The World as Will and Representation

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER
1788–1860

The World as Will and Representation

Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung

Translated from the German with AI (Claude) and edited



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The World as Will and Representation · Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860)

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CONTENTS

Introduction xi

Prefaces 1

Preface to the first edition 1
Kant, Plato and the Upanishads 5
A book for the few 6
Preface to the second edition 8
Two volumes, two ages of life 13
Kant as the starting point 15
The professors of philosophy 18
Preface to the third edition 21

Book One 23

§ 1. The world is my representation 23
§ 2. Subject and object 26
§ 3. Intuitive representation and time 27
§ 4. Matter as causality 30
§ 5. The dispute over the external world 36
Life and dream 40
§ 6. The body and the understanding 44
§ 7. Starting from representation 52
Materialism 54
Fichte and starting from the subject 60
§ 8. Reason and reflection 64
§ 9. Concepts and logic 70
The origin of logic 79
The art of persuasion 81
§ 10. Knowledge 83
§ 11. Feeling 84
§ 12. The uses and limits of abstract knowledge 86
§ 13. Laughter 93

§ 14. Science and proof 97
§ 15. Euclid's method 107
Truth and error 119
Explanation and philosophy 121
§ 16. Practical reason 125
The Stoic sage 129

Book Two 137
§ 17. The meaning of representation 137
§ 18. Body and will 143
§ 19. The body as the key 147
Theoretical egoism 149
§ 20. The body as visible will 151
§ 21. The will as thing in itself 155
From one's own will to all nature 156
§ 22. Why the name "will" 157
§ 23. The groundless, undivided will 159
Will without knowledge 161
The will in inorganic nature 166
§ 24. The unexplained remainder 168
§ 25. One will, many grades 179
§ 26. Forces and laws of nature 182
Occasional causes 190
§ 27. The limits of etiology 193
Conflict throughout nature 202
Knowledge kindles a light 207
§ 28. The pyramid of nature 210
§ 29. What does the will want? 222

Book Three 227
Ideas as the grades of the will 227
Kant's thing in itself and Plato's Idea 228
The Idea is not the thing in itself 234
Knowledge in the service of the will 236
The pure, will-less subject of knowing 238
History as the costume of the Idea 242

Art, the work of genius 246
Genius as perfect objectivity 248
Genius and madness 256
The artist lends us his eyes 259
Release from the wheel of Ixion 260
Light, the most gladdening of things 265
The sublime 267
The dynamically and the mathematically sublime 273
The charming, opposite of the sublime 275
Everything is beautiful 277
Two sources of aesthetic pleasure 282
Architecture: gravity against rigidity 283
Gardens, landscapes and animals 289
Human beauty and the ideal 291
Why Laocoön does not scream 299
Drapery and style 303
History painting and genre painting 304
Idea and concept 308
Against allegory in the visual arts 312
Allegory and symbol in poetry 316
Poetry and history 320
The lyric 327
Tragedy, the summit of poetry 333
Music 336
Bass, harmony and melody 339
Music and philosophy 347
Art, the flower of life 350

Book Four 353
§ 53. Philosophy does not preach 353
§ 54. Life is certain to the will to live 358
The present as the form of life 362
The fear of death 366
Affirmation and denial defined 371
§ 55. Freedom and necessity 373
The acquired character 394

§ 56. Striving without an end 399
§ 57. Between pain and boredom 403
§ 58. Happiness is negative 414
§ 59. Every life story a story of suffering 419
§ 60. Affirmation of the body 423
§ 61. Egoism 429
§ 62. Wrong and right 432
The origin of the state 443
The right to punish 449
§ 63. Eternal justice 453
§ 64. Two hints of eternal justice 461
§ 65. Good and evil 464
§ 66. Virtue from intuitive knowledge 474
§ 67. All love is compassion 483
§ 68. The denial of the will 487
Saints of every faith 493
The second way: suffering 505
§ 69. Suicide 513
§ 70. Freedom as grace 518
§ 71. Nothing 526

Appendix: Critique of the Kantian Philosophy 531
Why this appendix is a polemic 533
Kant's greatest merit 535
Dogmatic and transcendental philosophy 539
Kant's other merits 540
From merits to errors 545
The fundamental thought examined 546
Kant's style and his love of symmetry 549
Reason and understanding never defined 552
The two editions of the Critique 556
The derivation of the thing in itself 558
Intuitive and abstract knowledge confused 559
The contradiction in the Transcendental Logic 563
The object of representation 568
The deduction of the categories 571

How the Transcendental Logic arose 574
Apperception and the table of judgments 577
Quantity, quality and relation 582
Against interaction 587
Modality 592
The table of categories as a Procrustean bed 601
The persistence of substance 603
Phenomena and noumena 605
The forms of thinking 610
The Transcendental Dialectic 614
Soul, world and God 620
Rational psychology 624
The antinomies 628
Kant's resolution of the antinomies 637
Freedom and the thing in itself 640
The ideal of reason and the proofs of God 648
Kant's ethics: practical reason 656
The categorical imperative 667
Duty and inclination 671
The Doctrine of Right 674
The Critique of Judgment 675
Teleological judgment 679

INTRODUCTION

The World as Will and Representation was published in Dresden at the end of 1818, when Schopenhauer was thirty, and was almost entirely ignored. He spent the rest of his life defending and extending it: a second edition of 1844 added a whole volume of supplements, and the third edition of 1859, the year before his death, appeared when he had at last become famous. This is the first volume, the book proper, in the text of 1859.

It opens with "The world is my representation": everything we know is object for a subject, shaped by space, time and causality. But that is only half the truth. From the inside, in our own bodies, we know the world as something else, as will: a blind, restless striving that shows itself in gravity, in the growth of plants, in animal instinct and in human desire. Because the will can never be satisfied, life swings "like a pendulum" between pain and boredom.

The four books move from knowledge to nature, then to art, where contemplation frees us for a moment from willing, and music expresses the will itself, and finally to ethics: compassion, which sees through the illusion that separates one individual from another, and the saint's denial of the will to live. A long appendix criticizes the philosophy of Kant, whose work Schopenhauer took as his starting point.

Prefaces

Vorreden
How to read the book ("a single thought"), and the prefaces of 1844 and 1859 on philosophy as a trade and the neglect of the book.

P *Might nature not, in the end, be fathomed after all? / Goethe.*[1]

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Schopenhauer explains that the book communicates a single thought and sets three demands on the reader.

P1 Here I propose to explain how this book is to be read if it is to have any chance of being understood.—What it is meant to communicate is a single thought. Yet, despite all my efforts, I could find no shorter way of communicating it than this whole book.—I consider this thought to be what has been sought for a very long time under the name of philosophy. For that very reason, those with a historical education hold its discovery to be as impossible as that of the philosopher's stone, although Pliny already told them: *Quam multa fieri non posse, priusquam sint facta, judicantur? (Hist. nat., 7, 1.)* [How many things are judged impossible before they have actually been done? (*Natural History* 7.1)][2]

Depending on the side from which one views this one thought that is to be communicated, it shows itself as what has been

1 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), whom Schopenhauer knew personally; the motto is a line from one of his poems.
2 Pliny the Elder (AD 23/24–79), Roman author of the encyclopedic *Natural History*.

called metaphysics, what has been called ethics, and what has been called aesthetics. And of course it would have to be all of these, if it were what I take it to be, as I have already admitted.

A *system of thoughts* must always have an architectonic coherence: one in which each part always supports another but is not in turn supported by it, the foundation stone finally supports all the parts without being supported by them, and the summit is supported without supporting anything. A *single thought*, on the other hand, however comprehensive it may be, must preserve the most perfect unity. If, for the purpose of communicating it, it can nonetheless be divided into parts, then the connection of these parts must in turn be an organic one, that is, one in which each part sustains the whole just as much as it is held by the whole; in which no part is the first and none the last; in which the whole thought gains in clarity through each part, and even the smallest part cannot be fully understood unless the whole has already been understood first.—A book, however, must have a first and a last line, and to that extent will always remain very unlike an organism, however much its content may resemble one. Consequently, form and matter will here stand in contradiction.

It follows of itself that, under such circumstances, there is no other advice for penetrating into the thought set forth here than *to read the book twice*. The first time, one must read it with a great deal of patience—a patience that can be drawn only from the freely granted belief that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end presupposes the beginning, and likewise that each earlier part presupposes the later one almost as much as the later presupposes the earlier. I say "almost": for it is by no means entirely so. Whatever could possibly be done to put first what is least in need of being explained by what follows—and in general whatever could contribute to making the work as easy to grasp and as clear as possible—has been done honestly and conscientiously. Indeed, this might even have succeeded to a certain degree, if only the reader, as is very natural, did not think while reading not merely of what is being said at each

point but also of its possible consequences. In this way, besides the many contradictions of the opinions of the age, and presumably of the reader's own, that really are there, so many others, anticipated and imaginary, may be added that what is still mere misunderstanding must present itself as lively disapproval. And it is all the less recognized as misunderstanding because the laboriously achieved clarity of presentation and distinctness of expression, while it probably never leaves the immediate sense of what is said in doubt, cannot at the same time state its relations to everything else. That is why, as I said, the first reading requires patience, drawn from the confidence that on the second one will see much, or everything, in quite a different light. Moreover, the earnest effort to be completely and even easily understood, in dealing with a very difficult subject, must justify the occasional repetition. The organic rather than chain-like structure of the whole already made it necessary at times to touch on the same point twice. This same structure, too, and the very close connection of all the parts, did not permit a division into chapters and paragraphs, which I otherwise value highly; instead it compelled me to rest content with four main divisions, four viewpoints, as it were, on the one thought. In each of these four books one must take particular care not to lose sight, over the details that necessarily have to be discussed, of the main thought to which they belong and of the progression of the whole presentation.—With this, then, the first demand has been made of the reader (who is ill-disposed toward the philosopher precisely because he is one himself)—a demand that, like those that follow, is indispensable.

The second demand is that the introduction to the book be read before the book itself, even though it is not contained in the book but appeared five years earlier under the title *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Philosophical Treatise*.—Without acquaintance with this introduction and propaedeutic, a real understanding of the present work is quite impossible, and the content of that treatise is presupposed here

throughout as if it were included in the book.[3] Besides, had it not preceded the book by several years, it would probably not stand before it as an introduction at all, but would be incorporated into the first book. As it is, the first book lacks what is said in the treatise, and through these gaps alone shows a certain imperfection, which it must constantly fill by referring to that treatise. But my aversion to copying myself, or to laboriously presenting once again in other words what has already been said adequately once, was so great that I preferred this course. This is so even though I could now give the content of that treatise a somewhat better presentation, especially by purging it of a number of concepts that stem from my then excessive captivity to the Kantian philosophy, such as categories, outer and inner sense, and the like. Still, even there those concepts appear only because I had never really engaged with them in depth up to that point—hence only as accessories, entirely out of contact with the main matter. For that reason, the correction of such passages in that treatise will take place quite by itself in the reader's mind once he is acquainted with the present work. — But only when one has fully grasped from that treatise what the principle of sufficient reason is and means, to what its validity extends and to what it does not; and that the principle does not exist before all things, with the whole world existing only in consequence of it and in accordance with it, as its corollary, so to speak; but that, on the contrary, it is nothing more than the form in which the object—of whatever kind, and always conditioned by the subject—is everywhere known, insofar as the subject is a knowing individual: only then will it be possible to enter into the method of philosophizing attempted here for the first time, which departs completely from all previous ones.

But the same aversion to copying myself word for word, or else to saying exactly the same thing a second time in other and worse words after having used up the better ones myself, has caused a second gap in the first book of this work. For I have left

3 Schopenhauer's doctoral dissertation (1813). *Satz vom (zureichenden) Grunde*, the principle of sufficient reason, literally means "principle of the (sufficient) ground."

out everything contained in the first chapter of my treatise *On Vision and Colors*, which would otherwise have found its place here word for word. So acquaintance with this earlier short work is presupposed here as well.[4]

KANT, PLATO AND THE UPANISHADS

The reader should know Kant's main works; Plato and the Vedas prepare him still better.

Finally, the third demand to be made of the reader could even be taken for granted in silence. For it is none other than acquaintance with the most important phenomenon to have appeared in philosophy for two thousand years, and one so close to us: I mean the principal works of Kant. The effect they produce in the mind to which they really speak is, I find—as has perhaps been said before—very much like that of a cataract operation on a blind man. And if we wish to pursue the comparison, my aim can be described by saying that I have wanted to put into the hands of those on whom the operation has succeeded a pair of cataract spectacles, for whose use, then, the operation itself is the most necessary condition. —However much, then, I start from what the great Kant achieved, it is precisely the serious study of his writings that has made me discover significant errors in them. I had to separate these out and show them to be untenable, so that I could presuppose and apply what is true and excellent in his doctrine in pure and purified form. But in order not to interrupt and confuse my own presentation with frequent polemics against Kant, I have put these into a separate appendix. Just as my work, according to what has been said, presupposes acquaintance with the Kantian philosophy, so too it presupposes acquaintance with that appendix. In this respect it would therefore be advisable to read the appendix first, all the more so because its content is closely related to the first book of the present work in particular. On the other hand, it was

4 Published in 1816, the treatise grew out of Schopenhauer's collaboration with Goethe on the theory of color.

unavoidable, given the nature of the matter, that the appendix too should now and then refer to the work itself. From this nothing else follows than that it too, just like the main part of the work, must be read twice.

Kant's philosophy, then, is the only one with which a thorough acquaintance is directly presupposed for what is to be presented here.—But if, in addition, the reader has lingered in the school of the divine *Plato*, he will be all the better prepared and more receptive to hear me. And if he has even come to share in the blessing of the *Vedas*—access to which, opened up to us by the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage that this still young century has over earlier ones, for I suspect that the influence of Sanskrit literature will go no less deep than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth[5] century—if, I say, the reader has also already received the initiation of ancient Indian wisdom and taken it in receptively, then he is prepared in the very best way to hear what I have to set before him. It will not strike him, as it will many others, as alien or even hostile. For, if it did not sound too proud, I would like to claim that each of the individual, disconnected utterances that make up the Upanishads could be derived as a consequence from the thought I am to communicate, although by no means is the converse true, that this thought is already to be found there.

A BOOK FOR THE FEW

He mocks the impatient reader and suggests uses for the book other than reading it.

But most readers have already started up impatiently and burst out with the reproach they have so long and so laboriously held back: how can I dare to present the public with a book hedged with demands and conditions, the first two of which are presumptuous and utterly immodest—and this at a time when there is such a general wealth of original thoughts that in Germany

5 Schopenhauer knew the Upanishads through Anquetil-Duperron's Latin translation from a Persian version, the *Oupnek'hat* (1801–02).

alone they are made common property by the printing press every year in three thousand substantial, original and utterly indispensable works, and besides that in countless periodicals, or even daily papers? at a time when, in particular, there is not the slightest shortage of thoroughly original and profound philosophers, but more of them are living simultaneously in Germany alone than several successive centuries could otherwise show? how, the indignant reader asks, is one ever to get to the end if one had to go about a book in so roundabout a way?

Since I have nothing whatever to say against such reproaches, I hope only for some gratitude from these readers for having warned them in good time, so that they lose not an hour on a book that could bear no fruit if read without fulfilling the demands made, and which should therefore be left unread altogether. This is all the more so since there is every reason besides to bet that it cannot please them, that it will rather always be *paucorum hominum* [for the few], and must therefore wait calmly and modestly for the few whose unusual way of thinking might find it palatable. For, even apart from the long-windedness and the effort it asks of the reader, which educated person of this age —whose knowledge has come close to that splendid point where paradoxical and false are one and the same—could bear to meet, on almost every page, thoughts that flatly contradict what he himself has settled once and for all as true and established? And then, how unpleasantly disappointed many a reader will be to find here no mention at all of what he believes he must look for here of all places, because his way of speculating coincides with that of a great philosopher still living,[6] who has written truly touching books and has only the small weakness of taking everything he learned and approved before his fifteenth year for innate fundamental ideas of the human mind. Who could bear all this? Hence my advice is simply to put the book down again.

But I fear I shall not get off even so. The reader who has got as far as the preface, which turns him away, has paid good money

for the book and asks what is to compensate him.—My last refuge now is to remind him that he knows how to make use of a book in all sorts of ways, even without actually reading it. Like many others, it can fill a gap in his library, where, neatly bound, it is sure to look well. Or he can lay it on the dressing table or the tea table of his learned lady friend. Or, finally, he can—and this is certainly the best of all, and what I particularly recommend—review it.

And so, having allowed myself this jest—and in this thoroughly ambiguous life hardly any page can be too serious to grant a jest a place—I hand over the book in deep earnest, confident that sooner or later it will reach those to whom alone it can be addressed. For the rest, I am calmly resigned to its also meeting, in full measure, the fate that in every field of knowledge, and so all the more in the most important, has always befallen truth: to truth only a brief victory celebration is allotted, between the two long periods in which it is condemned as paradoxical and disparaged as trivial. The first of these fates usually strikes its author as well. —But life is short, and truth works far and lives long: let us speak the truth.

(Written in Dresden in August 1818.)

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Schopenhauer hands his completed work to humanity and attacks philosophy pursued for the state and for money.

P2 Not to my contemporaries, not to my compatriots—to humanity I hand over my now completed work, confident that it will not be without value for humanity, even if that value should be recognized only late, as is the lot of what is good of every kind. For it can only have been for humanity, and not for the generation hurrying past, busy with its passing delusion, that my mind, almost against my will, has applied itself unremittingly to

6 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. F. H. Jacobi.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819), philosopher of faith and feeling and a critic of Kant.

its work throughout a long life. Nor, during all this time, has the lack of interest been able to make me doubt its value. For I constantly saw the false and the bad, and finally the absurd and nonsensical,[7] held in universal admiration and reverence. And I reflected that if those capable of recognizing what is genuine and right were not so rare that one can look around for them in vain for some twenty years, then those capable of producing it could not be so few that their works afterward form an exception to the transience of earthly things. And then the refreshing prospect of posterity would be lost—the prospect that everyone who has set himself a high goal needs to strengthen him. —Whoever takes seriously and pursues something that does not lead to material gain must not count on the interest of his contemporaries. He will, however, usually see that meanwhile the semblance of that very thing gains currency in the world and enjoys its day: and this is as it should be. For the thing itself must be pursued for its own sake; otherwise it cannot succeed, because every ulterior aim everywhere endangers insight. Accordingly, as literary history attests throughout, everything of value has needed a long time to gain recognition, especially if it was of the instructive rather than the entertaining kind; and meanwhile the false shone. For to unite the thing with the semblance of the thing is difficult, if not impossible. That is precisely the curse of this world of want and need: that everything must serve and slave for these. That is exactly why the world is not so constituted that any noble and sublime striving, such as the striving for light and truth, may flourish unhindered in it and exist for its own sake. Rather, even when such a striving has for once managed to assert itself, and the concept of it has thereby been introduced, material interests and personal ends will at once take hold of it too, to make it their tool or their mask. Accordingly, after Kant had brought philosophy back into esteem, philosophy too very soon had to become the tool of ends—those of the state from above, personal ones from below—or, strictly speaking, not philosophy itself but its double, which passes for

7 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Hegelian philosophy.

it. This should not even surprise us. For the incredibly great majority of human beings are, by their nature, quite incapable of any but material ends; indeed, they cannot even conceive of any others. Hence the striving for truth alone is far too lofty and eccentric for one to expect that all, or many, or even just a few should sincerely take part in it. If, nevertheless, one sees at some point—as, for example, right now in Germany—a striking animation, a general bustle of writing and talking in matters of philosophy, then one may confidently assume that the real *primum mobile* [prime mover], the hidden mainspring of such a movement, despite all the solemn faces and assurances, is solely real, not ideal, ends. That is, it is personal, official, ecclesiastical, political—in short, material—interests that people have in view; consequently, it is mere party ends that set the many pens of would-be sages in such vigorous motion. Thus aims, not insights, are the guiding star of these agitators, and truth is certainly the last thing anyone thinks of. Truth finds no partisans. On the contrary, it can make its way through such a philosophical tumult as calmly and unnoticed as through the winter night of the darkest century, gripped by the most rigid church dogma, when it was perhaps communicated only as a secret doctrine to a few adepts, or even entrusted to parchment alone. Indeed, I would say that no time can be more unfavorable to philosophy than one in which it is shamefully misused, on one side as an instrument of the state, on the other as a means of earning a living. Or does anyone perhaps believe that, amid such striving and such tumult, truth—which is not at all what anyone is aiming at—will somehow come to light incidentally? Truth is no prostitute who throws her arms around the necks of those who do not desire her. On the contrary, she is so coy a beauty that even one who sacrifices everything to her cannot yet be sure of her favor.

If governments make philosophy a means to their political ends, scholars, for their part, see in professorships of philosophy a trade that feeds its man like any other. So they push their way toward them, assuring everyone of their right-

mindedness, that is, of their intention to serve those ends. And they keep their word: not truth, not clarity, not Plato, not Aristotle, but the ends they have been appointed to serve are their guiding star, and at once become the criterion as well of what is true, valuable and worth attention, and of its opposite. Hence whatever does not accord with those ends, even if it were the most important and extraordinary thing in their field, is either condemned or, where that seems risky, stifled by unanimous ignoring. Just look at their unanimous zeal against pantheism: will even a simpleton believe that it springs from conviction?—And how, in general, could philosophy, degraded into a bread-winning trade, fail to degenerate into sophistry? Precisely because this is inevitable, and because the rule "Whose bread I eat, his song I sing" has always held, earning money with philosophy was, among the ancients, the mark of the sophist.—Add to this that, since nothing but mediocrity is to be expected anywhere in this world, nothing more can be demanded, and nothing more can be had for money, one has to make do with mediocrity here too. Accordingly, at all the German universities we see good old mediocrity toiling to produce, from its own resources, the philosophy that does not yet exist at all—and to prescribed measure and specification at that—a spectacle it would almost be cruel to mock.

While philosophy has thus long had to serve throughout as a means, on the one side to public, on the other to private ends, I, undisturbed by all this, have followed my train of thought for more than thirty years. I did so simply because I had to and could not do otherwise, from an instinct-like drive, which was, however, supported by the confidence that whatever true thing someone has thought, whatever hidden thing he has illuminated, will at some time be grasped by another thinking mind, will speak to it, gladden it and console it. It is to such a mind that one speaks, just as those like us have spoken to us and so become our consolation in this wasteland of life. Meanwhile one pursues one's work for its own sake and for oneself. Now, strangely enough, with philosophical meditations it is the case

that only what someone has thought through and investigated for himself later benefits others as well, and not what was intended for others from the outset. The former is recognizable first of all by its character of thoroughgoing honesty; for one does not try to deceive oneself, nor hand oneself hollow nuts. Thus all sophistry and all verbal clutter fall away, and as a result every sentence written down at once repays the effort of reading it. Correspondingly, my writings bear the stamp of honesty and openness so plainly on their brow that this alone sets them in glaring contrast to those of the three famous sophists of the post-Kantian period. I am always to be found at the standpoint of *reflection*, that is,[8] of rational deliberation and honest communication, never at that of *inspiration*, called intellectual intuition or absolute thinking, but, by its right name, windbaggery and charlatanry.—Working in this spirit, then, and all the while seeing the false and the bad in general currency, indeed windbaggery[9] and charlatanry[10] held in the highest reverence, I long ago renounced the applause of my contemporaries. A generation of contemporaries that for twenty years has proclaimed a Hegel, that intellectual Caliban, the greatest of philosophers—so loudly that it echoed through all Europe—cannot possibly make anyone who has watched this eager for its applause. It has no more laurels to award: its applause is prostituted, and its censure means nothing.[11] That I mean this seriously can be seen from the fact that, had I in any way sought the applause of my contemporaries, I would have had to strike out twenty passages that utterly contradict all their views and must in part even offend them. But I would count it a transgression to sacrifice even a single syllable to that applause. My guiding star has quite seriously been truth. Following it, I could seek only my own

8 The three sophists are Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, the leading German idealists after Kant.

9 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Fichte and Schelling.

10 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Hegel.

11 "Intellectual intuition" was a key term for Fichte and Schelling, "absolute thinking" an allusion to Hegel. Caliban is the brutish, misshapen creature in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*.

approval in the first place, turning away entirely from an age sunk deep with respect to all higher intellectual endeavors, and from a national literature that, apart from the exceptions, is demoralized, and in which the art of combining lofty words with base sentiments has reached its peak. I can, of course, never escape the faults and weaknesses that necessarily cling to my nature, as everyone's cling to his; but I will not increase them by unworthy accommodations.—

TWO VOLUMES, TWO AGES OF LIFE

He explains why the second edition adds a separate volume of supplements rather than revising the first.

As for this second edition, I am glad above all that after twenty-five years I find nothing to retract, so that my fundamental convictions have at least proved themselves to me. The changes in the first volume, which alone contains the text of the first edition, therefore nowhere touch what is essential. Some concern only minor matters; most, however, consist of mostly short explanatory additions inserted here and there. Only the Critique of the Kantian Philosophy has received significant corrections and extensive additions, since these could not be put into a supplementary book here, as has been done for the four books presenting my own doctrine, each of which has received one in the second volume. For these I chose the latter form of enlargement and improvement because the twenty-five years that have passed since they were written have brought about so marked a change in my manner of presentation and in the tone of my exposition that it would hardly have done to fuse the content of the second volume with that of the first into one whole; in such a fusion both would have suffered. I therefore present the two works separately, and in the earlier presentation I have often changed nothing even where I would now express myself quite differently; for I wanted to guard against spoiling the work of my younger years through the carping of old age. Whatever might need correcting in this respect will set itself right in the

reader's mind of its own accord, with the help of the second volume. The two volumes stand in a complementary relation to each other in the full sense of the word, insofar as this rests on the fact that one stage of a person's life is, intellectually, the complement of another. Hence one will find not only that each volume contains what the other lacks, but also that the merits of the one consist precisely in what the other is missing. So if the first half of my work has the advantage over the second of what only the fire of youth and the energy of the first conception can give, the second will surpass the first in the maturity and thorough working-out of the thoughts, which falls only to the fruits of a long life and its diligence. For when I had the power to grasp the fundamental thought of my system at the outset, to follow it at once into its four branches, to return from them to the unity of their trunk, and then to present the whole clearly, I could not yet be in a position to work out all the parts of the system with the completeness, thoroughness and detail that are attained only through many years of meditating on it. Such meditation is needed to test and illustrate the system against countless facts, to support it with the most varied evidence, to illuminate it brightly from all sides, then to set its different viewpoints boldly in contrast, and to separate its manifold materials cleanly and set them out in good order. So although the reader would certainly have found it more agreeable to have my whole work cast in a single mold, instead of in two halves that have to be brought together in use, let him consider that this would have required me to accomplish in one stage of life what is possible only in two. For that, I would have had to possess in one stage of life the qualities that nature has distributed between two quite different ones. The necessity of delivering my work in two mutually complementary halves may therefore be compared to the necessity by which an achromatic objective lens, since it is impossible to make it from a single piece, is produced by combining a convex lens of crown glass with a concave lens of flint glass, whose combined effect alone achieves what is intended. On the other hand, for the inconvenience of using two volumes at once, the

reader will find some compensation in the variety and refreshment brought by the treatment of the same subject by the same mind, in the same spirit, but in very different years. Still, for anyone not yet acquainted with my philosophy it is altogether advisable first to read through the first volume without consulting the supplements, and to use these only on a second reading. Otherwise it would be too hard for him to grasp the system in its coherence, for only the first volume presents it that way, while in the second the main doctrines are individually grounded in more detail and fully developed. Even someone who should not decide on a second reading of the first volume will do better to read the second only after it, and on its own, in the straight order of its chapters. These do stand in a connection with one another, though a looser one, whose gaps his memory of the first volume will fill completely, provided he has grasped it well. Besides, he will find references throughout to the relevant passages of the first volume; for this purpose I have given paragraph numbers in the second edition to the sections that in the first edition were marked merely by dividing lines.—

KANT AS THE STARTING POINT

A thorough knowledge of Kant's own writings is presupposed, not second-hand reports of them.

Already in the preface to the first edition I declared that my philosophy starts from Kant's and therefore presupposes a thorough knowledge of it: I repeat this here. For Kant's doctrine produces in every mind that has grasped it a fundamental change, so great that it can count as an intellectual rebirth. For it alone is able really to remove the realism innate in that mind, which stems from the original function of the intellect—something for which neither Berkeley nor Malebranche suffices. They remain too much in generalities, while Kant goes into particulars, and in a way that has neither model nor imitation and has a quite peculiar, one might say immediate, effect on the mind. As a result, the mind undergoes a thorough disillusionment and thence-

forth sees all things in a different light. Only in this way, however, does it become receptive to the more positive disclosures that I have to give.[12] Whoever, on the other hand, has not mastered the Kantian philosophy, whatever else he may have pursued, is in a state of innocence, as it were: he has remained caught in the natural and childlike realism in which we are all born, which fits one for everything possible except philosophy. Consequently, such a person stands to the former as a minor to someone who has come of age. That this truth sounds paradoxical nowadays—which would by no means have been the case in the first thirty years after the *Critique of Reason* appeared—comes from the fact that a generation has since grown up that does not really know Kant. For this requires more than a hasty, impatient reading or a second-hand report. And this in turn comes from the fact that this generation, badly guided, has wasted its time on the philosophemes of ordinary, and therefore unqualified, minds, or even of windbag sophists, irresponsibly recommended to it. Hence the confusion in its first concepts, and in general the unspeakable crudeness and clumsiness that peer out from beneath the veil of preciosity and pretentiousness in the philosophical attempts of the generation brought up in this way. But anyone who imagines he can come to know Kant's philosophy from other people's accounts of it is caught in a disastrous error. On the contrary, I must seriously warn against such reports, especially recent ones: and in these very last years I have come across accounts of the Kantian philosophy in writings of the Hegelians that really verge on the fabulous. And how could minds dislocated and ruined in their early youth by the nonsense of Hegelry still be capable of following Kant's profound investigations? They are accustomed early on to take the hollowest verbal clutter for philosophical thoughts, the most wretched sophisms for acumen, and silly lunacy for dialectic; and by absorbing frenzied combinations of words, over which the mind tortures and exhausts itself in vain trying to think

12 George Berkeley (1685–1753) and Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), philosophers who questioned the independent reality of the external world.

something, their heads have been disorganized. What they need is no critique of reason, no philosophy: what they need is a *medicina mentis* [medicine for the mind], starting, as a purgative, with something like *un petit cours de senscommunologie* [a little course in common-sense-ology]; and then one will have to see whether there can ever be any talk of philosophy with them.—So one will look in vain for Kant's doctrine anywhere but in Kant's own works; and these are instructive throughout, even where he errs, even where he fails. Because of his originality, what really holds of all genuine philosophers holds of him in the highest degree: one comes to know them only from their own writings, not from other people's reports. For the thoughts of those extraordinary minds cannot bear being filtered through an ordinary head. Born behind broad, high, beautifully arched foreheads, beneath which radiant eyes shine out, these thoughts, when transplanted into the cramped lodging and low roof of narrow, compressed, thick-walled skulls, from which dull glances bent on personal ends peer out, lose all their force and all their life, and no longer look like themselves. Indeed, one can say that heads of this kind act like uneven mirrors, in which everything is warped and distorted, loses the symmetry of its beauty and presents a caricature. Only from their originators themselves can one receive philosophical thoughts. Hence whoever feels drawn to philosophy must seek out its immortal teachers in the quiet sanctuary of their own works. The principal chapters of each of these genuine philosophers will give a hundred times more insight into their doctrines than the plodding and squinting reports on them produced by everyday minds, which are moreover mostly deeply caught up in whatever philosophy is currently in fashion, or in their own pet opinions. But it is astonishing how decidedly the public prefers to reach for those second-hand accounts. Here, in fact, the elective affinity seems to be at work by virtue of which a common nature is drawn to its like, and so would rather hear even what a great mind has said from its like. Perhaps this rests on the same

principle as the system of mutual instruction, according to which children learn best from their peers.[13]

THE PROFESSORS OF PHILOSOPHY

He ironically praises the professors' unanimous method of ignoring his philosophy.

Now one more word for the professors of philosophy.—I have always had to admire the sagacity, the correct and fine tact with which, as soon as my philosophy appeared, they recognized it as something utterly heterogeneous to their own endeavors, perhaps even dangerous—or, to put it in plain terms, something that does not suit their line of business; as well as the sure and shrewd policy by which they at once hit upon the only correct way of dealing with it, the perfect unanimity with which they applied it, and finally the perseverance with which they have remained faithful to it. This procedure, which incidentally also recommends itself by being exceedingly easy to carry out, consists, as is well known, in ignoring completely and thereby "secreting"—to use Goethe's malicious expression, which really means suppressing what is important and significant. The effectiveness of this quiet means is heightened by the Corybantic din with which those in league together mutually celebrate the birth of one another's intellectual offspring, and which forces the public to look and to notice the important airs with which they greet one another over it. Who could fail to see how well suited this procedure is to its purpose? After all, there is nothing to object to in the principle *primum vivere, deinde philosophari* [first live, then philosophize].[14] These gentlemen want to live, and to live, indeed, from *philosophy*: they depend on *it*, with wife and child, and have taken the risk despite Petrarch's *povera e nuda vai filosofia* [poor and naked you go, philosophy]. Now, my

13 The "system of mutual instruction" is the monitorial system of Bell and Lancaster, in which more advanced pupils taught the others.

14 The Corybantes were the priests of the goddess Cybele, known for their frenzied, noisy rites.

philosophy is not at all designed for anyone to be able to live from it.[15] It lacks the first requisites indispensable for a well-paid lectern philosophy. Above all, it has no speculative theology whatever—which, after all, is supposed to be, and must be, the main theme of all philosophy, in defiance of that tiresome Kant with his critique of reason, even though philosophy is thereby given the task of forever talking about what it can know absolutely nothing about. Indeed, mine does not even admit the fable, so cleverly devised by the professors of philosophy and now indispensable to them, of a reason that knows, intuits or apprehends immediately and absolutely. One need only palm this off on one's readers right at the start in order afterward to drive, as it were with a coach and four, in the most comfortable way in the world, into the realm beyond the possibility of all experience, which Kant closed off to our knowledge entirely and for ever. There one then finds, directly revealed and most beautifully laid out, precisely the fundamental dogmas of modern, Judaizing, optimistic Christianity. What in all the world, then, has my brooding philosophy—lacking these essential requisites, heedless of consequences and providing no livelihood, which has truth alone as its North Star, the naked, unrewarded, friendless, often persecuted truth, and steers straight toward it without looking right or left—to do with that *alma mater* [nourishing mother], the good, nourishing university philosophy, which, burdened with a hundred aims and a thousand considerations, comes tacking cautiously along its way, always keeping in view the fear of the Lord, the will of the ministry, the statutes of the established church, the wishes of the publisher, the attendance of the students, the good friendship of colleagues, the course of the day's politics, the momentary leaning of the public, and who knows what else? Or what has my quiet, earnest search for truth in common with the shrill scholastic squabbling of lecterns and benches, whose innermost motives are always personal ends? Rather, the two kinds of philosophy are funda-

15 Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374), Italian poet; the line is from sonnet 7 of his *Canzoniere*.

mentally heterogeneous. That is why there is no compromise and no comradeship with me, and why no one finds his account with me, except perhaps someone who sought nothing but the truth—and so none of the philosophical parties of the day. For they all pursue their aims; but I have only insights to offer, which suit none of them, precisely because they are modeled on none of them. For my philosophy itself to become fit for the lectern, quite different times would first have to dawn. —What a fine thing it would be, then, if such a philosophy, from which one cannot make a living at all, were to gain air and light, perhaps even general attention! So this had to be prevented, and against it all had to stand as one man. Disputing and refuting, however, is not so easy a game; besides, it is a risky means for the very reason that it directs the public's attention to the matter, and reading my writings might spoil the public's taste for the lucubrations of the professors of philosophy. For whoever has tasted earnestness will no longer relish jest, especially of the boring kind. Accordingly, the system of silence so unanimously adopted is the only correct one, and I can only advise sticking to it and carrying on with it as long as it works—that is, until one day people infer ignorance from the ignoring: then there will still be just time to change course. Meanwhile, of course, everyone remains free to pluck out a little feather here and there for his own use, since at home the abundance of thoughts is not usually very oppressive. So the system of ignoring and silence may hold out for a good while yet, at least for the span of time I may still have to live; and with that much is already gained. Even if an indiscreet voice has now and then made itself heard in the meantime, it is soon drowned out by the loud lecturing of the professors, who know how to entertain the public, with an important air, on quite different matters. I advise, however, that the unanimity of the procedure be enforced somewhat more strictly, and that the young people in particular be watched, since they are sometimes terribly indiscreet. For even so I cannot guarantee that the praised procedure will hold out for ever, and I cannot answer for the final outcome. There is, you see,

something peculiar about steering the public, which is on the whole good and docile. Though we see the Gorgiases and Hippiases on top at pretty much all times, though the absurd as a rule reaches its peak, and though it seems impossible that the voice of the individual should ever penetrate the chorus of the deceivers and the deceived—genuine works nonetheless always retain a quite peculiar, quiet, slow, powerful effect. And as if by a miracle one finally sees them rise out of the tumult, like a balloon that floats up out of the thick atmosphere of this earthly sphere into purer regions, where, once it has arrived, it remains, and no one can pull it down again.[16]

Written in Frankfurt am Main, February 1844.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

Schopenhauer, now seventy-one, notes the late start of his influence and the additions to this edition.

P3 What is true and genuine would more easily gain ground in the world if those who are incapable of producing it were not at the same time sworn to keep it from rising. This circumstance has already hindered and delayed, if not actually stifled, many a thing that should have benefited the world. For me its consequence has been that, although I was only thirty when the first edition of this work appeared, I do not live to see this third edition until my seventy-second year. For this, however, I find consolation in *Petrarch's* words: *si quis, toto die currens, pervenit ad vesperam, satis est de vera sapientia (p. 140)* [if anyone who has been running all day reaches the evening, it is enough].[17] Yet I too have arrived at last, and I have the satisfaction, at the end of my career, of seeing the beginning of my influence—in the hope that, according to an old rule, it will last in proportion to how late it began.—

The reader will miss nothing in this third edition of what the second contains; rather, he will receive considerably more,

16 Gorgias and Hippias were Greek sophists of the 5th century BC, both satirized by Plato.

since, thanks to the additions made to it, it has 136 more pages than the second, in the same type.

Seven years after the second edition appeared, I published two volumes, *Parerga and Paralipomena*. What is comprised under the latter name consists of additions to the systematic presentation of my philosophy and would have found its proper place in these volumes. At the time, however, I had to put it wherever I could, since it was very doubtful whether I would live to see this third edition. It is to be found in the second volume of the said Parerga and will easily be recognized by the chapter headings.[18]

Frankfurt am Main, September 1859.

17 The quotation is from Petrarch's dialogue *De vera sapientia* ("On True Wisdom").
18 *Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851), Greek for "subsidiary works and things left out": the volumes of essays and aphorisms that finally brought Schopenhauer fame.

Book One

Erstes Buch. Der Welt als Vorstellung erste Betrachtung: Die Vorstellung unterworfen dem Satze vom Grunde: das Objekt der Erfahrung und Wissenschaft
The World as Representation, first aspect: representation subject to the principle of sufficient reason; the object of experience and science.

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[1] *Sors de l'enfance, ami, réveille-toi!* [Leave childhood behind, friend, wake up!] / *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*

§ 1. THE WORLD IS MY REPRESENTATION

Everything that exists for knowledge is object for a subject; the world is representation.

1.1 "The world is my representation"—this is the truth that holds for every living and knowing being, although only the human being can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness. And if he really does so, philosophical awareness has dawned in him. It then becomes clear and certain to him that he knows no sun and no earth, but only ever an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world surrounding him is there only as representation, that is, throughout only in relation to something else, the one who represents, which is he himself.[1] —If any truth can be asserted *a priori*, it is this one. For it states that form of all possible and conceivable experience which is more general than all others, than time, space and causality: all of these already

1 Vorstellung is rendered "representation" throughout; older English translations have "idea."

presuppose it. Each of these forms, all of which we have recognized as so many particular configurations of the principle of sufficient reason, holds only for one particular class of representations. The division into object and subject, by contrast, is the common form of all those classes; it is the form under which alone any representation of whatever kind—abstract or intuitive, pure or empirical—is possible and conceivable at all. No truth, therefore, is more certain, more independent of all others and less in need of proof than this: that everything that exists for knowledge—hence this whole world—is only object in relation to the subject, intuition of the one who intuits; in a word, representation. Naturally this holds of every past and every future as much as of the present, of what is most distant as of what is near: for it holds of time and space themselves, in which alone all these things are distinguished. Everything that belongs or can belong to the world is inescapably burdened with this being-conditioned by the subject, and exists only for the subject. The world is representation.

This truth is by no means new. It already lay in the skeptical reflections from which Descartes set out. But Berkeley was the first to state it decisively; he thereby earned an immortal merit in philosophy, even though the rest of his doctrines cannot stand. Kant's first mistake was his neglect of this proposition, as is shown in the Appendix.—How early, on the other hand, this fundamental truth was recognized by the sages of India—for it appears as the fundamental tenet of the Vedanta philosophy ascribed to *Vyasa*—is attested by W. *Jones* in the last of his essays: *on the philosophy of the Asiatics; Asiatic researches*, Vol. IV, p.[2] 164: the fundamental tenet of the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence

2 Sir William Jones (1746–1794), British orientalist and pioneer of Sanskrit studies. Vyasa is the legendary sage traditionally credited with compiling the Vedas.

and perceptibility are convertible terms.[3] These words sufficiently express the coexistence of empirical reality with transcendental ideality.

It is thus only from the side indicated, only insofar as it is representation, that we consider the world in this first book. That this consideration, however, notwithstanding its truth, is one-sided, and hence brought about by some arbitrary abstraction, is announced to everyone by the inner reluctance with which he accepts the world as his mere representation—an assumption from which, on the other hand, he can never escape. But the one-sidedness of this consideration will be made good by the following book, through a truth that is not as immediately certain as the one from which we start here. Only deeper inquiry, more difficult abstraction, the separation of what is different and the uniting of what is identical can lead to it. It is a truth that must be very serious for everyone and, if not terrifying, then at least disquieting: namely this, that he too can say, and must say: "The world is my will."—

Until then, however—that is, in this first book—it is necessary to consider steadily that side of the world from which we start, the side of its knowability. Accordingly, without reluctance, we must regard all objects whatever that are present, indeed even one's own body (as we shall soon discuss more fully), only as representation, and call them mere representation. What is abstracted from here is, as I hope will later be certain to everyone, always only the will, which alone makes up the other side of the world: for the world, just as it is on the one hand through and through *representation*, is on the other hand through and through *will*. But a reality that would be neither of these two, but an object in itself (which is what Kant's thing in itself, unfortunately, degenerated into in his hands), is a dreamed-up non-

3 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. The fundamental dogma of the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is, of solidity, impenetrability and extension (to deny which would be madness), but in correcting the common concept of it, by asserting that it has no existence independent of cognitive apprehension, since existence and perceptibility are interchangeable concepts.

entity, and to assume it is to follow a will-o'-the-wisp in philosophy.

§ 2. SUBJECT AND OBJECT

The knowing subject and the object are two inseparable halves of the world as representation.

1.2 That which knows everything and is known by nothing is the *subject*. It is accordingly the bearer of the world, the universal and always presupposed condition of everything that appears, of every object: for whatever exists, exists only for the subject. Everyone finds himself as this subject, but only insofar as he knows, not insofar as he is an object of knowledge. But his body is already an object, and therefore from this standpoint we call even it representation. For the body is an object among objects and subject to the laws of objects, although it is the immediate object.[4] Like all objects of intuition, it lies within the forms of all knowing, in time and space, through which there is plurality. But the subject, that which knows and is never known, does not lie within these forms either; rather, it is always already presupposed by them. Neither plurality nor its opposite, unity, therefore belongs to it. We never know it; rather, it is precisely what knows, wherever anything is known.

The world as representation, then—the sole aspect in which we are considering it here—has two essential, necessary and inseparable halves. One is the *object*: its form is space and time, and through these, plurality. But the other half, the subject, does not lie in space and time: for it is whole and undivided in every representing being. Hence a single one of these beings, just as completely as the millions that exist, together with the object completes the world as representation; but if that single one were also to vanish, the world as representation would be no more. These halves are therefore inseparable, even in thought: for each of the two has meaning and existence only through and for the other; each is there with the other and vanishes with it.

4 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 2nd ed., § 22.

They border directly on each other: where the object begins, the subject ends. That this boundary is shared is shown precisely by the fact that the essential and therefore universal forms of every object—time, space and causality—can be found and completely known, starting from the subject, even without knowledge of the object itself; that is, in Kant's language, they lie in our consciousness *a priori*. To have discovered this is one of Kant's chief merits, and a very great one. I maintain, moreover, that the principle of sufficient reason is the common expression for all these forms of the object of which we are conscious *a priori*, and that therefore everything we know purely *a priori* is nothing but the content of that principle and what follows from it; in it, then, all our knowledge that is certain *a priori* is really expressed. In my essay on the principle of sufficient reason I have shown in detail how every possible object is subject to it, that is, stands in a necessary relation to other objects, on the one hand as determined, on the other as determining. This goes so far that the whole existence of all objects, insofar as they are objects, representations and nothing else, comes back entirely to that necessary relation of theirs to one another, consists only in it, and is therefore wholly relative—of which more soon. I have further shown that, according to the classes into which objects fall with respect to their possibility, that necessary relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses in general appears in different forms; and this in turn confirms that those classes have been correctly divided. Here I constantly presuppose everything said there as known and present to the reader's mind: for if it had not already been said, it would have its necessary place here.

§ 3. INTUITIVE REPRESENTATION AND TIME

Time and space can be intuited a priori; time shows the relative, dreamlike being of everything.

1.3 The chief distinction among all our representations is that between the intuitive and the abstract. The latter makes up only

one class of representations, concepts; and on earth these are the property of the human being alone, whose capacity for them, which distinguishes him from all animals, has always been called *reason*.[5] We shall consider these abstract representations on their own later on; first, however, we shall speak exclusively of *intuitive representation*. This comprises the whole visible world, or experience as a whole, together with the conditions of its possibility. It is, as has been said, a very important discovery of Kant's that precisely these conditions, these forms of experience, that is,[6] what is most general in its perception, what belongs equally to all its appearances—time and space—can, even by themselves and separated from their content, not only be thought *in abstracto* [in the abstract] but also be immediately intuited; and that this intuition is not some phantasm borrowed from experience through repetition, but so independent of experience that, on the contrary, experience must be thought of as dependent on it. For the properties of space and time, as intuition knows them *a priori*, hold for all possible experience as laws in accordance with which it must always turn out. For this reason, in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, I treated time and space, insofar as they are intuited purely and empty of content, as a particular class of representations existing by itself. Important as it is, this property of those universal forms of intuition discovered by Kant—namely, that they can be intuited by themselves and independently of experience and known in the whole of their lawfulness, on which mathematics with its infallibility rests—there is another property of theirs no less worth noting. The principle of sufficient reason, which determines experience as the law of causality and of motivation, and thinking as the law of the grounding of judgments, appears here in a quite peculiar form, to which I have given the name

5 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Kant alone has confused this concept of reason; on this point I refer to the Appendix, and also to my *Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*: *On the Basis of Morality*, § 6.

6 Anschauung / anschaulich is rendered "intuition / intuitive" in the Kantian sense of immediate, perceptual awareness, as opposed to abstract concepts; "perception" is used only where "intuition" would mislead.

ground of being. In time this form is the succession of its moments, and in space the position of its parts, which determine one another reciprocally to infinity.

Whoever has come to see clearly, from the introductory essay, the complete identity of the content of the principle of sufficient reason, for all the diversity of its forms, will also be convinced of how important for insight into its innermost essence is precisely the knowledge of the simplest of its configurations as such; and this we have recognized to be *time*. In time each moment exists only insofar as it has annihilated the preceding one, its father, only to be annihilated itself just as quickly; past and future (apart from the consequences of their content) are as null as any dream, while the present is only the boundary, without extension or duration, between the two. In just the same way we shall recognize the same nullity in all the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason as well. We shall see that, like time, so too space, and like space, so too everything that exists in it and in time at once—everything, then, that proceeds from causes or motives—has only a relative existence, exists only through and for something else of the same kind, that is, something that in turn exists in just the same way. The essence of this view is ancient. Heraclitus lamented in it the eternal flux of things; Plato disparaged its object as what is forever becoming but never is; Spinoza called it mere accidents of the one substance that alone is and endures; Kant opposed what is known in this way, as mere appearance, to the thing in itself. Finally, the age-old wisdom of India declares: "It is *Maya*, the veil of deception, which covers the eyes of mortals and makes them see a world of which one can say neither that it is nor that it is not: for it is like a dream, like the sunlight on the sand that the traveler from afar takes for water, or like a rope tossed on the ground that he takes for a snake." (These similes are found repeated in countless passages of the Vedas and Pur-

anas.)[7] But what all of them meant, and what they speak of, is nothing other than what we too are now considering: the world as representation, subject to the principle of sufficient reason.

§ 4. MATTER AS CAUSALITY

Matter is nothing but acting; the understanding, whose sole function is knowing causality, creates intuition.

1.4 Whoever has recognized the form of the principle of sufficient reason that appears in pure time as such, and on which all counting and calculating rests, has thereby also recognized the whole essence of time. Time is nothing more than that very form of the principle of sufficient reason, and has no other property. Succession is the form of the principle of sufficient reason in time; succession is the whole essence of time.—Whoever, further, has recognized the principle of sufficient reason as it governs mere, purely intuited space has thereby exhausted the whole essence of space; for space is through and through nothing other than the possibility of the reciprocal determination of its parts by one another, which is called position. The detailed consideration of this, and the setting down of the results that follow from it in abstract concepts for more convenient application, is the content of the whole of geometry.—In just the same way, whoever has recognized that form of the principle of sufficient reason which governs the content of those forms (of time and space), their perceptibility, that is, matter—in other words, the law of causality—has thereby recognized the whole essence of matter as such: for matter is through and through nothing but causality, as anyone sees immediately as soon as he reflects. Its being, namely, is its acting: no other being of matter can even be conceived. Only as acting does it fill space and fill time. Its action on the immediate object (which is itself matter) conditions the intuition in which alone it exists. The consequence of

7 Maya: in Indian (especially Vedanta) thought, the illusion that makes the world appear as a multiplicity of things; the "veil of Maya" recurs throughout the book. The Puranas are a large body of Hindu mythological and religious texts.

the action of any material object on another is known only insofar as the latter now acts differently than before on the immediate object; it consists in nothing else. Cause and effect, then, is the whole essence of matter: its being is its acting. (More on this in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 21, p. 77.) Most aptly, therefore, the sum total of everything material is called in German *Wirklichkeit*,[8] a word far more expressive than "Realität."[9] What it acts on is always, in turn, matter. Its whole being and essence thus consists only in the lawful change that *one* part of it produces in another, and is consequently wholly relative, according to a relation that holds only within its own limits—just like time, just like space.

Time and space, however, each on its own, can be represented intuitively even without matter; but matter cannot be so represented without them. The very form that is inseparable from it presupposes space, and its acting, in which its whole existence consists, always concerns a change, and thus a determination of *time*. But time and space are not merely presupposed by matter each on its own; rather, a union of the two constitutes its essence, precisely because this essence, as has been shown, consists in acting, in causality. For all conceivable, countless appearances and states could lie side by side in infinite space without crowding one another, or follow one another in infinite time without disturbing one another. Hence a necessary relation among them, and a rule determining them in accordance with it, would not be needed at all, indeed would not even be applicable. Consequently, for all the juxtaposition in space and all the change in time, as long as each of these two forms had its existence and course on its own, without connection with the other,

8 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quaedam efficacissimis notis signat* [In certain matters the aptness of words is remarkable, and the usage of the old language marks some things with the most telling signs]. *Seneca epist.* 81.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Seneca the Younger (c. 4 BC–AD 65), Roman Stoic philosopher; the passage is from his *Letters to Lucilius* 81.

9 Wirklichkeit ("actuality, reality") comes from wirken, "to act, to take effect"; hence Schopenhauer's point that matter's being is its acting.

there would still be no causality at all; and since causality constitutes the real essence of matter, there would be no matter either. —But the law of causality receives its meaning and necessity solely from the fact that the essence of change does not consist in the mere alternation of states in themselves. It consists rather in this: that at *the same* place in space there is now *one* state and then *another*, and at one and the same particular time there is *here* this state and *there* that one. Only this mutual limitation of time and space by each other gives meaning, and at the same time necessity, to a rule according to which change must proceed. What is determined by the law of causality, then, is not the succession of states in mere time, but this succession with regard to a particular space; and not the existence of states in a particular place, but in this place at a particular time. Change, that is, the alteration that occurs according to the causal law, thus always concerns a particular part of space and a particular part of time *together* and in union. Accordingly, causality unites space with time. But we have found that the whole essence of matter consists in acting, hence in causality: consequently space and time must also be united in matter, that is, it must bear within itself at once the properties of time and those of space, however much the two conflict with each other, and must unite in itself what is impossible in each of the two on its own: thus the unstable flight of time with the rigid, unchanging persistence of space; infinite divisibility it has from both. Accordingly, we find that it is through matter, first of all, that *simultaneity* is brought about, which could exist neither in mere time, which knows no side by side, nor in mere space, which knows no before, after or now. But the *simultaneity* of many states is what really constitutes the essence of actuality: for through it *duration* first becomes possible, since duration can be known only by the change in what exists simultaneously with what endures. Yet it is also only by means of what endures amid the change that the change now takes on the character of *alteration*, that is, of a change of quality and form while the *substance*, that

is, *matter*, persists.[10] In mere space the world would be rigid and motionless: no succession, no alteration, no acting—but with acting, the representation of matter is also abolished. In mere time, again, everything would be fleeting: no persistence, no side by side and hence no simultaneity, consequently no duration—thus, again, no matter either. Only through the union of time and space does matter arise, that is, the possibility of simultaneity and thereby of duration, and through this, in turn, of the persistence of substance amid the alteration of states.[11] Having its essence in the union of time and space, matter bears throughout the stamp of both. It attests its origin in space partly through form, which is inseparable from it, but especially (since change belongs to time alone, while in time alone and by itself there is nothing lasting) through its persistence (substance), the *a priori* certainty of which is therefore to be derived entirely from that of space.[12] Its origin in time, however, it reveals in quality (accident), without which it never appears, and which is always, without exception, causality, action on other matter, and thus alteration (a concept of time). But the lawfulness of this acting always relates to space and time together, and has meaning only through this. What state must arise *at this time in this place* is the one determination to which the legislation of causality extends. It is on this derivation of the fundamental determinations of matter from the forms of our knowledge of which we are conscious *a priori* that our ascribing certain properties to matter *a priori* rests: namely, filling of space, that is, impenetrability, that is, efficacy; then extension, infinite divisibility, persistence, that is, indestructibility; and finally mobility. Gravity, on the other hand, although it admits no exceptions, is probably to be counted as knowledge *a posteriori*, even though Kant, in the

10 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. That matter and substance are one is shown in the Appendix.

11 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Not from the knowledge of time, as Kant would have it; this is shown in the Appendix.

12 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. This also shows the ground of Kant's definition of matter, "that it is what is movable in space": for motion consists only in the union of space and time.

Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, p. 71 (Rosenkranz edition, p. 372), presents it as knowable *a priori*.[13]

But just as the object in general exists only for the subject, as its representation, so each particular class of representations exists only for an equally particular determination in the subject, which is called a cognitive faculty. The subjective correlate of time and space by themselves, as empty forms, Kant called pure sensibility. The term may be retained, since Kant broke the path here, although it is not quite apt, since sensibility already presupposes matter. The subjective correlate of matter, or of causality—for the two are one—is the understanding, and it is nothing besides this. To know causality is its sole function, its only power; and it is a great power, embracing much, of manifold application, yet unmistakably identical in all its manifestations. Conversely, all causality, hence all matter, and consequently the whole of actuality, exists only for the understanding, through the understanding, in the understanding. The first, simplest, ever-present manifestation of the understanding is the intuition of the actual world: this is wholly knowledge of the cause from the effect; hence all intuition is intellectual. Yet it could never come about unless some effect were known immediately and thereby served as a starting point. This, however, is the effect on animal bodies. To this extent they are the *immediate objects* of the subject: the intuition of all other objects is mediated through them. The changes that every animal body undergoes are known immediately, that is, felt; and as this effect is at once referred to its cause, there arises the intuition of the cause as an *object*. This referring is not an inference in abstract concepts; it does not happen through reflection, nor by choice, but immediately, necessarily and surely. It is the pure understanding's way of knowing, without which intuition would never come about. There would remain only a dull, plant-like consciousness of the changes in the immediate object, which would follow one another wholly without meaning, unless they had

13 The Rosenkranz edition is the collected works of Kant edited by Karl Rosenkranz and Friedrich Wilhelm Schubert (1838–1842).

some meaning for the will as pain or pleasure. But just as the visible world stands there when the sun rises, so the understanding, at a stroke, by its single, simple function, transforms dull, meaningless sensation into intuition. What the eye, the ear, the hand senses is not intuition: it is mere data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world stand there as intuition, spread out in space, changing in form, persisting in matter through all time: for the understanding unites space and time in the representation *matter*, that is, efficacy. This world as representation exists only through the understanding, and likewise only for the understanding. In the first chapter of my essay *On Vision and Colors* I have already explained how the understanding creates intuition out of the data the senses supply; how the child learns to intuit by comparing the impressions that the different senses receive from the same object; and how precisely this alone explains so many sensory phenomena—single vision with two eyes; double vision with a squint, or when we look at the same time at objects standing one behind another at unequal distances; and every illusion produced by a sudden change in the sense organs. I have treated this important subject much more fully and thoroughly, however, in the second edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 21. Everything said there would have its necessary place here, and so ought really to be said again here. But since I have almost as much aversion to copying myself as to copying others, and am not able to present it better than it was presented there, I refer to it instead of repeating it here—but now I also presuppose it as known.

Children learning to see, and people born blind learning to see after an operation; the single vision of what is sensed double, with two eyes; the double vision and double touch that occur when the sense organs are displaced from their usual position; the upright appearance of objects while their image in the eye is inverted; the transfer to external objects of color, which is merely an internal function, a polar division of the activity of the eye; and finally the stereoscope as well—all this is firm and

irrefutable proof that all *intuition* is not merely sensory but intellectual, that is, pure *knowledge by the understanding of the cause from the effect*, and consequently presupposes the law of causality. On knowledge of this law all intuition, and hence all experience, depends for its first and entire possibility—and not, conversely, knowledge of the causal law on experience, which latter was Hume's skepticism, refuted only by this. For the independence of knowledge of causality from all experience, that is, its apriority, can be demonstrated solely from the dependence of all experience on it. And this in turn can be done only by showing—in the manner indicated here and worked out in the passages just referred to—that knowledge of causality is already contained in intuition in general, within whose domain all experience lies, and thus exists completely *a priori* with respect to experience: experience presupposes it as its condition, rather than it presupposing experience. It cannot, however, be demonstrated in the way Kant attempted, which I have criticized in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 23.

§ 5. THE DISPUTE OVER THE EXTERNAL WORLD

Realism and idealism wrongly apply cause and effect between object and subject.

1.5 But one must beware of the great misunderstanding that, because intuition is mediated by knowledge of causality, the relation of cause and effect therefore holds between object and subject. On the contrary, this relation always holds only between the immediate and the mediated object, and thus always only between objects. It is precisely on that false presupposition that the foolish dispute about the reality of the external world rests, in which dogmatism and skepticism confront each other, the former appearing now as realism, now as idealism. Realism posits the object as cause and places its effect in the subject. Fichte's idealism makes the object the effect of the subject. But since—and this cannot be stressed enough—no relation at all according to the principle of sufficient reason obtains

between subject and object, neither of the two assertions could ever be proved, and skepticism made victorious attacks on both. —For just as the law of causality already precedes intuition and experience as their condition, and therefore cannot have been learned from them (as Hume thought), so object and subject precede all knowledge as its very first condition, and therefore also precede the principle of sufficient reason in general. For this principle is only the form of every object, the universal manner of its appearance; but the object always already presupposes the subject. Between the two, therefore, there can be no relation of ground and consequent. My essay on the principle of sufficient reason is meant to accomplish precisely this: to present the content of that principle as the essential form of every object, that is, as the universal manner of all being-an-object, as something that belongs to the object as such. But as such the object everywhere presupposes the subject as its necessary correlate; the subject therefore always remains outside the domain in which the principle of sufficient reason is valid. The dispute over the reality of the external world rests precisely on that false extension of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason to the subject as well, and, starting from this misunderstanding, it could never understand itself. On the one hand, realist dogmatism, regarding the representation as the effect of the object, would separate these two, representation and object, which are in fact one, and assume a cause quite different from the representation—an object in itself, independent of the subject: something wholly unthinkable. For already as object it always presupposes the subject again, and therefore always remains merely its representation. Against it skepticism, under the same false presupposition, objects that in representation we always have only the effect, never the cause, and therefore never know the *being* of objects, only ever their *acting*; that this acting, however, may bear no resemblance at all to that being, and may indeed be wholly mistakenly assumed, since the law of causality has first been taken from experience—whose reality, in turn, is supposed to rest on it. —To this, both sides need to be taught,

first, that object and representation are the same; then, that the *being* of intuitive objects is precisely their *acting*, that the actuality of the thing consists precisely in this, and that the demand for the existence of the object outside the subject's representation, and also for a being of the actual thing distinct from its acting, has no meaning at all and is a contradiction. Knowledge of the way an intuited object acts therefore exhausts the object itself, insofar as it is object, that is, representation, since beyond this nothing remains in it for knowledge. To this extent, then, the intuited world in space and time, which proclaims itself as nothing but causality, is perfectly real, and is entirely what it presents itself as; and it presents itself wholly and without reserve as representation, connected according to the law of causality. This is its empirical reality. On the other hand, however, all causality exists only in the understanding and for the understanding; that whole actual, that is, acting, world is therefore, as such, always conditioned by the understanding and nothing without it. But not only for this reason—already because no object at all can be thought without a subject without contradiction—we must flatly deny to the dogmatist, who explains the reality of the external world as its independence from the subject, any such reality of it. The whole world of objects is and remains representation, and for that very reason is conditioned by the subject entirely and to all eternity; that is, it has transcendental ideality. But it is not, on that account, a lie or an illusion: it presents itself as what it is, as representation, and indeed as a series of representations whose common bond is the principle of sufficient reason. As such it is intelligible to sound understanding, even in its innermost meaning, and speaks a language perfectly clear to it. Only a mind twisted by sophistical reasoning can take it into its head to dispute its reality. This always happens through a wrong application of the principle of sufficient reason, which does indeed connect all representations, of whatever kind, with one another, but by no means connects them with the subject, or with something that would be neither subject nor object but merely the ground of the object—a

non-concept, since only objects can be grounds, and always, in turn, of objects. —If one investigates the origin of this question about the reality of the external world still more closely, one finds that, besides that false application of the principle of sufficient reason to what lies outside its domain, there is also a particular confusion of its forms. Namely, the form it has only with regard to concepts or abstract representations is transferred to intuitive representations, to real objects, and a ground of knowing is demanded of objects that can have no ground other than a ground of becoming. Over abstract representations, concepts joined into judgments, the principle of sufficient reason does indeed rule in such a way that each of them has its value, its validity, its whole existence—here called *truth*—solely and exclusively through the judgment's relation to something outside it, its ground of knowledge, to which one must therefore always go back. Over real objects, intuitive representations, on the other hand, the principle of sufficient reason rules not as the principle of the ground of *knowing* but of *becoming*, as the law of causality. Each of them has already paid its debt to it by having come to be, that is, by having proceeded as an effect from a cause. The demand for a ground of knowledge therefore has no validity and no meaning here; it belongs to an entirely different class of objects. Hence, too, the intuitive world, as long as one stays with it, arouses neither scruple nor doubt in the observer: here there is neither error nor truth; these are confined to the domain of the abstract, of reflection. Here, however, the world lies open to the senses and the understanding and presents itself with naive truth as what it is—as intuitive representation, unfolding lawfully along the bond of causality.

As we have considered the question about the reality of the external world so far, it had always arisen from an aberration of reason that went so far as to misunderstand itself, and to that extent the question could be answered only by clarifying its content. Once the whole essence of the principle of sufficient reason, the relation between object and subject, and the real

nature of sensory intuition had been investigated, the question had to cancel itself, because no meaning at all remained to it.

LIFE AND DREAM

No sure criterion but waking separates dream from reality; life is a long dream.

But this question has yet another origin, entirely different from the purely speculative one given so far: a truly empirical origin, although even so it is still raised with a speculative aim. In this significance it has a much more intelligible sense than in the former one, namely the following: we have dreams; might not the whole of life be a dream?—or, more precisely: is there a sure criterion between dream and reality? between phantasms and real objects?—The claim that dreamed intuition is less vivid and distinct than actual intuition deserves no consideration at all, since no one has yet held the two side by side for comparison; one could only compare the *memory* of the dream with present reality. —Kant solves the question thus: "The connection of representations among themselves according to the law of causality distinguishes life from dreaming."—But in dreams too every single thing is likewise connected according to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms, and this connection breaks off only between life and dream and between individual dreams. Kant's answer could therefore only run as follows: the *long* dream (life) has a thoroughgoing connection within itself according to the principle of sufficient reason, but not with the *short* dreams, although each of these has the same connection within itself; between these and the former, then, the bridge is broken, and by this we distinguish the two. —Yet to decide by this criterion whether something was dreamed or really happened would be very difficult and often impossible. For we are by no means able to trace the causal connection link by link between every event we have experienced and the present moment—and yet we do not on that account declare those events dreamed. This is why, in real life, people do not usually

use that kind of inquiry to distinguish dream from reality. The only sure criterion for distinguishing dream from reality is in fact none other than the entirely empirical one of waking up, through which, to be sure, the causal connection between the dreamed events and those of waking life is expressly and palpably broken off. An excellent confirmation of this is the remark Hobbes makes in *Leviathan*, chapter 2: namely, that we easily take dreams for reality even afterward when we have fallen asleep in our clothes without meaning to, and especially when, in addition, some undertaking or plan occupies all our thoughts and engages us in dreaming just as in waking. In these cases, namely, waking is noticed almost as little as falling asleep; dream flows together with reality and becomes mixed up with it. Then, to be sure, only the application of Kant's criterion remains. But if afterward, as is often the case, the causal connection with the present, or its absence, cannot be ascertained at all, then it must remain forever undecided whether an incident was dreamed or really happened. —Here, in fact, the close kinship between life and dream comes very near to us; nor shall we be ashamed to admit it, since it has been recognized and expressed by many great minds. The Vedas and Puranas know no better simile, and use none more often, for the whole knowledge of the actual world, which they call the web of Maya, than the dream. Plato often says that human beings live only in a dream, and that the philosopher alone strives to be awake. Pindar says (*Pythian* 8, 135): *skias onar anthrôpos* (umbrae somnium homo [man is the dream of a shadow]) and Sophocles:[14]

14 Pindar, Pythian Ode 8 (lines 95–96 in modern numbering); the reference in the German text is given in Greek numerals.

Horô gar hêmas ouden ontas allo, plên
Eidôl', hosoiper zômen, ê kouphên skian.
Ajax 125.
(Nos enim, quicunque vivimus, nihil aliud esse comperio, quam simulacra et levem umbram.) [For I find that all of us who live are nothing but phantoms and a fleeting shadow.][15]

And beside him, most worthily, stands Shakespeare:

We are such stuff
As dreams are made of, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.—
Tempest, act 4, scene 1.[16]

Finally, Calderón was so deeply gripped by this view that he sought to express it in a drama that is in a certain sense metaphysical, *Life Is a Dream*.[17]

After so many passages from the poets, may I too be permitted to express myself through a simile. Life and dreams are pages of one and the same book. Reading them in sequence is what we call real life. But when the hours set aside for reading (the day) are over and the time for rest has come, we often go on idly leafing through the book, opening a page here and there without order or connection. Often it is one we have already read, often one still unknown to us, but always from the same book. Such a page read in isolation is, to be sure, out of connection with the orderly reading from start to finish. Yet it is not so very much inferior to that reading on this account, if we consider that the whole of the orderly reading likewise begins and ends on the spur of the moment, and is therefore to be regarded merely as a larger single page.

So although individual dreams are set apart from real life by the fact that they do not fit into the connection of experience

15 Sophocles, *Ajax* 125–126: Odysseus' words on seeing Ajax driven mad by Athena. Schopenhauer adds a Latin translation, rendered here in brackets.
16 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. We are such stuff as that of which dreams are made, and our short life is enclosed by a sleep.
17 Pedro Calderón de la Barca (1600–1681), Spanish dramatist; *La vida es sueño* was first performed in 1635.

that runs continuously through it—and waking marks this difference—that very connection of experience belongs to real life as its form, and the dream, for its part, can point to a connection within itself as well. If we take up a standpoint for judging outside both, we find no definite difference in their nature, and we are forced to concede to the poets that life is a long dream.

Let us now return from this wholly self-contained, empirical origin of the question of the reality of the external world to its speculative origin. We have found that this lies, first, in the false application of the principle of sufficient reason, namely between subject and object as well; and second, in the confusion of its forms, since the principle of sufficient reason of knowing was carried over into the domain where the principle of sufficient reason of becoming holds. Even so, that question could hardly have occupied philosophers so persistently if it were entirely without any real content, and if there did not lie at its innermost core some correct thought and meaning as its truest origin. We would then have to assume that it was only when this thought entered reflection and sought its expression that it took on those distorted forms and questions which do not understand themselves. And so, in my opinion, it indeed is. As the pure expression of that innermost meaning of the question, which the question itself could not manage to hit upon, I put forward this: What else is this intuitive world, besides being my representation? Is the world—of which I am conscious in only one way, namely as representation—like my own body, of which I am conscious in two ways: on the one hand *representation*, on the other *will*?—The clearer explanation of this question and its answer in the affirmative will be the content of the second book, and the conclusions drawn from it will take up the rest of this work.

§ 6. THE BODY AND THE UNDERSTANDING

The body is the immediate object; all animals have understanding, and its lack is stupidity.

1.6 Meanwhile, for the present, in this first book, we consider everything only as representation, as object for the subject. And like all other real objects, we regard even our own body, from which each person's intuition of the world proceeds, solely from the side of its knowability: for us, accordingly, it is only a representation. It is true that everyone's consciousness, which already rebelled against declaring the other objects mere representations, resists even more when one's own body is supposed to be merely a representation. This is because each person knows the thing in itself immediately insofar as it appears as his own body, but only mediately insofar as it objectifies itself in the other objects of intuition. But the course of our inquiry makes this abstraction necessary—this one-sided way of looking at things, this forcible separation of what essentially belongs together. That resistance must therefore be suppressed for the time being, and calmed by the expectation that the considerations to follow will make up for the one-sidedness of the present one and lead to a complete knowledge of the nature of the world.

Here, then, the body is for us the immediate object, that is, the representation that forms the starting point of the subject's knowledge: together with its immediately known changes, it precedes the application of the law of causality and so supplies that law with its first data. The whole essence of matter consists, as has been shown, in its acting. But cause and effect exist only for the understanding, which is nothing other than their subjective correlate. Yet the understanding could never come to be applied if there were not something else from which it starts. This something is mere sensation, the immediate consciousness of the changes of the body, by virtue of which the body is the immediate object. We therefore find the possibility of the knowability of the intuitive world in two conditions. The first, *if we*

express it objectively, is the capacity of bodies to act on one another, to produce changes in one another; without this universal property of all bodies no intuition would be possible, even by means of the sensibility of animal bodies. But if we want to *express subjectively* this same first condition, we say: it is above all the understanding that makes intuition possible. For the law of causality, the possibility of cause and effect, springs from the understanding alone and holds only for it; and so it is only for the understanding and through it that the intuitive world exists. The second condition, however, is the sensibility of animal bodies, or the property of certain bodies of being immediate objects of the subject. The mere changes that the sense organs undergo through the external influence specifically suited to each are indeed already to be called representations, insofar as such influences arouse neither pain nor pleasure—that is, have no immediate significance for the will—and are nevertheless perceived, and so exist only for *knowledge*. To this extent, then, I say that the body is immediately *known*, is the *immediate object*. Here, however, the concept of object is not to be taken in its strictest sense even so. For through this immediate knowledge of the body, which precedes the application of the understanding and is mere sensation, the body itself does not really stand there as *object*; only the bodies acting upon it do. This is because all knowledge of an object in the proper sense, that is, of a representation intuitable in space, exists only through and for the understanding, and so not before its application but only after it. Hence the body as object in the proper sense—that is, as intuitive representation in space—is, just like all other objects, known only mediately, through the application of the law of causality to the action of one of its parts on another: as when the eye sees the body, or the hand touches it. Consequently, the shape of our own body is not made known to us by mere general bodily feeling. Rather, only through knowledge, only in representation, that is, only in the brain, does even our own body first present itself as something extended, articulated, organic. Someone born blind acquires this representation only gradually,

through the data that touch provides; a blind person without hands would never come to know his own shape, or at most would gradually infer and construct it from the action of other bodies on him. It is with this restriction, then, that we are to be understood when we call the body the immediate object.

Moreover, according to what has been said, all animal bodies are immediate objects, that is, starting points of the intuition of the world for the subject—the subject that knows everything and for that very reason is never known. *Knowing*, together with the movement on motives that it conditions, is therefore the true *character of animality*, just as movement on stimuli is the character of the plant. The inorganic, however, has no movement other than that brought about by causes proper, in the narrowest sense. I have discussed all this at greater length in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, 2nd ed., § 20; in the *Ethics*, first essay, III; and in *On Vision and Colors*, § 1—to which I therefore refer the reader.[18]

From what has been said it follows that all animals have understanding, even the most imperfect: for they all know objects, and this knowledge, as motive, determines their movements.—Understanding is the same in all animals and all human beings; everywhere it has the same simple form: knowledge of causality, the transition from effect to cause and from cause to effect, and nothing besides. But the degrees of its sharpness and the extent of its sphere of knowledge vary enormously and are graded in many different ways. They range from the lowest degree, which knows only the causal relation between the immediate object and the mediate ones—just enough, that is, to intuit the cause as an object in space by passing from the effect the body undergoes to that effect's cause—up to the higher degrees of knowledge of the causal connection among merely mediate objects themselves, which extend as far as understanding the most complex chains of causes and effects in nature. For even this latter still belongs to the understanding, not to reason.

18 The *Ethics* is Schopenhauer's *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (1841), whose first essay is *On the Freedom of the Will*.

Reason's abstract concepts can only serve to take up, fix and combine what has been immediately understood; they can never produce understanding itself. Every force of nature and law of nature, every case in which they manifest themselves, must first be known immediately by the understanding, grasped intuitively, before it can enter reflective consciousness *in abstracto*, for reason. Such intuitive, immediate grasping by the understanding was R. Hooke's discovery of the law of gravitation, and his tracing of so many great appearances back to this one law, as Newton's calculations then confirmed. The same was true of Lavoisier's discovery of oxygen and of its important role in nature, and of Goethe's discovery of how physical colors arise.[19] All these discoveries are nothing but a correct, immediate return from the effect to the cause, soon followed by knowledge of the identity of the natural force that manifests itself in all causes of the same kind. And this entire insight is a manifestation, differing only in degree, of the same single function of the understanding by which an animal, too, intuits the cause acting on its body as an object in space. Hence all those great discoveries, like intuition and every expression of the understanding, are an immediate insight, and as such the work of a moment—an *apperçu* [a flash of insight], a sudden inspiration—not the product of long chains of reasoning *in abstracto*. Such chains serve instead to fix the understanding's immediate knowledge for reason by laying it down in reason's abstract concepts, that is, to make it distinct—that is, to put oneself in a position to point it out and make it plain to others.—This sharpness of the understanding in grasping the causal relations of mediately known objects finds its application not only in natural science (all of whose discoveries are owed to it) but also in practical life, where it is called *prudence*; whereas in the former application it is better called acumen, penetration and sagacity. Strictly speaking, *prudence* denotes exclusively the understanding in the ser-

19 Robert Hooke (1635–1703) proposed an inverse-square law of attraction before Newton's *Principia*; Schopenhauer credits him with the discovery. On colors, Schopenhauer sided with Goethe's *Theory of Colors* (1810) against Newton.

vice of the will. Yet the boundaries of these concepts can never be sharply drawn, since it is always one and the same function of the same understanding, already active in every animal in the intuition of objects in space. In its greatest sharpness, this function at one time correctly traces, in the appearances of nature, the unknown cause from the given effect, and so gives reason the material for thinking general rules as laws of nature. At another time, by applying known causes to intended effects, it invents complicated, ingenious machines. At yet another, applied to motivation, it either sees through and foils subtle intrigues and machinations, or else itself sets the motives, and the people susceptible to each of them, in their proper places, and puts them in motion at will, like machines driven by levers and wheels, steering them toward its own ends. —Lack of understanding is, in the proper sense, called stupidity, and it is precisely *dullness in applying the law of causality*: an inability to grasp immediately the chains of cause and effect, of motive and action. A stupid person does not see the connection of the appearances of nature, either where they occur left to themselves or where they are deliberately guided, that is, put to work in machines; for this reason he readily believes in magic and miracles. A stupid person does not notice that different people, apparently independent of one another, are in fact acting in concert by prior arrangement; he is therefore easily hoaxed and outmaneuvered. He does not notice the concealed motives behind advice given, judgments pronounced, and so on. But he always lacks just one thing: sharpness, quickness, ease in applying the law of causality, that is, power of understanding.—The greatest example of stupidity I have ever come across, and an instructive one in the respect now under consideration, was a severely intellectually disabled boy of about eleven in a care institution. He did have reason, since he could speak and understand what was said to him, but in understanding he fell short of many an animal. For every time I came he would study an eyeglass that I wore around my neck, in which, by reflection, the windows of the room and the treetops beyond them appeared.

Each time this filled him with great wonder and delight, and he never tired of gazing at it in astonishment, because he did not understand this entirely immediate causality of reflection.

Just as the degrees of sharpness of the understanding vary greatly among human beings, they probably vary even more between the different species of animals. In all of them, even those closest to the plant, there is at least as much understanding as suffices for the transition from the effect in the immediate object to the mediated object as its cause—and hence for intuition, for the apprehension of an object. For it is precisely this that makes them animals, since it gives them the possibility of movement according to motives, and thereby of seeking out, or at least seizing, food. Plants, by contrast, have only movement on stimuli, whose immediate action they must wait for or else wither; they cannot go after them or seize them. In the most perfect animals we admire their great sagacity: in the dog, the elephant, the ape, and in the fox, whose cleverness Buffon has described so masterfully. In these cleverest of all animals we can gauge fairly precisely how much the understanding can do without the help of reason, that is, of abstract knowledge in concepts. In ourselves we cannot recognize this so well, because there understanding and reason always support each other. That is why we often find the expressions of understanding in animals now above, now below our expectations.[20] On the one hand we are surprised by the sagacity of the elephant that, having already crossed many bridges on its travels in Europe, once refused to step onto one over which it saw the rest of the procession of people and horses passing as usual, because the bridge seemed to it too lightly built for its weight. On the other hand we are astonished that clever orangutans, warming themselves at a fire they have found, do not keep it going by adding wood: a proof that this already requires deliberation, which cannot come about without abstract concepts. That knowledge of cause and effect, as the universal form of the understanding, is inher-

20 Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707–1788), French naturalist, author of the multivolume *Histoire naturelle*.

ent in animals even *a priori* is already completely certain from the fact that for them, as for us, it is the prior condition of all intuitive knowledge of the external world. But if one wants a particular piece of evidence as well, one need only observe, for example, how even a very young dog will not dare to jump off a table, however much it wants to, because it foresees the effect of its body's weight—without, for that matter, knowing this particular case from experience. In judging the understanding of animals, however, we must take care not to attribute to it what is a manifestation of instinct—a property entirely different from the understanding, and from reason too, but one that often acts in a way very similar to the combined activity of the two. The discussion of instinct does not belong here, however; it will find its place in the second book, in the consideration of the harmony or so-called teleology of nature, and Chapter 27 of the Supplements is devoted specifically to it.

Lack of *understanding* was called *stupidity*; lack of the application of *reason* to practical matters we shall later recognize as *folly*; likewise lack of *judgment* as *simple-mindedness*; and finally, partial or even total lack of memory as madness. But each in its proper place.—What is correctly known by *reason* is *truth*, namely an abstract judgment with a sufficient ground (essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 29 ff.); what is correctly known by the *understanding* is *reality*, namely the correct transition from the effect in the immediate object to its cause. To *truth* is opposed *error*, as deception of *reason*; to *reality*, *illusion*, as deception of the *understanding*. A fuller discussion of all this can be found in the first chapter of my essay *On Vision and Colors*. —*Illusion* arises when one and the same effect can be brought about by two entirely different causes, one of which acts very frequently and the other rarely. The understanding has no datum for distinguishing which cause is at work, since the effect is exactly the same; so it always presupposes the usual cause. And because its activity is not reflective and discursive but direct and immediate, this false cause stands before us as an intuited object—which is precisely the deceptive illusion. How

double vision and double touch arise in this way when the sense organs are brought into an unusual position I have shown in the place cited, and I thereby gave an irrefutable proof that intuition exists only through the understanding and for the understanding. Further examples of such deception of the understanding, or illusion, are the stick dipped in water, which appears broken, and the images in spherical mirrors, which appear somewhat behind the surface when it is convex and far in front of it when it is concave. Here too belongs the apparently greater size of the moon on the horizon than at the zenith. This is not optical, since, as the micrometer proves, the eye actually takes in the moon at the zenith at a somewhat larger visual angle than on the horizon. Rather, it is the understanding that assumes a greater distance of the moon and all the stars on the horizon as the cause of their fainter brightness there, estimating them like earthly objects according to aerial perspective. It therefore takes the moon on the horizon to be much larger than at the zenith, and at the same time takes the vault of the sky to be more extended at the horizon, that is, flattened. The same misapplied estimation by aerial perspective makes us take very high mountains, whose summit, the only part visible to us, lies in pure, transparent air, to be nearer than they are, to the detriment of their height—Mont Blanc seen from Sallanches, for example.—And all such deceptive illusions stand before us in immediate intuition, which no reasoning by reason can dispel. Such reasoning can only prevent error, that is, a judgment without sufficient ground, by means of an opposite, true judgment—for example, by recognizing *in abstracto* that the cause of the fainter brightness of the moon and stars on the horizon is not greater distance but the murkier vapors there. But in all the cases cited the illusion remains immovably in place, in defiance of all abstract knowledge. For the understanding is completely and sharply distinct from reason, a cognitive faculty added in human beings alone; and indeed, the understanding in itself is non-rational even in human beings. Reason can only ever know;

intuiting remains with the understanding alone, free from reason's influence.

§ 7. STARTING FROM REPRESENTATION

Unlike systems that start from the object or the subject, this one starts from representation.

1.7 With regard to the whole of our consideration so far, the following should be carefully noted. We started neither from the object nor from the subject, but from *representation*, which already contains and presupposes both; for the division into object and subject is its first, most universal and most essential form. We therefore considered this form as such first, and then (though here, in the main, referring to the introductory essay) the other forms subordinate to it—time, space and causality. These belong to the *object* alone; yet because they are essential to the object *as such*, and the object in turn is essential to the subject *as such*, they can also be discovered from the subject, that is, known *a priori*, and to that extent are to be regarded as the common boundary of the two. All of them, however, can be traced back to one common expression, the principle of sufficient reason, as has been shown in detail in the introductory essay.

This procedure distinguishes our way of looking at things completely from all philosophies ever attempted. These all started either from the object or from the subject, and accordingly tried to explain the one from the other—and, what is more, according to the principle of sufficient reason. We, by contrast, withdraw the relation between object and subject from the rule of that principle, leaving it only the object.—One might regard as not falling under this opposition the philosophy of identity that has arisen in our day and become generally known, insofar as it makes neither object nor subject its real starting point, but a third thing: the Absolute, knowable through rational intuition, which is neither object nor subject but the sameness of the

two.[21] Since I am wholly lacking in all rational intuition, I shall not presume to join in the talk about this venerable sameness and the Absolute. Nevertheless, basing myself merely on the records of the rational intuiters, which lie open to all, even to us uninitiated, I must point out that this philosophy is not to be exempted from the opposition of two errors set out above. For despite the identity of subject and object—which cannot be thought, but only intellectually intuited, or experienced by immersing oneself in it—it still does not avoid those two opposite errors; on the contrary, it merely combines both within itself, since it falls into two disciplines. The first is transcendental idealism, which is Fichte's doctrine of the I, and which accordingly, following the principle of sufficient reason, lets the object be produced by the subject or spun out of it. The second is the philosophy of nature, which in the same way lets the subject gradually come to be out of the object, by applying a method called construction. Very little about this method is clear to me, but at least this much is: that it is a progression in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason in various forms.[22] I renounce any claim to the profound wisdom that this construction contains; for to me, entirely lacking rational intuition as I am, all the expositions that presuppose it must be a book sealed with seven seals. This is indeed the case to such a degree that—strange to relate—whenever I hear those doctrines of profound wisdom, it always seems to me as if I were hearing nothing but atrocious and, on top of that, extremely tedious windbaggery.

The systems that start from the object have indeed always had the whole intuitive world and its order as their problem; but the object they take as their starting point is not always this world, or its basic element, matter. Rather, these systems can be classified according to the four classes of possible objects set out

21 Schelling's "philosophy of identity" (from about 1801) posited an Absolute beyond subject and object, grasped by "intellectual intuition"; his philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) is discussed below.

22 Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) derived the whole of experience from the self-positing "I" in his *Wissenschaftslehre* (Doctrine of Science); Schopenhauer heard his lectures in Berlin.

in the introductory essay. Thus one can say that the following started from the first of those classes, the real world: Thales and the Ionians, Democritus, Epicurus, Giordano Bruno and the French materialists. From the second, the abstract concept: Spinoza (namely from the merely abstract concept of substance, which exists only in its definition), and earlier the Eleatics. From the third class, namely time, and hence numbers: the Pythagoreans and Chinese philosophy in the Y-king.[23] Finally, from the fourth class, namely the act of will motivated by knowledge: the Scholastics, who teach a creation out of nothing through the act of will of a personal being outside the world.

MATERIALISM

Materialism tries to derive the knowing subject from matter and so begs the question.

The objective procedure is most consistent and can be carried furthest when it appears as materialism proper. Materialism posits matter, and time and space with it, as existing absolutely, and skips over the relation to the subject in which alone all this exists. It further seizes on the law of causality as the guiding thread along which it means to advance, taking it as an order of things existing in itself, *veritas aeterna* [eternal truth]—and thus skipping over the understanding, in which and for which alone causality exists. It then tries to find the first, simplest state of matter, and to develop all the others from it, ascending from mere mechanism to chemism, to polarity, to plant life, to animal life. And supposing this succeeded, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility, knowing—which would therefore now appear as a mere modification of matter, a state of it brought about by causality. Now if we had followed materialism this far with intuitive representations, then, on reaching its summit together with it, we would feel a sudden fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. For, as if waking from a

23 The *Y-king* is the *Yijing* (*I Ching*, "Book of Changes"), the ancient Chinese classic built on figures of broken and unbroken lines.

dream, we would all at once realize that its final result, arrived at with such effort—knowing—was already presupposed as an indispensable condition at the very first starting point, mere matter. We would realize that while we imagined we were thinking matter along with materialism, we had in fact been thinking nothing but the subject that represents matter, the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it.[24] Thus the enormous *petitio principii* [begging of the question] would unexpectedly reveal itself: for suddenly the last link would turn out to be the fixed point on which the first already hung, and the chain a circle. The materialist would be like Baron Münchhausen, who, swimming on horseback in the water, lifts the horse with his legs and himself by his own pigtail, pulled forward over his head. Accordingly, the fundamental absurdity of materialism lies in the fact that it starts from the *objective* and takes something *objective* as the ultimate ground of explanation —whether this be *matter in abstracto*, as it is merely *thought*, or matter that has already entered into form and is empirically given, that is, *material*, such as the chemical elements together with their simplest compounds.[25] Something of this kind it takes as existing in itself and absolutely, in order to let organic nature and finally the knowing subject emerge from it and thereby explain them completely—whereas in truth everything objective is, already as such, conditioned in manifold ways by the knowing subject with the forms of its knowing, presupposes these forms, and therefore vanishes entirely if the subject is thought away. Materialism is thus the attempt to explain what is immediately given to us from what is given mediately. Everything objective, extended, active—everything material, then—which materialism regards as so solid a foundation for its explanations that a reduction to it (especially if it came down in the end to impact and counter-impact) could leave nothing to be desired:

24 The "inextinguishable laughter" of the gods comes from Homer, *Iliad* 1.599.
25 The fictional Baron Münchhausen, hero of tall tales popularized by Rudolf Erich Raspe (1785) and Gottfried August Bürger (1786), claims to have pulled himself and his horse out of a swamp by his own hair.

all this, I say, is something given only very mediately and conditionally, and is therefore only relatively present. For it has passed through the machinery and manufacture of the brain and so has entered into its forms—time, space and causality—by virtue of which alone it presents itself as extended in space and acting in time. Yet from something given in this way materialism wants to explain even what is immediately given—representation (in which all of that exists)—and in the end even the will. In truth, it is rather from the will that all those fundamental forces, which manifest themselves along the guiding thread of causes and therefore in accordance with laws, are to be explained.—To the assertion that knowing is a modification of matter, the opposite assertion can therefore always be set with equal right: that all matter is only a modification of the subject's knowing, as its representation. Nevertheless, the goal and ideal of all natural science is, at bottom, a completely worked-out materialism. That we here recognize this as plainly impossible confirms another truth that will emerge from our further consideration: namely, that all science in the proper sense—by which I understand systematic knowledge guided by the principle of sufficient reason—can never reach an ultimate goal or give a completely satisfactory explanation. For it never reaches the innermost nature of the world; it can never get beyond representation, but at bottom teaches us nothing more than the relation of one representation to another.

Every science always starts from two principal data. One of these is invariably the principle of sufficient reason, in some form, as organon; the other is its particular object, as problem. Thus, for example, geometry has space as its problem and the ground of being in space as its organon; arithmetic has time as its problem and the ground of being in time as its organon; logic has the combinations of concepts as such as its problem and the ground of knowing as its organon; history has the deeds that human beings have done, on a large scale and in the mass, as its problem, and the law of motivation as its organon; natural science, finally, has matter as its problem and the law of causality

as its organon. Its aim and purpose, accordingly, is to follow the guiding thread of causality in order to trace all possible states of matter back to one another and ultimately to one, and again to derive them from one another and ultimately from one. Two states therefore stand opposed in natural science as extremes: the state of matter in which it is least the immediate object of the subject, and the state in which it is most so—that is, the deadest, crudest matter, the primary element, and then the human organism. Natural science seeks the first as chemistry, the second as physiology. But so far both extremes remain unreached, and only between them has some ground been gained. The prospect, too, is fairly hopeless. The chemists, assuming that the qualitative division of matter will not go on to infinity as the quantitative does, keep trying to reduce the number of their elements, still some sixty at present; and if they got down to two, they would want to reduce these to one. For the law of homogeneity leads to the assumption of a first chemical state of matter, which preceded all the others—these being not essential to matter as such, but only accidental forms, qualities —and which alone belongs to matter as such. On the other hand, it is impossible to see how this state, since there was as yet no second state to act on it, could ever have undergone a chemical change. Here, in chemistry, the same difficulty arises that Epicurus came up against in mechanics, when he had to explain how the first atom departed from the original direction of its motion. Indeed, this contradiction, which develops entirely of its own accord and can be neither avoided nor resolved, could quite properly be set up as a chemical *antinomy*. Just as it is found here at the first of the two extremes sought by natural science, so a corresponding counterpart will show itself to us at the second.[26] —There is just as little hope of reaching this other extreme of natural science, since it is becoming ever clearer that something chemical can never be reduced to something mechanical, nor something organic to something chemical or elec-

26 Epicurus' atoms fall in parallel through the void; to explain their collisions he posited an uncaused "swerve" (Lucretius' *clinamen*).

trical. Those who nowadays set out once again along this old wrong path will soon, like all their predecessors, creep back along it, silent and ashamed. This will be discussed in more detail in the next book. The difficulties mentioned here only in passing confront natural science in its own domain. Taken as philosophy, moreover, it would be materialism; but materialism, as we have seen, carries death in its heart from the moment of its birth, because it skips over the subject and the forms of knowing, which are presupposed just as much by the crudest matter it would like to begin with as by the organism it wants to arrive at. For "no object without a subject" is the principle that makes all materialism forever impossible. Suns and planets without an eye to see them and an understanding to know them can indeed be spoken of in words; but for representation these words are a sideroxylon [an "iron-wood," a contradiction in terms]. On the other hand, however, the law of causality, and the observation and investigation of nature that follow it, lead us necessarily to the confident assumption that, in time, every more highly organized state of matter came only after a cruder one: that animals existed before human beings, fish before land animals, plants before these too, and the inorganic before anything organic; and consequently that the original mass had to go through a long series of changes before the first eye could open. And yet the existence of that whole world always remains dependent on this first eye that opened, even if it belonged to an insect. For that eye is the necessary intermediary of knowledge, for which and in which alone the world exists, and without which it cannot even be thought: the world is absolutely representation, and as such needs the knowing subject as the bearer of its existence. Indeed, that long series of ages itself, filled with countless changes, through which matter rose from form to form until at last the first knowing animal came to be—this whole time itself is thinkable only in the identity of a consciousness. It is that consciousness's succession of representations, its form of knowing; and outside it, time loses all meaning whatsoever and is nothing at all. Thus we see, on the one hand, the

existence of the whole world necessarily dependent on the first knowing being, however imperfect it may be; on the other hand, and just as necessarily, we see this first knowing animal wholly dependent on a long chain of causes and effects that preceded it, into which it itself enters as a small link. These two contradictory views, to each of which we are in fact led with equal necessity, could indeed again be called an *antinomy* in our cognitive faculty, and set up as the counterpart of the one found at the first extreme of natural science. Kant's fourfold antinomy, by contrast, will be shown, in the critique of his philosophy appended to the present work, to be a groundless sham fight. —The contradiction that here finally and necessarily confronts us is resolved, however, by the fact that—to speak in Kant's language —time, space and causality belong not to the thing in itself but only to its appearance, of which they are the form. In my language this reads: the objective world, the world as representation, is not the only side of the world but merely one side, its outer side, as it were; and the world has another, entirely different side, which is its innermost nature, its kernel, the thing in itself. This we shall consider in the next book, naming it after the most immediate of its objectifications: will. The world as representation, however, which is all we are considering here, does indeed begin only with the opening of the first eye; without this medium of knowledge it cannot exist, and so it did not exist before. But without that eye, that is, outside knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Yet it does not follow that time has a beginning; rather, all beginning is in time. But since time is the most universal form of knowability, into which all appearances fit by means of the bond of causality, time too is there along with the first act of knowing, in its whole infinity in both directions. And the appearance that fills this first present must at the same time be known as causally connected with, and dependent on, a series of appearances stretching infinitely into the past. This past, however, is itself just as much conditioned by this first present as the present is by the past. So, like the first present, the past from which it springs is also dependent on the

knowing subject and nothing without it. Yet it brings with it the necessity that this first present should present itself not as the first, that is, not as having no past for its mother and as the beginning of time, but as the consequence of the past, according to the ground of being in time; and likewise that the appearance filling it should present itself as the effect of earlier states filling that past, according to the law of causality.—Anyone fond of mythological interpretation may regard the birth of Kronos (*chronos* [time]), the youngest of the Titans, as a figure for the moment expressed here: the entry of time, which is nevertheless without beginning. With him, since he castrates his father, the crude offspring of Heaven and Earth come to an end, and the race of gods and human beings now takes the stage.[27]

This account, which we arrived at by following the most consistent of the philosophical systems that start from the object, namely materialism, serves at the same time to make intuitively clear the inseparable mutual dependence of subject and object, together with their irremovable opposition. This knowledge leads us to seek the innermost nature of the world, the thing in itself, no longer in either of those two elements of representation, but rather in something entirely different from representation, something not burdened with such an original, essential and at the same time indissoluble opposition.

FICHTE AND STARTING FROM THE SUBJECT

Fichte's derivation of the object from the subject repeats materialism's error in reverse.

Opposed to the procedure just discussed—starting from the object in order to have the subject arise from it—is starting from the subject in order to drive the object out of it. But however frequent and widespread the former has been in all philosophy so far, of the latter there is really only a single example, and a very recent one: the sham philosophy of J. G. Fichte. He must there-

27 In Hesiod's *Theogony* Kronos castrates his father Ouranos (Heaven); from antiquity his name was associated with *chronos*, "time."

fore be mentioned in this respect, however little genuine value and inner substance his doctrine had in itself. Indeed, it was on the whole merely a sham fight; yet, presented with an air of the deepest seriousness, in a measured tone and with lively zeal, and defended with eloquent polemics against weak opponents, it was able to shine and to seem to be something. But genuine seriousness, which, impervious to all outside influences, keeps its goal, the truth, steadily in view, was entirely lacking in him, as in all similar philosophers who adapt themselves to circumstances. It could not, of course, have been otherwise. For one always becomes a philosopher through a perplexity from which one seeks to extricate oneself—the *thaumazein* [wondering] of Plato, which he calls *mala philosophikon* [eminently philosophical].[28] But what separates the spurious philosophers from the genuine ones is this: in the latter, that perplexity arises from the sight of the world itself; in the former, only from a book, a system lying before them. This was indeed Fichte's case, since he became a philosopher merely over Kant's thing in itself, and without it would very probably have pursued quite different things with much better success, for he possessed considerable rhetorical talent. Had he penetrated even somewhat deeply into the meaning of the book that made him a philosopher, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he would have understood that its main doctrine, in spirit, is this: that the principle of sufficient reason is not, as all scholastic philosophy would have it, a *veritas aeterna*, that is, does not have an unconditional validity before, outside and above the whole world, but only a relative and conditional one, holding solely in appearance, whether it appears as the necessary nexus of space or of time, or as the law of causality or of the ground of knowing; that the inner nature of the world, the thing in itself, can therefore never be found by following its guiding thread, but that everything it leads to is always itself again dependent and relative, always mere appearance, not thing in itself; further, that it does not touch the subject at all

28 Plato, *Theaetetus* 155d: wonder is the philosopher's feeling, and philosophy has no other beginning.

but is only the form of objects, which for that very reason are not things in themselves; and that with the object the subject is there at once, and with the subject the object—so that neither can the object be added to the subject, nor the subject to the object, as a consequent to its ground. But not the slightest bit of all this stuck to Fichte. For him the only interesting thing in the matter was *starting from the subject*, which Kant had chosen in order to show that the previous practice of starting from the object—which had thereby become the thing in itself—was false. Fichte, however, took this starting from the subject to be what really mattered. In the manner of all imitators, he imagined that if he outdid Kant in this, he would also surpass him; and in this direction he now repeated the errors that previous dogmatism had committed in the opposite direction, and that had occasioned Kant's critique in the first place. So in the main nothing was changed. The old fundamental error—the assumption of a relation of ground and consequent between object and subject—remained as before; the principle of sufficient reason therefore kept its unconditional validity, just as before; and the thing in itself had merely been moved from the object, where it used to be, into the subject of knowing. But the complete relativity of these two, which shows that the thing in itself, or the inner nature of the world, is to be sought not in them but outside them, as outside everything else that exists only relatively, remained as unrecognized as ever. As if Kant had never existed, the principle of sufficient reason is for Fichte still just what it was for all the Scholastics, an *aeterna veritas*. For just as eternal fate still ruled over the gods of the ancients, so over the God of the Scholastics there still ruled those *aeternae veritates* [eternal truths], that is, the metaphysical, mathematical and metalogical truths, and for some also the validity of the moral law. These *veritates* alone depended on nothing; but it was through their necessity that both God and the world existed. In accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, taken as such a *veritas aeterna*, the I is therefore for Fichte the ground of the world, or of the not-I, the object, which is precisely its consequent, its fab-

rication. He therefore took good care not to examine or check the principle of sufficient reason any further. But if I were to state the form of that principle by whose guiding thread Fichte lets the not-I emerge from the I, like a web from a spider, I find that it is the principle of sufficient reason of being in space. For only in relation to this do those agonizing deductions of the way in which the I produces and fabricates the not-I out of itself acquire some sort of sense and meaning—deductions that make up the content of the most senseless book ever written, and, for that reason alone, the most tedious.[29] —This Fichtean philosophy, otherwise not even worth mentioning, is therefore of interest to us only as the belated true opposite of age-old materialism: materialism was the most consistent starting from the object, as Fichte's philosophy is the most consistent starting from the subject. Just as materialism overlooked the fact that with the simplest object it had at once posited the subject as well, so Fichte overlooked not only that with the subject (whatever title he chose to give it) he had already posited the object as well, since no subject is thinkable without one, but also this: that all derivation *a priori*, indeed all proof whatever, rests on a necessity, and all necessity rests solely on the principle of sufficient reason, because being necessary and following from a given ground—are interchangeable concepts;[30] and that the principle of sufficient reason is nothing other than the universal form of the object as such. It therefore already presupposes the object, and cannot, as if it held before and outside the object, first bring it about and let it arise in accordance with its own legislation. In general, then, starting from the subject has the same error in common with starting from the object, described above: it assumes in advance what it claims first to derive, namely the necessary correlate of its starting point.

Our procedure differs *toto genere* [in its whole kind] from both of these opposite mistakes. We start neither from the object nor

29 Presumably Fichte's *Foundations of the Entire Doctrine of Science* (*Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre*, 1794–95).

from the subject, but from *representation*, as the first fact of consciousness. Its first and most essential basic form is the division into object and subject. The form of the object, in turn, is the principle of sufficient reason in its various shapes. Each of these governs its own class of representations so completely that, as has been shown, to know that shape is to know the essence of the whole class, since the class (as representation) is nothing other than that shape itself. Thus time itself is nothing other than the ground of being in it, that is, succession; space nothing other than the principle of sufficient reason in it, that is, position; matter nothing other than causality; the concept (as will be shown directly) nothing other than relation to the ground of knowing. This complete and thoroughgoing relativity of the world as representation, both in its most universal form (subject and object) and in the form subordinate to it (the principle of sufficient reason), directs us, as has been said, to seek the innermost essence of the world in a quite different side of it, one *entirely distinct from representation*. The next book will point to this side in a fact that is just as immediately certain to every living being.

First, however, we must consider the class of representations that belongs to human beings alone. Its material is the *concept*, and its subjective correlate is *reason*, just as the subjective correlate of the representations considered so far was understanding and sensibility, which must be ascribed to every animal as well.[31]

§ 8. REASON AND REFLECTION

Concepts reflect intuitive knowledge; reason gives human beings language, planning, and also error.

1.8 As from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed reflection of the moon, we now pass from intuitive representation—imme-

30 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See on this *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, 2nd ed., § 49.

diate, standing for itself and vouching for itself—to reflection, to the abstract, discursive concepts of reason, which have all their content only from that intuitive knowledge and in relation to it. As long as we remain purely intuitive, everything is clear, firm and certain. There are no questions, no doubts, no errors: one wants to go no further, can go no further; one finds rest in intuiting, satisfaction in the present. Intuition is sufficient to itself. Hence whatever has sprung purely from it and remained true to it, like the genuine work of art, can never be false, nor be refuted by any passage of time: for it offers no opinion, but the thing itself. With abstract knowledge, however, with reason, doubt and error have entered the theoretical sphere, and care and remorse the practical. If in intuitive representation *illusion* distorts reality for a few moments, in abstract representation *error* can reign for millennia, lay its iron yoke on whole peoples, stifle the noblest impulses of humanity, and even have the one it cannot deceive put in chains by its slaves, its dupes. Error is the enemy against which the wisest minds of all ages have waged an unequal fight, and only what they have won from it has become the property of humanity. So it is well to draw attention to it at once, as we set foot on the ground where its domain lies. It has often been said that one should pursue truth even where no use for it can be foreseen, because its use may be indirect and may appear where one does not expect it. To this I must add that one should strive just as hard to expose and root out every error, even where no harm from it can be foreseen, because this harm, too, may be very indirect and may one day appear where one does not expect it: for every error carries a poison within it. If it is mind, if it is knowledge, that makes human beings masters of the earth, then there are no harmless errors, still less venerable, sacred errors. And to console those who devote their strength and their life, in whatever way and in whatever cause, to the noble and so difficult fight against error, I cannot refrain from adding this. As long as the truth is not yet there, error may

31 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. The first four chapters of the first book of the Supplements belong to these first seven sections.

indeed carry on its game, like owls and bats in the night. But one may sooner expect owls and bats to scare the sun back into the east than that truth, once recognized and clearly and completely stated, should be driven out again, so that the old error might once more spread itself undisturbed over its broad place. Such is the power of truth: its victory is hard and laborious, but once won, it can never be wrested from it.

Besides the representations considered so far—which, as to their composition, could be traced back to time, space and matter if we look to the object, or to pure sensibility and understanding (that is, knowledge of causality) if we look to the subject—another cognitive power has appeared in human beings alone of all the inhabitants of the earth. An entirely new consciousness has dawned, which is very aptly, and with prescient rightness, called *reflection*. For it is in fact a reflected light, something derived from that intuitive knowledge; yet it has taken on a fundamentally different nature and character, knows nothing of the forms of intuitive knowledge, and even the principle of sufficient reason, which rules over every object, takes an entirely different shape here. This new consciousness, raised to a higher power, this abstract reflection of everything intuitive in the non-intuitive concept of reason, is what alone gives human beings that deliberateness which so thoroughly distinguishes their consciousness from that of animals, and which makes their whole course on earth turn out so differently from that of their irrational brothers. Humans surpass them equally in power and in suffering. Animals live in the present alone; humans live in it and at the same time in the future and the past. Animals satisfy the need of the moment; humans provide, by the most elaborate arrangements, for their future, even for times they cannot live to see. Animals are wholly at the mercy of the impression of the moment, of the effect of the intuitive motive; humans are determined by abstract concepts independent of the present. Hence they carry out considered plans, or act according to maxims, without regard to their surroundings and the chance impressions of the moment. They can, for example,

calmly make elaborate arrangements for their own death, can dissemble to the point of inscrutability and take their secret with them to the grave, and, finally, they have a real choice between several motives. For only *in abstracto* can such motives, present side by side in consciousness, carry with them the knowledge that one excludes the other, and so measure their power over the will against one another. The motive that prevails, by tipping the balance, is then the deliberate decision of the will, and as a sure sign it reveals the will's character. The animal, by contrast, is determined by the present impression: only fear of present compulsion can tame its desire, until that fear has at last become habit and now determines it as habit: that is training. The animal feels and intuits; the human being in addition *thinks* and *knows*: both *will*. The animal communicates its sensations and moods by gesture and sound; the human being communicates thoughts to another by language—or conceals thoughts by language. Language is the first product and the necessary instrument of reason: hence in Greek and in Italian, language and reason are denoted by the same word: *ho logos*, *il discorso* [word, speech and reason; discourse]. *Vernunft* (reason) comes from *vernehmen*, which is not synonymous with hearing but means becoming aware of thoughts communicated in words.[32] Only with the help of language does reason bring about its most important achievements: the concerted action of several individuals, the planned cooperation of many thousands, civilization, the state; then science, the preservation of earlier experience, the gathering of what is common into one concept, the communication of truth, the spread of error, thinking and poetry, dogmas and superstitions. The animal comes to know death only in dying; the human being consciously draws nearer to death with every hour, and this at times makes life a cause for misgiving even to someone who has not already recognized in life as a whole this character of constant annihilation. It is chiefly for this reason that human beings have philosophies

32 *Vernehmen*: to take in, to perceive what is said; Schopenhauer's etymology links the German word for reason to understanding speech.

and religions. Whether, however, what we rightly value above all else in human conduct—doing right of one's own accord, and nobility of disposition—has ever been the fruit of either of them is uncertain. What does stand there, by contrast, as sure products belonging to them alone, productions of reason along this path, are the strangest and most extravagant opinions of the philosophers of various schools, and the oddest, sometimes even cruel, customs of the priests of various religions.

That all these so varied and so far-reaching manifestations spring from one common principle—from that special power of mind which human beings have over animals, and which has been called *reason*, *ho logos, to logistikon, to logimon* [reason, the reasoning part, the rational], *ratio*—is the unanimous opinion of all ages and peoples. All people also know very well how to recognize the manifestations of this faculty and to say what is rational and what irrational, where reason appears in contrast with other human capacities and qualities, and finally what, for want of it, can never be expected even of the cleverest animal. The philosophers of all ages, on the whole, also speak in agreement with this general acquaintance with reason, and in addition they single out some particularly important manifestations of it, such as mastery of the emotions and passions, the capacity to draw inferences and to lay down general principles, even ones that are certain prior to all experience, and so on. Nevertheless, all their explanations of the real nature of reason are wavering, not sharply defined, diffuse, without unity or center, stressing now this manifestation and now that, and hence often at odds with one another. Moreover, many of them start from the opposition between reason and revelation, which is wholly foreign to philosophy and serves only to increase the confusion. It is most striking that no philosopher so far has strictly traced all those varied manifestations of reason back to one simple function that could be recognized in all of them, from which they could all be explained, and which would therefore constitute the real inner essence of reason. The excellent Locke, it is true, in the *Essay on Human Understanding*, Book 2, Chap. 11, §§ 10

and 11, very rightly names abstract general concepts as the character that distinguishes animal from human being, and Leibniz repeats this in full agreement in the *Nouveaux essays sur l'entendement humain* [New Essays on Human Understanding], Book 2, Chap. 11, §§ 10 and 11. But when Locke, in Book 4, Chap. 17, §§ 2, 3, comes to his actual explanation of reason, he entirely loses sight of that simple principal character and likewise falls into a wavering, indefinite, incomplete account of fragmentary and derivative manifestations of it. Leibniz too, in the corresponding passage of his work, does on the whole the same, only with more confusion and obscurity. How badly Kant has confused and falsified the concept of the essence of reason I have discussed in detail in the Appendix. And anyone who goes to the trouble of working through, with this in view, the mass of philosophical writings that have appeared since Kant will recognize that, just as the faults of princes are paid for by whole peoples, so the errors of great minds spread their harmful influence over whole generations, even centuries, and indeed, growing and propagating themselves, finally degenerate into monstrosities. All of which is to be explained by the fact that, as Berkeley says: *Few men think; yet all will have opinions.*[33]

The understanding has only *one* function: immediate knowledge of the relation of cause and effect; and the intuition of the actual world, together with all cleverness, sagacity and inventiveness, however varied their application, are quite obviously nothing but manifestations of that simple function. In the same way, reason too has *one* function: the formation of the concept. From this single function all the phenomena listed above that distinguish human life from animal life are explained very easily and entirely of themselves, and absolutely everything that has anywhere and at any time been called rational or irrational points to the application or non-application of that function.[34]

33 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Few people think, but all want to have opinions.
34 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Compare with this section §§ 26 and 27 of the second edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason.

§ 9. CONCEPTS AND LOGIC

Concepts are representations of representations; their spheres explain judgment, logic and sophistry.

1.9 Concepts form a class of their own, distinct *toto genere* from the intuitive representations considered so far, and present only in the human mind. We can therefore never attain an intuitive, a truly evident knowledge of their nature, but only an abstract and discursive one. It would therefore be absurd to demand that they be exhibited in experience—insofar as experience is taken to mean the real external world, which is precisely intuitive representation—or be brought before the eyes or the imagination like intuitive objects. They can only be thought, not intuited, and only the effects that human beings produce through them are objects of experience proper. These are language, deliberate planned action and science, and then whatever results from all of these. Speech, as an object of outer experience, is obviously nothing but a very perfect telegraph, transmitting arbitrary signs with the greatest speed and the finest nuance. But what do these signs mean? How are they interpreted? While the other person is speaking, do we perhaps immediately translate his speech into pictures of the imagination, which fly past us at lightning speed and move, link up, transform themselves and fill in their colors according to the words streaming in and their grammatical inflections? What a tumult there would be in our heads while we listened to a speech or read a book! That is not at all how it happens. The meaning of speech is taken in immediately, grasped precisely and definitely, without, as a rule, any mental images mixing in. It is reason speaking to reason and keeping within its own domain, and what it communicates and receives are abstract concepts, non-intuitive representations, which are formed once and for all and are relatively few in number, yet comprehend, contain and stand for all the countless objects of the actual world. This alone explains why no animal can ever speak and understand speech, although it shares with

us the organs of speech and intuitive representations as well: precisely because words denote that wholly peculiar class of representations whose subjective correlate is reason, they are without sense or meaning for the animal. Thus language, like every other phenomenon we ascribe to reason and like everything that distinguishes human beings from animals, is to be explained by this one simple thing as its source: concepts—representations that are abstract, not intuitive; universal, not individual in time and space. Only in particular cases do we pass from concepts to intuition, forming mental images as intuitive *representatives of concepts*, to which, however, they are never adequate. These have been specially discussed in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 28, so I will not repeat the same thing here. With what is said there, compare what Hume says in the twelfth of his *Philosophical essays*, p. 244, and what Herder says in the *Metakritik* (an otherwise bad book), Part 1, p.[35] 274.—The Platonic Idea, which becomes possible through the union of imagination and reason, is the main subject of the third book of the present work.[36]

So although concepts are fundamentally different from intuitive representations, they nevertheless stand in a necessary relation to them, without which they would be nothing; this relation consequently makes up their whole essence and existence. Reflection is necessarily a copy, a repetition, of the original intuitive world, though a copy of a quite special kind, in an entirely heterogeneous material. Hence concepts may quite fittingly be called representations of representations. Here too the principle of sufficient reason has a shape of its own. The shape under which it rules in a class of representations always in fact makes up and exhausts the whole essence of that class, insofar as they are representations: as we have seen, time is through and through succession and nothing else, space through and through position and nothing else, matter through and through

35 Herder's *Metakritik* (1799) was a polemic against Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.
36 "Idea" is capitalized for Plato's Ideas (Forms), to keep it apart from "idea" in the ordinary sense.

causality and nothing else. In the same way, the whole essence of concepts, or of the class of abstract representations, consists solely in the relation that the principle of sufficient reason expresses in them. And since this is the relation to the ground of knowing, the abstract representation has its whole essence solely and exclusively in its relation to another representation, which is its ground of knowing. This other representation may, in the first instance, again be a concept or abstract representation, and this in turn may again have only another such abstract ground of knowing; but this cannot go on endlessly: in the end the series of grounds of knowing must close with a concept that has its ground in intuitive knowledge. For the whole world of reflection rests on the intuitive world as its ground of knowing. Hence what distinguishes the class of abstract representations from the others is this: in them the principle of sufficient reason only ever requires a relation to another representation of the *same* class, whereas with abstract representations it finally requires a relation to a representation from *another* class.

Concepts which, as just stated, relate to intuitive knowledge not directly but only through the mediation of one or even several other concepts have been called *abstracta* preeminently, and those which have their ground directly in the intuitive world have been called *concreta*. This latter name, however, fits the concepts it denotes only very loosely, since these too are still always *abstracta* and by no means intuitive representations. These names arose, moreover, only from a very unclear awareness of the distinction they were meant to mark; with the interpretation given here, however, they may stand. Examples of the first kind, that is, *abstracta* in the eminent sense, are concepts like "relation, virtue, investigation, beginning" and so on. Examples of the latter kind, or so-called *concreta* in the loose sense, are the concepts "human being, stone, horse" and so on. If it were not a somewhat too pictorial comparison, and so one that slides into the facetious, we could very aptly call the latter

the ground floor and the former the upper stories of the edifice of reflection.[37]

That a concept comprehends many things under it—that is, that many intuitive, or even abstract, representations stand to it in the relation of the ground of knowing, that is, are thought through it—is not, as is usually claimed, an essential property of it, but only a derivative, secondary one, which need not always be present in fact, though it must always be present in possibility. This property flows from the fact that the concept is a representation of a representation, that is, has its whole essence solely in its relation to another representation. But since it is not this representation itself—indeed, the latter usually belongs to an entirely different class of representations, namely the intuitive—this other representation can have temporal, spatial and other determinations, and in general many further relations, that are not thought along with it in the concept at all. Hence several representations that differ in inessential respects can be thought through the same concept, that is, subsumed under it. But this applying to several things is not an essential but only an accidental property of the concept. There can therefore be concepts through which only a single real object is thought, but which are nonetheless abstract and universal, and in no way individual and intuitive representations. Such is, for example, the concept someone has of a particular city that he knows only from geography: although only this one city is thought through it, several cities differing in some respects would still be possible, and it would fit all of them. So it is not because a concept has been abstracted from several objects that it has universality. On the contrary: it is because universality, that is, the nondetermination of the particular, is essential to it as an abstract representation of reason that different things can be thought through the same concept.

From what has been said it follows that every concept, precisely because it is an abstract and not an intuitive representa-

37 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapters 5 and 6 of the second volume (the Supplements).

tion, and for that very reason not a thoroughly determinate one, has what is called an extension or sphere—even in the case where only a single real object exists that corresponds to it. Now we find throughout that the sphere of each concept has something in common with the spheres of others, that is, that part of what is thought in it is the same as what is thought in those others, and part of what is thought in them is in turn the same as in the first; although, if they really are different concepts, each of the two, or at least one of them, contains something the other does not. This is the relation in which every subject stands to its predicate. To recognize this relation is to *judge*. Representing these spheres by spatial figures is an exceptionally happy thought. It was probably first had by Gottfried Ploucquet, who used squares for the purpose; Lambert, though after him, still used mere lines, which he set one beneath another; Euler was the first to carry it out fully with circles. What this so exact analogy between the relations of concepts and those of spatial figures ultimately rests on, I cannot say. It is, however, a very fortunate circumstance for logic that all relations of concepts, even as to their possibility, that is, *a priori*, can be presented intuitively by such figures, as follows:[38]

1) The spheres of two concepts are exactly equal: for example, the concept of necessity and that of following from a given ground; likewise those of *Ruminantia* and *Bisulca* (ruminants and animals with cloven hooves); also those of vertebrates and red-blooded animals (though something might be objected here on account of the annelids): these are interchangeable concepts. They are then represented by a single circle, which stands for the one as well as the other.[39]

38 Ploucquet (1716–1790), Lambert (1728–1777) and Euler (1707–1783) were eighteenth-century logicians and mathematicians; "Euler circles" anticipate the later Venn diagrams.

39 Annelids (segmented worms such as the earthworm) have red blood but are not vertebrates.

2) The sphere of one concept wholly includes that of another:[40]

3) One sphere includes two or more that exclude one another and together fill the sphere:

4) Two spheres each include a part of the other:

5) Two spheres lie in a third, which, however, they do not fill:

This last case holds of all concepts whose spheres have nothing directly in common, since there will always be a third, though often a very wide one, that includes both.

All combinations of concepts can presumably be traced back to these cases, and the whole theory of judgments—their conversion, contraposition, reciprocation and disjunction (this last according to the third figure)—can be derived from them. So too can the properties of judgments on which Kant based the alleged categories of the understanding—with the exception, however, of the hypothetical form, which is no longer a combination of mere concepts but of judgments; and further with the exception of modality, of which, as of every property of judgments on which the categories are based, the Appendix gives a detailed account. Regarding the possible combinations of concepts indicated here, it need only be added that they can also be combined with one another in many ways, for example, the fourth figure with the second. Only when a sphere that wholly or partly contains another is in turn wholly or partly enclosed by a third do these together present the syllogism in the first figure, that is, that combination of judgments by which we recognize that a concept wholly or partly contained in another is likewise contained in a third that in turn contains this other; or also the converse of this, the negation, whose pictorial presentation can naturally consist only in two connected spheres not lying within a third. If many spheres enclose one another in this way, long chains of syllogisms arise. —This schematism of concepts, which has already been set out fairly well in several textbooks, can be made the basis of the theory of judgments and of the

40 Schopenhauer illustrates cases 2–5 with circle diagrams, which are not reproduced in this edition.

whole of syllogistic, which makes the exposition of both very easy and simple. For all their rules can be understood, derived and explained from it according to their origin. But there is no need to load one's memory with these rules, since logic can never be of practical use, but only of theoretical interest for philosophy. For although it might be said that logic is to rational thinking what thoroughbass is to music—and also, if we take it less strictly, what ethics is to virtue or aesthetics to art—we must bear in mind, on the other hand, that no one has yet become an artist by studying aesthetics, nor a noble character by studying ethics; that people composed correctly and beautifully long before Rameau; and also that one need not have mastered thoroughbass in order to notice discords. Just as little does one need to know logic in order not to be taken in by sophisms.[41] It must be granted, however, that thoroughbass is of great use, if not for judging musical composition, then for practicing it; and aesthetics and even ethics may also, though to a far lesser degree, be of some use in practice, albeit chiefly negative, so that not all practical value can be denied them either. But not even this much can be said in praise of logic. It is merely the knowledge *in abstracto* of what everyone knows *in concreto*. Hence, just as little as one needs it in order to withhold assent from a false argument, so little does one call on its rules for help in making a correct one; and even the most learned logician sets them entirely aside in his actual thinking. This is explained as follows. Every science consists of a system of general, and hence abstract, truths, laws and rules concerning some kind of objects. Each particular case that later comes under them is then determined by that general knowledge, which holds once and for all, because applying the general in this way is infinitely easier than investigating the particular case in question on its own from the beginning; for general abstract knowledge, once attained, always lies closer to hand for us than the empirical investigation

41 Thoroughbass (figured bass) was the basis of the teaching of harmony; Jean-Philippe Rameau (1683–1764), French composer, founded modern harmonic theory with his *Treatise on Harmony* (1722).

of the particular. With logic, however, it is exactly the reverse. Logic is the general knowledge of reason's way of proceeding, known through reason's observation of itself and abstraction from all content, and expressed in the form of rules. But this way of proceeding is necessary and essential to reason: so reason will in no case depart from it, as long as it is left to itself. It is therefore easier and safer to let reason proceed in each particular case according to its nature than to hold up before it the knowledge of this procedure—knowledge that was first abstracted from that very procedure—in the form of an alien law given from outside. It is easier because, while in all other sciences the general rule lies closer to us than the investigation of the particular case alone and by itself, in the use of reason, conversely, the procedure reason requires in a given case always lies closer to us than the general rule abstracted from it, since what thinks in us is, after all, that very reason. It is safer because an error can much more easily occur in such abstract knowledge, or in its application, than reason can proceed in a way contrary to its essence, its nature. Hence the curious fact that, whereas in other sciences we test the truth of the particular case against the rule, in logic, conversely, the rule must always be tested against the particular case. And even the most practiced logician, if he notices that in a particular case he infers differently from what a rule states, will always look for a mistake in the rule sooner than in the inference he has actually drawn. To want to make practical use of logic would thus mean wanting to derive, with unspeakable effort, from general rules what we are immediately conscious of in the particular case with the greatest certainty. It would be just as if one wanted to consult mechanics before making a movement, and physiology before digesting; and whoever learns logic for practical purposes is like someone who wants to train a beaver to build its lodge.—Although it has no practical use, logic must nonetheless be retained, because it has philosophical interest as a special knowledge of the organization and action of reason. As a self-contained, independent, internally complete, rounded and perfectly certain discipline, it is entitled

to be treated scientifically on its own and independently of everything else, and likewise to be taught at universities. But it receives its real value only in the context of philosophy as a whole, in the consideration of knowing—specifically, of rational or abstract knowing. Accordingly, its exposition should not so much take the form of a science aimed at practice, and should not merely contain baldly stated rules for correctly converting judgments, drawing inferences and so on; it should aim rather at a knowledge of the nature of reason and of the concept, and at a detailed consideration of the principle of sufficient reason of knowing. For logic is a mere paraphrase of this principle, and indeed really only for the case where the ground that gives judgments their truth is not empirical or metaphysical, but logical or metalogical. Alongside the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, therefore, the other three fundamental laws of thought so closely related to it, or judgments of metalogical truth, should be set out; from these the whole technique of reason then gradually grows. The essence of thinking proper, that is,[42] of judging and inferring, should be presented through the combination of the spheres of concepts according to the spatial schema, in the way indicated above, and all the rules of judging and inferring should be derived from this by construction. The only practical use one can make of logic is to point out to one's opponent in a debate not so much his actual fallacies as his deliberate sophisms, by calling them by their technical names. Pushing back its practical orientation in this way, and emphasizing the connection of logic with philosophy as a whole, as one chapter of it, need not make knowledge of logic any rarer than it is now. For nowadays anyone who does not want to remain crude in the main things and be counted among the ignorant multitude sunk in dullness must have studied speculative philosophy. And this is because this nineteenth century is a philosophical one—by which is meant not so much that it pos-

42 In the *Fourfold Root* Schopenhauer calls "metalogical" the truth of the laws of identity, contradiction and excluded middle and of the principle of sufficient reason of knowing.

sesses philosophy, or that philosophy prevails in it, as rather that it is ripe for philosophy and for that very reason stands in absolute need of it. This is a sign of highly advanced education, indeed a fixed point on the scale of the culture of the ages.[43]

THE ORIGIN OF LOGIC

Logic arose from Greek disputation and was systematized by Aristotle.

Little practical use as logic can have, it can hardly be denied that it was invented for practical ends. I explain its origin to myself as follows. When among the Eleatics, Megarians and Sophists the pleasure in disputation had developed further and further and had gradually risen almost to an addiction, the confusion into which almost every disputation fell must soon have made them feel the need for a methodical procedure, and a scientific dialectic had to be sought as a guide to it. The first thing that had to be noticed was that both contending parties always had to agree on some proposition to which the disputed points could be traced back in the course of the dispute.[44] The beginning of methodical procedure consisted in stating these commonly acknowledged propositions formally as such and placing them at the head of the investigation. At first, however, these propositions concerned only the material of the investigation. People soon became aware that in the way they went back to the commonly acknowledged truth and tried to derive their assertions from it, certain forms and laws were also followed, about which, although there had been no prior agreement, they never disagreed. From this they saw that these must be the course peculiar to reason itself, lying in its nature: the formal element of the investigation. Although this element was not exposed to doubt or disagreement, some mind systematic to the point of pedantry nevertheless hit on the notion that it would look very

43 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapters 9 and 10 of the second volume (the Supplements).

44 The Eleatics (Parmenides, Zeno) and the Megarians (the school of Euclid of Megara) were Greek schools famous for their arguments and paradoxes.

fine, and would be the crowning of methodical dialectic, if this formal element of all disputation, this ever law-governed procedure of reason itself, were likewise expressed in abstract propositions. These would be placed at the head of the investigation just like those commonly acknowledged propositions concerning its material, as the fixed canon of disputation itself, to which one would always have to look back and appeal. By thus wanting to acknowledge consciously as law, and to state formally, what had until then been followed as if by tacit agreement or practiced as if by instinct, people gradually found more or less perfect formulations of logical principles, such as the principles of contradiction, of sufficient reason and of the excluded middle, the *dictum de omni et nullo* [the rule of "all and none": what is affirmed or denied of a whole class is affirmed or denied of each member], and then the more specific rules of syllogistic, such as *ex meris particularibus aut negativis nihil sequitur* [from merely particular or merely negative premises nothing follows], *a rationato ad rationem non valet consequentia* [the inference from consequence to ground is not valid], and so on. That this was achieved only slowly and with great effort, and that before Aristotle everything remained very imperfect, we see partly from the clumsy and long-winded way in which logical truths are brought to light in several of Plato's dialogues, but still better from what Sextus Empiricus reports of the disputes of the Megarians over the easiest and simplest logical laws and of the laborious way in which they made them clear *(Sext. Emp. adv. Math. L. 8. p. 112 seqq.)*. Aristotle, however, collected, arranged and corrected what he found, and brought it to an incomparably higher perfection.[45] When one considers in this way how the course of Greek culture had prepared and brought about Aristotle's work, one will be little inclined to believe the report of Persian writers, passed on to us by *Jones*, who is much taken with it, that Callisthenes found a finished logic in India and sent it to his uncle Aristotle *(Asiatic researches, vol. 4, p. 163)*.—It is easy

45 Sextus Empiricus (2nd–3rd century AD), Greek Skeptic; *Adversus Mathematicos* ("Against the Professors") is his critique of the learned disciplines.

to understand that in the dismal Middle Ages the disputatious spirit of the Scholastics, which, lacking all real knowledge, fed on formulas and words alone, was bound to welcome Aristotelian logic most warmly, seizing on it eagerly even in its Arabic mutilation and soon raising it to the center of all knowledge.[46] Though it has since fallen from its high standing, it has nevertheless kept, down to our own time, the credit of an independent, practical and highly necessary science. Indeed, in our day Kant's philosophy, which really took its foundation stone from logic, has stirred up new interest in it—interest that logic certainly deserves in this respect, that is, as a means to knowledge of the nature of reason.

THE ART OF PERSUASION

Sophistry exploits overlapping spheres of concepts to pass from one concept to another.

Correct and rigorous inferences come about by examining the relation of the spheres of concepts precisely, and by acknowledging the first sphere as wholly contained in the third only when it is wholly contained in a second and this in turn wholly in the third. The *art of persuasion*, by contrast, rests on subjecting the relations of the spheres of concepts to a merely superficial examination and then determining them one-sidedly to suit one's purposes—chiefly in this way: when the sphere of a concept under consideration lies only partly in another and partly in a quite different one, one declares it to lie wholly in the first, or wholly in the second, as the speaker intends. For example, when passion is being discussed, one can subsume it at will under the concept of the greatest force, the mightiest agent in the world, or under the concept of irrationality, and this in turn under that of impotence, of weakness. The same procedure can then be continued and applied anew to every concept the argument leads to. Almost always the sphere of a concept is

46 Callisthenes (c. 360–327 BC), Aristotle's relative, accompanied Alexander the Great to Asia as his historian.

shared by several others, each of which contains part of the first concept's territory within its own while also taking in more besides. Of these latter spheres, however, one lets only that one be illuminated under which one wants to subsume the first concept, while leaving the others unnoticed or keeping them hidden. On this trick, in fact, rest all the arts of persuasion, all the subtler sophisms: for the logical ones, like the *mentiens*, *velatus*, *cornutus* [the Liar, the Veiled Man, the Horned Man] and so on, are obviously too crude for actual use. As far as I know, no one has so far traced the essence of all sophistry and persuasion back to this ultimate ground of its possibility and shown that ground in the peculiar nature of concepts, that is, in reason's mode of knowing. So, since my exposition has led me to it, I will illustrate the matter, easy as it is to grasp, by a schema on the accompanying chart, which is meant to show how the spheres of concepts overlap in many ways and so give free play to arbitrariness in passing from any concept to this or that other one.[47] I would only not want the chart to mislead anyone into ascribing more importance to this small incidental discussion than it can by its nature have. As an illustrative example I have chosen the concept of *traveling*. Its sphere reaches into the territory of four others, to any of which the persuader can pass at will; these in turn reach into other spheres, some of them into two or more at once, and through these the persuader makes his way as he pleases, always as if it were the only way, finally arriving, depending on what his aim was, at good or at evil. In following the spheres, one must only always keep to the direction from the center (the given main concept) to the periphery, and not go backward. Such sophistry can be dressed up as continuous speech or in strict syllogistic form, depending on what the listener's weak side suggests. At bottom, most scientific, and especially philosophical, proofs are not much different. How else would it be possible that so much, at various times, was not merely wrongly assumed (for error itself has another origin) but demonstrated and proved, and yet later found to be utterly false

47 Classic ancient paradoxes attributed to Eubulides of Megara.

—for example, the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, Ptolemaic astronomy, Stahl's chemistry, Newton's theory of colors, and so on and so forth?[48][49]

§ 10. KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is abstract cognition fixed in concepts, which only reason can have.

1.10 Through all this, one question presses ever closer upon us. How is *certainty* to be attained? How are *judgments* to be grounded? In what do *knowledge* and science consist, which we extol as the third great advantage conferred by reason, alongside language and deliberate action?

Reason is feminine in nature: it can give only after it has received. Of itself alone it has nothing but the empty forms of its operation. Indeed, there is no perfectly pure rational cognition at all except the four principles to which I have ascribed metalogical truth: the principles of identity, of contradiction, of the excluded middle, and of the sufficient ground of cognition. For even the rest of logic is no longer perfectly pure rational cognition, since it presupposes the relations and combinations of the spheres of concepts. But concepts as such exist only once intuitive representations have preceded them. Their whole essence consists in their relation to these representations, which they therefore already presuppose. Since, however, this presupposition extends not to the specific content of concepts but only, in general, to their existence, logic can still, taken as a whole, count as a pure science of reason. In all the other sciences reason has received its content from intuitive representations. In mathematics it comes from the relations of space and time, of which we are intuitively conscious prior to all experience. In pure natural science—that is, in what we know about the course of nature prior to all experience—the content of the science

48 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 11 of the second volume (the Supplements).

49 Georg Ernst Stahl (1659–1734) founded the phlogiston theory of combustion.

comes from the pure understanding, that is, from the *a priori* cognition of the law of causality and its connection with those pure intuitions of space and time. In all other sciences, everything not borrowed from the ones just named belongs to experience. *Knowing* in general means having in the power of one's mind, for reproduction at will, such judgments as have their sufficient ground of cognition in something outside themselves, that is, are *true*. Abstract cognition alone, then, is knowledge. Knowledge is therefore conditioned by reason, and strictly speaking we cannot say of animals that they *know* anything. They do have intuitive cognition, and for this also memory, and for that very reason imagination, which their dreaming moreover proves. We ascribe consciousness to them. Although the word is taken from "knowing," the concept of consciousness therefore coincides with that of representing in general, of whatever kind it may be.[50] That is also why we ascribe life to the plant, but not consciousness.—*Knowledge*, then, is abstract consciousness: having fixed, in concepts of reason, what has been cognized in some other way.

§ 11. FEELING

The concept of feeling has a merely negative content: whatever is not abstract knowledge.

1.11 In this respect the real opposite of *knowledge* is *feeling*, and so we must insert a discussion of it here. The concept denoted by the word *feeling* has an entirely *negative* content, namely this: that something present in consciousness *is not a concept, not abstract cognition of reason*. Beyond that, it may be whatever it likes; it still falls under the concept *feeling*. The immoderately wide sphere of that concept therefore takes in the most heterogeneous things. We will never see how they come together until

50 Schopenhauer distinguishes *Wissen* (knowledge proper, abstract and fixed in concepts) from *Erkenntnis* (any knowing, intuitive or abstract), rendered here mostly as "cognition." The German word for consciousness, *Bewusstsein*, is formed from *wissen*, "to know."

we recognize that they agree solely in this negative respect: that they are *not abstract concepts*. For the most varied, indeed the most hostile elements lie peacefully side by side in that concept, for example religious feeling; the feeling of sensual pleasure; moral feeling; bodily feeling as touch, as pain, as feeling for colors, for tones and their harmonies and disharmonies; the feeling of hatred, of disgust, of self-satisfaction, of honor, of shame, of right, of wrong; the feeling of truth; aesthetic feeling; the feeling of strength, of weakness, of health, of friendship, of love, and so on and so forth. There is no community whatever between them except the negative one, that they are not abstract rational cognition. This becomes most striking when even the intuitive *a priori* cognition of spatial relations, and indeed that of the pure understanding, is brought under that concept. The same happens whenever it is said of any cognition or any truth that we *feel* it, as long as we are only intuitively conscious of it and have not yet laid it down in abstract concepts. To illustrate this I will adduce a few examples from recent books, since they strikingly confirm my explanation. I remember reading, in the introduction to a German translation of Euclid, that beginners in geometry should first be made to draw all the figures before proceeding to demonstration. They would then already *feel* the geometrical truth before the demonstration gave them complete cognition of it.—In the same way, F. Schleiermacher's *Critique of Moral Philosophy* speaks of logical and mathematical feeling (p. 339), and also of the feeling of the sameness or difference of two formulas (p. 342). And in Tennemann's *History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, p.[51] 361, we read: "People *felt* that the fallacies were not correct, yet could not discover the error."—So long as this concept of *feeling* is not viewed from the right standpoint, and the one negative mark that alone is essential to it goes unrecognized, it must constantly give rise to misunderstandings and disputes. Its sphere is excessively wide, and its content is merely negative,

51 Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), theologian and philosopher; the work is his *Outlines of a Critique of Previous Moral Philosophy* (1803). Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1761–1819) wrote an eleven-volume history of philosophy.

wholly one-sidedly determined and very meager. Since in German we also have the fairly synonymous word *Empfindung* [sensation], it would be useful to reserve that word for bodily feelings, as a subspecies. The origin of this concept of feeling, so out of proportion to all others, is without doubt the following. All concepts—and only concepts are what words denote—exist only for reason and proceed from it. With them, therefore, we already stand at a one-sided standpoint. From such a standpoint, what is nearer appears distinct and is posited as positive; what is farther off runs together and soon comes to be regarded only negatively. Thus every nation calls all others foreigners; the Greek calls all others barbarians; the Englishman calls everything that is not England or English *continent* and *continental*; the believer calls all others heretics or heathens; the nobility calls all others *roturiers* [commoners]; the student calls all others philistines; and so on. Strange as it may sound, reason itself is guilty of the same one-sidedness—one might say the same crude ignorance born of pride. It lumps together under the *one* concept *feeling* every modification of consciousness that simply does not belong directly to *its own* mode of representation, that is, is not an *abstract concept*. Because its own procedure had not become clear to it through thorough self-knowledge, reason has so far had to pay for this with misunderstandings and aberrations in its own domain: people have even set up a special faculty of feeling and are now constructing theories of it.

§ 12. THE USES AND LIMITS OF ABSTRACT KNOWLEDGE

Abstract knowledge makes cognition communicable and practical, but hinders skill, art and conduct.

1.12 *Knowledge*, whose contradictory opposite I have just discussed in the concept of feeling, is, as I have said, any abstract cognition, that is, cognition of reason. But reason only ever brings back before cognition what it has received from elsewhere, so it does not really extend our knowing; it merely gives it another form. What was cognized intuitively, *in concreto* [in

the concrete], it enables us to cognize abstractly and universally. Put like this, it may seem a small matter at first glance, but it is incomparably more important. For all secure preservation of cognition, all its communicability, and all secure and far-reaching application of it to practical life depend on its having become knowledge, abstract cognition. Intuitive cognition always holds only for the single case. It extends only to what is nearest and stops there, because sensibility and understanding can really grasp only *one* object at a time. Every sustained, composite, planned activity must therefore start from principles, that is, from abstract knowledge, and be guided by it. Take, for example, the cognition the understanding has of the relation of cause and effect. In itself it is far more complete, deeper and more exhaustive than anything that can be thought of it *in abstracto*. The understanding alone cognizes intuitively, immediately and completely how a lever, a pulley or a cogwheel works, how a vault rests upon itself, and so on. But intuitive cognition has the property just mentioned of extending only to what is immediately present, and so the mere understanding does not suffice for constructing machines and buildings. Here reason must step in. It must put abstract concepts in place of intuitions and take these as the guideline for action; and if they were correct, success will follow. In the same way, we cognize perfectly in pure intuition the nature and lawfulness of a parabola, a hyperbola, a spiral. But to apply this cognition reliably in reality, it first had to become abstract knowledge. In doing so it does, of course, lose its intuitive character, but it gains in exchange the certainty and precision of abstract knowledge. Thus the whole of differential calculus does not really extend our cognition of curves at all; it contains nothing more than the mere pure intuition of them already contained. But it changes the kind of cognition, turning the intuitive into the abstract, and this has enormous consequences for application. Here yet another peculiarity of our cognitive faculty comes up for discussion. It could hardly have been noticed so long as the difference between intuitive and abstract cognition had not been made perfectly clear. It

is this: the relations of space cannot be carried over directly and as such into abstract cognition; only temporal magnitudes, that is, numbers, are suited to this. Numbers alone, not spatial magnitudes, can be expressed in abstract concepts that correspond to them exactly. The concept "thousand" is exactly as different from the concept "ten" as the two temporal magnitudes are in intuition. In thinking "thousand" we think a definite multiple of ten, into which we can resolve it at will for intuition in time, that is, we can count it. But take the abstract concept of a mile and that of a foot, without any intuitive representation of either and without the help of number: between them there is no precise difference at all, none corresponding to those magnitudes themselves. In both, only a spatial magnitude in general is thought. If the two are to be adequately distinguished, we must either call spatial intuition to our aid—and so already leave the domain of abstract cognition—or else think the difference in *numbers*. If, then, we want abstract cognition of spatial relations, they must first be translated into temporal relations, that is, into numbers. That is why only arithmetic, not geometry, is the general theory of magnitude, and why geometry must be translated into arithmetic if it is to have communicability, precise determinacy and practical applicability. It is true that a spatial relation as such can also be thought *in abstracto*, for example, "the sine increases in proportion to the angle"; but if the magnitude of this relation is to be stated, number is needed. Space, with its three dimensions, must be translated into time, which has only one dimension, if we want abstract cognition (that is, *knowledge*, not mere intuiting) of its relations. It is this necessity that makes mathematics so difficult. This becomes very clear if we compare the intuition of curves with their analytic calculation, or even just the tables of logarithms of the trigonometric functions with the intuition of the changing relations of the parts of a triangle that these tables express. Intuition here grasps at a single glance, completely and with the utmost precision, how the cosine decreases as the sine increases, how the cosine of one angle is the sine of the other, the inverse relation between the decrease

and increase of the two angles, and so on. And what an enormous web of numbers, what laborious calculation it took to express this *in abstracto*! How, one might say, time with its *one* dimension must torment itself to reproduce the three dimensions of space! But this was necessary if, for the sake of application, we wanted to possess the relations of space laid down in abstract concepts. They could not enter these concepts directly, but only through the mediation of purely temporal magnitude, number, which alone attaches itself directly to abstract cognition. It is further worth noting that space is well suited to intuition and, by means of its three dimensions, lets us easily survey even complicated relations, yet it eludes abstract cognition. Time, conversely, enters easily into abstract concepts but gives very little to intuition. Our intuition of numbers in their own proper element, mere time, without calling in space, hardly reaches as far as ten. Beyond that we have only abstract concepts, no longer intuitive cognition of numbers. On the other hand, we connect precisely determined abstract concepts with every numeral and every algebraic sign.

It may be remarked in passing that some minds find complete satisfaction only in what is cognized intuitively. What they seek is the ground and consequent of being in space, set out intuitively; a Euclidean proof, or an arithmetical solution of spatial problems, does not speak to them. Other minds, by contrast, demand abstract concepts, which alone are useful for application and communication. They have patience and memory for abstract propositions, formulas, proofs in long chains of inference, and calculations whose signs stand for the most complicated abstractions. The latter seek precision, the former intuitiveness. The difference is characteristic.

Knowledge, abstract cognition, has its greatest value in its communicability and in its capacity to be fixed and preserved: only thereby does it become so inestimably important for practice. Someone may have, in the mere understanding, an immediate, intuitive cognition of the causal connection of the changes and motions of natural bodies, and find complete satisfaction in

it. But it becomes fit for communication only after he has fixed it in concepts. Even for practice, cognition of the first kind is sufficient, provided he carries out the task entirely alone, in an action that can be completed while the intuitive cognition is still alive. It is not sufficient if he needs the help of others, or even just actions of his own spread over different times, and hence a deliberate plan. Thus, for example, a practiced billiard player can have a complete knowledge of the laws governing the impact of elastic bodies on one another, merely in the understanding, merely for immediate intuition, and it serves him perfectly well. Only the scientific student of mechanics, by contrast, has real knowledge of those laws, that is, a cognition of them *in abstracto*. Even for the construction of machines, that merely intuitive cognition of the understanding suffices if the inventor also builds the machine by himself, as one often sees in talented craftsmen with no science at all. But suppose several people are needed to carry out a mechanical operation, a machine or a building, and their composite activity takes place at different moments. Then whoever directs it must have drawn up the plan *in abstracto*, and such cooperative activity is possible only with the help of reason. It is remarkable, however, that in the first kind of activity, where one person is to carry something out alone in an uninterrupted action, knowledge—the application of reason, reflection—can often even be a hindrance, for example precisely in playing billiards, in fencing, in tuning an instrument, in singing. Here intuitive cognition must guide the activity directly. Passing through reflection makes it unsure, since reflection divides the attention and confuses the person. That is why peoples living close to nature, and unschooled people little accustomed to thinking, perform many physical feats—fighting animals, shooting arrows at a target and the like—with a sureness and speed the reflective European never attains, precisely because his deliberation makes him waver and hesitate. He tries, for example, to find the right spot or the right moment by keeping an equal distance from both false extremes; the person living close to nature hits it directly, without reflect-

ing on the ways of going wrong. Likewise, it does me no good to be able to state *in abstracto*, in degrees and minutes, the angle at which I must apply the razor, if I do not know it intuitively, that is, have it in my grip. The application of reason is similarly disruptive in understanding physiognomy. This too must happen directly through the understanding: the expression, the meaning of the features, can only be *felt*, as people say—that is, it simply does not enter into abstract concepts. Everyone has his own immediate, intuitive physiognomics and pathognomics; yet some recognize that *signatura rerum* [signature of things] more clearly than others.[52] But a physiognomics *in abstracto*, to be taught and learned, cannot be achieved, because the nuances here are so fine that the concept cannot descend to them. Abstract knowledge therefore relates to them as a mosaic relates to a painting by *van der Werff* or *Denner*. However fine the mosaic, the boundaries of the stones always remain, so that no continuous transition from one tint to another is possible. In the same way concepts, with their rigidity and sharp boundaries, however finely one might split them by closer determination, are always incapable of reaching the fine modifications of the intuitive—and these are precisely what matters in physiognomy, the example taken here.[53][54]

This same property of concepts, which makes them like the stones of a mosaic and by virtue of which intuition always

52 *Signatura rerum* alludes to the mystic Jakob Böhme's *De signatura rerum* (1622): the inner nature of things is legible in their outward form.

53 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. For this reason I am of the opinion that physiognomy cannot safely go further than setting up a few quite general rules, such as these: the intellectual is to be read in the forehead and the eyes, the ethical—the expressions of the will—in the mouth and the lower half of the face; forehead and eyes explain each other, and each of the two, seen without the other, is only half intelligible; genius never comes without a high, broad, beautifully arched forehead, though such a forehead often comes without genius; from a clever look one may infer cleverness the more safely, the uglier the face, and from a stupid look stupidity the more safely, the more beautiful the face; for beauty, as conformity to the type of humanity, already in and of itself carries the expression of mental clarity, while ugliness behaves in the opposite way; and so on.

remains their asymptote, is also the reason why nothing good is achieved through them in art. If the singer or the virtuoso tries to guide his performance by reflection, he remains lifeless. The same holds for the composer, the painter, indeed the poet: for art the concept always remains unfruitful. It may guide only the technical side of art; its domain is science. In the third book we shall examine more closely why all genuine art springs from intuitive cognition, never from the concept. —Even with regard to conduct, to personal charm in social life, the concept is useful only negatively: it holds back the crude outbursts of egoism and bestiality, and politeness is its commendable work. But what is attractive, graceful and winning in conduct, what is loving and friendly, must not have sprung from the concept; otherwise

"we sense the purpose, and we are put out."[55]

All dissimulation is the work of reflection; but it cannot be kept up for long or without a break. *Nemo potest personam diu ferre fictam* [no one can wear a mask for long], says Seneca in the book *de clementia* [On Mercy]. Besides, it is then usually recognized and fails to have its effect. In the great press of life, where quick decisions, bold action, and swift and firm intervention are needed, reason is certainly necessary. But if it gains the upper hand, it confuses and hinders the intuitive, immediate discovery of what is right—a discovery that belongs purely to the understanding and seizes the right course in the same moment. It then brings about indecision and can easily ruin everything.[56]

Finally, virtue and holiness too do not spring from reflection, but from the inner depth of the will and its relation to knowing. That discussion belongs in a quite different part of this work. Here I will only remark this much: the dogmas concerning ethics can be the same in the reason of whole nations while action differs in each individual, and vice versa. Action takes place, as people say, according to *feelings*—that is, simply not according to

54 Adriaen van der Werff (1659–1722), Dutch painter of highly polished pictures; Balthasar Denner (1685–1749), German portraitist famous for minutely detailed faces.

55 Goethe, *Torquato Tasso*, act 2, scene 1.

56 *On Mercy* 1.1.6.

concepts, as far as its ethical content is concerned. Dogmas occupy idle reason; action in the end goes its own way independently of them, mostly according not to abstract maxims but to unspoken ones, whose expression is the whole person himself. Hence, however different the religious dogmas of peoples may be, among all of them the good deed is accompanied by an inexpressible contentment and the bad deed by an infinite horror. No mockery shakes the former; no confessor's absolution frees one from the latter. This is not to deny that the application of reason is needed to carry through a virtuous way of life. Only it is not the source of that life. Its function is a subordinate one: preserving resolutions once taken, and holding up maxims, so as to resist the weakness of the moment and to lend consistency to action. In the end reason performs the same service in art as well. There too it can do nothing in the main thing, but it supports the execution, precisely because genius is not at our command every hour, and yet the work is to be completed in all its parts and rounded into a whole.[57]

§ 13. LAUGHTER

Laughter arises from a sudden incongruity between a concept and the real objects thought through it.

1.13 All these reflections on both the benefits and the drawbacks of applying reason are meant to make one thing clear. Abstract knowledge is the reflection of intuitive representation and is grounded in it; yet it is by no means so congruent with it that it could take its place everywhere. Rather, it never corresponds to it quite exactly. Hence, as we have seen, many human undertakings are accomplished only with the help of reason and deliberate procedure, but some succeed better without applying it. — This very incongruity between intuitive and abstract cognition, by virtue of which the latter only ever approximates the former as mosaic work approximates painting, is also the ground of a

57 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 7 of the second volume (the Supplements).

very remarkable phenomenon. Like reason, it belongs exclusively to human nature; but the explanations of it, attempted again and again, have all been unsatisfactory. I mean *laughter*. Because of its origin we cannot avoid discussing it at this point, even though this holds up our progress once again. *Laughter* always arises from nothing other than the suddenly perceived incongruity between a concept and the real objects that had been thought through it in some relation; and laughter itself is just the expression of this incongruity. This incongruity often comes to light when two or more real objects are thought through *one* concept and its identity is transferred to them; but then a complete difference between them in other respects makes it striking that the concept fitted them only in one one-sided respect. Just as often, however, it is a single real object whose incongruity with the concept under which it has, in one respect, rightly been subsumed suddenly makes itself felt. The more correct the subsumption of such realities under the concept on the one hand, and the greater and more glaring their unfitness for it on the other, the stronger the effect of the ludicrous that springs from this contrast. All laughter, then, is occasioned by a paradoxical and therefore unexpected subsumption, no matter whether this is expressed in words or in deeds. This, in brief, is the correct explanation of the ludicrous.

I will not stop here to tell anecdotes as examples of it, to illustrate my explanation. The explanation is so simple and comprehensible that it does not need them, and any ludicrous thing the reader remembers will serve equally well to confirm it. Our explanation does, however, receive both confirmation and illustration when we unfold the two kinds of the ludicrous into which it divides, which follow directly from that explanation. Either two or more very different real objects, intuitive representations, came first in cognition, and one has deliberately identified them through the unity of a concept that embraces both; this kind of the ludicrous is called *wit*. Or else, conversely, the concept comes first in cognition, and one proceeds from it to reality, to acting upon reality, to action. Objects that are other-

wise fundamentally different, but are all thought in that concept, are now regarded and treated in the same way, until their great difference in other respects comes out, to the surprise and astonishment of the one acting. This kind of the ludicrous is called *folly*. Accordingly, everything ludicrous is either a witty notion or a foolish action, depending on whether one went from the discrepancy of the objects to the identity of the concept, or the other way round. The former is always deliberate; the latter always involuntary and forced upon one from outside. To reverse this starting point in appearance, however, and to mask wit as folly, is the art of the court jester and the buffoon. Well aware of the diversity of the objects, such a person unites them, with secret wit, under one concept. Then, starting from this concept, he receives from the diversity of the objects discovered afterward the very surprise he had prepared for himself.—It follows from this brief but sufficient theory of the ludicrous that, setting aside this last case of the professional merrymakers, wit must always show itself in words, folly mostly in actions. Folly shows itself in words too, however, when it merely states its intention instead of actually carrying it out, or when it expresses itself in mere judgments and opinions.

Pedantry also belongs to folly. It arises when someone has little confidence in his own understanding and therefore will not leave it to recognize directly what is right in the individual case. He accordingly places his understanding entirely under the guardianship of reason and wants to use reason everywhere. That is, he always wants to start from general concepts, rules and maxims and hold strictly to them—in life, in art, even in ethical conduct. Hence the clinging to form, to manner, to expression and to words that is peculiar to pedantry: for the pedant, these take the place of the essence of the matter. Then the incongruity of the concept with reality soon shows itself. It becomes evident that the concept never descends to the individual, and that its universality and rigid determinacy can never fit exactly the fine nuances and manifold modifications of reality. With his general maxims, therefore, the pedant almost always comes off

badly in life and shows himself imprudent, insipid and useless. In art, for which the concept is unfruitful, he produces lifeless, stiff, mannered and misbegotten works. Even in ethics, the resolve to act rightly or nobly cannot everywhere be carried out according to abstract maxims. In many cases the infinitely finely nuanced character of the circumstances calls for a choice of what is right that springs directly from character. Applying merely abstract maxims, by contrast, partly gives false results, because they only half fit, and partly cannot be carried through, because they are foreign to the individual character of the person acting, and this character can never be wholly denied. Inconsistencies then follow. Insofar as *Kant* makes it a condition of the moral worth of an action that it be done from purely rational abstract maxims, without any inclination or momentary impulse, we cannot entirely acquit him of the charge of giving rise to moral pedantry. This charge is also the point of Schiller's epigram entitled "Scruples of Conscience."—When, especially in politics, people speak of doctrinaires, theorists, scholars and so on, they mean pedants: people who know things well enough *in abstracto* but not *in concreto*. Abstraction consists in thinking away the more specific determinations; yet it is precisely on these that a great deal depends in practice.[58]

To complete the theory, a spurious kind of wit remains to be mentioned: the play on words, *calembourg*, *pun*. Ambiguity, *l'équivoque*, whose chief use is the obscene (the smutty joke), may also be counted here. Just as wit forces two very different real objects under one concept, the pun, by exploiting chance, brings two different concepts under one word. The same contrast arises again, but much fainter and more superficial, because it springs not from the essence of things but from the accident of naming. In wit the identity lies in the concept and the difference in reality; in the pun, however, the difference lies in the concepts and the identity in reality, to which the sound of

58 In Schiller's epigram (from "The Philosophers," 1796) a man worries that he helps his friends gladly, from inclination, and so is not virtuous; he is advised to despise them first and then do with aversion what duty commands.

the word belongs. It would be only a somewhat far-fetched simile to say that the pun is related to wit as the hyperbola of the upper, inverted cone is to that of the lower. The misunderstanding of a word, however, or the *quid pro quo* [one thing for another], is the involuntary *calembourg*, and is related to it exactly as folly is to wit. That is why the hard of hearing, just like the fool, must often supply material for laughter, and bad writers of comedy use the former instead of the latter to raise a laugh.

I have considered laughter here only from the psychological side; for the physical side, I refer to what I have said on the subject in *Parerga*, vol. 2, ch. 6, § 96, p. 134 (first edition).[59]

§ 14. SCIENCE AND PROOF

Science is systematic knowledge; all proof rests ultimately on intuitive evidence.

1.14 I hope these manifold considerations have brought the difference and the relation between the two sides to complete clarity. On one side stand reason's mode of cognition, knowledge and the concept; on the other, immediate cognition in purely sensory, mathematical intuition and apprehension by the understanding. From these considerations, and from the digressions on feeling and laughter to which reflecting on that remarkable relation between our modes of cognition led us almost unavoidably, I now return. I take up again the discussion of science, the third advantage, alongside language and deliberate action, that reason gives to human beings. The general consideration of science that falls to us here will concern partly its form, partly the grounding of its judgments, and finally also its content.

We have seen that, apart from the foundation of pure logic, no knowledge whatever has its origin in reason itself. It is gained elsewhere, as intuitive cognition, and then deposited in reason, thereby passing into a quite different mode of cognition,

59 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 8 of the second volume (the Supplements).

the abstract. All *knowledge*, that is, cognition raised to consciousness *in abstracto*, is related to science proper as a fragment to the whole. Everyone has gained, through experience, through considering the individual things that present themselves, knowledge of all sorts of things. But only someone who sets himself the task of obtaining complete cognition *in abstracto* of some kind of objects strives for *science*. Only through the concept can he single out that kind. Hence at the head of every science stands a concept, through which we think the part of the whole of things of which that science promises complete cognition *in abstracto*. Examples are the concept of spatial relations, or of the action of inorganic bodies on one another, or of the nature of plants or of animals, or of the successive changes of the surface of the globe, or of the changes of the human race as a whole, or of the structure of a language, and so on. Suppose science tried to gain knowledge of its object by investigating one by one all the things thought through the concept, until it had gradually come to know the whole. Then no human memory would suffice, and no certainty of completeness could be attained. Science therefore makes use of the property of conceptual spheres discussed above, that they include one another, and concentrates chiefly on the wider spheres lying within the concept of its object in general. Once it has determined their relations to one another, everything thought in them is thereby determined in general as well, and can then be determined more and more precisely by singling out ever narrower conceptual spheres. This makes it possible for a science to comprehend its object completely. This path it takes to cognition—from the universal to the particular—distinguishes it from ordinary knowledge; hence systematic form is an essential and characteristic mark of science. The connection of the most general conceptual spheres of each science, that is, knowledge of its highest propositions, is the indispensable condition for learning it. How far one wishes to go from these to the more particular propositions is up to the individual; it increases not the thoroughness but the scope of one's learning.—The number of higher propositions to which all

the rest are subordinated varies greatly among the different sciences, so that in some there is more subordination, in others more coordination. In this respect the former make greater demands on the power of judgment, the latter on memory. It was already known to the Scholastics[60] that, since an inference requires two premises, no science can start from a single major premise that cannot be further derived; it must have several, at least two. The properly classificatory sciences—zoology and botany, and also physics and chemistry insofar as these reduce all inorganic action to a few fundamental forces—have the most subordination. History, by contrast, really has none at all. The universal in history consists merely in the survey of the main periods, and the particular events cannot be derived from these; they are subordinated to the periods only in time, but coordinated with them in concept. Hence history, strictly speaking, is indeed knowledge, but not a science. In mathematics, to be sure, according to Euclid's treatment, the axioms are the only indemonstrable first propositions, and all demonstrations are strictly subordinated to them step by step. But this treatment is not essential to mathematics. In fact every theorem begins a new spatial construction, which is in itself independent of the preceding ones and can really be cognized entirely independently of them, from itself, in the pure intuition of space. In that intuition even the most intricate construction is really as immediately evident as the axiom. But more on this below. Nevertheless, every mathematical proposition remains a universal truth that holds for countless individual cases, and a step-by-step progression from simple propositions to complicated ones reducible to them is essential to mathematics; so mathematics is in every respect a science.—The perfection of a science as such, that is, in its form, consists in there being as much subordination and as little coordination of propositions as possible. The

60 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Suárez, *Disput. metaphysicae, disp. III, sect. 3, tit. 3.*
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), Spanish Jesuit philosopher; his *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597) was the standard textbook of late Scholastic metaphysics.

general talent for science is accordingly the ability to subordinate conceptual spheres according to their various determinations. As Plato repeatedly recommends, science should not consist merely of something universal with an unsurveyable manifold set side by side directly beneath it. Knowledge should descend gradually from the most universal to the particular, through intermediate concepts and through divisions made according to ever closer determinations.[61] In Kant's terms, this means satisfying equally the law of homogeneity and the law of specification. But since this constitutes scientific perfection proper, it follows that the aim of science is not greater certainty —for even the most isolated single piece of cognition can have that just as much. The aim is rather to make knowledge easier through its form, and thereby to make completeness of knowledge possible. It is therefore a common but mistaken opinion that the scientific character of cognition consists in greater certainty. Equally false is the assertion that has arisen from it, that only mathematics and logic are sciences in the proper sense, because only in them, owing to their wholly *a priori* character, is there irrefutable certainty of cognition.[62] This latter advantage cannot be denied them; it simply gives them no special claim to be scientific. Scientific character lies not in certainty but in the systematic form of cognition, grounded in the step-by-step descent from the universal to the particular. —This path of cognition peculiar to the sciences, from the universal to the particular, means that much in them is grounded by derivation from preceding propositions, that is, by proofs. This has given rise to the old error that only what is proved is perfectly true and that every truth needs a proof. On the contrary, every proof needs an unproved truth that ultimately supports it, or in turn supports its proofs. Hence a truth grounded immediately is as preferable to one grounded by a proof as water from the spring is to water

61 Plato urges this method of division through intermediate kinds especially in the *Philebus* (16c–17a).

62 Kant sets out these laws in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

from the aqueduct. Intuition—partly pure, *a priori*, as it grounds mathematics, partly empirical, *a posteriori*, as it grounds all the other sciences—is the source of all truth and the foundation of all science. (The sole exception is logic, which is grounded on reason's non-intuitive yet immediate knowledge of its own laws.) It is not the proved judgments, nor their proofs, but the judgments drawn directly from intuition and grounded on it instead of on any proof, that are in science what the sun is in the universe. From them proceeds all the light by which the others, once illuminated, shine in turn. To ground the truth of such primary judgments directly on intuition, to lift such foundations of science out of the unsurveyable mass of real things—that is the work of the *power of judgment*. It consists in the ability to carry over what is cognized intuitively, correctly and precisely, into abstract consciousness, and is accordingly the mediator between understanding and reason. Only an outstanding strength of this power in an individual, exceeding the ordinary measure, can really advance the sciences; but anyone with sound reason can infer propositions from propositions, prove and conclude. By contrast, the power of judgment lays down and fixes what is cognized intuitively in concepts suitable for reflection. What is common to many real objects is thought through *one* concept, and what differs among them through just as many concepts. The different, despite a partial agreement, is still cognized and thought as different; the identical, despite a partial difference, as identical. All this happens in accordance with the purpose and the consideration prevailing in each case, and all of it is done by the *power of judgment*. The lack of it is *simple-mindedness*. The simple-minded person fails to recognize now the partial or relative difference of what is identical in one respect, now the identity of what is relatively or partially different. Incidentally, Kant's division of the power of judgment into reflecting and subsuming can also be applied to this explanation of it. The power of judgment reflects when it passes from intuitive objects to the concept, and subsumes when it passes from the concept to the objects. In both cases it always mediates

between the intuitive cognition of the understanding and the reflective cognition of reason.—There can be no truth that could be brought out unconditionally by inferences alone. The necessity of grounding a truth merely by inferences is always only relative. Indeed, subjective.[63] Since all proofs are inferences, for a new truth we must seek not a proof first but immediate evidence, and set up a proof only provisionally, for as long as such evidence is lacking. No science can be provable through and through, any more than a building can stand in the air: all its proofs must lead back to something intuitive, and therefore no longer provable. For the whole world of reflection rests and is rooted on the intuitive world. All ultimate, that is, original *evidence* is *intuitive*: the word itself already betrays this. Accordingly, it is either empirical or else grounded on the *a priori* intuition of the conditions of possible experience. In both cases, therefore, it yields only immanent, not transcendent cognition.[64] Every concept has its value and its existence solely in its relation, however mediated, to an intuitive representation. What holds of concepts holds also of the judgments composed of them, and of whole sciences. Hence it must somehow be possible to cognize directly, without proofs and inferences, every truth that is found through inferences and communicated through proofs. This is certainly hardest with some complicated mathematical propositions that we reach only by chains of inference, for example the calculation of the chords and tangents for all arcs by means of inferences from the Pythagorean theorem. But even such a truth cannot rest essentially and solely on abstract propositions. The spatial relations underlying it must also be capable of being brought out for pure *a priori* intuition in such a way that their abstract statement is grounded immediately. But proof in mathematics will be discussed in detail shortly.

People often speak in lofty tones of sciences that rest throughout on correct inferences from certain premises and are there-

63 Kant draws the distinction between reflecting and determining (subsuming) judgment in the Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790).

fore irrefutably true. But from purely logical chains of inference, however true the premises may be, one will never obtain more than a clarification and elaboration of what already lies complete in the premises. One will only set out *explicitly* what was already understood there *implicitly*. By these much-praised sciences, however, people mean chiefly the mathematical ones, and astronomy in particular. The certainty of astronomy, though, comes from the fact that it is grounded on the intuition of space, which is given *a priori* and is therefore infallible. All spatial relations, moreover, follow one from another with a necessity (ground of being) that yields certainty *a priori*, and so they can be derived from one another with assurance. To these mathematical determinations astronomy adds only a single force of nature, gravity, which acts in exact proportion to the masses and the square of the distance. Finally, it adds the law of inertia, which is secured *a priori* because it follows from the law of causality, together with the empirical datum of the motion impressed once and for all on each of these masses. That is the whole material of astronomy. Through its simplicity as well as its certainty it leads to firm results, and, given the magnitude and importance of its objects, to highly interesting ones. For example, if I know the mass of a planet and the distance of its satellite from it, I can infer the satellite's period of revolution with certainty, according to Kepler's second law. But the ground of this law is that, at this distance, only this velocity both binds the satellite to the planet and keeps it from falling into it.—So only on such a geometrical foundation, that is, by means of an intuition *a priori*, and with the application of a law of nature besides, can one get far with inferences. Here they are, as it were, merely bridges from one intuitive apprehension to another. It is not the same with bare, pure inferences along an exclusively logical path.—The origin of the first fundamental truths of astronomy, however, is really induction, that is, the gathering of what is given in many intuitions into a correct,

64 "Evidence" comes from Latin *videre*, "to see"; the German *anschaulich* (intuitive) likewise derives from *schauen*, "to look."

immediately grounded judgment. From this judgment hypotheses are then formed, and their confirmation by experience, as an induction approaching completeness, furnishes the proof of that first judgment. For example, the apparent motion of the planets is known empirically. After many false hypotheses about the spatial connection of this motion (the planetary orbit), the correct one was finally found; then the laws it follows (Kepler's); and at last also its cause (universal gravitation). The empirically known agreement of all the cases that occur with these hypotheses and with the consequences drawn from them, that is, induction, gave all of them complete certainty. Finding the hypothesis was the business of the power of judgment, which correctly grasped the given fact and expressed it accordingly; but induction, that is, manifold intuition, confirmed its truth. Indeed, that truth could even be established directly, through a single empirical intuition, if only we could roam freely through the spaces of the universe and had telescopic eyes. Consequently, here too inferences are not the essential and sole source of knowledge, but always really only a makeshift.

Finally, to set up a third, heterogeneous example, let us note that the so-called metaphysical truths also do not owe their evidence to proofs. By these I mean truths such as Kant sets out in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. What is certain *a priori* we know immediately: as the form of all knowledge, it is present to our consciousness with the greatest necessity. For example, we know immediately, as a negative truth, that matter persists, that is, can neither come into being nor pass away. For our pure intuition of space and time gives the possibility of motion; the understanding, in the law of causality, gives the possibility of change of form and quality; but for a coming into being or vanishing of matter we lack any forms that would make it representable.[65] That is why this truth has at all times and everywhere been evident to everyone, and has never been seriously doubted. That could not be so if its ground of knowledge were nothing but a Kantian proof as difficult as this one, tiptoe-

65 Kant's *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (1786).

ing along on needle points. What is more, I have found Kant's proof to be false (as set out in the Appendix), and have shown above that the persistence of matter is to be derived not from the part that time plays in the possibility of experience, but from the part played by space. The real grounding of all truths called metaphysical in this sense, that is, of abstract expressions of the necessary and universal forms of knowing, cannot in turn lie in abstract propositions. It can lie only in our immediate consciousness of the forms of representation, a consciousness that makes itself known in apodictic statements *a priori* that fear no refutation. If one nevertheless wants to give a proof of them, it can consist only in showing that the truth to be proved is already contained, as a part or as a presupposition, in some truth that is not doubted. Thus I have shown, for example, that all empirical intuition already involves the application of the law of causality. Knowledge of this law is therefore a condition of all experience, and so cannot first be given and conditioned by experience, as Hume maintained.—Proofs in general are less for those who want to learn than for those who want to dispute. The latter stubbornly deny insight that is immediately grounded. Only the truth can be consistent in every direction. So one must show such people that they concede in *one* form, and mediately, what they deny in another form, and immediately; that is, one must show them the logically necessary connection between what they deny and what they concede.

Beyond this, the scientific form itself, namely the subordination of everything particular under something universal, and so on ever upward, entails that the truth of many propositions is grounded only logically. It is grounded, that is, through their dependence on other propositions, and hence through inferences that at the same time appear as proofs. But one should never forget that this whole form is only a means of making knowledge easier, not a means to greater certainty. It is easier to learn the nature of an animal from the species to which it belongs, and so upward from the *genus*, the family, the order and the class, than to examine each animal given to us on its own.

But the truth of all propositions derived through inferences is always only conditional, and ultimately depends on some truth that rests not on inferences but on intuition. If intuition were always as close at hand as derivation through an inference, it would be by all means preferable. For all derivation from concepts is exposed to many deceptions, because of the manifold interlocking of their spheres shown above and the often fluctuating determination of their content. The many proofs of false doctrines, and sophisms of every kind, are examples of this. — Inferences, it is true, are completely certain as to their form; but they are very unreliable through their matter, the concepts. For the spheres of concepts are often not sharply enough determined, and they also intersect in so many ways that one sphere is partly contained in many others. One can therefore pass arbitrarily from it into one or another of these, and from there onward again, as has already been shown. Or, in other words: the *terminus minor* [minor term], and the *medius* [middle term] as well, can always be subordinated to various concepts, from among which one chooses the *terminus major* [major term] and the *medius* at will, and the inference then turns out differently. — Everywhere, consequently, immediate evidence is far preferable to proved truth. Proved truth is to be accepted only where immediate evidence would have to be fetched from too far away, not where it lies just as near as the proof, or even nearer. That is why we saw above that in logic, where immediate knowledge lies nearer to hand in each particular case than derived, scientific knowledge, we in fact always guide our thinking only by our immediate knowledge of the laws of thought, and leave logic unused.[66]

66 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 12 of the second volume (the Supplements).

§ 15. EUCLID'S METHOD

Euclid's logical proofs obscure the intuitive evidence that grounds geometry.

1.15 We are convinced that intuition is the first source of all evidence, and that only an immediate or mediated relation to it is absolute truth. We are further convinced that the most direct path to such truth is always the surest, since every mediation through concepts exposes us to many deceptions. Now if, I say, with this conviction we turn to *mathematics*, as Euclid established it as a science and as it has on the whole remained to this day, we cannot help finding the path it takes strange, indeed perverse. We demand that every logical grounding be traced back to an intuitive one. Mathematics, on the contrary, strives with great effort wantonly to reject the intuitive evidence that is peculiar to it and everywhere close at hand, in order to substitute a logical evidence for it. We cannot but find that this is as if someone were to cut off his legs in order to walk on crutches; or like the prince in *The Triumph of Sensibility*, who flees from real, beautiful nature to take his pleasure in a stage set that imitates it.[67] —Here I must recall what I said in the sixth chapter of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, and I assume it to be fresh in the reader's memory and fully present to him. So I attach my remarks to it here without setting out anew the distinction between the mere ground of knowledge of a mathematical truth, which can be given logically, and the ground of being. The ground of being is the immediate connection of the parts of space and time, which can be known only intuitively. Insight into it alone affords true satisfaction and thorough knowledge, whereas the mere ground of knowledge always stays on the surface; it can indeed give a knowledge that something is so, but none of *why* it is so. Euclid took this latter path, to the manifest detriment of the science. Right at the start, for example, he

67 Goethe's satirical play *Der Triumph der Empfindsamkeit* (1777), whose sentimental prince prefers an artificial stage nature to the real thing.

ought to have shown once and for all how in a triangle the angles and sides determine one another and are ground and consequent of each other. This follows the form that the principle of sufficient reason has in mere space, a form which there, as everywhere, supplies the necessity by which one thing is as it is because another, entirely different thing is as it is. Instead of thus giving a thorough insight into the nature of the triangle, he sets up a few disconnected, arbitrarily chosen propositions about the triangle, and gives a logical ground of knowledge for them through a laborious proof conducted logically in accordance with the principle of contradiction. Instead of an exhaustive knowledge of these spatial relations, one therefore receives only a few results from them, communicated at random. One is in the position of someone who is shown the various effects of an ingenious machine while its inner connection and works are withheld from him. That everything Euclid demonstrates is so, one must concede, compelled by the principle of contradiction; but *why* it is so, one does not learn. One is therefore left with almost the uneasy feeling that follows a conjuring trick, and indeed most of Euclid's proofs strikingly resemble one. Almost always the truth comes in by the back door, resulting *per accidens* [incidentally] from some side circumstance. Often an apagogic proof shuts all the doors one after another and leaves only one open, through which one must now go simply for that reason. Often, as in the Pythagorean theorem, lines are drawn without our knowing why. Afterwards it turns out that they were snares, which unexpectedly tighten and capture the *assensus* [assent] of the learner. He must now concede in astonishment what remains wholly incomprehensible to him as to its inner connection, so much so that he can study the whole of Euclid through without gaining any real insight into the laws of spatial relations, learning by heart instead only a few of their results. This really empirical and unscientific knowledge resembles that of a physician who knows the disease and the remedy for it, but not the connection between the two. All this, however, is the consequence of capriciously rejecting the mode of grounding

and evidence peculiar to a kind of knowledge and forcibly introducing in its place one foreign to its nature. For the rest, the way Euclid carried this through deserves all the admiration that has been bestowed on him over so many centuries. It went so far that his treatment of mathematics was declared the model of all scientific exposition, and people even tried to mold all the other sciences on it, though later they abandoned the attempt without quite knowing why. In our eyes, however, that method of Euclid's in mathematics can appear only as a very brilliant perversity. Now for every great aberration that is pursued deliberately and methodically and accompanied by general applause, whether it concerns life or science, the reason can surely always be traced to the philosophy prevailing in its time.—The Eleatics were the first to discover the difference, and indeed the frequent conflict, between what is intuited, *phainomenon* [what appears], and what is thought, *nooumenon* [what is thought].[68] They made manifold use of it for their philosophemes, and for sophisms too. They were later followed by the Megarians, dialecticians, Sophists, New Academics and Skeptics. These drew attention to illusion, that is, to the deception of the senses, or rather of the understanding, which transforms the data of the senses into intuition. This deception often lets us see things to which reason denies reality with certainty, for example the stick that looks broken in water, and the like. It was recognized that sensory intuition is not to be trusted unconditionally, and the hasty conclusion was drawn that rational, logical thinking alone establishes truth. Yet Plato (in the *Parmenides*), the Megarians, Pyrrho and the New Academics showed by examples (in the manner later adopted by Sextus Empiricus) how, on the other hand, inferences and concepts also lead astray. They even produce paralogisms and sophisms, which arise much more easily and are much harder to resolve than illusion in sensory intuition. Meanwhile the rationalism that had thus arisen in opposition to empiricism kept the upper hand, and it was in accordance with

68 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Kant's misuse of these Greek terms, which is censured in the Appendix, is not to be considered here at all.

it that Euclid worked out mathematics. Only the axioms did he rest, because he had to, on intuitive evidence (*phainomenon*); everything else he rested on inferences (*nooumenon*). His method remained dominant through all the centuries, and was bound to, as long as pure intuition *a priori* was not distinguished from empirical intuition. It is true that Euclid's commentator Proclus already seems to have fully recognized this distinction, as is shown by the passage of his commentary that Kepler translated into Latin in his book *de harmonia mundi* [On the Harmony of the World]. But Proclus did not lay enough weight on the matter, presented it in too isolated a way, went unheeded and did not prevail. Only two thousand years later, therefore, will the teaching of Kant, which is destined to bring about such great changes in all the knowledge, thought and activity of the European peoples, bring about such a change in mathematics as well.[69] For only now have we learned from this great mind that the intuitions of space and time are entirely different from empirical intuition, entirely independent of any impression on the senses, conditioning it, not conditioned by it, that is, *a priori*, and therefore not open to the deception of the senses at all. Only now can we see that Euclid's logical treatment of mathematics is a useless precaution, a crutch for healthy legs. It is like a traveler at night who takes a bright, firm road for water, takes care not to step on it, and always walks beside it on bumpy ground, content to run up against the supposed water from stretch to stretch. Only now can we assert with certainty that what announces itself to us as necessary when we intuit a figure does not come from the figure drawn on paper, perhaps very imperfectly, nor from the abstract concept we think along with it. It comes immediately from the form of all knowledge, of which we are conscious *a priori*. This form is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason; here, as the form of intuition, that is, space, it is the principle of the ground of being. Its evidence and validity, however, are just as great and immediate as those of the prin-

69 Proclus (AD 412–485), Neoplatonist philosopher, wrote a commentary on the first book of Euclid's *Elements*; Kepler's *Harmonices mundi* appeared in 1619.

ciple of the ground of knowing, that is, as logical certainty. So we need not, and may not, leave the peculiar domain of mathematics in order to trust logical certainty alone, and to authenticate mathematics in a domain wholly foreign to it, that of concepts. If we keep to the ground peculiar to mathematics, we gain the great advantage that in it the knowledge *that* something is so is now one and the same as the knowledge why it is so. Euclid's method, by contrast, separates the two entirely and lets us know only the former, not the latter. Aristotle, however, puts it quite admirably in the *Posterior Analytics* I, 27: "*Akribestera d epistêmê epistêmês kai protera, hête tou hoti kai tou dioti hê autê, alla mê chôris tou hoti, tês tou dioti.*" *(Subtilior autem et praestantior ea est scientia, quâ quod aliquid sit, et cur sit una simulque intelligimus, non separatim quod, et cur sit.)* [That science is more subtle and more excellent by which we understand that something is and why it is, as one and at the same time, not separately that it is and why it is.] After all, in physics we are satisfied only when the knowledge *that* something is so is united with the knowledge *why* it is so. That the mercury in Torricelli's tube stands at 28 inches is poor knowledge unless we add that it is held there by the counterweight of the air. And in mathematics are we supposed to be content with the *qualitas occulta* [occult quality] of the circle, that the segments of any two chords intersecting in it always form equal rectangles? That it is so Euclid certainly proves in the 35th proposition of the third book; the why is still left open. Likewise the Pythagorean theorem acquaints us with a *qualitas occulta* of the right-angled triangle. Euclid's stilted, indeed underhanded proof abandons us at the why. The simple figure shown here, already familiar, gives at a glance far more insight into the matter than that proof, and a firm inner conviction of that necessity and of the dependence of that property on the right angle:[70]

With unequal legs too it must be possible to bring the matter to such an intuitive conviction, as indeed with every possible

70 The figure, a diagram for the isosceles right triangle, is not reproduced in this edition.

geometrical truth. This is so if only because its discovery always started from such an intuited necessity, and the proof was thought up only afterward. So one needs only to analyze the train of thought in the first discovery of a geometrical truth in order to know its necessity intuitively. In general, it is the analytic method that I would wish for in the teaching of mathematics, instead of the synthetic method Euclid used. With complicated mathematical truths, admittedly, this will involve very great, though not insurmountable, difficulties. Already in Germany people are beginning here and there to change the teaching of mathematics and to follow this analytic path more. This has been done most decidedly by Mr. *Kosack*, teacher of mathematics and physics at the Gymnasium in Nordhausen, who appended to the program for the school examinations of April 6, 1852 a detailed attempt to treat geometry according to my principles.

To improve the method of mathematics, what is chiefly required is to give up a prejudice: the prejudice that proved truth has any advantage over truth known through intuition, or that logical truth, resting on the principle of contradiction, has any advantage over metaphysical truth, which is immediately evident and to which the pure intuition of space also belongs.

What is most certain, and everywhere inexplicable, is the content of the principle of sufficient reason. For this principle, in its various forms, denotes the universal form of all our representations and cognitions. All explanation is a tracing back to it: a demonstration, in the particular case, of the connection of representations that it expresses in general. It is therefore the principle of all explanation, and so is neither capable of explanation itself nor in need of it, since every explanation already presupposes it and acquires meaning only through it. Now none of its forms has any priority over another: it is equally certain and unprovable as the principle of the ground of being, of becoming, of acting or of knowing. The relation of ground to consequent is a necessary one in each of its forms; indeed, it is in general the origin, as well as the sole meaning, of the concept

of necessity. There is no necessity other than that of the consequent when the ground is given, and there is no ground that does not bring about the necessity of the consequent. Just as surely, then, as the consequent stated in the conclusion flows from the ground of knowing given in the premises, so surely does the ground of being in space condition its consequent in space. Once I have known the relation between the two intuitively, this certainty is just as great as any logical certainty. Every geometrical theorem, however, is the expression of such a relation, just as much as any of the twelve axioms. It is a metaphysical truth, and as such just as immediately certain as the principle of contradiction itself, which is a metalogical truth and the universal foundation of all logical demonstration. Whoever denies the necessity, intuitively displayed, of the spatial relations stated in some theorem can with equal right deny the axioms, and with equal right deny that the conclusion follows from the premises, and even deny the principle of contradiction itself. For all of these are equally unprovable, immediately evident relations, knowable *a priori*. So if one wants first to derive the intuitively knowable necessity of spatial relations from the principle of contradiction by a logical demonstration, it is just as if a stranger wanted to grant a country as a fief to the man who already rules it in his own right. Yet that is what Euclid did. Only his axioms does he let rest, because he must, on immediate evidence; all the subsequent geometrical truths are proved logically. They are proved, namely, on the presupposition of those axioms, from their agreement with the assumptions made in the theorem, or with an earlier theorem; or else from the contradiction between the opposite of the theorem and the assumptions, the axioms, the earlier theorems, or even itself. But the axioms themselves have no more immediate evidence than any other geometrical theorem; they only have more simplicity, because they have less content.

When an accused person is interrogated, his statements are taken down in a record so that their truth can be judged by their consistency. But this is a mere makeshift, and one does not rest

content with it if one can investigate the truth of each of his statements directly and on its own, especially since he could have lied consistently from the start. Yet it is by this first method that Euclid investigated space. He did, admittedly, start from the correct presupposition that nature must be consistent everywhere, and so also in its fundamental form, space. He presupposed, therefore, that since the parts of space stand to one another in the relation of ground and consequent, no single spatial determination can be other than it is without contradicting all the others. But this is a very laborious and unsatisfying detour. It prefers mediate knowledge to immediate knowledge that is just as certain. It separates the knowledge *that* something is from the knowledge *why* it is, to the great detriment of the science. And finally it entirely withholds from the learner insight into the laws of space; indeed, it weans him from real inquiry into the ground and the inner connection of things, and trains him instead to content himself with a merely historical knowledge *that* it is so. The exercise of acuteness so unceasingly praised in this method consists merely in the pupil's practicing inference, that is, the application of the principle of contradiction, and above all in straining his memory to retain all those data whose agreement has to be compared.

It is noteworthy, moreover, that this method of proof has been applied only to geometry and not to arithmetic. In arithmetic, rather, the truth really is allowed to become evident through intuition alone, which here consists simply in counting. The intuition of numbers is in *time alone*, and so cannot be represented by any sensory schema, as the geometrical figure can. Here, therefore, the suspicion fell away that intuition is merely empirical and so subject to illusion—the very suspicion that alone could have brought the logical method of proof into geometry. Because time has only one dimension, counting is the sole arithmetical operation, to which all the others can be reduced. And this counting is nothing other than intuition *a priori*, to which no one here hesitates to appeal, and by which alone everything else, every calculation, every equation, is ulti-

mately verified. One does not prove, for example, that (7+9)·8-2 / 3 = 42; one appeals to pure intuition in time, to counting, and so makes every single proposition an axiom. Instead of the proofs that fill geometry, the whole content of arithmetic and algebra is therefore a mere method for abbreviating counting. Our immediate intuition of numbers in time, it is true, reaches, as mentioned above, no further than about ten. Beyond that, an abstract concept of the number, fixed by a word, must take the place of intuition, which is then no longer actually carried out but only quite definitely designated. Yet even so, thanks to the important aid of the number system, which lets larger numbers always be represented by the same small ones, an intuitive evidence of every calculation is made possible. This holds even where one calls in abstraction so heavily that not only the numbers but indeterminate quantities and whole operations are thought only *in abstracto* and designated as such, like $\sqrt{(r^{-b})}$, so that they are no longer carried out but only indicated.

With the same right and the same certainty as in arithmetic, one could let truth in geometry too be grounded by pure intuition *a priori* alone. Indeed, it is always this necessity, known intuitively in accordance with the principle of the ground of being, that gives geometry its great evidence, and on which the certainty of its propositions rests in everyone's consciousness. It is by no means the logical proof striding along on stilts. That proof, always foreign to the matter, is mostly soon forgotten with no loss of conviction, and could be dropped altogether without diminishing the evidence of geometry. For that evidence is entirely independent of it, and the proof only ever proves what one is already fully convinced of beforehand through another kind of knowledge. In this respect it resembles

a cowardly soldier who deals one more wound to an enemy slain by others and then boasts of having finished him off.[71]

In view of all this, it will, I hope, no longer be open to any doubt that the evidence of mathematics, which has become the model and symbol of all evidence, rests by its nature not on proofs but on immediate intuition. Here, as everywhere, intuition is thus the ultimate ground and source of all truth. The intuition underlying mathematics, however, has a great advantage over every other, and so over empirical intuition. Since it is *a priori*, and hence independent of experience, which is only ever given piecemeal and successively, everything in it is equally close at hand, and one can start at will from the ground or from the consequent. This gives it complete infallibility, because in it the consequent is known from the ground, and this knowledge alone has necessity: for example, the equality of the sides is known as grounded by the equality of the angles. All empirical intuition, by contrast, and the greater part of all experience, goes only the other way, from the consequent to the ground. This kind of knowledge is not infallible, since necessity belongs only to the consequent insofar as the ground is given, not to the knowledge of the ground from the consequent; for the same consequent can spring from different grounds. This latter kind of knowledge is always only induction, that is, from many consequents that point to one ground, the ground is taken as certain. But since the cases can never all be assembled, the truth here is never unconditionally certain either. Yet this is the only kind of truth possessed by all knowledge through sensory intu-

71 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Spinoza*, who always boasts of proceeding *more geometrico* [in the geometrical manner], actually did this even more than he himself knew. For what was certain and settled for him from an immediate, intuitive apprehension of the nature of the world he tries to demonstrate logically, independently of that knowledge. He attains the intended result, which was certain for him in advance, only by taking arbitrary, self-made concepts (*substantia* [substance], *causa sui* [cause of itself], and so on) as his starting point, and by allowing himself in his proofs all the liberties for which the nature of wide conceptual spheres affords convenient opportunity. What is true and excellent in his teaching is therefore, in his case too, entirely independent of the proofs, just as in geometry. See Chapter 13 of the second volume (the Supplements).

ition and by by far the greater part of experience. The affection of a sense occasions an inference of the understanding from the effect to the cause. But since the inference from what is grounded to the ground is never secure, false illusion, as deception of the senses, is possible and often actual, as set out above. Only when several or all five senses receive affections pointing to the same cause has the possibility of illusion become extremely small; yet it still exists. For in certain cases, for example with counterfeit coin, the whole of sensibility is deceived. All empirical knowledge is in the same case, and consequently the whole of natural science, setting aside its pure part (metaphysical, in Kant's terms). Here too the causes are known from the effects; hence all natural science rests on hypotheses, which are often false and then gradually give way to more correct ones. Only in deliberately arranged experiments does knowledge proceed from cause to effect, and so take the secure path; but the experiments themselves are undertaken only as a result of hypotheses. That is why no branch of natural science, such as physics, astronomy or physiology, could be discovered all at once, as mathematics or logic could. It needed, and still needs, the collected and compared experiences of many centuries. Only manifold empirical confirmation brings the induction on which the hypothesis rests so close to completeness that for practical purposes it takes the place of certainty. The hypothesis's origin is then considered no more detrimental to it than the incommensurability of straight and curved lines is to the application of geometry, or the unattainable perfect exactness of the logarithm to arithmetic. For just as the quadrature of the circle and the logarithm are brought infinitely close to exactness by infinite fractions, so too through manifold experience induction, that is, knowledge of the ground from the consequents, is brought close to mathematical evidence, that is, knowledge of the consequent from the ground. It is not brought infinitely close, to be sure, but close enough that the possibility of deception becomes small enough to be neglected. Yet the possibility does exist. For example, the inference from countless cases to all cases, that is, really, to the

unknown ground on which all of them depend, is also an inductive inference. Now what inference of this kind seems more certain than that all human beings have their heart on the left side? And yet there are, as extremely rare and wholly isolated exceptions, people whose heart sits on the right side.—Sensory intuition and empirical science therefore have the same kind of evidence. The advantage that mathematics, pure natural science and logic have over them, as knowledge *a priori*, rests merely on this: the formal element of knowledge, on which all apriority is founded, is given whole and all at once. Here, therefore, one can always go from the ground to the consequent, whereas there one can mostly go only from the consequent to the ground. In itself, moreover, the law of causality, or the principle of the ground of becoming, which guides empirical knowledge, is just as certain as those other forms of the principle of sufficient reason that the sciences named above follow *a priori*.—Logical proofs from concepts, or inferences, have, just as much as knowledge from intuition *a priori*, the advantage of going from the ground to the consequent, which makes them in themselves, that is, in their form, infallible. This has done much to bring proofs in general into such high repute. But their infallibility is a relative one: they merely subsume under the higher propositions of the science. It is these, however, that contain the science's whole fund of truth, and they in turn may not merely be proved; they must be grounded on intuition. In the few *a priori* sciences just named this intuition is pure; otherwise it is always empirical, and raised to universality only through induction. So even if in the empirical sciences the particular is proved from the universal, the universal in turn has received its truth only from the particular. It is only a granary of gathered stores, not a soil that bears fruit of itself.

TRUTH AND ERROR

Every error is an inference from consequent to ground, analogous to illusion in intuition.

So much for the grounding of truth.—As to the origin and possibility of *error*, many explanations have been attempted since Plato's figurative solutions, the dovecote in which one grabs the wrong dove, and so on (*Theaetetus*, p. 167 ff.). *Kant's* vague, indefinite explanation of the origin of error, using the image of diagonal motion, can be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 294 of the first and p. 350 of the fifth edition.—Since truth is the relation of a judgment to its ground of knowing, it is indeed a problem how someone who judges can really believe he has such a ground and yet have none; that is, how error, the deception of reason, is possible.[72] I find this possibility entirely analogous to that of illusion, or the deception of the understanding, explained above. My view, namely (and this is what gives the explanation its place just here), is *that every error is an inference from the consequent to the ground*. Such an inference is indeed valid where one knows that the consequent can have that ground and absolutely no other, but not otherwise. The person in error either assigns to the consequent a ground it cannot have at all, in which case he shows a real lack of understanding, that is, of the capacity for immediate knowledge of the connection between cause and effect. Or else, which is more often the case, he assigns to the consequent a ground that is indeed possible, but adds to the major premise of his inference from consequent to ground that the said consequent *always* arises only from the ground he has named. Only a complete induction could entitle him to this, and he presupposes it without having made it. That *always* is therefore too wide a concept; in its place should stand only *sometimes* or *mostly*, and then the conclusion would turn

72 Plato, *Theaetetus* 197c ff., compares the mind to an aviary: to err is to catch the wrong bird. Kant compares error to the diagonal resultant of two forces, understanding and sensibility.

out problematic, and as such would not be erroneous. That the person in error proceeds in the way described is due either to haste or to too limited a knowledge of the possibilities, because of which he does not know that the induction needs to be made. Error, then, is entirely analogous to illusion. Both are inferences from the consequent to the ground. Illusion is always carried out according to the law of causality and by the understanding alone, hence immediately in intuition itself. Error is carried out according to all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason and by reason, hence in thinking proper, but most often likewise according to the law of causality. The following three examples show this; they may be regarded as types or representatives of three kinds of error. (1) Illusion of the senses (deception of the understanding) occasions error (deception of reason), for example when one takes a painting for a *haut-relief* [high relief] and really believes it to be one. This happens through an inference from the following major premise: "When dark gray passes in places through all shades into white, the cause is *always* the light striking projections and depressions unequally: *ergo*—." (2) "When money is missing from my cash box, the cause is *always* that my servant has a duplicate key: ergo—." (3) "When the image of the sun refracted through the prism, that is, shifted up or down, now appears elongated and colored instead of round and white as before, the cause is once and always that the light contained homogeneous rays of different colors and at the same time of different refrangibility, which, separated by their different refrangibility, now show an elongated and at the same time variously colored image: *ergo*—*bibamus*! [therefore—let us drink!]"—Every error must be traceable to such an inference from a hypothetical major premise, often only falsely generalized, that has arisen from assuming a ground for a consequent. The exception is errors of calculation, say, which are not really errors at all but mere mistakes: the operation indicated by the concepts of the numbers has not

been carried out in pure intuition, in counting, but another one in its place.[73]

EXPLANATION AND PHILOSOPHY

Science explains relations between appearances; philosophy asks what the world itself is.

As for the *content* of the sciences in general, this is really always the relation of the appearances of the world to one another, in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason and following the guiding thread of the why, which has validity and meaning only through that principle. Demonstrating this relation is called *explanation*. Explanation, then, can never go further than showing that two representations stand to each other in the relation of that form of the principle of sufficient reason which prevails in the class to which they belong. Once it has got that far, one cannot ask why any further: for the relation demonstrated is one that simply cannot be represented otherwise; that is, it is the form of all knowledge. That is why no one asks why 2+2=4; or why equality of the angles in a triangle determines equality of the sides; or why its effect follows upon any given cause; or why the truth of the conclusion becomes evident from the truth of the premises. Every explanation that leads back to such a relation, of which no further why can be demanded, stops at an assumed *qualitas occulta*; and every original force of nature is of this kind. Every explanation in natural science must ultimately stop at such a force, and so at something completely obscure. It must therefore leave the inner nature of a stone just as unexplained as that of a human being. It can give as little account of the gravity, cohesion, chemical properties and so on that the former displays as of the knowing and acting of the latter. Thus, for example, gravity is a *qualitas occulta*: for it can be thought away, and so does not arise as something necessary from the

73 The third example is Newton's theory of color, which Schopenhauer, siding with Goethe, rejected. "Ergo bibamus!" is a student drinking tag (also a Goethe poem) mocking a conclusion that does not follow.

form of knowing. This is the case, on the other hand, with the law of inertia, since it follows from the law of causality; hence tracing something back to that law is a perfectly sufficient explanation. For two things are absolutely inexplicable, that is, cannot be traced back to the relation that the principle of sufficient reason expresses. First, the principle of sufficient reason itself, in all its four forms, because it is the principle of all explanation, that in relation to which alone explanation has meaning; and second, that which is not reached by it, but from which arises precisely what is original in all appearances: this is the thing in itself, knowledge of which is not at all knowledge subject to the principle of sufficient reason. This last point must remain entirely uncomprehended here, since it can become comprehensible only through the following book, in which we shall also take up again this consideration of what the sciences can achieve. But at the point where natural science, indeed every science, leaves things—because not only its explanation of them but even the principle of that explanation, the principle of sufficient reason, leads no further than this point—there philosophy really takes things up again and considers them in its own way, which is quite different from theirs. —In the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 51, I showed how in the various sciences one or another form of that principle is the main guiding thread; indeed, the most apt classification of the sciences might perhaps be made on this basis. But every explanation given by that guiding thread is, as has been said, always only relative. It explains things in relation to one another, but always leaves something unexplained, which it in fact already presupposes. This is, for example, in mathematics, space and time; in mechanics, physics and chemistry, matter, qualities, original forces, laws of nature; in botany and zoology, the diversity of species and life itself; in history, the human race with all its peculiarities of thinking and willing—in all of them, the principle of sufficient reason in whichever form is to be applied in each case.—*Philosophy* has this peculiarity, that it presupposes absolutely nothing as known: everything is equally strange to it

and a problem. This holds not only for the relations of appearances but for the appearances themselves, and indeed for the principle of sufficient reason itself, to which the other sciences are content to trace everything back. For philosophy, however, nothing would be gained by such a tracing back, since one link of the series is as strange to it as another. Further, that kind of connection itself is just as much a problem for it as what is linked by it, and what is linked is as much a problem after its connection has been shown as before. For, as has been said, precisely what the sciences presuppose, lay at the basis of their explanations and set as their limit is the real problem of philosophy, which therefore begins, in this respect, where the sciences leave off. Proofs cannot be its foundation: for they derive unknown propositions from known ones, whereas for philosophy everything is equally unknown and strange. There can be no proposition in consequence of which the world, with all its appearances, would first come to exist. Hence a philosophy cannot, as Spinoza wanted, be derived demonstratively *ex firmis principiis* [from firm principles]. Philosophy is, moreover, the most universal knowledge, and its main propositions therefore cannot be consequences of some other knowledge still more universal. The principle of contradiction merely establishes the agreement of concepts; it does not itself supply concepts. The principle of sufficient reason explains connections between appearances, not the appearances themselves. Hence philosophy cannot set out to look for a *causa efficiens* [efficient cause] or a *causa finalis* [final cause] of the whole world. The present philosophy, at any rate, by no means seeks to know *whence* or *to what end* the world exists, but merely what the world is. The why, however, is here subordinate to the what: for it already belongs to the world, since it arises solely through the form of the world's appearance, the principle of sufficient reason, and has meaning and validity only to that extent. It could indeed be said that everyone knows without further help *what* the world is, since he himself is the subject of knowing whose representation it is; and this would be true so far as it goes. But that know-

ledge is intuitive; it is *in concreto*. The task of philosophy is to reproduce it *in abstracto*: to raise the successive, changing intuition, and in general everything that the broad concept *feeling* covers and designates only negatively, as not abstract, distinct knowledge, to precisely such knowledge—to a lasting knowledge. Philosophy must accordingly be a statement *in abstracto* of the nature of the whole world, of the whole as well as of all its parts. Yet in order not to lose itself in an endless multitude of particular judgments, it must make use of abstraction and think everything particular in the universal, and its differences in turn in the universal as well. Hence it will partly separate and partly unite, in order to deliver to knowledge all the manifold of the world in general, according to its nature, gathered together into a few abstract concepts. Through those concepts in which it fixes the nature of the world, however, the wholly particular must be known as well as the universal, and so the knowledge of both must be bound together as closely as possible. Hence the capacity for philosophy consists precisely in what Plato took it to be: knowing the one in the many and the many in the one. Philosophy will accordingly be a sum of very universal judgments whose ground of knowing is immediately the world itself in its totality, without excluding anything; thus everything that is found in human consciousness. It will be *a complete repetition, a mirroring as it were, of the world in abstract concepts*, which is possible only by uniting what is essentially identical in one concept and separating out what is different into another. Bacon of Verulam already set philosophy this task when he said: *ea demum vera est philosophia, quae mundi ipsius voces fidelissime reddit, et veluti dictante mundo conscripta est, et nihil aliud est, quam ejusdem* simulacrum et reflectio, *neque addit quidquam de proprio, sed tantum iterat et resonat* [that alone is the true philosophy which renders most faithfully the voices of the world itself, and is written down as it were at the world's dictation, and is nothing other than its *copy and reflection*, adding nothing of its own

but only repeating and echoing]. (*de augm. scient.*, L. 2, c. 13).[74] We, however, take this in a wider sense than Bacon could conceive of at the time.

The harmony that all sides and parts of the world have with one another, precisely because they belong to one whole, must also be found again in that abstract copy of the world. Accordingly, within that sum of judgments one could in a certain sense be derived from another, and indeed always reciprocally. For this, however, they must first exist, and so must first be laid down as grounded directly in knowledge of the world *in concreto*. This is all the more necessary because all direct grounding is more certain than indirect grounding. Their harmony with one another, by virtue of which they even flow together into the unity of *a single* thought, springs from the harmony and unity of the intuitive world itself, which is their common ground of knowledge. That harmony will therefore not be used as the first thing in grounding them; it will only come in afterward as a confirmation of their truth.—This task itself can become perfectly clear only through its solution.[75]

§ 16. PRACTICAL REASON

Reason gives human beings a second, abstract life and shapes conduct, whether good or bad.

1.16 After this whole consideration of reason as a special cognitive power belonging to human beings alone, and of the achievements and phenomena peculiar to human nature that it brings about, it would now remain for me to speak of reason insofar as it guides human actions and can therefore in this respect be called *practical*. But most of what should be mentioned here has found its place elsewhere, namely in the Appendix to this work. There I had to dispute the existence of what Kant calls practical

74 Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam (1561–1626); *De augmentis scientiarum* (1623) is the expanded Latin version of his *Advancement of Learning*.

75 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 17 of the second volume (the Supplements).

reason, which he presents (very conveniently, to be sure) as the direct source of all virtue and as the seat of an absolute (that is, fallen from heaven) *ought*. I later provided a detailed and thorough refutation of this Kantian principle of morality in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. —So here I have only a little more to say about the real influence of reason, in the true sense of the word, on action. At the very beginning of our consideration of reason we remarked in general how greatly the doings and conduct of human beings differ from those of animals. We also remarked that this difference is nevertheless to be regarded solely as a consequence of the presence of abstract concepts in consciousness. The influence of these concepts on our entire existence is so pervasive and significant that it places us, in a sense, in the same relation to animals that seeing animals have to eyeless ones (certain larvae, worms and zoophytes). The eyeless ones know by touch alone what is immediately present to them in space and in contact with them; those that see, by contrast, know a wide circle of things near and far. In just the same way, the absence of reason confines animals to the intuitive representations immediately present to them in time, that is, to real objects. We, on the other hand, by virtue of knowledge *in abstracto*, encompass not only the narrow actual present but also the whole past and future, together with the wide realm of possibility: we survey life freely in every direction, far beyond the present and the actual. What the eye is in space and for sensory knowledge, reason is, in a sense, in time and for inner knowledge. But the visibility of objects has its value and meaning only because it announces their tangibility. In the same way, the entire value of abstract knowledge always lies in its relation to intuitive knowledge. That is why natural human beings always set far more value on what is known directly and intuitively than on abstract concepts, on what is merely thought: they prefer empirical knowledge to logical knowledge. Those who live more in words than in deeds, who have looked more into paper and books than into the real world, and who in their worst degeneration become pedants and mere literalists, think the

other way round. This alone makes it comprehensible how Leibniz, along with Wolff and all their followers, could go so far astray as to declare, following the lead of Duns Scotus, that intuitive knowledge is merely confused abstract knowledge! To Spinoza's credit I must mention that his sounder sense declared, conversely, that all common concepts arise from the confusion of what is known intuitively. (Eth. II, prop. 40, Schol.[76] 1.)—The same perverse attitude gave rise to several further errors. People rejected the evidence peculiar to mathematics in order to accept only the logical kind. In general, they lumped every non-abstract kind of knowledge together under the broad name of feeling and held it in low esteem. Finally, Kantian ethics declared the pure good will to be mere feeling and impulse, without worth or merit: the will that speaks to us directly as soon as we know the circumstances and leads us to act rightly and do good. It was willing to grant moral worth only to action that proceeds from abstract maxims.

The all-round overview of life as a whole, which reason gives human beings over animals, may also be compared to a geometrical, colorless, abstract, reduced ground plan of the course of one's life. In this respect a human being stands to the animal as the navigator stands to the ignorant crew. The navigator knows exactly his course and his position at any moment on the sea by means of chart, compass and quadrant; the crew see only the waves and the sky. It is therefore worth considering, indeed astonishing, how human beings, besides their life *in concreto*, always lead a second one *in abstracto*. In the first they are exposed to all the storms of reality and to the influence of the present; they must strive, suffer and die like the animal. But their life *in abstracto*, as it stands before their rational reflection, is the calm mirror image of the first and of the world in which they live; it is that reduced ground plan just mentioned. Here, in the realm of calm deliberation, what there possesses them

76 Christian Wolff (1679–1754) turned Leibniz's philosophy into the dominant school system of the German universities. John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) was a medieval scholastic theologian.

wholly and moves them violently appears cold, colorless and, for the moment, foreign: here they are mere spectators and observers. In this withdrawal into reflection a person is like an actor who has played his scene and, until he must go on again, takes his seat among the audience. From there he calmly watches whatever may happen, even if it is the preparation for his own death (in the play). Afterwards he goes back on stage to act and suffer as he must. From this double life comes that human composure, so very different from animal thoughtlessness, with which someone, after prior deliberation, a resolution taken or a necessity recognized, coolly carries out or submits to what is most important to him and often most terrible: suicide, execution, a duel, perilous ventures of every kind, and in general things against which his whole animal nature rebels. Then one sees to what degree reason masters animal nature, and one calls out to the strong man: *sidêreion ny toi êtor*! *(ferreum certe tibi cor!)* ["Surely your heart is of iron!"] *Il. 24, 521*.[77] Here, one can truly say, reason expresses itself *practically*. Thus wherever action is guided by reason, wherever the motives are abstract concepts, wherever what determines us is neither intuitive, individual representations nor the impression of the moment that guides the animal, there *practical reason* shows itself. But this is entirely different from and independent of the ethical worth of action. Acting rationally and acting virtuously are two quite different things. Reason is found allied just as readily with great wickedness as with great goodness, and by joining either one it first lends it great effectiveness. It is equally ready and willing to serve the methodical, consistent execution of a noble intention or a wicked one, of a prudent maxim or a foolish one—which is precisely what its feminine nature entails, receptive and retentive, not itself generative. All this I have set out in detail in the Appendix and illustrated with examples. What is said there would stand in its proper place here, but because of the polemic against Kant's alleged practical reason it had to be

77 Homer, *Iliad* 24.521: Achilles to Priam, who has come alone into the enemy camp to ransom the body of his son Hector.

moved there; and so I refer the reader to it once again from here.

THE STOIC SAGE

Stoic ethics uses reason to seek peace of mind, but its ideal sage remains lifeless.

The most perfect development of *practical reason* in the true and genuine sense of the word, the highest summit a human being can reach by the mere use of reason, where the difference from the animal shows most clearly, is presented as an ideal in the *Stoic sage*. For Stoic ethics is originally and essentially not a doctrine of virtue at all, but merely a guide to the rational life, whose aim and end is happiness through peace of mind. Virtuous conduct turns up in it only, as it were, *per accidens*, as a means, not as an end. Hence Stoic ethics, in its whole nature and point of view, is fundamentally different from the ethical systems that insist directly on virtue, such as the doctrines of the Vedas, of Plato, of Christianity and of Kant. The end of Stoic ethics is happiness: *telos to eudaimonein (virtutes omnes finem habere beatitudinem)* ["all the virtues have happiness as their end"], as it says in the account of the Stoa in Stobaeus. *(Ecl., L. II, c. 7, p. 114*, and likewise *p. 138.)* Yet Stoic ethics shows that happiness is to be found with certainty only in inner peace and tranquility of mind (*ataraxia*) [freedom from disturbance], and that this in turn is to be reached only through virtue. This alone is what the expression "virtue is the highest good" means.[78] In time, however, the end is gradually forgotten over the means, and virtue is recommended in a way that betrays an interest quite different from that of one's own happiness, since it contradicts that happiness too plainly. This is one of those inconsistencies by which, in every system, the truth that is known directly—or, as people say, felt—leads back to the right path, doing violence to the inferences. One sees this clearly, for example, in Spinoza's eth-

78 Joannes Stobaeus (5th century AD) compiled an anthology, the *Eclogae* (Selections), that preserves many fragments of Greek philosophy.

ics, which by palpable sophisms derives a pure doctrine of virtue from the egoistic *suum utile quaerere* [seeking one's own advantage]. As I understand the spirit of Stoic ethics, its origin lies in the following question. Reason, the great prerogative of human beings, eases life and its burdens so greatly in an indirect way, through planned action and what results from it. Might it not also be capable directly, that is, through mere knowledge, of removing them at a stroke, either wholly or at least almost wholly, from the sufferings and torments of every kind that fill their life? The being endowed with reason encompasses and surveys through it an infinity of things and states. It was thought unbecoming to this privilege that such a being should nevertheless be exposed, through the present and through the incidents that the few years of so short, fleeting and uncertain a life may contain, to such violent pain, to such great anxiety and suffering, arising from the impetuous urge of desire and aversion. It was held that the proper use of reason must be able to lift a person above all this and make him invulnerable. Hence Antisthenes said: *Dei ktasthai noun, ê brochon (aut mentem parandam, aut laqueum. Plut. de stoic. repugn., c. 14)* ["One must acquire either understanding or a noose"], that is,[79] life is so full of troubles and vexations that one must either rise above it by means of corrected thoughts or leave it. It was recognized that privation, suffering, did not arise directly and necessarily from not having, but only from wanting to have and yet not having. This wanting-to-have is therefore the necessary condition under which alone not-having becomes privation and produces pain. *Ou penia lypên ergazetai, alla epithymia (non paupertas dolorem efficit, sed cupiditas)* ["it is not poverty that causes pain, but desire"], *Epict., fragm. 25*.[80] Experience further taught that it is only hope, the claim, that begets and nourishes the wish. Hence we are neither disturbed nor tormented by the many evils that are

79 Antisthenes (c. 445–365 BC), a pupil of Socrates, was regarded as the founder of the Cynic school. The source is Plutarch's essay *On Stoic Self-Contradictions*.
80 Epictetus (c. AD 50–135), a Stoic philosopher and former slave, whose teachings his pupil Arrian recorded in the *Discourses* and the *Handbook*.

common to all and unavoidable, nor by unattainable goods, but only by the insignificant more or less of what a person can avoid or attain. Indeed, not only what is absolutely unattainable or unavoidable, but even what is relatively so, leaves us quite calm. Hence the evils once allotted to our individuality, or the goods that must necessarily remain denied to it, are regarded with indifference. And in accordance with this human peculiarity, every wish soon dies and so can no longer produce pain, provided no hope feeds it. From all this it followed that all happiness rests merely on the ratio between our claims and what we receive. How great or small the two terms of this ratio are makes no difference, and the ratio can be established as well by reducing the first quantity as by increasing the second. It followed likewise that all suffering really arises from the disproportion between what we demand and expect and what comes to us. This disproportion, however, obviously lies only in knowledge[81] and could be entirely removed by better insight. Hence Chrysippus said: *dei zên kat' empeirian tôn physei symbainontôn* (*Stob. Ecl.*, L. II, c. 7, p. 134), that is, one should live with a proper knowledge of how things go in the world.[82] For whenever someone somehow loses his composure, is struck down by a misfortune, or grows angry or despondent, he shows by that very fact that he finds things other than he expected. Consequently he was caught in error: he did not know the world and life, did not know how at every step the will of the individual is thwarted, in inanimate nature by chance, in animate nature by opposing purposes and also by malice. So either he has not used his reason to arrive at a general knowledge of this character of

81 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione* ["they hold that all disturbances of the mind arise from judgment and opinion"]. Cic. Tusc., 4, 6. *Tarassei tous anthrôpous ou ta pragmata, alla ta peri tôn pragmatôn dogmata. (Perturbant homines non res ipsae, sed de rebus opiniones.)* ["It is not things themselves that disturb people, but their opinions about things."] Epictet., c. V.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.6; Epictetus, *Handbook* (Enchiridion), chapter 5.

82 Chrysippus of Soli (c. 280–207 BC), third head of the Stoic school and its chief systematizer.

life, or else he lacks judgment, if he does not recognize in the particular case what he knows in general, and is therefore surprised by it and thrown off balance.[83] Likewise every lively joy is an error, a delusion. No fulfilled wish can satisfy lastingly, and every possession and every happiness is merely lent by chance for an indefinite time and can therefore be reclaimed in the very next hour. Every pain, on the other hand, rests on the vanishing of such a delusion. Both, then, arise from faulty knowledge. Hence exultation and pain alike always stay far from the sage, and no event disturbs his *ataraxia*.

In keeping with this spirit and aim of the Stoa, *Epictetus* begins with one point and constantly returns to it as the core of his wisdom. One should consider carefully and distinguish what depends on us and what does not, and should therefore not count on the latter at all; in this way one will reliably remain free of all pain, suffering and anxiety. Now what depends on us is the will alone, and here a gradual transition to the doctrine of virtue takes place. For it is observed that, just as the external world, which does not depend on us, determines good and bad fortune, so inner contentment or discontent with ourselves proceeds from the will. Afterwards, however, the question was raised whether the names *bonum et malum* [good and evil] should be given to the first pair or to the second? This was really arbitrary, a matter of choice, and made no difference to the substance. Nevertheless the Stoics argued about it incessantly with the Peripatetics and Epicureans. They entertained themselves with the illegitimate comparison of two completely incommensurable quantities and with the opposing, paradoxical pronouncements that resulted from it, which they hurled at one

83 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Touto gar esti to aition tois anthrôpois pantôn tôn kakôn, to tas prolêpseis tas koinas mê dynasthai epharmozein tais epi merous. (Haec est causa mortalibus omnium malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus.)* ["For this is the cause of all evils for mortals: not being able to apply general notions to particular cases."] *Epict. dissert., III, 26*.

another. Cicero's *Paradoxa* give us an interesting collection of these from the Stoic side.[84]

Zeno, the founder, seems originally to have taken a somewhat different route. His starting point was this: to attain the highest good, that is, bliss through peace of mind, one should live in agreement with oneself. (*homologoumenôs zên; touto d' esti kath hena logon kai symphônon zên.—Consonanter vivere: hoc est secundum unam rationem et concordem sibi vivere* ["to live consistently: that is, to live according to one single principle and in harmony with oneself"]. *Stob. Ecl. eth., L. II, c.* 7, *p. 132*. Likewise: *Aretên diathesin einai psyxês symphônon heautê peri holon ton bion. Virtutem esse animi affectionem secum per totam vitam consentientem* ["virtue is a disposition of the soul in agreement with itself throughout one's whole life"], ibid., p.[85] 104.) Now this was possible only if one determined oneself thoroughly rationally, according to concepts, not according to changing impressions and moods. But only the maxim of our action is in our power, not its success, nor the external circumstances. So in order always to remain consistent, one had to make the former alone one's aim, not the latter; and this again leads into the doctrine of virtue.

But even to Zeno's immediate successors his moral principle —to live in agreement—seemed too formal and empty of content. They therefore gave it material content by adding "to live in agreement with nature" (*homologoumenos tê physei zên*). As Stobaeus reports in the place cited, this was first added by *Cleanthes*, and it pushed the matter very far afield, through the wide sphere of the concept and the vagueness of the expression. For *Cleanthes* meant universal nature as a whole, while Chrysippus meant human nature in particular *(Diog. Laert., 7, 89)*. What alone was fitting to human nature was then supposed to be virtue, just as the satisfaction of animal drives is fitting to animal natures. By this means the argument was again forcibly steered back to the doctrine of virtue, and ethics was to be grounded in

84 Cicero's short work *Paradoxa Stoicorum* (46 BC) defends six Stoic paradoxes, such as "only the wise man is free."

85 Zeno of Citium (c. 334–262 BC), founder of the Stoic school in Athens.

physics, come what may.[86] For the Stoics everywhere aimed at unity of principle, just as for them God and the world were in no way two different things.

Taken as a whole, Stoic ethics is in fact a very valuable and estimable attempt to use the great prerogative of human beings, reason, for an important and salutary purpose: namely to lift them above the sufferings and pains to which every life is subject, through instruction in

> "*Qua ratione queas traducere leniter aevum:*
> *Ne te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido,*
> *Ne pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes*." ["how you may pass your life gently, so that ever-needy desire does not always drive and torment you, nor fear and the hope of things of little use"][87]

and thereby to let them share in the highest degree in the dignity that belongs to them as rational beings, in contrast to the animal—a dignity that can indeed be spoken of in this sense, though not in any other.—This view of mine of Stoic ethics made it necessary to mention it here, in presenting what *reason* is and what it can accomplish. That aim can be reached to a certain degree through the application of reason and through a purely rational ethics. Experience, too, shows that those purely rational characters commonly called practical philosophers—rightly so, because just as the real, that is, the theoretical, philosopher translates life into concepts, they translate concepts into life—are probably the happiest. But however far this may go, it is still very far from true that anything perfect of this kind could be achieved, and that reason, rightly used, could really remove us from all the burden and all the sufferings of life and lead us to bliss. On the contrary, there is a complete contradiction in wanting to live without suffering, a contradiction that the often-used phrase "blessed life" therefore also carries within it. This will surely be evident to anyone who has grasped my following

86 Cleanthes of Assos (c. 330–230 BC) succeeded Zeno as head of the Stoa. Diogenes Laertius (3rd century AD) wrote the *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*.
87 Horace, *Epistles* 1.18.97–99.

exposition to the end. This contradiction reveals itself even in that ethics of pure reason itself. The Stoic is compelled to weave into his instructions for the blissful life (for that is what his ethics always remains) a recommendation of suicide—just as among the splendid ornaments and utensils of Eastern despots there is also a precious little vial of poison. It is meant for the case in which the sufferings of the body, which cannot be philosophized away by any propositions and syllogisms, are overwhelming and incurable. Then his sole aim, bliss, is frustrated after all, and nothing remains to escape suffering but death, which is then to be taken with indifference, like any other medicine. Here a sharp contrast becomes evident between Stoic ethics and all those others mentioned above, which make virtue in itself and directly their aim, even amid the heaviest sufferings, and will not have a person end his life in order to escape suffering. Yet not one of them was able to state the true reason for rejecting suicide; instead they laboriously scrape together all sorts of specious reasons. In the fourth book that reason will emerge in the context of our inquiry. But the contrast just described reveals and confirms precisely the essential difference, lying in the fundamental principle, between the Stoa, which is really only a particular kind of eudaemonism, and those doctrines mentioned, even though the two often coincide in their results and seem to be related. The inner contradiction mentioned above, with which Stoic ethics is afflicted even in its basic idea, shows itself further in the fact that its ideal, the Stoic sage, could never gain life or inner poetic truth even in its own presentation. He remains a wooden, stiff mannequin with whom one can do nothing, who himself does not know what to do with his wisdom, and whose perfect calm, contentment and bliss flatly contradict the nature of humanity and do not allow us to form any intuitive representation of it. How very different, set beside him, appear those who have overcome the world and the voluntary penitents whom Indian wisdom holds up to us and has actually produced! Or indeed the Savior of Christianity: that excellent figure, full of profound life, of the greatest poetic

truth and the highest significance, who nevertheless, with perfect virtue, holiness and sublimity, stands before us in a state of supreme suffering.[88]

88 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 16 of the second volume (the Supplements).

Book Two

Zweites Buch. Der Welt als Wille erste Betrachtung: Die Objektivation des Willens
The World as Will, first aspect: the objectification of the will.

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[2] *Nos habitat, non tartara, sed nec sidera coeli: / Spiritus, in nobis qui viget, illa facit*. ["It dwells in us, not in the underworld, nor in the stars of heaven: the spirit that lives in us makes all these."][1]

§ 17. THE MEANING OF REPRESENTATION

Mathematics, morphology and etiology describe the world of representation but cannot say what it means.

[2.17] In the first book we considered representation only as such, that is, only in its general form. It is true that, as regards abstract representation, the concept, we also came to know it in its content, insofar as it has all its content and meaning solely through its relation to intuitive representation, without which it would be worthless and empty. So, being referred entirely to intuitive representation, we shall want to come to know its content too, its more precise determinations and the forms it presents to us. We shall be especially concerned to gain some light on its real meaning, the meaning that is otherwise only felt. By virtue of this meaning, these images do not pass us by utterly strange and meaningless, as they would otherwise have to. Instead they speak to us directly, are understood, and acquire an interest that engages our whole being.

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1 Motto of the Second Book, from a letter of Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486–1535), Renaissance scholar of magic and the occult (*Epistles* 5.14).

We turn our gaze to mathematics, natural science and philosophy, each of which gives us hope that it will provide part of the desired explanation.—But first of all we find philosophy to be a monster with many heads, each of which speaks a different language. They are not, indeed, all at odds with one another on the point raised here, the meaning of intuitive representation. With the exception of the skeptics and idealists, the others speak fairly unanimously, in the main, of an *object* that is supposed to be the *ground* of representation. This object is supposed to differ from representation in its whole being and essence, and yet to be as like it in every respect as one egg is like another. But this will not help us. We cannot distinguish such an object from representation at all; we find that the two are one and the same, since every object always and eternally presupposes a subject and therefore remains representation. We have also recognized being-an-object as belonging to the most general form of representation, which is precisely the division into object and subject. Moreover, the principle of sufficient reason, which is appealed to here, is for us likewise only a form of representation. It is the lawful connection of one representation with another, not the connection of the whole series of representations, finite or infinite, with something that would not be representation at all and so cannot be representable at all. —The skeptics and idealists, however, were discussed above, in examining the dispute about the reality of the external world.

So far we have come to know intuitive representation only in a wholly general way, by its mere form. If we now look to mathematics for the closer knowledge of it that we desire, mathematics will tell us about those representations only insofar as they fill time and space, that is, insofar as they are magnitudes. It will state the how-many and the how-large with the greatest precision. But this is always only relative, that is, a comparison of one representation with others, and indeed only in that one-sided respect of magnitude. So this too will not be the information we are chiefly seeking.

If finally we look at the wide domain of natural science, divided into many fields, we can first distinguish two main divisions. Natural science is either description of forms, which I call *morphology*, or explanation of changes, which I call *etiology*. The former considers the permanent forms; the latter considers matter as it changes, according to the laws of its passage from one form into another. The former is what is called, though improperly, natural history, in its whole extent. Especially as botany and zoology, it acquaints us with the various organic and thereby firmly determined forms that remain constant amid the ceaseless change of individuals and that make up a large part of the content of intuitive representation. It classifies, separates and unites them, arranges them according to natural and artificial systems, and brings them under concepts that make an overview and knowledge of them all possible. It further demonstrates an infinitely nuanced analogy that runs through them all, both as wholes and in their parts (*unité de plan* [unity of plan]), by virtue of which they resemble very manifold variations on a theme that is not itself given. The passage of matter into those forms, that is,[2] the origin of individuals, is not a main part of this inquiry, since every individual arises from one like itself through generation. Generation is everywhere equally mysterious and has so far eluded clear knowledge; the little that is known about it finds its place in physiology, which already belongs to etiological natural science. Mineralogy, which belongs mainly to morphology, also already leans toward etiology, especially where it becomes geology. Etiology proper comprises all those branches of natural science for which knowledge of cause and effect is everywhere the main thing. They teach how, according to an unfailing rule, *one* state of matter is necessarily followed by a certain other; how one particular change necessarily conditions and brings about another particular change. This demonstration is called *explanation*. Here we find chiefly mechanics, physics, chemistry and physiology.

2 The doctrine of a single underlying plan of animal structure, associated with the French naturalist Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772–1844).

But if we give ourselves over to their teaching, we soon become aware that the information we are chiefly seeking is no more granted to us by etiology than by morphology. Morphology presents us with countless, infinitely varied forms that are nevertheless related by an unmistakable family resemblance. For us they are representations that by this route remain forever foreign and, if considered only in this way, stand before us like hieroglyphs no one understands.—Etiology, on the other hand, teaches us that, according to the law of cause and effect, this particular state of matter brings about that other one; and with that it has explained it and done its part. Yet at bottom it does nothing more than demonstrate the lawful order in which states occur in space and time, and teach for all cases which appearance must necessarily occur at this time and in this place. It thus assigns them their position in time and space according to a law whose specific content experience has taught us, but whose general form and necessity we are aware of independently of experience. About the inner nature of any one of those appearances, however, we gain not the slightest insight from this. That inner nature is called a *natural force* and lies outside the domain of etiological explanation. Etiology calls the unvarying constancy with which the expression of such a force occurs, whenever the conditions known to it are present, a law of nature. This *law of nature*, these conditions, this occurrence at a definite place and a definite time—these are all that etiology knows or ever can know. The force itself that expresses itself, the inner nature of the appearances that occur according to those laws, remains forever a mystery to it, something entirely foreign and unknown, in the simplest appearance as in the most complicated. Etiology has so far achieved its aim most perfectly in mechanics and least perfectly in physiology. Even so, the force by which a stone falls to the earth, or one body pushes another, is in its inner nature no less foreign and mysterious to us than the force that produces the movements and growth of an animal. Mechanics presupposes matter, gravity, impenetrability, the communicability of motion by impact, rigidity and so

on as unfathomable. It calls them natural forces, and their necessary and regular appearance under certain conditions a law of nature. Only then does it begin its explanation, which consists in stating faithfully and with mathematical precision how, where and when each force expresses itself, and in tracing every appearance it encounters back to one of those forces. Physics, chemistry and physiology do the same in their fields, except that they presuppose far more and accomplish less. Accordingly, even the most perfect etiological explanation of the whole of nature would really never be more than a catalogue of inexplicable forces and a reliable statement of the rule by which their appearances occur in time and space, succeed one another and make way for one another. But the inner nature of the forces that thus appear it would always have to leave unexplained, because the law it follows does not lead that far; it would have to stop at the appearance and its order. In this respect it could be compared to a cross-section of marble, which shows many veins side by side but does not let us see the course of those veins inside the marble up to that surface. Or, if I may permit myself a humorous comparison, because it is more striking: even with a completed etiology of the whole of nature, the philosophical inquirer would still always have to feel like someone who, without knowing how, has landed in a company of people entirely unknown to him. Each of its members in turn presents another to him as his friend and cousin, and so makes him sufficiently acquainted with them all. He himself, meanwhile, while assuring each time that he is delighted to meet the person presented, would all along have this question on his lips: "But how the devil did I come to be among this whole company?"

So etiology, too, can never give us the desired information about those appearances, which we know only as our representations—information that would lead us beyond them. For after all its explanations they still stand before us, completely foreign, as mere representations whose meaning we do not understand. The causal connection merely states the rule and relative order of their occurrence in space and time; it does not teach us

to know more closely what thus occurs. Moreover, the law of causality itself is valid only for representations, for objects of a particular class, and has meaning only on the presupposition of those objects. Like these objects themselves, then, it exists only in relation to the subject, that is, conditionally. This is why it is known just as well when one starts from the subject, that is, *a priori*, as when one starts from the object, that is, *a posteriori*, as Kant himself taught us.

But what drives us to inquire now is precisely that we are not satisfied to know that we have representations, that they are such and such, and that they hang together according to these or those laws, whose general expression is always the principle of sufficient reason. We want to know the meaning of those representations. We ask whether this world is nothing more than representation—in which case it would have to pass us by like an insubstantial dream or a ghostly phantom, not worth our attention—or whether it is something else as well, something besides, and if so, what that is. This much is certain at once: what we are asking about must be something completely different from representation, fundamentally different in its whole nature, to which the forms and laws of representation must therefore be entirely foreign. Consequently one cannot reach it, starting from representation, by following the guiding thread of those laws that merely connect objects, representations, with one another—that is, the forms of the principle of sufficient reason.

We see already here that the nature of things can never be got at *from outside*: however one may inquire, one gains nothing but images and names. One is like someone who walks around a castle looking in vain for an entrance and meanwhile sketching the façades. And yet this is the path that all philosophers before me have taken.

§ 18. BODY AND WILL

The knower is an individual with a body, given both as representation and immediately as will.

2.18 Indeed, the meaning we are seeking of the world that confronts me solely as my representation—or the transition from it, as mere representation of the knowing subject, to whatever else it may be—could never be found if the inquirer himself were nothing more than the purely knowing subject (a winged angel's head without a body). But he himself is rooted in that world; he finds himself in it as an *individual*. That is, his knowing, which is the conditioning bearer of the whole world as representation, is nevertheless entirely mediated by a body, whose affections, as has been shown, are the understanding's starting point for its intuition of that world. To the purely knowing subject as such, this body is a representation like any other, an object among objects. Its movements and actions are, to that extent, known to him in no other way than the changes in all other intuitive objects. They would be just as foreign and incomprehensible to him if their meaning were not unriddled for him in some entirely different way. Otherwise he would see his actions follow upon given motives with the constancy of a law of nature, just as the changes in other objects follow upon causes, stimuli and motives. But he would understand the influence of the motives no more closely than the connection of any other effect that appears to him with its cause. He would then call the inner nature of those expressions and actions of his body, which he did not understand, likewise a force, a quality or a character, as he pleased, but would have no further insight into it. But none of this is so. Rather, the subject of knowing, appearing as an individual, has been given the word that solves the riddle, and that word is *will*. This, and this alone, gives him the key to his own appearance, reveals its meaning to him, and shows him the inner workings of his being, his doing and his movements. The subject of knowing appears as an individual through its identity

with the body, and to it this body is given in two entirely different ways. It is given once as representation in the intuition of the understanding, as an object among objects and subject to their laws. But it is also given at the same time in an entirely different way, namely as that which is immediately known to everyone and is denoted by the word *will*. Every true act of his will is at once and inevitably also a movement of his body: he cannot really will the act without at the same time perceiving that it appears as a movement of the body. The act of will and the action of the body are not two different states known objectively and linked by the bond of causality; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect. Rather, they are one and the same, only given in two entirely different ways: once quite immediately, and once in intuition for the understanding. The action of the body is nothing but the act of will objectified, that is, having entered into intuition. Further on it will become clear to us that this holds for every movement of the body—not merely for movement that follows on motives, but also for involuntary movement that follows on mere stimuli. Indeed, it will become clear that the whole body is nothing but the objectified will, that is, will that has become representation; all of this will emerge and become clear as we proceed. In the previous book and in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, from the deliberately one-sided standpoint taken there (that of representation), I called the body the *immediate object*. Here, from another point of view, I shall therefore call it the *objecthood of the will*. In a certain sense one can therefore also say: the will is the knowledge *a priori* of the body, and the body is the knowledge *a posteriori* of the will.[3] —Resolutions of the will that relate to the future are mere deliberations of reason about what one will someday will; they are not actual acts of will. Only the carrying out puts its stamp on the resolve, which until then is still only an alterable intention and exists only in reason, *in abstracto*. Only

3 "Objecthood" renders Schopenhauer's coinage *Objektität*, the will's state of having become object; *Objektivation* (objectification) names the corresponding process.

in reflection are willing and doing different: in reality they are one. Every true, genuine, immediate act of will is at once and immediately also an appearing act of the body. Correspondingly, every impression on the body is at once and immediately also an impression on the will. As such it is called pain when it runs counter to the will, and well-being or pleasure when it accords with it. The gradations of both are very diverse. But it is entirely wrong to call pain and pleasure representations. They are nothing of the kind; they are immediate affections of the will in its appearance, the body: a compelled, momentary willing or not-willing of the impression the body undergoes. Only a certain few impressions on the body are to be regarded directly as mere representations and therefore excepted from what has just been said. These do not stir the will, and through them alone the body is an immediate object of knowing; for as intuition in the understanding, the body is already an indirect object, like all others. What is meant here are the affections of the purely objective senses—sight, hearing and touch—though only insofar as these organs are affected in the particular, specific, natural way peculiar to them. This is so extremely weak a stimulation of the heightened and specifically modified sensibility of these parts that it does not affect the will; undisturbed by any stirring of the will, it merely supplies the understanding with the data from which intuition arises. Any stronger or different kind of affection of those sense organs, however, is painful, that is, contrary to the will—to whose objecthood, therefore, they too belong. — Weakness of the nerves shows itself in the following way. Impressions that should have only the degree of strength sufficient to make them data for the understanding reach the higher degree at which they move the will, that is, arouse pain or pleasurable feeling—more often pain, though, which is partly dull and indistinct. So it not only makes single tones and strong light feel painful, but also, in general, gives rise to a morbid hypochondriac mood without being clearly recognized.—Further, the identity of body and will shows itself, among other things, in the fact that every violent and excessive movement of the will, that

is, every emotion, quite directly shakes the body and its inner workings and disturbs the course of its vital functions. This is discussed in detail in *On the Will in Nature*, p. 27 of the second edition.[4]

Finally, the knowledge I have of my will, though immediate, cannot be separated from the knowledge I have of my body. I do not know my will as a whole, not as a unity, not completely in its nature. I know it only in its individual acts, and so in time, which is the form of the appearance of my body, as of every object. Hence the body is the condition of my knowledge of my will. Accordingly, I cannot really represent this will without my body. It is true that in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason the will, or rather the subject of willing, is set up as a special class of representations or objects. But even there we saw this object coincide with the subject, that is, cease to be an object at all. There we called this coincidence the miracle *kat' exochên* [par excellence], and in a certain sense the whole of the present work is its explanation.—Insofar as I really know my will as an object, I know it as body. But then I am back with the first class of representations set up in that essay, that is, with real objects. As we go on, we shall see more and more clearly that this first class of representations finds its explanation, its solution, only in the fourth class set up there, which would no longer properly stand over against the subject as an object. Correspondingly, we shall see that we must learn to understand the inner nature of the law of causality, which holds in the first class, and of what happens in accordance with it, from the law of motivation, which governs the fourth class.

The identity of will and body, presented here provisionally, can only be demonstrated—as has been done here, for the first time, and is to be done more and more as we proceed. That is, it can only be raised from immediate consciousness, from knowledge *in concreto*, to the knowledge of reason, or carried over into knowledge *in abstracto*. By its very nature, however, it can

4 Schopenhauer's *On the Will in Nature* (1836; 2nd ed. 1854) collects findings of the natural sciences that he took to confirm his metaphysics.

never be proved, that is, derived as mediate knowledge from some other, immediate knowledge, precisely because it is itself the most immediate knowledge of all. If we do not grasp it and hold on to it as such, we shall wait in vain to recover it in some mediate way, as derived knowledge. It is knowledge of an entirely peculiar kind, and for that very reason its truth cannot even properly be brought under any of the four headings into which I divided all truth in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 29 ff., namely logical, empirical, transcendental and metalogical. For unlike all of these, it is not the relation of an abstract representation to another representation, or to the necessary form of intuitive or of abstract representing. It is the relation of a judgment to the relation that an intuitive representation, the body, has to something that is not representation at all, but something *toto genere* [wholly in kind] different from it: will. I should therefore like to single out this truth from all others and call it *philosophical truth kat' exochên*. Its expression can be turned in various ways. One can say: my body and my will are one;—or: what as intuitive representation I call my body, I call my will insofar as I am conscious of it in an entirely different way, comparable to no other;—or: my body is the *objectivity* of my will;—or: apart from being my representation, my body is only my will; and so on.[5]

§ 19. THE BODY AS THE KEY

Other objects are to be understood by analogy with one's own body, as both representation and will.

2.19 In the first book we declared, with inner reluctance, that one's own body, like all the other objects of this intuitive world, is mere representation of the knowing subject. Now it has become clear to us what, in everyone's consciousness, distinguishes the representation of one's own body from all others, which are otherwise quite like it. It is this: the body also occurs

5 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 18 of the second volume (the Supplements).

in consciousness in an entirely different way, *toto genere* different, which is denoted by the word *will*. And it is precisely this double knowledge we have of our own body that gives us information about the body itself—about its acting and moving in response to motives, as well as about what it undergoes from external influences; in a word, about what it is not as representation but beyond that, and so *in itself*. This is information we do not have directly about the nature, the acting and the undergoing of any other real objects.

It is precisely through this special relation to one body—which, considered apart from that relation, is for it only a representation like all the rest—that the knowing subject is an *individual*. But the relation by virtue of which the knowing subject is an individual holds, for that very reason, only between it and one single representation among all its representations. So it is conscious of this one alone not merely as a representation but at the same time in an entirely different way, namely as a will. But if it abstracts from that special relation, from that twofold and wholly heterogeneous knowledge of one and the same thing, then that one thing, the body, is a representation like all the others. To find its bearings here, therefore, the knowing individual must assume one of two things. Either it must assume that what distinguishes that one representation lies merely in the fact that its knowledge stands in this double relation to that one representation alone—that insight into this *one* intuitive object alone is open to it in two ways at once—and that this is to be explained not by a difference between this object and all others, but only by a difference between the relation of its knowledge to this one object and the relation it has to all others. Or else it must assume that this one object is essentially different from all others, that it alone among them all is both will and representation, while the rest are mere representation, that is, mere phantoms, so that its body is the only real individual in the world, that is, the only appearance of will and the only immediate object of the subject. —That the other objects, considered as mere *representation*, are like its body—that is, like it they fill space (which may itself exist

only as representation), and like it they act in space—can indeed be demonstrated with certainty from the law of causality, which is certain *a priori* for representations and admits no effect without a cause. But quite apart from the fact that from an effect one can infer only a cause in general, not a cause of the same kind, this still leaves us within the domain of mere representation, for which alone the law of causality holds and beyond which it can never lead.

THEORETICAL EGOISM

The view that only one's own body is real cannot be refuted but can safely be left behind.

But whether the objects the individual knows only as representations are nonetheless, like its own body, appearances of a will—this, as was already said in the previous book, is the real meaning of the question about the reality of the external world. To deny it is the meaning of *theoretical egoism*, which for that very reason takes all appearances other than its own individual to be phantoms—just as practical egoism does exactly the same in practical terms, regarding and treating only its own person as really a person and all others as mere phantoms. Theoretical egoism can indeed never be refuted by proofs. Yet in philosophy it has certainly never been used except as a skeptical sophism, that is, for show. As a serious conviction, on the other hand, it could be found only in a mental hospital; and as such it would call not so much for a proof as for a cure. So we shall not go into it any further on that score, but regard it only as the last stronghold of skepticism, which is always polemical. Our knowledge is always bound to individuality and has its limitation precisely in this. If this necessarily means that each of us can *be* only one thing but can *know* everything else—a limitation which is really what creates the need for philosophy—then we, who for that very reason strive through philosophy to extend the bounds of our knowledge, will regard this skeptical argument of theoretical egoism which here confronts us as a small frontier fortress.

It is admittedly impregnable forever; but its garrison can never get out of it either, so one may pass it by and leave it in one's rear without danger.

Accordingly, from now on we shall use the double knowledge we have of the nature and action of our own body—knowledge now raised to clarity and given in two completely heterogeneous ways—as a key to the nature of every appearance in nature. We shall judge all objects that are not our own body, and are therefore given to our consciousness not in a double way but only as representations, precisely by analogy with that body. We shall therefore assume that, just as on the one hand they are representation, exactly as it is, and in that respect of the same kind as it, so on the other hand, if one sets aside their existence as representation of the subject, what then remains must in its inner nature be the same as what in ourselves we call *will*. For what other kind of existence or reality could we attribute to the rest of the corporeal world? Where would we get the elements from which to compose such a reality? Apart from will and representation, nothing at all is known to us, or even thinkable. If we want to attribute the greatest reality known to us to the corporeal world, which exists immediately only in our representation, then we give it the reality that each person's own body has for him; for to each of us that is the most real thing there is. But when we analyze the reality of this body and its actions, we find nothing in it, apart from its being our representation, but the will; with that, even its reality is exhausted. So we can find no other sort of reality anywhere to attribute to the corporeal world. If, then, the corporeal world is to be something more than merely our representation, we must say that apart from representation, and so in itself and in its innermost nature, it is what we find immediately in ourselves as will. I say "in its innermost nature": but we must first come to know this nature of the will more closely, so that we can distinguish from it what belongs not to the will itself but only to its appearance, which has many degrees. One such thing is, for example, being accompanied by knowledge, and the determination by motives that

this makes possible. As we shall see as we go on, this belongs not to the will's nature but merely to its most distinct appearance, as animal and human being. So when I say that the force which drives the stone toward the earth is, in its nature, in itself and apart from all representation, will, no one will read into this proposition the absurd opinion that the stone moves according to a known motive because that is how the will appears in human beings.[6]—Now, however, we want to demonstrate, establish and develop in its full scope, more thoroughly and more clearly, what has so far been presented provisionally and in general terms.[7]

§ 20. THE BODY AS VISIBLE WILL

Bodily actions are acts of will made visible, and the body's organs are objectified desires.

2.20 As the inner nature of one's own body, as what this body is apart from being an object of intuition, a representation, the *will* first makes itself known, as has been said, in the voluntary movements of this body—insofar, that is, as these are nothing but the visibility of the individual acts of will. These movements occur immediately and entirely simultaneously with those acts, as one and the same with them, differing from them only by the form of knowability into which they have passed, that is, by having become representation.

These acts of will, however, always have a ground outside themselves, in motives. Yet motives never determine more than

6 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. We shall therefore by no means agree with Bacon of Verulam when he holds (*De augmentis scientiarum*, Book 4, at the end) that all mechanical and physical movements of bodies occur only after a preceding perception in those bodies—although a presentiment of the truth gave birth even to this false proposition. The same holds for Kepler's claim, in his treatise *De planeta Martis* [On the Planet Mars], that the planets must have knowledge in order to keep to their elliptical orbits so accurately and to measure the speed of their motion so that the triangles of the area of their orbit always remain proportional to the time in which they traverse their bases.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) set out his laws of planetary motion in his work on Mars, the *Astronomia nova* (1609).

what I will at *this time*, in *this* place, under *these* circumstances; not that I will at all, nor *what* I will in general, that is, the maxim that characterizes all my willing. Hence my willing cannot be explained in its entire nature from motives. Motives merely determine its expression at a given moment; they are merely the occasion on which my will shows itself. The will itself, on the other hand, lies outside the domain of the law of motivation; only its appearance at each moment is necessarily determined by that law. Only on the presupposition of my empirical character is the motive a sufficient ground for explaining my action. But if I abstract from my character and then ask why I will this and not that at all, no answer is possible, precisely because only the *appearance* of the will is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, not the will itself, which in this respect must be called *groundless*. Here I presuppose, on the one hand, Kant's doctrine of the empirical and the intelligible character, as well as my own discussions of the subject in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, pp. 48–58 and again pp. 178 ff. of the first edition; on the other hand, we shall have to speak of this more fully in the fourth book. For now I need only point out that one appearance's being grounded by another—here, the deed by the motive—does not in the least conflict with the fact that its inner nature is will, which itself has no ground. For the principle of sufficient reason, in all its forms, is merely the form of knowledge; its validity therefore extends only to the representation, the appearance, the visibility of the will, not to the will itself, which becomes visible.

Now if every action of my body is the appearance of an act of will in which, given the motives, my will itself in general and as a whole—that is, my character—expresses itself once again, then the indispensable condition and presupposition of that action must also be an appearance of the will. For its appearing cannot depend on something that does not exist immediately and solely through it, something that would therefore be merely accidental

7 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 19 of the second volume (the Supplements).

for it, which would make its appearing itself merely accidental. But that condition is the whole body itself. The body itself, then, must already be an appearance of the will. It must stand in the same relation to my will as a whole—that is, to my intelligible character, whose appearance in time is my empirical character—as the individual action of the body stands to the individual act of the will. So the whole body must be nothing but my will become visible; it must be my will itself, insofar as this is an intuitive object, a representation of the first class.—In confirmation of this it has already been noted that every influence on my body at once and immediately affects my will as well, and in this respect is called pain or pleasure, or in a lower degree agreeable or disagreeable sensation; and also, conversely, that every violent movement of the will, and so every emotion and passion, convulses the body and disturbs the course of its functions. —It is true that one can also give an etiological account—though a very imperfect one—of the origin of my body, and a somewhat better one of its development and preservation; that account is precisely physiology. But physiology explains its subject only in the way motives explain action. So just as the grounding of the individual action by the motive, and the action's following necessarily from it, do not conflict with the fact that action in general and in its nature is only the appearance of a will that is in itself groundless, so too the physiological explanation of the body's functions takes nothing away from the philosophical truth that the whole existence of this body and the entire series of its functions are only the objectification of that very will which appears in the same body's outward actions in accordance with motives. After all, physiology even tries to trace these very outward actions, the immediately voluntary movements, back to causes in the organism—for example, to explain the movement of a muscle by an influx of fluids ("like the contraction of a rope that gets wet," says Reil in his *Archive for Physiology*, vol. 6, p. 153). But suppose one really arrived at a thorough explanation of this kind: it would still never cancel the immediately certain truth that every voluntary movement (*func-*

tiones animales [animal functions]) is the appearance of an act of will. Just as little can the physiological explanation of vegetative life (*functiones naturales, vitales* [natural, vital functions]), however far it may advance, ever cancel the truth that this whole animal life, developing as it does, is itself an appearance of the will.[8] In general, as was discussed above, no etiological explanation can ever state more than the necessarily determined position of an individual appearance in time and space, and its necessary occurrence there according to a fixed rule. The inner nature of every appearance, by contrast, always remains unfathomable along this path; every etiological explanation presupposes it and merely designates it by the names force, or law of nature, or, where actions are concerned, character, will. —So every individual action, given the particular character, follows necessarily when the motive is presented; and growth, the process of nutrition and all the changes in the animal body proceed according to necessarily acting causes (stimuli). And yet the whole series of actions, and consequently each individual one as well, and likewise their condition, the whole body itself that performs them, and consequently also the process through which and in which it exists—all this is nothing but the appearance of the will, the will's becoming visible, the *objecthood* of the *will*. On this rests the perfect fitness of the human and animal body for the human and animal will in general—a fitness similar to, but far surpassing, that of a deliberately made tool for the will of its maker—which for this reason appears as purposiveness, that is, as the possibility of explaining the body teleologically. The parts of the body must therefore correspond perfectly to the chief desires through which the will manifests itself; they must be the visible expression of those desires. Teeth, gullet and intestinal canal are objectified hunger; the genitals are the objectified sex drive; the grasping hands and the swift feet correspond to the already more indirect strivings of the will which they present. Just as the general human form corresponds to the general

8 Johann Christian Reil (1759–1813), German physician and physiologist, founder of the first German journal of physiology.

human will, so the individual bodily structure corresponds to the individually modified will, the character of the individual; and that is why it is characteristic and expressive throughout and in all its parts. It is very remarkable that Parmenides already said this, in the following verses quoted by Aristotle (*Metaphysics III, 5*):[9]

Hôs gar hekastos echei krasin meleôn polykamptôn,
Tôs noos anthrôpoisi parestêken; to gar auto
Estin, hoper phroneei, meleôn physis anthrôpoisi,
Kai pasin kai panti; to gar pleon esti noêma.

(Ut enim cuique complexio membrorum flexibilium se habet, ita mens hominibus adest: idem namque est, quod sapit, membrorum natura hominibus, et omnibus et omni: quod enim plus est, intelligentia est.) [For as the blending of the flexible limbs is in each person, so is mind present in human beings: for that which thinks is the same thing, the nature of the limbs, in human beings, both in all and in each: for what predominates is thought.]
[10]

§ 21. THE WILL AS THING IN ITSELF

The will known in ourselves is recognized as the inner nature of every appearance.

2.21 Through all these considerations, then, a reader may have come to know *in abstracto* as well—and so clearly and securely—what everyone possesses *in concreto*, immediately, that is, as feeling: namely, that the inner nature of his own appearance, which presents itself to him as representation both through his actions and through their permanent substratum, his body, is his *will*; that this will makes up what is most immediate in his consciousness, but as such has not fully entered into the form of

9 Parmenides of Elea (fifth century BC), the pre-Socratic philosopher; the lines are from his didactic poem.

10 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 20 of the second volume (the Supplements); and also, in my work *On the Will in Nature*, the sections "Physiology" and "Comparative Anatomy," where what is only hinted at here has been worked out thoroughly.

representation, in which object and subject stand over against each other;

FROM ONE'S OWN WILL TO ALL NATURE

The same will is recognized in plants, crystals, magnets, chemical affinities and gravity.

but that it makes itself known in an immediate way in which subject and object are not quite clearly distinguished, and yet becomes knowable to the individual himself not as a whole but only in its individual acts. Whoever, I say, has come with me to this conviction will find that it becomes, quite of its own accord, the key to knowledge of the innermost nature of the whole of nature. For he will now transfer it to all those appearances that are given to him not, like his own, in immediate knowledge alongside mediate knowledge, but only in the latter, and so only one-sidedly, as *representation* alone. Not only in those appearances that are quite like his own, in human beings and animals, will he recognize that same will as their innermost nature. Continued reflection will lead him to recognize as well the force that shoots up and vegetates in the plant; indeed, the force by which the crystal shoots into shape; the force that turns the magnet toward the North Pole; the force whose shock meets him when heterogeneous metals come into contact; the force that appears in the elective affinities of substances as fleeing and seeking, separating and uniting; and finally even gravity, which strives so powerfully in all matter, drawing the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun. He will recognize all these as different only in appearance, but in their inner nature as the same: as that which is known to him immediately, so intimately and better than anything else, and which, where it emerges most distinctly, is called *will*. It is this application of reflection alone that no longer lets us stop at the appearance but leads us across to the *thing in itself*. Appearance means representation, and nothing more: all representation, of whatever kind, every *object*, is appearance. But the *thing in itself* is the *will* alone. As such it is not representation

at all, but *toto genere* different from it. It is that of which all representation, every object, is the appearance, the visibility, the *objecthood*. It is the innermost, the kernel of every individual thing and likewise of the whole. It appears in every blindly acting force of nature; it appears, too, in the deliberate action of human beings. And the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the appearing, not the nature of what appears.

§ 22. WHY THE NAME "WILL"

Force is to be understood as will, the one thing known immediately, and not the reverse.

2.22 This *thing in itself* (we shall keep Kant's expression as a standing formula) is as such never an object, precisely because every object is already only its appearance and no longer the thing itself. If it was nonetheless to be thought objectively, it had to borrow a name and a concept from an object, from something given objectively in some way, and hence from one of its appearances. But in order to serve as a point of mutual understanding, this could be none other than the most perfect of all its appearances, that is, the most distinct, the most fully developed, the one most directly illuminated by knowing; and that is precisely the human *will*. It should be clearly noted, however, that here we are admittedly using only a *denominatio a potiori* [a naming after the most prominent member], by which, precisely for that reason, the concept of will receives a wider extension than it has had until now. Knowledge of what is identical in different appearances, and of what is different in similar ones, is, as Plato so often remarks, precisely the condition of philosophy. Until now, however, it had not been recognized that the nature of every force in nature that strives and acts in any way is identical with the will. The manifold appearances, which are only different species of the same genus, were therefore not seen as such but regarded as heterogeneous; and so there could be no word to designate the concept of this genus. I therefore name the genus

after its foremost species, the immediate knowledge of which lies closer to us and leads to the mediate knowledge of all the others. For this reason, however, anyone would remain caught in a perpetual misunderstanding who was unable to carry out the extension of the concept demanded here, and who insisted on understanding by the word *will* only the one species it has so far denoted: the will that is guided by knowing and expresses itself exclusively according to motives—indeed perhaps only according to abstract motives, and so under the guidance of reason—which, as has been said, is only the most distinct appearance of the will. We must now, in thought, purely isolate the innermost nature of precisely this appearance, which is known to us immediately, and then transfer it to all the weaker, less distinct appearances of the same nature. In this way we carry out the required extension of the concept of will. —But anyone who thought, say, that in the end it made no difference whether one designated that inner nature of all appearance by the word will or by some other word would misunderstand me in the opposite way. That would be the case if the thing in itself were something whose existence we merely *inferred*, so that we knew it only mediately and merely *in abstracto*. Then, indeed, one could call it whatever one liked: the name would stand there as the mere sign of an unknown quantity. But in fact the word *will*, which is to unlock for us, like a magic word, the innermost nature of every thing in nature, by no means denotes an unknown quantity, something reached by inference. It denotes something known utterly immediately, and so well known that we know and understand what will is far better than anything else, whatever it may be.—Until now the concept of *will* has been subsumed under the concept of force. I, by contrast, do exactly the reverse and want every force in nature to be thought of as will. Let no one suppose that this is a dispute about words, or a matter of indifference; on the contrary, it is of the very highest significance and importance. For the concept of *force*, like all other concepts, is ultimately based on intuitive knowledge of the objective world, that is, on appearance, on rep-

resentation, and it is drawn from there. It is abstracted from the domain where cause and effect hold sway, and so from intuitive representation; and it signifies precisely the causality of the cause at the point where this can no longer be explained etiologically at all, but is simply the necessary presupposition of all etiological explanation. The concept of *will*, on the other hand, is the only one among all possible concepts that has its origin *not* in appearance, *not* in mere intuitive representation, but comes from within, arising from each person's most immediate consciousness. In this consciousness each of us knows his own individual, in its nature, immediately, without any form, even without that of subject and object, and at the same time is that individual, since here the knower and the known coincide. So if we trace the concept of *force* back to that of *will*, we have in fact traced something less known back to something infinitely better known—indeed, to the only thing really known to us immediately and completely—and we have extended our knowledge very greatly. If, on the other hand, we subsume the concept of *will* under that of *force*, as has been done until now, we give up the only immediate knowledge we have of the inner nature of the world, letting it vanish into a concept abstracted from appearance, with which we can therefore never get beyond appearance.

§ 23. THE GROUNDLESS, UNDIVIDED WILL

The will lies outside time, space and plurality; only its appearances obey necessity.

2.23 The *will* as thing in itself is wholly different from its appearance and completely free of all the forms of appearance, which it enters only in appearing. These forms therefore concern only its *objecthood* and are foreign to the will itself. Even the most general form of all representation, that of being an object for a subject, does not apply to it; still less do the forms subordinate to this one, which all have their common expression in the principle of sufficient reason. To these, as is well known, time and

space also belong, and consequently also the plurality that exists and has become possible only through them. In this last respect I shall call time and space, using an expression borrowed from the old scholasticism proper, the *principium individuationis*, which I ask the reader to note once and for all.[11] For time and space alone are that by means of which what is the same and one in nature and concept nonetheless appears as different, as a plurality side by side and in succession. They are consequently the *principium individuationis*, the object of so many subtle speculations and disputes among the scholastics, which one finds collected in Suárez (*Disp. 5, sect. 3*). —According to what has been said, the will as thing in itself lies outside the domain of the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms, and is consequently absolutely groundless, although each of its appearances is entirely subject to that principle. It is, further, free of all *plurality*, although its appearances in time and space are countless. It is itself one—yet not as an object is one, whose unity is known only in contrast to possible plurality; nor as a concept is one, which has arisen only through abstraction from plurality. It is one as that which lies outside time and space, the *principium individuationis*, that is, the possibility of plurality. Only when all this has become completely clear to us through the following consideration of the appearances and various manifestations of the will shall we fully understand the meaning of Kant's doctrine that time, space and causality do not belong to the thing in itself but are only forms of knowing.

The groundlessness of the will has indeed been recognized where it manifests itself most distinctly, as the will of human beings, and this will has been called free, independent. But at once, over the groundlessness of the will itself, people have also overlooked the necessity to which its appearance is everywhere subject, and have declared actions to be free—which they are not, since every individual action follows with strict necessity from the effect of the motive on the character. All necessity, as

11 Latin: "principle of individuation," the scholastic term for whatever makes a thing this particular individual, distinct from others of the same kind.

already said, is the relation of consequent to ground, and nothing more. The principle of sufficient reason is the universal form of all *appearance*, and the human being in his doings must, like every other appearance, be subject to it. But because in self-consciousness the will is known immediately and in itself, this consciousness also contains the consciousness of freedom. What is overlooked, however, is that the individual, the person, is not will as thing in itself but already an appearance of the will, and as such already determined and entered into the form of appearance, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence the strange fact that everyone considers himself *a priori* entirely free, even in his individual actions, and thinks he could begin a different way of life at any moment—which would mean becoming someone else. But *a posteriori*, through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free but subject to necessity; that for all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct; and that from the beginning of his life to its end he must carry through the same character, which he himself disapproves of, and, as it were, play the role he has taken on to the very end. I cannot pursue this consideration further here, since as an ethical matter it belongs elsewhere in this work. For the moment I only wish to point out that the *appearance* of the will, which is in itself groundless, is nonetheless as such subject to the law of necessity, that is, to the principle of sufficient reason—so that the necessity with which the appearances of nature follow may not deter us from recognizing in them the manifestations of the will.

WILL WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE

Animal instinct, bodily processes and plants show the will acting blindly, on stimuli rather than motives.

Until now only those changes that have no ground other than a motive, that is, a representation, have been regarded as appearances of the will; hence in nature a will was attributed only to human beings and at most to animals. For knowing, represent-

ing, is indeed, as I have mentioned elsewhere, the true and exclusive characteristic of animality. But that the will is also at work where no knowledge guides it we see, first of all, in the instinct of animals and in their constructive instincts.[12][13] That animals have representations and knowledge is of no account here, since the end toward which they work, exactly as if it were a known motive, remains entirely unknown to them. Their action here therefore takes place without a motive, is not guided by representation, and shows us first and most clearly how the will is active even without any knowledge. The year-old bird has no representation of the eggs for which it builds a nest; the young spider none of the prey for which it weaves a web; nor the antlion of the ant for which it digs a pit for the first time. The larva of the stag beetle gnaws the hole in the wood where it is to undergo its metamorphosis twice as large if it is to become a male beetle as if it is to become a female—in the first case, to have room for horns of which it as yet has no representation. In such activity of these animals, as in the rest of their activity, the will is obviously at work; but it is in blind activity, which is accompanied by knowledge but not guided by it. Once we have gained the insight that representation as motive is not a necessary and essential condition of the will's activity, we shall more easily recognize the working of the will in cases where it is less evident. Then, for example, we shall no more attribute the snail's house to a will foreign to the snail itself but guided by knowledge than we would say that the house we build ourselves comes into existence through a will other than our own. Instead, we shall recognize both houses as works of the will that objectifies itself in both appearances—a will that works in us according to motives, but in the snail still blindly, as a formative drive directed outward. In us, too, the same will often works blindly: in all those functions of our body that no knowledge guides, in all

12 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Chapter 27 of the second volume deals with these in particular.

13 "Constructive instincts" renders *Kunsttriebe*, the building instincts of animals, as in nests, webs and honeycombs.

its vital and vegetative processes—digestion, circulation of the blood, secretion, growth, reproduction. Not only the body's actions but the body itself, entirely, is, as shown above, an appearance of the will, objectified will, concrete will. Everything that goes on in it must therefore go on through will, although here this will is not guided by knowledge and does not determine itself according to motives, but acts blindly, according to causes, which in this case are called *stimuli*.

By *cause*, in the narrowest sense of the word, I mean that state of matter which, in necessarily bringing about another state, itself undergoes a change just as great as the one it causes; this is expressed by the rule "action and reaction are equal." Further, with a cause in the proper sense the effect increases in exactly the same proportion as the cause, and so, again, does the reaction; so that once the mode of action is known, the degree of the effect can be measured and calculated from the degree of intensity of the cause, and likewise the other way round. Such causes, properly so called, act in all the phenomena of mechanics, chemistry and so on—in short, in all changes of inorganic bodies. By *stimulus*, on the other hand, I mean a cause that itself undergoes no reaction proportionate to its effect, and whose intensity does not run parallel in degree with the intensity of the effect, so that the effect cannot be measured by it. Rather, a small increase in the stimulus can bring about a very large increase in the effect, or, conversely, cancel the previous effect entirely, and so on. All action on organic bodies as such is of this kind. It is in response to stimuli, then, and not to mere causes, that all properly organic and vegetative changes in the animal body take place. But the stimulus, like every cause in general, and likewise the motive, never determines more than the point at which the expression of any force enters in time and space, not the inner nature of the force expressing itself. That nature, in accordance with our preceding derivation, we recognize as will, and to it we therefore ascribe both the unconscious and the conscious changes of the body. The stimulus holds the middle ground: it forms the transition between the motive, which is

causality that has passed through knowing, and the cause in the narrowest sense. In particular cases it lies now closer to the motive, now closer to the cause, but it can still always be distinguished from both. Thus, for example, the rising of the sap in plants takes place in response to a stimulus and cannot be explained by mere causes, according to the laws of hydraulics or of capillary tubes; yet it is certainly assisted by these and is, on the whole, already very close to purely causal change. By contrast, the movements of *Hedysarum gyrans* and *Mimosa pudica*, although still occurring in response to mere stimuli, are already very similar to movements in response to motives, and seem almost to want to make the transition. The contraction of the pupil in increased light takes place in response to a stimulus, but already passes over into movement in response to a motive, since it happens because too strong a light would painfully affect the retina, and to avoid this we contract the pupil.[14] —The occasion of an erection is a motive, since it is a representation; yet it acts with the necessity of a stimulus: that is, it cannot be resisted, but must be removed if it is to be made ineffective. The same is true of disgusting objects that provoke a tendency to vomit. We have just considered the instinct of animals as a real intermediate link, of an entirely different kind, between movement in response to a stimulus and action according to a known motive. One might be tempted to regard breathing as yet another intermediate link of this kind. For it has been disputed whether it belongs to the voluntary or to the involuntary movements, that is, really, whether it occurs in response to a motive or to a stimulus; accordingly, it might perhaps be explained as something in between the two. Marshall Hall (*On the Diseases of the Nervous System*, § 293 ff.) declares it a mixed function, since it is under the influence partly of the cerebral (voluntary) and partly of the spinal (involuntary) nerves. In the end, however, we must count it among the expressions of will that occur in response to motives. For other motives, that is, mere representa-

14 The telegraph plant, whose leaflets move visibly of their own accord, and the sensitive plant, whose leaves fold up when touched.

tions, can move the will to check it or to speed it up; and, like every other voluntary action, it has the appearance of something one could leave off entirely, freely suffocating oneself. And in fact one could, as soon as some other motive determined the will so strongly that it outweighed the urgent need for air.[15] According to some, Diogenes actually ended his life in this way (*Diog. Laert. VI, 76*). Africans, too, are said to have done this (F. B. Osiander, *On Suicide*, pp. 170–180). This would give us a striking example of the influence of abstract motives, that is, of the superior power of properly rational willing over merely animal willing. That breathing is at least partly conditioned by cerebral activity is supported by the fact that prussic acid kills primarily by paralyzing the brain and so indirectly stopping respiration; but if respiration is kept up artificially until the brain's stupor has passed, death does not occur at all.[16] At the same time, breathing here incidentally gives us the most striking example of the fact that motives act with just as much necessity as stimuli and mere causes in the narrowest sense, and can be put out of action only by opposing motives, as pressure by counter-pressure. For in breathing the appearance of being able to refrain is incomparably weaker than in other movements that follow from motives. The reason is that there the motive is very urgent and very near; its satisfaction, owing to the tirelessness of the muscles that carry it out, is very easy; as a rule nothing stands in its way; and the whole is supported by the individual's oldest habit. And yet in reality all motives act with the same necessity. The recognition that necessity is common to movements in response to motives and to those in response to stimuli will make it easier for us to see that even what goes on in the organic body in response to stimuli, in complete conformity with law, is nonetheless in its inner nature will—will which is never in itself, but is in all its appearances, subject to the principle of sufficient

15 Marshall Hall (1790–1857), English physician and physiologist, known for his work on reflex action.

16 Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412–323 BC), the Cynic philosopher. Friedrich Benjamin Osiander (1759–1822), German physician, published *Über den Selbstmord* (On Suicide) in 1813.

reason, that is, to necessity.[17] We shall therefore not stop at recognizing animals as appearances of will, in their whole existence, bodily structure and organization as well as in their actions. We shall extend this immediate knowledge of the inner nature of things, the only such knowledge given to us, to plants as well, all of whose movements occur in response to stimuli; for the absence of knowledge, and of the movement in response to motives that knowledge makes possible, is all that constitutes the essential difference between animal and plant. So what appears to representation as a plant, as mere vegetation, as blindly driving force, we shall claim in its inner nature to be will, and recognize it as precisely what forms the basis of our own appearance, as this expresses itself in our actions and already in the whole existence of our body itself.

THE WILL IN INORGANIC NATURE

Falling water, the magnet, crystals and gravity are the same will at its feeblest.

Only the last step remains for us to take: to extend our way of looking at things to all those forces in nature that act according to universal, unchanging laws. According to these laws, the movements of all those bodies take place which, having no organs at all, have no receptivity to stimulus and no knowledge for motive. We must therefore apply the key to understanding the essence of things in themselves, which only the immediate knowledge of our own essence could give us, to these appearances of the inorganic world as well. Of all appearances, these stand furthest from us. —Now let us look at them with an inquiring eye. We see the mighty, irresistible urge with which the waters rush down to the depths, the persistence with which the magnet turns again and again to the North Pole, the longing

17 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. This knowledge is fully established by my prize essay on the freedom of the will. There (pp. 30–44 of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*) the relation between *cause, stimulus and motive* is therefore also discussed in detail.

with which iron flies to it. We see the vehemence with which the poles of electricity strive to reunite, a vehemence which, just like that of human desires, is heightened by obstacles. We see the crystal shoot up quickly and suddenly, with such regularity of structure, which is plainly nothing but a thoroughly decided and precisely determined striving in different directions, seized and held fast by solidification. We notice the selectiveness with which bodies, set free by the fluid state and released from the bonds of rigidity, seek and flee one another, unite and separate; and finally we feel quite immediately how a load, whose striving toward the mass of the earth our body holds back, presses and pushes on that body unceasingly, pursuing its one aim.—If we consider all this, it will cost us no great effort of imagination to recognize our own essence again, even at so great a distance. It is the same thing that in us pursues its ends by the light of knowledge, but here, in the feeblest of its appearances, strives only blindly, dully, one-sidedly and unalterably. Yet because it is everywhere one and the same—just as the first glimmer of dawn shares the name of sunlight with the rays of full noon—it must here as there bear the name *will*. This name designates what is the being-in-itself of every thing in the world and the sole kernel of every appearance.

The distance, however, indeed the semblance of a complete difference, between the appearances of inorganic nature and the will that we perceive as the inner core of our own being, arises chiefly from a contrast. In the one kind of appearance there is completely determinate conformity to law, in the other a seemingly lawless arbitrariness. For in human beings individuality stands out powerfully: each has a character of his own. Hence the same motive does not have equal power over everyone. A thousand incidental circumstances, which find room in the individual's wide sphere of knowledge but remain unknown to others, modify its effect. For this reason the action cannot be predicted from the motive alone, because the other factor is missing: exact knowledge of the individual character and of the knowledge that accompanies it. The appearances of the forces of

nature, by contrast, show the other extreme here. They act according to universal laws, without deviation, without individuality, according to circumstances that lie open to view, and they are subject to the most exact prediction. The same natural force manifests itself in exactly the same way in the millions of its appearances. To clear up this point, and to demonstrate the identity of the one and indivisible will in all its so various appearances, in the feeblest as in the strongest, we must first consider the relation that the will as thing in itself has to its appearance, that is, the relation of the world as will to the world as representation. This will open for us the best path to a deeper investigation of the whole subject treated in this second book.[18]

§ 24. THE UNEXPLAINED REMAINDER

Every explanation leaves an unfathomable remainder, the forces of nature, which are will.

2.24 We have learned from the great Kant that time, space and causality, in their whole conformity to law and in the possibility of all their forms, are present in our consciousness quite independently of the objects that appear in them and make up their content. In other words, they can be found just as well if one starts from the subject as if one starts from the object. Hence one may with equal right call them the subject's modes of intuition or properties of the object *insofar as it is object* (in Kant: appearance), that is, *representation*. These forms can also be regarded as the indivisible boundary between object and subject. Hence every object must indeed appear in them, but the subject too, independently of the appearing object, possesses and surveys them completely. —Now if the objects appearing in these forms are not to be empty phantoms but are to have a meaning, they would have to point to something, be the expres-

18 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 23 of the second volume (the Supplements); likewise, in my essay *On the Will in Nature*, the chapter "Plant Physiology" and the chapter "Physical Astronomy," which is extremely important for the core of my metaphysics.

sion of something, that was not again, like themselves, object, representation, something present only relatively, namely for a subject. It would have to be something that existed without any such dependence on something standing over against it as its essential condition, and on that thing's forms. That is, it would have to be precisely *not a representation* but a *thing in itself*. Accordingly, one could at least ask: Are those representations, those objects, something more besides, apart from the fact that they are representations, objects of the subject? And if so, what would they be in this sense? What is that other side of theirs, different *toto genere* from representation? What is the thing in itself? —*The will*: that has been our answer, but for now I set it aside.

Whatever the thing in itself may be, Kant rightly concluded that time, space and causality (which we later recognized as shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, and this principle as the universal expression of the forms of appearance) could not be determinations of it. They could belong to it only after and insofar as it had become representation; that is, they belonged only to its appearance, not to it itself. For since the subject knows and constructs them completely out of itself, independently of any object, they must attach to *being-represented* as such, not to what becomes representation. They must be the form of representation as such, not properties of what has taken on this form. They must already be given with the mere opposition of subject and object (not in concept but in fact), and must consequently be only the closer determination of the form of knowledge in general, whose most general determination is that opposition itself. Now consider what, in the appearance, in the object, is in turn conditioned by time, space and causality, since it can be represented only by means of them: namely *plurality*, through coexistence and succession; *change and duration*, through *the* law of causality; matter, which can be represented only on the presupposition of causality; and finally everything that in turn can be represented only by means of these. All this, taken together, does not essentially belong to what appears, to

what has entered into the form of representation, but attaches only to this form itself. Conversely, however, whatever in the appearance is *not* conditioned by time, space and causality, and can neither be traced back to them nor explained by them, will be precisely that in which what appears, the thing in itself, directly makes itself known. Accordingly, the most perfect knowability—that is, the greatest clarity, distinctness and exhaustive fathomability—will necessarily belong to what is proper to knowledge *as such*, and thus to the *form* of knowledge. It will not belong to what is in itself *not* representation, *not* object, and has become knowable, that is, representation, object, only by entering into these forms. Only that, therefore, which depends solely on being known, on being-represented in general and as such (not on what is known and has only then become representation); which therefore belongs without distinction to everything that is known; which for that very reason is found just as well if one starts from the subject as if one starts from the object—this alone will be able to afford, without qualification, a sufficient, completely exhaustive knowledge that is clear down to the ultimate ground. But this consists in nothing other than the forms of all appearance of which we are conscious *a priori*. They can be expressed together as the principle of sufficient reason, and the shapes of this principle that relate to intuitive knowledge (with which alone we are concerned here) are time, space and causality. On them alone the whole of pure mathematics and pure natural science *a priori* is founded. Only in these sciences, therefore, does knowledge meet no obscurity; it does not strike against the unfathomable (the groundless, i.e. will), against what cannot be derived any further. In this respect Kant, as has been said, wanted to call these branches of knowledge, together with logic, sciences in a preeminent, indeed an exclusive, sense. On the other hand, however, these branches of knowledge show us nothing more than mere relationships, relations of one representation to another, form without any content. Every content they receive, every appearance that fills those forms, already contains something that is no longer completely knowable in its

whole nature, no longer entirely explicable by something else—something groundless, then. With this, knowledge at once loses its evidence and forfeits its perfect transparency. But this, which eludes all fathoming, is precisely the thing in itself. It is what is essentially not representation, not object of knowledge, and has become knowable only by entering into those forms. The form is originally foreign to it, and it can never become wholly one with it. It can never be reduced to mere form, and since this form is the principle of sufficient reason, it can therefore never be completely *fathomed*.[19] Therefore, all mathematics may give us exhaustive knowledge of what, in appearances, is magnitude, position, number, in short, spatial and temporal relation. All etiology may state completely the law-governed conditions under which appearances, with all their determinations, occur in time and space, and yet with all this it teaches nothing more than why, in each case, every particular appearance must show itself just now here and just here now; but with their help we still never penetrate into the inner nature of things. There always remains something that no explanation may venture upon, but that every explanation presupposes: namely the forces of nature, the determinate way in which things act, the quality, the character of every appearance. This is the groundless, which does not depend on the form of appearance, the principle of sufficient reason. This form is in itself foreign to it, but it has entered into the form and now emerges according to its law. That law, however, determines only the emerging, not *what* emerges; only the how, not the what of the appearance; only the form, not the content. —Mechanics, physics and chemistry teach the rules and laws by which the forces of impenetrability, gravity, rigidity, fluidity, cohesion, elasticity, heat, light, elective affinities, magnetism, electricity and so on act. That is, they teach the law, the rule, that these forces observe with regard to their entry into time and space in each case. But the forces

19 *Ergründen,* "to fathom", contains *Grund,* "ground", as in the principle of sufficient reason (*Satz vom Grunde*); likewise *grundlos,* "groundless", and *unergründlich,* "unfathomable".

themselves remain, however one may carry on, *qualitates occultae* [occult qualities]. For it is precisely the thing in itself which, in appearing, presents those phenomena, while being entirely different from them. In its appearance it is completely subject to the principle of sufficient reason as the form of representation, but it itself can never be reduced to this form. It therefore cannot be explained etiologically down to the last, can never be completely fathomed. It is indeed completely comprehensible insofar as it has taken on that form, that is, insofar as it is appearance; but in its inner nature it is not in the least explained by that comprehensibility. Hence, the more necessity a piece of knowledge carries with it, the more it contains of what simply cannot be thought or represented otherwise—as, for example, spatial relations—and the clearer and more satisfying it therefore is, the less purely objective content it has, or the less reality proper is given in it. And conversely: the more in it must be taken as purely contingent, the more of it forces itself on us as merely empirically given, the more there is of the genuinely objective and truly real in such knowledge—but at the same time also the more that is inexplicable, that is, not further derivable from anything else.

It is true that at all times an etiology mistaking its goal has striven to reduce all organic life to chemism or electricity; all chemism, that is, quality, in turn to mechanism (action through the shape of atoms); and mechanism again partly to the object of phoronomy, that is, time and space united to make motion possible, partly to that of mere geometry, that is, position in space (roughly as one constructs, rightly, the decrease of an effect with the square of the distance, and the theory of the lever, purely geometrically). Geometry, finally, can be dissolved into arithmetic. Because it has only one dimension, arithmetic is the most comprehensible, most surveyable shape of the principle of sufficient reason, fathomable down to the last.[20] Examples of the method described here in general terms are the atoms of Demo-

20 Phoronomy: Kant's term (in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*) for the pure theory of motion considered only in terms of space and time.

critus, the vortices of Descartes, and the mechanical physics of *Lesage*, who toward the end of the last century tried to explain both chemical affinities and gravitation mechanically, by impact and pressure, as can be seen in more detail in the *Lucrèce Neutonien* [Newtonian Lucretius]. Reil's form and mixture as the cause of animal life also tends in this direction. Finally, wholly of this kind is the materialism warmed over again just now, in the middle of the nineteenth[21] century: a crude materialism that, out of ignorance, fancies itself original. First, with a stupid denial of the vital force, it would explain the phenomena of life by physical and chemical forces; then it would let these in turn arise from the mechanical action of matter, from the position, shape and motion of dreamed-up atoms; and so it would reduce all the forces of nature to impact and counter-impact, which are its "thing in itself." Accordingly, even light is supposed to be the mechanical vibration, or even undulation, of an imaginary ether postulated for this purpose. On arriving, this ether drums on the retina, where, for example, 483 trillion drumbeats a second give red, and 727 trillion violet, and so on. The color-blind, then, would presumably be those who cannot count the drumbeats—isn't that so? Such crass, mechanical, Democritean, clumsy and truly clodhopping theories are wholly worthy of people who, fifty years after the appearance of Goethe's *Theory of Colors*, still believe in Newton's homogeneous lights and are not ashamed to say so. They will learn that what is overlooked in the child (in Democritus) will not be forgiven the man. They might even come to a disgraceful end one day; but then everyone will sneak off and act as if he had never been part of it. We shall soon have occasion to speak again of this false reduction of original natural forces to one another; enough for now. Supposing this could be done, then of course everything would be explained and fathomed, indeed ultimately reduced to an arithmetical sum. That sum would then be the holy of holies in the temple of wisdom, to which the principle of sufficient reason would in the

21 Georges-Louis Le Sage (1724–1803), Genevan physicist, author of *Lucrèce Newtonien* (1784).

end have happily led us. But all content of appearance would have vanished, and mere form would be left. What appears would be reduced to how it appears, and this *how* would be what is also knowable *a priori,* hence entirely dependent on the subject, hence existing only for the subject, hence finally mere phantom, representation and form of representation through and through. No question could then be asked about any thing in itself. —Supposing this could be done, then the whole world would really be derived from the subject, and what Fichte wanted to *seem* to accomplish with his windbaggery would in fact be accomplished.—But it cannot be done: fantasies, sophistries, castles in the air have been produced in that way, not science. What has succeeded, and each time it succeeded it was genuine progress, is to reduce the many and manifold phenomena in nature to particular original forces. Several forces and qualities at first held to be different have been derived one from another (for example, magnetism from electricity), and so their number has been reduced. Etiology will have reached its goal when it has recognized and set out all the original forces of nature as such, and has established their modes of action: that is, the rule by which, along the guiding thread of causality, their appearances enter time and space and fix their positions relative to one another. But original forces will always remain. There will always remain, as an insoluble residue, a content of appearance that cannot be reduced to its form, and so cannot be explained from something else according to the principle of sufficient reason. —For in every thing in nature there is something for which no ground can ever be given, for which no explanation is possible, no further cause is to be sought. It is the specific way in which the thing acts, that is, precisely the way of its existence, its essence. For each single effect of the thing, a cause can indeed be shown, from which it follows that it had to act just now, just here; but for the fact that it acts at all, and acts just so—never. If it has no other properties, if it is a mote in a sunbeam, it still shows that unfathomable something at least as gravity and impenetrability. But this something, I say, is to it what his

will is to a human being. Like the will, it is in its inner nature not subject to explanation; indeed, in itself it is identical with the will. For every manifestation of the will, for every single act of it at this time and in this place, a motive can indeed be shown on which, given the person's character, the act necessarily had to follow. But that he has this character, that he wills at all, that of several motives just this one and no other, indeed that any motive at all moves his will—for this no ground can ever be given. What his unfathomable character, presupposed in every explanation of his deeds from motives, is to a human being, that very thing is its essential quality to every inorganic body: its way of acting. Its manifestations are called forth by influences from outside, whereas the quality itself is determined by nothing outside it and is therefore also inexplicable. Its individual appearances, through which alone it becomes visible, are subject to the principle of sufficient reason; it itself is groundless. The Scholastics had already recognized this essentially correctly and called it *forma substantialis* [substantial form]. (On this see Suárez, *Disput. metaph., disp. XV, sect. I.*)

It is an error as great as it is common to think that the most frequent, most universal and simplest phenomena are the ones we understand best. They are rather only the ones whose sight, and our ignorance about them, we have grown most used to. It is just as inexplicable to us that a stone falls to the earth as that an animal moves. As mentioned above, people have supposed that by starting from the most universal natural forces (e.g. gravitation, cohesion, impenetrability) they could explain from them those that act more rarely and only under combined circumstances (e.g. chemical quality, electricity, magnetism), and finally from these in turn understand the organism and the life of animals, indeed human knowing and willing. They tacitly resigned themselves to starting from nothing but *qualitates occultae*, whose elucidation was given up altogether, since the plan was to build on top of them, not to dig beneath them. As has been said, such a thing cannot succeed. But even apart from that, such a building would always stand in the air. What use are

explanations that in the end lead back to something just as unknown as the original problem was? In the end, does one understand more of the inner nature of those universal natural forces than of the inner nature of an animal? Is not the one as unexplored as the other? Unfathomable, because groundless, because it is the content, the what of appearance, which can never be reduced to its form, to the how, to the principle of sufficient reason. But we, who aim here not at etiology but at philosophy, that is, not at relative but at unconditioned knowledge of the essence of the world, take the opposite path. We start from what is known to us immediately, what is most completely known and entirely familiar to us, what lies closest to us, in order to understand what is known to us only distantly, one-sidedly and indirectly. From the most powerful, most significant, most distinct appearance we mean to learn to understand the less perfect, weaker one. Of all things, my own body excepted, only *one* side is known to me, that of representation. Their inner nature remains closed to me and a deep mystery, even if I know all the causes on which their changes follow. Only by comparison with what goes on in me when a motive moves me and my body performs an action—with what is the inner nature of my own changes determined by external grounds—can I gain insight into the way in which those lifeless bodies change in response to causes, and so understand what their inner nature is. Of the appearing of that inner nature, knowledge of the cause gives me merely the rule of its entry into time and space, and nothing more. I can do this because my body is the only object of which I know not merely the *one* side, that of representation, but also the second, which is called *will*. So instead of believing that I would understand my own organization, and then my knowing and willing and my movement on motives, better if only I could reduce them to movement from causes, through electricity, chemism, mechanism, I must do the reverse, insofar as I seek philosophy and not etiology. I must first learn to understand in their inner nature even the simplest and commonest movements of the inorganic body, which I see following on

causes, from my own movement on motives. And I must recognize the unfathomable forces that manifest themselves in all the bodies of nature as identical in kind with what in me is the will, and as differing from it only in degree. That is to say: the fourth class of representations set out in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason must become for me the key to knowledge of the inner nature of the first class, and from the law of motivation I must learn to understand the law of causality in its inner meaning.

Spinoza says (*Epist. 62*) that a stone flying through the air because of a push would, if it had consciousness, think it was flying of its own will. I add only that the stone would be right. The push is for it what the motive is for me. And what appears in it as cohesion, gravity, persistence in the state it has assumed is, in its inner nature, the same as what I recognize in myself as will, and what it too would recognize as will if knowledge were added in its case as well. In that passage Spinoza had his eye on the necessity with which the stone flies, and wants, rightly, to transfer it to the necessity of a person's individual act of will.[22] I, on the other hand, consider the inner nature that first gives all real necessity (i.e. effect from cause) its meaning and validity, as its presupposition. In human beings it is called character, in the stone quality, but in both it is the same; where it is known immediately it is called *will*; and in the stone it has the weakest, in human beings the strongest degree of visibility, of objecthood.—Even St. Augustine, with a true feeling, recognized this element in the striving of all things that is identical with our willing, and I cannot refrain from setting down his naive expression of the matter: Si pecora essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum ejusdem est amaremus, idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum, et secundum hoc si esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quaereremus. [If we were cattle, we would love the life of the flesh and whatever accords with its senses; that would be sufficient as our good, and if things went well with us in this

22 The letter to G. H. Schuller of 1674, numbered 58 in modern editions of Spinoza's correspondence.

respect, we would seek nothing else.] Item, si arbores essemus, nihil quidem sentientes motu amare possemus: verumtamen id quasi *appetere* videremur, quo feracius essemus, uberiusque fructuosae. Si essemus lapides, aut fluctus, aut ventus, aut flamma, vel quid ejusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis *appetitus*. Nam velut *amores* corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive deorsum gravitate, sive sursum levitate nitantur: ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus *amore* fertur quocunque fertur. [Likewise, if we were trees, we could indeed love nothing with the movement of feeling; yet we would seem, as it were, to *strive* for that by which we might be more fertile and bear fruit more abundantly. If we were stones, or waves, or wind, or flame, or anything of that kind, without any feeling or life, we would still not lack a kind of *longing* for our own places and order. For the weights of bodies are, as it were, their *loves*, whether they press downward by heaviness or upward by lightness: for a body is carried by its weight, as the mind by its *love*, wherever it is carried.] *(de civ. Dei, XI, 28)*.

It also deserves mention that *Euler* already saw that the nature of gravitation must ultimately be traced back to an "inclination and desire" (thus will) peculiar to bodies (in the 68th letter to the Princess). Indeed, precisely this makes him averse to the concept of gravitation as it stands in Newton. He is inclined to attempt a modification of it along the lines of the earlier Cartesian theory, that is, to derive gravitation from the impact of an ether on bodies, as being "more reasonable and better suited to people who love clear and comprehensible principles." He wants to see attraction banished from physics as a *qualitas occulta* [occult quality].[23] This is simply in keeping with the dead view of nature that prevailed in Euler's time as the correlate of the immaterial soul. But it is noteworthy with regard to the fundamental truth I have set forth. Even then this subtle mind saw it glimmering through from afar, hastened to turn

23 Euler's *Letters to a German Princess* (1768–1772) popularized the natural philosophy of the day.

back in good time, and then, in his fear of seeing all the fundamental views of his day endangered, even sought refuge in the old absurdity that had already been disposed of.

§ 25. ONE WILL, MANY GRADES

The will is whole in every thing; its fixed grades of objectification are Plato's Ideas.

2.25 We know that *plurality* in general is necessarily conditioned by time and space and is thinkable only in them; in this respect we call them the *principium individuationis*. But we have recognized time and space as shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, in which all our knowledge *a priori* is expressed. As explained above, however, this knowledge, precisely as such, belongs only to the knowability of things, not to things themselves. That is, it is only our form of knowledge, not a property of the thing in itself. The thing in itself as such is free of every form of knowledge, even the most general, that of being an object for the subject; that is, it is something entirely different from representation. Now if this thing in itself is *the will*, as I believe I have sufficiently shown and made evident, then the will, considered as such and apart from its appearance, lies outside time and space. Accordingly it knows no plurality and is consequently *one*—yet, as has already been said, not as an individual or a concept is one, but as something to which the condition of the possibility of plurality, the *principium individuationis*, is foreign. The plurality of things in space and time, which together are its *objecthood*, therefore does not touch it, and in spite of that plurality it remains indivisible. It is not as if there were a smaller part of it in the stone and a larger one in a human being. For the relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space and has no meaning once we have left this form of intuition. Rather, the more and less, too, concern only the appearance, that is, the visibility, the objectification. Of this there is a higher degree in the plant than in the stone, a higher one in the animal than in the plant. Indeed, the will's emergence

into visibility, its objectification, has gradations as infinite as those between the faintest twilight and the brightest sunlight, between the loudest tone and the softest echo. We shall return further on to the consideration of these degrees of visibility, which belong to its objectification, to the copy of its essence. But even less than the gradations of its objectification touch the will itself directly, does the plurality of appearances at these different grades touch it: that is, the multitude of individuals of each form, or of the particular manifestations of each force. For this plurality is directly conditioned by time and space, into which the will itself never enters. It reveals itself as wholly and as fully in one oak as in millions. Their number, their multiplication in space and time, has no meaning at all with regard to the will, but only with regard to the plurality of individuals who know in space and time and are themselves multiplied and scattered in them. And their plurality, in turn, concerns only the will's appearance, not the will. Hence one could even assert that if, *per impossibile* [by an impossibility], a single being, even the least, were entirely annihilated, the whole world would have to perish with it. Sensing this, the great mystic Angelus Silesius says:[24]

"I know that without me God cannot live an instant: / If I come to nothing, he must of necessity give up the ghost."

People have tried in many ways to bring the immeasurable size of the universe closer to everyone's powers of comprehension, and have then taken it as an occasion for edifying reflections: on the relative smallness of the earth, say, and still more of human beings; and then again, by contrast, on the greatness of the mind in this so small human being, who can work out, grasp and even measure that cosmic magnitude, and so on. All well and good! For me, however, when I consider the immensity of the world, the most important thing is this. The being in itself whose appearance the world is—whatever it may be—cannot have had its true self pulled apart and divided up in this way in boundless space. Rather, this infinite extension belongs solely to

24 Angelus Silesius (Johann Scheffler, 1624–1677), German mystical poet; the couplet is from *The Cherubinic Wanderer* (I, 8).

its appearance, while it itself is present whole and undivided in every thing in nature, in every living being. For that very reason one loses nothing by stopping at any single thing. True wisdom is not to be attained by measuring the boundless world or—what would be still more to the purpose—by flying through endless space in person. It is attained rather by investigating any single thing thoroughly, seeking to know and understand its true and real essence completely.

Accordingly, the following point, which has already forced itself on every student of Plato, will be the subject of detailed consideration in the next book. Those different grades of the objectification of the will, expressed in countless individuals, stand there as the unattained models of these individuals, or as the eternal forms of things. They do not themselves enter time and space, the medium of individuals, but stand fixed, subject to no change, always being, never having become, while the individuals arise and pass away, always become and never are. These *grades of the objectification of the will*, I say, are nothing other than *Plato's Ideas*. I mention this here provisionally so that from now on I may use the word *Idea* in this sense. With me, therefore, it is always to be understood in its genuine and original meaning, the one Plato gave it. One must not think at all of those abstract productions of scholastically dogmatizing reason which Kant, as unsuitably as illegitimately, misused the word to designate—a word already taken possession of by Plato and used by him most appropriately. By *Idea*, then, I understand every determinate and fixed *grade of the objectification of the will*, insofar as the will is thing in itself and therefore foreign to plurality. These grades are indeed related to individual things as their eternal forms, or their models. The shortest and most concise expression of that famous Platonic doctrine is given us by Diogenes Laertius (*III, 12*): *ho Platôn phêsi, en tê physei tas ideas hestanai, kathaper paradeigmata; ta d'alla tautais eoikenai, toutôn homoiômata kathestôta. (Plato ideas in natura velut exemplaria dixit subsistere; cetera his esse similia, ad istarum similitudinem consistentia.)* [Plato says that the Ideas exist in nature as patterns, and

that other things resemble them, existing as their likenesses.] Of that Kantian misuse I take no further notice; what needs to be said about it is in the Appendix.

§ 26. FORCES AND LAWS OF NATURE

Natural forces are the lowest grades of the will; causes fix only when and where they appear.

2.26 The lowest grade of the objectification of the will is presented by the most universal forces of nature. Some of these appear in all matter without exception, such as gravity and impenetrability. Others have divided among themselves the matter that exists in general, so that some rule over this matter and others over that, which is thereby specifically different: such as rigidity, fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, and chemical properties and qualities of every kind. In themselves they are immediate appearances of the will, just as much as human action is. As such they are groundless, like a person's character. Only their individual appearances are subject to the principle of sufficient reason, like a person's actions. They themselves, on the other hand, can never be called either effect or cause, but are the prior and presupposed conditions of all causes and effects, through which their own essence unfolds and reveals itself. It is therefore senseless to ask for a cause of gravity or of electricity. These are original forces, whose manifestations do indeed proceed according to cause and effect, so that every single appearance of them has a cause. That cause is itself again just such a single appearance, and it determines that the force had to manifest itself here, to emerge in time and space. But the force itself is by no means the effect of a cause, nor the cause of an effect.—Hence it is also wrong to say: "Gravity is the cause of the stone's falling." Rather, the cause here is the nearness of the earth, since the earth attracts the stone. Take the earth away, and the stone will not fall, although gravity remains. The force itself lies wholly outside the chain of causes and effects. That chain presupposes time, since it has meaning only in relation to

time; but the force lies outside time as well. The individual change always has as its cause another equally individual change, not the force of which it is the manifestation. For what always gives a cause its efficacy, however countless the times it may occur, is a natural force. As such it is groundless, that is, it lies wholly outside the chain of causes and outside the whole domain of the principle of sufficient reason. Philosophically it is recognized as immediate objecthood of the will, which is the in-itself of the whole of nature; in etiology, here physics, it is identified as an original force, that is, a *qualitas occulta.*

At the higher grades of the will's objecthood we see individuality stand out markedly, especially in human beings, as the great diversity of individual characters, that is, as complete personality. It is expressed outwardly already by a strongly marked individual physiognomy that takes in the entire bodily form. No animal has this individuality to anything like such a degree. Only the higher animals have a tinge of it, but the character of the species still predominates over it entirely, and for that very reason they also have only a little individual physiognomy. The further down we go, the more every trace of individual character is lost in the general character of the species, whose physiognomy alone remains. We know the psychological character of the species, and from it we know exactly what is to be expected of the individual. In the human species, by contrast, every individual demands to be studied and fathomed for himself; and to predict his conduct with any certainty is extremely difficult, because of the possibility of dissimulation, which first came in with reason. It is probably connected with this difference of the human species from all others that the furrows and convolutions of the brain—still entirely absent in birds and still very faint in rodents—are, even in the higher animals, far more symmetrical on both sides and more constantly the same in every individual than in human beings.[25] Further, a phe-

25 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Wenzel, *De structura cerebri hominis et brutorum*, 1812, ch. 3.—Cuvier, *Leçons d'anat. comp. leçon 9, art. 4 and 5.*—Vicq d'Azyr, *Hist. de l'acad. d. sc. de Paris 1783*, pp. 470 and 483.

nomenon of that genuine individual character which distinguishes human beings from all animals is to be seen in this: in animals the sexual drive seeks its satisfaction without noticeable selection, whereas in human beings this selection is carried so far—and indeed in an instinctive way, independent of all reflection—that it rises to a violent passion. Every human being, then, is to be regarded as a particularly determined and characterized appearance of the will, even in a certain sense as an Idea of his own. In animals, by contrast, this individual character is on the whole lacking, since only the species still has a distinctive meaning, and its trace disappears more and more the further they stand from human beings. Plants, finally, no longer have any individual peculiarities other than those that can be fully explained from favorable or unfavorable external influences of soil and climate and other accidents. And so, finally, in the inorganic realm of nature all individuality disappears completely. Only the crystal can still be regarded in a certain sense as an individual: it is a unity of striving in determinate directions, seized by solidification, which makes the trace of that striving permanent. At the same time it is an aggregate of its nuclear form, bound into unity by an Idea. In just the same way the tree is an aggregate of the single sprouting fiber, which presents and repeats itself in every rib of the leaf, every leaf, every branch, and in a certain sense lets each of these be regarded as a plant in its own right, nourishing itself parasitically on the larger one. So the tree, like the crystal, is a systematic aggregate of small plants, although only the whole is the complete presentation of an indivisible Idea, that is, of this determinate grade of the objectification of the will. Individuals of the same species of crystal, however, can have no difference other than what external accidents bring about; one can even make any species crystallize at will into large or small crystals. But the individual as such, that is, with traces of an individual character, is no longer found at all in inorganic nature. All its appearances are manifestations of universal natural forces, that is, of such grades of the objectification of the will as do not objectify them-

selves at all (as they do in organic nature) through the mediation of a diversity of individualities, each expressing part of the whole of the Idea. They present themselves only in the species, and present the species wholly and without any deviation in every single appearance. Time, space, plurality and being conditioned by a cause belong not to the will, nor to the Idea (the grade of the will's objectification), but only to the individual appearances of the Idea. Therefore a natural force such as gravity or electricity must present itself as such in exactly the same way in all the millions of its appearances, and only external circumstances can modify the appearance. This unity of its essence in all its appearances, this unchanging constancy with which they occur as soon as, along the guiding thread of causality, the conditions for them are present, is called a *law of nature*. Once such a law is known through experience, the appearance of the natural force whose character is expressed and laid down in it can be exactly predicted and calculated. But it is precisely this conformity to law in the appearances of the lower grades of the will's objectification that gives them so different an aspect from the appearances of the same will at the higher, that is, more distinct, grades of its objectification: in animals, in human beings and their actions. There the stronger or weaker emergence of individual character, and being moved by motives which, because they lie in knowledge, often remain hidden from the onlooker, have until now caused the identity of the inner nature of both kinds of appearance to be entirely overlooked.

If we start from knowledge of the individual thing rather than of the Idea, the infallibility of the laws of nature has something surprising about it, at times even something almost eerie. One might marvel that nature never once forgets its laws. Suppose it accords with a law of nature that, when certain substances meet under specific conditions, a chemical compound, a release of gas or combustion takes place. Then whenever those conditions come together, whether through our arrangement or entirely by chance (where the punctuality is all the more surprising for being unexpected), the specific appearance occurs immediately

and without delay, today just as a thousand years ago. We feel this marvel most vividly with rare appearances that occur only under highly complex combinations of circumstances, but that have been predicted to us for those circumstances. One example is that when certain metals are brought into contact with one another, alternating with an acidified liquid, silver leaf placed between the ends of this chain must suddenly go up in green flames. Another is that under certain conditions the hard diamond turns into carbonic acid. What surprises us then is the ghostly omnipresence of the forces of nature. And here we notice what no longer occurs to us with everyday appearances: that the connection between cause and effect is really as mysterious as the one imagined in stories between a magic formula and the spirit that, summoned by it, necessarily appears. Suppose, by contrast, that we have penetrated to the philosophical knowledge that a force of nature is a specific grade of the objectification of the will, that is, of what we too recognize as our own innermost being. Suppose we know that this will, in itself and as distinct from its appearance and the forms of that appearance, lies outside time and space, so that the plurality conditioned by time and space belongs neither to it nor directly to the grade of its objectification, that is, to the Idea, but only to the appearances of the Idea. Suppose we know that the law of causality has meaning only in relation to time and space, because it determines the place within them of the multiplied appearances of the various Ideas in which the will manifests itself, regulating the order in which they must occur. Once, I say, this knowledge has opened up to us the inner meaning of Kant's great doctrine that space, time and causality belong not to the thing in itself but only to appearance, that they are only forms of our knowledge and not properties of the thing in itself— then we shall see that our astonishment at the regularity and punctuality with which a force of nature acts, at the perfect sameness of all its millions of appearances and at the infallibility of their occurrence, is in fact comparable to the astonishment of a child, or of a person living in a state of nature, who looks at a flower, say, for the first time

through a glass with many facets. He marvels at the perfect sameness of the countless flowers he sees and counts the petals of each one separately.

Every universal, original force of nature is therefore, in its inner being, nothing other than the objectification of the will at a low grade. We call each such grade an eternal *Idea*, in Plato's sense. The *law of nature*, however, is the relation of the Idea to the form of its appearance. This form is time, space and causality, which are necessarily and inseparably connected and related to one another. Through time and space the Idea is multiplied into countless appearances. But the order in which these enter those forms of multiplicity is firmly determined by the law of causality. This law is, as it were, the norm for the boundary points of those appearances of different Ideas, the norm by which space, time and matter are allotted to them. This norm is therefore necessarily related to the identity of the whole of existing matter, which is the common substrate of all those different appearances. If they were not all bound to that common matter, which they have to share among themselves, no such law would be needed to settle their claims: they could all fill infinite space at once and side by side, throughout an infinite time. Only because all those appearances of the eternal Ideas are bound to one and the same matter did there have to be a rule for their entry and exit. Otherwise none would make way for another. In this way the law of causality is essentially bound up with the law of the permanence of substance: each gets its meaning solely from the other. And space and time stand in just the same relation to them. For time is the mere possibility of opposite determinations in the same matter; space is the mere possibility of the same matter persisting under all opposite determinations. That is why in the previous book we explained matter as the union of time and space. This union shows itself as the change of accidents while substance persists, and the general possibility of this is precisely causality, or becoming. We therefore also said that matter is through and through causality. We explained the understanding as the subjective correlate of

causality, and said that matter (and therefore the whole world as representation) exists only for the understanding: the understanding is its condition, its bearer, as its necessary correlate. All this is mentioned here only in passing, as a reminder of what was set out in the first book. A full understanding of the two books requires attention to their inner agreement. For what is inseparably united in the actual world as its two sides, will and representation, has been torn apart in these two books, so that each might be recognized all the more clearly in isolation.

It may not be superfluous to make still clearer by an example how the law of causality has meaning only in relation to time and space and to matter, which consists in the union of the two. The law determines the boundaries according to which the appearances of the forces of nature share in the possession of matter. The original forces of nature themselves, however, as immediate objectifications of the will, which as thing in itself is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason, lie outside those forms. Only within those forms does any etiological explanation have validity and meaning, and for that very reason it can never lead to the inner being of nature.—For this purpose, let us imagine, say, a machine constructed according to the laws of mechanics. Iron weights set the motion going through their gravity. Copper wheels resist through their rigidity, and push and lift one another and the levers by virtue of their impenetrability, and so on. Here gravity, rigidity and impenetrability are original, unexplained forces. Mechanics states only the conditions under which, and the manner in which, they express themselves, come forth, and govern a particular matter, time and place. Now a strong magnet, say, might act on the iron of the weights and overpower gravity. The machine's motion stops, and the matter at once becomes the scene of an entirely different force of nature, magnetism, of which etiological explanation likewise states nothing more than the conditions under which it appears. Or suppose the copper disks of that machine are now laid on zinc plates and an acidified liquid is run between them. At once the same matter of the machine has fallen to another

original force, galvanism, which now governs it according to its own laws and reveals itself in it through its appearances. Of these, too, etiology can state no more than the circumstances under which, and the laws according to which, they show themselves. Now let us raise the temperature and add pure oxygen: the whole machine burns up. That is, once again an entirely different force of nature, chemism, has at this time and in this place an undeniable claim to that matter, and reveals itself in it as Idea, as a specific grade of the objectification of the will. — Now let the metal oxide produced in this way combine with an acid: a salt is formed, crystals shoot up. They are the appearance of another Idea, itself once again quite unfathomable, while the occurrence of its appearance depended on conditions that etiology is able to state. The crystals weather and mix with other substances, and vegetation springs up from them: a new appearance of the will.—And so one could follow the same persisting matter to infinity and watch how now this, now that force of nature gains a right to it and inevitably seizes that right, in order to come forth and reveal its being. The law of causality states how this right is determined, the point in time and space where it becomes valid; but the explanation based on that law goes only that far and no further. The force itself is an appearance of the will, and as such it is not subject to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason; that is, it is groundless. It lies outside all time, is omnipresent, and seems, as it were, to be forever waiting for the circumstances to arise under which it can come forth and take possession of a particular matter, displacing the forces that had governed it until then. All time exists only for its appearance and has no meaning for the force itself. Chemical forces slumber in a piece of matter for thousands of years, until contact with reagents sets them free: then they appear; but time exists only for this appearance, not for the forces themselves. For thousands of years galvanism slumbers in copper and zinc, and they lie quietly beside the silver, which, as soon as all three touch under the required conditions, must go up in flames. Even in the organic realm we see a dry seed preserve for three thou-

sand years the slumbering force that, when favorable circumstances at last arise, shoots up as a plant.—[26]

OCCASIONAL CAUSES

With Malebranche, every natural cause is only the occasion for the groundless will to appear.

This discussion, then, has made clear to us the difference between a force of nature and all its appearances. We have seen that the force is the will itself at this particular grade of its objectification, while plurality belongs only to the appearances, through time and space, and the law of causality is nothing but the determination of the place of individual appearances within time and space. Now we shall also recognize the complete truth and the deep meaning of *Malebranche*'s doctrine of occasional causes, *causes occasionelles*.[27] It is well worth comparing this doctrine of his, as he presents it in the *Recherches de la vérité*, especially in the third chapter of the second part of the sixth book and in the *éclaircissements* [elucidations] appended at the end to

26 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. On 16 September 1840, at the Literary and Scientific Institution of the City of London, Mr. Pettigrew, in a lecture on Egyptian antiquities, exhibited grains of wheat that Sir G. Wilkinson had found in a tomb near Thebes, where they must have lain for thirty centuries. They had been found in a hermetically sealed vase. He had sown twelve grains and obtained from them a plant that had grown five feet high and whose seeds were now fully ripe. From the *Times* of 21 September 1840.—Similarly, in 1830, at the Medico-Botanical Society in London, Mr. Haulton produced a bulbous root that had been found in the hand of an Egyptian mummy, where it may have been placed for some religious reason, and which was therefore at least 2,000 years old. He had planted it in a flowerpot, where it had immediately grown and put out green shoots. This is cited from the *Medical Journal* of 1830 in the *Journal of the Royal Institution of Great Britain*, October 1830, p. 196.—"In the garden of Mr. Grimstone, of the Herbarium, Highgate, London, there is now a pea plant in full fruit, which grew from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew and the officers of the British Museum took from a vase found in an Egyptian sarcophagus, where it must have lain for 2,844 years."—From the *Times* of 16 August 1844. —Indeed, the living toads found in limestone lead us to assume that even animal life is capable of such suspension for thousands of years, if it is initiated by hibernation and maintained by special circumstances.

27 On Malebranche's doctrine of occasionalism, natural causes are only the occasions on which God acts; his main work is *De la recherche de la vérité* (The Search after Truth, 1674–75).

this chapter, with my present account, and seeing how completely the two doctrines agree despite the great difference in their line of thought. Indeed, I cannot help admiring how Malebranche, wholly caught up in the positive dogmas that his age irresistibly forced on him, nevertheless, in such fetters and under such a burden, hit upon the truth so happily and so correctly, and managed to reconcile it with those very dogmas, or at least with their language.

For the power of truth is incredibly great and of unspeakable endurance. We find frequent traces of it in all the dogmas of different ages and countries, even the most bizarre, indeed the most absurd: often in strange company, in odd mixtures, but still recognizable. Truth is then like a plant that sprouts beneath a heap of large stones and yet climbs up toward the light, working its way through with many detours and twists, misshapen, pale, stunted—but still toward the light.

Malebranche is certainly right: every natural cause is only an occasional cause. It gives only the occasion, the opportunity, for the appearance of that one and indivisible will which is the in-itself of all things and whose graded objectification is this whole visible world. Only the coming forth, the becoming visible at this place and at this time, is brought about by the cause and to that extent depends on it—not the whole of the appearance, not its inner being. That inner being is the will itself, to which the principle of sufficient reason does not apply, and which is therefore groundless. Nothing in the world has a cause of its existence absolutely and in general, but only a cause of its being there precisely here and precisely now. Why a stone shows now gravity, now rigidity, now electricity, now chemical properties depends on causes, on external influences, and is to be explained from them. But those properties themselves, and so the stone's whole being, which consists of them and therefore expresses itself in all the ways just mentioned—the fact, then, that it is at all such as it is, that it exists at all—has no ground; it is the becoming visible of the groundless will. So every cause is an occasional cause. That is how we found it in nature devoid of

knowledge. But it is exactly the same where it is no longer causes and stimuli but motives that determine the point at which appearances occur, that is, in the actions of animals and human beings. For here as there it is one and the same will that appears. It is extremely diverse in the degrees of its manifestation, multiplied in the appearances of these degrees and, with respect to them, subject to the principle of sufficient reason, but in itself free of all this. Motives do not determine a person's character, but only the appearance of that character, that is, his deeds; they determine the outward shape of the course of his life, not its inner meaning and content. These proceed from the character, which is the immediate appearance of the will and is therefore groundless. Why one person is wicked and another good does not depend on motives and external influences, on teachings and sermons, say, and in this sense it is absolutely inexplicable. But whether a wicked man displays his wickedness in petty injustices, cowardly intrigues and low villainies practiced within the narrow circle of those around him, or whether as a conqueror he oppresses nations, plunges a world into misery and sheds the blood of millions—this is the outward form of his appearance, what is inessential in it. It depends on the circumstances in which fate placed him, on his surroundings, on external influences, on motives. But his decision in response to these motives can never be explained from them: it proceeds from the will whose appearance this person is. More on this in the fourth book. The way in which a character unfolds its qualities is entirely comparable to the way in which every body in nature devoid of knowledge shows its own. Water remains water, with the properties inherent in it. But whether as a still lake it mirrors its banks, or foams down over rocks, or, artificially induced, spurts up high in a long jet—that depends on external causes. One is as natural to it as another; but it will show one or the other according to the circumstances, equally ready for all, yet in every case true to its character and always revealing only that. So too every human character will reveal

itself under all circumstances; but the appearances that proceed from it will be according to what the circumstances were.

§ 27. THE LIMITS OF ETIOLOGY

Physics must not reduce higher Ideas to lower forces; organisms arise by overpowering lower forces.

2.27 All the preceding discussions of the forces of nature and their appearances have made clear to us how far explanation from causes can go and where it must stop, if it is not to fall into the foolish endeavor of reducing the content of all appearances to their mere form, so that in the end nothing but form would remain. We shall now also be able to determine in general what is to be demanded of all etiology. Its task is to seek out the causes of all appearances in nature, that is, the circumstances under which they invariably occur. Then, however, it has to trace the appearances, which take many shapes under manifold circumstances, back to what is at work in every appearance and is presupposed in the cause: to the original forces of nature. In doing so it must correctly distinguish whether a difference in the appearance stems from a difference in the force, or only from a difference in the circumstances under which the force expresses itself. It must guard equally against taking for the appearance of different forces what is the expression of one and the same force merely under different circumstances, and, conversely, against taking for expressions of one force what belongs originally to different forces. This calls directly for judgment; that is why so few people are capable of extending insight in physics, while all are capable of extending experience. Laziness and ignorance make people inclined to appeal to original forces too soon. This shows itself, with an exaggeration that verges on irony, in the entities and quiddities of the Scholastics. Nothing could be further from my wish than to have encouraged their reintroduction. Instead of giving a physical explanation, one may no more appeal to the objectification of the will than to the creative power of God. For physics demands causes, but the will

is never a cause. Its relation to appearance does not follow the principle of sufficient reason at all. Rather, what in itself is will exists on the other side as representation, that is, as appearance; and as such it obeys the laws that make up the form of appearance. Thus, for example, every movement, although it is always an appearance of the will, must nevertheless have a cause, from which it is to be explained in relation to a specific time and place —that is, not in general, according to its inner being, but as an *individual* appearance. With a stone this cause is a mechanical one; with a human being's movement it is a motive; but it can never be absent. On the other hand, the universal, the common being of all appearances of a particular kind, that without whose presupposition explanation from the cause would have neither sense nor meaning—that is the universal force of nature, which in physics must remain a *qualitas occulta*, precisely because here etiological explanation ends and metaphysical explanation begins. The chain of causes and effects, however, is never broken off by an original force to which one would have to appeal. It does not run back to such a force as to its first link. Rather, the nearest link of the chain, just as much as the most remote, already presupposes the original force and could otherwise explain nothing. A series of causes and effects can be the appearance of the most diverse forces, whose successive entry into visibility it guides, as I illustrated above with the example of a metal machine. But the difference between these original forces, which cannot be derived from one another, in no way interrupts the unity of that chain of causes or the connection between all its links. The etiology of nature and the philosophy of nature never detract from each other; they go side by side, considering the same object from different points of view. Etiology gives an account of the causes that necessarily brought about the particular appearance to be explained. As the foundation of all its explanations, it points out the universal forces active in all these causes and effects. It determines these forces precisely, their number and their differences, and then all the effects in which each force comes forth differently according to

the difference of circumstances, always in keeping with its own peculiar character, which it unfolds according to an infallible rule called a *law of nature*. As soon as physics has accomplished all this completely and in every respect, it will have reached its consummation. Then no force in inorganic nature will remain unknown, and no effect will be left that has not been shown to be the appearance of one of those forces under specific circumstances, in accordance with a law of nature. Even so, a law of nature remains merely the rule, observed in nature, by which nature proceeds every time certain circumstances arise. Hence one can indeed define a law of nature as a fact stated in general terms, *un fait généralisé*; and accordingly a complete exposition of all the laws of nature would, after all, be only a complete register of facts. —The consideration of nature as a whole is then completed by *morphology*, which enumerates, compares and classifies all the enduring forms of organic nature. About the cause of the appearance of individual beings it has little to say, since in all of them this cause is procreation, whose theory is a separate matter, and in rare cases *generatio aequivoca* [spontaneous generation]. Strictly speaking, however, this latter also includes the way in which all the lower grades of the objecthood of the will, that is, the physical and chemical appearances, come forth in particular cases; and stating the conditions for this coming forth is precisely that task of etiology. Philosophy, on the other hand, everywhere, and so in nature too, considers only the universal. Here its object is the original forces themselves, and it recognizes in them the different grades of the objectification of the will, which is the inner being, the in-itself, of this world—a world that philosophy, when it leaves the will out of account, declares to be the mere representation of the subject.—But suppose etiology, instead of preparing the way for philosophy and supplying its teachings with applications through examples, thinks its goal is to explain away all original forces except perhaps *one*, the most universal—impenetrability, for instance—which it imagines it understands from the ground up, and to which it therefore tries forcibly to reduce all the others.

Then it cuts away its own foundation and can yield only error instead of truth. The content of nature is now displaced by the form; everything is ascribed to the circumstances acting from outside, nothing to the inner being of things. If one really succeeded along this path, then, as already said, a sum in arithmetic would in the end solve the riddle of the world. But this is the path taken when, as already mentioned, every physiological effect is to be reduced to form and composition, and so, say, to electricity, this in turn to chemism, and chemism to mechanism. The last of these was, for example, the mistake of Descartes and of all the atomists. They reduced the movement of the heavenly bodies to the impact of a fluid, and qualities to the cohesion and shape of atoms, and strove to explain all the appearances of nature as mere phenomena of impenetrability and cohesion. Although this view has been abandoned, the same thing is being done in our own day by the electrical, chemical and mechanical physiologists, who stubbornly insist on explaining the whole of life and all the functions of the organism from the "form and composition" of its constituents. That the goal of physiological explanation is to reduce organic life to the universal forces studied by physics is still stated in Meckel's *Archive for Physiology*, 1820, vol. 5, p. 185.—*Lamarck*, too, in his *Philosophie zoologique*, vol. 2, ch. 3, declares life to be a mere effect of heat and electricity: *le calorique et la matière électrique suffisent parfaitement pour composer ensemble cette cause essentielle de la vie* [heat and electrical matter are perfectly sufficient, together, to make up this essential cause of life] (p. 16).[28] On this view, heat and electricity would really be the thing in itself, and the animal and plant world its appearance. The absurdity of this opinion stands out glaringly on pp. 306 ff. of that work. It is common knowledge that quite recently all those views, so often exploded, have reappeared with renewed brazenness. Looked at closely, they ultimately rest on the presupposition that the organism is only an aggregate of appearances of physical, chemical and mechan-

28 Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829), French naturalist; his *Philosophie zoologique* (1809) set out an early theory of the transformation of species.

ical forces which, having come together here by chance, produce the organism as a chance play of nature without any further significance. Considered philosophically, then, the organism of an animal or of a human being would not be the presentation of an Idea of its own, that is, not itself immediately the objecthood of the will at a particular, higher grade. Rather, only those Ideas that objectify the will in electricity, chemism and mechanism would appear in it. The organism would therefore be blown together from the meeting of these forces as fortuitously as the shapes of people and animals in clouds or stalactites, and so would be of no further interest in itself.—We shall see presently, however, to what extent the application of physical and chemical modes of explanation to the organism might nonetheless be permissible and useful within certain limits. For I shall show that the vital force does indeed make use of and employ the forces of inorganic nature, yet in no way consists of them, any more than the blacksmith consists of hammer and anvil. Hence not even plant life, simple as it is, will ever be explained from them—from capillary action and endosmosis, say—let alone animal life. The following consideration will pave the way for that rather difficult discussion.

It follows from everything said so far that natural science goes astray when it tries to reduce the higher grades of the objecthood of the will to lower ones. For failing to recognize, and denying, original and self-subsistent forces of nature is just as mistaken as groundlessly assuming special forces where there is merely a particular mode of appearance of forces already known. Kant is therefore right to say that it is absurd to hope for a Newton of the blade of grass—that is, for someone who would reduce the blade of grass to appearances of physical and chemical forces. The blade of grass would then be their chance concretion, and so a mere play of nature, in which no distinct Idea appeared, that is,[29] in which the will did not reveal itself immediately at a higher and special grade, but only just as it does in the appearances of inorganic nature, and only by

29 Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), §75.

chance in this form. The Scholastics, who would never have allowed anything of the kind, would have been quite right to say that this was a complete denial of the *forma substantialis* [substantial form] and a degradation of it to a mere *forma accidentalis* [accidental form]. For Aristotle's *forma substantialis* designates exactly what I call the degree of the objectification of the will in a thing.—On the other hand, however, we must not overlook that in all the Ideas, that is, in all the forces of inorganic nature and all the forms of organic nature, it is *one and the same will* that reveals itself, that is, enters the form of representation, *objecthood*. Its unity must therefore also make itself known through an inner kinship among all its appearances. At the higher grades of its objecthood, where the whole appearance is more distinct, that is, in the plant and animal kingdoms, this kinship reveals itself through the pervasive analogy of all forms, the basic type found again in every appearance. That is why this type has become the guiding principle of the excellent zoological systems that the French originated in this century, and it is demonstrated most completely in comparative anatomy as *l'unité de plan, l'uniformité de l'élément anatomique* [unity of plan, uniformity of the anatomical element]. Finding this type has also been a chief occupation, or at any rate certainly the most commendable endeavor, of the nature philosophers of Schelling's school, who even deserve some credit for it, although in many cases their hunt for analogies in nature degenerates into mere play of wit. But they were right to demonstrate that universal kinship and family resemblance in the Ideas of inorganic nature as well: for example, between electricity and magnetism, whose identity was later established, between chemical attraction and gravity, and so on. They drew particular attention to the fact that *polarity*, that is, the splitting of a force into two qualitatively different, opposed activities striving to reunite, which usually also reveals itself spatially as a moving apart in opposite directions, is a basic type of almost all the appearances of nature, from the magnet and the crystal up to the human being. In China, however, this knowledge has been current since the most ancient

times, in the doctrine of the opposition of *Yin* and *Yang*. — Indeed, precisely because all things in the world are the objecthood of one and the same will, and hence identical in their inner being, there must not only be that unmistakable analogy between them, with the trace, the hint, the rudiment of the next more perfect thing already showing itself in each less perfect one. Also, since all those forms belong only to the world as *representation*, we may even assume that already in the most universal forms of representation, in this real basic framework of the world of appearance, that is, in space and time, the basic type, the hint, the rudiment of everything that fills those forms can be found and demonstrated. It seems to have been an obscure awareness of this that gave rise to the Kabbalah and to all the mathematical philosophy of the Pythagoreans, and also of the Chinese in the Y-king. And in that Schellingian school, too, among its manifold efforts to bring to light the analogy between all the appearances of nature, we find a number of attempts, though unsuccessful ones, to derive laws of nature from the mere laws of space and time. Still, there is no knowing how far a mind of genius may one day carry out both endeavors.

Now the difference between appearance and thing in itself must never be lost sight of. Therefore the identity of the will objectified in all the Ideas must never (since the will has particular grades of its objecthood) be twisted into an identity of the particular Ideas themselves in which it appears. So, for example, chemical or electrical attraction may never be reduced to attraction through gravity, even though their inner analogy is recognized and the former can be regarded, as it were, as higher powers of the latter—any more than the inner analogy in the structure of all animals entitles us to mix up and identify species and, say, to declare the more perfect ones mere varieties of the less perfect. And physiological functions, finally, can never be reduced to chemical or physical processes either. Nevertheless, to justify that procedure within certain limits, we may assume the following with considerable probability.

Suppose that several appearances of the will at the lower grades of its objectification, that is, in the inorganic realm, come into conflict with one another, each trying, following the guiding thread of causality, to take possession of the available matter. Out of this conflict there then emerges the appearance of a higher Idea, which overpowers all the less perfect ones that were there before, yet in such a way that it lets their being continue in a subordinate manner, taking up into itself an analogue of it. This process is intelligible only from the identity of the will appearing in all the Ideas and from its striving toward ever higher objectification. Thus, for example, in the hardening of bones we see an unmistakable analogue of crystallization, which originally governed the lime, although ossification can never be reduced to crystallization. This analogy shows itself more weakly in the firming of flesh. Likewise, the mixing of fluids in the animal body, and secretion, are an analogue of chemical mixing and separation. Indeed, the laws of these continue to operate here, but in a subordinate way, much modified, overpowered by a higher Idea. That is why merely chemical forces outside the organism will never produce such fluids; rather,

Encheiresin naturae [nature's handiwork] is what chemistry calls it, / It mocks itself and doesn't know how.[30]

The more perfect Idea that emerges from such a victory over several lower Ideas, or objectifications of the will, acquires an entirely new character, precisely by taking up into itself from each of the overpowered ones an analogue raised to a higher power. The will objectifies itself in a new, more distinct way. There arises, originally by *generatio aequivoca*, later by assimilation to the existing germ, organic fluid, plant, animal, human being. Thus from the conflict of lower appearances emerges the higher one, which devours them all but also realizes the striving of all of them to a higher degree.—Here already, then, the law

30 Goethe, *Faust* Part One, lines 1940–41, spoken by Mephistopheles to the student; the Greek-Latin term means roughly nature's own manipulation.

holds: *serpens, nisi serpentem comederit, non fit draco* [a snake does not become a dragon unless it has eaten a snake].[31]

I wish it had been possible for me, through clarity of exposition, to overcome the obscurity that clings to the subject matter of these thoughts. But I see very well that the reader's own reflection must come greatly to my aid if I am not to go uncomprehended or be misunderstood. —According to the view given here, one will indeed be able to point out in the organism traces of chemical and physical modes of action, but never to explain it from them. For it is by no means a phenomenon produced by the combined action of such forces, and hence by chance. It is a higher Idea that has subjected those lower ones to itself by *overpowering assimilation*. For the *one* will that objectifies itself in all the Ideas, striving toward the highest possible objectification, here abandons the lower grades of its appearance after a conflict among them, in order to appear all the more powerfully at a higher one. No victory without struggle. Since the higher Idea, or objectification of the will, can come forth only by overpowering the lower ones, it meets with their resistance; for although brought into servitude, they still constantly strive to attain the independent and complete expression of their being. Think of the magnet that has lifted a piece of iron: it keeps up a continuous struggle with gravity, which, as the lowest objectification of the will, has a more original right to the matter of that iron; and in this constant struggle the magnet even grows stronger, since the resistance spurs it, as it were, to greater exertion. Just so, every appearance of the will, including the one presented in the human organism, keeps up a lasting struggle against the many physical and chemical forces which, as lower Ideas, have a prior right to that matter. That is why the arm one has held raised for a while, overcoming gravity, sinks. That is why the comfortable feeling of health, which expresses the victory of the Idea of the self-conscious organism over the physical and chemical laws that originally govern the fluids of the body, is nevertheless so

31 An old Latin proverb, quoted among others by Francis Bacon in his essay "Of Fortune."

often interrupted—indeed, is really always accompanied by a certain greater or lesser discomfort. This discomfort arises from the resistance of those forces, and through it even the vegetative part of our life is constantly bound up with a faint suffering. That is also why digestion depresses all the animal functions: it claims the whole vital force for overpowering chemical forces of nature through assimilation. Hence, in general, the burden of physical life, the necessity of sleep and finally of death. For in the end, favored by circumstances, those subjugated forces of nature win back from the organism, worn out even by its constant victory, the matter that was wrested from them, and attain the unhindered presentation of their being. One can therefore also say that every organism presents the Idea of which it is the copy only after deduction of that part of its force which is spent on overpowering the lower Ideas that dispute its matter with it. This seems to have been in Jakob Böhme's mind when he says somewhere that all the bodies of human beings and animals, and indeed all plants, are really half dead. According as the organism succeeds more or less in overpowering those forces of nature that express the lower grades of the objecthood of the will, it becomes a more perfect or a less perfect expression of its Idea; that is, it stands nearer to or further from the *ideal* to which, in its species, beauty belongs.

CONFLICT THROUGHOUT NATURE

Every grade of the will fights the others for matter, space and time; the will feeds on itself.

Thus everywhere in nature we see conflict, struggle and victory changing sides, and in this very fact we shall later recognize more clearly the division of the will against itself that is essential to it. Every grade of the objectification of the will disputes matter, space and time with the others. Persisting matter must constantly change its form, since, following the guiding thread of causality, mechanical, physical, chemical and organic appearances, greedily pressing to come forth, snatch matter away from

one another, each wanting to reveal its Idea. This conflict can be traced throughout the whole of nature; indeed, nature exists only through it: ei gar mê ên to neikos en tois pragmasin, hen an ên hapanta, hôs phêsin Empedoklês; (nam si non inesset in rebus contentio, unum omnia essent, ut ait Empedocles. Arist. Metaph.[32] B., 5): *[for if strife were not present in things, all would be one, as Empedocles says; Aristotle,* Metaphysics B, 5]—yet this strife itself is only the revelation of the will's essential division against itself. This universal struggle becomes most plainly visible in the animal world, which has the plant world for its food, and in which each animal in turn becomes the prey and food of another; that is, it must give up the matter in which its Idea was presented for the presentation of another, since every animal can maintain its existence only by constantly abolishing another's. So the will to live everywhere feeds on itself and is, in different forms, its own nourishment. Finally the human race, because it overpowers all the others, regards nature as a product manufactured for its use. Yet this same race too, as we shall find in the fourth book, reveals in itself that struggle, that self-division of the will, with the most terrible distinctness, and *homo homini lupus* [man is a wolf to man] comes true. Meanwhile, we shall recognize the same conflict, the same overpowering, just as well at the lower grades of the objecthood of the will.[33] Many insects (especially the ichneumon wasps) lay their eggs on the skin, indeed inside the body, of the larvae of other insects, whose slow destruction is the first work of the hatching brood. The young hydra, which grows out of the old one as a branch and later separates from it, is already fighting the old one for the prey that presents itself while it is still attached, so that one tears it out of the other's mouth (*Trembley, Polypod. II*, p. 110, and *III*, p. 165). The most glaring example of this kind, however, is provided by the bulldog ant (*bull-dog-ant*) of Australia. If it is cut in two, a battle begins between the head part and the tail part:

32 Empedocles (5th century BC), Greek philosopher who made Love and Strife the two moving forces of the cosmos.

33 A proverb from Plautus's comedy *Asinaria*, made famous by Hobbes.

the head attacks the tail with its jaws, and the tail defends itself bravely by stinging the head. The fight usually lasts half an hour, until they die or are dragged away by other ants. This happens every time. (From a letter by Howitt in the *W. Journal*, reprinted in Galignani's *Messenger* of 17 November 1855.) On the banks of the Missouri one sometimes sees a mighty oak so entwined, fettered and bound, on its trunk and all its branches, by a gigantic wild grapevine that it must wither as if strangled. The same thing appears even at the lowest grades, for example where through organic assimilation water and carbon are transformed into plant sap, or plants or bread into blood; and so wherever animal secretion takes place with the chemical forces restricted to a subordinate mode of action. Then, too, in inorganic nature, when, for example, crystals shooting up meet, cross and disturb one another so much that they cannot show the purely crystallized form—indeed, almost every druse is the image of such a conflict of the will at that very low grade of its objectification. Or when a magnet forces magnetism on iron in order to present its Idea there too. Or when galvanism overpowers elective affinities, decomposes the firmest compounds and suspends chemical laws to such an extent that the acid of a salt decomposed at the negative pole must travel to the positive pole without being allowed to combine with the alkalis through which it passes on the way, or even to redden the litmus it meets. On a large scale it shows itself in the relation between a central body and a planet. The planet, although dependent in varying degrees, still always resists, just as the chemical forces do in the organism. From this arises the constant tension between centripetal and centrifugal force that keeps the edifice of the universe in motion, and this tension is itself already an expression of that universal struggle, essential to the appearance of the will, which we are now considering. For since every body must be regarded as the appearance of a will, and will necessarily presents itself as a striving, the original state of every heavenly body balled into a sphere cannot be rest. It must be motion, a striving forward into infinite space, without rest or

goal. Neither the law of inertia nor the law of causality stands in the way of this. For since, according to the former, matter as such is indifferent to rest and motion, motion can be its original state just as well as rest. Hence, if we find it in motion, we are no more entitled to assume that a state of rest preceded it, and to ask for the cause of the onset of the motion, than, conversely, if we found it at rest, we would have to assume a motion preceding the rest and ask for the cause of its cessation. Hence no first impulse is to be sought for centrifugal force. In the case of the planets, according to the hypothesis of Kant and Laplace, it is a remnant of the original rotation of the central body, from which the planets separated as it contracted. To this central body itself, however, motion is essential: it still rotates, and at the same time flies onward through endless space, or perhaps circles around a greater central body invisible to us.[34] This view agrees entirely with the astronomers' conjecture of a central sun, and also with the observed advance of our whole solar system, and perhaps of the whole star cluster to which our sun belongs. From this, finally, a general advance of all the fixed stars, together with the central sun, may be inferred. In infinite space, of course, this advance loses all meaning (since motion in absolute space is indistinguishable from rest). And precisely through this, as already directly through the striving and flying without a goal, it becomes the expression of that nothingness, that lack of any final aim, which at the close of this book we shall have to ascribe to the striving of the will in all its appearances. That, in turn, is why endless space and endless time had to be the most universal and essential forms of the will's entire appearance, which exists to express its whole being. —Finally, we can recognize the struggle of all the appearances of the will against one another, which we have been considering, even in mere matter considered as such, insofar as Kant correctly stated the essence of its appearance to be repulsive and attractive force; so that matter itself has its existence only in a struggle of opposing

34 The nebular hypothesis, proposed by Kant (1755) and independently by Laplace (1796), derives the solar system from a rotating, contracting cloud of matter.

forces. If we abstract from all chemical difference in matter, or think ourselves back along the chain of causes and effects to the point where there is as yet no chemical difference, we are left with mere matter, the world balled into a sphere, whose life, that is,[35] objectification of the will, now consists in that struggle between the force of attraction and the force of repulsion: the former, as gravity, pressing in from all sides toward the center; the latter, as impenetrability, whether through rigidity or elasticity, resisting it. This constant pressure and resistance can be regarded as the objecthood of the will at the very lowest grade, and even there it expresses the will's character.

So here, at the lowest grade, we see the will presenting itself as a blind urge, an obscure, muffled striving, remote from all direct knowability. It is the simplest and feeblest mode of its objectification. Yet it still appears as such a blind urge and striving without knowledge throughout inorganic nature, in all the original forces whose discovery, and the learning of whose laws, keep physics and chemistry busy. Each of these forces presents itself to us in millions of entirely similar, law-governed appearances that show no trace of individual character. They are merely multiplied through time and space, that is, through the *principium individuationis*, as an image is multiplied by the facets of a cut glass.

Objectifying itself more distinctly from grade to grade, the will nevertheless still acts entirely without knowledge, as a dark driving force, even in the plant kingdom, where the bond among its appearances is no longer causes in the proper sense but stimuli. And so, finally, it acts without knowledge in the vegetative part of animal appearance too: in the generation and development of every animal and in the maintenance of its internal economy, where only mere stimuli still determine its appearance with necessity. The ever higher grades of the will's objecthood at last lead to a point where the individual that presents the Idea could no longer obtain the food it must assim-

35 Kant constructs matter from an attractive and a repulsive force in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.

ilate by mere movement in response to stimuli. For a stimulus has to be waited for. Here, however, the food is of a more specifically determined kind. With the ever-growing multiplicity of appearances, the crowding and confusion have also become so great that they interfere with one another, and chance, from which an individual moved by mere stimuli must expect its food, would be too unfavorable. From the point at which the animal has struggled free of the egg or the womb in which it vegetated without knowledge, its food must therefore be sought out and selected.

KNOWLEDGE KINDLES A LIGHT

At a high grade the will produces knowledge as a tool, and the world as representation appears.

This makes movement in response to motives necessary here, and, because of motives, knowledge. Knowledge therefore enters as an aid required at this grade of the will's objectification, a *mêchanê* [device], for preserving the individual and propagating the species. It emerges represented by the brain or a larger ganglion, just as every other endeavor or determination of the self-objectifying will is represented by an organ, that is, presents itself to representation as an organ.[36]—But with this aid, this *mêchanê*, the *world as representation* now stands there at a single stroke, with all its forms: object and subject, time, space, plurality and causality. The world now shows its second side. Hitherto mere *will*, it is now at the same time *representation*, object of the knowing subject. The will, which up to this point pursued its drive in darkness, with the greatest certainty and infallibility, has at this grade kindled a light for itself. The light is a means that had become necessary to remove a disadvantage. That disadvantage would arise from the crowding and complicated nature of its appearances, and would fall pre-

36 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 22 of the second volume (the Supplements); also my essay *On the Will in Nature*, pp. 54 ff. and pp. 70–79 of the first edition, or pp. 46 ff. and pp. 63–72 of the second.

cisely on the most perfect of them. The infallible certainty and regularity with which the will had so far worked in inorganic and merely vegetative nature rested on the fact that it was active solely in its original essence, as blind urge, as will. It had no assistance, but also no disturbance, from a second, entirely different world, the world as representation. That world is indeed only the copy of the will's own essence, yet it is of quite another nature, and it now intervenes in the connection of the will's appearances. With this, their infallible certainty comes to an end. Animals are already exposed to illusion and deception. They have, however, only intuitive representations: no concepts, no reflection. They are therefore bound to the present and cannot take the future into account.—It seems as though this knowledge without reason was not sufficient for its purpose in every case, and sometimes needed a helping hand, as it were. For we are presented with the very remarkable phenomenon that, in two kinds of appearances, the blind working of the will and the working illuminated by knowledge reach over, in a most surprising way, each into the other's territory. In the first case, amid the conduct of animals guided by intuitive knowledge and its motives, we find conduct carried out without these, and so with the necessity of the blindly working will: in the constructive instincts. Guided by no motive and no knowledge, these look as though they brought their works about on abstract, rational motives. The other, opposite case is where, conversely, the light of knowledge penetrates into the workshop of the blindly working will and illuminates the vegetative functions of the human organism: in magnetic clairvoyance.[37] —Finally, where the will has reached the highest degree of its objectification, the knowledge that dawned in animals is no longer enough. This is the knowledge of the understanding, to which the senses supply the data, and from which arises mere intuition, bound to the present. The human being is a complicated, many-sided, malleable, supremely needy being, exposed to countless injuries. In

37 "Magnetic clairvoyance" is the trance state claimed by practitioners of animal magnetism (mesmerism), which Schopenhauer took seriously.

order to survive, this being had to be illuminated by a twofold knowledge. A higher power, as it were, of intuitive knowledge had to be added to it, a reflection of it: reason, as the faculty of abstract concepts. With reason came reflectiveness. It contains a survey of future and past and, in consequence, deliberation, care, the capacity for premeditated action independent of the present, and finally a fully distinct consciousness of one's own decisions of will as such. Mere intuitive knowledge had already brought in the possibility of illusion and deception, and with it the former infallibility of the will's knowledgeless drive was abolished. That is why instinct and constructive instinct, as manifestations of will without knowledge, had to come to its aid amid the manifestations guided by knowledge. With the entry of reason, however, that certainty and unerringness of the will's manifestations is almost entirely lost. (At the other extreme, in inorganic nature, it even appears as strict regularity by law.) Instinct withdraws completely. Deliberation, which is now supposed to replace everything, gives birth (as shown in the first book) to wavering and uncertainty. Error becomes possible, and in many cases it hinders the adequate objectification of the will through deeds. For the will has already taken its definite and unalterable direction in the character, and in accordance with that direction willing itself infallibly occurs on the occasion of motives. Even so, error can falsify the will's manifestations, because delusive motives then flow in like real ones and cancel them.[38] This happens, for example, when superstition substitutes imaginary motives that force a person into a course of action directly opposed to the way his will would otherwise express itself in the given circumstances. Agamemnon

38 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. The Scholastics therefore put it very well: *Causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum* [The final cause moves not according to its real being but according to its being as known]. See Suárez, *Disp. metaph. disp. XXIII, sect. 7 et 8* [*Metaphysical Disputations*, disputation 23, sections 7 and 8].

slaughters his daughter; a miser gives alms out of pure egoism, hoping to be repaid a hundredfold one day; and so on.[39]

Knowledge in general, rational as well as merely intuitive, thus springs originally from the will itself. It belongs to the essence of the higher grades of the will's objectification as a mere *mêchanê*, a means for preserving the individual and the species, just like any organ of the body. Originally destined, then, to serve the will and accomplish its aims, knowledge also remains almost everywhere entirely in its service: so in all animals and in almost all human beings. Yet we shall see in the third book how, in individual human beings, knowledge can withdraw from this servitude, throw off its yoke, and, free from all the aims of willing, exist purely for itself, as a mere clear mirror of the world. This is the source of art. Finally, in the fourth book, we shall see how this kind of knowledge, when it acts back upon the will, can bring about the will's self-abolition, that is, resignation. Resignation is the final goal, indeed the innermost essence, of all virtue and holiness, and it is redemption from the world.

§ 28. THE PYRAMID OF NATURE

All grades together express the one will, which explains the inner and outer purposiveness of nature.

2.28 We have considered the great multiplicity and diversity of the appearances in which the will objectifies itself; indeed, we have seen their endless and irreconcilable struggle against one another. Yet according to our whole account so far, the will itself, as thing in itself, is by no means included in that plurality, that change. The diversity of the (Platonic) Ideas, that is, of the gradations of objectification, the multitude of individuals in which each of these presents itself, the struggle of forms for matter: none of this touches the will. It is only the manner of the will's objectification, and only through this does it have an indir-

39 In Greek legend, Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia at Aulis, at a seer's bidding, to obtain winds for the Greek fleet sailing to Troy.

ect relation to the will, by virtue of which it belongs to the expression of the will's essence for representation. A magic lantern shows many and varied images, yet it is only one and the same flame that gives them all their visibility. In the same way, in all the manifold appearances that fill the world side by side, or displace one another in succession as events, it is only the *one will* that appears. All of it is the will's visibility, its objecthood, and the will remains unmoved amid all that change. It alone is the thing in itself; every object, however, is appearance, phenomenon, to speak in Kant's language.—Although in the human being, as (Platonic) Idea, the will finds its most distinct and most perfect objectification, this alone still could not express its essence. To appear in its proper significance, the Idea of the human being could not present itself alone and in isolation. It had to be accompanied by the descending series of grades through all the forms of animals, through the plant kingdom, down to the inorganic. Only all of them together make up the complete objectification of the will. They are presupposed by the Idea of the human being as the blossoms of a tree presuppose leaves, branches, trunk and root. They form a pyramid, and its apex is the human being. Or, if one enjoys comparisons, one can say that their appearance accompanies that of the human being as necessarily as full light is accompanied by the gradual gradations of all the half-shadows through which it fades into darkness. Or again, one can call them the echo of the human being and say: animal and plant are the descending fifth and third of the human being, and the inorganic kingdom is the lower octave. But the whole truth of this last simile will become clear to us only in the next book, when we try to fathom the deep significance of music. There it will be shown that melody, progressing coherently in high, nimble tones, is in a certain sense to be regarded as presenting the life and striving of the human being, which has its coherence through reflection. By contrast, the unconnected ripieno parts and the heavily moving bass, from which the harmony necessary to the completeness of music arises, portray the rest of nature, animal and without

knowledge. But more of this in its place, where it will no longer sound so paradoxical.[40] —But we also find that *inner necessity* of the series of grades of the will's appearances, which is inseparable from the will's adequate objecthood, expressed in the whole of these appearances by an *outer necessity*. This is the necessity by which the human being needs animals for his preservation, and the animals, grade by grade, need one another. They also need plants, which in turn need soil, water, the chemical elements and their compounds, the planet, the sun, rotation and revolution around the sun, the obliquity of the ecliptic, and so on.—At bottom this springs from the fact that the will must feed on itself, because nothing exists besides it and it is a hungry will. Hence the hunt, the anguish and the suffering.

Only knowledge of the unity of the will, as thing in itself, amid the infinite diversity and multiplicity of appearances, gives the true explanation of that wondrous, unmistakable analogy among all the productions of nature. It explains that family resemblance which lets us regard them as variations on the same theme, a theme not given along with them. In the same way, a clear and deeply grasped knowledge of that harmony, that essential connection of all the parts of the world, that necessity of their gradation which we have just considered, will open up to us a true and sufficient insight into the inner essence and meaning of the undeniable *purposiveness* of all organic products of nature. We even presuppose this purposiveness *a priori* when we consider and judge them.[41]

This *purposiveness* is of two kinds. In part it is *inner*: an agreement among all the parts of an individual organism, so ordered that the preservation of the organism and of its species results from it, and therefore presents itself as the purpose of that arrangement. In part, however, purposiveness is *outer*. It is then a relation of inorganic nature to organic nature in general, or of

40 Ripieno parts: the "filling" inner voices of an ensemble, as distinct from the leading or solo part.

41 "Purposiveness" (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) is Kant's term in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*: the appearance of being designed for an end.

individual parts of organic nature to one another, that makes possible the preservation of organic nature as a whole, or of individual animal species, and therefore strikes our judgment as a means to this end.

Now *inner purposiveness* enters the context of our discussion as follows. If, according to what has been said so far, all diversity of forms in nature and all plurality of individuals belong not to the will but only to its objecthood and the form of that objecthood, it necessarily follows that the will is indivisible and wholly present in every appearance, though the degrees of its objectification, the (Platonic) Ideas, differ greatly. For ease of understanding, we may regard these different Ideas as individual acts of will, simple in themselves, in which the will's essence expresses itself to a greater or lesser degree. The individuals, in turn, are appearances of the Ideas, and so of those acts, in time and space and plurality. —Now, on the lowest grades of objecthood, such an act (or an Idea) retains its unity even in appearance. On the higher grades, by contrast, it needs a whole series of states and developments in time in order to appear, and only all of these taken together complete the expression of its essence. Thus, for example, the Idea that reveals itself in any universal force of nature always has only a single, simple manifestation, even though this presents itself differently according to external circumstances. Otherwise its identity could not even be demonstrated, which is done precisely by separating out the diversity that springs merely from the external circumstances. In the same way the crystal has only *one* manifestation of life, its crystallizing. Afterward, this has its wholly sufficient and exhaustive expression in the solidified form, the corpse of that momentary life. The plant, however, already expresses the Idea whose appearance it is not all at once and through a simple manifestation, but in a succession of developments of its organs in time. The animal not only develops its organism in the same way, in a succession of often very different forms (metamorphosis). This form itself, though already the objecthood of the will at this grade, is not sufficient for a com-

plete presentation of its Idea. Rather, the Idea is completed only by the animal's actions. In them its empirical character, which is the same throughout the species, expresses itself, and this is only then the complete revelation of the Idea, presupposing the specific organism as its basic condition. In the human being, the empirical character is already peculiar to each individual (indeed, as we shall see in the fourth book, to the point of wholly abolishing the character of the species, namely through the self-abolition of all willing). Through the necessary development in time, and the breaking up into individual actions that this entails, something is known as empirical character. When we abstract from this temporal form of appearance, it is the *intelligible character*, to use the expression of Kant. His immortal merit shows itself especially splendidly in demonstrating this distinction and presenting the relation between freedom and necessity, that is, really, between the will as thing in itself and its appearance in time.[42] The intelligible character therefore coincides with the Idea, or more properly still with the original act of will that reveals itself in the Idea. To this extent, not only the empirical character of every human being but also that of every animal species, indeed of every plant species and even of every original force of inorganic nature, is to be regarded as the appearance of an intelligible character, that is, of an indivisible act of will outside time.—In passing, I should like to draw attention here to the naivety with which every plant expresses and openly displays its entire character through its mere shape, revealing its whole being and willing. This is what makes the physiognomies of plants so interesting. The animal, by contrast, must already be observed in its doings and dealings if it is to be known according to its Idea. The human being must be thoroughly investigated and put to the test, since reason makes him capable of dissimulation to a high degree. The animal is just as

42 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Resolution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality of the Derivation of Cosmic Events," pp. 560–586 of the fifth and pp. 532 ff. of the first edition, and *Critique of Practical Reason*, fourth edition, pp. 169–179; Rosenkranz's edition, pp. 224 ff. Compare my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 43.

much more naive than the human being as the plant is more naive than the animal. In the animal we see the will to live more naked, as it were, than in the human being. In us it is clothed in so much knowledge, and veiled besides by the capacity for dissimulation, that its true nature comes to light almost only by chance and here and there. Quite naked, but also much weaker, it shows itself in the plant, as a mere blind urge to exist, without purpose or goal. For the plant reveals its whole being at first glance and with perfect innocence. That innocence does not suffer from the fact that it carries its genitals on its summit, on show for all to see, when in all animals they have been given the most hidden place. This innocence of the plant rests on its lack of knowledge: guilt lies not in willing, but in willing with knowledge. Every plant, then, speaks first of its homeland, of the climate there and the nature of the soil from which it sprang. That is why even someone with little practice easily recognizes whether an exotic plant belongs to the tropical or the temperate zone, and whether it grows in water, in a marsh, on mountains or on the heath. But beyond this, every plant also expresses the special will of its species and says something that cannot be expressed in any other language.—But now to the application of what has been said to the teleological consideration of organisms, insofar as it concerns their inner purposiveness. In inorganic nature, the Idea, which is everywhere to be regarded as a single act of will, also reveals itself only in a single, always identical manifestation. One can therefore say that here the empirical character directly shares in the unity of the intelligible character and, as it were, coincides with it, which is why no inner purposiveness can appear here. All organisms, by contrast, present their Idea through a succession of developments, one after another, conditioned by a multiplicity of different parts, side by side. The sum of the manifestations of their empirical character is therefore the expression of the intelligible character only when taken all together. But this necessary side-by-side of the parts and one-after-another of the development does not abolish the unity of the appearing Idea, of the act of will that

manifests itself. Rather, this unity now finds its expression in the necessary relation and interlinking of those parts and developments with one another, according to the law of causality. It is the one and indivisible will, and for that very reason wholly in agreement with itself, that reveals itself in the whole Idea as in a single act. Its appearance, therefore, though it breaks apart into a diversity of parts and states, must nevertheless show that unity again in a thoroughgoing agreement among them. This happens through a necessary relation and dependence of all the parts on one another, through which the unity of the Idea is restored in the appearance too. Accordingly, we now recognize those various parts and functions of the organism as reciprocally means and end of one another, and the organism itself as the final end of them all. Consider, then, on the one hand, the breaking apart of the Idea, simple in itself, into the plurality of the organism's parts and states. Consider, on the other, the restoration of its unity through the necessary connection of those parts and functions, by their being cause and effect, and hence means and end, of one another. Both are peculiar and essential not to the appearing will as such, the thing in itself, but only to its appearance in space, time and causality (nothing but shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, the form of appearance). They belong to the world as representation, not to the world as will: they belong to the way in which the will becomes object, that is, representation, at this grade of its objecthood. Whoever has grasped the meaning of this perhaps somewhat difficult discussion will now understand Kant's doctrine properly. It holds that both the purposiveness of the organic and the lawfulness of the inorganic are first brought into nature by our understanding, and that both therefore belong only to appearance, not to the thing in itself. The astonishment mentioned above at the infallible constancy of the lawfulness of inorganic nature is essentially the same as the astonishment at the purposiveness of organic nature. For in both cases what surprises us is only the

sight of the original unity of the Idea, which, for appearance, had taken on the form of plurality and diversity.[43]

Now for the second kind of purposiveness in the classification made above, the outer kind. It shows itself not in the internal economy of organisms but in the support and help they receive from outside, both from inorganic nature and from one another. This kind too finds its general explanation in the discussion just set out. For the whole world, with all its appearances, is the objecthood of the one and indivisible will. It is the Idea that relates to all other Ideas as harmony relates to the individual voices. Hence that unity of the will must also show itself in the agreement of all its appearances with one another. But we can raise this insight to much greater clarity if we look somewhat more closely at the phenomena of that outer purposiveness, the agreement of the various parts of nature with one another. This discussion will at the same time cast light back on the preceding one. We shall best arrive at it by considering the following analogy.

The character of each individual human being, insofar as it is thoroughly individual and not wholly contained in that of the species, can be regarded as a particular Idea, corresponding to a distinctive act of the will's objectification. This act itself would then be his intelligible character, and his empirical character would be its appearance. The empirical character is wholly and completely determined by the intelligible one. The intelligible character is groundless will, that is, will that as thing in itself is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason (the form of appearance). The empirical character must furnish the copy of the intelligible character in the course of a life, and cannot turn out otherwise than the essence of the intelligible character demands. But this determination extends only to what is essential in the course of life that accordingly appears, not to what is inessential. The inessential includes the more precise determination of the events and actions that are the material in which the

43 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Compare *On the Will in Nature*, at the end of the section "Comparative Anatomy."

empirical character shows itself. These are determined by external circumstances, which supply the motives to which the character reacts according to its nature. Since these circumstances can differ greatly, the outer shape of the empirical character's appearance, that is, the specific factual or historical shape of the course of life, will have to conform to their influence. This shape can turn out very differently, even though what is essential in this appearance, its content, remains the same. Thus, for example, it is inessential whether one plays for nuts or for crowns; but whether one cheats at the game or plays honestly, that is what is essential. The latter is determined by the intelligible character, the former by external influence. Just as the same theme can present itself in a hundred variations, so can the same character in a hundred very different courses of life. But however varied the external influence may be, and whatever form it takes, the empirical character that expresses itself in the course of a life must nevertheless objectify the intelligible character exactly. It does so by adapting its objectification to the material of factual circumstances it finds before it. — Now, if we want to think how the will, in the original act of its objectification, determines the various Ideas in which it objectifies itself, we must assume something analogous to this influence of external circumstances on a course of life essentially determined by the character. These Ideas are the various forms of natural beings of every kind among which the will distributes its objectification, and which must therefore necessarily have a relation to one another in appearance. We must assume that among all those appearances of the *one* will there took place a universal mutual adaptation and accommodation. Here, however, as we shall soon see more clearly, every determination of time must be left out, since the Idea lies outside time. Accordingly, each appearance had to adapt itself to the surroundings it entered, but these in turn also had to adapt to it, even if it occupies a much later place in time; and everywhere we see this *consensus naturae* [harmony of nature]. That is why every plant is suited to its soil and climate, and every animal to its element

and to the prey that is to become its food; and why every animal is also, in some way and to some degree, protected against its natural pursuer. The eye is suited to light and its refrangibility, the lungs and blood to air, the swim bladder to water, the eye of the seal to the change of its medium, the water-holding cells in the camel's stomach to the drought of African deserts, the sail of the nautilus to the wind that is to drive its little boat—and so on, down to the most specific and astonishing instances of outer purposiveness.[44][45] Here, however, we must abstract from all temporal relations, since these can concern only the appearance of the Idea, not the Idea itself. Accordingly, this kind of explanation must also be applied in reverse. We must assume not only that each species accommodated itself to the circumstances it found, but that these circumstances themselves, which preceded it in time, likewise took account of the beings still to come. For it is, after all, one and the same will that objectifies itself in the whole world. It knows no time, since this shape of the principle of sufficient reason belongs neither to the will nor to its original objecthood, the Ideas. It belongs only to the way in which the Ideas are known by individuals who are themselves transient, that is, to the appearance of the Ideas. Hence, in our present consideration of how the will's objectification is distributed among the Ideas, temporal succession has no significance at all. Some Ideas have *appearances* that entered the temporal sequence earlier, in accordance with the law of causality to which they are subject as appearances. This gives them no precedence over those whose appearance enters later. On the contrary, the later ones are precisely the most perfect objectifications of the will, and the earlier ones had to adapt to them just as much as they had to adapt to the earlier. Thus the course of the planets, the inclination of the ecliptic, the rotation of the earth, the distribution of land and sea, the atmosphere, light, heat and

44 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See *On the Will in Nature*, the section "Comparative Anatomy."

45 The "sail" of the nautilus refers to the paper nautilus (argonaut), long believed to raise its webbed arms as a sail.

all similar *appearances*, which are in nature what the ground bass is in harmony, accommodated themselves, as if in foreboding, to the species of living beings to come, whose bearers and sustainers they were to become. In the same way the soil accommodated itself to the nourishment of plants, plants to the nourishment of animals, and these to the nourishment of other animals, just as, conversely, all of these in turn accommodated themselves to the former. All the parts of nature meet one another halfway, because it is *one* will that appears in all of them. Temporal succession, however, is wholly foreign to the will's original and only *adequate objecthood* (the next book explains this expression), the Ideas. Even now, when species have only to maintain themselves and no longer to come into being, we see here and there such a provision of nature, one that reaches into the future and really, as it were, abstracts from temporal succession: an accommodation of what exists to what is yet to come. Thus the bird builds the nest for young it does not yet know. The beaver builds a lodge whose purpose is unknown to it. The ant, the hamster and the bee gather stores for a winter unknown to them. The spider and the antlion set traps, as if with deliberate cunning, for future prey unknown to them. Insects lay their eggs where the future brood will find food in the future. At flowering time, the female flower of the dioecious Vallisneria unwinds the spiral coils of its stalk, which until then had held it at the bottom of the water, and so rises to the surface. At exactly that moment, the male flower, growing on a short stalk at the bottom of the water, tears itself loose from its stalk and so reaches the surface, at the sacrifice of its life. There it swims about in search of the female flower. After fertilization has taken place, the female flower contracts its spiral and withdraws again to the bottom, where the fruit develops.[46] Here too I must once more mention the larva of the male stag beetle, which gnaws its hole in the wood for its metamorphosis twice as

46 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Chatin, *Sur la Valisneria spiralis* [On Vallisneria spiralis], in the *Comptes rendus de l'acad. d. sc.* [Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences], no. 13, 1855.

large as the female does, to make room for its future horns.[47] In general, then, the instinct of animals gives us the best illustration of the rest of nature's teleology. For just as instinct is an action like one guided by a concept of purpose, and yet entirely without one, so all of nature's shaping is like shaping guided by a concept of purpose, and yet entirely without one. For in the outer as in the inner teleology of nature, what we must think of as means and end is everywhere only what, for our mode of knowledge, has broken apart in space and time: *the appearance of the unity of the one will, which is so far in agreement with itself.*

Even so, the mutual adaptation and accommodation of appearances that springs from this unity cannot erase the inner conflict described above, which appears in the universal struggle of nature and is essential to the will. That harmony goes only so far as to make possible the continued existence of the world and its beings, which without it would long since have perished. It therefore extends only to the continued existence of the species and of the general conditions of life, not to that of individuals. By virtue of that harmony and accommodation, the *species* in the organic realm and the *universal forces of nature* in the inorganic exist side by side and even support one another. The inner conflict of the will objectified through all those Ideas, on the other hand, shows itself in the ceaseless war of extermination among the *individuals* of those species, and in the constant wrestling of the *appearances* of those natural forces with one another, as set out above. The arena and the object of this struggle is matter, which they strive to wrest from one another. It is also space and time, whose union through the form of causality is really what matter is, as demonstrated in the first book.[48]

47 Vallisneria (eelgrass or tape grass) is a freshwater plant whose male and female flowers grow on separate plants.

48 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapters 26 and 27 of the second volume (the Supplements).

§ 29. WHAT DOES THE WILL WANT?

The world is through and through will and representation; the will itself has no final goal.

2.29 I conclude here the second main part of my exposition. I hope that I have succeeded—so far as this is possible in the very first communication of a thought that has never existed before, and which therefore cannot be wholly free of the traces of the individuality in which it was first generated—in conveying a clear certainty: that this world in which we live and have our being is, in its whole essence, through and through *will* and at the same time through and through *representation*; that this representation, already as such, presupposes a form, namely object and subject, and is therefore relative; and that, if we ask what still remains once this form and all the forms subordinate to it, which the principle of sufficient reason expresses, are abolished, this can be nothing other than *will*, as something *toto genere* different from representation, and that the will is therefore the real *thing in itself*. Everyone finds himself to be this will, in which the inner essence of the world consists. He also finds himself to be the knowing subject, whose representation the whole world is, and to that extent the world exists only in relation to his consciousness, as its necessary bearer. In this double respect, then, everyone is himself the whole world, the microcosm, and finds both its sides whole and complete within himself. And what he thus recognizes as his own essence also exhausts the essence of the whole world, the macrocosm. So the world too, like himself, is through and through will and through and through representation, and nothing else remains. So here we see the philosophy of Thales, which considered the macrocosm, and that of Socrates, which considered the microcosm, coincide, since the object of both proves to be the same.—The whole of the knowledge communicated in the first two books, however, will gain greater completeness, and with it greater certainty, from the two books still to follow. In them, I hope, many a

question that may have arisen, clearly or vaguely, in the course of our discussion so far will also find a satisfactory answer.[49]

Meanwhile *one* such question may be discussed separately here. It can really be raised only as long as one has not yet fully grasped the meaning of the preceding account, and to that extent it can serve to illustrate it. It is this. Every will is a will for something; it has an object, a goal of its willing. What, then, does that will ultimately want, what does it strive for—the will that has been presented to us as the being in itself of the world? —This question, like so many others, rests on confusing the thing in itself with appearance. The principle of sufficient reason, of which the law of motivation is also a shape, extends only to appearance, not to the thing in itself. A reason can always be given only for appearances as such, for individual things, never for the will itself, nor for the Idea in which it adequately objectifies itself. Thus for every individual movement, or change in general, in nature a cause is to be sought, that is, a state that necessarily brought it about. But a cause is never to be sought for the force of nature itself that reveals itself in that change and in countless similar appearances. It is therefore sheer lack of understanding, springing from a want of reflection, to ask for a cause of gravity, of electricity, and so on. Only if it had been shown, say, that gravity and electricity were not original, distinctive forces of nature but only modes of appearance of a more general, already known force of nature, could one ask for the cause that makes this force of nature produce the appearance of gravity, or of electricity, here. All this has been set out at length above. In just the same way, every individual act of will of a knowing individual (who is himself only an appearance of the will as thing in itself) necessarily has a motive, without which that act would never occur. The material cause contains merely the determination that at this time, in this place, in this matter, a manifestation of this or that force of

49 Thales of Miletus (6th century BC), traditionally the first Greek philosopher, inquired into the nature of the cosmos; Socrates (469–399 BC) turned philosophy toward the human being and self-knowledge.

nature must occur. Just so, the motive determines only the act of will of a knowing being, at this time, in this place, under these circumstances, as something wholly individual. It by no means determines that this being wills at all, and wills in this way. That is the manifestation of its intelligible character, which, as the will itself, the thing in itself, is groundless, since it lies outside the domain of the principle of sufficient reason. That is why every human being always has purposes and motives by which he guides his conduct, and can always give an account of his individual actions. But if one were to ask him why he wills at all, or why he wants to exist at all, he would have no answer; the question would rather seem absurd to him. And in precisely this, really, his awareness would find expression that he himself is nothing but will. His willing in general therefore goes without saying, and needs closer determination by motives only in its individual acts, for each moment in time.

In fact, the absence of any goal, of any limit, belongs to the essence of the will in itself, which is an endless striving. This was already touched on above, when centrifugal force was mentioned. It also reveals itself most simply on the very lowest grade of the will's objecthood, namely in gravity, whose constant striving, in the face of the evident impossibility of a final goal, is there before our eyes. For even if all existing matter were united in a single lump, as gravity wills, inside that lump gravity, striving toward the center, would still be struggling with impenetrability, in the form of rigidity or elasticity. The striving of matter can therefore only ever be checked, never, ever fulfilled or satisfied. But this is exactly how it is with all the striving of all the will's appearances. Every goal attained is again the beginning of a new course, and so on to infinity. The plant raises its appearance from the seed through stem and leaf to blossom and fruit, which again is only the beginning of a new seed, a new individual, which once more runs the old course, and so on through infinite time. The life course of the animal is the same. Procreation is its summit; once this is reached, the life of the first individual declines, quickly or slowly, while a new one

guarantees nature the preservation of the species and repeats the same appearance. Indeed, the constant renewal of the matter of every organism is also to be regarded as the mere appearance of this constant urge and change. Physiologists are now ceasing to regard this renewal as the necessary replacement of the material used up in movement, since the possible wear on the machine can in no way be equivalent to the constant inflow through nutrition. Eternal becoming, endless flux, belongs to the revelation of the will's essence. The same shows itself, finally, in human strivings and desires, which always delude us by presenting their fulfillment as the final goal of willing. But as soon as they are attained, they no longer look the same. They are therefore soon forgotten, grow antiquated, and are really always, even if we do not admit it, laid aside as vanished illusions. We are lucky enough if something is still left to wish for and strive after, so that the game of constant passage from desire to satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a new desire, is kept going. When it runs quickly it is called happiness; when it runs slowly, suffering. And so it does not come to that standstill which shows itself as dreadful, life-numbing boredom, a dull longing without any definite object, a deadening *languor* [listlessness]. —In consequence of all this, the will, where knowledge illuminates it, always knows what it wills now, what it wills here, but never what it wills in general. Every individual act has a purpose; willing as a whole has none. In just the same way, every individual natural phenomenon is determined by a sufficient cause to occur in this place, at this time, but the force manifesting itself in it has no cause at all, since such a force is a grade of appearance of the thing in itself, of the groundless will. —The only self-knowledge of the will as a whole, however, is representation as a whole, the entire intuitive world. It is the will's objecthood, its revelation, its mirror. What it tells us in this capacity will be the subject of our further consideration.[50]

50 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 28 of the second volume (the Supplements).

Book Three

Drittes Buch. Der Welt als Vorstellung zweite Betrachtung: Die Vorstellung, unabhängig vom Satze des Grundes: die Platonische Idee: das Objekt der Kunst
The World as Representation, second aspect: representation independent of the principle of sufficient reason; the Platonic Idea; the object of art.

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[3] *Ti to on yen aei, genesin de ouk echon; kai ti to gignomenon men kai apollymenon, ontôs de oudepote on;* [What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which becomes and passes away, but never truly is?] / *PLATÔN*[1]

IDEAS AS THE GRADES OF THE WILL

The Platonic Ideas are the fixed grades in which the will becomes object, outside time and plurality.

[3.30] In the first book the world was presented as mere *representation*, object for a subject. In the second book we considered it from its other side and found that this side is *will*, which alone proved to be what that world is besides representation. In keeping with this insight, we called the world as representation, both as a whole and in its parts, the *objecthood of the will*, which accordingly means: the will that has become object, i.e. representation. We further recall that this objectification of the will had many but definite grades. On these, with gradually increasing distinctness and perfection, the nature of the will entered into representation, i.e. presented itself as object. Already there

1 Plato, *Timaeus* 27d–28a.

we recognized Plato's Ideas in these grades, insofar as those grades are precisely the determinate species, or the original, unchanging forms and properties of all natural bodies, inorganic as well as organic, and also the universal forces that reveal themselves according to natural laws. These Ideas, then, taken together, present themselves in countless individuals and particulars, to which they stand as the archetype stands to its copies. The plurality of such individuals can be represented only through time and space, and their arising and passing away only through causality. In all these forms we recognize nothing but the different shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, which is the ultimate principle of all finitude and all individuation, and the universal form of representation as it falls within the knowledge of the individual as such. The Idea, on the other hand, does not enter into that principle, and hence neither plurality nor change belongs to it. While the individuals in which it presents itself are countless and ceaselessly come into being and pass away, it remains unchanged, one and the same, and the principle of sufficient reason has no meaning for it. But since this principle is the form under which all the subject's knowledge stands, insofar as the subject knows as an *individual*, the Ideas will also lie entirely outside the sphere of its knowledge as such. If, therefore, the Ideas are to become objects of knowledge, this can happen only through the abolition of individuality in the knowing subject. The closer and more detailed explanation of this is what will now occupy us first.

KANT'S THING IN ITSELF AND PLATO'S IDEA

Kant and Plato, set side by side, teach at bottom the same thing about the world of appearance.

3.31 First, however, the following very essential remark. I hope that in the preceding book I have succeeded in producing the conviction that what Kant's philosophy calls the *thing in itself*—which appears there as a highly significant yet obscure and paradoxical doctrine, and which, above all because of the way

Kant introduced it, namely by inference from what is grounded to its ground, was found to be a stumbling block, indeed the weak side of his philosophy—that this, I say, when one arrives at it by the entirely different path we have taken, is nothing other than the *will*, in the sphere of this concept as extended and defined in the manner indicated. I hope further that, after what has been set out, no one will hesitate to recognize, in the definite grades of the objectification of that will which constitutes the in-itself of the world, what Plato called the *eternal Ideas*, or the unchangeable forms (*eidê*). Acknowledged as the principal yet at the same time most obscure and paradoxical dogma of his teaching, they have been an object of reflection, dispute, mockery and veneration for so many and such differently minded heads over a succession of centuries.

Now if for us the will is the *thing in itself*, while the *Idea* is the immediate objecthood of that will at a definite grade, then we find Kant's thing in itself and Plato's Idea, which for him alone is *ontôs on* [that which truly is]—these two great obscure paradoxes of the two greatest philosophers of the West—to be not indeed identical, but still very closely related, and distinguished by only a single determination. Indeed, for all their inner harmony and kinship, these two great paradoxes sound so extremely different because of the extraordinarily different individualities of their authors; and precisely for that reason each is the best commentary on the other, for they are like two quite different paths leading to *one* goal.—This can be made clear in a few words. What *Kant* says is, in essence, the following: "Time, space and causality are not determinations of the thing in itself; they belong only to its appearance, since they are nothing but forms of our knowledge. But since all plurality and all arising and passing away are possible only through time, space and causality, it follows that these too attach only to appearance and in no way to the thing in itself. And because our knowledge is conditioned by those forms, the whole of experience is only knowledge of appearance, not of the thing in itself; hence its laws cannot be made valid for the thing in itself either. What has been

said extends even to our own self: we know it only as appearance, not as it may be in itself." This, in the important respect under consideration, is the sense and content of Kant's teaching. —Plato, for his part, says: "The things of this world, which our senses perceive, have no true being at all: *they are always becoming, but never are*. They have only a relative being; all of them exist only in and through their relation to one another; hence one may just as well call their whole existence a non-being. Consequently they are not objects of knowledge proper (*epistêmê*) either: for there can be such knowledge only of what is in and for itself and always in the same way, whereas they are only the object of an opinion occasioned by sensation (*doxa met' aisthêseôs alogou*). So long as we are confined to perceiving them, we are like people sitting in a dark cave, bound so tightly that they cannot even turn their heads. By the light of a fire burning behind them, they see on the wall opposite them nothing but the shadows of real things that are carried past between them and the fire; and even of one another, indeed each of himself, they see only the shadows on that wall.[2] Their wisdom would consist in predicting the sequence of those shadows as learned from experience. What alone, by contrast, can be called truly being (*ontôs on*), because it *always is, but never becomes nor passes away*, are the real archetypes of those shadow images: they are the eternal Ideas, the original forms of all things. *No plurality* belongs to them: for each is by its nature only one, since it is the archetype itself, whose copies or shadows are all the individual, perishable things of the same kind that bear its name. Nor does *any arising and passing away* belong to them: for they truly are, and never become or perish, as their fleeting copies do. (These two negative determinations, however, necessarily presuppose that time, space and causality have neither meaning nor validity for them, and that they do not exist in these.) Of them alone, therefore, is there knowledge proper, since the object of such knowledge can only be what always and in every respect (hence in itself) is—not what is, and then again is not, depending on

2 Plato's allegory of the cave, *Republic* 7, 514a–517a.

how one looks at it."—This is Plato's teaching. It is obvious and needs no further demonstration that the inner meaning of both teachings is entirely the same. Both declare the visible world to be an appearance that is in itself null and has meaning and a borrowed reality only through what expresses itself in it (for the one, the thing in itself; for the other, the Idea). And to this latter, the truly existent, all the forms of that appearance, even the most universal and essential, are, according to both teachings, utterly foreign. In order to deny these forms, Kant grasped them directly in abstract terms and flatly denied time, space and causality, as mere forms of appearance, to the thing in itself. Plato, on the other hand, did not reach the highest expression; he denied those forms to his Ideas only indirectly, by denying of the Ideas what is possible only through those forms, namely plurality of the homogeneous, and arising and passing away. Though it is hardly necessary, I will make this remarkable and important agreement vivid by an example. Let there stand before us an animal in the full activity of life. Plato will say: "This animal has no true existence, only an apparent one, a constant becoming, a relative existence that may just as well be called a non-being as a being. What truly exists is only the Idea that is depicted in that animal, or the animal in itself (*auto to thêrion*), which depends on nothing but is in and for itself (*kath' heauto, aei hôsautôs*), which has not come into being and does not end, but is always in the same way (*aei on, kai mêdepote oute gignomenon, oute apollymenon*). Insofar as we recognize its Idea in this animal, it is all the same and of no significance whether we have this animal before us now or its ancestor that lived a thousand years ago; whether, further, it is here or in a distant land; whether it presents itself in this or that manner, posture or action; whether, finally, it is this individual of its kind or any other: all this is null and concerns only the appearance. The Idea of the animal alone has true being and is the object of real knowledge."—So says Plato. Kant would say something like this: "This animal is an appearance in time, space and causality, all of which are the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience

lying in our cognitive faculty, not determinations of the thing in itself. Hence this animal, as we perceive it at this particular time and in this given place—as an individual that has come into being in the context of experience, i.e. in the chain of causes and effects, and is just as necessarily perishable—is not a thing in itself but an appearance valid only in relation to our knowledge. To know it as it may be in itself, and consequently independently of all the determinations lying in time, space and causality, would require a mode of knowledge other than the only one possible for us, through the senses and the understanding."

To bring Kant's expression still closer to Plato's, one could also say: time, space and causality are that arrangement of our intellect by virtue of which the *one* being of each kind, which alone really exists, presents itself to us as a plurality of homogeneous beings, ever arising anew and passing away, in endless succession. The apprehension of things by means of and in accordance with this arrangement is the *immanent* one; the apprehension that becomes aware of how matters stand with it, by contrast, is the *transcendental* one. The latter is acquired *in abstracto* through the *Critique of Pure Reason*; but by way of exception it can also arise intuitively. This last point is my own addition, and it is precisely this that I am endeavoring to elucidate in the present third book.

If Kant's teaching had ever been properly understood and grasped, if Plato had been properly understood and grasped since Kant, if people had reflected faithfully and seriously on the inner meaning and content of the teachings of these two great masters, instead of flinging about the technical terms of the one and parodying the style of the other, then they could not have failed to discover long ago how much the two great sages agree, and that the pure meaning, the aim of both teachings, is entirely the same. Then not only would people not have constantly compared Plato with Leibniz, on whom his spirit by no means rested, or even with a well-known gentleman still living,[3] as if they meant to mock the shade of the great thinker of

3 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. F. H. Jacobi.

antiquity. They would, in general, have got much further than they are—or rather, they would not have gone so shamefully far backwards as they have in these last forty years. They would not have let themselves be led by the nose today by one windbag and tomorrow by another; and the nineteenth century, which announced itself so momentously, would not have been opened in Germany with philosophical farces performed over Kant's grave (as the ancients sometimes did at the funeral rites of their own dead), to the just derision of other nations—for such things become the earnest and even stiff Germans least of all. But so small is the real public of genuine philosophers that even pupils who understand them are brought to them only sparingly by the centuries.—*Eisi dê narthêkophoroi men polloi, bakchoi de ge pauroi. (Thyrsigeri quidem multi, Bacchi vero pauci.)* [Many carry the thyrsus, but few are true Bacchants.] *Hê atimia philosophia dia tauta prospeptôken, hoti ou kat' axian autês haptontai; ou gar nothous edei haptesthai, alla gnêsious. (Eam ob rem philosophia in infamiam incidit, quod non pro dignitate ipsam attingunt: neque enim a spuriis, sed a legitimis erat attrectanda.)* [Philosophy has fallen into disrepute because people do not take it up as it deserves; for it ought to be taken up not by the spurious but by the genuine.] *Plat.*[4]

People went by the words—the words "representations *a priori*, forms of intuiting and thinking of which we are conscious independently of experience, primary concepts of the pure understanding," and so on. They then asked whether Plato's Ideas, which are after all also supposed to be primary concepts and, moreover, recollections of an intuition of truly existing things that preceded this life, might perhaps be the same as Kant's forms of intuiting and thinking lying *a priori* in our consciousness. These two entirely heterogeneous teachings—the Kantian teaching of the forms that restrict the individual's knowledge to appearance, and the Platonic teaching of the Ideas, knowledge of which expressly denies precisely those

4 The first quotation is from Plato's *Phaedo* (69c), the second from the *Republic* (7, 535c); the Latin versions are Schopenhauer's.

forms—these teachings, diametrically opposed in this respect, were attentively compared because they resemble each other a little in their expressions. People deliberated and argued about whether they were identical, finally found that they were not the same after all, and concluded that Plato's theory of Ideas and Kant's critique of reason had no agreement whatsoever.[5] But enough of this.

THE IDEA IS NOT THE THING IN ITSELF

The Idea is the will's immediate objecthood, differing from the thing in itself only in being representation.

3.32 As a result of our considerations so far, and despite all the inner agreement between Kant and Plato and the identity of the goal both had in view—or of the view of the world that stirred and guided them to philosophize—for us the Idea and the thing in itself are nonetheless not simply one and the same. Rather, for us the Idea is only the immediate and therefore adequate objecthood of the thing in itself; the thing in itself, however, is the *will*—the will insofar as it is not yet objectified, has not yet become representation. For the thing in itself, precisely according to Kant, is supposed to be free of all the forms that attach to knowing as such. And it is simply an error on Kant's part (as is shown in the Appendix) that he did not count among these forms, before all others, being-object-for-a-subject, since this is precisely the first and most universal form of all appearance, i.e. of representation. He should therefore have expressly denied being-an-object to his thing in itself; this would have saved him from that great inconsistency which was exposed early on. The Platonic Idea, on the other hand, is necessarily object, something known, a representation; and precisely in this, but also only in this, does it differ from the thing in itself. It has laid aside merely the subordinate forms of appearance, all of which

5 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See, for example, *Immanuel Kant, ein Denkmal* [Immanuel Kant: A Memorial] by Fr. Bouterweck, p. 49, and Buhle's *Geschichte der Philosophie* [History of Philosophy], vol. 6, pp. 802–815 and 823.

we comprehend under the principle of sufficient reason—or rather, it has not yet entered into them. But it has retained the first and most universal form, that of representation in general, of being object for a subject. It is the forms subordinate to this one (whose general expression is the principle of sufficient reason) that multiply the Idea into particular and perishable individuals, whose number is a matter of complete indifference with respect to the Idea. The principle of sufficient reason is thus, once again, the form into which the Idea enters when it falls within the knowledge of the subject as individual. The particular thing, appearing in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, is thus only a mediate objectification of the thing in itself (which is the will). Between the thing in itself and the particular thing there still stands the Idea, as the sole immediate objecthood of the will, since the Idea has assumed no form peculiar to knowing as such other than that of representation in general, i.e. of being object for a subject. Hence it alone is the most adequate objecthood possible of the will or thing in itself; it is itself the whole thing in itself, only under the form of representation. And here lies the reason for the great agreement between Plato and Kant, although, in the strictest sense, what the two are speaking of is not the same. Particular things, however, are not an entirely *adequate objecthood* of the will; here it is already clouded by those forms whose common expression is the principle of sufficient reason, but which are the condition of knowledge as it is possible for the individual as such.—If it is permissible to draw conclusions from an impossible supposition, we would in fact no longer know particular things, nor events, nor change, nor plurality, but would apprehend only Ideas, only the ladder of objectification of that one will, the true thing in itself, in pure, unclouded knowledge; and consequently our world would be a *Nunc stans* [an abiding now]—if we were not, as subject of knowing, at the same time individuals, i.e. if our intuition were not mediated by a body, from whose affections it proceeds. That body is itself only concrete willing, objecthood of the will, and thus an object among objects; and as

such, in entering knowing consciousness, it can do so only in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason; consequently it already presupposes time and all the other forms that principle expresses, and thereby introduces them. Time is merely the divided and fragmented view that an individual being has of the Ideas, which are outside time and hence *eternal*. That is why Plato says that time is the moving image of eternity: *aiônos eikôn kinêtê ho chronos*.[67]

KNOWLEDGE IN THE SERVICE OF THE WILL

Ordinary knowledge and science grasp only relations, because knowledge arose to serve the will.

3.33 Since, then, as individuals we have no knowledge other than that which is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, and since this form excludes knowledge of the Ideas, it is certain that, if it is possible for us to rise from knowledge of particular things to knowledge of the Ideas, this can happen only through a change taking place in the subject. This change must correspond to, and be analogous with, that great transformation in the whole nature of the object; and by virtue of it the subject, insofar as it knows an Idea, is no longer an individual.

We remember from the previous book that knowing in general itself belongs to the objectification of the will at its higher grades, and that sensibility, nerves and brain, just like other parts of the organic being, are merely the expression of the will at this degree of its objecthood. Hence the representation that arises through them is likewise destined to serve the will, as a means (*mêchanê*) of attaining its now more complicated (*polytelestera*) ends, of preserving a being with manifold needs. Originally, then, and by its nature, knowledge is wholly in the service of the will. And just as the immediate object, which through the application of the law of causality becomes its starting

6 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 29 of the second volume (the Supplements).
7 Plato, *Timaeus* 37d.

point, is only objectified will, so too all knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason remains in a closer or more distant relation to the will. For the individual finds its body as an object among objects, to all of which the body has manifold relations and connections according to the principle of sufficient reason; and so considering these always leads back, by a shorter or longer path, to its body, and thus to its will. Since it is the principle of sufficient reason that places objects in this relation to the body and thereby to the will, knowledge that serves the will will strive solely to learn about objects precisely those relations that the principle of sufficient reason posits, and so will pursue their manifold connections in space, time and causality. For only through these is the object *interesting* to the individual, i.e. does it have a relation to the will. Hence knowledge that serves the will actually knows nothing more of objects than their relations. It knows objects only insofar as they exist at this time, in this place, under these circumstances, from these causes, with these effects—in a word, as particular things. And if all these relations were abolished, the objects too would have vanished for it, precisely because it knew nothing else about them.—Nor should we conceal that what the sciences consider in things is likewise, in essence, nothing other than all this, namely their relations: the relations of time and space, the causes of natural changes, the comparison of shapes, the motives of events—thus nothing but relations. What distinguishes the sciences from ordinary knowledge is merely their form: their systematic character, the easing of knowledge by gathering everything particular into the universal through the subordination of concepts, and the completeness of knowledge thereby attained. All relation itself has only a relative existence. For example, all being in time is at the same time a non-being: for time is precisely that alone through which opposite determinations can belong to the same thing. Hence every appearance in time, in turn, also is not: for what separates its beginning from its end is only time, something essentially fleeting, insubstantial and relative, here called duration. Time, however, is the

most universal form of all objects of the knowledge that stands in the service of the will, and the archetype of its other forms.

As a rule, knowledge always remains subject to the service of the will, for it arose for this service—indeed it has sprung from the will, as it were, as the head from the trunk. In animals this servitude of knowledge to the will can never be abolished. In human beings such abolition occurs only as an exception, as we shall presently consider more closely. This difference between human being and animal is outwardly expressed in the different relation of head to trunk. In the lower animals the two are still completely grown together; in all of them the head is turned toward the ground, where the objects of the will lie. Even in the higher animals head and trunk are still far more one than in the human being, whose head seems set freely upon the body, merely carried by it, not serving it. This human distinction is displayed to the highest degree by the Apollo Belvedere: the far-gazing head of the god of the Muses stands so freely on the shoulders that it seems wholly wrested from the body and no longer subject to care for it.[8]

THE PURE, WILL-LESS SUBJECT OF KNOWING

Losing oneself in an object, the knower becomes a pure subject and the object its Idea.

3.34 The transition from ordinary knowledge of particular things to knowledge of the Idea—possible, as has been said, but to be regarded only as an exception—occurs suddenly, when knowledge tears itself free from the service of the will. Precisely thereby the subject ceases to be merely individual and is now a pure, will-less subject of knowledge, which no longer follows relations in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, but rests in fixed contemplation of the object presented to it, apart from its connection with any others, and is absorbed in it.

To become clear, this necessarily requires a detailed exposition. For the time being the reader must set aside whatever

seems strange in it, until, once the whole thought to be communicated in this work has been taken together, the strangeness has vanished of its own accord.

Suppose that, raised up by the power of the mind, one abandons the ordinary way of considering things and ceases to follow, along the guiding thread of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, merely their relations to one another, whose final goal is always their relation to one's own will. One then no longer considers the where, the when, the why and the what-for in things, but simply and solely the *what*. Nor does one let abstract thought, the concepts of reason, occupy consciousness; instead of all this, one devotes the whole power of one's mind to intuition, sinks oneself entirely into it, and lets the whole of consciousness be filled by the calm contemplation of the natural object actually present, be it a landscape, a tree, a rock, a building or anything else. In a telling German phrase, one wholly *loses* oneself in this object, i.e. one forgets precisely one's individuality, one's will, and continues to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object. It is then as if the object alone were there, without anyone to perceive it, and one can no longer separate the one who intuits from the intuition; the two have become one, since the whole of consciousness is completely filled and taken up by a single intuitive image. When, in this way, the object has stepped out of all relation to anything outside it, and the subject out of all relation to the will, then what is thus known is no longer the particular thing as such; it is the *Idea*, the eternal form, the immediate objecthood of the will at this grade. And precisely thereby the one caught up in this intuition is at the same time no longer an individual—for the individual has lost itself in such intuition—but is the *pure*, will-less, painless, timeless *subject of knowledge*. This, which for now is so striking (and which, I know very well, confirms the saying that goes back to Thomas Paine, *du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas* [from the sublime to the ridiculous there is only one step]),

8 Roman marble statue of Apollo in the Vatican, for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the supreme model of classical beauty.

will gradually become clearer and less strange through what follows. It was also what Spinoza had in mind when he wrote: *mens aeterna est, quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit* [the mind is eternal insofar as it conceives things under the aspect of eternity] *(Eth. V, pr. 31, schol.)*.[9] In such contemplation, at a single stroke, the particular thing becomes the *Idea* of its species, and the intuiting individual becomes the *pure subject of knowing*. The individual as such knows only particular things; the pure subject of knowing knows only Ideas.[10] For the individual is the subject of knowing in its relation to a definite particular appearance of the will, and in the service of that appearance. This particular appearance of the will is as such subject to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms; all knowledge relating to it therefore also follows the principle of sufficient reason, and no knowledge other than this, which always has only relations as its object, is of any use for the purposes of the will. The knowing individual as such and the particular thing it knows are always somewhere, at some time, and are links in the chain of causes and effects. The pure subject of knowledge and its correlate, the Idea, have stepped out of all those forms of the principle of sufficient reason: time, place, the individual that knows and the individual that is known have no meaning for them. Only when, in the way described, a knowing individual raises itself to the pure subject of knowing, and precisely thereby raises the contemplated object to the Idea, does the *world as representation* emerge wholly and purely, and does the complete objectification of the will take place, since the Idea alone is its *adequate objecthood*. The Idea includes object and subject within itself in the same way, since these are its sole form; but in it the two are in perfect

9 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. To illuminate the mode of knowledge under discussion here, I also recommend reading what he says in the same work, *L. II, prop. 40, schol. 2*, and likewise *L. V, prop. 25* to 38, about the *cognitio tertii generis, sive intuitiva* [knowledge of the third kind, or intuitive knowledge]—most especially *prop. 29, schol.; prop 36, schol.* and *prop. 38 demonstr. et schol.*

10 Paine wrote in *The Age of Reason* (1794) that one step above the sublime makes the ridiculous; the French form is Napoleon's. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part 5, Proposition 31, Scholium.

equilibrium. And just as the object here too is nothing but the representation of the subject, so the subject, by passing entirely into the intuited object, has become that object itself, since the whole of consciousness is nothing more than its most distinct image. It is precisely this consciousness—when one thinks of all the Ideas, or grades of the will's objecthood, passing through it one after another—that actually constitutes the whole *world as representation*. The particular things of all times and spaces are nothing but the Ideas, multiplied by the principle of sufficient reason (the form of knowledge of individuals as such) and thereby clouded in their pure objecthood. When the Idea emerges, subject and object can no longer be distinguished in it, because the Idea—the adequate objecthood of the will, the world as representation proper—arises only when they completely fill and permeate each other. In just the same way, the individual that knows and the individual that is known are, as things in themselves, not distinct. For if we disregard that world as representation proper entirely, nothing remains but the *world as will*. The will is the in-itself of the Idea, which objectifies it completely; it is also the in-itself of the particular thing and of the individual that knows it, both of which objectify it incompletely. As will, outside representation and all its forms, it is one and the same in the contemplated object and in the individual that, soaring up in this contemplation, becomes conscious of itself as pure subject. Those two are therefore not distinct in themselves: for in themselves they are the will, which here knows itself. Only in the way in which this knowledge comes to the will, i.e. only in appearance, is there, by virtue of appearance's form—the principle of sufficient reason—plurality and difference. Just as without the object, without representation, I am not a knowing subject but mere blind will, so without me as subject of knowing the thing known is not an object but mere will, blind urge. This will is in itself, i.e. outside representation, one and the same with mine; only in the world as representation, whose form is always at least subject and object, do we come apart as known and knowing individual. As soon as knowing, the world as rep-

resentation, is abolished, nothing whatever remains but mere will, blind urge. That it should acquire objecthood, become representation, posits at a single stroke both subject and object; but that this objecthood should be the pure, perfect, adequate objecthood of the will posits the object as Idea, free from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and the subject as pure subject of knowledge, free from individuality and from servitude to the will.

Whoever, in the manner described, has become so absorbed and lost in the intuition of nature that he exists only as purely knowing subject becomes immediately aware, precisely thereby, that as such he is the condition, and hence the bearer, of the world and of all objective existence, since this now presents itself as dependent on his own existence. He thus draws nature into himself, so that he feels it to be only an accident of his own being. In this sense *Byron* says:

Are not the mountains, waves and skies, a part / Of me and of my soul, as I of them?[11][12]

But how could someone who feels this regard himself, in contrast to imperishable nature, as absolutely perishable? Rather, he will be seized by the consciousness of what the Upanishad of the Veda declares: *Hae omnes creaturae in totum ego sum, et praeter me aliud ens non est* [I am all these creatures taken together, and besides me there is no other being]. *(Oupnekhat, I, 122.)*[13]

HISTORY AS THE COSTUME OF THE IDEA

Events and history are inessential to the Idea of humanity, like the shapes of drifting clouds.

3.35 To gain a deeper insight into the nature of the world, it is indispensable to learn to distinguish the will as thing in itself from its adequate objecthood; and then to distinguish the differ-

11 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Are mountains, waves and sky not a part / Of me and of my soul, I of them?

12 Byron, *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, Canto III, stanza 75.

13 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 30 of the second volume (the Supplements).

ent grades on which this objecthood emerges more distinctly and completely, i.e. the Ideas themselves, from the mere appearance of the Ideas in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, the constricted mode of knowledge of individuals. Then one will agree with Plato when he attributes real being to the Ideas alone and grants only an apparent, dreamlike existence to things in space and time, this world that is real for the individual. Then one will see how one and the same Idea reveals itself in so many appearances and offers its nature to knowing individuals only piecemeal, one side after another. One will then also distinguish the Idea itself from the way its appearance falls within the individual's observation, recognizing the former as essential and the latter as inessential. Let us consider this by way of example, first in the smallest things and then in the greatest.—When the clouds drift, the figures they form are not essential to them; they are indifferent to them. But that, as elastic vapor, they are pressed together, driven off, spread out and torn apart by the thrust of the wind—this is their nature, the essence of the forces that objectify themselves in them; this is the Idea. The figures of any given moment exist only for the individual observer. —To the brook that tumbles downward over stones, the eddies, waves and shapes of foam it displays are indifferent and inessential. That it follows gravity and behaves as an inelastic, wholly mobile, formless, transparent fluid—this is its essence; this, *when known intuitively*, is the Idea. Those shapes exist only for us, so long as we know as individuals.—The ice on the windowpane forms according to the laws of crystallization, which reveal the essence of the natural force emerging here and present the Idea; but the trees and flowers it forms in the process are inessential and exist only for us.—What appears in cloud, brook and crystal is the faintest echo of that will which emerges more completely in the plant, more completely still in the animal, and most completely in the human being. But only what is *essential* in all these grades of its objectification constitutes the *Idea*. The unfolding of the Idea, on the other hand, as it is drawn apart in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason

into manifold and many-sided appearances—this is inessential to the Idea; it lies merely in the individual's mode of knowledge and has reality only for the individual. The same necessarily holds of the unfolding of that Idea which is the most complete objecthood of the will. Consequently the history of the human race, the throng of events, the changing of the times, the many-shaped forms of human life in different countries and centuries—all this is only the accidental form in which the Idea appears. It does not belong to the Idea itself, in which alone the adequate objecthood of the will lies, but only to the appearance that falls within the individual's knowledge; and it is as foreign, inessential and indifferent to the Idea itself as the figures they depict are to the clouds, the shape of its eddies and foam to the brook, and its trees and flowers to the ice.

Whoever has properly grasped this, and knows how to distinguish the will from the Idea and the Idea from its appearance, will find meaning in the events of the world only insofar as they are the letters from which the Idea of humanity can be read, and not in and for themselves. He will not believe, as most people do, that time brings forth anything really new and significant, that through it or in it anything absolutely real comes into existence, or even that time itself as a whole has beginning and end, plan and development, and has as its final goal, say, the highest perfection (by their notions) of the latest generation, which lives for thirty years. Hence he will no more, with Homer, appoint a whole Olympus full of gods to steer the events of time than, with Ossian, take the figures of the clouds for individual beings; for, as has been said, the two have equal significance with regard to the Idea that appears in them.[14] In the manifold forms of human life and the ceaseless change of events, he will regard as abiding and essential only the Idea, in which the will to live has its most complete objecthood. This Idea shows its various sides in the qualities, passions, errors and excellences of the human race—in self-interest, hatred, love, fear, boldness, frivolity, dullness,

14 Ossian, the legendary Gaelic bard whose poems James Macpherson published in the 1760s; in them the spirits of the dead appear in the clouds.

cunning, wit, genius and so on. All of these, converging and congealing into thousands of shapes (individuals), continually perform the great and the small history of the world; and in itself it makes no difference whether what sets them in motion is nuts or crowns. Finally, he will find that the world is like the plays of Gozzi, in all of which the same characters always appear, with the same intentions and the same fate. The motives and events are of course different in each play, but the spirit of the events is the same; and the characters of one play know nothing of what happened in another, even though they themselves acted in it. Hence, after all the experiences of the earlier plays, Pantalone has become no nimbler or more generous, Tartaglia no more conscientious, Brighella no braver, and Colombina no more modest.—[15]

Suppose we were for once granted a clear view into the realm of possibility and across all the chains of causes and effects. Suppose the Earth Spirit came forth and showed us in a single picture the most excellent individuals, enlighteners of the world and heroes, whom chance destroyed before their time to act had come—then the great events that would have changed the history of the world and ushered in periods of the highest culture and enlightenment, but which the blindest accident, the most trivial chance, checked at their birth—and finally the splendid powers of great individuals that would have made whole ages fruitful, but which they, misled by error or passion or forced by necessity, squandered uselessly on unworthy and barren objects, or even frittered away in play:—if we saw all this, we would shudder and lament over the lost treasures of whole ages.[16] But the Earth Spirit would smile and say: "The source from which individuals and their powers flow is inexhaustible and infinite, like time and space: for, just like time and space, these forms of all appearance, individuals too are only appear-

15 Carlo Gozzi (1720–1806), Venetian dramatist whose fairy-tale plays use the stock characters of the commedia dell'arte.

16 The Earth Spirit is the elemental spirit Faust conjures in Goethe's *Faust*, Part One.

ance, the visibility of the will. No finite measure can exhaust that infinite source; hence undiminished infinity still stands open for the return of every event or work that was stifled in the germ. In this world of appearance, true loss is as little possible as true gain. The will alone is: it, the thing in itself; it, the source of all those appearances. Its self-knowledge, and the affirmation or denial decided upon in the light of it, is the only event in itself."—[17]

ART, THE WORK OF GENIUS

Science follows the principle of sufficient reason; art contemplates the Ideas independently of it.

3.36 History follows the thread of events. It is pragmatic insofar as it derives them according to the law of motivation, the law that determines the will as it appears wherever that will is illuminated by knowledge. At the lower grades of the will's objecthood, where it still acts without knowledge, natural science considers the laws of the changes in its appearances as etiology, and what is permanent in them as morphology. Morphology lightens its almost infinite theme with the help of concepts, gathering up the general so as to derive the particular from it. Finally, mathematics considers the mere forms, time and space, in which the Ideas appear drawn apart into multiplicity for the knowledge of the subject as an individual. All these, whose common name is science, thus follow the principle of sufficient reason in its various forms, and their theme remains appearance, with its laws, its connections and the relations arising from them.—But what kind of knowledge, then, considers what alone is truly essential in the world, what exists outside and independently of all relation? What considers the true content of the world's appearances, which is subject to no change and is therefore known with equal truth for all time? In a word, what considers *the Ideas*, which are the immediate and adequate objecthood of the thing

17 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. This last sentence cannot be understood without some acquaintance with the following book.

in itself, the will?—It is *art*, the work of genius. Art repeats the eternal Ideas grasped through pure contemplation, the essential and abiding element in all the appearances of the world. According to the material in which it repeats them, it is visual art, poetry or music. Its one and only origin is knowledge of the Ideas; its one and only aim is the communication of this knowledge.—Science follows the restless, unstable stream of grounds and consequents in their fourfold form. At every goal it reaches it is directed further on, and it can never find a final goal or complete satisfaction, any more than one can reach, by running, the point where the clouds touch the horizon. Art, by contrast, is everywhere at its goal. For it plucks the object of its contemplation out of the stream of the world's course and holds it isolated before it. And this single thing, which in that stream was a vanishingly small part, becomes for art a representative of the whole, an equivalent of the infinitely many in space and time. Art therefore stops at this single thing: it halts the wheel of time; for it the relations vanish; only the essential, the Idea, is its object.—We can therefore describe it outright as *the way of considering things independently of the principle of sufficient reason*, in contrast to the way of considering them that follows precisely this principle, which is the path of experience and science. This latter way of considering things may be compared to an infinite line running horizontally; the former, to the vertical line that cuts it at any point one likes. The way that follows the principle of sufficient reason is the rational way, which alone is valid and useful in practical life as in science. The way that looks away from the content of that principle is the way of genius, which alone is valid and useful in art. The first is the way of Aristotle; the second is, on the whole, that of Plato. The first is like the mighty storm that sweeps along without beginning or goal, bending, shaking and carrying everything away with it; the second is like the calm sunbeam that cuts across the storm's path, entirely unmoved by it.

GENIUS AS PERFECT OBJECTIVITY

Genius is the capacity to leave the will's service behind and remain a clear eye of the world.

The first is like the countless, violently driven drops of the waterfall, which, forever changing, never rest for an instant; the second is like the rainbow resting quietly above this raging tumult.—Only through the pure contemplation described above, which becomes wholly absorbed in the object, are Ideas grasped, and the essence of *genius* consists precisely in a preeminent capacity for such contemplation. Now since this contemplation demands a complete forgetting of one's own person and its relations, *genius* is nothing other than the most perfect *objectivity*, that is, an objective orientation of the mind, as opposed to the subjective orientation directed toward one's own person, that is, the will. Accordingly, genius is the capacity to hold oneself in pure intuition, to lose oneself in intuition, and to withdraw knowledge, which originally exists only to serve the will, from this service—that is, to leave one's own interests, one's willing and one's aims entirely out of sight, and thus for a time to divest oneself completely of one's personality, so as to remain as *pure knowing subject*, a clear eye of the world. And this not for moments only, but as continuously and with as much self-possession as is needed to repeat what has been grasped through deliberate art, and "to fix in lasting thoughts what hovers in wavering appearance."—It is as if, for genius to emerge in an individual, that individual must have been allotted a measure of cognitive power far exceeding what is required to serve an individual will; and this surplus of knowledge, now set free, becomes the subject purified of will, the bright mirror of the essence of the world.[18] —This explains the liveliness, amounting to restlessness, of individuals of genius: the present can seldom satisfy them, because it does not fill their consciousness. This gives them that restless striving, that ceaseless search for new

18 Adapted from Goethe, *Faust*, Prologue in Heaven.

objects worthy of contemplation, and also that almost never satisfied longing for beings like themselves, their equals, to whom they might communicate themselves. The ordinary mortal, by contrast, is entirely filled and satisfied by the ordinary present and is absorbed in it; and since he finds his like everywhere, he enjoys that particular ease in everyday life which is denied to genius.—Imagination has been recognized as an essential component of genius, and has sometimes even been held to be identical with it: the former rightly, the latter wrongly. The objects of genius as such are the eternal Ideas, the enduring, essential forms of the world and of all its appearances, and knowledge of the Idea is necessarily intuitive, not abstract. The knowledge of genius would therefore be limited to the Ideas of the objects actually present to his own person, and dependent on the chain of circumstances that brought those objects to him —were it not that imagination extends his horizon far beyond the reality of his personal experience. It enables him to construct all the rest from the little that has come into his actual apperception, and so to let almost every possible picture of life pass before him. Moreover, actual objects are almost always only very imperfect specimens of the Idea that presents itself in them. Genius therefore needs imagination in order to see in things not what nature has actually formed, but what she strove to form yet did not achieve, because of the conflict of her forms with one another mentioned in the previous book. We shall return to this below, when we consider sculpture. Imagination, then, extends the horizon of genius beyond the objects that actually present themselves to his person, in quality as well as in quantity. For this reason unusual strength of imagination is the companion, indeed the condition, of genius. But the converse does not hold: imagination is no evidence of genius; on the contrary, even people quite devoid of genius can have a great deal of imagination. For a real object can be considered in two opposite ways: purely objectively, in the manner of genius, grasping its Idea; or in the common way, merely in its relations, in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, to other

objects and to one's own will. In just the same way, a phantasm can be intuited in both ways. Considered in the first way, it is a means to knowledge of the Idea, whose communication is the work of art. In the second case the phantasm is used to build castles in the air that suit one's selfishness and one's whims, and that deceive and delight for a moment; and of the phantasms so combined, only their relations are ever really known. The person who plays this game is a fantasist. He will easily mix the images with which he entertains himself in solitude into reality, and so become unfit for reality. He may perhaps write down the tricks of his imagination, and then they yield the ordinary novels of every kind, which entertain his like and the general public, as the readers dream themselves into the hero's place and then find the whole account very "cozy."

The ordinary person, that factory product of nature which she turns out by the thousand every day, is, as has been said, incapable—at least in any sustained way—of a consideration that is disinterested in every sense, which is what contemplativeness really is. He can direct his attention to things only insofar as they have some relation, however indirect, to his will. In this respect, which always requires only knowledge of relations, the abstract concept of the thing is sufficient and usually even more serviceable. So the ordinary person does not dwell long on mere intuition, and does not fix his gaze long on any object. Instead, in everything that presents itself to him, he looks only for the concept under which it can quickly be brought, as a lazy man looks for a chair, and then it interests him no further. That is why he is so quickly done with everything: with works of art, with beautiful things in nature, and with the sight of life in all its scenes, which is in truth significant everywhere. He does not linger: he looks only for his own way through life, or at most for everything that might at some point become his way—topographical notes in the widest sense. On the contemplation of life itself as such he wastes no time. The person of genius, by contrast, whose cognitive power, through its preponderance, withdraws for part of his time from the service of his will, lingers

over the contemplation of life itself and strives to grasp the Idea of each thing, not its relations to other things. In doing so he often neglects to consider his own way through life, and so for the most part walks it clumsily enough. For the ordinary person his faculty of knowledge is the lantern that lights his way; for the person of genius it is the sun that reveals the world. This very different way of looking into life soon becomes visible even in the outward appearance of the two. The gaze of a person in whom genius lives and works readily sets him apart: at once lively and steady, it bears the character of contemplativeness, of contemplation—as we can see in the portraits of the few heads of genius that nature has produced now and then among countless millions. In the gaze of the others, on the other hand, when it is not, as it mostly is, dull or prosaic, the true opposite of contemplation readily becomes visible: spying. Accordingly, the "expression of genius" in a face consists in this, that a decided preponderance of knowing over willing is visible in it, and hence that a knowing without any relation to a willing, that is, *a pure knowing*, expresses itself in it. In faces as they usually are, by contrast, the expression of willing predominates, and one sees that knowing comes into activity only at the prompting of willing, and so is directed merely at motives.

The knowledge of genius, or knowledge of the Idea, is the kind that does not follow the principle of sufficient reason, while the kind that does follow it confers prudence and rationality in life and brings the sciences into being. Individuals of genius will therefore be burdened with the defects that neglect of the latter way of knowing brings in its train. Here, however, a qualification must be noted. What I am about to adduce in this regard applies to them only insofar as, and while, they are actually engaged in the way of knowing proper to genius. This is by no means the case at every moment of their lives, since the great, though spontaneous, exertion required for the will-free apprehension of the Ideas necessarily slackens again and has long intervals, during which such people stand pretty much on a level with ordinary people, in their merits as in their defects.

For this reason the working of genius has always been regarded as an inspiration—indeed, as the name itself indicates, as the working of a superhuman being distinct from the individual himself, which takes possession of him only periodically.[19] The aversion of individuals of genius to directing their attention to the content of the principle of sufficient reason will show itself first with regard to the ground of being, as an aversion to mathematics. Mathematics considers the most general forms of appearance, space and time, which are themselves only forms of the principle of sufficient reason. It is therefore the very opposite of the kind of consideration that seeks only the content of appearance, the Idea expressed in it, disregarding all relations.[20] Besides this, the logical treatment of mathematics will be repugnant to genius. It shuts off genuine insight and so does not satisfy; it offers a mere chain of inferences according to the principle of the ground of knowing, and of all the mental powers it makes the greatest demands on memory, since one must keep constantly present all the earlier propositions to which one appeals. Experience has also confirmed that great geniuses in art have no aptitude for mathematics: no one has ever been highly distinguished in both at once. Alfieri relates that he could never even understand Euclid's fourth theorem.[21] Goethe was reproached often enough for his lack of mathematical knowledge by the uncomprehending opponents of his theory of colors. Here, to be sure, what mattered was not calculating and measuring on hypothetical data but immediate knowledge, by the understanding, of cause and effect. The reproach was therefore so utterly beside the point and out of place that his opponents revealed their total lack of judgment by it as plainly as by

19 Latin *genius* originally meant a guardian spirit attending a person.
20 In Schopenhauer's *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, the ground of being governs the relations of positions in space and time—the domain of mathematics.
21 Vittorio Alfieri (1749–1803), Italian tragic poet; the admission comes from his autobiography.

all their other Midas-like verdicts.[22] That even today, almost half a century after Goethe's theory of colors appeared, Newton's humbug remains in undisturbed possession of the professorial chairs, even in Germany, and that people go on talking in all seriousness about the seven homogeneous lights and their differing refrangibility—this will one day be listed among the great intellectual traits of humanity in general and of Germandom in particular. —The same reason given above also explains the equally well-known fact that, conversely, eminent mathematicians have little receptivity for works of fine art. This finds particularly naive expression in the well-known anecdote of the French mathematician who, after reading Racine's Iphigenia, shrugged and asked: *Qu'est-ce-que cela prouve?* [What does that prove?]— Further, a keen apprehension of relations according to the laws of causality and motivation is really what prudence consists in, whereas the knowledge of genius is not directed at relations. So a prudent person, insofar as and while he is prudent, will not be a genius, and a genius, insofar as and while he is a genius, will not be prudent.[23] —Finally, intuitive knowledge, to whose domain the Idea belongs entirely, is in general directly opposed to rational or abstract knowledge, which is guided by the principle of the ground of knowing. It is well known, too, that great genius is seldom found paired with a predominance of rationality; on the contrary, individuals of genius are often subject to violent emotions and irrational passions. The cause of this, however, is not weakness of reason. It lies partly in the unusual energy of the whole appearance of will that the individual of genius is, an energy that expresses itself in the vehemence of all his acts of will. It lies partly in the preponderance of intuitive knowledge, through the senses and the understanding, over abstract knowledge—hence a decided orientation toward the intuitive, whose impression, extremely vivid in such people, so

22 Goethe's *Theory of Colors* (1810) attacked Newton's optics. King Midas was given ass's ears for judging Pan's music superior to Apollo's.

23 Racine's tragedy *Iphigénie* (1674); the anecdote has been attached to more than one French mathematician.

outshines colorless concepts that it is no longer the concepts but the impression that guides action, which for that very reason becomes irrational. Accordingly the impression of the present is very powerful in them and sweeps them into thoughtlessness, emotion and passion. For this reason too, and in general because their knowledge has partly withdrawn from the service of the will, in conversation they will think less of the person to whom they are speaking than of the matter they are speaking about, which hovers vividly before them. So they will judge or narrate too objectively for their own interest, will not keep quiet about what it would have been wiser to keep quiet about, and so on. And so, finally, they are inclined to soliloquies and in general can show several weaknesses that really do approach madness. That genius and madness have a side where they border on each other, indeed pass into each other, has often been observed, and poetic inspiration has even been called a kind of madness: Horace calls it *amabilis insania* [a lovable madness] *(Od. III, 4)*, and Wieland, at the opening of "Oberon," "sweet madness."[24] Even Aristotle is said, as Seneca reports *(de tranq. animi, 15, 16)*, to have said: *Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae fuit* [There has never been a great genius without an admixture of madness]. Plato expresses it in the myth of the dark cave cited above *(de Rep. 7)*. Those who have seen the true sunlight and the things that truly are (the Ideas) outside the cave, he says, can no longer see afterwards in the cave, because their eyes have grown unaccustomed to the darkness; they no longer properly recognize the shadow-images down there, and so, for their blunders, they are mocked by the others, who have never left this cave and these shadow-images. In the Phaedrus (p. 317) he also says outright that there can be no genuine poet without a certain madness, and indeed (p. 327) that everyone who recognizes the eternal Ideas in transitory things appears mad. Cicero, too, reports: *Negat enim, sine furore, Democritus, quemquam poetam magnum esse posse; quod idem dicit Plato (de*

24 Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813); his verse romance *Oberon* (1780) opens by invoking "holder Wahnsinn."

divin. I, 37). [For Democritus denies that anyone can be a great poet without frenzy; and Plato says the same.] And finally Pope says:

Great wits to madness sure are near allied, / And thin partitions do their bounds divide.[25][26]

Particularly instructive in this respect is Goethe's "Torquato Tasso," in which he sets before our eyes not only the suffering, the essential martyrdom, of genius as such, but also its steady passage into madness. Finally, the fact of the direct contact between genius and madness is confirmed partly by the biographies of people of great genius, for example Rousseau, Byron and Alfieri, and by anecdotes from the lives of others. Partly, on the other hand, I must mention that on frequent visits to mental hospitals I have found individuals of unmistakably great gifts, whose genius clearly showed through their madness, although here madness had gained the upper hand completely.[27] This cannot be ascribed to chance. For on the one hand the number of mad people is relatively very small; on the other, an individual of genius is a phenomenon rare beyond all ordinary estimation, appearing only as the greatest exception in nature. One can convince oneself of this simply by counting up the truly great geniuses that the whole of cultivated Europe has produced in all of ancient and modern times—among whom one may count only those who produced works that have kept a lasting value for humanity through all ages—by counting, I say, these individuals and comparing their number with the 250 million who constantly live in Europe, renewing themselves every thirty years. Indeed, I will not leave unmentioned that I have known some people of a mental superiority that, though not considerable, was nonetheless decided, who at the same time betrayed a faint tinge of derangement. From this it might seem that every

25 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. The great mind is akin to madness, / And only a thin wall divides the two.

26 The couplet is in fact by John Dryden, *Absalom and Achitophel* (1681), lines 163–64.

27 Goethe's play *Torquato Tasso* (1790) dramatizes the Italian Renaissance poet's descent into instability.

heightening of the intellect beyond the ordinary measure, as an abnormality, already predisposes to madness. Meanwhile, I shall set out as briefly as possible my opinion on the purely intellectual ground of this kinship between genius and madness, since this discussion will certainly help to explain the real nature of genius, that is, of the mental quality that alone can create genuine works of art. This, however, requires a brief discussion of madness itself.[28]

GENIUS AND MADNESS

Madness is a broken memory, and genius, blind to relations, borders on it.

A clear and complete insight into the nature of madness, a correct and distinct concept of what really distinguishes the mad from the sane, has, to my knowledge, still not been found.—Neither reason nor understanding can be denied to the mad: they speak and understand, and they often draw quite correct inferences; as a rule their intuition of what is present is also quite correct, and they see the connection between cause and effect. Visions, like the fantasies of fever, are not a usual symptom of madness: delirium falsifies intuition, madness falsifies thoughts. For the most part, that is, the mad are not at all mistaken in their knowledge of what is immediately *present*; their wandering talk always relates to what is *absent* and *past*, and only through that to its connection with the present. It therefore seems to me that their illness particularly affects *memory*. Not, indeed, in such a way that memory is entirely lacking, for many of them know a great deal by heart and sometimes recognize people they have not seen for a long time; but rather in such a way that the thread of memory is broken, its continuous connection abolished, and no evenly connected recollection of the past is possible. Individual scenes from the past stand there correctly, as does the individual present; but there are gaps in their

28 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 31 of the second volume (the Supplements).

recollection, which they then fill with fictions. These fictions are either always the same, and become fixed ideas—then it is a fixed delusion, melancholy—or different each time, momentary notions—then it is called folly, *fatuitas*. That is why it is so hard to find out from a mad person, on admission to the hospital, the course of his earlier life. In his memory, then, the true becomes more and more mixed with the false. Although the immediate present is correctly known, it is falsified by its fictitious connection with an imagined past. Such people therefore take themselves and others to be identical with persons who exist only in their fictitious past; they fail altogether to recognize some acquaintances; and so, while their representation of the individual thing present is correct, they have nothing but false relations of it to what is absent. If madness reaches a high degree, complete loss of memory ensues, so that madness is then quite incapable of any regard for anything absent or past, and is determined solely by the whim of the moment, combined with the fictions that fill the past in its head. In that case, unless one constantly keeps one's superior strength before the mad person's eyes, one is not safe for a moment from assault or murder in his presence.—The knowledge of the mad person has this in common with that of the animal: both are confined to the present. But what distinguishes them is this. The animal has really no representation at all of the past as such, although the past acts on the animal through the medium of habit; hence, for example, a dog recognizes its former master even after years, that is, receives the accustomed impression from the sight of him; but of the time that has since elapsed it has no recollection. The mad person, by contrast, always carries around in his reason a past *in abstracto* as well, but a false one, which exists only for him, and does so either always or only just now; and the influence of this false past then also prevents the use of the correctly known present, a use the animal does make. That violent mental suffering and unexpected, terrible events frequently bring on madness I explain to myself as follows. Every such suffering, as an actual event, is always confined to the present, and

is thus only transitory, and to that extent still not excessively heavy. It becomes overwhelmingly great only insofar as it is a lasting pain; but as such it is again only a thought, and therefore lies in *memory*. Now when such grief, such painful knowledge or remembrance, is so tormenting that it is utterly unbearable and the individual would succumb to it—then nature, alarmed to such a degree, seizes on *madness* as the last means of saving life. The mind so greatly tortured now, as it were, tears the thread of its memory, fills the gaps with fictions, and so flees from the mental pain that exceeds its strength into madness—just as one amputates a limb seized by gangrene and replaces it with a wooden one. —As examples, consider the raging Ajax, King Lear and Ophelia. For the creations of true genius, which alone can be appealed to here as generally known, are to be set equal in truth to real persons; and besides, frequent actual experience shows exactly the same thing here. A faint analogue of this kind of transition from pain to madness is the way all of us, when a tormenting memory suddenly occurs to us, often try, as if mechanically, to scare it away with some loud exclamation or some movement, to divert ourselves from it, to distract ourselves by force.—[29]

Now, as stated, we see the mad person correctly knowing the individual present, and much that is individual in the past as well, but mistaking the connection, the relations, and therefore erring and talking wildly. This is precisely his point of contact with the individual of genius. For the latter, too, abandons knowledge of relations, which is knowledge according to the principle of sufficient reason, in order to see and seek in things only their Ideas and to seize their real essence as it expresses itself intuitively—an essence with respect to which *one* thing represents its whole species, so that, as Goethe says, one case counts for thousands. The person of genius, too, therefore loses sight of the knowledge of the connection of things. The single object of his contemplation, or the present that he grasps with excessive vividness, appears in so bright a light that the other

29 Ajax, driven mad by the goddess Athena, in Sophocles' tragedy *Ajax*.

links of the chain to which they belong recede, as it were, into darkness; and this is exactly what gives rise to phenomena long recognized as resembling those of madness. What is present in the individual existing thing only imperfectly and weakened by modifications, the way of seeing of genius heightens into the Idea of it, into the perfect. He therefore sees extremes everywhere, and for that very reason his actions run to extremes: he does not know how to hit the right measure, he lacks sobriety, and the result is as described. He knows the Ideas perfectly, but not individuals. Hence, as has been remarked, a poet can know *the* human being deeply and thoroughly, yet know *human beings* very badly; he is easily deceived and a plaything in the hands of the cunning.[30]

THE ARTIST LENDS US HIS EYES

All people share the capacity for aesthetic knowing; the genius has more of it and can communicate it.

3.37 According to our account, genius consists in the capacity to know independently of the principle of sufficient reason: to know, instead of individual things, which have their existence only in relation, the Ideas of those things, and in the face of these Ideas to be oneself the correlative of the Idea, and so no longer an individual but pure subject of knowing. Yet this capacity must nevertheless dwell in all human beings too, in a lesser and varying degree. Otherwise they would be as little capable of enjoying works of art as of producing them, and would have no receptivity whatever for the beautiful and the sublime; indeed, these words could have no meaning for them. We must therefore assume that all human beings—unless there happen to be some who are utterly incapable of aesthetic pleasure—possess that faculty of knowing the Ideas in things and, in so doing, of momentarily divesting themselves of their personality. The genius has the advantage over them only in the far higher

30 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 32 of the second volume (the Supplements).

degree and more sustained duration of this way of knowing. These allow him to retain in it the self-possession required to repeat what he has thus known in a deliberate work; this repetition is the work of art. Through it he communicates the Idea he has grasped to others. The Idea remains unchanged and the same in this process. Hence aesthetic pleasure is essentially one and the same, whether it is called forth by a work of art or directly by the intuition of nature and life. The work of art is merely a means of facilitating the knowledge in which that pleasure consists. That the Idea comes to meet us more easily from the work of art than directly from nature and reality arises solely from this: the artist, who knew only the Idea and no longer reality, has also repeated in his work only the Idea, purely, having separated it out from reality and left out all disturbing contingencies. The artist lets us look into the world through his eyes. That he has these eyes, that he knows what is essential in things and lies outside all relations, is precisely the gift of genius, what is innate. But that he is able to lend this gift to us too, to fit us with his eyes—this is what is acquired, the technical side of art. For this reason, having set out above the inner nature of the aesthetic way of knowing in its most general outlines, I shall now proceed to a closer philosophical consideration of the beautiful and the sublime, which will discuss both in nature and in art at once, without separating them further. We shall first consider what goes on in a human being when the beautiful moves him, and when the sublime moves him. Whether he draws this emotion directly from nature, from life, or partakes of it only through the mediation of art makes no essential difference, only an external one.

RELEASE FROM THE WHEEL OF IXION

Willing springs from lack and never ends; will-less contemplation brings a painless peace.

3.38 In the aesthetic way of considering things we have found *two inseparable components*: knowledge of the object, not as an indi-

vidual thing but as a Platonic *Idea*, that is, as the enduring form of this whole species of things; and the self-consciousness of the knower, not as an individual but as *pure, will-less subject of knowledge*. The condition under which both components always appear together was the abandonment of the way of knowing bound to the principle of sufficient reason—which, on the other hand, is the only one suitable for serving the will, and for science.—The *pleasure* aroused by the contemplation of the beautiful, too, we shall see arising from these two components, sometimes more from the one, sometimes more from the other, depending on what the object of aesthetic contemplation is.

All *willing* springs from need, hence from lack, hence from suffering. Fulfillment puts an end to this; yet for every wish that is fulfilled, at least ten remain denied. Moreover, desire lasts long and its demands go on to infinity; fulfillment is brief and meagerly measured out. Indeed, even final satisfaction is itself only apparent: the fulfilled wish at once makes way for a new one; the former is a recognized error, the latter an error not yet recognized. No object of willing, once attained, can give lasting satisfaction that no longer gives way; it is always like the alms thrown to a beggar, which keeps him alive today so as to prolong his torment until tomorrow. —Therefore, so long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given over to the press of desires with its constant hoping and fearing, so long as we are the subject of willing, we shall never have lasting happiness or peace. Whether we pursue or flee, fear harm or strive for enjoyment, is essentially the same: care for the ever-demanding will, in whatever form, continually fills and moves consciousness; and without peace no true well-being is possible at all. So the subject of willing lies forever on the turning wheel of Ixion, forever draws water in the sieve of the Danaids, is the eternally thirsting Tantalus.[31]

But when some external occasion or inner mood suddenly lifts us out of the endless stream of willing and snatches know-

ledge from its slavery to the will, attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing. It grasps things free from their relation to the will; it considers them, that is, without interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively, wholly given over to them insofar as they are mere representations, not insofar as they are motives. Then the peace that we always sought on that first path of willing, but that always fled from us, has come of its own accord all at once, and all is entirely well with us. It is the painless state that Epicurus praised as the highest good and as the state of the gods; for in that moment we are freed from the vile pressure of the will, we keep the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing, the wheel of Ixion stands still.

But this state is precisely the one I described above as required for knowledge of the Idea: pure contemplation, absorption in intuition, losing oneself in the object, forgetting all individuality, abolishing the way of knowing that follows the principle of sufficient reason and grasps only relations. In this state, at the same time and inseparably, the individual thing intuited rises to the Idea of its species, and the knowing individual to the pure subject of will-less knowing; and now both, as such, no longer stand in the stream of time and of all other relations. It is then all the same whether one sees the sun set from a prison or from a palace.

Inner mood, the preponderance of knowing over willing, can call forth this state in any surroundings. This is shown by those admirable Dutch painters who directed such purely objective intuition at the most insignificant objects and set up a lasting monument to their objectivity and peace of mind in the *still life*. The aesthetic beholder does not contemplate it without being moved, since it brings before him the calm, still, will-free state of mind of the artist that was needed to intuit such insignificant things so objectively, to consider them so attentively, and to repeat this intuition with such self-possession. And since the

31 Punishments of the Greek underworld: Ixion bound to a revolving wheel, the Danaids made to fill a leaking vessel with sieves, Tantalus forever reaching for water and fruit that recede.

picture invites him too to share in such a state, his emotion is often heightened still further by the contrast with his own restless state of mind, clouded by vehement willing, in which he happens to find himself. In the same spirit, landscape painters, especially Ruisdael, have often painted extremely insignificant landscape subjects and thereby produced the same effect even more delightfully.[32]

This much is achieved by the inner power of an artistic mind alone. But that purely objective mood is made easier and promoted from outside by objects that meet it halfway, by the abundance of beautiful nature, which invites, indeed presses itself upon, our intuition. Whenever nature suddenly opens before our gaze, she almost always succeeds in snatching us, if only for moments, from subjectivity, from slavery to the will, and transporting us into the state of pure knowing. That is why a person tormented by passions, or by want and care, is so suddenly refreshed, cheered and restored by a single free glance at nature: the storm of passions, the press of desire and fear and all the torment of willing are then at once, in a wonderful way, calmed. For at the moment when, torn away from willing, we have given ourselves over to pure, will-less knowing, we have stepped, as it were, into another world, where everything that moves our will and thereby shakes us so violently no longer exists. This liberation of knowledge lifts us out of all that just as fully and completely as sleep and dreams do: happiness and unhappiness have vanished. We are no longer the individual—that is forgotten—but only pure subject of knowledge. We are there only as the *one* eye of the world that looks out from all knowing beings, but that can become entirely free from the service of the will in human beings alone. In this way all difference of individuality vanishes so completely that it is then all the same whether the beholding eye belongs to a mighty king or to a tormented beggar. For neither happiness nor misery is carried across that boundary. So close to us, always, lies a realm in which we have entirely escaped all our misery; but who has the

32 Jacob van Ruisdael (c. 1628–1682), leading Dutch landscape painter.

strength to remain there for long? As soon as any relation of those very objects so purely intuited to our will, to our person, re-enters consciousness, the spell is at an end. We fall back into the knowledge governed by the principle of sufficient reason; we now know no longer the Idea but the individual thing, the link of a chain to which we too belong; and we are once more given over to all our misery.—Most people, because they wholly lack objectivity, that is, genius, stand almost always at this standpoint. That is why they do not like being alone with nature: they need company, or at least a book. For their knowing remains in the service of the will. They therefore look in objects only for whatever relation they may have to their will, and at everything that has no such relation there sounds within them, like a ground bass, a constant, desolate "It's no use to me." Hence in solitude even the most beautiful surroundings take on for them a bleak, gloomy, alien, hostile look.

It is, finally, this same bliss of will-less intuition that casts so wondrous a spell over the past and the distant and presents them to us in so embellishing a light—through a self-deception. For when we call up days long gone, spent in some distant place, it is the objects alone that our imagination recalls, not the subject of the will, which carried its incurable sufferings around with it then just as it does now; but these are forgotten, because they have since often made way for others. Now objective intuition in memory works just as present intuition would work if we could bring ourselves to give ourselves up to it free of will. That is why, especially when some distress troubles us more than usual, the sudden memory of scenes from the past and from far away flits past us like a lost paradise. Imagination recalls only the objective, not the individually subjective, and we imagine that the objective stood before us back then just as purely, untroubled by any relation to the will, as its image now stands in imagination—whereas in fact the relation of the objects to our willing caused us torment then, just as it does now. We can withdraw from all suffering through present objects just as well as through distant ones, as soon as we raise

ourselves to a purely objective consideration of them and are able to produce the illusion that only those objects were present, not we ourselves. Then, rid of the wretched self, we become, as pure subject of knowing, entirely one with those objects; and as foreign as our distress is to them, so foreign is it, in such moments, to ourselves. Then the world as representation alone remains, and the world as will has vanished.

Through all these considerations I hope to have made clear of what kind and how great a share in aesthetic pleasure belongs to its subjective condition, namely the liberation of knowing from the service of the will, the forgetting of one's self as an individual, and the elevation of consciousness to the pure, will-less, timeless subject of knowing, independent of all relations. Together with this subjective side of aesthetic contemplation, its objective side always appears at the same time as its necessary correlative: the intuitive apprehension of the Platonic Idea. But before we turn to a closer consideration of this objective side, and to the achievements of art in relation to it, it is more fitting to linger a little longer on the subjective side of aesthetic pleasure. We can then complete our consideration of it by discussing the impression of the *sublime,* which depends on that side alone and arises from a modification of it. After that, our inquiry into aesthetic pleasure will attain its full completeness through the consideration of its objective side.

LIGHT, THE MOST GLADDENING OF THINGS

Light pleases because it is the condition of the purest, will-free kind of knowledge.

Before that, however, the following remarks still belong to what has been said so far. Light is the most delightful of things: it has become the symbol of everything good and salutary. In all religions it signifies eternal salvation, and darkness signifies damnation. Ormuzd dwells in the purest light, Ahriman in eternal night. Dante's Paradise looks rather like Vauxhall in London, since all the blessed spirits there appear as points of light that

arrange themselves into regular figures. The absence of light makes us immediately sad, and its return makes us happy. Colors immediately excite a lively delight, which reaches its highest degree when they are transparent.[33] All this comes solely from the fact that light is the correlate and condition of the most perfect intuitive mode of knowledge, the only one that does not directly affect the will at all. Sight differs from the affection of the other senses. In itself, directly and through its sensory effect, it is incapable of any pleasantness or unpleasantness of *sensation* in the organ. In other words, it has no direct connection with the will. Only the intuition that arises in the understanding can have such a connection, and that connection then lies in the relation of the object to the will. With hearing it is already different: sounds can directly cause pain, and they can also be directly pleasant to the senses, without any reference to harmony or melody. Touch, being one with the feeling of the whole body, is still more subject to this direct influence on the will. Even so, there is a kind of touching that involves neither pain nor pleasure. Smells, however, are always pleasant or unpleasant, and tastes are even more so. These last two senses are therefore the most contaminated by the will. That is why they are always the least noble, and Kant called them the subjective senses. The joy we take in light is thus in fact only joy in the objective possibility of the purest and most perfect intuitive mode of knowledge. As such, it is to be derived from the fact that pure knowing, freed and delivered from all willing, is supremely delightful and, simply as such, has a large share in aesthetic enjoyment.[34] —From this view of light we can in turn derive the incredibly great beauty we attribute to the reflection of objects in water. Bodies act on one another in many ways, and the lightest, quickest and finest of them is action by means of reflected rays of light. To it we also owe by far the most perfect and purest of our

33 Ormuzd (Ahura Mazda) and Ahriman are the good and evil principles of Zoroastrianism. Vauxhall Gardens was a London pleasure garden famous for its illuminations of thousands of lamps.

34 Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), which classes taste and smell as senses more subjective than objective.

perceptions. Here this action is brought before our eyes wholly distinctly, surveyably and completely, in cause and effect, and on a large scale. Hence our aesthetic joy in it. In the main, this joy is rooted entirely in the subjective ground of aesthetic pleasure, and it is joy in pure knowing and its ways.[35]

THE SUBLIME

The sublime is contemplation won by consciously rising above objects hostile to the will.

3.39 All these considerations have been meant to bring out the subjective part of aesthetic pleasure, that is, this pleasure insofar as it is joy in mere intuitive knowing as such, in contrast to the will. Directly connected with them is the following explanation of the state of mind that has been called the feeling of the *sublime*.

It was remarked above that we pass most easily into the state of pure intuition when the objects meet it halfway. This happens when their manifold and at the same time definite and distinct form lets them readily become representatives of their Ideas, which is precisely what beauty, in the objective sense, consists in. Beautiful nature above all has this property, and so it wins at least a fleeting aesthetic pleasure even from the most insensitive. Indeed, it is so striking how the plant world in particular invites aesthetic contemplation and, as it were, presses itself upon it, that one might suppose this readiness to be connected with a further fact. Unlike animal bodies, these organic beings are not themselves an immediate object of knowledge. They therefore need the alien, intelligent individual in order to pass from the world of blind willing into that of representation. It is as if they longed for this entry, in order to attain at least indirectly what is denied them directly. For the rest, I leave this bold thought, which perhaps borders on fanciful enthusiasm, entirely undecided, since only a very intimate and devoted con-

35 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 33 of the second volume (the Supplements).

templation of nature can prompt or justify it.[36] Now, so long as what transports us from the knowledge of mere relations, which serves the will, into aesthetic contemplation, and so raises us to the will-free subject of knowing, is this readiness of nature—the significance and distinctness of its forms, from which the Ideas individualized in them readily speak to us—so long it is merely the *beautiful* that acts on us, and the feeling of beauty that is aroused. But now suppose that those very objects whose significant forms invite us to contemplate them purely stand in a hostile relation to the human will in general, as it presents itself in its objecthood, the human body. They are opposed to it, and they threaten it with a superior power that cancels all resistance, or they reduce it to nothing before their immeasurable magnitude. And suppose that the beholder nevertheless does not direct his attention to this hostile relation to his will, which forces itself upon him; suppose instead that he perceives and acknowledges it, yet consciously turns away from it, forcibly tearing himself loose from his will and its relations. Given over to knowledge alone, he calmly contemplates, as pure will-less subject of knowing, those very objects that are fearful to the will. He grasps only their Idea, which is alien to every relation, and therefore gladly lingers over their contemplation, and in just this way he is lifted above himself, his person, his willing and all willing.—Then he is filled with the feeling of the *sublime*. He is in a state of elevation, and that is why the object that occasions such a state is also called *sublime*.[37] What distinguishes the

36 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. All the more am I delighted and surprised now, forty years after I wrote the above thought down so timidly and hesitantly, to discover that St. Augustine had already expressed it: Arbusta formas suas varias, quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent; ut, pro eo quod *nosse* non possunt, quasi *innotescere* velle videantur. [Plants offer their manifold forms, by which the structure of this visible world is made beautiful, to the senses to be perceived; so that, since they cannot *know*, they seem as it were to want to *be known*.] *(De civ. Dei, XI, 27.)*

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Augustine of Hippo (AD 354–430), *The City of God*, Book XI, chapter 27.

37 The German plays on *Erhebung* (elevation, being lifted up) and *erhaben* (sublime), literally "raised up."

feeling of the sublime from that of the beautiful, then, is this. With the beautiful, pure knowing has gained the upper hand without a struggle. The beauty of the object, that is, its property of making knowledge of its Idea easier, has removed from consciousness, without resistance and therefore imperceptibly, both the will and the knowledge of relations that slaves in its service. It has left consciousness behind as pure subject of knowing, so that not even a memory of the will remains. With the sublime, on the other hand, that state of pure knowing is first won by consciously and forcibly tearing oneself away from the relations of the same object to the will, relations recognized as unfavorable. It is won through a free elevation, accompanied by consciousness, above the will and the knowledge related to it. This elevation must not only be won consciously but also consciously sustained. It is therefore accompanied by a constant remembrance of the will. This is not, however, a remembrance of some single, individual willing, such as fear or desire, but of human willing in general, insofar as it is universally expressed by its objecthood, the human body. Suppose a real, single act of will entered consciousness through actual personal distress and danger from the object. Then the individual will, now actually stirred, would at once gain the upper hand, and the calm of contemplation would become impossible. The impression of the sublime would be lost, giving way to fear, in which the individual's effort to save himself would crowd out every other thought. —A few examples will do a great deal to make this theory of the aesthetically sublime clear and to place it beyond doubt. At the same time they will show the different degrees of that feeling of the sublime. In its chief determination this feeling is one with the feeling of the beautiful: both consist in pure, will-free knowing and in the knowledge, necessarily arising with it, of the Ideas that stand outside every relation determined by the principle of sufficient reason. The feeling of the sublime differs from that of the beautiful only by an addition, namely the elevation above the recognized hostile relation of the very object contemplated to the will in general. Hence, according as

this addition is strong, loud, urgent and near, or only weak, distant and merely hinted at, there arise several degrees of the sublime, and indeed transitions from the beautiful to the sublime. I consider it better suited to the exposition to present first, by examples, these transitions and in general the weaker degrees of the impression of the sublime. Admittedly, those whose aesthetic receptivity is not very great in general, and whose imagination is not lively, will understand only the later examples of the higher, more distinct degrees of that impression. They should therefore keep to these alone and leave aside the examples of the very weak degrees, which are to be cited first.

A human being is at once the impetuous, dark urge of willing (indicated by the pole of the genitals as its focal point) and the eternal, free, serene subject of pure knowing (indicated by the pole of the brain). Corresponding to this antithesis, the sun is at once the source of *light* and the source of *warmth*. Light is the condition of the most perfect kind of knowledge, and for that very reason the most delightful of things. Warmth is the first condition of all life, that is, of every appearance of the will at its higher grades. What warmth is for the will, therefore, light is for knowledge. For this very reason light is the largest diamond in the crown of beauty and has the most decisive influence on the knowledge of every beautiful object. Its presence as such is an indispensable condition, and its favorable position enhances the beauty of even the most beautiful. Above all else, however, the beauty of architecture is enhanced by its favor, though through that favor even the most insignificant thing becomes a beautiful object. —Now suppose that in a hard winter, when all nature is frozen stiff, we see the rays of the low sun reflected by masses of stone. There they illuminate without warming, and so they favor only the purest mode of knowledge, not the will. Contemplating the beautiful effect of the light on these masses then transports us, like all beauty, into the state of pure knowing. Here, however, we are faintly reminded that those very rays lack warmth, and so lack the life-giving principle. Because of this reminder, the state already demands a certain elevation above

the interest of the will and contains a gentle summons to persist in pure knowing, turning away from all willing. For that very reason it is a transition from the feeling of the beautiful to that of the sublime. It is the faintest breath of the sublime upon the beautiful, and here even the beautiful appears only to a slight degree. An example almost as weak is the following.

Let us imagine ourselves in a very lonely region with an unbounded horizon, under a completely cloudless sky. The trees and plants stand in utterly motionless air; there are no animals, no people, no moving water, only the deepest silence.—Such surroundings are like a call to seriousness and contemplation, tearing us away from all willing and its neediness. Yet precisely this already gives such surroundings, which are merely lonely and deeply at rest, a touch of the sublime. The will needs constant striving and attaining, and these surroundings offer it no objects, whether favorable or unfavorable. So only the state of pure contemplation remains, and whoever is incapable of it is abandoned, with shameful humiliation, to the emptiness of the unoccupied will, to the torment of boredom. To that extent such surroundings provide a measure of our own intellectual worth, for which the degree of our capacity to endure, or to love, solitude is in general a good yardstick. The surroundings described thus give an example of the sublime in a low degree. In them the state of pure knowing, in its calm and all-sufficiency, is mixed, by way of contrast, with a reminder of the dependence and wretchedness of the will, which needs constant activity.—This is the kind of sublime that is said to belong to the sight of the endless prairies of the interior of North America.

But now let such a region also be stripped of plants and show only bare rocks. Then the complete absence of the organic things necessary for our subsistence already alarms the will directly. The desolation takes on a fearful character, and our mood becomes more tragic. The elevation to pure knowing occurs with a more decided tearing away from the interest of the will, and as we persist in the state of pure knowing, the feeling of the sublime distinctly emerges.

The following surroundings can occasion it in a still higher degree. Nature in stormy commotion; a half-light under threatening black thunderclouds; enormous, bare, overhanging rocks that interlock and shut off the view; roaring, foaming waters; complete desolation; the wailing of the wind as it sweeps through the ravines. Our dependence, our struggle with hostile nature, our will broken in that struggle, now appear vividly before our eyes. But as long as personal distress does not gain the upper hand and we remain in aesthetic contemplation, the pure subject of knowing looks through that struggle of nature, through that image of the broken will. Calm, unshaken, untouched *(unconcerned)*, it grasps the Ideas in the very objects that are threatening and terrible to the will. It is precisely in this contrast that the feeling of the sublime lies.

But the impression becomes still more powerful when we have before our eyes the struggle of the enraged forces of nature on a large scale. Perhaps, in such surroundings, a cascading torrent rages so loudly that we cannot hear our own voice;—or we stand by the wide sea whipped up by a storm. Waves as high as houses rise and fall; dashed violently against the steep cliffs of the shore, they fling their spray high into the air. The storm howls, the sea roars, lightning flashes from black clouds, and thunderclaps drown out storm and sea. Then, in the unshaken spectator of this scene, the twofold nature of his consciousness reaches its greatest distinctness. He feels himself at once as an individual, as a frail appearance of the will that the slightest blow of those forces can shatter: helpless against mighty nature, dependent, abandoned to chance, a vanishing nothing in the face of tremendous powers. And at the same time he feels himself as the eternal, calm subject of knowing. As the condition of every object, this subject is the bearer of this whole world, and the fearful struggle of nature is only its representation, while it calmly grasps the Ideas, free of and alien to all willing and all needs. This is the full impression of the sublime. Here it is occasioned by the sight of a power incomparably superior to the individual and threatening it with annihilation.

THE DYNAMICALLY AND THE MATHEMATICALLY SUBLIME

Overwhelming power or immeasurable magnitude shrinks the individual yet lifts the knowing subject.

It can arise in an entirely different way when we call to mind a mere magnitude in space and time whose immeasurableness reduces the individual to nothing. We may call the first kind the dynamically sublime and the second the mathematically sublime. In doing so we keep Kant's names and his correct division, although in explaining the inner nature of that impression we depart from him entirely. We grant no part in it either to moral reflections or to hypostases from scholastic philosophy.[38]

We may lose ourselves in contemplating the infinite magnitude of the world in space and time, pondering the millennia past and those to come. Or the night sky may actually bring countless worlds before our eyes, so that the immeasurableness of the world presses in upon consciousness.—Then we feel ourselves reduced to nothing. As individuals, as living bodies, as transient appearances of the will, we feel ourselves vanish like a drop in the ocean and dissolve into nothing. But at the same time, against such a specter of our own nothingness, against such a lying impossibility, there rises the immediate consciousness that all these worlds exist only in our representation. They exist only as modifications of the eternal subject of pure knowing, which we find ourselves to be as soon as we forget our individuality, and which is the necessary, conditioning bearer of all worlds and all times. The vastness of the world, which disquieted us before, now rests within us: our dependence on it is abolished by its dependence on us. —All this, however, does not enter reflection at once. It shows itself as a merely felt consciousness that in some sense (which philosophy alone makes clear) one is one with the world, and that the world's immeasurableness therefore uplifts rather than crushes us. It is the felt

38 Kant draws the distinction between the mathematically and the dynamically sublime in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), §§ 24–29.

consciousness of what the Upanishads of the Vedas express again and again in so many varied turns of phrase, and above all in the saying already quoted above: *Hae omnes creaturae in totum ego sum, et praeter me aliud ens non est* [All these creatures together am I, and besides me there is no other being] *(Oupnek'hat, vol. I, p. 122).* It is elevation above one's own individuality, the feeling of the sublime.

We receive this impression of the mathematically sublime in a quite immediate way even from a space that is small compared with the universe. Because this space has become wholly and immediately perceptible to us, it acts on us in all three dimensions with its whole magnitude, and that magnitude is enough to make the measure of our own body almost infinitely small. A space that is empty for perception can never do this, and so an open space never can. Only a space made immediately perceptible by being bounded in all dimensions can do it: a very high and large vault, like that of St. Peter's in Rome or St. Paul's in London. The feeling of the sublime arises here as we become aware of the vanishing nothingness of our own body before a magnitude. On the other hand, this magnitude itself lies only in our representation, and we, as knowing subject, are its bearer. Here, then, as everywhere, the feeling arises through a contrast. On one side stand the insignificance and dependence of our self as individual, as appearance of the will; on the other stands the consciousness of ourselves as pure subject of knowing. Even the vault of the starry sky, if contemplated without reflection, acts just like that vault of stone, and not with its true magnitude but only with its apparent one. —Many objects of our intuition arouse the impression of the sublime because, through both their spatial magnitude and their great age, that is, their duration in time, we feel ourselves reduced to nothing before them, and yet we revel in the enjoyment of beholding them. Of this kind are very high mountains, the Egyptian pyramids, and colossal ruins of great antiquity.

Indeed, our explanation of the sublime can also be carried over to the ethical, namely to what is called a sublime character.

Such a character, too, springs from the fact that the will is not aroused by objects that would certainly be apt to arouse it; here too knowing keeps the upper hand. Such a character will accordingly consider people purely objectively, and not according to the relations they might have to his will. He will, for example, notice their faults, even their hatred and injustice toward himself, without being provoked to hatred in turn. He will look upon their good fortune without feeling envy. He will recognize their good qualities without, however, wishing for closer association with them. He will perceive the beauty of women without desiring them. His personal fortune or misfortune will not affect him strongly; rather, he will be as Hamlet describes Horatio:

> *for thou hast been*
> *As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing;*
> *A man, that fortune's buffets and rewards*
> *Hast ta'en with equal thanks, etc. (Act 3, sc. 2.)*[39][40]

For in the course of his own life and its misfortunes he will see not so much his individual lot as the lot of humanity in general. Accordingly, he will relate to it more as one who knows than as one who suffers.

THE CHARMING, OPPOSITE OF THE SUBLIME

What excites the will, such as painted food or lascivious nudes, destroys aesthetic contemplation.

3.40 Since opposites illuminate each other, this may be the place to remark that the real opposite of the sublime is something one would probably not recognize as such at first glance: the *charming*. By this I mean whatever excites the will by directly holding out to it gratification, fulfillment.[41] —The feeling of the sublime

39 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. For you were always as though, / with everything striking you, you had nothing to suffer; / fate's blows and gifts you have / accepted with equal thanks, etc.

40 Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act 3, Scene 2.

41 German *das Reizende*, from *Reiz* (stimulus, allure): that which stimulates the will. Other translations have "the attractive" or "the stimulating."

arose when an object directly unfavorable to the will became the object of pure contemplation. That contemplation is then sustained only by constantly turning away from the will and rising above its interest, and this is just what constitutes the sublimity of the mood. The charming, by contrast, drags the beholder down from the pure contemplation that every apprehension of the beautiful requires. It necessarily stimulates his will through objects that directly appeal to it, so that the beholder no longer remains pure subject of knowing but becomes the needy, dependent subject of willing.—People usually call every beautiful thing of the cheerful kind charming. That is a concept drawn too broadly for lack of proper distinctions, and I must set it aside entirely, indeed reject it. —In the sense stated and explained, however, I find only two kinds of the charming in the domain of art, and both are unworthy of it. One, a very low kind, appears in the still lifes of the Dutch painters when they go so far astray as to depict articles of food. Through their illusionistic rendering, these necessarily arouse our appetite for them, and that is precisely an excitation of the will, which puts an end to all aesthetic contemplation of the object. Painted fruit is still admissible. It presents itself as a further development of the flower, and through its form and color as a beautiful product of nature, without our being directly compelled to think of its edibility. But unfortunately we often find, rendered with deceptive naturalness, dishes prepared and set on the table: oysters, herrings, lobsters, bread and butter, beer, wine and so on. This is altogether objectionable. —In history painting and sculpture, the charming consists in nude figures whose pose, half-drapery and whole manner of treatment aim at arousing lust in the beholder. Purely aesthetic contemplation is thereby at once abolished, and the purpose of art is thus counteracted. This fault corresponds exactly to the one just censured in the Dutch painters. The statues of antiquity, for all the beauty and complete nakedness of their figures, are almost always free of it, because the artist himself created them in a purely objective spirit filled with ideal beauty, not in a spirit of subjective, base

desire.—The charming, therefore, is to be avoided everywhere in art.

There is also a negative charming, which is even more objectionable than the positive charming just discussed: namely the disgusting. Just like the charming proper, it arouses the will of the beholder and thereby destroys purely aesthetic contemplation. But what it arouses is a violent not-willing, an aversion: it arouses the will by holding before it objects of its abhorrence. Hence it has always been recognized as absolutely inadmissible in art, whereas even the ugly, as long as it is not disgusting, can be tolerated in the right place, as we shall see further on.

EVERYTHING IS BEAUTIFUL

Every thing expresses an Idea and so is beautiful; things differ in how readily they do so.

3.41 The course of our inquiry made it necessary to insert the discussion of the sublime here, when that of the beautiful was only half complete, finished only on one of its sides, the subjective. For it was only a particular modification of this subjective side that distinguished the sublime from the beautiful. Every aesthetic contemplation presupposes and demands the state of pure will-less knowing. That state may have come about as if of its own accord, without resistance, through the mere disappearance of the will from consciousness, because the object invited and drew us into it. Or it may have been won only through a free, conscious elevation above the will, to which the contemplated object itself stands in an unfavorable, hostile relation, so that dwelling on this relation would abolish contemplation.—This is the difference between the beautiful and the sublime. In their object the two do not essentially differ. For in each case the object of aesthetic contemplation is not the individual thing but the Idea striving to reveal itself in it, that is, adequate objecthood of the will at a definite grade. Its necessary correlate, which like the Idea itself is withdrawn from the principle of sufficient reason, is the pure subject of knowing. In the same way,

the correlate of the individual thing is the knowing individual, and both of these lie within the domain of the principle of sufficient reason.

When we call an object *beautiful*, we are saying that it is an object of our aesthetic contemplation, and this implies two things. On the one hand, the sight of it makes us *objective*: in contemplating it we are conscious of ourselves no longer as individuals but as pure will-less subject of knowing. On the other hand, we know in the object not the individual thing but an Idea. This can happen only insofar as our contemplation of the object is not given over to the principle of sufficient reason. It must not follow up the object's relation to anything outside it (a relation that in the end is always bound up with its relation to our willing), but must rest on the object itself. For the Idea and the pure subject of knowing, as necessary correlates, always enter consciousness together, and with their entry every distinction of time at once vanishes. Both are wholly alien to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms and lie outside the relations it posits. They may be compared to the rainbow and the sun, which have no part in the constant motion and succession of the falling drops. Hence if, for example, I contemplate a tree aesthetically, that is, with an artist's eyes, so that I know not the tree but its Idea, it at once becomes of no significance whether it is this tree or its ancestor that flourished a thousand years ago. Likewise it makes no difference whether the beholder is this individual or any other, living at any time and in any place. Along with the principle of sufficient reason, the individual thing and the knowing individual are abolished, and nothing remains but the Idea and the pure subject of knowing, which together constitute the adequate objecthood of the will at this grade. And the Idea is exempt not only from time but also from space. For what is really the Idea is not the spatial form hovering before me, but its expression, its pure significance, its innermost being, which discloses itself to me and speaks to me. The Idea can remain entirely the same even when the spatial proportions of the form differ greatly.

Now, on the one hand, every existing thing can be contemplated purely objectively and outside all relation. On the other hand, the will appears in every thing at some grade of its objecthood, so that each thing is the expression of an Idea. Every thing, therefore, is also *beautiful*.—That even the most insignificant thing admits of purely objective and will-less contemplation, and so proves itself beautiful, is attested by the still lifes of the Dutch painters, already mentioned in this connection above (§ 38). But one thing is more beautiful than another because it makes that purely objective contemplation easier, meets it halfway, indeed as it were compels it. We then call it very beautiful. This happens in part when the thing, as an individual thing, expresses the Idea of its species purely, through the very distinct, clearly defined, thoroughly significant relation of its parts. Uniting in itself all the manifestations possible to its species, it reveals that Idea perfectly, and so greatly eases for the beholder the transition from the individual thing to the Idea, and with it the state of pure contemplation. In part, that merit of special beauty in an object lies in the fact that the Idea speaking to us from it is itself a high grade of the will's objecthood, and therefore thoroughly significant and eloquent. That is why the human being is beautiful above all else, and why the revelation of human nature is the highest aim of art. Human form and human expression are the most significant object of the visual arts, just as human action is the most significant object of poetry.—Yet every thing nonetheless has its own beauty. This holds not only for everything organic that presents itself in the unity of an individuality, but also for everything inorganic and formless, and indeed for every artifact. For all of these reveal the Ideas through which the will objectifies itself at the lowest grades; they sound, as it were, the deepest, fading bass notes of nature. Gravity, rigidity, fluidity, light and so on are the Ideas expressed in rocks, buildings and waters. Landscape gardening and architecture, as fine arts, can do no more than help these things to unfold those properties of theirs distinctly, manysidedly and completely. They give them occasion to express

themselves purely, and in this way invite and facilitate aesthetic contemplation. Poor buildings, and regions that nature neglected or art spoiled, accomplish this little or not at all. Yet even from them those universal fundamental Ideas of nature cannot entirely disappear. Here too they speak to the beholder who seeks them, and even poor buildings and the like still admit of aesthetic contemplation. The Ideas of the most universal properties of their material can still be recognized in them. It is just that the form artificially given to them is no aid, but rather an obstacle that makes aesthetic contemplation more difficult. Artifacts, too, therefore serve to express Ideas. Only it is not the Idea of the artifact that speaks from them, but the Idea of the material to which this artificial form was given. In the language of the scholastics this can be put very conveniently in two words. In the artifact the Idea of its *forma substantialis* expresses itself, not that of its *forma accidentalis*. The latter leads to no Idea, but only to a human concept from which it originated. It goes without saying that by artifact we expressly do not mean here a work of the visual arts. For the rest, what the scholastics actually understood by *forma substantialis* is what I call the grade of the will's objectification in a thing. When we consider architecture as a fine art, we shall shortly return to the expression of the Idea of the material.—On our view, however, we cannot agree with Plato when he asserts *(De Rep. X, p. 284–285, et Parmen., p. 79, ed. Bip.)* that table and chair express the Ideas of table and chair. Instead we say that they express the Ideas already expressed in their mere material as such. According to Aristotle *(Metaph., XI, ch. 3)*, however, Plato himself posited Ideas only of natural beings: *ho Platôn ephê, hoti eidê estin hoposa physei. (Plato dixit, quod ideae eorum sunt, quae natura sunt)* [Plato said that there are Ideas of the things that exist by nature]. And in chapter 5 it is said that, according to the Platonists, there are no Ideas of house and ring.[42] At any rate, Plato's immediate followers, as Alcinous

42 "Ed. Bip." is the Bipontine (Zweibrücken) edition of Plato; the passages are *Republic* X, 596a–597d, and *Parmenides* 130c–d. The Aristotle passage is *Metaphysics* 1070a18.

reports *(introductio in Platonicam philosophiam*, ch. *9)*, already denied that there are Ideas of artifacts. He says: *Horizontai de tên idean, paradeigma tôn kata physin aiônion. Oute gar tois pleistois tôn apo Platônos areskei, tôn technikôn einai ideas, hoion aspidos ê lyras, oute mên tôn para physin, hoion pyretou kai choleras, oute tôn kata meros, hoion Sôkratous kai Platônos, all' oute tôn eutelôn tinos, hoion rypou kai karphous, oute tôn pros ti, hoion meizonos kai hyperechontos; einai gar tas ideas noêseis theou aiônious te kai autoteleis.*— (Definiunt autem ideam exemplar aeternum eorum, quae secundum naturam existunt.[43] Nam plurimis ex iis, qui Platonem secuti sunt, minime placuit, arte factorum ideas esse, ut clypei atque lyrae, neque rursus eorum, quae praeter naturam, ut febris et cholerae; neque particularium, ceu Socratis et Platonis, neque etiam rerum vilium, veluti sordium et festucae; neque relationum, ut majoris et excedentis: esse namque ideas intellectiones dei aeternas, ac seipsis perfectas.) *[They define the Idea as the eternal exemplar of the things that exist according to nature. For most of Plato's followers did not accept that there are Ideas of things made by art, such as a shield or a lyre; nor of things contrary to nature, such as fever and cholera; nor of particulars, such as Socrates and Plato; nor even of worthless things, such as dirt and chaff; nor of relations, such as the greater and the exceeding. For the Ideas are God's eternal thoughts, complete in themselves.]—This is also the place to mention another point on which our doctrine of Ideas departs very greatly from Plato's. He teaches* (De Rep., X, p. 288) that the object which fine art aims to depict, the model for painting and poetry, is not the Idea but the individual thing. Our exposition so far maintains exactly the opposite. Plato's opinion will lead us astray here all the less because it is the source of one of that great man's greatest and acknowledged errors, namely his disdain for and rejection of art, especially poetry. He links his false judgment of poetry directly to the passage cited.

43 Alcinous, a Platonist of the 2nd century AD, is the traditional author of the *Didaskalikos*, a handbook of Platonic doctrine.

TWO SOURCES OF AESTHETIC PLEASURE

Pleasure comes more from will-less knowing at low grades, more from the Idea at high ones.

3.42 I return to our exposition of the aesthetic impression. Knowledge of the beautiful always posits, simultaneously and inseparably, a purely knowing subject and a known Idea as its object. Yet the source of aesthetic enjoyment will lie sometimes more in the apprehension of the known Idea, and sometimes more in the bliss and peace of mind of pure knowing. That knowing is freed from all willing, and thereby from all individuality and the torment that arises from it. Whether the one or the other component of aesthetic enjoyment predominates will depend on whether the intuitively apprehended Idea is a higher or a lower grade of the will's objecthood. Thus in the aesthetic contemplation of beautiful nature in the inorganic and vegetable kingdoms, and of works of architecture (whether in reality or through the medium of art), the enjoyment of pure will-less knowing will predominate. The Ideas apprehended here are only low grades of the will's objecthood, and so they are not appearances of deep significance and rich content. On the other hand, when animals and human beings are the object of aesthetic contemplation or depiction, the enjoyment will consist more in the objective apprehension of these Ideas, which are the most distinct revelations of the will. For they display the greatest variety of forms and the richest, most deeply significant appearances. They reveal to us most perfectly the nature of the will, whether in its violence, its terribleness, its satisfaction, or its breaking (the last in tragic depictions), and finally even in its turning or self-abolition, which is above all the theme of Christian painting. In general, history painting and drama have as their object the Idea of the will illuminated by full knowledge.—We shall now go through the arts one by one, and in this way the theory of the beautiful set out here will gain completeness and clarity.

ARCHITECTURE: GRAVITY AGAINST RIGIDITY

Architecture as a fine art makes visible the struggle between gravity and rigidity, and the nature of light.

3.43 Matter as such cannot be the depiction of an Idea. For, as we found in the first book, it is through and through causality: its being is sheer acting. But causality is a form of the principle of sufficient reason, whereas knowledge of the Idea essentially excludes the content of that principle. In the second book, too, we found matter to be the common substratum of all the individual appearances of the Ideas, and hence the connecting link between the Idea and the appearance, or individual thing. So for both reasons matter by itself cannot depict an Idea. *A posteriori*, however, this is confirmed by the fact that of matter as such no intuitive representation at all is possible, only an abstract concept. In intuitive representation only the forms and qualities appear, whose bearer is matter, and in all of which Ideas reveal themselves. This also corresponds to the fact that causality (the whole essence of matter) cannot by itself be intuitively depicted; only a particular causal connection can.—On the other hand, every *appearance* of an Idea, having as such entered into the form of the principle of sufficient reason, or into the *principium individuationis*, must present itself in matter, as a quality of matter. To this extent, as has been said, matter is the connecting link between the Idea and the *principium individuationis*, which is the form of the individual's knowledge, or the principle of sufficient reason.—Plato was therefore quite right to set up only matter as a third thing distinct from both the Idea and its appearance, the individual thing, which between them otherwise comprise all the things in the world *(Timaeus, p.* 345). The individual, as appearance of the Idea, is always matter. And every quality of matter is always the appearance of an Idea, and as such is also capable of aesthetic contemplation, that is, of

knowledge of the Idea presenting itself in it.[44] This holds even of the most universal qualities of matter, without which it never exists, and whose Ideas are the weakest objecthood of the will. Such are gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity, reaction to light, and so on.

Let us now consider *architecture* merely as a fine art, apart from its use for practical ends, in which it serves the will rather than pure knowledge and so is no longer art in our sense. Considered this way, we can attribute to it no other aim than to bring some of those Ideas that are the lowest grades of the will's objecthood to distinct intuitive clarity. These are gravity, cohesion, rigidity and hardness, the universal properties of stone, the first, simplest, dullest forms in which the will becomes visible, the fundamental bass notes of nature; and then, alongside them, light, which is in many respects their opposite. Even at this low grade of the will's objecthood we already see its nature revealing itself in discord. For the struggle between gravity and rigidity is in fact the sole aesthetic material of beautiful architecture, and its task is to make that struggle stand out with perfect distinctness in manifold ways. It accomplishes this by denying those indestructible forces the shortest path to their satisfaction and holding them off by a detour. The struggle is thereby prolonged, and the inexhaustible striving of both forces becomes visible in manifold ways.—Left to its original tendency, the whole mass of the building would present a mere lump, bound as firmly as possible to the body of the earth. Gravity, which is how the will appears here, presses unceasingly toward the earth, while rigidity, likewise objecthood of the will, resists. But architecture prevents precisely this tendency, this striving, from being satisfied directly, and allows it only an indirect satisfaction, by detours. Thus, for example, the entablature can press on the earth only by means of the column; the vault must support itself and can satisfy its striving toward the mass of the earth only through the mediation of the piers; and so on. But it

44 Plato's "third kind," the receptacle in which things come to be (*Timaeus* 48e–52d).

is precisely on these enforced detours, and precisely through these obstructions, that the forces inherent in the raw mass of stone unfold most distinctly and in the most varied ways. The purely aesthetic purpose of architecture can go no further than this. Hence the beauty of a building certainly lies in the evident purposiveness of every part. This is not purposiveness for the external, arbitrary *purpose* of human beings (in that respect the work belongs to useful architecture), but directly for the stability of the whole. The position, size and form of every part must stand in so necessary a relation to the whole that, if possible, the whole would have to collapse were any part removed. For only when each part bears as much as it properly can, and each is supported exactly where and exactly as much as it must be, does that interplay, that struggle between rigidity and gravity, unfold to the most complete visibility. This struggle constitutes the life of the stone, its expressions of will, and in it these lowest grades of the will's objecthood distinctly reveal themselves. Likewise the shape of every part must be determined by its purpose and its relation to the whole, not by caprice. The column is the very simplest form of support, determined solely by its purpose. The twisted column is tasteless. The square pillar is in fact less simple than the round column, although it happens to be easier to make. Likewise the forms of frieze, beam, arch and dome are wholly determined by their immediate purpose, and so they explain themselves. The ornaments of capitals and so on belong to sculpture, not to architecture, which merely admits them as added decoration and could also do without them. —In accordance with what has been said, to understand and aesthetically enjoy a work of architecture we must have a direct, intuitive acquaintance with its material, with its weight, rigidity and cohesion. Our pleasure in such a work would suddenly be much diminished if we learned that it was built of pumice stone, for then it would strike us as a kind of sham building. Learning that it was only wood, when we had supposed it to be stone, would have almost the same effect. This is precisely because it alters and shifts the relation between rigidity and gravity, and with it

the significance and necessity of all the parts, since those natural forces reveal themselves far more weakly in a wooden building. That is also why no real work of architecture as a fine art can be made of wood, however readily wood takes on every form; only our theory can explain this. And suppose we were told that the building whose sight delights us actually consisted of entirely different materials, of very unequal weight and consistency, which the eye could not tell apart. The whole building would then become as incapable of giving us enjoyment as a poem in a language we do not know. All this proves precisely that architecture acts not merely mathematically but dynamically. What speaks to us through it is not, say, mere form and symmetry, but rather those fundamental forces of nature, those first Ideas, those lowest grades of the will's objecthood. —The regularity of the building and its parts comes about partly through the immediate purposiveness of each member for the stability of the whole. Partly it serves to make the whole easier to survey and understand. And partly, finally, regular figures contribute to beauty by revealing the lawfulness of space as such. But all this is only of subordinate value and necessity, and by no means the main thing, since not even symmetry is indispensable—after all, ruins are still beautiful.

Works of architecture also have a quite special relation to light. They gain a double beauty in full sunshine, with the blue sky as their background, and produce a quite different effect again by moonlight. That is why, whenever a beautiful work of architecture is erected, special attention is always paid to the effects of light and to the points of the compass. All this is largely grounded in the fact that bright, sharp illumination is what first makes all the parts and their proportions properly visible. Beyond that, however, I am of the opinion that architecture is meant to reveal not only gravity and rigidity but, at the same time, the nature of light, which is entirely opposed to them. For when light is caught, checked and thrown back by great, opaque, sharply outlined and variously shaped masses, it unfolds its nature and properties most purely and distinctly.

This is a great delight to the beholder, since light is the most gladdening of things, being the condition and the objective correlate of the most perfect kind of intuitive knowledge.

Now, the Ideas that architecture brings to distinct intuition are the lowest grades of the objecthood of the will, and consequently the objective significance of what architecture reveals to us is comparatively slight. The aesthetic pleasure of seeing a beautiful and favorably lit building will therefore lie not so much in the apprehension of the Idea as in the subjective correlate posited along with that apprehension. It will consist predominantly in this: at the sight of the building the beholder is torn away from the individual's way of knowing, which serves the will and follows the principle of sufficient reason, and raised up to that of the pure, will-free subject of knowing. It lies, in other words, in pure contemplation itself, freed from all the suffering of willing and of individuality. —In this respect the opposite of architecture, the other extreme in the series of the fine arts, is drama. Drama brings the most significant Ideas of all to knowledge, and so in the aesthetic enjoyment of it the objective side decidedly predominates.

What distinguishes architecture from the visual arts and from poetry is that it gives not a copy but the thing itself. It does not, as they do, repeat the Idea the artist has known, so that the artist lends the beholder his eyes. Here the artist merely sets the object in the right position for the beholder, and makes it easier for him to apprehend the Idea by bringing the real, individual object to a distinct and complete expression of its nature.

Unlike the other works of fine art, works of architecture are very rarely erected for purely aesthetic purposes. Instead, these purposes are subordinated to others—useful ones, foreign to art itself. The great merit of the architect therefore lies in carrying through and achieving the purely aesthetic aims despite their subordination to alien ones. He skillfully adapts them in manifold ways to whatever arbitrary purpose is at hand, and judges correctly which aesthetic-architectural beauty is compatible with, and can be combined with, a temple, which with a palace,

which with an arsenal, and so on. The more a harsh climate multiplies the demands of need and utility, fixes them more firmly and prescribes them more inexorably, the less scope beauty has in architecture. In the mild climate of India, Egypt, Greece and Rome, where the demands of necessity were fewer and less strictly defined, architecture could pursue its aesthetic aims most freely. Under northern skies these aims were badly stunted. Here, where boxes, pointed roofs and towers were what was required, architecture could unfold its own beauty only within very narrow limits. By way of compensation, it had to adorn itself all the more with ornament borrowed from sculpture, as can be seen in beautiful Gothic architecture.

If architecture must thus suffer great restrictions from the demands of necessity and utility, it also has in these very demands a strong support. Given the size and cost of its works and the narrow sphere of its aesthetic effect, it could not maintain itself at all as a merely fine art unless it also held, as a useful and necessary trade, a secure and honorable place among human occupations. It is precisely the lack of such a place that prevents another art from standing beside it as a sister, although in aesthetic respects this art quite properly belongs alongside it as its counterpart. I mean the fine art of waterworks. For what architecture achieves for the Idea of gravity where it appears combined with rigidity, the fine art of waterworks achieves for the same Idea where it is joined with fluidity—that is, with formlessness, the utmost mobility and transparency. Waterfalls plunging, foaming and roaring, over rocks, cataracts silently dissolving into spray, fountains rising as tall columns of water, and clear, mirroring lakes reveal the Ideas of fluid, heavy matter exactly as the works of architecture unfold the Ideas of rigid matter. The fine art of waterworks finds no support in useful waterworks, since as a rule the purposes of the latter cannot be

combined with its own; this happens only by way of exception, for example in the *Cascata di Trevi* in Rome.[4546]

GARDENS, LANDSCAPES AND ANIMALS

Gardening, landscape and animal painting and sculpture present the Ideas of plants and animals.

3.44 What the two arts just mentioned achieve for those lowest grades of the objecthood of the will, the fine art of gardening achieves, to some extent, for the higher grade of vegetable nature. The scenic beauty of a spot rests largely on the variety of the natural objects found together in it. It rests, further, on these objects being clearly separated and standing out distinctly, while still presenting themselves in fitting connection and alternation. It is these two conditions that the fine art of gardening helps along. But it is nowhere near as much the master of its material as architecture is of its own, and so its effect is limited. The beauty it displays belongs almost entirely to nature; the art itself has done little toward it. On the other hand, it can do very little against the disfavor of nature, and where nature works not with it but against it, its achievements are slight.

The plant world offers itself everywhere for aesthetic enjoyment without any mediation of art. Insofar as it is an object of art, then, it belongs chiefly to landscape painting, in whose domain lies also the whole of the rest of nature that is without knowledge.—In still lifes, and in paintings of mere architecture, ruins, church interiors and the like, the subjective side of aesthetic enjoyment predominates; that is, our pleasure in them does not lie chiefly in the direct apprehension of the Ideas represented, but rather in the subjective correlate of that apprehension, in pure, will-less knowing. For since the painter lets us see things through his eyes, we here receive at the same time a sym-

45 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 35 of the second volume (the Supplements).

46 The Trevi Fountain (completed 1762), which is also the terminus of the ancient Aqua Virgo aqueduct.

pathetic sense and an after-feeling of the deep peace of mind and the complete silence of the will that were needed to sink knowledge so wholly into those lifeless objects and to apprehend them with such love—that is, here, with such a degree of objectivity. —The effect of landscape painting proper is, on the whole, still of this kind too. But the Ideas it represents, as higher grades of the objectification of the will, are already more significant and more telling. So the objective side of aesthetic pleasure comes further forward and holds the subjective in balance. Pure knowing as such is no longer quite the main thing. The known Idea acts with equal force: the world as representation at a significant grade of the objectification of the will.

But a much higher grade still is revealed by animal painting and animal sculpture. Of animal sculpture we have significant remains from antiquity: horses, for example, in Venice, on *Monte cavallo* and on the Elgin reliefs, and also in Florence, in bronze and marble; in Florence too the ancient boar and the howling wolves; then the lions at the Arsenal in Venice; and in the Vatican a whole hall full of animals, mostly ancient; and so on. In these representations the objective side of aesthetic pleasure gains a decided predominance over the subjective. The calm of the subject who knows these Ideas, and who has silenced his own will, is present here as in every aesthetic contemplation; but its effect is not felt, for we are occupied with the restlessness and vehemence of the will represented.[47] It is that same willing which also constitutes our own nature that comes before our eyes here. It appears in forms in which it is not, as in us, governed and tempered by reflection, but presents itself in bolder strokes and with a distinctness bordering on the grotesque and the monstrous. For that very reason, however, it is also without dissimulation, naive and open, lying freely in plain view; and it is precisely on this that our interest in animals rests. What is characteristic of the species already emerged in the representa-

47 Monte Cavallo is the Quirinal Hill in Rome, named after its colossal ancient statues of the Dioscuri with their horses; the Elgin reliefs are the Parthenon sculptures that Lord Elgin brought to London.

tion of plants, but showed itself only in the forms. Here it becomes much more significant, expressing itself not only in shape but in action, posture and gesture—though still only as the character of the species, not of the individual. —This knowledge of the Ideas of higher grades, which in painting we receive through another's mediation, we can also share in directly, through purely contemplative intuition of plants and observation of animals—the latter, that is, in their free, natural and comfortable state. Objective contemplation of their manifold, wondrous shapes and of all their doings is an instructive lesson from the great book of nature; it is the deciphering of the true *Signatura rerum* [signature of things].[48] In it we see the many grades and modes in which the will manifests itself. One and the same in all beings, the will everywhere wills the same thing, which objectifies itself precisely as life, as existence, in such endless variation and such diverse shapes, all of them accommodations to different external conditions—comparable to many variations on the same theme. But if we had to convey to the beholder, for reflection too and in a single word, the key to their inner nature, we could do no better than to use that Sanskrit formula which occurs so often in the sacred books of the Hindus and is called *Mahavakya*, that is, the great word: *"Tat twam asi"*, which means: "This living thing you are."[49]

HUMAN BEAUTY AND THE IDEAL

The artist anticipates beauty half a priori, because artist and connoisseur are themselves the will.

3.45 Finally, to represent directly and intuitively the Idea in which the will reaches the highest grade of its objectification is the

48 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Jakob Böhme, in his book *de Signatura rerum* [On the Signature of Things], ch. I, §§ 15, 16, 17, says: "And there is no thing in nature that does not also reveal its inner form outwardly: for the inward always labors toward revelation. ... Every thing has its mouth for revelation. ... And that is the language of nature, in which every thing speaks out of its own property and always reveals and presents itself. ... For every thing reveals its mother, who thus gives the *essence and the will* to its formation."

49 The formula comes from the Chandogya Upanishad.

great task of history painting and of sculpture. Here the objective side of the pleasure in the beautiful decidedly predominates, and the subjective side has receded into the background. It should also be noted that at the grade just below this, in animal painting, the characteristic is entirely one with the beautiful: the most characteristic lion, wolf, horse, sheep or bull was also always the most beautiful. The reason is that animals have only the character of the species, no individual character. In the representation of human beings, however, the character of the species separates from that of the individual. The former is now called beauty (in an entirely objective sense), while the latter keeps the name of character or expression. And a new difficulty arises: that of representing both perfectly at once in the same individual.

Human beauty is an objective expression denoting the most perfect objectification of the will at the highest grade of its knowability: the Idea of the human being in general, completely expressed in intuited form. But however much the objective side of the beautiful stands out here, the subjective side remains its constant companion. No object carries us away so swiftly into purely aesthetic intuition as the most beautiful human face and form, at the sight of which an inexpressible pleasure instantly seizes us and lifts us above ourselves and everything that torments us— and this is possible only because this most distinct and purest knowability of the will also transports us most easily and quickly into the state of pure knowing, in which our personality, our willing with its constant torment, vanishes for as long as the purely aesthetic joy lasts. That is why Goethe says: "Whoever beholds human beauty can be touched by nothing evil; he feels himself in harmony with himself and with the world."— That nature succeeds in producing a beautiful human form must be explained as follows. When the will objectifies itself at this highest grade in an individual, it completely overcomes, through fortunate circumstances and its own strength, all the obstacles and resistance set against it by the appearances of the will at lower grades. Such are the forces of nature, from which it

must always first win and wrest the matter that belongs to them all. Moreover, the appearance of the will at the higher grades always has multiplicity in its form. Even the tree is only a systematic aggregate of countlessly repeated sprouting fibers. This composition increases more and more as we go higher, and the human body is a highly complex system of quite different parts, each of which has a life subordinate to the whole yet also its own, *vita propria*. That all these parts should be subordinated to the whole and coordinated with one another in exactly the right way, conspiring harmoniously to present the whole, with nothing excessive and nothing stunted—these are the rare conditions whose result is beauty, the perfectly stamped character of the species.—So much for nature. But what of art?—People think: by imitating nature. —But how is the artist to recognize nature's successful work, the one worth imitating, and pick it out from among the failures, unless he anticipates the beautiful *prior to experience*? Besides, has nature ever produced a human being perfectly beautiful in all his parts?—So it has been thought that the artist must gather together the beautiful parts distributed singly among many people and compose a beautiful whole from them: a perverse and thoughtless opinion. For again the question arises: how is he to know that precisely these forms are the beautiful ones and not those?—We can also see how far the old German painters got in beauty by imitating nature. Just look at their nude figures.—Purely *a posteriori*, from mere experience, no knowledge of the beautiful is possible at all. It is always, at least in part, *a priori*, though of a quite different kind from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason of which we are conscious *a priori*. These forms concern the universal form of appearance as such, insofar as it grounds the possibility of knowledge in general—the universal, exceptionless *how* of appearing; and from this knowledge mathematics and pure natural science arise. That other kind of *a priori* knowledge, by contrast, which makes the representation of the beautiful possible, concerns not the form but the content of appearances: not the *how* but the *what* of appearing. We all recognize human beauty

when we see it; but in the genuine artist this happens with such clarity that he shows it as he has never seen it, and surpasses nature in his representation. This is possible only because the will, whose adequate objectification at its highest grade is here to be judged and found, is in fact we *ourselves*. Through this alone do we really have an anticipation of what nature (which is, after all, precisely the will that constitutes our own being) strives to represent. In the true genius this anticipation is accompanied by such a degree of reflective awareness that, recognizing in the individual thing its *Idea*, he as it were *understands nature from half a word*, and now utters clearly what nature only stammers. He stamps on hard marble the beauty of form that nature fails to achieve in a thousand attempts, and sets it before nature, calling out to it, as it were: "That is what you meant to say!" And "Yes, that was it!" echoes back from the connoisseur. —Only in this way could the Greek genius find the archetype of the human form and set it up as the canon of the school of sculpture; and only by virtue of such an anticipation is it possible for all of us to recognize the beautiful where nature has actually succeeded with it in a particular case. This anticipation is the *ideal*. It is the *Idea* insofar as it is known, at least half, *a priori*, and becomes practical for art by coming to meet and complete what is given *a posteriori* by nature. The possibility of such an *a priori* anticipation of the beautiful in the artist, and of its *a posteriori* recognition by the connoisseur, lies in the fact that artist and connoisseur are themselves the in-itself of nature, the will that objectifies itself. For only by like, as Empedocles said, is like known: only nature can understand itself;

only nature will fathom itself; but also only by mind is mind perceived.[5051]

The opinion that the Greeks discovered their established ideal of human beauty wholly empirically, by collecting individual beautiful parts—uncovering and noting a knee here, an arm there—is perverse, even though it was voiced by Xenophon's Socrates (*Stobaei Floril. Vol. 2, p. 384*). Incidentally, it has an entirely analogous counterpart in regard to poetry: namely the assumption that Shakespeare, for example, noted from his own experience of the world, and then reproduced, the innumerably varied characters in his plays, so true, so consistent, so worked out from the depths.[52] The impossibility and absurdity of such an assumption need no discussion. It is obvious that just as genius produces works of the visual arts only through a presentient anticipation of the beautiful, so it produces works of poetry only through a similar anticipation of the characteristic. Both, it is true, need experience as a schema: only through it is what they are dimly aware of *a priori* called forth into full distinctness, so that deliberate representation becomes possible.

Human beauty was explained above as the most perfect objectification of the will at the highest grade of its knowability. It expresses itself through form, and form lies in space alone and has no necessary relation to time, as movement, for example, does. To that extent we can say: the adequate objectification of the will through a merely spatial appearance is

50 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. The last sentence renders into German the saying of Helvétius, *il n'y a que l'esprit qui sente l'esprit*, which in the first edition I had no need to point out. But since then the stupefying influence of Hegelian pseudo-wisdom has so debased and coarsened the age that some might even imagine that here, too, an allusion is being made to the antithesis of "mind and nature." I am therefore compelled to protest expressly against having such rabble philosophemes foisted on me.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771), French philosopher, author of *De l'esprit*.

51 Aristotle reports Empedocles' principle that like is known by like (*On the Soul* 1.2, 404b).

52 In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (3.10) Socrates says this to the painter Parrhasius; Schopenhauer cites it from the anthology of Stobaeus.

beauty, in the objective sense. The plant is nothing but such a merely spatial appearance of the will, since no movement, and consequently no relation to time (apart from its development), belongs to the expression of its nature. Its mere shape expresses its whole nature and lays it open. Animals and human beings, however, need in addition a series of actions for the complete revelation of the will appearing in them, and through these actions that appearance acquires in them a direct relation to time. All this has already been discussed in the previous book; it connects with our present consideration in the following way. The merely spatial appearance of the will can objectify it perfectly or imperfectly at each particular grade, and this is precisely what constitutes beauty or ugliness. In the same way, the temporal objectification of the will—that is, action, and indeed direct action, hence movement—can correspond purely and perfectly to the will that objectifies itself in it, without foreign admixture, without anything superfluous, without anything lacking, expressing only the particular act of will in each case;—or all this can be the other way round. In the first case the movement takes place with *grace*; in the other, without it. Thus, just as beauty is the corresponding representation of the will in general through its merely spatial appearance, so grace is the corresponding representation of the will through its temporal appearance—that is, the perfectly correct and fitting expression of every act of will through the movement and posture that objectify it. Since movement and posture already presuppose the body, Winckelmann's phrase is very apt and to the point when he says: "Grace is the peculiar relation of the acting person to the action." (Works, vol. I, p. 258.) It follows of itself that beauty, but not grace, can be attributed to plants, except in a figurative sense; to animals and human beings, however, both beauty and grace.[53] Grace, according to what has been said, consists in every movement and posture being carried out in the easiest, most fitting and most comfortable way, and thus being the

53 Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–1768), German art historian whose writings shaped the classical ideal of Greek art.

purely corresponding expression of its intention, or of the act of will. There is nothing superfluous, which would appear as purposeless, meaningless fidgeting or contorted posture, and nothing lacking, which would appear as wooden stiffness. Grace presupposes as its condition a correct proportion of all the limbs, a regular, harmonious build; for only by means of this is perfect ease and evident purposiveness possible in all postures and movements. Hence grace is never without a certain degree of bodily beauty. The two, perfect and united, are the most distinct appearance of the will at the highest grade of its objectification.

It is, as mentioned above, one of the distinctive features of humankind that in it the character of the species and that of the individual come apart, so that, as was said in the previous book, every human being represents to a certain extent a quite peculiar Idea. The arts whose aim is to represent the Idea of humanity therefore have as their task, besides beauty as the character of the species, also the character of the individual, which is called *character* in a special sense. But again, they have it as their task only insofar as it is not to be regarded as something accidental, wholly peculiar to the individual in his singularity. It must rather be a side of the Idea of humanity that stands out especially in precisely this individual, so that representing him serves to reveal that Idea. Thus character, though individual as such, must nevertheless be apprehended and represented ideally, that is, with its significance brought out in respect of the Idea of humanity in general (to whose objectification it contributes in its own way). Otherwise the representation is a portrait, a repetition of the particular as such, with all its accidents. And even the portrait should be, as Winckelmann says, the ideal of the individual.

This *character*, which is to be apprehended ideally and which brings out a peculiar side of the Idea of humanity, presents itself visibly partly through lasting physiognomy and bodily build, partly through passing emotion and passion, the mutual modification of knowing and willing by each other—all of which is expressed in facial expression and movement. The individual

always belongs to humanity, and humanity, on the other hand, always reveals itself in the individual, and indeed with a peculiar ideal significance of that individual. Therefore neither may beauty be abolished by character nor character by beauty. For abolishing the character of the species through that of the individual would yield caricature, and abolishing the individual through the character of the species would yield meaninglessness. Hence representation, when it aims at beauty, as sculpture chiefly does, will nevertheless always modify beauty (that is, the character of the species) somewhat through individual character, and will always express the Idea of humanity in a definite, individual way, bringing out a particular side of it. For the human individual as such has to some extent the dignity of an Idea of its own, and it is essential to the Idea of humanity precisely that it presents itself in individuals of peculiar significance. That is why, in the works of the ancients, we find the beauty they so clearly apprehended expressed not by a single figure but by many figures bearing different characters. It is grasped, as it were, always from another side, and accordingly represented one way in Apollo, another in Bacchus, another in Hercules, another in Antinous. Indeed, the characteristic can limit the beautiful and finally even emerge to the point of ugliness, as in the drunken Silenus, in the Faun, and so on. But if the characteristic goes so far as actually to abolish the character of the species, that is, to the point of the unnatural, it becomes caricature.[54] —But grace must be impaired by the characteristic even less than beauty. Whatever posture and movement the expression of character may require, it must still be carried out in the way most fitting, most purposive and easiest for the person. This will be observed not only by the sculptor and the painter but by every good actor too; otherwise here too caricature arises, as distortion and contortion.

In sculpture, beauty and grace remain the main thing. The real character of the mind, emerging in emotion, passion and

54 Antinous, the youth favored by the Roman emperor Hadrian, was portrayed in many ancient statues.

the interplay of knowing and willing, can be represented only through the expression of the face and through gesture, and is above all the property of *painting*. For although eyes and color, which lie outside the domain of sculpture, contribute much to beauty, they are far more essential still for character. Further, beauty unfolds more completely when contemplated from several viewpoints, whereas expression, character, can be fully grasped even from *one* viewpoint.

Because beauty is obviously the chief aim of sculpture, *Lessing* sought to explain the fact that *Laocoön does not scream* by saying that screaming cannot be reconciled with beauty. This subject became for Lessing the theme, or at least the starting point, of a whole book, and a great deal has been written about it before and after him. I may therefore be permitted to present my own opinion on it here as an episode, although so specific a discussion does not properly belong in the context of our inquiry, which is directed throughout at the universal.[55]

WHY LAOCOÖN DOES NOT SCREAM

The marble Laocoön cannot scream because a scream is a sound, outside the domain of sculpture.

3.46 That Laocoön, in the famous group, does not scream is obvious, and the general, ever-recurring surprise at this must stem from the fact that in his situation we would all scream. Nature demands it, too. With the most violent physical pain and the sudden onset of the greatest bodily terror, all reflection that might perhaps bring about silent endurance is completely driven from consciousness. Nature then relieves itself by screaming, thereby at once expressing the pain and the terror, summoning the rescuer and frightening off the attacker. Winckelmann had already missed the expression of screaming. But in seeking to justify the artist, he really turned Laocoön into a Stoic

55 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's *Laokoon* (1766) starts from the Hellenistic marble group in the Vatican showing the Trojan priest Laocoön and his sons attacked by serpents.

who considers it beneath his dignity to scream *secundum naturam* [according to nature], and who adds to his pain the useless constraint of suppressing its expression. Winckelmann therefore sees in him "the tried spirit of a great man, who struggles with torments and seeks to suppress the expression of feeling and lock it within himself: he does not break out into loud cries, as in Virgil, but only anxious sighs rise from him," and so on (Works, vol. 7, p. 98.—The same at greater length in vol. 6, p. 104 ff.). Lessing then criticized this opinion of Winckelmann's in his *Laocoön* and improved on it in the way indicated above: for the psychological reason he substituted the purely aesthetic one that beauty, the principle of ancient art, does not permit the expression of screaming. He adds another argument, namely that a wholly transitory state, incapable of any duration, must not be represented in a motionless work of art. Against this stand a hundred examples of excellent figures caught in quite fleeting movements—dancing, wrestling, catching, and so on. Indeed Goethe, in the essay on the Laocoön that opens the *Propyläen* (p. 8), holds the choice of just such a wholly transitory moment to be positively necessary.[56] —In our own day *Hirt* (*Horen*, 1797, seventh issue), tracing everything back to the highest truth of expression, settled the matter thus: Laocoön does not scream because, already on the point of dying of suffocation, he can no longer scream. Finally Fernow (*Römische Studien*, vol. I, p. *426* ff.) discussed and weighed all three of these opinions; he added no new one himself, but mediated between the three and united them.[57]

I cannot help being astonished that such thoughtful and sharp-sighted men should laboriously drag in inadequate reasons from afar, seizing on psychological and even physiological arguments, to explain a matter whose reason lies close at hand and is immediately obvious to the unprejudiced—and especially

56 *Propyläen*, the art journal Goethe edited from 1798 to 1800.
57 Aloys Hirt (1759–1837), archaeologist, writing in Schiller's journal *Die Horen*; Carl Ludwig Fernow (1763–1808), art theorist.

that Lessing, who came so near to the correct explanation, nevertheless missed the real point entirely.

Whether Laocoön in his situation would scream or not—and, incidentally, I would answer that question entirely in the affirmative—there is something to be settled before any psychological or physiological inquiry. With regard to the group, screaming could not be represented in it, for the sole reason that representing it lies wholly outside the domain of sculpture. One could not produce a screaming Laocoön out of marble, but only one tearing his mouth open and vainly straining to scream, a Laocoön whose voice has stuck in his throat, *vox faucibus haesit*. The essence of screaming, and consequently also its effect on the onlooker, lies solely in the sound, not in the gaping of the mouth.[58] This gaping, the phenomenon that necessarily accompanies screaming, must first be motivated and justified by the sound it produces. Then, as characteristic of the action, it is admissible, indeed necessary, even though it detracts from beauty. But in the visual arts, to which the representation of screaming itself is entirely foreign and impossible, it would be truly foolish to represent the violent means of screaming, the gaping mouth, which disturbs all the features and the rest of the expression. For one would then be putting before our eyes the means, which demands many sacrifices besides, while its end—the scream itself, together with its effect on the heart—would be missing. What is more, one would thereby produce the invariably ridiculous sight of an effort that remains without effect. It is truly comparable to the sight a prankster once treated himself to: he plugged the horn of a sleeping night watchman firmly with wax, then woke him with cries of "Fire!" and amused himself with the man's fruitless efforts to blow.—Where, on the other hand, the representation of screaming lies within the domain of the representing art, it is entirely admissible, because it serves truth, that is, the complete representation of the Idea. So it is in poetry, which calls on the reader's imagination for its intuitive representation. That is why in Virgil Laocoön bellows like a bull

58 The Latin phrase is from Virgil, *Aeneid* 2.774.

that has broken loose after being struck by the axe; that is why Homer (*Il., XX, 48-53*) has Mars and Minerva scream quite dreadfully, without detriment either to their divine dignity or to their divine beauty. The same holds in the art of acting: Laocoön on the stage would absolutely have to scream. Sophocles, too, has Philoctetes scream, and on the ancient stage the actor will certainly have actually screamed. As a quite similar case, I remember seeing the famous actor *Kemble* in London, in a play translated from the German, *Pizarro*, playing the Native American Rolla, a man only half touched by civilization but of very noble character. Yet when he was wounded, he cried out loudly and violently, and this had a great and excellent effect, because, being highly characteristic, it contributed much to the truth.[59] —A painted or stone mute screamer, on the other hand, would be even more ridiculous than painted music, which is already censured in Goethe's *Propyläen*. For screaming detracts far more from the rest of the expression and from beauty than music does. Music mostly occupies only the hands and arms, and is to be regarded as an action that characterizes the person; to that extent it can indeed quite properly be painted, as long as it requires no violent movement of the body or distortion of the mouth—for example, Saint Cecilia at the organ, Raphael's *Violin Player* in the Sciarra Gallery in Rome, and many more. —Since, then, because of the limits of art, Laocoön's pain could not be expressed by screaming, the artist had to set every other expression of it in motion. This he achieved with the highest perfection, as Winckelmann (Works, vol. 6, p. 104 ff.) so masterfully describes. His excellent description therefore keeps its full value and truth, as long as one sets aside the Stoic disposition he attributes to Laocoön.[60]

59 John Philip Kemble (1757–1823), English actor; Sheridan's *Pizarro* (1799) was adapted from Kotzebue's *Die Spanier in Peru*.

60 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. This episode too has received its supplement in Chapter 36 of the second volume (the Supplements).

DRAPERY AND STYLE

Sculpture uses drapery to reveal form, as a clear mind uses plain words.

3.47 Because beauty together with grace is the chief object of sculpture, sculpture loves the nude and tolerates clothing only insofar as it does not conceal the forms. It uses drapery not as a covering but as an indirect representation of form. This mode of representation greatly occupies the understanding, since the understanding arrives at intuition of the cause, namely the form of the body, only through the effect, the fall of the folds, which alone is directly given. Accordingly, drapery is in sculpture to some extent what foreshortening is in painting. Both are intimations—not symbolic ones, but such as, when successful, directly compel the understanding to intuit what is intimated just as if it were actually given.

Allow me here, in passing, to insert a simile concerning the verbal arts. A beautiful bodily form is seen to best advantage with the lightest clothing or none at all; a very beautiful person, if he also had taste and were allowed to follow it, would therefore prefer to go about almost naked, clothed only in the manner of the ancients.—In just the same way, every beautiful mind rich in thought will always express itself in the most natural, most candid, simplest way, striving, if at all possible, to communicate its thoughts to others and so to ease the loneliness it must feel in a world such as this. Conversely, poverty of mind, confusion and perversity will dress themselves in the most farfetched expressions and the most obscure turns of phrase, so as to wrap small, tiny, dull or commonplace thoughts in difficult and pompous phrases. They are like someone who, lacking the majesty of beauty, tries to make up for this defect with clothing, and seeks to hide the smallness or ugliness of his person under barbaric finery, tinsel, feathers, ruffs, puffs and cloak. Many an author, if forced to translate his pompous, obscure book into its

small, clear content, would be as embarrassed as that man would be if he had to go naked.

HISTORY PAINTING AND GENRE PAINTING

Inner, not outward, significance counts in painting, so scenes of everyday life are as worthy as history.

3.48 *History painting*, besides beauty and grace, has character as its chief object. By this is to be understood, in general, the representation of the will at the highest grade of its objectification. There the individual, as bringing out a particular side of the Idea of humanity, has a peculiar significance, and makes it known not through mere shape alone but through action of every kind and through the modifications of knowing and willing that occasion and accompany it, visible in facial expression and gesture. Since the Idea of humanity is to be represented in this full range, the unfolding of its many-sidedness must be brought before our eyes in significant individuals; and these in turn can be made visible in their significance only through manifold scenes, events and actions. History painting solves this infinite task by bringing before our eyes scenes of life of every kind, of great and of slight significance. No individual and no action can be without meaning: in all of them and through all of them the Idea of humanity unfolds more and more. Therefore absolutely no event of human life is to be excluded from painting. It is consequently a great injustice to the excellent painters of the Dutch school to value merely their technical skill while otherwise looking down on them with contempt because they mostly depicted subjects from ordinary life—as if only events from world history or biblical history were significant. One should first of all consider that the inner significance of an action is quite different from its outer significance, and that the two often go their separate ways. Outer significance is the importance of an action with respect to its consequences for and in the real world, hence according to the principle of sufficient reason. Inner significance is the depth of insight into the Idea of

humanity that the action opens up. It brings to light the less frequently displayed sides of that Idea by letting clearly and decidedly expressed individualities unfold their peculiarities in suitably arranged circumstances. Only inner significance counts in art; outer significance counts in history. The two are completely independent of each other: they can occur together, but each can also appear alone. An action of the highest significance for history can, in inner significance, be quite everyday and commonplace. Conversely, a scene from everyday life can be of great inner significance if human individuals and human doing and willing, down to their most hidden folds, appear in it in a bright and clear light. Again, where the outer significance differs greatly, the inner can be one and the same. For the inner significance it may make no difference whether ministers quarrel over a map about countries and peoples, or peasants in a tavern try to prove their rights to one another over cards and dice—just as it makes no difference whether one plays chess with gold pieces or wooden ones. Besides, the scenes and events that make up the lives of so many millions of people—their doings and dealings, their troubles and their joys—are for that reason alone important enough to be the subject of art, and by their rich variety they must provide ample material for unfolding the many-sided Idea of humanity. Indeed, the very fleetingness of the moment that art has fixed in such a picture (nowadays called a *genre* picture) arouses a quiet, peculiar emotion. For to hold fast in a lasting image the fleeting world, which ceaselessly transforms itself, in individual events that nonetheless stand for the whole, is an achievement of the art of painting by which it seems to bring time itself to a standstill, raising the individual to the Idea of its kind. Finally, historical and outwardly significant subjects of painting often have the disadvantage that precisely what is significant in them cannot be represented intuitively but has to be added in thought. In this respect the nominal meaning of a picture must in general be distinguished from its real meaning. The former is the outer meaning, which comes in only as a concept; the latter is the side of the Idea of humanity that

becomes manifest to intuition through the picture. For example, let the nominal meaning be Moses found by the Egyptian princess—a moment of the greatest importance for history. The real meaning, by contrast, what is actually given to intuition, is a foundling rescued from its floating cradle by a noblewoman—an event that may well have happened more than once. Costume alone can make that particular historical case recognizable to the scholar here; but costume is valid only for the nominal meaning and is irrelevant to the real one, for the real meaning knows only the human being as such, not arbitrary forms. Subjects taken from history have no advantage over those taken from mere possibility, which can therefore be named only generically, not individually. For what is truly significant in historical subjects is, after all, not the individual, not the particular event as such, but the universal in it, the side of the Idea of humanity that expresses itself through it. On the other hand, definite historical subjects are by no means to be rejected on that account. It is only that the truly artistic view of them, in painter and beholder alike, is never directed at the individual particular in them, which is what properly constitutes the historical, but at the universal that expresses itself in it—at the Idea. And only such historical subjects should be chosen in which the main thing can really be represented and need not merely be added in thought. Otherwise the nominal meaning strays too far from the real one: what is merely thought in connection with the picture becomes the most important thing and detracts from what is intuited. If even on the stage it is no good for the main action to take place behind the scenes (as in French tragedy), in a picture it is obviously a far greater fault. Historical subjects have a decidedly harmful effect only when they confine the painter to a field chosen arbitrarily, not for artistic purposes but for other ones—and above all when this field is poor in picturesque and significant subjects: when, for instance, it is the history of a small, isolated, obstinate people, ruled hierarchically, that is, by delusion, and despised by the great contemporary nations of East and West, such as the Jews. —The great

migration of peoples lies between us and all the ancient peoples, just as a former shift of the sea bed lies between the present surface of the earth and the one whose organisms show themselves to us only as fossils. It must therefore be regarded, in general, as a great misfortune that the people whose past culture was to serve as the chief foundation of ours were not, say, the Indians, or the Greeks, or even just the Romans, but precisely these Jews. It was an especially unlucky star, however, for the painters of genius in Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that, within the narrow circle to which they were arbitrarily confined in choosing their subjects, they had to resort to miseries of every kind. For the New Testament, in its historical part, is almost even more unfavorable to painting than the Old, and the subsequent history of the martyrs and doctors of the Church is a downright unhappy subject. Among the pictures whose subject is the historical or mythological side of Judaism and Christianity, however, one must sharply distinguish those in which the true, that is, the ethical spirit of Christianity is revealed to intuition through the representation of people who are full of this spirit. These representations are in fact the highest and most admirable achievements of the art of painting, and only the greatest masters of this art succeeded in them, especially Raphael and Correggio—the latter particularly in his earlier pictures. Paintings of this kind should really not be counted as history paintings at all, for mostly they depict no event, no action. They are mere groupings of saints, of the Redeemer himself, often still as a child, with his mother, angels, and so on. In their faces, especially the eyes, we see the expression, the reflection, of the most perfect knowledge: the knowledge, namely, that is not directed at individual things but has perfectly grasped the Ideas, and so the whole nature of the world and of life. Acting back on the will in them, this knowledge does not, like that other kind, supply *motives* for it; on the contrary, it has become a *quieter* of all willing. From it has come the perfect resignation that is the innermost spirit of Christianity as of Indian wisdom: the giving up of all willing, the turning back, the abolition of the

will and with it of the whole inner nature of this world—that is, redemption. Thus those eternally praiseworthy masters of art expressed the highest wisdom intuitively through their works.[61] And here is the summit of all art. Art has followed the will in its adequate objecthood, the Ideas, through all its grades: from the lowest, where causes move it, then where stimuli move it, and finally where motives move it so variously and unfold its nature. Now it ends with the representation of the will's free self-abolition through the one great quieter that dawns on it from the most perfect knowledge of its own nature.[62]

IDEA AND CONCEPT

The concept is barren for art; only the intuitively grasped Idea produces genuine and lasting works.

3.49 All our reflections on art so far rest throughout on one truth. The object of art is the thing whose presentation is the artist's aim, and knowledge of it must therefore precede his work as its germ and origin. That object is an *Idea* in Plato's sense, and absolutely nothing else. It is not the individual thing, the object of ordinary apprehension, nor the concept, the object of rational thought and of science. Idea and concept do have something in common, in that both, as unities, stand for a plurality of actual things. Yet the great difference between them should by now be clear and evident enough from what was said about the concept in the first book and about the Idea in the present one. I by no means wish to claim, however, that Plato himself had already grasped this difference in its purity. On the contrary, many of his examples of Ideas, and many of his discussions of them, apply merely to concepts. Meanwhile we leave this matter aside and go our own way. We are glad whenever we tread in the track of a great and noble mind, yet we follow our own goal, not his

61 Schopenhauer's coinage *Quietiv* (from Latin *quietivum*, something that quiets), set against *Motiv*: what calms and stills the will, as a motive sets it in motion. It is rendered "quieter" here; others have "quietive."

62 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. This passage cannot be understood without the whole of the following book.

footsteps.—The *concept* is abstract and discursive. It is wholly indeterminate within its sphere and determinate only as to its boundary. Anyone who merely has reason can reach and grasp it. It can be communicated by words without further mediation, and it can be completely exhausted by its definition. The *Idea*, on the other hand, which might at most be defined as the adequate representative of the concept, is thoroughly intuitive. Although it stands for an infinite number of individual things, it is nevertheless determinate throughout. It is never known by the individual as such, but only by one who has raised himself above all willing and all individuality to the pure subject of knowing. It is therefore accessible only to the genius. Beyond him, it is accessible to anyone whose pure power of knowledge has been heightened, usually by the works of genius, so that he is for the moment in a frame of mind akin to genius. Hence it can be communicated not absolutely but only conditionally, for the Idea, once grasped and repeated in the work of art, speaks to each person only in proportion to his own intellectual worth. That is why precisely the finest works of every art, the noblest products of genius, must remain forever closed books to the dull majority of people. They are inaccessible to it, separated from it by a wide gulf, just as the society of princes is inaccessible to the mob. It is true that even the shallowest people accept the acknowledged great works on authority, so as not to betray their own weakness. But in secret they always remain ready to pass sentence of condemnation on them, as soon as they are given hope that they can do so without exposing themselves. Then their long-suppressed hatred joyfully finds vent: hatred of everything great and beautiful, which never spoke to them and humiliated them for that very reason, and hatred of its creators. For in general, to acknowledge and give its due to the worth of others willingly and freely, one must have worth of one's own. On this rests the necessity of modesty in every kind of merit. On it, too, rests the disproportionately loud fame of this virtue: alone among all its sisters, it is invariably appended to his praise by anyone who ventures to praise a man of any distinction

whatever, in order to conciliate and appease the wrath of worthlessness. For what, after all, is modesty but feigned humility? By means of it, in a world bursting with base envy, one tries to beg pardon for one's advantages and merits from those who have none. For whoever lays claim to none because he really has none is not modest, only honest.

The *Idea* is the unity that has fallen apart into plurality by virtue of the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension. The *concept,* by contrast, is the unity restored out of plurality by means of the abstraction performed by our reason. The latter can be designated *unitas post rem* [unity after the thing], the former *unitas ante rem* [unity before the thing]. Finally, the difference between concept and Idea can also be expressed by an analogy. The *concept* is like a dead container. What has been put into it really does lie there side by side, but no more can be taken out of it (by analytic judgments) than was put in (by synthetic reflection). The *Idea,* on the other hand, develops in whoever has grasped it representations that are new with respect to the concept of the same name. It is like a living organism, developing and endowed with generative power, which brings forth what was not already packed away inside it.

From all that has been said, then, the concept, however useful it is for life and however serviceable, necessary and fruitful it is for science, is forever barren for art. The grasped Idea, on the other hand, is the true and only source of every genuine work of art. In its vigorous originality it is drawn only from life itself, from nature, from the world. And it is drawn only by the genuine genius, or by one who is inspired for the moment to the point of genius. Only from such immediate conception do genuine works arise, works that carry immortal life within them. Precisely because the Idea is and remains intuitive, the artist is not conscious *in abstracto* of the intention and aim of his work. Not a concept but an Idea hovers before him. Hence he cannot give an account of what he is doing: he works, as people say, from mere feeling and unconsciously, indeed instinctively. Imitators and mannerists, on the other hand—*imitatores, servum*

pecus [imitators, a servile herd]—start from the concept in art. They note what pleases and has an effect in genuine works, make it clear to themselves and grasp it in a concept, that is, abstractly. Then they imitate it, openly or covertly, with shrewd deliberateness. Like parasitic plants, they suck their nourishment from the works of others, and like polyps, they take on the color of their food.[63] Indeed, pressing the comparison further, one could say that they are like machines. These chop up very finely and mix together whatever is put into them, but can never digest it, so that the foreign ingredients can still always be found again, picked out of the mixture and separated. The genius alone, by contrast, is like the organic body, which assimilates, transforms and produces. For although he is educated and formed by his predecessors and their works, he is fertilized only by life and the world themselves, directly, through the impression of what is intuitive. That is why even the highest education never harms his originality. All imitators, all mannerists grasp the essence of others' exemplary achievements in concepts; but concepts can never impart inner life to a work. The age, that is, the dull crowd of the day, itself knows only concepts and clings to them. It therefore receives mannered works with quick and loud applause. But after a few years these same works are already unpalatable, because the spirit of the age has changed, that is, the prevailing concepts in which alone such works could take root. Only genuine works, drawn directly from nature and from life, remain like nature and life themselves: eternally young and always full of primal power. For they belong to no age, but to humanity. For that very reason they were received lukewarmly by their own age, to which they disdained to conform. And because they indirectly and negatively exposed the errors of that age, they were recognized late and reluctantly. By the same token, however, they cannot grow old, but still speak to us freshly and ever anew even in the latest times. Nor are they then exposed any longer to being overlooked and misjudged. They stand crowned and sanctioned by the applause of the few

63 Horace, *Epistles* 1.19.19.

heads capable of judgment, who appear singly and sparsely over the centuries[64] and cast their votes. The slowly growing sum of these votes establishes authority, and that authority alone is the tribunal one means when one appeals to posterity. It is these individuals, appearing one after another, and they alone. For the mass and multitude of posterity will always be and remain just as perverse and dull as the mass and multitude of contemporaries always was and always is.—Read the complaints of great minds in every century about their contemporaries: they always sound as if written today, because the human race is always the same. In every age and in every art, manner takes the place of spirit, which is only ever the property of a few individuals. But manner is the old, cast-off garment of the last appearance of spirit that was present and recognized. In accordance with all this, the applause of posterity is, as a rule, won only at the expense of the applause of one's contemporaries, and vice versa.[65]

AGAINST ALLEGORY IN THE VISUAL ARTS

Allegory makes a picture point to a concept, which is foreign to the aim of art.

3.50 The purpose of all art is to communicate the grasped Idea. Mediated in this way through the artist's mind, where it appears cleansed of everything extraneous and isolated, the Idea now becomes comprehensible even to someone with weaker receptivity and no productive power. If this is so, and if, further, starting from the concept is objectionable in art, then we cannot approve when a work of art is deliberately and avowedly designed to express a concept. This is the case with allegory. An allegory is a work of art that means something other than what

64 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Apparent rari, nantes in gurgite vasto.* [Here and there they appear, swimming in the vast abyss.]

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Virgil, *Aeneid* 1.118, on the scattered survivors of the Trojan shipwreck.

65 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 34 of the second volume (the Supplements).

it depicts. But what is intuitive, and consequently the Idea too, expresses itself immediately and quite completely. It does not need the mediation of something else to hint at it. Therefore, whatever is hinted at and represented in this way by something quite different, because it cannot itself be brought before intuition, is always a concept. Allegory is thus always meant to designate a concept. It is meant, consequently, to lead the mind of the beholder away from the intuitive representation depicted to a quite different one, abstract and non-intuitive, which lies entirely outside the work of art. Here, then, a picture or statue is supposed to accomplish what writing accomplishes, and writing does it far more perfectly. What we declare to be the purpose of art, the presentation of the Idea, which can be grasped only intuitively, is not the purpose here. Nor, for what is intended here, is any great perfection of the work of art required. It is enough that one sees what the thing is supposed to be. As soon as this has been discovered, the purpose is achieved, and the mind is now led to a representation of a quite different kind, an abstract concept, which was the goal set in advance. Allegories in the visual arts are consequently nothing but hieroglyphs. Whatever artistic value they may otherwise have as intuitive presentations belongs to them not as allegories but on other grounds. That Correggio's *Night*, Annibale Carracci's *Genius of Fame* and Poussin's *Hours* are very beautiful pictures must be kept entirely separate from the fact that they are allegories.[66] As allegories they accomplish no more than an inscription, indeed rather less. We are reminded here once more of the distinction made above between the real and the nominal significance of a picture. The nominal significance here is precisely the allegorical as such, for example the Genius of Fame. The real significance is what is actually depicted: here, a beautiful winged youth with beautiful boys flying around him. This expresses an Idea. But this real significance takes effect only so long as one forgets

66 Correggio's *Holy Night* (Adoration of the Shepherds), in which the light radiates from the Christ child, and Carracci's *Genius of Fame* were both in the Dresden gallery. Poussin's picture is probably the *Dance to the Music of Time*.

the nominal, allegorical one. If one thinks of the latter, one leaves intuition behind, and an abstract concept occupies the mind. But the transition from the Idea to the concept is always a fall. Indeed, that nominal significance, that allegorical intention, often impairs the real significance, the intuitive truth. An example is the unnatural lighting in Correggio's *Night*. However beautifully it is executed, it is motivated merely allegorically and is impossible in reality. So if an allegorical picture also has artistic value, that value is entirely separate from and independent of what it accomplishes as an allegory. Such a work of art serves two purposes at once, namely the expression of a concept and the expression of an Idea. Only the latter can be an artistic purpose. The other is an extraneous purpose: the playful amusement of making a picture serve at the same time as an inscription, as a hieroglyph, an amusement invented for the benefit of those to whom the true nature of art can never speak. It is the same as when a work of art is at the same time a useful tool, in which case it likewise serves two purposes: for example, a statue that is at the same time a candelabrum or a caryatid, or a bas-relief that is at the same time the shield of Achilles. Pure friends of art will approve of neither. It is true that an allegorical picture can make a vivid impression on the mind precisely in this capacity. But in that case an inscription would, under the same circumstances, have the same effect. For example, suppose the desire for fame is lastingly and firmly rooted in someone's mind. He may even regard fame as his rightful property, withheld from him only as long as he has not yet produced the documents proving his ownership. If this person now steps before the Genius of Fame with its laurel crowns, his whole mind will be stirred by it and his energy called to action. But the same would happen if he suddenly saw the word "Fame" written large and clear on the wall. Or suppose someone has made known a truth that is important either as a maxim for practical life or as an insight for science, but has not been believed. Then an allegorical picture showing Time lifting the veil and revealing the naked Truth will have a powerful effect on him. But the motto

"*Le tems découvre la vérité*" [Time uncovers the truth] would do the same. For what really has the effect here is always only the abstract thought, not what is intuited.

According to what has been said, then, allegory in the visual arts is a faulty endeavor, serving a purpose wholly foreign to art. It becomes utterly intolerable when it leads so far astray that the presentation of forced and far-fetched interpretations sinks into the absurd. Examples are a tortoise to indicate feminine seclusion; Nemesis looking down into the bosom of her robe, to indicate that she sees into what is hidden too; and Bellori's interpretation that Annibale Carracci clothed Voluptuousness in a yellow garment because he wanted to indicate that her pleasures soon wither and turn as yellow as straw.[67] —Sometimes, moreover, there is no connection at all between what is depicted and the concept it indicates that rests on subsumption under that concept or on the association of ideas. Sign and signified are then linked quite conventionally, by a positive stipulation that arose by chance. I call this variety of allegory a symbol. Thus the rose is a *symbol* of discretion, the laurel a symbol of fame, the palm a symbol of victory, the scallop shell a symbol of pilgrimage, the cross a symbol of the Christian religion. Here too belong all indications given directly by mere colors, such as yellow as the color of falsehood and blue as the color of fidelity. Such symbols may often be useful in life, but their value is foreign to art. They are to be regarded entirely like hieroglyphs, or even like Chinese logographic script. They really belong in the same class as coats of arms, the bush hung out to signal an inn, the key by which one recognizes chamberlains, or the leather apron by which one recognizes miners.—Finally, when certain historical or mythical persons, or personified concepts, are made recognizable by symbols fixed once and for all, these might properly be called *emblems*. Such are the animals of the Evangelists, Minerva's owl, the apple of Paris, the anchor of Hope, and so on. Usually, however, "emblems" are taken to mean those simple symbolic pictures, explained by a motto, that

67 Giovan Pietro Bellori (1613–1696), Italian art theorist and biographer of artists.

are meant to make a moral truth intuitive. There are large collections of them by J. Camerarius, Alciatus and others. They form the transition to poetic allegory, which will be discussed below.—Greek sculpture addresses itself to intuition, which is why it is *aesthetic*. Indian sculpture addresses itself to the concept, which is why it is merely symbolic.[68]

This judgment on allegory is founded on our previous reflections on the inner nature of art and is closely bound up with them. It is directly opposed to the view of Winckelmann. Far from declaring allegory, as we do, to be something wholly foreign to the purpose of art and often disruptive of it, he speaks up for it everywhere. He even (Works, vol. I, pp. 55 ff.) places the highest purpose of art in the "presentation of universal concepts and non-sensuous things." Everyone is free to side with one view or the other. These and similar views of Winckelmann's concerning the metaphysics of the beautiful proper made one truth very clear to me. One can have the greatest receptivity and the most correct judgment about beauty in art without being able to give an abstract and properly philosophical account of the nature of the beautiful and of art. In the same way, one can be very noble and virtuous and have a very tender conscience, one that decides individual cases with the precision of a goldsmith's scale, without therefore being able to fathom the ethical significance of actions philosophically and set it out *in abstracto*.

ALLEGORY AND SYMBOL IN POETRY

In poetry, allegory leads from concepts to intuition and so is fully legitimate.

Allegory, however, has quite a different relation to *poetry* than to the visual arts. Objectionable in the latter, it is quite admissible and serviceable in the former. For in the visual arts it leads away from what is given intuitively, the proper object of all art, to abstract thoughts. In poetry, however, the relation is reversed.

68 Joachim Camerarius the Younger (1534–1598) and Andrea Alciato (Alciatus, 1492–1550), whose *Emblemata* founded the genre of emblem books.

Here what is immediately given in words is the concept, and the first aim is always to lead from it to the intuitive, whose presentation the listener's imagination must take over. If in the visual arts we are led from what is immediately given to something else, this must always be a concept, because here only the abstract cannot be given immediately. But a concept must never be the origin of a work of art, nor its communication the purpose. In poetry, on the other hand, the concept is the material, the immediately given. One may therefore very well leave it behind in order to call up something intuitive of an entirely different kind, in which the goal is reached. In the context of a poem, many a concept or abstract thought may be indispensable that is nevertheless, in itself and directly, incapable of any intuitiveness. It is then often made intuitive by some example that can be subsumed under it. This happens already in every figurative expression, and it happens in every metaphor, simile, parable and allegory, all of which differ only in the length and detail of their presentation. For this reason similes and allegories have an excellent effect in the literary arts. How beautifully Cervantes says of sleep, in order to express that it takes us away from all mental and bodily suffering, that "it is a cloak that covers the whole man." How beautifully Kleist expresses allegorically the thought that philosophers and scholars enlighten the human race, in the line:[69]

"Those whose nightly lamp lights up the whole globe,"

How forcefully and intuitively Homer characterizes Ate, the bringer of ruin, when he says: "She has tender feet, for she does not tread on the hard ground but walks only on the heads of men" (*Il., XIX, 91*). How great an effect Menenius Agrippa's fable of the stomach and the limbs had on the Roman people who had seceded from the city. How beautifully Plato's allegory of the cave, already mentioned, at the beginning of the seventh book of the *Republic*, expresses a highly abstract philosophical doctrine. The fable of Persephone is likewise to be regarded as a

69 Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Part II, ch. 68. Ewald Christian von Kleist (1715–1759), German poet.

profound allegory with a philosophical tendency: by tasting a pomegranate in the underworld, she falls under its power. This becomes especially evident in the treatment of this fable, beyond all praise, that Goethe wove into *The Triumph of Sensibility* as an episode.[70] I know of three extensive allegorical works. One, open and avowed, is Baltasar Gracián's incomparable *Criticón*. It consists of a great, rich fabric of interlinked and highly ingenious allegories. Here they serve as a cheerful dress for moral truths, which Gracián thereby makes as intuitive as possible, astonishing us with the wealth of his inventions. The other two are concealed allegories: *Don Quixote* and *Gulliver in Lilliput*. The former allegorizes the life of everyone who, unlike others, does not merely want to look after his personal welfare, but pursues an objective, ideal aim that has taken possession of his thinking and willing. With it he does, of course, cut a strange figure in this world.[71] In *Gulliver* one need only take everything physical as mental in order to see what the *satirical rogue*, as Hamlet would call him, meant by it.—In poetic allegory, then, the concept is always what is given, and the allegory seeks to make it intuitive through an image. So it may well be expressed or supported at times by a painted picture. But this picture is still not regarded as a work of the visual arts, only as a signifying hieroglyph, and it lays claim not to pictorial but only to poetic value.[72] Of this kind is that beautiful allegorical vignette by Lavater, which must be so heartening to every noble champion of truth. A hand holding a light is being stung by a wasp, while above, gnats are burning themselves in the flame. Beneath it is the motto:[73]

"And though it may singe the gnat's little wing,

70 Ate is the Greek personification of delusion and ruin. According to Livy, Menenius Agrippa persuaded the plebs who had withdrawn from Rome in 494 BC to return. Goethe's episode is the monodrama *Proserpina*.

71 Baltasar Gracián (1601–1658), Spanish Jesuit writer; his allegorical novel *El Criticón* appeared in 1651–57. Schopenhauer translated his *Oráculo manual*.

72 *Hamlet*, Act 2, Scene 2.

73 Johann Caspar Lavater (1741–1801), Swiss pastor and writer, known for his *Physiognomic Fragments*.

And shatter its skull and its tiny brain,
Light remains light!
And though the fiercest wasp may sting me,
I will not let it go."

Here also belongs that gravestone with the blown-out, smoking candle and the inscription around it:

"When it is out, it becomes plain / Whether it was a candle of tallow or of wax."—

Of this kind, finally, is an old German family tree. The last scion of a family reaching far back resolved to end his life in complete abstinence and chastity, and therefore to let his line die out. He expressed this by having himself depicted at the root of the many-branched tree, cutting off the tree above him with a pair of shears. In general, the symbolic pictures mentioned above, usually called emblems, belong here as well. They could also be described as short painted fables with an explicit moral. —Allegories of this kind are always to be counted among the poetic, not the pictorial, and are justified precisely by that. Here, too, the pictorial execution always remains secondary, and nothing more is required of it than that it present the thing recognizably. In poetry, however, just as in the visual arts, allegory passes over into the symbol when the connection between what is presented intuitively and the abstract thing it designates is merely arbitrary. Precisely because everything symbolic rests at bottom on convention, the symbol has, among other disadvantages, this one: its meaning is forgotten in time, and it then falls completely silent. Who, not already knowing it, would guess why the fish is a symbol of Christianity? Only a Champollion, for it is through and through a phonetic hieroglyph. That is why the Revelation of John now stands as a poetic allegory much as the reliefs bearing *magnus Deus sol Mithra*

[great god the sun Mithras] do, which people are still busy interpreting.[74][75]

POETRY AND HISTORY

Poetry presents the Idea of humanity more truly than history, which follows only the chain of events.

3.51 If we now turn, with our reflections on art in general thus far, from the visual arts to *poetry*, we shall not doubt that it too aims to reveal the Ideas, the grades of the objectification of the will. It aims to communicate them to the listener with the clarity and vividness with which the poetic mind grasped them. Ideas are essentially intuitive. So if in poetry what is immediately communicated by words is only abstract concepts, the intention is nevertheless obviously to let the listener intuit the Ideas of life in the representatives of these concepts. This can happen only with the help of his own imagination. But to set the imagination in motion in a way that serves this purpose, the abstract concepts must be combined in a particular way. These concepts are the immediate material of poetry, as of the driest prose. Their spheres must be made to intersect so that none of them can persist in its abstract universality. Instead, an intuitive representative appears before the imagination in its place, and the poet's words then keep modifying it further according to his intention. The chemist, by combining perfectly clear and transparent liquids, obtains solid precipitates. In the same way, by the manner in which he combines concepts, the poet knows how to precipitate, as it were, the concrete, the individual, the intuitive representation out of their abstract, transparent universality. For the Idea is known only intuitively; and knowledge of the Idea is the purpose of all art. Mastery in poetry, as in chemistry, enables one to obtain in each case precisely the precipitate one

74 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 36 of the second volume (the Supplements).

75 Jean-François Champollion (1790–1832) deciphered Egyptian hieroglyphs. The Greek word for fish, ICHTHYS, was read as an acronym for "Jesus Christ, Son of God, Savior."

intends. This purpose is served by the many epithets in poetry, by which the universality of every concept is restricted more and more, until it becomes intuitive. Homer adds an epithet to almost every noun. Its concept intersects the sphere of the first concept and at once considerably diminishes it, bringing it that much closer to intuition: for example,

> *En d' epes' Ôkeanô lampron phaos êelioio,*
> *Helkon nykta melainan eti zeidôron arouran.*
> *(Occidit vero in Oceanum splendidum lumen solis,*
> *Trahens noctem nigram super almam terram.)* [And the shining light of the sun sank into Ocean, drawing black night over the nourishing earth.][76]

And

"A gentle wind blows from the blue sky, / The myrtle stands still, and high the laurel,"—[77]

precipitates the whole bliss of the southern climate before the imagination out of a few concepts.

Rhythm and rhyme are a quite special aid to poetry. I can give no other explanation of their incredibly powerful effect than this: our powers of representation, being essentially bound to time, have acquired a peculiarity by virtue of which we inwardly follow every regularly recurring sound and, as it were, join in with it. As a result, rhythm and rhyme become, on the one hand, a means of holding our attention, since we follow the recitation more willingly. On the other hand, they produce in us a blind agreement with what is recited, prior to all judgment, and this gives it a certain emphatic power of conviction independent of all reasons.

Because of the universality of the material poetry uses to communicate the Ideas, namely concepts, the range of its domain is very large. The whole of nature, the Ideas of every grade, can be presented by it. Depending on the Idea to be communicated, it proceeds now descriptively, now narratively, now

76 Homer, *Iliad* 8.485–486, with a Latin translation.
77 From Mignon's song "Kennst du das Land" in Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*.

by direct dramatic presentation. In presenting the lower grades of the objecthood of the will, it is true, the visual arts mostly surpass it, because nature without knowledge, and even merely animal nature, reveals almost its whole essence in a single well-chosen moment. Man, on the other hand, is the chief subject of poetry, insofar as he expresses himself not through his mere form and facial expression but through a chain of actions and the thoughts and emotions that accompany them. Here no other art equals poetry, because it has the advantage of progression in time, which the visual arts lack.

The great theme of poetry, then, is the revelation of that Idea which is the highest grade of the objecthood of the will: the presentation of man in the connected series of his strivings and actions.—It is true that experience and history also teach us to know man, but more often *human beings* than *the human being*. That is, they give us more empirical information about how people behave toward one another, from which rules for one's own conduct follow, than deep insight into the inner nature of man. Still, the latter is by no means excluded from them. Yet whenever it is the nature of humanity itself that is disclosed to us in history or in our own experience, we have grasped our experience, and the historian has grasped history, already with an artist's eyes, already poetically, that is, according to the Idea, not the appearance, according to the inner nature, not the relations. One's own experience is an indispensable condition for understanding poetry as well as history, for it is, as it were, the dictionary of the language both of them speak. History, however, is really related to poetry as portrait painting is to history painting. The former gives what is true in the particular, the latter what is true in the universal. The former has the truth of the appearance and can document it from the appearance. The latter has the truth of the Idea, which is to be found in no single appearance and yet speaks from all of them. The poet deliberately chooses significant characters and presents them in significant situations; the historian takes both as they come. Indeed, he must regard and select events and persons not by their inner,

genuine significance, which expresses the Idea, but by their outward, apparent, relative significance, which matters for connection and consequences. He may consider nothing in and for itself, according to its essential character and expression. He must consider everything in its relation, in its concatenation, in its influence on what follows, and above all on his own age. That is why he will not pass over an action of a king that is of little significance, even common in itself, for it has consequences and influence. On the other hand, actions of individuals that are in themselves highly significant, and even very distinguished individuals, are not for him to mention if they have no consequences, no influence. For his way of considering things follows the principle of sufficient reason and seizes on the appearance, whose form that principle is. The poet, however, grasps the Idea, the essence of humanity, outside all relation, outside all time: the adequate objecthood of the thing in itself at its highest grade. Now even in the way of considering things that is necessary to the historian, the inner nature, the significance of appearances, the kernel within all those shells, can never be entirely lost. At least whoever looks for it can still find and recognize it. Nevertheless, what is significant in itself, not in relation, the real unfolding of the Idea, will be found far more accurately and clearly in poetry than in history. Therefore, paradoxical as it sounds, far more real, genuine, inner truth is to be attributed to poetry than to history. For the historian is supposed to follow the individual event exactly as it happened in life, as it develops in time along the manifold, intertwined chains of grounds and consequences. But he cannot possibly possess all the data for this, or have seen everything, or have found out everything. At every moment the original of his picture deserts him, or a false one is slipped in in its place. This happens so often that I think I may assume that in all history there is more that is false than true. The poet, on the other hand, has grasped the Idea of humanity from some definite side, the one he is about to present. It is the essence of his own self that is objectified for him in it. His knowledge, as was explained above

in connection with sculpture, is half *a priori*. His model stands before his mind firm, clear, brightly lit, and it cannot desert him. Hence he shows us the Idea purely and clearly in the mirror of his mind, and his portrayal is, down to the particulars, as true as life itself.[78] The great historians of antiquity are therefore poets in the particulars where the data desert them, for example in the speeches of their heroes. Indeed, their whole way of handling their material approaches the epic. But precisely this gives their presentations unity and lets them keep inner truth even where outer truth was inaccessible to them or had even been falsified. Above, we compared history to portrait painting, in contrast to poetry, which would correspond to history painting. Now we find that Winckelmann's dictum, that the portrait should be the ideal of the individual, was followed by the ancient historians too. For they present the particular in such a way that the side of the Idea of humanity expressed in it stands out. The modern historians, by contrast, with few exceptions,

78 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. It goes without saying that throughout I am speaking exclusively of the rare, great, genuine poet. I mean no one less than that stale crowd of mediocre poets, rhymesters and inventors of fairy tales that flourishes so rankly in Germany, especially nowadays. Into their ears one ought to cry ceaselessly from all sides: *Mediocribus esse poëtis / Non homines, non Dî, non concessere columnae.* [Neither men nor gods nor booksellers' columns have ever allowed poets to be mediocre.] It is even worth serious consideration how much of their own and others' time and paper this swarm of mediocre poets spoils, and how harmful their influence is. For the public, on the one hand, always reaches for what is new, and on the other hand is by nature more inclined toward the perverse and the shallow, as being more congenial to it. Hence the works of the mediocre draw the public away from the genuine masterpieces and hold it back from being educated by them. Consequently, working directly against the beneficial influence of the geniuses, they corrupt taste more and more and so hinder the progress of the age. Criticism and satire should therefore flog the mediocre poets without any indulgence or compassion, until, for their own good, they are brought to prefer spending their leisure reading what is good rather than writing what is bad.—For if the bungling of the uncalled threw even the gentle god of the Muses into such a rage that he could flay Marsyas, I do not see on what grounds mediocre poetry proposes to base its claims to tolerance.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Horace, *Ars Poetica* 372–373. The columns are the pillars where booksellers displayed their wares.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The satyr Marsyas challenged Apollo to a musical contest and, having lost, was flayed alive.

mostly give us only "a trash bin and a junk room, and at best a pompous melodrama of state."[79] —Whoever, then, wants to know humanity according to its inner nature, which is identical in all its appearances and developments, that is, according to its Idea, will find that the works of the great, immortal poets hold up a far more faithful and clearer picture than the historians are ever able to. For even the best of the historians are far from the first rank as poets, and their hands are not free either. The relation between the two in this respect can also be illustrated by the following analogy. The mere, pure historian, working from the data alone, is like someone without any knowledge of mathematics who investigates the proportions of figures he happens to come across by measuring them. His empirically found result is therefore burdened with all the errors of the drawn figure. The poet, on the other hand, is like the mathematician, who constructs those proportions *a priori*, in pure intuition. He states them not as the drawn figure actually has them, but as they are in the Idea that the drawing is meant to make perceptible to the senses.—That is why Schiller says:

"What has never, anywhere, come to pass, / That alone never grows old."[80]

Indeed, with regard to knowledge of the nature of humanity, I must even grant biographies, and above all autobiographies, a greater value than history proper, at least as it is usually written. For one thing, the data for the former can be assembled more accurately and completely than for the latter. For another, in history proper it is not so much human beings who act as nations and armies. The individuals who do still appear are seen at so great a distance, with so much around them and so large a retinue, and moreover wrapped in stiff robes of state or heavy, inflexible armor, that it is truly hard to discern the human movement through all this. The faithfully portrayed life of the individual, on the other hand, shows within a narrow sphere the

79 Goethe, *Faust* I, lines 582–583. A *Haupt- und Staatsaktion* was a bombastic popular play about affairs of state.
80 Schiller, "An die Freunde" (To My Friends, 1802).

way people act in all its nuances and forms: the excellence, virtue and even holiness of a few; the perversity, wretchedness and malice of most; the wickedness of some. In the only respect considered here, namely the inner significance of what appears, it is quite indifferent whether the objects around which the action turns are, relatively considered, trifles or matters of great weight, farmsteads or kingdoms. For all these things are without significance in themselves. They acquire it only through the will's being moved by them, and only insofar as it is. The motive has significance solely through its relation to the will; the relation it has as a thing to other such things does not come into consideration at all. Just as a circle one inch in diameter and a circle forty million miles in diameter have exactly the same geometrical properties, so the events and history of a village and those of an empire are essentially the same. One can study and come to know humanity in the one as well as in the other. It is also wrong to think that autobiographies are full of deceit and dissimulation. On the contrary, lying (though possible everywhere) is perhaps harder there than anywhere else. Dissimulation is easiest in mere conversation. Indeed, paradoxical as it sounds, it is at bottom already harder in a letter. There a person, left to himself, looks into himself and not outward. He finds it hard to bring what is foreign and distant close to him, and he does not have before his eyes the measure of the impression he makes on the other. The other person, by contrast, calmly and in a mood foreign to the writer, surveys the letter, reads it repeatedly and at different times, and so easily discovers the hidden intention. One also comes to know an author as a person most easily from his book, because all those conditions operate here still more strongly and persistently. And dissimulating in an autobiography is so hard that there is perhaps not a single one that is not, on the whole, truer than any other written history. The person who records his life surveys it as a whole and in broad outline. The particular becomes small, the near recedes, the distant comes near again, regard for others shrinks away. He sits as his own confessor, and he has sat down of his own free

will. The spirit of lying does not seize him so easily here. For in every person there is also an inclination toward truth, which must first be overpowered in every lie, and which has taken up an uncommonly strong position precisely here. The relation between biography and the history of nations can be made intuitive by the following analogy. History shows us humanity as a view from a high mountain shows us nature. We see much at once, wide stretches, great masses; but nothing becomes clear, or recognizable in its whole real nature. The portrayed life of the individual, by contrast, shows us the human being as we know nature when we walk about among its trees, plants, rocks and waters. In landscape painting the artist lets us look into nature through his eyes, and so greatly eases for us the knowledge of its Ideas and the state of will-less, pure knowing that this requires. In the same way, poetry has a great advantage over both history and biography in presenting the Ideas that we can seek in them. For here too genius holds up to us the clarifying mirror, in which everything essential and significant meets us gathered together and placed in the brightest light, while everything accidental and extraneous has been eliminated.[81]

THE LYRIC

The song expresses the contrast between the singer's own willing and the calm of pure knowing.

The poet's task is to present the Idea of humanity, and he can carry it out in one of two ways. Either the one presented is at the same time the one presenting. This happens in lyric poetry, in the song proper, where the poet only vividly intuits and describes his own state, so that, because of its subject matter, a certain subjectivity is essential to this genre.—Or else what is to be presented is entirely different from the one presenting it, as in all the other genres, where the presenter hides more or less behind what is presented and finally disappears altogether. In

81 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 38 of the second volume (the Supplements).

the ballad the presenter still expresses his own state to some extent through the tone and bearing of the whole. So although the ballad is far more objective than the song, it still has something subjective about it. This subjective element recedes further in the idyll, much further in the novel, almost entirely in the epic proper, and finally, down to the last trace, in drama. Drama is the most objective genre of poetry, the most perfect in more than one respect, and also the most difficult. For that very reason the lyric genre is the easiest. Art otherwise belongs only to genuine genius, which is so rare. Yet even a person who is on the whole not very eminent can produce a beautiful song, if some inspiration, kindled by a strong stimulus from outside, really does heighten his mental powers. All this requires is a vivid intuition of one's own state in a moment of excitement. This is proved by many single songs by individuals who have otherwise remained unknown, especially the German folk songs, of which we have an excellent collection in the "Wunderhorn." It is proved just as well by countless love songs and other songs of the people in every language.[82] For to seize the mood of the moment and embody it in a song is the whole achievement of this poetic genre. Yet the lyric poetry of genuine poets reflects the inner life of all humanity. Everything that millions of people, past, present and future, have felt and will feel in the same situations finds its corresponding expression there; and the situations are the same because they always recur. By constantly recurring, those situations stand permanent, just like humanity itself, and always call forth the same feelings. That is why the lyrical works of genuine poets remain true, effective and fresh through thousands of years. The poet is, after all, the universal human being. Everything that has ever moved any human heart, everything that human nature drives forth from itself in any situation, whatever dwells and broods anywhere in a human breast—that is his theme and his material, as is the whole rest of nature besides. Hence the poet can sing of sensual

82 *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (The Boy's Magic Horn, 1805–08), a collection of German folk songs edited by Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano.

pleasure as well as of mysticism, be an Anacreon or an Angelus Silesius, write tragedies or comedies, portray sublime or vulgar sentiments—as mood and calling dictate. Accordingly, no one may prescribe to the poet that he should be noble and sublime, moral, pious, Christian, or this or that, still less reproach him for being this and not that.[83] He is the mirror of humanity, and brings to its consciousness what it feels and does.

Let us now look more closely at the nature of the song proper. We should take as examples specimens that are both excellent and pure, not ones that already approach another genre in some way, such as the ballad, the elegy, the hymn, the epigram and so on. We shall then find that the peculiar essence of the song in the narrowest sense is as follows.—It is the subject of the will, that is, the singer's own willing, that fills his consciousness. Often this is a released, satisfied willing (joy), but probably still more often a thwarted one (sorrow); always it is emotion, passion, an agitated state of mind. Beside this, however, and at the same time, the sight of the surrounding nature makes the singer conscious of himself as the subject of pure, will-less knowing. The unshakable, blissful peace of this subject now stands in contrast with the urgency of willing, which is always limited, always still needy. The feeling of this contrast, of this interplay, is really what finds expression in the song as a whole, and what constitutes the lyrical state in general. In this state pure knowing comes toward us, as it were, to deliver us from willing and its urgency. We follow, but only for moments. Again and again willing, the memory of our personal aims, tears us away from calm contemplation. But again and again, too, the beautiful surroundings nearest at hand, in which pure will-less knowledge offers itself to us, lure us away from willing. That is why, in the song and in the lyrical mood, willing (the personal interest of our aims) and the pure intuition of the surroundings that present themselves are wondrously mingled together. Relations between the two are sought and imagined. The subjective mood, the affection of the will, lends its color to the intuited surround-

83 Anacreon (6th century BC), Greek lyric poet of wine and love.

ings, and these in turn reflect their color back onto it. The genuine song is the imprint of this whole state of mind, so mingled and divided. —To make this abstract analysis of a state very far removed from all abstraction comprehensible through examples, one may take up any of Goethe's immortal songs. As especially clear for this purpose I will recommend only a few: "Shepherd's Lament," "Welcome and Farewell," "To the Moon," "On the Lake," "Autumn Feeling." The songs proper in the "Wunderhorn" are also excellent examples, quite especially the one that begins: "O Bremen, I must leave you now."—As a comic and strikingly apt parody of the lyrical character, I find a song by Voss remarkable. In it he describes the feelings of a drunken lead-roofer falling from a tower, who, as he falls past it, observes that the tower clock is just showing half past eleven—a remark quite foreign to his situation, and hence belonging to will-free knowledge.[84] —Anyone who shares the view of the lyrical state set out here will also admit that it is really the intuitive and poetic knowledge of a proposition I put forward in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason and have already mentioned in this work: that the identity of the subject of knowing with the subject of willing can be called the miracle *kat' exochên*. So the poetic effect of the song ultimately rests on the truth of that proposition.—In the course of life those two subjects, or, to put it in popular terms, head and heart, drift further and further apart; more and more one separates one's subjective feeling from one's objective knowledge. In the child the two are still completely fused: it scarcely knows how to distinguish itself from its surroundings; it merges into them. In the youth, every perception acts first of all as feeling and mood, and indeed blends with them, as *Byron* expresses very beautifully:

84 Johann Heinrich Voss (1751–1826), German poet, best known for his translations of Homer.

I live not in myself, but I become
Portion of that around me; and to me
High mountains are a feeling.[8586]

That is precisely why the youth clings so much to the intuitive outer side of things; that is precisely why he is suited only for lyric poetry, and only the grown man for dramatic poetry. The old man can at most be thought of as an epic poet, like Ossian or Homer: for storytelling belongs to the character of old age.

In the more objective kinds of poetry, especially the novel, the epic and drama, the aim—the revelation of the Idea of humanity—is achieved chiefly by two means: by the true and deeply conceived portrayal of significant characters, and by the invention of significant situations in which those characters unfold. The chemist has the task not only of exhibiting the simple elements and their chief compounds pure and unadulterated, but also of exposing them to the influence of reagents that make their peculiar properties clearly and strikingly visible. In the same way the poet has the task not only of presenting significant characters to us truly and faithfully, like nature itself. To make them recognizable to us, he must also place them in situations in which their peculiarities unfold completely and they show themselves clearly, in sharp outline; such situations are therefore called significant. In real life and in history, chance only rarely brings about situations of this kind, and there they stand isolated, lost and hidden by the mass of what is insignificant. The significance that runs through all the situations is meant to distinguish the novel, the epic and drama from real life, just as much as the selection and grouping of significant characters. In both, however, the strictest truth is an indispensable condition of their effect. Lack of unity in the characters, their contradicting themselves or the nature of humanity in general, as well as impossibility, or an improbability approaching it, in the events, even if only in minor circumstances—all this

85 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Not in myself alone I live; I become / A part of what surrounds me, and to me / High mountains are a feeling.
86 Byron, *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, Canto III, stanza 72.

offends in poetry just as much as badly drawn figures, false perspective or faulty lighting do in painting. For there, as here, we demand the faithful mirror of life, of humanity, of the world, only made clearer by the presentation and significant by the arrangement. The aim of all the arts is one and the same, the presentation of the Ideas. Their essential difference lies only in which grade of the will's objectification the Idea to be presented is, and this in turn determines the material of the presentation. Hence even the arts most remote from one another can shed light on each other by comparison. Thus, for example, to grasp fully the Ideas that express themselves in water, it is not enough to see it in a still pond or in an evenly flowing river. Those Ideas unfold completely only when water appears under all the circumstances and obstacles that, acting on it, prompt it to the full manifestation of all its properties. That is why we find it beautiful when it plunges down, roars, foams and leaps up again, or when it scatters into spray as it falls, or finally when, artificially forced, it strives upward as a jet. Behaving differently under different circumstances in this way, it nevertheless always faithfully keeps its character: it is just as natural for it to spurt upward as to rest in mirroring stillness; it is equally ready for the one as for the other, as soon as the circumstances arise. Now what the builder of fountains achieves with fluid matter, the architect achieves with rigid matter, and the epic or dramatic poet with the Idea of humanity. To unfold and make clear the Idea that expresses itself in the object of each art—the will objectifying itself at each grade—is the common aim of all the arts. Human life, as it mostly shows itself in reality, is like water as it mostly shows itself, in pond and river. But in the epic, the novel and tragedy, selected characters are placed in circumstances in which all their peculiarities unfold; the depths of the human heart open up and become visible in extraordinary and momentous actions. In this way poetry objectifies the Idea of the human being, whose peculiarity it is to present itself in highly individual characters.

TRAGEDY, THE SUMMIT OF POETRY

Tragedy shows the will in conflict with itself, and its heroes renouncing the will to live.

Tragedy is to be regarded as the summit of poetry, both for the greatness of its effect and for the difficulty of its achievement, and is recognized as such. It is very significant for the whole of our inquiry, and well worth noting, that the aim of this highest poetic achievement is to present the terrible side of life. Nameless pain, the misery of humanity, the triumph of wickedness, the mocking dominion of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and the innocent are here brought before us. For in this lies a significant hint about the nature of the world and of existence. It is the conflict of the will with itself that here, most completely unfolded at the highest grade of its objecthood, comes terribly to the fore. It becomes visible in the suffering of humanity. This suffering is brought about partly by chance and error, which appear as the rulers of the world and are personified as fate, through a malice that goes as far as the semblance of intention. Partly the conflict springs from humanity itself, through the crossing strivings of individual wills, through the wickedness and perversity of most people. It is one and the same will that lives and appears in them all; but its appearances fight against themselves and tear themselves to pieces. In this individual it comes forth violently, in that one more weakly; here more, there less brought to reflection and softened by the light of knowledge. Finally, in a few, this knowledge, purified and heightened by suffering itself, reaches the point where appearance, the veil of Maya, no longer deceives it. The form of appearance, the *principium individuationis*, is seen through, and the egoism that rests on it thereby dies away. As a result the *motives* that were formerly so powerful lose their power, and in their place the complete knowledge of the essence of the world, acting as a *quieter* of the will, brings about resignation: the giving up not merely of life but of the whole will to live itself. So in

tragedy we finally see the noblest, after long struggle and suffering, renounce forever the aims they had until then pursued so vehemently, and all the pleasures of life, or else give up life itself willingly and joyfully. So Calderón's Constant Prince; so Gretchen in "Faust"; so Hamlet, whom his Horatio would gladly follow, but whom Hamlet bids stay and breathe a while longer in pain in this harsh world, to make Hamlet's fate known and clear his memory;—so too the Maid of Orleans and the Bride of Messina: they all die purified by suffering, that is,[87] after the will to live has first died away in them. In Voltaire's "Mahomet" this is even expressed in so many words in the closing lines that the dying Palmira cries out to Mahomet: "The world is for tyrants: you, live on!"—The demand for so-called poetic justice, on the other hand, rests on a complete misunderstanding of the nature of tragedy, indeed of the nature of the world itself. It appears brazenly, in all its shallowness, in the criticisms that *Dr.* Samuel Johnson provided on the individual plays of Shakespeare, where he complains quite naively that poetic justice is consistently neglected. It is indeed neglected: for what guilt have the Ophelias, the Desdemonas, the Cordelias incurred?[88] —But only the shallow, optimistic, Protestant-rationalist, or really Jewish, worldview will demand poetic justice and find its own satisfaction in seeing that demand met. The true sense of tragedy is the deeper insight that what the hero atones for is not his particular sins but original sin, that is, the guilt of existence itself:

> *Pues el delito mayor*
> *Del hombre es haber nacido.*
> (For man's greatest guilt
> Is that he was born.)[89]

as Calderón states outright.

87 Calderón's *El príncipe constante* (1629); *The Maid of Orleans* and *The Bride of Messina* are tragedies by Schiller. Hamlet's words to Horatio: "in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain, / To tell my story" (*Hamlet* V.2).

88 Voltaire, *Le Fanatisme, ou Mahomet le prophète* (1741). Samuel Johnson (1709–1784) made such objections in the notes to his edition of Shakespeare (1765), for instance to Cordelia's death in *King Lear*.

89 From Segismundo's monologue in Act 1 of Calderón's *La vida es sueño*.

As to the treatment of tragedy in more detail, I will permit myself only one remark. The presentation of a great misfortune is the only thing essential to tragedy. But the many different ways in which the poet brings it about can be brought under three kinds. It can happen, namely, through the extraordinary wickedness of one character, bordering on the utmost limits of possibility, who becomes the author of the misfortune. Examples of this kind are Richard III, Iago in "Othello," Shylock in "The Merchant of Venice," Franz Moor, Euripides' Phaedra, Creon in "Antigone," and the like. It can happen, further, through blind fate, that is,[90] chance or error. A true model of this kind is Sophocles' King Oedipus, and also the Women of Trachis; indeed most of the tragedies of the ancients belong here. Among the moderns, examples are "Romeo and Juliet," Voltaire's "Tancred," and "The Bride of Messina." Finally, however, the misfortune can also be brought about merely by the way the characters are placed in relation to one another, by their circumstances. Then there is no need of a monstrous error or an unheard-of accident, nor of a character who reaches the limits of humanity in evil. Rather, characters of the ordinary moral kind, in circumstances such as often occur, are so placed against one another that their situation compels them, knowingly and with open eyes, to do each other the greatest harm, without the wrong lying entirely on any one side. This last kind seems to me far preferable to the other two. For it shows us the greatest misfortune not as an exception, not as something brought about by rare circumstances or monstrous characters, but as something that arises easily and of its own accord out of human actions and characters, almost as something essential to them; and precisely in this way it brings it terribly close to us. In the other two kinds we see monstrous fate and appalling wickedness as terrible powers, yet ones that threaten us only from a great distance, which we ourselves might well escape without taking refuge in renunciation. The last kind, by contrast, shows us the powers that destroy happiness and life in such a way that the

90 Franz Moor: the villain of Schiller's play *The Robbers* (1781).

path from them to us, too, lies open at every moment. It shows the greatest suffering brought about by entanglements whose essentials our own fate might also take on, and by actions that we too might perhaps be capable of committing, so that we could not complain of injustice. Then, shuddering, we feel ourselves already in the midst of hell. But carrying out this last kind is also the most difficult, since one has to produce the greatest effect with the least expenditure of means and motivating causes, merely through the way they are placed and distributed. That is why even many of the best tragedies avoid this difficulty. Yet a perfect model of this kind can be cited, a play that is far surpassed in other respects by several others by the same great master: it is "Clavigo." "Hamlet" belongs here to a certain extent, that is, if one looks only at Hamlet's relationship to Laertes and to Ophelia. "Wallenstein" also has this merit. "Faust" is wholly of this kind, if one considers only the story of Gretchen and her brother as the main action. So is Corneille's "Cid," except that it lacks the tragic ending, which the analogous relationship of Max to Thekla, by contrast, does have.[91][92]

MUSIC

Music, alone among the arts, is not a copy of the Ideas but of the will itself.

3.52 We have now considered all the fine arts, in the generality appropriate to our standpoint. We began with architecture as a fine art, whose aim as such is to make clear the objectification of the will at the lowest grade of its visibility, where it shows itself as the dull, unknowing, law-governed striving of mass, and yet already reveals self-division and struggle, namely between gravity and rigidity;—and we concluded our inquiry with tragedy, which, at the highest grade of the will's objectification, brings

91 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 37 of the second volume (the Supplements).

92 *Clavigo* (1774) is a tragedy by Goethe; Max Piccolomini and Thekla are the lovers in Schiller's *Wallenstein* trilogy.

that very conflict of the will with itself before our eyes in terrible magnitude and clarity.—Yet we find that one fine art has remained excluded from our consideration, and had to remain so, since there was no fitting place for it at all in the systematic structure of our exposition: it is *music*. It stands entirely apart from all the others. In it we do not recognize the copy, the repetition, of any Idea of the beings in the world. And yet it is so great and so exceedingly glorious an art; it acts so powerfully on the innermost being of a human being, and is understood there so completely and so deeply, as an entirely universal language whose clarity surpasses even that of the intuitive world itself—that we certainly have to look for more in it than an *exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi* [an unconscious exercise in arithmetic, in which the mind does not know that it is counting], as Leibniz called it.[93] And yet he was quite right, insofar as he considered only its immediate and outward significance, its shell. But if it were nothing more, the satisfaction it gives would have to resemble the satisfaction we feel when a sum comes out right, and could not be that heartfelt joy with which we see the deepest recesses of our being given voice. From our standpoint, therefore, where our concern is the aesthetic effect, we must grant music a far more serious and profound significance, one that relates to the innermost essence of the world and of our own self. With respect to this significance, the numerical ratios into which music can be resolved are not the thing signified; they are themselves only the sign. That music must stand, in some sense, to the world as presentation to what is presented, as copy to original, we can infer from its analogy with the other arts. This character belongs to all of them, and their effect on us is on the whole of the same kind as that of music, only music's effect is stronger, quicker, more necessary, more unfailing. Its imitative relation to the world must also be a very intimate one, infinitely true and strikingly apt. For it is understood instantly by everyone, and it displays a certain infal-

93 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Leibnitii epistolae, collectio Kortholti: ep. 154.* [Leibniz's letters, Kortholt's collection, letter 154]

libility in that its form can be reduced to quite definite rules expressible in numbers, from which it cannot depart at all without ceasing entirely to be music. —Nevertheless the point of comparison between music and the world, the respect in which music stands to the world in the relation of imitation or repetition, lies very deeply hidden. Music has been practiced in every age without anyone being able to give an account of this. Content to understand it immediately, people forgo any abstract comprehension of this immediate understanding itself.

I gave my mind over entirely to the impression of music in its manifold forms, and then returned to reflection and to the course of my thoughts set out in the present work. In this way I arrived at an insight into its inner essence and into the nature of its imitative relation to the world, a relation that, by analogy, must necessarily be presupposed. This insight is fully sufficient for me and satisfying for my inquiry, and will probably be just as evident to anyone who has followed me so far and agreed with my view of the world. Yet I recognize that it is essentially impossible to prove it. For it assumes and establishes a relation of music, as a representation, to that which by its very nature can never be representation; it would have music regarded as the copy of an original that can itself never be directly represented. I can therefore do nothing more, here at the end of this third book, which is devoted chiefly to the consideration of the arts, than set out this explanation of the wonderful art of tones that satisfies me. Whether my view is accepted or rejected I must leave to the effect that music, on the one hand, and on the other the whole and single thought I have communicated in this work, has on each reader. Moreover, if one is to give the account of the significance of music offered here one's assent with genuine conviction, I consider it necessary that one should often listen to music while reflecting on that account at length; and this in turn requires that one already be very familiar with the whole thought I have set out.

The (Platonic) Ideas are the adequate objectification of the will. The aim of all the other arts is to stimulate knowledge of

these Ideas by presenting individual things (for that is what works of art themselves always are); this is possible only if a corresponding change takes place in the knowing subject. So all these arts objectify the will only indirectly, namely by means of the Ideas. Now our world is nothing other than the appearance of the Ideas in multiplicity, through their entry into the *principium individuationis* (the form of the knowledge possible to the individual as such). Music, since it passes over the Ideas, is therefore also entirely independent of the phenomenal world; it simply ignores it, and could to a certain extent exist even if there were no world at all—which cannot be said of the other arts. For music is as *immediate* an objectification and copy of the whole *will* as the world itself is, indeed as the Ideas are, whose multiplied appearance makes up the world of individual things. Music is therefore by no means, like the other arts, a copy of the Ideas, but a *copy of the will itself*, whose objecthood the Ideas also are. That is precisely why the effect of music is so very much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts: for they speak only of the shadow, but music speaks of the essence. But since it is the same will that objectifies itself both in the Ideas and in music, only in quite different ways in each, there must be, not indeed any direct likeness, but still a parallelism, an analogy, between music and the Ideas, whose appearance in multiplicity and imperfection is the visible world. Demonstrating this analogy will serve as an illustration, and make it easier to understand this explanation, which the obscurity of its subject makes difficult.

BASS, HARMONY AND MELODY

The bass, the middle voices and the melody correspond to the grades of nature up to the human being.

In the deepest tones of harmony, in the fundamental bass, I recognize the lowest grades of the will's objectification: inorganic nature, the mass of the planet. All the high tones, light, mobile and dying away more quickly, are, as is well known, to

be regarded as having arisen from the secondary vibrations of the deep fundamental tone; whenever it sounds, they always sound softly along with it. And it is a law of harmony that a bass note may be joined only by those high tones that actually already sound of their own accord together with it through the secondary vibrations (its *sons harmoniques* [harmonics]). Now this is analogous to the fact that all the bodies and organisms of nature must be regarded as having arisen through gradual development out of the mass of the planet: this mass is both their support and their source. The higher tones have the same relation to the fundamental bass.—Depth has a limit beyond which no tone is audible any longer. This corresponds to the fact that no matter is perceptible without form and quality, that is, without the manifestation of a force that cannot be further explained, in which precisely an Idea expresses itself; and, more generally, that no matter can be entirely without will. So just as a certain degree of pitch is inseparable from tone as such, a certain degree of manifestation of will is inseparable from matter. —The fundamental bass, then, is for us in harmony what inorganic nature is in the world: the crudest mass, on which everything rests and from which everything rises and develops. —Further, in all the ripieno voices that produce the harmony, between the bass and the leading voice that sings the melody, I recognize the whole gradation of the Ideas in which the will objectifies itself. Those nearer the bass are the lower of those grades, the bodies that are still inorganic but already manifest themselves in several ways; the higher ones represent for me the plant and animal worlds.—The definite intervals of the scale are parallel to the definite grades of the will's objectification, the definite species in nature. Deviation from the arithmetical correctness of the intervals, whether through some temperament or brought about by the chosen key, is analogous to the individual's deviation from the type of its species. Indeed, the impure discords that yield no definite interval can be compared to monstrous hybrid births between two animal species, or between human and animal.—But these bass and ripieno voices,

which make up the *harmony*, lack the connectedness in their progression that only the upper voice, the one singing the *melody*, possesses. This voice alone also moves quickly and lightly in modulations and runs, while all the others have only a slower motion, without any connection that holds in each of them on its own. The deep bass, the representative of the crudest mass, moves most ponderously. It rises and falls only in large steps, in thirds, fourths and fifths, never by *one* tone, unless it is a bass transposed by double counterpoint. This slow motion is also physically essential to it: a quick run or trill in the low register cannot even be imagined. The higher ripieno voices, which run parallel to the animal world, move more quickly, but still without melodic connection and meaningful progression. The disconnected course and law-governed determination of all the ripieno voices is analogous to the fact that in the whole non-rational world, from the crystal to the most perfect animal, no being has a truly connected consciousness that would make its life a meaningful whole. None undergoes a succession of mental developments, none perfects itself through education; everything stands there uniformly at every moment as it is according to its kind, determined by fixed law.— Finally, in the *melody* I recognize the highest grade of the will's objectification, the reflective life and striving of the human being. The melody is the high, singing principal voice that leads the whole and progresses with unfettered freedom, in the unbroken, meaningful connection of *one* thought from beginning to end, presenting a whole. The human being alone, because he is endowed with reason, constantly looks forward and backward along the path of his actual life and of countless possibilities, and so accomplishes a course of life that is reflective and therefore connected as a whole. Correspondingly, the *melody* alone has a meaningful, purposeful connection from beginning to end. It therefore tells the story of the will illuminated by reflection, whose imprint in reality is the series of its deeds. But it says more: it tells the will's most secret story; it paints every stirring, every striving, every movement of the

will, everything that reason gathers under the broad and negative concept of feeling and cannot take up any further into its abstractions. That is why it has always been said that music is the language of feeling and passion, just as words are the language of reason. Plato already defines it as *hê tôn melôn kinêsis memimêmenê, en tios pathênasin hotan psychê ginêtai (melodiarum motus, animi affectus imitans)* [the movement of melodies, imitating the emotions of the soul], *De leg. VIII*; and Aristotle too says: *dia ti hoi rythmoi kai ta melê, phônê ousa, êthesin eoike*; *(cur numeri musici et modi, qui voces sunt, moribus similes sese exhibent?)* [why do musical rhythms and melodies, which are mere sounds, resemble states of character?], *Probl. c. 19.*[94]

The essence of the human being consists in this: his will strives, is satisfied, and strives anew, and so on forever. Indeed his happiness and well-being consist only in the passage from wish to satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a new wish, moving on quickly; for the absence of satisfaction is suffering, and the absence of a new wish is empty longing, *languor*, boredom. Correspondingly, the essence of melody is a constant deviation, a straying from the keynote in a thousand ways—not only to the harmonic degrees, the third and the dominant, but to every tone, to the dissonant seventh and to the augmented degrees—but it is always followed by a final return to the keynote. In all these ways melody expresses the many-shaped striving of the will; but it always also expresses its satisfaction, through finally finding again a harmonic degree, and still more the keynote. The invention of melody, the uncovering in it of all the deepest secrets of human willing and feeling, is the work of genius. Here, more obviously than anywhere else, the activity of genius lies far from all reflection and conscious intention, and could be called inspiration. Here, as everywhere in art, the concept is barren: the composer reveals the innermost essence of the world and utters the deepest wisdom in a language his reason does not understand, just as a somnambulist in a magnetic

94 *De leg.*: Plato's *Laws*; *Probl.*: the *Problems* ascribed to Aristotle, book 19 of which deals with music.

trance gives disclosures about things of which she has no concept when awake. Hence in a composer, more than in any other artist, the human being is wholly separate and distinct from the artist. Even in explaining this wonderful art the concept shows its poverty and its limits; I will nevertheless try to carry our analogy through.—Just as a quick passage from wish to satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a new wish, is happiness and well-being, so quick melodies without great deviations are cheerful. Slow melodies that stumble into painful dissonances and wind their way back to the keynote only after many bars are sad, as analogous to delayed, hampered satisfaction. The delay of the will's new stirring, *languor*, could have no other expression than a sustained keynote, whose effect would soon be unbearable; very monotonous, vacuous melodies already come close to this. The short, easily grasped phrases of quick dance music seem to speak only of common happiness, easily attained. The *Allegro maestoso*, on the other hand, with its great phrases, long passages and wide deviations, signifies a greater, nobler striving toward a distant goal, and its final attainment. The *Adagio* speaks of the suffering of a great and noble striving that disdains all petty happiness. But how wonderful is the effect of *minor* and *major*! How astonishing that the change of a half-tone, the entry of the minor third instead of the major, at once and inevitably forces upon us an anxious, painful feeling, from which the *major* delivers us again just as instantly. In the *minor* the *Adagio* attains the expression of the most intense pain and becomes the most harrowing lament. Dance music in the minor seems to signify the failure to attain the petty happiness one ought rather to disdain; it seems to speak of reaching a low aim amid toil and drudgery.—The inexhaustibility of possible melodies corresponds to nature's inexhaustible variety of individuals, physiognomies and life courses. The passage from one key into a quite different one, since it wholly abolishes the connection with what came before, is like death, insofar as in death the individual comes to an end. But the will that appeared in this individual lives on as before, appearing in other individuals,

whose consciousness, however, has no connection with that of the first.

In demonstrating all these analogies, however, one must never forget that music has no direct relation to them, but only an indirect one; for it never expresses the appearance, but solely the inner essence, the in-itself of all appearance, the will itself. It therefore does not express this or that particular, definite joy, this or that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or exultation, or merriment, or peace of mind; rather it expresses *joy*, *sorrow*, *pain*, *horror*, *exultation*, *merriment*, *peace of mind themselves*, as it were *in abstracto*, what is essential in them, without any accessories, and so also without the motives for them. Yet we understand them perfectly in this distilled quintessence. This is why our imagination is so easily stirred by music. It then tries to give shape to that invisible yet so vividly moving spirit world that speaks to us so directly, and to clothe it in flesh and blood, that is, to embody it in an analogous example. This is the origin of song with words and, finally, of opera—whose text, for that very reason, should never abandon this subordinate position so as to make itself the main thing and the music a mere means of expressing it, which is a great mistake and a gross perversity. For music everywhere expresses only the quintessence of life and its events, never these themselves, and so their differences do not always bear on it. It is precisely this universality, which belongs to music alone, combined with the most exact determinacy, that gives it the high value it has as a panacea for all our sufferings. So when music tries too hard to cling to the words and to mold itself to the events, it is striving to speak a language that is not its own. No one has kept so free of this fault as *Rossini*. That is why his music speaks its *own* language so clearly and purely that it has no need of words at all, and so produces its full effect even when performed by instruments alone.

In consequence of all this, we can regard the phenomenal world, or nature, and music as two different expressions of the same thing. This thing is therefore itself the sole mediator of the analogy between them, and one must know it in order to see

that analogy. Accordingly, music, regarded as an expression of the world, is a language universal in the highest degree, which even stands to the universality of concepts roughly as concepts stand to individual things. Its universality, however, is by no means the empty universality of abstraction; it is of quite another kind, and is combined with thoroughgoing, clear determinacy. In this it resembles geometrical figures and numbers, which, as the universal forms of all possible objects of experience and applicable to all of them *a priori*, are nevertheless not abstract but intuitive and thoroughly determinate. All possible strivings, excitements and manifestations of the will, all those processes within the human being that reason throws into the broad negative concept of feeling, can be expressed by the infinitely many possible melodies—but always in the universality of mere form, without the material, always only according to the in-itself, not according to the appearance: their innermost soul, as it were, without the body. This intimate relation that music has to the true essence of all things also explains why, when suitable music sounds with any scene, action, event or setting, it seems to disclose to us its most secret meaning and appears as the most accurate and clearest commentary on it. It likewise explains why anyone who gives himself up entirely to the impression of a symphony feels as if he saw all the possible events of life and the world passing before him. Yet if he reflects, he cannot point to any resemblance between that play of tones and the things that hovered before his mind. For music, as has been said, differs from all the other arts in that it is not a copy of appearance, or more correctly of the adequate objecthood of the will, but directly a copy of the will itself. So to everything physical in the world it presents the metaphysical, to all appearance the thing in itself. Accordingly, one could call the world embodied music just as well as embodied will. This, then, explains why music at once makes every painting, indeed every scene of real life and of the world, stand out with heightened significance—the more so, of course, the more closely its melody corresponds to the inner spirit of the given appearance. This is why one can

set a poem to music as song, or an intuitive presentation as pantomime, or both as opera. Such individual pictures of human life, set to the universal language of music, are never bound to it or corresponding to it with thoroughgoing necessity. They stand to it only in the relation of an arbitrary example to a universal concept: they present in the determinacy of reality what music states in the universality of mere form. For melodies are to a certain extent, like universal concepts, an abstraction from reality. Reality, that is, the world of individual things, supplies the intuitive, the particular and individual, the single case, both to the universality of concepts and to the universality of melodies. But these two universalities are in a certain respect opposed to each other. Concepts contain only the forms first abstracted from intuition, the stripped-off outer shell of things, as it were, and so are quite properly abstractions; music, on the other hand, gives the innermost kernel, prior to all form, or the heart of things. This relation could be expressed very well in the language of the Scholastics by saying: concepts are the *universalia post rem* [universals after the thing], but music gives the *universalia ante rem* [universals before the thing], and reality the *universalia in re* [universals in the thing]. The general sense of a melody set to a poem could be matched to the same degree by other examples, just as arbitrarily chosen, of the universal it expresses. That is why the same composition suits many verses, and why there is the *Vaudeville*. But that any relation at all between a composition and an intuitive presentation is possible rests, as has been said, on the fact that the two are only quite different expressions of the same inner essence of the world.[95] Now when, in a particular case, such a relation really exists—when the composer has known how to express in the universal language of music the stirrings of will that make up the core of an event—then the melody of the song, the music of the opera, is expressive. But the analogy the composer has found between the two must have come from immediate knowledge of the

95 Vaudeville: a popular satirical song set to a familiar tune, to which new words were continually fitted.

essence of the world, without his reason being aware of it; it must not be imitation mediated by concepts, with conscious intention. Otherwise the music does not express the inner essence, the will itself, but merely imitates its appearance inadequately, as all properly imitative music does: for example, Haydn's "The Seasons," and also his *Creation* in many passages where appearances of the intuitive world are directly imitated; so too all battle pieces. All this is to be utterly rejected.

The inexpressible intimacy of all music rests on the fact that it reproduces all the stirrings of our innermost being, but entirely without their reality and far from their torment. Because of this, music passes by us like a paradise that is so wholly familiar and yet eternally remote, so wholly intelligible and yet so inexplicable. The seriousness essential to music, which completely excludes the ludicrous from its own immediate domain, is likewise to be explained by the fact that its object is not representation, in regard to which alone deception and absurdity are possible. Its object is immediately the will, and the will is essentially the most serious thing of all, since everything depends on it. —How rich in content and full of meaning its language is can be seen even from the repeat signs, together with the *da capo*. In works written in words these would be unbearable, whereas in music they are very fitting and welcome: for to grasp it fully, one must hear it twice.

MUSIC AND PHILOSOPHY

A complete explanation of music in concepts would be the true philosophy.

In this whole account of music I have tried to make clear that music expresses, in a supremely universal language, the inner essence, the in-itself of the world, which we think under the concept of will after its most distinct manifestation. It does so in a single kind of material, namely mere tones, and with the greatest determinacy and truth. Further, in my view and according to my endeavor, philosophy is nothing other than a complete

and correct repetition and expression of the essence of the world in very general concepts, since only in such concepts is it possible to survey that whole essence in a way that is everywhere adequate and applicable. Anyone who has followed me and entered into my way of thinking will therefore not find it so very paradoxical when I say the following. Suppose we succeeded in giving a perfectly correct, complete and detailed explanation of music, that is, a thorough repetition in concepts of what it expresses. This would at once also be an adequate repetition and explanation of the world in concepts, or wholly equivalent to one: it would be the true philosophy. Consequently, in the sense of our higher view of music, we can parody Leibniz's dictum quoted above, which is quite correct from a lower standpoint, as follows: *Musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se philosophari animi* [Music is an unconscious exercise in metaphysics, in which the mind does not know that it is philosophizing].[96] For *scire*, to know, always means to have set something down in abstract concepts. Further, the truth of Leibniz's dictum has been confirmed many times over. Apart from its aesthetic or inner significance, and considered merely externally and purely empirically, music is nothing other than the means of grasping larger numbers and more complex numerical ratios immediately and *in concreto*, which we can otherwise know only indirectly, by grasping them in concepts. By uniting these two very different yet correct views of music, we can now form a conception of how a philosophy of number is possible, such as that of Pythagoras and also that of the Chinese in the *Y-king*. We can then interpret in this sense the saying of the Pythagoreans quoted by Sextus Empiricus (*Adversus Mathematicos*, Book VII): *tô arithmô de ta pant' epeoiken* (*numero cuncta assimilantur*) [all things are like number]. And if we finally bring this view to bear on our interpretation of harmony and melody above, we shall find that a mere moral philosophy without an explanation of nature, such as Socrates wanted to introduce, is

96 Leibniz's dictum (quoted at the start of § 52) comes from a letter to Christian Goldbach of 1712.

entirely analogous to a melody without harmony, which is what Rousseau exclusively wanted. By contrast, a mere physics and metaphysics without ethics will correspond to a mere harmony without melody.—To these incidental reflections I may be permitted to add a few remarks on the analogy between music and the world as it appears.[97] We found in the previous book that the highest grade of the will's objectification, the human being, could not appear alone and in isolation. It presupposed the grades below it, and these in turn presupposed the lower ones. In just the same way music, which objectifies the will immediately, just as the world does, is complete only in full harmony. To make its full impression, the high, leading voice of the melody needs the accompaniment of all the other voices, down to the deepest bass, which is to be regarded as the origin of them all. The melody itself enters into the harmony as an integral part, just as the harmony enters into the melody. Music says what it aims to say only in this way, in the full-voiced whole. In the same way the one, timeless will finds its complete objectification only in the complete union of all the grades that reveal its essence in countless degrees of increasing distinctness.—The following analogy is also very remarkable. We saw in the previous book that all the will's appearances are adapted to one another with respect to species, which gives rise to the teleological view. Yet despite this, an irreconcilable conflict remains between those appearances as individuals. It is visible at every one of their grades and makes the world a constant battleground of all those appearances of one and the same will, whose inner contradiction with itself thereby becomes visible. Even this has its counterpart in music. A perfectly pure harmonic system of tones is impossible, not only physically but even arithmetically. The very numbers by which the tones can be expressed contain irresolvable irrationalities. No scale can even be calculated in which every fifth would stand to the keynote as 2 to 3, every major third as 4 to 5, every minor third as 5 to 6, and so on. For if

97 Rousseau argued that melody, not harmony, is the soul of music, notably in his *Letter on French Music* (1753) and his dispute with Rameau.

the tones are correct in relation to the keynote, they are no longer correct in relation to one another, since, for example, the fifth would have to be the minor third of the third, and so on. The tones of the scale are like actors who must play now this role, now that one. Hence a perfectly correct music cannot even be conceived, let alone performed, and for this reason every possible music departs from perfect purity. It can only conceal the dissonances essential to it by distributing them among all the tones, that is, by temperament. On this see Chladni's *Acoustics*, § 30, and his *Brief Survey of the Theory of Sound and Tone*, p. 12.[98][99]

I would have much more to add about the way music is perceived: namely solely in and through time, with the complete exclusion of space, and also without the influence of knowledge of causality, that is, of the understanding. For tones produce their aesthetic impression simply as effects, without our going back to their cause, as we do in intuition.—But I will not prolong these reflections further, since in this third book I may already have been too long-winded for some readers, or have gone too far into detail.

ART, THE FLOWER OF LIFE

Art consoles only for moments; the artist does not reach the denial of the will.

My purpose, however, made it necessary. It will be the less disapproved of if we call to mind the importance and high value of art, which is seldom sufficiently recognized. On our view, the whole visible world is only the objectification, the mirror, of the will, accompanying it to its self-knowledge and indeed, as we shall soon see, to the possibility of its redemption. At the same time, the world as representation, when viewed on its own—

98 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 39 of the second volume (the Supplements).

99 Ernst Florens Friedrich Chladni (1756–1827), German physicist regarded as a founder of the science of acoustics.

when, torn free from willing, we let it alone occupy consciousness—is the most gladdening and the only innocent side of life. If we consider both of these points, we must regard art as the higher intensification, the more perfect development of all this. For art achieves essentially the very same thing as the visible world itself, only more concentrated and more complete, with intention and deliberation. It may therefore be called, in the full sense of the word, the flower of life. If the whole world as representation is only the visibility of the will, then art is the clarification of this visibility. It is the *camera obscura* that shows objects more purely and lets us survey and take them in better: the play within the play, the stage upon the stage in *Hamlet*.

Consider the enjoyment of everything beautiful, the consolation that art affords, and the enthusiasm of the artist that makes him forget the troubles of life. This enthusiasm is the one advantage the genius has over others. It alone compensates him for a suffering that grows in the same measure as the clarity of his consciousness, and for his barren loneliness among a race of beings unlike himself. All this rests on the fact that, as will become clear to us later, the in-itself of life, the will, existence itself, is a constant suffering, partly pitiful, partly terrible. Yet the same thing, as representation alone, purely intuited or repeated by art, free from torment, presents a significant spectacle. This purely knowable side of the world, and its repetition in any art, is the artist's element. He is captivated by contemplating the spectacle of the will's objectification. He lingers over it and never tires of contemplating it and repeating it in his portrayals. Meanwhile he himself bears the costs of staging that spectacle: that is, he is himself the will that objectifies itself in this way and remains in constant suffering. That pure, true and deep knowledge of the essence of the world now becomes for him an end in itself, and there he stops. Therefore this knowledge does not become for him a quieter of the will, as we shall see in the next book with the saint who has attained resignation. It does not redeem him from life forever, but only for moments. So it is not yet the way out of life for him, but only a temporary

consolation within it—until his strength, heightened by it, at last grows tired of play and seizes on what is serious. Raphael's *Saint Cecilia* may be regarded as a symbol of this transition. To what is serious, then, we too shall now turn in the next book.[100]

100 Raphael's *Saint Cecilia* (c. 1514–16, Bologna) shows the saint letting her instruments fall as she listens to a heavenly choir.

Book Four

Viertes Buch. Der Welt als Wille zweite Betrachtung: Bei erreichter Selbsterkenntniß Bejahung und Verneinung des Willens zum Leben
The World as Will, second aspect: with self-knowledge attained, affirmation and denial of the will to live.

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4 *Tempore quo cognitio simul advenit, amor e medio supersurrexit.* [At the very moment that knowledge came, desire rose up and withdrew.]
Oupnek'hat, edited by Anquetil-Duperron, vol. II, p. 216.

§ 53. PHILOSOPHY DOES NOT PREACH

Ethics too can only interpret human action, not prescribe it; there is no unconditional ought.

4.53 The last part of our inquiry announces itself as the most serious, since it concerns human action. This subject concerns everyone directly and can be foreign or indifferent to no one. Indeed, it is so much in keeping with human nature to relate everything else to it that in any coherent investigation people will always regard the part that bears on conduct as the result of its entire content, at least insofar as that content interests them. They will therefore give serious attention to this part, if to no other.—In this respect, in the usual way of speaking, one would call the part of our inquiry that now follows practical philosophy, as opposed to the theoretical philosophy dealt with so far. In my opinion, however, all philosophy is always theoretical.

Whatever the immediate subject of inquiry, it is essential to philosophy to adopt a purely contemplative attitude and to investigate, not to prescribe. To become practical, to guide conduct, to transform character—these are old pretensions that, with matured insight, it ought finally to give up. For here the worth or worthlessness of an existence is at stake, salvation or damnation. What decides the matter is not philosophy's dead concepts, but a person's own innermost being: the daemon that guides him, which has not chosen him but which he himself has chosen—as Plato says—his intelligible character, as Kant puts it.[1] Virtue can no more be taught than genius can. Indeed, the concept is as unfruitful for virtue, and as usable only as a tool, as it is for art. We would therefore be just as foolish to expect our moral systems and ethics to produce virtuous, noble and holy people as to expect our aesthetics to produce poets, sculptors and musicians.

Philosophy can never do more than interpret and explain what is there. It brings the essence of the world, which expresses itself *in concreto*—that is, as feeling—intelligibly to everyone, to clear, abstract knowledge of reason, and it does so in every possible respect and from every point of view. In the three preceding books we sought to do this from other points of view, with the generality peculiar to philosophy. In the present book, human action will be considered in the same way. This side of the world might well be found the most important of all, not only by subjective judgment, as I remarked a moment ago, but by objective judgment too. In doing so I shall remain wholly faithful to our previous way of considering things and rely on what has been set forth so far as a presupposition. Indeed, I shall really only develop the one thought that is the content of this whole work. I have developed it so far in all other subjects, and I shall now do the same with human action. In this way I

1 In the myth of Er (Plato, *Republic* X, 617e) souls choose their own daemon before rebirth. For Kant, the "intelligible character" is the self's timeless character as thing in itself, as opposed to its empirical character in time (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A539/B567).

shall do the last thing in my power to communicate that thought as completely as possible.

The standpoint given and the method announced already make it plain that no precepts, no doctrine of duties, are to be expected in this ethical book. Still less will a universal moral principle be put forward, a universal recipe, as it were, for producing all the virtues. Nor shall we speak of an "*unconditional ought*", since, as explained in the Appendix, such a thing contains a contradiction. Nor shall we speak of a "law for freedom", which is in the same case. We shall not speak of "ought" at all: that is how one speaks to children and to peoples in their infancy, not to those who have appropriated the whole culture of an age that has come of age. Surely it is a palpable contradiction to call the will free and yet prescribe laws for it according to which it ought to will. "Ought to will"—wooden iron! On our whole view, however, the will is not only free but even almighty. From it comes not only its action but also its world, and as the will is, so its action appears, so its world appears. Both are its self-knowledge and nothing else. It determines itself, and in doing so it determines both, for outside it there is nothing, and they are itself. Only thus is it truly autonomous; on any other view it is heteronomous.[2] Our philosophical endeavor can aim only at interpreting and explaining human action in its innermost essence and content, together with the very various, indeed opposed, maxims of which it is the living expression. We shall do this in connection with our reflections so far, and exactly as we have so far sought to interpret the other appearances of the world and bring their innermost essence to clear, abstract knowledge. In doing so our philosophy will maintain the same *immanence* as throughout the preceding inquiry. Contrary to Kant's great teaching, it will not try to use the forms of appearance, whose general expression is the principle of sufficient reason, as a vaulting pole. It will not use them to leap over appearance itself, which alone gives those forms their meaning, and to land in the boundless realm of empty fictions. Instead,

2 "Wooden iron" (*hölzernes Eisen*) is a German idiom for a contradiction in terms.

this actual world of the knowable, in which we are and which is in us, remains both the material and the limit of our inquiry. It is so rich in content that even the deepest research of which the human mind might be capable could not exhaust it. The actual, knowable world, then, will never let our ethical reflections lack material and reality, any more than it did the preceding ones. So nothing will be less necessary for us than to take refuge in negative concepts empty of content, and then perhaps even to persuade ourselves that we are saying something when we speak, with raised eyebrows, of "the Absolute", "the Infinite", "the Supersensible" and whatever other mere negations of this kind there are (*ouden esti, ê to tês sterêseôs onoma, meta amydras epinoias.—nihil est, nisi negationis nomen, cum obscura notione* [it is nothing but the name of a negation, together with an obscure notion]. *Julian, Oration* 5). Instead of all these one could more briefly say Cloudcuckooland (*nephelokokkygia*). We shall not need to serve up covered, empty dishes of this kind.[3] —Finally, here as before, we shall not tell stories and pass them off as philosophy. For we hold that anyone who imagines he can grasp the essence of the world *historically* in any way, however finely disguised, is still worlds away from a philosophical knowledge of it. And this is the case as soon as his view of the essence of the world in itself contains any *becoming*, or having-become, or going-to-become. It is the case as soon as any earlier or later has the slightest significance, so that a starting point and an endpoint of the world, together with the path between them, are sought and found, whether openly or covertly—and the philosophizing individual perhaps even recognizes his own place on this path. Such *historical philosophizing* in most cases yields a cosmogony, which admits of many varieties, or else a system of emanation, a doctrine of a fall. Or finally, driven onto the last path in despair at fruitless attempts along the others, it produces, conversely, a doctrine of constant becoming, sprouting, arising, coming forth into the light out of darkness, out of the

3 Julian: the Roman emperor Julian (AD 331–363), called "the Apostate". Cloudcuckooland is the city of the birds in Aristophanes' comedy *Birds* (414 BC).

dark ground, the primal ground, the unground, and whatever other drivel of this sort there is. All this, incidentally, is most quickly disposed of by remarking that a whole eternity, that is, an infinite time, has already elapsed up to the present moment. Everything that can or is to come into being must therefore already have come into being.[4] For all such historical philosophy, however grand its airs, takes *time* to be a determination of things in themselves, as if Kant had never existed. It therefore stops at what Kant calls appearance, as opposed to the thing in itself; at what Plato calls that which becomes and never is, as opposed to that which is and never becomes; or finally at what the Indians call the web of Maya. It is precisely that knowledge given over to the principle of sufficient reason, with which one never reaches the inner essence of things. One only pursues appearances endlessly, moving without end or goal like a squirrel in its wheel, until at last, perhaps, one grows tired and stops at some arbitrary point, above or below, and now tries to force others to respect it as well.[5] The genuinely philosophical way of considering the world, the one that teaches us to know its inner essence and so leads us beyond appearance, does not ask about the whence and whither and why of the world. It always and everywhere asks only about its *what*. That is, it considers things not according to any relation, not as coming into being and passing away—in short, not according to any of the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason. On the contrary, its object is precisely what remains once this whole way of considering things, which follows that principle, has been set aside: the essence of the world that appears in all relations but is not itself subject to them and always remains the same—the world's Ideas. It is from such knowledge that philosophy proceeds, as art does. Indeed, as we shall find in this book, the disposition of mind

4 "Ground", "primal ground" and "unground" (*Ungrund*) are terms from Schelling's treatise on human freedom (1809), taken over from the mystic Jakob Böhme.
5 Plato draws the contrast between what always becomes and never is and what always is and never becomes in the *Timaeus* (27d–28a).

that alone leads to true holiness and to redemption from the world also proceeds from it.

§ 54. LIFE IS CERTAIN TO THE WILL TO LIVE

Individuals arise and perish, but the will and the knowing subject are untouched by birth and death.

4.54 The first three books will, I hope, have produced the clear and certain knowledge that in the world as representation a mirror has arisen for the will, in which it knows itself with increasing degrees of distinctness and completeness. The highest of these degrees is the human being. Yet his essence receives its complete expression only through the connected series of his actions. The self-conscious connection of these actions is made possible by reason, which always lets him survey the whole *in abstracto*.

Considered purely in itself, the will is without knowledge and only a blind, irresistible urge, as we still see it appearing in inorganic and vegetable nature and their laws, and also in the vegetative part of our own life. Through the world of representation that has been added to it, developed in its service, it receives knowledge of its willing and of what it is that it wills: namely, nothing other than this world, life, exactly as it stands there. That is why we called the world as it appears the will's mirror, its objecthood. And what the will wills is always life, precisely because life is nothing but the presentation of that willing for representation. So it is all the same, and a mere pleonasm, if instead of simply saying "the will" we say "the will to live".

The will is the thing in itself, the inner content, the essence of the world; life, the visible world, appearance, is only the mirror of the will. So this appearance will accompany the will as inseparably as a body is accompanied by its shadow; and where there is will, there will also be life, a world. To the will to live, then, life is certain, and as long as we are filled with the will to live we need not fear for our existence, not even at the sight of death. We do indeed see the individual come into being and pass away.

But the individual is only appearance, and exists only for knowledge caught up in the principle of sufficient reason, the *principium individuationis*. For this kind of knowledge, admittedly, the individual receives its life as a gift, emerges from nothing, then suffers the loss of that gift through death, and returns to nothing. But we mean precisely to consider life philosophically, that is, in terms of its Ideas. Then we shall find that neither the will, the thing in itself in all appearances, nor the subject of knowing, the spectator of all appearances, is in any way touched by birth and death. Birth and death belong precisely to the appearance of the will, and so to life. It is essential to life to present itself in individuals that come into being and pass away. They are fleeting appearances, arising in the form of time, of that which in itself knows no time but must present itself in just this way in order to objectify its true essence. Birth and death belong to life in the same way and hold each other in balance as mutual conditions of one another—or, if one likes the expression, as poles of the whole phenomenon of life. The wisest of all mythologies, the Indian, expresses this as follows. Brahma, the most sinful and lowest god of the Trimurti, symbolizes procreation and coming into being, and Vishnu preservation. The god who symbolizes destruction, death, is Shiva—and precisely to Shiva, I say, this mythology gives as his attribute, along with the necklace of skulls, the lingam, that symbol of procreation, which thus appears here as the counterbalance to death. This indicates that procreation and death are essential correlates that neutralize and cancel each other.[6] —It was exactly the same attitude that moved the Greeks and Romans to decorate their costly sarcophagi just as we still see them: with feasts, dances, weddings, hunts, animal fights and bacchanals. These are portrayals of the most violent urge of life, which the ancients present to us not only in such festivities but even in voluptuous groups, going as far as the coupling of satyrs and goats. The purpose was evidently to point, with the greatest emphasis, away from the death

6 The Trimurti is the Hindu triad of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva. The lingam is the phallic emblem under which Shiva is worshipped.

of the mourned individual to the immortal life of nature. In this way they indicated, though without abstract knowledge, that the whole of nature is the appearance and also the fulfillment of the will to live. The form of this appearance is time, space and causality, and by means of these, individuation. Individuation entails that the individual must come into being and pass away. But this affects the will to live—of whose appearance the individual is, as it were, only a single example or specimen—as little as the whole of nature is harmed by the death of an individual. For it is not the individual but the species alone that nature cares about. Nature insists with all seriousness on the preservation of the species, providing for it so lavishly through the enormous surplus of seeds and the great power of the reproductive urge. The individual, on the other hand, has no value for nature and can have none, since infinite time, infinite space and, within them, an infinite number of possible individuals are its realm. So nature is always ready to let the individual fall. The individual is therefore exposed to destruction in a thousand ways, through the most trivial accidents. More than that, it is destined for destruction from the outset, and nature itself leads it there from the moment it has served the preservation of the species. In this way nature itself quite naively expresses the great truth that only the Ideas, not individuals, have genuine reality, that is, are the complete objecthood of the will. Now the human being is nature itself, and indeed nature at the highest degree of its self-consciousness; but nature is only the objectified will to live. So a person who has grasped this point of view and holds to it may certainly, and rightly, console himself for his own death and that of his friends by looking back to the immortal life of nature, which he himself is. This, then, is how Shiva with the lingam is to be understood, and so too those ancient sarcophagi, which with their images of the most glowing life call out to the grieving onlooker: *Natura non contristatur* [Nature does not grieve].

That procreation and death are to be regarded as belonging to life and essential to this appearance of the will is also evident

from the fact that both present themselves to us as merely higher-powered expressions of what all the rest of life consists of. For life is through and through nothing other than a constant change of matter while the form firmly persists—and this is just the transience of individuals alongside the imperishability of the species. Constant nourishment and reproduction differ from procreation only in degree, and constant excretion differs from death only in degree. The former is seen most simply and clearly in the plant. The plant is through and through only the constant repetition of the same shoot, its simplest fiber, which groups itself into leaf and branch. It is a systematic aggregate of similar plants supporting one another, whose constant reproduction is its sole drive. To satisfy this drive more completely, it rises by the ladder of metamorphosis at last to blossom and fruit, that compendium of its existence and striving. In the fruit it attains by a shorter path what is its sole aim, and at a single stroke, a thousandfold, it accomplishes what until then it had achieved piece by piece: the repetition of itself. Its growth up to the fruit is related to the fruit as handwriting is to printing. With the animal it is evidently just the same.[7] The process of nourishment is a constant procreation, and the process of procreation is nourishment raised to a higher power. The sensual pleasure of procreation is the comfortable feeling of being alive, raised to a higher power. On the other hand, excretion, the constant exhaling and casting off of matter, is the same as what death, the opposite of procreation, is at a higher power. Now in excretion we are always content to preserve the form without mourning the matter cast off. We should behave in the same way when in death the same thing happens at a higher power and as a whole that happens daily and hourly, piece by piece, in excretion. As we are indifferent to the former, so we should not shrink back from the latter. From this standpoint, therefore, it seems just as perverse to demand the continuance of one's individuality, which is replaced by other individuals, as to demand the per-

7 "Metamorphosis" alludes to Goethe's *Metamorphosis of Plants* (1790), which traces all the organs of the plant back to the leaf.

manence of the matter of one's body, which is constantly replaced by new matter. It seems just as foolish to embalm corpses as it would be to preserve one's excrement carefully. As for the individual consciousness bound to the individual body, it is completely interrupted every day by sleep. Deep sleep often passes quite continuously into death, for example in freezing to death. While it lasts, it does not differ from death at all; it differs only with regard to the future, namely with respect to waking. Death is a sleep in which individuality is forgotten: everything else wakes again, or rather has stayed awake.[8]

THE PRESENT AS THE FORM OF LIFE

Only the present is real; past and future exist only in concepts, and the present never ends.

Above all we must clearly recognize that the form of the appearance of the will, and so the form of life or of reality, is really only the *present*, not the future or the past. These exist only in concepts, only in the connected whole of knowledge insofar as it follows the principle of sufficient reason. No one has ever lived in the past, and no one will ever live in the future. The *present* alone is the form of all life, but it is also life's sure possession, which can never be torn from it. The present is always there, together with its content: both stand firm without wavering, like the rainbow on the waterfall. For to the will life is sure and certain, and to life the present. —Of course, when we think back to

8 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. The following consideration may also help anyone who does not find it too subtle to see clearly that the individual is only appearance, not the thing in itself. Every individual is, on the one hand, the subject of knowing, that is, the complementary condition of the possibility of the whole objective world. On the other hand, it is a single appearance of the will, of the same will that objectifies itself in every thing. But this duality of our being does not rest on a unity existing for itself. Otherwise we would be able to be conscious of ourselves *in ourselves and independently of the objects of knowing and willing*. But this we absolutely cannot do. As soon as we try—going into ourselves and seeking, by turning our knowing inward, to reflect fully on ourselves for once—we lose ourselves in a bottomless void. We find ourselves like the hollow glass sphere from whose emptiness a voice speaks whose cause is not to be found in it. And in trying to grasp ourselves, we catch, with a shudder, nothing but an insubstantial ghost.

the millennia that have passed and the millions of people who lived in them, we ask: What were they? What has become of them?—But against this we need only call to mind the past of our own life, vividly renew its scenes in imagination, and then ask again: What was all this? What has become of it?—As with our own life, so with the life of those millions. Or are we to suppose that the past acquires a new existence by being sealed by death? Our own past, even the most recent, even yesterday, is now only an empty dream of the imagination, and the same is true of the past of all those millions. What was? What is? —The will, whose mirror life is, and the will-free knowing that beholds the will clearly in that mirror. Whoever has not yet recognized this, or does not want to, must add another question to the earlier one about the fate of past generations. Why is it precisely he, the questioner, who is so fortunate as to possess this precious, fleeting, uniquely real present, while those hundreds of human generations, and even the heroes and sages of those ages, have sunk into the night of the past and thereby become nothing, whereas he, his insignificant self, actually exists?—Or, more briefly, if strangely: why should this now, his now, be precisely now, and not also have *been* long ago? —In asking this strange question he regards his existence and his time as independent of each other, and his existence as thrown into his time. He really assumes two nows, one belonging to the object, the other to the subject, and marvels at the happy chance of their coinciding. In truth, however (as is shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason), the present consists only in the point of contact between the object, whose form is time, and the subject, which has no form of the principle of sufficient reason as its form. Now everything that is object is the will insofar as it has become representation, and the subject is the necessary correlate of every object. But real objects exist only in the present; past and future contain mere concepts and phantasms. Hence the present is the essential form of the will's appearance and inseparable from it. The present alone is what is always there and stands immovably firm. Grasped empirically, it is the most fleeting thing of all. But

to the metaphysical eye, which sees beyond the forms of empirical intuition, it presents itself as the only thing that endures, the *Nunc stans* [standing now] of the Schoolmen. The source and bearer of its content is the will to live, or the thing in itself—which is what we are.[9] What constantly comes into being and passes away, because it either has already been or is yet to come, belongs to appearance as such, by virtue of its forms, which make coming into being and passing away possible. Accordingly, think: *Quid fuit?—Quod est.—Quid erit?—Quod fuit* [What was?—What is.—What will be?—What was]. Take it in the strict sense of the words, understanding not *simile* [similar] but *idem* [the same]. For to the will life is certain, and to life the present. Hence everyone can also say: "I am once and for all master of the present, and through all eternity it will accompany me like my shadow. So I do not wonder where it has come from, or how it happens that it is precisely now."—We can compare time to an endlessly turning circle. The half that is always sinking would be the past, the half that is always rising the future; but at the top, the indivisible point that touches the tangent would be the extensionless present. Just as the tangent does not roll on with the circle, neither does the present. It is the point of contact between the object, whose form is time, and the subject, which has no form because it does not belong to the knowable but is the condition of all that is knowable. Or: time is like an irresistible stream, and the present like a rock on which the stream breaks but which it does not carry away with it. The will, as thing in itself, is no more subject to the principle of sufficient reason than the subject of knowledge is, which in a certain respect is ultimately the will itself or its expression. And just as life, its own appearance, is certain to the will, so is the present, the only form of real life. We therefore need not inquire into the past before life or the future after death. Rather, we must recognize the *present* as the only form in which the will appears to

9 *Nunc stans*: the scholastic definition of eternity as a "standing now", a present that does not pass, rather than endless time.

itself.[10] The present will not escape the will—but truly, neither will the will escape it. Whoever, therefore, is satisfied with life as it is, whoever affirms it in every way, can confidently regard it as endless and banish the fear of death as an illusion. This illusion instills in him the absurd fear that he could ever be deprived of the present, and deceives him with the picture of a time with no present in it. With respect to time, it is what another illusion is with respect to space: the one by which everyone, in imagination, regards the spot on the globe he happens to occupy as "up" and everything else as "down". In the same way, everyone ties the present to his individuality and supposes that with it all present is extinguished, and that past and future will then be without a present. But just as on the globe it is "up" everywhere, so too the form of all life is the *present*. To fear death because it snatches the present from us is no wiser than to fear that one might slide down off the round globe, on top of which one is now, happily, standing. The form of the present is essential to the objectification of the will. As an extensionless point it cuts through time, which is infinite in both directions, and stands immovably firm, like an everlasting noon without a cooling evening—just as the real sun burns without ceasing, and only seems to sink into the lap of night. Hence when a person fears death as his annihilation, it is just as if one thought that the sun could lament in the evening: "Woe is

10 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Scholastici docuerunt, quod aeternitas non sit temporis sine fine aut principio successio, sed* Nunc stans; *i.e. idem nobis* Nunc *esse, quod erat* Nunc *Adamo; i.e. inter* nunc *et* tunc *nullam esse differentiam.* [The Schoolmen taught that eternity is not a succession of time without end or beginning, but a standing now; that is, that the now is the same for us as it was for Adam; that is, that between now and then there is no difference.] Hobbes, *Leviathan, ch. 46.*

me! I am going down into eternal night."—[11] Conversely, however, consider someone weighed down by the burdens of life, who would indeed like to live and affirms life, but abhors its torments, and in particular can no longer bear the hard lot that has fallen precisely to him. Such a person cannot hope for deliverance through death and cannot save himself by suicide. The dark, cool Orcus lures him as a haven of rest, but only with a false appearance. The earth rolls from day into night; the individual dies; but the sun itself burns without ceasing in an eternal noon.[12] To the will to live, life is certain. The form of life is an endless present, no matter how individuals, the appearances of the Idea, come into being and pass away in time, like fleeting dreams.—Suicide, then, already appears to us here as a futile and therefore foolish act. When we have advanced further in our inquiry, it will present itself to us in a still less favorable light.

THE FEAR OF DEATH

Animals and people live on as if immortal; knowledge of the will can overcome the terror of death.

Dogmas change and our knowledge is deceptive; but nature does not err: its course is sure, and it does not conceal it. Each

11 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. In Eckermann's "Conversations with *Goethe*" (second edition, vol. 1, p. 154), Goethe says: "Our spirit is a being of an altogether indestructible nature: it is something that goes on working from eternity to eternity. It is like the sun, which only seems to set to our earthly eyes, but which in fact never sets, and shines on unceasingly."—*Goethe* got the simile from me, not I from him. No doubt he uses it in this conversation of 1824 as the result of a perhaps unconscious recollection of the passage above. For it appears, in the same words as here, in the first edition, p. 401, and recurs there on p. 528, as it does here at the end of § 65. That first edition had been sent to him in December 1818. In March 1819, when I was in Naples, he had my sister send me a letter reporting his approval, and he enclosed a slip of paper on which he had noted the numbers of some pages that had particularly pleased him. So he had read my book.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Johann Peter Eckermann (1792–1854), Goethe's assistant in his last years, published his *Conversations with Goethe* in 1836–48.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Schopenhauer's sister Adele (1797–1849) moved in Goethe's circle in Weimar.

12 Orcus: the Roman god of the underworld, and the underworld itself.

thing is wholly in nature, and nature is wholly in each thing. In every animal nature has its center: the animal found its way into existence with certainty, and it will find its way out again with certainty. Meanwhile it lives without fear of annihilation and without care, borne up by the consciousness that it is nature itself and, like nature, imperishable. Man alone carries around with him, in abstract concepts, the certainty of his death. Yet, very strangely, this certainty can frighten him only at isolated moments, when some occasion brings it vividly before his imagination. Against the mighty voice of nature reflection can do little. In man too, as in the animal that does not think, a lasting state of security prevails. It springs from the innermost consciousness that he is nature, the world itself. Because of it no one is noticeably disturbed by the thought of death, though death is certain and never far off; instead everyone lives on as though he must live forever. This goes so far that one could say that no one has a truly living conviction of the certainty of his death, since otherwise there could not be so great a difference between his mood and that of a condemned criminal. Rather, everyone acknowledges that certainty *in abstracto* [in the abstract] and in theory. But he sets it aside, like other theoretical truths that cannot be applied in practice, without ever taking it into his living consciousness. Whoever pays close attention to this peculiarity of the human frame of mind will see that the psychological explanations of it are by no means sufficient: explanations from habit, and from resigning oneself to the inevitable. Its ground is rather the deeper one I have indicated. The same ground also explains why at all times and among all peoples we find dogmas of some kind of continued existence of the individual after death, and why they are held in esteem. Yet the proofs for such continued existence must always have been highly inadequate, while those for the contrary are strong and numerous. Indeed, the contrary really needs no proof at all. Sound understanding recognizes it as a fact, and it is confirmed as a fact by our confidence that nature no more lies than it errs. Nature lays open what it does and what it is, and even states

them naively; only we ourselves obscure them with delusion, in order to read into them whatever happens to suit our limited view.

We have now brought something to clear consciousness. The individual appearance of the will begins in time and ends in time, but the will itself, as thing in itself, is not affected by this, nor is the correlate of every object, the knowing but never known subject; and life is always certain to the will to live. This is not to be counted among those doctrines of continued existence. For neither persistence nor perishing belongs to the will considered as thing in itself, nor to the pure subject of knowing, the eternal eye of the world. Persistence and perishing are determinations valid in time alone, whereas the will and the subject lie outside time. The egoism of the individual (this particular appearance of the will, illuminated by the subject of knowing) wishes to maintain itself through an endless time. Hence it can draw as little nourishment and consolation for this wish from the view we have set out as it could from the knowledge that after its death the rest of the external world will go on existing in time. That knowledge is merely the expression of this very same view, but considered objectively and therefore temporally. For it is true that each of us is perishable only as appearance, while as thing in itself he is timeless and hence also endless. But it is also only as appearance that he is different from the other things of the world. As thing in itself he is the will that appears in everything, and death abolishes the illusion that separates his consciousness from that of the rest: this is continued existence. He is untouched by death only as thing in itself, and for the appearance this coincides with the continued existence of the rest of the external world.[13] This is also why we have an inward and merely felt consciousness of what we have just

13 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. In the Veda this is expressed by saying that when a man dies, his power of sight becomes one with the sun, his smell with the earth, his taste with water, his hearing with the air, his speech with fire, and so on (*Oupnek'hat*, vol. 1, pp. 249 ff.). It is also expressed in a special ceremony in which the dying man hands over his senses and all his faculties, one by one, to his son, in whom they are now to live on. (Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 82 ff.)

raised to clear knowledge. As I said, this consciousness prevents the thought of death from poisoning life, even for a rational being. It is the basis of that courage for living which sustains every living thing and lets it live on cheerfully as though there were no death—as long, that is, as it has life in view and is directed toward life. But death may approach the individual in a particular case and in reality, or even only in imagination, so that the individual must now look death in the face. Then that consciousness does not prevent the individual from being seized by the fear of death and trying in every way to escape. For as long as its knowledge was directed at life as such, it had to recognize imperishability in life as well. In the same way, when death comes before its eyes, it must recognize death for what it is: the temporal end of the particular temporal appearance. What we fear in death is by no means the pain. For one thing, pain clearly lies on this side of death. For another, we often flee from pain into death, just as, conversely, we sometimes take on the most dreadful pain merely to escape death for a while longer, though death would be quick and easy. So we distinguish pain and death as two entirely different evils. What we fear in death is in fact the destruction of the individual, which death openly declares itself to be. And since the individual is the will to live itself in a single objectification, its whole being resists death.—Where feeling leaves us helpless in this way, reason can nevertheless step in and largely overcome feeling's disagreeable impressions. Reason does this by placing us at a higher standpoint, where we now have the whole in view instead of the particular. Suppose, then, that a philosophical knowledge of the essence of the world had come as far as the point at which we now stand in our inquiry, but went no further. Even from this standpoint it could already overcome the terrors of death, to the extent that reflection in the given individual had power over immediate feeling. Suppose a man had firmly incorporated into his way of thinking the truths set out so far. Suppose that he had not also come, through his own experience or through a further insight, to recognize constant suffering as essential to all life.

Suppose instead that he found satisfaction in life and felt perfectly at ease in it, and that on calm reflection he wished his course of life, as he had experienced it so far, to last endlessly or to return again and again. And suppose his courage for living were so great that, in return for life's pleasures, he would willingly and gladly take into the bargain all the hardship and pain to which life is subject. Such a man would stand "with firm, sturdy bones on the well-founded, enduring earth," and would have nothing to fear:[14] armed with the knowledge we attribute to him, he would look with indifference on death as it hurries toward him on the wings of time. He would regard death as a false show, a powerless specter to frighten the weak, which has no power over anyone who knows that he himself is that will whose objectification or image the whole world is. To such a man life therefore remains certain at all times, and so does the present, the real and only form in which the will appears. No infinite past or future in which he would not exist can frighten him, since he regards these as the empty illusion and web of Maya. He would therefore have as little to fear from death as the sun from the night. —In the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna raises his novice pupil Arjuna to this standpoint. At the sight of the armies ready for battle, Arjuna is seized with sorrow (somewhat as Xerxes was), loses heart, and wants to give up the fight in order to prevent the destruction of so many thousands. Krishna places him at that standpoint, and the death of those thousands can no longer hold him back: he gives the signal for battle.—Goethe's Prometheus also expresses this standpoint, especially when he says:[15]

14 The quotation is from Goethe's poem "Grenzen der Menschheit" ("Limits of Humanity").

15 In the *Bhagavad Gita*, part of the *Mahabharata*, the god Krishna instructs the warrior Arjuna. Xerxes wept on reviewing his vast army because none of those men would be alive in a hundred years (Herodotus 7.45–46).

"Here I sit, forming men
In my own image,
A race that shall be like me,
To suffer, to weep,
To enjoy and to be glad,
And to pay no heed to you,
As I do!"[16]

The philosophy of Bruno and that of Spinoza could also bring someone to this standpoint, provided their faults and imperfections did not disturb or weaken his conviction. Bruno's philosophy has no ethics in the proper sense. The ethics in Spinoza's philosophy does not proceed at all from the essence of his doctrine; though laudable and fine in itself, it is attached to that doctrine only by weak and obvious sophisms.—Finally, many people would probably stand at the standpoint described if their knowledge kept pace with their willing, that is, if they were able, free of every delusion, to become clear and distinct to themselves. For this is, as far as knowledge is concerned, the standpoint of complete *affirmation of the will to live.*[17]

AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL DEFINED

The will either goes on willing life with knowledge, or that knowledge becomes a quieter and it abolishes itself.

"The will affirms itself" means this: in its objecthood, that is, in the world and in life, the will's own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, and this knowledge in no way checks its willing. Rather, this very life, known in this way, is also willed by the will as such. Before, it was willed without knowledge, as blind urge; now it is willed with knowledge, consciously and deliberately.—The opposite of this, the *denial of the will to live*, shows itself when willing comes to an

16 The closing lines of Goethe's poem "Prometheus" (1774), in which the Titan defies Zeus.

17 Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), Italian philosopher of an infinite universe pervaded by a single principle; he was burned as a heretic in Rome.

end as a result of that knowledge. Then the individual appearances that are known no longer act as *motives* of willing. Instead the whole knowledge of the essence of the world, which has grown out of the apprehension of the *Ideas* and mirrors the will, becomes a *quieter* of the will, and so the will freely abolishes itself. These concepts are entirely unfamiliar and hardly intelligible in this general formulation. I hope they will become clear through the account, soon to follow, of the phenomena in which affirmation, in its various degrees, expresses itself on the one hand, and denial on the other; here the phenomena are ways of acting. For both do proceed from *knowledge*, but not from an abstract knowledge that expresses itself in words. They proceed from a living knowledge, which is expressed in deed and conduct alone and remains independent of the dogmas that occupy reason alongside it as abstract knowledge. My only aim can be to present both and bring them to reason's clear knowledge. It cannot be to prescribe or recommend one or the other, which would be as foolish as it would be pointless: the will in itself is absolutely free, determining itself entirely by itself alone, and there is no law for it.—First, however, before we proceed to that exposition, we must discuss this *freedom* and its relation to necessity, and define it more precisely. We must then also make some general observations about life, whose affirmation and denial is our problem, observations relating to the will and its objects. By all this we shall make it easier to reach the knowledge we are aiming at: knowledge of the ethical significance of ways of acting, in their innermost essence.

As I have said, this whole work is only the unfolding of a single thought. It follows that all its parts are most intimately connected with one another. It is not merely that each part stands in necessary relation to the one immediately preceding it, and so presupposes that the reader remembers only that one, as is the case with all philosophies that consist merely of a chain of inferences. Rather, each part of the whole work is related to every other and presupposes it. The reader is therefore required to remember not only what immediately preceded but also

everything earlier, so that he can connect it with whatever is before him at the moment, however much else may stand in between. Plato, too, made this demand of his reader through the many winding labyrinths of his dialogues, which take up the main thought again only after long episodes, and are all the clearer for doing so. In our case the demand is necessary. Breaking up our one and only thought into many considerations is indeed the only means of communicating it, but for the thought itself it is not an essential form, only an artificial one.—To make the presentation easier to follow, four main points of view have been separated into four books, and whatever is related and homogeneous has been connected with the utmost care. Even so, the material does not in the least permit a progression in a straight line, as in history. It makes necessary a more intricate presentation, and this in turn makes necessary a repeated study of the book. Only through such study does the connection of each part with every other become clear, and only then do all the parts illuminate one another and become fully bright.[18]

§ 55. FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

The will as thing in itself is free, but every appearance, human action included, is strictly necessary.

4.55 That the will as such is *free* follows already from the fact that, on our view, it is the thing in itself, the content of all appearance. Appearance, on the other hand, we know to be subject throughout to the principle of sufficient reason in its four forms. We know that necessity is absolutely identical with following from a given ground, the two being interchangeable concepts. So everything that belongs to appearance, that is, everything that is object for the subject knowing as individual, is on the one hand ground and on the other consequent. In this latter capacity it is necessarily determined throughout, and so cannot in any respect be other than it is. The whole content of nature, all its

18 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapters 41–44 of the second volume (the Supplements).

appearances, are therefore absolutely necessary. The necessity of every part, every appearance, every event can always be demonstrated, since it must be possible to find the ground on which it depends as consequent. This admits of no exception: it follows from the unrestricted validity of the principle of sufficient reason. On the other hand, however, this same world, in all its appearances, is for us the objecthood of the will. And the will is not itself appearance, not representation or object, but thing in itself. It is therefore also not subject to the principle of sufficient reason, the form of every object, and so is not determined as consequent by a ground. It thus knows no necessity; that is, it is *free*. The concept of freedom is thus really a negative one, since its content is merely the negation of necessity, that is, the negation of the relation of consequent to ground that accords with the principle of sufficient reason.—Here, as clearly as could be, lies before us the point at which that great antithesis is unified: the union of freedom with necessity, which has often been discussed in recent times, though never, as far as I know, clearly or adequately. Every thing, as appearance, as object, is necessary throughout; the same thing is *in itself* will, and the will is completely free, for all eternity. The appearance, the object, is necessarily and unalterably determined in the concatenation of grounds and consequents, which can have no interruption. But the existence of this object as such, and the manner of its existence, that is, the Idea that reveals itself in it—or, in other words, its character—is directly appearance of the will. In accordance with the freedom of this will, then, the object might not exist at all, or might be originally and essentially something quite different. But in that case the whole chain of which it is a link, and which is itself appearance of the same will, would also be quite different. Once the object is there and present, however, it has entered the series of grounds and consequents and is always necessarily determined within it. Accordingly it can neither become something else, that is, change, nor leave the series, that is, disappear. Man, like every other part of nature, is objecthood of the will; so everything that has been said holds for him

too. Every thing in nature has its forces and qualities, which react in a determinate way to a determinate influence and make up its character. In the same way man too has his *character*, from which motives call forth his actions with necessity. In this way of acting his empirical character reveals itself, and in the empirical character, in turn, his intelligible character reveals itself: the will in itself, of which he is the determined appearance. But man is the most perfect appearance of the will. As was shown in the second book, in order to subsist it had to be illuminated by so high a degree of knowledge that this knowledge made possible even a completely adequate repetition of the essence of the world under the form of representation. This repetition is the apprehension of the Ideas, the pure mirror of the world, as we came to know it in the third book. In man, then, the will can attain complete self-consciousness, clear and exhaustive knowledge of its own essence as it is mirrored in the whole world. From the actual presence of this degree of knowledge art arises, as we saw in the previous book. At the end of our whole inquiry, however, it will also turn out that through this same knowledge, when the will relates it to itself, the will can be abolished and deny itself in its most perfect appearance. Freedom otherwise belongs only to the thing in itself and so can never show itself in appearance; but in that case it emerges in appearance too. By abolishing the essence that underlies the appearance, while the appearance itself still continues in time, it produces a contradiction of the appearance with itself. In precisely this way it presents the phenomena of holiness and self-renunciation. But all this can become fully intelligible only at the end of this book. —For the present this merely indicates, in general terms, how man differs from all other appearances of the will. Freedom, that is, independence of the principle of sufficient reason, belongs only to the will as thing in itself and contradicts appearance; yet in man it can possibly enter appearance as well. There, however, it necessarily presents itself as a contradiction of the appearance with itself. In this sense not only the will in itself but even man can indeed be called free, and thereby distin-

guished from all other beings. But how this is to be understood can become clear only through all that follows; for now we must leave it entirely aside. For we must first guard against the error of supposing that the action of the individual, particular human being is not subject to any necessity, that is, that the force of the motive is less certain than the force of the cause, or than the way a conclusion follows from its premises. As I said, we are leaving aside the case mentioned above, which only ever concerns an exception. Apart from it, the freedom of the will as thing in itself in no way passes over directly to its appearance, not even where the appearance reaches the highest grade of visibility. It thus does not pass over to the rational animal with an individual character, that is, to the person. The person is never free, although it is the appearance of a free will: for it is the already determined appearance of that will's free willing. And since this appearance enters into the form of every object, the principle of sufficient reason, it does indeed develop the unity of that will into a multiplicity of actions. But because the willing in itself has a unity outside time, this multiplicity presents itself with the lawfulness of a force of nature. Yet it is that free willing which becomes visible in the person and its whole conduct, and it relates to this conduct as a concept to its definition. So each individual deed of the person is also to be ascribed to the free will, and announces itself directly to consciousness as such. That is why, as was said in the second book, everyone considers himself *a priori* (that is, here, according to his original feeling) to be free in his individual actions as well, in the sense that in any given case every action would be possible for him. Only *a posteriori*, from experience and from reflection on experience, does he recognize that his action proceeds with complete necessity from the meeting of his character with the motives. This is why the crudest person, following his feeling, defends complete freedom in individual actions most vehemently, while the great thinkers of all ages, and indeed even the more profound religious doctrines, have denied it. Suppose someone has seen clearly that the whole essence of man is will, and that man him-

self is only appearance of this will. Such appearance has as its necessary form the principle of sufficient reason, a form knowable already from the side of the subject, which in this case takes shape as the law of motivation. To such a person, a doubt about the inevitability of the deed, given the character and the motive at hand, will seem like a doubt that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.—Priestley has demonstrated the necessity of individual action very satisfactorily in his *Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity*. But the coexistence of this necessity with the freedom of the will in itself, that is,[19] outside appearance, was first demonstrated[20] by Kant, whose merit here is especially great. He did so by setting up the distinction between intelligible and empirical character, which I retain completely. The intelligible character is the will as thing in itself insofar as it appears in a particular individual and to a particular degree. The empirical character is this appearance itself, as it presents itself in the way of acting, in time, and already in bodily form, in space. To make the relation of the two comprehensible, the best expression is the one already used in the introductory essay. The intelligible character of every human being is to be regarded as an act of will outside time, and hence indivisible and unchangeable. When this act appears developed and drawn out in time and space and all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, its appearance is the empirical character, as it presents itself in experience in this person's whole way of acting and course of life. The whole tree is only the constantly repeated appearance of one and the same impulse. This impulse presents itself most simply in the fiber, and is repeated and easily recognized in the fibers' combination into leaf, stalk, branch and trunk. In the same way all of a person's deeds are only the constantly repeated expression of his intelligible character, varying somewhat in form, and the induction arising from their sum

19 Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), English chemist and theologian; *The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated* appeared in 1777.

20 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Critique of Pure Reason*, first edition, pp. 532–558; fifth edition, pp. 560–586; and *Critique of Practical Reason*, fourth edition, pp. 169–179.—Rosenkranz edition, pp. 224–231.

gives his empirical character.—I shall not, by the way, rework and repeat Kant's masterly exposition here, but presuppose it as known.

In 1840 I treated the important topic of the freedom of the will thoroughly and in detail in my prize-winning essay on it. In particular I uncovered the ground of the illusion that leads people to think they find in self-consciousness, as a fact of it, an empirically given absolute freedom of the will, that is, a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae* [free choice of indifference]. For it was precisely at this point that the prize question was aimed, very perceptively. I refer the reader, then, to that essay, and likewise to § 10 of the prize essay *On the Basis of Morality*, published together with it under the title *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. I now omit the still imperfect account of the necessity of acts of will that was given at this point in the first edition. Instead I shall further elucidate the illusion mentioned above by a brief discussion. It presupposes the nineteenth chapter of our second volume, and so could not be given in that prize essay.

The will, as the true thing in itself, is something really original and independent. For this reason the feeling of originality and autonomy must also accompany its acts in self-consciousness, although here the acts are already determined. Apart from this, the semblance of an empirical freedom of the will (instead of the transcendental freedom that alone is to be attributed to it), that is, of a freedom of individual deeds, arises from the separate and subordinate position of the intellect in relation to the will. This position is set out in the nineteenth chapter of the second volume, especially under no. 3. The intellect, that is, learns of the will's decisions only *a posteriori* and empirically. Accordingly, when a choice lies before it, it has no datum as to how the will is going to decide. For the intelligible character does not fall within the intellect's knowledge. It is by virtue of this character that, given the motives, only *one* decision is possible, which is therefore a necessary one. Only the empirical character becomes known to the intellect, successively, through its individual acts. That is why it seems to the knowing con-

sciousness (the intellect) that in a given case two opposite decisions are equally possible for the will. But this is exactly like saying of an upright pole that has lost its balance and begun to sway, "it can fall to the right or to the left." This "*can*" has only a subjective meaning and really means "as far as the data known to us go": for objectively the direction of the fall is already necessarily determined as soon as the swaying begins. In the same way, then, the decision of one's own will is undetermined only for its spectator, one's own intellect. It is undetermined only relatively and subjectively, namely for the subject of knowing. In itself and objectively, on the other hand, the decision in every choice presented is at once determined and necessary. It is just that this determination reaches consciousness only through the decision that follows. We even get empirical confirmation of this when some difficult and important choice lies before us, but only under a condition that has not yet arisen and can merely be hoped for, so that for the time being we can do nothing about it and must remain passive. We now consider what we will resolve to do once the circumstances have arisen that allow us free activity and decision. Usually far-sighted, rational deliberation speaks more for one of the resolutions, and immediate inclination more for the other. As long as we are forced to remain passive, the side of reason seems set to keep the upper hand; but we foresee how strongly the other side will pull when the opportunity for action is there. Until then we eagerly try, by cool meditation on the *pro et contra* [for and against], to set the motives on both sides in the clearest light. That way each can act on the will with its full force when the moment comes, and no error on the intellect's part can mislead the will into deciding otherwise than it would if everything acted on it equally. But this clear unfolding of the opposing motives is all the intellect can do in the choice. It awaits the actual decision as passively, and with the same tense curiosity, as if it were the decision of someone else's will. From its standpoint, therefore, both decisions must appear equally possible: and this is precisely the semblance of the empirical freedom of

the will. The decision certainly enters the intellect's sphere quite empirically, as the final outcome of the matter. Yet it has proceeded from the inner constitution, the intelligible character, of the individual will in its conflict with given motives, and therefore with complete necessity. The intellect can do nothing more here than illuminate the nature of the motives sharply and from every side. It cannot determine the will itself, since the will is wholly inaccessible to it, and even, as we have seen, unfathomable.

Suppose a person could act one way on one occasion and another way on another under the same circumstances. Then his will itself would have to have changed in the meantime, and so would lie in time, since change is possible only in time. But then either the will would have to be a mere appearance, or time a determination of the thing in itself. Accordingly, that dispute about the freedom of the individual deed, about the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*, really turns on the question whether the will lies in time or not. Both Kant's doctrine and my whole exposition make it necessary that the will, as thing in itself, lies outside time and every form of the principle of sufficient reason. If so, then not only must the individual always act in the same way in the same situation, and not only must every evil deed be a firm guarantee of countless others that he *must* commit and *cannot* refrain from. Also, as Kant says, if only the empirical character and the motives were completely given, a person's future conduct could be calculated like an eclipse of the sun or moon. As nature is consistent, so is character. Every individual action must turn out in accordance with the character, just as every phenomenon turns out in accordance with natural law. The cause in the latter case and the motive in the former are only occasional causes, as was shown in the second book. The will, whose appearance is the whole being and life of a person, cannot deny itself in the individual case, and what a person wills as a whole he will always will in the particular too.

The assertion of an empirical freedom of the will, a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*, is most closely bound up with placing

the essence of man in a *soul*. This soul would originally be a *knowing* being, indeed really an abstractly *thinking* one, and only as a result a *willing* one too. The will was thus made secondary in nature, whereas in truth it is knowledge that is secondary. The will was even regarded as an act of thought and identified with judgment, notably by Descartes and Spinoza. On this view every person would have become what he is only as a result of his *knowledge*: he would come into the world as a moral zero, get to know the things in it, and then decide to be this or that person and to act in this or that way. He could also, as a result of new knowledge, take up a new way of acting and so become someone else again. Further, on this view he would first recognize a thing as good and as a result will it, instead of first *willing* it and as a result calling it *good*. For according to my whole fundamental view, all this is an inversion of the true relation. The will is what is first and original. Knowledge has merely been added, as belonging to the appearance of the will, as its instrument. Every person, accordingly, is what he is through his will, and his character is original, since willing is the basis of his essence. Through the knowledge that has been added he learns, in the course of experience, what he is, that is, he comes to know his character. He thus *knows* himself as a result of, and in accordance with, the constitution of his will. On the old view, by contrast, he *wills* as a result of, and in accordance with, his knowing. On that view he would need only to consider how he would most like to be, and he would be it: that is its freedom of the will. It really consists, then, in a person's being his own work, by the light of knowledge. I, on the other hand, say that he is his own work prior to all knowledge, and knowledge is merely added to illuminate it. That is why he cannot resolve to be this kind of person or that, nor can he become someone else. Rather, he *is*, once and for all, and comes to know successively what he is. For them he *wills* what he knows; for me he *knows* what he wills.

The Greeks called character *êthos*, and its expressions, that is, morals, *êthê*. But this word comes from *ethos*, habit: they chose it

in order to express the constancy of character metaphorically through the constancy of habit. *To gar êthos apo tou ethous echei tên epônymian. êthikê gar kaleitai dia to ethizesthai* (*a voce ethos, i.e. consuetudo, êthos est appellatum: ethica ergo dicta est apo tou ethizesthai, sive ab assuescendo*) [*êthos* takes its name from the word *ethos*, that is, habit; ethics is therefore so called from *ethizesthai*, that is, from becoming accustomed], says Aristotle (*Magna Moralia*, I, 6, p. 1186, and *Eudemian Ethics*, p. 1220, and *Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 1103, Berlin edition). Stobaeus quotes: *hoi de kata Zênôna tropikôs; êthos esti pêgê biou, aph' hês hai kata meros praxeis reousi* (*Stoici autem, Zenonis castra sequentes, metaphorice ethos definiunt vitae fontem, e quo singulae manant actiones.*) [The Stoics, however, who follow in Zeno's camp, metaphorically define *ethos* as the source of life, from which individual actions flow.][21] II, ch. 7.—In Christian doctrine we find the dogma of predestination, based on election to grace and reprobation (Romans 9:11–24). It evidently sprang from the insight that man does not change. His life and conduct, that is, his empirical character, are only the unfolding of the intelligible character, the development of decided, unchangeable dispositions already recognizable in the child. His conduct is therefore fixed, as it were, already at birth, and remains essentially the same to the end. We too agree with this. But this entirely correct insight was combined with the dogmas found ready-made in Jewish doctrine, and consequences arose from that combination. They then produced the very greatest difficulty, the eternally insoluble Gordian knot around which most of the Church's disputes revolve. I will not undertake to defend these consequences, since even the apostle Paul himself hardly succeeded in doing so with the simile of the potter he put forward for the purpose. For then the result would, in the end, be nothing other than:[22]

21 The reference that follows (II, ch. 7) is to the second book of Stobaeus' *Eclogae*.
22 Romans 9:20–21: the potter has the right to make from the same lump of clay one vessel for honor and another for dishonor.

"Let the gods be feared
By the human race!
They hold dominion
In everlasting hands,
And can use it
As they please.—"[23]

But such considerations are really foreign to our subject. It will be more to the purpose now to make some remarks on the relation between character and knowledge, in which all its motives lie.

The motives that determine the appearance of the character, or action, act on the character through the medium of knowledge. But knowledge is changeable. It often wavers back and forth between error and truth, though as a rule it is increasingly corrected as life goes on, to very different degrees, of course. So a person's way of acting can be noticeably altered without our being entitled to infer from this a change in his character. What a person really and generally wills, the striving of his innermost essence and the goal he pursues in accordance with it—this we can never change by acting on him from outside, by instruction. Otherwise we could create him anew. Seneca puts it excellently: *velle non discitur* [willing cannot be taught]. Here he prefers the truth to his Stoics, who taught *didaktên einai tên aretên* (*doceri posse virtutem*) [that virtue can be taught]. The will can be acted on from outside only by motives. But motives can never change the will itself, for they have power over it only on the presupposition that it is just as it is. All they can do, then, is change the direction of its striving, that is, make it seek what it invariably seeks by a different path from before.[24] Hence instruction, improved knowledge—influence from outside, that is—can indeed teach a person that he erred in the means. It can accordingly bring it about that he pursues the goal he strives for, once and for all, in accordance with his inner essence, by an entirely

23 From the Song of the Fates in Goethe's *Iphigenie auf Tauris*, Act 4, scene 5.
24 Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 81.13.

different path, even in an entirely different object than before. But it can never make him will something really different from what he has willed hitherto. That remains unchangeable, for he is nothing but this willing itself, which would otherwise have to be abolished. The former, however—the modifiability of knowledge and thereby of action—goes so far that he may seek to attain his ever unchangeable end, say Muhammad's paradise, at one time in the real world and at another in an imaginary world. He measures his means accordingly: the first time he uses cunning, force and fraud, the other time abstinence, justice, almsgiving and pilgrimage to Mecca. But his striving itself has not changed on that account, still less has he himself. So even though his action does indeed look very different at different times, his willing has remained entirely the same. *Velle non discitur.*

For motives to be effective, it is not enough that they are present; they must also be known. For, in a very good expression of the Scholastics that I have already mentioned once, *causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum* [the final cause moves not according to its real being but according to its being as known]. For example, for the relation between egoism and compassion in a given person to emerge, it is not enough that he possess wealth, say, and see the misery of others. He must also know what can be done with wealth, both for himself and for others. And not only must the suffering of others present itself to him; he must also know what suffering is, and also what enjoyment is.[25] Perhaps on a first occasion he did not know all this as well as on a second. If he now acts differently on the same occasion, this is only because the circumstances were really different, namely in the part that depends on his knowledge of them, even though they seem to be the same.—Just as ignorance of circumstances that are actually present deprives them of their effectiveness, so, on the other hand, entirely imaginary circumstances can act like real ones. This holds not only for a single deception but also as a whole and per-

25 *Mitleid*, here "compassion," is also often translated "pity."

manently. If, for example, a person is firmly persuaded that every good deed will be repaid to him a hundredfold in the next life, such a conviction counts and works exactly like a sound bill of exchange at very long sight. He can then give out of egoism, just as, with a different view, he would take out of egoism. He has not changed: *velle non discitur.* Because knowledge has this great influence on action while the will remains unchanged, character develops only gradually and its various traits come to the fore one by one. That is why it shows itself differently at every age of life, and a violent, wild youth can be followed by a settled, temperate, mature manhood. In particular, the evil in a character will emerge ever more powerfully with time. But sometimes, too, passions indulged in youth are later curbed voluntarily, merely because the opposing motives have only now come within the range of knowledge. That is also why we are all innocent at first, which merely means that neither we nor others know the evil in our own nature. It emerges only in response to motives, and the motives come within the range of knowledge only with time. In the end we come to know ourselves as quite different from what we took ourselves to be *a priori*, and then we are often horrified at ourselves.

Repentance never arises from a change of the will (which is impossible), but from a change of knowledge. What was essential and genuine in whatever I have ever willed, I must still will: for I myself am this will, which lies outside time and change. So I can never repent of what I have willed, though I can repent of what I have done; because, led by false concepts, I did something other than what accorded with my will. Seeing this, once my knowledge is more accurate, is *repentance*. This extends not merely to worldly prudence, to the choice of means and to judging whether the end suits my real will, but also to what is properly ethical. Thus, for example, I may have acted more egoistically than accords with my character. I may have been misled by exaggerated representations of the need I myself was in, or of the cunning, falseness and malice of others. Or I may have acted rashly, that is, without reflection, determined not by

motives clearly known *in abstracto* but by merely intuitive ones: by the impression of the present moment and the emotion it aroused, which was so strong that I did not really have the use of my reason. Here too, then, the return of composure is only corrected knowledge. From it repentance can arise, and repentance always shows itself by making good what has been done, as far as that is possible. It should be noted, however, that in order to deceive ourselves we stage apparent rash acts which are really actions secretly deliberated in advance. For there is no one we deceive and flatter with such subtle tricks as ourselves.—The reverse of the case just described can also occur. Too much trust in others, or ignorance of the relative value of the goods of life, or some abstract dogma in which I have since lost faith, may lead me to act less egoistically than accords with my character, and so prepare for me repentance of another kind. Repentance, then, is always corrected knowledge of the relation of the deed to the real intention.—Where the will reveals its Ideas in space alone, that is, through mere shape, matter, already dominated by other Ideas (here, natural forces), resists it. It seldom allows the shape that was striving here for visibility to emerge perfectly pure and distinct, that is, beautiful. In the same way, the will that reveals itself in time alone, that is, through actions, meets an analogous obstacle in knowledge, which seldom gives it the data quite correctly. As a result, the deed does not turn out exactly in accordance with the will, and so prepares the way for repentance. Repentance, therefore, always comes from corrected knowledge, not from a change of the will, for such a change is impossible. Anguish of conscience over what one has done is anything but repentance. It is pain at knowing oneself as one is in oneself, that is, as will. It rests precisely on the certainty that one still has the same will. If the will had changed, and anguish of conscience were therefore mere repentance, it would abolish itself. The past could then arouse no further anguish, since it would exhibit the expressions of a will that was no longer that of the penitent. We shall discuss the significance of anguish of conscience in detail further on.

Knowledge, as the medium of motives, has an influence, not indeed on the will itself, but on the way the will emerges in actions. This influence also accounts for the chief difference between what human beings do and what animals do, since their ways of knowing differ. The animal has only intuitive representations; the human being, through reason, also has abstract ones, concepts. Now although animal and human being are determined by motives with equal necessity, the human being has over the animal the advantage of a complete *power of choice*. This has often been taken for a freedom of the will in individual deeds. Yet it is nothing but the possibility of a conflict between several motives being fought out to the end, the stronger of which then determines him with necessity. For this to happen, the motives must have taken the form of abstract thoughts, since only through these is real deliberation possible, that is, a weighing of opposing reasons for acting. In the animal, choice can take place only between motives present to intuition, and so it is confined to the narrow sphere of its present intuitive apprehension. Hence the necessity with which the motive determines the will, which is the same as the necessity with which the cause produces the effect, can be exhibited intuitively and directly only in animals. Here the onlooker has the motives before his eyes as directly as their effect. In human beings, by contrast, the motives are almost always abstract representations in which the onlooker has no share, and even from the agent himself the necessity of their working is concealed behind their conflict. For only *in abstracto* can several representations, as judgments and chains of inferences, lie side by side in consciousness and then act against one another, free of every determination of time, until the strongest overpowers the rest and determines the will. This is the complete *power of choice*, or capacity for deliberation, which the human being has over the animal. On account of it, freedom of the will has been ascribed to him, in the belief that his willing is a mere result of the operations of the intellect, with no definite impulse serving as its basis. In truth, however, motivation works only on the basis and

presupposition of his definite impulse, which in his case is individual, that is, a character. A more detailed account of this capacity for deliberation, and of the difference it brings about between human and animal choice, will be found in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (1st ed., p. 35 ff.), to which I therefore refer the reader here. This human capacity for deliberation is, moreover, one of the things that make human existence so very much more tormented than that of the animal. In general, our greatest pains do not lie in the present, as intuitive representations or immediate feeling. They lie in reason, as abstract concepts, tormenting thoughts, and from these the animal, living in the present alone and therefore in enviable freedom from care, is entirely free.

The human capacity for deliberation thus depends on the faculty of thinking *in abstracto,* and hence also of judging and inferring. It seems to have been this dependence that misled both Descartes and Spinoza into identifying the decisions of the will with the faculty of affirming and denying (the power of judgment). From this Descartes concluded that the will, which for him is free in the sense of indifference, is to blame for all theoretical error as well. Spinoza, on the other hand, concluded that the will is necessarily determined by motives, just as judgment is by reasons;[26] this latter view is in fact correct, but it appears as a true conclusion drawn from false premises.—

We have shown that animals and human beings are moved by motives in different ways. This difference extends its influence very far into the nature of both, and it contributes most to the thoroughgoing and conspicuous difference between their two kinds of existence. While the animal is always motivated only by an intuitive representation, the human being strives to exclude this kind of motivation altogether and to let himself be determined by abstract representations alone. In this way he uses his prerogative of reason to the greatest possible advantage. Independent of the present, he does not simply choose the passing

26 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Descartes, *Meditations,* 4.—Spinoza, *Ethics,* Part II, props. 48 and 49, etc.

pleasure or flee the passing pain, but considers the consequences of both. In most cases, apart from quite insignificant actions, we are determined by abstract motives conceived in thought, not by present impressions. That is why any single privation of the moment is fairly easy for us, but every renunciation is terribly hard. The former touches only the fleeting present, while the latter touches the future and therefore includes countless privations, of which it is the equivalent. The cause of our pain, as of our joy, therefore lies for the most part not in the real present but merely in abstract thoughts. It is these that often weigh on us unbearably and create torments beside which all the sufferings of animal life are very small; for over them even our own physical pain often goes quite unfelt. Indeed, in violent mental suffering we inflict physical suffering on ourselves merely in order to divert our attention from the one to the other. That is why, in the greatest mental pain, people tear out their hair, beat their breasts, lacerate their faces, roll on the ground. All of this is really only a violent means of distraction from a thought that has become unbearable. Precisely because mental pain, being far the greater, makes us insensible to physical pain, suicide becomes very easy for someone in despair or consumed by morbid dejection, even if earlier, in comfortable circumstances, he shrank in horror from the very thought of it. Likewise, care and passion, that is, the play of thought, wear down the body more often and more severely than physical ailments do. In keeping with this, Epictetus rightly says: *Tarassei tous anthrôpous ou ta pragmata, alla ta peri tôn pragmatôn dogmata* (*Perturbant homines non res ipsae, sed de rebus decreta* [What disturbs people is not things themselves, but their judgments about things]) *(V.)*, and Seneca: *Plura sunt, quae nos terrent, quam quae premunt, et saepius opinione quam re laboramus (Ep.5).* [There are more things that frighten us than crush us, and we suffer more often in imagination than in reality.] Eulenspiegel, too, satirized human nature quite superbly when

he laughed going uphill but wept going downhill.[27] Indeed, children who have hurt themselves often cry not at the pain. They cry only when someone pities them, at the thought of the pain that the pity arouses. Such great differences in acting and suffering flow from the difference between the animal and the human way of knowing. Further, a distinct and decided individual character emerges in the human being, and this chiefly distinguishes him from the animal, which has almost nothing but the character of its species. This emergence is likewise conditioned by choice between several motives, a choice possible only by means of abstract concepts. Resolutions turn out differently in different individuals. Only when a choice has preceded them are they a sign of each individual's character, which is different in everyone. What an animal does, by contrast, depends only on the presence or absence of the impression, provided that the impression is a motive for its species at all. Hence, finally, in the human being it is only the resolution, not the mere wish, that is a valid sign of his character, both for himself and for others. But the resolution becomes certain only through the deed, for himself as for others. The wish is merely the necessary consequence of the present impression, whether of an external stimulus or of a passing inner mood. It is therefore as immediately necessary and unreflective as what animals do. That is also why, just like animal action, it expresses only the character of the species, not the individual character. That is, it merely indicates what *human beings in general* would be capable of doing, not what the *individual* feeling the wish would be capable of. The deed alone is different. As a human action it always requires a certain reflection, and a human being is as a rule master of his reason, and so is deliberate, that is, he decides according to abstract motives present in thought. For these reasons the deed is the expression of the intelligible maxim of his conduct, the result of his innermost willing. It stands as a letter in the word that denotes his

27 Epictetus, *Enchiridion* 5; Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* (the line is in fact from Letter 13). Till Eulenspiegel, the prankster of German folk tales, wept going downhill at the thought of the climb to come.

empirical character, which is itself only the temporal expression of his intelligible character. That is why, in a healthy mind, only deeds weigh on the conscience, not wishes and thoughts. For only our deeds hold up to us the mirror of our will. The deed mentioned above, committed entirely without reflection and truly in blind emotion, is in a sense something between mere wish and resolution. Hence it can be erased, like a misdrawn line, from the picture of our will that is our course of life, through true repentance, which, however, also shows itself as a deed. —Here, incidentally, there is room for a remark that makes a curious simile. The relation between wish and deed has a quite accidental but exact analogy with that between electrical induction and electrical conduction.[28]

As a result of this whole consideration of the freedom of the will and what relates to it, we find the following. The will in itself and outside appearance must be called free, even omnipotent. Yet in its individual appearances illuminated by knowledge, that is, in human beings and animals, it is determined by motives, to which the character in each case reacts always in the same way, lawfully and necessarily. We see that the human being, thanks to the additional abstract or rational knowledge, has over the animal the advantage of a *power of choice*. But this only makes him the battleground of the conflict of motives, without removing him from their rule. So although it is the condition that makes the complete expression of individual character possible, it is by no means to be regarded as freedom of individual willing, that is, as independence from the law of causality, whose necessity extends over the human being as over every other appearance. Up to the point indicated, then, and no further, goes the difference that reason, or knowledge by means of concepts, brings about between human and animal willing. But a quite different phenomenon of the human will, impossible in animals, can arise. This happens when a human being abandons all knowledge of individual things as such, which is subject

28 In induction a charge is separated in a body at a distance without anything passing over; in conduction the charge is actually transmitted by contact.

to the principle of sufficient reason, and, by means of knowledge of the Ideas, sees through the *principium individuationis*. A real emergence of the true freedom of the will as thing in itself then becomes possible. Through it the appearance enters into a certain contradiction with itself, which the word self-denial denotes, and in the end the in-itself of its essence even abolishes itself.—This true and only immediate expression of the freedom of the will in itself, even in appearance, cannot yet be clearly presented here, but will be the subject of our consideration at the very end.

These discussions have now made two things clear to us. The empirical character is unalterable, being the mere unfolding of the timeless intelligible character, and actions follow with necessity from its meeting with motives. We must therefore first dispose of a conclusion that could very easily be drawn from this in favor of reprehensible inclinations. For our character is to be regarded as the temporal unfolding of a timeless, and therefore indivisible and unalterable, act of will, or of an intelligible character. By it everything essential, that is, the ethical content of our conduct of life, is unalterably determined, and must accordingly express itself in its appearance, the empirical character. Only what is inessential in this appearance, the outward shape of our course of life, depends on the shapes in which motives present themselves. From all this one might conclude that it would be wasted effort to work at improving one's character or to resist the power of evil inclinations. It would then be wiser to submit to the unalterable and to indulge every inclination at once, even an evil one. —But this is exactly the same case as the theory of inescapable fate and the conclusion drawn from it, which is called the *argos logos* [the "idle argument"], and in more recent times "Turkish fatalism." Its correct refutation, as Chrysippus is said to have given it, is set out by Cicero in his book *de fato* [On Fate], chapters 12 and 13.[29]

For although everything may be regarded as irrevocably predetermined by fate, it is so only by means of the chain of causes.

Hence it can in no case be determined that an effect should occur without its cause. It is not the event simply as such that is predetermined, then, but the event as the result of preceding causes. So fate has decreed not the result alone, but also the means as whose result it is destined to occur. Accordingly, if the means do not occur, the result will certainly not occur either. Both are always in accordance with the determination of fate, which, however, we always learn only afterward.

Events will always turn out in accordance with fate, that is, with the endless concatenation of causes. In the same way our deeds will always turn out in accordance with our intelligible character. But just as we do not know fate in advance, so we are given no insight *a priori* into our character. Only *a posteriori*, through experience, do we come to know ourselves, as we do others. Suppose the intelligible character entailed that we could form a good resolution only after a long struggle against an evil inclination. Then this struggle must come first and be waited out. Reflection on the unalterability of character, on the unity of the source from which all our deeds flow, must not mislead us into anticipating the character's decision in favor of one side or the other. In the resolution that follows we shall see what kind of beings we are, and see ourselves mirrored in our deeds. This is precisely what explains the satisfaction, or the anguish of soul, with which we look back on the stretch of life we have traveled. Neither feeling comes from those past deeds still having any existence: they are past, they have been, and they are now nothing more. Their great importance for us comes from their significance. These deeds are the imprint of the character, the mirror of the will, and looking into it we recognize our innermost self, the kernel of our will. Because we learn this not beforehand but only afterward, it is up to us to strive and struggle in time. We do so precisely in order that the picture we produce by our deeds may turn out such that the sight of it reassures us as much as possible, rather than filling us with anguish.

29 The "idle argument" (usually *argos logos*) holds that if everything is fated, all effort is pointless.

The significance of such reassurance, or anguish of soul, will, as I said, be examined further on. What still belongs here, on the other hand, is the following self-contained consideration.

THE ACQUIRED CHARACTER

Knowing one's own strengths and limits lets a person act consistently and spares him much pain.

Besides the intelligible and the empirical character, a third must be mentioned, distinct from both: the *acquired character*. One obtains it only in life, through experience of the world, and it is what is meant when someone is praised as a person of character, or censured as lacking character.—One might indeed think that the empirical character, as the appearance of the intelligible, is unalterable and, like every natural appearance, consistent in itself. For that very reason, one might suppose, a human being must always appear the same and consistent, and would have no need to acquire a character artificially through experience and reflection. But this is not so. Although one is always the same, one does not always understand oneself, but often misjudges oneself, until one has to some degree acquired real self-knowledge. The empirical character, as mere natural impulse, is in itself irrational. Indeed, its expressions are disturbed by reason into the bargain, and all the more so the more reflectiveness and power of thought a person has. For these always hold before him *what befits human beings in general*, as the character of the species, and what is possible for them in willing as in achieving. This makes it harder for him to see which of all these things he alone, by virtue of his individuality, wills and is capable of. He finds in himself the aptitudes for all human aspirations and powers, however diverse; but the differing degree of them in his individuality does not become clear to him without experience. Even if he does take up the pursuits that alone suit his character, he still feels, especially at particular moments and in particular moods, the urge toward exactly opposite ones that are incompatible with them. These must be completely sup-

pressed if he wants to pursue the former undisturbed. For just as our physical path on earth is always only a line, never a surface, so in life, if we want to grasp and possess one thing, we must renounce countless others and leave them lying, to the right and to the left. If we cannot bring ourselves to do this, and instead, like children at a fair, grab at everything that attracts us as we pass, we are making the perverse attempt to turn the line of our path into a surface. We then run in zigzags, flit to and fro like will-o'-the-wisps, and get nowhere. —Or, to use another simile: according to Hobbes's theory of right, everyone originally has a right to everything, but an exclusive right to nothing. He can, however, acquire an exclusive right to particular things by renouncing his right to all the rest, while the others do the same with regard to what he has chosen. It is exactly the same in life. We can pursue some definite aim, be it pleasure, honor, wealth, science, art or virtue, really seriously and successfully only when we give up all claims foreign to it and renounce everything else.[30] That is why mere willing, and even ability, is not yet sufficient in itself. A person must also *know* what he wills, and *know* what he can do. Only thus will he show character, and only then can he accomplish anything worthwhile. Before he gets there, he is still without character, despite the natural consistency of the empirical character. On the whole he must remain true to himself and run his course, drawn by his daemon; yet he will trace not a straight line but a trembling, uneven one. He will waver, deviate, turn back, and cause himself repentance and pain. All this happens because, in great things and small, he sees before him so much that is possible and attainable for human beings, and does not yet know which of it alone suits him and is feasible for him, or even which of it he alone can enjoy. He will therefore envy many a person their position and circumstances, which suit only that person's character, not his own. In them he would feel unhappy, and perhaps could not even bear them. For just as the fish is at ease only in water, the bird only in the air, the mole only under the earth, so

30 Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), in *De cive* and *Leviathan*.

every human being is at ease only in the atmosphere suited to him. The air of a court, for example, is not breathable for everyone. For lack of sufficient insight into all this, many a person will make all sorts of failed attempts. He will do violence to his character in particulars and yet, on the whole, have to give in to it again. What he thus laboriously obtains against his nature will give him no pleasure; what he thus learns will remain dead. Even in ethical respects, a deed too noble for his character, one sprung not from a pure, immediate impulse but from a concept, a dogma, will lose all merit through subsequent egoistic regret, even in his own eyes. *Velle non discitur* [Willing cannot be taught]. We become aware of the inflexibility of other people's characters only through experience. Until then we childishly believe that by unreasonable remonstrances, by pleas and entreaties, by example and magnanimity, we could bring someone to abandon his ways, change his manner of acting, depart from his way of thinking, or even extend his abilities. So it is with ourselves as well. We must first learn from experience what we will and what we can do. Until then we do not know it, we are without character, and we often have to be thrown back onto our own path by hard knocks from outside.—But once we have finally learned it, we have obtained what the world calls character: the *acquired character*. This, then, is nothing other than the most complete possible knowledge of one's own individuality. It is the abstract, and therefore distinct, knowledge of the unalterable qualities of one's own empirical character and of the measure and direction of one's mental and physical powers, that is, of all the strengths and weaknesses of one's own individuality. It enables us to play the role of our own person, which is in itself unalterable once and for all. We previously improvised this role haphazardly; now we can carry it out deliberately and methodically, and fill in, under the guidance of firm concepts, the gaps that whims or weaknesses cause in it. Our individual nature makes a certain way of acting necessary in any case. We have now brought it under clearly conscious maxims, always present to us, and according to these we carry it out as

deliberately as if it had been learned. We are never led astray by the passing influence of mood or of the present impression, never checked by the bitterness or sweetness of some particular thing met with on the way; we act without hesitation, without wavering, without inconsistencies. We shall no longer, like novices, wait, experiment and grope about to see what we really will and what we are capable of. We know it once and for all; with every choice we have only to apply general principles to particular cases, and we arrive at a decision at once. We know our will in general, and do not let ourselves be led by mood or outside pressure into resolving in a particular case what runs counter to it as a whole. We likewise know the kind and measure of our powers and of our weaknesses, and shall thereby spare ourselves much pain. For there is really no enjoyment at all except in using and feeling one's own powers, and the greatest pain is a perceived lack of powers where one needs them. Once we have explored where our strengths and where our weaknesses lie, we shall cultivate our outstanding natural aptitudes. We shall use them, try to make the most of them in every way, and always turn to where they are useful and count for something. But we shall resolutely, and with self-mastery, avoid those pursuits for which we have little natural aptitude, and beware of attempting what we will not succeed at anyway. Only someone who has reached this point will always be entirely himself with full deliberateness. He will never be left in the lurch by himself, because he always knew what he could expect of himself. He will then often share the joy of feeling his strengths, and seldom experience the pain of being reminded of his weaknesses. That pain is humiliation, and perhaps causes the greatest mental pain of all. That is why we can bear to face our bad luck squarely much better than our lack of skill.—Once, then, we are fully acquainted with our strengths and weaknesses, we shall not try to display powers we do not have, and will not play with counterfeit coin, because such shadowboxing misses its mark in the end. For since the whole human being is only the appearance of his will, nothing can be more perverse than to want, on the

strength of reflection, to be something other than one is: that is a direct contradiction of the will with itself. Imitating other people's qualities and peculiarities is far more shameful than wearing other people's clothes, for it is a verdict of one's own worthlessness pronounced on oneself. Knowledge of one's own disposition, of one's abilities of every kind and of their unalterable limits, is in this respect the surest way to the greatest possible contentment with oneself. For what holds of external circumstances holds of inner ones too: there is no more effective consolation for us than the complete certainty of unalterable necessity. An evil that has befallen us torments us less than the thought of the circumstances by which it might have been averted. That is why nothing does more to calm us than considering what has happened from the standpoint of necessity, in short, fatalism. From this standpoint all accidents present themselves as instruments of a governing fate, and we recognize that the evil which has occurred was drawn in inescapably by the conflict of inner and outer circumstances. We wail or rage, in fact, only as long as we hope thereby either to affect others or to rouse ourselves to some unheard-of exertion. But children and adults know very well how to resign themselves as soon as they see clearly that things simply are as they are:

thymon eni stêthessi philon damasantes anankê. / (Animo in pectoribus nostro domito necessitate.) [Our heart in our breast subdued by necessity.][31]

We are like captured elephants, which rage and struggle terribly for many days until they see that it is fruitless, and then suddenly and calmly offer their necks to the yoke, tamed forever. We are like King David, who, as long as his son was still alive, besieged Jehovah ceaselessly with prayers and behaved as if in despair, but as soon as the son was dead, thought no more about it. That is why countless lasting ills, such as physical disability, poverty, low rank, ugliness, or an unpleasant place to live, are borne with complete indifference by countless people. They are no longer felt at all, like wounds that have scarred

31 Homer, *Iliad* 18.113 and 19.66, spoken by Achilles.

over, merely because these people know that inner or outer necessity leaves nothing here to be changed. The more fortunate, meanwhile, cannot see how anyone can bear it.[32] Now, with inner necessity as with outer necessity, nothing reconciles us so firmly as a clear knowledge of it. Suppose we have clearly recognized, once and for all, our faults and weaknesses as well as our good qualities and strengths, have set our goal accordingly, and have resigned ourselves about what is unattainable. We then most surely escape, as far as our individuality allows, the bitterest of all sufferings: dissatisfaction with ourselves. This is the inevitable consequence of ignorance of our own individuality, of false conceit and the presumption that arises from it. To the bitter chapters of the self-knowledge recommended here, Ovid's verse applies excellently:

Optimus ille animi vindex laedentia pectus / Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque semel. [Best liberator of the mind is he who has burst the chains that wounded his heart, and has done with grieving once and for all.][33]

So much for the *acquired character*. It is important not so much for ethics proper as for life in the world, but its discussion took its place as a third kind alongside that of the intelligible and the empirical character. On those two we had to enter into a somewhat detailed consideration, in order to make clear to ourselves how the will is subject to necessity in all its appearances, while in itself it can nevertheless be called free, even omnipotent.

§ 56. STRIVING WITHOUT AN END

In all nature the will strives without final goal; suffering grows with the clarity of knowledge.

4.56 The whole visible world, its appearance, stands there as the expression and image of this freedom, this omnipotence, and develops progressively according to the laws that the form of knowledge brings with it. This freedom can now also express

32 2 Samuel 12:15–23.

33 Ovid, *Remedia amoris* (The Cure for Love), lines 293–294.

itself anew, precisely where, in its most perfect appearance, a completely adequate knowledge of its own essence has dawned on it. It can do so in one of two ways. Here too, at the summit of reflection and self-consciousness, it may will the same thing that it willed blindly and without knowing itself, and then knowledge, in the particular as in the whole, always remains a *motive* for it. Or, conversely, this knowledge becomes for it a *quieter*, which calms and abolishes all willing. This is the affirmation and denial of the will to live, already set out above in general terms. With regard to the conduct of the individual, it is a general, not an individual, expression of the will. It therefore neither disturbs and modifies the development of character nor finds its expression in individual actions. Instead, either through an ever stronger emergence of the whole previous way of acting, or conversely through its abolition, it gives living expression to the maxim that the will has freely adopted in the light of the knowledge it has now obtained. —The clearer development of all this is the main subject of this last book. It has now been somewhat eased and prepared for by the intervening considerations of freedom, necessity and character. It will be still more so once we have postponed it yet again and first turned our consideration to life itself, whose willing or not-willing is the great question. We shall try to recognize in general what the will itself, which is everywhere the innermost essence of this life, really gains by its affirmation, and in what way and how far this affirmation satisfies it, or indeed can satisfy it. In short, we shall ask what is to be regarded, in general and in essentials, as its condition in this world, which is its own and belongs to it in every respect.

First, I would like the reader to recall here the consideration with which we concluded the second book, prompted by the question raised there about the goal and aim of the will. Instead of an answer to it, something else came before our eyes. The will, at all grades of its appearance from the lowest to the highest, entirely lacks any final goal and aim, and always strives, because striving is its sole essence. No goal attained brings this

striving to an end. It is therefore incapable of any final satisfaction and can only be held up by obstruction, while in itself it goes on to infinity. We saw this in the simplest of all natural appearances, gravity. It does not cease to strive and press toward an extensionless center, the reaching of which would mean its own annihilation and that of matter; and it would not cease even if the whole universe were already rolled into a ball. We see it in the other simple natural appearances. The solid strives, whether by melting or by dissolving, toward fluidity, where alone its chemical forces become free: rigidity is their imprisonment, in which they are held by cold. The liquid strives toward the form of vapor, into which it passes at once as soon as it is freed from all pressure. No body is without affinity, that is, without striving, or without craving and desire, as Jakob Böhme would say. Electricity propagates its inner self-division to infinity, even though the mass of the earth swallows up the effect. Galvanism, likewise, as long as the pile is alive, is a purposeless, ceaselessly renewed act of self-division and reconciliation. The existence of the plant is just such a restless, never-satisfied striving. It is a ceaseless urge through ever higher forms, until the end point, the seed, becomes the starting point again, and this is repeated to infinity: nowhere a goal, nowhere final satisfaction, nowhere a point of rest. At the same time we shall recall from the second book that everywhere the manifold forces of nature and organic forms contest with one another for the matter in which they seek to appear. Each possesses only what it has wrested from another, and so a constant struggle of life and death is kept up. It is chiefly from this struggle that the resistance comes by which that striving, the innermost essence of every thing, is everywhere obstructed. The striving presses in vain, yet cannot give up its essence, and torments itself onward until this appearance perishes, whereupon others greedily seize its place and its matter.

We long ago recognized that this striving, which forms the kernel and the in-itself of every thing, is one and the same as what in us is called *will*, where it manifests itself most distinctly,

in the light of fullest consciousness. When an obstacle places itself between the will and its temporary goal, we call this obstruction *suffering*; its attainment of the goal, on the other hand, we call *satisfaction*, well-being, happiness. We can also transfer these names to those appearances of the world without knowledge, which are weaker in degree but identical in essence. We then see these caught up in constant suffering and without lasting happiness. For all striving springs from lack, from dissatisfaction with one's condition, and is therefore suffering as long as it is not satisfied. But no satisfaction is lasting; rather, it is always only the starting point of a new striving. We see striving everywhere obstructed in many ways, everywhere struggling, and so always as suffering. No final goal of striving, therefore no measure and no end of suffering.

In nature without knowledge we discover this only with sharpened attention and effort. In nature endowed with knowledge, in the life of animals, it confronts us plainly, and their constant suffering is easy to demonstrate. Without lingering at this intermediate stage, however, we shall turn to where everything, illuminated by the brightest knowledge, emerges most distinctly: to the life of the human being. For as the appearance of the will becomes more perfect, so suffering too becomes more and more evident. In the plant there is as yet no sensibility, and therefore no pain. A certainly very slight degree of both dwells in the lowest animals, the infusoria and radiata; even in insects the capacity to feel and to suffer is still limited. Only with the complete nervous system of the vertebrates does it appear in a high degree, and in an ever higher degree the more intelligence develops. In the same measure, then, as knowledge attains distinctness and consciousness heightens, torment grows too. It consequently reaches its highest degree in the human being, and there again all the more, the more distinctly a person knows, the more intelligent he is: the one in whom genius lives suffers most. It is in this sense, that is, with reference to the degree of knowledge in general and not to mere abstract learning, that I understand and use here that saying of

Koheleth: *Qui auget scientiam, auget et dolorem* [He who increases knowledge increases sorrow].—This exact relation between the degree of consciousness and that of suffering has been expressed most beautifully, in an intuitive and striking depiction, in a drawing by that philosophical painter, or painting philosopher, *Tischbein*.[34] The upper half of his sheet shows women whose children are being carried off, and who, in various groups and postures, express in manifold ways deep maternal pain, anguish and despair. The lower half shows, in exactly the same arrangement and grouping, sheep whose lambs are being taken away. Thus to every human head and every human posture in the upper half there corresponds, below, an animal counterpart. One sees clearly how the pain possible in dull animal consciousness compares with the tremendous torment that only distinctness of knowledge and clarity of consciousness made possible.

For this reason we shall consider the inner and essential destiny of the will in *human existence*. Anyone will easily find the same thing again in the life of animals, only more weakly, expressed in various degrees. From suffering animals, too, he can sufficiently convince himself how essentially *all life is suffering*.

§ 57. BETWEEN PAIN AND BOREDOM

Human life is a constant dying, driven by need, and swings between pain and boredom.

4.57 At every grade that knowledge illuminates, the will appears to itself as an individual. In infinite space and infinite time the human individual finds himself as a finite magnitude, and hence one that vanishes in comparison with them, thrown into them. Because they are unbounded, he always has only a relative, never an absolute *when* and *where* of his existence: for his place

34 Koheleth ("the Preacher") is the Hebrew name of Ecclesiastes; the line is 1:18 in the Latin Vulgate. J. H. W. Tischbein (1751–1829), German painter, known for his portrait of Goethe in the Roman Campagna.

and his duration are finite parts of something infinite and boundless. —His real existence is only in the present, whose unchecked flight into the past is a constant passage into death, a constant dying. His past life may have consequences for the present, and it bears the testimony to his will imprinted in it. Apart from these, it is already entirely done with, dead, and nothing more. Hence it must also, reasonably, be a matter of indifference to him whether the content of that past was torments or pleasures. But the present is constantly turning into the past under his hands, and the future is entirely uncertain and always short. Thus his existence, even considered from its formal side alone, is a constant plunging of the present into the dead past, a constant dying. But if we now look at it from the physical side as well, it is evident that, just as our walking is, as is well known, only a constantly checked falling, so the life of our body is only a continually checked dying, an ever-postponed death. In the same way, finally, the activity of our mind is a continually deferred boredom. Every breath wards off the death that constantly presses in on us, and with which we thus struggle every second. We struggle with it again, at longer intervals, through every meal, every sleep, every warming of ourselves, and so on. In the end it must win: for we have fallen to it already by being born, and it only plays with its prey for a while before swallowing it. We nevertheless carry on our life with great interest and much care for as long as possible, just as one blows up a soap bubble for as long and as large as possible, though with the firm certainty that it will burst.

We already saw that the inner essence of nature, even where it lacks knowledge, is a constant striving without goal and without rest. When we consider animals and human beings, this confronts us far more distinctly still. Willing and striving are their whole essence, entirely comparable to an unquenchable thirst. But the basis of all willing is neediness, lack, and hence pain. To pain, therefore, they are subject from the outset and by their very nature. If, on the other hand, they lack objects of willing, because too easy a satisfaction immediately takes these

away again, they are seized by a terrible emptiness and boredom: that is, their essence and their very existence become an unbearable burden to them. Their life therefore swings like a pendulum back and forth between pain and boredom, which are in fact its ultimate constituents. This has had to express itself, very strangely, in the fact that, after humankind had placed all suffering and torment in hell, nothing was left over for heaven but boredom itself.

At the higher grades of objectification, the constant striving that makes up the essence of every appearance of the will receives its first and most general foundation from the fact that here the will appears to itself as a living body, under the iron command to nourish it. What gives this command its force is precisely that this body is nothing other than the objectified will to live itself. Human beings, as the most perfect objectification of that will, are accordingly also the neediest of all beings: they are concrete willing and needing through and through, a concretion of a thousand needs. With these they stand upon the earth, left to themselves, uncertain about everything except their neediness and their want. Accordingly, care for the preservation of that existence, under demands so heavy and renewed every single day, as a rule fills the whole of human life. Directly bound up with it is the second demand, that of propagating the species. At the same time, the most varied dangers threaten them from every side, and escaping these requires constant vigilance. They make their way with cautious steps, peering anxiously about them, for a thousand accidents and a thousand enemies lie in wait for them. So they went in the wilderness, and so they go in civilized life; there is no safety for them:

> *Qualibus in tenebris vitae, quantisque periclis*
> *Degitur hocc' aevi, quodcunque est!* [In what darkness of life,
> amid what great dangers, this span of time is spent,
> whatever it may be!]
> *Lucretius, II, 15.*[35]

35 Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 2.15–16.

The life of the vast majority, moreover, is only a constant struggle for this very existence, with the certainty of losing it in the end. What makes them hold out in this toilsome struggle, however, is not so much love of life as fear of death, which nevertheless stands in the background, inescapable, and may step forward at any moment. —Life itself is a sea full of reefs and whirlpools. Human beings avoid them with the utmost caution and care, although they know that, even if with all their effort and skill they manage to thread their way through, they come with every stroke closer to the greatest, the total, the inevitable and irreparable shipwreck, and are indeed steering straight toward it—death. Death is the final goal of the toilsome voyage, and for them worse than all the reefs they avoided.

Now it is at once very remarkable that, on the one hand, the sufferings and torments of life can easily grow so great that even death—and the whole of life consists in fleeing from it—becomes desirable, and one hastens to it of one's own accord. On the other hand, as soon as want and suffering grant a person a respite, boredom is at once so close that some pastime becomes a necessity. What occupies all living beings and keeps them in motion is the striving for existence. But once their existence is secured, they do not know what to do with it. Hence the second thing that sets them in motion is the striving to get rid of the burden of existence, to make it imperceptible, to "kill time", that is, to escape boredom. Accordingly, we see that almost all people who are sheltered from want and cares, having at last cast off every other burden, are now a burden to themselves. They count every hour they get through as a gain—that is, every deduction from the very life they had summoned all their powers to preserve for as long as possible. Boredom, however, is anything but an evil to be taken lightly: in the end it paints true despair on the face. It causes beings who love one another as little as human beings do to seek one another out so eagerly, and thereby becomes the source of sociability. Everywhere, too, public measures are taken against it, as against other general calamities, if only out of political prudence. This evil, just as

much as its opposite extreme, famine, can drive people to the greatest excesses: the people need *panem et Circenses* [bread and circuses]. The strict Philadelphia penitentiary system makes boredom alone, through solitude and inactivity, its instrument of punishment. It is so fearful an instrument that it has already driven convicts to suicide. As want is the constant scourge of the common people, so boredom is the scourge of the fashionable world. In middle-class life, boredom is represented by Sunday, as want is by the six weekdays.[36]

Every human life flows on, throughout, between willing and attaining. A wish is by its nature pain; attainment quickly begets satiety; the goal was only apparent; possession takes away the charm; the wish, the need, reappears in a new form. If not, there follows dreariness, emptiness, boredom, against which the struggle is just as tormenting as against want.—When wish and satisfaction follow each other at intervals neither too short nor too long, the suffering both bring is reduced to its smallest measure. That makes for the happiest course of life. For consider what one might otherwise call the finest part of life, its purest joys—and they are that only because they lift us out of real existence and turn us into disinterested spectators of it: namely pure knowing, to which all willing remains foreign, the enjoyment of the beautiful, genuine delight in art. Because this already requires rare gifts, it is granted only to very few, and even to them only as a passing dream. And then the higher intellectual power of these few makes them susceptible to far greater sufferings than duller people can ever feel. It also places them in solitude among beings markedly different from themselves. And so this, too, evens out. To by far the greater part of humanity, however, purely intellectual pleasures are inaccessible. They are almost wholly incapable of the joy that lies in pure knowing; they are thrown back entirely on willing. So if anything is to win their involvement, to be *interesting* to them, it must (as the very

36 "Bread and circuses": Juvenal, *Satires* 10.81. The Philadelphia system, introduced at Eastern State Penitentiary in 1829, kept prisoners in permanent solitary confinement.

meaning of the word implies) somehow stir their *will*, even if only through a remote relation to it that lies merely in the realm of possibility. The will must never be left entirely out of play, because their existence lies far more in willing than in knowing: action and reaction is their only element. The naive expressions of this disposition can be gathered from trifles and everyday occurrences. For example, at sights worth seeing that they visit, they write up their names, so as to react, to act upon the place, since it did not act upon them. Again, they cannot easily just look at a strange, rare animal, but must provoke it, tease it, play with it, just to feel action and reaction. Above all, however, that need to have the will stirred shows itself in the invention and perpetuation of card-playing, which is quite truly the expression of the pitiable side of humanity.

But whatever nature, whatever fortune may have done, whoever one may be and whatever one may possess, the pain essential to life cannot be cast off:

Pêleidês d' ômôxen, idôn eis ouranon euryn. / *(Pelides autem ejulavit, intuitus in coelum latum.)* [The son of Peleus cried aloud, gazing up at the broad sky.][37]

And again:

Zênos men pais êa Kronionos, autar oizyn
Eichon apeiresiên.
(Jovis quidem filius eram Saturnii; verum aerumnam
Habebam infinitam.) [I was indeed the son of Jupiter, son of Saturn; yet I bore boundless hardship.][38]

Unceasing efforts to banish suffering achieve nothing more than a change in its form. Originally, this form is lack, want, care for the preservation of life. If one succeeds—which is very hard—in driving out pain in this form, it at once reappears in a thousand others, varying with age and circumstances: as sexual desire, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred, anxiety, ambi-

37 Homer, *Iliad* 21.272: Achilles, son of Peleus, cries out as the river Scamander overwhelms him.
38 Homer, *Odyssey* 11.620–621: the shade of Heracles speaking to Odysseus in the underworld.

tion, avarice, illness, and so on and so on. If at last it can find entry in no other form, it comes in the sad gray garment of weariness and boredom, against which all sorts of things are then tried. If one finally succeeds in driving boredom away, this will hardly happen without letting pain back in, in one of its earlier forms, and so beginning the dance all over again; for every human life is tossed back and forth between pain and boredom. Dispiriting as this reflection is, I want nevertheless to point out in passing one side of it from which consolation can be drawn, and perhaps even a Stoic indifference to one's own present ill attained. For our impatience with such an ill arises largely from our recognizing it as contingent, as brought about by a chain of causes that could easily have been otherwise. After all, we do not usually grieve over ills that are immediately necessary and entirely universal, such as the necessity of old age and death, and many daily inconveniences. It is rather the thought of how contingent the circumstances were that brought a suffering upon us in particular that gives it its sting. But suppose we have recognized that pain as such is essential to life and inescapable, and that nothing but its mere shape, the form in which it presents itself, depends on chance. Suppose we see, then, that our present suffering fills a place into which, without it, another would at once step, and which that other is now kept out of; so that, in essentials, fate can do little to us. Such a reflection, if it became a living conviction, could bring about a considerable degree of Stoic equanimity and greatly lessen our anxious concern for our own well-being. In fact, however, so powerful a dominion of reason over directly felt suffering may seldom or never be found.

Incidentally, this reflection—on the inevitability of pain, on how one pain displaces another, and on how the departure of the old one draws in a new one—might even lead us to a paradoxical but not absurd hypothesis. It is that in every individual the measure of pain essential to them is determined once and for all by their nature: a measure that could neither remain empty nor be overfilled, however much the form of suffering

may change. Their suffering and well-being would accordingly not be determined from outside at all, but solely by that measure, that disposition. It might indeed rise and fall somewhat at different times according to physical condition, but on the whole it would remain the same. It would be nothing other than what is called a person's temperament—or, more precisely, the degree to which, as Plato puts it in the first book of the *Republic*, they are *eukolos* or *dyskolos*, that is, of an easy or a difficult disposition.[39] —This hypothesis is supported not only by the familiar experience that great sufferings make all lesser ones quite imperceptible, while conversely, in the absence of great sufferings, even the smallest annoyances torment and upset us. Experience also teaches that when a great misfortune, the mere thought of which made us shudder, has actually happened, our mood, once we have got over the first pain, nevertheless remains on the whole fairly unchanged. Conversely, after a long-desired happiness has arrived, we do not on the whole and lastingly feel noticeably better or more comfortable than before. Only the moment when those changes occur moves us with unusual force, as deep grief or loud jubilation; but both soon vanish, because they rested on illusion. For they arise not over the immediately present enjoyment or pain, but only over the opening up of a new future that is anticipated in it. Only because pain or joy borrowed from the future could they be heightened so abnormally—and consequently not for long. —According to the hypothesis put forward, a very large part of the feeling of suffering or well-being, as of knowing, is subjective and determined *a priori*. Further evidence for it can be found in these observations. First, human cheerfulness or gloom is evidently not determined by external circumstances, by wealth or rank, since we meet at least as many cheerful faces among the poor as among the rich. Second, the motives that lead to suicide are extremely varied. We cannot name any misfortune great enough to bring it about with even much probability in every character,

39 Plato, *Republic* 329d, where old Cephalus says it is character, not age, that makes life easy or hard to bear.

and few so small that misfortunes of equal weight have not already occasioned it. Now if the degree of our cheerfulness or sadness is not the same at all times, then on this view we shall attribute this not to a change in external circumstances but to a change in our inner state, our physical condition. For when a real, though always only temporary, heightening of our cheerfulness occurs, even to the point of joy, it usually arrives without any external occasion at all. We often do see our pain arising solely from some particular external situation, and are visibly weighed down and saddened by this alone. We then believe that if only this were removed, the greatest contentment would have to follow. But this is an illusion. According to our hypothesis, the measure of our pain and well-being as a whole is determined subjectively for each point in time. In relation to it, that external motive for sadness is only what a blistering plaster is for the body: it draws to itself all the bad humors that would otherwise be dispersed. The pain grounded in our nature for this period of time, and therefore impossible to cast off, would, without that particular external cause of suffering, be spread over a hundred points. It would appear in the form of a hundred small annoyances and moody fancies about things we now completely overlook, because our capacity for pain is already filled by that principal ill, which has concentrated all our otherwise scattered suffering on a single point. This also agrees with the observation that when a great, oppressive worry is at last lifted from our chest by a happy outcome, another immediately takes its place. All the material for it was already there before, but it could not enter consciousness as a worry, because consciousness had no capacity left for it. That is why this material for worry remained only as a dim, unnoticed, misty shape at the farthest edge of its horizon. But now that there is room, this ready-made material at once steps forward and takes the throne of the reigning (*prytaneuousa* [presiding]) worry of the day. Even if in substance it is far lighter than the material of the worry that has vanished, it knows how to puff itself up until it equals that worry in appar-

ent size, and so, as the day's chief worry, fills the throne completely.

Excessive joy and very violent pain are only ever found in the same person: for each conditions the other, and both are also jointly conditioned by great liveliness of mind. Both, as we have just found, are produced not by what is purely present but by anticipation of the future. But pain is essential to life, and its degree, too, is determined by the nature of the subject; sudden changes, being always external, therefore cannot really alter that degree. So excessive jubilation or pain always rests on an error, a delusion. Consequently, those two overexcitements of the mind could be avoided through insight. Every excessive jubilation (*exultatio, insolens laetitia* [exultation, immoderate joy]) always rests on the delusion of having found something in life that is not to be found there at all: namely, lasting satisfaction of the tormenting wishes or cares that are forever born anew. From every single delusion of this kind one must inevitably be brought back later, and then, when it vanishes, pay for it with pains as bitter as the joy its arrival caused. In this respect it is exactly like a height from which one can come down again only by falling; which is why one should avoid it. And every sudden, excessive pain is simply the fall from such a height, the vanishing of such a delusion, and is therefore conditioned by it. One could therefore avoid both, if one could bring oneself always to survey things with complete clarity, as a whole and in their connections, and steadfastly to guard against actually lending them the color one would wish them to have. Stoic ethics aimed chiefly at freeing the mind from all such delusion and its consequences, and at giving it instead an unshakable equanimity. Horace is filled with this insight in the well-known ode:[40]

40 Horace, *Odes* 2.3.

Aequam memento rebus in arduis
Servare mentem, non secus in bonis
Ab insolenti temperatam
Laetitia.—[Remember to keep your mind level in hard times, and no less, in good times, restrained from immoderate joy.]

Mostly, however, we close ourselves off from the knowledge—comparable to a bitter medicine—that suffering is essential to life, and therefore does not pour in on us from outside; rather, each of us carries its inexhaustible source around within ourselves. Instead, we always look for some single external cause of the pain that never leaves us, a pretext as it were, just as the free man makes himself an idol in order to have a master. For we strive tirelessly from wish to wish. Every satisfaction we attain, however much it promised, does not satisfy us, and mostly soon stands revealed as an embarrassing error. Yet we still do not see that we are drawing water with the vessel of the Danaids, but hurry on to ever new wishes:

Sed, dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur
Caetera; post aliud, quum contigit illud, avemus;
Et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantes. [But while what we crave is absent, it seems to surpass all else; once it has come to us, we crave something else, and an equal thirst for life always holds us, forever gaping.]
(Lucretius III, 1095.)[41]

So it goes on either endlessly, or—what is rarer and already presupposes a certain strength of character—until we come upon a wish that cannot be fulfilled and yet cannot be given up. Then we have, as it were, what we were looking for: something we can blame at every moment, instead of our own nature, as the source of our sufferings. Through it we are now at odds with our fate but, in return, reconciled with our existence, since the knowledge recedes once more that suffering is essential to this existence itself and that true satisfaction is impossible. The res-

41 Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 3.1082–1084 in modern numbering.

ult of this last course of development is a somewhat melancholy mood: one bears a single great pain constantly, and from this arises a disdain for all lesser sufferings or joys. It is thus already a more dignified phenomenon than the constant chasing after ever new phantoms, which is far more common.

§ 58. HAPPINESS IS NEGATIVE

Satisfaction is only release from a lack; poetry and music can show striving, never lasting happiness.

4.58 All satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is in reality and in essence always only *negative*, and never positive at all. It is not a blessing that comes to us originally and of its own accord, but must always be the satisfaction of a wish. For a wish, that is, a lack, is the precondition of every enjoyment. But with satisfaction the wish ceases, and consequently so does the enjoyment. Hence satisfaction or happiness can never be more than liberation from a pain, from a want. This includes not only every actual, manifest suffering, but also every wish whose importunity disturbs our peace, and indeed even the deadening boredom that makes existence a burden to us. —But it is so hard to attain or accomplish anything: every undertaking meets with endless difficulties and toil, and at every step the obstacles pile up. And when at last everything has been overcome and attained, nothing can ever have been gained except that one is freed from some suffering or some wish, and so finds oneself just as one was before it arose.—What is directly given to us is always only lack, that is, pain. Satisfaction and enjoyment we can know only indirectly, by recalling the preceding suffering and privation, which ceased when they arrived. That is why we are not properly aware of the goods and advantages we actually possess, and do not value them, but simply take it that things must be so: for they only ever make us happy negatively, by keeping suffering away. Only after we have lost them do we feel their worth: for lack, privation, suffering is what is positive, what announces itself directly. That is also why we enjoy

remembering hardship, illness, want and the like that we have come through, because this is the only means of enjoying the goods we have now. Nor can it be denied that, in this respect and from this standpoint of egoism, which is the form of the will to live, the sight or description of other people's sufferings gives us satisfaction and enjoyment in just this way. Lucretius says so, beautifully and frankly, at the beginning of his second book:

> *Suave, mari magno, turbantibus aequora ventis,*
> *E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem:*
> *Non, quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas;*
> *Sed, quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est.* [Pleasant it is, when on the great sea the winds are churning the waters, to watch from the shore another's great struggle —not because anyone's distress is a delight, but because it is pleasant to see from what ills you yourself are free.]

We shall see later, however, that this kind of joy, which comes from a knowledge of one's own well-being mediated in this way, lies very close to the source of real, positive malice.

All happiness is only negative, not positive in nature. For this very reason it cannot be lasting satisfaction and contentment, but only ever releases us from some pain or lack, which must be followed either by a new pain or by *languor*, empty longing and boredom. This, too, finds confirmation in that faithful mirror of the essence of the world and of life: in art, and especially in poetry. Every epic or dramatic work can only ever represent a wrestling, striving and fighting for happiness, never lasting and perfect happiness itself. It leads its hero through a thousand difficulties and dangers to the goal; as soon as the goal is reached, it quickly lets the curtain fall. For nothing would then remain for it but to show that the glittering goal in which the hero imagined he would find happiness had only been teasing him too, and that after reaching it he was no better off than before. Because genuine, lasting happiness is not possible, it cannot be an object of art. The aim of the idyll, to be sure, is really to depict such happiness; but one also sees that the idyll as such cannot sustain itself. In the poet's hands it always turns either

epic—and is then only a very insignificant epic, made up of small sorrows, small joys and small endeavors; this is the most frequent case—or else it becomes merely descriptive poetry. It then depicts the beauty of nature, that is, really, pure knowing free of will. This is indeed in fact the only pure happiness, one not preceded by suffering or need, and not necessarily followed by regret, suffering, emptiness or satiety; only this happiness cannot fill the whole of life, but only moments of it.—What we see in poetry we find again in music. In its melody, as we have seen, we recognized the innermost history of the self-conscious will, expressed in universal form: the most secret life, longing, suffering and joy, the ebb and flow of the human heart. Melody is always a departure from the keynote, through a thousand strange wanderings, up to the most painful dissonance, after which it at last finds the keynote again. The keynote expresses the satisfaction and calming of the will; but nothing more can then be done with it, and holding it any longer would be only tiresome and meaningless monotony, the counterpart of boredom.

Everything these reflections were meant to make clear—the unattainability of lasting satisfaction and the negativity of all happiness—finds its explanation in what was shown at the end of the second book: namely, that the will, whose objectification human life is, like every appearance, is a striving without goal and without end. We find the stamp of this endlessness impressed on every part of its entire appearance as well, from its most general form, endless time and space, up to the most perfect of all appearances, the life and striving of the human being.—In theory one can posit three extremes of human life and regard them as the elements of actual human life. First, powerful willing, the great passions (Radscha-Guna).[42] It comes to the fore in the great historical characters; it is depicted in epic and drama. But it can also show itself in a small sphere, for the greatness of the objects is measured here only by the degree to

42 The three gunas ('qualities') of Sankhya philosophy and the Bhagavad Gita: rajas (passion, activity), sattva (goodness, clarity) and tamas (inertia, darkness).

which they move the will, not by their external circumstances. Second, pure knowing, the apprehension of the Ideas, which depends on knowledge being freed from the service of the will: the life of the genius (Satwa-Guna). Finally, third, the deepest lethargy of the will and hence of the knowledge bound to it, empty longing, boredom that numbs all life (Tama-Guna). The life of the individual, far from remaining in one of these extremes, touches them only rarely. Mostly it is only a weak and wavering approach to one side or the other, a paltry willing of small objects, constantly recurring and so escaping boredom.—It is truly incredible how insignificantly and meaninglessly, seen from outside, and how dully and unreflectively, felt from within, the life of the vast majority of people flows by. It is a feeble longing and tormenting, a dreamy stagger through the four ages of life toward death, accompanied by a series of trivial thoughts. They are like clockworks that are wound up and go without knowing why. Every time a human being is begotten and born, the clock of human life is wound up anew, to repeat once more, phrase by phrase and bar by bar, with insignificant variations, the barrel-organ tune it has already played countless times.—Every individual, every human face and its course of life, is only one more brief dream of the infinite spirit of nature, of the persistent will to live. It is only one more fleeting shape, which the will playfully sketches on its infinite page, space and time, lets exist for a while that is vanishingly small in comparison with them, and then erases to make room for new ones. And yet—and here lies the troubling side of life—each of these fleeting shapes, these insipid whims, must be paid for by the whole will to live, in all its vehemence, with many deep pains, and finally with a bitter death, long feared and at last arriving. That is why the sight of a corpse makes us so suddenly serious.

The life of every individual, surveyed as a whole and in general, with only its most significant features brought out, is really always a tragedy; but gone through in detail, it has the character of a comedy. For the bustle and vexations of the day, the restless teasing of the moment, the wishes and fears of the week, the

mishaps of every hour, all brought about by chance, which is always bent on mischief, are nothing but scenes of comedy. But the wishes never fulfilled, the frustrated striving, the hopes mercilessly trampled by fate, the calamitous errors of a whole life, with mounting suffering and death at the end, always make a tragedy. So, as if fate had wanted to add mockery to the misery of our existence, our life must contain all the woes of tragedy, and yet we cannot even maintain the dignity of tragic figures, but in the broad detail of life are inevitably foolish comic characters.

Yet however much great and small troubles fill every human life and keep it in constant unrest and motion, they cannot conceal how inadequate life is to fill the mind, how empty and shallow existence is; nor can they shut out boredom, which is always ready to fill every pause that care leaves. This is how it has come about that the human mind, not yet content with the cares, worries and occupations the real world lays upon it, creates for itself an imaginary world as well, in the form of a thousand different superstitions. It then busies itself with this world in every way, and squanders time and energy on it, as soon as the real world is willing to grant it the rest to which it is not at all receptive. Hence this was originally most the case among peoples whose life is made easy by a mild climate and soil: above all the Hindus, then the Greeks and Romans, and later the Italians, the Spaniards and so on.—Human beings create demons, gods and saints in their own image. To these they must then incessantly offer sacrifices, prayers, temple decorations, vows and their fulfillment, pilgrimages, salutations, the adorning of images, and so on. Their worship is everywhere interwoven with reality, and indeed obscures it: every event in life is then taken as the doing of those beings. Dealings with them fill half of life's time, constantly keep hope alive, and through the charm of illusion often become more interesting than dealings with real beings. These dealings are the expression and symptom of a twofold neediness in human beings: partly for help and support, and partly for occupation and diversion. They often

work directly against the first need, since, when accidents and dangers occur, precious time and energy are uselessly spent on prayers and sacrifices instead of on averting them. But they serve the second need all the better, through that fanciful conversation with a dreamed-up spirit world: and this is the by no means contemptible gain of all superstitions.

§ 59. EVERY LIFE STORY A STORY OF SUFFERING

Experience and history confirm the misery of life; optimism is called absurd and wicked.

4.59 Through the most general of considerations, by examining the first elementary features of human life, we have now convinced ourselves *a priori*, in this sense, that by its whole constitution human life is incapable of true happiness, but is essentially a many-shaped suffering and a thoroughly wretched state. We could now awaken this conviction in ourselves far more vividly if we proceeded more *a posteriori*: if we went into more specific cases, brought images before the imagination, and depicted in examples the nameless misery that experience and history present, wherever one may look and in whatever respect one may inquire. But the chapter would be endless, and would take us away from the standpoint of generality that is essential to philosophy. Moreover, such a depiction might easily be taken for a mere declamation on human misery, of the kind that has often been heard before, and as such be accused of one-sidedness, because it started from individual facts. Our demonstration of the inevitable suffering grounded in the essence of life is wholly cool and philosophical; it starts from the universal and is conducted *a priori*. It is therefore free from any such reproach and suspicion. Confirmation *a posteriori*, however, is easy to find everywhere. Anyone who has woken from the first dreams of youth, who pays attention to their own and others' experience, and who has looked about in life, in the history of the past and of their own age, and finally in the works of the great poets, will surely recognize the result—unless some indelibly imprinted

prejudice paralyzes their judgment. This human world is the realm of chance and error, which rule it without mercy, in great things as in small; and beside them folly and malice also wield the scourge: hence everything better forces its way through only with difficulty; what is noble and wise very rarely makes its appearance or finds effect or a hearing; while the absurd and perverse in the realm of thought, the flat and tasteless in the realm of art, the evil and deceitful in the realm of deeds actually hold sway, disturbed only by brief interruptions. Excellence of every kind, on the other hand, is always only an exception, one case in millions. And so, when it has made itself known in a lasting work, that work afterwards, having outlived the resentment of its contemporaries, stands isolated and is preserved like a meteorite, sprung from an order of things other than the one that prevails here. —As for the life of the individual, every life story is a story of suffering. For every course of life is, as a rule, a continuous series of misfortunes great and small. Everyone conceals them as far as possible, knowing that others, seeing them, will seldom feel sympathy or compassion, but almost always satisfaction at the thought of the troubles from which they themselves happen to be spared just now.—But perhaps no one, at the end of their life, if they are thoughtful and at the same time honest, will ever wish to go through it again; rather than that, they would much prefer to choose complete non-existence. The essential content of the world-famous soliloquy in *Hamlet*, summed up, is this: our condition is so wretched that complete non-existence would be decidedly preferable to it. Now if suicide really offered us this, so that the alternative "to be or not to be" lay before us in the full sense of the words, then it would have to be chosen unconditionally, as a most desirable end (*a consummation devoutly to be wish'd*). But there is something in us that tells us this is not so: that this is not the end of it, that death is no absolute annihilation.—Likewise, what the father of history already reports[43] has probably not been refuted since: namely, that no human being has ever existed who has

43 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Herodotus, VII, 46.*

not wished more than once not to live to see the next day. So the brevity of life, so often lamented, may perhaps be the very best thing about it.[44] —If, finally, one were to set before everyone's eyes the dreadful pains and torments to which their life is constantly exposed, they would be seized with horror. Lead the most hardened optimist through the hospitals, infirmaries and surgical chambers of torment, through the prisons, torture chambers and slave pens, over battlefields and places of execution; then open to him all the dark dwellings of misery, where it hides from the gaze of cold curiosity; and finally let him look into Ugolino's tower of starvation—and he too would surely come to see at last what kind of world this *meilleur des mondes possibles* [best of all possible worlds] is. For where else did Dante take the material for his hell, if not from this actual world of ours? And yet it turned out quite a proper hell.[45] When, on the other hand, he came to the task of depicting heaven and its joys, he faced an insurmountable difficulty, precisely because our world offers no material at all for anything of the kind. So nothing was left for him but to give us, instead of the joys of paradise, the instruction imparted to him there by his ancestor, his Beatrice and various saints. This makes it clear enough what kind of world this is.[46] Of course, human life, like all shoddy goods, is coated on the outside with a false sheen. What suffers always hides itself; whereas whatever pomp and splendor people can afford, they put on display, and the more they lack inner contentment, the more they wish to be seen as happy in the opinion of others. So far does folly go; and the opinion of others is a chief goal of everyone's striving, although its utter nullity is already expressed by the fact that in almost all languages vanity, *vanitas*, originally means emptiness and nothingness.—Yet even beneath all this glittering illusion, the torments of life can very easily grow so great—and it happens every day—

44 Shakespeare, *Hamlet* 3.1.

45 Ugolino, in Dante's *Inferno* 33, was starved to death with his sons in a tower in Pisa. "The best of all possible worlds" is Leibniz's formula, mocked in Voltaire's *Candide*.

46 The ancestor is Dante's great-great-grandfather Cacciaguida (*Paradiso* 15–17).

that death, otherwise feared above all things, is eagerly seized upon. Indeed, if fate wants to show all its malice, even this refuge can be barred to the sufferer, who may then remain delivered over, beyond rescue, to cruel, slow tortures at the hands of enraged enemies. In vain the tormented person then calls on their gods for help: they remain abandoned to their fate without mercy. But this impossibility of rescue is merely the mirror of the invincibility of their will, whose objecthood their person is.—Just as no external power can change or abolish this will, so no alien power can free it from the torments that proceed from life, which is the appearance of that will. Human beings are always thrown back on themselves, in the main matter as in every other. In vain do they make gods for themselves, in order to beg and flatter from them what only their own willpower can bring about. If the Old Testament had made the world and humankind the work of a god, the New Testament, in order to teach that salvation and redemption from the misery of this world can come only from the world itself, found itself compelled to let that god become human. It is and remains the human will on which everything depends for human beings. Saniassis, martyrs, saints of every faith and name have endured every torture willingly and gladly, because in them the will to live had abolished itself; and then even the slow destruction of its appearance was welcome to them. But I do not want to anticipate the later exposition.[47] —For the rest, I cannot refrain from declaring here that *optimism*, where it is not merely the thoughtless talk of those beneath whose flat foreheads nothing but words are lodged, seems to me not merely an absurd but a truly *wicked* way of thinking, a bitter mockery of the nameless sufferings of humanity.—Let no one imagine that Christian doctrine is favorable to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels "world" and "evil" are *used* almost as synonymous expressions.[48]

47 Sannyasis: Hindu ascetics who have renounced the world.

48 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 46 of the second volume (the Supplements).

§ 60. AFFIRMATION OF THE BODY

The will affirms itself in preserving the body and, most strongly, in the act of procreation.

4.60 We have now completed the two discussions that had to be inserted here. The first concerned the freedom of the will in itself together with the necessity of its appearance. The second concerned its lot in the world that mirrors its essence, on the basis of whose knowledge it must affirm or deny itself. We can therefore now bring this affirmation and denial themselves, which above we only stated and explained in general terms, to greater clarity. We shall do so by presenting the modes of conduct in which alone they find expression, and considering these in their inner significance.

The affirmation of the will is constant willing itself, undisturbed by any knowledge, as it fills human life in general. The human body is already the objecthood of the will as it appears at this grade and in this individual. So his willing, unfolding in time, is as it were the paraphrase of the body, the elucidation of the meaning of the whole and of its parts; it is another way of presenting the same thing in itself whose appearance the body already is. Hence instead of affirmation of the will we can also say affirmation of the body. The basic theme of all the manifold acts of will is the satisfaction of the needs that are inseparable from the existence of the body in health. These needs already have their expression in the body and can be traced back to the preservation of the individual and the propagation of the species. But indirectly, through them, the most varied motives gain power over the will and produce the most manifold acts of will. Each of these is only a sample, an example, of the will that appears here in general. What kind of sample it is, what shape the motive has and imparts to it, is not essential; what matters here is only that there is willing at all, and with what degree of vehemence. The will can become visible only in motives, just as the eye expresses its power of sight only in light. The motive in

general stands before the will like a many-shaped Proteus. It always promises complete satisfaction, the quenching of the will's thirst; but once it is attained, it at once stands there in another shape and in this shape moves the will anew—always in keeping with the will's degree of vehemence and its relation to knowledge, which are revealed as the empirical character precisely through these samples and examples.

From the moment consciousness sets in, the human being finds himself willing, and as a rule his knowledge remains in constant relation to his will. He first seeks to become fully acquainted with the objects of his willing, then with the means to them. Now he knows what he has to do, and as a rule he strives for no other knowledge. He acts and bustles about: the consciousness of always working toward the goal of his willing keeps him upright and active; his thinking concerns the choice of means. Such is the life of almost all people: they will, they know what they will, and they strive for it with just enough success to protect them from despair and just enough failure to protect them from boredom and its consequences. From this there arises a certain cheerfulness, or at least composure, which wealth or poverty do not really alter. For the rich and the poor do not enjoy what they have, since this, as has been shown, acts only negatively; they enjoy what they hope to obtain through their exertions. They press forward with great seriousness, indeed with an air of importance—just as children go about their play.—It is always an exception when such a course of life is disturbed because, from a knowing that is independent of the service of the will and directed to the essence of the world as such, there arises either the aesthetic summons to contemplation or the ethical summons to renunciation. Most people are driven through life by need, which never lets them stop and reflect. On the other hand, the will often flares up to a degree far exceeding the affirmation of the body. This degree is then shown by violent emotions and powerful passions, in which the individual not only affirms his own existence but denies that of others and seeks to abolish it where it stands in his way.

The preservation of the body through its own powers is so slight a degree of affirmation of the will that, if the will voluntarily stopped there, we could assume that with the death of this body the will that appeared in it was also extinguished. But the satisfaction of the sexual drive already goes beyond the affirmation of one's own existence, which fills so short a time; it affirms life beyond the death of the individual, into an indefinite time. Nature, always true and consistent, here even naive, lays out the inner meaning of the act of procreation quite openly before us. Our own consciousness, the vehemence of the drive, teaches us that in this act the most decided *affirmation of the will to live* expresses itself, pure and without any further addition (such as a denial of other individuals). And now, in time and in the causal series, that is, in nature, a new life appears as the consequence of the act: the begotten stands before the begetter, different from him in appearance, but in itself, or according to the Idea, identical with him. Hence it is through this act that the species of living beings each bind themselves into a whole and perpetuate themselves as such. In relation to the begetter, procreation is only the expression, the symptom, of his decided affirmation of the will to live. In relation to the begotten, it is not, say, the ground of the will that appears in him, since the will in itself knows neither ground nor consequent; rather, like every cause, it is only the occasional cause of the appearance of this will at this time in this place. As thing in itself, the will of the begetter and that of the begotten are not different, since only the appearance, not the thing in itself, is subject to the *principium individuationis*. With this affirmation beyond one's own body, extending as far as the presentation of a new one, suffering and death, as belonging to the appearance of life, are also affirmed anew along with it; and the possibility of redemption brought about by the most perfect capacity for knowledge is this time declared fruitless. Here lies the deep reason for the shame attached to the business of procreation.—This view is presented mythically in the dogma of Christian doctrine that we all share in Adam's fall (which is obviously only the satisfaction of sexual desire) and

through it are deserving of suffering and death. In this, that doctrine goes beyond the consideration according to the principle of sufficient reason and recognizes the Idea of man, whose unity, after its falling apart into countless individuals, is restored by the bond of procreation that holds them all together. Accordingly, it regards every individual, on the one hand, as identical with Adam, the representative of the affirmation of life, and to that extent as having fallen prey to sin (original sin), suffering and death. On the other hand, knowledge of the Idea also shows it every individual as identical with the Redeemer, the representative of the denial of the will to live, and to that extent as sharing in his self-sacrifice, redeemed through his merit, and saved from the bonds of sin and death, that is, of the world (Rom. 5:12–21).

Another mythical presentation of our view of sexual satisfaction—as the affirmation of the will to live beyond individual life, as a surrender to life that is only thereby consummated, or as it were a renewed signing-over of oneself to life—is the Greek myth of Proserpina. Return from the underworld was still possible for her as long as she had not tasted the fruits of the underworld, but by eating the pomegranate she falls wholly into its power. This meaning of the myth speaks very clearly from Goethe's incomparable presentation of it, especially when, immediately after she has eaten the pomegranate, the invisible chorus of the Fates suddenly breaks in:[49]

"You are ours!
Fasting you should have returned:
And the bite of the apple makes you ours!"
The Triumph of Sensibility, IV.

It is remarkable that *Clement of Alexandria (Strom., III, c. 15)* describes the matter with the same image and the same expression: *Hoi men eunouchisantes heautous apo pasês hamartias, dia tên basileian tôn ouranôn, makarioi houtoi eisin, hoi tou kosmou nêsteuontes. (Qui se castrarunt ab omni peccato, propter regnum*

49 The Parcae (*Parzen*) are the Roman Fates.

coelorum, ii sunt beati, a mundo jejunantes.) [Those who have made themselves eunuchs from all sin for the sake of the kingdom of heaven—they are blessed, who fast from the world.][50]

The sexual drive confirms itself as the decided, strongest affirmation of life also by the fact that for natural man, as for the animal, it is the final purpose, the highest goal of his life. Self-preservation is his first striving, and as soon as he has provided for it, he strives only for the propagation of the species: as a merely natural being he cannot aim at anything more. Nature too, whose inner essence is the will to live itself, drives man, like the animal, toward propagation with all her power. After that she has achieved her purpose with the individual and is wholly indifferent to its destruction, since to her, as the will to live, only the preservation of the species matters; the individual is nothing to her. —Because in the sexual drive the inner essence of nature, the will to live, expresses itself most strongly, the ancient poets and philosophers—Hesiod and Parmenides—said, very meaningfully, that Eros is the first, the creative, the principle from which all things came forth. (See *Aristot. Metaph., I, 4.)* Pherecydes said: *Eis erôta metabeblêsthai ton Dia, mellonta dêmiourgein. (Jovem, cum mundum fabricare vellet, in cupidinem sese transformasse.)* [When Zeus was about to fashion the world, he transformed himself into Eros.] *Proclus ad Plat. Tim., L. III.*—A detailed treatment of this subject has recently been given us by G. F. *Schoemann, "De cupidine cosmogonico"* [On Cosmogonic Desire], 1852. The Maya of the Indians too, whose work and web is the whole world of illusion, is paraphrased by *amor* [love].[51]

The genitals are, far more than any other external member of the body, subject merely to the will and not at all to knowledge. Indeed, the will shows itself here almost as independent of knowledge as in those parts that, prompted by mere stimuli, serve vegetative life, reproduction, and in which the will acts

50 Clement of Alexandria (c. AD 150–215), Christian theologian; his *Stromata* ("Miscellanies") is a wide-ranging work of Christian philosophy.

51 Pherecydes of Syros (6th century BC), an early Greek cosmologist, is quoted by Proclus in his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*. G. F. Schoemann (Schömann) was a German classical scholar.

blindly, as in nature devoid of knowledge. For procreation is only reproduction passing over to a new individual, reproduction to the second power, as it were, just as death is only excretion to the second power.—In view of all this, the genitals are the true focus of the will and consequently the opposite pole to the brain, the representative of knowledge, that is, of the other side of the world, the world as representation. They are the life-preserving principle, the principle that assures time of endless life. In this capacity they were worshipped among the Greeks in the phallus and among the Hindus in the lingam, which are thus the symbol of the affirmation of the will. Knowledge, by contrast, provides the possibility of abolishing willing, of redemption through freedom, of overcoming and annihilating the world.

We have already considered at length, at the beginning of this fourth book, how the will to live, in its affirmation, must regard its relation to death. Death does not trouble it, because death stands there as something already included in life and belonging to it; it is completely counterbalanced by its opposite, procreation, which, despite the death of the individual, secures and guarantees life to the will to live for all time. To express this, the Indians gave the lingam to Shiva, the god of death, as his attribute. We also explained there how someone who, with full reflective awareness, stands on the standpoint of decided affirmation of life faces death without fear. So nothing more on that here. Most people stand on this standpoint without clear reflective awareness, and continually affirm life. As the mirror of this affirmation the world stands there, with countless individuals, in endless time and endless space and endless suffering, between procreation and death without end.—Yet no complaint is to be raised about this from any quarter: for the will stages the great tragedy and comedy at its own expense, and is also its own spectator. The world is just such a world because the will, whose appearance it is, is such a will—because it so wills. The justification for the sufferings is that the will affirms itself even in the face of this appearance; and this affirmation is justified and balanced by the fact that it bears the sufferings. Here already a

view opens up to us of *eternal justice*, in the whole; further on we will recognize it more closely and clearly in particulars as well. But first we must still speak of temporal or human justice.[52]

§ 61. EGOISM

Each individual, as microcosm, makes itself the center of the world and would sacrifice all else to itself.

4.61 We recall from the second book that throughout nature, at all grades of the will's objectification, there was necessarily a constant struggle between the individuals of all species, and that precisely through this an inner conflict of the will to live with itself found expression. At the highest grade of objectification this phenomenon, like everything else, will present itself with heightened clarity and can therefore be deciphered further. For this purpose we will first trace *egoism*, as the starting point of all struggle, back to its source.

We have called time and space the *principium individuationis*, because only through them and in them is a plurality of the homogeneous possible. They are the essential forms of natural knowledge, that is, of knowledge that has sprung from the will. Hence the will everywhere appears to itself in the plurality of individuals. But this plurality does not touch the will as thing in itself, only its appearances: it is present whole and undivided in each of these, and sees around itself the countlessly repeated image of its own essence. But this essence itself, that is, what is actually real, it finds immediately only within itself. Hence each wants everything for himself, wants to possess everything, or at least to control it, and whatever opposes him he would like to annihilate. Added to this, in knowing beings, is the fact that the individual is the bearer of the knowing subject, and this subject is the bearer of the world. That is, the whole of nature outside him, and so also all other individuals, exist only in his representation; he is always conscious of them only as his representa-

52 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 45 of the second volume (the Supplements).

tion, thus merely indirectly and as something dependent on his own essence and existence; for with his consciousness the world necessarily perishes for him as well, that is, its being and non-being become equivalent and indistinguishable. Every knowing individual is therefore in truth, and finds himself to be, the whole will to live, or the in-itself of the world itself, and also the complementary condition of the world as representation—consequently a microcosm to be valued as equal to the macrocosm. Nature itself, always and everywhere truthful, gives him this knowledge from the outset and independently of all reflection, simply and with immediate certainty. From the two necessary determinations just stated it can now be explained why every individual, though it vanishes utterly in the boundless world and is diminished to nothing, nevertheless makes itself the center of the world, puts its own existence and well-being before everything else—indeed, from the natural standpoint, is ready to sacrifice everything else to this, ready to annihilate the world merely to preserve its own self, this drop in the ocean, a little longer. This disposition is *egoism*, which is essential to every thing in nature. But it is precisely through egoism that the inner conflict of the will with itself comes to terrible revelation. For this egoism has its basis and essence in that opposition of microcosm and macrocosm—that is, in the fact that the objectification of the will has the *principium individuationis* as its form, and that as a result the will appears to itself in the same way in countless individuals, and indeed in each of them whole and complete in both aspects (will and representation). So while each is immediately given to itself as the whole will and the whole of what represents, the others are at first given to it only as its representations; hence its own essence and the preservation of that essence take precedence over all the others together. Everyone regards his own death as the end of the world, whereas he hears of the death of his acquaintances as a fairly indifferent matter, unless he happens to be personally involved. In consciousness raised to the highest degree, the human, egoism too—like knowledge, pain and joy—must have reached the

highest degree, and the conflict among individuals that it conditions must emerge in the most appalling way. And this is indeed what we see everywhere before our eyes, in small things as in great. We see it now from its terrible side, in the lives of great tyrants and villains and in wars that devastate the world; now from its ludicrous side, where it is the theme of comedy and appears most particularly in conceit and vanity, which La Rochefoucauld grasped and presented *in abstracto* like no one else. We see it in world history and in our own experience.[53] But it emerges most clearly as soon as any crowd of people is released from all law and order: there at once the *bellum omnium contra omnes* [war of all against all] shows itself most plainly, which Hobbes has admirably described in the first chapter of *De cive*. It becomes evident that not only does each try to snatch from the other what he himself wants to have, but that often one person will even destroy another's entire happiness or life in order to increase his own well-being by some insignificant addition. This is the highest expression of egoism, whose appearances, in this respect, are surpassed only by those of actual malice, which, quite disinterestedly, seeks the harm and pain of others without any advantage to itself. Of this we shall soon speak.[54] —This uncovering of the source of egoism may be compared with my account of it in my prize essay on the basis of morality, § 14.[55]

One chief source of the suffering that we found above to be essential and unavoidable in all life is—as soon as it actually occurs in a definite form—that *Eris*, the struggle of all individuals, the expression of the contradiction with which the will to live is inwardly afflicted and which becomes visible through the *principium individuationis*. Animal fights are the cruel means of illustrating it immediately and glaringly. In this original discord lies an inexhaustible source of suffering, despite the precau-

53 François de La Rochefoucauld (1613–1680), French moralist, author of the *Maxims*.

54 *De cive* (On the Citizen, 1642) sets out Hobbes's theory of the state of nature.

55 Schopenhauer's essay *On the Basis of Morality* (1840) was submitted to the Royal Danish Society of Sciences, which declined to award it the prize.

tions that have been taken against it, which we shall now examine more closely.

§ 62. WRONG AND RIGHT

Wrong is the denial of another's will; right is only its negation, and property rests on labor.

4.62 It has already been explained that the first and simple affirmation of the will to live is only affirmation of one's own body, that is, presentation of the will through acts in time, to the extent that the body, in its form and purposiveness, already presents the same will spatially—and no further. This affirmation shows itself as preservation of the body through the application of its own powers. Directly connected with it is the satisfaction of the sexual drive; indeed it belongs to it, insofar as the genitals belong to the body. Hence *voluntary* renunciation of the satisfaction of that drive, grounded in no motive whatever, is already a degree of denial of the will to live: it is a voluntary self-abolition of the will upon the arrival of knowledge that acts as a *quieter*. Accordingly, such denial of one's own body already presents itself as a contradiction of the will against its own appearance. For although here too the body objectifies the will to propagation in the genitals, propagation is nevertheless not willed. Precisely for this reason—because it is denial or abolition of the will to live—such renunciation is a hard and painful self-conquest; but more on that below. —Now since the will presents that *self-affirmation* of its own body in countless individuals side by side, it very easily goes, by virtue of the egoism peculiar to all, beyond this affirmation in one individual, as far as the *denial* of the same will appearing in another individual. The will of the first breaks across the bounds of another's affirmation of will when the individual either destroys or injures the other body itself, or else compels the powers of that other body to serve *his* will instead of the will appearing in that other body itself. That is, he withdraws the powers of this body from the will appearing as that other body, and thereby increases the power serving his

will beyond the power of his own body; consequently he affirms his own will beyond his own body by denying the will appearing in another body.—This encroachment on the bounds of another's affirmation of will has always been clearly recognized, and its concept designated by the word *wrong*.[56] For both parties recognize the matter—not, as we do here, in clear abstraction, but as feeling, instantly. The one who suffers wrong feels the intrusion into the sphere of the affirmation of his own body, through its denial by another individual, as an immediate and mental pain, quite separate and distinct from the physical suffering caused by the deed, or from the vexation at the loss, which he feels alongside it. To the one who does wrong, on the other hand, there presents itself the knowledge that he is in himself the same will that also appears in that body—the will that affirms itself in the one appearance with such vehemence that, overstepping the bounds of its own body and its powers, it becomes the denial of this very will in the other appearance; and that consequently he, regarded as will in itself, strives against himself precisely through his vehemence and tears into his own flesh. To him too, I say, this knowledge presents itself instantly, not *in abstracto* but as an obscure feeling; and this is called remorse, or, more precisely in this case, the feeling of *wrong done*.

Wrong, whose concept we have thus analyzed in the most general abstraction, expresses itself *in concreto* most completely, most properly and most palpably in cannibalism. This is its clearest, most evident type, the appalling image of the greatest conflict of the will with itself at the highest grade of its objectification, which is man. Next to this, it expresses itself in murder. Upon the commission of murder, therefore, remorse—whose meaning we have just stated abstractly and dryly—instantly follows with terrible clarity and strikes a wound in the peace of mind that remains incurable for a whole lifetime. For our horror at a murder committed, like our shrinking back from a murder

56 *Unrecht* (wrong, injustice) and its opposite *Recht* (right; also law) are rendered "wrong" and "right" throughout.

yet to be committed, corresponds to the boundless attachment to life with which everything living, precisely as appearance of the will to live, is permeated. (We shall, by the way, later analyze in more detail that feeling which accompanies the doing of wrong and of evil, the anguish of conscience, and raise it to the clarity of a concept.) Intentional mutilation, or mere injury of another's body, indeed every blow, is to be regarded as essentially of the same kind as murder and as differing from it only in degree.—Further, wrong presents itself in the subjugation of another individual, in forcing him into slavery; and finally in an attack on another's property, which, insofar as that property is regarded as the fruit of his labor, is essentially of the same kind as slavery and stands to it as mere injury stands to murder.

For *property* that cannot be taken from a person *without wrong* can, according to our explanation of wrong, only be what has been worked on by his powers. By taking it away, one therefore withdraws the powers of his body from the will objectified in that body, in order to make them serve the will objectified in another body. For only in this way does the wrongdoer—by attacking not another's body but a lifeless thing quite different from it—nevertheless break into the sphere of another's affirmation of will: the powers, the labor, of the other body have, as it were, grown together with this thing and become identified with it. From this it follows that all genuine, that is, moral, right of property is originally founded solely and exclusively on working a thing. This was fairly generally assumed before Kant; indeed the oldest of all law codes states it clearly and beautifully: "Sages who know antiquity declare that a cultivated field is the property of him who cut down the timber, cleared it and plowed it, just as an antelope belongs to the first hunter who wounded it mortally."—Laws of Manu, IX, 44.—Only Kant's senility can explain to me his whole doctrine of right, a curious tangle of errors each dragging in the next, and also the fact that he wants to base the right of property on first occupation. For how could the mere declaration of my will to exclude others

from the use of a thing at once give me a *right* to do so?[57] Obviously such a declaration itself first needs a ground of right, whereas Kant assumes that it is one. And how could someone act wrongly in himself, that is, morally, if he disregarded claims to the exclusive possession of a thing that rest on nothing but their own declaration? How should his conscience trouble him about it? For it is so clear and easy to see that there can be no such thing at all as a *rightful taking of possession*, but only a rightful *appropriation, acquisition of possession* of the thing, through the application of one's own original powers to it. For where a thing has been worked on, improved, protected from accidents or preserved through someone's effort, however small—even if this effort were only the plucking of a wild-grown fruit or picking it up from the ground—whoever seizes such a thing obviously deprives the other of the result of the power he has expended on it. He thus makes the other's body serve *his* will instead of its own; he affirms his own will beyond its appearance, to the point of denying the other's; that is, he does wrong.[58]—By contrast, mere enjoyment of a thing, without any working of it or securing it against destruction, gives just as little right to it as the declaration of one's will to exclusive possession. Hence, even if a family has hunted alone in a certain territory for a century, but without doing anything to improve it, it cannot, without moral wrong, prevent a stranger who arrives and now wants to hunt there from doing so. The so-called right of preoccupation—according to which one demands, for the mere enjoyment one has had of a thing, a reward on top of that, namely an exclusive right to its further enjoyment—is thus morally quite groundless. Against someone relying merely on this right, the newcomer could reply with much better right: "Precisely

57 The Laws of Manu (*Manusmṛti*) is an ancient Indian code of law and conduct. Kant's doctrine of right is the first part of his *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797).

58 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. So to establish the natural right of property there is no need to assume two grounds of right side by side, one based on *detention* alongside one based on *formation*; the latter suffices everywhere. Only the name *formation* is not quite apt, since the expenditure of some effort on a thing need not always be a giving of form.

because you have enjoyed it so long, it is right that others should now enjoy it too." Of any thing that is utterly incapable of being worked on, whether by improvement or by being secured against accidents, there is no morally grounded exclusive possession—unless through voluntary cession on the part of all others, perhaps as a reward for other services; but this already presupposes a community regulated by convention, the state. —The morally grounded right of property, as derived above, by its nature gives the owner a power over the thing just as unrestricted as the power he has over his own body. From this it follows that he can transfer his property, by exchange or gift, to others, who then possess the thing with the same moral right as he.

As regards the *doing* of wrong in general, it takes place either through *force* or through *cunning*, which comes to the same thing as far as what is morally essential is concerned. First, in the case of murder it is morally the same whether I use a dagger or poison; and analogously with every bodily injury. The other cases of wrong can always be traced back to this: that I, as the wrongdoer, compel the other individual to serve my will instead of his own, to act according to my will instead of his. By way of force I achieve this through physical causality; by way of cunning, however, through motivation, that is, through causality that has passed through knowledge—consequently by pushing *sham motives* before his will, by virtue of which he follows *my* will while believing that he follows his own. Since the medium in which motives lie is knowledge, I can do this only by falsifying his knowledge, and this is the *lie*. It always aims at an effect on the other's will—not on his knowledge alone, for itself and as such, but on knowledge only as a means, namely insofar as it determines his will. For my lying itself, since it proceeds from my will, needs a motive. But such a motive can only be the other's will, not the other's knowledge in and for itself, since knowledge as such can never have an influence on *my* will, and so can never move it, never be a motive for its aims. Only the other's willing and doing can be such a motive, and through it, thus only indirectly, the other's knowledge. This holds not only

of all lies that spring from obvious self-interest, but also of those that arise from pure malice, which wants to gloat over the painful consequences of the error it has caused in another. Even mere bragging aims, by means of the greater respect or better opinion it wins from others, at a greater or easier influence on their willing and doing. Merely withholding a truth, that is, withholding any statement at all, is in itself no wrong; but foisting a lie on someone always is. Whoever refuses to show a lost traveler the right way does him no wrong; but whoever directs him down the wrong one does. —From what has been said it follows that every *lie*, just like every act of violence, is as such *wrong*: because already as such it has the aim of extending the dominion of my will over other individuals, thus of affirming my will by denying theirs, just as much as force does.—But the most complete lie is the *broken contract*, because here all the determinations mentioned are present together, completely and clearly. For when I enter into a contract, the other's promised performance is immediately and avowedly the motive for my own, which now follows. The promises are exchanged deliberately and formally. The truth of the statement each makes in them is, by assumption, within his power. If the other breaks the contract, he has deceived me: by slipping mere sham motives into my knowledge he has steered my will according to his intention and extended the dominion of his will over another individual, and has thus committed a complete wrong. On this rests the moral lawfulness and validity of *contracts*.

Wrong through force is not so *disgraceful* for the one who commits it as wrong through *cunning*. For the former testifies to physical strength, which under all circumstances impresses the human race; the latter, by taking a detour, betrays weakness and so degrades the wrongdoer as a physical and a moral being at once. Moreover, lies and fraud can succeed only if the one who practices them at the same time himself professes loathing and contempt for them in order to gain trust, and his victory rests on others crediting him with an honesty he does not have. —The deep loathing that treachery, faithlessness and betrayal arouse

everywhere rests on the fact that fidelity and honesty are the bond that, from outside, reunites into a unity the will splintered into the plurality of individuals, and thereby sets limits to the consequences of the egoism that has arisen from that splintering. Faithlessness and betrayal tear this last, external bond, and so give the consequences of egoism boundless scope.

In the context of our approach, we have found the content of the concept *wrong* to be the character of an individual's action in which it extends the affirmation of the will appearing in its life so far that this affirmation becomes the denial of the will appearing in other bodies. We have also shown, with quite general examples, the boundary where the domain of wrong begins, while at the same time determining its gradations, from the highest degree down to the lower ones, by means of a few principal concepts. Accordingly, the concept *wrong* is the original and positive one; the opposite concept of *right* is the derived and negative one. For we must keep not to words but to concepts. In fact, there would never have been any talk of *right* if there were no wrong. The concept *right*, that is, contains merely the negation of wrong, and under it is subsumed every action that is not a transgression of the boundary described above, that is, not a denial of another's will for the sake of a stronger affirmation of one's own. With respect to a purely *moral* determination, therefore, that boundary divides the whole domain of possible actions into those that are wrong and those that are right. As soon as an action does not, in the manner explained above, intrude upon the sphere of another's affirmation of will, denying it, it is not wrong. Hence, for example, refusing help when another is in urgent need, or calmly watching another die of hunger while one has plenty oneself, is indeed cruel and fiendish, but not wrong. Only this can be said with complete certainty: whoever is capable of carrying lovelessness and hardness to such a degree will quite certainly also commit every wrong as soon as his desires demand it and no compulsion prevents it.

The concept of *right*, as the negation of wrong, has however found its chief application, and no doubt also its first origin, in cases where attempted wrong is warded off by force. Such warding off cannot itself in turn be wrong, and is consequently right —although the violence exercised in it, considered merely in itself and in isolation, would be wrong, and here is only justified by its motive, that is, becomes right. If an individual goes so far in the affirmation of his own will that he intrudes upon the sphere of the affirmation of will essential to my person as such, and thereby denies it, then my warding off of that intrusion is only the denial of that denial. To that extent it is nothing more, on my part, than the affirmation of the will that appears essentially and originally in my body and is already *implicite* expressed by that body's mere appearance; consequently it is not wrong, and hence *right*. This means: I then have a right to deny that other's denial with the force necessary to abolish it. As is easy to see, this can go as far as killing the other individual, whose encroachment, as an intruding external force, may be warded off by a counteraction somewhat exceeding it, without any wrong, and consequently by right. For everything that happens on my side always lies only within the sphere of the affirmation of will essential to my person as such and already expressed by it (which is the scene of the struggle), and does not intrude upon the other's sphere; consequently it is only negation of the negation, thus affirmation, not itself negation. I can therefore, *without wrong*, *compel* the other's will to desist from denying my will—my will as it appears in my body and in the use of that body's powers for its preservation, without denying any other will that keeps within the same bounds. That is, to this extent I have a *right of coercion*.

In all cases where I have a right of coercion, a complete right to use *force* against others, I can, as circumstances require, just as well oppose cunning to the other's force without doing wrong; consequently I have an actual *right to lie, precisely as far as I have a right to coerce.* Hence someone who assures a highway robber searching him that he has nothing more on him acts per-

fectly rightly; so too does someone who, by a lie, lures a burglar who has broken in at night into a cellar and locks him up there. Someone carried off captive by robbers, for instance by Barbary pirates, has the right, in order to free himself, to kill them not only by open force but also by treachery. —That is also why a promise extorted by direct bodily violence is not binding at all: the one suffering such coercion can, with full right, free himself from his oppressors by killing them, let alone by deceiving them. Whoever cannot take back his stolen property by force commits no wrong if he recovers it by cunning. Indeed, if someone gambles away money he has stolen from me, I have the right to use loaded dice against him, because everything I win from him already belongs to me. Whoever wished to deny this would have to deny even more the lawfulness of ruses of war, which are even lies in action and a confirmation of the saying of Queen Christina of Sweden: "The words of men are to be counted for nothing; one can scarcely trust their deeds."—So sharply, then, does the boundary of right border on that of wrong. For the rest, I consider it superfluous to show that all this agrees completely with what was said above about the wrongfulness of lying as well as of force. It can also *serve* to shed light on the strange theories about the lie of necessity.[59]

According to all that has been said, then, wrong and right are merely *moral* determinations, that is, determinations that are valid with regard to the consideration of human action as such, and in relation to the *inner significance of this action in itself*. This significance announces itself immediately in consciousness. On the one hand, doing wrong is accompanied by an inner pain, which is the wrongdoer's merely felt awareness of the excessive strength of the affirmation of the will in himself—a strength that goes as far as denying another's appearance of will—and also of the fact that, although as appearance he is different from the one who suffers wrong, in himself he is identical with him. The

59 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. A fuller account of the doctrine of right set out here will be found in my prize essay "On the Basis of Morality," § 17, pp. 221–230 of the first edition.

further explanation of this inner significance of all anguish of conscience can only come later. The one who suffers wrong, on the other hand, is painfully conscious of the denial of his will as it is already expressed by his body and its natural needs, for whose satisfaction nature refers him to the powers of this body. At the same time he is conscious that, without doing wrong, he could ward off that denial in every way, if only he did not lack the power. This purely moral significance is the only one that right and wrong have for the human being as a human being, not as a citizen. It would therefore remain even in the state of nature, without any positive law, and it forms the basis and content of everything that has for this reason been called *natural right*, but would better be called moral right. For its validity extends not to suffering, to external reality, but only to doing and to the self-knowledge of his individual will that arises for the human being from his doing, and which is called *conscience*. In the state of nature, however, it cannot in every case assert itself outwardly as well, upon other individuals, and prevent force from ruling instead of right. In the state of nature, that is, it depends on each person alone not to *do* wrong in any case, but by no means not to *suffer* wrong in any case, which depends on his accidental external power. Hence the concepts right and wrong are valid for the state of nature too, and are by no means conventional; but there they hold merely as *moral* concepts, for the self-knowledge of one's own will in each person. They are, namely, a fixed point on the scale of the widely differing degrees of strength with which the will to live affirms itself in human individuals, like the freezing point on a thermometer: the point where the affirmation of one's own will becomes the denial of another's, that is, the point that, through wrongdoing, indicates the degree of the will's vehemence, combined with the degree to which knowledge is entangled in the *principium individuationis* (which is the form of knowledge wholly in the service of the will). But whoever wants to set aside or disavow the purely moral consideration of human action, and to consider action merely according to its external effect and its result, can indeed,

with *Hobbes*, declare right and wrong to be conventional determinations, arbitrarily adopted and therefore not existing at all outside positive law. And we can never teach him through external experience what does not belong to external experience; just as we could never show that same Hobbes a point without extension and a line without breadth. He characterized his thoroughly empirical way of thinking most remarkably by denying, in his book *"De principiis Geometrarum"* [On the Principles of the Geometers], the whole of pure mathematics proper, and stubbornly maintaining that the point has extension and the line breadth. So we could no more teach him the apriority of mathematics than the apriority of right, because he simply closes himself off from all non-empirical knowledge.

The pure *doctrine of right* is therefore a chapter of *ethics*, and it relates directly only to *doing*, not to *suffering*. For only doing is an expression of the will, and ethics considers the will alone. Suffering is a mere event. Ethics can take suffering into account only indirectly: its sole purpose there is to show that what is done merely to avoid suffering wrong is not doing wrong. — Working out that chapter of ethics would mean determining precisely the limit up to which an individual may go in affirming the will already objectified in his body, without this becoming a denial of that same will insofar as it appears in another individual. It would then also mean determining the actions that overstep this limit. These are consequently wrong, and can therefore in turn be warded off without wrong. So one's own *doing* would always remain the focus of the inquiry.

But in outer experience, as an event, there appears *suffering wrong*. In it, as I said, the will to live's conflict with itself shows itself more clearly than anywhere else. This conflict arises from the multiplicity of individuals and from egoism, both of which are conditioned by the *principium individuationis*, the form the world as representation takes for the individual's knowledge. We also saw above that a very large part of the suffering essential to human life has its ever-flowing source in this conflict between individuals.

THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE

Egoism, guided by reason, forms the state through a contract to escape suffering wrong.

Now all these individuals share reason, which lets them know not merely the particular case, as animals do, but also the whole in its connections, abstractly. Reason soon taught them to see the source of that suffering, and set them thinking about the means of reducing it or, if possible, abolishing it. That means is a common sacrifice, which is nevertheless outweighed by the common advantage that arises from it. For however pleasant doing wrong may be to the individual's egoism when occasion arises, it has a necessary correlate: another individual suffers the wrong, and to him this is a great pain. Reason, surveying the whole, stepped out of the one-sided standpoint of the individual to which it belongs and for the moment freed itself from its attachment to that individual. It then saw that one individual's enjoyment in doing wrong was always outweighed by a proportionately greater pain in the other's suffering of wrong. It found, further, that because everything here was left to chance, each person would have to fear that the enjoyment of occasionally doing wrong would fall to his lot far less often than the pain of suffering it. From this reason recognized that there was one means, the best and the only one, both to lessen the suffering spread over everyone and to distribute it as evenly as possible. That means was to spare everyone the pain of suffering wrong by having everyone also renounce the enjoyment to be gained from doing wrong.—This means was easily devised and gradually perfected by egoism, once egoism uses reason, proceeds methodically and abandons its one-sided standpoint. It is the *social contract*, or the *law*. Plato already set out its origin, as I give it here, in the *Republic*. Indeed, that origin is essentially the only one, the one fixed by the nature of the case.[60] Nor can the state,

60 In book 2 of the *Republic*, Glaucon describes justice as a compact made because people fear suffering wrong more than they enjoy doing it.

in any country, ever have had any other, for it is precisely this way of arising, this purpose, that first makes it a state. It makes no difference whether the condition that preceded it in a particular people was that of a crowd of mutually independent people living in a state of nature (anarchy), or that of a crowd of slaves ruled arbitrarily by the stronger (despotism). In neither case was there yet a state. A state arises only through that common agreement, and it is more or less perfect according as this agreement is more or less free of any admixture of anarchy or despotism. Republics tend toward anarchy, monarchies toward despotism. Constitutional monarchy, the middle way devised to avoid both, tends toward rule by factions. To found a perfect state, one would have to begin by creating beings whose nature allows them to sacrifice their own welfare to the public good in every case. Until then, however, something can already be achieved by having one family whose welfare is quite inseparable from that of the country, so that, at least in the main things, it can never promote the one without the other. This is the source of the strength and advantage of hereditary monarchy.

Ethics, then, was concerned exclusively with *doing* right or wrong, and could mark out precisely the limit of his actions for anyone who might be resolved to do no wrong. Political theory, the theory of legislation, is conversely concerned solely with *suffering* wrong. It would never trouble itself about *doing* wrong were it not for doing wrong's invariably necessary correlate, suffering wrong, which is its focus as the enemy it works against. Indeed, if a wrongdoing could be conceived that involved no suffering of wrong on anyone else's part, the state, to be consistent, would by no means forbid it. —Further, in *ethics* the will, the disposition, is the object of consideration and alone is real. For ethics, therefore, a firm will to commit a wrong, held back and made ineffective only by external power, counts exactly as much as a wrong actually committed, and ethics condemns whoever wills it as unjust before its judgment seat. The state, by contrast, cares nothing at all about will and disposition merely as such. It cares only about the *deed* (whether merely attempted or carried

out), because of its correlate, the *suffering* on the other side. For the state, then, the deed, the event, alone is real. The disposition, the intention, is inquired into only insofar as it reveals the significance of the deed. Hence the state will forbid no one to carry murder and poison against another constantly in his thoughts, as long as it knows for certain that fear of the sword and the wheel will constantly check the effects of that willing. Nor does the state have the foolish plan of eradicating the inclination to do wrong, the wicked disposition. It merely sets beside every possible motive for committing a wrong an outweighing motive for refraining from it, in the form of inevitable punishment. Accordingly the criminal code is as complete a register as possible of countermotives to all criminal acts presumed possible—both *in abstracto*, so that they can be applied *in concreto* when a case arises. For this purpose political theory, or legislation, will borrow from ethics the chapter that is the doctrine of right. Besides the inner significance of right and wrong, this chapter determines the exact boundary between them. But legislation borrows it solely in order to use its reverse side. Ethics lays down limits that are impassable if one does not want to *do* wrong. Legislation looks at them from the other side, as the limits whose transgression by others one must not tolerate if one does not want to *suffer* wrong, and from which one therefore has a *right* to drive others back. So these limits are now, from the possibly passive side, fortified with laws. It follows that, just as the historian has quite wittily been called a prophet turned backward, the teacher of law is the moralist turned around. Accordingly, the doctrine of right in the proper sense, that is, the doctrine of the *rights* one may assert, is ethics turned around, in the chapter where ethics teaches the rights one must not violate. The concept of wrong, and of its negation, right, is originally *moral*. It becomes *juridical* when the starting point is shifted from the active to the passive side, that is, by being turned around.[61] This, together with the doctrine of right of

61 The quip is Friedrich Schlegel's: "The historian is a prophet facing backward" (*Athenaeum* Fragments, 1798).

Kant, who very wrongly derives the establishment of the state from his categorical imperative as a moral duty, has in recent times occasionally given rise to a very strange error. According to this error, the state is an institution for promoting morality, arises from the striving for morality, and is therefore directed against egoism. As if the inner disposition, to which alone morality or immorality belongs—the eternally free will—could be modified from outside and changed by influence! Still more perverse is the theorem that the state is the condition of freedom in the moral sense, and thereby of morality. Yet freedom lies beyond appearance, let alone beyond human institutions. The state, as I said, is so far from being directed against egoism in general and as such that, on the contrary, it has sprung from the egoism of all and exists solely to serve it. This is an egoism that understands itself well, proceeds methodically, steps from the one-sided to the universal standpoint, and so becomes common by being added up. The state was established on the correct assumption that pure morality, that is, acting rightly from moral reasons, is not to be expected; otherwise the state itself would indeed be superfluous. The state, whose aim is well-being, is therefore directed not at all against egoism. It is directed only against egoism's harmful consequences, which arise for all egoistic individuals from their multiplicity, mutually, and disturb their well-being. Hence *Aristotle* already says (*De Rep.*, III): *Telos men oun poleôs to eu zên; touto de estin to zên eudaimonôs kai kalôs; (Finis civitatis est bene vivere, hoc autem est beate et pulchre vivere.)* [The end of the state is living well; and this is living happily and nobly.] Hobbes too set out this origin and purpose of the state quite correctly and excellently. The old principle of all political order, *salus publica prima lex esto* [let the public welfare be the first law], expresses the same thing.—If the state fully attains its purpose, it will produce the same phenomenon as if perfect justice of disposition prevailed everywhere. But the inner essence and origin of the two phenomena will be the reverse of

each other.[62] In the latter case, that is, the source would be that no one wanted to *do* wrong. In the former, the source would be that no one wanted to *suffer* wrong and that the proper means to this end had been applied perfectly. Thus the same line can be drawn from opposite directions, and a beast of prey with a muzzle is as harmless as a grazing animal.—But the state cannot get beyond this point. It cannot, therefore, present a phenomenon like the one that would spring from universal mutual goodwill and love. We have just found that, by its nature, the state would not forbid a wrongdoing to which no suffering of wrong on anyone's part corresponded, and that it forbids every wrongdoing only because such a case is impossible. In the same way, conversely, its tendency toward the well-being of all would make it very glad to see that everyone *received* goodwill and works of human kindness of every kind. The obstacle is that these too have an unavoidable correlate in the *performing* of kindnesses and works of love. Here, however, every citizen of the state would want to take the passive role and none the active, and there would be no reason to expect the active role of one person rather than another. Accordingly, only the negative, which is precisely *right*, can be *enforced*. The positive, which has been understood under the name of duties of love, or imperfect duties, cannot.

Legislation, as I said, borrows the pure doctrine of right—the doctrine of the essence and limits of right and wrong—from ethics. It applies it from the reverse side to its own purposes, which are foreign to ethics, and on that basis establishes positive legislation and the means of upholding it, that is, the state. Positive legislation is therefore the purely moral doctrine of right applied from the reverse side. This application can take into account the particular conditions and circumstances of a given people. But only on one condition is the resulting legislation really a *positive right*, and the state a *lawful* association, a *state* in the proper sense of the word, a morally permissible and not an

62 Aristotle, *Politics*, book 3, ch. 9. The maxim adapts Cicero's *salus populi suprema lex esto* (*On the Laws* 3.8).

immoral institution. Positive legislation must, in essentials, be determined throughout under the guidance of the pure doctrine of right, and for each of its statutes a ground must be demonstrable in the pure doctrine of right. Otherwise positive legislation establishes a *positive wrong*; it is itself a publicly avowed, enforced wrong. Such is every despotism, and the constitution of most Muslim empires. To this class belong even some parts of many constitutions, for example serfdom, forced labor and the like. —The pure doctrine of right, or natural right, or better, moral right, underlies all lawful positive legislation, though always by inversion, just as pure mathematics underlies every branch of applied mathematics. The most important points of the pure doctrine of right, as philosophy has to hand it over to legislation for that purpose, are the following: 1) Explanation of the inner and real significance and the origin of the concepts of wrong and right, and of their application and place in ethics. 2) The derivation of the right of property. 3) The derivation of the moral validity of contracts, since this is the moral foundation of the social contract. 4) Explanation of the origin and purpose of the state, of the relation of this purpose to ethics, and of the transfer of the moral doctrine of right to legislation, by inversion, which this relation makes appropriate. 5) The derivation of the right to punish.—The rest of the doctrine of right is mere application of these principles. It determines more closely the limits of right and wrong for all possible relations of life, which are therefore grouped and divided under certain headings and titles. On these particular doctrines the textbooks of pure law all agree fairly well. Only in their principles do they differ widely, because principles are always bound up with some philosophical system. We have now discussed the first four of those main points in accordance with our own system, briefly and in general, but definitely and clearly. It remains to speak of the right to punish in the same way.

THE RIGHT TO PUNISH

Punishment exists only in the state and aims at deterring future crime, unlike revenge.

Kant puts forward the fundamentally false assertion that outside the state there is no perfect right of property. According to our derivation above, there is property even in the state of nature, with perfect natural, that is, moral, right. It cannot be violated without wrong, but it can be defended to the utmost without wrong. On the other hand, it is certain that outside the state there is no *right to punish*. All right to punish is grounded solely in positive law. Positive law fixed a punishment for the offense *before* the offense took place, and the threat of this punishment, as a countermotive, was meant to outweigh any motives for the offense. This positive law is to be regarded as sanctioned and acknowledged by all the citizens of the state. It rests, therefore, on a common contract, which the members of the state are bound to fulfill under all circumstances: to carry out the punishment on the one side, and to submit to it on the other. Hence submission can rightly be compelled. Consequently, the immediate *purpose of punishment* in the individual case is *fulfillment of the law as a contract*. But the sole purpose of the *law* is *deterrence* from infringing the rights of others. People united into a state, renounced doing wrong and took on the burdens of maintaining the state precisely so that everyone might be protected from suffering wrong. The law, then, and its execution, punishment, are essentially directed toward the *future*, not the *past*. This distinguishes *punishment* from *revenge*, which is motivated solely by what has happened, that is, by the past as such. Every requiting of wrong by inflicting pain, without a purpose for the future, is revenge. Its only possible purpose is to console oneself for what one has suffered by the sight of the suffering one has caused another. Such a thing is malice and cruelty, and ethically unjustifiable. A wrong someone has done me in no way entitles me to do him wrong. Repaying evil with

evil, with no further intention, cannot be justified morally or on any other rational ground. The *jus talionis* [law of retaliation], set up as the independent, ultimate principle of the right to punish, is meaningless. Hence Kant's theory of punishment as mere retribution, for retribution's sake, is a completely groundless and perverse view. And yet it still haunts the writings of many legal scholars, dressed up in all sorts of grand phrases that come down to empty verbiage, such as: punishment expiates the crime, or neutralizes and cancels it, and so on. But no human being has the authority to set himself up as a purely moral judge and avenger, to visit another's misdeeds upon him through the pains he inflicts, and so to impose penance on him for them. This would rather be the most presumptuous arrogance. Hence, precisely, the biblical saying: "Vengeance is mine, says the Lord, and I will repay."[63] Human beings do, however, have the right to see to the safety of society. This can be done only by proscribing all the actions designated by the word "criminal", so as to prevent them through countermotives, which are the threatened punishments. And the threat can be effective only if it is carried out when such a case nevertheless occurs. That the purpose of punishment, or more precisely of the criminal law, is deterrence from crime is so universally acknowledged, indeed so self-evident, a truth that in England it is even stated in the very old form of accusation (*indictment*) still used today by counsel for the Crown in criminal cases. It ends: *if this be proved, you, the said N. N., ought to be punished with pains of law, to deter others from the like crimes, in all time coming.*[64] When a prince wishes to pardon a justly condemned criminal, his minister will object that the crime would then soon be repeated.—A purpose for the future distinguishes punishment from revenge, and punishment has such a purpose only when it is carried out *in fulfillment of a law*. Only in this way does the fulfillment announce itself as inevitable for every future case too, and so preserve for the law the

63 Romans 12:19, quoting Deuteronomy 32:35.

64 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. If this is proved, you, the said *N. N.*, must suffer the legal penalty, to deter others from similar crimes in all time to come.

power to deter, which is precisely its purpose.—Here a Kantian would infallibly object that, on this view, the punished criminal would be used "merely as a *means*". All the Kantians tirelessly repeat the proposition that "one may always treat a human being only as an end, never as a means". It certainly sounds impressive, and it is therefore highly suitable for all those who like a formula that spares them any further thinking. But looked at in broad daylight, it is a most vague and indefinite pronouncement, which achieves its aim only very indirectly. In every case where it is applied, it first needs special explanation, specification and modification; taken in such generality, it is inadequate, says little, and is problematic besides. The murderer who has incurred the death penalty under the law must now certainly, and with full right, be used as a mere *means*. For he has disturbed public security, the chief purpose of the state, and it is indeed abolished if the law remains unfulfilled. He, his life, his person, must now be the *means* of fulfilling the law and thereby of restoring public security. He is made into this means with every right, in execution of the social contract, which he too had entered into insofar as he was a citizen. Under that contract, in order to enjoy security for his life, his freedom and his property, he had also pledged his life, his freedom and his property for the security of all—and that pledge has now been forfeited.

This theory of punishment, which I have set out here and which is immediately evident to sound reason, is admittedly not a new thought in the main. It is only a thought that new errors have almost displaced, and to that extent it needed the clearest possible statement. In essentials it is already contained in what Pufendorf says on the subject in *"De officio hominis et civis"* [On the Duty of Man and Citizen], book 2, chapter 13. Hobbes agrees with it too: "Leviathan", chapters 15 and 28. In our own day, as is well known, *Feuerbach* has championed it. Indeed, it is found already in the sayings of the ancient philosophers. Plato sets it out clearly in the *Protagoras* (p. 114, *edit. Bip.*), also in the *Gorgias*

(p. 168), and finally in the eleventh book of the *Laws* (p. 165).[65] Seneca states Plato's opinion, and the theory of all punishment, perfectly in a few words: *Nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est; sed ne peccetur (De ira, I,16)* [No sensible person punishes because a wrong has been done, but so that no wrong will be done].[66]

In the state, then, we have come to know the means by which egoism, equipped with reason, tries to avoid its own evil consequences, which turn against itself. Now each person promotes the well-being of all, because he sees his own included in it. Through the human powers united in it, the state is also able to make the rest of nature more and more serviceable to it. If it attained its purpose completely, it could therefore in a sense finally bring about something approaching a land of Cockaigne, by removing every kind of ill.[67] But, for one thing, the state has always remained very far from this goal. For another, countless ills that are absolutely essential to life would still keep life in suffering as before. Among them is boredom, which, even if all the others were removed, in the end immediately occupies every place they have vacated. For another, the state can never entirely abolish even the strife between individuals, which needles in small things where it is proscribed in great ones. And finally Eris, happily driven out from within, at last turns outward. Banished by the institutions of the state as strife between individuals, she returns from outside as war between peoples. Now, on a large scale and all at once, she demands like an accumulated debt the bloody sacrifices that prudent precautions had withheld from her in individual cases.[68] Indeed, suppose that all this too were at last overcome and removed by a prudence founded on the experience of millennia. The final result would be

65 Anselm von Feuerbach (1775–1833), the criminal jurist and father of the philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, grounded punishment in deterrence.
66 Seneca, *On Anger*, book 1.
67 Cockaigne is the imaginary land of plenty and idleness of medieval legend (German *Schlaraffenland*).
68 Eris is the Greek goddess of strife and discord.

the actual overpopulation of the whole planet, whose terrible ills only a bold imagination can now picture.[69]

§ 63. ETERNAL JUSTICE

Seen through the veil of Maya, tormentor and tormented are one will, so the world is its own court.

4.63 We have come to know *temporal justice*, which has its seat in the state, as requiting or punishing. We have seen that it becomes justice only through regard for the *future*. Without such regard, all punishing and requiting of an outrage would remain unjustified. Indeed, it would merely add a second evil to what has happened, without sense or significance. But it is quite otherwise with *eternal justice*, which was mentioned earlier. It rules not the state but the world. It does not depend on human institutions and is not subject to chance and deception. It is not uncertain, wavering and erring, but infallible, fixed and sure. —The concept of requital already contains time within it. Hence *eternal justice* cannot be a requiting justice. Unlike requiting justice, it cannot allow postponement and delay; it cannot balance the bad deed with the bad consequence only by means of time, and so it cannot need time in order to exist. Here the punishment must be so bound up with the offense that the two are one.

69 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 47 of the second volume (the Supplements).

Dokeite pêdan t' adikêmat' eis theous
Pteroisi, kapeit' en Dios deltou ptychais
Graphein tin' auta, Zêna d' eisorônta nin
Thnêtois dikazein; Oud' ho pas [an] ouranos,
Dios graphontos tas brotôn hamartias,
Exarkeseien, oud' ekeinos an skopôn
Pempein hekastô zêmian; all' hê Dikê
Entautha pou stin engys, ei boulesth' horan.
Eurip., ap. Stob. *Ecl., I, c. 4.*
(Volare pennis scelera ad aetherias domus
Putatis, illic in Jovis tabularia
Scripto referri; tum Jovem lectis super
Sententiam proferre – sed mortalium
Facinora coeli, quantaquanta est, regia
Nequit tenere: nec legendis Juppiter
Et puniendis par est. Est tamen ultio,
Et, si intuemur, illa nos habitat prope.) [You think that crimes fly on wings to the dwellings of heaven, are recorded there in writing in Jupiter's archives, and that Jupiter then reads them and pronounces sentence. But the palace of heaven, vast as it is, could not hold the misdeeds of mortals, nor is Jupiter equal to reading and punishing them. Yet retribution exists, and, if we look, it dwells close beside us.][70]

That such an eternal justice really lies in the essence of the world will soon become perfectly evident, from the whole of the thought we have developed so far, to anyone who has grasped it.

The world, in all the multiplicity of its parts and forms, is the appearance, the objecthood, of the one will to live. Existence itself, and the kind of existence, in the totality as in each part, comes from the will alone. The will is free; it is omnipotent. In every thing the will appears exactly as it determines itself in itself and outside time. The world is only the mirror of this will-

70 A fragment of a lost play by Euripides, preserved in Stobaeus' *Eclogae*; the Latin is a verse rendering of the Greek.

ing. All the finitude, all the sufferings, all the torments it contains belong to the expression of what the will wills. They are as they are because the will so wills. Accordingly, every being bears, with the strictest right, existence in general. It bears, further, the existence of its species and of its own particular individuality, exactly as it is and in surroundings as they are, in a world such as it is: ruled by chance and error, temporal, transitory, always suffering. And in everything that befalls it, or indeed only can befall it, justice is always done to it. For the will is its own, and as the will is, so is the world. Responsibility for the existence and nature of this world can be borne only by the world itself, and by no other; for how could another have taken it on?—If we want to know what human beings, morally considered, are worth as a whole and in general, let us consider their fate as a whole and in general. Their fate is want, misery, wretchedness, torment and death. Eternal justice prevails. If they were not, taken as a whole, worthless, their fate, taken as a whole, would not be so sad. In this sense we can say: the world itself is the world's court of judgment. If one could lay all the misery of the world in *one* pan of the scales and all the guilt of the world in the other, the pointer would certainly stand level.[71]

Knowledge, however, sprang up to serve the will, and as it comes to the individual as such, the world does not present itself to it as it finally reveals itself to the inquirer: as the objecthood of the one and only will to live, which he himself is. Instead, as the Indians say, the veil of Maya clouds the sight of the untutored individual. What he sees, in place of the thing in itself, is only the appearance, in time and space, the *principium individuationis*, and in the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason. In this form of his limited knowledge he does not see the essence of things, which is one. He sees its appearances, as separated, divided, innumerable, very different, indeed opposed. So pleasure appears to him as one thing and torment as quite another; this man as tormentor and murderer, that one

71 An echo of Schiller's line "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht" (world history is the world's court of judgment), from his poem "Resignation".

as sufferer and victim; wickedness as one thing and ill as another. He sees one person living in joy, abundance and pleasures, and at the same time, at that person's door, another dying in agony from want and cold. Then he asks: where is the retribution? And he himself, driven by the violent urge of will that is his origin and his essence, seizes the pleasures and enjoyments of life and clutches them tight. He does not know that by this very act of his will he is seizing, and pressing tightly to himself, all the pains and torments of life at whose sight he shudders. He sees ill, he sees wickedness in the world. But far from recognizing that both are only different sides of the appearance of the one will to live, he takes them to be very different, indeed quite opposed. Often, caught up in the *principium individuationis* and deceived by the veil of Maya, he tries through wickedness—that is, by causing another's suffering—to escape ill, the suffering of his own individual self. —For just as a boatman sits in a small boat on a raging sea, boundless on every side, that raises and lowers howling mountains of water, trusting his frail craft; so the individual human being sits calmly in the midst of a world full of torments, supported by and trusting in the *principium individuationis*, the way in which the individual knows things, as appearance. The boundless world, full of suffering everywhere, in an infinite past, in an infinite future, is foreign to him—indeed it is a fairy tale to him. His vanishing person, his extensionless present, his momentary comfort: this alone has reality for him. And to preserve this he does everything, as long as no better knowledge opens his eyes. Until then, only in the innermost depths of his consciousness there lives a wholly obscure presentiment. It tells him that all this is not really so foreign to him after all, but has a connection with him against which the *principium individuationis* cannot protect him. From this presentiment comes that ineradicable *dread*, common to all human beings (and perhaps even to the more intelligent animals), which suddenly seizes them when some chance makes them lose their hold on the *principium individuationis*. This happens when the principle of sufficient reason, in one of its forms,

seems to suffer an exception: for example, when it seems that some change is taking place without a cause, or that someone dead is here again, or that in some other way the past or the future is present, or the distant near. The immense horror such things arouse rests on the fact that people suddenly lose their hold on the forms in which appearances are known, which alone keep their own individual self separate from the rest of the world. But this separation lies only in appearance and not in the thing in itself. And on precisely this rests eternal justice. —In fact, all temporal happiness stands, and all prudence walks—on undermined ground. They protect the person from misfortunes and procure it pleasures. But the person is mere appearance. Its difference from other individuals, and its freedom from the sufferings they bear, rest on the form of appearance, the *principium individuationis*. According to the true essence of things, everyone has to regard all the sufferings of the world as his own, indeed all merely possible sufferings as actual for him, as long as he is the firm will to live, that is, as long as he affirms life with all his strength. For knowledge that sees through the *principium individuationis*, a happy life in time, whether bestowed by chance or won from it by prudence, amid the sufferings of countless others—is after all only a beggar's dream in which he is a king. But he must wake from it, and learn that only a fleeting illusion had separated him from the suffering of his life.

Eternal justice eludes a gaze that is caught up in the knowledge following the principle of sufficient reason, in the *principium individuationis*. Such a gaze misses it entirely, unless it rescues it through fictions. It sees the wicked man, after misdeeds and cruelties of every kind, living in joy and leaving the world unchallenged. It sees the oppressed dragging out a life full of suffering to the end, with no avenger, no requiter appearing. But eternal justice will be comprehended and grasped only by one who rises above that knowledge, which proceeds along the guiding thread of the principle of sufficient reason and is bound to individual things. He must know the Ideas, see through the *principium individuationis*, and become aware that

the forms of appearance do not belong to the thing in itself. He alone, too, by virtue of the same knowledge, can understand the true nature of virtue, as it will soon be disclosed to us in connection with the present discussion—although this knowledge *in abstracto* is by no means required for practicing virtue. So whoever has attained this knowledge sees clearly that the will is the in-itself of all appearance. It follows that the torment inflicted on others and the torment one experiences oneself, wickedness and ill, always strike only that one and the same being. This is so even though the appearances in which the one and the other present themselves stand there as quite different individuals, and are even separated by distant times and places. He sees that the difference between the one who inflicts the suffering and the one who must endure it is only phenomenon, and does not touch the thing in itself, which is the will living in both. Deceived here by the knowledge bound to its service, the will fails to recognize itself. Seeking enhanced well-being in *one* of its appearances, it produces great suffering in *another*. So, in its violent urge, it sinks its teeth into its own flesh, not knowing that it only ever wounds itself. In this way, through the medium of individuation, it reveals the conflict with itself that it bears within. The tormentor and the tormented are one. The former errs in believing he has no share in the torment, the latter in believing he has no share in the guilt. If the eyes of both were opened, the one who inflicts suffering would recognize that he lives in everything that suffers torment anywhere in the wide world. If such a being is endowed with reason, it ponders in vain why it was called into existence for such great suffering, when it cannot see what it is guilty of. And the tormented would see that all the wickedness committed in the world, now or ever, flows from the will that also constitutes *his* essence and appears in *him* too. Through this appearance and its affirmation he has taken upon himself all the sufferings that proceed from such a will, and he rightly endures them as long as he is this will.—It is from this knowledge that the prescient poet Calderón speaks in *Life Is a Dream*:

Pues el delito mayor
Del hombre es haber nacido.
(For man's greatest guilt
Is that he was born.)[72]

How could it not be a guilt, when by an eternal law death is its penalty? In that verse Calderón has merely expressed the Christian dogma of original sin.

Eternal justice is the balance beam that inseparably links the *malum culpae* [evil of guilt] with the *malum poenae* [evil of punishment]. Living knowledge of it requires complete elevation above individuality and the principle that makes individuality possible. Like the pure and distinct knowledge of the essence of all virtue, which is akin to it and will be discussed shortly, it will therefore always remain inaccessible to most people.—That is why the wise forefathers of the Indian people expressed it directly only in the Vedas, which are permitted solely to the three twice-born castes, or in the esoteric doctrine of wisdom. They expressed it there as far as concept and language can grasp it and as their still figurative, even rhapsodic, manner of presentation allows. In the popular religion, or exoteric doctrine, they communicated it only in myth. We find the direct presentation in the Vedas, the fruit of the highest human knowledge and wisdom, whose kernel has at last reached us in the Upanishads as the greatest gift of this century. It is expressed there in many ways, but above all in this: all the beings of the world, living and lifeless, are led one after another before the pupil's eyes, and over each of them is pronounced the word that has become a formula and is, as such, called the *Mahavakya*: *Tatoumes*, more correctly *tat twam asi*, which means:[73] "This you are."[74]—To the people, however, that great truth was translated, as far as they could grasp it in their limitation, into the mode of knowledge

72 From Segismundo's soliloquy in Act 1.

73 *Mahavakya* means "great saying". *Tat tvam asi* comes from the Chandogya Upanishad (6.8.7); *Tatoumes* is the form given in the Latin *Oupnek'hat*, Schopenhauer's source.

74 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Oupnek'hat*, vol. 1, pp. 60 ff.

that follows the principle of sufficient reason. By its nature this mode of knowledge cannot take in that truth purely and in itself at all, and even stands in direct contradiction to it. Yet in the form of myth it received a substitute for the truth, which was sufficient as a guide for conduct. For the myth makes the ethical significance of conduct comprehensible through figurative presentation, within the mode of knowledge according to the principle of sufficient reason, which is eternally foreign to that significance itself. This is the aim of all religious doctrines, since they are all mythical garbs for a truth inaccessible to the untutored human mind. In this sense, too, that myth could be called, in Kant's language, a postulate of practical reason. Regarded as such, however, it has the great advantage of containing no elements except those that lie before our eyes in the realm of reality, so that it can back all its concepts with intuitions. The myth meant here is that of the transmigration of souls. It teaches that all the sufferings one inflicts on other beings in life must be atoned for in a following life in this very world, by precisely the same sufferings. This goes so far that whoever kills even an animal will one day, in infinite time, be born as just such an animal and suffer the same death. It teaches that wicked conduct brings in its train a future life, in this world, in suffering and despised beings: one is then reborn in lower castes, or as a woman, or as an animal, as a Pariah or Chandala, as someone afflicted with leprosy, as a crocodile, and so on. All the torments the myth threatens it backs with intuitions from the real world, through suffering beings who likewise do not know how they deserved their torment, and it needs no other hell to help it out. As a reward, on the other hand, it promises rebirth in better, nobler forms: as a Brahmin, as a sage, as a saint.[75] The highest reward awaits the noblest deeds and complete resignation. It is also granted to the woman who in seven successive lives has voluntarily died on her husband's funeral pyre, and no less to the person whose pure mouth has

75 Pariahs and Chandalas were groups placed outside the four castes and treated as the lowest in the traditional Indian social order.

never spoken a single lie. The myth can express this reward in the language of this world only negatively, through the promise, so often repeated, of never again being reborn: *non adsumes iterum existentiam apparentem* [you will not again take on apparent existence]. Or, as the Buddhists, who accept neither the Veda nor castes, put it: "You shall attain Nirvana, that is, a state in which four things do not exist: birth, old age, sickness and death."

Never has a myth, and never will one, adhered more closely to the philosophical truth, accessible as it is to so few, than this ancient doctrine of the noblest and oldest people. Degenerate as that people now is in many respects, the doctrine still prevails among them as universal popular belief and has a decisive influence on life, today as much as four thousand years ago. That is why Pythagoras and Plato already seized with admiration on this *non plus ultra* [ultimate] of mythical presentation, took it over from India or Egypt, revered it, applied it, and—we do not know how far—believed it themselves.—We, by contrast, now send the Brahmins English *clergymen* and Moravian linen weavers, to set them right out of compassion and to inform them that they were made out of nothing and should be thankfully glad of it.[76] But what happens to us is what happens to someone who fires a bullet at a rock. In India our religions will never, ever take root: the primeval wisdom of the human race will not be displaced by the events in Galilee. On the contrary, Indian wisdom is flowing back to Europe and will bring about a fundamental change in our knowledge and thought.

§ 64. TWO HINTS OF ETERNAL JUSTICE

The demand that the wrongdoer suffer, and the avenger who gives his life, show a dim sense of it.

4.64 But we now want to move on from our presentation of eternal justice, which is philosophical rather than mythical, to the

76 The Moravian Brethren (Herrnhuter), a Pietist church based at Herrnhut in Saxony, were active missionaries, many of them artisans.

related considerations of the ethical significance of action and of conscience, which is the merely felt knowledge of that significance.—First, though, I want to draw attention here to two peculiarities of human nature. They may help to make clear how everyone is conscious, at least as an obscure feeling, of the nature of that eternal justice and of the unity and identity of the will in all its appearances, on which that justice rests.

Quite independently of the state's purpose in punishment, which we have demonstrated and on which penal law is founded, it gives satisfaction, after an evil deed has been done, to see that the one who caused another pain suffers in return exactly the same measure of pain. This satisfaction is felt not only by the injured party, who is mostly driven by vindictiveness, but also by the wholly uninvolved spectator. In this, it seems to me, nothing other is expressed than precisely the consciousness of that eternal justice. The unpurified mind, however, at once misunderstands and falsifies it. Caught in the *principium individuationis*, it commits an amphiboly of concepts and demands of the appearance what belongs only to the thing in itself. It does not see to what extent the offender and the offended are in themselves one, and that it is the same being which, not recognizing itself in its own appearance, bears both the torment and the guilt. Instead, it demands to see the torment again in the very same individual to whom the guilt belongs.[77] —That is why most people would also demand that a man with a very high degree of wickedness—wickedness that may well be found in many, only not paired, as in him, with other qualities—a man, that is, who at the same time far surpassed others through unusual power of mind, and who consequently inflicted unspeakable sufferings on millions of others, for instance as a conqueror of the world—they would demand, I say, that such a man should at some time and in some place atone for all those sufferings with an equal measure of pain. For they do not recognize how in themselves the tormentor and the tormented are

77 "Amphiboly of concepts" is Kant's term (*Critique of Pure Reason*) for confusing what holds of one kind of object with what holds of another.

one. They do not see that the same will through which the tormented exist and live is also the very will that appears in the tormentor and, precisely through him, reaches the clearest revelation of its nature; and that this will suffers in the oppressor just as in the oppressed—indeed, in the oppressor all the more, in proportion as his consciousness has greater clarity and distinctness and his will greater vehemence.—But that the deeper knowledge, no longer caught in the *principium individuationis*, from which all virtue and nobility of mind proceed, no longer harbors that disposition which demands retribution, is already attested by Christian ethics. It absolutely forbids all repaying of evil with evil and lets eternal justice hold sway in the realm of the thing in itself, which is distinct from that of appearance. ("Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord." Romans 12:19.)

A far more striking, but also far rarer, trait of human nature expresses that desire to draw eternal justice into the domain of experience, that is, of individuation. At the same time it hints at a felt consciousness that, as I put it above, the will to live performs the great tragedy and comedy at its own expense, and that one and the same will lives in all appearances. Such a trait, I say, is the following. We sometimes see a person so deeply outraged by a great atrocity that he has suffered, or perhaps only witnessed, that he deliberately stakes his own life, with no hope of escape, on taking revenge on the perpetrator of that outrage. We see him, say, hunting down a powerful oppressor for years, finally murdering him, and then himself dying on the scaffold, as he had foreseen, and indeed often did not even try to avoid, since his life had kept its value for him only as a means to revenge. —Such examples are found especially among the Spaniards.[78] Now if we look closely at the spirit of this craving for retribution, we find it very different from common revenge,

78 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. That Spanish bishop who, in the last war, poisoned himself and the French generals at his table at the same time belongs here, as do several other facts from that war. Examples can also be found in Montaigne, Book 2, Chapter 12.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The "last war" is the Peninsular War against Napoleon (1808–1814). Montaigne's *Essays* II.12 is the "Apology for Raymond Sebond."

which seeks to soften the suffering endured by the sight of the suffering it causes. Indeed, we find that what it aims at deserves to be called not so much revenge as punishment. For it really contains the intention of acting on the future through the example—and here without any selfish purpose, whether for the avenging individual, since he perishes in the process, or for a society that secures its safety through laws. For this punishment is carried out by an individual, not by the state, and not in fulfillment of a law; rather, it always falls on a deed that the state would not or could not punish, and whose punishment in this way it disapproves of. It seems to me that the indignation which drives such a person so far beyond the bounds of all self-love springs from the deepest consciousness that he himself is the whole will to live, which appears in all beings through all times; and that therefore the most distant future belongs to him just as the present does, and cannot be indifferent to him. Affirming this will, he nevertheless demands that in the drama which presents his own nature no such monstrous outrage should ever appear again. Through the example of a revenge against which there is no defensive wall, since fear of death does not deter the avenger, he wants to strike terror into every future wrongdoer. Here the will to live, though still affirming itself, no longer clings to the single appearance, the individual. It embraces the Idea of the human being and wants to keep its appearance pure of so monstrous and revolting an outrage. It is a rare, significant, even sublime trait of character, by which the individual sacrifices himself in striving to make himself the arm of eternal justice, whose true nature he still fails to recognize.

§ 65. GOOD AND EVIL

Good means suited to a will; the wicked person's vehement will brings inner torment and remorse.

4.65 Through all our previous considerations of human action we have prepared for the last one, and greatly eased our task. That task is to raise to abstract and philosophical clarity the true eth-

ical significance of action—which in life is designated by the words *good* and *evil*, words by which people understand one another perfectly—and to show that it is a member of our main thought.

But first I want to trace those concepts *good* and *evil* back to their real meaning. The philosophical writers of our day, most strangely, treat them as simple concepts, and hence as incapable of analysis. I do this so that no one remains caught in the vague delusion that they contain more than is actually the case and by themselves already say everything needed here. I can do this because I am as little inclined to seek a hiding place in ethics behind the word *Good* as I earlier sought one behind the words *Beautiful* and *True*. I will not then, by tacking on a "*-heit*"—which nowadays is supposed to have a special *semnotês* [solemnity] and thus to help out in several cases—and by putting on a solemn face, try to make people believe that in uttering such words I had done more than designate three very broad and abstract concepts, and consequently concepts not at all rich in content, which have very different origins and meanings.[79] For who, having acquainted himself with the writings of our day, has not finally come to loathe those three words, however excellent the things they originally point to? He has had to watch a thousand times as every person least capable of thinking believes he need only bring out those three words, with a wide-open mouth and the look of an inspired sheep, to have spoken great wisdom.

The explanation of the concept *true* has already been given in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, Chapter 5, § 29 ff. The content of the concept *beautiful* found its proper explanation for the first time through the whole of our third book. Now we want to trace the concept *good* back to its meaning, which can be done very briefly. This concept is essentially relative and designates *the suitability of an object to some definite striving of the will*. So everything that suits the will in any one of its manifestations and fulfills its purpose is thought through the concept

79 German forms abstract nouns with the suffix -heit, as in *Schönheit* (beauty) and *Wahrheit* (truth).

good, however different it may be in other respects. That is why we say good food, good roads, good weather, good weapons, a good omen, and so on. In short, we call everything good that is just as we want it; hence what is good for one person can be precisely the opposite for another. The concept of the good divides into two subspecies: the immediately present satisfaction of the will in each case, and a satisfaction that is merely mediate and directed toward the future—that is, the pleasant and the useful. —The opposite concept, as long as we are speaking of beings without knowledge, is expressed by the word *bad* (*schlecht*), more rarely and more abstractly by *ill* (*Übel*), which thus designates everything that does not suit the will's striving in each case. Now, like all other beings that can enter into relation with the will, people too who were favorable, helpful or friendly to the ends willed at the moment have been called *good*, in the same sense and always with the relative element retained, which shows itself, for example, in the expression: "He is good to me, but not to you." But those whose character led them in general not to hinder the strivings of other people's wills as such, but rather to further them—who were thus consistently helpful, benevolent, friendly and charitable—have been called *good* people because of this relation of their way of acting to the will of others in general. In German, and for about the last hundred years in French as well, the opposite concept is designated by a different word for beings with knowledge (animals and humans) than for beings without it, namely by *böse*, *méchant* [wicked, evil]. In almost all other languages this distinction does not exist, and *kakos*, *malus*, *cattivo*, *bad* are used of people as well as of lifeless things that run counter to the ends of a particular individual will. Having thus started entirely from the passive side of the good, the inquiry could only later pass to the active side and examine the way of acting of the person called *good*, no longer in relation to others but in relation to himself. In particular, it set itself the task of explaining, on the one hand, the purely objective esteem that this way of acting aroused in others, and on the other, the peculiar contentment with himself

that it evidently produced in him, since he bought it even at the cost of sacrifices of another kind; and likewise, conversely, the inner pain that accompanied an evil disposition, however many outward advantages it brought to the one who harbored it. From this sprang the ethical systems, both the philosophical ones and those supported by doctrines of faith. Both always sought somehow to connect happiness with virtue. The former did so either through the principle of contradiction or through that of sufficient reason, thus making happiness either identical with virtue or its consequence—always sophistically. The latter did so by asserting other worlds than the one that can possibly be known through experience.[80] By contrast, according to our inquiry, the inner nature of virtue will turn out to be a striving in the very opposite direction to the striving for happiness, that is, for well-being and life.

According to the above, the *good* is by its concept *tôn pros ti* [one of the things relative to something]; so every *good* is essentially relative, for it has its being only in its relation to a desiring will. *Absolute good* is accordingly a contradiction in terms. Highest good, *summum bonum*, means the same thing: really, a

80 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Let it be remarked here in passing that what gives every positive religion its great strength, the point of purchase by which it takes firm possession of people's minds, is entirely its ethical side. This is so not directly, however, but because the ethical side, firmly bound up and interwoven with the rest of the mythical dogma peculiar to each religion, appears to be explicable only through that dogma. So much so that, although the ethical significance of actions cannot be explained at all according to the principle of sufficient reason, whereas every myth follows this principle, believers nevertheless hold the ethical significance of action and their myth to be wholly inseparable, indeed simply one, and regard every attack on the myth as an attack on right and virtue. This goes so far that among the monotheistic peoples atheism, or godlessness, has become synonymous with the absence of all morality. Priests welcome such confusions of concepts, and only in consequence of them could that fearful monster, fanaticism, arise and come to rule not merely particular, exceptionally perverse and wicked individuals but whole peoples. Finally—something that, to the honor of humankind, stands only once in its history—it became embodied here in the West as the Inquisition. According to the latest, finally authentic reports, in Madrid alone (while in the rest of Spain there were many more such clerical dens of murderers) it had 300,000 people die agonizing deaths at the stake over matters of faith in 300 years. Every zealot should be reminded of this at once, whenever he wants to raise his voice.

final satisfaction of the will, after which no new willing would arise, a last motive whose attainment would give the will an indestructible contentment. According to our inquiry so far in this fourth book, such a thing is unthinkable. The will can no more cease, through any satisfaction, to will again and again anew than time can end or begin. For the will there is no lasting fulfillment that would satisfy its striving completely and forever.[81] It is the vessel of the Danaids: for it there is no highest good, no absolute good, but always only a provisional one. If, however, one wishes to give an old expression, which out of habit one would not like to abolish entirely, an honorary post, as it were, as an *emeritus* [one retired with honors], then one may, figuratively and metaphorically, call the complete self-abolition and denial of the will the absolute good, the *summum bonum*. This is true will-lessness, which alone stills and appeases the craving of the will forever, alone gives that contentment which cannot be disturbed again, and alone redeems the world; we shall treat of it soon, at the close of our whole inquiry. One may regard it as the only radical cure for the disease against which all other goods—all fulfilled wishes and all happiness attained—are mere palliatives, mere anodynes. In this sense the Greek *telos* [end, goal], like *finis bonorum* [the end of goods], fits the matter even better.—So much for the words *good* and *evil*; now to the matter itself.[82]

When a person is always inclined to do *wrong* as soon as there is occasion and no external power restrains him, we call him *wicked*. According to our explanation of wrong, this means that such a person not only affirms the will to live as it appears in his body, but goes so far in this affirmation that he denies the will appearing in other individuals. This shows itself in his demanding their powers for the service of his will and seeking to destroy their existence when they stand in the way of his will's strivings. The ultimate source of this is a high degree of egoism,

81 *Pros ti* ("relative to something") is Aristotle's category of relation.
82 *Finis bonorum* echoes the title of Cicero's *De finibus bonorum et malorum* (On the Ends of Goods and Evils).

whose nature was set out above. Two things are immediately evident here. *First,* in such a person an exceedingly vehement will to live expresses itself, going far beyond the affirmation of his own life. *Second,* his knowledge, wholly given over to the principle of sufficient reason and caught in the *principium individuationis,* stops fast at the complete difference that this principle posits between his own person and all others. Hence he seeks only his own well-being, perfectly indifferent to that of all others, whose nature is instead completely foreign to him, separated from his own by a wide gulf; indeed, he really regards them only as masks without any reality.—And these two qualities are the basic elements of the wicked character.

Now that great vehemence of willing is already, in and of itself and directly, a constant source of suffering. First, because all willing as such springs from lack, and thus from suffering. (That is why, as will be remembered from the third book, the momentary silence of all willing that sets in as soon as we are given over to aesthetic contemplation as pure will-less subject of knowing—the correlate of the Idea—is already a principal component of our joy in the beautiful.) Second, because through the causal connection of things most desires must remain unfulfilled, and the will is far more often thwarted than satisfied; consequently, for this reason too, vehement and abundant willing always brings vehement and abundant suffering with it. For all suffering is absolutely nothing other than unfulfilled and thwarted willing; and even the pain of the body when it is injured or destroyed is possible as such only because the body is nothing other than the will itself become object.—For this reason, then—because much and vehement suffering is inseparable from much and vehement willing—the very facial expression of very wicked people bears the stamp of inner suffering. Even when they have attained every outward good fortune, they always look unhappy, except when caught up in a moment of exultation or when they are dissembling. From this inner torment, which is quite immediately essential to them, there finally arises even that delight in the suffering of others which

does not spring from mere egoism but is disinterested. This is *malice* proper, and it rises to *cruelty*. For cruelty, the suffering of others is no longer a means to attaining the ends of one's own will, but an end in itself. The closer explanation of this phenomenon is as follows. Because the human being is an appearance of the will illuminated by the clearest knowledge, he always measures the real and felt satisfaction of his will against the merely possible satisfaction that knowledge holds up before him. From this springs envy: every privation is infinitely heightened by the enjoyment of others, and eased by the knowledge that others too endure the same privation. The ills that are common to all and inseparable from human life trouble us little; so too those that belong to the climate, to the whole country. The recollection of sufferings greater than ours stills their pain; the sight of others' sufferings soothes our own. Suppose, then, that a person is filled with an exceedingly vehement craving of the will and would like, with burning greed, to gather everything to himself in order to cool the thirst of his egoism. In doing so he must learn, as is inevitable, that all satisfaction is only apparent; that what is attained never delivers what the object of desire promised, namely a final stilling of the will's furious craving; that instead, through fulfillment, the wish merely changes its form and now torments him in another; indeed, that finally, when all its forms are exhausted, the craving of the will itself remains even without any recognized motive, and makes itself known as a feeling of the most terrible desolation and emptiness, with hopeless torment: if from all this—which, at ordinary degrees of willing, is felt only in lesser measure and produces only the ordinary degree of gloom—there necessarily grows, in one who is an appearance of the will extending to extraordinary malice, an excessive inner torment, an eternal unrest, an incurable pain; then he seeks indirectly the relief of which he is incapable directly. He seeks, namely, to soften his own suffering by the sight of the suffering of others, which he at the same time recognizes as an expression of his power. The suffering of others now becomes an end in itself for him, a spectacle in which he

revels; and so arises the phenomenon of cruelty proper, of bloodthirstiness, which history shows so often—in the Neros and Domitians, in the African Deys, in Robespierre, and so on.[83]

Vindictiveness, too, is related to malice. It repays evil with evil not out of regard for the future, which is the character of punishment, but merely on account of what has happened, of the past as such; thus disinterestedly, not as a means but as an end, in order to revel in the torment of the offender that one has caused oneself. What distinguishes revenge from pure malice, and excuses it somewhat, is a semblance of right: namely, insofar as the same act that is now revenge would be punishment, and thus right, if it were decreed lawfully—that is, according to a rule determined and known in advance, and within an association that had sanctioned that rule.

Besides the suffering described, however, which sprang from the same root as wickedness, namely a very vehement will, and is therefore inseparable from it, wickedness is accompanied by yet another, quite different and special pain. It makes itself felt at every evil action, whether this be mere injustice from egoism or pure malice, and, depending on how long it lasts, it is called *remorse* or *anguish of conscience*.—Now whoever has in mind and remembers the preceding content of this fourth book—especially the truth set out at its beginning, that life itself, as its mere image or mirror, is always certain to the will to live, and also the account of eternal justice—will find that, in accordance with those considerations, remorse can have no other meaning than the following; that is, its content, expressed abstractly, is the following. In it one can distinguish two parts, though they coincide completely and must be thought of as wholly united.

However densely the veil of Maya envelops the mind of the wicked man—that is, however firmly he is caught in the *principium individuationis*, according to which he regards his own person as absolutely different from every other and separated from it by a wide gulf, a knowledge he clings to with all his

83 Nero and Domitian were Roman emperors notorious for cruelty; the Deys were the Ottoman-era rulers of Algiers and Tunis.

might because it alone suits his egoism and is its support, just as knowledge is almost always bribed by the will—there nevertheless stirs, in the innermost depths of his consciousness, the secret presentiment that such an order of things is only appearance, and that in itself the matter stands quite otherwise. He senses that however much time and space may separate him from other individuals and from the countless torments they suffer, indeed suffer through him, and however much they may present these as wholly foreign to him, it is nevertheless, in itself and apart from representation and its forms, the one will to live that appears in them all. Here, failing to recognize itself, this will turns its weapons against itself, and by seeking heightened well-being in one of its appearances, it precisely thereby imposes the greatest suffering on another. He senses that he, the wicked man, is this whole will, and consequently not only the tormentor but also the tormented, from whose suffering he is separated and kept free only by a deceptive dream whose form is space and time. But this dream vanishes, and he must in truth pay for pleasure with torment; and all the suffering that he knows only as possible actually strikes him as the will to live. For possibility and actuality, nearness and distance in time and space, are different only for the knowledge of the individual, only by means of the *principium individuationis*—not so in themselves. It is this truth that is expressed mythically—that is, adapted to the principle of sufficient reason and thereby translated into the form of appearance—through the transmigration of souls. Its purest expression, free of all admixture, it has precisely in that obscurely felt but inconsolable torment called anguish of conscience.—This anguish, however, also springs from a *second* immediate knowledge closely bound up with the first: namely, knowledge of the strength with which the will to live affirms itself in the wicked individual—a strength that goes far beyond his individual appearance, to the point of the complete denial of the same will as it appears in other individuals. Consequently, the inner horror of the evildoer at his own deed, which he tries to conceal from himself, contains two things.

Alongside that presentiment of the nothingness and mere illusoriness of the *principium individuationis* and of the distinction it posits between him and others, it also contains the knowledge of the vehemence of his own will, of the force with which he has seized life and sucked himself fast to it. This is the very life whose terrible side he sees before him in the torment of those he oppresses, and with which he has nevertheless grown together so firmly that precisely because of this the most horrible things proceed from him himself, as means to the complete affirmation of his own will. He recognizes himself as a concentrated appearance of the will to live. He feels to what degree he has fallen prey to life, and with it to the countless sufferings essential to it, since life has endless time and endless space in which to abolish the difference between possibility and actuality and to transform all the torments he as yet merely *knows* into torments he *feels*. The millions of years of constant rebirth, to be sure, exist here merely in concept, just as the whole past and future exist only in concept. Fulfilled time, the form of the appearance of the will, is the present alone, and for the individual time is always new: it always finds itself newly arisen. For life is inseparable from the will to live, and the only form of life is the now. *Death* (the repetition of the simile will be forgiven) is like the setting of the sun, which only seems to be swallowed by the night, but in reality, itself the source of all light, burns without ceasing, brings new days to new worlds, always rising and always setting. Beginning and end concern only the individual, by means of time, the form of this appearance for representation. Outside time lies only the will, Kant's thing in itself, and its adequate objecthood, Plato's Idea. Hence suicide offers no escape: what each person *wills* in his innermost being, that he must *be*; and what each person *is*, that is just what he *wills*. — Thus, besides the merely felt knowledge of the illusoriness and nothingness of the forms of representation that separate individuals, it is the self-knowledge of one's own will and of its degree that gives conscience its sting. The course of a life weaves the image of the empirical character, whose original is

the intelligible character, and the wicked man is horrified at this image—no matter whether it is woven in bold lines, so that the world shares his abhorrence, or in lines so fine that he alone sees it; for it concerns him alone directly. The past would be a matter of indifference, as mere appearance, and could not trouble the conscience, if the character did not feel itself free of all time and unchangeable by it, so long as it does not deny itself. That is why things done long ago still weigh on the conscience. The prayer "Lead me not into temptation" means: "Do not let me see who I am."—By the force with which the wicked man affirms life, a force revealed to him in the suffering he inflicts on others, he measures how far from him lies the giving up and denial of that very will, the only possible redemption from the world and its torment. He sees how far he belongs to the world and how firmly he is bound to it: the *known* suffering of others has not been able to move him; he falls prey to life and to *felt* suffering. Whether this will ever break and overcome the vehemence of his will remains an open question.

This exposition of the meaning and inner nature of *evil*, which, as mere feeling—that is, *not* as distinct, abstract knowledge—is the content of *anguish of conscience,* will gain still more clarity and completeness through a consideration, carried out in the same way, of the *good* as a quality of the human will, and finally of the complete resignation and holiness that proceed from it once it has reached its highest degree. For opposites always illuminate each other, and the day reveals both itself and the night, as Spinoza has excellently said.[84]

§ 66. VIRTUE FROM INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE

Virtue cannot be taught; justice and goodness come from seeing through the principium individuationis.

4.66 A morality without grounding, that is, mere moralizing, cannot have any effect, because it does not motivate. But a morality

84 Spinoza, *Ethics* II, proposition 43, scholium: as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard of both itself and falsity.

that *does* motivate can do so only by acting on self-love. And whatever springs from self-love has no moral worth. It follows that no genuine virtue can be brought about by morality, or by abstract knowledge in general. Virtue must instead spring from intuitive knowledge, which recognizes in another individual the same nature as in one's own.

For virtue does indeed proceed from knowledge, but not from abstract knowledge that can be communicated in words. If it did, it could be taught, and by expressing here in abstract terms its nature and the knowledge underlying it, we would have improved ethically everyone who grasps this. But that is by no means the case. On the contrary, ethical lectures or sermons can no more produce a virtuous person than all the treatises on aesthetics, from Aristotle's onward, have ever made a poet. For the concept is barren for the real, inner nature of virtue, just as it is for art. It can render services only in a wholly subordinate way, as a tool for carrying out and preserving what has been known and resolved in some other way. *Velle non discitur* [Willing cannot be taught]. On virtue, that is, on goodness of disposition, abstract dogmas are in fact without influence: false ones do not disturb it, and true ones hardly further it. It would indeed be very bad if the main thing in human life, its ethical worth, valid for eternity, depended on something whose attainment is so much subject to chance as dogmas, religious doctrines and philosophemes. For morality, dogmas have only this value: the person who is already virtuous by virtue of another kind of knowledge, soon to be discussed, has in them a schema, a formula, by which he renders to his own reason an account of his non-egoistic conduct—conduct whose nature his reason, that is, he himself, does not *comprehend*—an account that is mostly merely fictitious, but with which he has accustomed his reason to be satisfied.

Dogmas can indeed have a strong influence on *action*, on outward conduct, as can habit and example (the latter two because the ordinary person does not trust his own judgment, of whose weakness he is aware, but follows only his own or others' experi-

ence); but the disposition is not thereby changed.[85] All abstract knowledge gives only motives; but motives, as shown above, can change only the direction of the will, never the will itself. And all communicable knowledge can act on the will only as a motive. So however dogmas may steer the will, what the person really and fundamentally wills always remains the same. He has merely acquired different thoughts about the ways by which it is to be attained, and imaginary motives guide him just as real ones do. Thus, for example, with regard to his ethical worth it makes no difference whether he makes large donations to the needy, firmly convinced that he will receive everything back tenfold in a future life, or whether he spends the same sum on improving an estate that will yield interest late, to be sure, but all the more securely and substantially.—And a murderer, just as much as the bandit who earns a reward by it, is also the man who in orthodox zeal hands the heretic over to the flames; indeed, depending on the inner circumstances, so is the man who slaughters the Turks in the Promised Land—if, that is, like the former, he really does it because he believes it will earn him a place in heaven. For these people want to provide only for themselves, for their egoism, just like that bandit, from whom they differ only in the absurdity of their means.—From outside, as has already been said, the will can be reached only through motives; but these change merely the way it expresses itself, never the will itself. *Velle non discitur.*

In the case of good deeds whose doer appeals to dogmas, however, one must always distinguish whether these dogmas really are the motive for them, or whether, as I said above, they are nothing more than the ostensible account by which he seeks to satisfy his own reason. The good deed itself flows from a quite different source: he performs it because he is *good*, but does not know how to explain it properly, because he is no philosopher, and yet he would like to think something about it. The differ-

85 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Mere *opera operata* [works performed], the Church would say, which are of no help unless grace grants the faith that leads to rebirth. More on this below.

ence, however, is very hard to find, because it lies in the depths of the heart. That is why we can almost never judge the actions of others morally correctly, and seldom our own. —The deeds and ways of acting of an individual and of a people can be greatly modified by dogmas, example and habit. But in themselves all deeds (*opera operata*) are mere empty images, and only the disposition that leads to them gives them moral significance. And this disposition can in fact be exactly the same under very different outward appearances. With an equal degree of wickedness, one person may die on the wheel, another peacefully in the bosom of his family. It can be the same fund of wickedness that expresses itself in *one* people in coarse strokes, in murder and cannibalism, but in *another* finely and quietly, *en miniature* [in miniature], in court intrigues, oppressions and subtle schemes of every kind: the essence remains the same. It is conceivable that a perfect state, or perhaps even a dogma of rewards and punishments after death that was believed with complete firmness, might prevent every crime. Politically, much would be gained by this; morally, nothing at all. Rather, the will's being mirrored in life would merely be obstructed.

Genuine goodness of disposition, disinterested virtue and pure nobility of mind therefore do not proceed from abstract knowledge—but they do proceed from knowledge. They proceed from an immediate and intuitive knowledge that can neither be reasoned away nor reasoned into anyone; from a knowledge that, precisely because it is not abstract, cannot be communicated either, but must dawn on each person for himself; a knowledge that therefore finds its truly adequate expression not in words but solely in deeds, in conduct, in the course of a person's life. We who are seeking here the theory of virtue, and must therefore also express abstractly the nature of the knowledge underlying it, will nevertheless not be able to convey that knowledge itself in this expression, but only the concept of it. In doing so we always start from action, in which alone this knowledge becomes visible, and refer back to action as its only

adequate expression. We merely interpret and explain this expression; that is, we state abstractly what really goes on in it.

Before we speak of real goodness, in contrast to the evil we have described, we must touch, as an intermediate stage, on the mere negation of evil: this is *justice*. What right and wrong are has been sufficiently explained above. So we can say here in a few words that the person who voluntarily recognizes that merely moral boundary between wrong and right, and lets it hold even where no state or other power secures it—who therefore, according to our explanation, never goes so far in affirming his own will as to deny the will presenting itself in another individual—is *just*. He will not, then, inflict suffering on others in order to increase his own well-being: that is, he will commit no crime, and will respect the rights and the property of everyone. —We see, then, that for such a just person the *principium individuationis* is no longer, as it is for the wicked man, an absolute partition. He does not, like the wicked man, affirm only his own appearance of will and deny all others; others are not mere masks to him, whose nature is wholly different from his own. Rather, he shows by his way of acting that he *recognizes* his own nature—namely the will to live as thing in itself—in the other's appearance too, which is given to him merely as representation. He thus finds himself again in it, up to a certain degree: namely, that of not doing wrong, that is, of not injuring. To exactly this degree, then, he sees through the *principium individuationis*, the veil of Maya: to that extent he sets the being outside himself equal to his own: he does not injure it.

If one looks at the innermost core of this justice, it already contains the resolve not to go so far in affirming one's own will that this affirmation denies the other appearances of will by forcing them to serve it. One will therefore want to give others as much as one receives from them. The highest degree of this justice of disposition—which, however, is always already paired with real goodness, whose character is no longer merely negative—goes so far that one calls into question one's rights to inherited property, wants to sustain one's body only by one's

own powers, mental or physical, feels every service performed by others and every luxury as a reproach, and finally turns to voluntary poverty. Thus we see *Pascal*, when he took the ascetic path, refusing to accept any more service, although he had servants enough: in spite of his constant ill health he made his own bed, fetched his own food from the kitchen, and so on (*Vie de Pascal par sa sœur* [Life of Pascal, by His Sister], p. 19). Quite in keeping with this, it is reported that many Hindus, even rajas, despite great wealth, spend it only on the upkeep of their families, their courts and their servants, and follow with strict scrupulousness the maxim of eating nothing but what they have sown and harvested with their own hands.[86] Yet a certain misunderstanding underlies this. For the individual, precisely because he is rich and powerful, can render such considerable services to human society as a whole that they balance the inherited wealth whose security he owes to society. Strictly speaking, the excessive justice of such Hindus is already more than justice: it is actual renunciation, denial of the will to live, asceticism, of which we shall speak last. Conversely, however, pure idleness, living off the efforts of others on inherited property without achieving anything, can already be regarded as morally wrong, even if by positive law it must remain right.

We have found that voluntary justice has its innermost origin in a certain degree of seeing through the *principium individuationis*, while the unjust person remains wholly caught up in it. This seeing-through can occur not only in the degree that justice requires but also in a higher degree, one that drives a person to positive benevolence and beneficence, to love of humanity. And this can happen however strong and energetic in itself the will appearing in such an individual may be. Knowledge can always hold it in balance, teach it to resist the temptation to do wrong, and even produce every degree of goodness, indeed of resignation. The good person, then, is by no means to be regarded as an originally weaker appearance of the will than the wicked one.

86 The life of Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), French mathematician and religious thinker, was written by his sister Gilberte Périer.

Rather, it is knowledge that masters the blind urge of the will in him. There are, to be sure, individuals who merely seem good-natured because the will appearing in them is weak. But what they really are soon shows itself: they are incapable of any considerable self-conquest in order to carry out a just or good deed.

Now suppose that, as a rare exception, we come across a person who perhaps has a considerable income but uses only a little of it for himself and gives all the rest to those in need, while he himself goes without many pleasures and comforts. And suppose we try to make his conduct clear to ourselves. Then, quite leaving aside the dogmas by which he himself may try to make his conduct intelligible to his reason, we shall find, as the simplest and most general expression and as the essential character of his way of acting, that he *makes less of a distinction than is usually made between himself and others*. In the eyes of many others this very distinction is so great that another's suffering is an immediate joy to the malicious person and a welcome means to his own well-being to the unjust one. The merely just person stops at not causing it. Most people in general know of countless sufferings of others close by, and are well acquainted with them, yet cannot bring themselves to relieve them, because they would have to accept some deprivation themselves. To each of all these, then, a mighty distinction seems to prevail between one's own I and another's. To the noble person we are imagining, by contrast, this distinction is not so significant. The *principium individuationis*, the form of appearance, no longer holds him so firmly in its grip; rather, the suffering he sees in others touches him almost as closely as his own. He therefore tries to establish a balance between the two: he denies himself pleasures and takes on deprivations in order to relieve the sufferings of others. He becomes aware that the distinction between himself and others, which to the wicked person is so great a gulf, belongs only to a transitory, deceptive appearance. He recognizes, immediately and without inference, that the in-itself of his own appearance is also that of others—namely, that will to live which constitutes the inner nature of every thing and

lives in all; indeed, that this extends even to animals and to the whole of nature. Therefore he will not torment an animal either.[87]

He is now as little able to let others go in want, while he himself has what is superfluous and dispensable, as anyone would go hungry one day in order to have more the next than he can enjoy. For to the one who practices works of love, the veil of Maya has become transparent, and the illusion of the *principium individuationis* has left him. Himself, his self, his will he recognizes in every being, and consequently in the one who suffers too. Gone from him is the perversity with which the will to live, failing to recognize itself, enjoys fleeting, illusory pleasures here in one individual and in return suffers and starves there in *another*, and so inflicts torment and endures torment. It does not recognize that, like Thyestes, it is greedily devouring its own flesh; and then here it laments undeserved suffering and there commits outrages without fear of Nemesis—always and only because it fails to recognize itself in the appearance of another, and therefore does not perceive eternal justice, caught up as it is in the *principium individuationis*, that is, in general in that kind of knowledge which is governed by the principle of sufficient reason. To be cured of this delusion and deceptive spell of Maya

87 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Man's right to the life and the strength of animals rests on the following. Since suffering increases in step with the increasing clarity of consciousness, the pain the animal suffers through death or through work is not yet as great as the pain a human being would suffer through merely going without meat, or without the animal's strength. Man can therefore go so far in affirming his own existence as to deny the existence of the animal; and the will to live as a whole thereby bears less suffering than if things were the other way round. This also determines the extent to which man may make use of the strength of animals without doing wrong—a limit that is often exceeded, however, especially with beasts of burden and hunting dogs; and it is chiefly against this that the activity of the animal protection societies is directed. Nor, in my view, does that right extend to vivisection, especially of the higher animals. On the other hand, the insect does not yet suffer as much through its death as a human being does through its *sting*.—The Hindus do not see this.

and to practice works of love are one and the same. The latter, however, is the unfailing symptom of that knowledge.[88]

The opposite of the pangs of conscience, whose origin and meaning were explained above, is *the good conscience*: the satisfaction we feel after every disinterested deed. It arises because such a deed, springing as it does from the immediate recognition of our own inner being in itself in the appearance of another as well, in turn gives us confirmation of this knowledge —the knowledge that our true self exists not only in our own person, this single appearance, but in everything that lives. This makes the heart feel enlarged, just as egoism makes it feel contracted. For egoism concentrates our concern on the single appearance of our own individual, while knowledge constantly holds before us the countless dangers that continually threaten this appearance, so that anxiety and worry become the keynote of our mood. In just the same way, the knowledge that everything living is our own inner being in itself just as much as our own person is spreads our concern over everything living: this is what enlarges the heart. Through this lessened concern for our own self, anxious care for it is attacked at its root and limited. Hence the calm, confident serenity that a virtuous disposition and a good conscience give, and its more distinct emergence with every good deed, since the deed confirms to us ourselves the ground of that mood. The egoist feels himself surrounded by alien and hostile appearances, and all his hope rests on his own well-being. The good person lives in a world of friendly appearances: the well-being of each of them is his own. So even if knowledge of the human lot in general does not make his mood a joyful one, the abiding knowledge of his own inner being in everything that lives nevertheless gives him a certain evenness, and even serenity, of mood. For concern spread over countless appearances cannot cause such anxiety as concern concentrated on *one*. The accidents that befall the totality of

88 In Greek myth, Thyestes was tricked by his brother Atreus into eating the flesh of his own sons.

individuals balance out, whereas those that befall the single individual bring good or bad fortune.

Others have set up moral principles, which they presented as prescriptions for virtue and as laws that must necessarily be obeyed. I, as already said, cannot do this, since I have no "ought" or law to hold before the eternally free will. Instead, within the context of my inquiry, what in a sense corresponds to and is analogous with that undertaking is the purely theoretical truth—of which the whole of my exposition can be regarded as merely the working-out—that the will is the in-itself of every appearance, but is itself, as such, free from the forms of appearance and thereby from plurality. In relation to conduct, I know no worthier way to express this truth than by the formula of the Veda already mentioned: *"Tat twam asi!"* ("This you are!"). Whoever is able to say this to himself, with clear knowledge and firm, heartfelt conviction, about every being with whom he comes into contact is by that very fact assured of all virtue and blessedness and is on the direct path to salvation.

But before I go further and show, as the last part of my exposition, how love—whose origin and essence we recognize to be the seeing through of the *principium individuationis*—leads to salvation, namely to the complete giving up of the will to live, that is, of all willing; and also how another path, less gentle but more frequent, brings a person to the very same point—a paradoxical proposition must first be stated and explained here. I state it not because it is paradoxical but because it is true and belongs to the completeness of the thought I am setting forth. It is this: "All love (*agapê*, *caritas*) is compassion."[89]

§ 67. ALL LOVE IS COMPASSION

Pure love can only relieve suffering, so it is compassion; weeping is compassion with oneself.

4.67 We have seen how, from seeing through the *principium individuationis*, there arose in a lesser degree justice, and in a higher

89 *Agapê* and *caritas* are the Greek and Latin words for selfless love (charity).

degree genuine goodness of disposition, which showed itself as pure, that is, disinterested, love toward others. Where this becomes perfect, it puts the other individual and his fate completely on a level with one's own. It can never go further than that, since there is no reason to prefer another individual to one's own. But the greater number of other individuals, when their whole well-being or life is in danger, may well outweigh a single person's regard for his own well-being. In such a case the character that has attained the highest goodness and perfect nobility will sacrifice its well-being and its life entirely for the well-being of many others. So died Codrus, so Leonidas, so Regulus, so Decius Mus, so Arnold von Winkelried; so does everyone who freely and knowingly goes to certain death for his own people, for his fatherland. On this level too stands everyone who willingly takes on suffering and death in upholding what serves the good of all humanity and rightfully belongs to it, that is, for universal and important truths and for the eradication of great errors. So died Socrates, so Giordano Bruno; so many a hero of truth met his death at the stake, at the hands of the priests.[90]

Now, however, with regard to the paradox stated above, I must recall a few things. We previously found suffering to be essential to life as a whole and inseparable from it. We saw how every wish arises from a need, a lack, a suffering; that consequently every satisfaction is only a pain removed, not a positive happiness brought; and that pleasures, it is true, lie to desire, claiming to be a positive good, but in truth are only of a negative nature, merely the end of an ill. Whatever goodness, love and nobility do for others, therefore, is always only a relief of their sufferings. Consequently, what can move them to good deeds and works of love is always only *knowledge of another's suffering*, directly intelligible from one's own and put on a level with it. From this, however, it follows that pure love (*agapê*, *caritas*) is by

90 Codrus, legendary king of Athens; Leonidas, Spartan king who fell at Thermopylae (480 BC); Regulus, Roman general who returned to torture and death at Carthage; Decius Mus, Roman consul who gave his life in battle; Arnold von Winkelried, Swiss hero of the battle of Sempach (1386).

its nature compassion—whether the suffering it relieves be great or small, and every unsatisfied wish counts as suffering. We shall therefore not hesitate—in direct contradiction to Kant, who will recognize everything truly good and all virtue as such only if it has sprung from abstract reflection, and indeed from the concept of duty and of the categorical imperative, and who declares felt compassion to be weakness and by no means virtue—in direct contradiction to Kant, we shall not hesitate to say: the mere concept is as unfruitful for genuine virtue as it is for genuine art; all true and pure love is compassion, and every love that is not compassion is selfishness. Selfishness is *erôs*; compassion is *agapê*. Mixtures of the two occur frequently. Even genuine friendship is always a mixture of selfishness and compassion. The former lies in the pleasure we take in the presence of the friend, whose individuality corresponds to ours, and it almost always makes up the larger part; compassion shows itself in sincere sympathy with his weal and woe and in the disinterested sacrifices one makes for their sake. Even Spinoza says: *Benevolentia nihil aliud est, quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta* [Benevolence is nothing other than a desire arising from compassion] *(Ethics III, prop. 27, cor. 3, schol.)*. As confirmation of our paradoxical proposition one may note that the tone and words of speech and the caresses of pure love coincide entirely with the tone of compassion; and, incidentally, that in Italian compassion and pure love are designated by the same word, *pietà*.

This is also the place to discuss one of the most striking peculiarities of human nature, *weeping*, which, like laughter, belongs among the expressions that distinguish human beings from animals. Weeping is by no means simply an expression of pain, for we weep at very few pains. In my opinion one never even weeps directly over pain that is felt, but always only over its repetition in reflection. That is, one passes from the pain felt, even when it is physical, to a mere representation of it, and then finds one's own condition so pitiable that, if someone else were the sufferer, one is firmly and sincerely convinced one would help him, full of compassion and love. But now one is oneself

the object of one's own sincere compassion: with the most helpful of dispositions, one is oneself the one in need of help; one feels that one is enduring more than one could bear to see another endure. And in this strangely intertwined mood, in which the directly felt suffering comes back to perception only by a double detour—represented as another's, sympathized with as such, and then suddenly perceived again as directly one's own—nature obtains relief for itself through that strange bodily spasm. —*Weeping* is accordingly *compassion for oneself*, or compassion thrown back to its starting point. It is therefore conditioned by the capacity for love and compassion, and by imagination. Hence neither hard-hearted nor unimaginative people weep easily; and weeping is even always regarded as a sign of a certain degree of goodness of character, and it disarms anger. For one feels that whoever can still weep must necessarily also be capable of love, that is, of compassion toward others, precisely because this compassion, in the manner described, enters into the mood that leads to weeping.—Entirely in keeping with the explanation given is the description Petrarch gives, expressing his feeling naively and truthfully, of how his own tears arise:

> I vo pensando: e nel pensar m'assale
> *Una pietà si forte di me stesso*,
> Che mi conduce spesso,
> Ad alto lagrimar, ch' i non soleva.[91][92]

What has been said is also confirmed by the fact that children who have suffered some pain usually weep only when someone pities them—thus not over the pain but over the representation of it.—When we are moved to tears not by our own sufferings but by those of others, this happens because in imagination we vividly put ourselves in the sufferer's place, or else see in his fate the lot of all humanity and consequently, above all, our own. And so, by a long detour, we are still always weeping over

91 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. As I walk lost in thought, so strong a *compassion for myself* seizes me that I often have to weep aloud—something I was not otherwise accustomed to do.

92 The opening lines of Petrarch's canzone 264 in the *Canzoniere*.

ourselves again, feeling compassion for ourselves. This also seems to be a main reason for the universal, and therefore natural, weeping at deaths. It is not his loss that the mourner weeps over: he would be ashamed of such egoistic tears, whereas in fact he is sometimes ashamed of not weeping. First of all, of course, he weeps over the lot of the one who has died; yet he also weeps when, after long, grave and incurable suffering, death was a desirable deliverance for that person. Mainly, then, he is seized by compassion for the lot of all humanity, which has fallen prey to finitude, by which every life, however full of striving, often so rich in deeds, must be extinguished and come to nothing. In this lot of humanity, however, he sees above all his own—and all the more so the closer the deceased stood to him, hence most of all when it was his father. Even if age and illness had made life a torment to the father, and his helplessness had made him a heavy burden to the son, the son still weeps bitterly over his father's death—for the reason given.[93]

§ 68. THE DENIAL OF THE WILL

Whoever sees the suffering of the whole world as his own turns away from willing to asceticism.

4.68 After this digression on the identity of pure love with compassion—compassion whose turning back onto one's own individual has the phenomenon of weeping as its symptom—I take up again the thread of our interpretation of the ethical significance of conduct. I do so in order now to show how, from the same source from which all goodness, love, virtue and nobility spring, there finally also arises what I call the denial of the will to live.

Earlier we saw hatred and malice conditioned by egoism, and egoism resting on knowledge being caught up in the *principium*

93 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 47 of the second volume (the Supplements). It is hardly necessary to point out that the whole ethics set out in outline in §§ 61–67 has received a fuller and more complete exposition in my prize essay on the basis of morality.

individuationis. In the same way, we found that the origin and essence of justice—and then, when it goes further, of love and nobility, up to the highest degrees—is the seeing through of that *principium individuationis*. It alone, by abolishing the distinction between one's own individual and others, makes possible and explains perfect goodness of disposition, up to the most disinterested love and the most magnanimous self-sacrifice for others.

But if this seeing through the *principium individuationis*, this immediate knowledge of the identity of the will in all its appearances, is present in a high degree of clarity, it will at once show an influence on the will that goes still further. For suppose the veil of Maya, the *principium individuationis,* is lifted so far from a person's eyes that he no longer makes the egoistic distinction between his own person and that of others. He takes as much interest in the sufferings of other individuals as in his own, and is thus not only helpful in the highest degree but even ready to sacrifice his own individual as soon as several others can be saved by it. Then it follows of itself that such a person, who recognizes in all beings himself, his innermost and true self, must also regard the endless sufferings of all that lives as his own, and so take upon himself the pain of the whole world. No suffering is any longer foreign to him. All the torments of others that he sees and is so seldom able to relieve, all the torments he learns of indirectly, indeed those he merely knows to be possible, act upon his mind as his own do. It is no longer the changing weal and woe of his own person that he has in view, as is the case with the person still caught up in egoism; rather, since he sees through the *principium individuationis*, everything lies equally close to him. He knows the whole, grasps its inner nature, and finds it caught up in constant passing away, vain striving, inner conflict and perpetual suffering. Wherever he looks, he sees suffering humanity and the suffering animal world, and a world that is fading away. But all this now lies as close to him as only his own person does to the egoist. How, with such knowledge of the world, should he now affirm this very life through constant acts of will, and thereby bind himself

ever more firmly to it, press it ever more tightly to himself? The person who is still caught up in the *principium individuationis*, in egoism, knows only individual things and their relation to his own person, and these then become ever-renewed *motives* of his willing. By contrast, the knowledge of the whole described above, of the inner nature of things in themselves, becomes the *quieter* of each and every willing. The will now turns away from life: it now shudders at life's pleasures, in which it recognizes life's affirmation. The person attains the state of voluntary renunciation, of resignation, of true composure and complete will-lessness.—We others, whom the veil of Maya still envelops, may at times—in our own keenly felt suffering, or in another's that we vividly recognize—come close to knowledge of the vanity and bitterness of life. We may then wish, by complete renunciation decided once and for all, to break off the sting of our desires, to close off every access to suffering, to purify and sanctify ourselves. Yet the illusion of appearance soon ensnares us again, and its motives set the will in motion anew: we cannot tear ourselves free. The lures of hope, the flattery of the present, the sweetness of pleasures, the well-being that falls to our person amid the misery of a suffering world under the rule of chance and error—all this draws us back to it and fastens the bonds anew. That is why Jesus says: "It is easier for a cable to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God."[94]

Let us compare life to a circular path of glowing coals, with a few cool places, which we had to run round without ceasing. Then the one caught up in delusion is comforted by the cool place he is standing on right now, or sees close ahead, and he goes on running the course. But the one who sees through the *principium individuationis*, and knows the inner nature of things in themselves and thereby the whole, is no longer receptive to such comfort: he sees himself in all places at once, and steps out.—His will turns; it no longer affirms its own inner nature,

94 Schopenhauer follows the reading "cable" (Greek *kamilos*) instead of the usual "camel" (*kamêlos*) in Matthew 19:24.

mirrored in appearance, but denies it. The phenomenon by which this makes itself known is the transition from virtue to *asceticism*. That is to say, it is no longer enough for him to love others as himself and to do as much for them as for himself. Rather, there arises in him a horror of the inner nature of which his own appearance is the expression: the will to live, the kernel and essence of that world recognized as full of misery. He therefore disowns this very inner nature that appears in him and is already expressed by his body, and his conduct now gives the lie to his appearance and comes into open contradiction with it. Though essentially nothing but an appearance of the will, he ceases to will anything, guards against attaching his will to anything, and seeks to establish in himself the greatest indifference toward all things. —His body, healthy and strong, expresses the sexual impulse through the genitals; but he denies the will and gives the lie to the body: he wants no sexual satisfaction, on any condition. Voluntary, complete chastity is the first step in asceticism, or the denial of the will to live. Chastity thereby denies the affirmation of the will that goes beyond the individual life, and so indicates that with the life of this body the will whose appearance it is also abolishes itself. Nature, always true and naive, declares that if this maxim became universal, the human race would die out. And after what was said in the second book about the connection of all appearances of the will, I believe I may assume that with the highest appearance of the will its weaker reflection, the animal world, would also fall away, just as the half-shadows vanish along with the full light. With the complete abolition of knowledge, the rest of the world would then of itself vanish into nothing, since without a subject there is no object. I would even like to relate to this a passage in the Veda, where it says: "As in this world hungry children press around their mother, so all beings wait for the holy sacrifice." (*Asiatic researches*, vol. 8. Colebrooke, *On the Vedas*, the extract from the Sama Veda; also found in Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous essays*, vol. 1, p. 88.) Sacrifice means resignation in general, and the rest of nature has to await its redemption from man, who is priest and

sacrifice at once. Indeed, it deserves to be mentioned as most remarkable that this thought has also been expressed by the admirable and immeasurably profound Angelus Silesius, in the little verse headed "Man brings everything to God." It runs:

"Man! All things love you; around you is a great throng: / All things run to you, that they may come to God."

But an even greater mystic, Meister Eckhart, whose wonderful writings have at last (1857) become accessible to us through Franz Pfeiffer's edition, says there, p. 459, entirely in the sense discussed here: "I prove this by Christ, when he says: When I am lifted up from the earth, I will draw all things to myself (John 12:32). So the good man is to carry all things up to God, to their first origin. The masters prove this to us: that all creatures are made for man's sake. Test this in all creatures: that one creature makes use of another—the ox of the grass, the fish of the water, the bird of the air, the wild animal of the forest.[95] So all creatures come to be of use to the good man: a good man carries one creature in another to God." What he means is: in return for man redeeming the animals too, in and with himself, he makes use of them in this life.—Even the difficult biblical passage Romans 8:21–24 seems to me to be interpreted in this sense.

Buddhism, too, is not lacking in expressions of the matter. For example, when the Buddha, while still a Bodhisattva, has his horse saddled for the last time—namely for his flight from his father's residence into the wilderness—he speaks this verse to it: "For a long time now you have been here in life and in death; but now you shall cease to carry and to haul. Only this once more, O Kantakana, carry me away from here, and when I have attained the Law (have become Buddha), I shall not forget you." (*Foe Koue Ki, trad. p. Abel Remusat*, p. 233.)[96]

Asceticism then shows itself further in voluntary and deliberate poverty. This poverty does not merely arise *per accidens*

95 Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–1328), German Dominican mystic; Pfeiffer's edition forms vol. 2 of his *Deutsche Mystiker des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts*.

96 Kanthaka was the horse on which the future Buddha left his father's palace. *Foe Koue Ki* is the travel record of the Chinese monk Faxian (5th century AD), translated into French by Abel Rémusat (1836).

[incidentally], through property being given away to relieve the sufferings of others; here it is already an end in itself, meant to serve as a constant mortification of the will, so that the satisfaction of wishes, the sweetness of life, may not stir up again the will against which self-knowledge has conceived a horror. The one who has reached this point still feels, as a living body, as a concrete appearance of the will, the disposition to will of every kind. But he deliberately suppresses it by forcing himself to do nothing of all that he would like to do, and on the contrary to do everything that he would not like to do, even if it has no further purpose than precisely that of serving the mortification of the will. Since he himself denies the will appearing in his person, he will not resist when another does the same, that is, does him wrong. Hence every suffering that comes to him from outside, through chance or another's malice, is welcome to him—every injury, every disgrace, every insult. He receives them joyfully as the opportunity to assure himself that he no longer affirms the will but joyfully takes the side of every enemy of the appearance of the will that is his own person. He therefore bears such disgrace and suffering with inexhaustible patience and gentleness, repays all evil with good, without ostentation, and never again lets the fire of anger, any more than that of desire, awaken in him. —As he mortifies the will itself, so he mortifies its visibility, its objecthood, the body. He nourishes it sparingly, so that its luxuriant flourishing and thriving may not also revive and more strongly stimulate the will, of which it is the mere expression and mirror. So he resorts to fasting; indeed, he resorts to chastisement and self-torment, in order through constant privation and suffering to break and kill more and more the will, which he recognizes and abhors as the source of his own suffering existence and that of the world. —When death finally comes and dissolves this appearance of that will—whose inner nature here, through free denial of itself, had long since died away, except for the feeble remnant that appeared as the animation of this body —it is most welcome as a longed-for deliverance and is joyfully received. With it, not merely the appearance ends here, as with

others; rather, the inner nature itself is abolished, which here had only a feeble existence in and through the appearance;[97] and this last brittle bond now snaps as well. For the one who ends thus, the world has ended at the same time.

SAINTS OF EVERY FAITH

Christian, Hindu and Buddhist saints show the same denial of the will, whatever their dogmas.

And what I have described here with a feeble tongue and only in general terms is not some philosophical fairy tale of my own invention, dating only from today. No: it was the enviable life of a great many saints and beautiful souls among the Christians, still more among the Hindus and Buddhists, and among adherents of other faiths too. However different the dogmas imprinted on their reason, the inner, immediate, intuitive knowledge from which alone all virtue and holiness can proceed expressed itself in one and the same way in their way of life. For here too there appears the great distinction between intuitive and abstract knowledge—a distinction so important and so pervasive throughout our whole inquiry, and hitherto too little noticed. Between the two there is a wide gulf, across which, as regards knowledge of the inner nature of the world, philosophy alone leads. For intuitively, or *in concreto*, every person is actually conscious of all philosophical truths; but to bring them into abstract knowledge, into reflection, is the business of the philosopher, who neither should nor can do anything more.

Perhaps, then, this is the first time that the inner nature of holiness, self-denial, the mortification of self-will, asceticism,

97 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. This thought is expressed by a beautiful simile in the ancient Sanskrit philosophical text *"Sankhya Karika"*: "Yet the soul remains clothed with the body for a while, as the potter's wheel, after the vessel is finished, still goes on spinning in consequence of the impulse it received earlier. Only when the enlightened soul separates from the body and nature ceases for it does its complete deliverance set in." Colebrooke, *"On the philosophy of the Hindus: Miscellaneous essays"*, vol. 1, p. 259. Likewise in the *"Sankhya Carica by Horace Wilson"*, § 67, p. 184.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the classic summary of the Sankhya school of Indian philosophy.

has been expressed abstractly and free of everything mythical, as the *denial of the will to live*—a denial that sets in once the complete knowledge of its own inner nature has become for the will the quieter of all willing. On the other hand, it has been known immediately and expressed in deed by all those saints and ascetics who, with the same inner knowledge, used very different language, according to the dogmas they had once taken into their reason. In keeping with these, an Indian saint, a Christian one, a Lamaist one must each give a very different account of his own conduct—which, however, makes no difference at all to the matter itself. A saint can be full of the most absurd superstition, or, conversely, he can be a philosopher: it makes no difference. His conduct alone certifies him as a saint. For, morally speaking, it proceeds not from abstract knowledge but from intuitively grasped, immediate knowledge of the world and its inner nature, and he interprets it through some dogma or other only to satisfy his reason. It is therefore as little necessary for the saint to be a philosopher as for the philosopher to be a saint—just as it is not necessary that a perfectly beautiful person be a great sculptor, or that a great sculptor himself be a beautiful person. In general, it is a strange demand to make of a moralist that he should recommend no virtue other than one he himself possesses. To repeat the whole inner nature of the world abstractly, universally and distinctly in concepts, and so to deposit it as a reflected image in permanent concepts of reason that are always ready to hand: this and nothing else is philosophy. I recall the passage from Bacon of Verulam quoted in the first book.[98]

But my description above of the denial of the will to live, or of the way of life of a beautiful soul, of a resigned saint voluntarily doing penance, is itself only abstract and general, and therefore cold. Just as the knowledge from which the denial of the will proceeds is intuitive and not abstract, so it finds its perfect expression not in abstract concepts either, but solely in deed and way of life. Therefore, in order to understand more fully

98 In § 15 Schopenhauer quotes Bacon's view that the true philosophy is the one that most faithfully echoes the voice of the world itself.

what we express philosophically as the denial of the will to live, one must come to know examples from experience and reality. Of course, one will not meet them in everyday experience: *nam omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt* [for all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare], as Spinoza admirably says. Unless one has been made an eyewitness by a particularly favorable fate, then, one will have to be content with the biographies of such people. Indian literature, as we can see even from the little we know of it so far through translations, is very rich in descriptions of the lives of saints and penitents, called Samanaeans, sannyasis and so on. Even the well-known, though by no means in every respect praiseworthy, *"Mythologie des Indous par Mad. de Polier"* contains many excellent examples of this kind (especially in the 13th chapter of the second volume). Among the Christians, too, there is no lack of examples to serve the elucidation intended. Read the mostly badly written biographies of those persons who are called now holy souls, now Pietists, Quietists, pious enthusiasts and so on.[99] Collections of such biographies have been made at various times, such as Tersteegen's "Lives of Holy Souls," Reiz's "Histories of the Reborn," and, in our own day, a collection by Kanne which, among much that is bad, also contains a good deal that is good—in which I especially count the "Life of Beata Sturmin." Quite properly belonging here is the life of St. Francis of Assisi, that true personification of asceticism and model for all mendicant friars. His life, written by his younger contemporary St. Bonaventure, who is also famous as a scholastic, has recently been republished: *"Vita S. Francisci a S. Bonaventura concinnata"* [The Life of St. Francis, Composed by St. Bonaventure] (Soest 1847). This came shortly after a careful, detailed biography of him, making use of all the sources, had appeared in France: "*Histoire de S. François d'Assise, par Chavin de Mallan*" [History of St. Francis of

99 Samanaeans (Sanskrit *śramaṇa*) are Indian wandering ascetics. Marie-Élisabeth de Polier's *Mythology of the Hindus* appeared in 1809.

Assisi, by Chavin de Mallan] (1845).[100] —As an Eastern parallel to these monastic writings we have the book by Spence Hardy, which is well worth reading: "*Eastern monachism, an account of the order of mendicants founded by Gotama Budha*" (1850). It shows us the same thing in a different garb. One also sees how indifferent it is to the matter whether it proceeds from a theistic or an atheistic religion. —Above all, however, I can recommend, as a special and highly detailed example and a factual illustration of the concepts I have set out, the autobiography of Madame Guyon. To come to know this beautiful and great soul, whose memory always fills me with reverence, and to do justice to the excellence of her disposition while making allowance for the superstition of her reason, must be as gratifying to every person of the better sort as that book will always be held in poor repute by the common-minded, that is, the majority. For always and everywhere, everyone can value only what is to some extent analogous to himself and for which he has at least a faint disposition. This holds for the ethical just as it does for the intellectual.[101] In a certain sense one could even regard the well-known French biography of Spinoza as an example belonging here—provided, that is, one uses as its key that magnificent opening of his unsatisfactory treatise *"De emendatione intellectus"* [On the Improvement of the Understanding], a passage I can also recommend as the most effective means I know of for calming the storm of the passions. Finally, even the great Goethe, Greek as he is through and through, did not think it beneath him to show us this most beautiful side of humanity in the clarifying mirror of poetry. In the "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul" he gave us an idealized portrait of the life of Fräulein Klettenberg, and later, in his own autobiography, he also gave a historical account of it;

100 Gerhard Tersteegen (1697–1769) and Johann Henrich Reitz (1655–1720) were German Pietist writers; Johann Arnold Kanne (1773–1824) collected Pietist lives, including that of Beata Sturm.

101 Jeanne-Marie Guyon (1648–1717), French mystic of the Quietist movement; her autobiography appeared posthumously in 1720.

just as he has even told us the life of St. Philip Neri twice.[102] — World history, it is true, will always be silent, and must be, about the people whose way of life is the best and only adequate illustration of this important point in our inquiry. For the material of world history is quite different, indeed opposite: not the denial and giving up of the will to live, but precisely its affirmation and its appearance in countless individuals. In this its discord with itself, at the highest summit of its objectification, emerges with perfect distinctness; and it sets before our eyes now the superiority of the individual through his cleverness, now the might of the crowd through its mass, now the power of chance personifying itself as fate—always the futility and vanity of all the striving. But we are not following the thread of appearances in time here. As philosophers, we are seeking to explore the ethical significance of actions, and we take this as the sole standard of what is significant and important to us. Surely, then, no fear of the ever-abiding majority vote of vulgarity and shallowness will keep us from confessing that the greatest, most important and most significant appearance the world can show is not the conqueror of the world but the one who overcomes the world. It is in fact nothing other than the quiet, unnoticed way of life of a person to whom that knowledge has dawned in consequence of which he gives up and denies that will to live which fills everything and drives and strives in all things—the will whose freedom emerges only here, in him alone, so that his conduct now becomes the exact opposite of the ordinary. For the philosopher, therefore, those biographies of holy, self-denying people—however badly written they mostly are, indeed however mixed with superstition and nonsense in their presentation —are in this respect, through the significance of their material, incomparably more instructive and important than even Plutarch and Livy.

A fuller and more complete acquaintance with what we express, in the abstraction and generality of our mode of exposi-

tion, as the denial of the will to live will also be greatly helped by considering the ethical precepts that were given in this spirit by people who were full of it. These will at the same time show how old our view is, however new its purely philosophical expression may *be*. What lies closest to hand is Christianity. Its ethics is entirely in the spirit just indicated, and it leads not only to the highest degrees of love of humanity but also to renunciation. This latter side is already very clearly present as a seed in the writings of the Apostles, but it develops fully and is stated *explicite* [explicitly] only later. We find the Apostles prescribing love of one's neighbor, equal in weight to self-love; beneficence; returning hatred with love and kindness; patience; gentleness; bearing every possible insult without resistance; abstinence in food for the suppression of desire; and resistance to the sexual impulse, entirely if one can. Here we already see the first stages of asceticism, or real denial of the will. This latter expression means exactly what the Gospels call denying oneself and taking up one's cross. (Matt. 16:24–25; Mark 8:34–35; Luke 9:23–24; 14:26–27, 33.) This tendency soon developed more and more and gave rise to penitents, anchorites and monasticism. In itself this origin was pure and holy, but for that very reason it was wholly unsuited to the great majority of people, so that what developed from it could only be hypocrisy and abomination: for *abusus optimi pessimus* [the abuse of the best is the worst]. As Christianity developed further, we then see that ascetic seed unfold into full flower in the writings of the Christian saints and mystics. Alongside the purest love, these preach complete resignation, voluntary and total poverty, true serenity, perfect indifference to all worldly things, dying to one's own will and rebirth in God, total forgetting of one's own person and absorption in the vision of God. A complete account of this can be found in Fénelon's *"Explication des maximes des Saints sur la vie intérieure"* [Explanation of the Maxims of the Saints on the Inner Life]. But probably

102 The "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul" form Book 6 of Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, modeled on Susanna von Klettenberg; Goethe tells the life of Philip Neri in his *Italian Journey*.

nowhere is the spirit of Christianity, in this development of it, expressed as perfectly and as forcefully as in the writings of the German mystics—that is, of Meister Eckhart—and in the justly famous book "The German Theology." In the preface he wrote for it, Luther says that from no book except the Bible and Augustine had he learned more about what God, Christ and man are than from this one. Its genuine and unadulterated text, however, we received only in 1851, in *Pfeiffer's* Stuttgart edition.[103] The precepts and teachings given in it are the most complete exposition, sprung from the deepest inner conviction, of what I have presented as the denial of the will to live. That, then, is where one should get to know it better before passing judgment on it with Jewish-Protestant self-assurance. Written in the same excellent spirit, though not quite to be rated as highly as that work, is *Tauler's* "Imitation of the Poor Life of Christ," together with his *"Medulla animae"* [Marrow of the Soul]. In my opinion, the teachings of these genuine Christian mystics are related to those of the New Testament as spirit of wine is to wine. Or: what becomes visible to us in the New Testament as if through veils and mist meets us in the works of the mystics unveiled, in full clarity and distinctness.[104] Finally, one could also regard the New Testament as the first initiation and the mystics as the second—*ta mikra kai megala mystêria* [the lesser and the greater mysteries].[105]

But in the ancient works of the Sanskrit language we find what we have called the denial of the will to live unfolded still further, expressed in more varied ways and portrayed more vividly than was possible in the Christian Church and the Western world. That this important ethical view of life could attain a still more far-reaching development and a more decided expres-

103 Fénelon (1651–1715), archbishop of Cambrai, wrote this 1697 work in defense of Quietist mysticism. The *Theologia Germanica* is an anonymous late-14th-century mystical treatise first published by Luther (1516–18).

104 Johannes Tauler (c. 1300–1361), Dominican preacher and mystic of Strasbourg; both works named here are now thought to be only ascribed to him.

105 An allusion to the Lesser and Greater Mysteries of Eleusis, the two stages of initiation in the ancient Greek cult.

sion there is perhaps due mainly to the fact that it was not restricted there by an element wholly foreign to it, as Jewish doctrine is in Christianity. The sublime founder of Christianity necessarily had to accommodate himself to that doctrine, partly consciously and partly perhaps even unconsciously, and attach his teaching to it. As a result, Christianity is composed of two very heterogeneous constituents. Of these I would call the purely ethical one the Christian one par excellence—indeed, exclusively—and distinguish it from the Jewish dogmatism it found already in place. If, as has often been feared, and especially at present, that excellent and salutary religion should one day fall into complete decline, I would look for the reason solely in the fact that it does not consist of one simple element but of two elements that were originally heterogeneous and were combined only through the course of world events. In such a case, the dissolution would have had to come about through their breaking apart, which arises from their unequal affinity with, and reaction to, the advancing spirit of the age. Yet even after this dissolution the purely ethical part would still have to remain intact, because it is indestructible. —Now, in the ethics of the Hindus, as we already find it expressed in the most varied and forceful ways—however imperfect our knowledge of their literature still is—in the Vedas, the Puranas, poetic works, myths, legends of their saints, maxims and rules of life,[106] we see prescribed: love of one's neighbor with complete renunciation of all self-love; love in general, not confined to the human race but embracing everything that lives; beneficence to the

106 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See, for example, *"Oupnek'hat, studio Anquetil du Perron"* [Oupnek'hat, edited by Anquetil du Perron], vol. 2, nos. 138, 144, 145, 146. —*"Mythologie des Indous par Mad. de Polier"* [Mythology of the Hindus, by Madame de Polier], vol. 2, chs. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.—Klaproth's "Asiatic Magazine," in the first volume: "On the Religion of Fo"; in the same place, "Bhaguat-Geeta," or "Conversations between Kreeshna and Arjoon"; in the second volume: "Moha-Mudgava."—Then *"Institutes of Hindu-Law, or the ordinances of Menu, from the Sanskrit by Wm. Jones,"* German translation by Hüttner (1797); especially the sixth and twelfth chapters.—Finally, many passages in the *"Asiatic researches."* (In the last forty years Indian literature in Europe has grown so much that if I wanted to complete this note from the first edition now, it would fill a couple of pages.)

point of giving away what one has earned each day by hard toil; boundless patience toward all who offend us; returning all evil, however bad it may be, with good and with love; voluntary and joyful endurance of every humiliation; abstinence from all animal food; complete chastity and renunciation of all sensual pleasure for anyone who strives for real holiness; casting away all property, abandoning every dwelling place and all one's kin; deep and total solitude, spent in silent meditation, with voluntary penance and terrible, slow self-torment, for the complete mortification of the will. This finally goes as far as voluntary death: by starvation, or by going out to meet crocodiles, by throwing oneself from the sacred mountain peak in the Himalayas, by being buried alive, or again by throwing oneself under the wheels of the huge chariot that carries the images of the gods about amid the singing, rejoicing and dancing of the temple dancers. And these precepts, whose origin reaches back well beyond four thousand years, are still lived by even now, however much that people has declined in many respects—by some individuals even to the most extreme lengths.[107] What has remained in practice for so long among a people numbering so many millions, while it imposes the heaviest sacrifices, cannot be a whim arbitrarily thought up; it must have its ground in the essential nature of humanity. But in addition, one cannot marvel enough at the unanimity one finds on reading the life of a Christian penitent or saint and that of an Indian one. With dogmas, customs and surroundings so fundamentally different, the striving and the inner life of both are exactly the same. So too in the precepts for both. Tauler, for example, speaks of the total poverty one should seek, which consists in completely giving up and divesting oneself of everything from which one could draw any comfort or worldly satisfaction—obviously because all this

107 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. At the Jaggernaut procession in June 1840, eleven Hindus threw themselves under the chariot and were killed instantly. (Letter from an East Indian landowner in the *"Times"* of 30 December 1840.)

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Jagannath ("lord of the world"), a form of Vishnu, whose image is drawn through Puri in Orissa on huge chariots at an annual festival.

constantly gives new nourishment to the will, whose complete dying away is the aim. And as the Indian counterpart we see, in the precepts of Fo, that the sannyasi, who is to be without a dwelling and entirely without property, is finally also enjoined not to lie down repeatedly under the same tree, so that he may not form any preference or inclination even for that tree.[108] The Christian mystics and the teachers of the Vedanta philosophy also agree in holding that, for one who has attained perfection, all outward works and religious exercises are superfluous.—So much agreement, among such different ages and peoples, is factual proof that what finds expression here is not, as optimistic shallowness likes to claim, some eccentricity and derangement of mind, but an essential side of human nature—one that shows itself only rarely because of its very excellence.

I have now indicated the sources from which one can come to know, directly and as drawn from life, the phenomena in which the denial of the will to live presents itself. In a certain sense this is the most important point of our whole inquiry; yet I have set it out only in quite general terms. For it is better to refer to those who speak from direct experience than to swell this book still further, without need, by a feebler repetition of what they have said.

I will add only a little more, to characterize their state in general. We saw above that the wicked person, through the vehemence of his willing, suffers constant, consuming inner torment, and at last, when all the objects of willing are exhausted, cools the fierce thirst of his self-will at the sight of others' pain. By contrast, the person in whom the denial of the will to live has dawned—however poor, joyless and full of privation his state may look from outside—is full of inner joy and true heavenly peace. It is not the restless urge to live, the exultant joy that has violent suffering as its preceding or following condition, such as makes up the life of the person who loves life. It is an unshakable peace, a deep calm and an inward serenity—a state that, when it is brought before our eyes or our imagination, we can-

108 Fo is the Chinese name for the Buddha.

not look upon without the greatest longing, because we at once recognize it as the only right thing, infinitely outweighing everything else, the state toward which our better spirit calls out to us the great *sapere aude* [dare to be wise].[109] We then feel that every fulfillment of our wishes won from the world is only like the alms that keep the beggar alive today so that he may go hungry again tomorrow; resignation, on the other hand, is like an inherited estate: it relieves its owner of all cares forever.

We remember from the third book that aesthetic delight in the beautiful consists, in large part, in this: that by entering the state of pure contemplation we are lifted for the moment above all willing, that is, above all wishes and cares, and are, as it were, rid of ourselves. We are then no longer the individual that knows for the sake of its constant willing, the correlate of the individual thing, for which objects become motives, but the eternal subject of knowing, purified of will, the correlate of the Idea. And we know that these moments, when, released from the fierce pressure of the will, we rise as it were out of the heavy ether of earth, are the most blissful we know. From this we can gather how blissful the life of a person must be whose will is stilled not for moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but forever—indeed, entirely extinguished, except for that last glimmering spark that sustains the body and will go out with it. Such a person, who after many bitter struggles against his own nature has at last completely overcome it, remains only as a purely knowing being, as the untroubled mirror of the world. Nothing can frighten him any more, nothing can move him: for he has cut all the thousand threads of willing that hold us bound to the world and, as craving, fear, envy and anger, drag us this way and that in constant pain. He now looks back, calm and smiling, on the phantasms of this world, which once had the power to move and torment his mind too, but which now stand before him as indifferently as chess pieces after the game is over, or as the masquerade costumes thrown off in the morning, whose figures teased and unsettled us on the night of carnival.

109 Horace, *Epistles* 1.2.40; Kant made the phrase the motto of the Enlightenment.

Life and its figures now only float before him like a fleeting appearance, like a light morning dream to someone half awake, through which reality already shimmers and which can no longer deceive; and, just like such a dream, they finally vanish without any violent transition. From these considerations we can learn to understand in what sense Madame *Guyon*, toward the end of her autobiography, often expresses herself as follows: "Everything is indifferent to me: I *can* will nothing any more: I often do not know whether I exist or not."—Allow me also, in order to express how, after the will has died away, the death of the body (which is, after all, only the appearance of the will, and so loses all meaning once the will is abolished) can no longer have anything bitter about it but is most welcome—allow me to set down that holy penitent's own words, although they are not elegantly turned: *"Midi de la gloire; jour où il n'y a plus de nuit; vie qui ne craint plus la mort, dans la mort meme: parceque la mort a vaincu la mort, et que celui qui a souffert la première mort, ne goutera plus la seconde mort."* [Noon of glory; day in which there is no more night; life that no longer fears death, even in death itself: because death has conquered death, and whoever has suffered the first death will no longer taste the second death.] (Vie de Mad. de Guion, vol. 2, p. 13.)

Yet we must not suppose that once the denial of the will to live has set in, through knowledge that has become a quieter, it never wavers again and one can rest on it as on property one has acquired. On the contrary, it must be won anew again and again through constant struggle. For since the body is the will itself, only in the form of objecthood, or as appearance in the world as representation, the whole will to live is still there in its possibility as long as the body lives, and it constantly strives to pass into actuality and to blaze up anew with all its heat. Hence in the lives of holy people we find the peace and bliss described above only as the blossom that springs from the constant overcoming of the will; and as the soil from which it grows we see the unceasing struggle with the will to live: for no one can have lasting peace on earth. We therefore see the histories of the saints'

inner lives full of spiritual struggles, temptations and abandonment by grace—that is, by that mode of knowledge which, rendering all motives ineffective, stills all willing as a universal quieter, gives the deepest peace and opens the gate of freedom. That is also why we see those who have once attained the denial of the will striving with all their might to keep to this path, by renunciations of every kind forced upon themselves, by a hard, penitential way of life and by seeking out what is unpleasant to them—all in order to subdue the will, which keeps striving up again. Hence, finally, because they already know the value of redemption, their anxious care to preserve the salvation they have won, and their scruples of conscience at every innocent pleasure or at every little stirring of their vanity—which here too is the last to die, being the most indestructible, the most active and the most foolish of all human inclinations. —By the expression *asceticism*, which I have already used often, I understand, in the narrower sense, this *deliberate* breaking of the will by refusing oneself what is pleasant and seeking out what is unpleasant—the self-chosen penitential way of life and self-chastisement, for the continual mortification of the will.

THE SECOND WAY: SUFFERING

Most people reach resignation not through knowledge but through suffering felt in their own person.

Now, while we see this practiced by those who have already attained the denial of the will, in order to keep to it, suffering in general, as inflicted by fate, is also a second way (*deuteros plous* [the second-best voyage]) of attaining that denial. Indeed, we may assume that most people arrive there only by this way, and that it is suffering felt in one's own person, not merely known, that most often brings about complete resignation, often only when death is near. For only in a few is mere knowledge enough to bring about the denial of the will—the knowledge that, seeing through the *principium individuationis*, first produces the most perfect goodness of disposition and universal love of humanity,

and finally lets them recognize all the sufferings of the world as their own.[110] Even in someone who approaches this point, the tolerable condition of his own person, the flattery of the moment, the lure of hope and the satisfaction of the will—that is, of desire—which offers itself again and again, are almost always a constant obstacle to the denial of the will and a constant temptation to affirm it anew. That is why, in this respect, all those temptations have been personified as devils. As a rule, therefore, the will must be broken by the greatest suffering of one's own before its self-denial sets in. Then we see a person who has been brought, through all the stages of mounting affliction and against the most violent resistance, to the brink of despair, suddenly turn inward, know himself and the world, change his whole nature, and rise above himself and all suffering. As if purified and sanctified by it, in unassailable peace, bliss and sublimity, he willingly renounces everything he previously willed with the greatest vehemence, and joyfully welcomes death. It is the silver flash of the denial of the will to live, that is, of redemption, suddenly breaking out of the purifying flame of suffering. Even those who were very wicked we sometimes see refined to this degree by the deepest pain: they have become other people and are completely transformed.[111] Their earlier misdeeds, therefore, no longer trouble their conscience; yet they gladly atone for them with death and willingly see the end of the appearance of that will which is now foreign and abhorrent to them. Of this denial of the will, brought about by great misfortune and by despair of all rescue, the great Goethe has given us, in his immortal masterpiece, "Faust," a portrayal more distinct and vivid than any other I know in poetry: the story of Gretchen's sufferings. This is a perfect model of the second way that leads to the denial of the will—not, like the first, through mere knowledge of the suffering of a whole world, which one

110 Plato, *Phaedo* 99c: a proverbial expression for taking to the oars when the wind fails, i.e. the next-best way.

111 "Silberblick" is a metallurgical term: the sudden gleam of pure silver when the last impurities burn off in refining.

voluntarily makes one's own, but through one's own boundless pain, felt in one's own person. Many tragedies, it is true, bring their powerfully willing hero at last to this point of complete resignation, where the will to live and its appearance usually end together; but no portrayal known to me brings the essence of that transformation before our eyes as distinctly and as free of everything extraneous as the one I have mentioned in "Faust."

In real life we very often see those unfortunates who have to drain the fullest measure of suffering transformed in this way: those who, once all hope has been taken from them entirely, go in full possession of their mental powers to a shameful, violent, often agonizing death on the scaffold. We must not, of course, assume that there is as great a difference between their character and that of most people as their fate suggests; their fate is for the most part to be ascribed to circumstances. They are, nonetheless, guilty and wicked to a considerable degree. But we see many of them, once complete hopelessness has set in, transformed in the way described. They now show real goodness and purity of disposition, a true abhorrence of committing any deed that is in the least wicked or unloving. They forgive their enemies—even those through whom they suffered innocently—not merely in words, and perhaps from a hypocritical fear of the judges of the underworld, but in deed and in inward earnest, and they want no revenge whatever. Indeed, their suffering and dying at last become dear to them; for the denial of the will to live has set in. They often refuse the rescue offered to them, and die gladly, peacefully, blissfully. To them, in the excess of pain, the last secret of life has been revealed: namely, that ill and evil, suffering and hatred, the tormented and the tormentor, however different they appear to knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason, are in themselves one—the appearance of that one will to live which objectifies its conflict with itself by means of the *principium individuationis*. They have come to know both sides, evil and ill, in full measure; and since they finally see that the two are identical, they now reject both at once: they deny the will to live. In what myths and dogmas they account to their

reason for this intuitive and immediate knowledge and for their transformation is, as has been said, a matter of complete indifference.

Matthias Claudius was, without doubt, a witness to a change of heart of this kind when he wrote the remarkable essay that appears in "The Wandsbeck Messenger" (Part 1, p. 115) under the title "Story of the Conversion of " and ends as follows: "A person's way of thinking can pass from one point of the circumference to the opposite one, and back again to the previous point, if circumstances trace the arc there for him. And these changes are not really anything great and interesting in a person.[112] But that *remarkable, catholic, transcendental change*, in which the whole circle is irretrievably torn apart and all the laws of psychology become vain and empty, in which the coat of skins is taken off, or at least turned inside out, and the scales fall from a person's eyes—that is something such that anyone who is at all conscious of the breath in his nostrils will leave father and mother if he can hear and learn something certain about it."[113]

Nearness of death and hopelessness, however, are not absolutely necessary for such purification through suffering. Even without them, great misfortune and pain can force upon us the knowledge of the will to live's contradiction with itself, and the vanity of all striving can be recognized. That is why people who had led very turbulent lives in the throng of the passions—kings, heroes, adventurers—have often been seen suddenly to change, turn to resignation and penance, and become hermits and monks. All genuine stories of conversion belong here—for example, that of Raymond Lull. He had long courted a beautiful woman, and when she at last summoned him to her room he expected the fulfillment of all his wishes; but she opened her bodice and showed him her breast, most horribly eaten away by

112 Matthias Claudius (1740–1815), German poet, published as "Asmus" in his periodical *Der Wandsbecker Bote*.

113 "Catholic" in its root sense of "universal"; the coat of skins alludes to Genesis 3:21.

cancer.[114] From that moment, as if he had looked into hell, he was converted, left the court of the King of Majorca and went into the wilderness to do penance.[115] Very similar to this story of conversion is that of the Abbé de Rancé, which I have told briefly in Chapter 48 of the second volume.[116] When we consider that in both men the occasion was the transition from pleasure to the horrors of life, this gives us an explanation of a striking fact: that it was among the most pleasure-loving, cheerful, sensual and frivolous nation in Europe, namely the French, that by far the strictest of all monastic orders, namely the Trappist, arose. After its decline it was restored by Rancé, and, despite revolutions, changes in the Church and spreading unbelief, it has maintained itself to the present day in its purity and fearful strictness.

Knowledge of the kind mentioned above, concerning the nature of this existence, can, however, depart again together with its occasion, and the will to live, and with it the former character, can return. Thus we see the passionate Benvenuto Cellini transformed in this way, once in prison and another time during a serious illness, but falling back into his old state once the suffering had gone. In general, the denial of the will by no means follows from suffering with the necessity of an effect from its cause; rather, the will remains free.[117] For this is precisely the one point where its freedom enters directly into appearance: hence Asmus's so strongly expressed astonishment at the "transcendental change." For every suffering one can conceive of a will that surpasses it in vehemence and is therefore unconquered by it. That is why Plato in the "Phaedo" tells of people who feast, drink and enjoy aphrodisia [the pleasures of

114 Raymond Lull (Ramon Llull, c. 1232–1316), Majorcan philosopher, mystic and missionary.

115 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Bruckeri hist. philos., tomi IV pars I, p. 10.* [Brucker, History of Philosophy, vol. 4, part 1, p. 10.]

116 Armand-Jean de Rancé (1626–1700), a worldly French abbé who, after a sudden conversion, reformed the abbey of La Trappe.

117 Benvenuto Cellini (1500–1571), Florentine goldsmith and sculptor, describes these episodes in his autobiography.

love] up to the very moment of their execution, affirming life right into death. Shakespeare, in Cardinal Beaufort,[118] brings before our eyes the terrible end of a wicked man who dies in despair, since no suffering or death can break his will, vehement to the point of the utmost malice.

The more vehement the will, the more glaring the appearance of its conflict, and so the greater the suffering. A world that was the appearance of a far more vehement will to live than the present one would display correspondingly greater suffering: it would be a *hell*.

Since all suffering, being a mortification and a summons to resignation, has a potentially sanctifying power, this explains why great misfortune and deep pain in themselves inspire a certain reverence. But the sufferer becomes wholly venerable to us only when, surveying the course of his life as a chain of sufferings, or mourning a great and incurable pain, he does not really look at the concatenation of circumstances that plunged his life in particular into sorrow, and does not stop at the single great misfortune that struck him.—For up to that point his knowledge still follows the principle of sufficient reason and clings to the individual appearance; he still wills life, only not under the conditions that have fallen to him.—He stands there as truly venerable only when his gaze has risen from the particular to the universal, when he regards his own suffering merely as an example of the whole and, becoming a genius in the ethical sense, takes *one* case as standing for thousands, so that the whole of life, grasped as essentially suffering, brings him to resignation. That is why it is venerable when, in Goethe's "Torquato Tasso," the Princess speaks at length of how her own life and that of her family have always been sad and joyless, and in doing so looks entirely toward the universal.

We always imagine a very noble character with a certain tinge of quiet sadness. This is anything but constant peevishness at the vexations of the day (that would be an ignoble trait and would make one fear a wicked disposition); it is a conscious-

118 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. *Henry VI, part 2, Act 3, Sc. 3.*

ness, arising from knowledge, of the vanity of all goods and of the suffering of all life, not merely one's own. Such knowledge, however, may first be awakened by suffering one has experienced oneself, especially by a single great one—as a single unfulfillable wish brought Petrarch to that resigned sadness about the whole of life which speaks to us so movingly from his works. For the Daphne he pursued had to vanish from his hands, so as to leave him the immortal laurel in her place.[119] When the will has been broken to a certain degree by such a great and irrevocable denial on the part of fate, then almost nothing more is willed in other respects, and the character shows itself gentle, sad, noble, resigned. When, finally, grief no longer has any definite object but spreads over the whole of life, it is in a sense a turning inward, a withdrawal, a gradual vanishing of the will, whose visibility, the body, it even quietly but inwardly undermines. The person then feels a certain loosening of his bonds, a gentle foretaste of death, which announces itself as the dissolution of the body and of the will at once. That is why this grief is accompanied by a secret joy; and it is this, I believe, that the most melancholy of all nations has called *the joy of grief*.[120] Yet here too lies the reef of *sentimentality*, both in life itself and in its portrayal in poetry: when there is endless mourning and endless lamenting without one's rising and taking heart to resignation, one has lost earth and heaven together and kept only watery sentimentalism. Only when suffering takes on the form of mere pure knowledge, and this knowledge then, as a *quieter of the will*, brings about true resignation, is it the way to redemption and thereby venerable. In this respect, however, at the sight of anyone very unfortunate we feel a certain respect, akin to the respect that virtue and nobility of mind compel from us, and at the same time our own fortunate condition seems like a reproach. We cannot help regarding that suffering, both our own and that of others, as at least a possible approach to virtue and holiness,

119 In the myth, Daphne, fleeing Apollo, was turned into a laurel; Petrarch's beloved was Laura, and he was crowned with the poet's laurel in 1341.
120 The phrase recurs in James Macpherson's *Ossian* poems (1760s).

and pleasures and worldly satisfactions, by contrast, as a moving away from them. This goes so far that every person who bears a great physical suffering or a heavy mental one—indeed, even anyone who merely performs physical labor demanding the greatest exertion, in the sweat of his brow and with visible exhaustion, but does all this patiently and without complaint—every such person, I say, when we observe him with close attention, seems to us like a sick person undergoing a painful cure. He bears the pain it causes willingly and even with satisfaction, because he knows that the more he suffers, the more the diseased matter is destroyed, so that the present pain is the measure of his healing.

According to all that has been said so far, the denial of the will to live—which is what is called complete resignation or holiness—always proceeds from the quieter of the will, which is the knowledge of its inner conflict and its essential vanity, as these express themselves in the suffering of all that lives. The difference that we have presented as two ways lies in whether that knowledge is called forth by suffering that is merely and purely *known*, and freely made one's own by seeing through the *principium individuationis*, or by suffering directly *felt* in one's own person. True salvation, redemption from life and suffering, is unthinkable without complete denial of the will. Until then, everyone is nothing other than this will itself, whose appearance is a vanishing existence, an ever-futile, constantly frustrated striving, and the world as presented, full of suffering, to which all belong irrevocably and in the same way. For we found above that life is always certain for the will to live, and that its only actual form is the present, which they never escape, however birth and death may hold sway in appearance. Indian myth expresses this by saying: "They are reborn." The great ethical difference between characters means this: the wicked person is infinitely far from attaining the knowledge from which the denial of the will proceeds, and is therefore in truth actually *exposed* to all the torments that appear in life as *possible*. For even whatever fortunate state his person may be in at present is only

an appearance mediated by the *principium individuationis* and an illusion of Maya—the beggar's happy dream. The sufferings that he, in the vehemence and fury of his will's urge, inflicts on others are the measure of the sufferings that, experienced in his own person, could not break his will and lead it to final denial. All true and pure love, on the other hand, and even all free justice, already proceed from seeing through the *principium individuationis*; and when this occurs in full clarity, it brings about complete sanctification and redemption, whose phenomenon is the state of resignation described above, the unshakable peace that accompanies it, and the highest joy in death.[121]

§ 69. SUICIDE

Suicide is not denial but a strong affirmation of the will, which only destroys an appearance.

4.69 We have now presented, sufficiently within the limits of our mode of inquiry, the denial of the will to live, which is the only act of the will's freedom that emerges in appearance and is therefore, as Asmus calls it, the transcendental change. Nothing differs from it more than the arbitrary abolition of the will's individual appearance: *suicide*. Far from being a denial of the will, suicide is a phenomenon of strong affirmation of the will. For the essence of denial lies not in abhorring the sufferings of life but in abhorring its pleasures. The suicide wills life and is merely dissatisfied with the conditions under which it has come to him. He therefore by no means gives up the will to live, but only life, by destroying the individual appearance. He wills life, wills the unhindered existence and affirmation of the body; but the tangle of circumstances does not allow these, and great suffering arises for him. The will to live itself finds itself so obstructed in this individual appearance that it cannot unfold its striving. It therefore decides in accordance with its essence in itself, which lies outside the forms of the principle of sufficient reason

121 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Chapter 48 of the second volume (the Supplements).

and to which, therefore, every individual appearance is indifferent, since it itself remains untouched by all arising and passing away and is the inner being of the life of all things. For the same firm inner certainty that lets us all live without constant shudders at death—the certainty, namely, that the will can never lack its appearance—also supports the deed in suicide. The will to live, then, appears just as much in this self-killing (Shiva) as in the comfort of self-preservation (Vishnu) and in the pleasure of procreation (Brahma). This is the inner meaning of the *unity of the Trimurti*, which every human being wholly is, although in time it brings to the fore now one, now another of its three heads.—As the individual thing is to the Idea, so suicide is to the denial of the will: the suicide denies merely the individual, not the species.[122] We found above that, since life is always certain for the will to live and suffering is essential to life, suicide is an entirely futile and foolish act. It is the arbitrary destruction of an individual appearance, while the thing in itself remains undisturbed, just as the rainbow stands firm however quickly the drops that bear it for moments are replaced. But beyond this it is also Maya's masterpiece, as the most glaring expression of the will to live's contradiction with itself. We recognized this contradiction already in the lowest appearances of the will, in the constant struggle of all manifestations of natural forces and of all organic individuals for matter, time and space; and we saw that conflict emerge more and more, with terrible distinctness, on the ascending grades of the will's objectification. So at last, on the highest grade, which is the Idea of the human being, it reaches the degree at which not only do the individuals presenting the same Idea destroy one another, but the same individual even declares war on itself. The vehemence with which it wills life and presses against what obstructs life—suffering—brings it to the point of destroying itself, so that the individual will, by an act of will, abolishes the body, which is only its own becoming-visible, rather than let suffering break the will. Precisely because the suicide cannot stop willing, he stops living; and

122 The Trimurti is often depicted as one figure with three heads.

here the will affirms itself precisely through the abolition of its appearance, because it can no longer affirm itself in any other way. But since it was precisely the suffering he thus escapes that, as mortification of the will, could have led the will to deny itself and to redemption, the suicide in this respect is like a sick person who, after a painful operation that could cure him at the root has begun, will not let it be completed but prefers to keep the disease. Suffering approaches and, as such, opens up the possibility of denying the will; but he rejects it by destroying the will's appearance, the body, so that the will may remain unbroken.—This is the reason why nearly all systems of ethics, philosophical as well as religious, condemn suicide, although they themselves can give no reasons for this other than strange sophistical ones. But if anyone has ever held himself back from suicide from a purely moral motive, the innermost meaning of this self-conquest (in whatever concepts his reason may have clothed it) was this: "I will not evade suffering, so that it may help to abolish the will to live, whose appearance is so wretched, by strengthening the knowledge of the true nature of the world that is already dawning in me, until that knowledge becomes the final quieter of my will and redeems me forever."

As is well known, cases occur again and again in which suicide extends to the children: the father kills the children he loves dearly, and then himself. Conscience, religion and all inherited concepts make him recognize murder as the gravest crime, and yet he commits it in the hour of his own death, and without being able to have any egoistic motive for it. If we consider this, the deed can be explained only as follows. Here the will of the individual recognizes itself directly in the children; but, caught in the delusion that takes the appearance for the essence in itself, and at the same time deeply stirred by knowledge of the misery of all life, it now imagines that by abolishing the appearance it abolishes the essence itself. And so it wants to rescue itself and the children, in whom it directly sees itself living again, from existence and its misery. —An entirely analogous error would be to imagine that one could achieve what volun-

tary chastity accomplishes by frustrating the purposes of nature in fertilization, or even, in view of the inevitable sufferings of life, by hastening the death of the newborn, instead of doing everything to secure life for every being that presses into life. For if will to live is there, then no force can break it, since it is the only metaphysical thing, the thing in itself; force can only destroy its appearance at this place and at this time. The will itself cannot be abolished by anything except *knowledge*. Hence the only way of salvation is this: that the will appear unhindered, so that in this appearance it can *know* its own essence. Only as a result of this knowledge can the will abolish itself, and thereby also end the suffering that is inseparable from its appearance; but this is not possible through physical force, such as destroying the seed, killing the newborn, or suicide. Nature leads the will into the light precisely because only in the light can it find its redemption. Therefore the purposes of nature are to be furthered in every way, once the will to live, which is nature's inner being, has made its decision.—

Entirely different from ordinary suicide there seems to be a special kind of it, though it has perhaps not yet been sufficiently established. This is death by starvation, freely chosen out of the highest degree of asceticism. Its occurrence, however, has always been accompanied by a great deal of religious fanaticism and even superstition, which have obscured it. Yet it seems that the complete denial of the will can reach the point where even the will needed to sustain the vegetative life of the body by taking in nourishment falls away. So far is this kind of suicide from arising out of the will to live that such a completely resigned ascetic ceases to live simply because he has altogether ceased to will. No manner of death other than starvation is really conceivable here (unless it sprang from some particular superstition), because the intention of shortening the torment would in fact already be a degree of affirmation of the will. The dogmas that fill such a penitent's reason meanwhile deceive him into believing that a being of a higher kind has commanded him to undertake the fast to which his inner inclination drives him. Older

examples of this can be found in the "Breslau Collection of Natural and Medical Histories," September 1719, pp. 363 ff.; in Bayle's *Nouvelles de la république des lettres* [News from the Republic of Letters], February 1685, pp. 189 ff.; in Zimmermann, "On Solitude," vol. 1, p.[123] 182; and in the *Histoire de l'académie des sciences* [History of the Academy of Sciences] for 1764 there is a report by Houttuyn, reprinted in the "Collection for Practical Physicians," vol. 1, p. 69. Later reports can be found in Hufeland's "Journal of Practical Medicine," vol. 10, p. 181, and vol. 48, p. 95; also in Nasse's "Journal for Psychological Physicians," 1819, no. 3, p. 460; and in the *Edinburgh medical and surgical Journal*, 1809, vol. 5, p. 319. In 1833 all the newspapers reported that the English historian *Dr.* Lingard had died of voluntary starvation at Dover in January. According to later reports, however, it was not he himself but a relative.[124] In these reports, however, the individuals are for the most part represented as insane, and it can no longer be determined to what extent this may have been the case. But I will set down here a more recent report of this kind, if only to preserve more securely one of the rare examples of the striking and extraordinary phenomenon of human nature just mentioned. At least to all appearances, it belongs where I would place it, and it would otherwise be hard to explain. This more recent report appears in the "Nürnberger Korrespondent" of 29 July 1813, in the following words:

"It is reported from Bern that near Thurnen, in a dense forest, a small hut was found, and in it the body of a man that had been lying in decay for about a month, in clothes that could give little clue to their owner's station in life. Two very fine shirts lay beside him. The most important item was a Bible with blank pages bound into it, some of which the deceased had written on. In them he records the day he left home (his home town, however, is not named), and then says that he had been driven by

123 Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), French skeptic and critic, edited this learned journal. Johann Georg Zimmermann (1728–1795), Swiss physician, wrote a widely read treatise on solitude.

124 John Lingard (1771–1851), English Catholic historian of England.

the Spirit of God into a wilderness to pray and to fast. On his journey here he had already fasted for seven days; then he had eaten again. After that, once he had settled here, he had begun to fast again, and that for so many days. Each day is then marked with a stroke; there are five of these, after which the pilgrim presumably died. A letter to a pastor was also found, about a sermon the deceased had heard him preach; but here too the address was missing."—Between this voluntary death springing from the extreme of asceticism and the ordinary one springing from despair there may be various intermediate stages and mixtures. This is admittedly hard to explain; but the human heart has depths, obscurities and intricacies that are extremely difficult to illuminate and unravel.

§ 70. FREEDOM AS GRACE

The only direct appearance of freedom is the will's self-abolition, what the Church called grace and rebirth.

4.70 It might perhaps be thought that our whole account, now completed, of what I call the denial of the will is irreconcilable with the earlier discussion of necessity. That necessity belongs to motivation just as much as to every other form of the principle of sufficient reason; according to it, motives, like all causes, are only occasional causes, on which the character here unfolds its nature and reveals it with the necessity of a law of nature. That is why we there flatly denied freedom as *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae* [freedom of indifferent choice]. Far from retracting this here, however, I call it to mind. In truth, real freedom, that is, independence of the principle of sufficient reason, belongs only to the will as thing in itself, not to its appearance, whose essential form is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason, the element of necessity. But the only case in which that freedom can also become directly visible in the appearance is the one in which it puts an end to what appears. And because, even so, the mere appearance—insofar as it is a link in the chain of causes, namely the living body—continues to exist in time,

which contains only appearances, the will that manifests itself through this appearance then stands in contradiction with it, since it denies what the appearance expresses. In such a case, for example, the genitals, as the visible form of the sexual drive, are there and healthy; and yet sexual satisfaction is not willed, even in one's innermost being. The whole body is nothing but the visible expression of the will to live, and yet the motives corresponding to this will no longer act; indeed, the dissolution of the body, the end of the individual and with it the greatest check on the natural will, is welcome and desired. Now there is a contradiction between our assertions: on the one hand, that the will is necessarily determined by motives in accordance with the character; on the other, that the will can be completely abolished, so that motives become powerless. This is only the repetition, in philosophical reflection, of the *real* contradiction that arises from the direct intervention of the freedom of the will in itself, which knows no necessity, in the necessity of its appearance. The key to reconciling these contradictions, however, lies in the fact that the state in which the character is withdrawn from the power of motives does not proceed directly from the will, but from an altered mode of knowledge. For as long as knowledge is only the kind that is caught up in the *principium individuationis* and simply follows the principle of sufficient reason, the force of motives is irresistible. But when the *principium individuationis* is seen through, when the Ideas, indeed the essence of things in themselves, are directly known as the same will in everything, and from this knowledge a universal quieter of willing arises, then individual motives become ineffective, because the mode of knowledge corresponding to them has receded, eclipsed by an entirely different one. Hence the character can never change in part, but must, with the consistency of a law of nature, carry out in particulars the will whose appearance it is as a whole. Yet this very whole, the character itself, can be completely abolished by the change of knowledge indicated above. It is this abolition of the character that Asmus, as quoted above, calls the "catholic, transcendental change" and

marvels at. It is also precisely what the Christian Church very aptly called *rebirth*, while the knowledge from which it springs is what it called the *working of grace*.—It is precisely because what is at issue is not a change but a complete abolition of the character that, however different the characters who underwent it were before that abolition, they nevertheless show a great similarity in their conduct afterwards, even though each still *speaks* very differently according to his concepts and dogmas.

In this sense, then, the old philosophical doctrine of the freedom of the will, always disputed and always reasserted, is not without foundation, and the Church's dogma of the working of grace and of rebirth is not without sense and meaning either. But now we unexpectedly see the two coincide, and can also understand in what sense the excellent Malebranche could say, *"La liberté est un mystère"* [Freedom is a mystery]—and was right. For precisely what the Christian mystics call the *working of grace* and *rebirth* is, for us, the only direct manifestation of the *freedom* of the *will*. It occurs only when the will, having arrived at knowledge of its own inner nature, receives from this a *quieter* and is thereby withdrawn from the effect of *motives*, which lies in the domain of another mode of knowledge whose objects are only appearances.—The possibility of freedom manifesting itself in this way is humanity's greatest privilege, forever denied to the animal, because its condition is the deliberation of reason, which, independent of the impression of the present, allows us to survey life as a whole. The animal lacks any possibility of freedom, just as it lacks even the possibility of a genuine, that is, deliberate, choice following a complete conflict of motives, which for this purpose would have to be abstract representations. Therefore, with the same necessity *with which the* stone falls to the earth, the hungry wolf sinks its teeth into the flesh of its prey, with no possibility of knowing that it is itself the one torn apart as well as the one tearing. *Necessity* is the *kingdom of nature*; *freedom* is the *kingdom of grace*.

Now, as we have seen, that *self-abolition* of the *will* proceeds from knowledge, while all knowledge and insight as such is

independent of arbitrary choice. Hence that denial of willing, that entry into freedom, cannot be forced by resolution; it springs from the innermost relation of knowing to willing in the human being, and so it comes suddenly, as if flying in from outside. That is precisely why the Church called it the *working of grace*. But just as the Church still makes grace depend on its being accepted, so too the effect of the quieter is ultimately an act of the will's freedom. And because, as a result of such a working of grace, a person's whole nature is changed and reversed from the ground up, so that he no longer wills anything of all that he previously willed so vehemently—so that a new human being really does, as it were, take the place of the old—the Church called this consequence of the working of grace *rebirth*. For what it calls the *natural man*, to whom it denies all capacity for good, is precisely the will to live, which must be denied if redemption from an existence like ours is to be attained. Behind our existence, that is, there lies something else, which becomes accessible to us only when we shake off the world.

Considering not individuals, in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, but the Idea of humanity in its unity, Christian doctrine symbolizes *nature, the affirmation of the will to live, in Adam*. His sin, passed on to us—that is, our unity with him in the Idea, which presents itself in time through the bond of procreation—makes us all partakers of suffering and eternal death. On the other hand, it symbolizes *grace*, the *denial of the will*, *redemption*, in God become man, who, being free of all sinfulness, that is, of all will to live, cannot have sprung, as we have, from the most decided affirmation of the will, nor can he have, as we do, a body that is through and through nothing but concrete will, appearance of the will; instead, born of the pure Virgin, he has only an apparent body. This last point, namely, is according to the Docetists, that is, certain Church Fathers who were very consistent in this respect. It was taught above all by Apelles, against whom and whose followers Tertullian rose up. But even Augustine himself comments on the passage Romans

8:3, *"Deus filium suum misit in similitudinem carnis peccati"* [God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh], as follows: *"Non enim caro peccati erat, quae non de carnali delectatione nata erat: sed tamen inerat ei similitudo carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat"* [For it was not sinful flesh, since it was not born of carnal pleasure; yet there was in it the likeness of sinful flesh, because it was mortal flesh] (Liber 83, quaestion. qu.[125] 66). *In his work known as the* opus imperfectum [unfinished work], 1, 47, the same author teaches that original sin is at once sin and punishment. It is already present in newborn children, but shows itself only when they have grown up. Nevertheless, the origin of this sin is to be traced to the will of the sinner. This sinner was Adam; but in him we all existed: Adam became unhappy, and in him we all became unhappy.—Truly, the doctrine of original sin (affirmation of the will) and of redemption (denial of the will) is the great truth that forms the kernel of Christianity, while the rest is for the most part merely clothing and covering, or accessory.[126] Accordingly, one should always understand Jesus Christ in general terms, as the symbol, or personification, of the denial of the will to live, and not individually, whether according to his mythical history in the Gospels or according to the probable true history underlying it. For neither the one nor the other will easily satisfy entirely. It is merely the vehicle of the former conception for the people, who always demand something factual.—That in more recent times Christianity has forgotten its true meaning and degenerated into shallow optimism does not concern us here.

It is, further, an original and evangelical doctrine of Christianity—one that Augustine, with the agreement of the heads of the Church, defended against the platitudes of the Pelagians, and that *Luther* made the chief aim of his efforts to purge of errors and bring to the fore again, as he expressly declares in his

125 The Docetists held that Christ's body was only apparent; Apelles (2nd century AD) was a disciple of Marcion, and Tertullian (c. AD 160–220) wrote against both. Augustine's work is *On Eighty-Three Different Questions*.

126 Augustine's *Unfinished Work against Julian* (of Eclanum), left incomplete at his death in AD 430.

book *De servo arbitrio* [On the Bondage of the Will]—namely, the doctrine that the *will is not free*, but is originally subject to the inclination to evil. Hence its works are always sinful and deficient and can never satisfy justice; hence, finally, it is by no means these works but faith alone that saves. This faith itself, however, does not arise from resolution and free will, but comes to us through the *working of grace*, without any doing of ours, as if from outside.[127] —Not only the dogmas mentioned earlier but this last, genuinely evangelical dogma too is among those that a crude and shallow outlook today rejects as absurd, or conceals. In spite of Augustine and Luther, this outlook is devoted to Pelagian homespun common sense, which is exactly today's rationalism; it treats as antiquated precisely these profound dogmas, which are peculiar and essential to Christianity in the narrowest sense, and instead clings solely to the dogma that stems from Judaism and was retained from it, connected with Christianity

127 The Pelagians followed Pelagius (c. AD 360–418), who held that human beings can attain salvation by their own free will; Luther's book (1525) answered Erasmus.

only by way of history,[128] making it the main thing.—We, however, recognize in the doctrine mentioned above the truth, in complete agreement with the result of our investigations. We see, namely, that genuine virtue and holiness of disposition have their first origin not in deliberate choice (works) but in knowledge (faith), exactly as we developed it from our main thought. If it were works, springing from motives and deliberate intention, that led to salvation, then virtue would always be merely a shrewd, methodical, far-sighted egoism, however one

128 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. How much this is the case can be seen from the following. All the contradictions and incomprehensibilities contained in the Christian dogmatics that Augustine systematized so consistently—which are precisely what led to the opposite, Pelagian, shallowness—vanish as soon as one abstracts from the fundamental Jewish dogma and recognizes that the human being is the work not of another's will but of his own. Then at once everything is clear and correct: then no freedom in the *Operari* [acting] is needed, for it lies in the *Esse* [being], and it is there too that sin lies, as original sin; the working of grace, however, is our own.—From today's rationalist standpoint, on the other hand, many doctrines of the Augustinian dogmatics grounded in the New Testament appear quite untenable, indeed revolting—predestination, for example. So one then rejects what is properly Christian and returns to crude Judaism. But the miscalculation, or original defect, of Christian dogmatics lies where no one ever looks for it, namely precisely in what is taken as settled and certain and exempted from all examination. Take this away, and the whole of dogmatics is rational; for that dogma ruins theology, just as it ruins all the other sciences. If one studies Augustinian theology in the books of *De civitate Dei* [The City of God] (especially the fourteenth), one experiences something like trying to make a body stand upright when its center of gravity falls outside it: however one turns and sets it, it always topples over again. So here too, despite all Augustine's efforts and sophisms, the guilt of the world and its torment always fall back on the God who made everything, and everything in everything, and moreover knew how things would turn out. That Augustine himself was aware of the difficulty and greatly perplexed by it I have already shown in my prize essay on the freedom of the will (ch. 4, pp. 66–68 of the first edition. — Likewise, the contradiction between God's goodness and the misery of the world, as also between the freedom of the will and God's foreknowledge, is the inexhaustible theme of a controversy lasting almost a hundred years among the Cartesians, Malebranche, Leibniz, Bayle, Clarke, Arnauld and many others. The only dogma fixed for the disputants is the existence of God, together with his attributes, and they all go round and round in circles incessantly, trying to bring those things into harmony—that is, to solve a sum that will never come out, whose remainder keeps reappearing now here, now there, after being covered up somewhere else. That the source of the difficulty is to be sought in the basic presupposition—precisely this occurs to no one, although it palpably forces itself on us. Only Bayle lets on that he has noticed it.

might twist and turn it. —But the faith to which the Christian Church promises salvation is this: that just as through the Fall of the first man we have all become partakers of sin and fallen prey to death and perdition, so too we are all redeemed only through grace and through the divine mediator's taking our monstrous guilt upon himself—and this entirely without any merit of our own (of the person). For what can proceed from the intentional action of the person (action determined by motives), namely works, can never justify us, absolutely and by its very nature, precisely because it is *intentional* action brought about by motives, *opus operatum* [a work performed]. This faith, then, implies first of all that our condition is originally and essentially without salvation, and that we need *redemption* from it; next, that we ourselves belong essentially to evil and are so firmly bound to it that our works according to law and precept, that is, according to motives, can never satisfy justice or redeem us. Redemption, rather, is gained only through faith, that is, through an altered mode of knowledge, and this faith itself can come only through grace, and thus as if from outside. This means that salvation is something wholly foreign to our person, and it points to a denial and surrender of this very person as necessary for salvation. Works, the observance of the law as such, can never justify, because they are always action on the basis of motives. Luther requires (in the book *De libertate Christiana* [On the Freedom of a Christian]) that, once faith has arrived, good works should follow from it entirely of their own accord, as its symptoms, its fruits—but by no means as in themselves laying claim to merit, justification or reward; they are to be done wholly freely and without payment.—In the same way, we too had first merely free justice, then love, up to the complete abolition of egoism, and finally resignation, or denial of the will, arise from an ever clearer seeing through of the *principium individuationis*.

I have drawn in these dogmas of Christian doctrine, which are in themselves foreign to philosophy, only in order to show the following. The ethics that emerges from our whole investiga-

tion, and that agrees and coheres exactly with all its parts, may be new and unheard of in its expression, but it is by no means so in its essence. It agrees completely with the truly Christian dogmas, and was even contained and present, in its essentials, in them; just as it also agrees equally closely with the doctrines and ethical precepts of the sacred books of India, presented in yet again quite different forms. At the same time, recalling the dogmas of the Christian Church served to explain and elucidate the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the necessity of all expressions of the character once motives are presented (kingdom of nature), and, on the other, the freedom of the will in itself to deny itself and to abolish the character, together with all the necessity of motives grounded on it (kingdom of grace).

§ 71. NOTHING

What remains when the will is abolished is nothing to us, and our world is nothing to those who have denied it.

4.71 In concluding here the main outlines of ethics, and with them the whole development of that single thought whose communication was my aim, I by no means wish to conceal an objection that applies to this last part of the exposition. I wish rather to show that it lies in the nature of the matter, and that it is absolutely impossible to remedy. It is this: our investigation has finally reached the point where, in perfect holiness, we have before our eyes the denial and surrender of all willing, and precisely thereby redemption from a world whose whole existence presented itself to us as suffering; and now this very thing appears to us as a passage into empty *nothingness*.

On this I must first remark that the concept of nothing is essentially relative and always refers only to a definite something that it negates. This property has been ascribed (especially by Kant) only to the *nihil privativum* [privative nothing], which is what is designated by – as opposed to +, and which, from the reverse point of view, could become +. In contrast to this *nihil*

privativum, the *nihil negativum* [negative nothing] has been set up, which would be nothing in every respect; the example used for it is the logical contradiction that cancels itself.[129] On closer inspection, however, no absolute nothing, no truly genuine *nihil negativum*, is even conceivable. Every nothing of this kind, viewed from a higher standpoint or subsumed under a wider concept, always turns out to be just a *nihil privativum* once again. Every nothing is such only when thought in relation to something else, and it presupposes this relation, and hence that something else too. Even a logical contradiction is only a relative nothing. It is not a thought of reason; but it is not for that reason an absolute nothing. For it is a combination of words; it is an example of the unthinkable, which one necessarily needs in logic in order to demonstrate the laws of thought. Hence when one sets out, for this purpose, to find such an example, one will hold fast to the nonsense as the positive thing one is looking for, and pass over the sense as the negative. Thus every *nihil negativum*, or absolute nothing, when subordinated to a higher concept, will appear as a mere *nihil privativum*, or relative nothing, which can always exchange signs with what it negates, so that the latter would then be thought of as negation and it itself as position. The result of the difficult dialectical investigation into nothing that Plato undertakes in the "Sophist" (pp. 277–287, *Bip.*) also agrees with this:[130]

Tên tou heterou physin apodeixantes ousan te, kai katakekermatismenên epi panta ta onta pros allêla, to pros to on hekastou morion autês antitithemenon, etolmêsamen eipein, hôs auto touto estin ontôs to mêon. (Cum enim ostenderemus, alterius ipsius naturam esse, perque omnia entia divisam atque dispersam invicem; tunc partem ejus oppositam ei, quod cujusque ens est, esse ipsum revera non ens asseruimus.) [For when we had shown that the nature of the other exists, and is divided up and distributed over all beings in

129 Kant distinguishes kinds of "nothing" at the end of the Transcendental Analytic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 290–292/B 346–349) and in his essay on negative magnitudes (1763).

130 The passage is *Sophist* 258d–e.

their relations to one another, we then ventured to assert that the part of it opposed to what is the being of each thing is itself, in truth, non-being.]

What is generally taken as positive, what we call that which is, and whose negation the concept of nothing expresses in its most general meaning, is precisely the world of representation, which I have shown to be the objecthood of the will, its mirror. This will and this world are also we ourselves, and to it belongs representation in general, as its one side. The form of this representation is space and time; hence everything that is, from this standpoint, must be somewhere and at some time. To representation there then also belongs the concept, the material of philosophy, and finally the word, the sign of the concept. Denial, abolition, turning of the will is also the abolition and vanishing of the world, its mirror. If we no longer see the will in this mirror, we ask in vain where it has turned to, and then, since it no longer has any where or when, we lament that it has been lost in nothingness.

A reversed standpoint, if it were possible for us, would make the signs change places, and would show what is, for us, as nothing, and that nothing as what is. But as long as we are ourselves the will to live, that latter can be known and designated by us only negatively. For the old principle of Empedocles, that like is known only by like, deprives us here of all knowledge, just as, conversely, the possibility of all our actual knowledge—that is, the world as representation, or the objecthood of the will—ultimately rests on it. For the world is the will's knowledge of itself.

If, nevertheless, one absolutely insisted on somehow obtaining positive knowledge of what philosophy can express only negatively, as denial of the will, nothing would remain for us but to point to the state experienced by all those who have attained complete denial of the will. It has been designated by the names ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God and so on. This state, however, cannot properly be called knowledge, because it no longer has the form of subject and object; moreover, it is

accessible only to one's own experience, which cannot be further communicated.

But we, who remain entirely at the standpoint of philosophy, must be content here with negative knowledge, satisfied to have reached the last boundary stone of the positive. If, then, we have recognized the inner nature of the world in itself as will, and in all its appearances only its objecthood, and have followed this from the urge, devoid of knowledge, of obscure natural forces up to the most fully conscious action of human beings, we by no means evade the consequence that with the free denial, the surrender, of the will, all those appearances too are now abolished. Abolished is that constant striving and driving without aim and without rest, at all grades of objecthood, in which and through which the world consists; abolished is the diversity of forms following one another grade by grade; abolished, with the will, is its whole appearance; and finally also the universal forms of this appearance, time and space, and also its last fundamental form, subject and object. No will: no representation, no world.

Before us there remains, to be sure, only nothingness. But what resists this dissolving into nothingness, our nature, is indeed just the will to live, which we ourselves are, as it is our world. That we abhor nothingness so much is nothing more than another expression of the fact that we will life so much, and are nothing but this will, and know nothing but it. —But let us turn our gaze from our own neediness and captivity to those who have overcome the world: those in whom the will, having reached full self-knowledge, found itself again in everything and then freely denied itself, and who now merely wait to see its last trace vanish along with the body it animates. Then, instead of the restless urging and striving, instead of the constant passage from desire to fear and from joy to sorrow, instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope that makes up the life-dream of the willing human being, we are shown that peace which is higher than all reason, that perfect, sea-like calm of the mind, that deep tranquility, unshakable confidence and serenity, whose mere reflection in the countenance, as Raphael and Cor-

reggio have depicted it, is a whole and sure gospel: only knowledge has remained; the will has vanished.[131] We, however, then look with deep and painful longing at this state, beside which the misery and wretchedness of our own appear, by contrast, in full light. Yet this contemplation is the only one that can lastingly console us when, on the one hand, we have recognized incurable suffering and endless misery as essential to the appearance of the will, the world, and, on the other, we see the world dissolve once the will is abolished, and are left with nothing before us but empty nothingness. In this way, then, by contemplating the life and conduct of the saints—whom we are seldom granted to meet in our own experience, but whom their recorded history, and art vouched for by the stamp of inner truth, bring before our eyes—we must dispel the dark impression of that nothingness which hovers as the final goal behind all virtue and holiness, and which we fear as children fear the dark. We must not evade it, as the Indians do, through myths and words empty of meaning, such as reabsorption into *Brahm*, or the *Nirvana* of the Buddhists. Rather, we will freely acknowledge: what remains after the will has been completely abolished is, for all who are still full of will, nothing.[132] But conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours, with all its suns and Milky Ways, is —nothing.

131 "The peace of God, which is higher than all reason" is Luther's rendering of Philippians 4:7 (in English Bibles: "which passeth all understanding").
132 Brahm: Schopenhauer's form of Brahman, the absolute of the Upanishads.

Appendix: Critique of the Kantian Philosophy

Anhang. Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie
What Kant achieved, and where he went wrong: the thing in itself, the categories, the Transcendental Dialectic and the ethics.

A *C'est le privilège du vrai génie, et surtout du génie, qui ouvre une carrière, de faire impunément de grandes fautes.* [It is the privilege of true genius, and above all of the genius who opens up a new path, to commit great errors with impunity.] / *Voltaire.*

A.1 It is much easier to point out the faults and errors in the work of a great mind than to give a clear and complete account of its worth. For the faults are something particular and finite, which can therefore be completely surveyed. The stamp that genius impresses on its works, on the other hand, is precisely this: that their excellence is unfathomable and inexhaustible. That is why they also become the unaging teachers of many successive centuries. The finished masterpiece of a truly great mind will always have a deep and pervasive effect on the whole human race, so much so that there is no calculating to what distant centuries and countries its illuminating influence may reach. This is always so because, however cultivated and rich the age in which the work itself arose, genius always rises, like a palm tree, above the soil in which it is rooted.

A.2 But a deep-reaching and wide-spreading effect of this kind cannot come about suddenly, because of the great distance between genius and ordinary humanity. The knowledge that this one man drew directly from life and the world in *one* life-

time, which he won and then set out for others ready won and prepared, still cannot immediately become the property of humanity; for humanity does not have even as much strength to receive as he had to give. Rather, even after surviving the struggle with unworthy opponents, who contest the right of the immortals to live from their very birth and would like to stifle the salvation of humanity in the germ (like the serpent at the cradle of Hercules), that knowledge must then first wander through the detours of countless false interpretations and distorted applications. It must survive attempts to unite it with old errors, and so live in struggle, until a new, unprejudiced generation grows up to meet it. This generation gradually receives part of the content of that source already in its youth, through a thousand derivative channels, assimilates it little by little, and so comes to share in the benefit that was to flow to humanity from that great mind. So slowly does the education of the human race proceed—genius's weak and at the same time recalcitrant pupil.[1] —So too the full power and importance of Kant's teaching will be revealed only in time, when one day the spirit of the age itself, gradually transformed by the influence of that teaching and altered in what is most important and innermost, will bear living witness to the might of that giant mind. I, however, have no wish here to anticipate it presumptuously and take on the thankless role of Calchas and Cassandra.[2] Only, in view of what has been said, may I be allowed to regard Kant's works as still very new. Nowadays many regard them as already out of date, indeed as settled and laid aside, or, as they put it, as behind them; and others, emboldened by this, even ignore them and, with brazen effrontery, go on philosophizing about God and the soul on the presuppositions of the old realist dogmatism and its scholasticism—which is as if one wanted to reassert the doctrines of the alchemists in modern chemistry.—For the rest,

1 The infant Hercules strangled the serpents sent against him by Hera. "The education of the human race" echoes the title of Lessing's essay (1780).
2 Calchas and Cassandra: the prophets of the Trojan War, the one Greek, the other Trojan, whose forecasts were unwelcome.

Kant's works do not need my feeble praise; they will themselves forever praise their master and, if perhaps not in his letter, then in his spirit, will always live on earth.

A.3 Admittedly, when we look back at the immediate result of his teaching, that is, at the attempts and developments in philosophy during the period that has elapsed since, a very disheartening saying of Goethe's is confirmed for us: "Just as the water displaced by a ship rushes together again right behind it, so too error, when outstanding minds have pushed it aside and made room for themselves, very quickly closes up again behind them, as is natural." (Poetry and Truth, Part 3, p. 521.) Yet this period has been only an episode, to be counted among the fates of every new and great insight mentioned above, and it is now unmistakably nearing its end, since the soap bubble, inflated so persistently, is finally bursting after all.[3] People are generally beginning to realize that real and serious philosophy still stands where Kant left it. At any rate, I do not recognize that anything has happened in it between him and me; hence I connect directly with him.

WHY THIS APPENDIX IS A POLEMIC

Schopenhauer explains that his debt to Kant obliges him to attack Kant's errors without forbearance.

A.4 What I intend in this Appendix to my work is really only a justification of the doctrine I have set out in it, insofar as on many points it does not agree with the Kantian philosophy, indeed contradicts it. A discussion of this is necessary, however, for my train of thought, however different its content from Kant's, is obviously under its influence throughout, necessarily presupposes it and starts from it. And I confess that, next to the impression of the world of intuition, I owe what is best in my own development as much to the impression made by Kant's works as to that of the sacred writings of the Hindus and of Plato. —But I can justify my disagreements with Kant, which exist despite

3 Goethe's autobiography, Dichtung und Wahrheit (1811–1833).

this, only by accusing him of error on those very points and exposing mistakes he made. Hence in this Appendix I must proceed polemically against Kant throughout, and do so in earnest and with all my strength; for only thus can the error that clings to Kant's teaching be worn away, and its truth shine the more brightly and stand the more securely. One should therefore not expect my reverence for Kant, which is certainly deeply felt, to extend to his weaknesses and faults as well, so that I would expose them only with the most cautious forbearance—whereby my presentation would inevitably grow weak and dull through circumlocution. Such forbearance is needed towards someone living, because human weakness bears even the most just refutation of an error only when it is sweetened with soothing words and flattery, and even then with difficulty; and a teacher of the centuries and benefactor of humanity deserves at the very least that his human weakness too be spared, so as not to cause him pain. A dead man, however, has cast off this weakness: his merit stands firm; time will cleanse it more and more of all overestimation and disparagement. His faults must be separated from it, rendered harmless, and then consigned to oblivion. Hence in the polemic against Kant that I am about to strike up here, I have in view solely his faults and weaknesses. I stand opposed to them as an enemy and wage a merciless war of extermination against them, always intent not on covering them up with forbearance but on placing them in the brightest light, so as to destroy them all the more surely. For the reasons given above, I am not conscious of any injustice or ingratitude towards Kant in doing so. Nonetheless, to avert any appearance of malice in the eyes of others as well, I will first demonstrate my deeply felt reverence and gratitude towards Kant by briefly stating his chief merit as it appears to me—and from points of view so general that I am not compelled to touch on the points on which I shall later have to contradict him.

KANT'S GREATEST MERIT

Kant separated appearance from the thing in itself, going beyond Locke and restating Plato and the Vedas.

A.5 *Kant's greatest merit is the distinction between appearance and the thing in itself*—on the basis of the demonstration that between things and us there always stands the *intellect*, which is why they cannot be known as they may be in themselves. He was led onto this path by Locke (see *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, § 13, Remark 2). Locke had shown that the secondary qualities of things, such as sound, smell, color, hardness, softness, smoothness and the like, being grounded in the affections of the senses, did not belong to the objective body, the thing in itself. To it he ascribed, rather, only the primary qualities, that is, those that presuppose merely space and impenetrability: extension, shape, solidity, number, mobility. But this Lockean distinction, easy to find and remaining on the surface of things, was, as it were, only a youthful prelude to Kant's. For Kant's distinction, starting from an incomparably higher standpoint, declares that everything *Locke* had allowed to count as *qualitates primarias* [primary qualities], that is, qualities of the thing in itself, likewise belongs only to its appearance in our faculty of apprehension—and precisely because the conditions of that faculty, space, time and causality, are known by us *a priori*. *Locke*, then, had subtracted from the thing in itself the share that the sense organs have in its appearance; *Kant*, however, now also subtracted the share of the brain functions (though not under this name). As a result, the distinction between appearance and thing in itself now acquired an infinitely greater significance and a far deeper meaning. To this end he had to undertake the great separation of our *a priori* knowledge from our *a posteriori* knowledge, which had never been carried out before him with due rigor and completeness, nor with clear awareness; accordingly, this now became the main subject of his profound investigations. —Here we should note straight away that *Kant's* philo-

sophy has a threefold relation to that of his predecessors. First, a confirming and extending relation to *Locke's*, as we have just seen. Secondly, a correcting and exploiting relation to *Hume's*, which one finds stated most clearly in the preface to the *Prolegomena* (this finest and most accessible of all Kant's main writings, which is far too little read, although it makes the study of his philosophy extraordinarily easier). Thirdly, a decidedly polemical and destructive relation to the Leibniz–Wolffian philosophy. One should know all three doctrines before proceeding to the study of the Kantian philosophy. —If, then, according to the above, the distinction between appearance and thing in itself—that is, the doctrine of the complete diversity of the ideal and the real—is the fundamental feature of the Kantian philosophy, then the assertion of the absolute identity of the two, which appeared soon afterwards, provides sad confirmation of the saying of Goethe quoted earlier. All the more so, since it rested on nothing but the windbaggery of intellectual intuition, and was accordingly only a return to the crudity of the common view, masked by imposing airs of distinction, bombast and gibberish. It became the worthy starting point for the still grosser nonsense of the clumsy and witless *Hegel*.[4] —Just as *Kant's* separation of appearance from thing in itself, understood in the way set out above, far surpassed everything that had ever existed in the depth and deliberateness of its grounding, so too it was infinitely rich in consequences. For in it he presented—found entirely by himself, in a wholly new way, from a new side and by a new path—the same truth that Plato had already tirelessly repeated, and mostly expressed in his language thus: this world that appears to the senses has no true being, but only an incessant becoming; it is, and also is not; and apprehending it is not so much knowledge as illusion. This is also what he expresses mythically in the passage already mentioned in the Third Book of the present work, the most important passage in all his works: the beginning of the seventh book of the *Republic*. There he says that human beings, chained fast in a dark cave, see

4 An allusion to Schelling's philosophy of identity.

neither the genuine original light nor the real things, but only the meager light of the fire in the cave and the shadows of real things that pass by this fire behind their backs; yet they think the shadows are reality, and that determining the succession of these shadows is true wisdom. —The same truth, presented again in an entirely different way, is also a main teaching of the Vedas and Puranas: the doctrine of Maya, by which is understood nothing other than what Kant calls appearance as opposed to the thing in itself. For the work of Maya is described precisely as this visible world in which we are: a magic conjured up, an unstable illusion without substance in itself, comparable to an optical illusion and to a dream, a veil enveloping human consciousness, something of which it is equally false and equally true to say that it is as that it is not. —Kant, however, not only expressed the same doctrine in an entirely new and original way, but, by means of the calmest and most sober exposition, made it a proven and indisputable truth. Plato and the Indians, by contrast, had based their assertions merely on a general intuition of the world, put them forward as the direct utterance of their consciousness, and presented them more mythically and poetically than philosophically and clearly. In this respect they stand to Kant as the Pythagoreans Hicetas, Philolaus and Aristarchus, who already asserted that the earth moves around the stationary sun, stand to Copernicus. Such clear knowledge and calm, deliberate exposition of this dreamlike constitution of the whole world is really the basis of the whole Kantian philosophy; it is its soul and its very greatest merit.[5] He achieved this by taking apart the whole machinery of our cognitive faculty, by means of which the phantasmagoria of the objective world comes about, and displaying it piece by piece, with admirable deliberation and skill. All earlier Western philosophy, which appears unspeakably clumsy compared with Kant's, had failed to recognize that truth, and had therefore really always spoken as if in a dream. Kant was the first to wake it suddenly from this

5 Copernicus himself names Hicetas and Philolaus (5th century BC) as forerunners; Aristarchus of Samos (c. 310–c. 230 BC) proposed a heliocentric system.

dream; which is also why the last sleepers (Mendelssohn) called him the "All-Crusher." He showed that the laws that rule with inviolable necessity in existence, that is, in experience in general, are not to be applied to derive and explain *existence itself*; that their validity is therefore only relative, that is,[6] it begins only once existence, the world of experience in general, is already posited and present; and that consequently these laws cannot be our guide when we set about explaining the existence of the world and of ourselves. All earlier Western philosophers had imagined that these laws—according to which appearances are linked to one another, and all of which, time and space as well as causality and inference, I sum up under the expression "principle of sufficient reason"—were absolute laws conditioned by nothing at all, *aeternae veritates*; that the world itself existed only as a consequence of them and in conformity with them; and that therefore the whole riddle of the world must be solvable by following their guiding thread. The assumptions made for this purpose, which Kant criticizes under the name of the Ideas of reason, really served only to raise mere appearance, the work of Maya, Plato's shadow world, to the one and highest reality, to put it in the place of the innermost and true essence of things, and thereby to make real knowledge of that essence impossible—in a word, to lull the dreamers still more soundly to sleep. Kant showed those laws, and consequently the world itself, to be conditioned by the subject's mode of knowing. From this it followed that however far one went on inquiring and inferring along their guiding thread, one would not advance a single step in the main matter, that is, in knowing the inner nature of the world in itself and outside representation, but would only move like the squirrel in its wheel. One can therefore also compare all the dogmatists to people who thought that if only they walked straight ahead long enough they would reach the end of the world; Kant, then, would have sailed around the world and shown that, because it is round, one can-

6 Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) called Kant "the all-crushing" in his Morning Hours (1785).

not get out of it by horizontal movement, but that by perpendicular movement it is perhaps not impossible. One can also say that Kant's teaching gives the insight that the end and beginning of the world are to be sought not outside us but within us.

DOGMATIC AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Critical philosophy traces the eternal truths of dogmatism back to the forms of the human intellect.

A.6 All this, however, rests on the fundamental difference between dogmatic and critical, or *transcendental*, *philosophy*. Anyone who wants to make this difference clear and see it in an example can do so very quickly. He need only read, as a specimen of dogmatic philosophy, an essay by *Leibniz* entitled *De rerum originatione radicali* [On the ultimate origination of things], first printed in Erdmann's edition of Leibniz's philosophical works, vol. 1, p. 147. Here, in a thoroughly realist-dogmatic manner, and with the help of the ontological and the cosmological proofs, the origin and the excellent constitution of the world are demonstrated *a priori*, on the basis of the *veritatum aeternarum*.[7] —In passing, it is admitted once that experience shows the very opposite of the excellence of the world demonstrated here. Experience is then told that it understands nothing about the matter and should keep its mouth shut once philosophy has spoken *a priori*.—*Critical philosophy* appeared with *Kant* as the adversary of this whole method. It makes its problem precisely those *veritates aeternas* that serve as the foundation of every such dogmatic structure. It investigates their origin and finds it in the human head. There they grow out of the forms that belong peculiarly to the head and that it carries within itself for the purpose of apprehending an objective world. Here, then, in the brain, is the quarry that supplies the material for that proud dogmatic edifice. To reach this result,

7 Leibniz's short essay of 1697 argues from eternal truths to God and to the excellence of the world. Johann Eduard Erdmann's edition of Leibniz's philosophical works appeared in 1839–40.

however, critical philosophy had to go *beyond* the *veritates aeternas* on which all previous dogmatism was based, so as to make them in turn the object of investigation. By doing so it became *transcendental* philosophy. From this it further follows that the objective world as we know it does not belong to the essence of things in themselves. It is merely the *appearance* of that essence, conditioned by precisely those forms that lie *a priori* in the human intellect (that is, the brain). Hence it can contain nothing but appearances.

KANT'S OTHER MERITS

Kant linked moral action to the thing in itself and overthrew Scholastic philosophy and its theology.

A.7 Kant, it is true, did not arrive at the knowledge that the appearance is the world as representation and the thing in itself is the will. But he showed that the world as it appears is conditioned just as much by the subject as by the object. He isolated the most universal forms of its appearance, that is, of representation. In doing so he demonstrated that these forms can be known, and surveyed in all their lawfulness, by starting not only from the object but equally from the subject, because they are really the boundary between object and subject, common to both. And he concluded that by following this boundary we penetrate the interior neither of the object nor of the subject, and consequently never know the essence of the world, the thing in itself.

A.8 He did not derive the thing in itself in the right way, as I shall soon show, but through an inconsistency, and he had to pay for it with frequent and irresistible attacks on this principal part of his doctrine. He did not directly recognize the thing in itself in the will. Yet he took a great, pioneering step toward this knowledge. He presented the undeniable moral significance of human action as entirely different from the laws of appearance and independent of them, never explicable in accordance with them, but as something that touches the thing in itself directly.

This is the second main point of view from which his merit should be seen.

A.9 As the third we may regard the complete overthrow of Scholastic philosophy. By that name I mean here, broadly, the whole period that begins with the Church Father Augustine and ends just before Kant. For the chief characteristic of Scholasticism is surely the one that *Tennemann* identified very correctly: the tutelage of the prevailing state religion over philosophy. Philosophy was really left with nothing to do but prove and embellish the principal dogmas that religion prescribed to it. The Scholastics proper, down to Suárez, admit this openly; the philosophers who followed do the same more unconsciously, or at any rate without admitting it. Scholastic philosophy is usually taken to extend only to about a hundred years before Descartes. A wholly new epoch of free inquiry, independent of all positive religious doctrine, is then supposed to begin with him. But such inquiry cannot in fact be attributed to Descartes and his suc-

cessors;[8] they had only the appearance of it, and at most a striving toward it. Descartes was a most distinguished mind and, if one takes his time into account, achieved a great deal. But set this consideration aside, and measure him by what he is praised for: freeing thought from all its fetters and inaugurating a new period of unprejudiced, independent inquiry. One is then bound to find the following. His skepticism still lacks real seriousness and therefore surrenders so quickly and so badly. With it he does put on the air of wanting to throw off, at a stroke, all the fetters of opinions implanted early and belonging to his age and nation. But he does so only for show and for a moment, only to take them up again at once and hold them all the more firmly. And the same goes for all his successors down to Kant. Goethe's lines therefore apply very well to a free independent thinker of this stamp:

8 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Bruno and Spinoza must be entirely excepted here. Each stands on his own and alone. They belong neither to their century nor to their part of the world, which rewarded the one with death and the other with persecution and abuse. Their meager existence and death in this West resemble those of a tropical plant in Europe. Their true spiritual home was the banks of the sacred Ganges: there they would have led a peaceful and honored life among the like-minded. —Bruno opens the book *della causa principio ed uno*, which brought him to the stake, with the following verses. In them he expresses, clearly and beautifully, how lonely he felt in his century. At the same time he shows a presentiment of his fate, which made him hesitate to set forth his cause, until that urge, so strong in noble minds, to communicate what one has recognized as true prevailed: *Ad partum properare tuum, mens aegra, quid obstat; / Seclo haec indigno sint tribuenda licet? / Umbrarum fluctu terras mergente, cacumen / Adtolle in clarum, noster Olympe, Jovem.* [What keeps you, sick mind, from hastening to bring forth your offspring, even if it must be offered to an unworthy age? Though the flood of shadows is drowning the earth, lift your summit, our Olympus, into the bright sky.] Whoever reads this principal work of his, and also his other Italian writings, formerly so rare and now accessible to everyone through a German edition, will find, as I do, that among all philosophers he alone comes somewhat close to Plato. He comes close, that is, in the strong admixture of poetic power and inclination alongside the philosophical, which he also shows in a particularly dramatic form. Picture this delicate, spiritual, thoughtful being, as he meets us in this work, in the hands of coarse, raging priests as his judges and executioners. And give thanks to time, which has brought a brighter and gentler century, so that the posterity whose curse was to fall on those diabolical fanatics is already the present generation.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Bruno's dialogue *De la causa, principio et uno* (On Cause, Principle and Unity) appeared in 1584.

"He seems to me, if your Grace will pardon me,
Like one of those long-legged cicadas
That's always flying, and in flying leaps—
And straight away sings its same old ditty in the grass."—[9]

A.10 Kant had reasons to give the impression that he, too, meant it only in this way. But the supposed leap, which had been permitted because everyone knew it would lead back into the grass, this time became a flight. Now those standing below can only watch it go, and can no longer catch it again.

A.11 Kant, then, dared to show from his doctrine that all those dogmas, allegedly proved so often, cannot be proved. Speculative theology and the rational psychology connected with it received their death blow from him. Since then they have vanished from German philosophy. One must not be misled by the fact that here and there the word is kept after the thing has been given up, or that some wretched professor of philosophy keeps the fear of his lord before his eyes and leaves truth to fend for itself. Only someone who has noticed the harmful influence of those concepts on natural science as well as on philosophy, in all the writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even the best, can gauge how great this merit of Kant's is. In German writings on natural science, the change of tone and of metaphysical background since Kant is striking: before him, things stood as they still stand in England.—This merit of Kant's is connected with the following fact. In all previous philosophy, ancient, medieval and modern, *realism* had been absolutely dominant: the thoughtless pursuit of the laws of appearance, the elevation of these laws into eternal truths, and thereby of fleeting appearance into the true essence of the world—in short, a realism undisturbed in its delusion by any reflection. *Berkeley*, like *Malebranche* before him, had recognized its one-sidedness, indeed its falsity. But he was unable to overthrow it, because his attack was confined to *one* point. It was thus reserved for *Kant* to help

9 Goethe, *Faust* Part One, "Prologue in Heaven": Mephistopheles describing man to the Lord.

the idealist fundamental view to dominance in Europe, at least in philosophy. Throughout Asia, wherever it has not been Islamized, this view is essentially the view even of religion. Before Kant, then, we were *in* time; now time is in us, and so on.

A.12 Ethics, too, had been treated by that realist philosophy according to the laws of appearance, which it held to be absolute and valid for the thing in itself as well. Ethics had therefore been founded now on a doctrine of happiness, now on the will of the Creator of the world, and finally on the concept of perfection. This concept is, in and of itself, entirely empty and without content. It denotes a mere relation, which receives meaning only from the things to which it is applied. For "to be perfect" means nothing more than "to correspond to some concept presupposed and given for the purpose." That concept must therefore be set up beforehand; without it, perfection is a number without a unit, and so, uttered on its own, says nothing at all. Suppose one wants to make the concept of "humanity" the tacit presupposition here, and accordingly to lay down as the moral principle that we should strive for perfect humanity. Then one is merely saying: "Human beings should be as they should be"—and is no wiser than before. For "perfect" is almost just a synonym of "complete in number." It states that in a given case, or individuo [individual], all the predicates contained in the concept of its species are represented, that is, actually present. Hence the concept of "perfection," used absolutely and *in abstracto*, is a word empty of thought; and so is the talk of the "most perfect being" and the like. All this is mere verbal clutter. Nevertheless, in the last century this concept of perfection and imperfection had become current coin. Indeed, it was the hinge on which almost all moralizing, and even theologizing, turned. Everyone had it on his lips, so that in the end it was downright abused. Even the best writers of the time, Lessing for example, we see most lamentably entangled in perfections and imperfections and wrestling with them. Yet any head that thought at all must have felt, at least dimly, that this concept has no positive content whatever, since, like an algebraic sign, it indicates a

mere relation *in abstracto*. —Kant, as already said, separated the undeniable, great ethical significance of actions entirely from appearance and its laws. He showed that this significance concerns the thing in itself, the innermost essence of the world, directly. Appearance and its laws, by contrast—that is, time and space, and everything that fills them and is ordered in them according to the law of causality—are to be regarded as an insubstantial, essenceless dream.

A.13 These few remarks, which by no means exhaust the subject, may suffice as testimony of my recognition of Kant's great merits. I set it down here for my own satisfaction. I also set it down because justice demanded that those merits be recalled to the mind of anyone who wishes to follow me in the unsparing exposure of his errors, to which I now proceed.

FROM MERITS TO ERRORS

Kant's revolution left a void that his successors filled with feeble and monstrous systems.

A.14 That Kant's great achievements were bound to be accompanied by great errors can be gauged on purely historical grounds. He brought about the greatest revolution in philosophy. He put an end to Scholasticism, which, understood in the broad sense indicated, had lasted fourteen centuries, and so truly began a wholly new, third world-epoch of philosophy. And yet the immediate result of his appearance was almost only negative, not positive. He did not set up a complete new system to which his followers could have held for any length of time. So everyone noticed that something very great had happened, but no one quite knew what. They saw clearly that all previous philosophy had been a fruitless dreaming, from which the new age was now awakening; but what they were to hold to now, they did not know. A great void, a great need had arisen, and the general attention, even of the wider public, had been aroused. Prompted by this, but not driven by an inner urge and a feeling of power (which express themselves even at the most unfavorable

moment, as with Spinoza), men without any distinguishing talent made manifold attempts, feeble, absurd, and sometimes even crazy. Yet the public, once aroused, gave them its attention and, with a great patience such as is found only in Germany, lent them its ear for a long time.

A.15 Things must once have gone the same way in nature, when a great revolution had changed the whole surface of the earth, sea and land had exchanged places, and the ground had been leveled for a new creation. It then took a long time before nature could bring forth a new series of lasting forms, each in harmony with itself and with the rest. Strange, monstrous organisms appeared which, out of harmony with themselves and with one another, could not last long. But it is precisely their remains, still extant, that have brought down to us the memory of that wavering and experimenting of nature as it shaped itself anew. —Now, as we all know, Kant brought about a quite similar crisis in philosophy, and an age of monstrous offspring. This alone allows us to conclude that his merit cannot have been complete, but must have been burdened with great defects, negative and one-sided. These defects we shall now track down.

THE FUNDAMENTAL THOUGHT EXAMINED

Kant assumed metaphysics may not draw on experience; Schopenhauer answers that the world must explain itself.

A.16 First of all, let us make clear to ourselves, and examine, the fundamental thought that contains the purpose of the whole *Critique of Pure Reason*.—Kant took up the standpoint of his predecessors, the dogmatic philosophers, and accordingly started with them from the following presuppositions. 1) Metaphysics is the science of that which lies beyond the possibility of all experience.—2) Such a thing can never be found according to principles that are themselves first drawn from experience (*Prolegomena*, § 1). Only what we know *before*, and thus independently *of*, all experience can reach further than possible experience.—3) Some principles of this kind are actually to be found in our

reason: they go by the name of cognitions from pure reason. — Thus far Kant goes along with his predecessors; but here he parts from them. They say: "These principles, or cognitions from pure reason, are expressions of the absolute possibility of things, *aeternae veritates*, sources of ontology. They stand above the world order as Fate stood above the gods of the ancients." Kant says: they are mere forms of our intellect, laws not of the existence of things but of our representations of them. They are therefore valid merely for our apprehension of things, and so cannot reach beyond the possibility of experience—which, according to point 1, was what was aimed at. For the apriority of these forms of knowledge can rest only on their subjective origin; and precisely for that reason it cuts us off forever from knowledge of the essence of things in themselves and confines us to a world of mere appearances. We cannot know things as they may be in themselves even *a posteriori*, let alone *a priori*. Metaphysics is accordingly impossible, and in its place comes the critique of pure reason. Against the old dogmatism Kant is here completely victorious. Hence all the dogmatic attempts made since have had to take quite different paths from the earlier ones. In accordance with the declared aim of the present critique, I shall now lead up to the justification of my own. For on closer examination of the above argument one will have to admit that its very first basic assumption is a *petitio principii*. It lies in the proposition (stated clearly above all in *Prolegomena*, § 1): "The source of metaphysics must not be empirical at all; its principles and basic concepts must never be taken from experience, whether inner or outer." Yet nothing whatever is offered in support of this cardinal assertion except the etymological argument from the word "metaphysics." In truth, however, the matter stands thus. The world and our own existence necessarily present themselves to us as a riddle. Now it is assumed without further ado that the solution of this riddle cannot come from a thorough understanding of the world itself, but must be sought in something entirely different from the world (for that is what "beyond the possibility of all experience" means). It is further

assumed that everything of which we can have any *immediate* acquaintance (for that is what possible experience, inner as well as outer, means) must be excluded from that solution. The solution must rather be sought only in what we can reach merely mediately, namely by inferences from universal propositions *a priori*. Once the chief source of all knowledge had been excluded in this way and the direct road to truth blocked, one need not wonder that the dogmatic attempts failed and that Kant could demonstrate the necessity of this failure. For metaphysics and knowledge *a priori* had been assumed in advance to be identical. To assume this, however, one would first have had to prove that the material for solving the riddle of the world absolutely cannot be contained in the world itself. One would have had to prove that it must be sought only outside the world, in something that can be reached only by the guiding thread of those forms of which we are conscious *a priori*. As long as this has not been proved, however, we have no reason, in the most important and most difficult of all tasks, to stop up the richest of all sources of knowledge, inner and outer experience, in order to operate with empty forms alone. I say, therefore, that the solution of the riddle of the world must come from the understanding of the world itself. The task of metaphysics, then, is not to fly beyond experience, in which the world stands before us, but to understand it from the ground up, since experience, outer and inner, is certainly the chief source of all knowledge. Hence the solution of the riddle of the world is possible only by connecting outer experience with inner in the proper way and at the right point, and so bringing about a combination of these two very heterogeneous sources of knowledge. Even then it is possible only within certain limits that are inseparable from our finite nature. We arrive at a correct understanding of the world itself, but without attaining a final explanation of its existence that would do away with all further problems. Therefore *est quadam prodire tenus* [one can advance some distance], and my path lies in the middle, between the doctrine of omniscience of earlier dogmatism and the despair of the Kantian critique. But the

important truths Kant discovered, by which the earlier metaphysical systems were overthrown, have supplied my own with data and material. Compare what I have said about my method in Chapter 17 of the second volume.—So much for Kant's fundamental thought: now let us consider how it is carried out, and the details.[10]

KANT'S STYLE AND HIS LOVE OF SYMMETRY

Kant writes with brilliant dryness but obscurely, and forces everything into symmetrical tables.

A.17 Kant's style everywhere bears the stamp of a superior mind, of genuine, firm originality, and of quite unusual power of thought. Its character may perhaps be aptly described as a *brilliant dryness*. By virtue of it he can grasp concepts firmly and pick them out with great sureness, and then toss them back and forth with the greatest freedom, to the reader's astonishment. I find the same brilliant dryness again in the style of Aristotle, though his is much simpler.—Nevertheless Kant's exposition is often indistinct, indefinite, inadequate, and sometimes obscure. This last, admittedly, is partly to be excused by the difficulty of the subject and the depth of the thoughts. But whoever is clear to himself down to the ground, and knows quite distinctly what he thinks and wants, will never write indistinctly. He will never set up wavering, indefinite concepts and scrape together highly difficult, complicated expressions from foreign languages to designate them, only to go on using them constantly afterward. Yet this is what Kant did: he took words and formulas from the older, even Scholastic philosophy and combined them for his own purposes, as in "transcendental synthetic unity of apperception"; and in general he always put "unity of synthesis" where "union" alone would have been quite enough. Nor, further, will such a writer explain again and again what has already been explained once, as Kant does, for example, with the understanding, the categories, experience and other main concepts.

10 Horace, *Epistles* 1.1.32.

Such a writer will not, in general, repeat himself incessantly and yet, in each new presentation of a thought that has come up a hundred times, leave it with exactly the same obscure spots. He will say what he means once, clearly, thoroughly, exhaustively, and leave it at that. *Quo enim melius rem aliquam concipimus, eo magis determinati sumus ad eam unico modo exprimendam* [For the better we conceive a thing, the more we are determined to express it in one single way], says Descartes in his fifth letter. But the greatest harm done by Kant's exposition, obscure in places, is that it acted as an *exemplar vitiis imitabile* [a model whose faults invite imitation], and was even misread as a pernicious license. The public had been forced to see that what is obscure is not always senseless: at once the senseless took refuge behind obscure exposition.[11] *Fichte* was the first to seize this new privilege and use it heavily. *Schelling* at least equaled him in this, and an army of hungry scribblers without intellect and without honesty soon outdid them both. But the greatest effrontery in serving up sheer nonsense, in scrawling together senseless, frenzied webs of words such as had previously been heard only in asylums, finally appeared in *Hegel*. It became the instrument of the clumsiest general mystification that has ever been, with a success that will seem fabulous to posterity and will remain a monument to German niaiserie [silliness]. In vain, meanwhile, did *Jean Paul* write his fine section "Higher Appreciation of Philosophical Madness on the Lecture Platform and of Poetic Madness on the Stage" (in the aesthetic Nachschule); for in vain had *Goethe* already said:[12]

> "So people chatter and teach, undisturbed;
> Who wants to bother with the fools?
> Usually, if only he hears words, a man believes
> There must be something there to think as well."[13]

A.18 But let us return to *Kant*. One cannot help admitting that he entirely lacks the grand simplicity of the ancients; that he

11 "Exemplar vitiis imitabile" is from Horace, *Epistles* 1.19.17.
12 Jean Paul's *Kleine Nachschule zur ästhetischen Vorschule* (1825) was a supplement to his *Vorschule der Ästhetik* (Introduction to Aesthetics).

lacks naivety, *ingénuité, candeur* [ingenuousness, candor]. His philosophy has no analogy with Greek architecture, which offers great, simple proportions that reveal themselves to the eye at a single glance. It is much more strongly reminiscent of the Gothic style. For a quite individual peculiarity of Kant's mind is a strange delight in *symmetry*. This symmetry loves a varied multiplicity, so that it can order it and repeat the order in sub-orders, and so on and on, just as in Gothic churches. Indeed, he sometimes carries this to the point of mere play. For the sake of that inclination he goes so far as to do open violence to truth, treating it as the old-fashioned gardeners treated nature, whose work consists of symmetrical avenues, squares and triangles, pyramid- and ball-shaped trees, and hedges twisted into regular curves. I will support this with facts.

A.19 He treats space and time in isolation. He then dismisses this whole world of intuition that fills space and time, in which we live and have our being, with the empty words "the empirical content of intuition is *given* to us." And then he at once arrives, with a single leap, at *the logical basis of his whole philosophy, the table of judgments*. From it he deduces a neat dozen categories, symmetrically staked out under four headings. These later become the fearful bed of Procrustes, into which he forcibly squeezes all the things of the world and everything that goes on in human beings, shrinking from no violence and scorning no sophism, if only he can repeat the symmetry of that table everywhere.[14] The first thing symmetrically derived from it is the pure physiological table of universal principles of natural science: namely, axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, and postulates of empirical thought in general. Of these principles the first two are simple, but the last two each put forth, symmetrically, three shoots. The mere categories were what he calls *concepts*; these principles of natural science, however, are *judgments*. In accordance with his supreme guide to all wisdom, namely symmetry, it is now the

13 Goethe, *Faust* Part One, "Witch's Kitchen": Mephistopheles speaking.
14 In Greek legend Procrustes stretched or cut his guests to fit his bed.

turn of *syllogisms* to prove fruitful; and they do so, once again, symmetrically and in strict time. For through the application of the categories to sensibility, experience, together with its *a priori* principles, arose for the *understanding*. In just the same way, through the application of *syllogisms* to the categories, the *Ideas* of reason come into being; this business is carried out by *reason*, according to its alleged principle of seeking the unconditioned. It proceeds as follows. The three categories of relation give the only three possible kinds of major premise for syllogisms. Syllogisms accordingly also fall into three kinds, and each kind is to be regarded as an egg from which reason hatches an Idea: from the categorical kind of syllogism the Idea of the *soul*, from the hypothetical the Idea of the world, and from the disjunctive the Idea of *God*. In the middle one, the Idea of the world, the symmetry of the table of categories is repeated once more: its four headings produce four theses, each of which has its antithesis as a symmetrical counterpart.

A.20 We do indeed pay our admiration to the truly most ingenious combination that produced this elegant edifice. But we shall go on to examine it thoroughly, in its foundation and in its parts. —First, however, the following considerations must be set out.

REASON AND UNDERSTANDING NEVER DEFINED

Kant gives shifting and contradictory definitions of reason and understanding throughout his works.

A.21 It is astonishing how Kant goes his way without further reflection, following his symmetry and ordering everything according to it, without ever considering any of the objects so treated on its own account. Let me explain myself more precisely. He considers intuitive knowledge only in mathematics, and so he entirely neglects the rest of intuitive knowledge, in which the world lies before us. He keeps solely to abstract thought. Yet abstract thought receives all its meaning and worth only from the intuitive world, which is infinitely more significant, more universal and richer in content than the abstract part

of our knowledge. Indeed—and this is a main point—he nowhere clearly distinguished intuitive from abstract knowledge. Precisely for this reason, as we shall see later, he became entangled in insoluble contradictions with himself.—Having dismissed the whole world of the senses with the empty "it is given," he now, as I said, makes the logical table of judgments the cornerstone of his edifice. But here, too, he does not reflect for a moment on what actually lies before him. These forms of judgment are, after all, *words* and *combinations of words*. Surely the first question should have been what they immediately designate: it would have turned out that these are *concepts*. The next question would then have been about the nature of *concepts*. The answer to it would have shown what relation concepts have to the intuitive representations in which the world stands before us: intuition and reflection would then have come apart. It would then have been necessary to investigate how not only pure, merely formal intuition *a priori*, but also its content, empirical intuition, enters consciousness. And then it would have become clear what share the *understanding* has in this, and so, in general, what the *understanding* is and what, by contrast, *reason* really is—the reason whose critique is being written here. It is most striking that he never once defines this latter properly and adequately. He gives only occasional, incomplete and incorrect explanations of it, as the context of the moment demands—in complete contradiction with the rule of Descartes cited above.[15] For example, on p. 11; V, 24 of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, reason is the faculty of principles *a priori*. On p. 299; V, 356, we are told again that reason is the faculty of *principles*, and it is contrasted with the understanding, which is said to be the faculty of *rules*! Now one would think there must be a world of difference between principles and rules, since it entitles him to assume a special cognitive faculty for each. But this great difference is

15 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Let me note here that I cite the *Critique of Pure Reason* throughout by the page numbers of *the first edition*, since these are given throughout in Rosenkranz's edition of the complete works. In addition, preceded by V, I give the page number of the fifth edition. All the other editions from the second onward agree with the fifth, and presumably, then, in their page numbers too.

supposed to lie merely in this: what is known *a priori* from pure intuition, or through the forms of the understanding, is a *rule*, and only what proceeds from mere concepts *a priori* is a principle. We shall come back to this arbitrary and inadmissible distinction later, in connection with the Dialectic. On p. 330; V, 386, reason is the faculty of inference; mere judging he often declares (p. 69; V, 94) to be the business of the understanding. But what he is really saying is this: judging is the business of the understanding as long as the ground of the judgment is empirical, transcendental or metalogical (essay On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §§ 31, 32, 33); but if the ground is logical, as it is in inference, then an entirely special and far superior cognitive faculty is at work, namely reason. Indeed, what is more, on p. 303; V, 360, it is explained that immediate inferences from a proposition are still the affair of the understanding, and only those in which a mediating concept is used are performed by reason. By way of example we are told that from the proposition "All human beings are mortal" the inference "Some mortals are human beings" is still drawn by the mere understanding, whereas the inference "All scholars are mortal" requires an entirely different and far superior faculty, reason. How was it possible for a great thinker to put forward such a thing! On p. 553; V, 581, reason is suddenly the abiding condition of all voluntary actions. On p. 614; V, 642, it consists in our being able to give an account of our assertions; on pp. 643, 644; V, 671, 672, it consists in uniting the concepts of the understanding into Ideas, as the understanding unites the manifold of objects into concepts. On p. 646; V, 674, it is nothing other than the faculty of deriving the particular from the universal.

A.22 The *understanding*, likewise, is explained over and over again, in seven places in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. On p. 51; V, 75, it is the faculty of producing representations itself. On p. 60; V, 94, it is the faculty of judging, that is, of thinking, that is, of knowing through concepts. On p. 137 of the fifth edition it is, in general, the faculty of cognitions. On p. 132; V, 171, it is the faculty of rules. On p. 158; V, 197, however, we are told: "It is not

only the faculty of rules, but the source of principles, according to which everything stands under rules"; and yet above it was contrasted with reason, because reason alone was supposed to be the faculty of principles. On p. 160; V, 199, the understanding is the faculty of concepts; on p. 302; V, 359, however, it is the faculty of the unity of appearances by means of rules.

A.23 My own explanations of these two cognitive faculties are firm, sharp, definite and simple, and always agree with the linguistic usage of all peoples and ages. I shall not need to defend them against such truly confused and groundless talk (even though it comes from Kant). I have cited it only as evidence for my charge that Kant pursues his symmetrical, logical system without sufficiently reflecting on the object he is treating in this way.

A.24 Now suppose Kant had, as I said above, seriously investigated how two such different cognitive faculties, one of which is the distinguishing mark of humanity, make themselves known, and what, in the linguistic usage of all peoples and all philosophers, is called reason and understanding. Then he would never have split reason into a theoretical and a practical reason, and made the latter the source of virtuous action—on no other authority than the *intellectus theoreticus* and *practicus* [theoretical and practical intellect] of the Scholastics, which were used in an entirely different sense. In the same way, Kant very carefully separated concepts of the understanding (by which he means partly his categories, partly all common concepts) from concepts of reason (his so-called Ideas), and made both the material of his philosophy, which for the most part deals only with the validity, application and origin of all these concepts. But before that, I say, he really ought to have investigated what a *concept* is in general. This very necessary investigation, too, was unfortunately omitted altogether; and this has contributed a great deal to the hopeless confusion of intuitive and abstract knowledge that I shall soon demonstrate.—The same lack of sufficient reflection with which he passed over the questions: What is intuition? What is reflection? What is a concept? What is reason?

What is understanding? —led him also to pass over the following equally indispensable investigations: What do I call the *object* that I distinguish from the *representation*? What is existence? What is an object, and what a subject? What are truth, illusion, error?—But without reflecting or looking around, he pursues his logical schema and his symmetry. The table of judgments shall and must be the key to all wisdom.

THE TWO EDITIONS OF THE CRITIQUE

Kant's idealism is stated plainly in the first edition and suppressed in the second.

A.25 I set out above, as Kant's chief merit, that he distinguished appearance from the thing in itself, declared this whole visible world to be appearance, and therefore denied its laws any validity beyond appearance. It is certainly striking that he did not derive this merely relative existence of appearance from the simple, obvious, undeniable truth "*No object without a subject*." That way he could have presented the object, at its very root, as dependent on the subject and conditioned by it, since it is always there only in relation to a subject—and hence as mere appearance, which does not exist in itself, does not exist unconditionally. Berkeley, to whose merit Kant does not do justice, had already made this important proposition the cornerstone of his philosophy, and had thereby secured himself an immortal memory. Yet he himself did not draw the proper conclusions from it, and was then partly misunderstood and partly insufficiently heeded. In my first edition I had explained Kant's avoidance of this Berkeleian proposition by a visible shyness of decided idealism. On the other hand, I found that idealism clearly expressed in many passages of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and I had accordingly accused Kant of contradicting himself. And this reproach was well founded, if one knows the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as I then did, only in the second edition or in the five subsequent editions printed from it. But when I later read Kant's main work in the first edition, which had already become

rare, I saw all those contradictions vanish, to my great joy. I found that Kant, even though he does not use the formula "no object without a subject," nevertheless declares, just as decisively as *Berkeley* and I, that the external world lying before us in space and time is mere representation of the subject that knows it. Thus, for example, on p. 383 of that edition he says without reservation: "If I take away the thinking subject, the whole corporeal world must fall away, since it is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a kind of its representations." But the whole passage from p. 348–392, in which Kant sets out his decided idealism with exceptional beauty and clarity, was suppressed by him in the second edition, and a mass of statements conflicting with it was inserted instead. As a result, the text of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as it circulated from 1787 until 1838 became disfigured and corrupted, and the work became a self-contradictory book, whose meaning, for that very reason, could not be entirely clear and intelligible to anyone. The details of this, and my conjectures about the reasons and weaknesses that may have moved Kant to disfigure his immortal work in this way, I have set out in a letter to Professor Rosenkranz. He included its main passage in his preface to the second volume of his edition of Kant's complete works, and to that I here refer. For in consequence of my urging, Professor Rosenkranz in 1838 was moved to restore the *Critique of Pure Reason* to its original form, having it printed in the said second volume according to the *first* edition of 1781. He thereby rendered philosophy an inestimable service, and perhaps even saved the most important work of German literature from perishing; and this should never be forgotten. But let no one imagine that he knows the *Critique of Pure Reason* and has a distinct concept of Kant's doctrine if he has read it only in the second or one of the later editions. That is absolutely impossible, for he has read only a mutilated, corrupted, in a certain sense spurious text. It is my duty to state this here decisively, as a warning to everyone.

THE DERIVATION OF THE THING IN ITSELF

Kant infers the thing in itself by applying causality beyond experience, contradicting his own doctrine.

A.26 The decidedly idealist fundamental view is expressed so clearly in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Yet the way in which Kant introduces the *thing in itself* stands in undeniable contradiction with it. This is doubtless the main reason why, in the second edition, he suppressed the principal idealist passage mentioned and declared himself outright against Berkeleian idealism. By doing so, however, he only brought inconsistencies into his work, without being able to remedy its chief defect. This defect, as is well known, is the introduction of the *thing in itself* in the manner he chose. Its inadmissibility was demonstrated at length by G. E. Schulze in "Aenesidemus," and it was soon recognized as the untenable point of his system. The matter can be made clear in very few words.[16] Kant bases the assumption of the thing in itself, though concealed under various turns of phrase, on an inference according to the law of causality: namely, that empirical intuition, or more correctly the *sensation* in our sense organs from which it proceeds, must have an external cause. But according to his own correct discovery, the law of causality is known to us *a priori*. Consequently it is a function of our intellect, and thus of *subjective* origin. Further, sense-sensation itself, to which we here apply the law of causality, is undeniably *subjective*. And finally, even space, into which we project the cause of the sensation as an object by means of this application, is a form of our intellect given *a priori*, and consequently *subjective*. Thus the whole of empirical intuition remains throughout on *subjective* ground, as a mere process within us. Nothing entirely different from it and independent of it can be brought in as a *thing in itself*, or shown to be a necessary presupposition. Empirical intuition really is, and

16 Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761–1833), Schopenhauer's teacher at Göttingen, attacked Kant's thing in itself in his skeptical treatise *Aenesidemus* (1792).

remains, merely our representation: it is the world as representation. We can reach the essence in itself of this world only by the entirely different path I have taken. That path draws on self-consciousness, which reveals the will as the in-itself of our own appearance. But then the thing in itself becomes something *toto genere* different from representation and its elements, as I have shown.

A.27 This great defect of the Kantian system on this point, exposed early on, as I have said, illustrates the fine Indian proverb: "No lotus without a stalk." The faulty derivation of the thing in itself is the stalk here. But only the *manner* of the derivation is at fault, not the recognition of a thing in itself for the given appearance. *Fichte,* however, misunderstood it in this latter way. He could do so only because he cared not about truth but about making a stir, in order to further his personal ends. Accordingly, he was bold and thoughtless enough to deny the thing in itself altogether. He set up a system in which not merely the formal element of representation, as with Kant, but also its material element, its entire content, was supposedly derived *a priori* from the subject. In doing so he counted, quite rightly, on the public's lack of judgment and its niaiserie [silliness], which accepted shabby sophisms, mere hocus-pocus and senseless twaddle as proofs. So he succeeded in drawing the public's attention away from Kant to himself, and in giving German philosophy the direction in which Schelling afterwards carried it further, until at last it reached its goal in the nonsensical sham wisdom of Hegel.

INTUITIVE AND ABSTRACT KNOWLEDGE CONFUSED

Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic is praised, but he never explains how empirical intuition arises.

A.28 I now return to Kant's great error, already touched on above: he did not properly separate intuitive knowledge from abstract knowledge. From this a hopeless confusion has arisen, which we must now consider more closely. Had he sharply separated

intuitive representations from concepts merely thought *in abstracto*, he would have kept the two apart and would always have known which of them he was dealing with. Unfortunately this was not the case, although the reproach has not yet been voiced and may therefore come as a surprise. His "object of experience," of which he constantly speaks and which is the proper object of the categories, is not the intuitive representation. Nor is it the abstract concept. It is different from both, and yet both at once, and a thing that makes no sense at all. For, incredible as it seems, he lacked the reflectiveness, or else the good will, to come to terms with himself on this point. He never explained clearly, to himself or to others, whether his "object of experience, that is, of the knowledge that comes about through the application of the categories" is the intuitive representation in space and time (my first class of representations) or merely the abstract concept. Strange as it is, what constantly hovers before his mind is something midway between the two. From this comes the disastrous confusion that I must now bring to light, and for this purpose I have to go through the whole Doctrine of Elements in general.

A.29 The *Transcendental Aesthetic* is so exceedingly meritorious a work that it alone could suffice to immortalize Kant's name. Its proofs are so completely convincing that I count its theorems among the incontestable truths. They are undoubtedly also among the truths richest in consequences, and are therefore to be regarded as the rarest thing in the world: a real, great discovery in metaphysics. He rigorously proved that we are conscious of part of our knowledge *a priori*, and this fact admits of no other explanation than that this part constitutes the forms of our intellect. Indeed, this is less an explanation than simply the clear expression of the fact itself. For *a priori* means nothing other than "not obtained by way of experience, and therefore not come into us from outside." But whatever is present in the intellect without having come from outside is precisely what belongs to it originally, its own essence. If what is thus present in it consists in the general manner in which all its objects must

present themselves to it, then this amounts to saying that it is the forms of its knowing, that is, the manner, fixed once and for all, in which it performs this function of its own. Accordingly, "cognitions *a priori*" and "the intellect's own forms" are basically just two expressions for the same thing, and so in a sense synonyms.

A.30 From the doctrines of the Transcendental Aesthetic, therefore, I would take nothing away and would only add a few things. In particular, Kant did not follow his thoughts through to the end, for he did not reject the whole Euclidean method of demonstration, even though he had said (p. 87; V, 120) that all geometrical knowledge has immediate evidence from intuition. It is most remarkable that even one of his opponents, and indeed the most acute of them, G. E. Schulze (*Critique of Theoretical Philosophy*, II, 241), draws the conclusion that Kant's doctrine would lead to a quite different treatment of geometry from the one actually in use. He believes he is thereby giving an apagogic proof (a reductio) against Kant. In fact, without knowing it, he is opening war on the Euclidean method. I refer to § 15 in the first book of the present work.

A.31 After the detailed discussion in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the general *forms* of all intuition, one must expect to receive at least some enlightenment about its *content*. One expects to learn how *empirical* intuition enters our consciousness, and how the knowledge of this whole world, so real and so important for us, arises in us. But on this point Kant's entire doctrine really contains nothing more than the oft-repeated, empty expression: "The empirical element of intuition is *given* from outside."—For this reason Kant here passes by a leap from the *pure forms of intuition* to *thinking*, to *Transcendental Logic*. Right at its entrance (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 50; V, 74), where Kant cannot avoid touching on the material content of empirical intuition, he takes the first false step and commits the *prôton pseudos* [first falsehood]. "Our knowledge," he says, "has two sources, namely receptivity of impressions and spontaneity of concepts: the first is the capacity to receive representations, the second

that of knowing an object through these representations; through the first an *object* is given to us, through the second it is thought."—This is false. According to it, the *impression*, for which alone we have mere receptivity, which therefore comes from outside and alone is really "given," would already be a *representation*, indeed already an *object*. But it is nothing more than a mere *sensation* in the sense organ. Only through the application of the *understanding* (that is, of the law of causality) and of the forms of intuition, space and time, does our *intellect* transform this mere *sensation* into a *representation*. This representation now stands there as an *object* in space and time. It cannot be distinguished from the object except insofar as one asks about the thing in itself; otherwise it is identical with it. I have set out this process in detail in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 21. With that, however, the work of the understanding and of *intuitive* knowledge is complete, and it needs no concepts and no thinking for it. That is why animals too have these representations. If concepts are added, if thinking is added (to which spontaneity can indeed be ascribed), then intuitive knowledge is left behind entirely, and a completely different class of representations enters consciousness, namely non-intuitive, abstract concepts. This is the activity of *reason*, which, however, has the whole content of its thinking solely from the intuition that preceded it and from comparing that content with other intuitions and concepts. Kant, however, brings thinking into intuition itself, and so lays the foundation for the hopeless mixing-up of intuitive and abstract knowledge that I am here engaged in censuring. He makes intuition, taken by itself, devoid of understanding, purely sensuous and thus entirely passive, and has an *object* apprehended only through thinking (a category of the understanding). In this way he brings *thinking into intuition.* But then, again, the object of *thinking* is a single, real object. Thinking thereby loses its essential character of universality and abstraction and receives individual things instead of universal concepts as its object, and so he in turn brings *intuiting into thinking*. From this springs the hopeless mixing-up already men-

tioned, and the consequences of this first false step extend over his whole theory of knowledge. Running through the whole of that theory is the complete merging of the intuitive representation with the abstract one into something midway between the two. He presents this as the object of knowledge through the understanding and its categories, and he calls this knowledge *experience*. It is hard to believe that Kant himself had anything entirely determinate and really clear in mind with this object of the understanding. I shall now prove this by the enormous contradiction that runs through the whole Transcendental Logic and is the real source of the obscurity that envelops it.

THE CONTRADICTION IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

Kant denies that the understanding intuits, yet makes it the source of intuition and of nature.

A.32 In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 67–69; V, 92–94; pp. 89, 90; V, 122, 123; and further V, 135, 139, 153, he repeats and insists on the following. The understanding is not a faculty of intuition, and its knowledge is not intuitive but discursive. The understanding is the faculty of judging (p. 69; V, 94), and a judgment is mediate knowledge, the representation of a representation (p. 68; V, 93). The understanding is the faculty of thinking, and thinking is knowledge through concepts (p. 69; V, 94). The categories of the understanding are by no means the conditions under which objects are given in intuition (p. 89; V, 122), and intuition in no way needs the functions of thinking (p. 91; V, 123). Our understanding can only think, not intuit (V, pp. 135, 139).—Further, in the *Prolegomena*, § 20: intuition, perception, *perceptio*, belongs merely to the senses, and judging pertains to the understanding alone; and § 22: the business of the senses is to intuit, that of the understanding to think, that is, to judge.—Finally, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, 4th ed., p. 247; Rosenkranz edition, p. 281: the understanding is discursive, and its representations are thoughts, not intuitions.—All these are Kant's own words.

A.33 From this it follows that this intuitive world would be there for us even if we had no understanding at all, and that it comes into our heads in a wholly inexplicable way. This is just what he often indicates by his curious expression that intuition is *given*, without ever explaining this vague and figurative expression any further.

A.34 But now the whole remainder of his doctrine of the understanding, of its categories and of the possibility of experience, as he expounds it in the Transcendental Logic, contradicts everything cited above in the most glaring way. Thus, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 79; V, 105, the understanding brings unity into the manifold of *intuition* through its categories, and the pure concepts of the understanding refer *a priori* to objects of *intuition*. On p. 94; V, 126, "the categories are the condition of experience, whether of intuition or of the thinking that is encountered in it." At V, p. 127, the understanding is the author of experience. At V, p. 128, the categories determine the *intuition* of objects. At V, p. 130, everything that we represent to ourselves as combined in the object (which is surely something intuitive and not an abstraction) has first been combined through an act of the understanding. At V, p. 135, the understanding is explained anew as the faculty of combining *a priori* and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception. But by all linguistic usage, apperception is not the thinking of a concept; it is *intuition*. At V, p. 136, we even find a supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to the understanding. At V, p. 143, there even stands as a heading that all sensuous intuition is conditioned by the categories. In the same place the *logical function of judgments* also brings the manifold of given *intuitions* under an apperception in general, and the manifold of a given intuition necessarily stands under the categories. At V, p. 144, unity comes into *intuition* through the understanding, by means of the categories. At V, p. 145, the thinking of the understanding is very strangely explained as its synthesizing, combining and ordering the manifold of *intuition*. At V, p. 161, experience is possible only through the categories

and consists in the connection of perceptions, which surely are intuitions after all. At V, p. 159, the categories are cognitions *a priori* of objects of *intuition* in general.—Further, here and at V, pp. 163 and 165, one of Kant's principal doctrines is put forward, namely *that the understanding first makes nature possible*, by prescribing laws to it *a priori*, so that nature conforms to its lawfulness, and so on. But nature is surely something intuitive and not an abstraction; the understanding would therefore have to be a faculty of intuition. At V, p. 168, it is said that the concepts of the understanding are the principles of the possibility of experience, and that experience is the determination of appearances in space and time in general—appearances which surely exist in intuition. Finally, pp. 189–211; V, 232–256, contain the long proof (whose incorrectness is shown in detail in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 23) that the objective succession and also the coexistence of objects of experience are not perceived by the senses. Instead, they are said to be brought into nature solely by the understanding, and nature itself first becomes possible thereby. But surely nature, the sequence of events and the coexistence of states are purely intuitive, and nothing merely thought in the abstract.

A.35 I challenge anyone who shares my reverence for Kant to reconcile these contradictions. Let him show that Kant had something quite clear and definite in mind in his doctrine of the object of experience and of the way it is determined by the activity of the understanding and its twelve functions. I am convinced that the contradiction demonstrated here, which runs through the whole Transcendental Logic, is the real reason for the great obscurity of its exposition. For Kant was dimly aware of the contradiction and struggled with it inwardly, yet would not or could not bring it to clear consciousness. He therefore veiled it, for himself and for others, and evaded it by all sorts of devious routes. Perhaps this is also why he made the faculty of knowledge into so strange and complicated a machine, with so many wheels: the twelve categories, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the inner sense, the transcendental

unity of apperception, and further the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding, and so on. And despite this great apparatus, not even an attempt is made to explain the intuition of the external world, which is surely the main thing in our knowledge. Instead, this pressing demand is always turned aside, very poorly, with the same empty, figurative expression: "Empirical intuition is given to us." On p. 145 of the fifth edition we learn further that it is given through the object; so the object must be something different from the intuition.

A.36 Now if we try to fathom Kant's innermost opinion, which he himself did not clearly express, we find the following. For him the proper object for the understanding really is such an object, different from *intuition* and yet by no means a *concept* either. Indeed, the strange presupposition of such an unrepresentable object is supposed to be what first turns intuition into experience. I believe that the ultimate ground of Kant's assumption of such an *absolute object*, which is an object in itself, that is, even without a subject, is an old, deep-rooted prejudice in him, long dead to all examination. It is by no means the *intuited object*. Rather, it is thought in addition to the intuition through the concept, as something corresponding to it. Now the intuition is experience and has value and truth, which it thus receives only through its relation to a concept (in diametrical opposition to our account, according to which the concept receives value and truth solely from intuition). Thinking this directly unrepresentable object in addition to intuition is then the proper function of the categories. "Only through intuition is the object given, which is afterwards thought in accordance with the category" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1st ed., p. 399). This becomes especially clear from a passage on p. 125 of the fifth edition: "Now the question arises whether concepts *a priori* do not also precede, as conditions under which alone something, even if *not intuited*, is nevertheless thought as an *object* in general"—a question he answers in the affirmative. Here the source of the error, and of the confusion enveloping it, shows itself clearly. For the *object* as such always exists only for *intuition* and

in it, whether that intuition is carried out through the senses or, in the object's absence, through the imagination. What is *thought*, on the other hand, is always a universal, non-intuitive *concept*, which at most can be the concept of an object in general. Thinking relates to *objects* only mediately, by means of concepts, for objects themselves always are and remain *intuitive*. For our thinking does not serve to lend reality to intuitions: they have it, so far as they are capable of it (empirical reality), through themselves. Rather, thinking serves to gather together what intuitions have in common, and their results, so that these can be stored and more easily handled. Kant, however, ascribes the objects themselves to *thinking*, in order to make experience and the objective world dependent on the *understanding*, yet without letting the understanding be a faculty of *intuition*. In this respect he does indeed distinguish intuiting from thinking, but he makes individual things the object partly of intuition, partly of thinking. In reality, however, they are only the former: our empirical intuition is immediately *objective*, precisely because it proceeds from the causal nexus. Its objects are immediately the things themselves, not representations different from them. Individual things as such are intuited in the understanding and through the senses, and the *one-sided* impression on the senses is at once completed by the imagination. As soon as we pass to *thinking*, on the other hand, we leave individual things behind and deal with universal concepts that lack intuitiveness, even if we afterwards apply the results of our thinking to individual things. If we hold fast to this, it becomes clear that one cannot assume that the intuition of things first acquires reality and becomes experience through a thinking of these same things that applies the twelve categories. Rather, empirical reality, and therefore experience, is already given in intuition itself. But intuition too can come about only through applying to sensation the knowledge of the causal nexus, which is the sole function of the understanding. Intuition is therefore really intellectual—which is precisely what Kant denies.

A.37 Besides the passage cited, the assumption of Kant's criticized here is expressed with particular clarity in the *Critique of Judgment*, § 36, right at the beginning, and likewise in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, in the remark to the first explanation of the "Phenomenology." But one finds it set out most plainly, and with a naivety that Kant himself least of all dared on this awkward point, in the book of a Kantian: Kiesewetter's *Outline of a General Logic*, 3rd ed., Part I, p. 434 of the exposition, and Part II, §§ 52 and 53 of the exposition; likewise in Tieftrunk's *Doctrine of Thinking in Purely German Dress* (1825). Here one sees very clearly how every thinker's disciples, if they do not think for themselves, become a magnifying mirror of his errors.[17] In presenting his doctrine of the categories, once he had settled on it, Kant always trod softly; his disciples, by contrast, trod quite boldly, and so laid bare what is false in the matter.

THE OBJECT OF REPRESENTATION

Kant's hybrid object between representation and thing in itself is shown to be groundless.

A.38 According to what has been said, then, the object of the categories in Kant is not the thing in itself, but it is its next of kin. It is the *object in itself*, an object that needs no subject. It is an individual thing, and yet not in time and space, because it is not intuitive. It is an object of thinking, and yet not an abstract concept. Accordingly, Kant really distinguishes three things: (1) the representation; (2) the object of the representation; (3) the thing in itself. The first is the business of sensibility, which for him includes, besides sensation, the pure forms of intuition, space and time. The second is the business of the understanding, which *thinks* it in addition through its twelve categories. The third lies beyond all knowability. (As evidence of this, see pp. 108 and 109 of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.) But

17 Johann Gottfried Kiesewetter (1766–1819) and Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk (1759–1837) were followers and popularizers of Kant.

the distinction between the representation and the object of the representation is groundless. Berkeley had already proved this, and it follows from my whole account in the first book, especially Chapter 1 of the Supplements, and indeed from Kant's own thoroughly idealist basic view in the first edition. If one did not want to count the object of the representation as part of the representation and identify it with it, one would have to assign it to the thing in itself: in the end this depends on the sense one gives the word "object." But this much always remains certain: on clear reflection, nothing more is to be found than representation and thing in itself. The unjustified insertion of that hybrid, the object of representation, is the source of Kant's errors. With its removal, the doctrine of the categories as concepts *a priori* also collapses. For they are supposed to contribute nothing to intuition and not to hold of the thing in itself; by means of them we are supposed merely to think those "objects of representations" and thereby transform representation into experience. For every empirical intuition is already experience, and every intuition that proceeds from sensation is empirical. The understanding, by means of its sole function (knowledge *a priori* of the law of causality), refers this sensation to its cause. Precisely thereby the cause presents itself in space and time (forms of pure intuition) as an object of experience, a material object persisting in space through all time—and yet even as such it still remains representation, just as space and time themselves do. If we want to go beyond this representation, we arrive at the question of the thing in itself, and answering it is the theme of my whole work, as of all metaphysics in general. Connected with Kant's error set out here is the fault of his that I censured earlier: he gives no theory of how empirical intuition arises, but simply lets it be *given*. He identifies it with mere sensation, to which he adds only the forms of intuition, space and time, comprising both under the name of sensibility. But these materials do not yet yield any objective representation. That absolutely requires relating the sensation to its cause, hence applying the law of causality, hence the understanding; without this the sensation

still remains subjective and places no object in space, even when space is added to it. But in Kant the understanding was not allowed to be used for intuition: it was supposed merely to think, so as to stay within the Transcendental Logic. Connected with this, in turn, is another of Kant's faults. He rightly recognized that the law of causality is *a priori*, yet he left it to me to give the only valid proof of this, namely the proof from the possibility of objective empirical intuition itself; instead he gives an obviously false one, as I have already shown in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 23.—From the above it is clear that Kant's "object of representation" (2) is put together from what he has stolen partly from the representation (1) and partly from the thing in itself (3). Suppose experience really came about only through our understanding applying twelve different functions in order to *think*, by means of just as many concepts *a priori*, the objects that were previously merely intuited. Then every real thing as such would have to have a host of determinations which, being given *a priori*, could absolutely not be thought away, just like space and time. They would belong quite essentially to the existence of the thing, and yet would not be derivable from the properties of space and time. But only a single such determination is to be found: that of causality. Materiality rests on it, since the essence of matter consists in acting, and matter is causality through and through (see vol. II, ch. 4). And it is materiality alone that distinguishes the real thing from the image of fancy, which is, after all, only representation. For matter, as persisting, gives the thing persistence through all time as regards its matter, while the forms change in accordance with causality. Everything else about the thing is either a determination of space or of time, or else its empirical properties, which all come back to its efficacy and are thus closer determinations of causality. But causality already enters as a condition into empirical intuition, which is therefore the business of the understanding. The understanding already makes intuition possible, but apart from the law of causality it contributes nothing to experience and its possibility. What fills

the old ontologies, apart from what has been indicated here, is nothing but relations of things to one another or to our reflection, and a *farrago* [hodgepodge] scraped together.

THE DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

The Analytic is obscure where the Aesthetic was clear, and only causality does real work.

A.39 The very way the doctrine of the categories is presented already betrays its groundlessness. What a difference, in this respect, between the Transcendental *Aesthetic* and the Transcendental *Analytic*! *There*, what clarity, precision and certainty, what firm conviction, openly expressed and unfailingly communicated! Everything is luminous; no dark hiding places are left: Kant knows what he wants, and knows that he is right. *Here*, on the other hand, everything is obscure, confused, indeterminate, wavering and uncertain; the procedure is anxious, full of excuses and appeals to what is still to come, or even to what is held back. Moreover, the whole second and third sections of the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding are completely changed in the second edition, because they did not satisfy Kant himself. They are quite different from those of the first edition, but they have not become any clearer. One really sees Kant struggling with the truth in order to push through the doctrine he had once settled on. In the Transcendental *Aesthetic* all his theorems are really proved, from undeniable facts of consciousness. In the Transcendental *Analytic*, on the other hand, if we look at it in the light of day, we find mere assertions that it is so and must be so. So here, as everywhere, the exposition bears the stamp of the thinking from which it arose: for style is the physiognomy of the mind. —It should also be noted that whenever Kant wants to give an example by way of closer discussion, he almost always takes the category of causality, and then what he says turns out right—precisely because the law of causality is the real, but also the only, form of the understanding, and the other eleven categories are mere blind windows.

The deduction of the categories is simpler and more straightforward in the first edition than in the second. There he tries to show how, once sensibility has given the intuition, the understanding brings about experience by thinking the categories. In the process the expressions recognition, reproduction, association, apprehension and transcendental unity of apperception are repeated to the point of exhaustion, and yet no clarity is reached. It is most noteworthy, however, that in this discussion he never once touches on what must surely occur to everyone first: the referring of sensation to its external cause. If he did not want to admit this, he ought to have expressly denied it; but he does not do that either. So he creeps around it, and all the Kantians have crept after him in just the same way. The secret motive for this is that he is saving the causal nexus, under the name "ground of the appearance," for his false derivation of the thing in itself. A further motive is that through the relation to the cause intuition would become intellectual, which he must not admit. Besides, he seems to have feared that if the causal nexus between sensation and object were admitted, the object would at once become the thing in itself and bring in Locke's empiricism. But this difficulty is removed by reflection, which reminds us that the law of causality is of subjective origin, just as much as sensation itself, and that one's own body, insofar as it appears in space, already belongs among the representations. But Kant was prevented from admitting this by his fear of Berkeley's idealism.

A.40 The essential operation of the understanding by means of its twelve categories is repeatedly given as "the combination of the manifold of intuition." Yet this is never properly explained, nor is it shown what this manifold of intuition is before the understanding combines it. But time and space—space in all three of its dimensions—are *continua*: all their parts are originally not separated but connected. And they are the pervasive forms of our intuition. So everything that presents itself (is given) in them also appears originally as a *continuum*: its parts already appear as connected and need no additional combina-

tion of the manifold. But one might interpret that unification of the manifold of intuition to mean, say, that I refer the various sense impressions from one object to this one object alone. For instance, in intuiting a bell, I recognize that what affects my eye as yellow, my hands as smooth and hard, and my ear as sounding is still only one and the same body. If so, this is rather a consequence of the knowledge *a priori* of the causal nexus (this real and sole function of the understanding). By virtue of this knowledge, all those different effects on my different sense organs lead me only to their common cause, namely the constitution of the body standing before me. Thus my understanding, despite the diversity and multiplicity of the effects, apprehends the unity of the cause as a single object, which precisely thereby presents itself intuitively. —In the fine recapitulation of his doctrine that Kant gives in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 719–726, or V, 747–754, he explains the categories perhaps more clearly than anywhere else, namely as "the mere rule of the synthesis of whatever perception may give *a posteriori*." He seems to have in mind something like this: that in constructing a triangle the angles give the rule for putting the lines together. At any rate, this image best serves to illustrate what he says about the function of the categories. The preface to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* contains a long note that likewise offers an explanation of the categories. It says that they "differ in nothing from the formal acts of the understanding in judging," except that in the latter subject and predicate can, if need be, change places. There, too, judgment in general is defined as "an act through which given representations first become cognitions of an object." According to this, animals, since they do not judge, would know no objects at all. In general, according to Kant, there are only concepts of *objects*, no intuitions of them. I, on the other hand, say: objects exist in the first place only for intuition, and concepts are always abstractions from this intuition. Abstract thinking must therefore conform exactly to the world present in intuition, since only the relation to this world gives concepts their content. We may assume no form determ-

ined *a priori* for concepts other than the capacity for reflection in general. Its essence is the formation of concepts, that is, of abstract, non-intuitive representations, and this constitutes the sole function of *reason*, as I showed in the first book. I therefore demand that we throw eleven of the categories out of the window and keep only that of causality. But we must recognize that its activity is already the condition of empirical intuition, which is accordingly not merely sensual but intellectual; and that the object so intuited, the object of experience, is one with the representation, from which only the thing in itself remains to be distinguished.

HOW THE TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC AROSE

Symmetry with the Aesthetic led Kant to invent pure concepts and their schemata.

A.41 After studying the *Critique of Pure Reason* again and again at different periods of my life, I have been forced to a conviction about how the Transcendental Logic came into being, and I share it here as very helpful for understanding it. The only discovery grounded in objective apprehension and the highest human reflectiveness is the *aperçu* that time and space are known by us *a priori*. Delighted by this happy find, Kant wanted to follow its vein further, and his love of architectonic symmetry gave him the guiding thread. He had found that a pure intuition *a priori* underlay empirical *intuition* as its condition. In just the same way, he thought, certain *pure concepts* would underlie empirically acquired *concepts* as their presupposition in our faculty of knowledge. Actual empirical thinking would first be made possible by a pure thinking *a priori*, which, however, would have no objects in itself but would have to take them from intuition. So, just as the *Transcendental Aesthetic* demonstrates a foundation *a priori* for mathematics, there would have to be one for logic too; and the former would then receive a symmetrical *counterpart* in a *Transcendental Logic*. From now on Kant was no longer unbiased, no longer in the state of pure inquiry

and observation of what is present in consciousness. Instead he was guided by a presupposition and pursued an aim: to find what he presupposed. He wanted to set on top of the so happily discovered Transcendental Aesthetic a Transcendental Logic analogous to it, and so symmetrically corresponding to it, as a second story. For this purpose he hit on the table of judgments, and from it he formed, as well as he could, the *table of categories*. This was to be the doctrine of twelve pure concepts *a priori*, supposed to be the condition of our *thinking* of those very *things* whose *intuition* is conditioned by the two forms of sensibility *a priori*. So now a *pure understanding* corresponded symmetrically to *pure sensibility*. After this he hit on yet another consideration, which offered him a means of making the whole thing more plausible: the assumption of the *schematism* of the pure concepts of the understanding. But it is precisely here that the course of his procedure, of which he himself was unconscious, betrays itself most clearly. For in setting out to find an analogous *a priori* function for every empirical function of the faculty of knowledge, he noticed something. Between our empirical intuiting and our empirical thinking, which is carried out in abstract, non-intuitive concepts, there is still, if not always then very often, a mediation: now and then we try to go back from abstract thinking to intuiting. But we only try, really in order to convince ourselves that our abstract thinking has not strayed far from the secure ground of intuition, perhaps overshooting it or even turning into mere verbiage—rather as, walking in the dark, we reach out now and then for the guiding wall. We then go back to intuiting, again only tentatively and for a moment, by calling up in the imagination an intuition corresponding to the concept that happens to be occupying us. This intuition, however, can never be entirely adequate to the concept; it is a mere provisional *representative* of it. On this point I have already said what is necessary in my essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, § 28. Kant calls a fleeting phantasm of this kind, in contrast to the finished image in the imagination, a *schema*, and says it is, as it were, a monogram of the imagination. He then asserts the fol-

lowing. Such a schema stands midway between our abstract thinking of empirically acquired concepts and our clear intuition occurring through the senses. Just so, between the faculty of intuition *a priori* of pure sensibility and the faculty of thinking *a priori* of the pure understanding (thus the categories), there exist similar *schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding a priori*. He describes these schemata one by one, as monograms of the pure imagination *a priori*, and assigns each to its corresponding category, in the curious "Chapter on the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding," which is famous for being extremely obscure, because no one has ever been able to make sense of it; its obscurity, however, clears up when one considers it from the standpoint given here. Then, more than anywhere else, the deliberateness of his procedure comes to light, together with his resolve, formed in advance, to find whatever would correspond to the analogy and could serve architectonic symmetry. Indeed, this is the case here to a degree that borders on the comic. For in assuming schemata of the pure (*contentless*) concepts of the understanding *a priori* (the categories), analogous to the empirical schemata (the representatives of our actual concepts through the imagination), he overlooks the fact that the purpose of such schemata falls away entirely here. In empirical (actual) thinking, the purpose of schemata relates solely to the *material content* of such concepts. Since these concepts are drawn from empirical intuition, we help and orient ourselves in abstract thinking by casting a fleeting glance back, every now and then, at the intuition from which the concepts were taken, to assure ourselves that our thinking still has real substance. But this necessarily presupposes that the concepts occupying us have sprung from intuition; it is a mere looking back at their material content, indeed a mere aid to our weakness. With concepts *a priori*, however, which as yet have no content at all, anything of the kind obviously and necessarily falls away. For these have not sprung from intuition but come to meet it from within, in order first to receive a content from it; so they have as yet nothing to look

back on. I dwell on this at length because it is precisely this that throws light on the secret course of Kant's philosophizing. It consists in this: after the happy discovery of the two forms of intuition *a priori*, Kant now strives, following the guiding thread of analogy, to demonstrate an analogue *a priori* for every determination of our empirical knowledge; and finally, in the schemata, he extends this even to a merely psychological fact. Here the apparent profundity and the difficulty of the exposition serve precisely to hide from the reader that its content remains a wholly unprovable and merely arbitrary assumption. And whoever finally penetrates the meaning of such an exposition is then easily misled into taking this laboriously gained understanding for conviction of the truth of the matter. If, on the other hand, Kant had behaved here as he did in discovering the intuitions *a priori*, in an unbiased and purely observing way, he would have had to find the following. What is added to the pure intuition of space and time, when it becomes empirical, is on the one hand sensation and on the other the knowledge of causality. This knowledge transforms mere sensation into objective empirical intuition. For that very reason it is not first borrowed and learned from that intuition, but is present *a priori*; it is the very form and function of the pure understanding—its only one, but one so rich in consequences that all our empirical knowledge rests on it. —If, as has often been said, the refutation of an error becomes complete only when one shows psychologically how it arose, then I believe I have accomplished this in the above with regard to Kant's doctrine of the categories and their schemata.

APPERCEPTION AND THE TABLE OF JUDGMENTS

Schopenhauer rejects the categories and sets out to derive the forms of judgment differently.

A.42 Having brought such great errors into the first simple outlines of a theory of the faculty of representation, Kant then fell into manifold and highly complicated assumptions. First among

these is the synthetic unity of apperception: a very odd thing, very oddly presented. "The *I think* must be able to accompany all my representations." Must—be able: this is a problematic-apodictic enunciation; in plain terms, a proposition that takes away with one hand what it gives with the other. And what is the meaning of this proposition, balanced so precariously on its point?—That all representing is thinking? —That is not so, and it would be disastrous. There would then be nothing but abstract concepts, and least of all a pure intuition free of reflection and will, such as the intuition of the beautiful, which is the deepest grasp of the true essence of things, that is, of their Platonic Ideas. Besides, animals would then in turn have either to think as well or not even to represent.—Or is the proposition perhaps meant to say: no object without a subject? That would be very badly expressed by it, and would come too late. If we sum up Kant's statements, we will find that what he understands by the synthetic unity of apperception is, as it were, the extensionless center of the sphere of all our representations, whose radii converge on it. It is what I call the subject of knowing, the correlate of all representations. It is at the same time what I have described and discussed at length in Chapter 22 of the second volume as the focus in which the rays of the brain's activity converge. I refer the reader there, so as not to repeat myself.

A.43 That I reject the whole doctrine of the categories, and count it among the groundless assumptions with which Kant burdened the theory of knowledge, is evident from the critique of it given above. It is evident likewise from the demonstration of the contradictions in the Transcendental Logic, which were grounded in the confusion of intuitive and abstract knowledge. It is evident further from the demonstration that Kant lacked a clear and definite concept of the nature of the understanding and of reason; in its place we found in his writings only incoherent, inconsistent, meager and incorrect pronouncements about those two faculties of the mind. It is evident, finally, from the explanations of these same faculties that I myself have given in the first book and its supplements, and in still greater detail in

the essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, §§ 21, 26 and 34. These explanations are very definite and clear; they follow plainly from a consideration of the nature of our knowledge; and they agree completely with the concepts of those two cognitive powers that show themselves in the usage of language and in the writings of all ages and peoples, only without ever having been brought to clarity. Their defense against Kant's very different account is for the most part already given with the exposure of that account's errors. —But since the table of judgments, which Kant makes the foundation of his theory of thinking, indeed of his whole philosophy, is in itself and on the whole correct, it still falls to me to show how these universal forms of all judgments arise in our faculty of knowledge, and to bring them into agreement with my account of that faculty.—In this discussion I shall always attach to the concepts understanding and reason the sense that my explanation has given them, which I therefore assume the reader to be familiar with.

A.44 An essential difference between Kant's method and the one I follow is that he starts from mediate, reflected knowledge, whereas I start from immediate, intuitive knowledge. He is like someone who measures the height of a tower from its shadow; I am like someone who applies the measuring rod directly. Hence for him philosophy is a science *from* concepts, for me a science *in* concepts: drawn from intuitive knowledge, the sole source of all evidence, and captured and fixed in universal concepts. He skips over this whole intuitive, many-shaped, meaning-rich world that surrounds us and holds to the forms of abstract thinking. Underlying this, though he never states it, is the presupposition that reflection is the ectype of all intuition, so that everything essential in intuition must be expressed in reflection —and indeed in highly condensed and therefore easily surveyed forms and outlines. Accordingly, what is essential and lawlike in abstract knowledge would put into our hands all the threads that set in motion the motley puppet show of the intuitive world before our eyes.—If only Kant had clearly stated this supreme principle of his method and then followed it consistently! He

would then at least have had to separate the intuitive cleanly from the abstract, and we would not have to struggle with insoluble contradictions and confusions. But from the way he has solved his problem one sees that this principle of his method hovered before him only very indistinctly; hence, even after a thorough study of his philosophy, one still has to guess at it.

A.45 As for this method and fundamental maxim itself, it has much in its favor and is a brilliant idea. The very essence of all science consists in gathering the endlessly manifold intuitive appearances under comparatively few abstract concepts. Out of these we arrange a system from which we hold all those appearances completely in the power of our knowledge, so that we can explain what has happened and determine what is to come. The sciences, however, divide the extensive domain of appearances among themselves according to its particular and manifold kinds. Now it was a bold and happy idea to isolate what is absolutely essential to concepts as such, apart from their content, in order to discover, from the forms of all thinking thus found, what is essential also to all intuitive knowledge, and consequently to the world as appearance in general. And because this would have been found *a priori*, owing to the necessity of those forms of thinking, it would be of subjective origin and would lead straight to Kant's goals. —But here, before going further, one ought to have investigated the relation of reflection to intuitive knowledge (which of course presupposes the clean separation of the two that Kant neglected). In what way does the former actually reproduce and stand for the latter—quite purely, or already altered and in part made unrecognizable by being taken up into reflection's own forms? Is the form of abstract, reflective knowledge determined more by the form of intuitive knowledge, or by the character that inalterably belongs to reflective knowledge itself? In the latter case even what is very heterogeneous in intuitive knowledge could no longer be distinguished once it had entered reflective knowledge, and conversely many distinctions we perceive in the reflective mode of knowledge would have sprung from that mode itself and would

by no means point to corresponding differences in intuitive knowledge. The result of this inquiry, however, would have been that intuitive knowledge, when taken up into reflection, undergoes almost as much change as food does when taken up into the animal organism, whose forms and compounds are determined by the organism itself, so that from their composition the character of the food can no longer be recognized at all.—Or (since this is saying a little too much) it would at least have turned out that reflection is by no means related to intuitive knowledge as a reflection in water is to the objects it mirrors, but scarcely even as the shadow of these objects is to the objects themselves. Such a shadow reproduces only a few outer contours, but also unites the most manifold things in the same shape and presents the most diverse things by the same outline, so that by starting from it one could by no means construct the shapes of things completely and reliably.

A.46 All reflective knowledge, or reason, has only one principal form, and that is the abstract concept. This form is peculiar to reason itself and has, directly, no necessary connection with the intuitive world. That world therefore exists for animals entirely without it; it could also be quite different, and that form of reflection would still fit it just as well. The combination of concepts into judgments, however, has certain definite and lawlike forms, which, found by induction, make up the table of judgments. These forms are for the most part to be derived from the reflective mode of knowledge itself, and so directly from reason, namely insofar as they arise through the four laws of thought (which I call metalogical truths) and through the *dictum de omni et nullo*. Others of these forms, however, have their ground in the intuitive mode of knowledge, and so in the understanding; but they by no means point for that reason to just as many particular forms of the understanding. Rather, they are to be derived entirely from the one function the understanding has, namely the immediate knowledge of cause and effect. Still others of these forms, finally, have arisen from the meeting and combination of the reflective and the intuitive modes of know-

ledge, or, strictly speaking, from the taking up of the latter into the former. I shall now go through the moments of judgment one by one and show the origin of each from the sources mentioned. From this it follows of itself that a deduction of categories from them falls away, and that the assumption of categories is as groundless as their presentation has been found to be confused and self-contradictory.

QUANTITY, QUALITY AND RELATION

The forms of judgment are traced to reason or to the understanding's knowledge of causality.

A.47 1) The so-called *quantity* of judgments springs from the nature of concepts as such. It therefore has its ground solely in reason and has no direct connection at all with the understanding and intuitive knowledge.—For, as was set out in the first book, it is essential to concepts as such that they have an extension, a sphere, and that the wider, less determinate concept includes the narrower, more determinate one, which can therefore also be singled out. This can be done either by designating the narrower concept merely as an indeterminate part of the wider concept in general, or by marking it off definitely and completely by giving it a special name. The judgment that carries out this operation is called in the first case a particular, in the second a universal judgment. For example, one and the same part of the sphere of the concept tree can be isolated by a particular and by a universal judgment, namely: "Some trees bear galls"; or thus: "All oaks bear galls."—One sees that the difference between the two operations is very slight; indeed, that their possibility depends on the richness of a language's vocabulary. Nevertheless Kant declared that this difference unveils two fundamentally different acts, functions, categories of the pure understanding, which through them determines experience *a priori*.

A.48 Finally, one can also use a concept in order to arrive, by means of it, at a definite, single, intuitive representation from

which (together with many others) the concept itself has been abstracted; this happens through the singular judgment. Such a judgment merely marks the boundary between abstract and intuitive knowledge, into which it passes over directly: "This tree here bears galls."—And Kant made a special category out of this too.

A.49 After all that has gone before, no further polemic is needed here.

A.50 2) In the same way, the *quality* of judgments lies wholly within the domain of reason. It is not an adumbration of any law of the understanding that makes intuition possible, that is, it does not point to any such law. The nature of abstract concepts, which is precisely the essence of reason itself apprehended objectively, carries with it, as was likewise set out in the first book, the possibility of uniting and separating their spheres. On this possibility, as their presupposition, rest the universal laws of thought of identity and of contradiction, to which I have ascribed *metalogical* truth because they spring purely from reason and cannot be explained further. They lay down that what is united must remain united and what is separated must remain separated, so that what has been posited cannot at the same time be canceled again. They therefore presuppose the possibility of combining and separating spheres, that is, judging itself. But judging, in its form, lies solely and exclusively in reason; and this form is not, like the *content* of judgments, carried over from the understanding's intuitive knowledge, in which therefore no correlate or analogue of it is to be sought. Once intuition has arisen through the understanding and for the understanding, it stands there complete, subject to neither doubt nor error, and so knows neither affirmation nor negation. For it speaks for itself, and does not, like the abstract knowledge of reason, have its value and content merely in its relation to something outside it, according to the principle of sufficient reason of knowing. It is therefore pure reality; all negation is foreign to its nature. Negation can only be added in thought by

reflection, and for that very reason it always remains within the domain of abstract thinking.

A.51 To affirmative and negative judgments Kant, making use of a whim of the old scholastics, adds infinite judgments as well—a subtly contrived stopgap that does not even need discussing, a blind window, of the kind he has put in many of for the sake of his symmetrical architectonic.

A.52 3) Under the very broad concept of relation Kant has lumped together three quite different characteristics of judgments, which we must therefore examine one by one in order to recognize their origin.

A.53 *a)* The *hypothetical judgment* in general is the abstract expression of that most universal form of all our knowledge, the principle of sufficient reason. That this principle has four quite different meanings, that in each of them it originates in a different cognitive power, and that it also concerns a different class of representations, I showed as early as 1813 in my essay on it. From this it follows sufficiently that the origin of the hypothetical judgment in general, this universal form of thought, cannot be merely the understanding and its category of causality, as Kant would have it. Rather, the law of causality, which on my account is the sole form of knowledge of the pure understanding, is only one of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason. That principle embraces all pure or a priori knowledge, and in every one of its meanings it has this hypothetical form of judgment as its expression. —Here, however, we see very clearly how items of knowledge that are quite different in origin and meaning nevertheless, when thought by reason *in abstracto*, appear in one and the same form of combination of concepts and judgments, and in that form can no longer be distinguished at all. To distinguish them, one must go back to intuitive knowledge and leave the abstract altogether. Hence the path Kant took—seeking, from the standpoint of abstract knowledge, the elements and inmost workings of intuitive knowledge as well—was entirely wrong. Incidentally, my whole introductory essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason* can to some extent be regarded

simply as a thorough discussion of the meaning of the hypothetical form of judgment; so I shall not dwell on it further here.

A.54 *b)* The form of the *categorical judgment* is nothing other than the form of judgment in general, in the strictest sense. For, strictly speaking, to judge means only to think the combination, or the incompatibility, of the spheres of concepts. Hence the hypothetical and the disjunctive combinations are not really special forms of judgment. They are applied only to judgments already complete, in which the combination of concepts remains, unchanged, the categorical one; and they in turn link these judgments, the hypothetical form expressing their dependence on one another, the disjunctive their incompatibility. Mere concepts, however, have only one kind of relation to one another, namely the one expressed in the categorical judgment. The closer determinations, or the subspecies, of this relation are the overlapping and the complete separation of the concept spheres, that is, affirmation and negation—out of which Kant made special categories under a quite different heading, that of *quality*. Overlapping and separation in turn have subspecies, according to whether the spheres overlap wholly or only in part; this determination constitutes the *quantity* of judgments, out of which Kant again made a quite separate heading of categories. Thus he separated what is very closely related, indeed identical—the easily surveyed modifications of the only possible relations of mere concepts to one another—and on the other hand united what is very different under this heading of relation.

A.55 Categorical judgments have as their metalogical principle the laws of thought of identity and contradiction. But the *ground* for connecting concept spheres, which gives *truth* to the judgment (the judgment being nothing but this connection), can be of very different kinds. Depending on it, the truth of the judgment is either logical, or empirical, or transcendental, or metalogical, as set out in the introductory essay, §§ 30–33, which need not be repeated here. It follows from this, however, how very different the immediate items of knowledge can be that all

present themselves *in abstracto* through the combination of the spheres of two concepts as subject and predicate, and that one can by no means set up a single function of the understanding as corresponding to them and producing them. For example, the judgments "Water boils; the sine measures the angle; the will resolves; occupation distracts; the distinction is difficult" express relations of the most varied kinds through the same logical form. From this we again get confirmation of how perverse it is to take up the standpoint of abstract knowledge in order to analyze immediate, intuitive knowledge.—Incidentally, the categorical judgment springs from genuine knowledge of the understanding, in my sense, only where a causality is expressed by it. But this is the case also with all judgments that designate a physical quality. For when I say: "This body is heavy, hard, fluid, green, acid, alkaline, organic, and so on," this always designates its acting, and so a knowledge that is possible only through the pure understanding. Now once this knowledge, like much that is entirely different from it (for example the subordination of highly abstract concepts), had been expressed *in abstracto* through subject and predicate, people carried these mere relations of concepts back over to intuitive knowledge and supposed that the subject and predicate of the judgment must have a proper, special correlate in intuition: substance and accident. But I shall make clear further on that the concept of substance has no true content other than that of the concept of matter. Accidents, however, are entirely synonymous with modes of acting, so that the supposed knowledge of substance and accident is still the pure understanding's knowledge of cause and effect. How the representation of matter actually arises is discussed partly in our first book, § 4, and still more intelligibly in the essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, at the end of § 21, p. 77; and partly we shall see it more closely when we examine the principle that substance persists.

AGAINST INTERACTION

Disjunctive judgments do not yield a category of interaction, a concept with no real example.

A.56 *c) Disjunctive judgments* spring from the law of thought of the excluded middle, which is a metalogical truth. They are therefore wholly the property of pure reason and do not have their origin in the understanding. But deriving the category of community, or *interaction*, from them is a truly glaring example of the violence Kant sometimes permits himself against the truth merely to satisfy his delight in architectonic symmetry. The inadmissibility of this derivation has often and rightly been censured and demonstrated on several grounds, especially by G. E. *Schulze* in his *Critique of Theoretical Philosophy* and by Berg in his *Epicritique of Philosophy*.—What real analogy is there, after all, between leaving open the determination of a concept by mutually exclusive predicates and the thought of interaction?[18] The two are even flatly opposed. In the disjunctive judgment, actually positing one of the two members of the division is at the same time necessarily canceling the other; whereas if we think of two things as related by interaction, positing the one is precisely a necessary positing of the other as well, and *vice versa*. Hence the real logical analogue of interaction is undoubtedly the *circulus vitiosus* [vicious circle], in which, just as supposedly in interaction, what is grounded is also in turn the ground, and conversely. And just as logic rejects the *circulus vitiosus*, so the concept of interaction must be banished from metaphysics. For I now quite seriously intend to show that there is no interaction at all in the proper sense, and that this concept—however popular its use may be, precisely because of the vagueness of the thought—proves on closer inspection to be empty, false and null. First, let us recall what causality is at all, and for assistance consult my account of it in the introductory essay, § 20, as also in my prize essay on the freedom of the will, chap. 3, pp. 27 ff., and

18 Franz Berg (1753–1821), a Würzburg theologian and critic of the post-Kantians.

finally in the fourth chapter of our second volume. Causality is the law according to which the *states* of matter that come about determine their places in time. Causality concerns only states—indeed, strictly, only *changes*—and neither matter as such nor persistence without change. *Matter* as such does not stand under the law of causality, since it neither comes into being nor passes away; nor, therefore, does the whole *thing*, as people commonly say, but only the *states* of matter. Further, the law of causality has nothing to do with *persistence*: for where nothing *changes*, there is no *acting* and no causality, but an abiding state of rest. Now if such a state is changed, then either the newly arisen state is again persistent, or it is not but immediately brings about a third state. The necessity with which this happens is precisely the law of causality, which is a form of the principle of sufficient reason and therefore cannot be explained further, since the principle of sufficient reason is precisely the principle of all explanation and all necessity. From this it is clear that being cause and being effect stand in precise connection and necessary relation to *succession in time*. Only insofar as state *A* precedes state *B* in time, and their succession is necessary and not accidental—that is, not a mere following after but a following from—only so far is state *A* cause and state *B* effect. The concept of *interaction*, however, contains this: that each is both cause and effect of the other. But this amounts to saying that each of the two is the earlier and also the later: a non-thought. For it cannot be assumed that both *states* are simultaneous, and necessarily simultaneous: because, as necessarily belonging together and existing simultaneously, they make up only *one* state. For this state to persist, the continued presence of all its determinations is indeed required; but then we are no longer speaking of change and causality at all, but of duration and rest. Nothing more is said than this: that if *one* determination of the whole state is changed, the new state thereby arising cannot last, but becomes the cause of a change in all the remaining determinations of the first state as well, whereby a new, third state again comes about. All this happens merely in accordance with the

simple law of causality and does not establish a new law, that of interaction.

A.57 I also maintain outright that the concept of *interaction* cannot be supported by a single example. Everything one might put forward as such is either a state of rest, to which the concept of causality, which has meaning only for changes, has no application at all; or it is an alternating succession of same-named, mutually conditioning states, for whose explanation simple causality entirely suffices. An example of the first kind is a pair of scales brought to rest by equal weights. Here there is no acting at all, for there is no change; it is a state of rest. Gravity strives, evenly distributed, as in every body supported at its center of gravity, but it cannot express its force through any effect. That removing *one* weight yields a second state, which at once becomes the cause of the third, the sinking of the other scale, happens according to the simple law of cause and effect and requires no special category of the understanding, not even a special name. An example of the other kind is the continued burning of a fire. The combination of oxygen with the combustible body is the cause of heat, and this in turn is the cause of the renewed occurrence of that chemical combination. But this is nothing other than a chain of causes and effects whose links, however, are alternately *of the same name*: the burning *A* produces free heat *B*, this a new burning *C* (that is, a new effect, of the same name as the cause *A* but not individually the same), this a new heat *D* (which is not really identical with the effect *B* but the same only in concept, that is, *of the same name* as it), and so on and on. A nice example of what in ordinary life is called interaction is provided by a theory of deserts given by Humboldt (*Views of Nature*, 2nd ed., vol. 2, p. 79). In sandy deserts it does not rain, but it does on the wooded mountains bordering them. The cause is not the attraction the mountains exert on the clouds. Rather, the column of heated air rising from the sandy plain prevents the vapor vesicles from breaking up and drives

the clouds upward.[19] Over the mountains the vertically rising air current is weaker, the clouds sink, and precipitation occurs in the cooler air. Thus lack of rain and absence of vegetation in the desert stand in interaction: it does not rain because the heated sandy surface radiates more heat; the desert does not become steppe or grassland because it does not rain. But clearly we again have here, as in the example above, only a succession of same-named causes and effects, and nothing whatever essentially different from simple causality. The same holds for the swinging of a pendulum, and indeed for the self-maintenance of the organic body. There too every state brings about a new one that is the same in kind as the one that produced it, but individually new. Only here the matter is more complicated, since the chain no longer consists of links of two kinds but of many, so that a same-named link recurs only after several others have intervened. But always we see before us only an application of the one simple law of causality, which gives the rule to the succession of states—not anything that would have to be grasped by a new and special function of the understanding.

A.58 Or would one perhaps even cite as evidence for the concept of interaction the fact that action and reaction are equal? But this lies precisely in what I insist on so strongly and have shown in detail in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason: that cause and effect are not two bodies but two successive states of bodies. Consequently each of the two states also implicates all the bodies involved, and the effect, that is, the newly arising state—in an impact, for example—extends to both bodies in equal proportion. However much the body struck is changed, just so much is the striking body changed (each in proportion to its mass and velocity). If one cares to call this interaction, then absolutely every effect is interaction; so no new concept comes in for it, still less a new function of the understanding, and we merely have a superfluous synonym for causality. Yet Kant incautiously states this very view outright in the

19 Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), German naturalist and explorer; *Ansichten der Natur* first appeared in 1808.

Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, where the proof of the fourth proposition of mechanics begins: "All external action in the world is interaction." How, then, can different functions lie *a priori* in the understanding for simple causality and for interaction—indeed, how can the real succession of things be possible and knowable only by means of the former, and their simultaneity only by means of the latter? On that basis, if all action is interaction, succession and simultaneity would also be the same, and so everything in the world would be simultaneous.—If there were true interaction, then a *perpetuum mobile* [perpetual motion machine] would also be possible, and even certain *a priori*. Rather, the assertion that it is impossible rests on the *a priori* conviction that there is no true interaction and no form of the understanding for such a thing.

A.59 Aristotle, too, denies interaction in the proper sense. He remarks that two things can indeed be causes of each other, but only if one understands this in a different sense for each—for example, one acts on the other as a motive, but the other on the first as the cause of its movement. We find the same words in two places, *Physics*, book II, chap. 3, and *Metaphysics*, book V, chap. 2: *Esti de tina kai allêlôn aitia; hoion to ponein aition tês euexias, kai hautê tou ponein; all' ou ton auton tropon, alla to men hôs telos, to de hôs archê kinêseôs. (Sunt praeterea quae sibi sunt mutuo causae, ut exercitium bonae habitudinis, et haec exercitii: at non eodem modo, sed haec ut finis, illud ut principium motus.)* [There are, further, things that are causes of each other, as exercise is of good condition, and good condition of exercise—but not in the same way: the latter as end, the former as the origin of movement.] If he also assumed a genuine interaction besides, he would list it here, since in both places he is concerned to enumerate all possible kinds of causes. In the *Posterior Analytics*, book II, chap. 11, he speaks of a cycle of causes and effects, but not of an interaction.

MODALITY

Necessity means following from a given ground; contingency and possibility arise only in reflection.

A.60 4) The categories of *modality* have this advantage over all the others: what each of them expresses really does correspond to the form of judgment from which it is derived. This is hardly ever the case with the other categories, since for the most part they are deduced out of the forms of judgment by the most arbitrary force.

A.61 That it is the concepts of the possible, the actual and the necessary that give rise to the problematic, assertoric and apodictic forms of judgment is perfectly true. But that those concepts are special, original forms of knowledge of the understanding, not to be derived further, is not true. Rather, they stem from the single original form of all knowing, of which we are therefore conscious *a priori*: the principle of sufficient reason. The knowledge of *necessity* stems directly from it; the concepts of contingency, possibility, impossibility and actuality, on the other hand, arise only when reflection is applied to that knowledge. None of these, therefore, originates in *one* mental power, the understanding; they arise from the conflict of abstract knowing with intuitive knowing, as will be seen at once.

A.62 I maintain that being necessary and being the consequence of a given ground are entirely interchangeable concepts and completely identical. We can never know anything as necessary, or even think it so, except insofar as we regard it as the consequence of a given ground. Beyond this dependence, this being posited by something else and inevitably following from it, the concept of necessity contains absolutely nothing. It therefore arises and exists solely and exclusively through the application of the principle of sufficient reason. Hence, according to the different forms of this principle, there is a physically necessary (the effect from the cause), a logically necessary (through the ground of knowing, in analytic judgments, syllo-

gisms, and so on), a mathematically necessary (according to the ground of being in space and time), and finally a practically necessary. By this last we do not mean, say, being determined by an alleged categorical imperative, but the action that necessarily ensues, given the empirical character, upon the motives at hand.—But everything necessary is so only relatively, namely on the presupposition of the ground from which it follows; hence absolute necessity is a contradiction.—For the rest I refer to § 49 of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason.

A.63 The contradictory opposite, that is, the negation of necessity, is *contingency*. The content of this concept is therefore negative, namely nothing more than this: absence of the connection expressed by the principle of sufficient reason. Consequently the contingent, too, is always only relative: it is contingent in relation to something that is *not* its ground. Every object of whatever kind, for example every event in the actual world, is always necessary and contingent at once: *necessary* in relation to the one thing that is its cause; *contingent* in relation to everything else. For its contact in time and space with everything else is a mere coincidence, without necessary connection; hence also the words *Zufall* [chance, literally 'what befalls'], *symptôma* [a falling together], *contingens* [touching upon]. An absolutely contingent thing is therefore as little conceivable as an absolutely necessary one. For the former would be precisely an object that stood to no other object in the relation of consequent to ground. But the unrepresentability of such an object is precisely the content of the principle of sufficient reason expressed negatively; that principle would therefore first have to be overthrown in order to think something absolutely contingent. But then this would itself have lost all meaning, since the concept of the contingent has meaning only in relation to that principle and signifies that two objects do not stand to each other in the relation of ground and consequent.

A.64 In nature, insofar as it is intuitive representation, everything that happens is necessary, for it proceeds from its cause. But if we consider this individual thing in relation to

everything else that is not its cause, we know it as contingent; this, however, is already an abstract reflection. Now if, in the case of an object of nature, we further abstract entirely from its causal relation to everything else, and so from its necessity and contingency, this kind of knowledge is comprised by the concept of the *actual* [*das Wirkliche*]. In it one considers only the *effect* [*Wirkung*], without looking round for the cause, in relation to which one would otherwise have to call it *necessary*, and in relation to everything else *contingent*. All this rests ultimately on the fact that the modality of a judgment designates not so much the objective character of things as the relation of our knowledge to it. But since in nature everything proceeds from a cause, everything *actual* is also *necessary*—but again only insofar as it is at *this time*, in *this place*: for determination by the law of causality extends to that alone. But if we leave intuitive nature and pass over to abstract thinking, we can, in reflection, represent to ourselves all the laws of nature known to us, partly *a priori*, partly only *a posteriori*. This abstract representation contains everything that is in nature at *any* time, in *any* place, but in abstraction from every particular place and time. And with just this, through such reflection, we have entered the wide realm of *possibility*. What finds no place even here, however, is the *impossible*. It is evident that possibility and impossibility exist only for reflection, for the abstract knowledge of reason, not for intuitive knowledge—although it is the pure forms of the latter that furnish reason with the determinations of the possible and the impossible. According to whether the laws of nature from which we start in thinking the possible and the impossible are known *a priori* or *a posteriori*, the possibility or impossibility is metaphysical or merely physical.

A.65 This account needs no proof, because it rests directly on the knowledge of the principle of sufficient reason and on the development of the concepts of the necessary, the actual and the possible. From it, it is sufficiently clear how utterly groundless is Kant's assumption of three special functions of the understanding for these three concepts, and that here again he has let

no misgiving disturb him in carrying out his architectonic symmetry.

A.66 To this, however, is added the very great error that, admittedly following the precedent of earlier philosophy, he confused the concepts of the necessary and the contingent with each other. That earlier philosophy had put abstraction to the following misuse. It was evident that that whose ground is posited follows inevitably, that is, cannot not be, and so is necessary. But people held exclusively to this last determination and said: the necessary is what cannot be otherwise, or whose opposite is impossible. They lost sight of the ground and root of such necessity, overlooked the relativity of all necessity that results from it, and thereby produced the utterly unthinkable fiction of an *absolutely necessary*, that is, of a something whose existence would be as inevitable as the consequence from the ground, but which would nevertheless not be the consequence of a ground and would therefore depend on nothing—an addition that is simply an absurd postulate, since it contradicts the principle of sufficient reason. Starting from this fiction, people then declared, in diametrical opposition to the truth, that precisely everything posited by a ground was the contingent: they looked, that is, at the relative character of its necessity and compared this with that *absolute* necessity, plucked entirely out of thin air and self-contradictory in its very concept.[20] Kant too retains this utterly perverse determination of the contingent and gives it as his definition: *Critique of Pure Reason*, V, pp. 289–291; 243. V, 301; 419,

20 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Christian Wolff's "Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, Welt und Seele" [Rational Thoughts on God, the World and the Soul], §§ 577–579.—It is strange that he declares contingent only what is necessary according to the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, that is, what happens from causes. By contrast, he also acknowledges as necessary what is necessary according to the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason: for example, what follows from the *essentia* [essence] (definition), hence analytic judgments, and also mathematical truths. His reason for this is that only the law of causality yields endless series, whereas the other kinds of grounds yield finite ones. This, however, is not at all the case with the forms of the principle of sufficient reason in pure space and time. It holds only of the logical ground of knowledge, but that is exactly what he took mathematical necessity to be. —Compare the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 50.

458, 460. V, 447, 486, 488. In doing so he even falls into the most glaring contradiction with himself, saying on p. 301: "Everything contingent has a cause," and adding: "That is contingent whose non-being is possible." But whatever has a cause, its non-being is absolutely impossible; so it is necessary.—Incidentally, the origin of this whole false definition of the necessary and the contingent is already to be found in Aristotle, namely in *De generatione et corruptione* [On Generation and Corruption], book II, chaps. 9 and 11. There the necessary is defined as that whose non-being is impossible; opposed to it is that whose being is impossible; and between these two lies that which can be and also not be—that is, what comes into being and passes away—and this would then be the contingent. From what has been said above it is clear that this definition, like so many of Aristotle's, arose from stopping short at abstract concepts without going back to the concrete and intuitive, in which, after all, the source of all abstract concepts lies and by which they must therefore always be checked. "Something whose non-being is impossible" can perhaps be thought *in abstracto*; but if we take it to the concrete, the real, the intuitive, we find nothing to bear out the thought even as a possibility—except precisely the aforesaid consequence of a given ground, whose necessity, however, is relative and conditional.

A.67 On this occasion I add a few more remarks about those concepts of modality.—Since all necessity rests on the principle of sufficient reason, and is for that very reason relative, all *apodictic* judgments are originally, and in their ultimate meaning, *hypothetical*. They become categorical only through the addition of an *assertoric* minor premise, that is, in the conclusion. If this minor is still undecided, and this undecidedness is expressed, the result is the *problematic* judgment.

A.68 What is apodictic in general (as a rule), such as a law of nature, is only ever problematic with respect to a single case, because the condition that brings the case under the rule must first actually occur. And conversely, what is necessary (apodictic) in the particular as such (every single change, necessary

through its cause) is, when stated generally and universally, again only problematic. For the cause that occurred concerned only the single case, and the apodictic judgment, which is always hypothetical, only ever states general laws, not single cases directly.—All this has its ground in the fact that possibility exists only in the domain of reflection and for reason; the actual exists in the domain of intuition and for the understanding; the necessary exists for both. Indeed, the difference between necessary, actual and possible really exists only *in abstracto* and conceptually. In the real world, by contrast, all three coincide in one. For everything that happens happens *necessarily*, because it happens from causes, and these in turn have causes, so that all the events of the world, great and small, form a strict concatenation of what necessarily occurs. Accordingly, everything actual is at the same time something necessary, and in reality there is no difference between actuality and necessity. Nor is there any difference between actuality and possibility: for what has not happened, that is, has not become actual, was not possible either. The causes without which it could never have occurred did not themselves occur, nor could they have occurred, in the great concatenation of causes: so it was something impossible. Every event, therefore, is either necessary or impossible. All this, however, holds only of the empirically real world, that is, the complex of individual things, and so of the wholly individual as such. If, on the other hand, we consider things in general by means of reason, grasping them *in abstracto*, then necessity, actuality and possibility separate again. We then recognize everything that conforms to the laws *a priori* belonging to our intellect as possible in general. We recognize whatever corresponds to the empirical laws of nature as possible in this world, even if it has never become actual. So we clearly distinguish the possible from the actual. In itself, the actual is indeed always also something necessary. But it is grasped as such only by someone who knows its cause: apart from its cause, it is, and is called, contingent. This consideration also gives us the key to that *contentio peri dynatôn* [dispute about the possible] between

Diodorus the Megarian and Chrysippus the Stoic, which Cicero reports in his book *De fato* [On Fate]. Diodorus says: "Only what becomes actual was possible, and everything actual is also necessary."—Chrysippus, on the other hand: "Much is possible that never becomes actual: for only the necessary becomes actual."—We can make this clear to ourselves as follows. Actuality is the conclusion of a syllogism for which possibility supplies the premises. But for this not only the major but also the minor is required: only the two together yield full possibility. The major gives a merely theoretical, general possibility *in abstracto*. In itself, however, this does not yet make anything possible at all, that is, capable of becoming actual.[21] The minor is needed as well, since it gives the possibility for the single case by bringing that case under the rule. By this very fact the case at once becomes actuality. For example:

A.69 Maj. All houses (and consequently my house too) can burn down.

A.70 Min. My house catches fire.

A.71 Concl. My house burns down.

A.72 For with regard to actuality, every general proposition, and so every major, determines things only under a presupposition, and therefore hypothetically. For example, being able to burn down presupposes catching fire. This presupposition is supplied in the minor. The major always loads the cannon, but only when the minor brings up the fuse does the shot follow: the conclusion. This holds throughout of the relation of possibility to actuality. Now since the conclusion, which is the statement of actuality, always follows *necessarily*, it follows that everything actual is also necessary. This can also be seen from the fact that being necessary means only being the consequent of a given ground. In the case of the actual, this ground is a cause: therefore everything actual is necessary. So here we see the concepts of the possible, the actual and the necessary coincide. The last does not merely presuppose the first; the reverse holds as well.

21 Diodorus Cronus (d. c. 284 BC), a Megarian logician famous for his "Master Argument" about possibility.

What keeps them apart is the limitation of our intellect by the form of time: for time is what mediates between possibility and actuality. The necessity of an individual event can be fully understood through knowledge of all its causes. But the coming together of all these different causes, which are independent of one another, appears to us as *contingent*. Indeed, their independence of one another is precisely the concept of contingency. But since each of them was the necessary consequence of *its* cause, and the chain of causes has no beginning, it turns out that contingency is a merely subjective appearance. It arises from the limited horizon of our understanding, and is as subjective as the optical horizon, where the sky touches the earth.—

A.73 Since necessity is the same as being the consequent of a given ground, it must also appear as a special kind in each form of the principle of sufficient reason. It must also have its opposite in possibility and impossibility, an opposite that arises only when reason applies its abstract consideration to the object. Hence the four kinds of necessity mentioned above are faced by just as many kinds of impossibility: physical, logical, mathematical, practical. It may further be noted that if one stays entirely within the domain of abstract concepts, possibility always attaches to the more general concept, necessity to the narrower one. For example, "an animal *can* be a bird, a fish, an amphibian, and so on"—"a nightingale *must* be a bird, a bird an animal, an animal an organism, an organism a body." —This is really because logical necessity, whose expression is the syllogism, goes from the general to the particular and never the reverse.— In intuitive nature (the representations of the first class), on the other hand, everything is really necessary, through the law of causality. Only reflection, when it is added, can at the same time grasp it as contingent, by comparing it with what is not its cause. Reflection can also grasp it as merely and purely actual, by disregarding all causal connection. It is really only with this class of representations that the concept of the *actual* [*wirklich*, from *wirken*, to act] applies, as the derivation of the word from the concept of causality already indicates. —In the third class of

representations, pure mathematical intuition, there is nothing but necessity, if one stays entirely within it. Here too possibility arises only through reference to the concepts of reflection. For example, "a triangle *can* be right-angled, obtuse-angled or equiangular; it *must* have three angles that add up to two right angles." So here one arrives at the *possible* only by passing from the intuitive to the abstract.

A.74 This account presupposes that the reader remembers what was said both in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason and in the first book of the present work. After it, I hope, there will be no further doubt about the true and very diverse origin of the forms of judgment that the table sets before our eyes. Nor will there be any doubt about the inadmissibility and complete groundlessness of assuming twelve special functions of the understanding to explain them. A number of individual and very easily made observations already point to the latter. Thus, for example, it takes a great love of symmetry, and much confidence in a guiding thread taken from it, to assume that an affirmative, a categorical and an assertoric judgment are three things so fundamentally different that they justify assuming a wholly distinctive function of the understanding for each of them.

A.75 Kant himself betrays his awareness that his doctrine of the categories is untenable. In the second edition he omitted several long passages of the first from the third chapter of the Analytic of Principles (*phaenomena et noumena* [phenomena and noumena]), namely pp. 241, 242, 244–246 and 248–253, because they revealed the weakness of that doctrine too openly. There, for example, on p. 241, he says that he had not defined the individual categories because he could not have defined them even if he had wanted to, since they are incapable of any definition.—In saying so he had forgotten that on p. 82 of the same first edition he had said: "I deliberately spare myself the definition of the categories, although I may be in possession of it."—So this was—*sit venia verbo* [pardon the expression]—hot air. This latter passage, however, he left standing. And so all those passages he later prudently left out betray that nothing distinct can be

thought in the categories, and that this whole doctrine stands on shaky legs.

THE TABLE OF CATEGORIES AS A PROCRUSTEAN BED

Kant forces space, time, the soul and nature under headings taken from logic.

A.76 This table of categories is now supposed to be the guiding thread for conducting every metaphysical, indeed every scientific, inquiry (*Prolegomena*, § 39). And in fact it is not only the foundation of the whole Kantian philosophy and the pattern by which its symmetry is carried through everywhere, as I have already shown above. It has also become, quite literally, the bed of Procrustes into which Kant forces every possible inquiry, by an act of violence that I shall now examine somewhat more closely. But what, on such an occasion, must the *imitatores, servum pecus* not have done! We have seen it. That violence is exercised by entirely setting aside and forgetting the meaning of the expressions that designate the headings, the forms of judgment and the categories, and holding solely to the expressions themselves. Some of them originate in Aristotle's *Analyt. priora* I, 23 (*peri poiotêtos kai posotêtos tôn tou syllogismou horôn*: *de qualitate et quantitate terminorum syllogismi* [on the quality and quantity of the terms of the syllogism]). But they are arbitrarily chosen. The extension of concepts could well have been designated by something other than the word *quantity*, although this word does fit its object better than the other headings of the categories. Even the word *quality* was obviously chosen only out of the habit of opposing quality to quantity: for affirmation and negation, the name "quality" has surely been seized on arbitrarily enough. Yet in every inquiry he undertakes, Kant brings every quantity in time and space, and every possible quality of things, physical, moral and so on, under those headings of the categories. And this although these things and those headings of the forms of judging and thinking have not the slightest thing in common, apart from an accidental, arbitrary name. One must

keep in mind all the respect that Kant is otherwise owed in order not to voice one's indignation at this procedure in harsh terms. —The very next example is supplied by the pure physiological table of general principles of natural science. What in the world does the quantity of judgments have to do with the fact that every intuition has an extensive magnitude? What does the quality of judgments have to do with the fact that every sensation has a degree?—The former rests, rather, on the fact that space is the form of our outer intuition. The latter is nothing more than an empirical, and moreover wholly subjective, perception, drawn merely from considering the constitution of our sense organs.—Further, on the table that lays the foundation of rational psychology (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 344; V, 402), the *simplicity* of the soul is listed under quality. But this is precisely a quantitative property, and it has no bearing whatever on affirmation or negation in judgment. Quantity, however, had to be filled in, and so it was filled with the *unity* of the soul, which is surely already included in its simplicity. Then modality is forced in in a ridiculous way: the soul, we are told, stands in a relationship to *possible* objects. But relationship belongs under Relation, and that heading is already taken by substance. Next, the four cosmological ideas, which are the material of the antinomies, are traced back to the headings of the categories; more on this further below, when we examine these antinomies. Several examples that are, if possible, even more glaring are supplied by the table of the *categories of freedom!* in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.—Further, by the first book of the *Critique of Judgment*, which runs through the judgment of taste according to the four headings of the categories. Finally, by the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, which is cut entirely to the pattern of the table of categories. This is perhaps the main cause of the falsehoods that are mixed in here and there with the truth and excellence of this important work. Just look at the end of its first chapter to see how the unity, plurality and totality of the directions of lines are supposed to correspond to the categories named after the quantity of judgments.

THE PERSISTENCE OF SUBSTANCE

Kant's proof from time fails; persistence of matter follows from causality and from space.

A.77 The principle of the *persistence of substance* is derived from the category of subsistence and inherence. But we know this category only from the form of categorical judgments, that is, from the connection of two concepts as subject and predicate. How forcibly, then, that great metaphysical principle has been made dependent on this simple, purely logical form! But this too was done only *pro forma* and for the sake of symmetry. The proof given here for this principle sets its supposed origin in the understanding and in the category entirely aside, and is conducted from the pure intuition of time. But this proof too is quite incorrect. It is false that there is *simultaneity* and *duration* in mere time. These representations first arise from the union of *space* with time, as I have already shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 18, and developed further in § 4 of the present work; I must presuppose both expositions for an understanding of what follows. It is false that time itself *remains* through all change. On the contrary, time itself is precisely what flows: a time that remains is a contradiction. Kant's proof is untenable, however much he has propped it up with sophisms. Indeed, it leads him into the most palpable contradiction. For after wrongly setting up *simultaneity* as a mode of time (p. 177; V, 219), he says (p. 183; V, 226), quite correctly: "*Simultaneity* is not a mode of time, since in time no parts at all are simultaneous, but all are successive."—In truth, space is implied in simultaneity just as much as time. For if two things are simultaneous and yet not one, they differ through space. If two states of *one* thing are simultaneous (for example, the glow and the heat of iron), they are two simultaneous effects of one thing, and so presuppose matter, and matter presupposes space. Strictly speaking, simultaneity is a negative determination. It contains only this: that two things, or states, do not differ through time, so that their dif-

ference must be sought elsewhere. —Our knowledge of the persistence of substance, that is, of matter, must certainly rest on an insight *a priori*, since it is beyond all doubt and therefore cannot be drawn from experience. I derive it from the following. The principle of all coming to be and passing away, the law of causality, of which we are conscious *a priori*, essentially concerns only *changes*, that is, the successive *states* of matter. It is thus restricted to form and leaves *matter* untouched. In our consciousness, therefore, matter stands as the foundation of all things: subject to no coming to be or passing away, and hence as what has always been and always remains. A deeper grounding of the persistence of substance, drawn from an analysis of our intuitive representation of the empirical world in general, is to be found in our first book, § 4. There it was shown that the essence of *matter* consists in the complete *union of space and time*. This union is possible only by means of the representation of causality, and hence only for the understanding, which is nothing but the subjective correlate of causality. That is why matter is never known otherwise than as acting, that is, as causality through and through: in matter, being and acting are one, as the very word *Wirklichkeit* [actuality] already suggests. Intimate union of space and time—causality, matter, actuality—are therefore one, and the subjective correlate of this one is the understanding. Matter must bear in itself the conflicting properties of the two factors from which it arises. It is the representation of causality that removes the contradiction between them and makes their coexistence comprehensible to the understanding. Through the understanding and for it alone does matter exist, and its entire capacity consists in knowing cause and effect. For the understanding, then, the unstable flow of time, appearing as the change of accidents, is united in matter with the rigid immobility of space, which presents itself as the persistence of substance. For if substance passed away as the accidents do, appearance would be torn loose from space altogether and would belong only to mere time. The world of experience would be dissolved through the destruction of matter: annihila-

tion. —It is therefore from the share that *space* has in matter, that is, in all appearances of actuality, that the principle of the persistence of substance, which everyone acknowledges as certain *a priori*, ought to have been derived and explained. For space is the opposite and counterpart of time, and so, in itself and apart from its union with time, knows no change at all. It ought not to have been derived from mere time, which Kant, for this purpose, quite absurdly credited with *remaining*.—

A.78 The proof that now follows, of the apriority and necessity of the law of causality from the mere temporal succession of events, is incorrect. I have shown this in detail in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 23, and may therefore simply refer to it here.[22] The case is exactly the same with the proof of interaction, whose very concept I had to show above to be null. —As for modality, whose principles are set out next, what was necessary has already been said.—

PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA

Kant claims intuition without concepts is empty, which inverts the true relation.

A.79 I would still have many details to refute in pursuing the Transcendental Analytic further. But I fear exhausting the reader's patience, and so I leave them to the reader's own reflection. Yet again and again in the *Critique of Pure Reason* we meet that principal and fundamental error of Kant's which I censured at length above: the complete failure to distinguish abstract, discursive knowledge from intuitive knowledge. It is this that spreads a constant obscurity over Kant's whole theory of the cognitive faculty. It never lets the reader know what is really being talked about at any given point. Instead of understanding,

22 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. With this refutation of mine of Kant's proof one may, if one likes, compare the earlier attacks on it by *Feder, Ueber Zeit, Raum und Kausalität* [On Time, Space and Causality], § 28, and by G. E. Schulze, *Critique of Theoretical Philosophy*, vol. 2, pp. 422–442.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. J. G. H. Feder (1740–1821) was a Göttingen philosopher and early critic of Kant.

the reader only ever guesses, trying to take each statement now as referring to thinking, now to intuiting, and always remains in suspense. That incredible lack of reflection on the nature of intuitive and abstract representation leads Kant, in the chapter "On the Distinction of All Objects into Phenomena and Noumena," to a monstrous assertion, as I shall discuss more closely in a moment. He asserts that without thinking, hence without abstract concepts, there is no knowledge of an object at all; and that intuition, because it is not thinking, is not knowing at all either, and is nothing but a mere affection of sensibility, mere sensation! Indeed, more than that: that intuition without a concept is entirely empty, whereas a concept without intuition is still something (p. 253; V, 309). Now this is the exact opposite of the truth. For it is precisely concepts that receive all their meaning, all their content, solely from their relation to intuitive representations. From these they have been abstracted, drawn off, that is, formed by dropping everything inessential; hence, if the foundation of intuition is taken away from them, they are empty and null. Intuitions, on the other hand, have in themselves an immediate and very great significance (for it is in them that the will, the thing in itself, objectifies itself). They stand for themselves, express themselves, and do not have merely borrowed content, as concepts do. For the principle of sufficient reason governs intuitions only as the law of causality, and as such determines only their place in space and time. It does not condition their content and their significance, as it does with concepts, where it holds as the principle of the ground of knowing. Incidentally, it looks as though Kant, precisely here, really means to set about distinguishing intuitive and abstract representation. He reproaches Leibniz and Locke: the former for having turned everything into abstract representations, the latter for having turned everything into intuitive ones. But no distinction comes of it after all. And even if Locke and Leibniz really did commit those errors, Kant himself is guilty of a third, which comprises both. He mixed the intuitive and the abstract to such an extent that a monstrous hybrid of

the two arose: an absurdity of which no distinct representation is possible, and which therefore could only confuse, stupefy and set his disciples quarrelling.

A.80 It is true that thinking and intuition come apart more in that chapter, "On the Distinction of All Objects into Phenomena and Noumena," than anywhere else. But the way they are distinguished here is fundamentally wrong. It says, on p. 253; V, 309: "If I take away all thinking (through categories) from an empirical cognition, no cognition of any object whatever remains: for through mere intuition nothing at all is thought, and the fact that this affection of sensibility is in me does not constitute any relation of such a representation to any object."—This sentence contains, as it were, all of Kant's errors in a nutshell. It brings to light that he has misconceived the relation between sensation, intuition and thinking. Accordingly, he identifies intuition—whose form is, after all, supposed to be space, and in all three dimensions—with mere subjective sensation in the sense organs. And he lets the knowledge of an object come in only through thinking, as something distinct from intuiting. I say, on the contrary: objects are in the first place objects of intuition, not of thinking, and all knowledge of *objects* is originally and in itself intuition. But intuition is by no means mere sensation: the understanding already shows itself active in it. *Thinking*, which is added only in human beings and not in animals, is mere abstraction from intuition. It gives no fundamentally new knowledge, and does not first posit objects that were not there before. It merely changes the form of the knowledge already gained through intuition, making it abstract knowledge in concepts. In this way its intuitive character is lost, but it becomes possible to combine that knowledge, which immeasurably extends its applicability. The *material* of our thinking, on the other hand, is nothing other than our intuitions themselves. It is not something that is not contained in intuition and is first brought in by thinking. That is why the material of everything that occurs in our thinking must be demonstrable in our intuition; otherwise it would be empty thinking. However variously thinking may

work over and transform this material, it must still be possible to recover it from them and trace the thinking back to it—just as a piece of gold is finally reduced again from all its solutions, oxidations, sublimations and compounds and presented once more as pure metal, undiminished. This could not be so if thinking itself had added something to the object, let alone the main thing.

A.81 The whole chapter on amphiboly that follows is merely a critique of the Leibnizian philosophy, and as such it is on the whole correct. Its entire layout, though, is made solely for the love of architectonic symmetry, which here too supplies the guiding thread. Thus, to bring out the analogy with the Aristotelian *Organon*, a transcendental topic is set up. It consists in having to consider every concept from four points of view, in order first to settle which cognitive faculty it belongs to. But those four points of view are adopted entirely at will, and ten others could be added with equal right. Their number four, however, corresponds to the headings of the categories, and so the chief Leibnizian doctrines are distributed among them as best they can be. This critique also, in a way, brands as natural errors of reason what were merely false abstractions of *Leibniz*. Instead of learning from his great philosophical contemporaries, Spinoza and Locke, he preferred to serve up his own strange inventions. At the end of the chapter on the amphiboly of reflection we are told that there could possibly be a kind of intuition entirely different from ours, to which our categories would nevertheless be applicable. The objects of that supposed intuition would then be the *noumena*: things that could merely be *thought* by us. But since we lack the intuition that would give that thinking meaning, and since it is indeed wholly problematic, the object of that thinking would also be merely a wholly indeterminate possibility. I have shown above, by citing passages, that Kant, in the greatest contradiction with himself, presents the categories now as the condition of intuitive representation, now as a function of merely abstract thinking. Here they appear exclusively in the latter sense, and it looks altogether as though

he meant to ascribe merely discursive thinking to them. But if this is really his meaning, then at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic, before specifying the various functions of thinking at such length, he absolutely ought to have characterized thinking in general. He ought therefore to have distinguished it from intuiting and shown what knowledge mere intuiting gives and what new knowledge thinking adds. Then we would have known what he is really talking about. Or rather, he would then have spoken quite differently: first about intuiting and then about thinking, instead of always dealing, as he does now, with something halfway between the two, which is an absurdity. Then, too, there would not be that great gap between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic. There, after presenting the mere form of intuition, he dismisses its content, the whole of empirical perception, with nothing more than "it is *given*." He does not ask how it comes about, *whether with or without understanding*. Instead he passes with one leap to abstract thinking—and not even to thinking in general, but straight to certain forms of thought. And he says not a word about what thinking is, what a concept is, what the relation of the abstract and discursive to the concrete and intuitive is, what the difference between human and animal knowledge is, and what reason is.

A.82 Yet it was precisely this distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge, entirely overlooked by Kant, that the ancient philosophers designated by *phainomena* and *nooumena* [things that appear and things that are thought].[23] Its opposition and incommensurability gave them a great deal of trouble: in the doctrines of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarians, and later among the Scholastics, in the dispute between nominalism and realism, whose late-developing seed was already contained in the opposed intellectual

23 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. See Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrh. hypotyp.* [Outlines of Pyrrhonism], Book I, ch. 13: *nooumena phainomenois antetithê Anaxagoras (intelligibilia apparentibus opposuit Anaxagoras)* [Anaxagoras opposed the things that are thought to the things that appear].

tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who irresponsibly neglected altogether the matter that those words *phainomena* and *nooumena* had already been taken to designate, now seizes on the words as though they still had no owner, and uses them to designate his things in themselves and his appearances.

THE FORMS OF THINKING

Schopenhauer suggests the forms of thought appear in grammar and in a reduced table of judgments.

A.83 I have had to reject Kant's doctrine of the categories just as he himself rejected Aristotle's. Still, I will point here, by way of suggestion, to a third way of reaching what was intended. What both of them sought under the name of categories were in any case the most general concepts: those under which all things, however different, would have to be subsumed, and through which, therefore, everything that exists would ultimately be thought. That is precisely why Kant conceived of them as the *forms* of all thinking.

A.84 Grammar is to logic as clothing is to the body. Should not, then, these supreme concepts, this ground bass of reason, lie ultimately in certain particular concepts? For they are the foundation of all more specific thinking, and without their application no thinking whatever can proceed. The concepts I mean are those which, precisely because of their boundless generality (transcendentality), are expressed not in single words but in whole classes of words, since with every word, whatever it may be, one of them is already thought along with it. Their designation would then have to be sought not in the dictionary but in grammar. Should they not, then, ultimately be those differences between concepts by virtue of which the word expressing them is a noun or an adjective, a verb or an adverb, a pronoun, a preposition or some other particle—in short, the *partes orationis* [parts of speech]? For these undoubtedly designate the forms that all thinking first takes on and within which it immediately moves. That is precisely why they are the essential forms

of language, the basic components of every language, so that we cannot conceive of any language that did not consist at least of nouns, adjectives and verbs. Subordinate to these basic forms would then be those forms of thought that are expressed by their inflections, that is, by declension and conjugation. Whether one enlists the article or the pronoun to help designate them is, on the main point, inessential. But let us examine the matter somewhat more closely and raise the question anew: what are the forms of thinking?

A.85 1) Thinking consists throughout of judgments: judgments are the threads of its whole fabric. For without the use of a verb our thinking does not budge, and whenever we use a verb, we judge.

A.86 2) Every judgment consists in cognizing the relation between subject and predicate, which it separates or unites, with various restrictions. It unites them in a range of ways. At one end is the recognition of their actual identity, which can occur only with convertible concepts. Next comes the recognition that the one is always thought along with the other, though not the reverse: this is the universal affirmative proposition. At the other end is the recognition that the one is sometimes thought along with the other: the particular affirmative proposition. Negative propositions take the reverse course. Accordingly, every judgment must contain a subject, a predicate and a copula, the copula being affirmative or negative—even if each of these is not designated by a word of its own, though usually it is. Often *one* word designates predicate and copula, as in "Caius ages"; sometimes *one* word designates all three, as in *concurritur,* that is, "the armies clash." This makes it clear that the forms of thinking are not to be sought so directly and immediately in words, nor even in the parts of speech. For the same judgment can be expressed in different languages, and even in the same language, by different words and even by different parts of speech, while the thought nevertheless remains the same, and consequently so does its form: the thought could not be the same if the form of thinking itself were different. But the

verbal construction may well differ while the thought and its form remain the same. For it is merely the outer garment of the thought, whereas the thought is inseparable from *its* form. Grammar, then, explains only the clothing of the forms of thought. The parts of speech can therefore be derived from the original forms of thought themselves, which are independent of all languages: to express these, with all their modifications, is the purpose of the parts of speech. They are the instrument of these forms, their garment, which must be exactly fitted to their anatomy, so that the anatomy can be recognized in it.

A.87 3) These real, unchangeable, original forms of thinking are indeed those of Kant's *logical table of judgments*—except that this table contains blind windows, put there for the sake of symmetry and of the table of categories, and these must be removed; it also has a false order. So, roughly:

A.88 a) *Quality*: affirmation or negation, that is, combining or separating concepts: two forms. It attaches to the copula.

A.89 b) *Quantity*: the subject concept is taken wholly or in part: totality or plurality. Individual subjects also belong to the former: "Socrates" means "all Socrateses." So there are only two forms. It attaches to the subject.

A.90 c) *Modality*: really does have three forms. It determines the quality as necessary, actual or contingent. Consequently it too attaches to the copula.

A.91 These three forms of thought spring from the laws of thought of contradiction and of identity. But from the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of the excluded middle there arises

A.92 d) *Relation*. It comes in only when we judge about judgments already formed. It can consist only in either stating that one judgment depends on another (also when there are several of each), and so connecting them, in the *hypothetical* proposition; or stating that judgments exclude one another, and so separating them, in the *disjunctive* proposition. It attaches to the copula, which here separates or connects the judgments already formed.

A.93 The *parts of speech* and grammatical forms are ways of expressing the three components of the judgment—subject, predicate and copula—and also the possible relations among these, that is, the forms of thought just listed, together with the closer determinations and modifications of those forms. Noun, adjective and verb are therefore essential basic components of language as such, which is why they must be found in all languages. Yet one could conceive of a language in which adjective and verb were always fused together, as they sometimes are in every language. Provisionally, one might say: for expressing the *subject* there are the noun, the article and the pronoun;—for expressing the *predicate*, the adjective, the adverb and the preposition;—for expressing the *copula*, the verb, which, however, with the exception of *esse* [to be], already contains the predicate as well. It is for philosophical grammar to teach the exact mechanism by which the forms of thought are expressed, as it is for logic to teach the operations with the forms of thought themselves.

A.94 *Note*. As a warning against a wrong path, and to illustrate the above, I mention S. *Stern*'s *Vorläufige Grundlage zur Sprachphilosophie* [Provisional Foundation for the Philosophy of Language], 1835, as an utterly failed attempt to construct the categories from grammatical forms. He has completely confused thinking with intuiting. He therefore tried to deduce from grammatical forms not the categories of thinking but the alleged categories of intuiting, and so put grammatical forms in direct relation to *intuition*.[24] He is caught in the great error of thinking that *language* relates immediately to *intuition*. In fact it relates immediately only to *thinking* as such, that is, to *abstract concepts*, and only through these to intuition. Concepts, however, stand in a relation to intuition that brings about a complete change of form. What is present in intuition, including the relations arising from time and space, does indeed become an object of thinking. So there must also be linguistic forms to express it, but

24 Sigismund Stern (1812–1867), a German educator and writer on the philosophy of language.

always only *in abstracto*, as concepts. The immediate material of thinking is always concepts, and the forms of logic refer only to these, never *directly* to intuition. Intuition only ever determines the material truth of propositions, never their formal truth, which is governed by logical rules alone.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

Kant's principle that the conditioned implies the unconditioned is shown to be a sophism.

A.95 I return to the Kantian philosophy and come to the *Transcendental Dialectic*. Kant opens it with his definition of *reason*, the faculty that is supposed to play the leading role in it, since until now only sensibility and understanding had been on the stage. Among his various definitions of reason, I have already discussed above the one given here, "that it is the faculty of principles." Here we are now taught that all the cognitions *a priori* considered so far, which make pure mathematics and pure natural science possible, yield mere *rules* but no *principles*. The reason given is that they arise from intuitions and forms of cognition, not from mere *concepts*, which is what is required for something to be called a principle. A principle is accordingly supposed to be a cognition *from mere concepts*, and yet synthetic. But this is utterly impossible. From mere concepts nothing but *analytic* propositions can ever arise. If concepts are to be combined synthetically and yet *a priori*, the combination must necessarily be mediated by a third thing: by a pure intuition of the formal possibility of experience, just as synthetic judgments *a posteriori* are mediated by empirical intuition. Consequently, a synthetic proposition *a priori* can never arise from mere concepts. But in general we are conscious *a priori* of nothing more than the principle of sufficient reason in its various forms. Hence no synthetic judgments *a priori* are possible other than those that arise from what gives that principle its content.

A.96 Kant does, however, finally come forward with an alleged principle of reason that meets his requirement, but only with

this *one*, from which other corollaries then flow. It is the proposition that Chr. Wolff sets out and explains in his *Cosmologia*, sect. 1, ch. 2, § 93, and in his *Ontologia*, § 178. Above, under the heading of amphiboly, mere Leibnizian doctrines were taken for natural and necessary errors of reason and criticized as such; exactly the same now happens here with Wolff's doctrines. Kant presents this principle of reason in a twilight produced by indistinctness, vagueness and fragmentation (p. 307; V, 364, and 322; V, 379). Stated distinctly, however, it runs as follows: "If the conditioned is given, then the totality of its conditions must also be given, and hence also the *unconditioned*, through which alone that totality becomes complete." The apparent truth of this proposition is felt most vividly if one pictures the conditions and the conditioned as the links of a hanging chain whose upper end cannot be seen, so that it might go on to infinity. But since the chain does not fall but hangs, *one* link at the top must be the first and must be fastened somehow. Or, more briefly: reason would like to have a point of attachment for the causal chain that points back to infinity; that would be convenient for it. But let us examine the proposition not through images but in itself. It is certainly synthetic: for analytically, nothing more follows from the concept of the conditioned than the concept of the condition. But it has no truth *a priori*, nor *a posteriori* either. Rather, it sneaks its semblance of truth in by a very subtle trick, which I must now expose. Immediately and *a priori* we possess the cognitions that the principle of sufficient reason expresses in its four forms. All abstract expressions of the principle of sufficient reason are already borrowed from these immediate cognitions and are thus mediate—and their corollaries even more so. I have already discussed above how *abstract* knowledge often unites manifold *intuitive* cognitions into *one* form or *one* concept in such a way that they can no longer be told apart. Hence abstract knowledge is related to intuitive knowledge as a shadow is to real objects, whose great variety it renders by *one* outline encompassing them all. This shadow is what the alleged principle of reason now exploits. Its aim is to infer from the prin-

ciple of sufficient reason the unconditioned, which flatly contradicts it. So it shrewdly abandons the immediate, intuitive knowledge of the content of the principle of sufficient reason in its individual forms. Instead it uses only the abstract concepts drawn from that knowledge, which have value and meaning only through it, so as to smuggle its unconditioned somehow into the wide extension of those concepts. Its procedure becomes clearest when dressed up in dialectical form, for example like this: "If the conditioned exists, its condition must also be given, and wholly so, hence completely, hence the totality of its conditions; consequently, if they make up a series, the whole series; consequently also its first beginning, hence the unconditioned."—Here it is already false that the conditions of something conditioned can, as such, make up a series. Rather, for everything conditioned, the totality of its conditions must be contained in its *nearest* ground, from which it immediately arises and which only thereby is a *sufficient* ground. Take, for example, the various determinations of the state that is the cause: all of them must have come together before the effect occurs. The series, however—for example, the chain of causes—arises only because we now regard what was just the condition as something conditioned in turn. At that point the whole operation starts over from the beginning, and the principle of sufficient reason comes forward anew with its demand. But there can never be, for something conditioned, a genuine successive *series* of conditions that would exist merely as such and for the sake of the final conditioned thing. It is always an alternating series of conditioned things and conditions. With each link traversed, however, the chain is broken off and the demand of the principle of sufficient reason is entirely satisfied; it starts up anew as the condition becomes something conditioned. Thus the principle of *sufficient* reason only ever demands the completeness of the *nearest condition,* never the completeness of a *series*. But precisely this concept of the completeness of the condition leaves it undetermined whether this completeness is to be simultaneous or successive. When the latter is chosen, the

demand arises for a complete *series* of successive conditions. Only through an arbitrary abstraction is a series of causes and effects regarded as a series of nothing but causes, which would exist merely for the sake of the final effect and would therefore be demanded as its *sufficient* ground. On closer and more careful consideration, however, descending from the vague generality of abstraction to the individual, determinate reality, one finds that the demand for a *sufficient* ground concerns only the completeness of the determinations of the *nearest* cause, not the completeness of a series. The demand of the principle of sufficient reason is wholly extinguished in every given sufficient ground. It starts up again at once, however, as soon as this ground is regarded in turn as a consequent. But it never directly demands a series of grounds. If, on the other hand, instead of going to the thing itself, one stays within abstract concepts, these differences vanish. A chain of alternating causes and effects, or of alternating logical grounds and consequents, is then passed off as a chain of nothing but causes or grounds of the final effect. And the *completeness of the conditions* through which a ground first becomes *sufficient* appears as the completeness of that assumed *series* of nothing but grounds, which would exist only for the sake of the final consequent. Then the abstract principle of reason steps forward very brazenly with its demand for the unconditioned. But to recognize that this demand is invalid we do not yet need a critique of reason by way of antinomies and their resolution. We need only a critique of reason understood in my sense: an investigation of the relation of abstract knowledge to immediately intuitive knowledge, descending from the vague generality of the former to the firm determinacy of the latter. Such an investigation shows here that the essence of reason by no means consists in demanding an unconditioned. For as soon as reason proceeds with full deliberation, it must itself find that an unconditioned is an outright absurdity. Reason, as a cognitive faculty, can only ever deal with objects. But every object for the subject is necessarily and irrevocably subject to, and at the mercy of, the principle of suffi-

cient reason, both *a parte ante* and *a parte post* [in the direction of what precedes and of what follows]. The validity of the principle of sufficient reason lies so deep in the form of consciousness that we simply cannot represent anything objectively of which no further "why" could be demanded—no absolute Absolute, like a board in front of one's head. That this or that person's convenience bids them stop somewhere and assume such an Absolute at will can do nothing against that irrefutable certainty *a priori*—not even if they put on very lofty airs while doing so.[25] In fact, all the talk of the Absolute, almost the sole theme of the philosophies attempted since Kant, is nothing but the cosmological proof *incognito*. After the lawsuit Kant brought against it, this proof was declared stripped of all its rights and outlawed. It may no longer show itself in its true form, and so it appears in all sorts of disguises. Sometimes these are distinguished ones, cloaked in intellectual intuition or pure thinking. Sometimes, in the more modest philosophies, it comes as a shady vagrant who half begs, half extorts what he wants. If the gentlemen absolutely must have an Absolute, I will put one into their hands that meets all the demands made of such a thing far better than the misty phantoms they have babbled into being: it is matter. Matter has not come into being and is imperishable, hence truly independent and *quod per se est et per se concipitur* [that which is in itself and is conceived through itself]. From its womb everything comes forth, and into it everything returns: what more can one ask of an Absolute?—But to those on whom no critique of reason has had any effect, one ought rather to call out:[26]

> Are you not like women, who forever
> Come back to nothing but their first word,
> When one has talked reason with them for hours?[27]

A.97 That going back to an unconditioned cause, to a first beginning, is by no means grounded in the nature of reason is,

25 German idiom: to have "a board in front of one's head" is to be obtuse, unable to see any further.
26 The Latin echoes Spinoza's definition of substance, *Ethics* I, definition 3.
27 From Schiller's *Wallenstein* trilogy (1799).

incidentally, also proved by the facts. The original religions of our race, which even now have the greatest number of adherents on earth, namely Brahmanism and Buddhism, neither know nor admit such assumptions, but carry the series of mutually conditioning appearances upward to infinity. On this I refer to the note that follows further below, in the critique of the first antinomy; one may also consult Upham's *Doctrine of Buddhaism* (p. 9), and in general any genuine account of the religions of Asia. One should not identify Judaism with reason.—[28]

A.98 Kant, who by no means wishes to assert his alleged principle of reason as objectively valid either, but only as subjectively necessary, deduces it, even as such, only by a shallow sophism, p. 307; V, 364. The argument runs like this: because we try to subsume every truth known to us under a more general one, for as long as this is possible, this is supposed to be nothing other than the very hunt for an unconditioned which we would already be presupposing. In truth, however, in such searching we do nothing but apply reason, and use it purposefully to simplify our knowledge by giving it an overview. Reason is that faculty of abstract, universal knowledge which distinguishes the reflective human being, gifted with language and thought, from the animal, the slave of the present. For the use of reason consists precisely in knowing the particular through the universal, the case through the rule, and the rule through the more general rule; that is, in seeking the most general points of view. Through such an overview our knowledge is so greatly eased and perfected that from it arises the great difference between the course of animal and of human life, and again between the life of the educated and that of the uncultivated person. Now it is true that the series of *grounds of knowledge*, which exists solely in the domain of the abstract, that is, of reason, always comes to an end at something indemonstrable. This is a representation that is not further conditioned according to this form of the principle of sufficient reason: namely the ground, immediately intuitive *a priori* or *a posteriori*, of the highest proposition in the chain of

28 Edward Upham, *The History and Doctrine of Budhism* (London, 1829).

inferences. I have already shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 50, that here the series of grounds of knowledge actually passes over into that of the grounds of becoming or of being. But to exploit this circumstance in order to establish something unconditioned according to the law of causality, even if only as a demand, is possible only for someone who has not yet distinguished the forms of the principle of sufficient reason at all, but holds on to the abstract formula and confounds them all. Kant, however, even tries to justify this confusion by a mere play on the words *Universalitas* [universality] and *Universitas* [totality], p. 322; V, 379. —It is therefore utterly false that our search for higher grounds of knowledge, for general truths, springs from the presupposition of an object unconditioned in its existence, or has anything whatever in common with it. How, indeed, could it be essential to reason to presuppose something that it must recognize as an absurdity as soon as it reflects? Rather, the origin of that concept of the unconditioned can never be traced to anything but the indolence of the individual, who wants to use it to rid himself of all further questions, his own and those of others, though without any justification whatsoever.

SOUL, WORLD AND GOD

The three Ideas repeat Christian scholastic philosophy, and Kant misuses Plato's word Idea.

A.99 Now Kant himself, it is true, denies objective validity to this alleged principle of reason. Yet he presents it as a necessary subjective presupposition, and so introduces into our knowledge an insoluble conflict, which he soon brings out more clearly. To this end he unfolds that principle of reason further, p. 322; V, 379, following his favorite architectonic-symmetrical method. From the three categories of relation spring three kinds of syllogism, each of which provides the guiding thread for seeking a particular unconditioned. There are therefore again three of these: the soul, the world (as object in itself and closed totality),

and God. Here a great contradiction must be noted at once, of which Kant, however, takes no notice, because it would be very dangerous to the symmetry: two of these unconditioneds are themselves conditioned in turn by the third, namely soul and world by God, who is their producing cause. The first two therefore do not share with the third the predicate of unconditionedness, which is what matters here. They share only that of being inferred according to principles of experience, beyond the domain of its possibility.

A.100 Setting this aside, in the three unconditioneds on which, according to Kant, all reason must light when it follows its essential laws, we find once again the three main subjects around which the whole of philosophy under the influence of Christianity has revolved, from the Scholastics down to Christian Wolff. However accessible and familiar all those philosophers may by now have made these concepts to mere reason, this by no means settles that they must emerge, even without revelation, from the development of any reason whatever, as a product peculiar to its very nature. To settle this, one would have to call on historical inquiry. One would have to investigate whether the ancient and the non-European peoples, especially those of Hindustan, and many of the oldest Greek philosophers really did arrive at these concepts; or whether it is only we who, too good-naturedly, ascribe them to them, just as the Greeks found their own gods everywhere, when we quite wrongly translate the Brahm of the Hindus and the Tien of the Chinese as "God." One would have to ask whether theism proper is not rather to be found solely in the Jewish religion and the two religions that arose from it. Precisely for this reason their adherents lump together the followers of all other religions on earth under the name of heathens—an expression, incidentally, that is extremely simple-minded and crude and ought at least to be banished from the writings of scholars, because it identifies Brahmanists, Buddhists, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Germanic peoples, Gauls, Iroquois, Patagonians, Caribs, Tahitians, Australians, and

many more,[29] and throws them all into one sack. For priests such an expression is fitting; but in the learned world it must be shown the door at once—it can travel to England and settle in Oxford.—That Buddhism in particular, the religion with the most adherents on earth, contains no theism whatever, indeed abhors it, is a thoroughly established fact. As for Plato, I am of the opinion that he owes the theism that comes over him from time to time to the Jews. For this reason *Numenius* (according to Clem. Alex. Strom., I, c. 22, Euseb. praep.[30] evang., XIII, 12, *and the Suda, under Numenius) called him the* Moses graecisans *[Moses speaking Greek]:* Ti gar esti Platôn, ê Môsês attikizôn *[For what is Plato but Moses speaking Attic?]; and he reproaches him with having stolen (*aposylêsas*, 'plundered') his doctrines of God and creation from the writings of Moses.* Clement *often returns to the claim that Plato knew and made use of Moses, for example,* Strom., *I, 25.–V, c. 14, § 90 etc.* – Paedagog., II 10, *and* III, 11*; also in the* Cohortatio ad gentes, c.[31] 6. *There, having scolded and ridiculed all the Greek philosophers in the preceding chapter, like a Capuchin preacher, for not having been Jews, he praises Plato alone. He breaks out into loud rejoicing that Plato, just as he learned his geometry from the Egyptians, his astronomy from the Babylonians, magic from the Thracians, and much from the Assyrians as well, so learned his theism from the Jews:* Oida sou tous didaskalous, kan apokryptein ethelês, ... doxan tên tou theou par' autôn ôphelêsai tôn Ebraiôn (tuos magistros novi, licet eos celare velis, ... illa de Deo sententia suppeditata tibi est ab Hebraeis). [I know your teachers, even if you would like to hide them ... that doctrine of God was supplied to you by the Hebrews.] A touching recognition scene.—But I discover a curious confirmation of the matter in the following. According to Plutarch (*in Mario* [in the Life of Marius]), and better according to Lactantius (*I, 3, 19*), Plato thanked nature that he had been born a human being and not an animal, a man

29 Tien (Tian): "Heaven," the supreme principle in classical Chinese thought.
30 Numenius of Apamea, a Platonist and Neopythagorean philosopher of the 2nd century AD.
31 The works of Clement cited are the *Stromata*, the *Paedagogus* and the *Exhortation to the Greeks*.

and not a woman, a Greek and not a barbarian. Now in Isaac Euchel's *Prayers of the Jews, from the Hebrew*, second edition, 1799, p. 7, there is a morning prayer in which they thank and praise God that the one giving thanks has been born a Jew and not a heathen, a free man and not a slave, a man and not a woman.[32] —Such a historical inquiry would have spared Kant an unfortunate necessity into which he now falls. He has these three concepts spring necessarily from the nature of reason, and yet shows that they are untenable and cannot be grounded by reason. He therefore makes reason itself into a sophist, when he says, p. 339; V, 397: "These are sophistications not of human beings but of pure reason itself, from which even the wisest cannot free himself. Perhaps after much effort he may guard against error, but he can never be rid of the illusion that ceaselessly teases and mocks him." On this view, these Kantian "Ideas of reason" would be comparable to the focus in which the rays reflected convergently by a concave mirror meet, a few inches in front of its surface. As a result, through an unavoidable process of the understanding, an object presents itself to us at that spot which is a thing without reality.

A.101 But the name *Ideas* was very unhappily chosen for those three allegedly necessary products of pure theoretical reason, and snatched away from Plato. He used it to designate the imperishable forms which, multiplied by time and space, become imperfectly visible in the countless, individual, perishable things. Plato's Ideas are accordingly thoroughly intuitive, as the word he chose so definitely indicates—a word that could be adequately translated only as 'intuitables' or 'visibles.' And Kant appropriated it to designate what lies so far from all possibility of intuition that even abstract thought can reach it only halfway.[33] The word *Idea*, which Plato first introduced, has moreover kept, through the twenty-two centuries since, the meaning in which Plato used it. Not only all the philosophers of

32 Isaac Euchel (1756–1804), writer of the Jewish Enlightenment, who translated the Jewish prayer book into German.

33 Greek *idea*, from *idein*, "to see."

antiquity, but also all the Scholastics and even the Church Fathers and the theologians of the Middle Ages used it solely in that Platonic sense, namely in the sense of the Latin word *exemplar* [model, pattern], as *Suárez* expressly states in his twenty-fifth Disputation, Sect. 1.—That the poverty of their languages later led the English and the French to misuse that word is bad enough, but of no weight. Kant's misuse of the word *Idea*, then, is wholly unjustifiable. He slips in a new meaning, dragged in on the thin thread of not-being-an-object-of-experience, a trait it shares with Plato's Ideas but also with every possible chimera. And since the misuse of a few years counts for nothing against the authority of many centuries, I have always used the word in its old, original, Platonic sense.

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

The concept of substance was formed only to slip in the idea of an immaterial soul.

A.102 The refutation of *rational psychology* is much more detailed and thorough in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* than in the second and subsequent ones, so here one absolutely must use the first. On the whole this refutation has very great merit and contains much truth. Yet I am firmly of the opinion that it is merely for love of his symmetry that Kant derives the concept of the soul as necessary from that paralogism, by applying the demand for the unconditioned to the concept of *substance*, which is the first category of relation. Accordingly he asserts that the concept of a soul arises in this way in every speculating reason. If this concept really had its origin in the presupposition of an ultimate subject of all the predicates of a thing, then a soul would have been assumed just as necessarily not only in human beings but in every lifeless thing as well, since such a thing too requires an ultimate subject of all its predicates. In general, though, Kant uses a quite inadmissible expression when he speaks of a something that can exist only as subject and not as predicate (for example, *Critique of Pure*

Reason, p. 323; V, 412; *Prolegomena*, §§ 4 and 47), although a precedent for this is already to be found in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, IV, ch. 8. Nothing at all exists as subject and predicate: for these expressions belong exclusively to logic and designate the relation of abstract concepts to one another. In the intuitive world their correlate or representative is supposed to be substance and accident. But then we need not look any further for what always exists only as substance and never as accident: we have it immediately in matter. Matter is the substance of all the properties of things, which are its accidents. It really is—if one wants to keep Kant's expression just censured—the ultimate subject of all predicates of every empirically given thing, namely what remains after all its properties of every kind have been subtracted. This holds of a human being as of an animal, plant or stone, and it is so evident that a determined refusal to see is needed for it not to be. That matter really is the prototype of the concept of substance I shall show shortly. —Subject and predicate, rather, stand to substance and accident as the principle of sufficient reason in logic stands to the law of causality in nature; and just as the confusion or identification of the latter two is inadmissible, so is that of the former two. Kant, however, carries this confusion and identification to the highest degree in the *Prolegomena*, § 46, in order to have the concept of the soul arise from that of the ultimate subject of all predicates and from the form of the categorical syllogism. To uncover the sophistry of this paragraph one need only reflect that subject and predicate are purely logical determinations, which concern abstract concepts alone, and indeed only as regards their relation in the judgment. Substance and accident, on the other hand, belong to the intuitive world and its apprehension in the understanding, but are found there only as identical with matter and with form or quality. More on this shortly.

A.103 The opposition that has occasioned the assumption of two fundamentally different substances, body and soul, is in truth that of the objective and the subjective. If a human being apprehends himself objectively in outer intuition, he finds a being

extended in space and altogether corporeal. If, on the other hand, he apprehends himself in mere self-consciousness, that is, purely subjectively, he finds something that merely wills and represents, free of all forms of intuition, and so also without any of the properties that belong to bodies. He now forms the concept of the soul, like all the transcendent concepts that Kant calls Ideas, by applying the principle of sufficient reason, the form of every object, to what is not object—here, namely, to the subject of knowing and willing. That is, he regards knowing, thinking and willing as effects whose cause he seeks; and since he cannot take the body to be that cause, he posits a cause of them wholly different from the body. This is how the first and the last of the dogmatists prove the existence of the soul—Plato already in the *Phaedrus*, and Wolff still: namely from thinking and willing as the effects that lead to that cause. Only after the concept of an immaterial, simple, indestructible being had arisen in this way, by hypostatizing a cause corresponding to the effect, did the Schools develop and demonstrate it from the concept of *substance*. But they had previously formed this concept itself expressly for this purpose, by the following remarkable trick.

A.104 With the first class of representations, that is, the intuitive, real world, the representation of matter is also given. For the law of causality that governs that world determines the change of states, and these presuppose something persistent of which they are the changes. Above, in discussing the principle of the persistence of substance, I showed, with reference to earlier passages, how this representation of matter arises. In the understanding, for which alone it exists, time and space are intimately united through the law of causality (the understanding's only form of knowledge); and the share of space in this product presents itself as the persistence of *matter*, while the share of time presents itself as the change of its *states*. Matter purely by itself can moreover only be thought *in abstracto*, not intuited, since to intuition it always already appears in form and quality. Of this concept of *matter*, *substance* is in turn an abstrac-

tion, and hence a higher *genus*. It arose by leaving standing, of the concept of matter, only the predicate of persistence, while thinking away all its other essential properties—extension, impenetrability, divisibility, and so on. Like every higher *genus*, then, the concept *substance* contains *less within itself* than the concept *matter*. But it does not in return, as the higher *genus* otherwise always does, contain *more under itself*, since it does not comprise several lower *genera* besides matter. Matter remains the only true subspecies of the concept of substance, the only thing that can be pointed to, through which its content is realized and confirmed. The purpose for which reason otherwise produces a higher concept by abstraction—namely, to think in it at once several subspecies differing by secondary determinations—has no place here at all. Consequently that abstraction has either been undertaken quite pointlessly and idly, or it has a secret ulterior motive. This motive comes to light when, under the concept of substance, a second subspecies is coordinated with its genuine subspecies, matter: namely immaterial, simple, indestructible substance, the soul. But this concept was smuggled in by proceeding unlawfully and illogically already in forming the higher concept *substance*. In its lawful course, reason always forms a higher generic concept only by placing several specific concepts side by side and then proceeding comparatively, discursively: by leaving out their differences and retaining their agreements, it obtains the generic concept that comprises them all but contains less. From this it follows that the specific concepts must always precede the generic concept. In the present case, however, it is the other way round. Only the concept of matter existed before the generic concept *substance*, which was formed from it idly, without occasion and hence without warrant, by arbitrarily leaving out all its determinations but one. Only afterwards was the second, spurious subspecies placed beside the concept of matter and so slipped in. To form it, however, nothing more was needed than an explicit negation of what had previously been tacitly left out in the higher generic concept, namely extension, impenetrability, divisibility.

Thus the concept *substance* was formed merely to serve as the vehicle for smuggling in the concept of immaterial substance. Consequently it is very far from being able to count as a category or necessary function of the understanding. It is, rather, a thoroughly dispensable concept, since its only true content already lies in the concept of matter; beyond that it contains only a great void, which can be filled by nothing except the smuggled-in secondary species *immaterial substance*, and it was formed solely to receive this. For this reason, strictly speaking, it is to be rejected altogether, and the concept of matter put in its place everywhere.

THE ANTINOMIES

The cosmological Ideas are forced into the categories; only the antitheses are soundly proved.

A.105 The categories were a Procrustean bed for every possible thing, but the three kinds of syllogism are one only for the three so-called Ideas. The Idea of the soul had been forced to find its origin in the categorical form of syllogism. Now it is the turn of the dogmatic representations about the world as a whole, insofar as it is thought, as an object in itself, between two limits: that of the smallest (the atom) and that of the largest (the limits of the world in time and space). These must now emerge from the form of the hypothetical syllogism. No particular forcing is needed for this in itself. For the hypothetical judgment has its form from the principle of sufficient reason. And all those so-called Ideas, not the cosmological ones alone, in fact arise from the thoughtless, unconditional application of this principle, followed by setting it aside at will. That is, in accordance with that principle one keeps seeking only the dependence of one object on another, until finally the fatigue of the imagination sets a goal to the journey. What is lost sight of here is that every object, indeed the whole series of objects and the principle of sufficient reason itself, stands in a much closer and greater dependence: namely on the knowing subject, for whose objects, that is, rep-

resentations, alone that principle is valid, since it determines merely their place in space and time. Since, then, the form of knowledge from which only the cosmological Ideas are derived here—namely the principle of sufficient reason—is the origin of all the hypostases of specious reasoning, no sophisms are needed for this purpose this time; but all the more are needed to classify those Ideas under the four headings of the categories.

A.106 1) The cosmological Ideas with regard to time and space, that is, those of the limits of the world in both, are boldly regarded as determined by the category of *quantity*. They obviously have nothing in common with it except that in logic the extent of the subject-concept in a judgment happens to be designated by the word *quantity*, a figurative expression for which another could just as well have been chosen. But for Kant's love of symmetry this is enough to exploit the happy accident of this naming and attach to it the transcendent dogmas about the extent of the world.

A.107 2) Still more boldly Kant attaches to *quality*, that is, to affirmation or negation in a judgment, the transcendent Ideas about matter, and here there is not even an accidental similarity of words to go on: for it is precisely to the quantity and not to the *quality* of matter that its mechanical (not chemical) divisibility relates. But what is more, this whole Idea of divisibility does not belong at all among the inferences according to the principle of sufficient reason, from which, as the content of the hypothetical form, all cosmological Ideas are nonetheless supposed to flow. For the assertion on which Kant relies here—that the relation of the parts to the whole is that of condition to conditioned, and so a relation according to the principle of sufficient reason—is a subtle but nonetheless groundless sophism. That relation rests rather on the principle of contradiction. For the whole does not exist through the parts, nor the parts through the whole; rather, both are necessarily together, because they are one and their separation is only an arbitrary act. This is why, according to the principle of contradiction, if the parts are thought away the whole is thought away too, and vice versa. It is by no means

because the parts, as *ground*, condition the whole as *consequent*, so that we would be necessarily driven, according to the principle of sufficient reason, to seek the ultimate parts in order to understand the whole from them as its ground.—Such great difficulties does the love of symmetry overcome here.

A.108 3) Under the heading of *relation* the Idea of the first cause of the world would now quite properly belong. But Kant must save this for the fourth heading, that of modality, for which nothing else would remain. He then forces that Idea under it on the ground that the contingent (that is, according to his explanation, which is diametrically opposed to the truth, every consequent of its ground) becomes the necessary through the first cause.—As the third Idea, therefore, the concept of *freedom* appears here, for the sake of symmetry; but what is really meant by it is only the Idea of the cause of the world, which after all is the only one that fits here, as the remark on the thesis of the third conflict clearly states. The third and fourth conflicts are therefore at bottom tautological.

A.109 Over and above all this, however, I find and maintain that the whole antinomy is mere shadow-boxing, a sham fight. Only the assertions of the *antitheses* really rest on the forms of our faculty of knowledge, that is, expressed objectively, on the necessary, most universal laws of nature, certain *a priori*. Their proofs alone are therefore conducted from objective grounds. The assertions and proofs of the *theses*, on the other hand, have no ground but a subjective one. They rest solely on the weakness of the reasoning individual, whose imagination tires in an infinite regress and therefore puts an end to it by arbitrary presuppositions, which it tries to gloss over as best it can; and whose power of judgment is, moreover, paralyzed at this point by prejudices impressed on it early and firmly. For this reason the proof of the thesis in all four conflicts is everywhere only a sophism, whereas that of the antithesis is an unavoidable inference of reason from the laws of the world as representation, of which we are conscious *a priori*. Kant, too, was able to keep the thesis standing only with much effort and art, and to have it make

apparent attacks on an opponent endowed with original strength. Here his first and constant trick is this. He does not do what one does when conscious of the truth of one's proposition—bring out the *nervus argumentationis* [the sinew of the argument] and set it before the reader's eyes as isolated, bare and clear as possible. Instead, on both sides he introduces it concealed under, and mixed into, a torrent of superfluous and long-winded propositions.

A.110 The theses and antitheses that thus come forward here in conflict recall the *dikaios* and *adikos logos* [the just and the unjust argument], which Socrates, in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, brings on stage to argue against each other. But this resemblance extends only to the form, not to the content, as would no doubt gladly be maintained by those who ascribe to these most speculative of all questions of theoretical philosophy an influence on morality, and who therefore seriously take the thesis for the *dikaios* and the antithesis for the *adikos logos*.[34] I shall not, however, stoop here to taking such narrow and perverse little minds into account. Giving the honor not to them but to the truth, I shall expose the proofs Kant gives for the individual theses as sophisms, whereas those of the antitheses are conducted quite honestly, correctly and from objective grounds.—I assume that in this examination the reader always has Kant's antinomy itself in front of him.

A.111 If one were to accept the proof of the thesis in the first conflict, it would prove too much, since it would apply just as well to time itself as to change in time, and would therefore prove that time itself must have had a beginning, which is absurd. Moreover, the sophism consists in this: in place of the beginninglessness of the series of states, which was the topic at first, its endlessness (infinity) is suddenly substituted. Then something is proved that nobody doubts—that being completed logically contradicts this endlessness, and yet every present is the end of the past. But the end of a beginningless series can

34 In Aristophanes' comedy *The Clouds* (423 BC), the Just and the Unjust Argument appear on stage as personified debaters.

always be thought without detracting from its beginninglessness, just as, conversely, the beginning of an endless series can be thought. Against the really correct argument of the antithesis, however—that the changes of the world, *going backward*, absolutely necessarily presuppose an infinite series of changes—nothing at all is brought forward. We can think the possibility that the causal series will one day end in an absolute standstill; but by no means the possibility of an absolute beginning.[35]

A.112 With regard to the spatial limits of the world, it is proved that if the world is to be called a *given whole*, it must necessarily have limits. The inference is correct; only its antecedent was precisely what was to be proved, and it remains unproved. Totality presupposes limits, and limits presuppose totality; but here both together are arbitrarily presupposed. —For this second point, however, the antithesis does not provide as satisfying a proof as for the first, because the law of causality furnishes necessary determinations only with regard to time, not to space. It gives us certainty *a priori* that no filled time could ever border on an empty time preceding it, and that no change could be the first; but not that a filled space cannot have an empty space beside it. To that extent no decision *a priori* on the latter would be possible. Yet the difficulty of thinking the world as limited in space lies in the fact that space itself is necessarily

35 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. That the assumption of a limit of the world in time is by no means a necessary thought of reason can even be shown historically. The Hindus teach no such thing, not even in their popular religion, let alone in the Vedas. Instead they try to express mythologically, through a monstrous chronology, the infinity of this world of appearance, this insubstantial and essenceless web of Maya, while at the same time bringing out very ingeniously the relativity of all lengths of time in the following myth (*Polier, Mythologie des Indous* [Mythology of the Hindus], *Vol. 2, p. 585*). The four ages, in the last of which we live, together comprise 4,320,000 years. Each day of the creating Brahma contains 1,000 such periods of four ages, and his night another 1,000. His year has 365 days and as many nights. He lives, always creating, for 100 of his years; and when he dies, a new Brahma is at once born, and so on from eternity to eternity. The same relativity of time is expressed in the particular myth retold from the Puranas in Polier's work, vol. 2, p. 594. There a raja, after a visit of a few moments with Vishnu in his heaven, returns to earth to find that several million years have passed and a new age has begun, because each day of Vishnu equals 100 recurrences of the four ages.

infinite. A limited, finite world in it, however large, therefore becomes an infinitely small magnitude. The imagination finds this disproportion an insurmountable stumbling block, since it is then left only with the choice of thinking the world either as infinitely large or as infinitely small. The ancient philosophers already saw this: *Mêtrodôros, ho kathêgêtês Epikourou, phêsin atopon einai en megalô pediô hena stachyn gennêthênai, kai hena kosmon en tô apeirô (Metrodorus, caput scholae Epicuri, absurdum ait, in magno campo spicam unam produci, et unum in infinito mundum).* [Metrodorus, the head of Epicurus' school, says it is absurd that a single ear of grain should grow in a great field, and a single world in the infinite.] Stob. Ecl., I, c. 23.—*Hence many of them taught (as follows immediately afterwards)* apeirous kosmous en tô apeirô (infinitos mundos in infinito) [infinitely many worlds in the infinite]. This is also the sense of Kant's argument for the antithesis; only he has disfigured it by a scholastic, stilted exposition. The same argument could also be used against limits of the world in time, if one did not already have a much better one along the guiding thread of causality. Further, if a world limited in space is assumed, the unanswerable question arises what privilege the filled part of space could have had over the infinite part that remained empty. A detailed and very readable exposition of the arguments for and against the finitude of the world is given by Giordano Bruno in the fifth dialogue of his book *Del infinito, universo e mondi* [On the Infinite, the Universe and Worlds]. Kant himself, moreover, seriously and on objective grounds asserts the infinity of the world in space in his *Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, Part II, ch. 7. Aristotle too professes it, *Physics*, III, ch. 4, a chapter which, together with those following, is well worth reading in connection with this antinomy.

A.113 In the second conflict the thesis at once commits a far from subtle *petitio principii* by beginning: "*Every composite* substance consists of simple parts." From the compositeness arbitrarily assumed here it then, of course, proves the simple parts very easily. But the very proposition that matters, "all matter is

composite," remains unproved, precisely because it is a groundless assumption. For the opposite of the simple is not the composite but the extended, what has parts, the divisible. What is really being tacitly assumed here, though, is that the parts existed before the whole and were brought together, and that the whole thereby came into being: for this is what the word "composite" says. But this can no more be asserted than its opposite. Divisibility means merely the possibility of breaking the whole down into parts, and by no means that it is composed of parts and came into being through them. Divisibility asserts the parts only *a parte post*; compositeness asserts them *a parte ante*. For between the parts and the whole there is essentially no temporal relation; rather, they condition each other reciprocally and are to that extent always simultaneous: for only insofar as both exist does the spatially extended exist. What Kant says in the remark on the thesis—"Space should properly be called not *compositum* [a composite] but *totum* [a whole], and so on"—therefore holds entirely of matter as well, since matter is merely space become perceptible. —The infinite divisibility of matter asserted by the antithesis, on the other hand, follows *a priori* and irrefutably from that of the space it fills. This proposition has nothing whatever against it. That is why Kant too, p. 513; V, 541, where he speaks seriously and in his own person, no longer as spokesman of the *adikos logos*, presents it as objective truth. Likewise, in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (p. 108, first edition), the proposition "matter is divisible to infinity" stands as an established truth at the head of the proof of the first proposition of mechanics, after it had appeared and been proved as the fourth proposition in the dynamics. Here, however, Kant spoils the proof of the antithesis through the greatest confusion of exposition and a useless torrent of words, with the cunning intention that the evidentness of the antithesis should not throw the sophisms of the thesis too far into the shade.—Atoms are not a necessary thought of reason but merely a hypothesis to explain the differences in the specific gravity of bodies. That we can explain this too in another way, and indeed better

and more simply than by atomism, Kant himself showed in the dynamics of his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*; before him, however, Priestley had done so, *On Matter and Spirit*, sect. I. Indeed, the basic idea of it is already to be found in Aristotle, *Physics*, IV, 9.[36]

A.114 The argument for the third thesis is a very subtle sophism, and is really Kant's pretended principle of pure reason itself, quite unmixed and unaltered. It aims to prove the finitude of the series of causes from the fact that a cause, in order to be *sufficient*, must contain the complete sum of the conditions from which the following state, the effect, arises. For this completeness of the determinations present *simultaneously* in the state that is the cause, the argument now substitutes the completeness of the *series* of causes through which that state itself first came to be actual. And because completeness presupposes closure, and closure finitude, the argument infers from this a first cause that closes the series and is therefore unconditioned. But the sleight of hand is obvious. In order to conceive state *A* as the sufficient cause of state *B*, I assume that it contains the completeness of the determinations required for this, through whose coexistence state *B* inevitably follows. My demand on it as a *sufficient* cause is thereby wholly satisfied, and this has no immediate connection with the question of how state *A* itself came to be actual. That question belongs rather to an entirely different consideration, in which I no longer regard this same state *A* as cause but as itself an effect in turn; and here another state must stand to it just as it stood to *B*. Nowhere in this, however, does the presupposition of the finitude of the series of causes and effects, and hence of a first beginning, appear necessary—any more than the presence of the present moment presupposes a beginning of time itself. That presupposition is only added by the indolence of the speculating individual. The claim that it lies in the assumption of a cause as a *sufficient reason* is therefore surreptitious and false, as I showed in detail above when considering Kant's principle of reason, which coincides

36 Priestley's *Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit* (1777).

with this thesis. To illustrate the assertion of this false thesis, Kant is not ashamed, in the remark on it, to offer his getting up from his chair as an example of an unconditioned beginning—as if it were not as impossible for him to get up without a motive as for a ball to roll without a cause. That his appeal to the philosophers of antiquity, prompted by a feeling of weakness, is groundless, I hardly need to demonstrate from Ocellus Lucanus, the Eleatics, and so on, not to mention the Hindus. Against the demonstration of the antithesis, as with the previous ones, there is nothing to object.[37]

A.115 The fourth conflict, as I have already remarked, is really tautological with the third. The proof of the thesis, too, is essentially the same again as that of the previous one. Its assertion that every conditioned thing presupposes a complete *series* of conditions, and hence one ending with the unconditioned, is a *petitio principii* that must be flatly denied. Every conditioned thing presupposes nothing but its condition: that this condition is conditioned in turn opens a new consideration, which is not immediately contained in the first.

A.116 A certain plausibility cannot be denied to the antinomy. Yet it is remarkable that no part of the Kantian philosophy has met with so little contradiction, indeed has found so much acknowledgment, as this highly paradoxical doctrine. Almost all philosophical parties and textbooks have accepted and repeated it, and even reworked it, while nearly all of Kant's other doctrines have been contested. Indeed, there has never been any lack of individual wrong-headed minds who rejected even the Transcendental Aesthetic. The undivided approval that the antinomy has found, by contrast, may in the end come from this: certain people contemplate with inward satisfaction the point where the understanding is really and truly supposed to come to a standstill, having hit upon something that at once is and is not;

37 Ocellus Lucanus: a Pythagorean to whom a treatise arguing that the universe has neither beginning nor end was ascribed.

and so here they would actually have before them the sixth trick of Philadelphia on Lichtenberg's playbill.[38]

KANT'S RESOLUTION OF THE ANTINOMIES

Kant's critical decision is really a verdict in favor of the antitheses.

A.117 Kant's *Critical Decision* of the cosmological conflict, which now follows, is, if one investigates its real meaning, not what he presents it as. He presents it as the resolution of the conflict through the disclosure that both sides, starting from false presuppositions, are both wrong in the first and second conflicts but both right in the third and fourth. In fact, however, it is the confirmation of the antitheses through the elucidation of what they state.

A.118 First, in this resolution Kant claims, quite plainly wrongly, that both sides start from the presupposition, as their major premise, that with the conditioned the completed (and hence closed) *series* of its conditions is also given. Only the *thesis* based its assertions on this proposition, Kant's pure principle of reason. The antithesis, by contrast, expressly denied it at every point and asserted the opposite. Kant further charges both sides with the presupposition that the world exists in itself, that is, independently of its being known and of the forms of that knowing. But this presupposition, too, is made only by the thesis. It underlies the assertions of the antithesis so little that it is in fact wholly incompatible with them. For it flatly contradicts the concept of an infinite series that it should be given as a whole. It is therefore essential to such a series that it exists only ever in relation to our running through it, not independently of that. The presupposition of definite limits, by contrast, includes that of a whole which stands on its own and exists independently of our carrying out its measurement. So only the thesis makes the false presupposition of a world-whole existing in itself, that is, given prior to all knowledge, with knowledge merely added to it.

38 In 1777 Georg Christoph Lichtenberg published a satirical playbill for the conjurer Jacob Philadelphia, announcing a series of absurd, impossible feats.

The antithesis is at odds with this presupposition from the very start. For the infinity of the series, which it asserted solely under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, can exist only insofar as the regress is carried out, not independently of it. For just as the object in general presupposes the subject, so the object determined as an *endless* chain of conditions necessarily presupposes in the subject the corresponding mode of knowledge, namely the *constant pursuit* of the links of that chain. But this is precisely what Kant offers as the resolution of the conflict and repeats so often: "The infinity of the world's magnitude exists only through the regress, not *before* it." This resolution of the conflict is therefore really just a decision in favor of the antithesis. Its assertion already contains that truth, just as that truth is wholly incompatible with the assertions of the thesis. Had the antithesis asserted that the world consists of infinite series of grounds and consequents and yet exists independently of representation and its regressive series, that is, exists in itself and therefore constitutes a given whole, then it would have contradicted not only the thesis but itself as well. For an infinite can never be given *as a whole*; nor can an *endless* series exist except insofar as it is endlessly run through; nor can something boundless make up a whole. So that presupposition which, Kant claims, led both sides astray belongs to the thesis alone.

A.119 It is already Aristotle's teaching that an infinite can never be *actu*, that is, actual and given, but only *potentiâ* [potentially]: *Ouk estin energeia einai to apeiron; … all' adynaton to entelecheia on apeiron (infinitum non potest esse actu: … sed impossibile, actu esse infinitum). Metaph. K, 10.* – [The infinite cannot exist in actuality … but it is impossible for the infinite to be actual.] Further: *kat' energeian men gar ouden estin apeiron, dynamei de epi tên diairesin (nihil enim actu infinitum est, sed potentia tantum, nempe divisione ipsa). De generat. et corrupt., 1, 3.* – [For nothing is infinite in actuality, but only potentially, namely in division itself.] He sets this out at length in *Phys. III, 5* and *6*, where in a certain sense he gives the entirely correct resolution of all the antinomial opposi-

tions. In his concise way he presents the antinomies and then says: "An arbiter (*diaitêtou*) is needed." He then gives the resolution: the infinite, whether of the world in space, in time or in division, is never *before* the regress or progress, but *in* it.—So this truth already lies in the correctly grasped concept of the infinite. Anyone who imagines he can think the infinite, of whatever kind, as something objectively present and finished, independent of the regress, therefore misunderstands himself.

A.120 Indeed, if we proceed the other way round and take as our starting point what Kant offers as the resolution of the conflict, the assertion of the antithesis follows directly from it. That is: if the world is not an unconditioned whole and does not exist in itself but only in representation, and if its series of grounds and consequents are there not *before* the regress of our representations of them but only *through* this regress, then the world cannot contain determinate and finite series. For their determination and limitation would have to be independent of the representation, which would then merely be added to them. Rather, all its series must be endless, that is, such that no representation can exhaust them.

A.121 On p. 506 (V, p. 534), Kant tries to prove the transcendental ideality of appearance from the fact that both sides are in the wrong, and he begins: "If the world is a whole existing in itself, it is either finite or infinite."—But this is false: a whole existing in itself cannot possibly be infinite.—Rather, that ideality could be inferred from the infinity of the series in the world, as follows. If the series of grounds and consequents in the world are altogether without end, then the world cannot be a whole given independently of representation. For such a whole always presupposes definite limits, just as infinite series, by contrast, presuppose an infinite regress. Hence the presupposed infinity of the series must be determined by the form of ground and consequent, and this form by the subject's mode of knowing; so the world as it is known must exist only in the representation of the subject.

A.122 Whether Kant himself knew or not that his critical decision of the dispute is really a verdict in favor of the antithesis, I cannot decide. For it depends on whether what Schelling somewhere very aptly called Kant's system of accommodation extends that far, or whether Kant's mind is here already caught up in an unconscious accommodation to the influence of his time and surroundings.

FREEDOM AND THE THING IN ITSELF

In the third antinomy Kant comes closest to recognizing the thing in itself as will.

A.123 The resolution of the third antinomy, whose subject was the idea of freedom, deserves special consideration. For it is very remarkable, from our point of view, that precisely here, in connection with the idea of *freedom*, Kant is compelled to speak at greater length of the *thing in itself*, which until now had been glimpsed only in the background. This is quite understandable to us, now that we have recognized the thing in itself as the *will*. In general, this is the point where Kant's philosophy leads on to mine, or where mine grows out of his as out of its trunk. Anyone will be convinced of this who reads attentively the *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 356 and 537 (V, pp. 564 and 565). With this passage compare also the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, pp. XVIII and XIX of the third edition, or p. 13 of Rosenkranz's edition, where it even says: "The concept of freedom can represent a thing in itself in its object (and that, surely, is the will), but not in intuition; the concept of nature, on the other hand, can represent its object in intuition, but not as a thing in itself." Above all, though, read § 53 *of the Prolegomena* on the resolution of the antinomies, and then answer honestly whether everything said there does not sound like a riddle to which my doctrine is the answer. Kant did not carry his thinking through to the end: I have merely seen his cause through. Accordingly, what Kant says of the human appearance alone I have extended to all appearance whatever, since it differs from the human

appearance only in degree: namely, that its inner nature in itself is something absolutely free, that is, a will. How fruitful this insight is when combined with Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space, time and causality is shown by my work.

A.124 Kant nowhere made the thing in itself the subject of a separate discussion or a clear derivation. Instead, whenever he needs it, he brings it in at once by the inference that the appearance, that is, the visible world, must after all have a ground, an intelligible cause, which would not be appearance and would therefore belong to no possible experience. He does this after tirelessly insisting that the categories, and so also the category of causality, have a use restricted solely to possible experience; that they are mere forms of the understanding, serving to spell out the appearances of the world of sense, beyond which they have no meaning at all; and so on. For this reason he most strictly forbids applying them to things beyond experience, and from the violation of this law he rightly explains all earlier dogmatism and at the same time overthrows it. The incredible inconsistency Kant committed here was soon noticed by his first opponents and used for attacks against which his philosophy could put up no resistance. For it is true that we apply the law of causality wholly *a priori*, prior to all experience, to the changes felt in our sense organs. But for that very reason the law is just as subjective in origin as these sensations themselves, and so it does not lead to the thing in itself. The truth is that by way of representation one can never get beyond representation. It is a closed whole, and has within its own means no thread leading to the inner nature of the thing in itself, which is *toto genere* different from it. If we were merely representing beings, the way to the thing in itself would be entirely closed to us. Only the other side of our own being can give us insight into the other side of the being in itself of things. This is the path I have taken. Kant's inference to the thing in itself, forbidden by himself, does however gain some excuse from the following. He does not posit the object, as the truth would require, simply and absolutely as conditioned by the subject, and vice versa. He posits only the man-

ner in which the object appears as conditioned by the subject's forms of knowledge, which therefore also come to consciousness *a priori*. By contrast, what is known only *a posteriori* is for him already the immediate effect of the thing in itself, which becomes appearance only by passing through those forms given *a priori*. This view goes some way toward explaining how he could fail to see that being an object as such already belongs to the form of appearance, and is conditioned by being a subject as such just as much as the object's mode of appearance is conditioned by the subject's forms of knowledge. He thus failed to see that, if a thing in itself is to be assumed, it cannot possibly be an object either—which is how he always presupposes it—but that such a thing in itself would have to lie in a domain *toto genere* different from representation (from knowing and being known), and could therefore least of all be inferred according to the laws governing the connection of objects with one another.

A.125 With the demonstration of the thing in itself, Kant fared exactly as he did with the demonstration of the apriority of the law of causality: both doctrines are correct, but their proof is false. They thus belong among correct conclusions drawn from false premises. I have retained both, but have grounded them in an entirely different and secure way.

A.126 I have neither smuggled in the thing in itself nor reasoned my way to it by laws that exclude it, since they already belong to its appearance; nor have I reached it by any detour at all. Rather, I have demonstrated it directly, where it directly lies: in the will, which reveals itself directly to everyone as the in-itself of his own appearance.

A.127 And it is this immediate knowledge of one's own will from which the concept of *freedom* arises in human consciousness. For the will as world-creating, as thing in itself, is indeed free from the principle of sufficient reason and thus from all necessity, and hence completely independent, free, indeed omnipotent. Strictly speaking, however, this holds only of the will in itself, not of its appearances, the individuals, which, as its appearances in time, are already unalterably determined, pre-

cisely by the will itself. But in ordinary consciousness, not purified by philosophy, the will is at once confused with its appearance, and what belongs only to the will is attributed to the appearance. This gives rise to the illusion that the individual is unconditionally free. It is for just this reason that Spinoza rightly says that even a stone that has been thrown, if it had consciousness, would believe it was flying of its own free will. For the in-itself of the stone, too, is indeed the one free will; but, as in all its appearances, so here too, where it appears as a stone, it is already completely determined. But all this has already been discussed sufficiently in the main part of this work.

A.128 Kant misrecognizes and overlooks this immediate origin of the concept of freedom in every human consciousness. So he now places (p. 533; V, p. 561) the source of that concept in a very subtle speculation: the unconditioned, toward which reason is supposed always to strive, occasions the hypostatizing of the concept of freedom, and it is on this transcendent idea of freedom that the practical concept of freedom is supposed to be founded in the first place. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, § 6, and p. 185 of the fourth edition, p. 235 of Rosenkranz's edition, however, he derives this latter concept differently again, namely from the fact that the categorical imperative presupposes it. That speculative idea, then, is supposed to be merely the first origin of the concept of freedom, serving this presupposition, while here the concept is said to acquire its real meaning and application. Neither, however, is the case. For the delusion that the individual is completely free in his particular actions is at its most vivid in the conviction of the least cultivated person, who has never reflected. So it is founded on no speculation, although it is often carried over into speculation. The only ones free of this delusion, by contrast, are philosophers, and indeed the most profound of them, and likewise the most thoughtful and enlightened writers of the Church.

A.129 From all that has been said, then, the real origin of the concept of freedom is in no way essentially an inference, either from the speculative idea of an unconditioned cause or from the

fact that the categorical imperative presupposes it. Rather, it springs directly from consciousness, in which everyone, without further ado, recognizes himself as the *will*, that is, as that which, being thing in itself, does not have the principle of sufficient reason as its form, and which itself depends on nothing, while everything else depends on it. But he does not at the same time, with philosophical criticism and reflection, distinguish himself, as an appearance of this will that has already entered time and is determined—one might say an act of will—from that will to live itself. And so, instead of recognizing his whole existence as an act of his freedom, he looks for freedom in his individual actions. On this point I refer the reader to my prize essay *On the Freedom of the Will*.

A.130 Now suppose Kant had merely inferred the thing in itself, as he claims here and also seemed to do on earlier occasions, and had done so with the great inconsistency of an inference he himself had strictly forbidden. What a strange coincidence it would then be that here, where he approaches the thing in itself more closely for the first time and sheds light on it, he at once recognizes it as the *will*, the free will that makes itself known in the world only through appearances in time!—I therefore really do assume, though it cannot be proved, that whenever Kant spoke of the thing in itself, he was always already thinking of the will, obscurely, in the darkest depths of his mind. Evidence for this is provided by the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. XXVII and XXVIII, in Rosenkranz's edition p. 677 of the Supplements.

A.131 Incidentally, it is precisely this intended resolution of the alleged third conflict that gives Kant occasion to express, very beautifully, the deepest thoughts of his whole philosophy. So it is in the whole "Sixth Section of the Antinomy of Pure Reason"; but above all in the exposition of the contrast between empirical and intelligible character, pp. 534–550 (V, pp. 562–578), which I count among the most excellent things ever said by human beings. (As a supplementary elucidation of this passage, one should take a parallel one in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, pp.

169–179 of the fourth edition, or pp. 224–231 of Rosenkranz's.) It is all the more to be regretted, however, that this does not stand in its proper place here. For one thing, it was not found by the route the exposition indicates, and so would have to be derived differently from the way it is. For another, it does not fulfill the purpose for which it stands there, namely the resolution of the alleged antinomy. From the appearance an inference is drawn to its intelligible ground, the thing in itself, through the inconsistent use of the category of causality beyond all appearance, which has already been sufficiently censured. In this case the thing in itself is taken to be the human will (which Kant, most inadmissibly and in unpardonable violation of all linguistic usage, calls reason), appealing to an unconditioned ought, the categorical imperative, which is simply postulated without further ado.

A.132 Instead of all this, the honest and open procedure would have been to start directly from the will; to show that it is the in-itself of our own appearance, known without any mediation; and then to give that exposition of empirical and intelligible character. It should have shown how all actions, although necessitated by motives, are nevertheless attributed, necessarily and absolutely, both by their author and by an outside judge, to that author himself and to him alone, as depending solely on him, so that guilt and merit are assigned to him in accordance with them.—This alone was the direct path to knowledge of that which is not appearance, and so is not found by the laws of appearance either, but is that which reveals itself through appearance, becomes knowable, objectifies itself: the will to live. Then the will would have had to be presented, simply by analogy, as the in-itself of every appearance. But then, of course, it could not have been said (p. 546; V, p. 574) that in inanimate, and indeed in animal, nature no faculty can be thought of except as sensuously conditioned. In Kant's language this really says that explanation according to the law of causality exhausts even the innermost essence of those appearances, so that for them the thing in itself—very inconsistently—drops out.—

Because Kant's exposition of the thing in itself was put in the wrong place and given a correspondingly roundabout derivation, the whole concept of it has been falsified as well. For, having been found by searching for an unconditioned cause, the will, or the thing in itself, here enters into the relation of cause to effect with appearance. But this relation occurs only within appearance; it therefore already presupposes appearance, and cannot connect appearance itself with what lies outside it and is *toto genere* different from it.

A.133 Further, the intended purpose, the resolution of the third antinomy, is not attained at all by the decision that both sides are right, each in a different sense. For neither thesis nor antithesis speaks in any way of the thing in itself; both speak entirely of appearance, the objective world, the world as representation. It is this, and absolutely nothing else, that the thesis, by the sophism pointed out above, wants to show contains unconditioned causes; and it is this, too, of which the antithesis rightly denies the same. Hence the whole exposition given here to justify the thesis—the account of the transcendental freedom of the will insofar as it is thing in itself—however excellent in itself, is here quite literally a *metabasis eis allo genos* [a shift into another kind]. For the transcendental freedom of the will set out here is by no means the unconditioned causality of a cause that the thesis asserts, since a cause must essentially be appearance, not something *toto genere* different lying beyond all appearance.

A.134 When cause and effect are under discussion, the relation of the will to its appearance (or of intelligible to empirical character) must never be dragged in, as happens here: for it is entirely different from the causal relation. Still, here too, in this resolution of the antinomy, it is said, truly, that the empirical character of a human being, like that of every other cause in nature, is unalterably determined, and that actions accordingly proceed from it necessarily, in proportion to external influences. Hence, despite all transcendental freedom (that is, the independence of the will in itself from the laws governing the connection of its appearance), no human being has the power to

begin a series of actions by himself—which, by contrast, is what the thesis had asserted. So freedom has no causality either. For only the will is free, and the will lies outside nature or appearance. Nature is simply its objectification, but does not stand in a relation of causality to it, since that relation is first met with within appearance; it therefore already presupposes appearance, and cannot include appearance itself and connect it with what is expressly not appearance. The world itself is to be explained solely from the will (since it is the will itself, insofar as the will appears), and not through causality.

A.135 But *in the world* causality is the sole principle of explanation, and everything happens solely according to laws of nature. So right lies entirely on the side of the antithesis, which sticks to what was under discussion and uses the principle of explanation valid for it, and therefore needs no apology. The thesis, by contrast, is supposed to be rescued from the affair by an apology that first leaps to something quite different from what the question was about, and then carries over to it a principle of explanation that cannot be applied there.

A.136 The fourth conflict, as already said, is in its innermost sense tautological with the third. In resolving it, Kant develops the untenability of the thesis still further. For its truth, however, and for its alleged coexistence with the antithesis, he brings forward no ground, just as, conversely, he is unable to set any ground against the antithesis. He introduces the assumption of the thesis merely as a favor asked, yet himself calls it (p. 562; V, p. 590) an arbitrary presupposition whose object might well be impossible in itself. He shows only a quite powerless effort to secure for that object some safe little spot somewhere against the all-pervading power of the antithesis—only so as not to expose the emptiness of the whole pretense, once he had taken a fancy to it, of a necessary antinomy in human reason.

THE IDEAL OF REASON AND THE PROOFS OF GOD

The ens realissimum is scholastic; Kant's refutation of speculative theology is his lasting merit.

A.137 There follows the chapter on the transcendental ideal, which at a stroke transports us back into the rigid scholasticism of the Middle Ages. One thinks one is hearing Anselm of Canterbury himself. The *ens realissimum* [most real being], the sum total of all realities, the content of all affirmative propositions, makes its entrance—and with the claim to be a necessary thought of reason!—For my part I must confess that such a thought is impossible for my reason, and that I cannot think anything definite at the words that denote it.[39]

A.138 I have no doubt, moreover, that Kant was forced into this strange chapter, unworthy of him, simply by his fondness for architectonic symmetry. The three principal objects of scholastic philosophy (which, as I said, understood in a wider sense, can be taken to extend up to Kant)—the soul, the world and God—were supposed to be derived from the three possible major premises of syllogisms. Yet it is obvious that they have arisen, and can arise, solely through the unconditioned application of the principle of sufficient reason. Now, once the soul had been squeezed into the categorical judgment and the hypothetical judgment had been used up on the world, nothing remained for the third idea but the disjunctive major premise. Fortunately, some groundwork in this direction was at hand, namely the *ens realissimum* of the scholastics, together with the ontological proof of God's existence, set up in rudimentary form by Anselm of Canterbury and then perfected by Descartes. Kant made use of this with delight, perhaps also with some reminiscence of a Latin work of his youth. The sacrifice that Kant makes to his love of architectonic symmetry with this chapter is, however, exceedingly great. In defiance of all truth, the representation—

39 Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), scholastic theologian, originator of the ontological argument for God's existence.

one has to say the grotesque representation—of a sum total of all possible realities is made into a thought essential and necessary to reason. To derive it, Kant seizes on the false pretext that our knowledge of individual things arises through an ever-continuing restriction of general concepts, and hence also of a most general concept of all, which would contain all reality *within itself*.[40] In this he contradicts his own doctrine just as much as the truth. For it is precisely the other way round: our knowledge starts from the individual and is extended to the general, and all general concepts arise through abstraction from real, individual, intuitively known things—an abstraction that can be continued up to the most general concept of all, which then comprehends everything under itself but almost nothing *within itself*. So here Kant has turned the procedure of our cognitive faculty upside down. He could therefore even be accused of having paved the way for a piece of philosophical charlatanry that has become famous in our day. Instead of recognizing concepts as thoughts abstracted from things, it makes concepts, conversely, the primary thing and sees in things only concrete concepts—thereby bringing the world upside down to market as a philosophical buffoonery, which naturally was bound to meet with great applause.—[41]

A.139 Even if we assume that every reason must, or at least can, arrive at the concept of God without revelation, this obviously happens solely by the guiding thread of causality—which is so evident that it needs no proof. Hence Christian Wolff, too, says *(Cosmologia generalis, praef. p. 1): Sane in theologia naturali existentiam Numinis e principiis cosmologicis demonstramus.* [Indeed, in natural theology we demonstrate the existence of the Deity from cosmological principles.] *Contingentia universi et ordinis naturae, una cum impossibilitate casus, sunt scala, per quam a mundo hoc adspectabili ad Deum ascenditur.* [The contingency of the universe and of the order of nature, together with the impossibility of

40 Probably Kant's Latin dissertation *Nova dilucidatio* (1755), which discusses the ontological proof.

41 An allusion to Hegel, for whom the concept is primary.

chance, are the ladder by which one ascends from this visible world to God.] And before him Leibniz had already said, with reference to the causal law: *Sans ce grand principe nous ne pourrions jamais prouver l'existence de Dieu (Théod., § 44).* [Without this great principle we could never prove the existence of God.] And likewise in his controversy with Clarke, § 126: *J'ose dire que sans ce grand principe on ne saurait venir à la preuve de l'existence de Dieu.* [I venture to say that without this great principle one could not arrive at the proof of the existence of God.] The thought developed in this chapter, by contrast, is so far from being essential and necessary to reason that it should rather be regarded as a real showpiece among the monstrous products of an age that strange circumstances had led onto the oddest byways and perversities. Such was the age of scholasticism, which stands without parallel in world history and can never return.[42] It is true that scholasticism, once it had reached its full development, based its main proof of God's existence on the concept of the *ens realissimum* and used the other proofs only alongside it, as accessories. But this is a mere method of teaching, and proves nothing about the origin of theology in the human mind. Here Kant has taken the procedure of scholasticism for that of reason—something that happened to him rather often in general. If it were true that, by essential laws of reason, the idea of God arose from the disjunctive syllogism in the form of an idea of the most real being, then this idea would surely have turned up among the philosophers of antiquity too. But of the *ens realissimum* there is no trace anywhere, in any of the ancient philosophers. Some of them do teach a creator of the world, but only as the giver of form to a matter that exists without him, a *dêmiourgos* [craftsman], and they infer him solely and exclusively according to the law of causality. It is true that Sextus Empiricus *(adv. Math., IX, § 88)* cites an argument of *Cleanthes* which some take to be the ontological proof. But it is not; it is a mere inference from analogy. Experience teaches that

42 Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), English theologian; his correspondence with Leibniz dates from 1715–16.

on earth *one* being is always more excellent than another, and that man, as the most excellent, closes the series, yet still has many faults; so there must be still more excellent beings, and finally a most excellent of all (*kratiston, ariston* [strongest, best]), and this would be the god.

A.140 On the detailed refutation of speculative theology that now follows, I need only remark briefly on one point. Like the whole critique of the three so-called ideas of reason, and thus the whole Dialectic of Pure Reason, it is in a certain sense the goal and purpose of the entire work. Yet this polemical part does not really have, as the preceding doctrinal part (the Aesthetic and Analytic) does, a wholly universal, lasting and purely philosophical interest. Its interest is rather temporal and local, since it relates in particular to the main tenets of the philosophy that reigned in Europe up to Kant—though its complete overthrow through this polemic redounds to Kant's immortal credit. He has eliminated theism from philosophy, since in philosophy, as a science and not a doctrine of faith, the only things that can find a place are those that are either empirically given or established by sound proofs. Naturally, what is meant here is only real philosophy, seriously understood and aimed at truth and nothing else—by no means the joke philosophy of the universities, in which speculative theology goes on playing the leading role as before, and where the soul, too, still makes its entrance without ceremony, as a familiar character. For this is the philosophy endowed with salaries and fees, and even with the title of court councillor. Looking down proudly from its heights, it has taken no notice whatever, for forty years, of little people like me, and would dearly love to be rid of old *Kant* and his critiques as well, so as to raise a hearty cheer for Leibniz.—It should further be noted here that Kant was, by his own admission, prompted to his doctrine of the apriority of the concept of causality by *Hume's* skepticism about that concept. Just so, perhaps, Kant's critique of all speculative theology has its occasion in Hume's critique of all popular theology, which Hume had set out in his eminently readable *Natural history of religion* and the *Dialogues*

on natural religion; indeed, Kant may in a sense have wanted to complete these. For the first-named work of *Hume* is really a critique of popular theology, whose wretchedness it aims to show, while pointing respectfully instead to rational or speculative theology as the genuine one. Kant, however, now exposes the groundlessness of the latter, but leaves popular theology untouched and even sets it up in an ennobled form, as a faith supported by moral feeling. The philosophasters later twisted this into reason-perceptions, God-consciousnesses, intellectual intuitions of the supersensible, of the deity, and so on. Kant, by contrast, in tearing down old, venerable errors and knowing how dangerous the business was, had merely wanted to slip a couple of weak props underneath for the time being, by way of moral theology, so that the collapse would not fall on him and he would gain time to get out of the way.

A.141 As for the execution: to refute the *ontological* proof of God's existence, no critique of reason was needed at all. Even without presupposing the Aesthetic and Analytic, it is very easy to make clear that the ontological proof is nothing but a hair-splitting play with concepts, entirely without persuasive force. Aristotle's *Organon* already contains a chapter that suffices to refute the ontotheological proof as completely as if it had been written expressly for the purpose: the seventh chapter of the second book of the *Analyt. post.*, where among other things it says explicitly: *to de einai ouk ousia oudeni*, that is, *existentia nunquam ad essentiam rei pertinet* [existence never belongs to the essence of a thing].

A.142 The refutation of the *cosmological* proof is an application of the Critique's doctrine, as expounded up to that point, to a given case, and there is nothing to object to it.—The *physico-theological* proof is a mere amplification of the cosmological proof, which it presupposes, and it receives its detailed refutation only in the *Critique of Judgment*. In this regard I refer my reader to the section "Comparative Anatomy" in my work *On the Will in Nature*.

A.143 In criticizing these proofs, as I said, *Kant* deals only with speculative theology and confines himself to the schools. Had he also kept life and popular theology in view, he would have had to add to the three proofs a fourth. This is the one actually effective with the great mass of people, and in Kant's technical language it might most fittingly be called the *keraunological* proof. It is founded on man's feeling of helplessness, powerlessness and dependence in the face of natural forces that are infinitely superior, unfathomable and mostly threatening disaster. To this is added his natural propensity to personify everything, and finally the hope of achieving something by pleading and flattery, and perhaps also by gifts.[43] For in every human undertaking there is something that is not in our power and does not enter into our calculations: the wish to win this over to our side is the origin of the gods. *Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor* [It was fear that first made gods in the world] is an old true saying of Petronius. It is chiefly this proof that *Hume*, who appears throughout as Kant's forerunner, criticizes in the writings mentioned above.—But the people whom Kant has put in lasting embarrassment with his critique of speculative theology are the professors of philosophy: paid by Christian governments, they may not abandon the chief article of faith.[44] So how do these gentlemen help themselves?—They simply assert that the exist-

43 From Greek keraunos, "thunderbolt": the proof from fear of the forces of nature.

44 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Kant said: "It is quite absurd to expect enlightenment from reason and yet to prescribe to it in advance which side it must necessarily come down on." (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 747; V, p. 775.) By contrast, the following piece of naivety is the pronouncement of a professor of philosophy of our own time: "If a philosophy denies the reality of the fundamental ideas of Christianity, then it is either false or, *even if true, still useless* —" *scilicet* [that is to say] for professors of philosophy. It was the late Professor Bachmann who, in the Jena Literaturzeitung of July 1840, no. 126, so indiscreetly blurted out the maxim of all his colleagues. Meanwhile, it is telling for the character of university philosophy how unceremoniously truth is shown the door here, if it will not fit in and comply: "Off with you, truth! We have no *use* for you. Do we owe you anything? Do you pay us?—So off you go!"

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Carl Friedrich Bachmann (1785–1855), professor of philosophy at Jena.

ence of God goes without saying.—Well![45] After the ancient world, at the expense of its conscience, worked miracles to prove it, and the modern world, at the expense of its understanding, marched ontological, cosmological and physico-theological proofs into the field—for these gentlemen it goes without saying. And from this self-evident God they then explain the world: that is their philosophy.

A.144 Until *Kant* there stood a genuine dilemma between materialism and theism, that is, between the assumption that the world had been brought about by blind chance or by an intelligence ordering it from outside according to purposes and concepts, *neque dabatur tertium* [and there was no third option]. Hence atheism and materialism were the same thing; hence the doubt whether there could really be an atheist, that is, a person who could actually ascribe the so abundantly purposive arrangement of nature, especially organic nature, to blind chance: see, for example, *Bacon's essays (sermones fideles* [faithful discourses]*), essay 16, on Atheism.* In the opinion of the great mass of people, and of the English, who in such matters belong entirely to the great mass *(mob)*, this is still how things stand, even among their most famous scholars: just look at *R. Owen's Ostéologie comparée* of 1855, *préface p. 11, 12*. There he still stands before the old dilemma between Democritus and Epicurus on the one hand and an *intelligence* on the other, in which *la connaissance d'un être tel que l'homme a existé avant que l'homme fit son apparition* [the knowledge of a being such as man existed before man made his appearance]. All purposiveness must have proceeded from an *intelligence*: it has never so much as occurred to him in his dreams to doubt this. After all, in the lecture he gave at the *Académie des sciences* on 5 September 1853—a version of this *préface*, which is somewhat modified here—he said with childlike naivety: *La téléologie, ou la théologie scientifique (Comptes rendus,* Sept. 1853) [Teleology, or scientific theology]. For him the two are simply one and the same! If something in nature is purposive, why then, it is the work of intention, of deliberation, of

45 Petronius, fragment 27; the line also occurs in Statius, *Thebaid* 3.661.

intelligence.[46] Well, of course, what do the *Critique of Judgment*, or even my book on the will in nature, matter to an Englishman like this and to the *Académie des sciences*? These gentlemen do not stoop to look that far down. These *illustres confrères* [illustrious colleagues] despise metaphysics and *philosophie allemande* [German philosophy], after all;—they stick to old wives' philosophy. The validity of that disjunctive major premise, that dilemma between materialism and theism, rests, however, on the assumption that the world before us is the world of things in themselves, and that consequently there is no order of things other than the empirical one. But once Kant had turned the world and its order into mere appearance, whose laws rest chiefly on the forms of our intellect, the existence and nature of things and of the world no longer had to be explained by analogy with the changes we perceive or bring about in the world; nor did what we grasp as means and end have to have arisen as a result of such knowledge. So while Kant, by his important distinction between appearance and thing in itself, pulled the foundation out from under theism, he opened up, on the other hand, the way to quite different and more profound explanations of existence.

A.145 In the chapter on the final aims of the natural dialectic of reason, it is claimed that the three transcendent ideas are valuable as regulative principles for the advance of our knowledge of nature. But Kant can hardly have been serious about this assertion. At any rate, its opposite—that those presuppositions obstruct and stifle all investigation of nature—will be beyond doubt for every student of nature. To test this by an example, consider whether the assumption of a soul as an immaterial, simple, thinking substance would have had to promote, or rather to obstruct in the highest degree, the truths so beautifully set forth by *Cabanis*, or the discoveries of Flourens, Marshall

46 Richard Owen (1804–1892), leading British comparative anatomist.

Hall and Charles *Bell*.[47] Indeed, Kant himself says (*Prolegomena*, § 44) "that the ideas of reason run counter to, and hinder, the maxims of reason's knowledge of nature."—

A.146 It is certainly not the least of Frederick the Great's merits that under his rule Kant was able to develop and was permitted to publish the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Under hardly any other government would a salaried professor have dared anything of the kind. To the great king's very successor Kant already had to promise to write no more.[48]

KANT'S ETHICS: PRACTICAL REASON

Rational action is not the same as virtuous action; reason serves villains as well as saints.

A.147 I could consider myself excused here from criticizing the ethical part of the Kantian philosophy, since twenty-two years later I supplied such a critique, more detailed and more thorough than the present one, in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. Nevertheless, what has been retained here from the first edition could not be dropped, if only for the sake of completeness. It can serve as a fitting prelude to that later and much more thorough critique, to which I therefore refer the reader for the main points.

A.148 In keeping with the love of architectonic symmetry, theoretical reason also had to have a *counterpart*. The *intellectus practicus* [practical intellect] of scholasticism, which in turn derives from the *nous praktikos* [practical mind] of Aristotle (*De anima, III, 10*, and *Polit., VII, c. 14*: *ho men gar praktikos esti logos, ho de theôrêtikos* [for one kind of reason is practical, the other theoretical]), supplies the word. Yet here it designates something quite different. It does not mean, as it did there, reason directed toward technique. Here practical reason appears as the

47 Pierre Cabanis (1757–1808) treated thought as a function of the brain; Pierre Flourens, Marshall Hall and Charles Bell were pioneers of nineteenth-century brain and nerve physiology.

48 In 1794 the government of Frederick William II reprimanded Kant, who promised to refrain from public statements on religion.

source and origin of the undeniable ethical significance of human action, and likewise of all virtue, all nobility of mind and every attainable degree of holiness. All this, then, would come from mere *reason* and would require nothing but reason. To act rationally and to act virtuously, nobly, holily would be one and the same, and to act selfishly, maliciously, viciously would merely be to act irrationally. Yet all ages, all peoples and all languages have always distinguished the two sharply and regarded them as entirely different things. So, to this very day, do all those who know nothing of the language of the newer school, that is, the whole world with the exception of a small handful of German scholars. All of them understand by virtuous conduct and by a rational course of life two altogether different things. To say that the sublime founder of the Christian religion, whose life is held up to us as the model of all virtue, was the *most rational* of all human beings would be called a most unworthy way of speaking, even a blasphemous one. Almost the same would be said if it were claimed that his precepts contained merely the best instructions for a thoroughly *rational life*. Consider, further, someone who follows these precepts. Instead of thinking ahead about himself and his own future needs, he always relieves only the greater present want of others, without further consideration. Indeed, he gives all he has to the poor, and then, stripped of all resources, goes out to preach to others the virtue he himself has practiced. Everyone rightly reveres this. But who dares to praise it as the summit of *rationality*? And finally, who praises it as an exceedingly rational deed that Arnold von Winkelried, with boundless nobility of mind, gathered the enemy spears together against his own body in order to win victory and deliverance for his countrymen?—On the other hand, suppose we see a man who from his youth on is intent, with rare deliberation, on procuring the means to a carefree livelihood, to the support of wife and children, to a good name among people, to outward honor and distinction. He is not diverted by the lure of present pleasures, or the itch to defy the arrogance of the powerful, or the wish to avenge insults suffered

or undeserved humiliation, or the attraction of useless aesthetic or philosophical pursuits and of travel to countries worth seeing. He does not let himself be thrown off course by any of this, or by anything like it, nor be tempted ever to lose sight of his goal, but works toward it alone with the greatest consistency. Who dares to deny that such a philistine is quite extraordinarily *rational*?[49] And this holds even if he had allowed himself a few means that were not praiseworthy, though they carried no risk. Indeed, more still. Suppose a villain, with calculated cunning and according to a well-thought-out plan, helps himself to riches, to honors, even to thrones and crowns. Then with the subtlest guile he ensnares neighboring states, overpowers them one by one and so becomes a conqueror of the world. In doing so he does not let himself be thrown off course by any consideration of right or humanity, but with rigorous consistency tramples and crushes everything that stands in the way of his plan. Without compassion he plunges millions into misfortune of every kind, millions into bloodshed and death, yet he royally rewards and always protects his followers and helpers, never forgetting anything, and in this way he reaches his goal. Who does not see that such a man had to go about his work with the utmost rationality? Just as a mighty understanding was required to design the plans, so a complete mastery of *reason*, indeed *practical reason* in the truest sense, was required to carry them out. —Or are the precepts that the shrewd and consistent, delib-

49 Arnold von Winkelried: legendary Swiss hero said to have broken the Austrian line at the Battle of Sempach (1386) by clasping a sheaf of enemy spears to his own body.

erate and far-sighted Machiavelli gives to the prince perhaps also *irrational*?[50]

A.149 Malice coexists very well with reason; indeed, it becomes truly fearsome only in this union. Conversely, nobility of mind is sometimes found combined with irrationality. Here one may count the deed of Coriolanus. For years he had spent all his strength on taking revenge on the Romans. Now that the time has at last come, he lets himself be softened by the pleading of the senate and the weeping of his mother and wife, and gives up the revenge he had prepared so long and so laboriously. Indeed, by thereby drawing upon himself the just anger of the Volscians, he dies for those very Romans whose ingratitude he knows and had wanted to punish with such great effort.[51] —Finally, for the sake of completeness, let it be mentioned that reason can very well unite with a lack of understanding. This is the case when a foolish maxim is chosen but carried out consistently. An example of this kind was given by Princess Isabella, daughter of Philip II. She vowed not to put on a clean shirt until Ostend had been captured, and she kept her word for three years. In general, all vows belong here. Their origin is always a lack of insight according to the law of causality, that is, a lack of understanding. Nonetheless it is rational to fulfill them, once one has been of such limited understanding as to make them.[52]

A.150 In keeping with what has been said, we find that even the writers who appeared just before Kant set conscience, as the

50 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Incidentally: Machiavelli's problem was to solve the question of how the prince could hold on to his throne *unconditionally*, in spite of enemies within and without. His problem was therefore by no means the ethical one, whether a prince, as a human being, ought to want such a thing or not. It was purely the political one: how, *if* he wants it, he can accomplish it. He gives the solution to this problem the way one writes a manual on chess, where it would surely be foolish to complain that it does not answer the question whether it is morally advisable to play chess at all. To reproach Machiavelli with the immorality of his book is just as apt as it would be to reproach a fencing master for not opening his lessons with a moral lecture against murder and manslaughter.

51 Coriolanus: legendary Roman general of the 5th century BC who went over to the Volscians; his story is told by Livy and Plutarch and dramatized by Shakespeare.

seat of moral impulses, in opposition to reason. Thus Rousseau in the fourth book of *Émile*: *La raison nous trompe, mais la conscience ne trompe jamais* [Reason deceives us, but conscience never deceives]; and a little further on: *il est impossible d'expliquer par les conséquences de notre nature le principe immédiat de la conscience indépendant de la raison même* [it is impossible to explain by the consequences of our nature the immediate principle of conscience, which is independent of reason itself]. Further still: *Mes sentimens naturels parlaient pour l'intérêt commun, ma raison rapportait tout à moi. … On a beau vouloir établir la vertu par la raison seule, quelle solide base peut-on lui donner?* [My natural feelings spoke for the common interest; my reason referred everything to myself. … It is no use trying to establish virtue by reason alone; what solid basis can one give it?]—In the Rêveries du promeneur, prom. 4ème, *he says:* Dans toutes les questions de morale difficiles je me suis toujours bien trouvé de les résoudre par le dictamen de la conscience, plutôt que par les lumières de la raison. *[In all difficult moral questions I have always done well to resolve them by the dictate of conscience rather than by the lights of reason.]—Indeed,* Aristotle *already says expressly (*Eth. magna, I, 5*) that the virtues have their seat in the* alogô moriô tês psychês (in parte irrationali animi) *[in the irrational part of the soul] and not in the* logos echonti (in parte rationali) *[in the rational part]. In accordance with this,* Stobaeus *(*Ecl., II, c. 7*), speaking of the Peripatetics, says:* Tên êthikên aretên hypolambanousi perito alogon meros gignesthai tês psychês, epeidê dimerê pros tên parousan theôrian hypethento tên psychên, to men logikon echousan, to d' alogon.[53] Kai peri men to logikon tên kalokagathian gignesthai, kai tên phronêsin, kai tên anchinoian, kai sophian, kai eumatheian, kai mnêmên, kai tas homoious; peri de to alogon, sôphrosynên, kai dikaiosynên, kai andreian, kai tas allas tas êthikas kaloumenas aretas. (Ethicam virtutem circa partem animae ratione carentem versari putant, cum duplicem, ad hanc

52 Isabella Clara Eugenia (1566–1633), co-sovereign of the Spanish Netherlands; the siege of Ostend lasted from 1601 to 1604.

53 Rousseau's *Reveries of the Solitary Walker* (1782), Fourth Walk.

disquisitionem, animam ponant, ratione praeditam, et ea carentem. In parte vero ratione praedita collocant ingenuitatem, prudentiam, perspicacitatem, sapientiam, docilitatem, memoriam et reliqua; in parte vero ratione destituta temperantiam, justitiam, fortitudinem, et reliquas virtutes, quas ethicas vocant.) *[They hold that ethical virtue concerns the part of the soul that lacks reason, since for the present inquiry they take the soul to be twofold, one part endowed with reason and one lacking it. In the part endowed with reason they place nobility of character, prudence, shrewdness, wisdom, readiness to learn, memory and the like; in the part lacking reason, temperance, justice, courage and the other virtues they call ethical.] And* Cicero (De nat. Deor., III, c. 26–31) explains at length that reason is the necessary means and instrument of all crimes.

A.151 I have declared *reason* to be the *faculty of concepts*. It is this quite distinctive class of general, non-intuitive representations, symbolized and fixed only by words, that distinguishes human beings from animals and gives them dominion on earth. The animal is the slave of the present and knows no motives other than immediately sensory ones. When these present themselves, it is therefore drawn or repelled by them as necessarily as iron is by a magnet. In human beings, by contrast, reflectiveness has dawned through the gift of reason. Reflectiveness allows them, looking backward and forward, easily to survey their life and the course of the world as a whole. It makes them independent of the present and lets them go to work deliberately, methodically and with forethought, for evil as for good. But what they do, they do with complete self-consciousness. They know exactly how their will decides, what they choose each time, and what other choice was possible in the nature of the case. From this self-conscious willing they come to know themselves, and they see themselves mirrored in their deeds. In all these relations to human action, reason is to be called *practical*. It is theoretical only insofar as the objects it deals with have no relation to the actions of the one who thinks, but only a theoretical interest, of which very few people are capable. What

in this sense is called *practical reason* is designated fairly well by the Latin word *prudentia* (circumspection, practical wisdom in life), which according to Cicero (*De nat. Deor., II, 22*) is a contraction of *providentia* [foresight]. *Ratio*, by contrast, when used of a mental power, mostly signifies theoretical reason proper, although the ancients do not strictly observe the distinction. — In almost all people reason has an almost exclusively practical direction. Suppose, however, that even this direction is abandoned and thought loses its mastery over action. Then the saying applies: *Scio meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor* [I see the better and approve it; I follow the worse], or *"Le matin je fais des projets, et le soir je fais des sottises"* [In the morning I make plans, and in the evening I do foolish things]. If, then, a person lets his actions be guided not by his thinking but by the impression of the present, almost in the manner of an animal, he is called *irrational* (without his being charged with moral badness). What he lacks, though, is really not reason but its application to his actions, and one could say, in a sense, that his reason is merely theoretical and not practical.[54] Such a person may be a very good human being, like many a one who cannot see anyone in misfortune without helping, even at a sacrifice, but who leaves his debts unpaid. An irrational character of this kind is quite incapable of committing great crimes, because the planning, dissimulation and self-control that they always require are impossible for him. But he will hardly attain a very high degree of virtue either. However strongly he may be inclined to good by nature, the individual vicious and malicious surges to which every human being is subject cannot fail to occur. And they must turn into deeds, unless reason, showing itself practical, opposes to them unalterable maxims and firm resolutions.

A.152 Finally, *reason* shows itself *practical* in the truest sense in genuinely rational characters. In everyday life these are therefore called practical philosophers. They are distinguished by an uncommon equanimity in unpleasant as in joyful events, by an even temper, and by firm persistence in resolutions once made.

54 The Latin is Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 7.20–21, spoken by Medea.

In fact it is the predominance of reason in them—that is, a knowing that is more abstract than intuitive, and hence a surveying of life by means of concepts, in general, as a whole and on a large scale—that has acquainted them once and for all with the deceptiveness of the momentary impression, with the instability of all things, the brevity of life, the emptiness of pleasures, the changes of fortune, and the great and small tricks of chance. Nothing, therefore, comes to them unexpectedly. What they know *in abstracto* does not surprise them or throw them off balance when it confronts them in reality and in the particular case. This is what happens with less rational characters, on whom the present, the intuitive, the actual exerts such power that the cold, colorless concepts recede entirely into the background of consciousness; forgetting their resolutions and maxims, they are at the mercy of affects and passions of every kind. I have already explained at the end of the first book that, in my view, Stoic ethics was originally nothing but a guide to a truly rational life in this sense. Such a life is also praised again and again by Horace in a great many passages. To this belongs his *Nil admirari*, too, and likewise the Delphic *Mêden agan* [Nothing in excess]. To translate *Nil admirari* as "admire nothing" is quite wrong. This saying of Horace refers not so much to the theoretical as to the practical, and what it really means is: "Do not value any object unconditionally, do not become infatuated with anything, do not believe that possessing anything can confer happiness. Every unspeakable craving for an object is only a teasing chimera, which one can get rid of just as well, and far more easily, through clarified knowledge as through possession won." Cicero also uses *admirari* in this sense, *De divinatione, II, 2.* What Horace means, then, is *athambia* [unperturbedness] and *akataplêxis* [not being dumbfounded], and also *athaumasia* [not marveling], which Democritus already praised as the highest good (see Clem. Alex.[55] *Strom., II, 21*, and compare Strabo, 1, pp. 98 and 105).—With such rationality of conduct, virtue and vice are not

55 Horace, *Epistles* 1.6.1: "Nil admirari"—to be dazzled by nothing—is offered there as nearly the only way to happiness.

really in question. But this practical use of reason brings into play the real prerogative that human beings have over animals, and only in this respect does it make sense, and is it permissible, to speak of a dignity of the human being.

A.153 In all the cases presented, and in all conceivable ones, the difference between rational and irrational action comes down to whether the motives are abstract concepts or intuitive representations. For this very reason, the explanation of reason I have given agrees exactly with the usage of language in all ages and among all peoples. No one, surely, will take that usage for something accidental or arbitrary. One will see, rather, that it has arisen precisely from the difference between the various mental faculties, a difference of which everyone is conscious. Everyone speaks in accordance with this consciousness, though of course without raising it to the clarity of abstract definition. Our forefathers did not make words without attaching a definite sense to them, just so that they would lie ready for philosophers who might come along centuries later and decide what was to be thought by them. They designated quite definite concepts with them. Words are therefore no longer without an owner. To foist on them a sense quite different from the one they have had so far is to misuse them. It is to introduce a license by which anyone could use any word in any sense he pleased, and boundless confusion would inevitably result. *Locke* already showed at length that most disagreements in philosophy arise from the wrong use of words. By way of illustration, just glance at the disgraceful misuse that thought-starved philosophasters nowadays make of the words substance, consciousness, truth and so on. The statements and explanations about reason made by all philosophers of all ages, with the exception of the most recent, agree with my explanation no less than do the concepts of that human prerogative which prevail among all peoples. Consider what Plato, in the fourth book of the *Republic* and in countless scattered passages, calls the *logikon* or *logistikon tês psychês* [the rational or reasoning part of the soul]; what Cicero says in *De nat. Deor., III, 26–31*; and what Leibniz and Locke say about it in

the passages already cited in the first book. There would be no end to the citations if one wanted to show how all philosophers before Kant spoke of reason, on the whole, in my sense, even though they were unable to explain its essence with complete precision and clarity by tracing it back to a single point. What was understood by reason shortly before Kant appeared is shown, on the whole, by two essays of Sulzer in the first volume of his *Miscellaneous Philosophical Writings*: one entitled "Analysis of the Concept of Reason," the other "On the Reciprocal Influence of Reason and Language."[56] If, on the other hand, one reads how reason is talked about in the most recent times, under the influence of Kant's error, which afterward grew like an avalanche, one is forced to assume that all the sages of antiquity, and all philosophers before Kant as well, had no reason at all. For the immediate perceptions, intuitions, apprehendings and presentiments of reason that have now been discovered remained as foreign to them as the sixth sense of bats is to us.[57] As for myself, I must confess that I too, in my limitedness, cannot make that reason comprehensible to myself or represent it in any other way than exactly like the sixth sense of bats—the reason, that is, which immediately perceives, or "apprehends," or intellectually intuits the supersensible, the Absolute, together with the long stories that happen to it. But this much must be said in praise of the invention, or discovery, of such a reason, which immediately perceives whatever one likes on the spot: it is an incomparable *expédient* [expedient] for getting oneself and one's fixed pet ideas out of a tight spot in the easiest way in the world, in defiance of all the *Kants* with their critiques of reason. The invention, and the reception it has met with, do honor to the age.

A.154 So the essential nature of *reason* (*to logimon, hê phronêsis, ratio, raison, reason*) was recognized correctly, on the whole and

56 Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–1779), Swiss-born philosopher and aesthetician of the Berlin Enlightenment.

57 An allusion to Jacobi, who derived *Vernunft* (reason) from *vernehmen* (to apprehend, to hear) and made reason an immediate apprehension of the supersensible.

in general, by all philosophers of all ages, though it was not defined sharply enough or traced back to a single point. What the *understanding* (*nous, dianoia, intellectus, esprit, intellect, understanding*) is, however, did not become so clear to them. Hence they often confuse it with reason, and for that very reason they also fail to arrive at a fully complete, pure and simple explanation of the essence of reason. Among the Christian philosophers, the concept of reason then acquired a quite alien secondary meaning through its opposition to revelation. Starting from this, many then rightly assert that knowledge of the obligation to virtue is possible from mere reason too, that is, even without revelation. This consideration has certainly influenced even Kant's exposition and his use of terms. But that opposition really has a positive, historical significance, and is therefore an element foreign to philosophy, from which philosophy must be kept free.

A.155 One might have expected that Kant, in his critiques of theoretical and practical reason, would have started from an account of the nature of reason in general. Having thus determined the *genus*, he would have gone on to explain the two *species*, showing how one and the same reason expresses itself in two such different ways and yet proves itself to be the same by retaining its principal character. But there is nothing of the sort. I have already shown how inadequate, wavering and discordant are the explanations he gives, here and there and in passing, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, of the very faculty he is criticizing. *Practical* reason already turns up unannounced in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Afterward, in the critique devoted specially to it, it stands there as a settled matter, with no further account given, and without the linguistic usage of all ages and peoples, trampled underfoot, or the definitions of the greatest earlier philosophers being allowed to raise their voices. On the whole, one can gather from individual passages that Kant's opinion runs as follows: the cognition of principles *a priori* is the essential character of reason. Now, since knowledge of the ethical significance of action is not of empirical origin, it too is a *principium a priori* [a priori principle] and therefore stems from

reason, which to that extent is *practical*.—I have already said enough about the incorrectness of that explanation of reason. But even apart from this, how superficial and unthorough it is to use here the single characteristic of independence from experience in order to unite the most heterogeneous things, overlooking the fundamental, essential, immeasurable distance that otherwise separates them! For even assuming—though not conceding—that knowledge of the ethical significance of action arises from an imperative lying within us, an unconditional *ought*, how fundamentally different such a thing would still be from those universal *forms of knowledge*! In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he shows that we are conscious of these *a priori*, and by virtue of this consciousness we can declare in advance an unconditional *must*, valid for all possible experience. But the difference between this *must*—this form of the object, necessarily determined already in the subject—and that *ought* of morality is so immense and so obvious that the coincidence of the two in the characteristic of a non-empirical mode of knowledge may well be put forward as a witty simile, but not as a philosophical warrant for identifying their origin.

THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

An unconditional ought is a contradiction, and Kant's moral formula rests on egoism.

A.156 Incidentally, the birthplace of this child of practical reason, the *absolute ought* or categorical imperative, is not the *Critique of Practical Reason* but already the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 802; V, p. 830. The birth is violent and succeeds only with the forceps of a *therefore*, which boldly and brazenly, one might even say impudently, plants itself between two propositions that are utter strangers to each other and have no connection, in order to join them as ground and consequent. The proposition Kant starts from is that we are determined not only by intuitive but also by abstract motives. He expresses it as follows: "It is not merely what stimulates, that is, what immediately affects the senses,

that determines the human power of choice; we have a faculty of overcoming the impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire by means of representations of what is useful or harmful even in a more remote way. These deliberations about what is worth desiring with regard to our whole condition, that is, what is good and useful, rest on reason." (Perfectly correct: if only he always spoke so reasonably about reason!) "Reason *therefore*! also gives laws, which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom, and which say what *ought* to happen, even though perhaps it never does happen."—! Thus, without further credentials, the categorical imperative leaps into the world, to rule there with its *unconditional ought*—a scepter of wooden iron.[58] For the concept of *ought* contains, absolutely and essentially, a reference to threatened punishment or promised reward as its necessary condition. This reference cannot be separated from the concept without abolishing the concept itself and depriving it of all meaning. Hence an *unconditional ought* is a *contradictio in adjecto* [contradiction in terms]. This error had to be censured, however closely it is otherwise related to Kant's great merit in ethics. That merit consists precisely in his having freed ethics from all principles of the world of experience, in particular from every direct or indirect doctrine of happiness, and in having shown, quite expressly, that the kingdom of virtue is not of this world. This merit is all the greater because all the ancient philosophers, with the single exception of Plato—that is, Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans—had tried, by very different devices, either to make virtue and happiness dependent on each other according to the principle of sufficient reason, or to identify them according to the principle of contradiction. The same reproach applies no less to all modern philosophers up to Kant. His merit in this respect is therefore very great. Yet justice also requires us to recall two things here. First, his exposition and execution often do not correspond to the tendency and spirit of his ethics, as we shall see at once. Second, even so he is not the very first to have purified virtue of all principles of happiness.

58 "Wooden iron" is a German idiom for a contradiction in terms.

For Plato already, especially in the *Republic*, whose main tendency is precisely this, teaches expressly that virtue is to be chosen for its own sake alone, even if misfortune and disgrace were inevitably bound up with it. Christianity, however, goes further still and preaches a wholly disinterested virtue. It is practiced not even for the sake of a reward in a life after death, but quite gratuitously, out of love of God, inasmuch as works do not justify, but faith alone. Virtue accompanies faith as, so to speak, its mere symptom, and therefore it arises quite gratuitously and of its own accord. Read Luther, *De libertate Christiana*. I will not even bring in the Indians, in whose sacred books the hope of a reward for one's works is everywhere described as the path of darkness, which can never lead to salvation. Kant's doctrine of virtue, however, we do not find so pure; or rather, its exposition has lagged far behind its spirit, indeed has fallen into inconsistency. In his *highest good*, discussed later, we find virtue married to happiness. The ought that was originally so unconditional afterward postulates a condition for itself after all—really in order to get rid of the inner contradiction with which it is afflicted and with which it cannot live. Happiness in the highest good is not, to be sure, supposed to be really the motive for virtue. Nevertheless it stands there like a secret article whose presence turns all the rest into a mere sham contract. It is not really the reward of virtue, but still a voluntary gift, for which virtue, its labor done, furtively holds out its open hand. Convince yourself of this from the *Critique of Practical Reason* (pp. 223–266 of the fourth edition, or pp. 264–295 of the Rosenkranz edition). His whole moral theology has the same tendency, and for that very reason morality really destroys itself through it. For, I repeat, all virtue that is practiced in any way for the sake of a reward rests on a shrewd, methodical, far-sighted egoism.

A.157 The content of the absolute ought, the fundamental law of practical reason, is now the celebrated formula: "Act so that the maxim of your will could always at the same time hold as a principle of universal legislation."—Someone who asks for a rule to regulate his own will is given by this principle the task of find-

ing one for the will of all, no less.—Then the question is how such a rule is to be found. Obviously, in order to discover the rule of my conduct, I am to take into account not myself alone but the totality of all individuals. Then, instead of my own well-being, the well-being of all, without distinction, becomes my end. But that end still remains well-being. I then find that all can be equally well off only if each sets the egoism of others as a limit to his own. From this it follows, to be sure, that I ought not to harm anyone, because if this principle is assumed to be universal, *I* am not harmed either. But that is the sole reason why I, who do not yet possess a moral principle but am only looking for one, can wish this to be universal law. Obviously, then, in this way the desire for well-being, that is, egoism, remains the source of this ethical principle. As the basis of a theory of the state it would be excellent; as the basis of ethics it is useless. For the task this moral principle sets is to establish a rule regulating the will of all, and whoever seeks such a rule necessarily needs a regulating rule of his own; otherwise everything would be a matter of indifference to him. This regulating rule, however, can only be his own egoism. Only his egoism is affected by the conduct of others, and so only through it and with regard to it can the seeker have a will concerning the actions of others and not be indifferent to them. Kant himself lets this be seen very naively on p. 123 of the *Critique of Practical Reason* (Rosenkranz edition, p. 192), where he carries out the search for the maxim for the will as follows: "If everyone looked on the need of others with complete indifference, and *you yourself belonged* to such an order of things, would you consent to it?"—*Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam!* [How rashly we sanction an unjust law against ourselves!] would be the regulating rule of the consent in question. Likewise in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 56 of the third edition, p.[59] 50 of the Rosenkranz edition: "A will that resolved to help no one in need would conflict with itself, since cases can arise *in which it needs the love and sympathy of others*," and so on. Seen in the light, therefore, this prin-

59 Horace, *Satires* 1.3.67.

ciple of ethics is nothing but an indirect and veiled expression of the old, simple maxim *quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris* [do not do to another what you do not want done to yourself]. It refers first and directly to the passive side, to suffering, and only then, by way of this, to doing. Hence, as I said, it would be quite serviceable as a guide for establishing the *state*, which aims to prevent the *suffering of wrong* and would also like to procure the greatest sum of well-being for each and all. But in ethics, the object of inquiry is *doing* as *doing*, in its immediate significance for the *doer*, not its consequence, suffering, or its relation to others. There that consideration is not admissible at all, since at bottom it comes down once again to a principle of happiness, and so to egoism.

A.158 We therefore cannot share Kant's delight in the fact that his principle of ethics is not a material one, that is, one positing an object as motive, but a merely formal one, so that it corresponds symmetrically to the formal laws the *Critique of Pure Reason* has taught us. Instead of a law, it is of course only the formula for finding one. But, first, we already had this formula in shorter and clearer form in the *quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*. And second, analysis of the formula shows that its content is given solely and exclusively by regard for one's own happiness, so that it can serve only rational egoism—to which, indeed, every lawful constitution owes its origin.

DUTY AND INCLINATION

Kant's demand that good acts be done without inclination runs counter to virtue.

A.159 Another error, which has often been censured because it offends everyone's feelings, and which Schiller satirized in an epigram, is the pedantic rule that an action, to be truly good and meritorious, must be done solely and exclusively out of respect for the recognized law and the concept of duty, and according to a maxim of which reason is conscious *in abstracto*. It must not be done in any way from inclination, not from felt goodwill toward

others, not from tender-hearted sympathy, compassion or a surge of the heart—which (according to the *Critique of Practical Reason,* p. 213; Rosenkranz edition, p. 257) are even very burdensome to right-thinking persons, since they confuse their considered maxims. Rather, the deed must be done reluctantly and with self-compulsion. Remember that hope of reward is nonetheless not supposed to play any part here, and gauge the great absurdity of the demand. But, what is more, the demand runs directly counter to the genuine spirit of virtue. It is not the deed that makes it meritorious, but doing it gladly—the love from which it springs and without which it is a dead work. Hence Christianity also rightly teaches that all outward works are worthless unless they spring from that genuine disposition which consists in true willingness and pure love. It teaches that what brings blessedness and redemption is not the works performed (*opera operata*), but faith, the genuine disposition, which the Holy Spirit alone bestows and which is not begotten by the free and deliberate will that has only the law before its eyes.—Kant demands that every virtuous action be done out of pure, deliberate respect for the law and according to its abstract maxims, coldly and without any inclination, indeed against all inclination. This is exactly as if someone asserted that every genuine work of art must come about through a well-considered application of aesthetic rules. The one is as perverse as the other. The question, already treated by Plato and Seneca, whether virtue can be taught, must be answered in the negative. We will finally have to bring ourselves to recognize what also gave rise to the Christian doctrine of election by grace: that in its main point and its inner nature, virtue is in a certain sense innate, like genius. All the professors of aesthetics, with their combined forces, cannot impart to anyone the capacity for producing works of genius, that is, genuine works of art. Just as little can all the professors of ethics and preachers of virtue transform an ignoble character into a virtuous, noble one—and the impossibility of this is far more evident than that of transmuting lead into gold. The search for an ethics, and for a

supreme principle of ethics, that would have practical influence and actually transform and improve the human race is exactly like the search for the philosophers' stone.—The possibility of a complete change of a person's mind (rebirth), however, not by means of abstract knowledge (ethics) but by means of intuitive knowledge (the effect of grace), is discussed in detail at the end of our fourth book. The content of that book in general relieves me of the need to dwell on this any longer.

A.160 That Kant by no means penetrated to the real significance of the ethical content of actions is finally also shown by his doctrine of the highest good as the necessary union of virtue and happiness, in such a way, moreover, that virtue would be the worthiness to be happy. Here he is open, first of all, to the logical objection that the concept of worthiness, which provides the standard here, already presupposes an ethics as its own standard, and so could not be taken as the starting point. In our fourth book it emerged that all genuine virtue, once it has reached its highest degree, leads in the end to a complete renunciation in which all willing comes to an end. Happiness, on the other hand, is a satisfied willing. The two are therefore fundamentally incompatible. For anyone who has been convinced by my account, no further discussion of the utter perversity of this Kantian view of the highest good is needed. And independently of my positive account, I have no further negative one to give here.

A.161 Kant's love of architectonic symmetry confronts us in the *Critique of Practical Reason* too. He gave it exactly the cut of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and brought in the same headings and forms again, with an obvious arbitrariness that is especially visible in the table of the categories of freedom.

THE DOCTRINE OF RIGHT

Kant's theory of right is weak, negative and hovers between ethics and positive law.

A.162 The *Doctrine of Right* is one of Kant's latest works, and so weak a one that, although I wholly disapprove of it, I consider a polemic against it superfluous. It must die a natural death of its own weakness, as if it were not the work of this great man but the product of an ordinary mortal. With regard to the doctrine of right, then, I forgo the negative procedure and refer to the positive one, that is, to the brief outline of it set out in our fourth book. Just a couple of general remarks on Kant's doctrine of right may stand here. The faults that I censured, when examining the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as clinging to Kant everywhere are found in the *Doctrine of Right* in such excess that one often thinks one is reading a satirical parody of the Kantian manner, or at least listening to a Kantian. Its two main faults, however, are these. He wants (and many have wanted this since) to separate the doctrine of right sharply from ethics, yet not to make it dependent on positive legislation, that is, on arbitrary coercion, but to let the concept of right stand on its own, pure and *a priori*. But this is not possible. Apart from its ethical significance, and apart from its physical relation to others and thereby to external coercion, action admits of no third point of view, not even as a possibility. Consequently, when he says, "A duty of right is one that *can* be enforced," this *can* is to be understood either physically—and then all right is positive and arbitrary, and conversely any arbitrary will that can be enforced is right—or ethically, and then we are back in the domain of ethics. In Kant, therefore, the concept of right hovers between heaven and earth and has no ground to stand on; with me it belongs to ethics. Second, his definition of the concept of right is entirely negative and thereby

inadequate:[60] "Right is that which is compatible with the coexistence of the freedoms of individuals side by side according to a universal law."—Freedom (here the empirical, that is, physical freedom, not the moral freedom of the will) means not being hindered, and is thus a mere negation. Coexistence, again, has exactly the same meaning. So we are left with nothing but negations and obtain no positive concept; indeed, we do not even learn what is really being talked about, unless we already know it from elsewhere.—In the working out, the most perverse views then develop, such as the view that in the natural state, that is, outside the state, there is no right to property at all. This really means that all right is positive, and it bases natural right on positive right, whereas it should be the other way round. Further, there is the grounding of lawful acquisition on taking possession; the ethical obligation to establish a civil constitution; the basis of the right to punish, and so on. As I said, I consider none of this worth any special refutation. Meanwhile, these Kantian errors too have had a very harmful influence. They have confused and obscured again truths long recognized and stated, and have given rise to strange theories and to much writing and wrangling. That cannot last, of course, and we already see truth and sound reason making their way again. Of the latter, in contrast to many a warped theory, the chief witness is J. C. F. Meister's *Natural Law*, although I do not for that reason regard it as a model of perfection attained.[61]

THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

Kant turned aesthetics toward the subject but started from judgments rather than the beautiful itself.

A.163 After what has been said so far, I can be very brief about the *Critique of Judgment* as well. It is astonishing how Kant managed

60 SCHOPENHAUER'S NOTE. Although the concept of right is really a negative one, in contrast to wrong, which is the positive starting point, the explanation of these concepts must not for that reason be negative through and through.
61 Johann Christian Friedrich Meister (1758–1828), German jurist, author of a textbook of natural law (1809).

it. Art probably remained very foreign to him. To all appearances he had little receptivity to the beautiful, and he probably never even had the opportunity to see a significant work of art. Finally, he seems not even to have known of Goethe, his giant brother and the only man, in the century as in the nation, fit to be set beside him. It is, I say, astonishing how, despite all this, Kant was able to earn a great and lasting merit in the philosophical study of art and the beautiful. This merit lies in the following. However many reflections had been made on the beautiful and on art, the matter had in fact always been considered only from the empirical standpoint. People had investigated, on the basis of facts, what property distinguished an object of some kind that was called *beautiful* from other objects of the same kind. Along this path they arrived first at quite specific propositions, then at more general ones. They tried to separate genuine artistic beauty from the counterfeit and to discover marks of this genuineness, which could then in turn serve as rules. What pleases as beautiful and what does not; what, therefore, is to be imitated and striven for, and what is to be avoided; what rules, at least negative ones, are to be laid down; in short, what the means are of arousing aesthetic pleasure, that is, what conditions for it lie in the *object*: this was almost exclusively the theme of all reflections on art. Aristotle had taken this path, and even in the most recent times we find Home, Burke, Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder and others on it. It is true that the generality of the aesthetic propositions discovered finally led back to the subject as well. People noticed that if the effect in the subject were properly known, one would then also be able to determine *a priori* the cause of it lying in the object, and that this alone would allow the inquiry to attain the certainty of a science. This prompted psychological discussions here and there. Above all, with this aim, Alexander Baumgarten set up a general aesthetics of everything beautiful, taking as his starting point the concept of the perfection of sensory, and therefore intuitive, know-

ledge.[62] Once he has set up this concept, however, he is also finished with the subjective part at once and proceeds to the objective part and the practical matters relating to it.—But here too the merit was reserved for Kant of investigating seriously and deeply *the arousal itself*, in consequence of which we call the object that occasions it beautiful, so as to discover, if possible, its components and conditions in our mind. His investigation therefore took an entirely subjective direction. This path was obviously the right one. For to explain an appearance given through its effects, one must first know this effect itself precisely if one is to determine the nature of the cause thoroughly. Yet Kant's merit here really extends little further than having shown the right path, and having given, by a provisional attempt, an example of roughly how one should travel it. For what he gave cannot be regarded as objective truth or real gain. He indicated the method of this investigation and broke the ground, but otherwise missed the goal.

A.164 In the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, the first thing that will force itself on us is that he retained the method peculiar to his whole philosophy, which I examined in detail above. I mean starting from abstract knowledge in order to fathom intuitive knowledge, so that the former serves him as a kind of *camera obscura* in which to capture and survey the latter. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* the forms of judgments were supposed to give him information about the knowledge of our entire intuitive world. In the same way, in this Critique of Aesthetic Judgment he does not start from the beautiful itself, from the intuitive, immediate beautiful. He starts instead from the *judgment* about the beautiful, which goes by the very ugly name of "judgment of taste." This is his problem. What particularly arouses his attention is the fact that such a judgment is obviously the report of an event in the subject, and yet is as universally valid as if it concerned a property of the object. It was this that struck him, not the beau-

62 Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696–1782), wrote *Elements of Criticism* (1762). Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762) coined the term "aesthetics" in his *Aesthetica* (1750–58).

tiful itself. He always starts only from the reports of others, from the judgment about the beautiful, not from the beautiful itself. It is therefore as if he knew it entirely by hearsay and not directly. In much the same way, a highly intelligent blind man could put together a theory of colors from precise reports he had heard about them. And we may in fact regard Kant's philosophical doctrines on the beautiful as standing almost exactly in this relation. We shall then find that his theory is very ingenious, and indeed that pertinent and true general observations are made here and there. But his actual solution of the problem is so utterly inadmissible, and remains so far beneath the dignity of the subject, that it cannot occur to us to take it for objective truth. That is why I consider myself excused even from refuting it, and here too refer to the positive part of my work.

A.165 As to the form of his whole book, it should be noted that it sprang from the notion of finding the key to the problem of the beautiful in the concept of *purposiveness*. The notion is given a deduction, which is never difficult, as we have learned from Kant's successors. So there now arises the baroque union of the knowledge of the beautiful with the knowledge of the purposiveness of natural bodies in *one* cognitive faculty, called the *power of judgment*, and the treatment of these two heterogeneous subjects in a single book. With these three cognitive powers, reason, judgment and understanding, all sorts of symmetrical-architectonic amusements are then undertaken. A fondness for these shows itself in many ways throughout this book: already in the cut of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, forcibly fitted to the whole, but quite especially in the far-fetched antinomy of aesthetic judgment. One could also charge him with great inconsistency. The *Critique of Pure Reason* repeats incessantly that the understanding is the faculty of judging, and the forms of its judgments are made the foundation stone of all philosophy. Yet now a quite peculiar power of judgment appears on the scene, completely different from the understanding. Incidentally, what I call the power of judgment, namely the ability to translate intuitive knowledge into abstract knowledge and to apply the latter cor-

rectly back to the former, is set out in the positive part of my work.

A.166 By far the most excellent part of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment is the theory of the sublime. It is incomparably more successful than the theory of the beautiful. It not only indicates, as that one does, the general method of the investigation, but also a stretch of the right path besides. So much so that, even if it does not give the actual solution of the problem, it comes very close to it.

TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

Purposiveness in organisms reflects our way of understanding, not an objective designing cause.

A.167 In the Critique of *Teleological* Judgment, because of the simplicity of the material, one can perhaps recognize more than anywhere else Kant's strange talent for turning a thought this way and that and expressing it in manifold ways until a book has come of it. The whole book aims at this alone: although organized bodies necessarily appear to us as if they had been put together in accordance with a concept of purpose that preceded them, this does not entitle us to assume that it is objectively so. For our intellect, to which things are given from outside and indirectly, and which therefore never knows their inner nature, through which they arise and subsist, but only their outside, cannot make a certain property peculiar to the organic products of nature comprehensible to itself except by analogy. It compares them with works deliberately made by human beings, whose constitution is determined by a purpose and the concept of it. This analogy is sufficient to make comprehensible to us the harmony of all their parts with the whole, and so even to provide the guiding thread for investigating them. But it must by no means be made, on that account, the real explanatory ground of the origin and existence of such bodies. For the necessity of conceiving them in this way is of subjective origin. —This, roughly, is how I would summarize Kant's teaching on the mat-

ter. In essentials he had already set it out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 692–702 (V, pp. 720–730). But in the knowledge of *this* truth, too, we find *David Hume* as Kant's illustrious forerunner. He too had sharply contested that assumption, in the second part of his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.* The difference between Hume's critique of that assumption and Kant's is chiefly this: Hume criticizes it as an assumption based on experience, Kant as an *a priori* one. Both are right, and their accounts complement each other. Indeed, we find the essence of Kant's teaching on this already expressed in Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*:[63]

A.168 *hê de planê gegonen autois apo tou hêgeisthai, panta ta heneka ton ginomena kata proairesin genesthai kai logismon, ta de physei mê houtôs horan ginomena. (Error iis ortus est ex eo, quod credebant, omnia, quae propter finem aliquem fierent, ex proposito et ratiocinio fieri, dum videbant, naturae opera non ita fieri.)* [Their error arose from believing that everything that happens for the sake of some end happens by design and reasoning, while they saw that the works of nature do not happen in this way.] *Schol. in Arist., ex edit. Berol. p. 354.* Kant is entirely right on this matter. Once it had been shown that the concept of cause and effect cannot be applied to the whole of nature as regards its existence, it was also necessary to show that, as regards its constitution, nature is not to be thought of as the effect of a cause guided by motives (concepts of purpose).[64] Consider how very plausible the physico-theological proof appears, which even *Voltaire* held to be irrefutable. It was therefore of the greatest importance to show the following. The subjective element in our apprehension, to which Kant had assigned space, time and causality, extends also to our judging of natural bodies. Accordingly, the compulsion we feel to think of them as having come about premeditatedly, according to concepts of purpose, and so in a way

63 Simplicius (6th century AD) was a Neoplatonist philosopher and one of the last great ancient commentators on Aristotle.

64 The citation refers to the Berlin Academy edition of the *Scholia in Aristotelem* (Greek commentaries on Aristotle), edited by C. A. Brandis in 1836.

in which the representation of them would have preceded their existence, is of just as subjective an origin as the intuition of space, which presents itself so objectively. It may therefore not be asserted as objective truth. Kant's exposition of the matter is excellent, apart from its tiring long-windedness and repetition.[65] He rightly maintains that we shall never succeed in explaining the constitution of organic bodies from merely mechanical causes, by which he means the unintentional, law-governed operation of all the universal forces of nature. Here, however, I still find a gap. He denies the possibility of such an explanation only with regard to the purposiveness and apparent intentionality of *organic bodies*. But we find that even where this does not obtain, the explanatory grounds from *one* domain of nature cannot be carried over into another. As soon as we enter a new domain they desert us, and in their place new fundamental laws appear, which there is no hope of explaining from those of the previous domain. Thus in the domain of the mechanical proper, the laws of gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity and elasticity hold sway. In themselves (apart from my explanation of all natural forces as lower grades of the objectification of the will) they stand there as manifestations of forces that cannot be further explained. Yet they themselves constitute the principles of all further explanation, which consists merely in tracing things back to them. If we leave this domain and come to the phenomena of chemism, electricity, magnetism and crystallization, those principles are no longer of any use at all. Indeed, those laws no longer hold, those forces are overpowered by others, and the phenomena take place in direct contradiction to them, according to new fundamental laws which, just like the first ones, are original and inexplicable, that is, cannot be traced back to any more general ones. Thus, for example, it will never be possible to explain by those laws of mechanism proper even the dissolving of a salt in water, let alone the more complicated phenomena of chemistry. All this has already been presented in

65 The physico-theological proof is the argument from design, which infers an intelligent creator from the order and purposiveness of nature.

more detail in the second book of the present work. A discussion of this kind would, it seems to me, have been of great use in the Critique of Teleological Judgment and would have shed much light on what is said there. It would have been especially favorable to his excellent suggestion that a deeper knowledge of the being in itself whose appearance the things in nature are would find, in both the mechanical (law-governed) and the apparently intentional workings of nature, one and the same ultimate principle, which could serve as the common explanatory ground of both. I hope to have supplied such a principle by establishing the will as the true thing in itself. In accordance with this, in our second book and its supplements generally, but especially in my essay *On the Will in Nature*, insight into the inner nature of the apparent purposiveness, and of the harmony and accord of the whole of nature, has perhaps become clearer and deeper. I therefore have nothing further to say about it here. —

A.169 The reader who is interested in this critique of the Kantian philosophy should not fail to read its supplement, given under the heading "Some Further Remarks on the Kantian Philosophy" in the second essay of the first volume of my *Parerga and Paralipomena*. For one must bear in mind that my writings, few as they are, were not all composed at once but successively, over the course of a long life and at wide intervals. Accordingly, one must not expect everything I have said on a subject to be found together in one place.