ τῆς ἐναντίας ταύτῃ πληγῆς, ἀγκίστρῳ τε γιγνόμενον καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οὐχ ᾗ τις ἂν τύχῃ τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ [221a] τοῖς τριόδουσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ θηρευθέντος ἑκάστοτε, καὶ κάτωθεν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄνω ῥάβδοις καὶ καλάμοις | **STRANGER** The one with the opposite kind of strike. It's done with a hook, and it doesn't hit the fish wherever on its body one happens to, as [221a] with tridents. Each time it strikes around the head and mouth of the catch, which is then pulled up |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | ἀνασπώμενον· οὖ τί φήσομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δεῖν τοὔνομα λέγεσθαι; | from below, in the opposite direction, with rods and reeds. What shall we say its name should be, Theaetetus? |
| 221a | **THEAETETUS** δοκῶ μέν, ὅπερ ἄρτι προυθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ νῦν ἀποτετελέσθαι. | **THEAETETUS** I think what we set out a moment ago to find has now been accomplished. |
| | **STRANGER** νῦν ἄρα τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικῆς πέρι σύ τε κἀγὼ 221b συνωμολογήκαμεν οὐ μόνον τοὔνομα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοὔργον εἰλήφαμεν ἱκανῶς. συμπάσης γὰρ τέχνης τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ μέρος κτητικὸν ἦν, κτητικοῦ δὲ χειρωτικόν, χειρωτικοῦ δὲ θηρευτικόν, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζῳοθηρικόν, ζῳοθηρικοῦ δὲ ἐνυγροθηρικόν, ἐνυγροθηρικοῦ δὲ τὸ κάτωθεν τμῆμα ὅλον ἁλιευτικόν, ἁλιευτικῆς δὲ πληκτικόν, πληκτικῆς δὲ ἀγκιστρευτικόν· τούτου δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν 221c ἄνω πληγὴν ἀνασπωμένην, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἀφομοιωθὲν τοὔνομα, ἡ νῦν ἀσπαλιευτικὴ ζητηθεῖσα ἐπίκλην γέγονεν. | **STRANGER** So now you and I 221b have agreed not only on the name of angling; we've also adequately grasped the account of the thing itself. Of art as a whole, half was acquisitive. Of the acquisitive, half was capture; of capture, hunting; of hunting, animal-hunting; of animal-hunting, fluid-hunting. Of fluid-hunting, the whole lower section was fishing; of fishing, strike-hunting; of strike-hunting, hook-hunting. And of this, the part concerned with the strike that pulls from below 221c upward has taken its name from the action itself. That's angling, which we were just looking for.[5] |
| 221c | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἱκανῶς δεδήλωται. | **THEAETETUS** That's certainly been made perfectly clear. |
| | **STRANGER** φέρε δή, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐπιχειρῶμεν εὑρεῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν. | **STRANGER** Come on, then, let's use this model and try to find out what the sophist is, too. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** By all means. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γ' ἦν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον, πότερον ἰδιώτην ἢ τινα τέχνην ἔχοντα θετέον εἶναι τὸν ἀσπαλιευτήν. | **STRANGER** Now, our first question was whether we should take the angler to be a layman or someone with an art. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| 221d | **STRANGER** καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦτον ἰδιώτην θήσομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἢ παντάπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν; | **STRANGER** And now, Theaetetus, shall we take this man to be a layman, or in every sense truly a sophist? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδαμῶς ἰδιώτην· μανθάνω γὰρ ὃ λέγεις, ὡς παντὸς δεῖ τοιοῦτος εἶναι τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχων. | **THEAETETUS** Not a layman at all. I see what you mean: someone with that name is anything but a layman. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλά τινα τέχνην αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἔχοντα, ὡς ἔοικε, θετέον. | **STRANGER** Then it seems we have to take him to have some art. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τίνα ποτ' οὖν δὴ ταύτην; | **THEAETETUS** Then what art can it be? |

5 The Greek word for angling, *aspalieutikē*, is linked here with *anaspan*, "to draw up."

## FIRST DEFINITION: THE HUNTER

*Divided down from hunting, the sophist is a paid hunter of rich young men.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** ἆρ' ὦ πρὸς θεῶν ἠγνοήκαμεν τἀνδρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα ὄντα συγγενῆ; | **STRANGER** Good gods, have we failed to notice that the one man is a relative of the other? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τίνα τοῦ; | **THEAETETUS** Who of whom? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸν ἀσπαλιευτὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ. | **STRANGER** The angler of the sophist. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** How? |
| | **STRANGER** θηρευτά τινε καταφαίνεσθον ἄμφω μοι. | **STRANGER** They both look to me like hunters. |
| 221e | **THEAETETUS** τίνος θήρας ἄτερος; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον εἴπομεν. | **THEAETETUS** What sort of hunting does the other one do? We've described the first. |
| | **STRANGER** δίχα που νυνδὴ διείλομεν τὴν ἄγραν πᾶσαν, νευστικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες. | **STRANGER** A moment ago we divided all hunting in two, cutting off one part for swimming creatures and the other for land creatures. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τὸ μὲν διήλθομεν, ὅσον περὶ τὰ νευστικὰ τῶν ἐνύδρων· τὸ δὲ πεζὸν εἰάσαμεν ἄσχιστον, εἰπόντες ὅτι πολυειδὲς εἴη. | **STRANGER** And we went through the first, as far as it concerns the swimming creatures that live in water. But we left the land part undivided, saying it had many kinds. |
| 222a | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** μέχρι μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ ὁ ἀσπαλιευτὴς ἅμα ἀπὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης πορεύεσθον. | **STRANGER** Up to this point, then, the sophist and the angler travel together, starting from the acquisitive art. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἐοίκατον γοῦν. | **THEAETETUS** It certainly looks that way. |
| | **STRANGER** ἐκτρέπεσθον δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς ζῳοθηρικῆς, ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ θάλαττάν που καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ λίμνας, τὰ ἐν τούτοις ζῷα θηρευσόμενος. | **STRANGER** But they part ways at animal-hunting. One heads for the sea, I suppose, and for rivers and lakes, to hunt the animals in them. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** ὁ δέ γε ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ ποταμοὺς ἑτέρους αὖ τινας, πλούτου καὶ νεότητος οἷον λειμῶνας ἀφθόνους, τἀν τούτοις θρέμματα χειρωσόμενος. | **STRANGER** The other heads for the land, and for rivers of a different sort—rich meadows, you might say, of wealth and youth—to capture the creatures there. |
| 222b | **THEAETETUS** πῶς λέγεις; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean? |
| | **STRANGER** τῆς πεζῆς θήρας γίγνεσθον δύο μεγίστω τινὲ μέρει. | **STRANGER** Land-hunting has two very large parts. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ποῖον ἑκάτερον; | **THEAETETUS** What is each of them? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν τῶν ἡμέρων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγρίων. | |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | | **STRANGER** One is the hunting of tame animals, the other of wild ones. |
| | **THEAETETUS** εἶτ' ἔστι τις θήρα τῶν ἡμέρων; | **THEAETETUS** So there's such a thing as hunting tame animals? |
| | **STRANGER** εἴπερ γέ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἥμερον ζῷον. θὲς δὲ ὅπῃ χαίρεις, εἴτε μηδὲν τιθεὶς ἥμερον, εἴτε ἄλλο μὲν ἡμερόν τι, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄγριον, εἴτε ἥμερον μὲν λέγεις αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώπων δὲ μηδεμίαν ἡγῇ θήραν· τούτων ὁπότερ' ἂν ἡγῇ φίλον εἰρῆσθαί σοι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν διόρισον. | **STRANGER** There is, if a human being is a tame animal. But put it however you like. You can count nothing as tame. You can count something else as tame but human beings as wild. Or you can say that human beings are tame but hold that there's no hunting of them. Settle it for us: which of these would you like to say? |
| 222c | **THEAETETUS** ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς τε ἥμερον, ὦ ξένε, ἡγοῦμαι ζῷον, θήραν τε ἀνθρώπων εἶναι λέγω. | **THEAETETUS** Well, Stranger, I think we're a tame animal, and I say there is such a thing as hunting human beings. |
| | **STRANGER** διττὴν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἡμεροθηρικὴν εἴπωμεν. | **STRANGER** Then let's say that tame-hunting is twofold as well. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κατὰ τί λέγοντες; | **THEAETETUS** On what basis? |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν μὲν ληστικὴν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστικὴν καὶ τυραννικὴν καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν πολεμικήν, ἓν πάντα, βίαιον θήραν, ὁρισάμενοι. | **STRANGER** We'll define piracy, slave-raiding, tyranny and warfare as a whole, all together as one, as violent hunting. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καλῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Good. |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν δέ γε δικανικὴν καὶ δημηγορικὴν καὶ προσομιλητικήν, ἓν αὖ τὸ σύνολον, πιθανουργικήν τινα μίαν 222d τέχνην προσειπόντες. | **STRANGER** And we'll call law-court pleading, public speaking and conversation, again all together as one, a single 222d art of persuasion. |
| 222d | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Right. |
| | **STRANGER** τῆς δὴ πιθανουργικῆς διττὰ λέγωμεν γένη. | **STRANGER** Of persuasion, then, let's say there are two kinds. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ποῖα; | **THEAETETUS** What are they? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἰδίᾳ, τὸ δὲ δημοσίᾳ γιγνόμενον. | **STRANGER** One takes place in private, the other in public. |
| | **THEAETETUS** γίγνεσθον γὰρ οὖν εἶδος ἑκάτερον. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, there are those two kinds. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν αὖ τῆς ἰδιοθηρευτικῆς τὸ μὲν μισθαρνητικόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ δωροφορικόν; | **STRANGER** And again, of private hunting, isn't one part wage-earning and the other gift-giving? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐ μανθάνω. | **THEAETETUS** I don't follow. |
| | **STRANGER** τῇ τῶν ἐρώντων θήρᾳ τὸν νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικας, οὔπω προσέσχες. | **STRANGER** It seems you haven't yet paid attention to the way lovers hunt. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τοῦ πέρι; | **THEAETETUS** What about it? |
| 222e | **STRANGER** ὅτι τοῖς θηρευθεῖσι δῶρα προσεπιδιδόασιν. | |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | | **STRANGER** That they actually give gifts to the ones they've caught. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. | **THEAETETUS** Very true. |
| | **STRANGER** τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης ἔστω εἶδος. | **STRANGER** Then let this be a kind of the art of love. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** τοῦ δέ γε μισθαρνητικοῦ τὸ μὲν προσομιλοῦν διὰ χάριτος καὶ παντάπασι δι' ἡδονῆς τὸ δέλεαρ πεποιημένον καὶ τὸν μισθὸν πραττόμενον τροφὴν ἑαυτῷ μόνον κολακικήν, ὡς [223a] ἐγῷμαι, πάντες φαῖμεν ἂν ἢ ἡδυντικήν τινα τέχνην εἶναι. | **STRANGER** Now take the part of wage-earning that keeps company by gratifying people. It makes pleasure its only bait and asks for nothing as its wage but its own keep. We'd all say, [223a] I think, that this is flattery, or some art of pleasing. |
| 223a | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δὲ ἐπαγγελλόμενον μὲν ὡς ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τὰς ὁμιλίας ποιούμενον, μισθὸν δὲ νόμισμα πραττόμενον, ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἑτέρῳ προσειπεῖν ἄξιον ὀνόματι; | **STRANGER** But the part that claims to keep company for the sake of excellence, and asks for money as its wage—doesn't that kind deserve to be called by another name? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** τίνι δὴ τούτῳ; πειρῶ λέγειν. | **STRANGER** What name, then? Try to say. |
| | **THEAETETUS** δῆλον δή· τὸν γὰρ σοφιστήν μοι δοκοῦμεν ἀνηυρηκέναι. τοῦτ' οὖν ἔγωγε εἰπὼν τὸ προσῆκον ὄνομ' ἂν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτόν. | **THEAETETUS** It's obvious. I think we've found the sophist. That's what I'd say, and I'd consider I was calling him by the right name. |
| 223b | **STRANGER** κατὰ δὴ τὸν νῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λόγον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς, χειρωτικῆς, κτητικῆς, θηρευτικῆς, ζῳοθηρίας, πεζοθηρίας, χερσαίας, ἡμεροθηρικῆς, ἀνθρωποθηρίας, πιθανοθηρίας, ἰδιοθηρίας, μισθαρνικῆς, νομισματοπωλικῆς, δοξοπαιδευτικῆς, νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐνδόξων γιγνομένη θήρα προσρητέον, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, σοφιστική. | **STRANGER** So according to our present account, Theaetetus, it seems that the art in question must be called sophistry. It belongs to appropriation, capture, acquisition, hunting, animal-hunting, land-hunting, hunting on dry land, tame-hunting, human-hunting, persuasion-hunting, private hunting, wage-earning, selling for money and education in seeming. It is the hunting of rich and prominent young men. That, at any rate, is where our present account lands us. |
| | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |

## SECOND DEFINITION: THE MERCHANT

*He trades in learning for the soul, carrying it from city to city for sale.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 223c | **STRANGER** ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῇδε ἴδωμεν· οὐ γάρ τι φαύλης μέτοχόν ἐστι τέχνης τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον, ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα ποικίλης. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις φάντασμα παρέχεται μὴ τοῦτο ὃ νῦν αὐτὸ ἡμεῖς φαμεν ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶναί τι γένος. | **STRANGER** Let's look at it this way too. What we're looking for has a share in no trivial art, but a highly complex one. In fact, even from what we said earlier, it gives the appearance of being not what we're now saying it is, but some other kind. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** πῇ δή; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλοῦν ἦν εἶδός που, τὸ μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἀλλακτικόν. | **STRANGER** The acquisitive art had two kinds, I believe: one part hunting, the other exchange. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἦν γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, it did. |
| | **STRANGER** τῆς τοίνυν ἀλλακτικῆς δύο εἴδη λέγωμεν, τὸ μὲν δωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀγοραστικόν; | **STRANGER** Shall we say there are two kinds of exchange, one by giving, the other by trading? |
| | **THEAETETUS** εἰρήσθω. | **THEAETETUS** Let's say so. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν αὖ φήσομεν ἀγοραστικὴν διχῇ τέμνεσθαι. | **STRANGER** And we'll say in turn that trading is cut in two. |
| 223d | **THEAETETUS** πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** How? |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαιρουμένην, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικήν. | **STRANGER** Into the selling of one's own products, practiced by those who make them, and dealing, which exchanges the works of others. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἡ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγή, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἥμισυ μέρος ὄν, καπηλικὴ προσαγορεύεται; | **STRANGER** Well then, isn't the part of dealing that exchanges within a city, roughly half of it, called retail? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλάττον ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει ἐμπορική; | **STRANGER** And the part that exchanges by buying and selling from one city to another is commerce? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| 223e | **STRANGER** τῆς δ' ἐμπορικῆς ἆρ' οὐκ ἠσθήμεθα ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσοις τὸ σῶμα τρέφεται καὶ χρῆται, τὸ δὲ ὅσοις ἡ ψυχή, πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται; | **STRANGER** And haven't we noticed that commerce sells things for money? Part of it exchanges the things the body feeds on and uses, and part the things the soul does. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean by that? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἴσως ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ τό γε ἕτερόν που συνίεμεν. | **STRANGER** Perhaps it's the part concerned with the soul that we don't recognize, since we do understand the other one, I take it. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| 224a | **STRANGER** μουσικήν τε τοίνυν συνάπασαν λέγωμεν, ἐκ πόλεως ἑκάστοτε εἰς πόλιν ἔνθεν μὲν ὠνηθεῖσαν, ἑτέρωσε δὲ ἀγομένην καὶ πιπρασκομένην, καὶ γραφικὴν καὶ θαυματοποιικὴν καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ μὲν παραμυθίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς χάριν ἀχθέντα καὶ πωλούμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πωλοῦντα μηδὲν ἧττον τῆς | **STRANGER** Then take music, all of it, which is regularly bought in one city and carried off to another and sold there. Take painting, too, and conjuring, and many other things for the soul that are carried around and sold, some for amusement and some for serious ends. Let's say that whoever carries and sells them can rightly be called a mer- |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | τῶν σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν πράσεως ἔμπορον ὀρθῶς ἂν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν. | chant, no less than someone who sells food and drink. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. | **THEAETETUS** Very true. |
| 224b | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα συνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταὐτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα; | **STRANGER** And won't you give the same name to someone who buys up learning and trades it for money from city to city? |
| | **THEAETETUS** σφόδρα γε. | **THEAETETUS** Definitely. |
| | **STRANGER** τῆς δὴ ψυχεμπορικῆς ταύτης ἆρ' οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικὴ δικαιότατα λέγοιτ' ἄν, τὸ δὲ γελοίῳ μὲν οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ πρόσθεν, ὅμως δὲ μαθημάτων οὖσαν πρᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἀδελφῷ τινι τῆς πράξεως ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἀνάγκη; | **STRANGER** Then one part of this soul-commerce could most justly be called display, couldn't it? The other part is in fact the sale of learning, so we have no choice but to call it by a name related to that activity—one no less ridiculous than the last. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς μαθηματοπωλικῆς τὸ μὲν περὶ [224c] τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μαθήματα ἑτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλῳ προσρητέον. | **STRANGER** Of this learning-selling, then, the part concerned [224c] with learning in the other arts must be called by one name, and the part concerned with excellence by another. |
| 224c | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** τεχνοπωλικὸν μὴν τό γε περὶ τἆλλα ἂν ἁρμόττοι· τὸ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα σὺ προθυμήθητι λέγειν ὄνομα. | **STRANGER** "Art-selling" would suit the part concerned with the other subjects. As for the part concerned with excellence, you try to name it. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ τί τις ἂν ἄλλο ὄνομα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν πλημμελοίη πλὴν τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ σοφιστικὸν γένος; | **THEAETETUS** What other name could anyone give it without striking a false note? It is the very thing we're looking for, the sophistic kind. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ἴθι δὴ νῦν συναγάγωμεν αὐτὸ λέγοντες ὡς τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς, ἀγοραστικῆς, [224d] ἐμπορικῆς, ψυχεμπορικῆς περὶ λόγους καὶ μαθήματα ἀρετῆς πωλητικὸν δεύτερον ἀνεφάνη σοφιστική. | **STRANGER** No other name. Come on, then, let's pull it together. Sophistry has come to light a second time. It is the selling part of acquisition, exchange, trading, [224d] commerce and soul-commerce, and what it sells is speeches and learning about excellence. |
| 224d | **THEAETETUS** μάλα γε. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |

### THIRD AND FOURTH: RETAILER AND MAKER

*Settled in one city, he sells learning bought from others or made up himself.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τρίτον δέ γ' οἶμαί σε, κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει, τὰ μὲν ὠνούμενος, τὰ δὲ καὶ τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸς μαθήματα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πωλῶν, ἐκ τούτου τὸ ζῆν προυτάξατο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νυνδή. | **STRANGER** And third, I think, suppose someone settled right here in a city. He buys some learning on these same subjects and makes some up himself, sells it, and has set himself to make his living that way. You'd call him nothing other than what we called him just now. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** τί δ' οὐ μέλλω; | **THEAETETUS** Of course I would. |
| 224e | **STRANGER** καὶ τὸ κτητικῆς ἄρα μεταβλητικόν, ἀγοραστικόν, καπηλικὸν εἴτε αὐτοπωλικόν, ἀμφοτέρως, ὅτιπερ ἂν ᾖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθηματοπωλικὸν γένος, ἀεὶ σὺ προσερεῖς, ὡς φαίνῃ, σοφιστικόν. | **STRANGER** So take acquisition, then exchange, then trading, whether it is retail or the selling of one's own products—either way. Whatever kind of it sells learning about such things, it seems you'll always call sophistic. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀνάγκη· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ δεῖ συνακολουθεῖν. | **THEAETETUS** I have to. We must follow the argument. |

## FIFTH DEFINITION: THE FIGHTER

*He makes money from eristic, private disputation about justice and everything else.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** ἔτι δὴ σκοπῶμεν εἴ τινι τοιῷδε προσέοικεν ἄρα τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον γένος. | **STRANGER** Let's look further, then, and see whether the kind we're now pursuing resembles something like this. |
| 225a | **THEAETETUS** ποίῳ δή; | **THEAETETUS** Like what? |
| | **STRANGER** τῆς κτητικῆς ἀγωνιστική τι μέρος ἡμῖν ἦν. | **STRANGER** We had competition as a part of acquisition. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἦν γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, we did. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τοίνυν ἐστὶ διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα. | **STRANGER** Then it wouldn't be out of place to divide it in two. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καθ' ὁποῖα λέγε. | **THEAETETUS** Tell me along what lines. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν ἁμιλλητικὸν αὐτῆς τιθέντας, τὸ δὲ μαχητικόν. | **STRANGER** Setting down one part as rivalry and the other as fighting. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔστιν. | **THEAETETUS** Agreed. |
| | **STRANGER** τῆς τοίνυν μαχητικῆς τῷ μὲν σώματι πρὸς σώματα γιγνομένῳ σχεδὸν εἰκὸς καὶ πρέπον ὄνομα λέγειν τι τοιοῦτον τιθεμένους οἷον βιαστικόν. | **STRANGER** Now, for the part of fighting done body against body, it would be reasonable and fitting to give it some such name as "violence." |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τῷ δὲ λόγοις πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄλλο [225b] εἴπῃ πλὴν ἀμφισβητητικόν; | **STRANGER** And for the part done words against words, Theaetetus, what else [225b] could one call it but disputation? |
| 225b | **THEAETETUS** οὐδέν. | **THEAETETUS** Nothing else. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε περὶ τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις θετέον διττόν. | **STRANGER** And disputation must be set down as twofold. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** How? |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** καθ' ὅσον μὲν γὰρ γίγνεται μήκεσί τε πρὸς ἐναντία μήκη λόγων καὶ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα δημοσίᾳ, δικανικόν. | **STRANGER** Insofar as it takes place in public, pitting long speeches against opposing long speeches about what is just and unjust, it is law-court pleading. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δ' ἐν ἰδίοις αὖ καὶ κατακεκερματισμένον ἐρωτήσεσι πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις μῶν εἰθίσμεθα καλεῖν ἄλλο πλὴν ἀντιλογικόν; | **STRANGER** And the part that takes place in private and is chopped into bits, questions against answers—surely we're used to calling that nothing but contradiction? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδέν. | **THEAETETUS** Nothing else. |
| | **STRANGER** τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μὲν ὅσον περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια [225c] ἀμφισβητεῖται μέν, εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνως περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται, ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἶδος, ἐπείπερ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὂν ὁ λόγος, ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας οὔθ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτυχεν οὔτε νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἄξιον. | **STRANGER** Within contradiction, take the part that disputes about contracts [225c] but goes about it at random and without art. We must set it down as a kind, since our account has recognized it as distinct. But it got no name from those before us, and it doesn't deserve to get one from us now. |
| 225c | **THEAETETUS** ἀληθῆ· κατὰ σμικρὰ γὰρ λίαν καὶ παντοδαπὰ διῄρηται. | **THEAETETUS** True. It's been divided into pieces that are too small and too various. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε ἔντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως ἀμφισβητοῦν, ἆρ' οὐκ ἐριστικὸν αὖ λέγειν εἰθίσμεθα; | **STRANGER** But the part that has art, and disputes about just and unjust things themselves and about everything else in general—aren't we used to calling that eristic? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| 225d | **STRANGER** τοῦ μὴν ἐριστικοῦ τὸ μὲν χρηματοφθορικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν ὂν τυγχάνει. | **STRANGER** Now, of eristic, one part happens to waste money and the other to make money. |
| | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασί γε. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοίνυν ἣν ἑκάτερον δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτῶν πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν. | **STRANGER** Then let's try to say what name we should call each of them by. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐκοῦν χρή. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, we should. |
| | **STRANGER** δοκῶ μὴν τό γε δι' ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ ταῦτα διατριβῆς ἀμελὲς τῶν οἰκείων γιγνόμενον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀκουόμενον καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὐχ ἕτερον ἀδολεσχικοῦ. | **STRANGER** Well, take the kind that, for the pleasure of spending time on such things, neglects its own affairs, and whose style most of its listeners find no pleasure in hearing. In my judgment it's called nothing other than idle chatter. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω πως. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, that's more or less what it's called. |
| 225e | **STRANGER** τούτου τοίνυν τοὐναντίον, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν ἐρίδων χρηματιζόμενον, ἐν τῷ μέρει σὺ πειρῶ νῦν εἰπεῖν. | **STRANGER** Now it's your turn. Try to name its opposite, the kind that makes money from private quarrels. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ τί τις ἂν αὖ εἰπὼν ἕτερον οὐκ ἐξαμάρτοι πλήν γε τὸν θαυμαστὸν πάλιν ἐκεῖνον ἥκειν αὖ νῦν τέταρτον τὸν μεταδιωκόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν σοφιστήν; | **THEAETETUS** And what could anyone say, without going wrong, except that here he comes again, for the fourth time now, that wonderful fellow we've been pursuing—the sophist? |
| 226a | **STRANGER** οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐριστικῆς ὂν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς ἀμφισβητητικῆς, τῆς μαχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς, τῆς κτητικῆς ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὖ μεμήνυκε νῦν, ὁ σοφιστής. | **STRANGER** Nothing else, it seems. The sophist is the money-making kind belonging to the art of eristic, which is part of contradiction, of disputation, of fighting, of competition, of acquisition—as our account has now revealed once again. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Exactly so. |
| | **STRANGER** ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον οὐ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ληπτόν; | **STRANGER** So do you see how truly it's said that this beast is many-sided and, as the saying goes, can't be caught with one hand? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐκοῦν ἀμφοῖν χρή. | **THEAETETUS** Then we'll need both. |

## SIXTH DEFINITION: THE PURIFIER

*Refutation purges the soul of false conceit of wisdom: the "sophistry of noble lineage."*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 226b | **STRANGER** χρὴ γὰρ οὖν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμίν γε οὕτω ποιητέον, τοιόνδε τι μεταθέοντας ἴχνος αὐτοῦ. καί μοι λέγε· τῶν οἰκετικῶν ὀνομάτων καλοῦμεν ἄττα που; | **STRANGER** We will, and we must do it as best we can, by following a track of his like this one. Tell me: we have words, I suppose, for certain household chores? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ πολλά· ἀτὰρ ποῖα δὴ τῶν πολλῶν πυνθάνῃ; | **THEAETETUS** Plenty. But which of the many are you asking about? |
| | **STRANGER** τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον διηθεῖν τε λέγομεν καὶ διαττᾶν καὶ βράττειν καὶ διακρίνειν. | **STRANGER** Ones like these: we speak of filtering, sifting, winnowing, and sorting. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ πρός γε τούτοις ἔτι ξαίνειν, κατάγειν, κερκίζειν, καὶ μυρία ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα ἐπιστάμεθα. ἦ γάρ; | **STRANGER** And besides these, carding, spinning, weaving; and we know of countless other such things in the arts. Don't we? |
| 226c | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον αὐτῶν πέρι βουληθεὶς δηλῶσαι παραδείγματα προθεὶς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἤρου; | **THEAETETUS** What is it about them that you want to point out, putting these forward as examples and asking about them all? |
| | **STRANGER** διαιρετικά που τὰ λεχθέντα εἴρηται σύμπαντα. | **STRANGER** Everything we mentioned is spoken of, I take it, as a way of dividing. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν τοίνυν λόγον ὡς περὶ ταῦτα μίαν οὖσαν ἐν ἅπασι τέχνην ἑνὸς ὀνόματος ἀξιώσομεν αὐτήν. | **STRANGER** Then by my reckoning, since in all of them there's one art concerned with these things, we'll count it worthy of one name. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** τίνα προσειπόντες; | **THEAETETUS** Calling it what? |
| | **STRANGER** διακριτικήν. | **STRANGER** The art of discrimination. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔστω. | **THEAETETUS** So be it. |
| | **STRANGER** σκόπει δὴ ταύτης αὖ δύο ἄν πῃ δυνώμεθα κατιδεῖν εἴδη. | **STRANGER** Now look and see whether we can somehow discern two kinds within it in turn. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις. | **THEAETETUS** That's a quick inquiry you're setting me—too quick for me. |
| 226d | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς εἰρημέναις διακρίσεσι τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἀπὸ βελτίονος ἀποχωρίζειν ἦν, τὸ δ' ὅμοιον ἀφ' ὁμοίου. | **STRANGER** Well, in the separations we mentioned, one was separating worse from better, the other like from like. |
| | **THEAETETUS** σχεδὸν οὕτω νῦν λεχθὲν φαίνεται. | **THEAETETUS** Put that way, it pretty much seems so. |
| | **STRANGER** τῆς μὲν τοίνυν ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον· τῆς δὲ καταλειπούσης μὲν τὸ βέλτιον διακρίσεως, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἀποβαλλούσης ἔχω. | **STRANGER** Now, I don't have a name in use for the one. But for the separation that keeps the better and throws away the worse, I do. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγε τί. | **THEAETETUS** Tell me what it is. |
| | **STRANGER** πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις, ὡς ἐγὼ συννοῶ, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις. | **STRANGER** Every separation of that sort, as I understand it, is called by everyone a kind of purification. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγεται γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, it is. |
| 226e | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν τό γε καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὖ διπλοῦν ὂν πᾶς ἂν ἴδοι; | **STRANGER** Then wouldn't anyone see that the purifying kind, in turn, is twofold? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί, κατὰ σχολήν γε ἴσως· οὐ μὴν ἔγωγε καθορῶ νῦν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, given time, perhaps. But I don't see it now. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν τά γε περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἴδη καθάρσεων ἑνὶ περιλαβεῖν ὀνόματι προσήκει. | **STRANGER** Well, the many kinds of purification that concern bodies are properly gathered under one name. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ποῖα καὶ τίνι; | **THEAETETUS** Which kinds, and under what name? |
| | **STRANGER** τά τε τῶν ζῴων, ὅσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμναστικῆς [227a] ἰατρικῆς τε ὀρθῶς διακρινόμενα καθαίρεται καὶ περὶ τἀκτός, εἰπεῖν μὲν φαῦλα, ὅσα βαλανευτικὴ παρέχεται· καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, ὧν γναφευτικὴ καὶ σύμπασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα ὀνόματα ἔσχεν. | **STRANGER** First, those of living things: what inside bodies is purified by being correctly separated through gymnastics [227a] and medicine, and, on the outside—trivial things to mention—what the bath-keeper's art provides. Then those of inanimate bodies, which fulling and the whole art of furbishing take care of, and which have acquired many petty names that seem ridiculous. |
| 227a | **THEAETETUS** μάλα γε. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαῖρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ [227b] ἕνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἤρου, τί προσεροῦμεν ὄνομα συμπάσας δυνάμεις ὅσαι σῶμα εἴτε ἔμψυχον εἴτε ἄψυχον [227c] εἰλήχασι καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διοίσει ποῖόν τι λεχθὲν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δόξει· μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα συνδῆσαν ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει. | **STRANGER** Quite, Theaetetus. But the method of argument cares neither less nor more about sponging than about taking medicine, whether one benefits us a little by purifying and the other a lot. For it is trying, for the sake of acquiring [227b] intelligence, to discern which of all the arts are akin and which are not. For that purpose it honors them all equally, and where they're alike it considers none more ridiculous than another. It doesn't regard someone who illustrates hunting by generalship as any more dignified than someone who illustrates it by lice-catching—only, as a rule, as more pretentious. And so now, as to your question—what name we'll give to all the capacities whose lot is to purify a body, whether animate or inanimate [227c] —it won't make any difference to the method which name seems most decent. Let the name simply bind together everything that purifies anything else, and keep it apart from the purifications of the soul. |
| 227c | τὸν γὰρ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καθαρμὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικεχείρηκεν ἀφορίσασθαι τὰ νῦν, εἴ γε ὅπερ βούλεται μανθάνομεν. | For what the method has just now tried to do is mark off the purification that concerns thought from the others—if we really understand what it wants. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀλλὰ μεμάθηκα, καὶ συγχωρῶ δύο μὲν εἴδη καθάρσεως, ἓν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδος εἶναι, τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς ὄν. | **THEAETETUS** Well, I've understood. And I agree that there are two kinds of purification, and that one of them is the kind that concerns the soul, separate from the kind that concerns the body. |
| | **STRANGER** πάντων κάλλιστα. καί μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπάκουε [227d] πειρώμενος αὖ τὸ λεχθὲν διχῇ τέμνειν. | **STRANGER** Excellent. Now listen to what comes next [227d] and try once more to cut what's been said in two. |
| 227d | **THEAETETUS** καθ᾽ ὁποῖ᾽ ἂν ὑφηγῇ πειράσομαί σοι συντέμνειν. | **THEAETETUS** Wherever you lead the way, I'll try to cut along with you. |
| | **STRANGER** πονηρίαν ἕτερον ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομέν τι; | **STRANGER** Do we say that wickedness in the soul is something different from excellence? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν καθαρμός γ᾽ ἦν τὸ λείπειν μὲν θάτερον, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ᾖ πού τι φλαῦρον. | **STRANGER** And purification, we said, was keeping the one and throwing out whatever is bad. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἦν γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, it was. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ ψυχῆς ἄρα, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν εὑρίσκωμεν κακίας ἀφαίρεσίν τινα, καθαρμὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἐν μέλει φθεγξόμεθα. | **STRANGER** So in the case of the soul too, insofar as we find some removal of vice, we'll be striking the right note if we call it purification. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ μάλα γε. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέον. | **STRANGER** We have to say that there are two kinds of vice in the soul. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ποῖα; | **THEAETETUS** What are they? |
| 228a | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν οἷον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δ' οἷον αἶσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον. | **STRANGER** One is like disease in a body, the other like ugliness arising in it. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐκ ἔμαθον. | **THEAETETUS** I don't follow. |
| | **STRANGER** νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταὐτὸν νενόμικας; | **STRANGER** Perhaps you haven't considered disease and discord to be the same thing? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι. | **THEAETETUS** Again, I don't know what I should say to that either. |
| | **STRANGER** πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν; | **STRANGER** Do you think discord is anything other than the falling-out of what is naturally akin, resulting from some corruption? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδέν. | **THEAETETUS** Nothing else. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ' αἶσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνὸν γένος; | **STRANGER** And is ugliness anything other than disproportion, a kind that's unsightly wherever it's present? |
| 228b | **THEAETETUS** οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο. | **THEAETETUS** Nothing else at all. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ἠσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα; | **STRANGER** Well then: in the soul of people in a bad state, haven't we noticed judgments at odds with desires, spirit with pleasures, reason with pains, and all these with one another? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ σφόδρα γε. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |
| | **STRANGER** συγγενῆ γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύμπαντα γέγονεν. | **STRANGER** And yet all of them are necessarily akin. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν. | **STRANGER** So if we call wickedness discord and disease of the soul, we'll be speaking correctly. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Quite correctly. |
| 228c | **STRANGER** τί δ'; ὅσ' ἂν κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπόν τινα θέμενα πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν καθ' ἑκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνηται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνῃ, πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν; | **STRANGER** Well then: when things that partake of motion set themselves a target and try to hit it, but on every attempt swerve away from it and miss, shall we say this happens to them because of proportion with one another, or, on the contrary, because of disproportion? |
| | **THEAETETUS** δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας. | **THEAETETUS** Obviously because of disproportion. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχήν γε ἴσμεν ἅπασαν πᾶσαν ἀγνοοῦσαν. | **STRANGER** But we know that every soul that is ignorant of anything is ignorant involuntarily. |
| | **THEAETETUS** σφόδρα γε. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |
| | **STRANGER** τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης [228d] ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη. | **STRANGER** Now being ignorant, when a soul is striving toward truth [228d] and its comprehension swerves off course, is nothing other than derangement. |
| 228d | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἄμετρον θετέον. | **STRANGER** So we have to set down a mindless soul as ugly and lacking proportion. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔοικεν. | **THEAETETUS** It seems so. |
| | **STRANGER** ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὄν. | **STRANGER** Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of bad things in it. One is what most people call wickedness, and it's quite clearly the soul's disease. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε ἄγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν. | **STRANGER** The other they call ignorance, but they're unwilling to admit that it is vice when it occurs only in the soul. |
| 228e | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὃ νυνδὴ λέξαντος ἡμφεγνόησά σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν σύμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἶσχος θετέον. | **THEAETETUS** I certainly have to concede what I doubted a moment ago when you said it: that there are two kinds of vice in the soul. Cowardice, licentiousness, and injustice must all be considered disease in us, while the condition of widespread and manifold ignorance must be set down as ugliness. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν ἔν γε σώματι περὶ δύο παθήματε τούτω δύο τέχνα τινὲ ἐγενέσθην; | **STRANGER** Now in the case of the body, two arts have arisen for these two conditions, haven't they? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τίνε τούτω; | **THEAETETUS** Which two? |
| 229a | **STRANGER** περὶ μὲν αἶσχος γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ νόσον ἰατρική. | **STRANGER** For ugliness, gymnastics; for disease, medicine. |
| | **THEAETETUS** φαίνεσθον. | **THEAETETUS** Apparently. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἡ κολαστικὴ πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ πασῶν προσήκουσα Δίκῃ. | **STRANGER** And so for insolence, injustice, and cowardice, the art of correction is by nature, of all the arts, the one most closely related to Justice. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν. | **THEAETETUS** That's likely, at any rate, so far as human opinion goes. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; περὶ σύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν μῶν ἄλλην τινὰ ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἴποι τις ἄν; | |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | | **STRANGER** Well then: for ignorance of every kind, could anyone more correctly name any art other than teaching? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδεμίαν. | **THEAETETUS** None. |
| 229b | **STRANGER** φέρε δή· διδασκαλικῆς δὲ ἆρα ἓν μόνον γένος φατέον εἶναι ἢ πλείω, δύο δέ τινε αὐτῆς εἶναι μεγίστω; σκόπει. | **STRANGER** Come now: must we say that teaching has only one kind, or more than one, with two that are greatest? Think about it. |
| | **THEAETETUS** σκοπῶ. | **THEAETETUS** I'm thinking. |
| | **STRANGER** καί μοι δοκοῦμεν τῇδε ἄν πῃ τάχιστα εὑρεῖν. | **STRANGER** And I think this is how we might find it most quickly. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** How? |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἴ πῃ κατὰ μέσον αὐτῆς τομὴν ἔχει τινά. διπλῆ γὰρ αὕτη γιγνομένη δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν, ἓν ἐφ' ἑνὶ γένει τῶν αὐτῆς ἑκατέρῳ. | **STRANGER** By looking at ignorance to see whether it has a cut somewhere down its middle. For if it turns out to be double, it clearly forces teaching to have two parts as well, one for each of its kinds. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί οὖν; καταφανές πῃ σοι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον; | **THEAETETUS** Well? Can you somehow see what we're looking for now? |
| 229c | **STRANGER** ἀγνοίας γοῦν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀφωρισμένον ὁρᾶν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσιν. | **STRANGER** I do seem, anyway, to see one large and difficult kind of ignorance marked off by itself, a counterweight to all its other parts. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ποῖον δή; | **THEAETETUS** What kind is that? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι· δι' οὗ κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοίᾳ σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν. | **STRANGER** Thinking you know something when you don't. It's probably through this that all our errors of thought arise, for every one of us. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀληθῆ. | **THEAETETUS** True. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ γε οἶμαι μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τοὔνομα προσρηθῆναι. | **STRANGER** And to this alone, of the kinds of ignorance, the name "stupidity" has been given, I think. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ἆρα μέρει τῷ τοῦτο ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον; | **STRANGER** And what should we call the part of teaching that gets rid of it? |
| 229d | **THEAETETUS** οἶμαι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ξένε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν δι' ἡμῶν κεκλῆσθαι. | **THEAETETUS** I think, Stranger, that the other part is called instruction in the crafts, but this part, here at least, we call education. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐν πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἆρ' ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας. | **STRANGER** Yes, Theaetetus, and pretty much among all the Greeks. But we still have to consider this as well: whether education is now wholly indivisible, or has some division worth naming. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν. | **THEAETETUS** Then we have to consider it. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | **STRANGER** δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πῃ σχίζεσθαι. | **STRANGER** Well, it seems to me that this too splits somewhere further. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κατὰ τί; | **THEAETETUS** Along what line? |
| 229e | **STRANGER** τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλικῆς ἡ μὲν τραχυτέρα τις ἔοικεν ὁδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἕτερον αὐτῆς μόριον λειότερον. | **STRANGER** Of teaching by speech, one road seems to be rougher, while its other part is smoother. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον δὴ τούτων ἑκάτερον λέγομεν; | **THEAETETUS** What do we mean by each of these? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον, ᾧ πρὸς τοὺς ὑεῖς μάλιστ' ἐχρῶντό τε καὶ ἔτι πολλοὶ χρῶνται τὰ νῦν, ὅταν [230a] αὐτοῖς ἐξαμαρτάνωσί τι, τὰ μὲν χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακωτέρως παραμυθούμενοι· τὸ δ' οὖν σύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθότατα εἴποι τις ἂν νουθετητικήν. | **STRANGER** One is time-honored, the way of our fathers. People used it above all with their sons, and many still use it now, when [230a] their sons do something wrong: sometimes being harsh with them, sometimes encouraging them more gently. The whole of it one might most correctly call admonition. |
| 230a | **THEAETETUS** ἔστιν οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** That's so. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε, εἴξασί τινες αὖ λόγον ἑαυτοῖς δόντες ἡγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ μαθεῖν οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν ἐθέλειν τὸν οἰόμενον εἶναι σοφὸν τούτων ὧν οἴοιτο πέρι δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν. | **STRANGER** As for the other, some people, it seems, reasoned it through for themselves and came to believe that all stupidity is involuntary. Someone who thinks he's wise, they concluded, would never be willing to learn anything about the things he thinks he's clever at, and the admonishing kind of education achieves little for a great deal of effort. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς γε νομίζοντες. | **THEAETETUS** And they're right to think so. |
| 230b | **STRANGER** τῷ τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ στέλλονται. | **STRANGER** So they set out to cast out this belief by another method. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τίνι δή; | **THEAETETUS** What method? |
| | **STRANGER** διερωτῶσιν ὧν ἂν οἴηταί τίς τι πέρι λέγειν λέγων μηδέν· εἶθ' ἅτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ῥᾳδίως ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταὐτὸν τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὑταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας. οἱ δ' ὁρῶντες ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται, [230c] καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ αὐτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται πασῶν τε ἀπαλλαγῶν ἀκούειν τε ἡδίστην καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι βεβαιότατα γιγνομένην. | **STRANGER** They question a person about the things he thinks he's saying something about when he's saying nothing. Then, since his judgments wander, they examine them easily. They bring them together in argument and set them side by side, and in doing so they show that they contradict one another at the same time, about the same things, in relation to the same things, in the same respects. When people see this, they get angry with themselves and become gentle toward others, [230c] and in this way they're freed from the inflated and rigid judgments they held about themselves. Of all releases it's the most pleasant to hear about, and the most lasting for the one who undergoes it. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 230c | νομίζοντες γάρ, ὦ παῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐντός τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διενοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἔξειν τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων [230d] ὄνησιν, πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίους δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον ἅπερ οἶδεν εἰδέναι μόνα, πλείω δὲ μή. | For those who purify them, my dear boy, think as the doctors of the body have come to believe: that a body can't benefit from the food it's given until someone gets rid of whatever is obstructing it inside. They've reasoned the same way about the soul—that it won't get any benefit from the lessons offered to it [230d] until someone refutes the person being refuted and brings him to shame. That removes the judgments that obstruct learning and shows him purified, believing that he knows only what he knows, and no more. |
| 230d | THEAETETUS βελτίστη γοῦν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἕξεων αὕτη. | THEAETETUS That's certainly the best and most sensible state to be in. |
| | STRANGER διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεών ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ [230e] βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὤν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. | STRANGER For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must say that refutation is the greatest and most authoritative of purifications. And we must consider that someone who hasn't been refuted, even if he happens [230e] to be the Great King, is unpurified in the most important respects. He has become uneducated and ugly in exactly those respects in which anyone who is going to be truly happy ought to be purest and finest.[6] |
| 230e | THEAETETUS παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | THEAETETUS Absolutely. |
| | STRANGER τί δέ; τοὺς ταύτῃ χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ τίνας [231a] φήσομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστὰς φάναι. | STRANGER Well then, who shall we say [231a] the people who use this art are? I'm afraid to call them sophists. |
| 231a | THEAETETUS τί δή; | THEAETETUS Why? |
| | STRANGER μὴ μεῖζον αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας. | STRANGER In case we grant them too great an honor. |
| | THEAETETUS ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικέ γε τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα. | THEAETETUS And yet what we've just described does resemble someone like that. |
| | STRANGER καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν· ὀλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος. ὅμως δὲ ἔστω· οὐ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὅρων τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἴομαι [231b] γενήσεσθαι τότε ὁπόταν ἱκανῶς φυλάττωσιν. | STRANGER So does a wolf resemble a dog—the wildest thing the tamest. A careful person must always be on guard above all about resemblances; they're a very slippery kind. Still, let it stand. For I don't think the dispute will [231b] be over minor boundaries, once people are sufficiently on their guard. |
| 231b | THEAETETUS οὔκουν τό γε εἰκός. | THEAETETUS No, probably not. |
| | STRANGER ἔστω δὴ διακριτικῆς τέχνης καθαρτική, καθαρτικῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχὴν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτου δὲ | STRANGER Then let purification be part of the art of discrimination; and let the part of purification |

6 The Great King: the king of Persia, to the Greeks the very image of wealth and power.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | διδασκαλική, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτική· τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική. | that concerns the soul be marked off. Of that, teaching; of teaching, education. And of education, the refutation of empty conceit of wisdom, which has turned up in our present discussion—let us call that nothing other than the sophistry of noble lineage. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λεγέσθω μέν· ἀπορῶ δὲ ἔγωγε ἤδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ [231c] πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτε ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα καὶ διισχυριζόμενον εἰπεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν. | **THEAETETUS** Let's call it that. But I'm at a loss now, because so many things have [231c] appeared, about what one should say, truthfully and with confidence, the sophist really is. |
| 231c | **STRANGER** εἰκότως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἀλλά τοι κἀκεῖνον ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ νῦν ἤδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον· ὀρθὴ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ τὰς ἁπάσας μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι διαφεύγειν. νῦν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα ἐπιθετέον αὐτῷ. | **STRANGER** Naturally you're at a loss. But you should suppose that by now he too is very much at a loss about how he'll still slip through our argument. For the proverb is right: it isn't easy to dodge them all. So now, especially, we have to go after him. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καλῶς λέγεις. | **THEAETETUS** You're right. |
| | **STRANGER** πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἷον ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν, καὶ πρὸς [231d] ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλογισώμεθα ἅμα ἀναπαυόμενοι, φέρε, ὁπόσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται. δοκῶ μὲν γάρ, τὸ πρῶτον ηὑρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής. | **STRANGER** First, then, let's stop and catch our breath, so to speak, and while we rest, let's reckon up among [231d] ourselves—come on—how many ways the sophist has appeared to us. I think he was first found to be a paid hunter of rich young men. |
| 231d | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε δεύτερον ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα. | **STRANGER** Second, a sort of merchant in learning for the soul. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** τρίτον δὲ ἆρα οὐ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κάπηλος ἀνεφάνη; | **STRANGER** And third, didn't he turn up as a retailer of these same goods? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί, καὶ τέταρτόν γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡμῖν ἦν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, and fourth, he was for us someone who sells learning of his own making. |
| | **STRANGER** ὀρθῶς ἐμνημόνευσας. πέμπτον δ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι [231e] μνημονεύειν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος. | **STRANGER** You remember correctly. I'll try to remember [231e] the fifth: he was a kind of athlete in verbal competition, who had claimed the art of eristic as his own. |
| 231e | **THEAETETUS** ἦν γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, he was. |
| | **STRANGER** τό γε μὴν ἕκτον ἀμφισβητήσιμον μέν, ὅμως δ' ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασιν περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι. | **STRANGER** The sixth was open to dispute, but still we granted him the point and set him down as a purifier of the soul, removing judgments that obstruct learning. |
| | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| 232a | | |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** ἆρ' οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνηται, μιᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὀνόματι προσαγορεύηται, τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτὸ πρός τινα τέχνην οὐ δύναται κατιδεῖν ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει; | **STRANGER** Now, do you notice that when someone appears to know many things, yet is called by the name of a single art, this appearance isn't sound? Clearly, whoever has this experience about some art can't discern the feature of it that all these branches of learning point to. That's why he calls the person who has them by many names instead of one. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κινδυνεύει τοῦτο ταύτῃ πῃ μάλιστα πεφυκέναι. | **THEAETETUS** That's very likely more or less how it is. |

## ARGUING ABOUT EVERYTHING

*He claims to dispute about every subject, so he can only seem to know.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 232b | **STRANGER** μὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς γε αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει δι' ἀργίαν πάσχωμεν, ἀλλ' ἀναλάβωμεν ἓν πρῶτον τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων. ἓν γάρ τί μοι μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν μηνῦον. | **STRANGER** Then let's not let this happen to us, at least, in our search, out of laziness. Let's first take up again one of the things we said about the sophist. For one of them struck me as revealing him more than any other. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** Which one? |
| | **STRANGER** ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαμεν εἶναί που. | **STRANGER** We said, I think, that he was a practitioner of contradiction. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δ'; οὐ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδάσκαλον γίγνεσθαι; | **STRANGER** Well, and also that he becomes a teacher of this very thing to others? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** σκοπῶμεν δή, περὶ τίνος ἄρα καί φασιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικούς. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔστω τῇδέ [232c] πῃ. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅσ' ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἆρ' ἱκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο δρᾶν; | **STRANGER** Let's consider, then, what it is such people claim to make others capable of contradicting about. Let our inquiry start from the beginning in some such way as this. [232c] Come: about divine things, which are hidden from most people, do they make them able to do this? |
| 232c | **THEAETETUS** λέγεται γοῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα. | **THEAETETUS** That's what's said of them, at any rate. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δ' ὅσα φανερὰ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; | **STRANGER** What about the visible things of earth and heaven and everything connected with them? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί γάρ; | **THEAETETUS** Naturally. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, ὁπόταν γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων λέγηταί τι, σύνισμεν ὡς αὐτοί τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατούς; | **STRANGER** And again, in private conversations, whenever something is said about coming-to-be and being in general, we know, don't we, that |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | | they're clever at contradicting, and that they make others capable of doing just what they do? |
| | THEAETETUS παντάπασί γε. | THEAETETUS Absolutely. |
| 232d | STRANGER τί δ' αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ συμπάντων τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἆρ' οὐχ ὑπισχνοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβητητικούς; | STRANGER And what about laws and all political matters? Don't they promise to make people able to dispute about them? |
| | THEAETETUS οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διελέγετο μὴ τοῦτο ὑπισχνουμένοις. | THEAETETUS Yes—practically nobody would talk with them if they didn't promise that. |
| | STRANGER τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν. | STRANGER And as for all the arts together and each one singly, what one should say to contradict each craftsman himself has been published, I believe, and set out in writing for anyone who wants to learn it. |
| | THEAETETUS τὰ Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνῃ περί τε πάλης καὶ 232e τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι. | THEAETETUS You seem to me to mean Protagoras's writings on wrestling and 232e the other arts.[7] |
| 232e | STRANGER καὶ πολλῶν γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἑτέρων. ἀτὰρ δὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἱκανή τις δύναμις ἔοικ' εἶναι; | STRANGER And on many other things too, my blessed friend. But, to sum up, doesn't the art of contradiction seem to be a capacity sufficient for disputing about everything? |
| | THEAETETUS φαίνεται γοῦν δὴ σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν. | THEAETETUS It certainly seems to leave almost nothing out. |
| | STRANGER σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ παῖ, δυνατὸν ἡγῇ τοῦτο; τάχα γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς μὲν ὀξύτερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποιτε, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμβλύτερον. | STRANGER Then, by the gods, my boy, do you think this is possible? Maybe you young people see it more sharply, and we older ones more dimly. |
| 233a | THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον, καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστα λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. | THEAETETUS Possible how, and what exactly are you referring to? I don't quite understand what you're asking now. |
| | STRANGER εἰ πάντα ἐπίστασθαί τινα ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ δυνατόν. | STRANGER Whether it's possible for any human being to know everything. |
| | THEAETETUS μακάριον μεντἂν ἡμῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἦν τὸ γένος. | THEAETETUS Our race would be blessed indeed, Stranger, if it were. |
| | STRANGER πῶς οὖν ἄν ποτέ τις πρός γε τὸν ἐπιστάμενον αὐτὸς ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν δύναιτ' ἂν ὑγιές τι λέγων ἀντειπεῖν; | STRANGER Then how could anyone who lacks knowledge himself ever contradict someone who has it and say anything sound? |
| | THEAETETUS οὐδαμῶς. | THEAETETUS He couldn't, in any way. |
| | STRANGER τί ποτ' οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνάμεως θαῦμα; | STRANGER Then what on earth would the wonder of the sophist's power be? |

7 Protagoras of Abdera (fifth century BC) was the most famous of the sophists, who taught for pay.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | THEAETETUS τοῦ δὴ πέρι; | THEAETETUS The wonder of what? |
| 233b | STRANGER καθ' ὅντινα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις δόξαν παρασκευάζειν ὡς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοὶ σοφώτατοι. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μήτε ἀντέλεγον ὀρθῶς μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαίνοντο, φαινόμενοί τε εἰ μηδὲν αὖ μᾶλλον ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, σχολῇ ποτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα διδοὺς ἤθελεν ἂν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητὴς γίγνεσθαι. | STRANGER How they're ever able to give young people the impression that they themselves are wiser than anyone about everything. For it's clear that if they didn't contradict correctly, or didn't appear to the young to do so—or if, appearing to, they didn't seem to have any more understanding because of their disputing—then, as you said yourself, hardly anyone would pay them money and be willing to become their student in these very things. |
| | THEAETETUS σχολῇ μεντᾶν. | THEAETETUS Hardly anyone, no. |
| | STRANGER νῦν δέ γ' ἐθέλουσιν; | STRANGER But as it is, people are willing? |
| | THEAETETUS καὶ μάλα. | THEAETETUS Very much so. |
| 233c | STRANGER δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἶμαι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημόνως ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἅπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν. | STRANGER Because, I suppose, the sophists seem to have knowledge themselves of the things they contradict about. |
| | THEAETETUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | THEAETETUS Of course. |
| | STRANGER δρῶσι δέ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα, φαμέν; | STRANGER And they do this about everything, we say? |
| | THEAETETUS ναί. | THEAETETUS Yes. |
| | STRANGER πάντα ἄρα σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται. | STRANGER So they appear to their students to be wise about everything. |
| | THEAETETUS τί μήν; | THEAETETUS Certainly. |
| | STRANGER οὐκ ὄντες γε· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη. | STRANGER Without being so—for that was shown to be impossible. |
| | THEAETETUS πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀδύνατον; | THEAETETUS Of course it's impossible. |
| | STRANGER δοξαστικὴν ἄρα τινὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστὴς ἡμῖν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπέφανται. | STRANGER So the sophist has turned out to have a kind of seeming knowledge about everything, but not the truth. |
| 233d | THEAETETUS παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι. | THEAETETUS Absolutely. And what's just been said about them may well be the most correct thing that has been said. |
| | STRANGER λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων. | STRANGER Then let's take a clearer example to show this. |
| | THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον δή; | THEAETETUS What example? |
| | STRANGER τόδε. καί μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα ἀποκρίνασθαι. | STRANGER This one. And try to pay close attention and answer carefully. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What is it? |
| | **STRANGER** εἴ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδ' ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μιᾷ τέχνῃ συνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα— | **STRANGER** Suppose someone claimed to know, not how to speak or contradict, but how to make and do all things together by a single art— |
| 233e | **THEAETETUS** πῶς πάντα εἶπες; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean, all things? |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ῥηθέντος σύ γ' ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἀγνοεῖς· τὰ γὰρ σύμπαντα, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐ μανθάνεις. | **STRANGER** You're lost at the very start of what I said. You don't understand "all things," it seems. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐ γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** No, I don't. |
| | **STRANGER** λέγω τοίνυν σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ πρὸς ἡμῖν τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ δένδρα. | **STRANGER** Well, by "all things" I mean you and me, and besides us the other animals and the trees. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς λέγεις; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean? |
| | **STRANGER** εἴ τις ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσειν φαίη— | **STRANGER** Suppose someone said he'd make me and you and everything else that grows— |
| 234a | **THEAETETUS** τίνα δὴ λέγων τὴν ποίησιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ γεωργόν γε ἐρεῖς τινα· καὶ γὰρ ζῴων αὐτὸν εἶπες ποιητήν. | **THEAETETUS** What sort of making do you mean? You can't be talking about a farmer, since you said he makes animals too. |
| | **STRANGER** φημί, καὶ πρός γε θαλάττης καὶ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμπάντων· καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ταχὺ ποιήσας αὐτῶν ἕκαστα πάνυ σμικροῦ νομίσματος ἀποδίδοται. | **STRANGER** I did, and the sea as well, and earth and heaven and gods and everything else besides. What's more, he makes each of them quickly and sells them off for a tiny coin. |
| | **THEAETETUS** παιδιὰν λέγεις τινά. | **THEAETETUS** You're talking about some kind of game. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἶδε καὶ ταῦτα ἕτερον ἂν διδάξειεν ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, μῶν οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον; | **STRANGER** Well then: when someone says he knows everything and could teach it all to someone else for a small fee and in a short time, mustn't we consider that a game? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάντως που. | **THEAETETUS** Surely. |

## SEVENTH DEFINITION: THE IMAGE-MAKER

*Like a painter, he makes images: true likenesses, or appearances that only look right from a distance.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 234b | **STRANGER** παιδιᾶς δὲ ἔχεις ἥ τι τεχνικώτερον ἢ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος ἢ τὸ μιμητικόν; | **STRANGER** And do you know of any kind of game more artful or more charming than imitation? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδαμῶς· πάμπολυ γὰρ εἴρηκας εἶδος εἰς ἓν πάντα συλλαβὼν καὶ σχεδὸν ποικιλώτατον. | **THEAETETUS** None at all. You've named a very large kind, gathering everything into one, and pretty much the most varied there is. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν τόν γ' ὑπισχνούμενον δυνατὸν εἶναι μιᾷ τέχνῃ πάντα ποιεῖν γιγνώσκομέν που τοῦτο, ὅτι | **STRANGER** Then about someone who promises he can make everything by a single art, we know |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατὸς ἔσται τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νέων παίδων, πόρρωθεν τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύς, λανθάνειν ὡς ὅτιπερ ἂν βουληθῇ δρᾶν, τοῦτο ἱκανώτατος ὢν ἀποτελεῖν ἔργῳ. | this much, I take it: by producing imitations of the things that are, which bear their names, with the art of painting, he'll be able to fool the mindless among young children. He shows them his pictures from a distance, and they don't notice that he isn't, as they think, perfectly capable of actually accomplishing whatever he wants to do. |
| 234c | THEAETETUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | THEAETETUS Of course. |
| | STRANGER τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἆρ' οὐ προσδοκῶμεν εἶναί τινα ἄλλην τέχνην, ᾗ αὖ δυνατὸν ὂν αὖ τυγχάνει τοὺς νέους καὶ ἔτι πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὤτων τοῖς λόγοις γοητεύειν, δεικνύντας εἴδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἅπαντ' εἶναι; | STRANGER Well then: shouldn't we expect that there's also another art, concerned with speech, by which it's possible to bewitch young people who still stand far off from the truth of things—with words, through their ears—by showing them spoken images of everything? It would make what's said seem true, and the speaker seem the wisest of all about everything. |
| 234d | THEAETETUS τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη τέχνη; | THEAETETUS Why shouldn't there be another art like that? |
| | STRANGER τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τῶν τότε ἀκουόντων ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη χρόνου τε ἐπελθόντος αὐτοῖς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προϊούσης ἡλικίας τοῖς τε οὖσι προσπίπτοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζομένους ἐναργῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μεταβάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὥστε σμικρὰ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ ῥᾴδια, καὶ πάντα [234e] πάντῃ ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων παραγενομένων; | STRANGER So then, Theaetetus, isn't it inevitable that most of those who listened back then, once enough time has passed and they've grown older, will run into the things that are at close quarters and be forced by their experiences to grasp them clearly? Won't they change the judgments they formed back then, so that big things appear small and easy things hard, and all [234e] the appearances in words are completely overturned by the realities they meet in action? |
| 234e | THEAETETUS ὡς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῷδε ὄντι κρῖναι. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἔτι πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι. | THEAETETUS Yes, at least so far as someone my age can judge. Though I suspect I'm one of those still standing far off myself. |
| | STRANGER τοιγαροῦν ἡμεῖς σε οἵδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα καὶ νῦν πειρώμεθα ὡς ἐγγύτατα ἄνευ τῶν παθημάτων προσάγειν. περὶ δ' οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τόδε μοι λέγε· πότερον ἤδη τοῦτο [235a] σαφές, ὅτι τῶν γοήτων ἐστί τις, μιμητὴς ὢν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ περὶ ὅσωνπερ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατὸς εἶναι, περὶ τοσούτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀληθῶς ἔχων τυγχάνει; | STRANGER That's exactly why all of us here will try, and are trying now, to bring you as close as we can without your having to go through those experiences. But about the sophist, tell me this. Is it [235a] clear by now that he's a kind of magician, an imitator of the things that are? Or are we still in doubt whether he might actually have real knowledge of all the subjects he seems able to dispute about? |
| 235a | THEAETETUS καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ ξένε; ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἤδη σαφὲς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδιᾶς μετεχόντων ἐστί τις μερῶν εἷς. | THEAETETUS How could he, my friend? No, from what's been said it's pretty clear by now that he's one of those who deal in play. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μιμητὴν ἄρα θετέον αὐτόν τινα. | **STRANGER** Then we must count him as a kind of magician and imitator. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὐ θετέον; | **THEAETETUS** Of course we must. |
| | **STRANGER** ἄγε δή, νῦν ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἤδη τὸν θῆρα μηκέτ' [235b] ἀνεῖναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν περιειλήφαμεν ἐν ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τινι τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων, ὥστε οὐκέτ' ἐκφεύξεται τόδε γε. | **STRANGER** Come on, then. Our job now is not to let our quarry [235b] get loose again. We've just about wrapped him in one of the netting devices that arguments use for this sort of thing, so this much at least he won't escape. |
| 235b | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What's that? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἷς. | **STRANGER** Being one of the kind of conjurers. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κἀμοὶ τοῦτό γε οὕτω περὶ αὐτοῦ συνδοκεῖ. | **THEAETETUS** That's how it looks to me too, as far as he's concerned. |
| | **STRANGER** δέδοκται τοίνυν ὅτι τάχιστα διαιρεῖν τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν τέχνην, καὶ καταβάντας εἰς αὐτήν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς ὁ σοφιστὴς ὑπομείνῃ, συλλαβεῖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα [235c] ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ λόγου, κἀκείνῳ παραδόντας ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἄγραν· ἐὰν δ' ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μιμητικῆς δύηταί πῃ, συνακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ διαιροῦντας ἀεὶ τὴν ὑποδεχομένην αὐτὸν μοῖραν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ληφθῇ. πάντως οὔτε οὗτος οὔτε ἄλλο γένος οὐδὲν μή ποτε ἐκφυγὸν ἐπεύξηται τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετιέναι καθ' ἕκαστά τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδον. | **STRANGER** Then it's settled. We must divide the art of image-making as fast as we can and go down into it. If the sophist stands his ground against us right away, we'll arrest him as ordered [235c] by the argument, our king, hand him over to it, and show off our catch. But if he slips off somewhere among the parts of the imitative art, we'll follow him, always dividing whichever section gives him shelter, until he's caught. Either way, neither he nor any other kind will ever boast of having escaped the method of those who can track things down like this, both part by part and as a whole. |
| 235c | **THEAETETUS** λέγεις εὖ, καὶ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ποιητέον. | **THEAETETUS** Well said. That's how we should go about it. |
| | **STRANGER** κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τρόπον τῆς διαιρέσεως [235d] ἔγωγέ μοι καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι δύο καθορᾶν εἴδη τῆς μιμητικῆς· τὴν δὲ ζητουμένην ἰδέαν, ἐν ὁποτέρῳ ποθ' ἡμῖν οὖσα τυγχάνει, καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατὸς εἶναι. | **STRANGER** Following the method of division we used before, [235d] I think I can make out two kinds of imitation this time as well. But which of the two contains the type we're looking for, I don't think I can tell yet. |
| 235d | **THEAETETUS** σὺ δ' ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πρῶτον καὶ δίελε ἡμῖν τίνε τὼ δύο λέγεις. | **THEAETETUS** Well, first tell us, and divide them for us. What are the two you mean? |
| | **STRANGER** μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνην. ἔστι δ' αὖτη μάλιστα ὁπόταν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς [235e] τούτοις ἔτι χρώματα ἀποδιδοὺς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις, τὴν τοῦ μιμήματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζηται. | **STRANGER** One I see in it is the art of likeness-making. That's chiefly when someone creates the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth and depth, [235e] and also gives each part the colors that suit it. |
| 235e | **THEAETETUS** τί δ'; οὐ πάντες οἱ μιμούμενοί τι τοῦτ' ἐπιχειροῦσι δρᾶν; | **THEAETETUS** What? Don't all imitators try to do that? |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** οὔκουν ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων πού τι πλάττουσιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀποδιδοῖεν τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν, οἶσθ' ὅτι σμικρότερα μὲν τοῦ δέοντος [236a] τὰ ἄνω, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω φαίνοιτ' ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ' ἐγγύθεν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ὁρᾶσθαι. | **STRANGER** Not those, at any rate, who sculpt or paint works on a large scale. If they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful things, you know the upper parts would look smaller than they should [236a] and the lower parts larger, because we see the one from far off and the other from close up. |
| 236a | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** ἆρ' οὖν οὐ χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐάσαντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ νῦν οὐ τὰς οὔσας συμμετρίας ἀλλὰ τὰς δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις ἐναπεργάζονται; | **STRANGER** So don't craftsmen these days say goodbye to the truth, and build into their images not the proportions that really are but the ones that will seem beautiful? |
| | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασί γε. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἕτερον οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκός γε ὄν, εἰκόνα καλεῖν; | **STRANGER** Then isn't it fair to call the first kind, since it's like the original, a likeness? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| 236b | **STRANGER** καὶ τῆς γε μιμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος κλητέον ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰκαστικήν; | **STRANGER** And the part of the imitative art concerned with it should be called what we called it before, likeness-making? |
| | **THEAETETUS** κλητέον. | **THEAETETUS** It should. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ θέαν ἐοικέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἴ τις λάβοι τὰ τηλικαῦτα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾶν, μηδ' εἰκὸς ᾧ φησιν ἐοικέναι, τί καλοῦμεν; ἆρ' οὐκ, ἐπείπερ φαίνεται μέν, ἔοικε δὲ οὔ, φάντασμα; | **STRANGER** And what about this? Take something that appears to resemble the beautiful because it's viewed from a poor vantage point, but that wouldn't even be like what it claims to resemble if someone gained the ability to see things that size properly. What do we call it? Since it appears but doesn't resemble, isn't it an appearance? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν τοῦτο τὸ [236c] μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ σύμπασαν μιμητικήν; | **STRANGER** And isn't this [236c] part a very large one, both in painting and in imitation as a whole? |
| 236c | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course it is. |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν δὴ φάντασμα ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργαζομένην τέχνην ἆρ' οὐ φανταστικὴν ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιμεν; | **STRANGER** And the art that produces an appearance rather than a likeness: wouldn't we be quite right to call it appearance-making? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πολύ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |
| | **STRANGER** τούτω τοίνυν τὼ δύο ἔλεγον εἴδη τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικήν. | **STRANGER** These, then, are the two kinds of image-making I meant: likeness-making and appearance-making. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Right. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** ὃ δέ γε καὶ τότ' ἠμφεγνόουν, ἐν ποτέρᾳ τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ νῦν πω δύναμαι θεάσασθαι σαφῶς, [236d] ἀλλ' ὄντως θαυμαστὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ κατιδεῖν παγχάλεπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μάλα εὖ καὶ κομψῶς εἰς ἄπορον εἶδος διερευνήσασθαι καταπέφευγεν. | **STRANGER** But the thing I was unsure about then, which of the two the sophist belongs in, I still can't see clearly. [236d] The man really is a marvel and extraordinarily hard to make out. Even now he has very neatly and cleverly taken refuge in a kind that's baffling to track down. |
| 236d | **THEAETETUS** ἔοικεν. | **THEAETETUS** It looks that way. |
| | **STRANGER** ἆρ' οὖν αὐτὸ γιγνώσκων σύμφης, ἤ σε οἷον ῥύμη τις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνειθισμένον συνεπεσπάσατο πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ συμφῆσαι; | **STRANGER** Do you agree because you recognize it yourself? Or did the argument's momentum, now that you're used to it, sweep you along into agreeing so quickly? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο εἴρηκας; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean, and what are you getting at? |

## HOW CAN WHAT IS NOT BE?

*Talk of images and falsehood says that what is not somehow is, which Parmenides forbade.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** ὄντως, ὦ μακάριε, ἐσμὲν ἐν παντάπασι χαλεπῇ [236e] σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρὴ ψευδῆ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ συνέχεσθαι, παντάπασιν, ὦ [237a] Θεαίτητε, χαλεπόν. | **STRANGER** My dear fellow, we really are in an extremely difficult [236e] inquiry. This business of appearing and seeming but not being, and of saying things but not true ones, has always been full of perplexity, in the past and now. How can someone say that it's really possible to say or judge falsehoods, and in uttering this not be caught up in contradiction? That, [237a] Theaetetus, is extremely hard. |
| 237a | **THEAETETUS** τί δή; | **THEAETETUS** Why? |
| | **STRANGER** τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν. Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὦ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεζῇ τε ὧδε ἑκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων—οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα· ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήμενος εἶργε νόημα. [237b] παρ' ἐκείνου τε οὖν μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μάλιστά γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἂν δηλώσειε μέτρια βασανισθείς. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα, εἰ μή τί σοι διαφέρει. | **STRANGER** This statement has dared to assume that what is not is. Otherwise there could be no such thing as falsehood. But the great Parmenides, my boy, protested against this to us from beginning to end, back when we were boys ourselves. He said it every time, in prose and in verse: "Never shall this be forced," he says, "that things that are not are. But as you inquire, keep your thought from this road." [237b] So we have his testimony. Best of all, though, the statement itself would show it, if it were put to a modest test. So let's look at this first, if it's all the same to you.[8] |
| 237b | **THEAETETUS** τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπῃ βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον ᾗ βέλτιστα διέξεισι σκοπῶν αὐτός τε ἴθι κἀμὲ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἄγε. | **THEAETETUS** Treat my part however you like. But find the best way through the argument, go ahead yourself, and lead me along that same road. |

8 Parmenides of Elea (early fifth century BC) set out his views in a hexameter poem; the lines quoted come from it.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ χρὴ δρᾶν ταῦτα. καί μοι λέγε· τὸ μηδαμῶς ὂν τολμῶμέν που φθέγγεσθαι; | **STRANGER** That's what we must do. So tell me: we do dare, I take it, to utter the phrase "what in no way is"? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** μὴ τοίνυν ἔριδος ἕνεκα μηδὲ παιδιᾶς, ἀλλ' εἰ σπουδῇ [237c] δέοι συννοήσαντά τινα ἀποκρίνασθαι τῶν ἀκροατῶν ποῖ χρὴ τοῦνομ' ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὄν, τί δοκοῦμεν ἂν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖον αὐτόν τε καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τῷ πυνθανομένῳ δεικνύναι; | **STRANGER** Now suppose it weren't for the sake of contest or play. Suppose that, in all seriousness, [237c] one of our listeners had to think it over and answer what this name "what is not" should be applied to. What do we think he'd use it for, and on what sort of thing? And what would he point to for the person asking? |
| 237c | **THEAETETUS** χαλεπὸν ἥρου καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οἵῳ γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον. | **THEAETETUS** That's a hard question. For someone like me it's almost completely impossible to answer. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐπί τι τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ οἰστέον. | **STRANGER** Well, this much is clear at any rate: "what is not" mustn't be applied to anything among the things that are. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ ἄν; | **THEAETETUS** How could it be? |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὸ τὶ φέρων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις φέροι. | **STRANGER** Then since it can't be applied to what is, neither would anyone be right to apply it to "something." |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δή; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| 237d | **STRANGER** καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ "τὶ" τοῦτο ῥῆμα ἐπ' ὄντι λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε· μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων, ἀδύνατον· ἦ γάρ; | **STRANGER** This too is plain to us, I suppose: we always use this word "something" of a thing that is. To say it on its own, naked as it were and cut off from all the things that are, is impossible. Isn't it? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀδύνατον. | **THEAETETUS** Impossible. |
| | **STRANGER** ἆρα τῇδε σκοπῶν σύμφης, ὡς ἀνάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἕν γέ τι λέγειν; | **STRANGER** Looking at it this way, do you agree that whoever says something must say some one thing? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** ἑνὸς γὰρ δὴ τό γε "τὶ" φήσεις σημεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ "τινὲ" δυοῖν, τὸ δὲ "τινὲς" πολλῶν. | **STRANGER** For you'll say that "something" signifies one, "a pair of somethings" two, and "some things" many. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| 237e | **STRANGER** τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τὶ λέγοντα ἀναγκαιότατον, ὡς ἔοικε, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν. | **STRANGER** And whoever says not something must, it seems, quite necessarily say nothing at all. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Quite necessarily. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | **STRANGER** ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγειν μέν τι, λέγειν μέντοι μηδέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὅς γ᾽ ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ μὴ ὂν φθέγγεσθαι; | **STRANGER** Then mustn't we refuse to grant even that such a person speaks but says nothing? Mustn't we deny that he even speaks, whoever tries to utter what is not? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι. | **THEAETETUS** That would certainly put an end to the argument's perplexity. |
| 238a | **STRANGER** μήπω μέγ᾽ εἴπῃς· ἔτι γάρ, ὦ μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτά γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη καὶ πρώτη. περὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὖσα τυγχάνει. | **STRANGER** Don't boast yet. There's still more, my dear fellow, and it's the greatest and first of the perplexities, because it concerns the very starting point of the matter. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς φῄς; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκνήσῃς. | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean? Tell me, and don't hold back. |
| | **STRANGER** τῷ μὲν ὄντι που προσγένοιτ᾽ ἄν τι τῶν ὄντων ἕτερον. | **STRANGER** To what is, I suppose, some other thing that is might be added. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** μὴ ὄντι δέ τι τῶν ὄντων ἆρά ποτε προσγίγνεσθαι φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἶναι; | **STRANGER** But shall we ever say it's possible for any of the things that are to be added to what is not? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How could it be? |
| | **STRANGER** ἀριθμὸν δὴ τὸν σύμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν. | **STRANGER** Now, we count number as a whole among the things that are. |
| 238b | **THEAETETUS** εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὡς ὄν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, if we're to count anything at all as being. |
| | **STRANGER** μὴ τοίνυν μηδ᾽ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ μήτε πλῆθος μήτε ἓν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὂν προσφέρειν. | **STRANGER** Then let's not even try to apply number to what is not, whether plurality or one. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὔκουν ἂν ὀρθῶς γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιχειροῖμεν, ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος. | **THEAETETUS** It seems we certainly wouldn't be right to try, as the argument says. |
| | **STRANGER** πῶς οὖν ἂν ἢ διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγξαιτο ἄν τις ἢ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ; | **STRANGER** Then how could anyone utter with his mouth, or even grasp at all in thought, things that are not or what is not, apart from number? |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγε πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** Explain. How so? |
| | **STRANGER** μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, ἆρα οὐ πλῆθος 238c ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι; | **STRANGER** When we say "things that are not," aren't we trying to attach a plurality 238c of number? |
| 238c | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** μὴ ὂν δέ, ἆρα οὐ τὸ ἓν αὖ; | **STRANGER** And when we say "what is not," aren't we attaching one? |
| | **THEAETETUS** σαφέστατά γε. | **THEAETETUS** Very plainly. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν οὔτε δίκαιόν γε οὔτε ὀρθόν φαμεν ὂν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὄντι προσαρμόττειν. | **STRANGER** And yet we say it's neither just nor right to try to fit what is onto what is not. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγεις ἀληθέστατα. | **THEAETETUS** Very true. |
| | **STRANGER** συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον; | **STRANGER** So you see that it's impossible to utter correctly, or to say, or to think what is not itself by itself. It's unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable and inexpressible. |
| | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| 238d | **STRANGER** ἆρ' οὖν ἐψευσάμην ἄρτι λέγων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπορίαν ἐρεῖν αὐτοῦ πέρι, τὸ δὲ ἔτι μείζω τινὰ λέγειν ἄλλην ἔχομεν; | **STRANGER** Then was I lying just now when I said I would state the greatest perplexity about it? Do we have yet another, even greater one, still to mention? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τίνα δή; | **THEAETETUS** What's that? |
| | **STRANGER** ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα εἰς ἀπορίαν καθίστησι τὸ μὴ ὂν οὕτως, ὥστε, ὁπόταν αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρῇ τις ἐλέγχειν, ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ περὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκάζεσθαι λέγειν; | **STRANGER** My remarkable friend, don't you see from the very things we've said that what is not throws even the person refuting it into perplexity? Whenever someone tries to refute it, he's forced to contradict himself about it. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς φῄς; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον. | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean? Put it more clearly still. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν 238e γὰρ ὑποθέμενος οὔτε ἑνὸς οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μὴ ὂν δεῖν μετέχειν, ἄρτι τε καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἓν αὐτὸ εἴρηκα· τὸ μὴ ὂν γὰρ φημί. συνίης τοι. | **STRANGER** There's no point looking to me for greater clarity. For I 238e laid it down that what is not must share in neither one nor many. Yet just now, and again now, I've spoken of it as one: I say "what is not." You do see that. |
| 238e | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἄφθεγκτόν τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄλογον ἔφην εἶναι. συνέπῃ; | **STRANGER** And again, a little earlier I said it was unutterable, unsayable and inexpressible. Are you following? |
| | **THEAETETUS** συνέπομαι. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** I'm following. Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν τό γε εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος ἐναντία 239a τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον; | **STRANGER** So in trying to attach "is" to it, wasn't I saying the opposite 239a of what I said before? |
| 239a | **THEAETETUS** φαίνῃ. | **THEAETETUS** Apparently. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ διελεγόμην; | **STRANGER** And in attaching it, wasn't I talking about it as one thing? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἄλογόν γε λέγων καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον ὥς γε πρὸς ἓν τὸν λόγον ἐποιούμην. | **STRANGER** And in calling it inexpressible, unsayable and unutterable, I was framing my statement as being about one thing. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** φαμὲν δέ γε δεῖν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς τις λέξει, μήτε ὡς ἓν μήτε ὡς πολλὰ διορίζειν αὐτό, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὸ καλεῖν· ἑνὸς γὰρ εἴδει καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἂν τὴν πρόσρησιν προσαγορεύοιτο. | **STRANGER** But we say that if someone is going to speak correctly, he mustn't define it as either one or many, or even call it anything at all. Even by that form of address it would be referred to as having the form of one. |
| | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασί γε. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| 239b | **STRANGER** τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε τί τις ἂν λέγοι; καὶ γὰρ πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡττημένον ἂν εὕροι περὶ τὸν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἔλεγχον. ὥστε ἐν ἔμοιγε λέγοντι, καθάπερ εἶπον, μὴ σκοπῶμεν τὴν ὀρθολογίαν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' εἶα δὴ νῦν ἐν σοὶ σκεψώμεθα. | **STRANGER** Well, then, what could anyone say of me? He'd find me beaten long ago, and still now, when it comes to refuting what is not. So, as I said, let's not look to me, as I speak, for correct speech about what is not. Come on, let's look for it in you now. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς φῄς; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean? |
| | **STRANGER** ἴθι ἡμῖν εὖ καὶ γενναίως, ἅτε νέος ὤν, ὅτι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι, μήτε οὐσίαν μήτε τὸ ἓν μήτε πλῆθος ἀριθμοῦ προστιθεὶς τῷ μὴ ὄντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν φθέγξασθαί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ. | **STRANGER** Come on, be brave and noble for us, since you're young. Strain as hard as you can and try to utter something correct about what is not, without attaching being, or one, or numerical plurality to it. |
| 239c | **THEAETETUS** πολλὴ μεντἄν με καὶ ἄτοπος ἔχοι προθυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαῦθ' ὁρῶν πάσχοντα αὐτὸς ἐπιχειροίην. | **THEAETETUS** I'd have to be gripped by a great and strange enthusiasm for the attempt if I tried it myself after seeing what happened to you. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ χαίρειν ἐῶμεν· ἕως δ' ἄν τινι δυναμένῳ δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐντυγχάνωμεν, μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούργως εἰς ἄπορον ὁ σοφιστὴς τόπον καταδέδυκεν. | **STRANGER** Well, if you like, let's leave you and me out of it. Until we meet someone who can do this, let's say that the sophist has, with the utmost cunning, burrowed down into a place where there's no getting at him. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται. | **THEAETETUS** That certainly seems to be so. |
| | **STRANGER** τοιγαροῦν εἴ τινα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν φανταστικὴν 239d τέχνην, ῥᾳδίως ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας τῶν λόγων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀποστρέψει τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιὸν αὐτὸν καλῶμεν, ἀνερωτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἴδωλον λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινεῖται. | **STRANGER** So if we say he has an appearance-making 239d art of some kind, he'll easily seize on this use of words to get a grip on us and turn our arguments back the opposite way. When we call him an image-maker, he'll ask what on earth we mean by an image at all. So we have to consider, Theaetetus, what answer anyone could give our young fellow to his question. |
| 239d | **THEAETETUS** δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἴδωλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα που τοιαῦτ' ἔσθ' ἕτερα. | **THEAETETUS** Obviously we'll say images in water and in mirrors, and also painted and engraved ones, and all the other things of that sort. |
| 239e | **STRANGER** φανερός, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἶ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἑωρακώς. | **STRANGER** It's clear, Theaetetus, that you've never seen a sophist. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | **THEAETETUS** τί δή; | **THEAETETUS** Why's that? |
| | **STRANGER** δόξει σοι μύειν ἢ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὄμματα. | **STRANGER** He'll seem to you to have his eyes shut, or to have no eyes at all. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὕτως αὐτῷ διδῷς ἐὰν ἐν κατόπτροις ἢ πλάσμασι λέγῃς τι, καταγελάσεταί σου τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὡς βλέποντι λέγῃς αὐτῷ, προσποιούμενος οὔτε κάτοπτρα [240a] οὔτε ὕδατα γιγνώσκειν οὔτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον. | **STRANGER** When you give him your answer like that, mentioning things in mirrors or in sculptures, he'll laugh at what you say for talking to him as though he could see. He'll pretend not to know about mirrors, [240a] or water, or even sight at all, and will ask you only about what follows from your words. |
| 240a | **THEAETETUS** ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What's that? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἑνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι φθεγξάμενος εἴδωλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἓν ὄν. λέγε οὖν καὶ ἀμύνου μηδὲν ὑποχωρῶν τὸν ἄνδρα. | **STRANGER** What runs through all these things you called many, yet saw fit to address by one name, uttering "image" over all of them as though they were one. So speak up, and defend yourself against the man without giving any ground. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί δῆτα, ὦ ξένε, εἴδωλον ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι πλήν γε τὸ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον; | **THEAETETUS** Well, Stranger, what would we say an image is, except another thing of the same sort, made to resemble the true one? |
| | **STRANGER** ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι τὸ [240b] τοιοῦτον εἶπες; | **STRANGER** Do you mean another true one of the same sort, or what were you referring to by [240b] "of the same sort"? |
| 240b | **THEAETETUS** οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' ἐοικὸς μέν. | **THEAETETUS** Not true at all. Just resembling it. |
| | **STRANGER** ἆρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὂν λέγων; | **STRANGER** Meaning by "true" what really is? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἆρ' ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς; | **STRANGER** Well, then: is what's not true the opposite of what's true? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὂν ἄρα λέγεις τὸ ἐοικός, εἴπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρεῖς. | **STRANGER** So you're saying that what resembles is not really what is, if you're going to call it not true. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀλλ' ἔστι γε μήν πως. | **THEAETETUS** But it is, in a way. |
| | **STRANGER** οὔκουν ἀληθῶς γε, φῄς. | **STRANGER** But not truly, you say. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐ γὰρ οὖν· πλήν γ' εἰκὼν ὄντως. | **THEAETETUS** No, not truly. Except that it really is a likeness. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκ ὂν ἄρα οὐκ ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα; | **STRANGER** So what we call a likeness is not really a thing that is, and yet it really is? |

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| 240c | **THEAETETUS** κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον. | **THEAETETUS** It looks as though what is not has been woven together with what is in some such tangle, and a very strange one. |
| | **STRANGER** πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον; ὁρᾷς γοῦν ὅτι καὶ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἐπαλλάξεως ταύτης ὁ πολυκέφαλος σοφιστὴς ἠνάγκακεν ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐχ ἑκόντας ὁμολογεῖν εἶναί πως. | **STRANGER** Strange? Of course it's strange. You can see, at any rate, that even now, through this crisscrossing, the many-headed sophist has forced us to agree against our will that what is not in a way is. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὁρῶ καὶ μάλα. | **THEAETETUS** I see it very well. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δὲ δή; τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ τίνα ἀφορίσαντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συμφωνεῖν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; | **STRANGER** Well, then. How are we to define his art and still be able to stay in agreement with ourselves? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῇ καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι φοβούμενος οὕτω λέγεις; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean? What sort of thing are you afraid of, to talk like that? |
| 240d | **STRANGER** ὅταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτὸν ἀπατᾶν φῶμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶναί τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτοῦ, τότε πότερον ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φήσομεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτ' ἐροῦμεν; | **STRANGER** When we say he deceives us with his appearance, and that his art is an art of deception, will we then say that our soul judges falsely because of his art? Or what will we say? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τοῦτο· τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο εἴπαιμεν; | **THEAETETUS** That. What else could we say? |
| | **STRANGER** ψευδὴς δ' αὖ δόξα ἔσται τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς; | **STRANGER** And false judgment, in turn, will be a judgment of things opposite to the things that are, or what? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως· τἀναντία. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. Opposite. |
| | **STRANGER** λέγεις ἄρα τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν; | **STRANGER** So you're saying that false judgment judges things that are not? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀνάγκη. | **THEAETETUS** It must. |
| 240e | **STRANGER** πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζουσαν, ἤ πως εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα; | **STRANGER** Judging that things that are not are not, or that things that in no way are in some way are? |
| | **THEAETETUS** εἶναί πως τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἴπερ ψεύσεταί ποτέ τίς τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ. | **THEAETETUS** Things that are not must in some way be, if anyone is ever to be wrong about anything, even slightly. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δ'; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα δοξάζεται; | **STRANGER** Well, and isn't it also judged that things that entirely are in no way are? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψεῦδος; | **STRANGER** And this, too, is falsehood? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ τοῦτο. | **THEAETETUS** This too. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** καὶ λόγος οἶμαι ψευδὴς οὕτω κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομισθήσεται [241a] τά τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι. | **STRANGER** And a statement, I suppose, will be considered false in the same way [241a] when it says that things that are are not, and that things that are not are. |
| 241a | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως τοιοῦτος γένοιτο; | **THEAETETUS** How else could it come to be false? |
| | **STRANGER** σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὁ σοφιστὴς οὐ φήσει. ἢ τίς μηχανὴ συγχωρεῖν τινα τῶν εὖ φρονούντων, ὅταν ἄφθεγκτα καὶ ἄρρητα καὶ ἄλογα καὶ ἀδιανόητα προσδιωμολογημένα ᾖ τὰ πρὸ τούτων ὁμολογηθέντα; μανθάνομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει; | **STRANGER** In hardly any other way. But the sophist won't admit this. How could any sensible person grant it, when what we agreed to before has since been agreed to be unutterable, unsayable, inexpressible and unthinkable? Do we understand, Theaetetus, what he's saying? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν ὅτι τἀναντία φήσει λέγειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς νυνδή, ψευδῆ τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν [241b] ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους; τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὂν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι, διομολογησαμένους νυνδὴ τοῦτο εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον. | **THEAETETUS** Of course we understand. He'll say we're contradicting what we said just now, since we dared to say that falsehood exists [241b] in judgments and in statements. For, he'll say, we're forced again and again to attach what is to what is not, though we agreed just now that this was the most impossible thing of all. |
| 241b | **STRANGER** ὀρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευσας. ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι τί χρὴ δρᾶν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι· τὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διερευνῶμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνῃ τιθέντες, ὁρᾷς ὡς εὔποροι καὶ πολλαί. | **STRANGER** You've remembered correctly. But it's time now to decide what we should do about the sophist. You see how ready to hand and how many the objections and perplexities are, if we search for him by placing him in the art of the falsehood-makers and magicians. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ μάλα. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |
| | **STRANGER** μικρὸν μέρος τοίνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, οὐσῶν [241c] ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπεράντων. | **STRANGER** And we've gone through only a small part of them, though there are, [241c] you might say, no end of them. |
| 241c | **THEAETETUS** ἀδύνατόν γ' ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἑλεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. | **THEAETETUS** It would seem impossible to catch the sophist, if that's how things are. |
| | **STRANGER** τί οὖν; οὕτως ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες; | **STRANGER** What then? Shall we go soft and give up now? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὔκουν ἔγωγέ φημι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν οἷοί τ' ἐπιλαβέσθαι πῃ τἀνδρός ἐσμεν. | **THEAETETUS** I certainly don't think we should, if we're able to get some sort of hold on the man, even a slight one. |
| | **STRANGER** ἔξεις οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες ἀγαπήσεις ἐάν πῃ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ παρασπασώμεθα οὕτως ἰσχυροῦ λόγου; | **STRANGER** So you'll forgive me, and, as you just said, be content if we manage to wrest even a little from so strong an argument? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἕξω; | **THEAETETUS** Of course I will. |

## FATHER PARMENIDES

*The Stranger asks not to be thought a parricide for laying hands on his teacher's doctrine.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 241d | **STRANGER** τόδε τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παραιτοῦμαί σε. | **STRANGER** Then there's something else I ask of you even more. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What's that? |
| | **STRANGER** μή με οἷον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνεσθαί τινα. | **STRANGER** Not to think I'm turning into a sort of parricide. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί δή; | **THEAETETUS** Why? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ. | **STRANGER** Because to defend ourselves we'll have to put the statement of our father Parmenides to the test, and force our way to the claims that what is not, in a certain respect, is, and that what is, in turn, in a way is not. |
| | **THEAETETUS** φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχετέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. | **THEAETETUS** It's apparent that this is what we have to fight out in our arguments. |
| | **STRANGER** πῶς γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο τυφλῷ; [241e] τούτων γὰρ μήτ' ἐλεγχθέντων μήτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ ποτέ τις οἷός τε ἔσται περὶ λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδώλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μιμημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτά εἰσι, μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι τά γ' ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὐτῷ λέγειν. | **STRANGER** Apparent? Of course it is, even to a blind man, as the saying goes. [241e] For unless these claims are either refuted or agreed to, hardly anyone will ever be able to talk about false statements or false judgment, whether about images, or likenesses, or imitations, or appearances themselves, or about the arts that deal with them, without making himself ridiculous by being forced to contradict himself. |
| 241e | **THEAETETUS** ἀληθέστατα. | **THEAETETUS** Very true. |
| 242a | **STRANGER** διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἐατέον, εἰ τοῦτό τις εἴργει δρᾶν ὄκνος. | **STRANGER** That's why we must now dare to attack our father's statement, or else drop the matter altogether, if some reluctance stops us from doing it. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς τοῦτό γε μηδὲν μηδαμῇ εἴρξῃ. | **THEAETETUS** Well, nothing at all is going to stop us from that. |
| | **STRANGER** τρίτον τοίνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παραιτήσομαι. | **STRANGER** Then I'll ask you for a third, small favor. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγε μόνον. | **THEAETETUS** Just say it. |
| | **STRANGER** εἶπόν που νυνδὴ λέγων ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταῦτ' ἔλεγχον ἀεί τε ἀπειρηκὼς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν. | **STRANGER** I said just now, I think, that I've always given up when it comes to refuting these things, and especially now. |
| | **THEAETETUS** εἶπες. | **THEAETETUS** You did. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μή ποτε διὰ ταῦτά σοι μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω καὶ [242b] κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγξειν τὸν λόγον ἐπιθησόμεθα, ἐάνπερ ἐλέγχωμεν. | **STRANGER** So I'm afraid that because of what I said you'll think I'm mad, turning myself up and [242b] down from one moment to the next. For it's for your sake that we'll set about refuting the statement, if we do refute it. |
| 242b | **THEAETETUS** ὡς τοίνυν ἔμοιγε μηδαμῇ δόξων μηδὲν πλημμελεῖν, ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἴῃς, θαρρῶν ἴθι τούτου γε ἕνεκα. | **THEAETETUS** Well, as far as I'm concerned, you won't seem to be doing anything out of line in the least if you go on to this refutation and proof. So go ahead with confidence, at least on that score. |
| | **STRANGER** φέρε δή, τίνα ἀρχήν τις ἂν ἄρξαιτο παρακινδυνευτικοῦ λόγου; δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ τήνδ', ὦ παῖ, τὴν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἡμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι. | **STRANGER** Come on, then. Where should one start so risky an argument? I think, my boy, that this is the road we most need to take. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ποίαν δή; | **THEAETETUS** Which one? |
| | **STRANGER** τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι πρῶτον [242c] μή πῃ τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὦμεν περὶ ταῦτα, ῥᾳδίως δ' ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὡς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες. | **STRANGER** First to examine the things that seem plain right now, [242c] in case we're somehow confused about them, yet readily agree with each other as though we had them clearly sorted out. |
| 242c | **THEAETETUS** λέγε σαφέστερον ὃ λέγεις. | **THEAETETUS** Tell me more clearly what you mean. |

## STORIES ABOUT BEING

*Earlier thinkers told stories about how many things there are; being turns out as puzzling as not-being.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὅστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν. | **STRANGER** It seems to me that Parmenides has talked to us in rather an easygoing way. So has everyone who ever set out to decide how many the things that are are, and of what sort. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** How? |
| | **STRANGER** μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις [242d] ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἄττα πῃ, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ἰάδες δὲ καὶ Σικελαί τινες ὕστερον Μοῦσαι συνενόησαν ὅτι συμπλέκειν [242e] ἀσφαλέστατον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ὂν πολλά τε καὶ ἕν ἐστιν, ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ φιλίᾳ συνέχεται. | |

GREEK

ENGLISH

**STRANGER** Each of them seems to me to be telling us a story, as if we were children. One says the things that are are three, and that some of them are at war [242d] with each other at times, in some way, while at other times they become friends, marry, have children and bring up their offspring. Another says there are two, wet and dry, or hot and cold, and he sets up house for them and marries them off. Our Eleatic tribe, starting from Xenophanes and even earlier, tells its stories on the basis that what are called "all things" are one. Later, certain Ionian and Sicilian Muses realized that it's safest to weave [242e] the two together and say that what is is both many and one, and is held together by enmity and friendship.[9]

242e διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν· αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἓν εἶναί φασι τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπ' [243a] ἀφροδίτης, τοτὲ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πολέμιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ διὰ νεῖκός τι. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς τις ἢ μὴ τούτων εἴρηκε, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλημμελὲς οὕτω μεγάλα κλεινοῖς καὶ παλαιοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν· ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήνασθαι—

"For in being drawn apart it is always drawn together," say the more tightly strung of the Muses. The softer ones slackened the claim that things are always this way. They say that by turns the whole is now one and friendly under [243a] Aphrodite, and now many and at war with itself through some kind of strife. Whether any of them spoke truly or not in all this, it's hard, and out of tune, to find such serious fault with famous men of old. But this much can be declared without giving offense —

243a **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον;

**THEAETETUS** What's that?

**STRANGER** ὅτι λίαν τῶν πολλῶν ἡμῶν ὑπεριδόντες ὠλιγώρησαν· οὐδὲν γὰρ φροντίσαντες εἴτ' ἐπακολουθοῦμεν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν [243b] εἴτε ἀπολειπόμεθα, περαίνουσι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι.

**STRANGER** That they looked down on us ordinary people far too much and made light of us. Without caring whether we follow what they're saying [243b] or get left behind, they each press on to their own conclusion.

243b **THEAETETUS** πῶς λέγεις;

**THEAETETUS** What do you mean?

**STRANGER** ὅταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγξηται λέγων ὡς ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γίγνεται πολλὰ ἢ ἓν ἢ δύο, καὶ θερμὸν αὖ ψυχρῷ συγκεραννύμενον, ἄλλοθί πῃ διακρίσεις καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτιθείς, τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἑκάστοτε σύ τι πρὸς θεῶν συνίης ὅτι λέγουσιν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος, τοῦτό τε τὸ νῦν ἀπορούμενον ὁπότε τις εἴποι, τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀκριβῶς ᾤμην συνιέναι. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ἵν' ἐσμὲν αὐτοῦ πέρι τῆς ἀπορίας.

**STRANGER** When one of them declares that many things, or one, or two, are, or have come to be, or are coming to be, and another that hot is mixed with cold, positing separations and unions somewhere else, do you, Theaetetus, for heaven's sake, understand what they mean by any of it, at any point? When I was younger, I thought I understood precisely whenever anyone said this thing we're now perplexed about, "what is not." But now you see how perplexed we are about it.

243c

9 Xenophanes of Colophon (sixth century BC) was later treated as the founder of the Eleatic school. The "Ionian" and "Sicilian Muses" are usually taken to be Heraclitus of Ephesus and Empedocles of Acragas.

GREEK

ENGLISH

THEAETETUS ὁρῶ.

THEAETETUS I see.

STRANGER τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως οὐχ ἧττον κατὰ τὸ ὂν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ μὲν τοῦτο εὐπορεῖν φαμεν καὶ μανθάνειν ὁπόταν τις αὐτὸ φθέγξηται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὔ, πρὸς ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως ἔχοντες.

STRANGER Then perhaps we've got this same condition in our soul no less about what is. We claim we're at ease about it and understand whenever someone says it, but not about the other, when in fact we're in the same state about both.

THEAETETUS ἴσως.

THEAETETUS Perhaps.

STRANGER καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο εἰρήσθω.

STRANGER And let the same be said about the other things we mentioned earlier.

THEAETETUS πάνυ γε.

THEAETETUS Certainly.

STRANGER τῶν μὲν τοίνυν πολλῶν πέρι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθ', 243d ἂν δόξῃ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ πρώτου νῦν σκεπτέον.

STRANGER We'll look into most of them later, 243d if we decide to. Right now we must look first at the greatest of them, the one that leads the rest.

243d THEAETETUS τίνος δὴ λέγεις; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὂν φῂς πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι τί ποθ' οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἡγοῦνται;

THEAETETUS Which one do you mean? Or is it obvious that you're saying we must first investigate what is, and what on earth the people who talk about it think they're pointing to?

STRANGER κατὰ πόδα γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες. λέγω γὰρ δὴ ταύτῃ δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον ἡμᾶς, οἷον αὐτῶν παρόντων ἀναπυνθανομένους ὧδε· "φέρε, ὁπόσοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἤ τινε δύο τοιούτω τὰ πάντ' εἶναί φατε, τί ποτε 243e ἄρα τοῦτ' ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν φθέγγεσθε, λέγοντες ἄμφω καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι; τί τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν; πότερον τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τρία τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο ἔτι καθ' ὑμᾶς τιθῶμεν; οὐ γάρ που τοῖν γε δυοῖν καλοῦντες θάτερον ὂν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἶναι λέγετε· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἂν ἀμφοτέρως ἕν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύο εἴτην."

STRANGER You've followed right on my heels, Theaetetus. Yes, I'm saying that this is how we must conduct our inquiry: we question them as if they were here in person, like this: "Come now, all of you who say that everything is hot and cold, or some such pair of things. What on earth 243e is it that you're saying about both, when you say that both and each of them *are*? What are we to take this 'being' of yours to be? Is it a third thing alongside those two, so that by your account we should suppose that the all is three, and no longer two? For surely you don't call one of the two 'being' and then say that both alike are. If you did, they'd pretty well be one either way, not two."

243e THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

THEAETETUS That's true.

STRANGER "ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὰ ἄμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν ὄν;"

STRANGER "Well, then, do you want to call the pair of them 'being'?"

THEAETETUS ἴσως.

THEAETETUS Perhaps.

244a STRANGER "ἀλλ', ὦ φίλοι," φήσομεν, "κἂν οὕτω τὰ δύο λέγοιτ' ἂν σαφέστατα ἕν."

STRANGER "But, my friends," we'll say, "even then the two would quite plainly be called one."

THEAETETUS ὀρθότατα εἴρηκας.

THEAETETUS Quite right.

STRANGER "ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς ἠπορήκαμεν, ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ ἡμῖν ἐμφανίζετε ἱκανῶς, τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὁπόταν ὂν φθέγγησθε. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν

STRANGER "Since we're at a loss, then, you must explain it to us properly: what on earth do you mean to signify whenever you say 'being'? Clearly

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | ταῦτα πάλαι γιγνώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ᾠόμεθα, νῦν δ' ἠπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα παρ' ὑμῶν, τὸ δὲ [244b] τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν τοὐναντίον." ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντές τε καὶ ἀξιοῦντες παρά τε τούτων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι πλεῖον ἑνὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, μῶν, ὦ παῖ, τὶ πλημμελήσομεν; | you've known this for a long time, while we used to think we knew and are now at a loss. So teach us this very thing first, so that we don't imagine we understand what you're saying when [244b] the exact opposite is the case." If we say this and make this request of these people, and of all the others who say the all is more than one, will we be striking a false note, my boy? |
| 244b | **THEAETETUS** ἥκιστά γε. | **THEAETETUS** Not in the least. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; παρὰ τῶν ἓν τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων ἆρ' οὐ πευστέον εἰς δύναμιν τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὄν; | **STRANGER** And what about those who say the all is one? Shouldn't we ask them, as best we can, what on earth they mean by what is? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθων. "ἕν πού φατε μόνον εἶναι;" — "φαμὲν γάρ," φήσουσιν. ἦ γάρ; | **STRANGER** Then let them answer this: "You say, I take it, that one thing alone is?" "Yes, we do," they'll say. Won't they? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** "τί δέ; ὂν καλεῖτέ τι;" | **STRANGER** "Well, then: do you call something 'being'?" |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| 244c | **STRANGER** "πότερον ὅπερ ἕν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς;" | **STRANGER** "Is it the same thing you call 'one,' so that you're using two names for the same thing? Or what?" |
| | **THEAETETUS** τίς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἡ μετὰ τοῦτ', ὦ ξένε, ἀπόκρισις; | **THEAETETUS** What will their answer be to that, Stranger? |
| | **STRANGER** δῆλον, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὁτιοῦν οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον ἀποκρίνασθαι. | **STRANGER** Clearly, Theaetetus, for someone who has laid down this hypothesis, answering the present question, or any other question for that matter, is not the easiest thing in the world. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| | **STRANGER** τό τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν θέμενον πλὴν ἓν καταγέλαστόν που. | **STRANGER** For one thing, it's surely ridiculous to agree that there are two names when you've laid it down that there is nothing but one. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαί του λέγοντος ὡς [244d] ἔστιν ὄνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον. | **STRANGER** And for that matter, so is accepting anyone's claim that [244d] there is a name at all. That would make no sense. |
| 244d | **THEAETETUS** πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** In what way? |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τιθείς τε τοὔνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἕτερον δύο λέγει πού τινε. | **STRANGER** If he posits the name as different from the thing, he's surely speaking of two things. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἂν ταὐτόν γε αὐτῷ τιθῇ τοὔνομα, ἢ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται λέγειν, εἰ δέ τινος αὐτὸ φήσει, συμβήσεται τὸ ὄνομα ὀνόματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς ὄν. | **STRANGER** And if he posits the name as the same as the thing, he'll be forced to say either that it's the name of nothing, or, if he says it's the name of something, it will turn out that the name is only the name of a name, and of nothing else. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** Just so. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τὸ ἕν γε, ἑνὸς ὄνομα ὂν καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὖ τὸ ἓν ὄν. | **STRANGER** And "the one," being the name of one, will also turn out to be the one of the name. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀνάγκη. | **THEAETETUS** Necessarily. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος ἑνὸς ἢ ταὐτὸν φήσουσι τούτῳ; | **STRANGER** Well, then: will they say that the whole is different from the one that is, or the same as it? |
| 244e | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσουσί τε καὶ φασίν; | **THEAETETUS** Of course they'll say it's the same. In fact they do say so. |
| | **STRANGER** εἰ τοίνυν ὅλον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ, τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν τὸ ὂν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει, ταῦτα δὲ ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν· ἢ πῶς; | **STRANGER** Well, if it is a whole, as Parmenides himself says ("in every direction like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere, equally balanced from the middle on every side; for it must not be any larger or any smaller here or there"), then what is, being like that, has a middle and extremities. And having these, it absolutely must have parts. Or how else could it be? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** Just so. |
| 245a | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ πᾶν τε ὂν καὶ ὅλον ἓν εἶναι. | **STRANGER** Yet nothing prevents what has been divided into parts from having oneness as a property over all its parts, and in this way, being all and a whole, from being one. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Why not? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα ἆρ' οὐκ ἀδύνατον αὐτό γε τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι; | **STRANGER** But isn't it impossible for what has these properties to be the one itself? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| | **STRANGER** ἀμερὲς δήπου δεῖ παντελῶς τό γε ἀληθῶς ἓν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον εἰρῆσθαι. | **STRANGER** Surely, on the correct account, what is truly one must be said to be completely without parts. |
| | **THEAETETUS** δεῖ γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, it must. |
| 245b | | |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὂν οὐ συμφωνήσει τῷ ὅλῳ λόγῳ. | **STRANGER** Whereas a thing like that, made up of many parts, won't fit that account. |
| | **THEAETETUS** μανθάνω. | **THEAETETUS** I see. |
| | **STRANGER** πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχον τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς οὕτως ἕν τε ἔσται καὶ ὅλον, ἢ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν ὅλον εἶναι τὸ ὄν; | **STRANGER** So will what is, by having oneness as a property, be one and a whole in that way? Or are we to deny altogether that what is is a whole? |
| | **THEAETETUS** χαλεπὴν προβέβληκας αἵρεσιν. | **THEAETETUS** That's a hard choice you've put in front of me. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθός τε γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναί πως οὐ ταὐτὸν ὂν τῷ ἑνὶ φανεῖται, καὶ πλέονα δὴ τὰ πάντα ἑνὸς ἔσται. | **STRANGER** You're absolutely right about that. If what is has the property of being one in some way, it will plainly not be the same as the one, and then all things will be more than one. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| 245c | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἐάν γε τὸ ὂν ᾖ μὴ ὅλον διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ' ἐκείνου πάθος, ᾖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, ἐνδεὲς τὸ ὂν ἑαυτοῦ συμβαίνει. | **STRANGER** And again, if what is is not a whole by having that property, but the whole itself is, then what is turns out to fall short of itself. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἑαυτοῦ στερόμενον οὐκ ὂν ἔσται τὸ ὄν. | **STRANGER** And by this argument, being deprived of itself, what is will be something that is not. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** Just so. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ ἑνός γε αὖ πλείω τὰ πάντα γίγνεται, τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὅλου χωρὶς ἰδίαν ἑκατέρου φύσιν εἰληφότος. | **STRANGER** And once again all things become more than one, since what is and the whole have each taken on a nature of its own, separately. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** μὴ ὄντος δέ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταὐτά τε [245d] ταῦτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὄντι, καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι μηδ' ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ ὄν. | **STRANGER** But if the whole doesn't exist at all, these same consequences [245d] hold for what is. On top of not being, it could never even come to be. |
| 245d | **THEAETETUS** τί δή; | **THEAETETUS** Why is that? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ γέγονεν ὅλον· ὥστε οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε γένεσιν ὡς οὖσαν δεῖ προσαγορεύειν τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι μὴ τιθέντα. | **STRANGER** Whatever has come to be has always come to be as a whole. So anyone who doesn't count the one or the whole among the things that are must not speak of either being or coming-to-be as something that is. |
| | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασιν ἔοικε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν. | **THEAETETUS** That seems to be entirely so. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὁποσονοῦν τι δεῖ τὸ μὴ ὅλον εἶναι· ποσόν τι γὰρ ὄν, ὁπόσον ἂν ᾖ, τοσοῦτον ὅλον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι. | **STRANGER** What's more, what isn't a whole can't have any quantity at all. If something is of some quantity, then however much it is, it must be a whole of that much. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τοίνυν ἄλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας ἕκαστον [245e] εἰληφὸς φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὂν εἴτε δύο τινὲ εἴτε ἓν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι. | **STRANGER** And countless other points will come to light, each [245e] carrying endless perplexities, for anyone who says that what is is either two things or one only. |
| 245e | **THEAETETUS** δηλοῖ σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα· συνάπτεται γὰρ ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου, μείζω καὶ χαλεπωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀεὶ ῥηθέντων πλάνην. | **THEAETETUS** The ones just emerging pretty much show it. Each links on to the next, always bringing greater and harder confusion about what was said before. |
| | **STRANGER** τοὺς μὲν τοίνυν διακριβολογουμένους ὄντος τε πέρι καὶ μή, πάντας μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν, ὅμως δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, ἵν' ἐκ πάντων ἴδωμεν [246a] ὅτι τὸ ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν. | **STRANGER** Well, we haven't gone through all those who give precise accounts of being and not-being, but let that suffice. Now we must look at those who speak about it differently, so that from all of them we may see [246a] that it is no easier to say what being is than to say what not-being is. |
| 246a | **THEAETETUS** οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους. | **THEAETETUS** Then we must move on to these people too. |

## THE BATTLE OF GODS AND GIANTS

*Materialists say only bodies are; the friends of the forms say only bodiless forms truly are.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντομαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους. | **STRANGER** And there does seem to be something like a battle of gods and giants going on among them, because of their dispute with one another about being. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| | **STRANGER** οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν [246b] τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τίς τι φήσει μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. | **STRANGER** Some of them drag everything down to earth from heaven and the invisible, literally clutching rocks and trees in their hands. They lay hold of all such things and insist that only what offers resistance and contact [246b] to the touch is. They define body and being as the same, and if any of the others says that something without a body is, they despise him utterly and refuse to listen to anything else. |
| 246b | **THEAETETUS** ἦ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἄνδρας· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον. | **THEAETETUS** They're formidable men you're describing. I've run into quite a few of them myself. |
| | **STRANGER** τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν [246c] κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ | **STRANGER** That's why their opponents defend themselves very cautiously from somewhere up above, out of the invisible, forcefully insisting that true being is certain intelligible and bodiless forms. As for the bodies of the other side, and what those people call truth, [246c] they smash them into little pieces in their arguments, and call it not |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ συνέστηκεν. | being but a kind of coming-to-be that is always on the move. Between the two sides, Theaetetus, an immense battle over these questions is always going on. |
| 246c | **THEAETETUS** ἀληθῆ. | **THEAETETUS** True. |
| | **STRANGER** παρ' ἀμφοῖν τοίνυν τοῖν γενοῖν κατὰ μέρος λάβωμεν λόγον ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας. | **STRANGER** Then let's take each of the two kinds in turn and get from them an account of the being they posit. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς οὖν δὴ ληψόμεθα; | **THEAETETUS** How are we going to get it, then? |
| | **STRANGER** παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν εἴδεσιν αὐτὴν τιθεμένων ῥᾷον, ἡμερώτεροι γάρ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἑλκόντων [246d] βίᾳ χαλεπώτερον, ἴσως δὲ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ' ὧδέ μοι δεῖν δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν δρᾶν. | **STRANGER** From those who place it in forms it's easier, since they're more civilized. From those who drag everything down into body [246d] by force, it's harder, and perhaps almost impossible. But here's what I think we must do about them. |
| 246d | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** What? |
| | **STRANGER** μάλιστα μέν, εἴ πῃ δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελτίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ, λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογηθὲν παρὰ βελτιόνων που κυριώτερον ἢ τὸ παρὰ χειρόνων· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τἀληθὲς ζητοῦμεν. | **STRANGER** Best of all, if it were somehow possible, would be to make them better in fact. If that can't be done, let's make them better in speech, supposing them willing to answer more civilly than they do now. After all, agreement from better people surely carries more authority than agreement from worse ones. But we aren't concerned with them. We're looking for the truth. |
| 246e | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθότατα. | **THEAETETUS** Quite right. |
| | **STRANGER** κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας ἀποκρίνασθαί σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρ' αὐτῶν ἀφερμήνευε. | **STRANGER** Then tell them, now that they've become better, to answer you, and interpret what they say. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ταῦτ' ἔσται. | **THEAETETUS** I will. |
| | **STRANGER** λεγόντων δὴ θνητὸν ζῷον εἴ φασιν εἶναί τι. | **STRANGER** Let them say whether they claim there's such a thing as a mortal living creature. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course they do. |
| | **STRANGER** τοῦτο δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὁμολογοῦσιν; | **STRANGER** And don't they agree that it's a body with a soul? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** τιθέντες τι τῶν ὄντων ψυχήν; | **STRANGER** Counting soul among the things that are? |
| 247a | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικόν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ ἄφρονα; | **STRANGER** Well, then: don't they say that one soul is just and another unjust, one has understanding and another lacks it? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ' οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ τοιαύτην αὐτῶν ἑκάστην γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἐναντίαν; | **STRANGER** But isn't it by the possession and presence of justice that each soul comes to be like that, and by the presence of the opposites that it comes to be the opposite? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί, καὶ ταῦτα σύμφασιν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, they agree to that too. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δυνατόν τῳ παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναί τι φήσουσιν. | **STRANGER** And surely they'll say that what can come to be present in something, or absent from it, is certainly something. |
| | **THEAETETUS** φασὶ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, they do say so. |
| 247b | **STRANGER** οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν ᾗ ταῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἁπτὸν εἶναί φασί τι αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα; | **STRANGER** Since, then, justice and understanding and the rest of excellence and their opposites are, and so is the soul in which they come to be, do they say that any of them is visible and tangible, or that they're all invisible? |
| | **THEAETETUS** σχεδὸν οὐδὲν τούτων γε ὁρατόν. | **THEAETETUS** Hardly any of these is visible. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δὲ τῶν τοιούτων; μῶν σῶμά τι λέγουσιν ἴσχειν; | **STRANGER** And what about things like these? Do they say they have some kind of body? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀποκρίνονται πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται 247c τὸ τολμᾶν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα διισχυρίζεσθαι. | **THEAETETUS** Here they no longer give the same answer across the board. The soul itself, they think, has some kind of body. But when it comes to understanding and each of the other things you asked about, they're ashamed 247c to dare either to agree that these are not among the things that are, or to insist that they're all bodies. |
| 247c | **STRANGER** σαφῶς γὰρ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, βελτίους γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες· ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδ' ἂν ἓν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν οἵ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοιντ' ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν. | **STRANGER** Clearly, Theaetetus, our men have become better. The real Sown Men and earth-born among them wouldn't be ashamed of a single one of these points. They'd insist that whatever they can't squeeze in their hands is, after all, nothing whatsoever.[10] |
| | **THEAETETUS** σχεδὸν οἷα διανοοῦνται λέγεις. | **THEAETETUS** That's pretty much how they think. |
| | **STRANGER** πάλιν τοίνυν ἀνερωτῶμεν αὐτούς· εἰ γάρ τι καὶ 247d σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ. τὸ γὰρ ἐπί τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφυὲς γεγονός, εἰς ὃ βλέποντες | **STRANGER** Then let's question them again. If they're willing to grant that even something 247d small among the things that are is bodiless, that's enough. For then they must tell us what it is that |

10 In Theban legend the "Sown Men" sprang up fully armed from the dragon's teeth that Cadmus sowed in the earth. The Stranger is extending his picture of the materialists as earth-born giants.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. τάχ' οὖν ἴσως ἂν ἀποροῖεν· εἰ δή τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ἡμῶν, ἆρ' ἐθέλοιεν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιόνδ' εἶναι τὸ ὄν. | belongs by nature both to these things and to those that have body, so that they look to it when they say that both kinds are. Perhaps they'll be at a loss. If something like that has happened to them, see whether they'd be willing to accept a suggestion from us and agree that what is is something like this. |
| 247d | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον δή; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα. | **THEAETETUS** Like what? Tell us, and we'll soon know. |
| | **STRANGER** λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν [247e] εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις. | **STRANGER** I'm saying that whatever has acquired any capacity at all, [247e] whether by nature to act on anything else whatever or to be acted on, even in the slightest degree, by the most trivial thing, and even if only once, all of this really is. For I propose as a definition marking off the things that are, that they are nothing other than capacity. |
| 247e | **THEAETETUS** ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ αὐτοί γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο. | **THEAETETUS** Well, since they have nothing better to say themselves for the moment, they accept this. |
| | **STRANGER** καλῶς· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὕστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις [248a] ἕτερον ἂν φανείη. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα μενέτω συνομολογηθέν. | **STRANGER** Good. Perhaps later something different may appear [248a] to us and to them. So, as far as they're concerned, let this stand as agreed for now. |
| 248a | **THEAETETUS** μένει. | **THEAETETUS** It stands. |

## THE FRIENDS OF THE FORMS

*What is fully real must include change, life, soul and understanding.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἑτέρους ἴωμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους· σὺ δ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευε. | **STRANGER** Then let's turn to the others, the friends of the forms. And you interpret their side for us too. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ταῦτ' ἔσται. | **THEAETETUS** I will. |
| | **STRANGER** γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρίς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἦ γάρ; | **STRANGER** You distinguish coming-to-be from being and speak of them as separate, I take it? Don't you? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. | **STRANGER** And you say that with the body, through perception, we commune with coming-to-be, but with the soul, through reasoning, we commune with real being. Being, you say, is always the same in the same respects, while coming-to-be is different at different times. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 248b | **THEAETETUS** φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, we do say so. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὦ πάντων ἄριστοι, τί τοῦθ' ὑμᾶς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φῶμεν; ἆρ' οὐ τὸ νυνδὴ παρ' ἡμῶν ῥηθέν; | **STRANGER** And this "communing," you finest of men: what are we to say you mean by it in both cases? Isn't it what we described just now? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What was that? |
| | **STRANGER** πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντων γιγνόμενον. τάχ' οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως διὰ συνήθειαν. | **STRANGER** Being acted on or acting, which results from some capacity when things meet one another. Perhaps, Theaetetus, you can't make out their answer to this, but I perhaps can, because I know them well. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τίν' οὖν δὴ λέγουσι λόγον; | **THEAETETUS** So what account do they give? |
| 248c | **STRANGER** οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι. | **STRANGER** They don't grant us what we said just now to the earth-born about being. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What was that? |
| | **STRANGER** ἱκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον που τῶν ὄντων, ὅταν τῳ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις; | **STRANGER** We laid it down as an adequate definition of the things that are, didn't we, that a thing has present in it the capacity to be acted on or to act, even in the slightest degree? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα τόδε λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἁρμόττειν φασίν. | **STRANGER** In reply they say that coming-to-be has a share in the capacity to be acted on and to act, but that the capacity for neither of these fits being. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι; | **THEAETETUS** And don't they have a point? |
| | **STRANGER** πρὸς ὅ γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν ὅτι δεόμεθα παρ' αὐτῶν 248d ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι. | **STRANGER** To which we must reply that we need to learn from them 248d more clearly still whether they also agree that the soul knows and that being is known. |
| 248d | **THEAETETUS** φασὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε. | **THEAETETUS** They certainly do say that. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἢ τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαί φατε ποίημα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀμφότερον; ἢ τὸ μὲν πάθημα, τὸ δὲ θάτερον; ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου τούτων μεταλαμβάνειν; | **STRANGER** Well, then: do you say that knowing or being known is acting, or being acted on, or both? Or that one of them is being acted on and the other is the other? Or that neither of them has any part in either of these at all? |
| | **THEAETETUS** δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου· τἀναντία γὰρ ἂν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λέγοιεν. | **THEAETETUS** Clearly neither has any part in either. Otherwise they'd be contradicting what they said before. |
| | **STRANGER** μανθάνω· τόδε γε, ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται 248e ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ | **STRANGER** I see. They'd have to face this, at least: if knowing is 248e acting on something, then what |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | συμβαίνει πάσχειν. τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γιγνωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ' ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν. | is known must in turn be acted on. And so, on this account, being, when it is known by knowledge, is changed to the extent that it is known, since it is acted on. And that, we say, couldn't happen to what is at rest. |
| 248e | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Right. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς 249a ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι; | **STRANGER** But tell me, by Zeus: are we really going to be so easily persuaded that change and life and soul and understanding are not present to what wholly 249a is, that it neither lives nor thinks, but stands there unchanging, solemn and holy, devoid of intelligence? |
| 249a | **THEAETETUS** δεινὸν μεντἄν, ὦ ξένε, λόγον συγχωροῖμεν. | **THEAETETUS** That would be a terrible claim to concede, Stranger. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν; | **STRANGER** Then are we to say that it has intelligence but not life? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How could we? |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνόντ' αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά; | **STRANGER** Then do we say that both of these are in it, and yet deny that it has them in a soul? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ τίν' ἂν ἕτερον ἔχοι τρόπον; | **THEAETETUS** And how else could it have them? |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν ἔμψυχον ὂν ἑστάναι; | **STRANGER** Then are we to say that it has intelligence and life and soul, and yet, though it has a soul, stands utterly unchanging? |
| 249b | **THEAETETUS** πάντα ἔμοιγε ἄλογα ταῦτ' εἶναι φαίνεται. | **THEAETETUS** All of that strikes me as unreasonable. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὡς ὄντα. | **STRANGER** Then we must grant that what changes, and change itself, are among the things that are. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** συμβαίνει δ' οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκινήτων τε ὄντων νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ. | **STRANGER** So it follows, Theaetetus, that if things are unchanging, there is no intelligence anywhere, in anyone, about anything. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Quite so. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἐὰν αὖ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα πάντ' εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσομεν. | **STRANGER** And again, if we grant that all things are in motion and changing, then by this argument too we'll remove this very thing from the things that are. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How? |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ [249c] σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ' ἄν; | **STRANGER** Do you think that what is the same, in the same respects, in the same way, and concerning the same thing, [249c] could ever come about without rest? |
| 249c | **THEAETETUS** οὐδαμῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Not at all. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δ'; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾷς ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον ἂν καὶ ὁπουοῦν; | **STRANGER** Well, then: without these, can you see intelligence being or coming to be anywhere at all? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἥκιστα. | **THEAETETUS** Not in the least. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν πρός γε τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον, ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων ἰσχυρίζηται περί τινος ὁπῃοῦν. | **STRANGER** And surely we must fight with every argument against anyone who does away with knowledge or understanding or intelligence and yet insists on any claim about anything in any way. |
| | **THEAETETUS** σφόδρα γε. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |
| | **STRANGER** τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι πᾶσα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἓν ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ [249d] εἴδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἑστηκὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ὂν κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχήν, ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν συναμφότερα λέγειν. | **STRANGER** So the philosopher, who prizes these things most of all, absolutely must, it seems, refuse to accept that the all is at rest, whether from those who say it is one or from those who say it is many [249d] forms. And he must not listen at all to those who make what is change in every way. Instead, like children begging for both, he must say that what is, the all, is both together: everything unchanging and everything changing.[11] |
| 249d | **THEAETETUS** ἀληθέστατα. | **THEAETETUS** Very true. |
| | **STRANGER** τί οὖν; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς ἤδη φαινόμεθα περιειληφέναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ὄν; | **STRANGER** Well, then: don't we now seem to have captured what is fairly well in our account? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** βαβαὶ μέντ' ἂν ἄρα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς μοι δοκοῦμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι πέρι τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς σκέψεως. | **STRANGER** And yet—dear me, Theaetetus! It seems to me that only now are we going to recognize how perplexing our inquiry into it really is. |
| 249e | **THEAETETUS** πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτ' εἴρηκας; | **THEAETETUS** How so? What do you mean by that? |
| | **STRANGER** ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι νῦν ἐσμεν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείστῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαινόμεθα δέ τι λέγειν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς; | **STRANGER** My dear friend, don't you realize that we're now in the deepest ignorance about it, even though we seem to ourselves to be saying something? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἐμοὶ γοῦν· ὅπῃ δ' αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως ἔχοντες, οὐ πάνυ συνίημι. | |

11 Children offered a choice between two things proverbially ask for both.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | | **THEAETETUS** We do seem so to me, at any rate. But how we've got into that state without noticing, I really don't see. |
| | **STRANGER** σκόπει δὴ σαφέστερον εἰ τὰ νῦν συνομολογοῦντες [250a] δικαίως ἂν ἐπερωτηθεῖμεν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ τότε ἠρωτῶμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ πᾶν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν. | **STRANGER** Then look more closely: given what we're agreeing to now, [250a] couldn't we justly be asked the very questions we ourselves were asking earlier of those who say the all is hot and cold? |
| 250a | **THEAETETUS** ποῖα; ὑπόμνησόν με. | **THEAETETUS** What questions? Remind me. |
| | **STRANGER** πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ πειράσομαί γε δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν σὲ καθάπερ ἐκείνους τότε, ἵνα ἅμα τι καὶ προΐωμεν. | **STRANGER** Certainly. And I'll try to do it by questioning you as I questioned them then, so that we can also make some progress at the same time. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Right. |
| | **STRANGER** εἶεν δή, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἆρ' οὐκ ἐναντιώτατα λέγεις ἀλλήλοις; | **STRANGER** Very well. Don't you say that change and rest are completely opposed to each other? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν εἶναί γε ὁμοίως φῂς ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ καὶ ἑκάτερον; | **STRANGER** And yet you say that both of them, and each of them, equally are? |
| 250b | **THEAETETUS** φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, I do. |
| | **STRANGER** ἆρα κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφότερα καὶ ἑκάτερον, ὅταν εἶναι συγχωρῇς; | **STRANGER** When you grant that they are, do you mean that both and each are changing? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδαμῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Not at all. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ' ἑστάναι σημαίνεις λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι; | **STRANGER** Then when you say that they both are, do you signify that they're at rest? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How could I? |
| | **STRANGER** τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὂν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς, ὡς ὑπ' ἐκείνου τήν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβὼν καὶ ἀπιδὼν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπας ἀμφότερα; | **STRANGER** So you're positing being in your soul as a third thing alongside these, on the grounds that rest and change are encompassed by it. And by taking them together and looking at their combination with being, you've said in that way that they both are? |
| 250c | **THEAETETUS** κινδυνεύομεν ὡς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομαντεύεσθαί τι τὸ ὄν, ὅταν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν εἶναι λέγωμεν. | **THEAETETUS** It really does look as though we divine being as some third thing, when we say that change and rest are. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ συναμφότερον τὸ ὂν ἀλλ' ἕτερον δή τι τούτων. | **STRANGER** So being is not change and rest together, but something different from them. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔοικεν. | **THEAETETUS** So it seems. |
| | **STRANGER** κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὂν οὔτε ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται. | **STRANGER** Then by its own nature being is neither at rest nor changing. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** σχεδόν. | **THEAETETUS** Pretty much. |
| | **STRANGER** ποῖ δὴ χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔτι τρέπειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἐναργές τι περὶ αὐτοῦ παρ' ἑαυτῷ βεβαιώσασθαι; | **STRANGER** Then where should someone turn his thought, if he wants to establish for himself something clear about it? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ποῖ γάρ; | **THEAETETUS** Where indeed? |
| | **STRANGER** οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμόσε ἔτι ῥᾴδιον. εἰ γάρ τι μὴ [250d] κινεῖται, πῶς οὐχ ἕστηκεν; ἢ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἑστὸς πῶς οὐκ αὖ κινεῖται; τὸ δὲ ὂν ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπέφανται. ἦ δυνατὸν οὖν τοῦτο; | **STRANGER** I think there's nowhere easy to turn any longer. If something isn't [250d] changing, how is it not at rest? And how is what is in no way at rest not changing? Yet being has now turned out, by our account, to lie outside both of these. Is that possible? |
| 250d | **THEAETETUS** πάντων μὲν οὖν ἀδυνατώτατον. | **THEAETETUS** It's the most impossible thing of all. |
| | **STRANGER** τόδε τοίνυν μνησθῆναι δίκαιον ἐπὶ τούτοις. | **STRANGER** Then here's something it's fair to recall at this point. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What? |
| | **STRANGER** ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐρωτηθέντες τοὔνομα ἐφ' ὅτι ποτὲ δεῖ φέρειν, πάσῃ συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορίᾳ. μέμνησαι; | **STRANGER** That when we were asked what on earth the name "what is not" should be applied to, we were caught in utter perplexity. Do you remember? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| 250e | **STRANGER** μῶν οὖν ἐν ἐλάττονί τινι νῦν ἐσμεν ἀπορίᾳ περὶ τὸ ὄν; | **STRANGER** Well, are we in any less perplexity now about what is? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ ξένε, εἰ δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν πλείονι φαινόμεθα. | **THEAETETUS** To me, Stranger, if it's possible to say so, we seem to be in more. |
| | **STRANGER** τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορημένον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐξ ἴσου τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπορίας μετειλήφατον, νῦν ἐλπὶς ἤδη καθάπερ ἂν αὐτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον ἀναφαίνηται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως [251a] ἀναφαίνεσθαι· καὶ ἐὰν αὖ μηδέτερον ἰδεῖν δυνώμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον ὅπηπερ ἂν οἷοί τε ὦμεν εὐπρεπέστατα διωσόμεθα οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἅμα. | **STRANGER** Then let this be laid down here as the full extent of our perplexity. But since what is and what is not have had an equal share of perplexity, there's now hope that as one of them comes to light, whether more dimly or more clearly, the other will [251a] come to light in the same way. And if, on the other hand, we can't see either of them, we'll at least push our argument through between the two of them at once, as creditably as we can. |
| 251a | **THEAETETUS** καλῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Good. |
| | **STRANGER** λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἑκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν. | **STRANGER** Then let's explain how it is that we call this same thing, on any given occasion, by many names. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οἷον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ. | **THEAETETUS** Such as what? Give me an example. |

GREEK

ENGLISH

**STRANGER** λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δήπου πόλλ' ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον [251b] ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναί φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἄπειρα, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἓν ἕκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν.

**STRANGER** We speak of a man, of course, and give him many further names. We attribute to him colors and shapes and sizes and vices and excellences, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only [251b] that he is a man but also that he is good, and endlessly many other things. And the same goes for everything else: we suppose each thing to be one, and then we speak of it as many and by many names.

251b **THEAETETUS** ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

**THEAETETUS** That's true.

**STRANGER** ὅθεν γε οἶμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δήπου χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν [251c] ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δή τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνηυρηκέναι.

**STRANGER** And that's how, I suppose, we've laid on a feast for the young, and for those among the old who've come late to learning. Anyone can object right away that it's impossible for the many to be one and the one many. And they certainly enjoy not letting us call a man good, [251c] but only the good good and the man man. I imagine, Theaetetus, you often meet people who take this kind of thing seriously, sometimes quite elderly people, who are dazzled by it because of how poorly stocked they are with understanding, and who even think they've discovered something supremely wise in this very point.

251c **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

**THEAETETUS** Certainly.

## WHICH KINDS BLEND?

*Neither all nor none: some kinds combine with one another, as some letters do.*

GREEK

ENGLISH

**STRANGER** ἵνα τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ τοὺς [251d] πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁτιοῦν διαλεχθέντας, ἔστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις ἔμπροσθεν διειλέγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἐρωτήσει λεχθησόμενα.

**STRANGER** So that our argument may be addressed to all those [251d] who have ever discussed being in any way whatever, let what we're about to say, put in the form of questions, be addressed both to these people and to the others we've been discussing before.

251d **THEAETETUS** τὰ ποῖα δή;

**THEAETETUS** What will that be?

**STRANGER** πότερον μήτε τὴν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει προσάπτωμεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μηδὲν μηδενί, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν; ἢ πάντα εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγάγωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις; ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δὲ μή; τούτων, [251e] ὦ Θεαίτητε, τί ποτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φήσομεν;

**STRANGER** Are we to attach neither being to change and rest, nor anything else to anything else, and treat them in our discussions as unblended and unable to share in one another? Or are we to bring them all together into one, as capable of combining with one another? Or some yes and some no? Of these options, [251e] Theaetetus, which shall we say they would choose?

251e

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι. | **THEAETETUS** I have no answer to that on their behalf. |
| | **STRANGER** τί οὖν οὐ καθ' ἓν ἀποκρινόμενος ἑφ' ἑκάστου τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω; | **STRANGER** Then why not answer one option at a time and examine what follows in each case? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καλῶς λέγεις. | **THEAETETUS** That's a good idea. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τιθῶμέν γε αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἰ βούλει, πρῶτον μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν. οὐκοῦν κίνησίς τε καὶ στάσις οὐδαμῇ μεθέξετον οὐσίας; | **STRANGER** And let's suppose, if you like, that first they say nothing has any power of combining with anything in any way. In that case change and rest won't share in being at all, will they? |
| 252a | **THEAETETUS** οὐ γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** No, they won't. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινωνοῦν; | **STRANGER** Well then, will either of them be, if it doesn't combine with being? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐκ ἔσται. | **THEAETETUS** It won't. |
| | **STRANGER** ταχὺ δὴ ταύτῃ γε τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἅμα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινούντων καὶ τῶν ὡς ἓν ἱστάντων καὶ ὅσοι κατ' εἴδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναί φασιν ἀεί· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τό γε εἶναι προσάπτουσιν, οἱ μὲν ὄντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως ἑστηκότ' εἶναι. | **STRANGER** Then that agreement has quickly turned everything upside down, it seems: the views of those who make the all change, of those who make it stand still as one, and of all who say that the things that are exist in forms that are always the same and unvarying. All of them attach being to things. Some say things really are changing, others that they really are at rest. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| 252b | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅσοι τοτὲ μὲν συντιθέασι τὰ πάντα, τοτὲ δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἴτε εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄπειρα εἴτε εἰς πέρας ἔχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως μὲν ἐὰν ἐν μέρει τοῦτο τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἀεί, κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα λέγοιεν ἂν οὐδέν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἔστι σύμμειξις. | **STRANGER** And what's more, take those who sometimes put everything together and sometimes divide it. They may divide things into one and out of one into unlimitedly many, or into a limited number of elements that they then compose things from. They may suppose this happens in turns, or that it happens always. Either way, none of them would be saying anything, if there's no blending at all. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Right. |
| | **STRANGER** ἔτι τοίνυν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάντων καταγελαστότατα μετίοιεν τὸν λόγον οἱ μηδὲν ἐῶντες κοινωνίᾳ παθήματος ἑτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν. | **STRANGER** And the people who won't let anything be called something else by sharing in what belongs to that other thing would be pursuing the argument in the most ridiculous way of all. |
| 252c | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How? |
| | **STRANGER** τῷ τε "εἶναί" που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ "χωρὶς" καὶ τῷ "τῶν ἄλλων" καὶ τῷ "καθ' αὐτὸ" καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέροις, ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων | **STRANGER** They're forced, I suppose, to use "is" about everything, and "apart," and "from the others," and "by itself," and countless other expressions. Since they can't keep away from these or |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγξόντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον οἴκοθεν τὸν πολέμιον καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποφθεγγόμενον ὥσπερ τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες ἀεὶ πορεύονται. | avoid linking them in their statements, they don't need anyone else to refute them. They have the enemy and opponent at home, as the saying goes, and they go around carrying him with them always, muttering from inside, like that strange Eurycles.[12] |
| 252d | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ λέγεις ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. | **THEAETETUS** That's exactly right—an apt comparison, and a true one. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δ', ἂν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐῶμεν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας; | **STRANGER** Well, what if we let all things have the power of combining with one another? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τοῦτο μὲν οἷός τε κἀγὼ διαλύειν. | **THEAETETUS** That one even I can dispose of. |
| | **STRANGER** πῶς; | **STRANGER** How? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὅτι κίνησίς τε αὐτὴ παντάπασιν ἵσταιτ' ἂν καὶ στάσις αὖ πάλιν αὐτὴ κινοῖτο, εἴπερ ἐπιγιγνοίσθην ἐπ' ἀλλήλοιν. | **THEAETETUS** Because change itself would come to a complete standstill, and rest in turn would itself change, if each of them came to belong to the other. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κίνησίν τε ἵστασθαι καὶ στάσιν κινεῖσθαι; | **STRANGER** But surely it's impossible, by the strictest necessity, for change to rest and rest to change? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ τρίτον δὴ μόνον λοιπόν. | **STRANGER** Then only the third option is left. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| 252e | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἕν γέ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα ἢ μηδὲν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλειν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμείγνυσθαι. | **STRANGER** And one of these must be the case: either everything blends, or nothing does, or some things are willing to blend and others not. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν τά γε δύο ἀδύνατον ηὑρέθη. | **STRANGER** And two of them were found to be impossible. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** πᾶς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὀρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει. | **STRANGER** So anyone who wants to answer correctly will posit the remaining one of the three. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| | **STRANGER** ὅτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τοῦτο δρᾶν, τὰ δ' οὔ, σχεδὸν 253a οἷον τὰ γράμματα πεπονθότ' ἂν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων τὰ μὲν ἀναρμοστεῖ που πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὰ δὲ συναρμόττει. | **STRANGER** Then since some things are willing to do this and others not, they'd be pretty much 253a in the same situation as letters. Some letters, after all, don't fit together with each other, while others do. |

12 Eurycles was a famous ventriloquist seer whose prophetic voice seemed to speak from inside his belly.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 253a | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** τὰ δέ γε φωνήεντα διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων οἷον δεσμὸς διὰ πάντων κεχώρηκεν, ὥστε ἄνευ τινὸς αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον ἁρμόττειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. | **STRANGER** And the vowels, unlike the rest, run through all of them like a bond, so that without one of them it's impossible for the others to fit together, one with another. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ μάλα γε. | **THEAETETUS** Very true. |
| | **STRANGER** πᾶς οὖν οἶδεν ὁποῖα ὁποίοις δυνατὰ κοινωνεῖν, ἢ τέχνης δεῖ τῷ μέλλοντι δρᾶν ἱκανῶς αὐτό; | **STRANGER** So does everyone know which letters can combine with which, or does someone who's going to do it adequately need an art? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τέχνης. | **THEAETETUS** An art. |
| | **STRANGER** ποίας; | **STRANGER** Which one? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τῆς γραμματικῆς. | **THEAETETUS** Grammar. |
| 253b | **STRANGER** τί δέ; περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων φθόγγους ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως; ὁ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γιγνώσκειν μουσικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ συνιεὶς ἄμουσος; | **STRANGER** And what about high and low notes? Isn't it the same there? The person who has the art of recognizing which ones blend and which don't is musical, and the one who doesn't understand is unmusical? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** That's right. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνιῶν τοιαῦτα εὑρήσομεν ἕτερα. | **STRANGER** And we'll find other differences of this sort with the other arts and the lack of them. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δ'; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταὐτὰ μείξεως ἔχειν ὡμολογήκαμεν, ἆρ' οὐ μετ' ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα 253c οὐ δέχεται; καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντ' ἄττ' αὖτ' ἐστιν, ὥστε συμμείγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν, εἰ δι' ὅλων ἕτερα τῆς διαιρέσεως αἴτια; | **STRANGER** Well then, we've agreed that the kinds, too, relate to one another in the same way where mixing is concerned. So mustn't someone who's going to show correctly which kinds harmonize with which, and which 253c won't accept one another, make his way through the discussion with some kind of knowledge? He has to show, especially, whether there are some running through all of them that hold them together, so that they're able to blend; and again, in divisions, whether there are others running through wholes that are responsible for the division. |
| 253c | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδόν γε ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης; | **THEAETETUS** Of course knowledge is needed—and perhaps pretty much the greatest knowledge. |

## THE PHILOSOPHER'S KNOWLEDGE

*Dividing by kinds is dialectic; the philosopher is hard to see for the brightness of being.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τίν' οὖν αὖ νῦν προσεροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ταύτην; ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηυρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον; | **STRANGER** Then what are we going to call this one, Theaetetus? Or, by Zeus, have we stumbled without noticing onto the knowledge that belongs to free people? Have we, in looking for the sophist, perhaps found the philosopher first? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς λέγεις; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean? |
| 253d | **STRANGER** τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταὐτὸν μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι; | **STRANGER** Dividing by kinds, and not taking the same form for a different one, or a different one for the same—won't we say that belongs to the knowledge of dialectic? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί, φήσομεν. | **THEAETETUS** Yes, we'll say so. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντῃ διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ δι' ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ συνημμένην, καὶ πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντῃ διωρισμένας· τοῦτο δ' 253e ἔστιν, ᾗ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι. | **STRANGER** Then the person who can do this adequately discerns one form extended everywhere through many, each of which lies separate; and many forms, different from one another, embraced from outside by one; and again one form connected into a unity through many wholes; and many marked off entirely apart. And this 253e is knowing how to distinguish, by kind, in what ways each thing can combine and in what ways it can't. |
| 253e | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι. | **STRANGER** But you won't grant the dialectical skill to anyone, I imagine, except the person who does philosophy purely and justly. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ δοίη τις; | **THEAETETUS** How could anyone grant it to anyone else? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀνευρήσομεν ἐὰν ζητῶμεν, ἰδεῖν μὲν χαλεπὸν 254a ἐναργῶς καὶ τοῦτον, ἕτερον μὴν τρόπον ἥ τε τοῦ σοφιστοῦ χαλεπότης ἥ τε τούτου. | **STRANGER** The philosopher, then, is someone we'll find in some such place, now and later, if we look for him. He too is hard to see 254a clearly, but the difficulty with the sophist and the difficulty with him are of different kinds. |
| 254a | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| | **STRANGER** ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβῇ προσαπτόμενος αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός· ἦ γάρ; | **STRANGER** The sophist runs off into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way around in it by long practice, and he's hard to make out because the place is so dark. Isn't that right? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔοικεν. | **THEAETETUS** It seems so. |

GREEK

ENGLISH

**STRANGER** ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετὴς ὀφθῆναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὄμματα [254b] καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ἀδύνατα.

**STRANGER** But the philosopher, who always devotes himself through reasoning to the form of being, is in his turn far from easy to see, because the region is so bright. The eyes of most people's souls [254b] can't bear to keep looking toward the divine.

254b **THEAETETUS** καὶ ταῦτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἧττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν.

**THEAETETUS** That's likely to be just as true as the other.

**STRANGER** οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ᾖ· περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ που δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀνετέον πρὶν ἂν ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν θεασώμεθα.

**STRANGER** Then we'll look into him more clearly soon, perhaps, if we still want to. But as for the sophist, clearly we mustn't let him go until we've had a good look at him.

**THEAETETUS** καλῶς εἶπες.

**THEAETETUS** You're right.

**STRANGER** ὅτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἡμῖν τῶν γενῶν ὡμολόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς [254c] πᾶσι κεκοινωνηκέναι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο συνεπισπώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τῇδε σκοποῦντες, μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἵνα μὴ ταραττώμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελόμενοι τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἄττα, πρῶτον μὲν ποῖα ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ἔπειτα κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἵνα τό τε ὂν καὶ μὴ ὂν εἰ μὴ πάσῃ σαφηνείᾳ δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν λόγου γε ἐνδεεῖς μηδὲν γιγνώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, καθ' ὅσον ὁ τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν σκέψεως, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν πῃ [254d] παρεικάθῃ τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ ὂν ἀθῴοις ἀπαλλάττειν.

**STRANGER** Well, we've agreed that some kinds are willing to combine with one another and others not; that some combine with a few and some with many; and that nothing prevents some, running through all of them, from having combined with them [254c] all. So let's follow the argument along by looking at the next point this way. We won't take all the forms, so as not to be confused among so many. Instead we'll pick out some of those called greatest and look first at what each of them is like, and then at how they stand with regard to their power of combining with one another. That way, even if we can't grasp being and not-being with complete clarity, we at least won't fall short of an account of them, so far as the method of our present inquiry allows—if it turns out that we're somehow [254d] permitted to get away unscathed when we say that not-being really is not-being.

254d **THEAETETUS** οὐκοῦν χρή.

**THEAETETUS** Yes, we should.

## THE GREATEST KINDS

*Being, change, rest, the same and the different are five distinct kinds, and the different pervades them all.*

GREEK

ENGLISH

**STRANGER** μέγιστα μὴν τῶν γενῶν ἃ νυνδὴ διῆμεν τό τε ὂν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.

**STRANGER** Now the greatest kinds are the ones we were just going through: being itself, rest, and change.

**THEAETETUS** πολύ γε.

**THEAETETUS** By far.

**STRANGER** καὶ μὴν τώ γε δύο φαμὲν αὐτοῖν ἀμείκτω πρὸς ἀλλήλω.

**STRANGER** And two of them, we say, don't mix with each other.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** σφόδρα γε. | **THEAETETUS** Definitely. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γε ὂν μεικτὸν ἀμφοῖν· ἐστὸν γὰρ ἄμφω που. | **STRANGER** But being mixes with both, since both of them are, I suppose. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** τρία δὴ γίγνεται ταῦτα. | **STRANGER** So these come to three. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτῷ ταὐτόν. | **STRANGER** And each of them is different from the other two, and the same as itself. |
| 254e | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** That's so. |
| | **STRANGER** τί ποτ' αὖ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτώ, τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, συμμειγνυμένω μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεί, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἢ τό τε ταὐτὸν [255a] τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον ὡς ἐκείνων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς; | **STRANGER** But now what on earth have we just meant by "the same" and "the different"? Are they two kinds, distinct from the three, though always necessarily blending with them, so that we must investigate five kinds rather than three? Or, when we speak of the same [255a] and the different, are we unwittingly naming one of those three? |
| 255a | **THEAETETUS** ἴσως. | **THEAETETUS** Perhaps. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ' οὔ τι μὴν κίνησίς γε καὶ στάσις οὔθ' ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν ἐστι. | **STRANGER** But change and rest, at any rate, are neither the different nor the same. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| | **STRANGER** ὅτιπερ ἂν κοινῇ προσείπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι. | **STRANGER** Whatever we call change and rest in common can't be either of them. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί δή; | **THEAETETUS** Why not? |
| | **STRANGER** κίνησίς τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὖ κινηθήσεται· περὶ γὰρ ἀμφότερα θάτερον ὁποτερονοῦν γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὖ θάτερον ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον τῆς αὑτοῦ [255b] φύσεως, ἅτε μετασχὸν τοῦ ἐναντίου. | **STRANGER** Change would come to rest, and rest in turn would change. Whichever of the two came to apply to both would force the other to change into the opposite of its own [255b] nature, since it would share in its opposite. |
| 255b | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ γε. | **THEAETETUS** Exactly. |
| | **STRANGER** μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου. | **STRANGER** Yet both of them do share in the same and the different. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησίν γ' εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἢ θάτερον, μηδ' αὖ στάσιν. | **STRANGER** Then let's not say that change is the same or the different, nor that rest is, either. |
| | **THEAETETUS** μὴ γάρ. | **THEAETETUS** No, let's not. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ' ἆρα τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν ὡς ἕν τι διανοητέον ἡμῖν; | **STRANGER** But should we think of being and the same as one thing? |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** ἴσως. | **THEAETETUS** Perhaps. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνετον, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγοντες [255c] ἀμφότερα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα προσεροῦμεν. | **STRANGER** But if being and the same signify nothing different, then when we say again that change and rest both are, [255c] we'll be calling them both the same, on the grounds that they are. |
| 255c | **THEAETETUS** ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον. | **THEAETETUS** But that's impossible. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀδύνατον ἄρα ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι. | **STRANGER** So it's impossible for the same and being to be one. |
| | **THEAETETUS** σχεδόν. | **THEAETETUS** Pretty much. |
| | **STRANGER** τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν εἴδεσιν τὸ ταὐτὸν τιθῶμεν; | **STRANGER** Shall we posit the same, then, as a fourth, in addition to the three forms? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δέ; τὸ θάτερον ἆρα ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον; ἢ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὂν ὡς δύ᾽ ἄττα ὀνόματα ἐφ᾽ ἑνὶ γένει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ; | **STRANGER** And what about the different? Should we call it a fifth? Or should we think of it and being as two names for a single kind? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τάχ᾽ ἄν. | **THEAETETUS** Maybe. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι. | **STRANGER** But I think you'll agree that among the things that are, some are spoken of themselves by themselves, others always in relation to other things. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί δ᾽ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| 255d | **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γ᾽ ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον· ἦ γάρ; | **STRANGER** And the different is always in relation to something different, isn't it? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην· ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅτιπερ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι. | **STRANGER** That wouldn't be so if being and the different weren't very far apart. If the different shared in both forms, as being does, then there would sometimes be something different that wasn't different in relation to something different. But as it is, we simply find that whatever is different is necessarily what it is in relation to something different. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει. | **THEAETETUS** That's just how it is. |
| | **STRANGER** πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς [255e] εἴδεσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα. | **STRANGER** So we must say that the nature of the different is a fifth, one of the [255e] forms we're picking out. |
| 255e | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν· ἓν ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου. | **STRANGER** And we'll say that it pervades all of them. Each one is different from the others not because of its own nature, but because it shares in the form of the different. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| | **STRANGER** ὧδε δὴ λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθ' ἓν ἀναλαμβάνοντες. | **STRANGER** Then let's put it this way about the five, taking them up one at a time. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How? |
| | **STRANGER** πρῶτον μὲν κίνησιν, ὡς ἔστι παντάπασιν ἕτερον στάσεως. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; | **STRANGER** First, change: it's altogether different from rest. Or how do we put it? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** That way. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐ στάσις ἄρ' ἐστίν. | **STRANGER** So it is not rest. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδαμῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Not at all. |
| 256a | **STRANGER** ἔστι δέ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος. | **STRANGER** But it is, because it shares in being. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔστιν. | **THEAETETUS** It is. |
| | **STRANGER** αὖθις δὴ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις ἕτερον ταὐτοῦ ἐστιν. | **STRANGER** And again, change is different from the same. |
| | **THEAETETUS** σχεδόν. | **THEAETETUS** Pretty much. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν. | **STRANGER** So it is not the same. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐ γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** No, it isn't. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλὰ μὴν αὖτη γ' ἦν ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὖ πάντ' αὐτοῦ. | **STRANGER** And yet it was the same, because everything in turn shares in the same. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ μάλα. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |
| | **STRANGER** τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταὐτόν τ' εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταὐτὸν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἴπωμεν αὐτὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ μὴ ταὐτόν, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ὁπόταν μὲν 256b ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν ταὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὕτω λέγομεν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὖ θατέρου, δι' ἣν ἀποχωριζομένη ταὐτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ὥστε ὀρθῶς αὖ λέγεται πάλιν οὐ ταὐτόν. | **STRANGER** So we must agree, without being troubled by it, that change is the same and not the same. When we call it the same and not the same, we aren't speaking in the same way. When we call it 256b the same, we say so because it shares in the same in relation to itself. When we call it not the same, it's because of its combination with the different, which separates it from the same and makes it not that but different. So, again, it's correctly called not the same. |
| 256b | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν κἂν εἴ πῃ μετελάμβανεν αὐτὴ κίνησις στάσεως, οὐδὲν ἂν ἄτοπον ἦν στάσιμον αὐτὴν προσαγορεύειν; | **STRANGER** So if change itself somehow had a share in rest, there'd be nothing strange in calling it stationary? |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθότατά γε, εἴπερ τῶν γενῶν συγχωρησόμεθα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἐθέλειν μείγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ μή. | **THEAETETUS** Quite right, if we're going to concede that some kinds are willing to mix with one another and others aren't. |
| 256c | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἐπί γε τὴν τούτου πρότερον ἀπόδειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα, ἐλέγχοντες ὡς ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν ταύτῃ. | **STRANGER** And we did reach the proof of that before our present points, when we showed by refutation that this is how things are by nature. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** λέγωμεν δὴ πάλιν· ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, καθάπερ ταὐτοῦ τε ἦν ἄλλο καὶ τῆς στάσεως; | **STRANGER** Then let's say it again: change is different from the different, just as it was other than the same and other than rest? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀναγκαῖον. | **THEAETETUS** Necessarily. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐχ ἕτερον ἄρ' ἐστί πῃ καὶ ἕτερον κατὰ τὸν νυνδὴ λόγον. | **STRANGER** So by our present argument it is, in a way, not different, and also different. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀληθῆ. | **THEAETETUS** True. |
| | **STRANGER** τί οὖν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἆρ' αὖ τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἕτερον αὐτὴν φήσομεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μὴ φῶμεν, [256d] ὁμολογήσαντες αὐτὰ εἶναι πέντε, περὶ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς προυθέμεθα σκοπεῖν; | **STRANGER** Then what comes next? Shall we say it's different from the three but deny that it's different from the fourth, [256d] when we've agreed that there are five kinds that we set out to examine, and to examine within? |
| 256d | **THEAETETUS** καὶ πῶς; ἀδύνατον γὰρ συγχωρεῖν ἐλάττω τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ νυνδὴ φανέντος. | **THEAETETUS** How could we? It's impossible to concede a smaller number than the one that just emerged. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀδεῶς ἄρα τὴν κίνησιν ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος διαμαχόμενοι λέγωμεν; | **STRANGER** So shall we fearlessly say, and fight hard for it, that change is different from being? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀδεέστατα μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** With no fear at all. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ὄν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει; | **STRANGER** Then clearly change really is something that is not, and also something that is, since it shares in being? |
| | **THEAETETUS** σαφέστατά γε. | **THEAETETUS** As clearly as can be. |
| | **STRANGER** ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπί τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἡ θατέρου [256e] φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ, καὶ σύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα. | **STRANGER** So not-being must necessarily be, both in the case of change and throughout all the kinds. Throughout all of them the nature of the different, [256e] by making each one different from being, makes it something that is not. In the same way, then, we'll be right to call them all things that are not; and again, because they share in being, to say that they are, and are things that are. |
| 256e | **THEAETETUS** κινδυνεύει. | **THEAETETUS** It looks that way. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν. | **STRANGER** So with each of the forms, being is many, and not-being is unlimited in number. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔοικεν. | **THEAETETUS** It seems so. |
| 257a | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον εἶναι λεκτέον. | **STRANGER** Then being itself, too, must be called different from the others. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀνάγκη. | **THEAETETUS** Necessarily. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἓν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τἆλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ. | **STRANGER** So being, as we see, is not in as many respects as there are other things. Since it isn't those, it is itself one thing, while the others, unlimited in number, it in turn is not. |
| | **THEAETETUS** σχεδὸν οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** Pretty much so. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δυσχεραντέον, ἐπείπερ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις. εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείσας ἡμῶν τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα. | **STRANGER** Then we mustn't be troubled by this either, since the nature of the kinds involves combination with one another. And if anyone won't accept this, let him first win over our earlier arguments, and then win over what follows from them. |
| | **THEAETETUS** δικαιότατα εἴρηκας. | **THEAETETUS** That's entirely fair. |

## WHAT IS NOT: THE DIFFERENT

*Not-being is not the opposite of being, only something different from it.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 257b | **STRANGER** ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε. | **STRANGER** Now let's look at this as well. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** At what? |
| | **STRANGER** ὁπόταν τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον. | **STRANGER** When we speak of not-being, it seems, we aren't speaking of something opposite to being, but only of something different. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How? |
| | **STRANGER** οἷον ὅταν εἴπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλόν τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι; | **STRANGER** For instance, when we call something not large, do we seem to you to be indicating the small by that expression any more than the equal? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How could we? |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκ ἄρ', ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τὶ μηνύει 257c τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὔ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἅττ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα. | **STRANGER** So when a negation is said to signify an opposite, we won't agree. We'll agree only this much: that "not" and "non-," placed before the names that follow, indicate something other 257c than those names—or rather, other than the things to which the names uttered after the negation apply. |
| 257c | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ. | **STRANGER** And let's think about this, if you agree. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** About what? |
| | **STRANGER** ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη. | **STRANGER** The nature of the different seems to me to be chopped up into pieces, just like knowledge. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| | **STRANGER** μία μέν ἐστί που καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δ' ἐπί τῳ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ [257d] ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν· διὸ πολλαὶ τέχναι τ' εἰσὶ λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. | **STRANGER** Knowledge too is one, I suppose, but each part of it that's marked off for a particular subject has a name [257d] of its own. That's why people speak of many arts and many kinds of knowledge. |
| 257d | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μόρια μιᾶς οὔσης ταὐτὸν πέπονθε τοῦτο. | **STRANGER** And the parts of the nature of the different, which is also one, are in the same situation. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τάχ' ἄν· ἀλλ' ὅπῃ δὴ λέγωμεν; | **THEAETETUS** Maybe. But how should we put it? |
| | **STRANGER** ἔστι τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτιθέμενον; | **STRANGER** Is there a part of the different set against the beautiful? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔστιν. | **THEAETETUS** There is. |
| | **STRANGER** τοῦτ' οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τιν' ἔχον ἐπωνυμίαν; | **STRANGER** Shall we say it's nameless, or that it has a name? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἔχον· ὃ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἑκάστοτε φθεγγόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως. | **THEAETETUS** It has one. Whatever we call "not beautiful" on any occasion is different from nothing other than the nature of the beautiful. |
| | **STRANGER** ἴθι νυν τόδε μοι λέγε. | **STRANGER** Come on, then, tell me this. |
| 257e | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What? |
| | **STRANGER** ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρός τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὕτω συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καλόν; | **STRANGER** Isn't this how the not-beautiful turns out to be: as something marked off from one particular kind among the things that are, and in turn set against one of the things that are? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὂν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικ', εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν. | **STRANGER** So the not-beautiful turns out, it seems, to be a setting of something that is against something that is. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθότατα. | **THEAETETUS** Quite right. |
| | **STRANGER** τί οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἆρα μᾶλλον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ἧττον δὲ τὸ μὴ καλόν; | |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | | **STRANGER** Well then? On this account, does the beautiful belong among the things that are any more, and the not-beautiful any less? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδέν. | **THEAETETUS** Not at all. |
| 258a | **STRANGER** ὁμοίως ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον; | **STRANGER** So we must say that the not-large is, just as much as the large itself is? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὁμοίως. | **THEAETETUS** Just as much. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ θετέον πρὸς τὸ μηδέν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου; | **STRANGER** And we must put the not-just on the same footing as the just, in that neither is any more than the other? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τἆλλα δὴ ταύτῃ λέξομεν, ἐπείπερ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὖσα, ἐκείνης δὲ οὔσης ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἧττον ὄντα τιθέναι. | **STRANGER** And we'll speak of the others in the same way, since the nature of the different turned out to be one of the things that are. And since it is, we must necessarily count its parts as being, no less than anything else. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως [258b] καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἧττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου. | **STRANGER** So it seems that the setting against each other of a part of the nature of the different [258b] and of the nature of being is—if it's permitted to say so—no less being than being itself. It signifies not something opposite to being, but only this much: something different from it. |
| 258b | **THEAETETUS** σαφέστατά γε. | **THEAETETUS** As clearly as can be. |
| | **STRANGER** τίν' οὖν αὐτὴν προσείπωμεν; | **STRANGER** Then what should we call it? |
| | **THEAETETUS** δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὃ διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐζητοῦμεν, αὐτό ἐστι τοῦτο. | **THEAETETUS** Obviously this is the very not-being we were looking for because of the sophist. |
| | **STRANGER** πότερον οὖν, ὥσπερ εἶπες, ἔστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἤδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα [258c] ἦν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἦν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν μὴ καλόν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἕν; ἢ τινα ἔτι πρὸς αὐτό, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀπιστίαν ἔχομεν; | **STRANGER** Then is it, as you said, something that falls short of none of the others in being? Must we now say with confidence that not-being securely is, having its own nature? That just as the large [258c] was large and the beautiful was beautiful, and the not-large not-large and the not-beautiful not-beautiful, in the same way not-being too was and is not-being, one form to be counted among the many things that are? Or do we still have some doubt about it, Theaetetus? |
| 258c | **THEAETETUS** οὐδεμίαν. | **THEAETETUS** None. |
| | **STRANGER** οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδῃ μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν; | **STRANGER** Do you realize that we've disobeyed Parmenides beyond the limit of his prohibition? |

GREEK

ENGLISH

**THEAETETUS** τί δή;

**THEAETETUS** How so?

**STRANGER** πλεῖον ἢ ᾽κεῖνος ἀπεῖπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.

**STRANGER** We've pushed our inquiry still further forward and shown him more than he forbade us to examine.

**THEAETETUS** πῶς;

**THEAETETUS** How?

258d **STRANGER** ὅτι ὁ μέν πού φησιν—οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα.

**STRANGER** Because he says, I believe: "Never shall this be forced, that things that are not are. But keep your thought from this road of inquiry."

**THEAETETUS** λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

**THEAETETUS** Yes, that's what he says.

**STRANGER** ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὖσάν 258e τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.

**STRANGER** But we haven't only shown that things that are not are; we've also brought to light what the form of not-being actually is. We showed that the nature of the different is, 258e and is chopped up over all the things that are in their relations to one another; and then we dared to say that each part of it that is set against being is precisely what not-being really is.

258e **THEAETETUS** καὶ παντάπασί γε, ὦ ξένε, ἀληθέστατά μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι.

**THEAETETUS** And to my mind, Stranger, what we've said is completely and utterly true.

**STRANGER** μὴ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς εἴπῃ τις ὅτι τοὐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀποφαινόμενοι τολμῶμεν λέγειν ὡς ἔστιν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίου τινὸς αὐτῷ χαίρειν πάλαι λέγομεν, 259a εἴτ᾽ ἔστιν εἴτε μή, λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον· ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ πειράτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας, ἢ μέχριπερ ἂν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτέον καὶ ἐκείνῳ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ὅτι συμμείγνυταί τε ἀλλήλοις τὰ γένη καὶ τό τε ὂν καὶ θάτερον διὰ πάντων καὶ δι᾽ ἀλλήλων διεληλυθότε τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὸν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε οὗ μετέσχεν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὂν ἔστι σαφέστατα 259b ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν·

**STRANGER** Then let no one say that we declare not-being to be the opposite of being and then dare to say that it is. As for any opposite of being, we said goodbye to that long ago, 259a whether it is or not, and whether it can be given an account or is entirely beyond account. But as for what we've now said not-being is, someone must either refute us and convince us that we're wrong, or else, so long as he can't, he too must say what we say. The kinds blend with one another. Being and the different pervade all of them and each other. The different, sharing in being, is because of that sharing; yet it is not that in which it shares, but different; and being different from being, it quite clearly 259b must of necessity be not-being.

259b τὸ δὲ ὂν αὖ θατέρου μετειληφὸς ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἂν εἴη γενῶν, ἕτερον δ᾽ ἐκείνων ἁπάντων ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐδὲ σύμπαντα τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν αὐτό, ὥστε τὸ ὂν ἀναμφισβητήτως αὖ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον οὕτω καὶ σύμπαντα πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστι, πολλαχῇ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν.

And being, in its turn, having a share in the different, would be different from the other kinds. Being different from all of them, it is not each of them, nor all the others together, but only itself. So being, beyond dispute, is not in countless upon countless respects; and in the same way the others, each one and all together, in many ways are and in many ways are not.

**THEAETETUS** ἀληθῆ.

**THEAETETUS** True.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** καὶ ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἴτε ἀπιστεῖ τις, σκεπτέον αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιόν τι τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων· [259c] εἴτε ὥς τι χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκὼς χαίρει τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἕλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τι κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἤδη καὶ χαλεπὸν ἅμα καὶ καλόν. | **STRANGER** And if anyone doesn't believe in these oppositions, he must look into them and come up with something better than what's been said now. [259c] But if he thinks he's hit on something difficult, and enjoys dragging arguments now one way and now the other, he's taking great pains over things not worth much effort, as our present arguments show. That sort of thing is neither clever nor hard to find. The other thing, though, is both hard and fine. |
| 259c | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What thing? |
| | **STRANGER** ὃ καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὡς δυνατὰ τοῖς λεγομένοις οἷόν τ' εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἑπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἕτερον ὂν πῃ ταὐτὸν [259d] εἶναι φῇ καὶ ὅταν ταὐτὸν ὂν ἕτερον, ἐκείνῃ καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ὅ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον. τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμῇ γέ πῃ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τἀναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὤν. | **STRANGER** What was said before: to leave those tricks alone as possible, and to be able to follow what people say and examine it point by point. When someone says that what is different is in some way the same, [259d] or that what is the same is different, one should examine in what way and in what respect he says it's in either condition. But to show that the same is different in some way or other, and the different the same, and the large small, and the like unlike, and to enjoy always bringing up opposites like this in arguments—that is no true refutation. It's obviously the newborn offspring of someone who has only just made contact with the things that are. |
| 259d | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ γάρ, ὠγαθέ, τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν [259e] ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου. | **STRANGER** Yes, my good friend, because trying [259e] to separate everything from everything else is not only out of tune in general, but also the mark of someone utterly unmusical and unphilosophical. |
| 259e | **THEAETETUS** τί δή; | **THEAETETUS** Why? |
| | **STRANGER** τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν. | **STRANGER** Detaching each thing from everything else is the most complete obliteration of all speech. It's through the weaving together of forms with one another that we come to have speech at all. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἀληθῆ. | **THEAETETUS** True. |

## SPEECH AND FALSEHOOD

*To show falsehood is possible, they must show that not-being blends with speech and judgment.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 260a | | |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** σκόπει τοίνυν ὡς ἐν καιρῷ νυνδὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκάζομεν ἐᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ μείγνυσθαι. | **STRANGER** Consider, then, how timely it was that we fought it out just now with people like that, and forced them to let one thing mix with another. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πρὸς δὴ τί; | **THEAETETUS** Timely for what? |
| | **STRANGER** πρὸς τὸ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἕν τι γενῶν εἶναι. τούτου γὰρ στερηθέντες, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθεῖμεν· ἔτι δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι τί ποτ' ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀφῃρέθημεν αὐτὸ μηδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι που λέγειν οἷοί τ' ἦμεν. 260b ἀφῃρέθημεν δ' ἄν, εἰ συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μεῖξιν μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδέν. | **STRANGER** Toward establishing that speech is one of the kinds of things that are. If we were robbed of that, we'd be robbed of philosophy, which matters most. Besides, right now we need to agree on what speech is. If we'd been deprived of its very being, we presumably couldn't say anything at all anymore. 260b And we would have been deprived of it if we'd conceded that nothing blends with anything. |
| 260b | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς τοῦτό γε· λόγον δὲ δι' ὅτι νῦν διομολογητέον οὐκ ἔμαθον. | **THEAETETUS** You're right about that. But I didn't follow why we need to reach agreement about speech now. |
| | **STRANGER** ἀλλ' ἴσως τῇδ' ἑπόμενος ῥᾷστ' ἂν μάθοις. | **STRANGER** Well, perhaps you'll find it easiest to follow if you come along this way. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** Which way? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ ὂν ἡμῖν ἕν τι τῶν ἄλλων γένος ὂν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον. | **STRANGER** What is not, we found, is one particular kind among the others, scattered through all the things that are. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** That's right. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ δόξῃ τε καὶ λόγῳ μείγνυται. | **STRANGER** So the next thing to examine is whether it blends with judgment and speech. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί δή; | **THEAETETUS** Why that? |
| 260c | **STRANGER** μὴ μειγνυμένου μὲν αὐτοῦ τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ἀληθῆ πάντ' εἶναι, μειγνυμένου δὲ δόξα τε ψευδὴς γίγνεται καὶ λόγος· τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτ' ἔστι που τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον. | **STRANGER** If it doesn't blend with them, everything has to be true. But if it does, false judgment and false speech come about. For to judge or to say things that are not is, I take it, exactly what falsehood is when it arises in thought or in speech. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** That's right. |
| | **STRANGER** ὄντος δέ γε ψεύδους ἔστιν ἀπάτη. | **STRANGER** And if there is falsehood, there's deception. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ἀπάτης οὔσης εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκόνων ἤδη καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἶναι. | **STRANGER** And once there's deception, everything is bound to be full of images, likenesses, and appearing. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τὸν δέ γε σοφιστὴν ἔφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ που τῷ τόπῳ [260d] καταπεφευγέναι μέν, ἔξαρνον δὲ γεγονέναι τὸ παράπαν μηδ' εἶναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὔτε διανοεῖσθαί τινα οὔτε λέγειν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ τὸ μὴ ὂν μετέχειν. | **STRANGER** And the sophist, we said, had fled for refuge somewhere in this region, [260d] but flatly denied that falsehood even exists. No one, he claimed, can either think or say what is not, because what is not has no share in being in any way whatever. |
| 260d | **THEAETETUS** ἦν ταῦτα. | **THEAETETUS** That's what we said. |
| | **STRANGER** νῦν δέ γε τοῦτο μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἂν μάχοιτο ἔτι· τάχα δ' ἂν φαίη τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τὰ δ' οὔ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων, ὥστε τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν καὶ φανταστικήν, ἐν ᾗ φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, [260e] διαμάχοιτ' ἂν πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ δόξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μὴ συνισταμένης τῆς κοινωνίας. | **STRANGER** But now what is not has turned out to share in what is, so on this front he probably won't fight any longer. He might well say, though, that some kinds share in what is not and some don't, and that speech and judgment are among those that don't. Then he'd insist that the art of image-making and appearance-making, where we say he lives, [260e] doesn't exist at all, and he'd fight that battle all over again. Judgment and speech, he'd say, have no combination with what is not, and without that combination there's no such thing as falsehood. |
| 260e | διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν, ἵνα φανέντων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ [261a] μὴ ὄντι κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὂν ἀποδείξωμεν, ἀποδείξαντες δὲ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνδήσωμεν, εἴπερ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει ζητῶμεν. | That's why we must first track down what speech, judgment, and appearing are. Once they've come to light, we can also make out their combination with [261a] what is not. Having made that out, we can show that falsehood is, and having shown that, we can tie the sophist up in it, if he's guilty. Or else we can let him go and look for him in another kind. |
| 261a | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ δέ γε, ὦ ξένε, ἔοικεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν κατ' ἀρχὰς λεχθέν, ὅτι δυσθήρευτον εἴη τὸ γένος. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων γέμειν, ὧν ἐπειδάν τι προβάλῃ, τοῦτο πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀφικέσθαι. νῦν γὰρ μόγις μὲν τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι προβληθὲν διεπεράσαμεν, ἕτερον δὲ [261b] προβέβληται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ ψεῦδος ὡς ἔστι καὶ περὶ λόγον καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδεῖξαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσως ἕτερον, καὶ ἔτ' ἄλλο μετ' ἐκεῖνο· καὶ πέρας, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεταί ποτε. | **THEAETETUS** It really does look true, Stranger, what was said about the sophist at the start: that his is a hard kind to hunt down. He seems to be packed with barricades, and whenever he throws one up, we have to fight our way through it before we can reach the man himself. Just now we barely got past the barricade he'd put up, that what is not is not, and another [261b] has gone up. Now we have to prove that falsehood exists, both in speech and in judgment, and after that perhaps another, and yet another after that. It looks as though no end will ever come in sight. |
| 261b | **STRANGER** θαρρεῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρόν τι δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ προϊέναι. τί γὰρ ὅ γ' ἀθυμῶν ἐν τούτοις δράσειεν ἂν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδὲν ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀνύτων ἢ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τοὔπισθεν ἀπωσθείς; σχολῇ που, τὸ κατὰ [261c] τὴν παροιμίαν λεγόμενον, ὅ γε τοιοῦτος ἄν ποτε ἕλοι πόλιν. νῦν δ' ἐπεί, ὠγαθέ, τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις διαπεπέρανται, τό τοι μέγιστον ἡμῖν τεῖχος ᾑρημένον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἤδη ῥᾴω καὶ σμικρότερα. | **STRANGER** Anyone who can make even a little headway, Theaetetus, should take heart and keep pressing forward. If a man loses heart here, what would he do in other situations, where he either got nowhere or was even driven back? Someone like that, as the saying [261c] goes, would hardly ever take a city. But now, my good friend, since we've got past the point you mention, the greatest wall |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | | will have been taken, and the rest will be easier and smaller. |
| 261c | **THEAETETUS** καλῶς εἶπες. | **THEAETETUS** Well said. |
| | **STRANGER** λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, λάβωμεν, ἵνα ἐναργέστερον ἀπολογισώμεθα πότερον αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὂν ἢ παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ μέν ἐστιν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέτερον. | **STRANGER** Then let's first take up speech and judgment, as we said just now. That way we can reckon up more clearly whether what is not touches them, or whether both are entirely true and neither is ever false. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Right. |

## NAMES AND VERBS

*A statement weaves a name with a verb: "Theaetetus sits" is true, "Theaetetus flies" is false.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 261d | **STRANGER** φέρε δή, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν ὡσαύτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα. φαίνεται γάρ πῃ ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον. | **STRANGER** Come on then. Let's look at names again in the same way we talked about kinds and letters. What we're after now seems to lie somewhere in that direction. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον οὖν δὴ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπακουστέον; | **THEAETETUS** So what exactly should I be listening for about names? |
| | **STRANGER** εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλοις συναρμόττει εἴτε μηδέν, εἴτε τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μή. | **STRANGER** Whether they all fit together with one another, or none do, or some are willing to and some aren't. |
| | **THEAETETUS** δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δ' οὔ. | **THEAETETUS** That much is clear: some are willing and some aren't. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις ἴσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφεξῆς λεγόμενα [261e] καὶ δηλοῦντά τι συναρμόττει, τὰ δὲ τῇ συνεχείᾳ μηδὲν σημαίνοντα ἀναρμοστεῖ. | **STRANGER** Perhaps you mean something like this. Those that are spoken in sequence [261e] and reveal something fit together, while those that signify nothing by their sequence don't fit. |
| 261e | **THEAETETUS** πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἶπας; | **THEAETETUS** How's that? What do you mean? |
| | **STRANGER** ὅπερ ᾠήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν που τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλωμάτων διττὸν γένος. | **STRANGER** What I thought you'd grasped when you agreed. We have, I take it, two kinds of vocal means for revealing being. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| 262a | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν. | **STRANGER** One is called names, the other verbs. |
| | **THEAETETUS** εἰπὲ ἑκάτερον. | **THEAETETUS** Tell me what each one is. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα ῥῆμά που λέγομεν. | **STRANGER** The means of revealing that applies to actions we call, I suppose, a verb. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |

| GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|
| **STRANGER** τὸ δέ γ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκείνας πράττουσι σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα. | **STRANGER** And the vocal sign applied to the ones who perform those actions is a name. |
| **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Exactly. |
| **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ' αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων. | **STRANGER** Now, a statement never consists of names alone spoken one after another, nor of verbs spoken without names. |
| **THEAETETUS** ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔμαθον. | **THEAETETUS** I didn't follow that. |
| 262b **STRANGER** δῆλον γὰρ ὡς πρὸς ἕτερόν τι βλέπων ἄρτι συνωμολόγεις· ἐπεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι συνεχῶς ὧδε λεγόμενα ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι λόγος. | **STRANGER** Clearly you had something else in view when you agreed just now. This is exactly what I meant to say: that these, spoken one after another like that, are not a statement. |
| **THEAETETUS** πῶς; | **THEAETETUS** How so? |
| **STRANGER** οἷον "βαδίζει" "τρέχει" "καθεύδει," καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, κἂν πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὖτ' εἴπῃ, λόγον οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται. | **STRANGER** For example, "walks," "runs," "sleeps," and all the other verbs that signify actions. Even if you say them all one after another, you still don't produce a statement. |
| **THEAETETUS** πῶς γάρ; | **THEAETETUS** How could you? |
| **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται "λέων" "ἔλαφος" "ἵππος," ὅσα τε ὀνόματα τῶν τὰς πράξεις αὖ πραττόντων 262c ὠνομάσθη, καὶ κατὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν συνέχειαν οὐδείς πω συνέστη λόγος· οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτ' ἐκείνως πρᾶξιν οὐδ' ἀπραξίαν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἄν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ. τότε δ' ἥρμοσέν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτός τε καὶ σμικρότατος. | **STRANGER** And again, take "lion," "stag," "horse," and all the names given to those who perform actions. 262c No statement has ever been formed from that sequence either. In neither case do the sounds uttered reveal any action or inaction, or the being of anything that is or is not, until someone mixes verbs with names. Then they fit, and the very first weaving together becomes a statement at once. It's about the first and smallest of statements. |
| 262c **THEAETETUS** πῶς ἄρ' ὧδε λέγεις; | **THEAETETUS** How do you mean? |
| **STRANGER** ὅταν εἴπῃ τις· "ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει," λόγον εἶναι φῂς τοῦτον ἐλάχιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον; | **STRANGER** When someone says, "A man learns," would you call that the smallest and first statement? |
| 262d **THEAETETUS** ἔγωγε. | **THEAETETUS** I would. |
| **STRANGER** δηλοῖ γὰρ ἤδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον ἀλλά τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἴπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον. | **STRANGER** Yes, because by then he's revealing something about things that are, or are coming to be, or have come to be, or will be. He doesn't just name. He accomplishes something by weaving verbs together with names. That's why we said he speaks and doesn't merely name, and this weaving is what we gave the name "statement." |
| **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Right. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | **STRANGER** οὕτω δὴ καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἥρμοττεν, τὰ δ' οὔ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὖ σημεῖα τὰ μὲν 262e οὐχ ἁρμόττει, τὰ δὲ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπηργάσατο. | **STRANGER** So just as some things fitted together and some didn't, so too with vocal signs: some 262e don't fit, while those that do fit produce a statement. |
| 262e | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| | **STRANGER** ἔτι δὴ σμικρὸν τόδε. | **STRANGER** There's one more small point. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ ποῖον; | **THEAETETUS** What's that? |
| | **STRANGER** λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, ὅτανπερ ᾖ, τινὸς εἶναι λόγον, μὴ δὲ τινὸς ἀδύνατον. | **STRANGER** Whenever there's a statement, it has to be a statement of something. It can't be of nothing. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** That's right. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ; | **STRANGER** And it must also have some quality, mustn't it? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. | **STRANGER** Then let's pay attention to ourselves. |
| | **THEAETETUS** δεῖ γοῦν. | **THEAETETUS** We certainly should. |
| | **STRANGER** λέξω τοίνυν σοι λόγον συνθεὶς πρᾶγμα πράξει δι' ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος· ὅτου δ' ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, σύ μοι φράζειν. | **STRANGER** Well, I'll make you a statement by putting a thing together with an action, using a name and a verb. You tell me what the statement is of. |
| 263a | **THEAETETUS** ταῦτ' ἔσται κατὰ δύναμιν. | **THEAETETUS** I'll do that as best I can. |
| | **STRANGER** "Θεαίτητος κάθηται." μῶν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος; | **STRANGER** "Theaetetus sits." That's not a long statement, is it? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὔκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος. | **THEAETETUS** No, it's just the right length. |
| | **STRANGER** σὸν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου. | **STRANGER** Your job, then, is to say what it's about and whose it is. |
| | **THEAETETUS** δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμός. | **THEAETETUS** Clearly it's about me, and it's mine. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δὲ ὅδ' αὖ; | **STRANGER** And what about this one? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ποῖος; | **THEAETETUS** Which one? |
| | **STRANGER** "Θεαίτητος, ᾧ νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται." | **STRANGER** "Theaetetus, whom I'm talking to now, flies." |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ τοῦτον οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἄλλως εἴποι πλὴν ἐμόν τε καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ. | **THEAETETUS** Nobody could describe this one any differently: it's mine and about me. |
| | **STRANGER** ποιὸν δέ γέ τινά φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν λόγων. | **STRANGER** But each statement, we say, has to have some quality. |
| 263b | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τούτων δὴ ποῖόν τινα ἑκάτερον φατέον εἶναι; | **STRANGER** So what quality should we say each of these has? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸν μὲν ψευδῆ που, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ. | **THEAETETUS** One is false, I suppose, and the other true. |
| | **STRANGER** λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ. | **STRANGER** And the true one says the things that are, as they are, about you. |
| | **THEAETETUS** τί μήν; | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων. | **STRANGER** And the false one says things different from the things that are. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει. | **STRANGER** So it says things that are not as though they were. |
| | **THEAETETUS** σχεδόν. | **THEAETETUS** Pretty much. |
| | **STRANGER** ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα. | **STRANGER** But they're things that are, only different from the things that are about you. We said, after all, that about each thing there are many things that are and many that are not. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Exactly. |
| 263c | **STRANGER** ὃν ὕστερον δὴ λόγον εἴρηκα περὶ σοῦ, πρῶτον μέν, ἐξ ὧν ὡρισάμεθα τί ποτ' ἔστι λόγος, ἀναγκαιότατον αὐτὸν ἕνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι. | **STRANGER** Now take the second statement I made about you. First of all, given how we defined a statement, it has to be one of the shortest. |
| | **THEAETETUS** νυνδὴ γοῦν ταύτῃ συνωμολογήσαμεν. | **THEAETETUS** We agreed on that much just now, anyway. |
| | **STRANGER** ἔπειτα δέ γε τινός. | **STRANGER** And second, it's of something. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὕτως. | **THEAETETUS** That's right. |
| | **STRANGER** εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν σός, οὐκ ἄλλου γε οὐδενός. | **STRANGER** And if it isn't yours, it certainly isn't anybody else's. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς γάρ; | **THEAETETUS** How could it be? |
| | **STRANGER** μηδενὸς δέ γε ὢν οὐδ' ἂν λόγος εἴη τὸ παράπαν· ἀπεφήναμεν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦν λόγον ὄντα μηδενὸς εἶναι λόγον. | **STRANGER** And if it were of nothing, it wouldn't be a statement at all. We showed that it was impossible for a statement to be a statement of nothing. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθότατα. | **THEAETETUS** Quite right. |
| 263d | **STRANGER** περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντάπασιν ὡς ἔοικεν ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἔκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής. | **STRANGER** So when things are said about you, but different things are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it looks as though a combination like this, made of verbs and |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | | names, really and truly turns out to be a false statement. |
| | THEAETETUS ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν. | THEAETETUS That's absolutely true. |
| | STRANGER τί δὲ δή; διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε ψευδῆ τε καὶ ἀληθῆ πάνθ' ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται; | STRANGER Well then, what about thought, judgment, and appearing? Isn't it clear by now that all of these occur in our souls as both false and true? |
| | THEAETETUS πῶς; | THEAETETUS How so? |
| | STRANGER ὧδ' εἴσῃ ῥᾷον, ἂν πρῶτον λάβῃς αὐτὰ τί ποτ' ἔστιν [263e] καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων. | STRANGER You'll see more easily if you first grasp what they are [263e] and how each differs from the others. |
| 263e | THEAETETUS δίδου μόνον. | THEAETETUS Go ahead. |
| | STRANGER οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια; | STRANGER Well, thought and speech are the same thing, aren't they? Except that the inner dialogue the soul carries on with itself, without voice, is what we've called by this very name, "thought." |
| | THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | THEAETETUS Certainly. |
| | STRANGER τὸ δέ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος; | STRANGER And the stream that flows from the soul out through the mouth with sound is called speech? |
| | THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ. | THEAETETUS True. |
| | STRANGER καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνὸν— | STRANGER And in speech, too, we know there's— |
| | THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον; | THEAETETUS What? |
| | STRANGER φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν. | STRANGER Affirmation and denial. |
| | THEAETETUS ἴσμεν. | THEAETETUS We know that. |
| 264a | STRANGER ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπῃς αὐτό; | STRANGER So when this occurs silently in the soul, in thought, can you call it anything except judgment? |
| | THEAETETUS καὶ πῶς; | THEAETETUS How could I? |
| | STRANGER τί δ' ὅταν μὴ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ δι' αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινι, τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος ἆρ' οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν; | STRANGER And when that sort of state comes to someone not on its own but through perception? Could you rightly call it anything other than appearing? |
| | THEAETETUS οὐδέν. | THEAETETUS No, nothing else. |
| | STRANGER οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ ψευδής, τούτων δ' ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, [264b] δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, "φαίνεται" δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, | STRANGER Then speech was true and false, and of these, thought turned out to be the soul's dialogue with itself, [264b] judgment the conclusion of thought, and what we mean by "it appears" a blend of perception and judgment. So, since these |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι. | are akin to speech, some of them must also be false, at least sometimes. |
| 264b | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |
| | **STRANGER** κατανοεῖς οὖν ὅτι πρότερον ηὑρέθη ψευδὴς δόξα καὶ λόγος ἢ κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἣν ἐφοβήθημεν ἄρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήνυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλλοίμεθα ζητοῦντες αὐτό; | **STRANGER** Do you see, then, that false judgment and false speech have been found sooner than we expected? A moment ago we were afraid that in searching for them we were taking on a task with no end at all. |
| | **THEAETETUS** κατανοῶ. | **THEAETETUS** I do. |
| | **STRANGER** μὴ τοίνυν μηδ' εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυμῶμεν. ἐπειδὴ [264c] γὰρ πέφανται ταῦτα, τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀναμνησθῶμεν κατ' εἴδη διαιρέσεων. | **STRANGER** Then let's not lose heart about what remains either. Now that [264c] these things have come to light, let's recall our earlier divisions into kinds. |
| 264c | **THEAETETUS** ποίων δή; | **THEAETETUS** Which ones? |
| | **STRANGER** διειλόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν εἰκαστικήν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικήν. | **STRANGER** We divided image-making into two kinds, likeness-making and appearance-making. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἴπομεν ὡς ἀποροῖμεν εἰς ὁποτέραν θήσομεν. | **STRANGER** And we said we were at a loss which of the two to put the sophist in. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἦν ταῦτα. | **THEAETETUS** That's what we said. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἔτι μείζων κατεχύθη σκοτοδινία, φανέντος τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πᾶσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς οὔτε εἰκὼν οὔτε εἴδωλον οὔτε φάντασμ' εἴη τὸ παράπαν [264d] οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι. | **STRANGER** And while we were at a loss over that, an even worse dizziness came pouring over us. The argument appeared that disputes everything, claiming that there's no such thing at all as a likeness or an image or an appearance, [264d] because there's never any falsehood, in any way, anywhere, at any time. |
| 264d | **THEAETETUS** λέγεις ἀληθῆ. | **THEAETETUS** That's true. |
| | **STRANGER** νῦν δέ γ' ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγος, πέφανται δ' οὖσα δόξα ψευδής, ἐγχωρεῖ δὴ μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίγνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικήν. | **STRANGER** But now that false speech has been shown to exist, and false judgment too, it's possible for there to be imitations of the things that are, and for an art of deception to arise from that condition. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ἐγχωρεῖ. | **THEAETETUS** It's possible. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν ὅτι γ' ἦν ὁ σοφιστὴς τούτων πότερον, διωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦν. | **STRANGER** And we agreed earlier that the sophist belonged to one or the other of these two. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |

## THE SOPHIST CAUGHT

*The seventh definition is completed: an insincere imitator in words, producing contradictions out of mere judgment.*

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ 264e προτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος, ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, τὴν οἰκείαν λιπόντες 265a φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν. | **STRANGER** Then let's try again. We'll split in two the kind 264e set before us and always proceed by the right-hand part of what's been cut, holding on to what the sophist shares in. We'll keep on until we've stripped away everything he has in common with others and are left with his own proper 265a nature. Then we can display it, above all to ourselves, and then to those whose nature is most akin to this kind of inquiry. |
| 265a | **THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς. | **THEAETETUS** Right. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἠρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ κτητικὴν τέχνην διαιρούμενοι; | **STRANGER** Back then, didn't we begin by dividing art into productive and acquisitive? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς ἐν θηρευτικῇ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ ἐμπορικῇ καί τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἴδεσιν ἐφαντάζεθ' ἡμῖν; | **STRANGER** And within the acquisitive art he kept appearing to us in hunting, competition, commerce, and other kinds like those? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** νῦν δέ γ' ἐπειδὴ μιμητικὴ περιείληφεν αὐτὸν τέχνη, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητικὴν δίχα διαιρετέον πρώτην. 265b ἡ γάρ που μίμησις ποίησίς τίς ἐστιν, εἰδώλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων· ἦ γάρ; | **STRANGER** But now that an imitative art has caught him, we obviously have to start by dividing the productive art itself in two. 265b Imitation, after all, is a kind of production, though of images, we say, and not of the things themselves. Isn't that so? |
| 265b | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |
| | **STRANGER** ποιητικῆς δὴ πρῶτον δύ' ἔστω μέρη. | **STRANGER** Then let production have two parts to begin with. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ποίω; | **THEAETETUS** Which two? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν θεῖον, τὸ δ' ἀνθρώπινον. | **STRANGER** One divine, the other human. |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὔπω μεμάθηκα. | **THEAETETUS** I don't understand yet. |
| | **STRANGER** ποιητικήν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα τὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς λεχθέντα, πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι. | **STRANGER** Production, if we remember what was said at the start, is any power that becomes a cause of things coming to be later that weren't there before. |
| | **THEAETETUS** μεμνήμεθα. | **THEAETETUS** We remember. |
| 265c | **STRANGER** ζῷα δὴ πάντα θνητά, καὶ δὴ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ συνίσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μῶν ἄλλου | **STRANGER** Now consider all mortal animals, all the plants that grow on the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless bodies, fusible and non- |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι— | fusible, that form inside the earth. Shall we say that anything other than a god's craftsmanship made them come to be later, when they didn't exist before? Or shall we adopt the belief and the way of talking that most people use— |
| | THEAETETUS ποίῳ τῳ; | THEAETETUS Which is what? |
| | STRANGER τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης; | STRANGER That nature produces them from some spontaneous cause that makes things grow without thought? Or that they come from a god, with reason and divine knowledge? |
| 265d | THEAETETUS ἐγὼ μὲν ἴσως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκις ἀμφότερα μεταδοξάζω· νῦν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἴεσθαί σε κατά γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα. | THEAETETUS For my part, maybe because of my age, I often switch back and forth between the two views. But right now, looking at you and supposing that you think they come about through a god, I've come to hold that view myself. |
| | STRANGER καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε. καὶ εἰ μέν γέ σε ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτ' ἂν χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ 265e ἄνευ τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσεισιν ἐφ' ἅπερ νῦν ἔλκεσθαι φῄς, ἐάσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοιτ' ἄν. ἀλλὰ θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων συνιστάμενα ἀνθρωπίνῃ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον. | STRANGER Well done, Theaetetus. If we thought you were the sort of person who'd end up thinking otherwise later on, we'd try now, with argument and compelling persuasion, to make you agree. But I can see your nature: even 265e without arguments from us it will go of its own accord where you say you're drawn now. So I'll let it be, since the time would be wasted. Instead I'll set it down that the things said to be by nature are made by divine art, and the things humans put together out of them by human art. By this account there are two kinds of production, one human and the other divine. |
| 265e | THEAETETUS ὀρθῶς. | THEAETETUS Right. |
| | STRANGER τέμνε δὴ δυοῖν οὔσαιν δίχα ἑκατέραν αὖθις. | STRANGER Now cut each of the two in two again. |
| | THEAETETUS πῶς; | THEAETETUS How? |
| 266a | STRANGER οἷον τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνων τὴν ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν, νῦν δὲ αὖ κατὰ μῆκος. | STRANGER As if you'd just cut the whole of production across its width, and now cut it again along its length. |
| | THEAETETUS τετμήσθω. | THEAETETUS Consider it cut. |
| | STRANGER τέτταρα μὴν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη γίγνεται, δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο δ' αὖ τὰ πρὸς θεῶν, θεῖα. | STRANGER That gives four parts of it in all: two on our side, which are human, and two on the gods' side, which are divine. |
| | THEAETETUS ναί. | THEAETETUS Yes. |
| | STRANGER τὰ δέ γ' ὡς ἑτέρως αὖ διῃρημένα, μέρος μὲν ἓν ἀφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικόν, τὼ δ' | STRANGER Now divide them the other way. In each section, one part produces the things themselves, and the remaining two could best be called |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | ὑπολοίπω σχεδὸν μάλιστ' ἂν λεγοίσθην εἰδωλοποιικώ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ διχῇ διαιρεῖται. | image-making. So by this cut production is divided in two again. |
| 266b | THEAETETUS λέγε ὅπῃ ἑκατέρα αὖθις. | THEAETETUS Tell me again how each of them works. |
| | STRANGER ἡμεῖς μέν που καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ ἐξ ὧν τὰ πεφυκότ' ἐστίν, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφά, θεοῦ γεννήματα πάντα ἴσμεν αὐτὰ ἀπειργασμένα ἕκαστα· ἢ πῶς; | STRANGER We ourselves and the other animals, I take it, and what natural things are made of, fire and water and their siblings, are all offspring of a god, each of them his handiwork. We know that, don't we? |
| | THEAETETUS οὕτως. | THEAETETUS Yes. |
| | STRANGER τούτων δέ γε ἑκάστων εἴδωλα ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὰ παρέπεται, δαιμονίᾳ καὶ ταῦτα μηχανῇ γεγονότα. | STRANGER And each of these is accompanied by images, which aren't the things themselves. These too have come about by divine contrivance. |
| | THEAETETUS ποῖα; | THEAETETUS What sort of images? |
| | STRANGER τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ ὅσα μεθ' ἡμέραν φαντάσματα αὐτοφυῆ λέγεται, σκιὰ μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ πυρὶ σκότος 266c ἐγγίγνηται, διπλοῦν δὲ ἡνίκ' ἂν φῶς οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεῖα εἰς ἓν συνελθὸν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν εἰωθυίας ὄψεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον εἶδος ἀπεργάζηται. | STRANGER The appearances in dreams, and all the ones by day that are said to arise of themselves. There's a shadow, when darkness 266c forms in firelight. And there's a double image, when the eye's own light and the light from outside meet in one on bright, smooth surfaces and produce a form that gives a perception reversed from the usual direct view. |
| 266c | THEAETETUS δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα θείας ἔργα ποιήσεως, αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν εἴδωλον ἑκάστῳ. | THEAETETUS So these are the two products of divine production: the thing itself, and the image that goes along with each. |
| | STRANGER τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἆρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δέ τιν' ἑτέραν, οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγρηγορόσιν ἀπειργασμένην; | STRANGER And what about our art? Won't we say that by building it makes an actual house, and by painting another one, a kind of human dream made for people who are awake? |
| 266d | THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | THEAETETUS Certainly. |
| | STRANGER οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ δύο διττὰ ἔργα τῆς ἡμετέρας αὖ ποιητικῆς πράξεως, τὸ μὲν αὐτό, φαμέν, αὐτουργική, τὸ δὲ εἴδωλον εἰδωλοποιική. | STRANGER And it's the same everywhere else. The products of our productive activity come in pairs: the thing itself, we say, made by the art that makes things themselves, and the image, made by image-making. |
| | THEAETETUS νῦν μᾶλλον ἔμαθον, καὶ τίθημι δύο διχῇ ποιητικῆς εἴδει· θείαν μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην κατὰ θάτερον τμῆμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα. | THEAETETUS Now I understand better. I set down two kinds of production, each split in two. By one cut there's divine and human, and by the other, production of things themselves and the begetting of likenesses of some sort. |
| | STRANGER τῆς τοίνυν εἰδωλουργικῆς ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἰκαστικόν, τὸ δὲ φανταστικὸν ἔμελλεν εἶναι | STRANGER Then let's recall that one kind of image-making was going to be likeness-making and |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
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| | γένος, εἰ τὸ [266e] ψεῦδος ὄντως ὂν ψεῦδος καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἔν τι φανείη πεφυκός. | the other appearance-making, if [266e] falsehood turned out to be really falsehood and by nature one of the things that are. |
| 266e | **THEAETETUS** ἦν γὰρ οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** So it was. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν ἐφάνη τε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καταριθμήσομεν αὐτὼ νῦν ἀναμφισβητήτως εἴδη δύο; | **STRANGER** And it has turned out that way, so now we'll count these as two kinds without any dispute? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| 267a | **STRANGER** τὸ τοίνυν φανταστικὸν αὖθις διορίζωμεν δίχα. | **STRANGER** Then let's mark off appearance-making in two again. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῇ; | **THEAETETUS** How? |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ μὲν δι' ὀργάνων γιγνόμενον, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ παρέχοντος ἑαυτὸν ὄργανον τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ φάντασμα. | **STRANGER** One kind is produced through instruments. In the other, whoever makes the appearance offers himself as the instrument. |
| | **THEAETETUS** πῶς φῄς; | **THEAETETUS** What do you mean? |
| | **STRANGER** ὅταν οἶμαι τὸ σὸν σχῆμά τις τῷ ἑαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωνὴν φωνῇ φαίνεσθαι ποιῇ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα κέκληταί που. | **STRANGER** When someone uses his own body to make his figure look like yours, I'd say, or his voice like your voice, this part of appearance-making is called, above all, imitation. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** μιμητικὸν δὴ τοῦτο αὐτῆς προσειπόντες ἀπονειμώμεθα· τὸ δ' ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν μαλακισθέντες καὶ παρέντες [267b] ἑτέρῳ συναγαγεῖν τε εἰς ἓν καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐπωνυμίαν ἀποδοῦναί τιν' αὐτῷ. | **STRANGER** So let's call this part imitation and mark it off for ourselves. As for all the rest, let's be lazy and drop it, and leave it to someone else [267b] to gather into one and give a fitting name. |
| 267b | **THEAETETUS** νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω. | **THEAETETUS** Let's mark this one off and let the rest go. |
| | **STRANGER** καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι διπλοῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄξιον ἡγεῖσθαι· δι' ἃ δέ, σκόπει. | **STRANGER** And this too, Theaetetus, deserves to be regarded as twofold. See why. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγε. | **THEAETETUS** Tell me. |
| | **STRANGER** τῶν μιμουμένων οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὃ μιμοῦνται τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐκ εἰδότες. καίτοι τίνα μείζω διαίρεσιν ἀγνωσίας τε καὶ γνώσεως θήσομεν; | **STRANGER** Some imitators do it knowing what they imitate, and others don't know it. And what greater division could we set down than the one between ignorance and knowledge? |
| | **THEAETETUS** οὐδεμίαν. | **THEAETETUS** None. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν τό γε ἄρτι λεχθὲν εἰδότων ἦν μίμημα; τὸ γὰρ σὸν σχῆμα καὶ σὲ γιγνώσκων ἄν τις μιμήσαιτο. | **STRANGER** And wasn't the example we just gave an imitation by people who know? Someone would imitate your figure because he knows both it and you. |
| 267c | **THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ; | **THEAETETUS** Of course. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| | **STRANGER** τί δὲ δικαιοσύνης τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλης συλλήβδην ἀρετῆς; ἆρ' οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες μέν, δοξάζοντες δέ πῃ, σφόδρα ἐπιχειροῦσιν πολλοὶ τὸ δοκοῦν σφίσιν τοῦτο ὡς ἐνὸν αὐτοῖς προθυμεῖσθαι φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν, ὅτι μάλιστα ἔργοις τε καὶ λόγοις μιμούμενοι; | **STRANGER** But what about the figure of justice, and of excellence as a whole? Many people don't know it but have some sort of judgment about it. Don't they try very hard to make what seems to them to be justice appear present in themselves, imitating it as much as they can in their deeds and words? |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ πάνυ γε πολλοί. | **THEAETETUS** Very many indeed. |
| | **STRANGER** μῶν οὖν πάντες ἀποτυγχάνουσι τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς ὄντες; ἢ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον; | **STRANGER** Do they all fail to seem just when they aren't just at all? Or is it quite the opposite? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πᾶν. | **THEAETETUS** Quite the opposite. |
| 267d | **STRANGER** μιμητὴν δὴ τοῦτόν γε ἕτερον ἐκείνου λεκτέον οἶμαι, τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τοῦ γιγνώσκοντος. | **STRANGER** Then this imitator, I think, has to be called different from that one, the one who doesn't know from the one who does. |
| | **THEAETETUS** ναί. | **THEAETETUS** Yes. |
| | **STRANGER** πόθεν οὖν ὄνομα ἑκατέρῳ τις αὐτῶν λήψεται πρέπον; ἢ δῆλον δὴ χαλεπὸν ὄν, διότι τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατ' εἴδη διαιρέσεως παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀργία τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσύννους παρῆν, ὥστε μηδ' ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαι· καθὸ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνάγκη μὴ σφόδρα εὐπορεῖν. ὅμως δέ, κἂν εἰ τολμηρότερον εἰρῆσθαι, διαγνώσεως ἕνεκα τὴν [267e] μὲν μετὰ δόξης μίμησιν δοξομιμητικὴν προσείπωμεν, τὴν δὲ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικήν τινα μίμησιν. | **STRANGER** So where will anyone find a fitting name for each of them? Obviously it's hard. The people before us, it seems, suffered from an old, thoughtless laziness about dividing kinds into forms, so nobody even tried to divide. As a result we're bound to be rather short of names. Still, even if it's a bit bold, let's call the [267e] imitation that goes with judgment "judgment-imitation," just so we can tell them apart, and the one that goes with knowledge "informed imitation." |
| 267e | **THEAETETUS** ἔστω. | **THEAETETUS** Very well. |
| | **STRANGER** θατέρῳ τοίνυν χρηστέον· ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἦν ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μιμουμένοις δή. | **STRANGER** Then it's the first of these we have to work with. The sophist wasn't among those who know, but among those who imitate. |
| | **THEAETETUS** καὶ μάλα. | **THEAETETUS** Very much so. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸν δοξομιμητὴν δὴ σκοπώμεθα ὥσπερ σίδηρον, εἴτε ὑγιὴς εἴτε διπλόην ἔτ' ἔχων τινά ἐστιν ἐν αὑτῷ. | **STRANGER** So let's examine the judgment-imitator as we'd examine a piece of iron, to see whether he's sound or still has some seam in him. |
| | **THEAETETUS** σκοπῶμεν. | **THEAETETUS** Let's. |
| | **STRANGER** ἔχει τοίνυν καὶ μάλα συχνήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐήθης [268a] αὐτῶν ἐστιν, οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἃ δοξάζει· τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίνδησιν ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδὼς ἐσχημάτισται. | **STRANGER** Well, he has quite a sizable one. One of them [268a] is simple-minded and thinks he knows what he only has judgments about. The other has rolled around in arguments so much that his posture is full of suspicion and fear that he doesn't know the things he poses as knowing in front of others. |

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 268a | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἑκατέρου γένος ὧν εἴρηκας. | **THEAETETUS** There certainly is a kind for each of the ones you've described. |
| | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν ἁπλοῦν μιμητήν τινα, τὸν δὲ εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θήσομεν; | **STRANGER** Then shall we set down one as a simple imitator and the other as a dissembling imitator? |
| | **THEAETETUS** εἰκὸς γοῦν. | **THEAETETUS** That seems reasonable, anyway. |
| | **STRANGER** τούτου δ' αὖ τὸ γένος ἓν ἢ δύο φῶμεν; | **STRANGER** And shall we say this second one's kind is one or two? |
| | **THEAETETUS** ὅρα σύ. | **THEAETETUS** You look. |
| 268b | **STRANGER** σκοπῶ, καί μοι διττὼ καταφαίνεσθόν τινε· τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλήθη δυνατὸν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ. | **STRANGER** I'm looking, and I see a pair. One I make out as able to dissemble in public, with long speeches before crowds. The other does it in private, with short speeches, forcing whoever he's talking with to contradict himself. |
| | **THEAETETUS** λέγεις ὀρθότατα. | **THEAETETUS** You're quite right. |
| | **STRANGER** τίνα οὖν ἀποφαινώμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον εἶναι; πότερα πολιτικὸν ἢ δημολογικόν; | **STRANGER** Then what shall we declare the long-winded one to be, a statesman or a popular orator? |
| | **THEAETETUS** δημολογικόν. | **THEAETETUS** A popular orator. |
| | **STRANGER** τί δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐροῦμεν; σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικόν; | **STRANGER** And what shall we call the other one, wise or sophistic? |
| | **THEAETETUS** τὸ μέν που σοφὸν ἀδύνατον, ἐπείπερ οὐκ εἰδότα [268c] αὐτὸν ἔθεμεν· μιμητὴς δ' ὢν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον ὅτι παρωνύμιον αὐτοῦ τι λήψεται, καὶ σχεδὸν ἤδη μεμάθηκα ὅτι τοῦτον δεῖ προσειπεῖν ἀληθῶς αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν παντάπασιν ὄντως σοφιστήν. | **THEAETETUS** Not wise, surely. That's impossible, since we laid it down that he doesn't [268c] know. But since he's an imitator of the wise man, he'll obviously take a name derived from that one. And I think I've almost understood now that this is the one we must truly call the real sophist, through and through. |
| 268c | **STRANGER** οὐκοῦν συνδήσομεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν, τοὔνομα συμπλέξαντες ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπ' ἀρχήν; | **STRANGER** Then shall we bind his name together, as before, weaving it from the end back to the beginning? |
| | **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Certainly. |
| | **STRANGER** τὸ δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικόν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς [268d] εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θεῖον ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον, "ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος" ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸν ὄντως σοφιστὴν εἶναι, τἀληθέστατα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρεῖ. | **STRANGER** The imitation that makes contradictions, from the dissembling part of judgment-imitation, of the appearance-making kind that comes from [268d] image-making; the conjuring portion of production, marked off as human, not divine, and working in words: whoever says the real sophist is "of this lineage and blood" will, it seems, be saying what is most true.[13] |

13 "Of this lineage and blood" echoes the formula Homeric heroes use to declare their descent.

| | GREEK | ENGLISH |
|---|---|---|
| 268d | **THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | **THEAETETUS** Absolutely. |