Theaetetus

PLATO

c. 428–348 BC

Theaetetus

Θεαίτητος

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited

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Theaetetus · Plato (c. 428–348 BC)

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INTRODUCTION

The dialogue begins in Megara, many years after Socrates' death. The mathematician Theaetetus has been carried home dying from a battle, and Euclides remembers a conversation Socrates had with him as a boy, just before Socrates' trial. He wrote it down, and has a slave read it aloud.

In that conversation Socrates, who calls himself a midwife to other people's ideas, asks the gifted young Theaetetus and his teacher Theodorus a single question: what is knowledge? Three answers are tried in turn. Knowledge is perception, which leads to Protagoras' claim that "man is the measure of all things" and to the idea that everything is in flux. Knowledge is true judgment, which raises the puzzle of how false judgment is possible at all, and the images of the mind as a wax tablet and an aviary. Finally, knowledge is true judgment with an account.

Each answer fails, and the dialogue ends without a definition. It is still one of the founding texts of the theory of knowledge.

Theaetetus

Megara, years after Socrates' death. Euclides has a slave read out his record of a conversation from just before the trial.
Socrates, the young mathematician Theaetetus and his teacher Theodorus ask what knowledge is.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
142a	**EUCLIDES** ἄρτι, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ;	**EUCLIDES** Just in from the country, Terpsion, or have you been back a while?[1]
	TERPSION ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐζήτουν κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦ εὑρεῖν.	**TERPSION** A good while. And I was looking for you in the marketplace, and wondering why I couldn't find you.
	EUCLIDES οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.	**EUCLIDES** Well, I wasn't in town.
	TERPSION ποῦ μήν;	**TERPSION** Where were you, then?
	EUCLIDES εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήναζε.	**EUCLIDES** I was going down to the harbor, and I ran into Theaetetus being carried from the army camp at Corinth to Athens.[2]
	TERPSION ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι;	**TERPSION** Alive or dead?
142b	**EUCLIDES** ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις· χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἱρεῖ τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.	**EUCLIDES** Alive, but only just. He's in a bad way from some wounds, but what's really getting the better of him is the sickness that's broken out in the army.
	TERPSION μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία;	**TERPSION** Not dysentery?
	EUCLIDES ναί.	**EUCLIDES** Yes.
	TERPSION οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.	**TERPSION** What a man you're telling me is in danger!
	EUCLIDES καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὦ Τερψίων, ἐπεί τοι καὶ νῦν ἤκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην.	**EUCLIDES** A fine and good man, Terpsion. Why, just now I was listening to some people singing his praises for the way he fought in the battle.
	TERPSION καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον εἰ [142c] μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ κατέλυεν;	**TERPSION** Nothing strange in that. It would be far more surprising if [142c] he weren't like that. But why didn't he stop over here in Megara?
142c	**EUCLIDES** ἠπείγετο οἴκαδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ' ἐδεόμην καὶ συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤθελεν. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας	**EUCLIDES** He was in a hurry to get home. I certainly begged him to stay and urged him to, but he

1 Euclides and Terpsion were followers of Socrates from Megara, a city about twenty-five miles west of Athens; both are named among those present at his death in the *Phaedo*.
2 Theaetetus (c. 415–369 BC) became one of the leading Greek mathematicians. The fighting at Corinth is probably that of 369 BC, though some date it to the Corinthian War of the 390s.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	αὐτόν, ἀπιὼν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σωκράτους ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μειρακίῳ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καί μοι ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τούς τε λόγους οὓς διελέχθη [142d] αὐτῷ διηγήσατο καὶ μάλα ἀξίους ἀκοῆς, εἶπέ τε ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἴη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι.	wouldn't. So I saw him off, and as I was walking back I remembered, with amazement, how prophetically Socrates had spoken, about this among other things. I think he met Theaetetus shortly before his death, when Theaetetus was still a boy, and after spending time with him and talking with him he greatly admired his nature. And when I went to Athens he told me in detail the conversation he'd had [142d] with him, which was very well worth hearing, and he said that it was absolutely inevitable that this boy would become distinguished, if he lived to grow up.
142d	**TERPSION** καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἂν διηγήσασθαι;	**TERPSION** And it seems he spoke the truth. But what was the conversation? Could you tell it to me?
	EUCLIDES οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔκουν οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος· [143a] ἀλλ' ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότ' εὐθὺς οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἔγραφον, καὶ ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνορθούμην· ὥστε μοι σχεδόν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται.	**EUCLIDES** Good heavens, no, not just like that, from memory. [143a] But as soon as I got home back then, I wrote down notes, and later I wrote it out at leisure as I recalled it, and whenever I went to Athens I would ask Socrates again about whatever I hadn't remembered, and when I got back here I would make corrections. So I have pretty much the whole conversation written down.
143a	**TERPSION** ἀληθῆ· ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέντοι ἀεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδεῖξαι διατέτριφα δεῦρο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἥκων.	**TERPSION** That's true. I've heard you say so before, and I've always meant to ask you to show it to me, but I've kept putting it off until now. But what's to stop us going through it now? I certainly need a rest anyway, since I've come in from the country.
143b	**EUCLIDES** ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρινοῦ Θεαίτητον προύπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἀναπαυοίμην. ἀλλ' ἴωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώσεται.	**EUCLIDES** Well, I myself saw Theaetetus off as far as Erineum, so I wouldn't mind a rest either. Let's go, and while we rest, the boy will read it to us.[3]
	TERPSION ὀρθῶς λέγεις.	**TERPSION** Good idea.
	EUCLIDES τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ Τερψίων, τουτί· ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὑτωσὶ τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ [143c] γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τε ὁπότε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷον "καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην" ἢ "καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον," ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ὅτι "συνέφη" ἢ "οὐχ ὡμολόγει," τούτων ἕνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.	**EUCLIDES** Here's the book, Terpsion. Now, this is how I wrote the conversation down: not with Socrates narrating it to me, the way he narrated it, but talking with the people he said he talked with. He said they were Theodorus the geometer and Theaetetus. So that in the [143c] writing the bits of narration between the speeches wouldn't be a nuisance—where Socrates says of himself, for example, "and I said" or "and I remarked," or of the person answering, "he agreed" or "he didn't accept

3 Erineum lay on the road from Megara toward Eleusis and Athens. "The boy" is a slave who reads the text aloud.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		that"—for that reason I wrote it as though he were talking directly with them, and cut out that sort of thing.[4]
143c	**TERPSION** καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδη.	**TERPSION** And that's perfectly reasonable, Euclides.
	EUCLIDES ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.	**EUCLIDES** Boy, take the book and read.

THEAETETUS AND THE MATHEMATICIANS

Theodorus praises young Theaetetus, who explains his work on square roots but cannot define knowledge.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
143d	**SOCRATES** εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων, εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἤ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι· νῦν δὲ ἧττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτός τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἂν ὁρῶ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας συγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι πλησιάζουσι, [143e] καὶ δικαίως· ἄξιος γὰρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἕνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τινι ἐνέτυχες ἀξίῳ λόγου, ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην.	**SOCRATES** If I cared more about things in Cyrene, Theodorus, I'd be asking you about things there and about the people there—whether any of the young men there are applying themselves to geometry or any other kind of philosophy. As it is, I love them less than the young men here, and I'm keener to know which of our young men are likely to turn out well. That's what I look into myself, as far as I can, and I ask the others whom I see the young men wanting to spend time with. And quite a lot of them come to you, [143e] and rightly so: you deserve it for your geometry, among other things. So if you've come across anyone worth mentioning, I'd be glad to hear about him.
143e	**THEODORUS** καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον οἵῳ ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καί τῳ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι. νῦν δέ—καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου—οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· ἧττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ' ἔχει. [144a] ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὧν δὴ πώποτε ἐνέτυχον —καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πω ἠσθόμην οὕτω θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα.	**THEODORUS** Well, Socrates, it's very much worth my telling and your hearing what a boy I've come across among your fellow citizens. If he were good-looking, I'd be very afraid to speak of him, in case anyone thought I was in love with him. As it is—and don't be offended with me—he's not good-looking. He looks like you, with his snub nose and his bulging eyes, though he has these features less than you do. [144a] So I speak without fear. Believe me, of all the people I've ever met—and I've spent time with a great many—I've never yet come across anyone with such an amazingly good nature.
144a	τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπὸν πρᾷον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὀντινοῦν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' ἂν ᾠόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον· ἀλλ' οἵ τε ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποί εἰσι, καὶ ᾄττοντες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα [144b] πλοῖα, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρειότεροι φύονται, οἵ τε αὖ	For someone to learn as easily as he does, which is hard for anyone else, and at the same time to be exceptionally gentle, and on top of that to be as brave as anyone—I'd never have thought it could happen, and I don't see it happening. Those who are quick like him, and sharp, and good at remembering, are mostly also quick to flare up in anger;

4 Theodorus of Cyrene, in North Africa, was a mathematician known for his work on irrational magnitudes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθροί πως ἁπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταίστως καὶ ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς πρᾳότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ῥεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ ῥέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτως ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.	they dart around like ships without [144b] ballast, and they turn out more manic than brave. The steadier ones, on the other hand, come to their studies rather sluggishly and full of forgetfulness. But he goes at his studies and inquiries so smoothly, so surely and effectively, with such gentleness—like a stream of oil flowing without a sound—that you're amazed that someone his age gets all this done in this way.
144b	**SOCRATES** εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολιτῶν;	**SOCRATES** That's good news. And whose son is he, among our citizens?
	THEODORUS ἀκήκοα μὲν τοὔνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὔ. ἀλλὰ [144c] γάρ ἐστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ· ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο ἑταῖροί τέ τινες οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψάμενοι δεῦρο ἰέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν.	**THEODORUS** I've heard the name, but I don't remember it. But [144c] actually, he's the one in the middle of the group coming toward us. Just now he and these friends of his were oiling themselves in the outer running track, and now I think they've finished and are coming this way. See if you recognize him.
144c	**SOCRATES** γιγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιῶς Εὐφρονίου ἐστίν, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἷον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διηγῇ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλὴν κατέλιπεν. τὸ δ' ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.	**SOCRATES** I do. He's the son of Euphronius of Sunium—exactly the sort of man, my friend, you describe his son as being, and well thought of in other ways too. What's more, he left a very large estate. But I don't know the boy's name.[5]
144d	**THEODORUS** Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε ὄνομα· τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκέναι. ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEODORUS** His name is Theaetetus, Socrates. As for the estate, I think some trustees have squandered it. Still, he's amazingly generous with money too, Socrates.
	SOCRATES γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καί μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** He sounds a thoroughly noble person. Tell him to come and sit here by me.
	THEODORUS ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη.	**THEODORUS** I will. Theaetetus, come here beside Socrates.
	SOCRATES πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κἀγὼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον· φησὶν γὰρ Θεόδωρος [144e] ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῷν ἐχόντοιν ἑκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἄν εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν λέγει;	**SOCRATES** Yes, do, Theaetetus, so that I can take a look at myself too and see what sort of face I have. Theodorus says [144e] mine is like yours. But suppose each of us had a lyre and he said they were tuned alike: would we believe him straight away, or would we look into whether he was speaking as a musician?
144e	**THEAETETUS** ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἄν.	**THEAETETUS** We'd look into it.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὑρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἄν, ἄμουσον δέ, ἠπιστοῦμεν;	**SOCRATES** And if we found he was one, we'd believe him, but if he knew nothing of music, we'd distrust him?

5 Sunium was an Attic deme (district), at the southern tip of Attica.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ.	**THEAETETUS** That's right.
	SOCRATES νῦν δέ γ', οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων [145a] ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὢν λέγει ἢ οὔ.	**SOCRATES** And now, I think, if we care at all about our faces being [145a] alike, we must look into whether he's speaking as someone skilled in drawing or not.
145a	**THEAETETUS** δοκεῖ μοι.	**THEAETETUS** I think so.
	SOCRATES ἦ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;	**SOCRATES** Well, is Theodorus a painter?
	THEAETETUS οὔχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.	**THEAETETUS** No, not so far as I know.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός;	**SOCRATES** Not a geometer either?
	THEAETETUS πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** Oh, he certainly is, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;	**SOCRATES** And an astronomer, and skilled in arithmetic and music, and everything that belongs to education?
	THEAETETUS ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**THEAETETUS** I think so.
	SOCRATES εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.	**SOCRATES** So if he says we're alike in some bodily feature, praising or criticizing us in some way, it isn't really worth paying attention to him.
	THEAETETUS ἴσως οὔ.	**THEAETETUS** Perhaps not.
145b	**SOCRATES** τί δ' εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἆρ' οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;	**SOCRATES** But what if he were praising the soul of one of us for excellence and wisdom? Wouldn't it be worthwhile for the one who heard it to be eager to look closely at the one praised, and for that one to be eager to show himself?
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** Very much so, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ὥρα τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρός με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπῄνεσεν ὡς σὲ νυνδή.	**SOCRATES** Then it's time, my dear Theaetetus, for you to show yourself and for me to look. Believe me, Theodorus has praised a lot of people to me, foreigners and citizens alike, but he's never yet praised anyone the way he praised you just now.
	THEAETETUS εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ παίζων [145c] ἔλεγεν.	**THEAETETUS** That would be nice, Socrates. But make sure he wasn't [145c] joking.
145c	**SOCRATES** οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν—πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψετ' αὐτῷ—ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ.	**SOCRATES** That isn't Theodorus's way. Now don't go back on what we've agreed on the excuse that he's joking, or he may be forced to give evidence under oath—and nobody is going to charge him with perjury in any case. Take heart and stand by the agreement.
	THEAETETUS ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.	**THEAETETUS** Well, I must do it, if you think so.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES λέγε δή μοι· μανθάνεις που παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἄττα;	**SOCRATES** Tell me, then: you're learning some geometry from Theodorus, I take it?
	THEAETETUS ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** I am.
145d	**SOCRATES** καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς;	**SOCRATES** And some astronomy and harmony and arithmetic?
	THEAETETUS προθυμοῦμαί γε δή.	**THEAETETUS** I'm certainly trying.
	SOCRATES καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρά τε τούτου καὶ παρ' ἄλλων οὓς ἂν οἴωμαί τι τούτων ἐπαΐειν. ἀλλ' ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, μικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καί μοι λέγε· ἆρ' οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶν τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις;	**SOCRATES** So am I, my boy, from him and from anyone else I think knows something about these things. But even so, though I'm reasonably well off in other respects, there's a little thing I'm puzzled about, which I must look into with you and the others here. So tell me: isn't learning becoming wiser about what one is learning?
	THEAETETUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES σοφίᾳ δέ γ' οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.	**SOCRATES** And it's by wisdom, I suppose, that the wise are wise.
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
145e	**SOCRATES** τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;	**SOCRATES** And this doesn't differ at all from knowledge, does it?
	THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον;	**THEAETETUS** What doesn't?
	SOCRATES ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί;	**SOCRATES** Wisdom. Or aren't people wise about just the things they have knowledge of?
	THEAETETUS τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;	**SOCRATES** So knowledge and wisdom are the same thing?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ποτὲ τυγχάνει ὄν. [146a] ἆρ' οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ ἁμαρτών, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος· ὃς δ' ἂν περιγένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὅτι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. τί σιγᾶτε; οὔ τί που, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** Well, this is exactly what I'm puzzled about and can't adequately grasp by myself: what on earth knowledge actually is. [146a] So can we say what it is? What do you all say? Which of us will speak first? Whoever gets it wrong, and whoever keeps getting it wrong, will sit down and be "donkey," as children playing ball say; and whoever comes through without a mistake will be our king and order us to answer whatever he likes. Why so quiet? I hope, Theodorus, my love of argument isn't making me rude, in my eagerness to get us talking and becoming friendly and sociable with one another?
146b		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEODORUS ἥκιστα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδ' αὖ συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω. τοῖσδε δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλέον ἐπιδιδοῖεν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.	**THEODORUS** Something like that would be far from rude, Socrates. But tell one of the boys to answer you. I'm not used to this kind of conversation, and I'm past the age for getting used to it. It would suit them, though, and they'd improve a great deal more; youth really can improve at anything. So, as you began, don't let Theaetetus go—ask him.
	SOCRATES ἀκούεις δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ᾧ 146c ἀπειθεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη;	**SOCRATES** You hear what Theodorus says, Theaetetus. I don't think you'll want 146c to disobey him, and it isn't right, in matters like these, for a younger man to disobey the orders of a wise one. So answer well and nobly: what do you think knowledge is?
146c	**THEAETETUS** ἀλλὰ χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἄν τι καὶ ἁμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε.	**THEAETETUS** Well, I must, Socrates, since you both tell me to. In any case, if I make a mistake, you'll correct me.
	SOCRATES πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε οἷοί τε ὦμεν.	**SOCRATES** Certainly, if we can.
	THEAETETUS δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἄν τις μάθοι ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἃς νυνδὴ σὺ διῆλθες, 146d καὶ αὖ σκυτοτομική τε καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαί τε καὶ ἑκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.	**THEAETETUS** Well then, I think that the things one might learn from Theodorus are kinds of knowledge—geometry and the subjects you went through just now— 146d and then shoemaking and the crafts of the other craftsmen too: all of these together, and each of them, are nothing other than knowledge.
146d	**SOCRATES** γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἓν αἰτηθεὶς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἁπλοῦ.	**SOCRATES** How noble and generous of you, my friend! Asked for one thing, you give many, and a varied assortment instead of something simple.
	THEAETETUS πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**THEAETETUS** What do you mean by that, Socrates?
	SOCRATES ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας;	**SOCRATES** Probably nothing. But I'll tell you what I think. When you say "shoemaking," you don't mean anything other than knowledge of making shoes, do you?
	THEAETETUS οὐδέν.	**THEAETETUS** Nothing else.
146e	**SOCRATES** τί δ' ὅταν τεκτονικήν; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;	**SOCRATES** And when you say "carpentry"? Anything other than knowledge of making wooden furniture?
	THEAETETUS οὐδὲ τοῦτο.	**THEAETETUS** No, not that either.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὗ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο ὁρίζεις;	**SOCRATES** So in both cases you're defining what each is knowledge of?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES τὸ δέ γ' ἐρωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινές· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα ἀλλὰ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;	**SOCRATES** But what you were asked, Theaetetus, wasn't that—what knowledge is knowledge of, or how many kinds of knowledge there are. We didn't ask because we wanted to count them, but to know what knowledge itself is. Or am I talking nonsense?
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.	**THEAETETUS** No, you're quite right.
147a	**SOCRATES** σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροιτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἰπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλινθουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἶμεν;	**SOCRATES** Now consider this too. Suppose someone asked us about something ordinary and everyday—about mud, for example, what it is. If we answered him, "potters' mud, and oven-makers' mud, and brickmakers' mud," wouldn't we be ridiculous?
	THEAETETUS ἴσως.	**THEAETETUS** Perhaps.
	SOCRATES πρῶτον μέν γέ που οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν [147b] κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἴτε ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἢ οἴει τίς τι συνίησίν τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν τί ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** First, I suppose, for thinking that the questioner understands anything from our answer when we say "mud," whether we add "the [147b] figurine-makers'" or any other craftsmen's. Or do you think anyone understands the name of something when he doesn't know what it is?
147b	**THEAETETUS** οὐδαμῶς.	**THEAETETUS** Not at all.
	SOCRATES οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.	**SOCRATES** Then someone who doesn't know what knowledge is doesn't understand "knowledge of shoes" either.
	THEAETETUS οὐ γάρ.	**THEAETETUS** No.
	SOCRATES σκυτικὴν ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.	**SOCRATES** So someone who is ignorant of knowledge doesn't understand shoemaking, or any other craft.
	THEAETETUS ἔστιν οὕτως.	**THEAETETUS** That's so.
	SOCRATES γελοία ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμη τί ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ [147c] ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτηθείς.	**SOCRATES** Then it's a ridiculous answer to someone who asks what knowledge is, to give him the name of some craft. The answer gives "knowledge of [147c] something," and that's not what was asked.
147c	**THEAETETUS** ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES ἔπειτά γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἁπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἂν εἴη, τὸ δ' ὅτου ἐᾶν χαίρειν.	**SOCRATES** Second, when it's possible to give a plain, short answer, it takes an endless roundabout road. In the question about mud, for example, it would be plain and simple to say that mud would be earth mixed with liquid, and to let go of whose mud it is.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἷον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἔναγχος εἰσῆλθε [147d] διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σῷ ὁμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει.	**THEAETETUS** Put like that, Socrates, it now seems easy. But you may be asking the sort of thing that occurred to us ourselves the other day while we were [147d] talking—me and your namesake here, Socrates.[6]
147d	**SOCRATES** τὸ ποῖον δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε;	**SOCRATES** What was that, Theaetetus?
	THEAETETUS περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ σύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἑπτακαιδεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθέ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθῆναι συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν, ὅτῳ πάσας [147e] ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις.	**THEAETETUS** Theodorus here was drawing diagrams for us about powers, showing that the powers of three square feet and of five square feet are not commensurable in length with the one-foot line, and taking each one in turn like that up to the power of seventeen square feet; and there, for some reason, he got stuck. So it occurred to us, since the powers seemed to be unlimited in number, to try to collect them into one thing by which we could [147e] call all these powers.[7]
147e	**SOCRATES** ἦ καὶ ηὕρετέ τι τοιοῦτον;	**SOCRATES** And did you find anything like that?
	THEAETETUS ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.	**THEAETETUS** I think we did. But you look at it too.
	SOCRATES λέγε.	**SOCRATES** Go on.
	THEAETETUS τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν· τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον προσείπομεν.	**THEAETETUS** We divided all number into two. The number that can come out as an equal number times an equal number we likened to the square in shape, and called it square and equal-sided.
	SOCRATES καὶ εὖ γε.	**SOCRATES** Well done.
	THEAETETUS τὸν τοίνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὧν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ [148a] τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκις γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὖ σχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.	**THEAETETUS** The numbers in between, then—which include three and [148a] five and every number that can't come out as an equal times an equal, but comes out either as a larger times a smaller or a smaller times a larger, and is always enclosed by a larger and a smaller side—we likened to the oblong shape, and called oblong number.
148a	**SOCRATES** κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;	**SOCRATES** Excellent. But what came next?
	THEAETETUS ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὡρισάμεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, [148b] δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ συμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται. καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.	**THEAETETUS** All the lines that form the square of an equal-sided plane number we defined as length; all those that form the square of an oblong number, [148b] as powers, since they aren't commensurable with the others in length, but only in the

6 The younger Socrates, a fellow student of Theaetetus, is present but silent; he takes part in Plato's *Statesman*.
7 A "power" here is the side of a square of given area—in modern terms a square root. Theodorus showed that the sides of squares of 3, 5, ... 17 square feet are irrational relative to a one-foot line.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		plane areas they have the power to produce. And there's another thing of the same kind about solids.
148b	SOCRATES ἄριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖδες· ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι.	SOCRATES Superb, boys! So I don't think Theodorus will be liable for false testimony.
	THEAETETUS καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ γε ἐρωτᾷς περὶ ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους τε καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σύ γέ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν· ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος.	THEAETETUS Still, Socrates, what you're asking about knowledge, I couldn't answer the way I did about length and power. And yet that seems to me the sort of thing you're looking for. So Theodorus turns out to be a liar after all.
148c	SOCRATES τί δέ; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ οὕτω δρομικῷ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέναι, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης, ἧττόν τι ἂν οἴει ἀληθῆ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσαι;	SOCRATES Well now, suppose he had praised you for running and said he'd never come across a young man so good at running, and then you raced and were beaten by the fastest runner in his prime: do you think his praise would be any less true?
	THEAETETUS οὐκ ἔγωγε.	THEAETETUS No, I don't.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἴει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντῃ ἄκρων;	SOCRATES But do you think finding out what knowledge is, as I was saying just now, is a small thing, and not something for those who are in every way at the top?
	THEAETETUS νὴ τὸν Δί' ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων.	THEAETETUS Good heavens, I think it's for those at the very top.
	SOCRATES θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῷ καὶ τὶ οἷου Θεόδωρον 148d λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν.	SOCRATES Then take heart about yourself, and believe that Theodorus 148d is right, and do your utmost, both about other things and about knowledge, to get hold of an account of what it actually is.
148d	THEAETETUS προθυμίας μὲν ἕνεκα, ὦ Σώκρατες, φανεῖται.	THEAETETUS If it's a matter of effort, Socrates, it'll come to light.
	SOCRATES ἴθι δή—καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω—πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἑνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν.	SOCRATES Come on, then—you showed the way well just now—try to imitate your answer about the powers: just as you gathered them, many as they were, into one form, so too try to address the many kinds of knowledge with one account.
148e	THEAETETUS ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω οὔτ' ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύῃ, οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλειν.	THEAETETUS But believe me, Socrates, I've often tried to look into it, when I heard reports of the questions you were asking. But I can't convince myself that I have anything adequate to say, or hear anyone else speak about it the way you require; and yet I can't stop worrying about it either.

SOCRATES THE MIDWIFE

Socrates says he is barren of wisdom but delivers others' ideas and tests whether they are real.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ὠδίνεις γάρ, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** That's because you're in labor, my dear Theaetetus—you're not empty, you're pregnant.
	THEAETETUS οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὃ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω.	**THEAETETUS** I don't know, Socrates. I'm just telling you what I've been going through.
149a	**SOCRATES** εἶτα, ὦ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι ὑὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης;	**SOCRATES** Well, you absurd boy, haven't you heard that I'm the son of a very fine and formidable midwife, Phaenarete?[8]
	THEAETETUS ἤδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, I have heard that.
	SOCRATES ἆρα καὶ ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην ἀκήκοας;	**SOCRATES** And have you also heard that I practice the same art?
	THEAETETUS οὐδαμῶς.	**THEAETETUS** Never.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπῃς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἦ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;	**SOCRATES** Well, believe me, I do. But don't give me away to the others. It's escaped their notice, my friend, that I have this art. They don't know it, so they don't say that about me; they say I'm utterly strange and that I reduce people to perplexity. Have you heard that too?
149b	**THEAETETUS** ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** I have.
	SOCRATES εἶπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἴτιον;	**SOCRATES** Shall I tell you the reason for it?
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, please.
	SOCRATES ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾷον μαθήσῃ ὃ βούλομαι. οἶσθα γάρ που ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἀλλ' αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν.	**SOCRATES** Then think about the whole business of midwives, how it is with them, and you'll more easily understand what I mean. You know, I suppose, that none of them attends other women in childbirth while she herself is still conceiving and giving birth; only those who are no longer able to give birth do.
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε. στερίφαις μὲν οὖν ἄρα [149c] οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἄπειρος· ταῖς δὲ δι' ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.	**SOCRATES** They say the cause of this is Artemis, because, though childless, she has been allotted childbirth as her province. She didn't give midwifery to barren women, [149c] because human nature is too weak to master a craft in matters it has no experience of; but she assigned it to those who are past bearing children because of their age, honoring their likeness to herself.[9]

8 Phaenarete's name means roughly "she who brings excellence to light."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
149c	**THEAETETUS** εἰκός.	**THEAETETUS** That's likely.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς κυούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;	**SOCRATES** And isn't this likely too, even necessary: that midwives know better than anyone else whether women are pregnant or not?
	THEAETETUS πάνυ γε.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια καὶ [149d] ἐπᾴδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδῖνας καὶ μαλθακωτέρας ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὂν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσιν;	**SOCRATES** What's more, by giving drugs and [149d] singing incantations, midwives can bring on the pains of labor and make them milder if they want to; they bring women who are having a difficult labor to give birth, and, if it seems best to miscarry while the fetus is young, they bring on a miscarriage.
149d	**THEAETETUS** ἔστι ταῦτα.	**THEAETETUS** That's so.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ᾔσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ὡς πάσσοφοι οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι ποίαν χρὴ ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ὡς ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν;	**SOCRATES** And have you noticed this about them too, that they are also the cleverest matchmakers, being thoroughly wise about recognizing what sort of woman should be with what sort of man in order to bear the best children?
	THEAETETUS οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.	**THEAETETUS** I didn't know that at all.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἴσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μεῖζον φρονοῦσιν ἢ ἐπὶ [149e] τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννόει γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης οἴει τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ συγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὖ τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον;	**SOCRATES** Well, believe me, they're prouder of this than of [149e] cutting umbilical cords. Think about it: do you think it belongs to the same craft or a different one to tend and harvest the fruits of the earth and also to know what kind of plant or seed should be sown in what kind of soil?
149e	**THEAETETUS** οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.	**THEAETETUS** No, the same one.
	SOCRATES εἰς γυναῖκα δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἴει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην δὲ συγκομιδῆς;	**SOCRATES** And in the case of a woman, my friend, do you think there's one craft for this sort of thing and another for the harvest?
	THEAETETUS οὔκουν εἰκός γε.	**THEAETETUS** It doesn't seem likely.
150a	**SOCRATES** οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον συναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ᾗ δὴ προαγωγία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἅτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φοβούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν· ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις μόναις που προσήκει καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς.	**SOCRATES** No. But because of the unjust and unskilled bringing together of man and woman, which is called procuring, midwives, being respectable women, avoid matchmaking too, for fear that through it they may fall under that charge. Yet it's surely only genuine midwives who can properly make matches.
	THEAETETUS φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν ἐνίοτε	

GREEK

μὲν [150b] εἴδωλα τίκτειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆν, μέγιστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ μή· ἢ οὐκ οἴει;

ENGLISH

SOCRATES So much, then, for the midwives' role. But it is less than my performance. For women don't sometimes [150b] give birth to phantoms and sometimes to real children, with the difference hard to tell. If they did, the greatest and finest task of midwives would be to judge what is real and what isn't. Don't you think so?

150b **THEAETETUS** ἔγωγε.

THEAETETUS I do.

SOCRATES τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἔνι [150c] τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοί μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαί με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν.

SOCRATES My art of midwifery has everything theirs has, but it differs in that I deliver men, not women, and in that I oversee their souls in labor, not their bodies. And the greatest thing in [150c] our art is being able to test, in every way, whether the young man's thinking is giving birth to a phantom and a falsehood, or to something fertile and true. Because I have this in common with midwives: I'm barren of wisdom. Many people have reproached me before now for questioning others while making no pronouncement about anything myself, because I have no wisdom in me—and the reproach is true. The reason is this: the god compels me to act as midwife but has prevented me from giving birth.

150c εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς [150d] μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι ἔστιν εὕρημα τοιοῦτον γεγονὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊούσης τῆς συνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὑτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὑρόντες τε καὶ τεκόντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ [150e] αἴτιος.

So I myself am [150d] not at all wise, and no discovery of that kind has ever been born to me as the offspring of my own soul. But those who spend time with me, though at first some of them seem quite ignorant, all make amazing progress as our association goes on—those whom the god permits—as they themselves and everyone else can see. And it's clear that they've never learned anything from me; they've found and given birth to many fine things themselves, from within themselves. For the delivery, though, it's the god and I who are [150e] responsible.

150e ὧδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἤδη τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες ἀπῆλθον πρῳαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν συνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις [151a] ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὧν εἷς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί· οὕς, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσι δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι

Here's how it's clear. Many before now, not knowing this and blaming themselves while thinking little of me, have gone away sooner than they should, either on their own or persuaded by others. Once gone, they've miscarried the rest through bad company, and they've lost the children I delivered by raising them badly, caring more for falsehoods and phantoms than for the truth; and in the end both they themselves and everyone else [151a] have seen that they are ignorant. Aristides son of Lysimachus is one of them, and

9 Artemis, a virgin goddess, was also the patron of childbirth.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ, καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασι.	there are a great many others. When they come back begging to be with me again, and doing extraordinary things to get it, the divine sign that comes to me forbids me to associate with some of them but allows it with others, and these make progress again.[10]
151a	πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλανται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ’κεῖναι· ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ [151b] ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοις δέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οἳ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι καί, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἂν συγγενόμενοι ὄναιντο· ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, ἕνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα· ὑποπτεύω σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἴει, ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον.	Those who spend time with me also have this in common with women giving birth: they suffer labor pains and are filled with perplexity night and day, far more than women are. And my art can bring on this labor and [151b] bring it to an end. So that’s how it is with them. But some, Theaetetus, who don’t seem to me to be pregnant at all, I realize have no need of me, and I very kindly play matchmaker for them and—with the god’s help, I may say—I’m quite good at guessing whose company would benefit them. I’ve given many of them away to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired men. I’ve gone on at such length, my excellent friend, for this reason: I suspect, as you yourself think, that you’re pregnant with something inside and in labor.[11]
151b	προσφέρου οὖν [151c] πρός με ὡς πρὸς μαίας ὑὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τ’ εἶ οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι· καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὧν ἂν λέγῃς ἡγήσωμαι εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρός με οὕτω διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἕτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονταί με εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι [151d] οὐδεὶς θεὸς δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ’ ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδός τε συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν· ὡς δ’ οὐχ οἷός τ’ εἶ, μηδέποτ’ εἴπῃς.	So put yourself [151c] in my hands, as the son of a midwife and a midwife myself, and do your best to answer whatever I ask as well as you can. And if, when I examine something you say, I judge it to be a phantom and not true, and then take it from you and throw it away, don’t be savage with me, the way first-time mothers are about their babies. Many people before now, my wonderful friend, have been so disposed toward me that they were ready to bite, literally, when I took some bit of nonsense away from them. They don’t think I’m doing it out of goodwill; they’re far from knowing that [151d] no god is ill-disposed to human beings, and that I don’t do anything like this out of ill will either; it’s just that it’s not at all right for me to accept a falsehood and suppress the truth. So once again, from the beginning, Theaetetus, try to say what knowledge is. And never say that you can’t.
151d	ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἷός τ’ ἔσῃ.	If the god is willing and you act like a man, you will be able to.

10 Aristides, grandson of the famous Athenian statesman of the same name, appears as a boy in Plato’s *Laches*.
11 Prodicus of Ceos was a well-known sophist, famous for his fine distinctions between words.

KNOWLEDGE IS PERCEPTION

Theaetetus says knowledge is perception, and Socrates links this to Protagoras' view that things are as they appear.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὅτι [151e] τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις.	**THEAETETUS** Well, Socrates, with you urging me on like that, it would be shameful not to do my utmost to say what [151e] I can. It seems to me, then, that someone who knows something perceives what he knows, and, as it appears now at least, knowledge is nothing other than perception.
151e	**SOCRATES** εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἴσθησις, φῄς, ἐπιστήμη;	**SOCRATES** Well done, my boy, that's a noble answer: that's how you should speak when you declare yourself. But come, let's examine it together, to see whether it turns out to be fertile or a wind-egg. Knowledge, you say, is perception?[12]
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ [152a] ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που "πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον" ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, "τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν." ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;	**SOCRATES** It looks as if you've given no ordinary account of [152a] knowledge; it's the one Protagoras gave too. He said the same thing in a different way. He says, you know, that a human being is "the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not." You've read it, I suppose?[13]
152a	**THEAETETUS** ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.	**THEAETETUS** I've read it, many times.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ;	**SOCRATES** Doesn't he mean something like this: that as each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so in turn it is for you—and you and I are each a human being?
	THEAETETUS λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, that's what he says.
152b	**SOCRATES** εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἑπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἆρ' οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγῷ, ὁ δ' οὔ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;	**SOCRATES** Well, it's likely that a wise man isn't talking nonsense. So let's follow him. Isn't it the case that sometimes, when the same wind is blowing, one of us feels cold and the other doesn't? Or one feels slightly cold and the other very cold?
	THEAETETUS καὶ μάλα.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγῶντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Then shall we say that at that moment the wind itself, by itself, is cold or not cold? Or shall we be persuaded by Protagoras that it is cold for the one who feels cold, and not for the one who doesn't?

12 A "wind-egg" is an unfertilized egg, one that will never hatch.
13 Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490–420 BC) was the most famous of the sophists; this sentence opened his book *Truth*. The saying is traditionally rendered "man is the measure of all things."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** It seems we should.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἑκατέρῳ;	**SOCRATES** And it appears that way to each of them?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τὸ δέ γε "φαίνεται" αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** And "appears" is the same as "is perceived"?
	THEAETETUS ἔστιν γάρ.	**THEAETETUS** It is.
152c	**SOCRATES** φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** Then appearing and perception are the same, in the case of hot things and everything of that kind. For as each person perceives things, so they are likely to be for each person.
	THEAETETUS ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα.	**SOCRATES** Then perception is always of what is, and it is free from falsehood, since it is knowledge.
	THEAETETUS φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ᾐνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;	**SOCRATES** Then, by the Graces, was Protagoras some kind of all-wise man, who spoke this to the rest of us, the great rabble, in riddles, while telling the truth to his students in secret?
152d	**THEAETETUS** πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;	**THEAETETUS** What do you mean by that, Socrates?
	SOCRATES ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, σύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· 152e ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται.	**SOCRATES** I'll tell you, and it's no ordinary account: that nothing is one thing, itself by itself, and you can't correctly call it anything or any sort of thing. If you call it large, it will also appear small, and if heavy, light, and so on with everything, since nothing is one thing or something or any sort of thing. It's from movement and motion and mixture with one another that all the things we say "are" come to be—though we're wrong to speak of them that way, 152e since nothing ever is; things are always coming to be.
152e	καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, ὃς εἰπών— Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;	And on this point let's take it that all the wise, one after another, except Parmenides, are in agreement: Protagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles, and the leading poets in each kind of poetry, Epicharmus in comedy and Homer in tragedy. When Homer says "Ocean, origin of the gods, and mother Tethys," he has said that all things are the offspring of flowing and motion. Or don't you think that's what he means?[14]

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	THEAETETUS ἔμοιγε.	**THEAETETUS** I do.
153a	**SOCRATES** τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;	**SOCRATES** Then who could still dispute with such an army, and with Homer as its general, without making himself ridiculous?
	THEAETETUS οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** It wouldn't be easy, Socrates.
	SOCRATES οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἆλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτω δὲ κινήσεις. ἢ οὐχ αὗται γενέσεις πυρός;	**SOCRATES** No, Theaetetus, it wouldn't. Here, in fact, are signs enough in support of the account: motion supplies what seems to be, and coming to be, while rest supplies not being and perishing. Heat and fire, which generate and govern everything else, are themselves generated from movement and friction, and these two are motions. Or aren't these the origins of fire?
153b	**THEAETETUS** αὗται μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** They certainly are.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζῴων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.	**SOCRATES** And the race of living creatures grows from these same things.
	THEAETETUS πῶς δ' οὔ;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ σῴζεται;	**SOCRATES** Well then, isn't the condition of bodies destroyed by rest and idleness, and preserved, for the most part, by exercise and motion?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σῴζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ 153c ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται;	**SOCRATES** And isn't it by learning and practice, which are motions, that the condition of the soul acquires things learned and is preserved and gets better; while through rest, which is lack of practice and 153c lack of learning, it learns nothing and forgets whatever it has learned?
153c	**THEAETETUS** καὶ μάλα.	**THEAETETUS** Very much so.
	SOCRATES τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον;	**SOCRATES** So one thing, motion, is good for both soul and body, and the other the opposite?
	THEAETETUS ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σῴζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζω τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον 153d Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ᾖ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σῴζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταίη	**SOCRATES** Do I need to go on and tell you about still air and calm seas and the like—that the stillness rots and destroys, while the other preserves? And to cap it all, must I compel you to agree that by the golden cord Homer means nothing other than the sun, 153d and is showing that as long as the heavens and the sun go round in their motion,

14 Parmenides of Elea held that what is is one and unchanging; Heraclitus of Ephesus and Empedocles of Acragas were philosophers of change; Epicharmus was a Sicilian comic poet. The line is *Iliad* 14.201.

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	τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ' ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα;	everything among gods and humans exists and is preserved, but if this were to stop as if tied fast, all things would be destroyed and, as the saying goes, everything would be turned upside down?[15]
153d	**THEAETETUS** ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν ἅπερ λέγεις.	**THEAETETUS** I think, Socrates, it shows just what you say.
	SOCRATES ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὑτωσί· κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδέ [153e] τιν' αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε δήπου ἐν τάξει καὶ μένον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.	**SOCRATES** Then take it this way, my excellent friend. Start with the eyes: what you call white color isn't itself some separate thing outside your eyes, or in your eyes either. Don't [153e] assign it any place, because then it would of course be somewhere in position, staying put, and it wouldn't come to be in the process of becoming.
153e	**THEAETETUS** ἀλλὰ πῶς;	**THEAETETUS** Then how?
	SOCRATES ἑπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν ὂν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον [154a] εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός· ἢ σὺ διισχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἷον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζῴῳ;	**SOCRATES** Let's follow the account we gave just now and posit that nothing is one thing, itself by itself. In that way black and white and any other color will turn out to have come to be from the eyes meeting the appropriate movement, and what we say each color [154a] is will be neither what meets nor what is met, but something in between, which has come to be private to each. Or would you insist that each color appears to a dog, or any other animal, just as it appears to you?
154a	**THEAETETUS** μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** Good heavens, no, I wouldn't.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἆρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;	**SOCRATES** Well, does anything appear the same to another human being as it does to you? Are you firmly convinced of that? Or much rather that it doesn't appear the same even to you yourself, because you are never in the same condition as yourself?
	THEAETETUS τοῦτο μᾶλλόν μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο.	**THEAETETUS** I think that rather than the other.
154b	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὗ ἐφαπτόμεθα μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλῳ προσπεσὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἤ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὡς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.	**SOCRATES** Now if what we measure ourselves against or touch were large or white or hot, it would never have become different by encountering something else, provided it didn't change in itself. And again, if what does the measuring or touching were any of these things, it wouldn't have become different when something else came up to it or was affected in some way, if it were not itself affected. As things are, my friend, we find ourselves rather casually forced to say amazing

15 In *Iliad* 8.18–27 Zeus boasts that he could haul up earth and sea with a golden cord and leave them hanging in the air.

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		and ridiculous things, as Protagoras would say, and everyone who undertakes to say what he does.
	THEAETETUS πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις;	**THEAETETUS** How do you mean? What sort of things?
154c	**SOCRATES** σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσῃ ἃ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἕξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκῃς, πλείους φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις, καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν· ἢ σὺ ἀνέξῃ;	**SOCRATES** Take a small example and you'll know everything I mean. Take six dice: if you put four beside them, we say they are more than the four, half as many again; but if you put twelve, we say they are fewer—half as many. And it isn't tolerable to say anything else. Or will you tolerate it?
	THEAETETUS οὐκ ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** No, I won't.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; ἄν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἤ τις ἄλλος· "ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μεῖζον ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν;" τί ἀποκρινῇ;	**SOCRATES** Well then, suppose Protagoras or someone else asks you, "Theaetetus, is it possible for anything to become larger or more in any way other than by being increased?" What will you answer?
	THEAETETUS ἐὰν μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν 154d ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.	**THEAETETUS** If I answer what I think in response to this 154d question, Socrates, I'll say it isn't possible. But if I answer with an eye to the earlier one, taking care not to contradict myself, I'll say it is.
154d	**SOCRATES** εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειόν τι συμβήσεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.	**SOCRATES** By Hera, my friend, that's a fine answer, and inspired. But it seems that if you answer that it is possible, we'll get something out of Euripides: our tongue won't be refuted, but our mind will.[16]
	THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ.	**THEAETETUS** That's true.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν 154e ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἅτε ἰδιῶται πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.	**SOCRATES** Now if you and I were clever and wise and had examined everything in our minds, we would by now be spending the rest of our time 154e testing each other out of sheer abundance, coming together like sophists for this sort of battle and knocking each other's arguments down with arguments. As it is, being ordinary people, we'll want first to look at our thoughts themselves in relation to themselves and see what they really are, and whether they agree with one another or not in any way at all.
154e	**THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ' ἂν βουλοίμην.	**THEAETETUS** That's certainly what I would want.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν ἐγώ. ὅτε δ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἠρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν	**SOCRATES** And so do I. Since that's how things stand, won't we look at it again quietly, as people

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ἐπανασκεψόμεθα, [155a] οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἄττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν; ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως;

with plenty of time on their hands, [155a] not getting irritated but really examining ourselves, to see what on earth these apparitions in us are? Examining the first of them, we'll say, I think, that nothing could ever become larger or smaller, either in bulk or in number, as long as it was equal to itself. Isn't that so?

155a **THEAETETUS** ναί.

THEAETETUS Yes.

SOCRATES δεύτερον δέ γε, ᾧ μήτε προστιθοῖτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαί ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἶναι.

SOCRATES And second, that a thing to which nothing was added and from which nothing was taken away would never either increase or diminish, but would always be equal.

THEAETETUS κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

THEAETETUS Absolutely.

155b **SOCRATES** ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ὕστερον ἀλλὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

SOCRATES And third, isn't it impossible for something to be later what it wasn't before, without having become it and coming to be?

THEAETETUS δοκεῖ γε δή.

THEAETETUS It does seem so.

SOCRATES ταῦτα δή, οἶομαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τοὐναντίον παθόντα, ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου [155c] ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὕστερον ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλὺς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγιγνόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. ἔπῃ γάρ που, ᾧ Θεαίτητε· δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἄπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

SOCRATES Now these three agreements, I think, are fighting among themselves in our soul when we speak about the dice, or when we say that I, at my age, neither having grown nor having undergone the opposite, am within a year larger than you, who are young, and later smaller—not because anything has been [155c] taken away from my bulk, but because you have grown. For then I am later what I was not before, without having become it. For without coming to be it is impossible to have become, and without losing any of my bulk I could never have become smaller. And there are thousands upon thousands of other cases like this, if we are going to accept these. You follow me, I take it, Theaetetus. You certainly seem to me to be no stranger to this sort of thing.

155c **THEAETETUS** καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς γε, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῶ.

THEAETETUS Yes, by the gods, Socrates, and I'm extraordinarily amazed at what on earth these things are; sometimes when I really look at them I get quite dizzy.

155d **SOCRATES** Θεόδωρος γάρ, ᾧ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἶριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον

SOCRATES That's because Theodorus, my friend, seems to have guessed rightly about your nature. This experience, wondering, belongs very much to a philosopher: there is no other starting point of philosophy than this. And it seems that whoever

16 An allusion to Hippolytus's line in Euripides' *Hippolytus* (612): "My tongue swore, but my mind is unsworn."

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	μανθάνεις ἤδη δι' ὃ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν, ἢ οὔπω;	said that Iris is the child of Thaumas was not a bad genealogist. But do you understand yet why these things are as they are, according to what we are saying Protagoras says, or not yet?[17]
	THEAETETUS οὔπω μοι δοκῶ.	**THEAETETUS** Not yet, I think.
	SOCRATES χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσῃ ἐάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην [155e] συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν;	**SOCRATES** Then will you be grateful to me if I help you search out the truth hidden in the thinking of a famous man—or rather, famous men— [155e] and get it out of them?
155e	**THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλήν;	**THEAETETUS** How could I not be? Very grateful indeed.

EVERYTHING IS IN MOTION

Socrates sets out a doctrine in which all is motion, and perceptions arise twinned with their objects.

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	SOCRATES ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶν δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἁπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.	**SOCRATES** Then look around and make sure none of the uninitiated are listening. These are the people who think that nothing exists except what they can grip tightly with both hands, and who don't accept actions and processes of becoming and everything invisible as part of being.
	THEAETETUS καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκληρούς γε λέγεις καὶ [156a] ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.	**THEAETETUS** Well, Socrates, they are hard and [156a] stubborn people you're talking about.
156a	**SOCRATES** εἰσὶν γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι· ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν [156b] ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.	**SOCRATES** Yes, my boy, they're very crude indeed. But there are others, much more refined, whose mysteries I am going to tell you. Their first principle, on which everything we were saying just now also depends, is this: that the universe was motion and nothing besides, and that there are two kinds of motion, each unlimited in number, one having the power to act, the other to be acted upon. From the intercourse and friction of these with each other come offspring, unlimited in number, [156b] but twins: on the one hand what is perceived, on the other a perception, which always emerges and is born together with what is perceived.
156b	αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὠνομασμέναι· τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητὸν γένος	The perceptions have names like these for us: seeings, hearings, smellings, feelings of cold and of heat, and also what are called pleasures and pains and desires and fears, and others besides—the unnamed ones are countless, the named ones very

17 In Hesiod's *Theogony* (265–66), Iris, goddess of the rainbow and messenger of the gods, is daughter of Thaumas, whose name suggests *thauma*, "wonder."

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τούτων ἑκάσταις ὁμόγονον, [156c] ὄψεσι μὲν χρώματα παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ συγγενῆ γιγνόμενα. τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἆρα ἐννοεῖς;

156c **THEAETETUS** οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἄθρει ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βούλεται γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν ὥσπερ λέγομεν κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτὴς ἔνι τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν [156d] κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ θάττω ἐστίν. φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν.

156d ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ συμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ σύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένετο ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν [156e] ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὔ τι ὄψις ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ συγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτῳοῦν συνέβη χρῆμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι.

156e καὶ τἆλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' [157a] αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἑνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι συνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι· τό τέ τινι συνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὖ προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλά [157b] τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.

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numerous. And the kind that is perceived is born alongside each of these: [156c] colors of all kinds with seeings of all kinds, sounds in the same way with hearings, and the other perceived things born akin to the other perceptions. So what does this story mean for us, Theaetetus, in relation to what we said before? Do you see?

THEAETETUS Not really, Socrates.

SOCRATES Well, watch and see whether it can be finished off somehow. What it means to say is that all these things are in motion, as we say, but that there is speed and slowness in their motion. What is slow has its motion in the same place and in relation to what comes near it, [156d] and in that way it generates; but the offspring generated in this way are faster. For they travel, and their motion naturally consists in travel.

So when an eye and something else commensurate with it come near each other and generate whiteness and the perception born along with it—which would never have come about if either of them had met something else—then, as they travel in between, [156e] sight from the eyes and whiteness from what joins in generating the color, the eye becomes full of sight and now sees, and has become not sight but a seeing eye; while what joined in generating the color is filled all round with whiteness and has become, in turn, not whiteness but white—whether it's wood or stone or anything else that happens to be colored with that sort of color.

And so with the rest—hard and hot and everything. We must understand them in the same way: none of them is anything itself by [157a] itself, as we were saying before; all things of every kind come to be from motion, in their intercourse with one another. For even the active and the passive among them cannot, they say, be firmly conceived as being anything on its own. Nothing is active until it comes together with what is passive, nor passive until it comes together with what is active; and what comes together with one thing and is active turns out to be passive when it encounters something else. So from all this, as we were saying at the start, nothing is one thing itself by itself; it is always coming to be [157b] for something. And "being" must be removed from everywhere—although we ourselves, many times and just now

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		too, have been forced by habit and lack of knowledge to use it.
157b	τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὅτι ἂν ἱστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα· ὡς ἐάν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι [157c] ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος. ταῦτα δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἆρ' ἡδέα δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γεύοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων;	But according to the wise, we shouldn't allow "something" or "someone's" or "mine" or "this" or "that" or any other word that makes things stand still. We should speak in accordance with nature of things coming to be and being made and perishing and altering. For if someone makes anything stand still by the way he speaks, he is easily refuted. And we must speak this way both about individual things and about many things gathered together—the aggregates [157c] to which people give the names "human being" and "stone" and each animal and kind. So, Theaetetus, do these things seem delightful to you, and would you taste them as something to your liking?
157c	**THEAETETUS** οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾷ.	**THEAETETUS** I don't know, Socrates. I can't even make out, where you're concerned, whether you're saying these things because you believe them or you're testing me.
	SOCRATES οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ' εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐπᾴδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι [157d] ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα συνεξαγάγω· ἐξαχθέντος δὲ τότ' ἤδη σκέψομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ.	**SOCRATES** You don't remember, my friend, that I don't know anything of this sort and don't claim any of it as my own—I am barren of it. I'm acting as your midwife, and that's why I'm singing incantations and serving up [157d] tastes of each of the wise, until I can help bring your belief out into the light. Once it has been brought out, I'll examine whether it turns out to be a wind-egg or fertile. So take heart and be steadfast, and answer well and bravely whatever appears to you about what I ask.
157d	**THEAETETUS** ἐρώτα δή.	**THEAETETUS** Go ahead and ask.
	SOCRATES λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ ἄρτι διῆμεν.	**SOCRATES** Then tell me again whether you like the view that nothing is, but that good and beautiful and all the things we went through just now are always coming to be.
	THEAETETUS ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω διεξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑπολεπτέον ἥπερ διελήλυθας.	**THEAETETUS** Well, since I've heard you go through it like this, it seems to me amazingly reasonable, and I think it should be accepted as you've set it out.

DREAMS, ILLNESS AND MADNESS

Socrates asks how the theory copes with dreams and madness: the sick and sleeping are different perceivers.

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157e	**SOCRATES** μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλεῖπον αὐτοῦ. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων τῶν τε	**SOCRATES** Then let's not leave out what remains of it. What remains is dreams and illnesses, mad-

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	ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἤ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διῆμεν λόγον, [158a] ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι.	ness in particular, and all the cases of what is called mishearing or misseeing or misperceiving in some other way. You know, I suppose, that in all of these the account we went through just now is by general agreement thought to be refuted, [158a] on the grounds that in them we certainly have false perceptions, and that it's far from true that what appears to each person also is; on the contrary, none of what appears is.
158a	THEAETETUS ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.	THEAETETUS What you say is very true, Socrates.
	SOCRATES τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φαίνεται;	SOCRATES Then what account is left, my boy, for someone who holds that perception is knowledge and that what appears to each person also is, for the person to whom it appears?
	THEAETETUS ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀκνῶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νυνδὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι αὐτό. ἐπεὶ ὡς [158b] ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβητῆσαι ὡς οἱ μαινόμενοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοί τε καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανοῶνται.	THEAETETUS I hesitate to say I don't know what to say, Socrates, because you scolded me just now for saying so. But I really [158b] couldn't dispute that people who are deranged or dreaming judge falsely, when some of them think they are gods and others imagine in their sleep that they have wings and are flying.[18]
158b	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ ὕπαρ;	SOCRATES Then don't you have in mind this other dispute about them either, especially about dreaming and being awake?
	THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον;	THEAETETUS What dispute?
	SOCRATES ὃ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, τί ἄν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδεῖξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρώττομεν, [158c] ἢ ἐγρηγόραμέν τε καὶ ὕπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.	SOCRATES The one I think you've often heard people raise when they ask what proof one could give if someone asked, right now, at the present moment, whether we are asleep and dreaming all our thoughts, [158c] or awake and talking to each other in waking life.
158c	THEAETETUS καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρὴ ἐπιδεῖξαι τεκμηρίῳ· πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἅ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνείρατα δοκῶμεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἄτοπος ἡ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοις.	THEAETETUS Well, Socrates, it's hard to see what proof one should use to show it. Everything corresponds exactly, as if in counterpart. Nothing prevents us from seeming to talk to each other in our sleep too about what we've just been discussing; and when in a dream we seem to be telling dreams, the likeness of the one to the other is uncanny.
	SOCRATES ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν, ὅτε [158d] καὶ πότερόν ἐστιν ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ δὴ ἴσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὃν	SOCRATES So you see that it isn't hard to raise a dispute, when [158d] people even dispute whether it's waking or dreaming. And since the time we spend

18 "Judge" and "judgment" render *doxazein* and *doxa,* often translated "believe" and "opinion"; the Greek covers whatever seems so to someone. This translation uses "judgment" throughout.

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	καθεύδομεν ᾧ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ἀεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἴσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμὲν ὄντα εἶναι, ἴσον δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέροις διισχυριζόμεθα.	asleep is equal to the time we spend awake, in each our soul fights hard for whatever beliefs are present at the time as being true above all, so that for an equal time we say these things are real and for an equal time those, and we insist on each with equal conviction.
158d	**THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου ὅτι οὐχὶ ἴσος;	**SOCRATES** And doesn't the same account hold for illnesses and madness, except that the time isn't equal?
	THEAETETUS ὀρθῶς.	**THEAETETUS** That's right.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁρισθήσεται;	**SOCRATES** Well then, will the truth be determined by length or shortness of time?
158e	**THEAETETUS** γελοῖον μεντἂν εἴη πολλαχῇ.	**THEAETETUS** That would be ridiculous in many ways.
	SOCRATES ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι ὁποῖα τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ;	**SOCRATES** But do you have anything else clear to point to, to show which of these judgments are true?
	THEAETETUS οὔ μοι δοκῶ.	**THEAETETUS** I don't think so.
	SOCRATES ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ ἀεὶ δοκοῦντα ὁριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες· "ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ παντάπασιν, μή πῃ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἕξει τῷ ἑτέρῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸν εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἕτερον."	**SOCRATES** Then listen to me tell you what those who define whatever seems at any time as true for whoever it seems to would say about them. They speak, I think, by asking like this: "Theaetetus, can something that is completely different have the same power in any way as the other thing? And let's not take what we're asking about to be in one way the same and in another way different, but wholly different."
159a	**THEAETETUS** ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταὐτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ὅταν ᾖ κομιδῇ ἕτερον.	**THEAETETUS** Then it's impossible for it to have anything the same, either in power or in anything else, when it's entirely different.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν;	**SOCRATES** Then mustn't we also agree that such a thing is unlike?
	THEAETETUS ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	**THEAETETUS** I think so.
	SOCRATES εἰ ἄρα τι συμβαίνει ὅμοιόν τῳ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταὐτὸν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον;	**SOCRATES** So if anything happens to become like or unlike something, either itself or something else, shall we say that in becoming like it becomes the same, and in becoming unlike, different?
	THEAETETUS ἀνάγκη.	**THEAETETUS** We must.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἴη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δέ γε τὰ πάσχοντα;	

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		SOCRATES Now we were saying earlier that the things that act are many, indeed unlimited, and so are the things that are acted upon?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμειγνύμενον καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα γεννήσει;	**SOCRATES** And also that a thing mixed with one thing and then with another will produce, not the same things, but different ones?
159b	**THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα. πότερον ὅμοιον τοῦτ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν;	**SOCRATES** Then let's now speak of me and you and other things according to the same account: Socrates healthy, and again Socrates sick. Shall we say that the latter is like or unlike the former?
	THEAETETUS ἆρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει;	**THEAETETUS** You mean Socrates sick, this as a whole, compared with that as a whole, Socrates healthy?
	SOCRATES κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.	**SOCRATES** You've taken my point perfectly: that's exactly what I mean.
	THEAETETUS ἀνόμοιον δήπου.	**THEAETETUS** Unlike, surely.
	SOCRATES καὶ ἕτερον ἄρα οὕτως ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον;	**SOCRATES** And so different, just as it is unlike?
	THEAETETUS ἀνάγκη.	**THEAETETUS** Necessarily.
159c	**SOCRATES** καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις;	**SOCRATES** And you'll say the same about Socrates asleep, and in all the states we went through just now?
	THEAETETUS ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** I will.
	SOCRATES ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἑτέρῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἑτέρῳ;	**SOCRATES** Now take each of the things whose nature it is to act on something. When it gets hold of Socrates healthy, won't it treat me as one person, and when it gets hold of Socrates sick, as a different one?
	THEAETETUS τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;	**THEAETETUS** Why wouldn't it?
	SOCRATES καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφ' ἑκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν;	**SOCRATES** And in each case the two of us, I who am acted on and that thing which acts, will generate different things?
	THEAETETUS τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς;	**SOCRATES** Now when I drink wine while I'm healthy, it appears pleasant and sweet to me?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.

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	SOCRATES ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό τε [159d] ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶτταν ἀπηργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώττῃ ἐποίησεν καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** Yes, because on what we agreed earlier, the thing that [159d] acts and the thing acted on have generated sweetness and a perception, both moving at once. The perception, being on the side of what is acted on, has made the tongue perceiving; the sweetness, on the side of the wine and moving about it, has made the wine both be and appear sweet to the healthy tongue.
159d	**THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὡμολόγητο.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, that's certainly how we agreed on the earlier points.
	SOCRATES ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθεν.	**SOCRATES** But when it gets hold of me sick, isn't it the case, first of all, that in truth it hasn't got hold of the same man? It has come upon someone unlike.
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
159e	**SOCRATES** ἕτερα δὴ αὖ ἐγεννησάτην ὅ τε τοιοῦτος Σωκράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἀλλ' αἰσθανόμενον;	**SOCRATES** Then this sort of Socrates and the drinking of the wine have generated different things again: around the tongue, a perception of bitterness; around the wine, a bitterness coming into being and moving. And they've made the wine not bitterness but bitter, and me not perception but perceiving?
	THEAETETUS κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Exactly.
	SOCRATES οὔκουν ἐγώ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις, καὶ ἀλλοῖον [160a] καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλῳ συνελθὸν ταὐτὸν γεννῆσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννῆσαν ἀλλοῖον γενήσεται.	**SOCRATES** So I will never become like this in perceiving anything else; a different object means a different perception, and it makes the perceiver of a different kind [160a] and a different person. Nor will the thing that acts on me ever, by meeting someone else and generating the same thing, become like this itself; by generating something else from someone else, it will become of a different kind.
160a	**THEAETETUS** ἔστι ταῦτα.	**THEAETETUS** That's so.
	SOCRATES οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.	**SOCRATES** Nor again will I become like this for myself, or it become like that for itself.
	THEAETETUS οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** No, they won't.
	SOCRATES ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον, [160b] ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνό τε τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.	**SOCRATES** But when I become perceiving, I must become perceiving of something; to become perceiving, yet perceiving nothing, is [160b] impossible. And the thing, in turn, must become so for someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter or anything of that sort; to become sweet, yet sweet to no one, is impossible.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
160b	**THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES λείπεται δὴ οἶμαι ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ' ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρός τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε 160c αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνει.	**SOCRATES** What's left, I think, is that we are, if we are, or become, if we become, for each other, since necessity binds our being together, but binds it to nothing else, and not to ourselves either. So what's left is that we're bound to each other. Hence if anyone speaks of something as being, he must say it is for someone, or of something, or in relation to something; and the same if he speaks of it as becoming. But that anything is or becomes in and of itself he must neither 160c say himself nor accept when someone else says it, as the account we've gone through indicates.
160c	**THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** Absolutely, Socrates.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοί ἐστιν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δ' οὔ;	**SOCRATES** Then since what acts on me is for me and not for anyone else, am I not also the one who perceives it, and no one else?
	THEAETETUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES ἀληθὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἴσθησις—τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστιν—καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.	**SOCRATES** So my perception is true for me, since it always belongs to my being; and I am the judge, as Protagoras says, of the things that are, for me, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.
	THEAETETUS ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
160d	**SOCRATES** πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀψευδὴς ὢν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην ὥνπερ αἰσθητής;	**SOCRATES** Then if I'm free of falsehood and don't stumble in my thinking about what is or what becomes, how could I fail to have knowledge of the things I perceive?
	THEAETETUS οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὔ.	**THEAETETUS** There's no way you could.
	SOCRATES παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέπτωκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ 160e δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷον νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;	**SOCRATES** So it was a splendid thing you said, that knowledge is nothing other than perception. And it has all come to the same thing: according to Homer and Heraclitus and that whole tribe, everything is in motion like flowing streams; according to Protagoras, wisest of men, a human being is the measure of all things; and according to 160e Theaetetus, given that this is how things are, perception turns out to be knowledge. Isn't that right, Theaetetus? Shall we say this is your newborn child, as it were, and my delivery? Or how would you put it?
160e	**THEAETETUS** οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** It has to be so, Socrates.

MAN IS THE MEASURE

Socrates asks why Protagoras is wiser than a pig or a tadpole, and tests whether seeing is knowing.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ὅτι δή ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, [161a] ἀλλὰ ἀνεμιαῖόν τε καὶ ψεῦδος. ἢ σὺ οἴει πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι, ἢ καὶ ἀνέξῃ ἐλεγχόμενον ὁρῶν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς ἐάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ;	**SOCRATES** Well then, it seems we've managed at last, with difficulty, to give birth to this, whatever it turns out to be. But after the birth we must hold its naming rite and really run around it in a circle, in argument, making sure we don't overlook that what's been born isn't worth rearing, [161a] but an empty wind-egg, a falsehood. Or do you think your child must be reared no matter what, and not exposed? Or will you bear to see it put to the test, and not get terribly angry if someone takes it from you, though it's your first?[19]
161a	**THEODORUS** ἀνέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπὲ ᾗ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;	**THEODORUS** Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates; he's not bad-tempered at all. But for heaven's sake, tell me: in what way is it not so after all?
	SOCRATES φιλόλογός γ' εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἴει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἐξελόντα [161b] ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα· τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀλλ' ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσομαι, οὔ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν.	**SOCRATES** You're a real lover of arguments, Theodorus, and a good fellow, to think I'm some sort of sack of arguments and can easily pull one out [161b] and say that this isn't so after all. You don't notice what's happening: none of the arguments comes from me; they always come from the person I'm talking with. I know nothing more than a little: just enough to take an argument from someone else who is wise and receive it fairly. So now too I'll try to do that with this boy, not to say anything myself.
161b	**THEODORUS** σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποίει οὕτως.	**THEODORUS** That's better put, Socrates. Do it that way.
	SOCRATES οἶσθ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἑταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου;	**SOCRATES** Do you know, then, Theodorus, what surprises me about your friend Protagoras?
161c	**THEODORUS** τὸ ποῖον;	**THEODORUS** What's that?
	SOCRATES τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἴρηκεν, ὡς τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστιν· τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς Ἀληθείας ὅτι "πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὗς" ἢ "κυνοκέφαλος" ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ δ' ἄρα [161d] ἐτύγχανεν ὢν εἰς	**SOCRATES** Most of what he said I like very much, that what seems to each person also is so. But I was surprised by the beginning of his account: that at the opening of his *Truth* he didn't say "a pig is the measure of all things," or "a baboon," or some even stranger creature that has perception. Then he would have begun addressing us in a grand and quite contemptuous style, showing that while we were admiring him like a god for his wis-

19 The Amphidromia ("running around") was a household rite a few days after birth: the baby was carried around the hearth and accepted into the family, and only then named. An unwanted infant might instead be exposed.

GREEK

φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπων. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν, ὦ Θεόδωρε;

161d εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἑτέρου ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ' ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δή ποτε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων 161e διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ' ἐκεῖνον, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἑκάστῳ τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία.

161e τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἑκάστου οὔσας, οὐ μακρὰ 162a μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἡ Ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο;

162a **THEODORUS** ὦ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνήρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ εἶπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην δι' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ' αὖ σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ· πάντως καὶ νυνδὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν.

162b **SOCRATES** ἆρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθών, ὦ Θεόδωρε, πρὸς τὰς παλαίστρας ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνούς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδυόμενος;

THEODORUS ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐᾶν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἕλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν.

SOCRATES ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ 162c ἐχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἰτέον. λέγε δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἆρα οὐ σὺ θαυμάζεις εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσῃ μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὁτουοῦν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἧττόν τι οἴει τὸ

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dom, he 161d was actually no better in understanding than a tadpole, let alone any other human being. Or what should we say, Theodorus?

For if what each person judges through perception is to be true for him, and no one is to discern another's experience better, and no one has more authority to examine another's judgment, whether it's correct or false, but, as has been said many times, each person alone will judge his own things, and these are all correct and true, then why on earth, my friend, was Protagoras wise, so as to be rightly thought fit to teach others 161e for large fees, while we were more ignorant and had to go to school to him, when each of us is himself the measure of his own wisdom? How can we not say that Protagoras is playing to the crowd in saying this? As for me and my art of midwifery, I say nothing of how much ridicule we earn; and so, I think, does the whole business of dialogue.

For to examine and try to refute one another's appearances and judgments, when each person's are correct, isn't that a long 162a and resounding piece of nonsense, if the *Truth* of Protagoras is true, and wasn't joking when it uttered its words from the inner sanctum of his book?

THEODORUS Socrates, the man was my friend, as you said just now. So I wouldn't want Protagoras refuted through my agreeing, nor again to resist you against what I think. So take Theaetetus again. In any case he seemed just now to be following you very nicely.

SOCRATES Theodorus, if you went to Sparta and visited the wrestling grounds, would you think it right to watch others naked, some of them in poor shape, and not strip off beside them and show your own figure in turn?

THEODORUS Why not, if they'd leave it to me and listen to me? Just as now I think I'll persuade you all to let me watch, and not drag me to the gymnasium, stiff as I already am, but to wrestle with the one who's younger and more supple.

SOCRATES Well, Theodorus, if that's dear to you, it's no enemy 162c to me, as the proverb-makers say. So back we must go to wise Theaetetus. Tell me first, Theaetetus, about what we went through just now: aren't you surprised if you're suddenly going

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	Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;	to turn out no worse in wisdom than any human being, or even any god? Or do you think the Protagorean measure applies any less to gods than to human beings?
162c	THEAETETUS μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε· καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾷς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἡνίκα γὰρ διῇμεν ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν [162d] ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τοὐναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.	THEAETETUS By Zeus, I don't. And as for what you're asking, I'm very surprised. When we were going through the way they say that what seems [162d] to each person also is, for the one it seems to, it seemed to me very well said. But now, all of a sudden, it has flipped over to the opposite.
162d	SOCRATES νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθῃ. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἤ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ· "ὦ γενναῖοι παῖδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε συγκαθεζόμενοι, θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, [162e] οὓς ἐγὼ ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῶ, καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοιντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὁτουοῦν· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν λέγετε ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδ' ἑνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίᾳ τε καὶ εἰκόσι [163a] περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένους λόγους."	SOCRATES That's because you're young, my dear boy, and so you're quick to listen to crowd-pleasing speeches and be persuaded. To this Protagoras, or someone else on his behalf, will say: "My fine boys and old men, you sit together making speeches to the crowd, and you drag in the gods, [162e] whom I leave out of my speaking and writing, whether they exist or do not. And you say what the many would be glad to hear: how terrible it would be if each human being were no different in wisdom from any grazing beast. But you state no demonstration or proof whatever; you rely on likelihood. If Theodorus or any other geometer were willing to do geometry relying on that, he wouldn't be worth a thing. So consider, you and Theodorus, whether you'll accept arguments stated with plausible talk and likelihoods [163a] about matters this important."[20]
163a	THEAETETUS ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν.	THEAETETUS But it wouldn't be just, Socrates; neither you nor we would say so.
	SOCRATES ἄλλῃ δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς ὅ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.	SOCRATES Then we must look at it another way, it seems, as your account and Theodorus's say.
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ.	THEAETETUS Yes, another way, by all means.
	SOCRATES τῇδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινεν, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γάρ;	SOCRATES Let's look at it like this, then: whether knowledge and perception are the same or different. That's what our whole argument has been aiming at, I suppose, and it was for its sake that we stirred up all these many strange things. Isn't it?
	THEAETETUS παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	THEAETETUS Absolutely.
163b	SOCRATES ἦ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἃ τῷ ὁρᾶν αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; οἷον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ	SOCRATES Well then, shall we agree that whatever we perceive by seeing or hearing, all of it, we also know at the same time? For example,

20 Protagoras wrote that about the gods he could not know whether they exist or do not.

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	ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἐπίστασθαι εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν διισχυριούμεθα;	before we've learned the language of foreigners, shall we say we don't hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and know what they're saying? And again, when we don't know our letters and look at them, shall we insist that we don't see them, or that we know them, if we see them?
	THEAETETUS αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὁρῶμέν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν 163c ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ἃ δὲ οἵ τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἑρμηνῆς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.	**THEAETETUS** Just that much of them, Socrates, that we see and hear, we'll say we know. In the one case we see and know the shape and the color; in the other we hear and at the same time know the 163c high and low pitch. But what the schoolteachers and interpreters teach about them we neither perceive by seeing or hearing, nor know.
163c	**SOCRATES** ἄριστά γ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει πῇ αὐτὸ διωσόμεθα.	**SOCRATES** Excellent, Theaetetus. It's not worth my disputing that with you, so that you can grow. But look, here's another thing coming at us, and consider how we'll fend it off.
	THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον δή;	**THEAETETUS** What's that?
163d	**SOCRATES** τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔροιτο· "ἆρα δυνατὸν ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σῳζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται;" μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι εἰ μαθών τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδε.	**SOCRATES** This sort of thing. Suppose someone asked: "If a person has once come to know something, and still has the memory of it and keeps it, is it possible that at the moment he remembers it he doesn't know the very thing he remembers?" I'm being long-winded, it seems, when all I want to ask is whether someone who has learned something and remembers it doesn't know it.
	THEAETETUS καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγεις.	**THEAETETUS** How could that be, Socrates? What you're describing would be a monstrosity.
	SOCRATES μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δέ. ἆρα τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἴσθησιν;	**SOCRATES** Am I talking nonsense, then? But consider. Don't you say that seeing is perceiving, and sight is perception?
	THEAETETUS ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** I do.
163e	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν ὁ ἰδών τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν ὃ εἶδεν κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον;	**SOCRATES** Then someone who has seen something has come to know what he saw, according to what we said just now?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;	**SOCRATES** Well? You do say there's such a thing as memory?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;	**SOCRATES** Memory of nothing, or of something?
	THEAETETUS τινὸς δήπου.	**THEAETETUS** Of something, surely.

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	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ᾔσθετο, τοιουτωνί τινων;	**SOCRATES** Of things one has learned and perceived, things of that sort?
	THEAETETUS τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES ὃ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίοτε;	**SOCRATES** And what someone has seen, he sometimes remembers, I suppose?
	THEAETETUS μέμνηται.	**THEAETETUS** He does.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ μύσας; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο;	**SOCRATES** Even with his eyes shut? Or does he forget it when he does that?
	THEAETETUS ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε φάναι.	**THEAETETUS** But that would be a terrible thing to say, Socrates.
164a	**SOCRATES** δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται.	**SOCRATES** Yet we have to say it, if we're going to save the earlier account. If not, it's done for.
	THEAETETUS καὶ ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πῇ.	**THEAETETUS** I suspect so too, by Zeus, but I don't quite grasp it. Tell me how.
	SOCRATES τῇδε· ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου γέγονεν οὗπερ ὁρῶν· ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτὸν ὡμολόγηται.	**SOCRATES** Like this. The one who sees has come to know what he sees, we say; for sight and perception and knowledge have been agreed to be the same.
	THEAETETUS πάνυ γε.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ὁ δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὖ ἑώρα, ἐὰν μύσῃ, μέμνηται μέν, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτό. ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** But the one who has seen and come to know what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it but doesn't see it. Right?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
164b	**SOCRATES** τὸ δέ γε "οὐχ ὁρᾷ" "οὐκ ἐπίσταταί" ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ "ὁρᾷ" "ἐπίσταται."	**SOCRATES** But "doesn't see" is "doesn't know," if "sees" is "knows."
	THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ.	**THEAETETUS** True.
	SOCRATES συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ· ὃ τέρας ἔφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο.	**SOCRATES** So the result is that someone who has come to know something doesn't know it though he still remembers it, since he doesn't see it. And that's what we said would be a monstrosity, if it happened.
	THEAETETUS ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.	**THEAETETUS** What you say is perfectly true.
	SOCRATES τῶν ἀδυνάτων δή τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται ἐάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν φῇ εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** So something impossible evidently follows if one says that knowledge and perception are the same.
	THEAETETUS ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES ἄλλο ἄρα ἑκάτερον φατέον.	

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		SOCRATES Then we must say that each is different.
	THEAETETUS κινδυνεύει.	**THEAETETUS** It looks that way.
164c	**SOCRATES** τί οὖν δῆτ' ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, λεκτέον. καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δρᾶν;	**SOCRATES** Then what could knowledge be? We have to start again from the beginning, it seems. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we about to do?
	THEAETETUS τίνος πέρι;	**THEAETETUS** About what?
	SOCRATES φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην πρὶν νενικηκέναι ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ᾄδειν.	**SOCRATES** We seem to me to be like a cock of poor breeding: we've jumped away from the argument and started crowing before we've won.
	THEAETETUS πῶς δή;	**THEAETETUS** How so?
	SOCRATES ἀντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι 164d εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταὐτὰ ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσιν ποιοῦντες.	**SOCRATES** We seem to have been content, like professional debaters, to reach agreement on the basis of agreements about words, and to have got the better of the argument by some such means. And though we say we're not contestants but philosophers, 164d we don't notice we're doing the same things as those clever fellows.
164d	**THEAETETUS** οὔπω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.	**THEAETETUS** I still don't understand what you mean.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὅ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἠρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον ὁρῶντα δὲ οὔ ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἅμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν.	**SOCRATES** Well, I'll try to make clear what I have in mind about them. We asked whether someone who has learned something and remembers it doesn't know it; and having shown that someone who saw and then shut his eyes remembers but doesn't see, we showed that he doesn't know and at the same time remembers, and that this was impossible. And so the Protagorean tale perished, and yours along with it, the one about knowledge and perception being the same.
164e	**THEAETETUS** φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES οὔ τι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπεν, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὧν Θεόδωρος εἷς ὅδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.	**SOCRATES** Not so, I think, my friend, if the father of the other tale were alive; he'd have done a lot to defend it. As it is, it's an orphan, and we're dragging it through the mud. Not even the guardians Protagoras left behind are willing to help it, and Theodorus here is one of them. Well then, we'll risk helping it ourselves, for justice's sake.
	THEODORUS οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας 165a ὁ Ἱππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος· ἡμεῖς δέ πως θᾶττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι σοὶ ἕξομεν ἐὰν αὐτῷ βοηθῇς.	**THEODORUS** It isn't I, Socrates, but rather Callias 165a son of Hipponicus who is guardian of his affairs. As for me, somehow I turned rather quickly

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		from bare argument to geometry. But we'll be grateful to you if you help it.[21]
165a	**SOCRATES** καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τήν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἄν τις ὁμολογήσειεν μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ᾗ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὅπῃ, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ.	**SOCRATES** Well said, Theodorus. Then look at my help, at any rate. For someone who didn't pay attention to the words, the way we're mostly used to affirming and denying things, might agree to things more terrible than these just now. Shall I tell you how, or Theaetetus?
	THEODORUS εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ νεώτερος· 165b σφαλεὶς γὰρ ἧττον ἀσχημονήσει.	**THEODORUS** Tell us both; but let the younger one answer. 165b If he trips, he'll disgrace himself less.
165b	**SOCRATES** λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα, ἔστι δὲ οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι· "ἆρα οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι;"	**SOCRATES** Then I'll put the most terrible question. It's something like this, I think: "Can the same person, knowing something, not know what he knows?"
	THEODORUS τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε;	**THEODORUS** What shall we answer, then, Theaetetus?
	THEAETETUS ἀδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** That it's impossible, I think.
	SOCRATES οὔκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί γὰρ χρήσῃ ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συσχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνήρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ 165c σοῦ τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ ὁρᾷς τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμένῳ;	**SOCRATES** Not if you hold that seeing is knowing. For what will you do with an inescapable question, trapped in a well, as the saying goes, when some unflappable man covers with his hand 165c one of your eyes and asks whether you see his cloak with the covered one?
165c	**THEAETETUS** οὐ φήσω οἶμαι τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι ἑτέρῳ.	**THEAETETUS** I'll say not with this one, I suppose, but with the other.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα ταὐτόν;	**SOCRATES** Then you see and don't see the same thing at the same time?
	THEAETETUS οὕτω γέ πως.	**THEAETETUS** In a way, yes.
	SOCRATES οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτ' ἠρόμην τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δὲ ὃ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὁρῶν φαίνῃ. ὡμολογηκὼς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι συμβαίνει.	**SOCRATES** "That's not what I'm setting you," he'll say, "and I didn't ask about the how. I asked whether what you know you also don't know. As it is, you're plainly seeing what you don't see. And you happen to have agreed that seeing is knowing, and not seeing not knowing. So work out from this what follows for you."
165d	**THEAETETUS** ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τἀναντία οἷς ὑπεθέμην.	**THEAETETUS** Well, I work out that it's the opposite of what I proposed.
	SOCRATES ἴσως δέ γ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἔπαθες εἴ τίς σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὀξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ	**SOCRATES** And perhaps, my wonderful friend, you'd have suffered more of this sort if someone had gone on to ask you whether it's possible to

21 Callias, the richest man in Athens, was a lavish patron of sophists; Protagoras stays at his house in Plato's *Protagoras*.

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μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἡνίκ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν ἔθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν [165e] ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιεὶς πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν συνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὗ δή σε χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ συνδήσας ἤδη ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὅσων σοί τε κἀκείνῳ ἐδόκει. τίν' οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἂν ἴσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ; ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;

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know sharply and dimly, and to know from close up but not from afar, and to know the same thing intensely and faintly, and countless other things. A light-armed mercenary in arguments would lie in ambush and ask them, once you'd laid it down that knowledge and perception are the same. He'd attack hearing and smelling and other perceptions like these, and keep refuting you, [165e] pressing on and not letting go, until you, lost in wonder at his much-prayed-for wisdom, got your feet tangled up by him; and then, once he'd subdued and tied you up, he'd release you for whatever ransom you and he agreed on. So what argument, you might ask, will Protagoras put forward in support of his own? Shall we try to state it?

165e **THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

THEAETETUS Certainly.

PROTAGORAS ANSWERS BACK

Socrates speaks for Protagoras: the wise man does not make judgments truer, only better.

GREEK

SOCRATES ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ [166a] λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε οἶμαι χωρήσεται καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων· "οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν εἰ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνῆσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησεν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν. τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥᾳθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῇδ' ἔχει· ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δι' ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῇς, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἷάπερ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ [166b] ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἀλλοῖα, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθείς. αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι συγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρεῖναί τῳ ὧν ἔπαθε, τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν πάθος οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.

ENGLISH

SOCRATES Well, he'll say all the things we're saying in his defense, [166a] and he'll come to close quarters, I think, full of contempt for us, and say: This fine Socrates here, when a little boy was asked whether the same person can remember something and at the same time not know it, and got scared, and in his fright said no because he couldn't see ahead, made me a laughingstock in his arguments. But the truth, Socrates, you lazybones, is this. When you examine any of my views by questioning, if the person questioned gives the answers I would give and is tripped up, then I [166b] am refuted; but if he gives different ones, it's the one questioned himself. For instance, do you think anyone will concede to you that a person's memory of what he experienced, when he's no longer experiencing it, is the same sort of experience as he had when he was experiencing it? Far from it.

166b ἢ αὖ ἀποκνήσειν ὁμολογεῖν οἷόν τ' εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἐάνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναί τινα ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τούς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ [166c] ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε," φήσει, "γενναιοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι,

Or again, that he'll shrink from agreeing that the same person can know and not know the same thing? Or, if he's afraid of that, that he'll ever grant that someone who is becoming unlike is the same as he was before becoming unlike? Or rather that there is a "someone" at all, and not "someones," and those becoming infinitely many, if [166c] unlikeness comes about, if we're going to have to guard

GREEK

ENGLISH

ἐξέλεγξον ὡς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται, ἢ ὡς ἰδίων γιγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, εἴη ᾧπερ φαίνεται· ὗς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑηνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου ἀναπείθεις, [166d] οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν.

against each other's hunting for words? No, my blessed friend—he'll say—go at what I actually say in a nobler way, and refute it if you can: show that our perceptions don't come about private to each of us; or that, if they are private, it wouldn't follow any the more that what appears comes to be, or, if we must use the word "is," is, for that person alone to whom it appears. And talking about pigs and baboons, you're not only behaving like a pig yourself, you're persuading your listeners to do the same with my writings, [166d] and that's not well done.

166d ἐγὼ γάρ φημι μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή, μυρίον μέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἄν τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου [166e] δίωκε, ἀλλ' ὧδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω. οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τἀναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται.

For I say the truth is as I've written: each of us is the measure of what is and what is not. But one person differs immensely from another in just this, that to one some things are and appear, and to another other things. And I'm far from saying there's no such thing as wisdom or a wise man. On the contrary, I call wise precisely the person who, when bad things appear and are to one of us, changes him and makes good things appear and be to him. But again, don't go after my account by attacking its wording; [166e] learn more clearly still what I mean, like this. Recall what was said earlier: to someone sick, what he eats appears and is bitter, while to someone healthy it is and appears the opposite.

166e σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ [167a] ποιῆσαι—οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν—οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθὴς ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφὸς ὅτι ἀλλοῖα, μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ἕξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὔ τί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τίς τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ, ταῦτα [167b] δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν.

Now neither of these needs to be [167a] made wiser; that isn't even possible. Nor should one accuse the sick man of being ignorant because he judges things like that, and call the healthy man wise because he judges otherwise. A change must be made to the other condition, since the other state is better. In the same way in education, a change must be made from one state to the better one. But the doctor makes the change with drugs, the sophist with words. For no one ever made someone who judged falsely later judge truly: it isn't possible to judge what is not, or anything other than what one is experiencing, and these [167b] are always true. Rather, I think, when someone with a bad condition of soul judges things akin to it, a good condition makes him judge other things of the corresponding kind. These appearances some people, out of inexperience, call true; I call some better than others, but not at all truer.

167b καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς

And the wise, my dear Socrates, I'm far from calling frogs. Where bodies are concerned I call them doctors, and where plants are concerned, farmers.

GREEK

ENGLISH

ἀντὶ πονηρῶν [167c] αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δέ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἷά γ' ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε [167d] καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν.

For I say that these too, whenever a plant is sick, instill in it, instead of bad [167c] perceptions, good and healthy ones, and true ones too; and that wise and good orators make good things, instead of bad, seem just to their cities. For whatever things seem just and fine to each city are so for it, as long as it holds them to be; but the wise man makes good things, instead of the bad ones they had in each case, be and seem so for them. And by the same account the sophist too, who is able to guide his pupils in this way, is wise [167d] and worth a lot of money to those he has taught.

167d καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἑτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, ἐάντε βούλῃ ἐάντε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρῳ· σῴζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος. ᾧ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτει λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών· εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποίει [167e] μέντοι οὑτωσί· μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν. καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν.

And in this way some are wiser than others, and no one judges falsely; and you, whether you like it or not, must put up with being a measure. For this account is saved by these points. If you can dispute it from the start, dispute it by setting out an argument against it; if you'd rather do it through questions, then through questions. That's not something to avoid either; it's what a person of sense should pursue above all. But do [167e] it this way: don't do wrong in your questioning. It makes very little sense for someone who claims to care about excellence to do nothing but go on doing wrong in arguments.

167e ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύμενος [168a] τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω ποιῇς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὑτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἵν' ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἵ πρότερον ἦσαν· ἐὰν δὲ τἀναντία τούτων δρᾷς ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τἀναντία συμβήσεταί σοι καὶ τοὺς συνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων [168b] μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποφανεῖς ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται.

Doing wrong, in this sort of thing, is when someone doesn't keep separate the time he spends competing from the time he spends in dialogue: in the one playing games and tripping people up as much as he can, but in dialogue being serious and setting his partner straight, pointing out to him only those [168a] errors he had been led into by himself and by his earlier company. If you do it this way, those who spend time with you will blame themselves, not you, for their confusion and perplexity; they'll pursue you and love you, and hate themselves and flee from themselves into philosophy, so as to become different people and be rid of who they were before. But if you do the opposite of this, as most people do, the opposite will happen to you: you'll turn your companions, instead of into philosophers, [168b] into people who hate this pursuit, once they grow older.

168b ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρήθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς ἀλλ' ἵλεῳ τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεὶς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψῃ τί ποτε λέγομεν, κινεῖσθαί τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα, τό τε δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι ἰδιώτῃ τε καὶ πόλει. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψῃ εἴτε ταὐτὸν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ

So if you take my advice, as was said before as well, you'll sit down with a gracious mind, not in a hostile or combative spirit, and really examine what we mean when we declare that everything is in motion and that what seems to each, individual or city, also is. And from there you'll consider

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐκ συνηθείας [168c] ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν ἕλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχουσι." ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἑταίρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσηρξάμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς ἔζη, μεγαλειότερον ἂν τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.	whether knowledge and perception are the same or different, and not, as just now, from the habitual use [168c] of words and names, which most people drag around any way they happen to, causing each other every kind of perplexity. That, Theodorus, is the help I've made a start at giving your friend, to the best of my ability, small help from small resources. If he were alive himself, he would have helped his own more grandly.
168c	**THEODORUS** παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.	**THEODORUS** You're joking, Socrates. You've come to the man's aid with real youthful vigor.
	SOCRATES εὖ λέγεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε. καί μοι εἰπέ· ἐνενόησάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος ἡμῖν ὅτι [168d] πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζοίμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριεντισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον;	**SOCRATES** Kind of you, my friend. Now tell me: did you notice just now how Protagoras was speaking and reproaching us because, [168d] carrying on our arguments with a child, we used the boy's fear to fight against his views? And how he called it a piece of frivolity, and, making much of his measure of all things, urged us to be serious about his account?
168d	**THEODORUS** πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**THEODORUS** Of course I noticed, Socrates.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;	**SOCRATES** Well then? Do you tell me to obey him?
	THEODORUS σφόδρα γε.	**THEODORUS** Very much so.
	SOCRATES ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ [168e] ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτό γε ἔχῃ ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον.	**SOCRATES** You see, then, that everyone here except you is a child. So if we're going to obey the man, you and I must question and [168e] answer each other and be serious about his account, so that he can't at least charge us with examining his account while playing around with youngsters.
168e	**THEODORUS** τί δ'; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πώγωνας ἐχόντων ἄμεινον ἂν ἑπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνωμένῳ;	**THEODORUS** What? Wouldn't Theaetetus follow an argument under investigation better than lots of men with long beards?
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὔ τι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἷου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ [169a] ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἴς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τἆλλα ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν.	**SOCRATES** But not better than you, Theodorus. So don't think that I must, in every possible way, [169a] defend your dead friend, and you in no way at all. Come on, my good man, follow along a little, just until we find out whether you have to be the measure where diagrams are concerned, or whether everyone is as competent in their own eyes as you are in astronomy and the other subjects in which you're reputed to excel.
169a	**THEODORUS** οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ μοι	**THEODORUS** It isn't easy, Socrates, to sit beside you and not give an account. I was talking nonsense just now when I said you'd let me keep my clothes on, and wouldn't compel me the way the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον [169b] τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖόν τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἂν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.	Spartans do. You seem to me, rather, to be going the way of Sciron. [169b] The Spartans tell you to leave or strip, but you seem to me to be playing more the part of Antaeus: you don't let anyone who comes near go until you've stripped him and forced him to wrestle in arguments.[22]
169b	**SOCRATES** ἄριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπῄκασας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυχόντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὖ συγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι· [169c] οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνῆσαι.	**SOCRATES** You've pictured my sickness very well, Theodorus. But I'm tougher than they were. Countless Heracleses and Theseuses, mighty at argument, have met me and given me a thorough beating, but I don't hold back any the more; [169c] so terrible a passion for exercise in these things has got into me. So don't you begrudge me a bout either, and benefit yourself and me at the same time.
169c	**THEODORUS** οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε ὅπῃ 'θέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἱμαρμένην ἣν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς δεῖ ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὧν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι.	**THEODORUS** I won't argue any more. Lead on wherever you like. Whatever fate you spin for me in these matters, I must endure being refuted. But I won't be able to put myself at your disposal beyond what you propose.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καί μοι πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή που παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων [169d] ποιούμενοι, καί τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ὀνειδίσῃ.	**SOCRATES** That far is enough. And watch out especially for this: that we don't slip into some childish kind of argument without noticing, [169d] and someone reproach us for it again.
169d	**THEODORUS** ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνωμαι.	**THEODORUS** Well, I'll try, as far as I can.

IS EVERY JUDGMENT TRUE?

If every judgment is true, so is the judgment that Protagoras is wrong, and his theory undermines itself.

GREEK	ENGLISH
SOCRATES τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβώμεθα οὗπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν συνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας περί τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί;	**SOCRATES** Then let's first get hold again of the same point as before, and see whether we were right or wrong to be dissatisfied when we criticized the account for making each person self-sufficient in understanding, and Protagoras conceded to us that some people are superior when it comes to the better and the worse, and that these are in fact the wise. Weren't we?
THEODORUS ναί.	**THEODORUS** Yes.
SOCRATES εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὡμολόγει ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡμεῖς [169e] βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι· νῦν δὲ τάχ' ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου	**SOCRATES** Now if he himself were here agreeing to it, and it weren't we [169e] who conceded it in helping him, there'd be no need to take it up again and confirm it. But as it is, someone might well rule

22 Sciron and Antaeus were mythical villains: Sciron kicked travelers off a cliff, and Antaeus made passers-by wrestle him to the death. Theseus killed Sciron, and Heracles Antaeus.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.	that we have no authority to agree on his behalf. So it's better to come to a clearer agreement on this very point; it makes no small difference whether it's so or otherwise.
169e	**THEODORUS** λέγεις ἀληθῆ.	**THEODORUS** That's true.
	SOCRATES μὴ τοίνυν δι' ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ὡς [170a] διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν.	**SOCRATES** Then let's get the agreement not through others but from his own statement, [170a] as briefly as possible.
170a	**THEODORUS** πῶς;	**THEODORUS** How?
	SOCRATES οὑτωσί· τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ;	**SOCRATES** Like this. He says, doesn't he, that what seems to each person also is, for the one it seems to?
	THEODORUS φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.	**THEODORUS** Yes, he does.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμὲν οὐδένα ὅντινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὑτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτῆρας σφῶν [170b] προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι· καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τἀνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὖ ἱκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἱκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν;	**SOCRATES** Well then, Protagoras, we too are stating the judgments of a human being, or rather of all human beings, when we say that there is no one who doesn't consider himself wiser than others in some things, and others wiser than himself in other things. In the greatest dangers, at any rate, when they're in trouble on campaign, or in sickness, or in a storm at sea, people treat those in charge in each case like gods, expecting them to be their saviors, [170b] though they're superior in nothing else but knowing. And all of human life, I suppose, is full of people looking for teachers and rulers for themselves, for other living things, and for their work, and of people who think themselves competent to teach and competent to rule. In all these cases, what else shall we say but that human beings themselves consider that wisdom and ignorance exist among them?
170b	**THEODORUS** οὐδὲν ἄλλο.	**THEODORUS** Nothing else.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;	**SOCRATES** And they consider wisdom to be true thinking, and ignorance false judgment?
170c	**THEODORUS** τί μήν;	**THEODORUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ; πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ τοτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, τοτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που συμβαίνει μὴ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλ' ἀμφότερα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἑτέρου ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.	**SOCRATES** Then what are we to make of the account, Protagoras? Shall we say that human beings always judge truly, or sometimes truly and sometimes falsely? Either way, it turns out that they don't always judge truly, but both truly and falsely. Consider, Theodorus: would any of Protagoras's followers, or you yourself, be willing to fight it out

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		that no one thinks anyone else is ignorant and judges falsely?
	THEODORUS ἀλλ᾽ ἄπιστον, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEODORUS** No, Socrates, that's beyond belief.
170d	**SOCRATES** καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἥκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον λέγων.	**SOCRATES** And yet that's the necessity the account comes to, the one that says a human being is the measure of all things.
	THEODORUS πῶς δή;	**THEODORUS** How so?
	SOCRATES ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρός με ἀποφαίνῃ περί τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστιν κριταῖς γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀεὶ σὲ κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἢ μυρίοι ἑκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** When you've decided something in your own mind and declare to me your judgment about it, let that be true for you, according to his account. But are the rest of us not allowed to act as judges of your decision? Or do we always decide that you judge truly? Or do countless people, every time, fight you with contrary judgments, holding that your decisions and beliefs are false?
170e	**THEODORUS** νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἵ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν.	**THEODORUS** By Zeus, Socrates, "countless thousands" indeed, as Homer says, and they give me all the trouble that people can.[23]
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;	**SOCRATES** Well then? Do you want us to say that you then judge truly for yourself, but falsely for the countless others?
	THEODORUS ἔοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.	**THEODORUS** It seems it has to be so, on the account at any rate.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ; ἆρ᾽ οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾤετο μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν [171a] ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.	**SOCRATES** And what about Protagoras himself? Isn't it necessary that, if neither he himself believed that a human being is the measure, nor did the many, as indeed they don't, then this truth [171a] he wrote is true for no one? And if he believed it, but the majority don't share his belief, you know that, to begin with, it is not more than it is, by as much as those it doesn't seem so to outnumber those it does.
171a	**THEODORUS** ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ᾽ ἑκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.	**THEODORUS** Necessarily, if it's going to be and not be according to each judgment.
	SOCRATES ἔπειτά γε τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει κομψότατον· ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ᾗ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας.	**SOCRATES** Next, it has this most exquisite feature. He, for his part, concedes about his own belief that the belief of those who judge the contrary, by which they consider him mistaken, is true, I suppose, since he agrees that everyone judges things that are.
	THEODORUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEODORUS** Certainly.

23 An echo of Homer's *Odyssey*, where the phrase describes a crowd of enemies.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
171b	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** Then he'd be conceding that his own belief is false, if he agrees that the belief of those who think he's mistaken is true?
	THEODORUS ἀνάγκη.	**THEODORUS** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES οἱ δέ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς ψεύδεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** But the others don't concede that they themselves are mistaken?
	THEODORUS οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**THEODORUS** No, they don't.
	SOCRATES ὁ δέ γ' αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὧν γέγραφεν.	**SOCRATES** And he, in turn, agrees that this judgment of theirs is true too, from what he has written.
	THEODORUS φαίνεται.	**THEODORUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES ἐξ ἁπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τἀναντία λέγοντι συγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, [171c] τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς οὗ ἂν μὴ μάθῃ. οὐχ οὕτως;	**SOCRATES** So it will be disputed by everyone, starting from Protagoras; or rather, he'll agree to it: when he concedes that the person saying the opposite judges truly, [171c] then Protagoras himself will concede that neither a dog nor any chance human being is the measure of even one thing he hasn't learned. Isn't that so?
171c	**THEODORUS** οὕτως.	**THEODORUS** It is.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου Ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὔτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.	**SOCRATES** Then since it's disputed by everyone, Protagoras's *Truth* would be true for no one, neither for anyone else nor for him himself.
	THEODORUS ἄγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἑταῖρόν μου καταθέομεν.	**THEODORUS** We're running my friend down too hard, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἀλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σοφώτερον [171d] ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη οἷμαι χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὁποῖοί τινές ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὀντινοῦν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;	**SOCRATES** Yet it isn't clear, my friend, that we aren't also running past what is right. Of course it's likely that he, being older, is wiser [171d] than we are. And if he were to pop his head up out of the ground right here, as far as the neck, he'd very likely convict me many times over of talking nonsense, and you of agreeing, and then sink down again and be off at a run. But we, I think, have to make do with ourselves as we are, and always say what seems so to us. And so now too, shall we say that anyone at all would agree at least to this: that one person is wiser than another, and also more ignorant?
171d	**THEODORUS** ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.	**THEODORUS** It seems so to me, at any rate.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ᾗ [171e] ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἃ δοκεῖ, ταύτῃ καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά,	**SOCRATES** And that the account would stand firmest in the way [171e] we sketched in helping Protagoras: that most things are, for each person, the

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γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ που ἔν τισι συγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον, καὶ θηρίον δέ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, εἴπερ που;

way they seem, hot, dry, sweet, everything of that type. But if he'll grant anywhere that one person is superior to another, he'd be willing to say it's about what is healthy and diseased: that not every woman and child, or animal either, is capable of healing itself by knowing what's healthy for it; here, rather, one person is superior to another, if anywhere?

171e **THEODORUS** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

THEODORUS That seems right to me.

172a **SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα αὑτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ που, αὖ ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλόν τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε [172b] φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὑτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὗ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε, ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον.

SOCRATES And in political matters too, fine and shameful, just and unjust, pious and not, whatever each city thinks and lays down as lawful for itself also is so in truth for each; and in these matters no individual is any wiser than another, and no city than another. But in laying down what is or isn't advantageous for itself, there, if anywhere, he'll agree in turn that one counselor is superior to another, and one city's judgment to another's, with respect to truth. And he would hardly dare [172b] to say that whatever a city lays down, thinking it advantageous for itself, will certainly turn out to its advantage. But in the area I'm speaking of, in just and unjust, pious and impious, people are willing to insist that none of these has by nature a being of its own, but that what seems so to people in common becomes true at the time it seems so, and for as long as it seems so.

172b καὶ ὅσοι γε ἂν μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγωσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι. λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος [172c] καταλαμβάνει.

And all those who don't state Protagoras's account in full conduct their wisdom somewhat like this. But, Theodorus, one argument after another, each larger than the last, is [172c] overtaking us.

172c **THEODORUS** οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

THEODORUS Well, don't we have leisure, Socrates?

THE DIGRESSION: THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE ORATOR

Socrates contrasts the courtroom speaker, a slave to the clock, with the free but awkward philosopher.

GREEK

ENGLISH

SOCRATES φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μέν γε δή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες.

SOCRATES Apparently. And often, my remarkable friend, I've noticed before, and I notice now too, how natural it is that those who have spent a long time in philosophy look ridiculous as speakers when they go into the law courts.

THEODORUS πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις;

THEODORUS What do you mean?

SOCRATES κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ

SOCRATES It's likely that those who've been knocking about in law courts and such places

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καὶ τῇ [172d] τοιᾷδε διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.

172d **THEODORUS** πῇ δή;

SOCRATES ἦι τοῖς μὲν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες ἀεὶ πάρεστι, σχολή, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται· ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κἀκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἀρέσῃ· καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος· οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ [172e] τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι—κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον—καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκομένην ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρί τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς [173a] ὁ δρόμος· ὥστ' ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ ἔργῳ ὑπελθεῖν, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς.

173a τὴν γὰρ αὖξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλευθέριον ἡ ἐκ νέων δουλεία ἀφῄρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἁπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι [173b] πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται, ὥσθ' ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὦ Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώμεθα, ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα;

173b **THEODORUS** μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες. πάνυ [173c] γὰρ εὖ τοῦτο εἴρηκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ

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since they were young have been brought up, compared with those raised in philosophy and in [172d] this kind of pursuit, like household slaves compared with free men.

THEODORUS In what way?

SOCRATES In that the one sort always has what you mentioned, leisure, and they carry on their discussions in peace and at leisure. Just as we are now taking up a third argument, one after another, so do they, if the newcomer pleases them more than the one in hand, as it did us. And they don't care whether they speak at length or briefly, if only they hit upon what is. But the others always speak with no leisure [172e] (the flowing water hurries them on), and they aren't free to make their speeches about whatever they want. The opposing party stands over them wielding compulsion, with the written charge read out alongside, beyond which nothing may be said: what they call the sworn statement. Their speeches are always about a fellow slave, addressed to a master who sits there with the case in his hand; and the contests are never about some other matter, but always about the speaker's own case, and often the race is run [173a] for his very life. As a result of all this they become tense and sharp, knowing how to flatter their master in words and fawn on him in deeds; but they're small and crooked in their souls.[24]

For their slavery from youth has robbed them of growth and straightness and freedom, forcing them to do crooked things and loading great dangers and fears on souls still tender. Unable to bear these with justice and truth, they turn straight to lies and to wronging each other in return, [173b] and they're bent and broken in many ways, so that they pass from youths to men with nothing healthy in their thinking, having become clever and wise, so they think. That's what these people are like, Theodorus. As for those of our own chorus, do you want us to describe them, or leave them and turn back to the argument, so that we don't, as we were saying just now, abuse our freedom to change from argument to argument too much?

THEODORUS Not at all, Socrates; describe them. You put it very [173c] well, that we who dance in this

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τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι ἡμέτεροι ὥσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικαστὴς οὔτε θεατὴς ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.

kind of chorus are not servants of our arguments; the arguments are ours, like household slaves, and each of them waits to be finished whenever we see fit. There's no juror over us, and no spectator, as with poets, to criticize us and give orders.

173c **SOCRATES** λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἄν τις τούς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς [173d] ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἤ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι· σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τις γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἤ τί τῳ κακόν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι [173e] χόες.

SOCRATES Let's talk, then, since that's what you want, about the leaders of the chorus; for why would anyone talk about those who spend their time in philosophy in a paltry way? These people, I suppose, from their youth first of all don't know the way to the [173d] marketplace, or where the law court is, or the council chamber, or any other public meeting place of the city. Laws and decrees, spoken or written, they neither see nor hear. The eager efforts of political clubs to win office, their meetings and dinners and revels with flute-girls: it doesn't occur to them to take part in these even in a dream. Whether someone in the city is of good or bad birth, or what flaw has come down to someone from his ancestors, on the men's side or the women's, he knows no more than, as the saying goes, he knows how many [173e] pints there are in the sea.

173e καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ πέτεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον "τᾶς τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε" καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, "οὐρανοῦ θ' ὕπερ" ἀστρονομοῦσα, [174a] καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα.

And he doesn't even know that he doesn't know all this. For he doesn't keep away from it to win a good reputation; in reality only his body is situated and resides in the city, while his mind, having judged all these things petty and worthless, disdains them and flies everywhere, as Pindar says, "beneath the earth," measuring its surfaces, and "above the heaven," studying the stars, [174a] and searching out every nature of each of the things that are, each as a whole, never lowering itself to anything close at hand.[25]

174a **THEODORUS** πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

THEODORUS What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES ὥσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θρᾷττά τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν. ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας [174b] ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὅτι πράττει, ἀλλ' ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα· τί δέ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει

SOCRATES Just as Thales, Theodorus, while studying the stars and looking upward, fell into a well, and a witty and charming Thracian servant girl is said to have joked that he was eager to know what was in the heavens, but didn't notice what was in front of him and at his feet. The same joke fits everyone [174b] who spends his life in philosophy. For really, such a person fails to notice his neighbor, the man next door: not only what he's doing, but almost whether he's a human being or some

24 Speeches in Athenian courts were timed by a water clock.
25 Pindar, the lyric poet of the fifth century BC; the words come from a lost poem.

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διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε· ἢ οὔ;

174b **THEODORUS** ἔγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

SOCRATES τοιγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἰδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος [174c] ἑκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἤ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θρᾴτταις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη· ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν, ἄτ' οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι· ἀπορῶν [174d] οὖν γελοῖος φαίνεται. ἔν τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις οὐ προσποιήτως ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν ἔνδηλος γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι.

174d τύραννόν τε γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον, ἕνα τῶν νομέων, οἷον συβώτην ἢ ποιμένα ἤ τινα βουκόλον, ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα· δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῷον καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς, ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἧττον τῶν [174e] νομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν.

174e τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὁρώντων ἡγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ [175a] ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἑκάστῳ γεγόνασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλῆς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολλάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὁτῳοῦν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι

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other creature. But what a human being is, and what it befits such a nature to do or undergo differently from the others, that he searches for and takes pains to investigate. You understand, Theodorus, don't you?[26]

THEODORUS I do. And what you say is true.

SOCRATES That's why, my friend, when such a person deals [174c] with anyone, privately or in public, as I was saying at the start, whenever he's forced in a law court or anywhere else to talk about what's at his feet and before his eyes, he gives a laugh not only to Thracian girls but to the rest of the crowd too, falling into wells and every kind of perplexity through inexperience. His awkwardness is dreadful, and gives an impression of stupidity. In exchanges of abuse he has nothing of his own to abuse anyone with, since he knows nothing bad about anyone, never having made a study of it. So, at a loss, [174d] he looks ridiculous. And at people's praises and the boasting of others he is plainly laughing, not pretending but really, and so he seems a fool.

For when a tyrant or king is being eulogized, he thinks he's hearing one of the herdsmen, a swineherd, say, or a shepherd or cowherd, being congratulated for getting a lot of milk; only he considers that they tend and milk an animal more ill-tempered and treacherous than those do, and that such a man is bound to become no less boorish and uneducated than the [174e] herdsmen, for lack of leisure, with his city wall thrown around him like a sheepfold in the hills. And when he hears that someone owns ten thousand plethra of land or more, and so possesses an amazing amount, it seems a tiny amount to him, used as he is to looking at the whole earth.[27]

And when people sing the praises of family lines, that someone is noble because he can point to seven wealthy grandfathers, he thinks the praise comes from people with altogether dull vision, who look at something small, who [175a] through lack of education can't keep their eyes on the whole, or work out that everyone has had countless tens of thousands of grandfathers and ancest-

26 Thales of Miletus (sixth century BC) was traditionally counted the first Greek philosopher and was famed for his astronomy.
27 The plethron was a Greek measure of about 100 feet, or, for land, about a quarter of an acre; the stadion, which appears later, was six plethra, about 600 feet.

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καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι [175b] δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν οἷα συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν.

175b ἐν ἅπασι δὴ τούτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾶται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ἀπορῶν.

THEODORUS παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

SOCRATES ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ [175c] ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ "τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ"; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ "εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων," "κεκτημένος τ' αὖ χρυσίον," βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίω τέ τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν—περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ὅταν αὖ δέῃ λόγον [175d] διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν· εἰλιγγιῶν τε ἀπὸ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βατταρίζων γέλωτα Θρᾴτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ' ἄλλῳ ἀπαιδεύτῳ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσι πᾶσιν.

175d οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὁ [175e] μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ᾧ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδῦναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους· ὁ δ' αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια ἐλευθερίως

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ors, among whom rich and poor, kings and slaves, foreigners and Greeks have often come by the tens of thousands, for anyone at all. And when people pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors and trace their line back to Heracles son of Amphitryon, the pettiness of it strikes him as absurd; and that [175b] the twenty-fifth ancestor going up from Amphitryon was whatever sort of man fortune happened to make him, and the fiftieth from him too, this he laughs at, since they can't do the reckoning and rid their foolish souls of vanity.[28]

In all these things such a person is laughed at by the many, partly because he seems arrogant, partly because he's ignorant of what's at his feet and at a loss in every situation.

THEODORUS You describe exactly what happens, Socrates.

SOCRATES But when he himself, my friend, draws someone upward, and [175c] the other is willing to step out of "What wrong am I doing you, or you me?" into an examination of justice and injustice themselves, what each of them is, and how they differ from everything else and from each other; or out of "whether a king is happy," or "a man who has gold in store," into an examination of kingship, and of human happiness and misery in general, what sort of things they are, and in what way it befits human nature to gain the one and escape the other: when that small-souled, sharp, litigious fellow has to [175d] give an account of all these things, he pays it back in reverse. Dizzy from hanging so high, gazing down from mid-air, unused to it, distressed and at a loss and stammering, he gives a laugh, not to Thracian girls or any other uneducated person, since they don't perceive it, but to everyone who has been brought up the opposite way from slaves.

That, Theodorus, is the character of each. The one, [175e] truly brought up in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher, can't be blamed for seeming simple and a nobody when he runs into slavish chores: if, say, he doesn't know how to pack up bedding, or to season a dish or a flattering speech. The other can do all such services smartly and sharply, but doesn't know how to throw his cloak over his right shoulder like a free man, or to take

28 Amphitryon was Heracles' mortal father (Zeus his divine one); many noble families claimed descent from Heracles.

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οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων [176a] λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.

176a **THEODORUS** εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ' ἀνθρώπους εἴη.

SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε— ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη —οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε [176b] ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὔ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν.

176b θεὸς οὐδαμῇ [176c] οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. περὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαι ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις [176d] βάναυσοι. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἄριστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι· ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ ὀνείδει καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λῆροί εἰσι, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ' ἄνδρες οἵους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους.

176d λεκτέον οὖν τἀληθές, ὅτι τοσούτῳ μᾶλλόν εἰσιν οἷοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἴονται· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσιν, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν [176e] οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν.

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up the harmony of words [176a] and rightly hymn the true life of gods and happy men.[29]

THEODORUS If you could persuade everyone of what you say as you persuade me, Socrates, there would be more peace and fewer evils among human beings.

SOCRATES But it isn't possible for bad things to be done away with, Theodorus—there must always be something opposed to the good—nor for them to have their seat among the gods. Of necessity they haunt mortal nature and this region here. That is why we should try to flee from here [176b] to there as quickly as we can. And fleeing means becoming like god so far as possible; and becoming like god means becoming just and holy, with understanding. But really, my excellent friend, it isn't at all easy to persuade people that the reasons most of them give for fleeing wickedness and pursuing excellence are not the reasons for practicing the one and not the other. They say it's so as not to seem bad and to seem good. That, as it seems to me, is what's called an old wives' tale. Let's put the truth like this.

God is in no way [176c] and by no means unjust, but as just as it is possible to be, and nothing is more like him than whichever of us becomes as just as he can. It is here that a man's true cleverness is to be found—and his worthlessness and cowardice too. For knowing this is wisdom and true excellence, and not knowing it is plain ignorance and badness. All the other things that pass for cleverness and wisdom are vulgar when they turn up in political power, and in the crafts, [176d] mere drudgery. So when someone does wrong and says or does unholy things, much the best course is not to concede that he's clever because he's unscrupulous. Such people glory in the reproach: they think they're being told they aren't fools, "useless burdens on the earth," but the kind of men a city needs if they're to come through safely.[30]

So we must tell them the truth: they are all the more what they don't think they are because they don't think it. They don't know the penalty for injustice, which is the last thing anyone should be ignorant of. It isn't what they suppose—beatings

29 Wearing one's cloak draped neatly over the right shoulder was a mark of a well-bred man.
30 The phrase "burdens on the earth" echoes Homer (*Iliad* 18.104).

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		and executions, which people sometimes suffer [176e] without doing any wrong at all—but a penalty there is no escaping.
176e	THEODORUS τίνα δὴ λέγεις;	THEODORUS What penalty do you mean?
	SOCRATES παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης [177a] ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. οὗ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοιοῦνται· ἐὰν δ' εἴπωμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.	SOCRATES There are two patterns, my friend, set up in reality: one divine and supremely happy, the other godless and supremely wretched. Not seeing that this is so, in their foolishness and utter [177a] senselessness they fail to notice that by their unjust actions they are growing like the one and unlike the other. They pay the penalty for this by living the life that matches the pattern they resemble. And if we tell them that unless they get rid of their cleverness, then when they die that place that is pure of evils will not receive them, but here on earth they will always have the kind of life that resembles them, bad men keeping company with bad—why then, being so clever and unscrupulous, they'll listen to all this as the talk of fools.
177a	THEODORUS καὶ μάλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες.	THEODORUS Very much so, Socrates.
177b	SOCRATES οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἓν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν· ὅταν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέῃ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φυγεῖν, τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν—εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω [177c] ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον—ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἴωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.	SOCRATES I know it, my friend. But there's one thing that does happen to them. When they have to give and receive an account in private about the things they disparage, and are willing to stand their ground like men for a good long while and not run away like cowards, then, strangely enough, my remarkable friend, in the end they aren't satisfied with what they themselves are saying. That rhetoric of theirs somehow withers away, so that they seem no different from children. But let's leave these matters, since they are really a digression—otherwise more and more [177c] will keep pouring in and bury our original argument—and let's go back to what we were discussing before, if you agree.
177c	THEODORUS ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν· ῥᾴω γὰρ τηλικῷδε ὄντι ἐπακολουθεῖν. εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν.	THEODORUS For my part, Socrates, things like this are no less pleasant to listen to; at my age they're easier to follow. Still, if you think best, let's go back.

JUDGING THE FUTURE

Socrates argues that about what will benefit us in the future, experts judge better than laymen.

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	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διισχυρίζεσθαι καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς [177d] παντὸς μᾶλλον ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τἀγαθὰ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἃ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμμ' ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχί;	**SOCRATES** Well then, we were at about this point in the argument. We were saying that those who claim that being is in motion, and that whatever seems to each person at any time also is so for the one it seems to, are willing to insist on this in other matters, and not least about what is just: [177d] that whatever a city decides seems just to it and lays down, this really is just for the city that laid it down, for as long as it stays laid down. But about good things, we said, no one is any longer brave enough to dare to fight it out and claim that whatever a city lays down thinking it beneficial to itself really is beneficial, for as long as it stays laid down—unless he meant the name; and that, surely, would make a mockery of what we're talking about. Isn't that so?
177d	**THEODORUS** πάνυ γε.	**THEODORUS** Certainly.
177e	**SOCRATES** μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρείτω.	**SOCRATES** Right—he mustn't speak of the name, but consider the thing that is named.
	THEODORUS μὴ γάρ.	**THEODORUS** No, he mustn't.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζῃ, τούτου δήπου στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἵεταί τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὠφελιμωτάτους ἑαυτῇ τίθεται· ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται;	**SOCRATES** But whatever the city calls it, that is surely what it aims at when it legislates, and it makes all its laws, so far as it believes and is able, as beneficial to itself as possible. Or does it legislate with an eye to something else?
178a	**THEODORUS** οὐδαμῶς.	**THEODORUS** Not at all.
	SOCRATES ἦ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἀεί, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἑκάστη;	**SOCRATES** Then does every city always hit the mark, or does it often miss as well?
	THEODORUS οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν.	**THEODORUS** I think they miss as well.
	SOCRATES ἔτι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειεν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἴδους ἐρωτῷη ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν· ἔστι δέ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετώμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ "μέλλον" ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν.	**SOCRATES** Well, everyone would be still more ready to agree to these same points if the question were asked about the whole class to which the beneficial belongs. And that, I take it, has to do with the time to come as well. When we legislate, we lay down laws on the understanding that they will be beneficial in the time that follows—and this we would rightly call "the future."
178b	**THEODORUS** πάνυ γε.	**THEODORUS** Certainly.

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SOCRATES ἴθι δή, οὑτωσὶ ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων· "πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν," ὡς φατέ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν βαρέων κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων· ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτω;

SOCRATES Come on, then, let's put our question to Protagoras, or to anyone else who says the same as he does, like this. "A human being is the measure of all things," as you people say, Protagoras—of white things, heavy things, light things, of every such thing without exception. For he has the standard for judging them within himself, and when he thinks they are the way he experiences them, he thinks what is true for him, and what is. Isn't that it?

THEODORUS οὕτω.

THEODORUS It is.

SOCRATES ἦ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, [178c] ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ οἷα ἂν οἰηθῇ ἔσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι; οἷον θερμή· ἆρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα;

SOCRATES "And does he also have within himself the standard for the things that are going to be, Protagoras," we'll say, [178c] "so that whatever he thinks will be actually comes about for the one who thought it? Take heat. When a layman thinks he's going to catch a fever and that his temperature will go up, and someone else, a doctor, thinks the opposite, whose judgment shall we say the future will bear out? Or will it bear out both, so that for the doctor the man won't become hot or feverish, but for himself he'll be both?"

178c **THEODORUS** γελοῖον μεντἂν εἴη.

THEODORUS That would be ridiculous.

SOCRATES ἀλλ' οἶμαι περὶ οἴνου γλυκύτητος καὶ αὐστηρότητος [178d] μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ κυρία.

SOCRATES Rather, I imagine, when it's a question of whether a wine is going to be sweet or dry, [178d] it's the farmer's judgment that carries authority, not the lyre player's.

178d **THEODORUS** τί μήν;

THEODORUS Of course.

SOCRATES οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρμόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσειεν μουσικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.

SOCRATES Nor, again, when it's a question of what will be out of tune or in tune, would a gymnastics trainer judge better than a musician what will later seem in tune even to the trainer himself.

THEODORUS οὐδαμῶς.

THEODORUS Not at all.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑστιάσεσθαι μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ [178e] ἤδη ὄντος ἑκάστῳ ἡδέος ἢ γεγονότος μηδέν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἄριστος κριτής, ἢ σύ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὁστισοῦν;

SOCRATES And when a feast is being prepared, the verdict of the man who is going to dine, if he knows nothing of cooking, carries less authority than the chef's about the pleasure it will give. Let's not yet fight it out about what is already [178e] pleasant to each person, or has been. The question is about what is going to seem and to be for each person in the future: is each of us the best judge of that for himself? Or would you, Protagoras—at least about what arguments will be persuasive to

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		each of us in a law court—judge beforehand better than any layman you like?
178e	**THEODORUS** καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.	**THEODORUS** Very much so, Socrates. That, at any rate, was where he emphatically promised to outdo everyone.
	SOCRATES νὴ Δία, ὦ μέλε· ἢ οὐδείς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διελέγετο [179a] δι δοὺς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἰ μὴ τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτός αὑτῷ.	**SOCRATES** Yes, by Zeus, my good fellow. Otherwise no one would have paid him a great deal of money [179a] to talk with him, if he hadn't persuaded his pupils that about what will be and will seem in the future, too, no seer or anyone else could judge better than he could himself.
179a	**THEODORUS** ἀληθέστατα.	**THEODORUS** Very true.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετουμένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν;	**SOCRATES** Then legislation, too, and the beneficial concern the future, and everyone would agree that a city, when it legislates, must often miss what is most beneficial?
	THEODORUS μάλα γε.	**THEODORUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρήσεται [179b] ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὁπωστιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἠνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἴτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** Then it will be fair for us to say to your teacher [179b] that he must agree that one person is wiser than another, and that such a person is a measure, while I, who don't know, have no need whatsoever to become a measure—though the argument on his behalf was forcing me just now to be one, whether I liked it or not.
179b	**THEODORUS** ἐκείνῃ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα ἁλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἁλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, ᾗ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι.	**THEODORUS** It seems to me, Socrates, that it's at that point above all that the argument is caught—though it is caught here too, where it makes other people's judgments authoritative, and those judgments turned out to hold that his own claims are not true at all.

THE FLOWERS AND THE PARTISANS OF THE WHOLE

Socrates shows that if everything changes in every way, nothing can be correctly said at all.

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179c	**SOCRATES** πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτον ἁλοίη μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἐλεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσίν, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ Θεαίτητος ὅδε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν [179d] αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην	**SOCRATES** There are many other ways too, Theodorus, in which a claim like that could be caught, the claim that every judgment of every person is true. But where it's a matter of each person's present experience, from which our perceptions and the judgments that go with them arise, it's harder to catch them out as untrue. Though perhaps I'm talking nonsense. They may well be uncatchable, and those who claim that they are self-evident and are knowledge may be telling the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οὐσίαν διακρούοντα εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται· μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ' ὀλίγοις γέγονεν.	truth, and Theaetetus here was not wide of the mark when he [179d] said that perception and knowledge are the same. So we must come to closer quarters, as the argument on Protagoras's behalf told us to, and examine this being that is in motion, tapping it to hear whether it rings sound or cracked. There has certainly been a fight over it, and no small one, nor among only a few.
179d	**THEODORUS** πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἑταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως.	**THEODORUS** Far from being small—in Ionia it's even growing enormously. The followers of Heraclitus are leading the chorus for this theory with tremendous vigor.
	SOCRATES τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ [179e] ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.	**SOCRATES** All the more reason, my dear Theodorus, to examine it from the [179e] beginning, just as they themselves put it forward.
179e	**THEODORUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων ἥ, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, Ὁμηρείων καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἔφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ' ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίως [180a] ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἧττον αὐτοῖς ἔνι ἢ τὸ μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἡσυχίας. ἀλλ' ἄν τινά τι ἔρῃ, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, κἂν τούτου ζητῇς λόγον λαβεῖν τί εἴρηκεν, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξῃ καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ.	**THEODORUS** Absolutely. In fact, Socrates, as for these Heraclitean doctrines—or, as you say, Homeric, and older still—you can no more discuss them with the people around Ephesus themselves, the ones who claim to be experts, than with people driven mad by a gadfly. They are simply in motion, true to their own writings. As for sticking to an argument or a question and calmly [180a] answering and asking in turn, there's less than nothing of that in them. Or rather, "not even nothing" overstates the case, so little calm is there in these men. If you ask one of them anything, they pull out little riddling phrases as if from a quiver and shoot them off at you; and if you try to get an account of what he meant by that one, you'll be struck by another, newly fashioned with some fresh name.
180a	περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν· οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ' εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐᾶν εἶναι [180b] μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσιν, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν.	You'll never get anywhere with any of them. Nor do they themselves with one another. They're very careful not to allow anything to be settled, [180b] either in an argument or in their own souls—thinking, I suppose, that that would be something standing still. That is what they wage all-out war on, and drive out from everywhere as far as they can.
180b	**SOCRATES** ἴσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἑώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσιν δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας· οὐ γὰρ σοὶ ἑταῖροί εἰσιν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὑτοῖς ποιῆσαι.	**SOCRATES** Perhaps, Theodorus, you've seen these men fighting but haven't been with them in peacetime—they aren't friends of yours. But I imagine they explain such things at their leisure to their students, whom they want to make like themselves.

GREEK

THEODORUS ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν [180c] τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητής, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ᾖα ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἑκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων· αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

180c **SOCRATES** καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ δὲ δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ ποιήσεως [180d] ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ῥεύματα ὄντα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων ἅτε σοφωτέρων ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἠλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, [180e] οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διισχυρίζονται, ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται.

180e τούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μή [181a] πῃ ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν, δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἕλκωνται εἰς τἀναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἑτέρους πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ' οὕσπερ ὡρμήσαμεν, τοὺς ῥέοντας, καὶ ἐὰν μέν τι φαίνωνται λέγοντες, συνέλξομεν μετ' αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν πειρώμενοι· ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται ἀληθέστερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ' [181b] αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὖ τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμφότεροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι ἡμᾶς μὲν τί λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπαλαίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. ὅρα οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προϊέναι κίνδυνον.

ENGLISH

THEODORUS What students, my remarkable friend? Among people like that, nobody becomes [180c] anybody's student. They spring up on their own, wherever each one happens to have caught his inspiration, and each thinks the other knows nothing. So from these people, as I was about to say, you'll never get an account, willingly or unwillingly. We have to take the matter over ourselves and examine it like a problem.

SOCRATES That's fair enough. And as for the problem, haven't we inherited it from the ancients, who hid it from the many in poetry— [180d] that the origin of all other things is Oceanus and Tethys, who are flowing streams, and that nothing stands still—and from later thinkers, who, being wiser, demonstrate it openly, so that even cobblers can hear and learn their wisdom, stop foolishly thinking that some things are at rest and others in motion, and, having learned that everything is in motion, hold them in honor? But I almost forgot, Theodorus, that others again have declared the opposite of this, [180e] such as "Unmoved is the name for the whole," and all the other things that the likes of Melissus and Parmenides insist on in opposition to all these: that all things are one, and that this one stands still in itself, having no place in which to move.[31]

So what are we to do with all these people, my friend? Advancing little by little, we've fallen without noticing into the middle between the two sides, and unless we [181a] somehow defend ourselves and escape, we'll pay the price, like the players in the wrestling schools who play tug-of-war across a line, when they get caught by both teams and dragged in opposite directions. So I think we should first examine the side we set out after, the flowers. If they appear to be talking sense, we'll pull alongside them and try to escape the others. But if the partisans of the Whole seem to speak more truly, we'll run over to [181b] them, away from those who would move even what is unmovable. And if both turn out to be saying nothing reasonable, we'll be ridiculous for thinking that we, insignificant as we are, have something to say, after rejecting men so very ancient

31 Melissus of Samos was a follower of Parmenides; the words quoted come from Parmenides' poem.

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		and so very wise. So consider, Theodorus, whether it pays to venture into such danger.[32]
181b	**THEODORUS** οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν.	**THEODORUS** Oh no, Socrates, it would be intolerable not to examine thoroughly what each side is saying.
	SOCRATES σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου. δοκεῖ [181c] οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως πέρι, ποῖόν τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντές φασι τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε· πότερον ἕν τι εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἤ, ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκείτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα κοινῇ πάσχωμεν ἄν τι καὶ δέῃ. καί μοι λέγε· ἆρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται;	**SOCRATES** Then we must examine it, since you're so eager. It seems [181c] to me, then, that the starting point of our inquiry is motion: what sort of thing do they mean when they say that everything is in motion? What I mean is this. Do they speak of one kind of motion, or, as it seems to me, two? But don't let it be only my view; you take part too, so that we share whatever we have to suffer. So tell me: do you call it motion when something changes from place to place, or turns around in the same place?
181c	**THEODORUS** ἔγωγε.	**THEODORUS** I do.
	SOCRATES τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ᾖ μὲν ἐν [181d] τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δέ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἆρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κινήσεως;	**SOCRATES** Let that be one kind, then. But when a thing stays in [181d] the same place but grows old, or becomes black from white or hard from soft, or undergoes some other alteration, isn't it right to call this another kind of motion?
181d	**THEODORUS** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν.	**THEODORUS** It seems to me it has to be.
	SOCRATES δύο δὴ λέγω τούτω εἴδει κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ φοράν.	**SOCRATES** Then I say there are these two kinds of motion: alteration and movement from place to place.
	THEODORUS ὀρθῶς γε λέγων.	**THEODORUS** And you're right.
	SOCRATES τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγώμεθα ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσιν κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν· πότερον πᾶν [181e] φατε ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενόν τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μέν τι ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δ' ἑτέρως;	**SOCRATES** Having made this distinction, then, let's now talk with those who say that everything is in motion, and ask them: "Do you say that everything [181e] is in motion in both ways, both moving from place to place and altering, or that some things move in both ways and others in only one?"
181e	**THEODORUS** ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· οἶμαι δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.	**THEODORUS** By Zeus, I can't say. But I think they would say in both ways.
	SOCRATES εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κινούμενά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἕξει εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἕστηκεν.	**SOCRATES** If not, my friend, things will turn out for them to be both in motion and at rest, and it will be no more correct to say that everything is in motion than that everything is at rest.

32 A pun: *rheontes*, "flowers," are those who say everything flows; *stasiōtai*, "partisans," suggests *stasis*, standing still—apt for those who say the Whole is at rest.

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	THEODORUS ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.	**THEODORUS** Very true.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι [182a] μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἀεὶ κινεῖται.	**SOCRATES** So since they must be in motion, and there must be no absence of motion [182a] in anything, all things are always in every kind of motion.
182a	**THEODORUS** ἀνάγκη.	**THEODORUS** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES σκόπει δή μοι τόδε αὐτῶν· τῆς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὁτουοῦν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντός τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητικὸν ἀλλ' οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ἴσως οὖν ἡ "ποιότης" ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· κατὰ [182b] μέρη οὖν ἄκουε. τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω· μέμνησαι γάρ που ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἓν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποι' ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.	**SOCRATES** Then consider this point in their theory. Didn't we say that they explain the coming-to-be of heat, or whiteness, or anything else, roughly like this: each of these moves, together with a perception, between what acts and what is acted on; and what is acted on becomes perceiving but not a perception, while what acts becomes something of a certain quality but not a quality? Perhaps "quality" seems a strange word to you, and you don't understand it when it's put so generally. So hear it [182b] piece by piece. What acts doesn't become heat or whiteness, but hot and white, and so on with the rest. You remember, I think, that earlier we said that nothing is one thing, itself by itself, and neither again is what acts or what is acted on; but that from the two of them coming together with each other, perceptions and things perceived are born, and the one side become things of a certain quality, the other perceivers.[33]
182b	**THEODORUS** μέμνημαι· πῶς δ' οὔ;	**THEODORUS** I remember—of course I do.
182c	**SOCRATES** τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἴτε ἄλλως εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτῶντες· Κινεῖται καὶ ῥεῖ, ὥς φατε, τὰ πάντα; ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Let's say goodbye to the rest, then, whether they put it this way or some other. Let's keep an eye only on the point we're discussing, and ask: "Everything is in motion and flows, as you say? Isn't that it?"
	THEODORUS ναί.	**THEODORUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ἃς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, φερόμενά τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα;	**SOCRATES** With both the motions we distinguished, moving from place to place and altering?
	THEODORUS πῶς δ' οὔ; εἴπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται.	**THEODORUS** Of course, if it's to be completely in motion.
	SOCRATES εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἠλλοιοῦτο δὲ μή, εἴχομεν ἄν που εἰπεῖν οἷα ἄττα ῥεῖ τὰ φερόμενα· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;	**SOCRATES** Now if things only moved from place to place and didn't alter, we could presumably say what the things are like that flow as they move. Or how do we put it?
	THEODORUS οὕτως.	**THEODORUS** Like that.

33 "Quality" (*poiotēs*) seems to be a word Plato coined here, from *poios*, "of what sort."

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182d	**SOCRATES** ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ῥεῖν τὸ ῥέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου εἶναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην χρόαν, ἵνα μὴ ἁλῷ ταύτῃ μένον, ἆρά ποτε οἷόν τέ τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;	**SOCRATES** But since not even this stays fixed—that what flows flows white—but it changes, so that there is a flowing of this very thing too, the whiteness, and a change into another color, so that it can't be caught staying put in this respect, is it ever possible to call anything by the name of a color in such a way as to name it correctly?
	THEODORUS καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ ἀεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται ἅτε δὴ ῥέον;	**THEODORUS** How could anyone, Socrates? Or anything else of that sort, if it always slips away while one is speaking, flowing as it does?
	SOCRATES τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὁποιασοῦν, οἷον τῆς [182e] τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν;	**SOCRATES** And what shall we say about any perception whatever—for example [182e] seeing or hearing? That it ever stays put in the very act of seeing or hearing?
182e	**THEODORUS** οὔκουν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται.	**THEODORUS** It can't, if everything is in motion.
	SOCRATES οὔτε ἄρα ὁρᾶν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὁρᾶν, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην αἴσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μή, πάντων γε πάντως κινουμένων.	**SOCRATES** Then we should no more call anything seeing than not seeing, nor any other perception than not, since everything is in every way in motion.
	THEODORUS οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**THEODORUS** No, we shouldn't.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν αἴσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.	**SOCRATES** And yet perception is knowledge, as Theaetetus and I said.
	THEODORUS ἦν ταῦτα.	**THEODORUS** You did say that.
	SOCRATES οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.	**SOCRATES** So when we were asked what knowledge is, the answer we gave was no more knowledge than not knowledge.
183a	**THEODORUS** ἐοίκατε.	**THEODORUS** So it seems.
	SOCRATES καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἄν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.	**SOCRATES** A fine way this would turn out to correct our answer! We were so eager to show that everything is in motion, precisely so that that answer would turn out to be correct. But what has turned up, it seems, is that if everything is in motion, every answer, whatever it's about, is equally correct—to say that it is so and that it is not so, or, if you like, that it "becomes" so, so as not to bring these people to a standstill by our words.
	THEODORUS ὀρθῶς λέγεις.	**THEODORUS** You're right.
	SOCRATES πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι "οὕτω" τε εἶπον καὶ "οὐχ οὕτω." δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο τὸ "οὕτω" λέγειν—οὐδὲ [183b] γὰρ ἂν ἔτι κινοῖτο τὸ "οὕτω" —οὐδ' αὖ "μὴ οὕτω" —οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κίνησις—ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον	**SOCRATES** Except, Theodorus, that I said "so" and "not so." One mustn't even say this "so"—for then [183b] the "so" would no longer be in motion—nor again "not so"—for that isn't motion either. The

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τοῖς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ "οὐδ' οὕτως" μάλιστα δ' οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῖς ἁρμόττοι, ἄπειρον λεγόμενον.	people who propound this theory need to establish some other language, since as things stand they have no words for their own hypothesis—unless perhaps "not even so": that would suit them best, said with no limit.
183b	THEODORUS οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς.	THEODORUS That would certainly be the idiom most natural to them.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἑταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὔπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ἄνδρα πάντων [183c] χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ φρόνιμός τις ᾖ· ἐπιστήμην τε αἴσθησιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα κατά γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον, ἢ εἰ μή τί πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει.	SOCRATES So, Theodorus, we're rid of your friend, and we don't yet grant him that every man is the measure of all [183c] things, unless he's a man of understanding. And we won't grant that knowledge is perception, at least not on the approach that everything is in motion—unless Theaetetus here has some other way of putting it.
183c	THEODORUS ἄριστ' εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες· τούτων γὰρ περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ ἔδει ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη.	THEODORUS Very well said, Socrates. With these points settled, I too was to be released from answering you, by our agreement, once the discussion of Protagoras's theory came to an end.
	THEAETETUS μὴ πρίν γ' ἄν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε καὶ σὺ [183d] τοὺς φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ πᾶν ἑστάναι διέλθητε, ὥσπερ ἄρτι προύθεσθε.	THEAETETUS Not before, Theodorus, you and Socrates [183d] have gone through the people who say that the whole stands still, as you proposed just now.
183d	THEODORUS νέος ὤν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον.	THEODORUS Theaetetus, young as you are, are you teaching your elders to do wrong by breaking their agreements? No—get ready to give Socrates an account of what remains.
	THEAETETUS ἐάνπερ γε βούληται. ἥδιστα μεντἂν ἤκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω.	THEAETETUS Yes, if he wants. But I'd very much have liked to hear about the people I mean.
	THEODORUS "Ἱππέας εἰς πεδίον" προκαλῇ Σωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσῃ.	THEODORUS When you challenge Socrates to argument, you're "challenging horsemen to the plain." So ask, and you'll hear.[34]
	SOCRATES ἀλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, περί γε ὧν κελεύει [183e] Θεαίτητος οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.	SOCRATES But I don't think, Theodorus, I'll do what [183e] Theaetetus is asking.
183e	THEODORUS τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι;	THEODORUS Why won't you do it?
	SOCRATES μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἓν ἑστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἧττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἕνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, "αἰδοῖός τέ μοι" εἶναι ἅμα "δεινός τε." συμπροσέμειξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, [184a] καί μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα	SOCRATES Melissus and the others who say that the whole is one and stands still—I'm ashamed to examine them crudely, but I'm less ashamed before them than before Parmenides, who is one. Parmenides seems to me, in Homer's words, "one to be revered" and at the same time "awesome." I met the man when I was very young and he was

34 A proverb: inviting someone to fight on the ground where they are strongest.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	συνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος ὥρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἄσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς πείσεται· ἄλλως τε καὶ ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον, εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξι' ἂν πάθοι, εἴτε ἱκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανιεῖ.	very old, [184a] and he seemed to me to have a depth that was altogether noble. So I'm afraid we may not understand what he says, and fall still further short of what he meant by it; and, most important, that the question our discussion set out to answer —what knowledge is—may go unexamined because of the arguments crowding in on us like a band of revelers, if we let them in. Besides, the argument we're rousing now is unmanageably large. If one examines it in passing, it would be treated unworthily; and if one does it justice, it will stretch out and make the question of knowledge disappear.[35]
184a	δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον [184b] ὧν κυεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι.	We must do neither, but try to use the art of midwifery to deliver [184b] Theaetetus of what he's carrying in the womb about knowledge.
184b	THEODORUS ἀλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.	THEODORUS Well, if you think so, that's what we should do.

THE SOUL AND THE SENSES

Being, sameness and difference are grasped by the soul itself, not through the senses, so perception is not knowledge.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω· ἦ γάρ;	SOCRATES Then, Theaetetus, consider one more point about what's been said. You answered that perception is knowledge, didn't you?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	THEAETETUS Yes.
	SOCRATES εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ' ἐρωτῴη· "τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει;" εἴποις ἂν οἶμαι "ὄμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν."	SOCRATES Now suppose someone asked you: "With what does a person see white and black things, and with what does he hear high and low sounds?" You'd say, I imagine, "With the eyes and ears."
	THEAETETUS ἔγωγε.	THEAETETUS I would.
184c	SOCRATES τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνῃ, ἢ οὐκ ὀρθή. σκόπει γάρ· ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ᾧ ὁρῶμεν τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὗ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν ὦτα, ἢ δι' οὗ ἀκούομεν;	SOCRATES Being easygoing with words and phrases, and not scrutinizing them with precision, is for the most part not ill-bred; if anything, the opposite is small-minded. But sometimes it's necessary—as now it's necessary to take hold of the answer you're giving, where it isn't correct. Consider: which answer is more correct—that the eyes are what we see with, or what we see through; and the ears what we hear with, or what we hear through?

35 Homer, *Iliad* 3.172, where Helen addresses Priam.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.	**THEAETETUS** It seems to me, Socrates, that they are what we perceive each thing through, rather than with.
184d	**SOCRATES** δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅτι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα συντείνει, ᾗ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.	**SOCRATES** Yes, it would surely be strange, my boy, if a lot of senses sat inside us as if in wooden horses, and they didn't all converge on some single form—soul, or whatever one should call it—with which we perceive, through these as instruments, everything that is perceptible.
	THEAETETUS ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως.	**THEAETETUS** Well, I think it's this way rather than that.
	SOCRATES τοῦδέ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ τινι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε [184e] καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἑτέρων αὖ τινῶν· καὶ ἔξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καί μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνῃ, ἆρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός;	**SOCRATES** Here's why I'm being so precise with you. I want to know whether it's with some one and the same part of ourselves that we reach white and black [184e] things through the eyes, and other things again through the other senses; and whether, if asked, you'll be able to refer all such things to the body. But perhaps it's better for you to say these things in answering than for me to do the work on your behalf. So tell me: the things through which you perceive what is hot and hard and light and sweet—do you count each of them as belonging to the body, or to something else?
184e	**THEAETETUS** οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.	**THEAETETUS** To nothing else.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν ἃ δι' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως [185a] αἰσθάνῃ, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς;	**SOCRATES** And will you also be willing to agree that what you perceive through one power [185a] it is impossible to perceive through another—for example, what you perceive through hearing, to perceive through sight, or what through sight, through hearing?
185a	**THEAETETUS** πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;	**THEAETETUS** Of course I'll be willing.
	SOCRATES εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοῇ, οὐκ ἂν διά γε τοῦ ἑτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἄν.	**SOCRATES** So if you think something about both, you couldn't be perceiving it about both through either the one organ or the other.
	THEAETETUS οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** No, I couldn't.
	SOCRATES περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ᾗ διανοῇ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν;	**SOCRATES** Now take a sound and a color. First of all, don't you think this very thing about both of them, that both of them are?
	THEAETETUS ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** I do.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταὐτόν;	**SOCRATES** And also that each of them is different from the other and the same as itself?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
185b	**THEAETETUS** τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἑκάτερον δὲ ἕν;	**SOCRATES** And that both together are two, and each is one?
	THEAETETUS καὶ τοῦτο.	**THEAETETUS** That too.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν, δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι;	**SOCRATES** And are you also able to consider whether they are unlike or like each other?
	THEAETETUS ἴσως.	**THEAETETUS** Perhaps.
	SOCRATES ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοῇ; οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἴη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι ἆρ' ἐστὸν ἁλμυρὰ ἢ οὔ, 185c οἶσθ' ὅτι ἔξεις εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπισκέψῃ, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοὴ φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο.	**SOCRATES** Now through what do you think all these things about them? It's not possible to grasp what they have in common either through hearing or through sight. Here's further evidence for what we're saying. If it were possible to consider whether both are salty or not, 185c you know you'll be able to say what you would consider it with; and that is clearly neither sight nor hearing, but something else.
185c	**THEAETETUS** τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, ἥ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις;	**THEAETETUS** Of course it is—the power that works through the tongue.
	SOCRATES καλῶς λέγεις. ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ τὸ "ἔστιν" ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ "οὐκ ἔστι" καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα;	**SOCRATES** Well said. But through what does the power work that makes plain to you what is common to all things, and to these in particular—what you apply the words "is" and "is not" to, and the other things we were just asking about them? What organs will you assign to all these, through which the perceiving part of us perceives each of them?
	THEAETETUS οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ 185d ἕν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἕπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.	**THEAETETUS** You mean being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, the same and the different, and also 185d one and the rest of number as applied to them. And clearly you're also asking about even and odd, and everything else that goes with these—through which of the body's parts do we perceive them with the soul?
185d	**SOCRATES** ὑπέρευ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.	**SOCRATES** You're following me splendidly, Theaetetus. Those are exactly the things I'm asking about.
	THEAETETUS ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλήν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' 185e αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.	**THEAETETUS** By Zeus, Socrates, I couldn't say—except that it seems to me there isn't any special organ for these things at all, as there is for the others. Rather, 185e it seems to me that the soul itself, through itself, examines what is common to all things.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
185e	**SOCRATES** καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεταί σοι τὰ μὲν αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι.	**SOCRATES** That's because you're beautiful, Theaetetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus was saying —for whoever speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful, you've done me a kindness: you've released me from a very long argument, if it seems to you that the soul examines some things itself through itself, and others through the body's powers. That was what I thought myself, and I wanted you to think so too.[36]
186a	**THEAETETUS** ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεταί γε.	**THEAETETUS** Well, it certainly does seem so.
	SOCRATES ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.	**SOCRATES** To which of the two, then, do you assign being? For this, above all, goes along with everything.
	THEAETETUS ἐγὼ μὲν ὧν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἐπορέγεται.	**THEAETETUS** I assign it to the things the soul reaches out for itself, by itself.
	SOCRATES ἦ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον;	**SOCRATES** And like and unlike too, and same and different?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί δέ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν;	**SOCRATES** What about beautiful and ugly, good and bad?
	THEAETETUS καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ [186b] γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.	**THEAETETUS** These too, I think, are among the things whose being it examines most of all in relation to one another, weighing up within itself the [186b] past and the present against the future.
186b	**SOCRATES** ἔχε δή· ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως;	**SOCRATES** Hold on. Won't it perceive the hardness of what is hard through touch, and the softness of what is soft in the same way?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν.	**SOCRATES** But their being, and the fact that they are, and their opposition to each other, and again the being of that opposition—these the soul itself tries to judge for us, by going back over them and comparing them with one another.
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει [186c] αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν	**SOCRATES** So there are some things that humans and animals alike are naturally able to perceive [186c] from the moment they're born: the experiences that reach the soul through the body. But reflections on these, as regards their being and use-

36 At the start of the dialogue Theodorus said Theaetetus was not handsome, being snub-nosed and bulging-eyed like Socrates.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται;	fulness, come only with difficulty and over time, through a great deal of trouble and education, to those they come to at all?
186c	**THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μηδὲ οὐσίας;	**SOCRATES** Now can someone reach truth who doesn't even reach being?
	THEAETETUS ἀδύνατον.	**THEAETETUS** Impossible.
	SOCRATES οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;	**SOCRATES** And if someone fails to reach the truth of something, will he ever have knowledge of it?
186d	**THEAETETUS** καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**THEAETETUS** How could he, Socrates?
	SOCRATES ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.	**SOCRATES** So knowledge is not in our experiences but in our reasoning about them. For in reasoning, it seems, it is possible to grasp being and truth, but in experiences it's impossible.
	THEAETETUS φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES ἦ οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε;	**SOCRATES** Then will you call the two by the same name, when they differ so greatly?
	THEAETETUS οὔκουν δὴ δίκαιόν γε.	**THEAETETUS** That wouldn't be right, anyway.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν ἀκούειν ὀσφραίνεσθαι ψύχεσθαι θερμαίνεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** Then what name do you give to the first—seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling cold, feeling hot?
186e	**THEAETETUS** αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;	**THEAETETUS** Perceiving. What else?
	SOCRATES σύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν;	**SOCRATES** So all of it together you call perception?
	THEAETETUS ἀνάγκη.	**THEAETETUS** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES ὧι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἅψασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.	**SOCRATES** Which, we say, has no share in grasping truth—since it has none in grasping being either.
	THEAETETUS οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** No, it hasn't.
	SOCRATES οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης.	**SOCRATES** Nor, then, in knowledge.
	THEAETETUS οὐ γάρ.	**THEAETETUS** No.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἴσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτόν.	**SOCRATES** Then perception and knowledge could never be the same thing, Theaetetus.
	THEAETETUS οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστά γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὂν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.	**THEAETETUS** Apparently not, Socrates. And now, above all, it has become perfectly plain that knowledge is something other than perception.
187a		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἀλλ᾽ οὔ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἠρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὕρωμεν τί ποτ᾽ οὐκ ἔστ᾽ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.	**SOCRATES** But we certainly didn't begin our conversation in order to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. Still, we've come this far: we won't look for it in perception at all, but in whatever name the soul has when it is occupied, itself by itself, with the things that are.
	THEAETETUS ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, δοξάζειν.	**THEAETETUS** Well, Socrates, that, I think, is called judging.

KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE JUDGMENT

Theaetetus proposes that knowledge is true judgment, and Socrates asks how false judgment is possible.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν πάλιν ἐξ [187b] ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾷς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγε αὖθις τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.	**SOCRATES** You think rightly, my friend. Now look again from the [187b] beginning. Wipe out everything that came before and see whether you can see any better, now that you've come this far. And tell me again what knowledge is.
187b	**THEAETETUS** δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδής ἐστι δόξα· κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καί μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προϊοῦσιν ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.	**THEAETETUS** It's impossible to say it's judgment of every kind, Socrates, since there is false judgment too. But it looks as if true judgment is knowledge; let that be my answer. If it doesn't turn out that way as we go on, as happened this time, we'll try to say something else.
	SOCRATES οὕτω μέντοι χρή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὤκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐὰν γὰρ [187c] οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὑρήσομεν ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἧττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν· καίτοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῄς; δυοῖν ὄντοιν ἰδέαιν δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὁρίζῃ;	**SOCRATES** That's the way to speak, Theaetetus—eagerly, rather than the way you hesitated to answer at first. For if [187c] we act like this, one of two things will happen: either we'll find what we're after, or we'll be less inclined to think we know what we don't know at all—and that would be no contemptible reward. So what do you say now? There being two kinds of judgment, one true and the other false, do you define knowledge as true judgment?
187c	**THEAETETUS** ἔγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** I do. That, in turn, is how it looks to me now.
	SOCRATES ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἔτ᾽ ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν—	**SOCRATES** Then is it still worth going back over something about judgment—
	THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;	**THEAETETUS** What do you mean?
187d	**SOCRATES** θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ᾽ ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον.	**SOCRATES** Something troubles me—now, and often before too—so that I've been in great perplexity, both by myself and with others, unable to say what this experience in us is and how it comes about.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον δή;	**THEAETETUS** What experience?
	SOCRATES τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.	**SOCRATES** Someone's judging falsely. Even now I'm still in two minds, considering whether we should let it go, or examine it in a different way from a little while ago.
	THEAETETUS τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὁπῃτιοῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατεπείγει.	**THEAETETUS** Why not, Socrates, if it seems in any way necessary? Just now you and Theodorus were saying, and rightly, about leisure, that in discussions like these nothing presses us.
187e	**SOCRATES** ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καιροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἴχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γάρ που σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι.	**SOCRATES** You're right to remind me. Perhaps it's not a bad moment to go back over our tracks, as it were. It's surely better to get through a little well than a lot inadequately.
	THEAETETUS τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῆ φαμεν ἑκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καί τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ, τὸν δ' αὖ ἀληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων;	**SOCRATES** Well then, what are we actually saying? Do we say that there is false judgment on each occasion, and that one of us judges falsely and another truly, as if that were how things naturally are?
	THEAETETUS φαμὲν γὰρ δή.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, we do.
188a	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἤτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν.	**SOCRATES** Now isn't it true for us, about all things together and each in particular, that either we know it or we don't know it? Learning and forgetting, as things in between, I'll leave aside for now; they have nothing to do with our argument at present.
	THEAETETUS ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.	**THEAETETUS** Well, Socrates, there's nothing else left about each thing except knowing it or not knowing it.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;	**SOCRATES** Then it follows that anyone who judges must judge either something he knows or something he doesn't know?
	THEAETETUS ἀνάγκη.	**THEAETETUS** It must.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα [188b] εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.	**SOCRATES** And it's certainly impossible for someone who knows a thing not to know it, or for someone who doesn't know it [188b] to know it.
188b	**THEAETETUS** πῶς δ' οὔ;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ αὖ ἀμφότερα;	**SOCRATES** Then does someone who judges falsely think that things he knows are not those things but some others of the things he knows—so that, knowing both, he is also ignorant of both?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** That's impossible, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἆρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἄττα ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαίτητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;	**SOCRATES** Well then, does he think that things he doesn't know are some others of the things he doesn't know? Is it possible for someone who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates to get it into his head that Socrates is Theaetetus, or Theaetetus Socrates?
188c	**THEAETETUS** καὶ πῶς ἄν;	**THEAETETUS** How could he?
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὐ μήν, ἅ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἴεταί που ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδεν.	**SOCRATES** But surely a person doesn't think that things he knows are things he doesn't know, or again that things he doesn't know are things he knows.
	THEAETETUS τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.	**THEAETETUS** That would be monstrous.
	SOCRATES πῶς οὖν ἂν ἔτι ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν που δοξάζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντ' ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι.	**SOCRATES** Then how could anyone still judge falsely? Outside these cases, surely, it is impossible to judge, since everything is either known or not known by us; and within them it appears nowhere possible to judge falsely.
	THEAETETUS ἀληθέστατα.	**THEAETETUS** Very true.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν οὐ ταύτῃ σκεπτέον ὃ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ 188d εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μή;	**SOCRATES** Then shouldn't we look for what we're seeking not this way, going by 188d knowing and not knowing, but by being and not being?
188d	**THEAETETUS** πῶς λέγεις;	**THEAETETUS** What do you mean?
	SOCRATES μὴ ἁπλοῦν ᾖ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὁτουοῦν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάσει, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ.	**SOCRATES** It may simply be that someone who judges about anything things that are not cannot fail to judge falsely, however things stand with his thinking otherwise.
	THEAETETUS εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** That's likely too, Socrates.
	SOCRATES πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ· "δυνατὸν δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ὃ λέγεται, καί τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό;" καὶ ἡμεῖς δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν· "ὅταν 188e γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἰόμενος·" ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;	**SOCRATES** Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if someone cross-examines us: "Is what you describe possible for anyone? Will any human being judge what is not, whether about one of the things that are or just by itself?" And we, it seems, will reply: "Yes, when 188e he thinks, but thinks what is not true." Or what shall we say?
188e	**THEAETETUS** οὕτως.	**THEAETETUS** That.
	SOCRATES ἦ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** Then is there something like this anywhere else too?
	THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον;	**THEAETETUS** Like what?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES εἴ τις ὁρᾷ μέν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν.	**SOCRATES** Someone's seeing something, yet seeing nothing.
	THEAETETUS καὶ πῶς;	**THEAETETUS** How could that be?
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἕν γέ τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ. ἢ σὺ οἴει ποτὲ τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** But surely if he sees some one thing, he sees one of the things that are. Or do you think that what is one can ever be among the things that are not?
	THEAETETUS οὐκ ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** I don't.
	SOCRATES ὁ ἄρα ἕν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ.	**SOCRATES** So whoever sees some one thing sees something that is.
	THEAETETUS φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** Apparently.
189a	**SOCRATES** καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἕν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὂν ἀκούει.	**SOCRATES** And whoever hears something hears some one thing, and something that is.
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ ὁ ἁπτόμενος δή του ἑνός γέ του ἅπτεται καὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἑνός;	**SOCRATES** And whoever touches something touches some one thing, and something that is, if it's one?
	THEAETETUS καὶ τοῦτο.	**THEAETETUS** That too.
	SOCRATES ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἕν γέ τι δοξάζει;	**SOCRATES** And doesn't whoever judges judge some one thing?
	THEAETETUS ἀνάγκη.	**THEAETETUS** He must.
	SOCRATES ὁ δ' ἕν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι;	**SOCRATES** And whoever judges some one thing judges something that is?
	THEAETETUS συγχωρῶ.	**THEAETETUS** I agree.
	SOCRATES ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὂν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.	**SOCRATES** So whoever judges what is not judges nothing.
	THEAETETUS οὐ φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** Apparently.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.	**SOCRATES** But whoever judges nothing doesn't judge at all.
	THEAETETUS δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** That seems clear.
189b	**SOCRATES** οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό.	**SOCRATES** So it isn't possible to judge what is not, either about the things that are or just by itself.
	THEAETETUS οὐ φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** Apparently not.
	SOCRATES ἄλλο τι ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.	**SOCRATES** So judging falsely is something other than judging things that are not.
	THEAETETUS ἄλλο ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** It seems to be something other.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES οὔτ' ἄρ' οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδής ἐστι δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.	**SOCRATES** So neither this way nor the way we were examining it a little while ago is there false judgment in us.
	THEAETETUS οὐ γὰρ οὖν δή.	**THEAETETUS** No, there isn't.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἆρα ὧδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν;	**SOCRATES** Well, is it when it happens like this that we give it that name?
	THEAETETUS πῶς;	**THEAETETUS** How?
	SOCRATES ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμεν εἶναι δόξαν, [189c] ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἑτέρου, καὶ ἁμαρτάνων οὗ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων.	**SOCRATES** We say that false judgment is a kind of other-judging, [189c] when someone, having swapped one of the things that are for another of the things that are in his thinking, says that it is that other. For in this way he always judges something that is, but one thing in place of another; and since he misses what he was aiming at, he could fairly be called someone who judges falsely.
189c	**THEAETETUS** ὀρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γάρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ.	**THEAETETUS** Now I think you've put it exactly right. When someone judges ugly in place of beautiful, or beautiful in place of ugly, then he truly judges falsely.
	SOCRATES δῆλος εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς.	**SOCRATES** It's obvious, Theaetetus, that you look down on me and aren't afraid of me.
	THEAETETUS τί μάλιστα;	**THEAETETUS** Why do you say that?
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄν οἶμαι σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψευδοῦς ἀντιλαβέσθαι, [189d] ἐρόμενος εἰ οἷόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρρήσῃς, ἀφίημι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φῄς, τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** You don't think, I imagine, that I'd pounce on your "truly falsely" [189d] and ask whether it's possible for what is swift to come about slowly, or what is light heavily, or for any other opposite to come about, not according to its own nature but according to that of its opposite, in a way opposite to itself. I'll let that pass, then, so that your boldness won't go for nothing. But you're satisfied, you say, that judging falsely is other-judging?
189d	**THEAETETUS** ἔμοιγε.	**THEAETETUS** I am.
	SOCRATES ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὡς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** So in your judgment it is possible to set down in one's thinking one thing as another and not as what it is.
	THEAETETUS ἔστι μέντοι.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, it is.
189e	**SOCRATES** ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἡ διάνοιά του δρᾷ, οὐ καὶ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἤτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανοεῖσθαι;	**SOCRATES** Now when someone's thinking does this, mustn't it be thinking either of both things or of one of them?
	THEAETETUS ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν· ἤτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει.	

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		THEAETETUS Yes, it must—either both at once or in turn.
	SOCRATES κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἆρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;	**SOCRATES** Excellent. And by thinking do you mean what I mean?
	THEAETETUS τί καλῶν;	**THEAETETUS** What do you mean by it?
	SOCRATES λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἐνδάλλεται διανοουμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ [190a] ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπᾴξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὑτόν· σὺ δὲ τί;	**SOCRATES** An account that the soul goes through with itself about whatever it's considering. I'm telling you this, mind you, as someone who doesn't know. But this is the picture I have of it: when the soul thinks, it is simply conversing, [190a] asking itself questions and answering them, saying yes and saying no. And when it has come to a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden leap, and is now saying the same thing and not in two minds, we call this its judgment. So what I call judging is speaking, and a judgment is a statement that has been made—not to someone else, though, and not aloud, but silently to oneself. What about you?
190a	**THEAETETUS** κἀγώ.	**THEAETETUS** I call it that too.
	SOCRATES ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησίν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.	**SOCRATES** So when someone judges one thing to be another, it seems he is also saying to himself that the one thing is the other.
190b	**THEAETETUS** τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES ἀναμιμνήσκου δὴ εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον. ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, σκόπει εἴ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἀρτιά ἐστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.	**SOCRATES** Now try to remember whether you've ever said to yourself that beyond all doubt what is beautiful is ugly, or what is unjust is just. Or—to sum it all up—consider whether you've ever tried to persuade yourself that beyond all doubt one thing is another. Isn't it quite the reverse? Not even in your sleep have you ever dared to say to yourself that odd numbers are, after all, completely even, or anything else of that sort.
	THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	**THEAETETUS** That's true.
190c	**SOCRATES** ἄλλον δέ τινα οἴει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν ἀναπείθοντα αὑτὸν ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἕν;	**SOCRATES** And do you think anyone else, sane or mad, would dare to say to himself in earnest, trying to talk himself into it, that the ox must be a horse, or two must be one?
	THEAETETUS μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** By Zeus, I don't.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερά γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ	**SOCRATES** So if speaking to oneself is judging, no one who speaks of both things and judges both, grasping both with his soul, could say and judge

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	ἑτέρου· λέγω [190d] γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.	that the one is the other. But you too must let the word "other" pass; [190d] what I mean by it is this: that no one judges that the ugly is beautiful, or anything else of that sort.
190d	THEAETETUS ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐῶ τε καί μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.	THEAETETUS Yes, Socrates, I'll let it pass, and I think it's as you say.
	SOCRATES ἄμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τό γε ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζειν.	SOCRATES So it is impossible for someone who is judging both things to judge that the one is the other.
	THEAETETUS ἔοικεν.	THEAETETUS It seems so.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῇ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι.	SOCRATES But then if he judges only one of them, and not the other at all, he will never judge that the one is the other.
	THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὗ μὴ δοξάζει.	THEAETETUS True. He'd be forced to grasp the one he isn't judging too.
	SOCRATES οὔτ' ἄρ' ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δοξάζοντι ἐγχωρεῖ [190e] ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὥστ' εἴ τις ὁριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδῆ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι· οὔτε γὰρ ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν ἡμῖν οὖσα δόξα.	SOCRATES So neither someone who judges both nor someone who judges one of them can [190e] other-judge. And so anyone who defines false judgment as other-judging would be talking nonsense. Neither this way nor the earlier ways does false judgment appear to exist in us.
190e	THEAETETUS οὐκ ἔοικεν.	THEAETETUS It seems not.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὄν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα.	SOCRATES And yet, Theaetetus, if it turns out that this doesn't exist, we'll be forced to agree to many absurd things.
	THEAETETUS τὰ ποῖα δή;	THEAETETUS What sort of things?
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ πειραθῶ σκοπῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἀποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων [191a] ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὕρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότ' ἤδη περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων αὐτὰ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἑστῶτες· ἐὰν δὲ πάντῃ ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινωθέντες οἶμαι τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὅτι ἂν βούληται. ᾗ οὖν ἔτι πόρον τινὰ εὑρίσκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἡμῖν, ἄκουε.	SOCRATES I won't tell you until I've tried examining it in every way. I'd be ashamed on our behalf if, while we're still at a loss, we were forced [191a] to agree to what I have in mind. But if we find the answer and get free, then we'll talk about other people as the ones this happens to, while we stand clear of the ridicule. And if we're completely at a loss, then I suppose we'll be humbled, and like seasick passengers we'll let the argument trample on us and do whatever it likes with us. So listen to where I still find a way through our problem.
191a	THEAETETUS λέγε μόνον.	THEAETETUS Just tell me.
	SOCRATES οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὁμολογῆσαι, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν ἅ τις οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτὰ [191b] καὶ ψευσθῆναι· ἀλλά πῃ δυνατόν.	SOCRATES I'll deny that we were right to agree, when we agreed that it's impossible for someone to judge that things he knows are things he doesn't

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		know, [191b] and to be deceived. It is possible, in a way.
191b	**THEAETETUS** ἆρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα, ἡνίκ' αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίοτ' ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὁρῶν ἄλλον ὃν οὐ γιγνώσκω, ᾠήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὃν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οἷον λέγεις.	**THEAETETUS** Do you mean what I suspected myself at the time we said it was like this: that sometimes I, who know Socrates, see someone else in the distance whom I don't know, and think it is Socrates, whom I know? That sort of thing you're talking about does happen in a case like that.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἃ ἴσμεν ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;	**SOCRATES** And didn't we back away from that, because it made us both know and not know what we know?
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὧδε· ἴσως πῃ ἡμῖν [191c] συγχωρήσεται, ἴσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τὶ λέγω. ἆρα ἔστιν μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν;	**SOCRATES** Let's not put it that way, then, but like this. Perhaps it will [191c] give way to us, perhaps it will resist. But really we're in such a tight spot that we have to turn every argument over and put it to the test. So see whether I'm talking sense. Is it possible for someone who didn't know something before to learn it later?
191c	**THEAETETUS** ἔστι μέντοι.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, it is.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον;	**SOCRATES** And again another thing, and another?
	THEAETETUS τί δ' οὔ;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.

THE WAX BLOCK

Memory is pictured as a block of wax taking imprints; false judgment mismatches perception and imprint.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES θὲς δή μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, [191d] ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος.	**SOCRATES** Then suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is a block of wax in our souls—larger in one person, smaller in another; of purer wax in one, dirtier in another; harder in some, [191d] softer in others, and in some of just the right consistency.
191d	**THEAETETUS** τίθημι.	**THEAETETUS** I'll suppose it.
	SOCRATES δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν βουληθῶμεν μνημονεῦσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους· καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῇ, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ· ὃ δ' ἂν ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε γένηται [191e] ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλελῆσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.	**SOCRATES** Let's say, then, that it is a gift from Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we want to remember something we see or hear or think of ourselves, we hold this block under our perceptions and thoughts and take an imprint of it, as if we were stamping the marks of signet rings. Whatever is imprinted, we remember and know for as long as its image is there;

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		whatever is wiped out, or can't [191e] be imprinted, we have forgotten and don't know.[37]
191e	**THEAETETUS** ἔστω οὕτως.	**THEAETETUS** Let it be so.
	SOCRATES ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δέ τι ὧν ὁρᾷ ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοιῷδε τρόπῳ ψευδῆ ἂν δοξάσαι.	**SOCRATES** Now take someone who knows these things and is considering something he is seeing or hearing. Look and see whether he might judge falsely in the following way.
	THEAETETUS ποίῳ δή τινι;	**THEAETETUS** What way?
	SOCRATES ἃ οἶδεν, οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ἃ οἶδε, τοτὲ δὲ ἃ μή. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀδύνατα.	**SOCRATES** By thinking that things he knows are sometimes things he knows, and sometimes things he doesn't. In our earlier discussion we were wrong to agree that these things are impossible.
	THEAETETUS νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;	**THEAETETUS** And what do you say now?
192a	**SOCRATES** δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους ὅτι ὃ μέν τις οἶδεν, σχὼν αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, οἰηθῆναι ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὅ γε οἶδεν αὖ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγῖδα· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν αὖ· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ οἶδε· καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεταί γε, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἶναι· καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ [192b] ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν αἰσθάνεται.	**SOCRATES** We must put it like this, drawing our distinctions from the beginning. Take something a person knows, having a record of it in his soul, but isn't perceiving: it is impossible for him to think it is some other thing he knows, of which he also has an imprint but which he isn't perceiving. And to think that something he knows is something he doesn't know and has no seal-impression of; and that something he doesn't know is something else he doesn't know; and that something he doesn't know is something he knows. And to think that something he is perceiving is some other thing he is perceiving; and that something he is perceiving is something he isn't perceiving; and [192b] that something he isn't perceiving is something else he isn't perceiving; and that something he isn't perceiving is something he is perceiving.
192b	καὶ ἔτι γε αὖ καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὖ ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἷόν τε. καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων [192c] κατὰ ταὐτά, ὃ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται· πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῆ τινα δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.	And again, further: to think that something he knows and is perceiving, and has the mark of in line with his perception, is some other thing he knows and is perceiving, and again has the mark of in line with his perception—that is still more impossible than those, if that can be. And it is impossible to think that something he knows and is perceiving, keeping the record correctly, is something he knows; or that something he knows and is perceiving, keeping it [192c] the same way, is something he is perceiving; or again that something he neither knows nor is perceiving is something he neither knows nor is perceiving; or that some-

37 Memory (Mnemosyne) was the mother of the nine Muses by Zeus.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		thing he neither knows nor is perceiving is something he doesn't know; or that something he neither knows nor is perceiving is something he isn't perceiving. In all these cases it is utterly impossible to judge anything falsely. What remains is that something like that happens, if it happens anywhere at all, in cases of the following sort.
192c	**THEAETETUS** ἐν τίσι δή; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕπομαι.	**THEAETETUS** In which cases? Maybe I'll understand better from them; at the moment I can't follow.
	SOCRATES ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερ' ἄττα εἶναι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται δέ· ἢ ὧν 192d οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται.	**SOCRATES** In cases where he thinks that things he knows are some other things that he knows and is perceiving; or that he doesn't know but is perceiving; or that things 192d he knows and is perceiving are other things that, again, he knows and is perceiving.
192d	**THEAETETUS** νῦν πολὺ πλέον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε.	**THEAETETUS** Now I'm left much further behind than before.
	SOCRATES ὧδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἷός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταὐτά, ἄλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτούς, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ, καὶ ἅπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ' οὔ, καὶ ἀκούω ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ' αἴσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ;	**SOCRATES** Then listen to it again, this way. I know Theodorus, and remember within myself what he is like, and Theaetetus in the same way. Don't I sometimes see them and sometimes not; sometimes touch them and sometimes not; and hear them or perceive them by some other sense, and at other times have no perception of the two of you at all, but remember you nonetheless and know you within myself?
192e	**THEAETETUS** πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον μάθε ὧν βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἃ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** Then here is the first of the things I want to make clear—learn this: that it is possible not to perceive things one knows, and possible to perceive them.
	THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ.	**THEAETETUS** True.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;	**SOCRATES** And things one doesn't know, often it is possible not to perceive them either, and often possible only to perceive them?
	THEAETETUS ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο.	**THEAETETUS** That's possible too.
	SOCRATES ἰδὲ δὴ ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίσπῃ. Σωκράτης 193a εἰ γιγνώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὁρᾷ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητός ἐστι Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἢ οὐδέν;	**SOCRATES** See, then, whether you can follow better now. If Socrates 193a knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither of them and has no other perception of them either, he could never judge within himself that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I talking sense or not?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
193a	**THEAETETUS** ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, that's true.
	SOCRATES τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὧν ἔλεγον.	**SOCRATES** Well, that was the first of the cases I was describing.
	THEAETETUS ἦν γάρ.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, it was.
	SOCRATES δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὖ οἰηθείην ὃν οἶδα εἶναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα.	**SOCRATES** The second, then: if I know one of you and don't know the other, and perceive neither, I could never think that the one I know is the one I don't know.
	THEAETETUS ὀρθῶς.	**THEAETETUS** Right.
193b	**SOCRATES** τρίτον δέ, μηδέτερον γιγνώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθανόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην ὃν μὴ οἶδα ἕτερόν τιν' εἶναι ὧν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τἆλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἑξῆς νόμιζε πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μέν, τὸν δ' οὐ γιγνώσκων· καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταὐτά, εἰ ἄρα ἔπῃ.	**SOCRATES** And the third: if I neither know nor perceive either of you, I could not think that the one I don't know is some other person I don't know. And imagine you've heard all the other earlier cases again in order, in which I will never judge falsely about you and Theodorus, whether I know both of you or neither, or know one and not the other. And the same goes for the cases involving perception, if you're following.
	THEAETETUS ἕπομαι.	**THEAETETUS** I'm following.
	SOCRATES λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷδε, ὅταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ [193c] ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σφῷν ἀμφοῖν τὰ σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἱκανῶς ὁρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημεῖον ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἴχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἶτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ οἷα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς [193d] ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης, ταὐτὸν παθὼν διαμάρτω· τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.	**SOCRATES** Then the only place left for judging falsely is here. Suppose I know you and Theodorus, and I have the marks of you both in that wax block, [193c] like the imprints of signet rings. I see you both from a distance, and not clearly enough, and I'm eager to assign the proper mark of each to the proper sight, fitting the sight into its own track so that recognition can take place. Then I fail at this: like people who put their shoes on the wrong feet, I switch them round and apply the sight of each of you to the other's mark. Or else the same thing happens to me as happens to sight in mirrors, when right flows over into [193d] left, and I go wrong. That's when mistaking one thing for another, and judging falsely, comes about.
193d	**THEAETETUS** ἔοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες. θαυμασίως ὡς λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, it seems so, Socrates. It's wonderful how well you describe what happens to judgment.
	SOCRATES ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γιγνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μή, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καί μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.	**SOCRATES** Then there's also the case where I know you both, and besides knowing one of you I perceive him, but not the other, and the knowledge I have of the other isn't matched with my perception. That's what I was describing earlier, and you didn't understand me then.

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THEAETETUS οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

THEAETETUS No, I didn't.

SOCRATES τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γιγνώσκων τὸν ἕτερον καὶ [193e] αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἰήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑτερόν τινα ὃν γιγνώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο;

SOCRATES Well, what I was saying was this: if someone knows one person and [193e] perceives him, and has his knowledge of him matched with his perception of him, he will never think that person is someone else whom he knows and perceives and whose knowledge he likewise has matched with his perception. Wasn't that it?

193e THEAETETUS ναί.

THEAETETUS Yes.

SOCRATES παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ᾧ δή φαμεν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γιγνώσκοντα [194a] καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἀμφοῖν τὼ σημείω μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον ἱέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ἄρα ὠνόμασται.

SOCRATES What was left out, I think, is the case we're describing now, where we say false judgment arises: someone knows both people and sees both, [194a] or has some other perception of both, but doesn't hold each of the two marks up against the perception that belongs to it. Like a poor archer, he shoots wide of the target and misses—and that, of course, is just what we've named falsehood.

194a THEAETETUS εἰκότως γε.

THEAETETUS Reasonably enough.

SOCRATES καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἴσθησις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ παρούσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντῃ ταύτῃ ψεύδεται ἡ διάνοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἶδέ τις μηδ' ἐπήσθετο πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, [194b] ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι οὔτε ψευδὴς δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιὲς λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίττεται ἡ δόξα ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθής, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδής.

SOCRATES And when perception is present for one of the marks but not for the other, and the mind fits the mark belonging to the absent perception to the present one, in every such case the mind is deceived. In a word: about things a person doesn't know and has never perceived, it seems there can be no [194b] being deceived and no false judgment, if what we're saying now makes any sense. It's about the very things we know and perceive that judgment twists and turns, becoming false or true. When it brings the proper stamps and imprints together squarely and directly, it's true; when it brings them together askew and crooked, it's false.

194b THEAETETUS οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεται;

THEAETETUS Well, isn't that finely put, Socrates?

194c SOCRATES ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τἀληθὲς δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.

SOCRATES You'll say so all the more when you've heard this too. Judging truly is a fine thing, and being deceived a shameful one.

THEAETETUS πῶς δ' οὔ;

THEAETETUS Of course.

SOCRATES ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὠργασμένος ᾖ, τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς "κέαρ," ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις [194d] καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ

SOCRATES Well, they say these come about like this. When the wax in someone's soul is deep, plentiful, smooth, and worked to just the right softness, the things that come in through the perceptions are stamped on this "heart" of the soul—Homer's word, hinting at its likeness to wax. In

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	ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;	people like that [194d] the marks that form are clean and deep enough, and they last a long time. Such people are, first, quick to learn; second, good at remembering; and third, they don't mismatch the marks of their perceptions, but judge truly. Since the marks are clear and have plenty of room, they quickly assign each thing to its own imprint—to what are called the things that are—and these people are called wise. Don't you think so?[38]
194d	**THEAETETUS** ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Extraordinarily so.
194e	**SOCRATES** ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ᾖ, ὃ δὴ ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ πάσσοφος ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρὸν εὐμαθεῖς μέν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, τἀναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθῶδές τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἴσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά· βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι. ἀσαφῆ [195a] δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ γίγνεται ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ' ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ᾖ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐάν του σμικρὸν ᾖ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ.	**SOCRATES** Now when someone's heart is "shaggy"—the thing the all-wise poet praised—or dirty, of impure wax, or very soft or hard: those with soft wax are quick to learn but forgetful, and those with hard wax the opposite. Those whose wax is shaggy and rough, something stony, full of earth or dirt mixed in, get unclear imprints. So do those with hard wax, since there's no depth in it. And those with soft wax get [195a] unclear imprints too, because they quickly run together and blur. And if, on top of all this, the imprints are crowded on top of one another for lack of room, because someone's little soul is small, they're even less clear than those. So all these people turn out to be the sort who judge falsely.[39]
195a	ὅταν γάρ τι ὁρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, ἕκαστα ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ ἑκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ οὗτοι ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.	For when they see or hear or think of something, they can't quickly assign each thing to its own mark. They're slow, and because they assign things to the wrong places they mostly missee, mishear and misthink. And these people in turn are said to be deceived about the things that are, and ignorant.
195b	**THEAETETUS** ὀρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** Nobody could put it more rightly, Socrates.
	SOCRATES φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** Shall we say, then, that there are false judgments in us?
	THEAETETUS σφόδρα γε.	**THEAETETUS** Very much so.
	SOCRATES καὶ ἀληθεῖς δή;	**SOCRATES** And true ones too?
	THEAETETUS καὶ ἀληθεῖς.	**THEAETETUS** True ones too.
	SOCRATES ἤδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἱκανῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τὼ δόξα;	

38 Greek *kear* ("heart") echoes *kēros* ("wax"); Homer uses the related word *kēr*.
39 Homer speaks of a hero's "shaggy heart" (e.g. *Iliad* 2.851)—a hairy chest, the sign of a brave man.

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	SOCRATES So do we now think it's been adequately agreed that both these kinds of judgment certainly exist?
THEAETETUS ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Emphatically.
SOCRATES δεινόν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης.	**SOCRATES** Theaetetus, a man who babbles really is a terrible and tiresome thing, it seems.
THEAETETUS τί δέ; πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες;	**THEAETETUS** What? What made you say that?
195c **SOCRATES** τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἕλκῃ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ᾗ δυσαπάλλακτος ἀφ' ἑκάστου λόγου;	**SOCRATES** I'm annoyed at my own slowness—and at what really is babbling. What else would you call it when someone drags arguments up and down because he's too dull to be convinced, and can't bear to let go of any of them?
THEAETETUS σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;	**THEAETETUS** But what are you annoyed about?
SOCRATES οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅτι ἀποκρινοῦμαι ἄν τις ἔρηταί με· "ὦ Σώκρατες, ηὕρηκας δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ' 195d ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν;" φήσω δὲ ἐγὼ οἶμαι καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς τι ηὑρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.	**SOCRATES** I'm not just annoyed; I'm also afraid of what I'll answer if someone asks me: "Socrates, so you've discovered false judgment: it's not in perceptions in relation to each other, nor 195d in thoughts, but in the fitting of perception to thought?" I expect I'll say yes, preening myself as though we'd discovered something fine.
195d **THEAETETUS** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.	**THEAETETUS** It seems to me, Socrates, that what we've just shown is nothing to be ashamed of.
SOCRATES "οὐκοῦν," φησί, "λέγεις ὅτι αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ' οὔ, ἵππον οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὃν αὖ οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἁπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ;" ταῦτα οἶμαι φήσω λέγειν.	**SOCRATES** "Then," he'll say, "you're claiming that we could never think a man we're only thinking of, and not seeing, is a horse, which again we neither see nor touch but only think of, without perceiving anything else about it?" I expect I'll say that's what I mean.
THEAETETUS καὶ ὀρθῶς γε.	**THEAETETUS** And rightly.
195e **SOCRATES** "τί οὖν," φησί, "τὰ ἕνδεκα ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ διανοεῖταί τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι ἃ μόνον αὖ διανοεῖται;" ἴθι οὖν δή, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.	**SOCRATES** "Well then," he'll say, "by this argument, wouldn't it follow that someone could never think that eleven, which he does nothing but think of, is twelve, which again he only thinks of?" Come on, then—you answer.
THEAETETUS ἀλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἄν τις ἢ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἕνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειεν οὕτως.	**THEAETETUS** Well, I'll answer that someone who sees or touches eleven things might think they're twelve, but that about the eleven and twelve he has in his thought he could never judge that.
SOCRATES τί οὖν; οἴει τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ πέντε καὶ 196a ἑπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, ἅ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ	**SOCRATES** Really? Take five and 196a seven. Do you think anyone has ever considered, in his own mind—I don't mean setting out seven men and five to look at, or anything like that, but five and seven

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εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ μέν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἕνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἢ πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι;

themselves, which we say are records there in the wax block, about which there can be no false judgment—has anyone ever considered these very things, talking to himself and asking how many they are, and one person thought and said they were eleven, and another twelve? Or does everyone say and think they're twelve?

196b **THEAETETUS** οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἕνδεκα· ἐὰν δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπῆται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

THEAETETUS No, by Zeus. Plenty say eleven. And if you consider it with larger numbers, people go wrong more often. I take it you're talking about numbers in general.

SOCRATES ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει· καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τι τότε γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἕνδεκα οἰηθῆναι.

SOCRATES You take it rightly. And consider whether what happens then is anything other than thinking that the twelve itself, the one in the wax block, is eleven.

THEAETETUS ἔοικέ γε.

THEAETETUS It seems so.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθών, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται εἶναι ὧν αὖ οἶδεν, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι 196c ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα.

SOCRATES Then doesn't that bring us back to our first arguments? Anyone to whom this happens thinks that something he knows is another of the things he knows, which we said was impossible. And that was exactly how we were forced to say that there's no 196c false judgment: so that the same person wouldn't be forced to know and not know the same things at the same time.

196c **THEAETETUS** ἀληθέστατα.

THEAETETUS Very true.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλλαγήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς δόξα, ἢ ἃ τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων πότερα αἱρῇ;

SOCRATES Then we have to show that judging falsely is something other than a mismatch of thought with perception. If that were what it was, we'd never be deceived in our thoughts by themselves. As things stand, either there's no false judgment, or it's possible not to know what one knows. Which of these do you choose?

THEAETETUS ἄπορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ Σώκρατες.

THEAETETUS That's no choice at all, Socrates.

196d **SOCRATES** ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὅμως δέ—πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον—τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν;

SOCRATES And yet the argument will probably not allow both. Still—since we must dare everything—what if we tried being shameless?

THEAETETUS πῶς;

THEAETETUS How?

SOCRATES ἐθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποῖόν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

SOCRATES By being willing to say what knowing is like.

THEAETETUS καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

THEAETETUS And what's shameless about that?

SOCRATES You don't seem to realize that our whole discussion from the start has been a search

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	SOCRATES ἔοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι τί ποτ' ἐστίν.	for knowledge, on the assumption that we don't know what it is.
	THEAETETUS ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** No, I do realize it.
	SOCRATES ἔπειτ' οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ [196e] Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ "γιγνώσκομεν" καὶ "οὐ γιγνώσκομεν," καὶ "ἐπιστάμεθα" καὶ "οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα," ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ' αὖ τῷ "ἀγνοεῖν" τε καὶ "συνιέναι," ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.	**SOCRATES** Then don't you think it's shameless, when we don't know what knowledge is, to declare what knowing is like? But in fact, [196e] Theaetetus, we've been infected all along with an impure way of talking. Countless times we've said "we know" and "we don't know," "we have knowledge" and "we don't have knowledge," as if we understood each other at all while we're still ignorant of knowledge. And, if you like, even at this very moment we've used "be ignorant" and "understand" again, as if it were proper for us to use them when we lack knowledge.
196e	**THEAETETUS** ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος;	**THEAETETUS** But how will you carry on a discussion, Socrates, if you keep away from these words?
197a	**SOCRATES** οὐδένα ὧν γε ὃς εἰμί, εἰ μέντοι ἦ ἀντιλογικός· οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ' ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμεν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου τι ἂν γενέσθαι.	**SOCRATES** Not at all, being the man I am—though I could if I were an expert in contradiction. If a man like that were here now, he'd tell us to keep away from them, and he'd come down hard on us for the things I'm saying. But since we're no good at it, do you want me to be bold and say what knowing is like? I think it might be of some use.
	THEAETETUS τόλμα τοίνυν νὴ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.	**THEAETETUS** Be bold, then, by Zeus. You'll be fully forgiven for not keeping away from those words.

THE AVIARY

The mind is pictured as an aviary of pieces of knowledge, where one can catch the wrong bird.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσιν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;	**SOCRATES** Well, have you heard what people nowadays say knowing is?
	THEAETETUS ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.	**THEAETETUS** Perhaps; but I don't remember at the moment.
197b	**SOCRATES** ἐπιστήμης που ἕξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** They say, I think, that it's the having of knowledge.
	THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ.	**THEAETETUS** That's true.
	SOCRATES ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν.	**SOCRATES** Well, let's make a small change and say it's the possession of knowledge.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν;	**THEAETETUS** And how will you say that differs from the other?
	SOCRATES ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε.	**SOCRATES** Perhaps not at all. But hear what I think and help me test it.
	THEAETETUS ἐάνπερ γε οἷός τ' ὦ.	**THEAETETUS** If I can.
	SOCRATES οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ἔχειν. οἷον ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατὴς ὢν μὴ φορῶν, ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαί γε μὴν φαῖμεν.	**SOCRATES** Well, to me possessing doesn't look the same as having. For example, if someone bought a cloak and it was his to use but he wasn't wearing it, we wouldn't say he had it, though we would say he possessed it.
	THEAETETUS ὀρθῶς γε.	**THEAETETUS** Rightly.
197c	**SOCRATES** ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας, περιστερὰς ἤ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι, τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἄν πού τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Now see whether it's possible in the same way to possess knowledge without having it. Suppose someone hunted wild birds—pigeons or some other kind—and kept them in an aviary he'd built at home. In one sense we might say he always has them, because he possesses them, mightn't we?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τρόπον δέ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν ἐπειδὰν 197d βούληται, θηρευσαμένῳ ἣν ἂν ἀεὶ ἐθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὁποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.	**SOCRATES** But in another sense he has none of them. Rather, he's acquired a power over them, since he's brought them under his control in an enclosure of his own: he can take them and hold them whenever 197d he wants, catching whichever one he likes, and let them go again, and he's free to do this as often as he sees fit.
197d	**THEAETETUS** ἔστι ταῦτα.	**THEAETETUS** That's so.
	SOCRATES πάλιν δή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας.	**SOCRATES** Once again, then: just as before we built a wax model of some kind in our souls—I don't know what— let's now make in each soul a kind of aviary of all sorts of birds, some in flocks apart from the others, some in small groups, and some alone, flying among all the rest wherever they happen to go.
197e	**THEAETETUS** πεποιήσθω δή. ἀλλὰ τί τοὐντεῦθεν;	**THEAETETUS** Consider it made. But what next?
	SOCRATES παιδίων μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρὴ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἣν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ ηὑρηκέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ' εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** We must say that while we're children this container is empty, and think of pieces of knowledge in place of the birds. Whatever piece of knowledge someone acquires and shuts up in the enclosure, we must say he has learned or discovered the thing this knowledge was of, and that this is what knowing is.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS ἔστω.	**THEAETETUS** Let's say so.
198a	**SOCRATES** τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἣν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὖθις ἀφιέναι σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ὅτε ἐκτᾶτο εἴτε ἑτέρων. μαθήσῃ δ' ἐνθένδε σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνην;	**SOCRATES** Now consider what words are needed for hunting again for whichever piece of knowledge he wants, taking and holding it, and letting it go again—whether the same ones as when he first acquired it, or different ones. You'll understand what I mean more clearly from this. You call arithmetic an art, don't you?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.	**SOCRATES** Then take it to be a hunt for pieces of knowledge of everything odd and even.
	THEAETETUS ὑπολαμβάνω.	**THEAETETUS** I take it that way.
	SOCRATES ταύτῃ δὴ οἶμαι τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχειρίους τὰς 198b ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς.	**SOCRATES** And it's by this art, I think, that someone both has the 198b pieces of knowledge of numbers under his control himself, and hands them on to someone else, if he hands them on.
198b	**THEAETETUS** ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.	**SOCRATES** And we call handing them on "teaching," taking them over "learning," and having them, by possessing them in that aviary, "knowing."
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἥδη πρόσσχες τὸν νοῦν. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὢν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσιν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι.	**SOCRATES** Now pay attention to what follows. The complete arithmetician knows all numbers, doesn't he? He has pieces of knowledge of all numbers in his soul.
	THEAETETUS τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
198c	**SOCRATES** ἦ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἄν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὑτὸν αὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμόν;	**SOCRATES** Then would such a person ever count anything—either numbers themselves, to himself, or some external thing that has number?
	THEAETETUS πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	**THEAETETUS** Of course he would.
	SOCRATES τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὤν.	**SOCRATES** And we'll say that counting is nothing other than examining how large some number happens to be.
	THEAETETUS οὕτως.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ὃ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὡμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι. ἀκούεις γάρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.	**SOCRATES** Then it appears that the man we agreed knows every number is examining what he knows as if he didn't know it. I'm sure you've heard such puzzles argued.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** I have.
198d	**SOCRATES** οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστερῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐροῦμεν ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτως δὲ καὶ ὧν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;	**SOCRATES** So, drawing our likeness from the possessing and hunting of pigeons, we'll say the hunting was of two kinds: one before possession, for the sake of possessing; the other, once one possesses them, to take and hold in one's hands what one possessed long ago. In the same way, with things he had pieces of knowledge of long ago, having learned them, and knew—isn't it possible to learn these very same things again, by taking up the knowledge of each and holding it, knowledge he possessed long ago but didn't have ready to hand in his thought?
	THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ.	**THEAETETUS** True.
198e	**SOCRATES** τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, ὅπως χρὴ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων ἴῃ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἤ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικός, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἆρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἃ ἐπίσταται;	**SOCRATES** That's just what I was asking a moment ago: how should we use our words in speaking of this, when the arithmetician sets out to count or the man who knows his letters to read something? Should we say that in such a case, although he knows, he comes to learn again from himself what he knows?
	THEAETETUS ἀλλ' ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** But that's absurd, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεσθαι [199a] καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;	**SOCRATES** Then should we say he'll read [199a] and count what he doesn't know, when we've granted that he knows all the letters and every number?
199a	**THEAETETUS** ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄλογον.	**THEAETETUS** That's unreasonable too.
	SOCRATES βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἕλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡρισάμεθα ἕτερον μέν τι τὸ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μέν τις ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι, ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὅ τις οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ μέντοι δόξαν οἷόν τ' εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν;	**SOCRATES** Then do you want us to say that we don't care about the words—let anyone drag "knowing" and "learning" wherever he likes—but since we've defined possessing knowledge as one thing and having it as another, we say it's impossible for someone not to possess what he possesses, so that it never happens that someone doesn't know what he knows, and yet it is possible to get a false judgment about it?
199b	μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἷόν τε, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν ἀντ' ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινά πού ποτ' ἐπιστήμην διαπετομένων ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἁμαρτὼν λάβῃ, τότε ἄρα τὰ ἕνδεκα δώδεκα ᾠήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἕνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβὼν τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.	For it's possible not to have the knowledge of that thing but another instead of it: when, hunting for some piece of knowledge as they fly about, he misses and takes one instead of another. That's when he thought eleven was twelve: he took the knowledge of eleven instead of the knowledge of twelve, the one inside him—a ring dove, as it were, instead of a pigeon.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS ἔχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, that makes sense.
	SOCRATES ὅταν δέ γε ἣν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβῃ, ἀψευδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τε καὶ 199c ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν μοι συμφήσεις· ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;	**SOCRATES** But when he takes the one he's trying to take, then he's free of deception and judges what is. And so there is both true and 199c false judgment, and none of the things that troubled us earlier stands in the way? Perhaps you'll agree with me. Or what will you do?
199c	**THEAETETUS** οὕτως.	**THEAETETUS** I agree.
	SOCRATES καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.	**SOCRATES** Yes, we're rid of the business of people not knowing what they know; for it no longer turns out anywhere that we don't possess what we possess, whether we're deceived about something or not. But I think another, stranger difficulty is coming into view.
	THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον;	**THEAETETUS** What's that?
	SOCRATES εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδὴς γενήσεταί ποτε δόξα.	**SOCRATES** Whether a swap of pieces of knowledge could ever turn out to be false judgment.
	THEAETETUS πῶς δή;	**THEAETETUS** How do you mean?
199d	**SOCRATES** πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνῃ ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγενομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ποιήσει.	**SOCRATES** First, that someone who has knowledge of something should be ignorant of that very thing—not through lack of knowledge but through his own knowledge. Then, that he should judge this thing to be that, and that to be this. Isn't it utterly unreasonable that when knowledge comes to it the soul should recognize nothing and be ignorant of everything? By this argument nothing stops ignorance, when it comes, from making someone know something, and blindness from making him see—if knowledge is ever going to make someone ignorant.
199e	**THEAETETUS** ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὄρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.	**THEAETETUS** Perhaps, Socrates, we weren't right to make the birds only pieces of knowledge. We should have put pieces of ignorance in the soul too, flying about along with them. Then the hunter, catching now a piece of knowledge and now a piece of ignorance of the same thing, judges falsely by the ignorance and truly by the knowledge.
	SOCRATES οὐ ῥᾴδιόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε· ὃ μέντοι εἶπες πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν 200a ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῆ μέν, φῄς, δοξάσει. ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** It's not easy not to praise you, Theaetetus. But look again at what you said. Let it be as you say: then the man who catches the 200a piece of ignorance will judge falsely, you say. Right?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
200a	**THEAETETUS** ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐ δήπου καὶ ἡγήσεταί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.	**SOCRATES** But surely he won't also believe he's judging falsely.
	THEAETETUS πῶς γάρ;	**THEAETETUS** Of course not.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται.	**SOCRATES** No—truly; and he'll be in the frame of mind of someone who knows about the things he's deceived about.
	THEAETETUS τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἰήσεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.	**SOCRATES** So he'll think he's caught and has a piece of knowledge, not a piece of ignorance.
	THEAETETUS δῆλον.	**THEAETETUS** Clearly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει· 200b "πότερον," ὦ βέλτιστοι, "ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν οἶδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεταί τινα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτὴν εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δ' οὔ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις 200c περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἕωσπερ ἂν κεκτῆται ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταὐτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες;" τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινούμεθα;	**SOCRATES** So after going a long way round we're back at our first puzzle. That expert in refutation will laugh and say: 200b "My excellent friends, does someone who knows both, a piece of knowledge and a piece of ignorance, think the one he knows is another of the ones he knows? Or, knowing neither, does he judge the one he doesn't know to be another of the ones he doesn't know? Or, knowing one and not the other, does he judge the one he knows to be the one he doesn't? Or believe the one he doesn't know is the one he knows? Or will you tell me again that there are pieces of knowledge of the pieces of knowledge and ignorance, which their possessor has shut up in some other ridiculous 200c aviaries or wax models, and knows as long as he possesses them, even if he doesn't have them ready to hand in his soul? Will you be forced in this way to keep running round to the same place countless times and get nowhere?" What shall we answer to that, Theaetetus?
200c	**THEAETETUS** ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.	**THEAETETUS** By Zeus, Socrates, I don't know what to say.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν 200d ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι πρὶν ἄν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.	**SOCRATES** Well then, my boy, isn't the argument right to rebuke us, and to point out that we're wrong to look for false judgment before 200d knowledge, and let knowledge go? It's impossible to understand false judgment until one has adequately grasped what knowledge is.
200d	**THEAETETUS** ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι.	**THEAETETUS** As things stand, Socrates, I have to think it's as you say.

TRUE JUDGMENT WITH AN ACCOUNT

Jurors judge truly without knowing, so Theaetetus proposes that knowledge is true judgment with an account.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω;	**SOCRATES** Then what will someone say knowledge is, starting again from the beginning? Surely we're not going to give up yet?
	THEAETETUS ἥκιστα, ἐάνπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύῃς.	**THEAETETUS** Not at all—unless you give up.
	SOCRATES λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;	**SOCRATES** Tell me, then: what could we say it is that would least contradict ourselves?
200e	**THEAETETUS** ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.	**THEAETETUS** What we tried before, Socrates. I don't have anything else.
	SOCRATES τὸ ποῖον;	**SOCRATES** What was that?
	THEAETETUS τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστιν τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.	**THEAETETUS** That true judgment is knowledge. Judging truly is surely free of error, and everything that comes of it turns out fine and good.
	SOCRATES ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχ' ἂν 201a ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνειεν τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν.	**SOCRATES** The man leading the way across the river, Theaetetus, said, "It will show you." So with this: if we go on and search into it, it may turn up 201a in our path and reveal what we're looking for; if we stay put, nothing will become clear.[40]
201a	**THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἴωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν.	**THEAETETUS** You're right. Let's go on and examine it.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.	**SOCRATES** Well, this won't take long to examine. There's a whole art that tells you it isn't knowledge.
	THEAETETUS πῶς δή; καὶ τίς αὕτη;	**THEAETETUS** How so? What art is that?
	SOCRATES ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσιν ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἴει δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, 201b ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἤ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;	**SOCRATES** The art of the greatest in wisdom—the people called orators and lawyers. They persuade by their art, I think, not by teaching but by making people judge whatever they want. Or do you think there are teachers so clever 201b that, in the little time the water clock allows, they can adequately teach the truth of what happened to people who weren't there when others were robbed of money or suffered some other violence?
201b	**THEAETETUS** οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μέν.	**THEAETETUS** I don't think so at all; but they can persuade them.
	SOCRATES τὸ πεῖσαι δ' οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;	

40 A proverb: asked how deep the river was, the guide answered that wading in would show.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		SOCRATES And by "persuade" don't you mean "make them judge"?
	THEAETETUS τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσιν δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ [201c] ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;	**SOCRATES** Then when jurors are justly persuaded about things only an eyewitness can know, and no one else, then, judging these things from [201c] hearsay and getting a true judgment, they've judged without knowledge, though they were rightly persuaded, if they gave a good verdict?
201c	**THEAETETUS** παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES οὐκ ἄν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτ' ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἑκάτερον εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** But, my friend, if true judgment and knowledge were the same, even in the law courts, the best of jurors would never judge correctly without knowledge. As it is, they seem to be two different things.
	THEAETETUS ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ· ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου [201d] ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστητά.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, Socrates—I'd forgotten it, but I heard someone say this, and now I'm thinking of it. He said that true judgment with an account [201d] is knowledge, and that true judgment without an account falls outside knowledge. And things of which there is no account are not knowable—that was the very word he used—while those that have one are knowable.
201d	**SOCRATES** ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα καὶ μὴ πῇ διῄρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ σύ τε κἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν.	**SOCRATES** That's well said. But tell me how he distinguished these knowable and unknowable things, so we can see whether you and I have heard the same version.
	THEAETETUS ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μεντἂν ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμ' ἄν.	**THEAETETUS** I don't know whether I'll be able to work it out; but if someone else stated it, I think I could follow.

THE DREAM

A theory holds that elements are unknowable and complexes knowable; Socrates tests it on letters and syllables.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν [201e] ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ [202a] ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ "αὐτὸ" οὐδὲ τὸ "ἐκεῖνο" οὐδὲ τὸ "ἕκαστον" οὐδὲ τὸ "μόνον" οὐδὲ "τοῦτο" προσοιστέον οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν	**SOCRATES** Then listen to a dream in return for a dream. I too seemed [201e] to hear some people say that the first elements, as it were, of which we and everything else are composed, have no account. Each of them, itself by itself, can only be named; nothing else can be said of it, neither that it is nor that it is not, for then being or not-being would [202a] already be attached to it, whereas nothing must be added if one is to speak of that thing alone. Not even "itself" or "that" or "each" or "alone" or "this"

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων λέγεσθαι.	should be added, nor many other such words. For these run around and attach to everything, being different from the things they're added to; whereas if it were possible to express the element itself, and it had an account all its own, it would have to be expressed without all the others.[41]
202a	νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι [202b] ὁτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον—ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν—τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, [202c] ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ' οὔ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. οὕτως σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;	As it is, it's impossible for [202b] any of the first things to be expressed in an account: it can only be named, since a name is all it has. But with the things composed of them, just as they themselves are woven together, so their names woven together become an account, since a weaving together of names is what an account is. So the elements are without an account and unknowable, but perceivable, while the syllables are knowable and expressible and can be judged with true judgment. So when someone gets a true judgment of something without an account, [202c] his soul is truthful about it but doesn't know it; for anyone who can't give and receive an account of a thing lacks knowledge of it. But when he has added an account, he has become capable of all this and is perfectly placed for knowledge. Is that how you heard the dream, or differently?
202c	THEAETETUS οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.	THEAETETUS Exactly like that.
	SOCRATES ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;	SOCRATES So you're satisfied, and you put it this way: that true judgment with an account is knowledge?
	THEAETETUS κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.	THEAETETUS Absolutely.
202d	SOCRATES ἆρ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγήρασαν;	SOCRATES Have we, Theaetetus, now, on this very day, caught what many wise men have long been searching for and grown old before finding?
	THEAETETUS ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.	THEAETETUS It seems to me, at any rate, Socrates, that what's just been said is well said.
	SOCRATES καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἓν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.	SOCRATES And it's likely that this very thing is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from an account and correct judgment? But one of the things that were said displeases me.
	THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον δή;	THEAETETUS Which one?
	SOCRATES ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν [202e] στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστόν.	SOCRATES The very one that seems to have been said most cleverly: that the [202e] elements are un-

41 Greek *stoicheion* means both "element" and "letter of the alphabet," and *syllabē* both "syllable" and "combination"; the discussion that follows plays on both senses.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		knowable, but the kind made up of syllables is knowable.
202e	THEAETETUS οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;	THEAETETUS Isn't that right?
	SOCRATES ἰστέον δή· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.	SOCRATES We must find out. We have as hostages, so to speak, for the theory the examples he used when he said all this.
	THEAETETUS ποῖα δή;	THEAETETUS What examples?
	SOCRATES τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἴει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἃ λέγομεν;	SOCRATES The elements of writing—the letters—and syllables. Or do you think the person who said what we're discussing had anything else in view when he said it?
	THEAETETUS οὔκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.	THEAETETUS No, just these.
203a	SOCRATES βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἆρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;	SOCRATES Then let's take them up again and put them to the test—or rather ourselves: did we learn our letters this way or not? Come on, first: do syllables have an account, while elements have none?
	THEAETETUS ἴσως.	THEAETETUS Perhaps.
	SOCRATES πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὑτωσί· "ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι ΣΩ"; τί ἀποκρινῇ;	SOCRATES It certainly looks that way to me too. At any rate, if someone asked you about the first syllable of "Socrates" like this: "Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO?" what will you answer?
	THEAETETUS ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ.	THEAETETUS That it's sigma and omega.[42]
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;	SOCRATES So that's your account of the syllable?
	THEAETETUS ἔγωγε.	THEAETETUS It is.
203b	SOCRATES ἴθι δή, οὕτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σῖγμα λόγον.	SOCRATES Come on, then, give me the account of sigma in the same way.
	THEAETETUS καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἑπτὰ φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ' ὁντινοῦν.	THEAETETUS But how can anyone give the elements of an element? Besides, Socrates, sigma is one of the voiceless letters—just a noise, like the tongue hissing—and beta has neither voice nor noise, and neither do most of the elements. So it's quite right to say they have no account, since even the clearest of them, the seven themselves, have only voice, and no account at all.[43]
	SOCRATES τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης.	SOCRATES Then this, my friend, is something we've got right about knowledge.

42 Theaetetus uses the Greek letter names: sigma is S and omega a long O; below, beta is B, and later theta is TH, epsilon E and tau T—theta being a single letter in Greek.
43 The seven are the vowels of the Greek alphabet.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS φαινόμεθα.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
203c	**SOCRATES** τί δέ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ἆρ' ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα;	**SOCRATES** What about this? Have we been right to declare that the element isn't knowable, but the syllable is?
	THEAETETUS εἰκός γε.	**THEAETETUS** It seems likely.
	SOCRATES φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ᾖ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;	**SOCRATES** Come, then: do we say the syllable is both elements—or, if there are more than two, all of them—or some single form that has come into being when they're put together?
	THEAETETUS τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.	**THEAETETUS** I think we mean all of them.
	SOCRATES ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι ὁ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;	**SOCRATES** Then consider the case of two, sigma and omega. Together they're the first syllable of my name. Doesn't someone who knows the syllable know both of them?
203d	**THEAETETUS** τί μήν;	**THEAETETUS** Of course.
	SOCRATES τὸ σῖγμα καὶ τὸ ὦ ἄρα γιγνώσκει.	**SOCRATES** So he knows sigma and omega.
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί δ'; ἑκάτερον ἆρ' ἀγνοεῖ καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;	**SOCRATES** What? Is he ignorant of each, and does he know both while knowing neither?
	THEAETETUS ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες.	**THEAETETUS** But that's monstrous and absurd, Socrates.
	SOCRATES ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται.	**SOCRATES** And yet if one has to know each in order to know both, then anyone who is ever going to know a syllable absolutely must know the elements first; and so our fine theory will have run off and vanished.
203e	**THEAETETUS** καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης.	**THEAETETUS** And very suddenly too.
	SOCRATES οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.	**SOCRATES** Because we're not guarding it well. Perhaps we should have made the syllable not the elements but some single form that has come into being out of them, with one character of its own, different from the elements.
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γ' ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ 'κείνως ἔχοι.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly. And perhaps it's more like that than the other way.
	SOCRATES σκεπτέον καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.	**SOCRATES** We must look into it, and not betray a great and imposing theory in such a cowardly way.
	THEAETETUS οὐ γὰρ οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** No, we mustn't.

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204a	**SOCRATES** ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμεν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι.	**SOCRATES** Then let it be as we now say: the syllable is a single form arising from the several elements fitted together, in letters and in everything else alike.
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.	**SOCRATES** Then it mustn't have parts.
	THEAETETUS τί δή;	**THEAETETUS** Why?
	SOCRATES ὅτι οὗ ἂν ᾖ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἕν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;	**SOCRATES** Because where something has parts, the whole must be all the parts. Or do you say that the whole, too, which has come to be from the parts, is a single form different from all the parts?
	THEAETETUS ἔγωγε.	**THEAETETUS** I do.
	SOCRATES τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταὐτὸν καλεῖς ἢ [204b] ἕτερον ἑκάτερον;	**SOCRATES** And do you call the sum and the whole the same thing, or [204b] each different from the other?
204b	**THEAETETUS** ἔχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον.	**THEAETETUS** I have nothing clear to say. But since you tell me to answer readily, I'll take the risk and say they're different.
	SOCRATES ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.	**SOCRATES** Your readiness, Theaetetus, is right. Whether your answer is too, we must look into.
	THEAETETUS δεῖ γε δή.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, we must.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος;	**SOCRATES** Then the whole would differ from the sum, according to the present argument?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἓσθ' ὅτι διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἕν, δύο, τρία, τέτταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ [204c] ἐὰν δὶς τρία ἢ τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν;	**SOCRATES** Well then: is there any difference between all the things and the sum? For example, when we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or [204c] twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one—are we saying the same thing in all these cases, or something different?
204c	**THEAETETUS** τὸ αὐτό.	**THEAETETUS** The same.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;	**SOCRATES** Anything other than six?
	THEAETETUS οὐδέν.	**THEAETETUS** Nothing.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἑκάστης λέξεως πάντα ἓξ εἰρήκαμεν;	**SOCRATES** So with each expression we've said all six?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES πᾶν δ' οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;	

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		SOCRATES And when we say all of them, aren't we speaking of a sum?
	THEAETETUS ἀνάγκη.	**THEAETETUS** We must be.
	SOCRATES ἦ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ;	**SOCRATES** Anything other than the six?
	THEAETETUS οὐδέν.	**THEAETETUS** Nothing.
204d	**SOCRATES** ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστι τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα;	**SOCRATES** So in things that consist of number, at least, what we call the sum and all the things are the same?
	THEAETETUS φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES ὧδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταὐτόν· ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** Then let's talk about them like this. The number of a plethron and the plethron are the same, aren't they?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως.	**SOCRATES** And the number of a stadion, likewise.
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὂν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστιν.	**SOCRATES** And again the number of an army and the army, and all such things alike? For in each case the whole number is all that the thing is.
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
204e	**SOCRATES** ὁ δὲ ἑκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ μέρη ἐστίν;	**SOCRATES** And is the number of each anything other than parts?
	THEAETETUS οὐδέν.	**THEAETETUS** Nothing.
	SOCRATES ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη;	**SOCRATES** So whatever has parts would consist of parts?
	THEAETETUS φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὡμολόγηται, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσται.	**SOCRATES** And it's been agreed that all the parts are the sum, if the whole number is to be the sum.
	THEAETETUS οὕτως.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τὸ ὅλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὰ πάντα ὂν μέρη.	**SOCRATES** Then the whole doesn't consist of parts. For then it would be a sum, being all the parts.
	THEAETETUS οὐκ ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** It seems not.
	SOCRATES μέρος δ' ἔσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὅλου;	**SOCRATES** But is a part, as such, a part of anything other than the whole?
	THEAETETUS τοῦ παντός γε.	**THEAETETUS** Of the sum, yes.
205a		

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	SOCRATES ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχῃ. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστιν;	**SOCRATES** You're putting up a manly fight, Theaetetus. But isn't the sum, when nothing is missing, precisely that—a sum?
	THEAETETUS ἀνάγκη.	**THEAETETUS** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὗ ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὗ δ' ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;	**SOCRATES** And won't a whole be this same thing—that from which nothing is missing anywhere? And whatever has something missing is neither a whole nor a sum, both at once, for the same reason?
	THEAETETUS δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.	**THEAETETUS** It seems to me now that sum and whole don't differ at all.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὗ ἂν μέρη ᾖ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;	**SOCRATES** Weren't we saying that where there are parts, the whole and the sum will be all the parts?
	THEAETETUS πάνυ γε.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES πάλιν δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ [205b] συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταὐτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** Then again, as I was trying to show just now: if the [205b] syllable is not the elements, mustn't it follow that it doesn't have the elements as its parts? Or else, if it's the same as them, that it's just as knowable as they are?
205b	**THEAETETUS** οὕτως.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα;	**SOCRATES** And it was to avoid that, wasn't it, that we made the syllable different from them?
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES τί δ'; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἄττα εἰπεῖν ἃ μέρη μέν ἐστι συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γ' ἐκείνης;	**SOCRATES** Well then, if the elements aren't parts of the syllable, can you name some other things that are parts of a syllable but aren't its elements?
	THEAETETUS οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μόρι' ἄττ' αὐτῆς συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἰέναι.	**THEAETETUS** Not at all. If I granted it had some parts, Socrates, it would surely be ridiculous to set aside the elements and go looking for other things.
205c	**SOCRATES** παντάπασι δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη.	**SOCRATES** Then, Theaetetus, by the present argument a syllable would be altogether a single, indivisible form.
	THEAETETUS ἔοικεν.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος ἐξ ὧν τἆλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ "εἶναι" περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ "τοῦτο," ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ;	**SOCRATES** Then do you remember, my friend, that a little earlier we accepted, thinking it well said, that there's no account of the first things of which the rest are composed, because each, itself by itself, is not composite; that it isn't correct even to attach "being" to it when speaking of it, nor "this," since these are said as things different from

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		it and foreign to it; and that this was the reason that made it without an account and unknowable?
	THEAETETUS μέμνημαι.	**THEAETETUS** I remember.
205d	**SOCRATES** ἦ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τε καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ ἄλλην.	**SOCRATES** Is there any reason other than this for its being single in form and indivisible? I don't see any other.
	THEAETETUS οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.	**THEAETETUS** No, there doesn't seem to be.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;	**SOCRATES** So hasn't the syllable fallen into the same class as the element, if it has no parts and is a single form?
	THEAETETUS παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Absolutely.
	SOCRATES εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβή ἐστιν καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἵ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτὸν ἐφάνη.	**SOCRATES** So if the syllable is many elements and a kind of whole, with these as its parts, then syllables and elements are alike knowable and expressible, since all the parts turned out to be the same as the whole.
205e	**THEAETETUS** καὶ μάλα.	**THEAETETUS** Very much so.
	SOCRATES εἰ δέ γε ἕν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.	**SOCRATES** But if it's one and without parts, then a syllable and an element alike are without an account and unknowable; the same cause will make them so.
	THEAETETUS οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.	**THEAETETUS** I can't say otherwise.
	SOCRATES τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοὐναντίον.	**SOCRATES** Then let's not accept it from anyone who says a syllable is knowable and expressible, and an element the opposite.
	THEAETETUS μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.	**THEAETETUS** No, if we're persuaded by the argument.
206a	**SOCRATES** τί δ' αὖ; τοὐναντίον λέγοντος ἆρ' οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;	**SOCRATES** And what about this? If someone said the opposite, wouldn't you be more ready to accept it, from what you know of your own experience in learning your letters?
	THEAETETUS τὸ ποῖον;	**THEAETETUS** What experience?
	SOCRATES ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.	**SOCRATES** That all through your learning you did nothing but try to tell the elements apart, each itself by itself, by sight and by hearing, so that their order wouldn't confuse you when they were spoken or written.
	THEAETETUS ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.	**THEAETETUS** That's very true.

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	SOCRATES ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν ἄλλο τι [206b] ἢν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἑκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη· ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;	**SOCRATES** And at the lyre teacher's, was having learned completely anything other [206b] than being able to follow each note and tell which string it came from? And everyone would agree that these are called the elements of music.
206b	**THEAETETUS** οὐδὲν ἄλλο.	**THEAETETUS** Nothing else.
	SOCRATES ὧν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροί ἐσμεν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μάθημα, καὶ ἐάν τις φῇ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτόν.	**SOCRATES** So from the elements and syllables we ourselves have experience of, if we're to infer from them to the rest, we'll say that the class of elements gives a knowledge far clearer than the syllable does, and more decisive for completely grasping each subject; and if anyone says that a syllable is by nature knowable and an element unknowable, we'll think he's joking, whether he means to or not.
	THEAETETUS κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Absolutely.
206c	**SOCRATES** ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅτι δή ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.	**SOCRATES** Well, I think still other proofs of this could be found. But let's not let them make us forget to look at the question before us: what can it mean to say that an account, added to true judgment, makes knowledge in its most complete form?
	THEAETETUS οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, we must look at that.

THREE MEANINGS OF ACCOUNT

Account as speech, as a list of elements, or as a distinguishing mark: each fails, and the inquiry ends.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἕν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.	**SOCRATES** Come then: what does "account" mean to tell us? I think it means one of three things.
	THEAETETUS τίνων δή;	**THEAETETUS** Which three?
206d	**SOCRATES** τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;	**SOCRATES** The first would be making one's thought evident through sound, with verbs and nouns, imprinting one's judgment on the stream that flows through the mouth, as on a mirror or water. Or don't you think that sort of thing is an account?
	THEAETETUS ἔμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.	**THEAETETUS** I do. At any rate we say that someone who does that is speaking.
	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν αὖ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι τι ὀρθὸν [206e] δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου	**SOCRATES** Well, anyone can do that, sooner or later—show what he thinks about each thing—unless he's been mute or deaf from birth. And so everyone who judges something [206e] correctly will

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	φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.	turn out to have it with an account, and there will no longer be correct judgment anywhere without knowledge.
206e	**THEAETETUS** ἀληθῆ.	**THEAETETUS** True.
	SOCRATES μὴ τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ νῦν σκοποῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων [207a] ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ.	**SOCRATES** Then let's not be quick to condemn the person who declared that knowledge is what we're now examining, as if he'd said nothing. Perhaps that isn't what he meant, but rather being able, when asked what each thing is, to give an answer through its elements [207a] to the person asking.
207a	**THEAETETUS** οἷον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**THEAETETUS** Such as what, Socrates?
	SOCRATES οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἁμάξης λέγει τὸ "ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ' ἁμάξης." ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλ' ἀγαπῷμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὅτι ἐστὶν ἅμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν τροχοί, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν.	**SOCRATES** Such as Hesiod's line about a wagon: "A hundred timbers make a wagon." I couldn't name them, and I don't think you could either. But if asked what a wagon is, we'd be content if we could say: wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke.[44]
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES ὁ δέ γε ἴσως οἴοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ συλλαβήν, [207b] γελοίους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ὀνόματος λόγον· τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνῃ τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε που ἐρρήθη.	**SOCRATES** But he might think that we—just like people asked your name who answered syllable by syllable—were [207b] ridiculous: judging correctly and saying what we say, but thinking we were experts in letters and had and could state, as an expert in letters would, the account of the name "Theaetetus." Whereas speaking with knowledge, he'd say, isn't possible until one goes through each thing element by element, along with true judgment—as was said earlier, I think.
207b	**THEAETETUS** ἐρρήθη γάρ.	**THEAETETUS** Yes, it was.
	SOCRATES οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἁμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διελθεῖν [207c] αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἁμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα.	**SOCRATES** In the same way, then, we have a correct judgment about a wagon, but the one who can go through [207c] what it is by way of those hundred parts has, by adding this, added an account to his true judgment; instead of merely judging, he's become an expert and a knower about what a wagon is, having gone through the whole by way of its elements.
207c	**THEAETETUS** οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες;	**THEAETETUS** Don't you think that's right, Socrates?
	SOCRATES εἰ σοί, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχῃ τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ	**SOCRATES** If you think so, my friend, and accept that going through each thing element by element is its account, while going through it by syllables,

44 Hesiod, *Works and Days* 456.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό μοι λέγε, [207d] ἵν' αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.	or by still larger units, is lack of account, tell me, [207d] so that we can examine it.
207d	THEAETETUS ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι.	THEAETETUS Well, I certainly accept it.
	SOCRATES πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὁντινοῦν ὁτουοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ;	SOCRATES Do you, thinking that anyone at all knows anything at all when the same thing seems to him sometimes to belong to one thing and sometimes to another? Or when he judges now one thing, now another, to belong to the same thing?
	THEAETETUS μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.	THEAETETUS By Zeus, no, I don't.
	SOCRATES εἶτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτά;	SOCRATES Then have you forgotten that at the start of learning your letters, you and the others did just that?
	THEAETETUS ἆρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, [207e] τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβήν;	THEAETETUS Do you mean thinking that now one letter, [207e] now another belonged to the same syllable, and putting the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable and sometimes into another?
207e	SOCRATES ταῦτα λέγω.	SOCRATES That's what I mean.
	THEAETETUS μὰ Δί' οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ πω ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας.	THEAETETUS By Zeus, I haven't forgotten, then; and I don't think that people in that state have knowledge yet.
	SOCRATES τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ "Θεαίτητον" γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἶ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, [208a] καὶ αὖ "Θεόδωρον" ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ εἶ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἆρ' ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων συλλαβήν;	SOCRATES Well then: at such a stage, when someone writing "Theaetetus" thinks he should write theta and epsilon, and writes them, [208a] and again, trying to write "Theodorus," thinks he should write tau and epsilon, and writes them—will we say he knows the first syllable of your names?
208a	THEAETETUS ἀλλ' ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι.	THEAETETUS But we agreed just now that someone in that state doesn't know yet.
	SOCRATES κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν;	SOCRATES Does anything stop the same person being in that state about the second, third, and fourth syllables too?
	THEAETETUS οὐδέν γε.	THEAETETUS Nothing.
	SOCRATES ἆρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει "Θεαίτητον" μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἐξῆς γράφῃ;	SOCRATES Then when he writes "Theaetetus" in order, will he be writing it with correct judgment and with the going-through by elements?
	THEAETETUS δῆλον δή.	THEAETETUS Clearly.
208b	SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὤν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων, ὡς φαμεν;	SOCRATES While still lacking knowledge, though judging correctly, as we say?

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὡμολογήσαμεν.	**SOCRATES** And yet having an account along with correct judgment. For he wrote with the way through the elements, and that, we agreed, is an account.
	THEAETETUS ἀληθῆ.	**THEAETETUS** True.
	SOCRATES ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἣν οὔπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.	**SOCRATES** So, my friend, there is correct judgment with an account that we mustn't yet call knowledge.
	THEAETETUS κινδυνεύει.	**THEAETETUS** It looks that way.
	SOCRATES ὄναρ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἢ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν;	**SOCRATES** So it seems we got rich in a dream, thinking we had the truest account of knowledge. Or shouldn't we condemn it yet?
	ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις αὐτὸν ὁριεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἕν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.	Perhaps this isn't how someone will define "account," but as the remaining one of the three kinds, one of which, we said, would be proposed as account by whoever defines knowledge as correct judgment with an account.
208c	**THEAETETUS** ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἓν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἴδωλον, τὸ δ' ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;	**THEAETETUS** You've reminded me rightly: there's still one left. The first was a sort of image of thought in sound; the one just discussed was the way to the whole through the elements. What do you say the third is?
	SOCRATES ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.	**SOCRATES** What most people would say: being able to state some sign by which the thing asked about differs from everything else.
	THEAETETUS οἷον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν;	**THEAETETUS** Can you give me an example of such an account of something?
208d	**SOCRATES** οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.	**SOCRATES** For example, if you like, in the case of the sun, I think it's enough for you to accept that it's the brightest of the things that travel through the heavens around the earth.
	THEAETETUS πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	**THEAETETUS** Certainly.
	SOCRATES λαβὲ δὴ οὗ χάριν εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς φασί τινες, λήψῃ· ἕως δ' ἂν κοινοῦ τινος ἐφάπτῃ, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ᾖ.	**SOCRATES** Grasp the point of saying it. It's what we were saying just now: if you grasp the difference by which each thing differs from the others, you'll grasp its account, as some say; but as long as you touch on something common, your account will be about those things the common feature belongs to.
208e		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	THEAETETUS μανθάνω· καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.	**THEAETETUS** I understand; and I think it's right to call that sort of thing an account.
	SOCRATES ὃς δ' ἂν μετ' ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὁτουοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ, αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται οὗ πρότερον ἦν δοξαστής.	**SOCRATES** And whoever, together with correct judgment about any of the things that are, grasps in addition its difference from the others, will have become a knower of what he was previously only judging.
	THEAETETUS φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτω.	**THEAETETUS** That's what we say, anyway.
	SOCRATES νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε, ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, συνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφειστήκη πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι.	**SOCRATES** Well, Theaetetus, now that I've come up close to what's being said, as if to a piece of scene painting, I understand none of it at all; while I was standing far off, it seemed to me to make some sense.[45]
	THEAETETUS πῶς τί τοῦτο;	**THEAETETUS** How do you mean?
209a	**SOCRATES** φράσω, ἐὰν οἷός τε γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σὸν λόγον, γιγνώσκω δή σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον.	**SOCRATES** I'll tell you, if I can. If I have a correct judgment about you and add your account, then I know you; if not, I only judge you.
	THEAETETUS ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἑρμηνεία.	**SOCRATES** And an account was the expression of your differentness.
	THEAETETUS οὕτως.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.
	SOCRATES ἡνίκ' οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ᾧ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ;	**SOCRATES** So when I was only judging, wasn't it the case that I wasn't grasping in my thought any of the things by which you differ from others?
	THEAETETUS οὐκ ἔοικε.	**THEAETETUS** It seems not.
	SOCRATES τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διενοούμην, ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.	**SOCRATES** So I was thinking of one of the common things, which you have no more than anyone else.
209b	**THEAETETUS** ἀνάγκη.	**THEAETETUS** Necessarily.
	SOCRATES φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν; θὲς γάρ με διανοούμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ᾖ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχῃ ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον;	**SOCRATES** Come, then, by Zeus: how in that case was I judging you rather than anyone else? Suppose I'm thinking, "This is Theaetetus: whoever is a human being and has a nose and eyes and a mouth," and so on through each of the limbs. Will this thought make me think of Theaetetus rather than Theodorus, or of the proverbial last of the Mysians?[46]
	THEAETETUS τί γάρ;	**THEAETETUS** How could it?

45 Scene painting used broad strokes meant to be seen from a distance.
46 "The last of the Mysians" was a proverbial phrase for the most insignificant person imaginable.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς [209c] διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι;	**SOCRATES** But if I think not only of the one with a nose and eyes, [209c] but of the one with a snub nose and bulging eyes, will I be judging you any more than myself or anyone else like that?
209c	**THEAETETUS** οὐδέν.	**THEAETETUS** Not at all.
	SOCRATES ἀλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη κατάθηται—καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ—ἥ με, καὶ ἐὰν αὔριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.	**SOCRATES** No—Theaetetus, I think, won't be judged in me until this snub-nosedness of yours has stamped and deposited in me a record different from the other snub-nosednesses I've seen—and likewise with the other features you're made of. Then, even if I meet you tomorrow, it will remind me and make me judge correctly about you.
	THEAETETUS ἀληθέστατα.	**THEAETETUS** Very true.
209d	**SOCRATES** περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου πέρι.	**SOCRATES** So correct judgment too would be about the differentness of each thing.
	THEAETETUS φαίνεταί γε.	**THEAETETUS** It seems so.
	SOCRATES τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ᾗ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις.	**SOCRATES** Then what would adding an account to correct judgment still be? If it means judging in addition how something differs from the others, the instruction becomes quite ridiculous.
	THEAETETUS πῶς;	**THEAETETUS** How?
	SOCRATES ὧν ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ [209e] λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον· τὸ γάρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένῳ.	**SOCRATES** Things of which we have a correct judgment of how they differ from others—it tells us to add a correct judgment of how they differ from others. Next to this instruction, the twirling of a stick or a pestle or whatever it's [209e] called would be nothing; it would more justly be called a blind man's advice. Telling us to add what we already have, so as to learn what we already judge, looks exactly like someone thoroughly in the dark.[47]
209e	**THEAETETUS** εἰπὲ δὴ τί νυνδὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου;	**THEAETETUS** Tell me, then: what were you going to say when you put that "if" to me just now?
	SOCRATES εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἡδὺ χρῆμ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι [210a] ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἐστιν· ἦ γάρ;	**SOCRATES** If adding an account, my boy, means we're told to know the differentness, and not just judge it, then this finest of accounts of knowledge would be a charming affair. For knowing [210a] is surely getting knowledge, isn't it?
210a	**THEAETETUS** ναί.	**THEAETETUS** Yes.

47 "Twirling a pestle" was proverbial for pointless, repetitive effort.

GREEK

ENGLISH

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθείς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κατ' ἐκεῖνον.

SOCRATES Then when asked what knowledge is, it seems he'll answer that it's correct judgment together with knowledge of differentness. For on his view that's what adding an account would be.

THEAETETUS ἔοικεν.

THEAETETUS It seems so.

SOCRATES καὶ παντάπασί γε εὖηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα αἴσθησις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε [210b] δόξα ἀληθὴς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη.

SOCRATES And it's utterly silly, when we're looking for knowledge, to say it's correct judgment together with knowledge, whether of differentness or of anything else. So, Theaetetus, knowledge would be neither perception, nor [210b] true judgment, nor an account added to true judgment.

210b **THEAETETUS** οὐκ ἔοικεν.

THEAETETUS It seems not.

SOCRATES ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

SOCRATES Well then, my friend, are we still pregnant and in labor with anything about knowledge, or have we given birth to everything?

THEAETETUS καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἴρηκα.

THEAETETUS Yes, by Zeus, I have—and thanks to you I've said more than I had in me.

SOCRATES οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;

SOCRATES And our art of midwifery tells us that all of these have turned out to be wind-eggs, not worth rearing?

THEAETETUS παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

THEAETETUS Absolutely.

SOCRATES ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῇς [210c] γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάντε γίγνῃ, βελτιόνων ἔσῃ πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐάντε κενὸς ᾖς, ἧττον ἔσῃ βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσί τε καὶ γεγόνασιν· τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, [210d] ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν ἥν με γέγραπται· ἔωθεν δέ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.

SOCRATES Then if after this you try to become [210c] pregnant with other things, Theaetetus, and you do, you'll be full of better ones because of today's examination; and if you stay empty, you'll be less of a burden to the people around you, and gentler, sensibly not thinking you know what you don't know. That's all my art can do, and nothing more; nor do I know any of the things that others know, all the great and wonderful men who are and have been. But this midwifery my mother and I were allotted by the god—she for women, [210d] and I for young men who are well born, and all who are beautiful. Now I must go to the Stoa of the King to meet the indictment Meletus has brought against me. But tomorrow morning, Theodorus, let's meet here again.[48]

48 The King Archon, whose office was at this stoa, handled charges of impiety; Meletus's indictment led to Socrates' trial and death in 399 BC.